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1NC Shell 1/1

CP Text: The United States Federal Government should engage in binding consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization prior to implementing (insert plan text) Throughout the consultation process the United States government should endorse the plan. We’ll clarify

Solvency Cards

Consultation on security issues is key to NATO

Zbigniew Brezezinski, Center for strategic and international studies counselor and trustee, Foreign Affairs, 2009, proquest

Even more perplexing is the current significance of Article 5 to Europe itself. It raises the question of how tightly binding are NATO's collective-security obligations. If a geopolitically exposed European member of nato were to become a victim of an armed attack and if the United States and the United Kingdom and other nato allies were inclined to come to its aid but, say, Greece and Italy were not, could Article 5 be invoked?

Despite the expansion of its membership to 28 countries, NATO remains bound by what it has defined as "a fundamental principle" namely, that "all NATO decisions are made by consensus," that "consensus has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making in NATO since the creation of the Alliance in 1949," and that "this principle remains in place." Accordingly, the secretary-general of NATO, as part of the task assigned to him at the recent alliance summit, might consider designating a senior allied group to undertake a review of the current meaning of Article 5. Not only the Afghan challenge but also the significant decline of the U.S. military presence in Europe, the increased membership in NATO itself, and the changes already noted in the global security context call for another look at this key article. Even if a war in Europe is unlikely (and in any such case, the U.S. reaction would be the most significant for some time to come), it is right to ask whether a single member - or even two or three members - of a collective-security alliance have the right to in effect veto a joint response. Perhaps some thought should be given to formulating a more operational definition of "consensus" when it is shared by an overwhelming majority but not by everyone.

Only binding consultation can maintain the alliance

Agence France Presse, May 8 2010 “Biden to trawl for Afghanistan ideas at NATO”, Lexis

US [**Vice President Joe Biden**](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9651702555&returnToId=20_T9651751148&csi=10903&A=0.9634439749594944&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Vice%20President%20Joe%20Biden%20&indexType=P) **heads to Brussels on Monday for consultations with NATO allies as a moment of decision looms on a new US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.** Biden, who holds a day of talks in Brussels Tuesday, will be on his second trip to Europe in a month, and officials said his high-profile journey was a sign of how seriously they took the war policy review. President [Barack Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9651702555&returnToId=20_T9651751148&csi=10903&A=0.9634439749594944&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Barack%20Obama&indexType=P) 's deputy will be tracing the steps of US Secretary of State Hillary **Clinton**, who **met NATO foreign ministers in Brussels last week.** "It's just an indication of the seriousness of the situation in Afghanistan, but I think it's also a recognition of the seriousness with which we take this," said a senior [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9651702555&returnToId=20_T9651751148&csi=10903&A=0.9634439749594944&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P) official on condition of anonymity."This is not just lip service, the idea of consultation, we mean it, and in return we want concrete ideas and concrete assistance," said the official. Biden will hold consultations with the North Atlantic Council, the political and decision-making body of the alliance's 26 member states, NATO [secretary general Jaap](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9651702555&returnToId=20_T9651751148&csi=10903&A=0.9634439749594944&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A2Y2%23&searchTerm=secretary%20general%20Jaap%20&indexType=P) and Belgian government officials.

(read net-benefit)

NATO Cohesion Net Benefit 1/2

NATO unified now

CBC News 10 (“US Vows Unified Afghan Battle After Shakeup”, June 24 2010, online)

The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan promised Thursday to work on a unified mission with Gen. David Petraeus after the ouster of Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the top commander in the war. President Barack Obama replaced McChrystal as head of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan on Wednesday after a magazine article in which McChrystal and his aides criticized the U.S. administration.

NATO has changed: They must be consulted in order to build cohesion, which is key to regional security and peace in Eastern Europe.

Christopher J. Eggert, Associate, Sherman, Sherman & Murch L.L.P. at Salem, Oregon. J.D., Willam ette University College of Law, 1996; B.A., Oregon State University, 1993., © 1997

Willamette Journal of International Law & Dispute Resolution , http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?\_m=0f611507b076590c44192a7dbbc7a839&\_docnum=12&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&\_md5=5371aed3fcd011cdedf2ea321fc576a0

The last decade has seen dramatic changes in the relation ship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. At the beginning of the post-Cold War era, NATO finds itself trying to redefine not only its reason for existence, but also its relationships with nations that, until recently, were viewed primarily as potential enemies. Whether NATO builds a lasting working relationship of openness with those nations or closes its borders to them, may be a significant factor in determining how long the post-Cold War era lasts. NATO must choose either openness or isolation. In 1984, at the height of the anti-Soviet Reagan-era efforts in the United States, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., wrote, "Our challenge, then is not to work at cross-purposes based on different perspec tives. As always, that remains the easiest course of action. In stead, our obligation is to work together, to try to reconcile these perspectives with the vision of a common interest." [1](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0f611507b076590c44192a7dbbc7a839&_docnum=12&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=5371aed3fcd011cdedf2ea321fc576a0" \l "n1" \t "_self) General Haig intended this statement to encourage NATO cohesion in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. But now, at the end of the twentieth century, General Haig's "vision of a common in terest" takes on a new, more expansive meaning for NATO. It appears NATO has chosen recently to take the more diffi cult route of building mutual cooperation and understanding with the nations of the former Warsaw Pact in areas of common interest. Russia is a focal point of these efforts. The framework within which the future relationship between NATO and Russia is likely to develop is the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Fed  [\*56]  eration (Founding Act). [2](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0f611507b076590c44192a7dbbc7a839&_docnum=12&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=5371aed3fcd011cdedf2ea321fc576a0" \l "n2" \t "_self) The Founding Act establishes a new relationship between NATO and Russia that promises to build a lasting peace and security in Eastern Europe if followed in both spirit and letter. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Be tween the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine (Dis tinctive Partnership) [3](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0f611507b076590c44192a7dbbc7a839&_docnum=12&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=5371aed3fcd011cdedf2ea321fc576a0" \l "n3" \t "_self) serves a similar purpose.

NATO Cohesion Net Benefit 2/2

Relations collapse between the U.S. and NATO causes regional instability that escalates to superpower nuclear conflict

John O'Sullivan, editor of the National Review and founder of the New Atlantic, 6-1998 [American Spectator]

Some of those ideas--notably, dissolution and "standing pat"--were never likely to be implemented. Quite apart from the sociological law that says organizations never go out of business even if their main aim has been achieved (the only exception being a slightly ominous one, the Committee for the Free World, which Midge Decter closed down after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), NATO's essential aim has not been permanently achieved. True, the Soviet threat is gone; but a nuclear-armed and potentially unstable Russia is still in the game; a major conflict has just been fought in the very Balkans which sparked the First World War; and there are a number of potential wars and civil wars lurking in such regions as the Tyrol, the Basque country, Northern Ireland (not yet finally settled), Corsica, Belgium, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe and the Balkans generally where, it is said, " every England has its Ireland, and every Ireland its Ulster." If none of these seems to threaten the European peace very urgently at present, that is in part because the existence of NATO makes any such threat futile and even counter-productive. No nation or would-be nation wants to take NATO on. And if not NATO, what? There are international bodies which could mediate some of the lesser conflicts: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe is explicitly given that responsibility, and the European Union is always itching to show it can play a Big Power role. But neither body has the military heft or the prestige to deter or repress serious strife. The OSCE is a collective security organization, and as Henry Kissinger said of a similar body: "When all participants agree, there is no need for it; when they split, it is useless." And the EU only made itself look ridiculous when it attempted to halt the Bosnian conflict in its relatively early stages when a decisive intervention might have succeeded. As for dealing with a revived Russian threat, there is no military alliance in sight other than NATO that could do the job. In a sense, NATO today is Europe's defense. Except for the American forces, Western armies can no longer play an independent military role. They are wedded to NATO structures and dependent on NATO, especially American, technology. (As a French general admitted in the Gulf War: "The Americans are our eyes and ears.") If NATO were to dissolve--even if it were to be replaced by some European collective defense organization such as a beefed-up Western European Union--it would invite chaos as every irredentist faction sought to profit from the sudden absence of the main guarantor of European stability

NATO Cohesion – Uniqueness

Patreaus proves NATO is unified now

Right Vision News 10 (“Petraeus stresses unity at first appearance in Kabul”, July 5 2010)

Ten days after his predecessor was forced out over published remarks that laid bare a dysfunctional civilian-military relationship, **the new American commander in Afghanistan sought Saturday to put a unified face on the US-led war effort**. US Army Gen. David **Petraeus**, who arrived Friday to assume command of US and Western forces here, made his public debut in Kabul at a Fourth of July weekend celebration at the US Embassy. There, both he and US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, who presides over the world's largest American diplomatic mission, **used brief remarks to drive home the message that** [**President Obama's**](http://oboler.isu.edu:2070/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9727949486&returnToId=20_T9727952087&csi=354856&A=0.47052889315105273&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=President%20Obama's%20&indexType=P)  **stern order to put aside internal rivalries would be heeded. "We look forward to being your team mates**," Eikenberry told Petraeus, whom he referred to at one point as "Dave." The ambassador ceremonially presented the camouflage-clad general with an access badge to the sprawling diplomatic compound and said: "**You're welcome at this embassy 24-7." "I feel like one of the team," Petraeus told about 1,700 invited guests,** who included military and diplomatic personnel, together with a number of Afghan dignitaries. "Cooperation is not optional," he added. "This is a tough mission

NATO cohesion is strong now

Stan Sloan, founding Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, 6.16.2010, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/nato-permanent-alliance-outlook-future

Will the NATO members continue to find NATO cooperation to their advantage, even with a difficult experience in Afghanistan? Only time will tell. However, history suggests that, in spite of their differences, the United States and Europe will try to keep their act together. And today, NATO remains an important part of the script for that routine. Dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and managing most other aspects of transatlantic relations demand more effective transatlantic cooperation in political, economic, financial, and social as well as military aspects of the relationship. The bottom line, therefore, is that the transatlantic bargain will survive Afghanistan. The alliance has already shown its resilience during the early twenty-first century when decisions by the Bush administration put alliance cooperation under severe pressure.

