## Cap K – 1NC

### The desire to explore and develop space is not neutral – it is rooted in capitalist ideology

Parker U of Leicester School of Management 2009 Martin The Sociological Review Volume 57 Wiley Online

This chapter explores a paradox.1 I want to believe that the ends of space exploration rest on a certain orientation to the future, a possibility that what comes next might be substantially different from what happens at the present time. This, I believe, is a sort of utopian projection that lies at the heart of any radical politics. At the same time, the means for space exploration currently appear to require that certain rather everyday desires are projected outwards to a star as if it were a new market segment. So we imagine 42 light years, and see PepsiCo in space. But I do not think that this is merely reducible to a matter of means or ends, as if the two never met. At the beginning of the 20th century Max Weber made a nice distinction between technical rationality (zweckrational) and value rationality (wertrational). The former refers to the sort of efficiency and organization that it is rational to adopt once you have decided on a particular course of action, and he claims that this is epitomised by the bureaucratic organizational form. Bureaucracy connects means to means, without hatred or passion, in order that ramified chains of cause and effect can be built that would otherwise stumble and evaporate. Without bureaucratic reason, we would not be able to administer a state, or manufacture a corn chip, or a Saturn V rocket. But states, corn chips and Saturn V rockets are insufficient to explain themselves, so Weber suggests that values must be the ultimate ends of action. Values, desires, are not ‘rational’ in themselves, but provide a target for technique. But, he says, there is a sense in which his age was becoming an age in which means were becoming ends in themselves, and notions of ‘calling’, of value, were fading away.

‘Where the fulfilment of the calling cannot be directly related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport.’ (Weber, 1930: 182)

So the means become the end. The end is the playing of the game, and finds no justification beyond itself, and questions about ends, about values, are no longer asked.

This, it seems to me, is the paradox of having capitalists in space. As if the distance between the Earth and 47 Ursae Majoris is a problem for marketing, and the sublime evaporates in the exhaust fumes of managerialism. But, at the same time, it is naïve to imagine that Apollo and the rest have been free from such earthly entanglements. In the context, it doesn't matter that much whether we articulate these entanglements as nation building; party political interest; hidden subsidy of the military industrial complex, or research institutes; career and identity projects; needing to pay the mortgage; or compensating for small penis size. All these, and many more, have undoubtedly driven human beings to work on space exploration projects. But now, in an era of globalising capitalism, it seems that matters of profit and loss are becoming more relevant than ever in driving human beings to such work. Commercial space tourist flights will be the first clear example of what has, so far, been a tendency partly concealed by state and state agency operations. But now, it seems, NASA is being pushed out of the way, in order that enterprise can be launched.

## Cap K – 1NC

### Resisting capitalism’s reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility – the current social order guarantees social exclusion on a global scale

Zizek and Daly 2k4 (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety.
For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears).

This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place.

Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

## Cap K – 1NC

### The Affirmative’s demand for urgency is a product of hypocritical outrage meant to extend the privilege of global capitalism – our alternative is to do nothing in the face of the affirmative

Zizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 6-8
Let’s think about the fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence: in it, abstraction and graphic (pseudo)concreteness coexist in the staging of the scene of violence—against women, blacks, the homeless, gays. . . “A woman is raped every six seconds in this country” and “In the time it takes you to read this paragraph, ten children will die of hunger” are just two examples. Underlying all this is a hypocritical sentiment of moral outrage. Just this kind of pseudo-urgency was exploited by Starbucks a couple of years ago when, at store entrances, posters greeting customers pointed out that a portion of the chain’s profits went into health-care for the children of Guatemala, the source of their coffee, the inference being that with every cup you drink, you save a child’s life.
There is a fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions. There is no time to reflect: we have to act now. Through this fake sense of urgency, the post-industrial rich, living in their secluded virtual world, not only do not deny or ignore the harsh reality outside their area—they actively refer to it all the time. As Bill Gates recently put it: “What do computers matter when millions are still unnecessarily dying of dysentery?”
Against this fake urgency, we might want to place Marx’s wonderful letter to Engels of 1870, when, for a brief moment, it seemed that a European revolution was again at the gates. Marx’s letter conveys his sheer panic: can’t the revolutionaries wait for a couple of years? He hasn’t yet finished his Capital*.*A critical analysis of the present global constellation—one which offers no clear solution, no “practical” advice on what to do, and provides no light at the end of the tunnel, since one is well aware that this light might belong to a train crashing towards us—usually meets with reproach: “Do you mean we should do nothing? Just sit and wait?” One should gather the courage to answer: **“YES, precisely that!”** There are situations when the only truly “practical” thing to do is to resist the temptation to engage immediately and to “wait and see” by means of a **patient, critical analysis.** Engagement seems to exert its pressure on us from all directions. In a well-known passage from his Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre deployed the dilemma of a young man in France in 1942, torn between the duty to help his lone, ill mother and the duty to enter the Resistance and fight the Germans; Sartre’s point is, of course, that there is no a priori answer to this dilemma. The young man needs to make a decision grounded only in his own abyssal freedom and assume full responsibility for it.6 An obscene third way out of the dilemma would have been to advise the young man to tell his mother that he will join the Resistance, and to tell his Resistance friends that he will take care of his mother, while, in reality, withdrawing to a secluded place and studying… .
There is more than cheap cynicism in this advice. It brings to mind a well-known Soviet joke about Lenin. Under socialism, Lenin’s advice to young people, his answer to what they should do, was “Learn, learn, and learn.” This was evoked at all times and displayed on all school walls. The joke goes: Marx, Engels, and Lenin are asked whether they would prefer to have a wife or a mistress. As expected, Marx, rather conservative in private matters, answers, “A wife!” while Engels, more of a bon vivant, opts for a mistress. To everyone’s surprise, Lenin says, “I’d like to have both!” Why? Is there a hidden stripe of decadent jouisseur behind his austere revolutionary image? No—he explains: “So that I can tell my wife that I am going to my mistress, and my mistress that I have to be with my wife. . .“ “And then, what do you do?” “I go to a solitary place to learn, learn, and learn!”
Is this not exactly what Lenin did after the catastrophe of 1914? He withdrew to a lonely place in Switzerland, where he “learned, learned, and learned,” reading Hegel’s logic. And this is what we should do today when we find ourselves bombarded with mediatic images of violence. We need to “learn, learn, and learn” what causes this violence.

# \*\*\*LINKS\*\*\*

## Space Links – Generic

The drive towards space is just a replications of Capital’s control over the psyche – the affirmatives argument refuses to confront the crisis of exploitation

Julien Tort, UNESCO (Working paper for the Ethical Working Group on Astrobiology and Planetary Protection of ESA (EWG) July 28, 2005“Exploration and Exploitation: Lessons Learnt from the Renaissance for Space Conquest” [http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL\_ID=6195&URL\_DO=DO\_TOPIC&URL\_SECTION=-465.html](http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID%3D6195%26URL_DO%3DDO_TOPIC%26URL_SECTION%3D-465.html)
The scenario in which extraterrestrial room is used as a response to the degradation of the terrestrial environment also leads us to the second question that may be asked when considering the parallel between the conquest of the West and the exploration of space. While the possibility of colonizing celestial bodies may seem distant, it diverts attention from terrestrial issues in a very real way. The paradigm of the accumulation of Capital is profoundly bound to the pollution and the overexploitation of natural resources. Likening space exploration to the discovery of America may then be misleading and dangerous. There is –most probably— no new earth to be discovered through space conquest and it is, so far, unlikely that any relief can come from outer space for environmental pain. Furthermore, even if the possibility of human settlements on other celestial bodies was likely, would it still be right to neglect the terrestrial environment, with the idea that we can go and live elsewhere when we are done with this specific planet (again a scenario that science fiction likes: see for example the end of Isaac Asimov’s Foundation)? In a way, the presentation of space as a new area for conquest and expansion tends to deny that the model of the limitless exploitation of natural resources is facing a crisis.

