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\*\*Phaseout Solvency\*\*

Signaling

CP sends a crucial signal for withdrawal

Phyllis Bennis, a Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, Accessed July 2010, “Obama's Iraq Withdrawal Plan and the Peace Movement,” Peace Action, http://www.ncpeaceaction.org/resources/obama-iraq-withdrawl-and-peace-movement.html

While he laid out partial versions of some of these issues (withdrawal and oil), others (mercenaries and bases) were left out entirely. And at the end of the day, President Obama did not make a single real commitment to meeting our definition of ending the war. As the New York Times columnist Bob Herbert described Obama's plan for Iraq and Afghanistan, "we're committed to these two conflicts for a good while yet, and there is nothing like an etched-in-stone plan for concluding them." Understanding all the problems, limitations, and dangers of President Obama's speech is crucial. (For a fuller analysis of the dangers in Obama's speech, see my February 26th talking points - http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1117.) But understanding those limitations does not tell us how to respond to this new moment, a moment when the president of the United States is telling Americans that he is ending the war, that he intends to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq, telling Iraqis that the U.S. "pursues no claim on your territory or your resources," and telling the world that the U.S. plans to engage with everybody in the region including Iran and Syria. We may - we must - understand all the reasons that those words don't constitute a firm commitment. But the reality is that the vast majority of people hearing those words, who already believe in what those words should mean, will assume President Obama means the same thing they do. That perception provides a huge opportunity for the peace movement. And it is for that reason that the assertions in his speech remain contested terrain.

Afghanistan (1/3)

Phased withdrawal is key to Afghan stability – alliance building and interest maintenance

BEN FELLER, 12/10/09, “Obama: Afghanistan Troop Drawdown Won't Be Steep, Aid Will Continue For Years,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/10/obama-afghanistan-troop-d\_n\_386938.html

President Barack Obama said Thursday that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, set to start in 19 months, will be gradual and U.S. aid to that nation will last for years. "We're not going to see some sharp cliff, some precipitous drawdown," Obama told reporters in Oslo, where he traveled to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. The president said he is sticking to his plan to start the drawdown in July 2011, but he signaled that the United States will help Afghanistan train its security forces and develop its economy for some time. "Several years after U.S. combat troops have been drastically reduced in the region," he said, "the Afghanistan government is still going to need support for those security forces. We are still going to have an interest in partnering with Afghans and Pakistanis and others in dealing with the remnants of terrorist activities there." Some critics have questioned Obama's timetable because the United States is about to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Many liberals in Congress and elsewhere oppose the buildup in the first place. Obama said there should be no confusion about his intentions. "Starting in July 2011 we will begin that transition, that transfer of responsibility," he said. "The pace at which that takes place, the slope of a drawdown, how it occurs tactically, those are all going to be conditions-based," he said, just as there has been "a constant monitoring of the situation" in Iraq. Obama seemed to place more emphasis on the eventual transfer of responsibilities to Afghans than on solid timetables for bringing U.S. troops home.

Phaseout is key to legitimacy of the government

Robert Naiman, 15 September 2009, “Withdraw from Afghanistan with a Public, Negotiated Timetable,” Just Foreign Policy, http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/329

The United States should withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan. The safest, most feasible and most ethical way to bring this about is through the establishment of a public, negotiated timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Such a timetable should be a core provision of an agreement negotiated by the United States with the Afghan government and with international military partners of the United States in Afghanistan governing the presence of foreign military forces in the country. Such an agreement would bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government, as well as the legitimacy of the foreign military presence; such an agreement would dramatically increase the patience of the Afghan public, and of Western publics, for the operations of foreign military forces while they remain.

Afghanistan (2/3)

The CP is key to stability and military backing

John Wickham, retired Army chief of staff, July 7, 2010, “Obama's timetable for Afghanistan makes sense,” Arizona Daily Star, http://azstarnet.com/news/opinion/article\_dc631003-365d-590d-a5ee-c0c9bac5e54a.html

President Obama plans to begin withdrawing U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011 and to turn over major responsibility for counterinsurgency operations to Afghan forces. Gen. David Petraeus, the newly appointed combat commander, as well as the U.S. defense chain of command, fully supports this plan though virtually all officials note that the timetable is not an exit but rather initiation of process for engaging Afghan forces more extensively in counter insurgency operations. This plan envisages U.S. involvement in assisting Afghanistan for many years, so we would not be abandoning the operation, nor should we do so given the vital importance of assuring that terrorists do not gain another foothold for training potential attackers of the U.S., and to destabilize neighboring Pakistan with its large arsenal of nuclear weapons. In my view this withdrawal timetable is sensible for at least two reasons. • First, the timetable forces the Afghan government to accelerate efforts, which remain woefully lacking, for improving governance, curtailing endemic corruption and fielding Afghan army forces and national police forces. Without a date, less Afghan incentive exists to achieve results. We have experienced this unfortunate reality in Vietnam, in Iraq and during the past 10 years in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Russians discovered this reality too late during their 10-year debacle in Afghanistan. • Second, the timetable forces U.S. military and coalition troops to accelerate Afghan training and counterinsurgency efforts. Again, without a date the mañana tendency will persist to our mutual disadvantage despite ongoing herculean efforts by U.S. as well as coalition forces to recruit and train Afghan army troops and police.