NATO Cohesion – Internal Links 1/2

Consult NATO solves cohesion – outweighs any lessens impact of deterrence

British American Security Information Council, mind the gap: healing the nato rift over us tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, January 2010, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BASIC-MindtheGapNATOnuclear.pdf

Assurance exists alongside deterrence. If members of the Alliance are appropriately assured, this builds cohesion and confidence, strengthens the relevance and legitimacy of the Alliance, and may persuade members against certain unilateral courses of action (such as acquiring their own nuclear arsenals) that could be deemed undesirable. The ability to present a united front is perhaps the most important element of NATO’s indirect deterrent capability – at least as important as any weapon system – and is carefully guarded by its members. If any potential adversary is left without doubt as to the willingness of NATO members to execute their Article V ‘commitments’ to each other, they are far more likely to be deterred from using any aggression against weaker or more vulnerable members. This could be termed indirect deterrence, as it can operate with or without a particular adversary in mind. Unfortunately, devotion to assurance can act as a deterrent to public debate, unilateral moves or even efforts to open conversation in private. This can, ironically, work against gradualist reform, and lead to more radical or unilateral shifts later on as other factors outside NATO’s control determine outcomes. NATO has to evolve to remain relevant to a changing security environment. Second, long-term cohesion may better be supported by paying attention to the management of change dynamics within the Alliance rather than simply burying problems, ensuring all allies are involved. Third, any hint of a tactic that appears to paper over cracks, and avoids discussion or public debate can look weak and itself undermine cohesion. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe is generally unpopular amongst most European publics, and could serve to make NATO nuclear posture in many countries more controversial than it need be. It would be a mistake to ignore this.

**Consultation With NATO Ends the Political Chill Against Overtures Toward**

**NATO and Spills Over**

Andrews, 05 (David M. Associate Professor of Politics and IR at Scripps College and former senior

research fellow in transatlantic relations at the European University Institute, 2005, The Atlantic

Alliance Under Stress, p. 266)

The obstacles to continued cooperation among the Atlantic allies are real; overcoming them will not be easy. In my contribution to this volume, I played the role of objective analyst in outlining the sources and character of those obstacles. In concluding, let me now assume the role of policy advocate. While abstract historical forces help shape the fate of nations, they do not determine them. One of the many aims of diplomacy is to construct cooperation out of the raw materials of state interests. Understood in this light, the Atlantic crisis over Iraq was a massive diplomatic failure – a failure that reflects well on no one. But there remains the potential to restructure the Alliance in accordance with a vision of shared interests and shared responsibilities. Leaders from both sides of the Atlantic can still forge a new understanding corresponding more closely to the contemporary needs of the Alliance members, if they choose to do so. Such an understanding might result in a renewed European “invitation,” to use Geir Lundestad’s evocative term, for continued US engagement in European security matters, and a corresponding restatement of traditional American support for continued European integration. If so, there will undoubtedly be important qualifications to both of these commitments. So be it. Far better to delineate the shape of the future Atlantic partnership than to allow it to become a casualty of war, and of the bickering of policy underlinings. At present, though, official attitudes toward these essential questions remain unclear precisely because leaders at the highest levels have permitted them to become so. This neglect does their collective publics a disservice. The alliance is a patrimony; citizens should hold their governments responsible if this legacy is unsquandered. The Atlantic partnership has survived past crises intact, even if it was transformed in the process. It can do so again, given the political will to accomplish this objective.

NATO Cohesion – Internal Links 2/2

**Failure to consult over domestic issues kills relations**

Werner **Weidenfeld**, Coordinator of German-American Cooperation at the German Foreign

Ministry, Summer **1997** (*The Washington Quarterly,* Summer 1997)

Successful U.S.-European conflict management rests on the permanent agreement between policymakers and their public on a common direction. If this agreement is lacking on the minor issues, or if politicians begin to prefer solving domestic problems at the cost of dealing with their foreign partners (for example, in trade policy), then, when a serious issue arises, neither the politicians nor the general public will see the value of

maintaining a transatlantic consensus. The ultimate consequences of such a split could be a permanent break in the transatlantic culture of close political and social interaction. Eventually, all parties involved will have to ask how transatlantic relations can be placed on a new footing for the future. The longer it takes to answer this question, the more difficult a new beginning will be. For now, however, the opportunity to refound the transatlantic community is still ripe. The latest discussions on a Transatlantic Treaty, a Charter, or a "New Agenda" have made major political, industrial, and social policymakers aware of the need for a new initiative. The generation of committed supporters of the transatlantic partnership from the days of the East-West conflict are still involved in policymaking and opinion-shaping. Both Europe and the United States must therefore make decisive use of these conditions for a new beginning.

Genuine consultation spills over to a new strategic dialogue that’s key to avert a collapse in relations

Simon Serfaty, senior professor in international politics at Old Dominion, 2005 *The Vital Partnership* p. 14

Thus faced with a crisis of international legitimacy coming on top of a crisis of structural legitimacy, the United States and the states of Europe ought to agree on a strategic dialogue that would transform an alliance based on shared goals, overlapping interests, compatible values, and close intimacy, as it was developed for the Cold War. into the community of action that first became necessary after the Cold War but has become urgent since September 11. That. too. will not be easy. For the United States especially, but also for some of its senior European partners, a Euro-Atlantic community of action presupposes a willingness to give NATO a right of first refusal because of a natural predilection for NATO members as like-minded partners of choice. Yet, even assuming a broad strategic agreement on goals and interests, action that demands the use of military force cannot be managed by a committee of twenty-six NATO member states, including nineteen countries that also belong to another committee of twenty-five EU members, six of which are not NATO mem­bers.14 That is a challenge to common sense. After the decision to act has been made by all NATO members, its enforcement should bear some re­semblance to the contributions made by each ally, reflective of its willing­ness but also respectful of its relevance and cognizant of its capabilities. As a second Bush administration gets under way, and after the historic enlargement of both NATO and the EU in the spring of 2004. new modalities in U.S.-EU-NATO relations are needed with the same ur­gency as was shown in 1949. when President Truman was starting a new presidential term after his surprising triumph over Governor Thomas Dewey. At the time, it took only a few months to sign a North Atlantic Treaty that revolutionized the nation's history, as well as the history of its relations with Europe. Not acting as urgently now would not only be a mistake, it would also be irresponsible.

NATO Cohesion – Impacts

Strong US-NATO Alliance Key to Solving Multiple Scenario’s for Extinction

Ivo H. **Daalder and** James M. **Goldgeiger**, senior fellows at the Brookings Institute, Spring **2001**, (Survival, “Putting Europe First,” http://nato.gov.si/slo/novinarskosredisce/clanki/putting-europe-first/)

Largely missing from the public reactions to Rice's call for a new division of labour was the other side of the proposed division: the idea that the United States alone should bear responsibility for dealing with flash-points in the Middle East and Asia. Yet this idea has major drawbacks. Although America today enjoys unrivalled military, economic and political power, it lacks the capacity to deal with many of the critical global challenges - ranging from weapons proliferation and terrorism to environmental degradation and the rapid spread of infectious disease - without support from allies. There are also fundamental political problems with such an approach. The unilateralism implied by assigning primary responsibility for global security and stability to the United States without support from or regard for the perspective of regional allies and other countries is hardly consistent with the desire, repeatedly emphasised by the incoming team, to exercise American power without arrogance and to pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster'.4 At a time when the United States is already regarded by much of the world as an overbearing 'hyperpower', insisting on a division of labour that assigns Washington the main international security role to the exclusion of others is unlikely to be popular among its allies. Such a posture is also unlikely to be popular at home. In recent years, it has become very clear that the American public will support the use of US military forces overseas only if other countries share the burden. This is not only in the case of so-called humanitarian interventions, but also when it involves the defence of such vital national interests as the world's supply of crude oil. In either case, international legitimacy of action and a commitment by other nations to share the costs will be a political prerequisite for gaining public support. Despite Europe's internal weaknesses and divisions, no part of the world offers the United States a better prospect for becoming a strong partner in taking on global challenges and opportunities. Europe combines actual economic strength with potential military and diplomatic capacity to be America's strategic partner, if not today, then tomorrow. And rather than assigning Europe a limited, albeit still important role, of handling its own affairs in ways that do not require US participation, as the new division of labour suggests, American interests are best served by developing a genuine partnership with a Europe that is both capable and willing to share the burdens of maintaining and strengthening international security.

NATO is key to prevent nuclear war

John Duffield, asst prof of govt and foreign affairs at Univ. of Virginia, Winter 1994, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, issue 5, pg. 766-7

Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe--as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies--remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.(11)

Solvency – Generic 1/2

Refusing to consult NATO makes the organization seem useless.

David Abshire, President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency. AND, S. Wesley Cross, Center for the Study of the Presidency. 2004. “Reinvesting in the Art of NATO.” http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia\_sumfall04/gjia\_sumfall04\_010.pdf

The United States must dispel myths and reaffirm trust among allies by reinvesting in the consultative arts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It must lead allies to do the same. Together, NATO allies must pave new avenues for meaningful, concrete consultation. These instruments will only be worth as much as members invest in them. Each member country must heed the words that grace the walls of the NAC, animus in consulendo liber: in consultation, a free mind. The United States must beware of consistently appearing to go it alone. Such an attitude can be ammunition for U.S. enemies, such as al Qaeda, who seek to divide the United States and its allies. A style that emphasizes consultation in good faith will improve perceptions of the United States abroad. In an election year, the United States should seize the opportunity to set a new course by approaching new challenges from a position of principled, realistic strength, and using consultative fora to unite efforts and marshall resources. With proper leadership, NATO is the only tool that combines the political foundation, operational capability, and transformational creativity to do precisely that.

Frequent consultation with NATO dissolves resentment to the US unilateralism and avoids overstretch

Joseph Nye, Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Foreign Affairs July 2003 - August 2003

Both the neo-Wilsonian and the Jacksonian strands of the new unilateralism tend to prefer alliance a la carte and to treat international institutions as toolboxes into which U.S. policymakers can reach when convenient. But this approach neglects the ways in which institutions legitimize disproportionate American power. When others feel that they have been consulted, they are more likely to be helpful. For example, NATO members are doing much of the work of keeping the peace in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. Nato works through many committees to achieve the standardization and interoperability that allow coalitions of the willing to be more than ad hoc groupings. Without regular institutional consultation, the United States may find others increasingly reluctant to put tools into the toolbox. One day the box might even be bare. American-led coalitions will become less willing and shrink in size -- witness the two gulf wars

Solvency – Generic 2/2

**Consultation With NATO Spills Over to Other Global Problems**

Andrews, 05 (David M. Associate Professor of Politics and IR at Scripps College and former senior

research fellow in transatlantic relations at the European University Institute, 2005, The Atlantic

Alliance Under Stress, p. 266)

The obstacles to continued cooperation among the Atlantic allies are real; overcoming them will not be easy. In my contribution to this volume, I played the role of objective analyst in outlining the sources and character of those obstacles. In concluding, let me now assume the role of policy advocate. While abstract historical forces help shape the fate of nations, they do not determine them. One of the many aims of diplomacy is to construct cooperation out of the raw materials of state interests. Understood in this light, the Atlantic crisis over Iraq was a massive diplomatic failure – a failure that reflects well on no one. But there remains the potential to restructure the Alliance in accordance with a vision of shared interests and shared responsibilities. Leaders from both sides of the Atlantic can still forge a new understanding corresponding more closely to the contemporary needs of the Alliance members, if they choose to do so. Such an understanding might result in a renewed European “invitation,” to use Geir Lundestad’s evocative term, for continued US engagement in European security matters, and a corresponding restatement of traditional American support for continued European integration. If so, there will undoubtedly be important qualifications to both of these commitments. So be it. Far better to delineate the shape of the future Atlantic partnership than to allow it to become a casualty of war, and of the bickering of policy underlinings. At present, though, official attitudes toward these essential questions remain unclear precisely because leaders at the highest levels have permitted them to become so. This neglect does their collective publics a disservice. The alliance is a patrimony; citizens should hold their governments responsible if this legacy is unsquandered. The Atlantic partnership has survived past crises intact, even if it was transformed in the process. It can do so again, given the political will to accomplish this objective.

