NSS Counterplan Aff

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A2: NSS CP – Analytics

Double bind – either CP links to the net-benefit because the process isn’t sufficient to overcome substantive disagreements, or the perm solves 100% of the link.

NSS isn’t ready – the CP forces immediate release of a document that isn’t ready. Supercharges our claims that it doesn’t solve and links to politics

Delay – Even if the NSS gets implemented, it takes awhile, case is a DA

Perm – Do both. Solves the link to the net-benefit.

Perm – Do the plan through the NSS.

Either the plan is the only thing in the NSS and Obama gets wrecked for releasing an incomplete document, or the whole NSS links to politics because it contains a ton of stuff Congress doesn’t like.

2AC Consult CP – Consult Theory

Consult is unfair and not competitive –

a) Fairness – We’re forced to make “say no” arguments, which the neg can concede to win a link to the Allied Prolif DA. This gives the negative to link to the biggest DA on the topic. Also forces the aff to defend contrived normal means against a counterplan which is designed to moot the whole 1AC, which makes it impossible for us to win.

b) Infinitely Regressive – 194 countries, plus international organizations. Lit doesn’t check because the neg just needs one card that says we should talk to another country to win on any risk of a contrived net benefit, but there’s no comparative ev we SHOULDN’T bother consulting with our allies. Broad topic doesn’t justify, it’s what the community voted for and shouldn’t change whether CP’s are fair.

c) Education – Everyone knows consult is designed to be a generic shortcut – incentivizes lazy research and trades off with more educational aff-specific strategies. Other CP’s and reading the net-benefit as a DA solves neg flex and education. And not real world, the US never gives other countries a “binding veto.”

Counterplan also isn’t competitive – it’s both textually plan plus, because it includes the entire text of the plan, and functionally plan plus because it just tacks on consultation. Their “resolved” argument is stupid because it’s a preamble, not the actual resolution. We can perm the part of the counterplan that changes normal means – nothing in our plan commits us to “certainty” or “immediacy.” The only way this counterplan competes is if you allow any other counterplan which competes for the same reasons, which justifies Delay and Condition the Plan on Space.

Reason to vote aff – introducing the CP fundamentally changed 2AC strategic calculus about where to generate offense, which affects the whole debate. It also sets a precedent against abusive counterplans and helps drive argument norms. At worst, legitimizes the perm to do the counterplan.

2AC NSS CP – Perms

 ( ) Perm – do both

( ) Perm – do the CP – plan doesn’t specify it actor

Textual competition is best – it checks infinite regression to the worst counterplans which short-circuit clash with the aff and decrease topic-specific education, it ensures core neg ground, and doesn’t allow bad perms

They’ll have no OFFENSIVE REASON to prefer infinite bad counterplans over select challenging ones, all their reasons textual comp is bad are CREATED by functional counterplans, and disads alone check

( ) Perm – pass the plan and have the president pass an executive order – solves their internal net benefits.

2AC NSS CP -- No Funding (1/2)

Historically and constitutionally – no presidential fiscal power

Peter Raven-Hansen, Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, and William C. Banks, Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law [81 Iowa L. Rev. 79] October, 1995

Even if the President enjoys this limited power, it does not follow that he may also constitutionally spend without any national security appropriations at all. History, as well as constitutional text, compels us to reject the claim that the Commander in Chief has inherent constitutional spending power.

The President has no constitutional authority to spend

Colonel Richard D. Rosen Chief, Personnel, Plans, & Training Office, Office of The Judge Advocate General [155 Mil. L. Rev. 1] February, 1998

These opinions are entirely consistent with the views expressed by the executive department over the last two centuries. As one early Attorney General stated:  The constitution declares that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law," . . . . This I consider as an explicit inhibition upon the President and all others to draw from the treasury any portion of the public money, until Congress shall have directed it to be done; and the expression in the clause of the constitution just quoted . . . clearly indicates that Congress shall also declare the uses to which the money to be drawn from the treasury is to be applied. The President, therefore, has no power, under the constitution, over the public treasure, except to apply it in the execution of the laws . . . .