### Nothing changes in space – profit motive makes resource exploitation inevitable and unquestioned under their framework

Julien Tort**,** UNESCO (Working paper for the Ethical Working Group on Astrobiology and Planetary Protection of ESA (EWG) July 28, 2005 “Exploration and Exploitation: Lessons Learnt from the Renaissance for Space Conquest” [http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL\_ID=6195&URL\_DO=DO\_TOPIC&URL\_SECTION=-465.html](http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID%3D6195%26URL_DO%3DDO_TOPIC%26URL_SECTION%3D-465.html)
The importance of the model of the first pioneers in the justification of space exploration should not be neglected, and it seems that claiming to justify space exploration only by its scientific benefits is contrary to the facts. In particular, serious studies about the economic interest of the exploitation of space resources could give an idea of what is really at stake in the exploration of the Moon and Mars. It is indeed necessary to have an idea of what could be expected in the absence of any regulation or guideline if we want to foster an exploration of outer space that would be beneficial to all **[hu]**mankind. If there is any interest –economic or political - in going to Mars and doing something there, then there will be competition between potential interested parties, and any ethical consideration of Mars exploration should take this aspect under consideration. In this perspective, the possible discovery of non-intelligent life on Mars would raise the issue of the possible exploitation of Martian resources and even the issue of the possible exploitation of this lifeform. The consideration of space as a new resource should also be handled with care, for it tends to divert attention from the need to take care of our own planet and its limited resources. It should be recalled that Earth is our natural environment and that the idea that human beings will adapt in space or on another planet is at best hypothetical and in any case an optimistic assumption. More generally, the effect of space conquest on our relationship to our own planet should be taken into account in “space ethics”.

## Space Links – Exploration

### Space exploration spills over to capitalist domination of space

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The rhetoric of the pioneer, and of the frontier, suggests that ordinary honest citizens will be able to stake their claims. However, as Dickens and Ormrod argue, these self-described space pioneers are not ordinary people, but members of a kind of ‘cosmic elite’ (2007: 4). Reading Kemp's description of the sort of people who are investing in these companies, it is easy to see what they mean (2007: 5). Added to Richard Branson are the founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal, Compusearch and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates. The entry level costs are huge, and the risks are gigantic. Even the people who might be travelling as space tourists will have to be very wealthy indeed. Virgin Galactic are currently asking $200,000 per flight, which is an expensive five minutes. Dickens and Ormrod's materialist analysis of the space industries concludes that off-earth capitalism is pretty much like capitalism on earth, in the sense that it runs into periodic crises that need to be fixed by the development and exploitation of new markets. These ‘fixes’ are necessarily temporary, but the promise of the ‘outer spatial fix’ is that it (potentially) opens a variety of ways in which capitalism might be extended beyond the boundaries of the earth. Adopting some ideas from the geographer David Harvey, they argue that the commodification of space allows for various circuits of capital to be re-imagined and a hegemonic model of neo-liberalism to spread skywards.

The relation between the military industrial complex and the war state is crucial in this regard, with space technologies including surveillance satellites, missile guidance, and the ‘weaponization’ of space being obvious gains. This much is clear from NASA onwards. However, the link between (for example) military satellites and communications and monitoring devices is clearly a very close one. Hence, access to the military high ground also means access to surveillance and media power over the entire planet, and this goes for both states and ‘defence’ companies. A further circuit is that of space tourism, clearly a domain only accessible to the hyper-rich, but further markets include the exploitation of materials from the moon, asteroids or planets; solar energy; off-earth manufacturing; colonies and terraforming projects. All of these would come with their attendant spin-off industries, such as clearing up space junk, provisioning off-planet habitats, accounting and legal services, security and so on.

### Space exploration 🡺 colonization and subjugation

MacDonlad Lecturer in Human Geography at U of Melbourne 2007 Fraser Progress in Human Geography http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf

The historic relationship between knowing a space and exerting political and strategic dominion over it is entirely familiar to geographers. Just as the geographical knowledge of Empire enabled its military subjugation, colonization and ultimately its ecological despoliation, this same pattern is being repeated in the 21st century ‘frontier’4. It is also worth remembering that the geographies of imperialism are made not given. In what follows, I want to examine how the geographies of outer space are being produced in and through contemporary social life on Earth. Such an account inevitably throws up some concerns about the politics and socialities of the new space age. Against this background, I set my argument on a trajectory which is intermittently guided by two key writers on technology with very different sensibilities. It is my intention to hold a line between the dark anticipations of Paul Virilio and the resplendent optimism of Nigel Thrift. This discursive flight may well veer off course; such are the contingencies of navigating space.

## Space Links – Exploration

### **Space exploration replicates the ideology of empire**

MacDonlad Lecturer in Human Geography at U of Melbourne 2007 Fraser Progress in Human Geography http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf

My basic claim, then, is that a geographical concern with outer space is an old project not a new one. A closely related argument is that a geography of outer space is a logical extension of earlier geographies of imperial exploration (for instance Driver, 2001; Smith and Godlewska, 1994). Space exploration has used exactly the same discourses, the same rationales, and even the same institutional frameworks (such as the International Geophysical Year, 1957-1958) as terrestrial exploration. And like its terrestrial counterpart, the move into space has its origins in older imperial enterprises. Marina Benjamin, for instance, argues that for the United States outer space was ‘always a metaphorical extension of the American West’ (Benjamin, 2003: 46). Looking at the imbricated narratives of colonialism and the Arianne space programme in French Guiana, the anthropologist Peter Redfield makes the case that ‘outer space reflects a practical shadow of empire’ (Redfield, 2002: 795; 2000). And the historian of science Richard Sorrenson, writing about the ship as geography’s scientific instrument in the age of high empire, draws on the work of David DeVorkin to argue that the V-2 missile was its natural successor (Sorrenson, 1996: 228; DeVorkin, 1992). A version of the V-2 – the two-stage ‘Bumper WAC Corporal’ – became the first earthly object to penetrate outer space reaching an altitude of 244 miles on the 24th February 1949 (Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 1961). Moreover, out of this postwar allied V-2 programme came the means by which Britain attempted to reassert its geopolitical might in the context of its own ailing empire. In 1954, when America sold Britain its first nuclear missile — a refined version of the WAC Corporal — its possession was seen as a shortcut back to the international stage at a time when Britain’s colonial power was waning fast (Clark, 1994; MacDonald, 2006). Even if the political geography literature has scarcely engaged with outer space, the advent of rocketry was basically Cold War (imperial) geopolitics under another name. Space exploration then, from its earliest origins to the present day, has been about familiar terrestrial and ideological struggles here on Earth.

## Space Links - Quick Fix

### Quick fix in space 🡺 imperialism

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Explanatory primacy is given here to economic mechanisms driving this humanization of the universe. In the same way that they have driven imperializing societies in the past to expand their economic bases into their ‘outsides’, the social relations of capitalism and the processes of capital-accumulation are driving the new kind of outer space imperialisms. Such is the starting-point of this paper (See also Dickens and Ormrod, 2007). It is a position based on the work of the contemporary Marxist geographer David Harvey (2003) and his notion of ‘spatial fixes’. Capitalism continually constructs what he calls ‘outer transformations.’ In the context of the over-accumulation of capital in the primary circuit of industrial capital, fresh geographic zones are constantly sought out which have not yet been fully invested in or, in the case of outer space, not yet been invested in at all.

‘Outer spatial fixes’ are investments in outer space intended to solve capitalism's many crises. At one level they may be simply described as crises of economic profitability. But ‘economic’ can cover a wide array of issues such as crises of resource-availability and potential social and political upheavals resulting from resource-shortages. Furthermore, there is certainly no guarantee that these investments will actually ‘fix’ these underlying economic, political and social crises. The ‘fix’ may well be of a temporary, sticking-plaster, variety.

## Space Links - Ethics

### Space exploration is unethical – it ignores the conditions which create violence and extends our destructive habits to space

Lin Assistant Professor at Ca-Poly & affiliate scholar at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society 2006 Patrick Viewpoint: Look Before Taking Another Leap For Mankind – Ethical and Social Considerations in Rebuilding Society in Space, Digital Commons http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=phil\_fac

One of the first and natural reactions of many is to ask: should we be encouraging private space exploration, given what we have done to our own planet? What is to prevent problems on Earth from following us into outer space, if we have not evolved the attitudes, and ethics, which have contributed to those problems? As examples, an over-developed sense of nationalism may again lead to war with other humans in space, and ignoring the cumulative effects of small acts may again lead to such things as the overcommercialization of space and space pollution. Have we learned enough about ourselves and our history to avoid the same mistakes as we have made on Earth?