Consensus decisions are crucial to the continued effectiveness of NATO.

Foreign Affairs, November- December 2002

The second argument for taking NATO's political standards seriously should concern even those who care only about its military effectiveness. American defense officials know that what makes NATO work as an effective military alliance is the daily participation of its members in its committees, military planning, and exercises. The integrated military command and NATO military interoperability -- the unprecedented hallmarks of NATO's capability and effectiveness -- work only because of the alliance's practical problem-solving and consensus principles that allow it to pursue a unified, and thereby stronger, policy. Willingness to operate by consensus rests on trust and confidence among the members. These traits, in turn, are rooted in the common purposes, values, and institutions of NATO's members.

Solvency – Afghanistan 1/2

Consultations are key to cohesive military strategy in Afghanistan

NATO OTAN, us vice president consults with allies on Afghanistan, 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\_51460.htm

The Vice President of the United States, Joseph Biden, met today with the North Atlantic Council to discuss the main challenges ahead in Afghanistan and consult with NATO Allies on the ongoing US strategic policy review towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Allies welcomed this consultation process and the recent decision by President Obama to send more forces to ISAF. They agreed that the international community cannot afford the cost of failure in Afghanistan and Pakistan. NATO Ambassadors highlighted the need to concentrate efforts on building a regional approach, engaging local Afghan communities at the district level, as well as on a stronger civilian effort and increased support for Afghan institution building, in particular the Afghan Army and Police. Allies also stressed the need to focus efforts on tackling the narcotics problem and reducing civilian casualties to an absolute minimum. Today's consultations were part of the discussions conducted by Allies in the run up to the 60th anniversary NATO Summit in Strasbourg / Kehl on April 3-4. NATO Allies agreed that these consultations are key as well as part of the development of a joint and agreed way forward for Afghanistan.

**Consultation with NATO is key to effective solvency in Afghanistan**

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar, career diplomat in the indian foreign service, the winner takes all in Afghanistan, 2.13.2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/LB13Df02.html

The main plot is about the expansion of NATO into Central Asia. At Munich, Rasmussen spoke of the "need to turn NATO into a forum of consultation on worldwide security issues ... NATO is a framework which has already proven to be uniquely able to combine security consultation, military planning and actual operations ... Afghanistan is a vivid example that in the 21st century, security can't be a relay race, with one individual handing the baton to the next runner ... That is why ... the Alliance should become the hub of a network of security partnerships ... Already today, the Alliance has a vast network of security partnerships, as far afield as northern Africa, the Gulf, Central Asia and the Pacific." The Central Asian region is increasingly projected in the Western media as a "ticking bomb waiting to go off". The argument runs like this: social and ethnic tensions are smoldering and the economic crisis is deepening, whereas the autocratic and repressive regimes are incapable of addressing the tensions; Islamists are, therefore, stepping into the political vacuum and Central Asia is becoming increasingly susceptible to al-Qaeda.

**Consulting with NATO will not solve for Afghanistan**

Sally McNamara, senior policy analyst in European affairs at the heritage foundations Margaret thatcher center for freedom, nato allies in Europe must do more in Afghanistan, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/nato-allies-in-europe-must-do-more-in-afghanistan

Despite the change in tone and style from his predecessor, President Obama has experienced exactly the same conspiracy of reluctance that President Bush faced in seeking more equitable burden sharing for the Afghanistan mission. Since October 2006, when NATO assumed full responsibility for Afghanistan's security, the U.S. has repeatedly attempted to secure greater European input for both military and civilian operations in Afghanistan. The contributing nations have had ample opportunity to make their voices heard through the countless NATO summits, ministerial meetings, bilateral discussions, strategy sessions, speeches, conferences, and compacts. It is therefore disingenuous to attribute the problems that ISAF is experiencing in Afghanistan to too few opportunities for the allies to consult. Rather, NATO has repeatedly agreed to strategies for Afghanistan but then failed to provide adequate resources. The comprehensive approach, which was endorsed at the heads-of-state level in Bucharest in April 2008, is a striking example of this disconnect.[[9]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/nato-allies-in-europe-must-do-more-in-afghanistan" \l "_ftn9) The alliance endorsed a strategy for a greater civilian-military footprint in Afghanistan, but after a short-term surge of largely American and British troops to combat the Taliban's spring offensive, ISAF's overall strength was almost the same in October as it had been in April. No additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been created since April 2008.[[10]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/nato-allies-in-europe-must-do-more-in-afghanistan" \l "_ftn10)

Solvency – Afghanistan 2/2

Afghanistan views consultation with NATO as an essential element to solvency process

Ambassador Said Jawad, Afghanistan ambassador to the united states, remarks by ambassador of Afghanistan to the united states said jawad to the Atlantic partnership, 2009, http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/RemarksbyAmbassadorofAfghanistantotheUnitedStates.html

This is what we demand. We are ready to take full responsibility of our country’s security in five years. This will be done in a province-to-province basis. We are already in charge of security in Kabul and are practically leading in a number of provinces in Central and North Afghanistan. Within the next three years, we want to lead and conduct military operations independently.  The drawdown of US combat troops may start sooner, if other security and regional factors remain unchanged. For an effective, smooth transfer, we want to establish a Joint Security Consultation Group with the US and NATO.  The Afghan National Army is fighting alongside your soldiers. On average, 3 Afghan National Police officers are dying every day defending Afghanistan. We want to increase our share of responsibility. There is not a shortage of courage or manpower; there is a shortage of skills and equipment and funds to adequately pay and recruit better soldiers and police officers. We need the US and NATO’s assistance with building the army and training the ANA (95,000) and the ANP (81,000).  Out of 2,375 Police Mentor Teams, only 1,050 (44%) are assigned. Out of 2,663 embedded army training teams, only 1,125 (44%) are filled. Out of 103 Operation Military Liaison Teams (OMLET), only 53 are assigned (55%). We appreciate NATO’s willingness to send additional troops. We understand the constraints they are facing. If our NATO allies cannot send more troops and trainers, there are many other ways they can assist. An alternative is to pay the salaries of the ANA and ANP and to provide equipment. We should seek a synergy between various degrees of commitment and capabilities that our NATO partners are bringing to the table. To further Afghanize security and development, planning is underway for 3 important international conferences, designed to find the proper mechanisms for a gradual transfer of security responsibilities and enhancing the pace of economic development.

NATO cannot win the war in Afghanistn

Tariq **Ali**, The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan, **2007**, http://www.zcommunications.org/the-case-for-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-by-tariq-ali

There is no way NATO can win this war now. Sending more troops will lead to more deaths. And full-scale battles will destabilise neighbouring Pakistan. Musharraf has already taken the rap for an air raid on a Muslim school in Pakistan. Dozens of children were killed and the Islamists in Pakistan organised mass street protests. Insiders suggest that the 'pre-emptive' raid was, in fact, carried out by US war planes who were supposedly targeting a terrorist base, but the Pakistan government thought it better they took the responsibility to avoid an explosion of anti-American anger. NATO's failure cannot be blamed on the Pakistani government. If anything, the war in Afghanistan has created a critical situation in two Pakistani provinces. The Pashtun majority in Afghanistan has always had close links to its fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan. The border was an imposition by the British Empire and it has always been porous. Attired in Pashtun clothes I crossed it myself in 1973 without any restrictions. It is virtually impossible to build a Texan fence or an Israeli wall across the mountainous and largely unmarked 2500 kilometre border that separates the two countries. The solution is political, not military. Washington's strategic aims in Afghanistan appear to be non-existent unless they need the conflict to discipline European allies who betrayed them on Iraq. True, the al-Qaeda leaders are still at large, but their capture will be the result of effective police work, not war and occupation. What will be the result of a NATO withdrawal? Here Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian states will be vital in guaranteeing a confederal constitution that respects ethnic and religious diversity. The NATO occupation has not made this task easy. Its failure has revived the Taliban and increasingly the Pashtuns are uniting behind it.

Solvency – Turkey

Turkey has asked for and received NATO consultation when the US military acting

The Star Ledger, February 11 2003, “3 NATO nations block plan to aid Turkey’s defense”, Lexis

Turkey, the only NATO country that borders Iraq, responded by requesting consultations under NATO's mutual-defense treaty - a dramatic step that displayed the seriousness of Turkey's security concerns. Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization charter says, "Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened."

Turkey will support NATO consultation

AFP, NATO to meet Tuesday on gaza flotilla raid, 5.23.2010, http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=173174

NATO will hold emergency talks on Tuesday at Turkey's behest after the deadly Israeli raid on a flotilla of aid-carrying ships bound for Gaza, NATO spokesperson James Appathurai said. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told reporters in Santiago, Chile, that his government was demanding the NATO council gather to address a crisis that has already seen Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cut short a visit to Canada and Washington, where he had been due to meet with US President Barack Obama on Tuesday. Appathurai said in a statement that the military alliance is deeply concerned about the loss of life in international waters, with at least nine people—many Turks according to reports—killed and dozens more reported wounded.

Solvency – South Korea

Consultation over South Korean security issues are key interests for NATO

Atlantic Council, nato wants to increase cooperation with south korea non-members, 7.6.2010, http://www.acus.org/natosource/nato-wants-increase-cooperation-south-korea-non-members

From [Yonhap News Agency](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/07/06/46/0301000000AEN20100706004200315F.HTML):  The world's biggest military alliance, NATO, is looking to increase cooperation with South Korea and other partners beyond Europe and North America to meet global challenges such as proliferation and piracy, a senior NATO official said Tuesday.