Phaseout is key to training the forces needed to maintain stability

Francis Fukuyama, December 3rd, 2009, “Why I like the Afghan timetable,” The American Interest Online, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/contd/2009/12/03/why-i-like-the-afghan-timetable/

The whole problem with the US approach to counterinsurgency, not just in Afghanistan but stretching all the way back to Vietnam and before, was the fact that the US has never sufficiently emphasized training indigenous forces as the core of what they are to do in a military intervention. There are a number of reasons for this, most importantly the fact that no US commander will ever want to fight an enemy with poorly trained and resourced indigenous forces when he could use American troops. But in the end, no counterinsurgency war will ever be won with foreign forces taking the lead. Nor will there ever be an exit for the US from the conflict other than humiliating defeat unless there is an indigenous government and army to eventually carry the burden. One of the reasons that we are in our current Afghan pickle is the fact that we never invested enough in training high quality Afghan forces from the moment we toppled the regime in Kabul back in 2001. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is by all accounts reasonably well trained, but is ridiculously small in comparison to the job they must shoulder. The police on the other hand have been a disaster from the beginning. Police training was first delegated to the Germans, and then to contractors like Dyncorp, and greatly under-resourced. Most Afghans run the other way when they see a policeman coming, such is their reputation for corruption and brutality. We now have commanders in the theater who understand the importance of training, but they will still have incentives to rely on American forces if the latter are readily available. Setting a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces puts both US commanders and the Afghan government under the gun (so to speak) to get sufficient indigenous forces in place to fill in behind departing US troops. It will also motivate them to get very creative in persuading as many Pushtun tribesmen as possible to switch sides, or to at least cease supporting the Taliban. The Afghan government has been less than serious about shouldering its part of the burden as well, because it has been able to take US backing for granted.

Afghanistan (3/3)

Solves the Aff while maintaining US credibility

RUSS FEINGOLD, Democratic senator from Wisconsin, AUGUST 28, 2009, “The Road Home From Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203706604574376872733294910.html

Announcing a flexible timetable for when our massive military presence will end would be one of the best things we could do to advance our national security interests in Afghanistan. By doing so, we would undercut the misperception of the U.S. as an occupying force that has propped up a weak, corrupt and unpopular government, while at the same time removing a tremendous strain on our troops and our economy.

Afghanistan – A2: Phaseout Emboldens Terrorists

Phased out withdrawal doesn’t embolden terrorists – other means of influence

John Wickham, retired Army chief of staff, July 7, 2010, “Obama's timetable for Afghanistan makes sense,” Arizona Daily Star, http://azstarnet.com/news/opinion/article\_dc631003-365d-590d-a5ee-c0c9bac5e54a.html

Some critics of the timetable argue that it gives comfort to the enemy, who will wait us out and reappear in force after we leave. While some truth exists in this criticism, clearly the U.S. will retain considerable leverage over events in Afghanistan for many years to come. The leverage will exist in the long-term presence of military and civilian advisers, and economic as well as military assistance to the Afghan government and its security forces. A historical example of leverage may be instructive. During the last year of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, when the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese clearly knew that the U.S. was leaving, negotiations on prisoner release broke down. As senior negotiator in Saigon, I faced Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military negotiators who brusquely refused to agree to terms for release of all prisoners. But fortunately, we still retained some leverage because at the same time we had begun, at North Vietnamese request, the clearance of anti-ship mines in the Haiphong harbor near Hanoi. When the communist negotiators walked out of the meeting, I directed that all mine clearance operations cease. Within hours, the communist negotiators reappeared to tell me that they would agree to all the conditions for total prisoner release if we would resume clearance of the mines. Although the example is not entirely analogous to what might occur in Afghanistan with the U.S. withdrawal timetable, it does illustrate that we can still influence future events in positive ways.

More evidence – public support betrays our bluff

Francis Fukuyama, December 3rd, 2009, “Why I like the Afghan timetable,” The American Interest Online, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/contd/2009/12/03/why-i-like-the-afghan-timetable/

Anyone who thinks that the Taliban are now suddenly encouraged by the administration’s announcement of a timetable needs to engage in a little reality check. The American public is simply not going to support a large, open-ended commitment to fight in Afghanistan. So we are either bluffing or kidding ourselves if we say today that we will bear any burden in this fight. Our interests there are simply not great enough to merit that. It is true that Afghans will not side with us if they know in advance we are leaving. But what is much worse is pretending to them that we will stick it out over the long haul, and then leaving anyway because we actually didn’t mean it. In the history of our foreign policy we have unfortunately made these kinds of hollow promises far too often.

Afghanistan – A2: Conditions on the Ground Key

The phaseout should set a date before discussing conditions

John Wickham, retired Army chief of staff, July 7, 2010, “Obama's timetable for Afghanistan makes sense,” Arizona Daily Star, http://azstarnet.com/news/opinion/article\_dc631003-365d-590d-a5ee-c0c9bac5e54a.html

In conclusion, the Obama administration's plan to start withdrawal of U.S. combat troops in summer of 2011 and turn over major counterinsurgency operations to Afghan forces makes sense in terms of our own national security interests and for practical and Afghan cultural reasons. The timetable for withdrawal is not an exit but the beginning of a process. The timetable might have to be adjusted based on conditions in Afghanistan, but we should support the proven principle of a timetable and Afghan security policy related to it.

Afghanistan - Conditional Withdrawal Now

Withdrawal is based on conditions now

FOXNews, June 20, 2010, “Gates: Afghanistan Progress a 'Tough Pull',” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/20/gates-afghanistan-progress-slower-planned-plugging/

Gates disputed a statement that he would not attribute to Vice President Joe Biden, who was quoted as saying in a new book that in July 2011, "you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it." "That absolutely has not been decided," Gates said. "I don't recall ever hearing the vice president say that. And whether he said it or not, we -- we clearly understand that in July of 2011, we begin to draw down our forces. The pace with which we draw down and how many we draw down is going to be conditions based. And there is general agreement that those conditions will be determined by General McChrystal, the NATO senior civilian representative, Ambassador Sedwill, and the Afghan government together."

No immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan

BBC, 24 June 2010, “Barack Obama on Afghanistan withdrawal timetable,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10409698

President Barack Obama has said he does not foresee an immediate withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011, the date he has set for the start of the drawdown of US forces. "We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us," he said at the White House, a day after naming Gen David Petraeus as his new Afghan commander. "We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility." He also said he did not foresee any other high-level departures from his Afghanistan policy team.

