Topic PICs Aff Answers

[Topic PICs Aff Answers 1](#_Toc267100044)

[\*\*Phaseout Answers\*\* 2](#_Toc267100045)

[A2: Phaseout CP – Commitment Trap 2](#_Toc267100046)

[\*Afghanistan\* 3](#_Toc267100047)

[A2: Phaseout CP – Commitment Trap 3](#_Toc267100048)

[A2: Timetable Popular 4](#_Toc267100049)

[A2: Timetable Key to Stability 5](#_Toc267100050)

[Immediate Withdrawal Good – Imperialism/Oppression 6](#_Toc267100051)

[Immediate Withdrawal Good – Karzai 7](#_Toc267100052)

[Immediate Withdrawal Good – Public Support 8](#_Toc267100053)

[Immediate Withdrawal Good – Elections 9](#_Toc267100054)

[Deadlines Bad – Afghanistan 10](#_Toc267100055)

[\*Iraq\* 11](#_Toc267100056)

[A2: Phaseout Key to Stability 11](#_Toc267100057)

[A2: Immediate Withdrawal Impossible – Iraq 12](#_Toc267100058)

[Iraq Timetable Key 13](#_Toc267100059)

[\*South Korea\* 14](#_Toc267100060)

[Immediate Withdrawal Key 14](#_Toc267100061)

[Immediate Withdrawal Good – NoKo 15](#_Toc267100062)

[\*\*Random Cards\*\* 16](#_Toc267100063)

[Civilian Casualties Key to Afghanistan 16](#_Toc267100064)

\*\*Phaseout Answers\*\*

A2: Phaseout CP – Commitment Trap

Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted

Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, 2009 “Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’,” CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

When opinion leaders in Washington talk about “lessons learned” from Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else’s domestic dispute, but that America should never give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost.29 But the longer we stay and the more money we spend, the more we’ll feel compelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predicament plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam: After 1968 it became increasingly clear that the survival of the [government of South Vietnam] was not worth the cost of securing it, but by then the United States had another rationale for staying— prestige and precedent setting. The United States said the [South Vietnamese government] would stand, and even those in the administration now long convinced of the hollowness of the domino argument could agree that a U.S. failure in South Vietnam might endanger vital US national interests elsewhere or in the future.30 For decades, the fear of America losing the world’s respect after withdrawing from a conflict has been instrumental in selling the American public bad foreign policy.

\*Afghanistan\*

A2: Phaseout CP – Commitment Trap

Immediate withdrawal is key to avoiding the commitment trap

Malou Innocent, a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank based in Washington, D.C, July 20, 2009, “Afghanistan: The Deadliest Month and It's Time to Get Out,” CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10369

Sadly, the longer we stay in Afghanistan and the more money we spend, the more we'll feel compelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predicament plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam. Oddly enough, when opinion leaders in Washington talk about "lessons learned" from Vietnam and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else's domestic dispute, but that America should never give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost. Driven by that misguided analysis, the United States risks repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan.

A2: Timetable Popular

The public is against a timetable

Rasmussen Reports, June 28, 2010, “25% Favor Immediate Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 28% Say Send More Troops,” http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public\_content/politics/current\_events/afghanistan/25\_favor\_immediate\_troop\_withdrawal\_from\_afghanistan\_28\_say\_send\_more\_troops

Following a shake-up of the U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan last week, President Obama on Sunday defended his war strategy and insisted that Americans would assist Afghanistan “for a long time to come." But the president still plans on starting the process of removing troops from Afghanistan by July 2011. The latest Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 25% of U.S. Voters believe the president should bring all U.S. troops home from Afghanistan immediately, while another 18% call for a firm timetable to bring all the troops home within a year. Forty-three percent (43%) oppose a firm timetable of any kind. Fourteen percent (14%) are undecided.

A2: Timetable Key to Stability

A timetable will embolden the enemy

Associated Press, July 04, 2010, “Senators, Afghan Ambassador Criticize Troop Withdrawal Timetable,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/04/senators-afghan-ambassador-criticize-troop-withdrawal-timetable/

Leading Republican lawmakers and the Afghan ambassador to the United States are voicing opposition to President Obama's plan to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan starting next year. Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, appearing on the Sunday talk shows while in the Afghan capital, said Obama's decision to start pulling out in July 2011 is a mistake and will embolden Taliban and Al Qaeda extremists. The senators and the Afghan envoy, Said Tayeb Jawad, said withdrawal should be based on a conditions on the ground, not a fixed date.