The executive can’t spend excess funds and there’s no emergency power funding

Colonel Richard D. Rosen Chief, Personnel, Plans, & Training Office, Office of The Judge Advocate General [155 Mil. L. Rev. 1] February, 1998

Two executive practices do strike at the heart of Congress' appropriations authority and merit separate consideration: expenditures by executive departments in excess of appropriations, and emergency expenditures by presidents in the absence of appropriations. Congress has expressly forbidden the former, and presidents have not asserted an independent spending authority based on the latter; thus, neither practice adds a gloss to the meaning of the Constitution's appropriations provisions such that Congress' exclusive authority to approve the expenditures is placed in doubt.

Budget and Accounting Act did not give the president authority to spend

Colonel Richard D. Rosen Chief, Personnel, Plans, & Training Office, Office of The Judge Advocate General [155 Mil. L. Rev. 1] February, 1998

With the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, [460](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=98b5ce94f73ff35797b6763322213771&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=2028a830a02e043bbecec28c18ea8370" \l "n460" \t "_self) the President finally assumed a formal role in the formulation of federal budgets. The Act required that he submit a proposed budget, including tax and spending legislation, to Congress annually. [461](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=98b5ce94f73ff35797b6763322213771&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=2028a830a02e043bbecec28c18ea8370" \l "n461" \t "_self) The Act also established the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) to assist the President in his responsibilities. [462](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=98b5ce94f73ff35797b6763322213771&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=2028a830a02e043bbecec28c18ea8370" \l "n462" \t "_self) The President's new statutory role did not, however, give him an executive power of the purse; Congress alone still determined funding levels and the objects for which expenditures could be made.

2AC NSS CP -- No Funding 2AC (2/2)

The Court recognizes that congress authorizes funding

Colonel Richard D. Rosen Chief, Personnel, Plans, & Training Office, Office of The Judge Advocate General [155 Mil. L. Rev. 1] February, 1998

Neither federal nor state courts have construed constitutional appropriations clauses as affording executives the power to spend public funds outside the laws enacted by the legislative departments. Courts have uniformly [\*111] held that the power to appropriate is exclusively legislative in character. While federal courts have recognized boundaries surrounding Congress' appropriations authority--namely that Congress cannot exercise its authority in contravention of specific constitutional limitations--they have not held that Congress may not use its power of the purse to foreclose presidential activities, including those relating to foreign policy and national defense. Practice in the state courts has paralleled the federal experience. Working with similar appropriations provisions, the states have uniformly recognized that their constitutional spending schemes mandate exclusive legislative control over state finances.

2AC NSS CP – AT: Consult NB

Obvious double bind – either the plan is popular and Congress doesn’t get mad, or the plan is unpopular and Congress will say no to the plan.

One act of consultation doesn’t solve the net-benefit

Lee H. Hamilton, Rep. Indiana, chair CFA, 1-21-1993, “President, Congress Need Dialogue,” CSM, ln

Consultation requires that Congress be given a legitimate opportunity to participate in the making of policy. It should start early, be bipartisan, and always include the congressional leadership. It should not be left to one or two individuals. The 535 members of the Congress cannot be reached by a handful of administration lobbyists. When meeting with members, a distinction should be made at the start as to whether the meeting is one in which members are to be informed or consulted. The goal of consultation should be to obtain the advice of Congress before a final decision is made or an action is carried out. The president should always try to provide Congress with a range of policy alternatives. The president, the secretary of state, and the key deputies in the State Department and the National Security Council all have to be involved. Consultation requires sustained contact with many members and committees in Congress. It involves a large commitment of time and resources. It needs special and probably separate units within the White House and the State Department dedicated to consultation.