East Asia

Minor instability is inevitable in the region – phasing out military presence is still the most effective strategy

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is the author or editor of several books, May 18, 1999 “Old Wine in New Bottles The Pentagon’s East Asia Security Strategy Report,” CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-344es.html

The end of the Cold War has eliminated any justification for a dominant U.S. military role in East Asia. U.S. policy, centered around the deployment of 100,000 military personnel throughout the region, is both expensive and risky. The United States now is expected to dampen potential conflicts that lack even a tangential link to America's own security. Washington should instead phase out its military presence in East Asia, transferring to its Cold War era allies responsibility for dealing with local security problems. Washington should maintain a mid-Pacific military presence and cooperate with friendly states but intervene directly only if a potential hegemon arises that cannot be otherwise contained. Some instability in the region is inevitable no matter what the U.S. role - as evidenced by the turbulence in Cambodia and Indonesia today. Acting as the balancer of last resort rather than the meddler of first resort, however, would make America more secure by insulating it from such strategically and economically marginal disorders.

Iraq (1/2)

Most effective strategy

Lawrence Korb, assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information, May 19, 2008, “The Road to Kuwait,” The American Conservative, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/may/19/00015/

The most effective strategy for removing American troops from Iraq involves gradually withdrawing forces from the outer geographic sectors first, with the goal of reducing our military footprint and consolidating our presence before our final departure. A phased consolidation would be a slower and more deliberate approach than “invasion in reverse.” Units would move using a combination of their own ground transportation and intra-theater air support. The American military footprint would shrink from the outside to the center, starting with withdrawal from the most northern bases. The remaining units would then redeploy from the rest of northern Iraq, followed by Diyala to the west and Anbar Province to the east. Our forces would then be consolidated in Baghdad, from where they would withdraw along the road to Kuwait, known as Route Tampa, until eventually all American forces would be gone. This could be done safely in 10 to 12 months and would result in comparatively few casualties, as it would play to our strengths. A movement of this size is not without precedent. Between December 2003 and May 2004, more than 211,000 pieces of equipment and a quarter of a million people were moved into or out of Iraq in the largest rotation since World War II.

Phasing out troops solves stability in Iraq

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005, “SECURITY REFORM PEACE” http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/WINEP/perspex-winep-usmiddleeaststrategy-2005.pdf

Iraq. America’s vital national interest is to leave Iraq as a stable country with a government that poses no threat to other states or to wider U.S. interests. The best way to achieve this is to support the emergence of a federal, unified Iraq that has a reasonably well-functioning, representative government, committed to the rule of law and protection of minority rights. Iraq’s recent elections and the expected formation of an Iraqi transitional government are important steps in this effort, which needs to include a process of drafting a constitution that is as inclusive as possible. The United States will have to retain high numbers of troops in Iraq well into this process, but the long-term success of U.S. policy will depend on the size and capability of Iraq’s own security forces. Hence, the equipping and training of Iraqi forces is to be viewed as “job one.” As for U.S. troops, their continued deployment should be determined by the achievement of objectives, not by arbitrary dates on the calendar. Throughout, U.S. policy should be that once an elected Iraqi government is in place under the authority of a ratified constitution, and the country’s security situation is under control, the United States would begin to phase out its military presence; this process could begin earlier if requested by the Iraqi government. Along the way, the administration should also make clear that it has no desire to maintain—either by force or agreement—long-term military bases in Iraq.

Iraq (2/2)

Phased withdrawal best allows for Iraq domestic stability

Lawrence J. Korb, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Brian Katulis, is director of democracy and public diplomacy at the Center for American Progress, May 5, 2006, “Striking the Right Balance in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/05/b673861\_ct2387933.html

Bush's ''stay-the-course" strategy in Iraq is unsustainable. Iraq's costs -- about 2,400 US military personnel killed and nearly 18,000 wounded, more than $300 billion spent, and US ground forces stretched to the breaking point -- are not worth the results. Being bogged down in Iraq also hampers our ability to deal with threats in Iran and Afghanistan. And while we are sympathetic with the aims of those recommending immediate withdrawal, we believe that too hasty a withdrawal increases chances of permanently destabilizing Iraq and the region. Expectations must change to fit today's grim realities. The administration must recognize that Iraq is not yet a real democracy, nor will it be anytime soon, and a new government in Iraq is not going to trigger a wave of democracy in the Middle East. Americans need and deserve a clear exit strategy for Iraq that spells out how much longer US troops will be involved and what it will cost. Iraq's leaders need to understand that the United States is not going to serve as a crutch indefinitely.

Iraq - A2:Perm

Significant debate in the literature as to the pace of withdrawal

Lawrence Korb, assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information, May 19, 2008, “The Road to Kuwait,” The American Conservative, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/may/19/00015/

There is significant disagreement and confusion over how much time is needed to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq. The debate has gravitated between supporters of a rapid, precipitous withdrawal and those calling for a long, drawn-out redeployment. Further clouding the issue are those backing an extended redeployment over several years in order to “stay the course” in Iraq, who cherry-pick logistical issues to make the case for a long-term American presence.

More evidence – crucial question

Steven N. Simon, the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, CSR NO. 23, FEBRUARY 2007, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IraqCSR23.pdf

A truly rapid withdrawal is not endorsed in this report. But raising the prospect of desperate deterioration in Iraq and its environs after an American military disengagement necessarily tends to obscure two things. First, the presence of U.S. forces has not stabilized Iraq thus far. Second, conditions for instability have become structural elements of Iraqi politics. Given these facts, how long should the U.S. keep troops in Iraq, when its military presence only delays an inevitable escalation of intra-Iraqi fighting?