Immediate Withdrawal Good – Imperialism/Oppression

Immediate withdrawal is key to prevent imperialism and oppression

Mike Ely, October 10, 2009, “We Must Demand Complete & Immediate Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Kasama, http://kasamaproject.org/2009/10/10/we-demand-complete-immediate-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/

We must demand that U.S. imperialism leave Afghanistan immediately and unconditionally — without finding ways to prop up residual collaborators and puppet forces, without continuing to “provide air cover” for continuing war crimes. The Afghanistan people need to be left to resolve their political affairs (and develop their own very difficult struggle for liberation) without U.S. domination and violence. And because this is apparently quite controversial (even on the left): We should deepen our own understanding that these armed forces cannot and will not help the people in any part of the world. Are there other reactionary forces in the world? Taliban? Al Qaida? Saddam Hussein? Islamic theocrats in Iran? Somali warlords? French colonial troops? Genocidal Israeli settlers and commanders? Turkish military commandos? Russian death squads in Chechnia? Catholic priests and bishops doing their secret crimes against humanity? And so on. Of course. There are many other reactionary forces in the world. Some of them are U.S. allies. Some of them have sharp contradictions with U.S. imperialism. Some of them flip back and forth. But U.S. occupation of Afghanistan (or Iraq) is itself a means of strengthening the world’s most odious and oppressive force. And the impact of a successful pro-U.S. pacification of Afghanistan cannot just be measured in terms of how it impacts people or sections of the people in Afghanistan. A victory for the U.S. in Afghanistan or stabilization of pro-U.S. arrangements in Afghanistan will be a major negative influence on the dynamics of the world as a whole.

Immediate Withdrawal Good – Karzai

Immediate withdrawal is key to Karzai credibility and negotiation leverage

Center for International Policy, Accessed July 2010, “The War in Afghanistan,” Win Without War, http://www.winwithoutwar.org/pages/facts/

 \* The U.S. military was established for the defense of the United States, not to prop up the regime of Afghan President Hamid Karzai on his side of the civil war against the Taliban -- but this is exactly what we are doing. By backing Karzai we also in turn weaken his government in the eyes of a public that sees the Karzai regime as a "puppet" of American interests. \* The longer we stay, the less likely Karzai will work to reach some form of agreement with the waring factions in both the outlying rural areas, the Taliban and his government. If we get a definite exit date, Karzai will be forced to negotiate with all who have a stake in the future of Afghanistan.

Immediate Withdrawal Good – Public Support

Immediate withdrawal is key to maintaining public support

Bernard Finel, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the American Security Project, August 20, 2009, “An Alternative Strategy for Afghanistan,” New Atlanticist, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/alternative-strategy-afghanistan

First, I believe the United States should begin a relative rapid withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan. It is not that I don’t think they can be locally effective. It is just that I question the cost/benefit calculus of extending the commitment. I think that many supporters of escalation fail to consider to potential consequences if we do fail to achieve our goal of largely defeating the Taliban and pacifying Afghanistan. The longer we stay, the more likely we will be forced by public opinion to wholly abandon Afghanistan. Apologists for Richard Nixon have long argued that he negotiated a honorable peace in Vietnam that was later undermined by Congress’ unwillingness to tolerate a bombing campaign in support of the South when North Vietnam invaded in 1975. But the fact is that dragging out our commitment until 1973 was what made effective post-withdrawal assistance impossible. If Nixon had gotten us out in 1969, it is possible that enough residual public support for the war would have remained to allow us to continue to use air power in defense of our allies in South Vietnam. In short, the risks of staying until public support collapses completely are significant. The sooner we get our forces out, the more likely I believe we are to be able to sustain an active policy in support of the Karzai regime or a legitimate successor.

Immediate Withdrawal Good – Elections

Immediate withdrawal avoids elections

Jonathan Alter is also the author of The Promise: President Obama, Year One and The Defining Moment: FDR's Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope. July 03, 2010, “T Minus Two Years,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/03/t-minus-two-years.html

The country simply cannot afford a trillion-dollar commitment to nation building. The only way funding will continue much longer is if Republicans take control of Congress this fall. Even then, the war remains unpopular with the public, a point that won’t be lost on the GOP (as RNC chair Michael Steele’s antiwar comments last week attest). And Obama is hardly oblivious to the electoral implications. Let’s say that Petraeus insists that the July 2011 timeline be pushed back a year, which is quite possible considering the current problems on the ground. That means the de-escalation—and the political windfall—will begin around the summer of 2012, just in time for the Democratic National Convention. In other words, Americans should get used to it: we ain’t staying long.