Congress will try to modify the plan with politically driven additions – ensures failure

Lee H. Hamilton, Dir. Woodrow Wilson Int’l Center, 1999, “Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Trilateral Commission, http://www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/trialog/trlgtxts/t53/ham.htm

I think the Congress often goes too far and makes judgements that are politically driven. In the final hours of the first session of the 105th Congress, the House of Representatives passed nine anti-China bills, which expressed displeasure with China’s policies on everything from human rights to nonproliferation. There were no hearings on any of the bills. The Administration was not consulted about the impact they could have on U.S.-China relations. From my point of view at least, those bills were politically driven. With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, we needed legislation to bring the United States into compliance with the convention. The Senate of the United States passed it unanimously. The House refused even to consider it. It attached the CWC implementing legislation to another bill and tried to force the President either to accept that flawed bill, or to veto the implementing legislation. Congress, quite unwisely I think, loves linkage. Rather than considering issues on their individual merits, the Congress links them together. We link UN funding to the abortion issue. We link the Russian-Iran sanctions bill to the CWC implementing legislation. The principal issues in American foreign policy are tough enough without trying to link several of them together. When you link them to another divisive issue, you make it almost impossible to solve them.

2AC NSS CP – AT: Consult NB

One act of consultation isn’t enough – must be sustained

Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow @ CFR, 4-17-2002, “Applying the War Powers,” http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=4514

First, if not carefully and regularly reconsidered in the context of future phases of the war on terrorism, the broad authority conveyed to the President by Senate Joint Resolution 23, even after refinement in the Senate, could lead to considerable friction between the branches over interpretation. Second, unless there is continuing consultation in good faith between Congress and the Executive, the unity that marks the beginning of the campaign against terrorism could degenerate into the profound disunity that scarred American politics thirty years ago. One doubts that meaningful consultation can be mandated; it must flow from mutual sensitivity between leaders in both branches. Nevertheless, the incentives for such consultation would certainly be enhanced by a firm assertion of congressional prerogatives, not as a challenge to the President but as a commitment by the House and Senate to perform their own constitutional duties.

2AC NSS CP – Links To Politics (1/2)

NSS links to politics – interagency debates and sparks intense lobbying

John K. Bartolotto, LTC in USAR, 5-3-2004, “The Origin and Developmental Process of the National Security Strategy,” US Army War College, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA423358

There are several issues that complicate the process of developing the NSS. First, there is a high turnover of and injection of new personnel, at times inexperienced and equipped with new predispositions about national security, at the top echelons of the American government with each new administration. Second, because the NSS expresses strategic vision, what the United States stands for in the world and what it’s diplomatic, economic, and military priorities are, 30 all the agencies involved in those arenas are placed at political odds with one another for their piece of the national pie. Third, each new administration will try to put its own stamp and spin on the NSS. 31 Lastly, in the case of every NSS that Don M. Snider and John A. Nagl reviewed in their book The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision , they found that the operating atmosphere in which the NSS was prepared was one of intense, adversarial politics. This adversarial environment exists because the Executive Branch must communicate its strategic vision to Congress and numerous constituencies (thus legitimizing its budget rationale), transition from campaign promises to governance (foreign policy in particular), and try to establish the overall agenda of the President while at the same time getting ready to prepare the more politically overshadowing State of the Union address.

NSS costs capital – process is heavily centered on the president

John K. Bartolotto, LTC in USAR, 5-3-2004, “The Origin and Developmental Process of the National Security Strategy,” US Army War College, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA423358

However, regardless of the variety of political actors involved in national security policy, the focal point is fixed on the presidency. It is the quality and capability of the person in the Oval Office that determines the success or failure of U.S. national security policy and strategy. 40 There are four important factors to a systematic study of the development of the NSS and all of them center on the President. First, the President’s leadership style, his personality and character as critical determinants of how the Oval Office functions with respect to national security policy and process. Second, how the President views the powers and limitations of the office and how he sees his role in furthering its prestige and power. Third, the President’s mindset (view of the world) regarding U.S. national interests and the international security environment and how these affect the national security policies and strategic posture his administration attempts to put into place. Lastly, the President’s ability to bring the first three components to bear upon the National Security Establishment so as to synthesize and integrate its efforts toward coherent policy and relevant options.