South Korea (1/2)

Phased withdrawal is key to strategic flexibility in the peninsula

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is the author or editor of several books, May 18, 1999 “Old Wine in New Bottles The Pentagon’s East Asia Security Strategy Report,” CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-344es.html

Washington should prepare a phased withdrawal program, during which Seoul could engage in an arms buildup or arms reduction negotiations with the North, or both. Upon completion of the troop withdrawal, the so-called mutual defense treaty between the United States and the ROK would terminate. At the very least, the United States should pull out forces that do little to augment the ROK’s military capabilities but act as a tripwire for automatic American involvement. The 1998 security strategy report actually lauds that role: “Our treaty commitment and the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea help deter any North Korean aggression by making it unmistakably clear that the U.S. would immediately be fully engaged in any such conflict.”58 Immediate engagement, however, prevents any considered reflection about the best course to take to defend America’s interests. Even if Washington wants to preserve the bilateral defense treaty, policymakers should at least protect this nation’s freedom of action by eliminating the troop deployment.

More evidence – phased withdrawal is key to solvency

CATO Institute Handbook for Policy Makers, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-54.pdf

Conversely, America’s risk exposure is largely discretionary. The principal reason Washington is obsessed with the North Korean problem is the presence of more than 27,000 U.S. troops in South Korea. Because of those forces, America has put itself, quite literally, on the frontlines of a potentially explosive crisis. That approach is precisely the opposite of the course Washington ought to adopt. The new administration should immediately begin to reduce America’s risk exposure by ordering a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Washington should also indicate to the East Asian powers that they bear primary responsibility for dealing with the problem of North Korea’s nuclear program, since they have the most at stake. It is time, indeed it is long past time, to insist that South Korea manage its own security affairs. The United States has drawn down its military forces stationed in that country from approximately 37,000 to 27,000 over the past six years. Washington should implement a complete withdrawal within the next three years and terminate the misnamed mutual security treaty. That commitment was designed for an entirely different era. There is no need and very little benefit today for keeping South Korea as a security client.

South Korea (2/2)

Phase out key to effective pressure

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, August 22, 1999, “Rethinking the North Korean Threat,” CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=4998

The goal should be to squeeze the North but not too hard. Again, the objective is to push the DPRK toward a more positive stance without creating either a potentially violent implosion or causing the North to strike out. For the same reason, the United States and its allies should fulfill their commitments under the atomic Framework Accord. Risking a restart of the nuclear crisis would benefit no one. Although U.S. leadership is important in the near term, over the long term Washington should step back, leaving Seoul and Tokyo to take the lead in dealing with the North. More important, Washington should develop a phased withdrawal program for its troops, and terminate the defense treaty when the pullout is complete.

Phaseout is key to the transfer of responsibility for stability

Doug Bandow, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, 09/08/09, “Why Are "We" Defending South Korea?,” Campaign for Liberty, http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=201

The ROK is an independent nation fully entitled to implement its own foreign policy and create its own military force. But the core duty of an independent nation is to defend itself. Having joined the ranks of leading countries -- South Korea's economy ranks in the top 15 -- Seoul should take over responsibility for ensuring its own defense as well as promoting regional stability. The U.S. can and should be a good friend of the South, as Americans expand cultural, economic, and political ties with South Koreans. But it's time to plan for a phase-out of America's troop presence, punctuated by ending America's security guarantee. The two governments should continue to cooperate on security issues of shared interest, of which there are many. However, they should work together as equals, not as guardian and dependent. Put bluntly, Americans should no longer be expected to subsidize their friends across the Pacific.

\*\*Phaseout Net-Benefits\*\*

Immediate Afghanistan Withdrawal Bad – US-India Relations

Rapid withdrawal destabilizes Pakistan and damages the US-India relationship

Anwar Iqbal, 09 Jul, 2010, “Former US envoy calls for Afghanistan’s partition,” Dawn, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/16-former-us-envoy-calls-for-afghanistans-partition-970-hs-07

Mr Blackwill also warns against a rapid US withdrawal from Afghanistan, pointing out that “it could dramatically increase likelihood of the Islamic radicalisation of Pakistan, which then calls into question the security of its nuclear arsenal.” A rapid withdrawal, he writes, might also weaken, if not rupture, the budding US-India strategic partnership.

Immediate Afghanistan Withdrawal Bad - CMR

Military leadership is against immediate withdrawal

Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2010, “Debate grows over Afghanistan withdrawal plan,” LA Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/15/world/la-fg-us-afghan-20100616

"In a perfect world, Mr. Chairman, we have to be very careful with timelines," Petraeus said under questioning by Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who wanted to know whether he supported the plan. Petraeus explained that the drawdown would be based on conditions in Afghanistan at the time. The reservation reflects longstanding uneasiness among military officials over the withdrawal timeline. In December, Obama announced plans for an increase in troop deployment to Afghanistan, which he said would begin to wind down in July 2011. Many military officials have downplayed the significance of the start of the withdrawal and have said the pace would be based on conditions. The U.S. will not leave Afghanistan precipitously, they say. But the timetable has put the military in uncomfortable positions, officials have said, forcing them to reassure skeptical Afghan leaders that the U.S. won't draw down quickly.

More evidence – they’re reassured it wont be immediate in the status quo

Anne Flaherty And Pauline Jelinek, Associated Press writers Robert Reid in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Barry Schweid in Washington contributed to this report., June 16, 2010, “Dem lawmakers challenge Pentagon on Afghan war,”

RealClearPolitics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/politics/2010/Jun/16/dem\_lawmakers\_challenge\_pentagon\_on\_afghan\_war.html

Much of the debate on Capitol Hill has focused on when U.S. troops should leave. Obama's promise to start the withdrawal in July 2011 helped him with Democrats. But it prompted Republican charges that the U.S. was encouraging the Taliban and demoralizing its allies by setting a hard and fast withdrawal date. To allay these fears, military officials have repeatedly said the number of troops and how soon they would leave will depend entirely on how the war is going. They did so again Wednesday. "We're just not going to know until we get much closer to July 2011 how many troops and where they'll come from, the pace and the place," Mullen said. During a House hearing Wednesday, California Republican Rep. Buck McKeon asked Petraeus what conditions would have to be in place for troops to leave. Petraeus said there would have to be better security and governance, and an Afghan security force able to contribute to that stability. Asked what happens if those conditions don't exist, Petraeus said he would recommend a delay in the withdrawal. "If that's what's necessary, that's what I will do," he said.