Deadlines Bad – Afghanistan

Deadlines destroy the Afghanistan war effort

Marc A. Thiessen, a visitng fellow at AEI. June 29, 2010, President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines, http://www.aei.org/article/102244

At his confirmation hearing tomorrow, Gen. David Petraeus will be pressed to answer a difficult question: Can his counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan succeed when the U.S. has already announced a date for withdrawal? There is growing concern among congressional Republicans that the answer is no. Until last week, a revolt had been brewing among senators who backed Obama on the surge but have concluded that the deadline could bring down the entire war effort. Petraeus's nomination has for the moment quelled this insurgency on Capitol Hill, but concern remains that Petraeus may not be able to quell the insurgency in Afghanistan if the president does not untie his hands. As Missouri Sen. Kit Bond put it, if the withdrawal date stands, Obama is "setting [Petraeus] up for failure." It is hard enough to get NATO countries to cough up troops, but when our NATO allies believe that America is packing its bags, they start packing as well. The deadline is more than a tactical error; it is a strategic miscalculation that undermines almost every element of our efforts in Afghanistan. A withdrawal date undermines the very premise of a counterinsurgency strategy -- that by protecting the population, you can earn their trust and get them to help you root out the terrorists and insurgents. As columnist Charles Krauthammer has explained, Afghans will not risk joining us in the fight if they think America will soon be leaving them to the mercy of the Taliban. The damage goes even deeper than that. The stated purpose of the deadline is to put pressure on Afghan President Hamid Karzai to eliminate corruption and increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government. Instead, it has had the opposite effect--creating a perverse incentive for Karzai to make overtures to the Taliban, and cut deals to stay in power, so that he can cover his bets when the Americans leave.

Also destroys the coalition behind the war

Marc A. Thiessen, a visitng fellow at AEI. June 29, 2010, President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines, http://www.aei.org/article/102244

The deadline is also weakening our coalition. It is hard enough to get NATO countries to cough up troops, but when our NATO allies believe that America is packing its bags, they start packing as well. Canada has announced its mission will end in 2011. In February, the Dutch announced they will withdraw by this December. And last week, Poland declared that all its troops will be leave by 2012 because, as the head of Poland's National Security Bureau put it, Afghanistan is heading toward a "strategic catastrophe" and Poland needed to "seek a way out of this situation." Obama can hardly push back on NATO allies to stay if America is not committed to staying itself.

And emboldens the enemy

Marc A. Thiessen, a visitng fellow at AEI. June 29, 2010, President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines, http://www.aei.org/article/102244

The deadline also sends the wrong message to Pakistan. Elements of Pakistani intelligence have long maintained quiet ties with the Taliban and other jihadist groups, using these militants to destabilize Afghanistan and India. Obama is pressing Pakistan to cut these ties and help us dismantle these networks--an effort that is critical to the success of both our mission in Afghanistan and our campaign against al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal regions. But if the Pakistanis perceive America is leaving, why would they accede to such pressure? The withdrawal date also emboldens the Taliban. As Arizona Sen. John McCain puts it, "We cannot tell the enemy when you are leaving in warfare and expect your strategy to be able to prevail."

\*Iraq\*

A2: Phaseout Key to Stability

Comparative evidence, immediate withdrawal is more effective at reaching stability

George Friedman, August 27, 2007, “Endgame: American Options in Iraq,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/endgame\_american\_options\_iraq

The third option is an immediate withdrawal. Immediate withdrawal is a relative concept, of course, since it is impossible to withdraw 150,000 troops at once. Still, what this would consist of is an immediate cessation of offensive operations and the rapid withdrawal of personnel and equipment. Theoretically, it would be possible to pull out the troops but leave the equipment behind. In practical terms, the process would take about three to six months from the date the order was given. If withdrawal is the plan, this scenario is more attractive than the phased process. It might increase the level of chaos in Iraq, but that is not certain, nor is it clear whether that is any longer an issue involving the U.S. national interest. Its virtue is that it leads to the same end as phased withdrawal without the continued loss of American lives.