Publishing an NSS is political suicide – Clinton analogy proves

Don M. Snider, army colonel, dir. Political-military studies @ CSIS, 3-15-1995, “The National Security Strategy,” SSI, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub332.pdf

Finally, there is the political situation of the President, who won only 43 percent of the popular vote running as a New Democrat in 1992. In addition to dealing with a Republican majority in Congress, he now must now create consensus within the Democratic party, since he is largely opposed in a unified manner by the Republicans except on issues of international trade. After the first six months, and particularly after the Congressionally mandated withdrawal from Somalia and the subsequent dismissal of his Secretary of Defense, the President's foreign policy record has become a major issue for his opponents. This was even the more so in June and July 1994 when the President's polls on foreign policy were the worst ever, showing no boost whatsoever for his participation in the G-7 summit and his subsequent European tour. Having now signed and sent to Congress his first formal report of security strategy, it will be interesting to see if the concern of one White House staffer will be valid, "To publish a detailed report of national security strategy now would just provide chum for the sharks."

2AC NSS CP – Links to Politics (2/2)

NSS is politicized

John K. Bartolotto, LTC in USAR, 5-3-2004, “The Origin and Developmental Process of the National Security Strategy,” US Army War College, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA423358

As it turns out, Earl H. Tilford was correct in his assessment that the NSS development is an “intensely political process”. The main reason for this is that the NSS is a product of an interagency system, in which the NSC plays the central role and has numerous interactions with other government procedures that introduce painful iterations.

CP links to politics and doesn’t get implemented – too politicized

Richard K. Betts, War studies prof @ Columbia, November 2004, “U.S. National Security Strategy,” Princeton Project on Nat’l Security, www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/betts.pdf

Politicians and their principal lieutenants con- centrate on grand strategy, general ideas for coordinating resources, alliances, and operations in a general vision. Political leaders also have a natural stake in pleasing many constituencies, so official declarations err on the side of inclusive- ness. The annual report mandated by Congress, National Security Strategy of the United States, has sometimes been a Christmas tree on which every interest group hangs its foreign policy concerns. This report rarely says much that really illumi- nates national security strategy, although it some- times provides a useful bumper-sticker version of official strategy— for instance, “engagement and enlargement” for Clinton, and “preemption” (a misnomer) for Bush the Younger.

CP links to politics – NSS is intensely politicized

Don M. Snider, army colonel, dir. Political-military studies @ CSIS, 3-15-1995, “The National Security Strategy,” SSI, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub332.pdf

The flip side of this positive, "I want to be part of the process," view is the recognition within the executive branch that this is not the only, or the principal, or even the most desirable means for the President to articulate publicly his strategic vision. What President in a fast-paced, media-oriented world wants to articulate once a year, in a static, written report a detailed statement of his forward-looking strategic vision? If ever there is a surefire means of insuring that one's boss would be "hoisted on his own petard," this is it to many of the President's closest political advisors. To influence public opinion and resource allocations it is considered far better to depend on current, personal testimonies by administration officials before the Congress, supported by Presidential and cabinet-level speeches, to create a coherent and wide-spread campaign of public diplomacy to the electorate of America. This view relegates the NSSR to a report of mushy "globaloney" before Congress. The writer must also provide, for context, a feel for the political atmosphere within which the 1987 and 1988 reports were prepared. My tenure on the staff of the National Security Council began just after the Iran-Contra fiasco and during the implementation of the Tower Commission recommendations. To say that White House/congressional relations were at absolute gridlock would be true, but would also vastly understate the passion, hostile intensity, and hyper-legalistic approach being taken by both sides on most every item of the mutual agenda. Whether it be war powers, strategic modernization, strategic defenses, or regional foreign and defense policies, there was a pervasive modus vivendi of little quarter being asked, and only rarely any given. During the Bush administration the atmosphere improved significantly for the first two years, but thereafter "gridlock" prevailed. Similarly, after the first year of the Clinton administration relations between the Executive and Congress deteriorated appreciably, particularly on matters of foreign policy. Thus in every case, the operating atmosphere in which each strategy report was prepared was one of intense, adversarial politics. It was clear from the beginning of each cycle that this report was not to be a neutral planning document, as many academics and even some in uniform think it to be. Rather it was, and still is in my judgement, intended to serve five primary purposes.