Immediate Afghanistan Withdrawal Bad – Pakistan Stability

Immediate Afghanistan withdrawal destabilizes Pakistan

The Independent Press Association, July 12 2010, “Nato chief in Afghanistan warning,” The Independent, http://www.independent.ie/breaking-news/world-news/nato-chief-in-afghanistan-warning-2255757.html

Mr Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister, said that withdrawing too soon from Afghanistan would lead to a re-newed terrorist threat from al Qaida, and would risk destabilising neighbouring Pakistan. "The Taliban would return to Afghanistan and Afghanistan would once again become a safe haven for terrorist groups who would use it as a launch pad for terrorist attacks on North America and Europe," he said.

Immediate Afghanistan Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism

Rapid withdrawal lets the pressure of al Qaeda threatening future attacks

James Cook, Army veteran who served in Afghanistan and is a professor of national security studies at the US Naval War College, December 04, 2009, “Afghanistan Debate Over, Now Time to Execute,” New Atlanticist, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/afghanistan-debate-over-time-execute

As my colleague, Derek Reveron, wrote in these pages “a good strategy assesses risk as it relates to the ends, ways, and means.” The speech addressed the issue of risk (he referred to them as “concerns”). Specifically, the president believes the argument that Afghanistan is another Vietnam comes from a “false reading of history.” After explaining the differences between these two conflicts, he directly confronted those who would advocate a rapid withdrawal by stating “To abandon this area now -- and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance -- would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.”

Immediate withdrawal leads to Taliban takeover of afghanistan

Gerhard Schröder, 02/12/2009, “The Way Forward in Afghanistan,” SPIEGEL ONLINE, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,607205,00.html

For this reason, demands for an immediate withdrawal are irresponsible. Such a withdrawal would strengthen the Taliban and, in the worst case, give it control over the entire country. This would be a setback for Afghan society and it would represent a great threat to international security. Moreover, we should not forget the successes of recent years in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Eighty-five percent of the population now has access to health care, 6 million children are back in school and 2 million of them are girls. Roads, wells and sewage canals are being built. The people were able to freely elect their country's leaders. These are successes that serve as a basis for the further development of a free and sovereign Afghanistan. But we also know that development is not possible without peace. Civil development is the Taliban's greatest enemy, which is why it fights such progress. For this reason, military protection of development activities remains indispensible.

Immediate Afghanistan Withdrawal Unpopular – Congress

Immediate withdrawal is unpopular with congress – empirically proven

Voice of Russia, Mar 11, 2010, “Congress against immediate withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan,” http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/03/11/5183944.html

The US Congress has voted down a draft resolution to immediately withdraw the US contingent from Afghanistan. The project was backed by only 64 Congressmen, mainly left-winged Democrats. The author of the draft, Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich, says ex-President George W. Bush and incumbent President Obama have violated War Powers Act of 1973 by going ahead with America’s military expansion in Afghanistan without the Congress’s clear consent. Earlier President Obama promised to pull back the US troops stationed in Afghanistan in July 2011. Meanwhile the US and NATO are continuing to build up their military presence there with the overall number of soldiers promised to reach 150 thousand by this September.

Immediate Afghanistan Withdrawal Unpopular – Public

The public is in favor of a timetable for leaving Afghanistan

Stephanie Sklar, Jul 16, 2010, “New Poll: Most Americans Want Afghanistan Withdrawal Timetable,” All Voices, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/6321284-new-poll-most-americans-want-afghanistan-withdrawal-timetable

Most Americans continue to say that things are going badly for the US in Afghanistan, and those assessments are more pessimistic now than they were just two months back, a new CBS News poll shows. In addition, most Americans want a timeline for withdrawal from the country. Today, the poll finds that 62% of Americans say that the war is going badly, up from 49% in May. Only 31% percent say that the Afghanistan War is going well. Nine years into the war, 33% of Americans say that they do not want large numbers of US troops in Afghanistan for another year. 23% of Americans say that they are willing to have troops stay there for one or two more years. Only 35% are willing to have troops stay longer than two years. Most Americans – 54% – think that the US should set a timeline for the withdrawal of US troops from the country. 41% disagree. 73% of Dems think that the US should set a timeline, while merely 32% of GOPers say that the US should do so. 54% of independents want a timeline.

Immediate Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Credibility/Iran

Immediate withdrawal destroys credibility and leads to Israel-Iran conflict

Jewish Post, Accessed July 2010, “The Danger of Immediate Withdrawal,” http://www.jewishpost.com/editor/danger-of-immediate-withdrawal.html

Immediate withdrawal sends the exact opposite message that our friends and enemies alike should hear. It says “when the going gets really tough, we’re going to leave the place in a hurry and in a mess”. This message will not inspire confidence from our allies in future conflicts but it will inspire confidence from our enemies. Confidence, that if our enemies can hang on just a little longer they can outlast America and its short term commitments. Hardly a message that should be sent as we are waging an aggressive campaign to squash the insurgency and make Iraq a safer place not only for Iraqis but to prevent it from becoming another terrorist breeding ground. And hardly a message that we would want Al Qaeda, Iran or North Korea to hear. Worse still, Iran is at least carefully following the Iraqi conflict if not actively participating in it. How we handle Iraq will have repercussions for how much of a threat Iran will pose to Iraq, the Middle East, Israel and ultimately America. Iran would love nothing more than for us to rapidly leave Iraq. Doing so allows Iran to exercise far greater influence in Iraq and that could spell serious trouble from a government that openly calls for the destruction of Israel.