"Our security interests and security interests of countries like Korea coincide today more than ever," **Dirk Brengelmann**, NATO's assistant secretary general for political affairs and security policy, said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency. "NATO's intention is not to become a global police. We intend to remain a Euro-Atlantic organization. But it's at the same time necessary to do cooperation with these (non-member) partners. There's an ever-increasing web of partnerships and cooperation," he said. Brengelmann was to wrap up his two-day stay in Seoul later Tuesday following the third annual policy consultation talks between South Korea and NATO. Brengelmann's NATO delegation will also visit Japan and China for similar policy talks.The German diplomat, who had served in missions in Haiti and Britain before being appointed to his current post in March this year, pointed to South Korea's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan as an example of cooperation. Seoul has joined NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the war-ravaged nation."We share interest when it comes to sound security policy," Brengelmann said, noting that it was "a happy coincidence" that he was in Seoul only a few days after South Korea launched its Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.  (photo: [AP](http://www.daylife.com/photo/06HoaIk08HdYZ))

NATO expects to be consulted on military issues over South Korea even if they are not taking action

Atlantic Council, damon wilson delivers speech on nato, 3.22.2010, http://www.acus.org/highlight/damon-wilson-delivers-speech-nato

This first role is the unique core of the Alliance. The second requires a recommitment to using NATO to consult among Allies on the full range of security issues even if there is no expectation that NATO as an organization should take action on a particular issue. The last two roles should be pursued by both NATO and the U.S.-EU partnership. Almost any conceivable military mission today would involve our NATO allies at the core, but also entail valuable contributions from other partners. NATO can and often should remain the organizing core around which such broader coalitions are built, as the Alliance offers an increasingly international standard of interoperability and command capable of incorporating partners. NATO’s track record with partners in the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is a good basis upon which to continue to strengthen ties to other global partners, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the African Union. In fact, as we work to strengthen the Alliance’s global partnerships, we should entertain the possibility of alliance within the Alliance with out closest partners who share our values and interests.

Solvency – Japan

**Japan says yes- they oppose unilateral US action- cp avoids this**

Federal News Service 08 (“HEARING OF THE UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION (AS RELEASED BY THE USCC); SUBJECT: "CHINA'S EXPANDING GLOBAL INFLUENCE: FOREIGN POLICY GOALS, PRACTICES, AND TOOLS"; CHAIRED BY: LARRY WORTZEL, CHAIRMAN; CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, VICE CHAIRMAN; DANIEL BLUMENTHAL, COMMISSIONER; March 18 2008)

**Japan still remains the second-largest economy in the world.** Japan poses significant challenges to any Chinese attempts to restore the old Sino-centric order in East Asia. So in the context of China- Japan relations, I have mentioned that there is going to be a "Cold Peace" type of relationship between these two old traditional rivals in East Asia. **Japan has fought with every great power over the last 100 years to maintain its hegemony in East Asia--Russia, Britain, U.S., and China.** As China emerges to challenge Japan's dominance in East Asia, Japan is not going to take it lying down. Japan is going to resist. That is why you see, in addition to revitalizing its alliance with the U.S., now Japan is increasingly looking beyond the U.S.-Japan security alliance and trying to establish closer mil-to-mil ties with India, Vietnam, Australia, looking beyond the U.S.-Japan alliance. So that's why I'm quite skeptical of China's capability to achieve its rather ambitious foreign policy goals because it would inevitably provoke countervailing actions by other great powers, especially Japan and India, and to some extent in the years and decades to come, though not in the short-to-medium term, from Russia too, because Russia and China's geopolitical concerns and interests diverge beyond a certain point. In the short term, of course, **they have joined hands to oppose U.S. unilateralism.** But over the long term, Russia cannot go along with China because it cannot afford to be subservient to China's foreign policy objectives.

NATO says yes- they have historically been consulted over US military decisions in Japan

**Japan Economic Newswire 03** (“U.S. to intensify military realignment talks with Japan, others”, November 25 2003)

**President George W. Bush said Tuesday the United States will intensify talks with its allies, including Japan**, South Korea **and** North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO)** members, **on a realignment of U.S. forces deployed abroad.** 'Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with the Congress and our friends, allies and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our overseas force posture,' Bush said in a statement. **'High-level U.S. teams will begin consultations in foreign capitals in Europe, Asia and elsewhere' following the meetings of NATO foreign and defense ministers** in Brussels from next Monday to Dec. 5, the statement said. The Bush administration is considering a realignment of U.S. forces overseas as part of its efforts to transform the U.S. military to better cope with new threats such as global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Shortly before visiting Japan and South Korea in the middle of this month, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld voiced readiness to begin military realignment talks with Japan and South Korea. **Japan hosts about 46,000 U.S. troops and 37,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed in South Korea. The focus of a U.S. military realignment in Japan would be whether part of the U.S. Marines forces deployed in Okinawa would be repositioned to Guam, Hawaii or elsewhere to reduce the heavy burden shouldered by the island**. Okinawa accommodates the bulk of the U.S. military presence in Japan.The U.S., meanwhile, has already agreed with South Korea to move U.S. troops to posts south of Seoul to cope with contingencies more rapidly. The U.S. military is now considering whether to reassign some troops from South Korea to other places. At a Pentagon press conference Tuesday, Rumsfeld said nothing has been decided on the realignment of U.S. troops overseas and that it would take a long time to complete the process. 'It will take some period of months to complete those consultations and discussions, to come to some conviction about what we actually believe is in the best interest of all of us -- the United States as well as our allies and alliances and friends,' he said. 'And it will take some period of years to actually roll out those decisions as we work with the Congress to determine how to do it and at what pace to do it,' Rumsfeld said.

Solvency – Kuwait

**Solvency- NATO and Kuwait are cooperating on the war on terrorism- says yes to the plan.**

**Agence France Presse** 06 **(**“Kuwait Signs Security agreement with NATO”, December 12th 2006, Lexis)

Kuwait on Tuesday signed a security agreement with NATO at the opening of an international conference to discuss boosting security links with Gulf Arab states. The Information Security Agreement, signed by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed al-Sabah and NATO [Secretary General Jaap](http://oboler.isu.edu:2070/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9726795130&returnToId=20_T9726796829&csi=10903&A=0.022226277355879787&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A2Y2%23&searchTerm=Secretary%20General%20Jaap%20&indexType=P)  will regulate the exchange of security information between the 26-member NATO and oil-rich Kuwait as part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The deputy head of Kuwait's National Security Agency, Sheikh Thamer Ali al-Sabah, told reporters the agreement will allow the exchange of "classified" security and defense information between NATO and Kuwait. "The agreement will enhance the existing security cooperation between NATO and Kuwait ... It also involves exchange of information on countering terrorism," he said. Kuwait is the only country of the ICI that has signed such an agreement, he said. Around 120 NATO delegates are attending the "International Conference of NATO and Gulf Countries: Facing Common Challenges through ICI." A number of senior officials, including Bahrain's crown prince, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, and military commanders are representing the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the conference.  NATO leaders at a summit in Istanbul in 2004 launched the ICI to offer practical security cooperation activities with states throughout the Middle East with a special focus on the energy-rich GCC states. Through ICI, NATO offers practical cooperation with interested nations in such areas as counter-terrorism, cooperation on border security, participation in NATO exercises and counter-WMD (weapons of mass destruction). ICI stands alongside NATO's long-standing Partnership for Peace programme and Mediterranean Dialogue. Kuwait became the first country to join the ICI in 2005 and has been "closely cooperating with NATO" in security-related matters, Sheikh Thamer said. Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have also joined.

**Solvency- NATO says yes- Kuwait’s security is a top concern**

**Elias 06** (Diana, Associated Press Writer, “Security cooperation between NATO, Gulf Arab states is imperative, alliance says”, Dec 12 2006)

Security cooperation between NATO and the six Arab states of the Gulf has become imperative in the face of threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the NATO secretary general said Tuesday. "Never has cooperation been more important than today," Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a conference on enhancing cooperation between the oil-rich Gulf states and the 26-nation Western alliance. "In a world of globalized threats, we need a globalized response," he added. The gathering took place a few days after [Saudi Arabia's King](http://oboler.isu.edu:2070/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9726795130&returnToId=20_T9726842811&csi=138211&A=0.8632215820733109&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0W1%23&searchTerm=Saudi%20Arabia's%20King%20&indexType=P)  Abdullah warned a summit of Gulf leaders that the Middle East, from the Palestinian territories to Iraq, was "like a keg of gunpowder waiting for a spark to explode." Sunni-Shiite sectarian strife is tearing Iraq apart, and Iran is at loggerheads with the West over its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment. The U.S. and some allies allege Tehran is secretly developing nuclear weapons, and are pressing for sanctions against the country. Iran insists its program is for peaceful purposes. The six Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman announced Sunday that they were considering a shared nuclear program for peaceful purposes. "We face the same threats: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states," the NATO secretary general told the conference. "We all have a vital strategic interest in a stable Iraq and a stable broader Middle East region. We all share a common interest in energy security, whether we are suppliers or consumers." He said the Western alliance had realized that a "territorial understanding" of security was simply too narrow in an age of global threats. "Rather than wait for the challenges to come to us, we must be prepared to meet the challenges where they emerge, even if that may mean deploying far away from our traditional European perimeter." The president of Kuwait's National Security Agency, Sheik Ahmed Fahd Al Ahmed, told the conference that NATO needed "to build confidence with the peoples and decision makers" of the Gulf area, which possesses 60 percent of the world's oil proven reserves. Any cooperation with Gulf countries has to be through agreements that complement the existing ones, especially those with the United States, Sheik Ahmed said. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have already joined NATO's cooperation initiative with Middle Eastern nations, which was launched at the alliance's 2004 summit in Istanbul, Turkey. The deputy head of Kuwait's National Security Agency, Sheik Thamer Al Ali Al Sabah, says his country wants to cooperate with NATO on border security, crisis management, fighting terrorism and military training. On Tuesday, Kuwait and NATO signed an agreement to streamline the exchange of sensitive security information. The conference was held at the level of senior civil servants and top military officers from the Gulf and NATO countries. It was also attended by the secretary general of the GCC, Abdul Rahman al-Attiyah. Kuwait has been a major ally of Washington since the U.S.-led 1991 Gulf War that liberated it from a seven-month Iraqi occupation. The United States also has military bases in Bahrain and Qatar.