2AC NSS CP – Links to Politics

Unpopular executive orders ignite huge Congressional and public backlash toward Bush

Risen ‘04

Clay, Assistant Editor – New Republic, The American Prospect, Aug, Lexis)

The most effective check on executive orders has proven to be political. When it comes to executive orders, "The president is much more clearly responsible," says Dellinger, who was heavily involved in crafting orders under Clinton. "Not only is there no involvement from Congress, but the president has to personally sign the order." Clinton's Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument executive order may have helped him win votes, but it also set off a massive congressional and public backlash. Right-wing Internet sites bristled with comments about "dictatorial powers," and Republicans warned of an end to civil liberties as we know them. "President Clinton is running roughshod over our Constitution," said then -- House Majority Leader Dick Armey. Indeed, an unpopular executive order can have immediate -- and lasting -- political consequences. In 2001, for example, Bush proposed raising the acceptable number of parts per billion of arsenic in drinking water. It was a bone he was trying to toss to the mining industry, and it would have overturned Clinton's order lowering the levels. But the overwhelmingly negative public reaction forced Bush to quickly withdraw his proposal -- and it painted him indelibly as an anti-environmental president.

2AC NSS CP – Yes Consult Congress

Consulting on lots of issues

Dan Benjamin, Counterterror coordinator @ State Dep., 1-26-2010, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” FNS, ln

Well, first of all, this president has consulted Congress on numerous issues all along the way. I would also question the characterization that he's losing support. If you look at the polls in historical context, he's in the upper half by any measure, compared to where lots of other presidents were after the 1-year mark, so I think that it's premature to make these kinds of judgments.

Economy

Jessica Rettig, US News. “Congress Returns to a Full Plate of Economic Issues.” 07-12-2010. http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/07/12/congress-returns-to-a-full-plate-of-economic-issues.html

From sea to shining sea, members of Congress spent their Fourth of July recess on the campaign trail, armed with economic talking points. Given last month's 9.5 percent national unemployment rate, jobs remain the foremost issue (including for incumbents who risk losing theirs), although other economic factors such as the policing of Wall Street and the size of the national deficit get top billing as well. Click here to find out more! Back home, the lawmakers discussed the major legislation facing predictably partisan wrangling as they return to Washington this week, notably a Democratic-backed jobs bill and the financial regulation reform package, which is due for a Senate vote after House passage June 30. As for what Congress has already done, such as healthcare reform, that provided political fuel to rally the base and to try to win over undecided independents. [See a slide show of 11 hot races this fall.]

Afghanistan

Reid Davenport, Politics AP. “Congress wants more scrutiny of U.S. spending in Afghanistan” 07-15-2010 http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/15/1732445/congress-wants-more-scrutiny-of.html

WASHINGTON -- Members of a House subcommittee drilled three U.S. agencies Thursday for not tracking billions in U.S. money invested in the rebuilding of Afghanistan since 2002. After reports that more than $3 billion has been smuggled out of Kabul's airport since 2007 and that Afghanistan ranks as the second-most corrupt country in the world, lawmakers demanded to know where their constituents' money is going. To approve the pending appropriation of another $3.9 billion for Afghanistan now would "(undermine) our civil-military mission and our responsibility to ensure Americans' hard-earned tax dollars are not squandered or mismanaged," said Rep. Nita Lowey, D-N.Y., the chairwoman of the Appropriations State and Foreign Operations subcommittee.

Immigration Reform

William Douglas, Politics AP. “Religious leaders, lawmakers wrangle over ethics of immigration reform”07-14-2010. http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/14/1730694/religious-leaders-lawmakers-wrangle.html

"The crisis the country is witnessing in Arizona over immigration is the result of a failed immigration policy at the federal level," said Mathew Staver, the dean of the Liberty University School of Law and a supporter of comprehensive immigration legislation. "The Arizona law is a symptom and a cry for help. However, the Constitution places the responsibility for immigration on the federal government, not the states." Prospects that Washington might tackle the problem this year appear bleak. President Barack Obama, who's been getting heat from Hispanics and others to make good on his 2008 campaign promise to revamp immigration laws, implored Congress to address the issue in a speech two weeks ago. However, many members of the House of Representatives and the Senate aren't eager to take on what they consider a politically radioactive issue in an election year. Leading House Democrats say the Senate must moves immigration legislation first. Sens. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., came up with a framework for a bill, but there's no consensus on any bill that could command a majority in either chamber.