Immediate Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Credibility/Terrorism

Immediate Iraq withdrawal destroys US credibility and the war against terror

Lee Kuan Yew, Staff Writer, March 8, 2008, “The Cost Of Retreat In Iraq,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702429.html

A hurried withdrawal from Iraq would cause the leaders of many countries to conclude that the American people cannot tolerate the nearly 4,000 casualties they have suffered in Iraq and that in a protracted asymmetrical war the U.S. government will not have its people's support to bear the pain that is necessary to prevail. And this even after the surge of 30,000 additional troops under Gen. David Petraeus has resulted in an improved security situation. Whatever candidates might say in the course of this presidential campaign, I cannot believe that any American president could afford to walk away from Iraq so lightly, damage American prestige and influence, and so undermine the credibility of American security guarantees. An additional concern is that a hasty U.S. withdrawal would leave Iran to become more of a power in the Gulf. Iran is Shiite, not Sunni. Shiites are the largest group in Iraq, too. The schism between Shiites and Sunnis goes back more than a millennium to the very earliest years of Islam. The divide between Arabs and Persians is even more ancient. Every Gulf state has a significant Shiite minority but is ruled by Sunni leaders. A dominant Iran with no regional counterweight would shift the balance of power between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East, changing the internal and external politics of the region. To survive, Iran's neighbors would adjust their positions. It also would become more difficult to work out a diplomatic compromise on the Iranian nuclear issue. Without a compromise, the issue will lead to a crisis at some point. A few years ago, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's Iraq were a check on Iran. The Taliban is again gathering strength, and a Taliban victory in Afghanistan or Pakistan would reverberate throughout the Muslim world. It would influence the grand debate among Muslims on the future of Islam. A severely retrograde form of Islam would be seen to have defeated modernity twice: first the Soviet Union, then the United States. There would be profound consequences, especially in the campaign against terrorism.

Immediate Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Stability (1/

Immediate withdrawal perpetuates instability

Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations AND Martin S. Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, December 2008, “A Time for Diplomatic Renewal: Toward a New U.S. Strategy in the Middle East,” Brookings Institution Press, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/12\_middle\_east\_haass.aspx

President Barack Obama will have to reprioritize and reorient U.S. policy toward the Middle East. For the past six years that policy has been dominated by Iraq. This need not, and should not, continue to be the case. The next president can gradually reduce the U.S. troop presence and combat role in Iraq, increasingly shifting responsibility to Iraqi forces. But because the situation is still fragile there, the drawdown should be done carefully and not so quickly or arbitrarily that it risks contributing to the undoing of progress achieved at great cost over the past two years. All this would be consistent with the accord governing U.S. troop presence being negotiated by U.S. and Iraqi officials. Instability generated by a too rapid withdrawal could distract the next president from the other priority initiatives he will need to take and create opportunities in Iraq for Iran and al Qaeda to exploit. However, a too slow withdrawal would leave American forces tied down in Iraq and unavailable for other priority tasks, including backing his diplomacy visà-vis Iran in particular with the credible threat of force. He will need to strike a balance. In no way should this call for retrenchment in Iraq be interpreted as a recommendation for a more general American pullback from the region. The greater Middle East will remain vital to the United States for decades to come given its geostrategic location, its energy and financial resources, the U.S. commitment to Israel, and the possibility both for terrorism to emanate from the region and for nuclear materials and weapons to spread there. Reduced American involvement will jeopardize all these interests.

More evidence – time is needed to create stability

DAN K. THOMASSON, Scripps Howard News Service, April 3, 2007, “Plan to end war is irresponsible,” Global Gazette, http://www.globegazette.com/news/opinion/article\_2079de3b-0ff6-5320-bd70-fa1d79f25b58.html

It will take some time to hash out the differences. Meanwhile, the commanders in the field are apparently supposed to keep their fingers crossed that the men and materiel needed to accomplish their assignment will be forthcoming before the pinch is really felt by early summer. It is quite obvious to everyone that Iraq was itself a bad idea. In fact, it vies with Vietnam as the most ill-advised expedition in American history. But nearly every military and diplomatic expert on both sides of the political fence has warned that to force a precipitous withdrawal and to telegraph when that would occur would increase the magnitude of this disaster exponentially. The gap that would leave and the chaos that likely would ensue would make what has gone before look mild.

Immediate Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Stability (2/

Its about timing – too rapid withdrawa leads to instability

Daniel Serwer, vice president for peace and stability operations at the U.S. Institute of Peace, September 2007, “Iraq: Time for a Change,” US Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/resources/iraq-time-change

U.S. withdrawal also has limits. Under extreme circumstances, U.S. forces could come out of Iraq quickly. But too rapid a withdrawal would cause the loss of valuable equipment and could create instability. The maximum pace of an orderly drawdown in a permissive environment is likely one brigade combat team of troops per month. The issue of force levels therefore comes down to the question of whether U.S. withdrawal, which in any event appears to have to start by April 2008, should continue at that pace past September 2008, when the force will return to its pre-surge level.

Immediate withdrawal leads to an emboldened insurgency with a new base of action

Steven N. Simon, the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, CSR NO. 23, FEBRUARY 2007, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IraqCSR23.pdf

It would be irresponsible to dismiss the grave scenario depicted by the administration and many other observers as the most likely consequence of a rapid U.S. 9 military drawdown: dramatically greater levels of violence, an emboldened al-Qaeda with a new base from which to operate, an isolated Kurdish north, the intervention of neighboring countries, and regional chaos. The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq asserts that a rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops could set in motion more intensive violence and ethnic cleansing, “political disarray,” and possibly Turkish intervention. For these reasons, the NIE concludes that the presence of coalition military forces continues to be “an essential stabilizing element.” Yet, as the NIE stresses, there was a “sea change” in the level of violence last year amid a large number of active coalition troops. The Iraqi Security Forces, which the NIE judges to be infected with debilitating sectarian loyalties and of little reliability, are put forward as a potential casualty of a U.S. drawdown, despite their currently parlous state and the intelligence community’s estimate that these forces would not be able to function effectively as a national, nonsectarian force for years to come.