Solvency – Iraq

**Solvency- NATO and our Allies don’t support our military adventures**

**Bacevich 10** (Andrew, Professor of history and international relations at Boston University, “Why Europeans Should Run NATO”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2010)

**If NATO has a future, it will find that future back where the alliance began: in Europe**. NATO's founding mission of guaranteeing the security of European democracies has lost none of its relevance. Although the Soviet threat has vanished, Russia remains. And Russia, even if no longer a military superpower, does not exactly qualify as a status quo country. The Kremlin nurses grudges and complaints, not least of them stemming from NATO's own steady expansion eastward. So let NATO attend to this new (or residual) Russian problem. **Present-day Europeans -- even Europeans with a pronounced aversion to war --** are fully capable of mounting the defenses necessary to deflect a much reduced Eastern threat. So why not have the citizens of France and Germany guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland and Lithuania, instead of fruitlessly demanding that Europeans take on responsibilities on the other side of the world that they can't and won't? Like Nixon setting out for Beijing, like Sadat flying to Jerusalem, like Reagan deciding that Gorbachev was cut from a different cloth, the United States should dare to do the unthinkable: **allow NATO to devolve into a European organization, directed by Europeans to serve European needs, upholding the safety and well-being of a Europe that is whole and free -- and more than able to manage its own affairs.**

Genuine Consultation is Key 1/2

Genuine consultation spills over to a new strategic dialogue solves relations collapse

Simon Serfaty, senior professor in international politics at Old Dominion, 2005 *The Vital Partnership* p. 14

Thus faced with a crisis of international legitimacy coming on top of a crisis of structural legitimacy, the United States and the states of Europe ought to agree on a strategic dialogue that would transform an alliance based on shared goals, overlapping interests, compatible values, and close intimacy, as it was developed for the Cold War. into the community of action that first became necessary after the Cold War but has become urgent since September 11. That. too. will not be easy. For the United States especially, but also for some of its senior European partners, a Euro-Atlantic community of action presupposes a willingness to give NATO a right of first refusal because of a natural predilection for NATO members as like-minded partners of choice. Yet, even assuming a broad strategic agreement on goals and interests, action that demands the use of military force cannot be managed by a committee of twenty-six NATO member states, including nineteen countries that also belong to another committee of twenty-five EU members, six of which are not NATO mem­bers.14 That is a challenge to common sense. After the decision to act has been made by all NATO members, its enforcement should bear some re­semblance to the contributions made by each ally, reflective of its willing­ness but also respectful of its relevance and cognizant of its capabilities. As a second Bush administration gets under way, and after the historic enlargement of both NATO and the EU in the spring of 2004. new modalities in U.S.-EU-NATO relations are needed with the same ur­gency as was shown in 1949. when President Truman was starting a new presidential term after his surprising triumph over Governor Thomas Dewey. At the time, it took only a few months to sign a North Atlantic Treaty that revolutionized the nation's history, as well as the history of its relations with Europe. Not acting as urgently now would not only be a mistake, it would also be irresponsible.

**Genuine consultation is key to relations**

Philip **Gordon**, Director of the Center on the United States and France at the Brookings Institute,

**2003,** Bridging the Atlantic Divide

There is much to be said for assertive American leadership. As developments over the past decade -- from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans to Central Asia -- have shown, Washington's willingness to lead often seems to be the only way to get the rest of the international community to act. But it is also clear that when taken too far, assertive leadership can quickly turn into arrogant unilateralism, to the point where resentful others become less likely to follow the lead of the United States. Few have put this argument better than did candidate Bush when, in October 2000, he warned that potential allies around the world would "welcome" a humble United States but "resent" an arrogant one. The Bush team's policies, however, thus far seem to have been based on the opposite premise. Telling allies that if they do not support Washington's approach to the war on terrorism, they are "with the terrorists," slighting key NATO allies (and NATO itself) in Afghanistan, and refusing genuine consultations before important decisions seem far more likely to foster resentment than to muster support. Whatever the merits of the administration's opposition to the long list of multilateral agreements it has fought since coming to office -- and many of those agreements were genuinely flawed -- it should have been clear that the United States could not abruptly pronounce the Kyoto Protocol "dead," seek to undermine the International Criminal Court, raise tariffs on steel and increase agricultural subsidies, and oppose a range of arms control agreements without such actions' having a cumulative impact on the attitudes of European leaders and publics toward the United States. The September 2002 German election, where for the first time in the postwar period a leading candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by running against the United States, should be taken as a warning that American unilateralism could indeed come at a price.

Genuine Consultation is Key 2/2

Genuine consultation unifies countries and avoids collapse

Phillip H. Gordon, fellow in Fopo at Brookings Institute, Foreign Affairs, “Bridging the Altantic Divide” Jan/ Feb 2003

There is much to be said for assertive American leadership. As developments over the past decade -- from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans to Central Asia -- have shown, Washington's willingness to lead often seems to be the only way to get the rest of the international community to act. But it is also clear that when taken too far, assertive leadership can quickly turn into arrogant unilateralism, to the point where resentful others become less likely to follow the lead of the United States. Few have put this argument better than did candidate Bush when, in October 2000, he warned that potential allies around the world would "welcome" a humble United States but "resent" an arrogant one. The Bush team's policies, however, thus far seem to have been based on the opposite premise. Telling allies that if they do not support Washington's approach to the war on terrorism, they are "with the terrorists," slighting key NATO allies (and NATO itself) in Afghanistan, and refusing genuine consultations before important decisions seem far more likely to foster resentment than to muster support. Whatever the merits of the administration's opposition to the long list of multilateral agreements it has fought since coming to office -- and many of those agreements were genuinely flawed -- it should have been clear that the United States could not abruptly pronounce the Kyoto Protocol "dead," seek to undermine the International Criminal Court, raise tariffs on steel and increase agricultural subsidies, and oppose a range of arms control agreements without such actions' having a cumulative impact on the attitudes of European leaders and publics toward the United States. The September 2002 German election, where for the first time in the postwar period a leading candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by running against the United States, should be taken as a warning that American unilateralism could indeed come at a price.Europeans have an equally important role to play in avoiding this outcome. The more they reject the notion that some international problems do have to be dealt with by force, the more they reinforce the conclusion among some Americans that consultation is a waste of time and Washington must go it alone. When Europeans appear to play down American concerns about issues such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, they also play directly into the hands of those in the United States who argue that there is no point even trying to get the Europeans on board. The European argument that Bush's approach to terrorism and his "axis of evil" speech are "simplistic" has the merit of being true, but it does not offer much of an alternative plan for confronting the threats that Europeans and Americans face. Europe's repeated "insistence" that Saddam Hussein comply with un Security Council resolutions and allow weapons inspectors to return to Iraq, without the backing of potential military force, was a hollow threat that had no chance of having any effect.

**Genuine consultation key to United States leadership**

Richard **Haass**, Director of the Office of Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, April

2K2(Excerpts from the *Arthur Ross Lecture*, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Journals/Journal\_Index/v.25\_1&2/Haass,%20Richar d%20N.pdf)

First and foremost, American leadership is fundamental. Without it, multilateral initiatives can be stillborn, go astray or worse. We must be resolute and confident once we have embarked upon a policy. Yet leadership demands, as President Bush has emphasized on many occasions, a sense of humility. Leadership thus requires genuine consultation. We must respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. We have no monopoly on wisdom.

Consultation Key 1/2

**Consultation with NATO spills over to other issues, reigniting relations in the alliance**

**Burwell**, **99,** Francis G. Executive Director at Center for International and Security at Maryland, 1999, (The United States and Europe in the Global Arena, ed. Burwell and Daalder)

These mechanisms foster collaboration in three ways. First, once a decision to cooperate has been made, they provide the processes that are necessary to make that decision a reality. This can be clearly seen in the relative success of US-European cooperation in Bosnia after NATO became the predom-inant implementing organization. Once the issue moved into NATO’s sphere of responsibilities, it was dealt with through a familiar set of procedures that reinforced US European cooperation, Similarly, the Partnership for Peace, being based on existing NATO procedures, was much more likely to succeed than if those procedures had not already existed. Second, these mechanisms create a general climate in which it is easier for views to be exchanged in a less-formal manner. By providing opportunities for consultation they allow policies to be clarified and may even encourage shifts in policies. This can be seen in NATO’s Defense Group on Proliferation, and in the working group on proliferation established under the Transatlantic Declaration. Third, some mechanisms especially those linked to regularly scheduled ministerials or other meetings, may encourage cooperation by establishing a series of small but regular deadlines. This can have the effect of breaking down an issue into a set of discrete, manageable steps. Thus, the presence of established mechanisms in a particular issue area may contribute greatly to the ability of the United States and Europe to work together in addressing that challenge.

**Prior Consultation is Key to solve alliance collapse**

B. **Heuser**, ORBIS staff writer, Spring 19**92**, (Orbis, “What nuclear strategy for post cold-war

Europe?” 36, 2, p.221)

Existing threats and risks may thus be recognized by all governments, but the level of concern differs from country to country; with time the instinctive responses of public opinion in each country will only widen the gap. In addition, with the end of the East-West divide, the values that NATO was conceived to defend are suddenly shared by other countries in Europe, countries with even more complex security problems. Will democratic values remain an integrating factor in a world where the central ideological challenge to democracy has fallen away? In view of the crucial importance of public opinion on security issues, NATO's status as a voluntary alliance that any of its members can leave unilaterally assumes a new aspect. In the past, this was NATO's moral strength. In the future, it may become a practical weakness. NATO members must work harder than ever before to understand each other's concerns, if the alliance is to be preserved. Much of the work will fall to the United States, which more than ever will be expected to consult allies in advance of major decisions and public statements, keep them well informed of developments in Washington during crises, and listen patiently to their views, taking the time to explain and defend its decisions before they are enacted. Intra-alliance cordiality has been considerably reduced on several occasions in the past by U.S. impatience, off-handedness, and lack of consultation, affecting particularly the smaller allies

Consultation issues concerning NATO member nations is key to maintain a unified alliance

David D. Newsom, Professor of Diplomacy at the University of Virginia, 1992

[*The Allies and Arms Control*, p. 279]

As political, security, and economic circumstances change in both Eastern and Western Europe, and as nations take different approaches to these changes, consultation between the other nations of the West [Western Europe and Canada] and the United States becomes more important than ever. The absence of understanding among the allies could threaten the cohesion that has under girded the policies of these likeminded nations since the end of World War II. Nevertheless, the feeling has persisted among NATO members that the United States pays too little attention to the specific problems of these allies and that, although Washington may listen, it ultimately does what it wants. Problems among the North Atlantic nations are frequently laid to a lack of true consultation, primarily on the part of the United States.