No Solvency– Not Operational (1/2)

NSS doesn’t get operationalized – their author

Sharon L. Caudle, Texas A&M, June 2009, “National security strategies,” Journal of Homeland Security, v. 6, iss 1, http://www.astrid-online.it/Sicurezza-/Studi--ric/Caudle\_Journal-of-Homeland-security\_06\_2009.pdf

Finally, it is clear that a national security strategy often will not be the strategy in practice. Doyle (2007), discussing a national security strategy, says that there is both an implicit or explicit strategy. Explicit strategy reflects a nation’s official, authoritative declarations about what it intends to achieve in formal documents, such as a national security strategy. Implicit strategy is what a nation actually puts in play as it acts within a security environment and responds to threats. Doyle makes the point that implicit strategy is likely to be much more complex than explicit strategy, given day-to-day implementation and adaptation to conditions.

CP doesn’t result in implementation – Obama won’t push the plan and it’s not durable fiat

Stephen M. Walt, IR Prof @ Harvard, 9-28-2009, “Why we don’t need another “National Strategy” document,” Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/27/why\_we\_dont\_need\_another\_national\_strategy\_document

According to Section 603 of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act, the president must submit an annual report to Congress outlining U.S. national security strategy. This requirement has produced a number of timeless literary classics, such as the Clinton administration's 1995 "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (a glowing paean to democracy, institutions, human rights, and other liberal ideals), or the Bush administration's 2002 "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," (a portentous bit of bombast mostly remembered for its justification of preventive war). Academics like me normally love such exercises, in part because it conforms to an idealized view of what the policy process should be. First, the administration identifies vital U.S. interests, and then sketches the various intermediate objectives that must be met in order to advance or protect them. Then it lays out the specific policies it intends to follow to achieve these goals, and then (supposedly) goes ahead and implements them. The whole exercise is also consistent with the appealing notion of democratic accountability, because Congress can ponder the administration's priorities and plans and decide not to fund policies it doesn't like. Grand strategic pronouncements of this sort are also an obvious opportunity to communicate intentions and priorities to the outside world. We scholars also like these documents because they give us a chance to aim our intellectual firepower at a fixed target. Dissecting written arguments is something we've been trained to do since graduate school, and giving an academic an official statement of "national security strategy" is like putting a seven-course meal in front of a gluttonous gourmet. We can dissect the underlying assumptions, identify the theoretical underpinnings that are supposedly shaping policy, compare and contrast this year's version with earlier reports, and look for contradictions, gaps in logic, or other shortcomings. Plus, these reports make a great teaching tool; they are the bureaucratese that has launched a thousand class discussions. If your job involves teaching and writing about U.S. foreign policy, in short, you should be grateful that Goldwater-Nichols forces every administration to produce something new to feed on each year. Of course, you shouldn't assume these reports actually tell you what the administration is going to do. They are often drafted by committee, or by some hired pen, and the president may not play much (any?) role in the process. More importantly, foreign policy always involves adapting to actions or events that one doesn't anticipate, and no government can ever stick to its strategic vision with complete fidelity. Even so, these statements are usually worth reading, if only to get an idea of an administration's basic inclinations, or at least what it thinks it is trying to accomplish. The Obama administration hasn't offered us its version of our "national security strategy" yet, and despite everything I just said, I'm beginning to wish they weren't compelled to do so by law. For one thing, I suspect it will look a lot like the Clinton administration's versions, and consist of a long "to-do" list drawn from familiar liberal interventionist dogma. But more importantly, this is one of those periods where the main features of U.S. grand strategy may not be easy to talk about openly and honestly. In simple terms, what Obama seems to be attempting is a wide-ranging process of selective retrenchment. This is hardly surprising, because the Bush administration got us badly overcommitted and refused to raise taxes to pay for it. So Obama is getting us out of Iraq, and appears to be rethinking his approach to Afghanistan. He's making constructive concessions to a number of potential adversaries (such as Russia), in order to gain their support on more pressing issues (such as Iran) He's telling his Secretary of Defense to rein in defense costs, emphasizing diplomacy at every turn, and letting everyone know that Uncle Sam isn't going to solve all the world's problems all by itself. He's not retreating to Fortress America, of course, but he and his team aren't swaggering around saying that America is the "indispensable nation" either. Given the mess he inherited from Bush and the need to repair America's public finances, this approach makes eminently good sense. But when you're s great power engaged in a process of retrenchment, you probably don't want advertise that fact in your official statement of "national security strategy." If you do, you'll just get a lot of flak from hardliners, who still haven't figured out that the previous eight years was mostly a disaster and that U.S. resources aren't infinite. And a few minor adversaries may decide to test your limits, and you'd rather not have to waste time responding. Spelling things out explicitly might also make some Americans nervous, because they've gotten used to America being #1 and they've forgotten that the best way to stay there is to get others to do the heavy lifting instead of trying to do it all ourselves. Obama should stick to his present course -- as subtly and quietly as possible -- and when it's time to fulfill that Section 603 requirement, he should ask his advisors to write up a strategy statement that does not spell out what is really going on. And if they can make it sufficiently boring so that nobody pays much attention, so much the better.