Immediate Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Stability (3/

Paced withdrawal is key to several crucial stability vectors

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive @ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 5 February 2008 “Military Balance 2008 Press Statement,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2008/military-balance-2008-press-statement/

In light of the strain on the US military stemming from the reinforced effort in Iraq and the commitment of over 3,000 additional Marines to Afghanistan, pressure is certain to mount for a reduction of US troops in Iraq below the pre-surge level of 15 brigades. It is likely, however, that General Petraeus will recommend slowing the reduction of US troops to hedge against reversals in the security situation. Several contingencies militate against too rapid a reduction in forces including the need to: · protect against increased Shia militia activity, especially the Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) and Iranian-supported ‘special groups’; · provide security for provincial elections (if they occur); · prevent Kurd-Turkmen-Arab violence from increasing in connection with the future of Kirkuk and Arab and Turkmen fears of Kurdish expansionism; and · provide more time for political and economic progress as well as reform and expansion of the security sector. As the Iraqi security sector expands, it remains to be seen whether or not professionalism and demographic balance can be improved so that Army and police forces are able to earn the trust of Iraq’s communities. Whether the Government of Iraq integrates Sunni Arabs who joined the fight against al-Qaeda, the so-called ’Concerned Local Citizens,’ is likely to have a significant impact on the durability of recent improvements in security.

Empirically proven rapid troop withdrawal incites civil war

NOAH FELDMAN, professor of law at Harvard Law School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, May 7, 2008, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, “The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State,” http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0039.html

So today when people say the too-rapid withdrawal will lead to a civil war and others say, "Well, how do you know that?" my answer to that is, because there already was a civil war. Ten months ago, we saw a civil war in Iraq, a low-level one. It's now dying down a little bit, but it could easily flare up again. It has not been brought to an end, by any stretch of the imagination.

Phase Out from Iraq Popular – Congress

Phasing out from Iraq avoids politics

William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, December 15, 2005, “Iraq: Withdrawal or Drawdown?,” Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/views05/1215-20.htm

The relevant debate now is over how to pull out, not whether to do so. But the Bush administration's rhetoric on this score needs to be carefully scrutinized. In his "Victory in Iraq" speech on November 30th, the president talked about re-deploying U.S. Troops out of Iraqi cities and using them for more specialized anti-terror missions. It is widely believed that there will be some kind of troop reduction before the mid-term Congressional elections in November 2006, but the question is how large. If the administration were to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Iraq by 23,000, from 160,000 to 137,000, levels would simply be back before U.S. forces were bulked up in anticipation of the December 15th elections. Other numbers discussed have U.S. troop levels going to as low as 100,000 by next fall. But whatever the number ends up being, a "drawdown" or "redeployment" is not the same as a withdrawal. As David Sanger of the New York Times pointed out in a story that ran on December 1st, the day after the "victory" speech, "he [President Bush] said that while the strategy was intended to help Iraqis take the lead in the fight within their country, his hope was that they would do so without 'major' foreign assistance. That suggested some form of continuing American presence." Sanger further noted that while Bush didn't say how long that continuing presence might last, "some of his aides point to South Korea, the Balkans and other places where some American presence remains years after the conflict." Given these points, the article's title, "Bush Gives Plan for Iraq Victory and Withdrawal," is somewhat misleading. Congress is slowly -- very slowly -- coming around to the notion that U.S. troops should be withdrawn. In mid-November, the Senate passed a resolution calling for a "phased re-deployment of United States forces from Iraq." Senate Minority leader Harry Reid (D-NV) asserted that the vote meant that "Democrats and Republicans acknowledged that staying the course is not the way to go. Therefore, this is a vote of no confidence on the Bush administration policy in Iraq." This is certainly an exaggeration, given that the resolution suggested no timeline for withdrawal and represented only a "sense of the Senate," not a binding resolution. While noting that the vote fell "far short of laying the foundation for a successful exit strategy," analyst Erik Leaver of Foreign Policy in Focus noted that "For the first time since giving the Bush administration authorization to go to war three years ago, the Senate engaged in a debate over Iraq policy. And while the demands of the peace movement to bring the troops home now were not met, Democrats were united in setting forth an exit strategy that Republicans were forced to accept." Whether voters will get a clear choice on Iraq policy in the November 2006 Congressional elections remains to be seen. When House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) endorsed Rep. Murtha's withdrawal plan, there was considerable push back by some members of the Democratic Caucus arguing that the party would not be well-served by such a stance in the upcoming elections. At this point it appears that some Democrats (and some Republicans like Rep. Walter Jones (R-NC) will take a clear position on withdrawal, while others will limit themselves to criticizing the Bush administration's mishandling of the conflict.

Immediate SoKo Withdrawal Bad – US-ROK Alliance

The CP is key to the US-ROK alliance

NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE, October 07, 2004, “U.S. will slow withdrawal of troops from S. Korea,” The Baltimore Sun, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-10-07/news/0410070325\_1\_south-korean-korean-peninsula-defend-south

In response to heavy South Korean pressure, the United States has agreed to stretch out over the next three years the withdrawal of one-third of American troops here, dropping an earlier deadline of next year, U.S. and South Korean officials said yesterday. Washington had announced the withdrawal in June, over objections from South Korea. This summer, 3,500 American soldiers left here for Iraq, the first of a total of 5,000 American troops to be withdrawn this year from South Korea. Under the new schedule, the next 5,000 are to leave by the end of 2006. The final 2,500 are to leave by the end of 2008, according to a new calendar announced yesterday by the U.S. Embassy and the South Korean Defense Ministry. In addition, the United States will leave in place many of its Apache ground-attack helicopters and its multiple-launch rocket systems, also known as counter-batteries, which are designed to locate and destroy North Korean artillery cannons that might fire on South Korea. Yesterday, South Korea's military praised the new timetable for "fully taking into consideration the concerns" of the Korean public. The drawdown was sparked by a series of motives: the need for combat-ready soldiers in Iraq, Washington's frustration with a perceived lack of appreciation here for the American military presence and a desire to shift U.S. troops here from serving as human "tripwires." Under the tripwire strategy, in vogue here and in Washington since the Korean War ended half a century ago, a North Korean invasion that causes American casualties would immediately galvanize the American public to defend South Korea. The new plan is to move U.S. troops south of the Han River, out of North Korean artillery range, to new bases. From there, they are to coordinate a counterattack from the south. In times of low tension on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. troops would deploy to regional trouble spots. The United States is also spending $11 billion to improve defense installations and equipment in South Korea in a three-year program. In Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, a firm supporter of military cooperation with the United States, has suggested that some American units be moved off Okinawa, a small southern island that is base to about 22,000 of the 37,585 American troops assigned to Japan.