Consultation Key 2/2

Consultation with NATO is key to our agenda- past foreign policy architects agree

Kissinger, 03 (Henry A. former secretary of state and adviser to numerous presidents, April 13, 2003, (The San Diego Union Tribune, “America also must rebuild its transatlantic relationships,” http://web.lexisnexis.com/scholastic/document?\_m=ab04b59c873c1cad1ad319199dac8954&\_docnum=12&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVk&\_md5=3ec46160c47837a06f1a95181a2579ee)

If the existing trend in transatlantic relations continues, the international system will be fundamentally altered. Europe will split into two groups defined by their attitude toward cooperation with America. NATO will change its character and become a vehicle for those continuingto affirm the transatlantic relationship. The United Nations, traditionally a mechanism by which the democracies vindicated their convictions against the danger of aggression, will instead turn into a forum in which allies implement theories of how to bring about a counterweight to the hyperpower United States. The debate over the postwar administration of Iraq illustrates these dangers. After a period of restoring security and searching for weapons of mass destruction, it is in America's interest not to insist on an exclusive role in a region in the heart of the Islamic world and to invite other nations to share the governance -- at first coalition partners, progressively other nations, and a significant role for the United Nations, especially its technical and humanitarian organs.But the French foreign minister's proposal, tacitly supported in Berlin, that American presence in Iraq lacks legitimacy until endorsed by diplomatic processes similar to those preceding the war would magnify existing fissures. Postwar Iraq reconstruction will have to recognize the desirability of a broad international base but also the imprudence of using multilateralism as a slogan and the United Nations as an institution to isolate the United States. Too much has happened to prevent a return to business as usual. A revitalization of the Atlantic relationship is imperative if global institutions are to function effectively and if the world is to avoid sliding into a return to 19th-century power politics. And that revitalization must be based on a sense of common destiny rather than seeking to turn the alliance into an a la carte safety net. If common ground cannot be found – if pre-Iraq war diplomacy becomes the pattern -- the United States will be driven to construct ad hoc coalitions together with the core of NATO that remains committed to a transatlantic relationship. That would be a sad end to a half-century of partnership. The time has come to put an end to the debate on unilateralism versus multilateralism and to concentrate on substance. Our European adversaries in the recent controversies should stop encouraging their media's tendency to describe the American administration as Rambo-like figures thirsting for war and the United States as if it were institutionally an obstacle to the fulfillment of Europe's purposes rather than a partner in achieving common aims. For its part, America needs more intense consultations to make the partners more predictable to each other. And a vast agenda awaits: curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, addressing the political implications of globalization, speeding reconstruction of the Middle East.

Actively engaging NATO key to effectiveness

[Strobe Talbott](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/author/strobe-talbott/index.html), Foreign Affairs Writer., 2002

Foreign Affairs, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk”, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101faessay9991/strobe-talbott/from-prague-to-baghdad-nato-at-risk.html

But Prague will also highlight a paradox: NATO's long-term potential is virtually limitless, but its cohesion is at imminent risk. That is largely due to another paradox. The strength of the alliance has always derived from American power, which has never been greater, and from American leadership, which has never been more assertive. Yet these days many allies are feeling not so much led by the United States as bossed around; for them, the exercise of American power has become less a source of protection and more a cause of resentment and a problem to be managed. The United States has been accused of high-handedness and unilateralism before, but the complaints have grown in volume and intensity during the nearly two years of George W. Bush's presidency. He has persistently taken the position that the United States knows best what is in the interests of the rest of the world, and his administration has sometimes seemed not just willing but eager to act alone, in defiance of treaties and over the objections of other nations. As a result, the United States has rarely been so at odds with so many of its traditional friends on so many issues, from trade and arms control to climate change and the International Criminal Court. This general dispute has naturally taken its toll on NATO, an organization that is itself based on a treaty, on the notion of America as first among equals, and on the principles of common interest, shared responsibility, concerted resolve, collective action, and decision by consensus.

Say Yes-Generic 1/2

The counterplan gets NATO nations on board to implement the plan

NATO Office of Information and Press – 2001 [NATO Handbook]

<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf>

Policy formulation and implementation, in an Alliance of independent sovereign countries, depends on all member governments being fully informed of each other’s overall policies and intentions and the underlying considerations which give rise to them. This calls for regular political consultation, whenever possible during the policy-making stage of deliberations before national decisions have been taken. Political consultation in NATO began as a systematic exercise when the Council first met in September 1949, shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty came into force. Since that time it has been strengthened and adapted to suit new developments. Political consultation in NATO began as a systematic exercise when the Council first met in September 1949, shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty came into force. Since that time it has been strengthened and adapted to suit new developments. The principal forum for political consultation remains the Council. Its meetings take place with a minimum of formality and discussion is frank and direct. The Secretary General, by virtue of his Chairmanship, plays an essential part in its deliberations and acts as its principal representative and spokesman both in contacts with individual governments and in public affairs. Consultation also takes place on a regular basis in other forums, all of which derive their authority from the Council: the Political Committee at senior and other levels, the Policy Coordination Group, Regional Expert Groups, Ad Hoc Political Working Groups, an Atlantic Policy Advisory Group and other special committees all have a direct role to play in facilitating political consultation between member governments. Like the Council, they are assisted by an International Staff responsible to the Secretary General of NATO and an International Military Staff responsible to its Director, and through him, responsible for supporting the activities of the Military Committee. Political consultation among the members of the Alliance is not limited to events taking place within the NATO Treaty area. Increasingly, events outside the geographical area covered by the Treaty have implications for the Alliance and therefore feature on the agenda of the Council and subordinate committees. The consultative machinery of NATO is readily available and extensively used by the member nations in such circumstances, even if NATO as an Alliance may not be directly involved. By consulting together they are able to identify at an early stage areas where, in the interests of security and stability, coordinated action may be taken. Neither is the need for consultation limited to political subjects. Wideranging consultation takes place in many other fields. The process is continuous and takes place on an informal as well as a formal basis with a minimum of delay or inconvenience, as a result of the collocation of national delegations to NATO within the same headquarters. Where necessary, it enables intensive work to be carried out at short notice on matters of particular importance or urgency with the full participation of representatives from all governments concerned.

The U.S. can gain consensus support quickly

Colin Powell, Former Secretary of State, 4-29-2003 [FNS]

SEC. POWELL: Sure. On the first question of consensus, clearly, when you go from 16 to 19 to 26 to 29, decision-making becomes more difficult when you have that many sovereign nations, each one represented at the council table and all the baggage that comes with them in terms of public opinion and the political dynamic within their parliament or legislature. It makes it much more difficult. But I don't think it makes it impossible to act at 29, or even that much more difficult or that much more unwieldy. I think long before you get into the council chamber, discussions take place, negotiations take place, and you essentially come in with a pretty good lineup. And we have been quite effective in bringing people around to our line of thinking within 19. And when I look at the next seven coming in and I see how they helped us and how they stood by us in this recent debate over Iraq, I have some confidence that they also would be inclined toward our point of view, but they are sovereign nations to make their own decision. So I think that we have been effective in playing the leadership role in the alliance which will help the alliance get through to a consensus decision quickly. And that leadership role will not be diminished as we move forward to either 26 or 29.

Say Yes-Generic 2/2

NATO will agree to consultation to boost its credibility

NATO OTAN, secretary general’s foreword, 2005,<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/foreword.html>

**NATO's credibility rests on its cohesion and military competence** - its proven ability to foster cooperation between its member nations and to engage them in demanding military operations in regions of vital strategic importance. In the face of a whole new set of risks and threats to our common security, we must strengthen our political dialogue to ensure continued Allied cohesion. In short, we must transform. **A lot of public attention** has **focused on NATO's contributions to peace and stability in the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, Afghanistan and recently Iraq. There has been considerable interest also in the widening of NATO's membership and** the **deepening** of **its partnership relations. But there is more to NATO's transformation.** We have adapted our strategy and concepts, our military command and force structures, and our internal organisation and procedures. Alliance Command Transformation is a key driver in the military transformation process. And with the NATO Response Force and our Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion, we now have force packages in place that are specifically geared to some of the most pressing requirements. Each of our 26 member nations has been taking a hard look at its own defence programmes and structures, to make sure that they are relevant to today's demands. A lot has already been achieved. But NATO's transformation is still very much a work in progress. In addition, we must ensure that NATO Headquarters structure is geared to support this process.  The three main strands of this work are clear. **First, we need to further enhance the usability, availability and sustainability of our forces - to make sure that a much larger proportion of our militaries is readily available for operations away from Alliance territory. Second, we must continue to better align our political and operational decisions - by further improving our defence-planning and force-generation processes, and by creating greater clarity on resourcing through a better balance between national and common funding. Finally, but fundamentally, we need enhanced political debate to muster and sustain the transatlantic consensus that has been, and will remain, crucial to the success of any Alliance undertaking.** I am encouraged by our February Summit, where **NATO leaders committed to strengthen the Alliance as a forum for strategic and political consultations and coordination.**

AT – Lie Perm

Allies will find out – security leaks

Patrick Moynihan, Senator, NY, Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 1997, LN.

There is a much greater rate of leakage from the agencies than could have been imagined 20 years ago.” –former DCI James Schlesinger One of the consequences of the failure of intelligence disclosure policy to keep up with current realities and public expectations is a significant erosion of security discipline, leading to a near epidemic of unauthorized disclosures of classified information, or “leaks.” Of course, leaks are nothing new. They are the yin to secrecy’s yang. It is only fitting that “the history of the CIA itself began with a leak,” as one writer put it. And compalints about leaks are equally old. But even setting aside the large number of “leaks” that are really authorized disclosures on a not-for-attribution basis, there appears to be a dramatically escalating number of genuinely unauthorized disclosrues, judging from the almost daily quotations from currently classified documents that appear in the national press.

Leaks are guaranteed: The American government is the leakiest in the world – agency representatives will leak the government’s position for political gain

James Q. Wilson, Professor of Political Science at UCLA, and John J. DiIulio, Professor of Political Science at Princeton, 1998 [American Government: Institutions and Policies, p. 291]

American government is the leakiest in the world. The bureaucracy, members of Congress, and the White House staff regularly leak stories favorable to their interests. Of late the leaks have become geysers, gushing forth torrents of insider stories. Many people in and out of government find it depressing that our government seems unable to keep anything secret for long. Others think that the public has a right to know even more and that there are still too many secrets. However you view leaks, you should understand why we have so many. The answer is found in the Constitution. Because we have separate institutions that must share power, each branch of government competes with the others to get power. One way to compete is to try to use the press to advance your pet projects and to make the other side look bad.

Lie perms inevitably fail – consultation guarantees leaks that cause an alliance backlash even if they support plan

Stanley Sloan, Senior Specialist in Security Policy with the Congressional Research Service, 1997, [CSM]

Self-confident US behavior has rubbed many Europeans the wrong way. When the Clinton administration revealed its choice of three candidates - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even France, which is a strong proponent of including Romania and Slovenia, was not surprised that the United States and several other allies would only support a smaller group. But the fact that the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations in making its choice clear, and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even our closest allies. It strengthened the hand of those in Europe who claim that the United States is acting like a "hegemonic" power, using its impressive position of strength to have its way with weaker European allies. One official of a pro-American northern European country that supports the package of three told me, "We liked the present but were troubled by the way it was wrapped." US officials say that they wanted to keep the issue within alliance consultations but that their position was being leaked to the press by other allies. They decided to put an end to "lobbying" for other outcomes. Their choice to go strong and to go public may be understandable and even defensible. However, the acknowledged leader of a coalition of democratic states probably needs to set the very best example in the consultative process if it wants other sovereign states to follow. Perhaps it is just hard being No. 1. US officials have noted that the United States is "damned if it does, and damned if it does not" provide strong leadership. Perhaps the style of the NATO decision simply reflects a Washington culture in which the bright and brash more often than not move ahead in the circles of power. But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies. Whatever the explanation, US-European relations would have been better served by a US approach that allowed the outcome to emerge more naturally from the consultative, behind-the-scenes consensus-forming process. The final result would have been the same, and the appearance of a United States diktat to the allies would have been avoided.