Preserving the pristine, unspoiled expanses of space is a recurring theme, much as it is important to preserve wetlands rainforests, and other natural wonders here on Earth. We have already littered the orbital environment in space with floating debris that we need to track so that spacecraft and satellites navigate around, not to mention abandoned equipment on the Moon and Mars. So what safeguards are in place to ensure we do not exacerbate this problem, especially if we propose to increase space traffic? Furthermore, are we prepared to risk accidents in space from the technologies we might use, such as nuclear power?

## Space Links - Get Off The Rock

### The get off the rock mentality only leads to continuation of exploitative practices – only the alternative can solve inevitability arguments

Lin Assistant Professor at Ca-Poly & affiliate scholar at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society 2006 Patrick Viewpoint: Look Before Taking Another Leap For Mankind – Ethical and Social Considerations in Rebuilding Society in Space, Digital Commons http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=phil\_fac

If not for adventure or knowledge, there are other, more pragmatic reasons to consider. For example, notable scientists, like the late Carl Sagan and Stephen Hawking, discuss ‘‘backing up the biosphere’’ in case our world becomes uninhabitable. Of course, if that ever happened, it may be our own fault, given our weapons of mass destruction, freely-distributed recipes for the 1918 killer virus, predicted misapplications of biotechnology and nanotechnology, and other possible man-made catastrophes. So is it a good enough reason to inhabit another planet, because we want a ‘‘do­over’’ if we destroy our own? And if so, again, what are we doing to ensure that we do not make the same mistakes and lay waste to another biosphere? If we have put ourselves in a position where we need a back-up plan, it is unclear how settling space will improve our self-destructive tendencies until we address those root issues.

## Space Links - Overpop

### Going to space to solve overpopulation is capitalist – it prefers extending exploitation over remedying the root cause of violence

Lin Assistant Professor at Ca-Poly & affiliate scholar at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society 2006 Patrick Viewpoint: Look Before Taking Another Leap For Mankind – Ethical and Social Considerations in Rebuilding Society in Space, Digital Commons http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=phil\_fac

Another related reason for space development is that inhabiting other planets is the ‘‘social release valve’’ we need to alleviate overcrowding and diminishing resources here on our home planet. But is this an argument for space exploration, or for population control and more intelligent use of our natural resources? Once again, if we need to escape our own planet for societal, political, or economic reasons, what is our plan for doing it right on another planet, or will we be bringing the same baggage into space to create more of the same?

## Space Links – Free Market Space

### The uncharted nature of space makes the extension of capitalism inevitable

Lin Assistant Professor at Ca-Poly & affiliate scholar at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society 2006 Patrick Viewpoint: Look Before Taking Another Leap For Mankind – Ethical and Social Considerations in Rebuilding Society in Space, Digital Commons http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=phil\_fac

Of course, we might simply extend our existing rules of property to govern space as well, assuming all states involved endorse a free-market system. But in uncharted territory, such as with cyberspace, our most obvious options seem to be limited to firstcome, first-served and to the highest bidder, which we have seen lead to the inefficient and disorderly Internet ‘‘gold rush.’’ And because how we formulate property rights sets the tone for whatever economic model is adopted—a high-bid process would naturally foster capitalism—this has great implications on how markets and transactions would proceed in space.

If entering space marks our opportunity to start over again, then it seems that unfettered capitalism should no longer be a sacred cow and should be subject to critical evaluation along with other competing economic models. For instance, a purely free market economy, while efficient at allocating scarce resources and inspiring innovation, is not so much concerned with need or merit, so a hybrid model may be desired.

## Space Links - Satellites

### Dual use nature of surveillance must be criticized – their use of technology is not neutral

MacDonlad Lecturer in Human Geography at U of Melbourne 2007 Fraser Progress in Human Geography http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf

In this discussion so far, I have been drawing attention to geography’s recent failure to engage outer space as a sphere of inquiry and it is important to clarify that this indictment applies more to human than to physical geography. There are, of course, many biophysical currents of geography that directly draw on satellite technologies for remote sensing. The ability to view the Earth from space, particularly through the Landsat programme, was a singular step forward in understanding all manner of Earth surface processes and biogeographical patterns (see Mack, 1990). The fact that this new tranche of data came largely from military platforms (often under the guise of ‘dual use’) was rarely considered an obstacle to science. But, as the range of geographical applications of satellite imagery have increased to include such diverse activities as urban planning and ice cap measurements, so too has a certain reflexivity about the provenance of the images. It is not enough, some are realizing, to say ‘I just observe and explain desertification and I have nothing to do with the military’; rather, scientists need to acknowledge the overall context that gives them access to this data in the first place (Cervino et al., 2003: 236). One thinks here of the case of Peru, whose US grant funding for agricultural use of Landsat data increased dramatically in the 1980s when the same images were found to be useful in locating insurgent activities of Maoist ‘Shining Path’ guerrillas (Schwartz, 1996). More recently, NASA’s civilian Sea- Wide Field Studies (Sea-WiFS) programme was used to identify Taliban forces during the war in Afghanistan (Caracciolo, 2004). The practice of geography, in these cases as with so many others, is bound up with military logics (Smith, 1992); the development of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) being a much-cited recent example (Pickles, 1995; 2004; Cloud, 2001; 2002; see Beck, 2003, for a case study of GIS in the service of the ‘war on terror’).

## Space Links – Heg

### Space is a zone for the extension of military-neoliberal hegemony – leads to militarism and global elitism

MacDonlad Lecturer in Human Geography at U of Melbourne 2007 Fraser Progress in Human Geography http://www.landfood.unimelb.edu.au/rmg/geography/papers/anti-outerspace.pdf

Among the technical and logistical advances in space technology too numerous to detail here, there are two tendencies that stand out. Firstly, space – and in particular the Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) – can no longer be considered remote. The journey through the Earth’s atmosphere is now made on an almost weekly basis. Such is the steady passage of space vehicles that there is now a growing literature on traffic management (Johnson, 2004; Lála, 2004). The costs of entering space are now so low that students at Cambridge University have tested an ‘amateur’ rocket that they hope can be readily launched to the edge of space (up to 32 km altitude) for under £1000 (Sample, 2006). Secondly, space is becoming ordinary. Space-based technology is routinely reconfiguring our experience of home, work, education and healthcare through applications in the transport, telecommunications, agricultural and energy sectors (Rumsfeld Commission, 2001). Our everyday lives already extend to the outer-Earth in ways that we entirely take for granted. America’s Global Positioning System (GPS), for instance, has become essential to the regular functioning of a variety of machines from bank tellers to super-tankers. The space-based science of weatherforecasting is now integrated into the day-to-day management of domestic and national affairs. Satellite-based telecommunications, particularly international and cellular telephony, are a mundane part of everyday life in the West (see Warf, 2006). More obvious, perhaps, are the technical advances in space-enabled warfare that have inspired recent American military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq (Gray, 2005; Graham, 2004). Following in the vapour-trails of the United States, Europe, Russia and China are also trying to extend their sovereignty into outer space. As I will go on to discuss, terrestrial geopolitics are increasingly being determined by extra-terrestrial strategic considerations. More abstractly, I want to argue that through space exploration, we are forging new subjectivities and new forms of sociality here on earth (Stern, 2000; Shaw 2004). Space is a modality for hyper-mobile information which, in combination with advanced technologies of ‘software-sorting’ (Graham, 2005), has enabled a wider ‘automatic production of space’ (Thrift and French, 2002; see also Dodge and Kitchin, 2005). Above all, I will make the case that outer space is the next frontier for military–neoliberal hegemony, as an earlier conception of space as common property, enshrined in the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty (OST), becomes subject to re-negotiation. In place of the OST is the prospect of a new space regime, as transformative in its own way as the Bretton Woods consensus, that would oversee the privatisation of space resources in the narrow interests of a global elite. Moreover, it is this conquest of space, I will argue, that underwrites much of the dynamic technological shaping and re-shaping of Earthly environments recently discussed by Nigel Thrift (Thrift 2005).