Immediate withdrawal creates the same windows for stable fill in

Michelle Chen, a staff journalist, Jan. 28, 2005, “Public Can Force Iraq Troop Withdrawal, Lawmakers and Critics Say,” The New Standard, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/1420

Yet even advocates of immediate withdrawal recognize that in Iraq’s post-occupation rebuilding efforts, there would still be a role for outside assistance. Zinn believes that if the US were to withdraw, the international community should step in to launch a "true reconstruction," instituted "not with troops but with negotiators and conciliators, and with food and medicine." Leaver commented that the US has an obligation to implement some sort of plan to support Iraqi security forces, pointing out that "when we leave, the danger isn’t going to be borne by us if civil war breaks out; it’s going to be borne by Iraq’s neighbors." With an interest in establishing regional peacekeeping efforts, bordering states like Iran and Syria would need resources and political support from the US. "We still owe it to [the Iraqis] to help them rebuild," asserted Mike Hoffman, co-founder of the activist group Iraq Veterans Against the War. "It’s just that the military aren’t the people to do this." Optimistic that the Iraqi people were ready to establish their political independence, he added, "The Iraqis are more than capable of rebuilding a country within a quick timeframe… It’s just going to come down to us supporting them properly." Ideally, Hoffman said, the US would provide support upon the request of the Iraqis themselves. "Whatever they ask for," he said, "we should be willing to give it to them. And actually, it will probably be a bargain price compared to what we’re paying right now to rebuild that country."

Our arguments are linear – the longer we stay, the greater the impacts

Michael Hudson, professor of Arab studies at Georgetown University, September/October 2003, “Rebuilding Iraq: Prospects for Democracy,” Cato Policy Report, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy\_report/v25n5/iraq.pdf

To cut to the chase, if I had to give a clear answer about what should be done, I would say we ought to get out of Iraq as quickly as we can. We ought to immediately set up a transitional regime that will, within a very short period of time, lead to a constitutional convention and the establishment of a permanent, legitimate Iraqi government. I am afraid the longer we stay, the more problems we are going to have. I think we are perhaps truly on the horns of a dilemma in Iraq.

A2: Immediate Withdrawal Impossible – Iraq

Quick withdrawal of troops is possible and effective

Lawrence Korb, assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information, May 19, 2008, “The Road to Kuwait,” The American Conservative, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/may/19/00015/

Supporters of immediate withdrawal are often accused of adopting a wildly unrealistic approach. This is a misplaced critique. It is possible to effect a withdrawal in as short a time as three months, if the U.S. military effectively conducts—in the words of Iraq War veteran and military analyst Phillip Carter—an “invasion in reverse.” If the Army were ordered to withdraw to Kuwait, it could do so quickly and relatively safely. Such an exit would sacrifice a significant amount of equipment and create an instantaneous political and security vacuum similar to that created by the initial overthrow of Saddam Hussein. While this option is feasible, it is not the best course of action.

Iraq Timetable Key

A timetable is key to effective withdrawal

Lawrence Korb, assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information, May 19, 2008, “The Road to Kuwait,” The American Conservative, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/may/19/00015/

But if the United States does not set a specific timetable, our military forces and our overall national security will remain hostage to events on the ground. Worse still, a startling development such as the assassination of the Ayatollah Sistani or a major sectarian attack could lead to an all-out civil war and compel our forces to withdraw in as little as three months. Those who argue that a withdrawal will have to take place over a number of years, perhaps as many as four, base their analysis on the time it takes to complete a meticulous extraction and dismantling of all U.S. equipment and facilities. Such an extended timeline increases the danger to American forces and is not cost-effective.

Key to political reconciliation

Lawrence Korb, assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information, May 19, 2008, “The Road to Kuwait,” The American Conservative, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/may/19/00015/

Finally, setting a date for a U.S. withdrawal will give Iraq’s political leaders the best incentive to undertake meaningful political reconciliation. The U.S. military presence allows the current dysfunctional central government to avoid making difficult decisions.

\*South Korea\*

Immediate Withdrawal Key

Withdrawal should be as quick as possible

KIM JOHNG SOHN, September 8th, 2009, “US Should Terminate Military Presence in S Korea As Early As Possible,” Tongil Korea, http://tongilkorea.net/2009/09/08/us-should-terminate-military-presence-in-s-korea-as-early-as-possible/