EU Relations Net Benefit

**Europe loves Obama**

**AP 10** (“US on Better Terms With Everyone Thanks to Obama: Spokesman”, July 11th 2010, online)

When asked whether the US president would "do the right thing" in world affairs, 87 percent in France, 90 percent in Germany and 84 percent in Britain expressed confidence in Obama. Those figures were down slightly from last year, but compared with Bush's rating of 13, 14 and 16 percent respectively in the European nations.

NATO is they key forum maintaining US-European relations

Agence France Presse, Feb 22 2005, “NATO vows to boost role, play down splits over future”, Lexis

**NATO vowed** Tuesday **to boost its role as an "essential forum" for political ties between Europe and north America,** playing down discord about the ex-Cold War bloc's future after the Iraq war crisis. The pledge by NATO leaders came amid a debate sharpened by recent remarks by German Chancellor [Gerhard Schroeder](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9651702555&returnToId=20_T9651720229&csi=10903&A=0.2949251321937528&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009ZSS%23&searchTerm=Gerhard%20Schroeder%20&indexType=P)  questioning NATO's strategic role, challenged by Washington's use of "coalitions of the willing.""**We are committed to strengthening NATO's role as a forum for strategic and political consultation ... while reaffirming its place as the essential forum for security consultations between Europe and north America,"** they said.

US-EU relations are key to heg

Dr. Daniel Hamilton, Richard von Weizsaecker Professor Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University. “Future Of Transatlantic Relations,” Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony June 11, 2003

Few great goals in this world can be reached without America, but few can be reached by America alone. The American people are unlikely to support an approach to the world that makes every problem our problem and then sends our warriors to conduct our foreign policy. In this era of shadowy networks and bioterrorists, failed states and recession, the only way we can share our burdens, extend our influence, and achieve our goals will often be by banding together with others, particularly our core allies. U.S. military capabilities are vast. But fire power is not staying power. We can win wars without allies, but we can only secure peace with allies. And the most essential allies for winning the pace are our European partners, because the tools of peace-winning--trade, aid, peacekeeping, monitoring and policing- -are European strengths. Europe delivers 70 percent of global civilian development assistance--four times more than the United States. 90 percent of international aid to Afghanistan flows from Europe. European troops are keeping the peace in trouble spots ranging from Afghanistan to Cyprus to Macedonia to Guatemala to Eritrea to the Congo. In fact, EU members and applicants contribute 10 times as many police forces and peacekeeping troops as the United States.

Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

EU Relations – Uniqueness

**Obama has improved relations with every country in the world, literally**

**AP 10** (“US on Better Terms With Everyone Thanks to Obama: Spokesman”, July 11th 2010, online)

**United States has better relations with almost every nation on the planet thanks to** President Barack **Obama's foreign policy "outreach**," his spokesman said Sunday. The bullish claim came in an interview in which White House spokesman Robert Gibbs fiercely defended Obama against accusations he has failed to reform US foreign policy from the damaging era of his predecessor George W. Bush. "**We have better relationships with virtually every country in the world as a result of the president's foreign policy outreach," Gibbs hit back. "There's no doubt that we have taken foreign policy in a different direction**."

US/EU relations are up

Jackson 10 (Rev. Jesse, “America is Socially Growing”, <http://www.neurope.eu/articles/101653.php> , June 27 2010, online)

The US commitment to the war was a big deal and having NATO Command here, that’s a big deal. We have had good relations and that’s been mutually beneficial. The US has been a bulwark against communism. We now have some unfinished business about people from third world countries coming to the US, coming to Europe. People who have been colonized years ago. Those who came over are now voting and we have to change to a multi-ethnic society, when we were once one ethnic group. This is the big challenge for Europe, as far as I can see.  They were colonized, became immigrants, and became citizens

EU Relations – Internals 1/2

European support is key to our foreign policy

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow for European Affairs at Heritage, 2-16-2005 FDCH

Whatever the global issue be it tracking down al-Qaeda, the Doha free trade round, Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or Iraq the United States simply cannot act effectively without the support of at least some European powers. But neither is the world one in which a concert of powers dominates. Whatever the issue, the U.S. remains first among equals. The structural reality makes America's courting of allies vital, for maddeningly the world we live in is not something out of a political science textbook it is neither genuinely unipolar nor multipolar. So if America is chairman of the board, but there are other board members, where is the U.S. to find allies? Both now and well into the future there is really only one place. Europe is the only part of the world where political, diplomatic, military, and economic power can be generated in sufficient strength to support American policies effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe led by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland has no parallel.

Europe is key- no other source for power projection

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow for European Affairs at Heritage, 2-6-2005 [FDCH]

Whatever the global issue be it tracking down al-Qaeda, the Doha free trade round, Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or Iraq the United States simply cannot act effectively without the support of at least some European powers. But neither is the world one in which a concert of powers dominates. Whatever the issue, the U.S. remains first among equals. The structural reality makes America's courting of allies vital, for maddeningly the world we live in is not something out of a political science textbook it is neither genuinely unipolar nor multipolar. So if America is chairman of the board, but there are other board members, where is the U.S. to find allies? Both now and well into the future there is really only one place. Europe is the only part of the world where political, diplomatic, military, and economic power can be generated in sufficient strength to support American policies effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe led by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland has no parallel. Given this reality, it is important for American to follow the sage advice offered by a very odd source, the Rolling Stones' Keith Richards. He is reputed to have said to Mick Jagger during one of their periodic spats when Jagger is reported to have threatened quitting, 'It's bigger than the both of us, darling. You'll be back tomorrow.' This is the unsentimental, unromantic geostrategic reality of the dawn of the 21st century. We simply need each other too much to let the genuine disagreements emanating from Iraq derail the only hope for global stability in this dangerous age.

EU Relations – Internals 1/2

**Strong NATO Key to solving conflicts from escalating in Europe**

John **Duffield,** assistant professor of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia,

winter 19**94**, (*Political Science Quarterly*, “NATO’s Functions After the Cold War,” 109, 5, p.

766-777)

A second post-cold war NATO function that has assumed greater prominence is the protection of alliance members against an array of newly emerging threats. Increasing attention has been paid to possible dangers emanating from North Africa and the Middle East, in part because of the spread of the technology for producing missiles and weapons of mass destruction to those areas. Highest on the list of new external concerns, however, are ethnic, territorial, and national conflicts within and among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as exemplified by the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Such conflicts have the potential to generate large numbers of refugees or even to spill over onto the territory of neighboring countries, which include NATO members. In a worst case scenario, outside states might feel compelled to intervene, risking an expansion of hostilities, as occurred at the beginning of World War I. Although so far unable to put an end to such conflicts, NATO helps to address the concerns they raise in several ways. First, it protects its members against the possible spillover of military hostilities. While no alliance countries have yet been seriously threatened in this way, NATO's long experience with organizing the defense of its members leaves it well prepared to deal with such contingencies. NATO also helps to prevent other countries from being drawn into conflicts of this type. The existence of the alliance reassures member states bordering on the region that they will not be left alone to deal with nearby wars should they escalate or spill over, thereby reducing the incentive to intervene unilaterally. Instead, NATO's presence helps to ensure that Western military involvement in such conflicts, where it occurs at all, is collective and consensual.[16] At the same time, the possibility of a sharp, coordinated NATO response may inhibit other countries from meddling. As the fighting in the former Yugoslavia has dragged on, moreover, the alliance has been increasingly seen as having an active role to play in containing and even suppressing conflict among national and subnational groups within Central and Eastern Europe, and it has steadily enhanced its political authority and organizational ability to act should its members choose to do so. In 1992, the allies agreed to make NATO resources available to support peacekeeping operations mandated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations (UN).[17] And in early 1994, they ap-proved the development of a mechanism termed Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that would enable groups of members - "coalitions of the willing" - to draw upon common alliance assets for specific operations outside of the treaty area.[18] Most dramatically, the alliance has gained valuable experience in the former Yugoslavia, firing shots in anger for the first time in its history. NATO forces have enforced both the maritime blockade in the Adriatic and the no-fly zone over Bosnia. They have provided protective air power for UN personnel on the ground. And they have used the threat of air strikes to establish exclusion zones for heavy weapons around Sarajevo and the UN-designated safe area of Gorazde. Although NATO's impact on the conflict has not yet been decisive, this lack of success can be only partly ascribed to the alliance itself; its ability to intervene effectively in future regional conflicts has clearly increased.

Making NATO look weak would collapse US-EU alliance.

Simon Serfaty, Professor of International Politics at Old Dominion University. 2005. *The Vital Partnership: Power and Order*. Pg. 12.

Second, a NATO that has gone global must be able and willing to act lo­cally if it is to remain the security institution of choice for its members. During the Cold War, Europe’s inability to produce more power was cause for exasperation but little else. After the Cold War, the limits of Eu­rope’s power were quickly exposed, as neither its leading nation-states nor their expanding Union were capable to assume the responsibilities they had claimed in Bosnia and elsewhere. Since September 2001, it has become clear that only a Euro-Atlantic partnership that relies on a better military balance can escape conditions that make a weak Europe look mostly like a dead weight relative to a powerful America whose prepon­derance makes it look like an imperial bully. Achieving such balance does not require America to become weaker or Europe to become as strong as America; more modestly, it demands that Europe itself acquire more of the military power it lacks so that America need not add to the power it already has.

Demo Promo Net Benefit 1/2

A strong NATO is essential to successful democracy promotion.