## Links – Violence

### Focus on subjective violence and easily identifiable flashpoints of conflict misses the boat – only focusing on the background or objective violence can solve root cause – cannot be viewed from the same stand point – the call to act will be strong but responding creates a stop-gap which prevents engaging in criticisms of capital

Zizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 1-4
If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict. But we should learn to **step back,** to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible “subjective” violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance.
This is the starting point, perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a “symbolic” violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call “our house of being.” As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious—and extensively studied—cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call “systemic” violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.
The catch is that subjective and objective violence **cannot be perceived from the same standpoint:** subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the “normal,” peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious “dark matter” of physics, the counterpart to an all-too- visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be “irrational” explosions of subjective violence.
When the media bombard us with those “humanitarian crises” which seem constantly to pop up all over the world, one should always bear in mind that a particular crisis only explodes into media visibility as the result of a complex struggle. Properly humanitarian considerations as a rule play a less important role here than cultural, ideologico-political, and economic considerations. The cover story of Time magazine on 5 June 2006, for example, was “The Deadliest War in the World.” This offered detailed documentation on how around 4 million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo as the result of political violence over the last decade. None of the usual humanitarian uproar followed, just a couple of readers’ letters—as if some kind of filtering mechanism blocked this news from achieving its full impact in our symbolic space. To put it cynically, Time picked the wrong victim in the struggle for hegemony in suffering. It should have stuck to the list of usual suspects: Muslim women and their plight, or the families of 9/11 victims and how they have coped with their losses. The Congo today has effectively re-emerged as a Conradean “heart of darkness.” No one dares to confront it head on. The death of a West Bank Palestinian child, not to mention an Israeli or an American, is mediatically worth thousands of times more than the death of a nameless Congolese.
Do we need further proof that the humanitarian sense of urgency is mediated, indeed overdetermined, by clear political considerations? And what are these considerations? To answer this, we need to step back and take a look from a different position. When the U.S. media reproached the public in foreign countries for not displaying enough sympathy for the victims of the 9/11 attacks, one was tempted to answer them in the words Robespierre addressed to those who complained about the innocent victims of revolutionary terror: “Stop shaking the tyrant’s bloody robe in my face, or I will believe that you wish to put Rome in chains.”1
Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as a lure which **prevents us from thinking**. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject’s report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content “contaminated” the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 The only appropriate approach to my subject thus seems to be one which permits variations on violence kept at a distance out of respect towards its victims.

## Link – Patriarchy

### The criticism of patriarchy as a dominant hegemonic ideology of our times is misguided. Market individualism has dissolved the power of patriarchy if favor of the power of the market. Their continued criticism of patriarchy as the root cause of violence is hegemonic ideology at its purest

Zizek 2010 Living in the End Times p 49-50
I totally agree with the general principle that "hegemonies are often represented as minority positions, as defenses against what are perceived to be hegemonic positions." Today's celebration of "minorities" and "marginals” is the predominant majority position. But we could add a series of other examples, such as the neocons who complain about the terrors of liberal political correctness, presenting themselves as protectors of an endangered minority. Or take those critics of patriarchy who attack it as if it were still a hegemonic position, ignoring what Marx and Engels wrote more than 150 years ago, in the first chapter of The Communist Manifesto "The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations." Such an insight is still ignored by those leftist cultural theorists who focus their critique on patriarchal ideology and practice. Is it not time to start wondering about the fact that the critique of patriarchal "phallogocentrism" and so forth was elevated into the main question at the very historical moment-ours-when patriarchy definitively lost its hegemonic role, when it was progressively swept away by the market individualism of rights? What becomes of patriarchal family values when a child can sue his parents for neglect and abuse, or when the family and parenthood itself are de jure reduced to a temporary and dissolvable contract between independent individuals? (And, incidentally, Freud was no less aware of this: for him, the decline of the Oedipal mode of socialization was the historical condition of the rise of psychoanalysis. 50) In other words, the critical claim that patriarchal ideology continued to be the hegemonic ideology is the form of the hegemonic ideology of our times -its function is to enable us to evade the deadlock of the hedonistic permissiveness which is actually hegemonic.

## Link – White Supremacy

### The focus on white supremacy ignores historical oppression – makes coalition building impossible – makes it impossible for them to access our alternative

Darder Prof of Education at Claremont, & Torres, Prof of Public Policy and Comp Latino Studies at CSU-Long Beach, 1999 Antonia and Rodolfo, Shattering the Race Lens, from Critical Ethnicity pages 184-185

What seems apparent in hooks's explanation is both her belief in the existence of a White ideology that has Black people as its primary object (albeit her mention of "people of color") and the reification of skin color as the most active determinant of social relations between Black and White populations. Consequently, the persistence of such notions of racialized exploitation and domination mistakenly privileges one particular form of racism, while it ignores the historical and contemporary oppression of populations who have been treated as distinct and inferior "races" without the necessary reference to skin color.

Moreover, "White supremacy" arguments analytically essentialize Black/White relations by inferring that the inevitability of skin color ensures the reproduction of racism in the post-colonial world, where White people predominantly associate Black people with inferiority. Inherent in this perspective is the failure to recognize the precolonial origins of racism which were structured within the interior of Europe by the development of nation-states and capitalist relations of production. "The dichotomous categories of Blacks as victims, and Whites as perpetrators of racism, tend to homogenize the objects of racism, without paying attention to the different experience of men and women, of different social classes and ethnicity."~~ As such there is little room to link, with equal legitimacy, the continuing struggles against racism of Jews, Gypsies, the Irish, immigrant workers, refugees, and other racialized populations of the world (including Africans racialized by Africans) to the struggle of African Americans in the United States.

Hence, theories of racism that are founded upon the racialized idea of White supremacy adhere rigidly to a "race relations paradigm." As such, these theories anchor racialized inequality to the alleged "nature" of White people and the psychological influence of White ideology on both Whites and Blacks, rather than to the complex nature of historically constituted social relations of power and their material consequences. In light of this, hooks's preference for White supremacy represents a perspective that, despite its oppositional intent and popularity among many activists and scholars in the field, still fails to critically advance our understanding of the debilitating structures of capitalism and the nature of class formations within a racialized world. More specifically, what we argue here is that the struggle against racism and class inequality cannot be founded on either academic or popularized notions of "race" or White supremacy, notions that ultimately reify and "project a 'phantom objectivity,' an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature."33 Rather than working to invert racist notions of racialized inferiority, anti-racist scholars and activists should seek to develop a critical theory of racism to confront the fundamental nature and consequences of structural inequalities as reproduced by the historical processes of racialization in U.S. society and around the globe.

# \*\*\*IMPACTS\*\*\*

## Impact – Extinction

### Global capitalism threatens survival

Zizek**,** Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana 1999 Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 350-351

This already brings us to the second aspect of our critical distance towards risk society theory: the way it approaches the reality of capitalism. Is it not that, on closer examination, its notion of 'risk' indicates a narrow and precisely defined domain in which risks are generated: the domain of the uncontrolled use of science and technology in the conditions of capitalism? The paradigmatic case of 'risk', which is not simply one among many out risk 'as such', is that of a new scientific-technological invention put to use by a private corporation without proper public democratic debate and control, then generating the spectre of unforeseen cata­strophic long-term consequences. However, is not this kind of risk rooted in the fact that the logic of market and profitability is driving privately owned corporations to pursue their course and use scientific and techno­logical innovations (or simply expand their production) without actually taking account of the long-term effects of such activity on the environ­ment, as well as the health of humankind itself?