\*\*Troop PICs\*\*

Afghanistan Special Forces PIC 1NC (1/2)

TEXT – The United States federal government should withdrawal virtually all United States forces from Afghanistan over the next 18 months. The United States federal government will retain small numbers of CIA and Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan.

The CP redirects the Afghanistan strategy towards a sustainable US presence solving the case

TED GALEN CARPENTER, " Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?" Cato Policy Report, November/December 2009, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy\_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html]

Finally, we do not need to crush the Taliban to achieve our legitimate objectives regarding al Qaeda. It has been a big mistake of U.S. policymakers to conflate al Qaeda and the Taliban. The former is a foreign terrorist organization with the United States in its crosshairs. The latter isan admittedly repulsive political faction, but it represents a parochial insurgency and, in some ways, Pashtun solidarity, which is something to which we'd better pay attention. It is not a direct security threat to the United States. What has happened over the years is that we have drifted into a war against the Taliban, not primarily against al Qaeda. Indeed, on September 11 General McChrystal made an admission that I found almost as startling as the admission about drug revenues in the report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said that there really is no evidence of a significant al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. My response to that was: well, if al Qaeda isn't in Afghanistan, why on Earth are we in Afghanistan? We went there to defeat al Qaeda. If this isn't the arena for al Qaeda anymore, then our mission seems to have no rational purpose whatsoever. I believe we can develop a strategy for success but have to dial back the concept of victory to something that protects America's core security interests and has a reasonable prospect of success. That means focusing on disrupting and weakening al Qaeda. And note the terms I use. I don't talk about a definitive victory. That's not possible against a shadowy, nonstate terrorist adversary. We're not going to get some kind of surrender ceremony, or a signed document. Instead, we have to treat the threat posed by al Qaeda as a chronic security problem, but one that can be managed. I tend to get very impatient with people in Washington and in the opinion-shaping sector in America generally, who seem to act as though Islamic terrorists are all 15 feet tall and about to take over the planet. They aren't, and they aren't. The sooner we realize that, the far better strategy we will have. We need to abandon the counter-narcotics campaign in its entirety. And we need to abandon any notion of a nation-building campaign in Afghanistan. Now what should we be doing? Well, we should be cutting deals with any relevant player, not just acting as though the government in Kabul is the only relevant actor. Not just focusing on trying to create something that has never really existed in Afghanistan: a very powerful central government in control of the whole country backed by a strong national army. We need to be cutting deals with every relevant player who's willing to work with us. That means regional warlords. That means tribal leaders. That means clan leaders. And yes, it includes trying to work out arrangements with elements of the Taliban that might be willing to try to work with us against al Qaeda. I don't think it is inevitable at all that, even if the Taliban were able to establish control over most of Afghanistan, it would necessarily give shelter again to al Qaeda. Taliban leaders have learned that there is a price to pay for that kind of decision. We don't need a large military footprint to achieve such modest military goals. Small numbers of CIA and Special Forces personnel, to work with cooperative players, should be sufficient. That means that virtually all U.S. forces can and should be withdrawn over the next 18 months. Escalation, which is the course we're on now, is precisely the wrong strategy. No matter how long we stay, how much money we spend, and how many lives we squander, Afghanistan is never going to become a central Asian version of Arizona. We should stop operating under the delusion that it will.

Afghanistan Special Forces PIC 1NC (2/2)

The net benefit is that maintaining special forces in Afghanistan is critical to prevent global terrorism

Tyler Moselle, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, " Responsible Withdrawal from Afghanistan" October 1, 2009, Homeland Security Today, http://www.google.com/search?q=cache%3ARgNJq207BAIJ%3Awww.hks.harvard.edu%2Fcchrp%2Fsbhrap%2Fnews%2FMoselle\_HSToday\_20091001.pdf+afghanistan+withdrawal&hl=en&gl=us]

Safe Havens in Many Places. Those in favor of a greater military presence also argue that once we leave, al Qaeda will take sanctuary in the country again and continue to launch attacks against the West like the did on 9/11. The reality is that most experts agree that a small number of troops in the region, along with increased Special Forces and intelligence operatives deployed to Afghanistan, can thwart global terrorist plans. Moreover, al Qaeda and global terrorists will inevitably then find safe-haven in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and numerous other countries around the world. Should we send troop surges to all of these countries just to thwart the possibility of an Islamist cell from attacking the West? That is not a sustainable strategy.

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction.

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly Political Analyst, Aug 26 2004, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Afghanistan Special Forces PIC Solvency

Empirically proven – wouldn’t require redeployments and increases stability

MALOU INNOCENT, November/December 2009, “Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?,” CATO, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy\_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html

Nonetheless, I think perhaps the worst thing we can do is turn our back on this region entirely. That's what we did after nearly a decade of funding the mujahedeen, and we paid for it dearly eight years ago. But there are costs to remaining in the region, not simply in manpower and resources, but in giving al Qaeda what it wants, pushing the conflict into Pakistan, and looking weak by remaining and possibly accomplishing little. America should scale down its combat presence, continue open relations and intelligence sharing with all countries in the region, deploy Special Forces for discrete operations against specific targets, and engage in intensive surveillance as it already does today.