David Abshire, President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency. AND, S. Wesley Cross, Center for the Study of the Presidency. 2004. “Reinvesting in the Art of NATO.” http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia\_sumfall04/gjia\_sumfall04\_010.pdf

These myths obscure the larger picture and overlook NATO’s history, successes, and potential. First, they misjudge the factors underlying the NATO mission and the depth of the alliance. NATO’s creation was motivated by multiple factors, not by a defensive reaction to the communist threat. One significant motivating factor was creating a security alliance of countries who shared common ideals. NATO countries share ideals of “freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”5 These values granted NATO a political raison d’être for European and transatlantic unity. Although unity guaranteed each member’s security, the alliance’s first mission was political. Europeans had waged countless internal wars culminating in two world wars that required American intervention and an enormous loss of life. NATO constitutes a strategic response to this unstable reality. By marshalling member resources and acting in concert, NATO gained power and influence for the purpose of maintaining peace and protecting freedom. It united the former warring powers of Europe and moored them to North America. Second, the myths underrate the organization’s successes. After ideological unity, NATO’s second mission was defense. Transatlantic ideological unity created a formidable foundation for employing defense resources against the Warsaw Pact and Soviet aggression. By maintaining unity and adapting to meet new threats, NATO was vital to winning the Cold War. It was one of the great accomplishments in political history: NATO prevailed without armed conflict. By averting another major European— and possibly world—war, NATO achieved what the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu described as perfect victory. Finally, the myths discount NATO’s potential for future success. NATO possesses remarkable capacities for both geographical and functional transformation. NATO’s geographic expansion illustrates this. Compare its founding members to its membership today: from the original twelve members, the alliance grew to fourteen in 1952, fifteen in 1955, sixteen in 1982, and nineteen members in 1999. It welcomed seven more in 2004. With each new member, NATO has not only added new arrows to its quiver but also spread democratic values. To enter the alliance, aspiring countries were required to: settle internal or external territorial disputes peacefully; demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establish democratic control of armed forces; and promote stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility.

Enlargement is key to the spread of democracy.

Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, European and Eurasian Affairs Department of State. June 22, 2007. Congressional Testimony, Committee on House Foreign Affairs. CQ Congressional Testimony, “Future of NATO.”

NATO enlargement is still playing this transformative role. European countries still seek to join NATO, strengthening their democracies, their economies, and their militaries through reform and through working together with NATO. They believe that NATO membership is in their interest. But it is also in NATO's interest to add new members that meet NATO's performance-based standards. Democratic, market economies strengthen the Alliance with their commitment to share values and their determination to contribute to common security - whether by reducing tensions among neighbors or deploying troops as part of NATO operations.

Demo Promo Net Benefit 2/2

Global democratic consolidation is essential to prevent many scenarios for war and extinction.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, October 1995, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s,” http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95\_01.html, accessed on 12/11/99

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Democracy prevents nuclear war—it solves their impacts

Nathan Sharansky, Israel’s Minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs and former Soviet dissident, 2004, The Case for Democracy, p. 88

Now we can see why nondemocratic regimes imperil the security of the world. They stay in power by controlling their populations. This control invariably requires an increasing amount of repression. To justify this repression and maintain internal stability, external enemies must be manufactured. The result is that while the mechanics of democracy make democracies inherently peaceful, the mechanics of tyranny make nondemocracies inherently bel­ligerent. Indeed, in order to avoid collapsing from within, fear societies must maintain a perpetual state of conflict. Nondemocratic societies have always been powder kegs ready to explode, but today the force of that explosion can be far more lethal than it was in the past. In an age of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, the dan­gers of ignoring the absence of democracy in any part of the world have increased dramatically. For a half century, the totalitarian regime in Pyongyang has threatened the security of South Korea. Once it devel­oped long-range missiles, it threatened the security of neigh­boring Japan and endangered other countries with the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Now that Pyongyang has reportedly developed nuclear weapons— weapons that can be provided to international terrorist organizations—it endangers the security of the entire world. The threat posed by North Korea is not a function of the increase of the destructive capacity of its weapons. Rather, it is the enhanced capacity of its weapons coupled with the nature of its regime that is the source of the problem. Just as nuclear weapons in the hands of a democratizing Russia do not pose the same threat as they did in the hands of the Soviet Union, the weapons of a democratic North Korea would pose no greater danger to the world than if they would be in the hands of a democratic South Korea. In the hands of leaders whose power is dependent on people who see war as a last resort, weapons of mass destruction will be a weapon of last resort. But in the hands of leaders whose survival depends on maintaining a constant state of tension, the danger of these weapons being used directly, or via ter­rorist proxies, increases enormously. That is not to say that nondemocratic regimes will never sign peace agreements. From time to time, if it suits their interests, they will. But we must remember that for these regimes, the decision to wage war or make peace is not based upon its impact on the public welfare but on whether it strengthens the regime’s control. To democratic governments, whose power is ultimately dependent on the popular will, peace is always an interest. To nondemocratic regimes, peace and war are merely interchangeable methods of subju­gation. One day staying in power will necessitate making peace. The next, it will necessitate waging war. That is why a genuine and lasting peace can only be made with democ­racies

Soft Power Net Benefit 1/2

US officials recognize the lack of implementing soft power in foreign policy now

Patrick Cronin, senior adviser and senior director at the Center for a New American Security, Washington and a former assistant administrator for policy and program coordination at the U.S. Agency for International Development and Kristin Lord, vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security and a former special adviser to the U.S. undersecretary of state for democracy and global affairs, 4.12.2010, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4577402

Yet again, a senior military official has argued that "U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military." Yet again, the defense community has cried out for more robust diplomacy and development and the greater use of "soft power" - the ability to attract and persuade rather than force. The most recent plea came March 3 from U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, America's highest-ranking military officer, in a speech at Kansas State University. Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed other uniformed officers such as Gen. David Petraeus and Adm. James Stavridis, as well as civilian leaders such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who made a similar case at Kansas State three years ago.

Consulting NATO countries makes operations more efficient and helps to improve global soft power

John Cogbill, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, **2K4** (*Kennedy School Review*,

“Crafting a Sustainable Transatlantic Security Partnership: The Comparative Advantages,” p. 86) 2005,

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p88911\_index.html

The U.S. Army is conducting combat and peacekeeping operations at an unsustainable pace. The costs of these operations come at the expense of military modernization. Europe has underfunded defense for the last fifty years and risks becoming irrelevant as a military force and a strategic partner. The United States and Europe must find an improved basis for the transatlantic security partnership for this century. By focusing on comparative advantages, the U.S. advantage in joint war fighting and the European advantage in peacekeeping, the NATO allies can make better use of their national resources. Not only will this division of labor result in more efficient allocation of defense dollars, but the combined nature of these operations will add global legitimacy to future endeavors, which will translate into greater international cooperation and trust.

Soft Power Net Benefit 2/2

NATO is key to US priorities and national interests

**The Heritage** Foundation, Where We Stand: Our Principles On A Policy for Europe That Reinforces National Sovereignty, **2005**

Europe will remain the foundation of all major U.S. defense alliances, with the United Kingdom remaining the cornerstone of American strategic thinking. A Europe in which national sovereignty remains paramount is in the best interest of the United States, and policy toward Europe must be based on reality, taking into account the many economic, military, and political problems within the European Union. While the members of the EU have long been our allies, they must be regarded, and encouraged to act, independently in order to support the United States’ priorities and national interests. To achieve this goal, the United States must ensure that NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic security organization while impressing upon its European allies that the current disparity in capability is not politically sustainable. The United States should continue to press for increased NATO flexibility and reconfiguration of troops in order to allow for more rapid responses in times of crisis.

US soft power is key to solving global problems

Joseph S. Nye Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2003

The problem for U.S. power in the twenty-first century is that more and more continues to fall outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although the United States does well on the traditional measures of hard power, these measures fail to capture the ongoing transformation of world politics brought about by globalization and the democratization of technology. The paradox of American power is that world politics is changing in a way that makes it impossible for the strongest world power since Rome to achieve some of its most crucial international goals alone. The United States lacks both the international and the domestic capacity to resolve conflicts that are internal to other societies and to monitor and control transnational developments that threaten Americans at home. On many of today’s key issues, such as international financial stability, drug trafficking, the spread of diseases, and especially the new terrorism, military power alone simply cannot produce success, and its use can sometimes be counterproductive. Instead, as the most powerful country, the United States must mobilize international coalitions to address these shared threats and challenges. By devaluing soft power and institutions, the new unilateralist coalition of Jacksonians and neo-Wilsonians is depriving Washington of some of its most important instruments for the implementation of the new national security strategy. If they manage to continue with this tack, the United States could fail what Henry Kissinger called the historical test for this generation of American leaders: to use current preponderant U.S. power to achieve an international consensus behind widely accepted norms that will protect American values in a more uncertain future. Fortunately, this outcome is not preordained.

Consult PICS are Legit

Good for two reasons

A. THEY’RE FAIR

1. They test our relations with allies, key on a military topic.

2. We PIC’d out of the immediacy of plan- we compete

3. They level the playing field against the structural biases of going aff by increasing neg options.

4. Key to check unpredictable and questionably topical affs- we can’t have a specific case hit on everything.

5. Counter-interpretation: only allow consultations with international organizations with which we have formal security alliances. This checks all abuse because there is ample literature, limits down to only a few possibilities, and ensures predictable ground.

B. THEY’RE EDUCATIONAL

1. Best Policy Option-as long as we challenge the aff plan, it increases education by finding the best policy option.

2. Ground-the aff can still weigh all of case against the possibility that consultation might say no, it doesn’t moot the 1AC.

Conditionality Good

A. IT’S FAIR

1. Key to negative flexibility: neg needs the ability to kick the CP if it becomes a worse policy option.

2. Aff side bias checks-the aff wins over 50% of rounds, so conditional advocacies are necessary.

3. Competition and lit check abuse: we are bound by the burden of producing solvency and net benefit ev, making it predictable and germane

4. Best Policy Option is necessary to education, finding the best way to do things requires a lot of research.

B. IT’S EDUCATIONAL

1. Most real world-policy-makers change their minds if their idea is proved worse than another, the neg should be able to change between cp and squo.

2. Increases critical thinking and education: forces aff to choose their arguments and forces the negative to have different ways to challenge the aff.

3. They encourage the neg to research and test the desirability of the aff from multiple viewpoints

C. OUR DEFENSE

1. Time and strat skews are inevitable-some debaters are faster than others, existence of T and theory proves skews inevitable.

2. Don’t vote on potential abuse, there is no round precedent and we haven’t done anything. Make them prove abuse

3. At worst reject the argument, not the team, aff advantage means err neg on theory.

4. They encourage the neg to research and test the desirability of the aff from multiple viewpoints.

AT – Text Comp Good

1. We meet- We are textually competitive-we sever out of immediacy and certainty in text.

2. C/I We get one functionally competitive cp.

A. Disad 1 - ground

1. It invites abuse counterplans like meaningless word PICS

2. It destroys ground reciprocity because the aff’s offense is implementation, but there is no comparable neg ground that cannot be claimed by plan wording

3. It nullifies all counterplans except exclusion PICs, even the “not plan” counterplan

4. It skews the evidentiary burden because policy lit focuses on method of implementation instead of the wording of proposals

B. Disad 2- education

1. It reduces debate to semantics

2. It’s not real world because it doesn’t test the desirability of the plan