Thus - despite all the talk about a 'second modernity' which compels us to leave the old ideological dilemmas of Left and Right, of capitalism versus socialism, and so on, behind - is not the conclusion to be drawn that in the present global situation, in which private corporations outside public political control are making decisions which can affect us all, even up to our chances of survival, the only solution lies in a kind of direct socialization of the productive process - in moving towards a society in which global decisions about the fundamental orientation of how to develop and use productive capacities at the disposal of society would somehow be made by the entire collective of the people affected by such decisions? Theorists of the risk society often evoke the need to counteract reign of the 'depoliticized' global market with a move towards radical repoliticization, which will take crucial decisions away from state planners and experts and put them into the hands of the individuals and groups concerned themselves (through the revitalization of active citizenship, broad public debate, and so on) - however, they stop short of putting in question the very basics of the anonymous logic of market relations and global capitalism, which imposes itself today more and more as the 'neutral' Real accepted by all parties and, as such, more and more depoliticized. 34

## Impact – Space Wars

### The logic of capitalism ensures that space exploration 🡺 imperial wars

Dickens Affiliated Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Politics, Psychology, Sociology and International Studies , University of Cambridge 2009 Peter Sociological Review wiley online

The imminent conquest of outer space raises the question of ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ yet again. Capitalism now has the cosmos in its sights, an outside which can be privately or publicly owned, made into a commodity, an entity for which nations and private companies can compete. As such the cosmos is a possible site of armed hostilities. This means, contra Hardt and Negri, that there is an outside after all, one into which the competitive market can now expand indefinitely. A new kind of imperialism is therefore underway, albeit not one attempting to conquer and exploit people ‘outside’ since there are no consumers or labour power to exploit in other parts of the solar system. Ferrying wealthy tourists into the cosmos is a first and perhaps most spectacular part of this process of capital's cosmic expansion. Especially important in the longer term is making outer space into a source of resources and materials. These will in due course be incorporated into production-processes, most of which will be still firmly lodged on earth.

Access to outer space is, potentially at least, access to an infinite outside array of resources. These apparently have the distinct advantage of not being owned or used by any pre-existing society and not requiring military force by an imperializing power gaining access to these resources.

Bringing this outside zone into capitalism may at first seem beneficial to everyone. But this scenario is almost certainly not so trouble-free as may at first seem. On the one hand, the investment of capital into outer space would be a huge diversion from the investments needed to address many urgent inequalities and crises on Earth. On the other hand, this same access is in practice likely to be conducted by a range of competing imperial powers. Hardt and Negri (2000) tell us that the history of imperializing wars is over. This may or may not be the case as regards imperialism on earth. But old-style imperialist, more particularly inter-imperialist, wars seem more likely than ever, as growing and competing power-blocs (the USA and China are currently amongst the most likely protagonists) compete for resources on earth and outer space.

### Space will be turned into a new more imperialist form of capital

Dickens Affiliated Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Politics, Psychology, Sociology and International Studies , University of Cambridge 2009 Peter Sociological Review wiley online

At the centre of the imperialising process (cosmic and earthly) is ‘the primary circuit of capital’ in which value is made through the exploitation of labour-power. (See Figure 1.) Money buys labour-power and the means of production; raw materials and technology. A labour-process is then set in train and commodities are produced. These commodities are sold on the market, with some of the money-proceeds taking the form of wages paid to workers and some being recycled back to the investors of capital investing in new circuits. This primary circuit is no less than the underlying essence of capitalism.

This recycling takes place (usually via banks and other financial institutions) into what Harvey calls ‘the secondary circuit’, that in which ‘fixed capital’ is created as inputs to new rounds of production (Figure 2). In this way the productivity of labour is increased. Alternatively the secondary circuit takes the form of consumers' savings being circulated, again via banks and the capital market, into the creation of consumer durables, houses and the like. This circuit is important to Harvey as a geographer since it underlies urban and regional development, including the process of suburbanisation in previously sparsely-populated regions. And it is important for this study since we are specifically interested in the spatial implications of capital's ‘fixes’.

Finally, Harvey identifies a ‘tertiary circuit’ in which states are mediators in the flow of capital into new investments (Figure 3). Surpluses are extracted (mainly by the device of government taxation) from the surpluses made in the primary circuit and reinvested in technology, science and administration. Similarly, they are extracted for other ‘state functions’ such as social expenditure; military expenditures, police, education and the like. Again, these flows generate new primary circuits of capital.
Figure 4 shows the three types of circuit of capital combined. The diagram looks rather mechanistic but circuits of capital are unstable and crisis-ridden. Indeed, crises often underlie the switching practices outlined above. One form of crisis develops when all those consumers inclined and able to consume a particular product at a particular price will have actually done so. A crisis of over-production ensues and rates of profit fall. There are a number of possible ‘fixes’ for this crisis, one of the most relevant to outer-space imperialism being the search for cheaper (usually meaning more plentiful) supplies of raw materials. Cheaper inputs should mean that commodities start reaching more consumers and, if this happens, new rounds of accumulation are underway.

Attempting to restore profitability through access to new raw materials therefore means that capitalism's fixes often involve geographical expansion. Capital, in Neil Smith's words ‘stalks the Earth in search of material resources’ (1984: 46). He goes on to say that ‘no part of the Earth's surface, the atmosphere, the oceans, the geological substratum or the biological superstratum are immune from transformation by capital’ (op. cit. p. 56). The galaxy can now be added to this list of resources being ‘stalked’ by capital.

## Impact – Root Cause

### Capital is the root cause of all of their impacts – you should denounce their simply relationship with violence because the system of capital produces the material reality which makes violence inevitable

Zizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 11-12
There is an old joke about a husband who returns home earlier than usual from work and finds his wife in bed with another man. The surprised wife exclaims: “Why have you come back early?” The husband furiously snaps back: “What are you doing in bed with another man?” The wife calmly replies: “I asked you a question first—don’t try to squeeze out of it by changing the topic!” The same goes for violence: the task is precisely to change the topic, to move from the desperate humanitarian SOS call to stop violence to the analysis of that other SOS, the complex interaction of the three modes of violence: subjective, objective, and symbolic. The lesson is thus that one should resist the fascination of subjective violence, of violence enacted by social agents, evil individuals, disciplined repressive apparatuses, fanatical crowds: subjective violence is just the most visible of the three.
The notion of objective violence needs to be thoroughly historicised: it took on a new shape with capitalism. Marx described the mad, self-enhancing circulation of capital, whose solipsistic path of parthenogenesis reaches its apogee in today’s meta-reflexive speculations on futures. It is far too simplistic to claim that the spectre of this self-engendering monster that pursues its path disregarding any human or environmental concern is an ideological abstraction and that behind this abstraction there are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources capital’s circulation is based and on which it feeds like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this “abstraction” is not only in our financial speculators’ misperception of social reality, but that it is “real” in the precise sense of determining the structure of the material social processes: the fate of whole strata of the population and sometimes of whole countries can be decided by the “solipsistic” speculative dance of capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in blessed indifference to how its movement will affect social reality. So Marx’s point is not primarily to reduce this second dimension to the first one, that is, to demonstrate how the theological mad dance of commodities arises out of the antagonisms of “real life.” Rather his point is that one cannot properly grasp the first (the social reality of material production and social interaction) without the second: it is the self-propelling metaphysical dance of capital that runs the show, that provides the key to real-life developments and catastrophes. Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than any direct pre capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their “evil” intentions, but is purely “objective,” systemic, anonymous. Here we encounter the Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: “reality” is the social reality of the actual people involved in interaction and in the productive processes, while the Real is the inexorable “abstract,” spectral logic of capital that determines what goes on in social reality. One can experience this gap in a palpable way when one visits a country where life is obviously in shambles. We see a lot of ecological decay and human misery. However, the economist’s report that one reads afterwards informs us that the country’s economic situation is “financially sound”—**reality doesn’t matter,** what matters is the situation of capital...

## Impact – Imperialism

### **Imperialism necessitates endless systems of war and global inequality**

Foster research at the North South Institute 2003 John Imperial America and War, Monthly Review, May 28 http://www.monthlyreview.org/0503jbf.htm

At present, U.S. imperialism appears particularly blatant because it is linked directly with war in this way, and points to an endless series of wars in the future to achieve essentially the same ends. However, if we wish to understand the underlying forces at work, we should not let this heightened militarism and aggression distract us from the inner logic of imperialism, most evident in the rising gap in income and wealth between rich and poor countries, and in the net transfers of economic surplus from periphery to center that make this possible. The growing polarization of wealth and poverty between nations (a polarization that exists within nations as well) is the system’s crowning achievement on the world stage. It is also what is ultimately at issue in the struggle against modern imperialism. As Magdoff argues in Imperialism without Colonies, there is an essential oneness to economic, political, and military domination under capitalism. Those seeking to oppose the manifestations of imperialism must recognize that it is impossible to challenge any one of these effectively without calling into question all the others—and hence the entire system.