It has passed 64 years since the U.S. imperialists’ occupation of south Korea. If the United States persistently enforces its policy of military presence in south Korea, lending a deaf ear to the voices of the peoples of Korea and other countries of the world demanding the earliest withdrawal of the U.S. forces from south Korea, it will face bitterer rebuff and denunciation at home and abroad. The U.S. forces’ landing in south Korea was aimed at keeping it under its occupation and turning it into its colony, dividing Korea into two parts and using its southern half as a military appendage for executing its policy of aggression. The U.S. moves to seek its forces’ permanent presence in south Korea and bolster up its combat capability are a challenge to the demand of the times for the withdrawal of foreign troops and their trend. The U.S. should pull its forces out of south Korea as early as possible as demanded by international law and the times. The termination of the U.S. forces’ presence in south Korea would remove the basic factor of threatening the peace in Korea and the biggest hurdle lying in the way of national reunification. The pullback of the U.S. forces from south Korea would result in eliminating the most dangerous hotbed of war in the world and thus help create environment favorable for ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the rest of Asia and the world. How to approach the issue of the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from south Korea serves as a barometer judging whether the U.S. has a will to rectify its hostile policy towards the DPRK or not and whether it wishes to see Korea’s reunification and peace or not. The world is waiting for the U.S. to make a switchover in its attitude.

More evidence – only way to solve the aff, otherwise bases are transferred inciting more mistrust

PMAINDF, June 2004. “Totally withdraw the US military bases in south Korea,” Pyongyang Mission of the AINDF, News Report: No. 11<http://ndfsk.dyndns.org/kuguk8/pym/nr0406-11/total.htm>.

There is a map of the facilities of the US Forces Korea on the USFK homepage (www.korea.army.mil.) The facilities cover south Korea as a net. The information officer of the US 8th Army said. “Now there are 90 facilities related to the US troops in south Korea. They involve 41 main bases, 38 military communication installations and 11 training camps. The land used by the USFK covers 6,770 thousand pyeongs. (One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters)” The US troops in south Korea number more than 35,000. This means that about 1,900 pyeongs of land is allotted to every GIs. It is equivalent to 61 apartment houses of 31 pyeongs. The Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul alone covers 780,000 pyeongs. The largest training camp of the USFK is “Bulls Eye”, the US 2nd Division training ground in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, which covers 28 million pyeongs of land. All the US military bases have inflicted disasters upon the Korean people for 60-odd years. The south Korean people have suffered from loss of lives and properties and human rights violation owing to the brigandish arbitrariness, atrocities and the war exercises of the US troops there for over half a century. In a word, they have suffered all kinds of misfortunes. Numerous are the damages caused by the US military bases including the case of “Cooney bombing firing range” in Maehyang-ri where several south Koreans were wounded by the wrong bombing by planes of the US 7th Air Force and the case of the US military base in Pyeongtaek where toxic oil was discharged due to damage of oil pipe. Keenly realizing that they cannot live comfortably leaving the US military bases intact, the south Korean people have turned out in the struggle to withdraw the military bases. Alarmed by the fierce anti-US resistance of the south Korean people, the United States schemes to calm down their anti-US sentiments by relocating some military bases. Its aim is not abandonment of the military bases in south Korea but transfer. And it is nothing but the relocation of its troops to the southern area of Han River in keeping with the new security strategy for preemptive attack against north Korea. The south Korean people do not want the US military presence in this land any longer. The Yankees must not relocate but totally withdraw the military bases and return home. The south Korean people will further intensify the struggle for the total withdrawal of the US troops under the banner of “by our nation itself.”

Immediate Withdrawal Good – NoKo

North Korea will only trust full withdrawal

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, August 14, 2006, “North Korea Demands US Troops Pull Out Of South,” Defence Talk, http://www.defencetalk.com/north-korea-demands-us-troops-pull-out-of-south-7104/

 North Korea urged South Korea Sunday to push for the withdrawal of US troops and said the military presence could bring disaster. The communist state's Minju Joson newspaper said the South would "not be free from any misfortune and disasters" arising from the US military presence which dates back to the 1950-1953 Korean War. "The South Korean authorities should take a step to force the US troops to withdraw from South Korea as demanded by the people," Minju Joson said. The United States is reducing its forces in South Korea from 37,000 to 25,000, with 2008 set as the deadline for the troop cut, and wants to be able to redeploy them outside the country in time of need. South Korea is pushing to secure wartime control over its troops which are currently under a US-led combined command. US troops are stationed in the South to help its 650,000-strong army face up to North Korea's 1.2 million-strong army. Rodong Sinmun, newspaper of the North's communist party newspaper, repeated Sunday that US "imperialists" were preparing an invasion by stepping up propaganda and military drills. "They are engrossed in a vicious anti-DPRK (North Korea) smear campaign based on sheer lies. ... It is an operation to be carried out by them prior to invading it by force of arms," Rodong said. "These reckless moves against the DPRK have created such a tense situation on the Korean Peninsula that a war may break out there any moment." The United States has flatly denied planning to go to war against North Korea despite a long-running standoff over its nuclear and missile development programs.