No Solvency– Not Operational (2/2)

NSS just documents policy, doesn’t change it – especially in election years

John K. Bartolotto, LTC in USAR, 5-3-2004, “The Origin and Developmental Process of the National Security Strategy,” US Army War College, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA423358

The congressionally mandated NSS document, which bears the President’s signature and is supposed to be produced annually as an indicator of an administration’s direction in national security and foreign policy. The NSS is also eagerly awaited because it is the best example of “purposeful adaptation” by the American government to changing global realities and responsibilities. It expresses the US strategic vision, what the US stands for in the world, its priorities, and a sensing of how the instruments of national power, (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) will be arrayed. Since it is truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves to discipline the interagency system to understand the President’s agenda and priorities, and develops a common language that gives coherence to policy within an administration. It is also more than a strategic document. It is political, designed to enhance the presidential authority in order to mobilize the nation. Finally, the NSS tends to document rather than drive the policy initiatives, which is especially true in election years. Through my research and after reviewing each NSS, I found this to be exactly the case – that each administration’s final NSS is merely a reiteration of the administration’s accomplishments.

NSS isn’t implemented and isn’t durable

Sharon L. Caudle, Texas A&M, June 2009, “National security strategies,” Journal of Homeland Security, v. 6, iss 1, http://www.astrid-online.it/Sicurezza-/Studi--ric/Caudle\_Journal-of-Homeland-security\_06\_2009.pdf

Fourth, there are numerous implementation and sustainability issues. Currently, there is no consistent process to update the strategies. Unless mandated by Congress as part of the quadrennial reviews, national strategy importance and commitment may end with the Administration that created it. Moreover, strategies may not drive new, innovative programs, but provide cover for preexisting interagency programs and policies that have been in place for years, regardless of fit or performance. Some goals and actors have not been de-conflicted across and within the primary security strategies and the other national strategies covering security topics. For example, commenting on the initial national security strategy, Daalder, Lindsay, and Steinburg (2002) note that one goal is to promote global freedom, but priority is placed on a counterterrorism policy requiring support from countries that may not share the value of freedom. Cornish (2008) believes the United Kingdom’s national strategy relied heavily on multilateralism and the use of rules in international affairs, without addressing obstructions such as international vetoes or unenforced or conflicting rules. Even if there are willing partners, achieving national goals without incentives for partner action may mean the national strategies revert to primarily a federal responsibility.

No Solvency –Military Overstretch Bad

NSS makes the world to militarily defined

Karen Deyoung, Washington Post Staff Writer. “Obama redefines national security strategy, looks beyond military might” 05-27-2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052701044.html

Obama's new doctrine represents a clear break with the unilateral military approach advocated by his predecessor after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Bush tempered that guidance toward the end of his presidency, but the Obama strategy offers "a broad concept of what constitutes our national security," the document says. Military superiority must be maintained and "the United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances," the document says. But "when we overuse our military might, or fail to invest in or deploy complementary tools, or act without partners," it says, "then our military is overstretched. Americans bear a greater burden, and our leadership around the world is too narrowly identified with military forces." The strategy cites four "enduring national interests" that are "inextricably linked:" security, prosperity, values and international order.