## Impact – Root of Racism

Capital’s construction of language creates the conditions for violence – they cannot win a root causeZizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 66-67So, perhaps, the fact that *reason* and *race* have the same root in Latin (ratio)tells us something: language, not primitive egotistic interest, is the first and greatest divider, it is because of language that we and our neighbours (can) “live in different worlds” even when we live on the same street. What this means is that verbal violence is not a secondary distortion, but the ultimate resort of every specifically human violence. Take the example of anti-Semitic pogroms, which can stand in for all racist violence. What the perpetrators of pogroms find intolerable and rage-provoking, what they react to, is not the immediate reality of Jews, but the image/figure of the “Jew” which circulates and has been constructed in their tradition. The catch, of course, is that one single individual cannot distinguish in any simple way between real Jews and their anti-Semitic image: this image overdetermines the way I experience real Jews themselves, and furthermore it affects the way Jews experience themselves. What makes a real Jew that an anti-Semite encounters on the Street “intolerable,” what the anti-Semite tries to destroy when he attacks the Jew, the true target of his fury, is this fantasmatic dimension.

Modern Racism is no longer based on ideologies of cultural or natural superiority - economic egotism is the root of modern racism
Zizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 101-104
But we are not dealing here only with good old racism. Something more is at stake: a fundamental feature of our emerging “global” society. On ii September 2001 the Twin Towers were hit. Twelve years earlier, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. That date heralded the “happy ‘9os,” the Francis Fukuyama dream of the “end of history” —the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won; that the search was over; that the advent of a global, liberal world community lurked just around the corner; that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time was up). In contrast, 9/11 is the main symbol of the end of the Clintonite happy ‘9os. This is the era in which new walls emerge everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, on the U.S.—Mexico border. The rise of the populist New Right is just the most prominent example of the urge to raise new walls.
A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the European Union passed almost unnoticed: the plan to establish an all-European border police force to secure the isolation of Union territory and thus to prevent the influx of immigrants. *This* is the truth of globalisation: the construction of new walls safeguarding prosperous Europe from the immigrant flood. One is tempted to resuscitate here the old Marxist “humanist” opposition of “relations between things” and “relations between persons”: in the much-celebrated free circulation opened up by global capitalism, it is “things” (commodities) which freely circulate, while the circulation of “persons” is more and more controlled. We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an unfinished project but with a true “dialectics of globalisation”: the segregation of the people *is* the reality of economic globalisation. This new racism of the developed is in a way much more brutal than the previous ones: its implicit legitimisation is neither naturalist (the “natural” superiority of the developed West) nor any longer culturalist (we in the West also want to preserve our cultural identity), but unabashed economic egotism. The fundamental divide is one between those included in the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it.

# \*\*\*ALT\*\*\*

## Do Nothing Alt - Ext

### The alternative is essential to opening a space for resistance to the ideology of capital – the plan can only replicate their harms

Zizek in 2004 Slavoj Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, page 71-71

The stance of simply condemning the postmodern Left for its accommodation, however, is also false, since one should ask the obvious difficult question: *what, in fact, was the alternative?* If today’s ‘post-politics’ is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant leftist reaction to it can be aptly characterized as ‘principle opportunism’: one simply sticks to old formulae (defence of the welfare state, and so on) and calls them ‘principles’, dispensing with the detailed analysis of how the situation has changed – and thus retaining one’s position of Beautiful Soul. The inherent stupidity of the ‘principled’ Left is clearly discernable in it standard criticism of any analysis which proposes a more complex picture of the situation, renouncing any simple prescriptions on how to act: ‘there is no clear political stance involved in your theory’ – and this from people with no stance but their ‘principled opportunism’. Against such a stance, one should have the courage to affirm that, in a situation like today’s, the only way really to remain open to a revolutionary opportunity is to renounce facile calls to direct action, which necessarily involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. Today’s predicament is that, if we succumb to the urge of directly ‘doing something’ (engaging in the anti-globalist struggle, helping the poor…) we will certainly and undoubtedly contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. The only way to lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, to ‘do nothing’ – thus opening up the space for a different kind of activity.

## Do Nothing Ext – Space Specific

### Alternative first – must critically reflect on the ethical questions of space exploration before we do the plan

Lin Assistant Professor at Ca-Poly & affiliate scholar at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society 2006 Patrick Viewpoint: Look Before Taking Another Leap For Mankind – Ethical and Social Considerations in Rebuilding Society in Space, Digital Commons http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=phil\_fac

If space development is just on our horizon, there looks to be enough questions to require forethought and advance planning related to the social, political, and economic landscape of space living, in addition to the usual near-term issues in space ethics. If this is our chance for a fresh start, then we should be deliberate and careful with our actions, thinking through as many of the unintended consequences as possible. We already have centuries of philosophical, political, and economic theories in our stockpile; now is the time evaluate them once again, and finally turn theory into action.

### **We should turn away from space**

Parker U of Leicester School of Management 2009 Martin The Sociological Review Volume 57 Wiley Online

Uninvited or not, business interests will continue to find their way into space. A year before the Armstrongs were watching TV, Stanley Kubrick had placed a rotating Hilton hotel and a Pam Am shuttle plane in 2001: A Space Odyssey. The brands may change, and the future will not happen as quickly as we think, but unless we imagine massive state interventionism on a Soviet scale, capitalism will go into space.

Dickens and Ormrod claim that it already has, at least in terms of near earth orbit, and that the key issue is to engineer ‘a relationship with the universe that does not further empower the already powerful’ (2007: 190). In other words, a Marxist political economy of space would suggest that the military-industrial complex has already empowered the powerful, but would presumably be equally sceptical about the space libertarians' claims to be representing the ordinary citizen. Of course we might conclude from this that the answer is simply to turn away from space. The whole programme has not been without its critics, whether of capitalism, imperialism, patriarchy, techno-fetishism, bad science, bad policy making or even new world order conspiracy (Etzioni, 1964; DeGroot, 2007). Even at the height of space euphoria, in the summer of 1969, we find dissenting voices. ‘The moon is an escape from our earthy responsibilities, and like other escapes, it leaves a troubled conscience’ said Anthony Lewis in the New York Times. An Ebony opinion leader, asking what we will say to extra-terrestrials, suggested ‘We have millions of people starving to death back home so we thought we'd drop by to see how you're faring’. Kurt Vonnegut, in the New York Times Magazine, put it with characteristic élan.

### Alt solves error replication

Lin Assistant Professor at Ca-Poly & affiliate scholar at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society 2006 Patrick Viewpoint: Look Before Taking Another Leap For Mankind – Ethical and Social Considerations in Rebuilding Society in Space, Digital Commons http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=phil\_fac

What we probably do not want to happen is to rush into orbit and the settlement of space without a ‘‘big picture’’ strategy that would allow individuals, corporations, or governments to make­up a plan as they go along, whether it is to camp on, erect billboards on, or lay claim to other planets, untethered by orderly processes and safeguards. Had we given that kind of forethought to administering the Internet, we might not have had cyber-squatters camping out on domain names, disgruntled teens writing virus programs that exploit gaps in the technology, unscrupulous companies clogging our e-mail in-boxes with spam, or any number of issues related to intellectual property, privacy, security, and other key areas.

History gives us plenty of other examples where we have introduced new technologies or crossed barriers without giving forethought to our actions, which then caused problems that we could have avoided. We do not even need to look at the most obvious cases, such as splitting the atom. The automobile enabled us to more easily and quickly travel greater distances, but it also created pollution, urban sprawl, pressure on natural resources, and other problems—things we could have addressed much earlier. Nanotechnology, as another example, promises to give us great benefits, but it also holds great potential for misuse and raises ethical questions related to health, privacy, human enhancement, military,economics, and more.

## Withdrawal Alternative

### Our alternative is to completely withdraw from the ideology of capital – this is essential to destroy the fetish that allows capital to survive

Johnston**,** interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, 2004

Adrian, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259 page infotrac
Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Zizek's recent writings isn't a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Zizek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance (Zizek, 2001d, pp 22-23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Zizek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of "magic," that is, the belief in money's social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance's powers. The "external" obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, "internally" believe in it--capitalism's life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others' belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism's frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic's fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Zizek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the "desert of the real"): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction ("Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism").

# \*\*\*AT\*\*\*

## AT: Perm

### One should renounce strategies of synthesis – instead radical criticism must assert that contradictions are irreducible – we should celebrate the gap between thesis and anti-thesis not try to fill it with constructed synthesis **Zizek in 2006** Slavoj, The Parallax View, The Symptom Volume 7, spring, <http://www.lacan.com/zizparallax.htm>

 In his formidable *Transcritique*, [7](http://www.lacan.com/zizparallax.htm#7x) Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of such a "parallax view": when confronted with an antinomic stance in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other (or, even more, to enact a kind of "dialectical synthesis" of the opposites); one should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but the irreducible gap between the positions itself, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant's stance is thus "to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference (parallax)." [8](http://www.lacan.com/zizparallax.htm#8x) (Is this not Karatani's way to assert the Lacanian Real as a pure antagonism, as an impossible difference which precedes its terms?) This is how Karatani reads the Kantian notion of the *Ding an sich* (the Thing-in-itself, beyond phenomena): this Thing is not simply a transcendental entity beyond our grasp, but something discernible only via the irreducibly antinomic character of our experience of reality. [9](http://www.lacan.com/zizparallax.htm#9x)  Let us take Kant's confrontation with the epistemological antinomy which characterized his epoch: empiricism versus rationalism. Kant's solution is neither to chose one of the terms, nor to enact a kind of higher "synthesis" which would "sublate" the two as unilateral, as partial moments of a global truth (and, of course, nor does he withdraw to pure scepticism); the stake of his "transcendental turn" is precisely to avoid the need to formulate one's own "positive" solution. What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution - the transcendental turn - is unique in that it, first, rejects the ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation ("finitude") of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated-reconciled - the "synthesis" of the two dimensions (i.e., the fact that our Reason seems to fit the structure of external reality that affects us)always relies on a certain salto mortale or "leap of faith." Far from designating a "synthesis" of the two dimensions, the Kantian "transcendental" rather stands for their irreducible gap "as such": the "transcendental" points at something in this gap, a new dimension which cannot be reduced to any of the two positive terms between which the gap is gaping. And Kant does the same with regard to the antinomy between the Cartesian *cogito* as *res cogitans*, the "thinking substance," a self-identical positive entity, and Hume's dissolution of the subject in the multitude of fleeting impressions: against both positions, he asserts the subject of transcendental apperception which, while displaying a self-reflective unity irreducible to the empirical multitude, nonetheless lacks any substantial positive being, i.e., it is in no way a *res cogitans*. Here, however, one should be more precise than Karatani who directly identifies the transcendental subject with transcendental illusion:

### Radical negation is key to open the space for the alternative – only wiping the slate clean can solve

Zizek 1999 (Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 91-92, gjm)

With regard to the opposition between abstract and concrete Universal­ity, this means that the only way towards a truly 'concrete' universality leads through the full assertion of the radical negativity by means of which the universal negates its entire particular content: despite misleading appearances, it is the 'mute universality’ of the neutral container of the particular content which is the predominant form of abstract universality. In other words, the only way for a Universality to become 'concrete' is to stop being a neutral-abstract medium of its particular content, and to *include itself among its particular subspecies.* What this means is that, paradox­ically, the first step towards 'concrete universality ' is the radical negation of the entire particular content: only through such a negation does the Universal gain existence, become visible 'as such'. Here let us recall Hegel's analysis of phrenology, which closes the chapter on 'Observing Reason' in his Phenomenology: Hegel resorts to an explicit phallic metaphor in order to explain the opposition of the two possible readings of the proposition 'the Spirit is a bone' (the vulgar-materialist 'reductionist' reading - the shape of our skull actually and directly determines the features of our mind - and the speculative reading - the spirit is strong enough to assert its identity with the most utterly inert stuff, and to 'sublate' it - that is to say, even the most utterly inert stuff cannot escape the Spirit's power of mediation). The vulgar-materialist reading is like the approach which sees in the phallus only the organ of urination, while the speculative reading is also able to discern in it the much higher function of insemination (i.e. precisely 'conception' as the biological anticipation of concept).

## AT: Perm

Permutation doesn’t solve – it supplements the system it does not disturbZizek 2008 In Defense of Lost Causes page 33
The "worldless" character of capitalism is linked to this hegemonic role of scientific discourse in modernity, a feature clearly identified already by Hegel who wrote that, for us moderns, art and religion no longer obey absolute respect: we can admire them, but we no longer kneel down in front of them, our heart is not really with them —today, only science (conceptual knowledge) deserves this respect. "Postmodernity" as the "end of grand narratives" is one of the names for this predicament in which the multitude of local fictions thrives against the background of scientific discourse as the only remaining universality deprived of sense. Which is why the politics advocated by many a leftist today, that of countering the devastating world-dissolving effect of capitalist moder­ nization by inventing new fictions, imagining "new worlds" (like the Porto Alegre slogan "Another world is possible!"), is inadequate or, at least, profoundly ambiguous: it all depends on how these fictions relate to the underlying Real of capitalism — do they just supplement it with the imaginary multitude, as the postmodern "local narratives" do, or do they disturb its functioning? In other words, the task is to produce a symbolic fiction (a truth) that intervenes into the Real, that causes a change within it.29

## AT: Particular 🡺 Universal

### The current political order makes the affirmatives attempt at metaphoric condensation impossible

Dean**,** Associate Professor of Political Theory at Hobart & William Smith, 2005

Jodi, Zizek against Democracy, jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/files/zizek\_against\_ democracy\_new\_version.doc –

The political problem today, then, is that global capital works as the frame or condition of our current, depoliticized, post-political situation. In a way, it appears as itself, rather than as something else; rather than, or perversely, *even as*, a horrific machine of brutalization, global capital is just the way things are. Put somewhat differently, an aspect of the current political impasse is the extraordinary difficulty of representing (metaphorically condensing) particular events or positions (the collapse of Enron, the war against Iraq; immigrants, the Iraqi and Afghani people) in such a way as to unsettle or challenge the existing order.

## AT: Transition Wars

### The spectacle of the affirmative’s argument is a very particular strategy – it establishes a scenario to fear in order to sustain the current order

Hardt & Negri, 2000Michael & Antonio, Empire, P 323

The society of the spectacle rules by wielding an age-old weapon. Hobbes recognized long ago that for effective domination “the Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear.” For Hobbes, fear is what binds and ensures social order, and still today fear is the primary mechanism of control that fills the society of the spectacle. Although the spectacle seems to function through desire and pleasure (desire for commodities and pleasure of consumption), it really works through the communication of fear—or rather, spectacle creates forms of desire and pleasure that are intimately wedded to fear. In the vernacular of early modern European philosophy, the communication of fear was called superstition. And indeed the politics of fear has always been spread through a kind of superstition. What has changed are the forms and mechanisms of the superstitions that communicate fear.

The spectacle of fear that holds together the postmodern, hybrid constitution and the media manipulation of the public and politics certainly takes the ground away from a struggle over the imperial constitution. It seems as if there is no place left to stand, no weight to any possible resistance, but only an implacable machine of power.

### The threat of nuclear war is a tool of global capitalism – it insists on fear knowing that it will diffuse conflict

Hardt & Negri, 2000Michael & Antonio, Empire, P 344-6

Imperial control operates through three global and absolute means: the bomb, money, and ether. The panoply of thermonuclear weapons, effectively gathered at the pinnacle of Empire, represents the continuous possibility of the destruction of life itself. This is an operation of absolute violence, a new metaphysical horizon, which completely changes the conception whereby the sovereign state had a monopoly of legitimate physical force. At one time, in modernity, this monopoly was legitimated either as the expropriation of weapons from the violent and anarchic mob, the disordered mass of individuals who tend to slaughter one another, or as the instrument of def ense against the enemy, that is, against other peoples organized in states. Both these means of legitimation were oriented finally toward the survival of the population. Today they are no longer effective. The expropriation of the means of violence from a supposedly self- destructive population tends to become merely administrative and police operations aimed at maintaining the segmentations of productive territories. The second justification becomes less effective too as nuclear war between state powers becomes increasingly unthinkable. The development of nuclear technologies and their imperial concentration have limited the sovereignty of most of the countries of the world insofar as it has taken away from them the power to make decisions over war and peace, which is a primary element of the traditional definition of sovereignty. Furthermore, the ultimate threat of the imperial bomb has reduced every war to a limited conflict, a civil war, a dirty war, and so forth. It has made every war the exclusive domain of administrative and police power. From no other standpoint is the passage from modernity to postmodernity and from modern sovereignty to Empire more evident than it is from the standpoint of the bomb. Empire is defined here in the final instance as the "non-place" of life, or, in other words, as the absolute capacity for destruction. Empire is the ultimate form of biopower insofar as it is the absolute inversion of the power of life.

## AT: Poverty

### Only the alt solves poverty

McMillian PhD in Psychoanalysis from Massey University 2009 Chris Disavowed Foundations1/30http://chrismcmillan.org/2009/01/30/hello-world/

Nonetheless, one should not jump to the vulgar conclusion that exclusion, suffering and hunger are active created by capitalist subjectivity, that some mysterious conspiring agents are secretly maintaining this situation in the name of Capital. Rather, the situation is much more complex and subsequently more horrific. Extreme poverty is not the consequence of a contingent aberration in the system, soon to be eliminated by economic progress or the enlightenment of the masses. Nor are some sinister agents of power responsible, such that a mere act of political will can rectify the situation. Instead, I contend that this extreme and absolute poverty is the systematic result of our mediocre day-to-day economic interactions and pleasures. That is, for the capitalist system to remain functional, providing the wealth available in the western world, extreme poverty, hunger and death occur on a horrific scale as the necessary consequence of capitalist subjectivity.

Consequently any discourse which seeks to intervene in the suffering of the hungry cannot do so within the epistemological limits of capitalism. Instead, we must develop a new space for our globally shared social life, or rather the material reproduction of that life. This new economic space must avoid both the exceptionality and the exclusion of both the masses and the even more marginalised hungry. In our current circumstances, however, such an alternative form of economy is not on the horizon. Capitalism has become so pervasive that both conservatives and many radicals have come to support Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis. While conservatives celebrate the victory of liberal-democratic (capitalism), for radicals such a resignation is tinged with more than a hint of tragedy. Meanwhile, although any alternative to capitalism is likely to be in the socialist, or at least Marxist, tradition, the existence of actually existing socialism provides little in the way of inspiration, but much in the way of melancholy and nostalgia.

Instead, given the lack of alternatives, this thesis turns to theory to consider both our current understanding of political economy and the conditions of possibility for the material reproduction of shared social life. In particular, this thesis is informed by post-Lacanian psychoanalysis and the work of Slavoj Žižek. Žižek’s work on universality (the understanding and discursive reproduction of social life) suggests that any universal, or utopian, position is ultimately impossible. Instead, universality is characterised by the dialectical operation of lack and excess, such that any universal identification is constituted upon the existence of an exception. In terms of political economy, Žižek labels this impossibility class struggle.

## AT: Cap Solves Warming

### Market based approaches make ecological capitalism impossible – its reliance on economic incentives assures fast warming and extinction

Harriss-White, Professor of Development Studies, Oxford, 2006 Barbara Undermining Sustainable Capitalism: The Market-Driven Politics of Renewable Energy socialistregister.com/socialistregister.com/files/ecolbhweh19Oct06.doc
Fossil energy underwrites and saturates capitalist social organisation. The energetics of capitalist production have involved ever more aggregate matter and energy which results in ever more physical waste and dissipated, useless forms of energy, social defences against the effects of which require ever increasing costs. While the building of an ecological capitalism is being imagined, the recreation of any kind of ‘re-humanised nature’ under capitalism cannot be achieved without an increase in entropy. The physical engine of capital relentlessly destroys carbon and methane sinks releasing greenhouse gases. It wreaks havoc with ecosystems, biodiversity and human wellbeing. ‘An enormous chemical experiment’ said Adair Turner of Merrill Lynch in 2003. By early 2006, some expert climate change modellers had estimated that the global CO2 concentration level above which dangerous climate change is unstoppable had been reached. Development as a process of catch-up is now well understood to be a thermodynamic impossibility which would **destroy human life.**  Indeed the ubiquitous and persistent petty commodity forms of capitalism associated with poverty make sense in part as one means by which capital polices its ecological limits : poor people tread with small ecological footprints.

### Sustainable capitalism is impossible – the market prevents environmentally friendly politics

Harriss-White, Professor of Development Studies, Oxford, 2006 Barbara Undermining Sustainable Capitalism: The Market-Driven Politics of Renewable Energy socialistregister.com/socialistregister.com/files/ecolbhweh19Oct06.doc

Capitalism is not fixing the environment. It is not able to, either in theory or in historical practice. Market-driven politics has ensured that renewable energy remains far from the point where it might start to form any kind of technological base, either for an alternative model of capitalist development (in the UK or in an engagement with large developing countries which are about to enter a highly polluting phase of industrialisation ), or for the remoralised and equitable allocations argued for by Altvater. In energy, there is no sign of the politics able to generate a new kind of social, non-market regulation of money and nature. Sustainable capitalism is a fiction and the politics of renewable energy are merely a reflection of the fiction.

### Capitalism destroys the environment – its unsustainable

Joel Kovel Professor, Saybrook Institute, San Francisco, CA, 2007 The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism Or the End of the World? Pg 262

As Kyoto is discredited, the possibility of a socialist alternative emerges, and, with it, the second theme enters. The deciding matter is the question of sustainability. Capitalism is unsustainable as a total system, not simply because it overproduces, but because the whole world it makes is **incompatible** with ecological balance. As we have seen, capital generates a society of addiction, as an overweening ego reproduces itself along the fault lines of destabilized ecosystems. As a result, an immense degree of self-deception and denial is built into the debate on climate, which tends to minimize the degree of damage to come, along with the degree of change necessary to build a world that no longer spews intolerable amounts of carbon in the air. Hence the craving for the technological fix that will enable continuing lives of reckless consumerism with the cocoon provide by capital. Trusting blindly in its innovative powers, people defend themselves against the “really inconvenient truth,” that capitalism led us into this nightmare and does not have the least clue as to how to free us from it.

## AT: Gibson-Graham

### PREFER OUR K - Psychoanalysis solve Gibson’s argument – we proved a space for individuals to have an interaction with the real

Daly**, Lecturer of International Studies @ University College of Northampton,** 2004 (Glyn, “Slavoj Zizek: Risking the Impossible,” Lacan.com, <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-primer.htm>, Kel)

Zizek's thought is concerned crucially to reactivate the dimension of the miraculous in political endeavour. For Zizek the miracle is that which coincides with trauma in the sense that it involves a fundamental moment of symbolic disintegration (2001b: 86). This is the mark of the act: a basic rupture in the weave of reality that opens up new possibilities and creates the space for a reconfiguration of reality itself. Like the miracle, the act is ultimately unsustainable - it cannot be reduced to, or incorporated directly within, the symbolic order. Yet it is through the act that we touch (and are touched by) the Real in such a way that the bonds of our symbolic universe are broken and that an alternative construction is enabled; reality is transformed in a Real sense.
The Real is not simply a force of negation against which we are helpless. In contrast to standard criticisms, what psychoanalysis demonstrates is that we are *not* victims of either unconscious motives or an infrastructural logic of the Real. If reality is a constitutive distortion then the ultimate lesson of psychoanalysis is that we are responsible for its reproduction. Miracles can and do happen. We are capable of Real acts that give reality a new texture and direction; acts that reflect this gap in the order of Being, this abyss of freedom. If Freud - in his theory of the unconscious - affirms an essential autonomization of the signifier, then what Zizek emphasises is an essential autonomization of the act: a basic capacity to break out of existing structures/cycles of signification. Far from being constrained by the notion of impossibility, Zizek's perspective is sustained and energised by the ontological potential for achieving the "impossible" through Real intervention. In this sense, Zizek's conception of the Real may be said to constitute both an inherent limit and an inherent opening/beginning: the radically negative dimension that is the condition of *creatio ex nihilo* and the political itself.

## AT: Robinson

### WAR ON TERROR – the strategy of contingency results in global war and destruction via the war on terrorism – only our alternative remedies this violence Jodi **Dean**, assc. Prof of political theory at Hobart and Williams smith **2007**

1. (Why Žižek for Political Theory? , http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/18/41, IJŽS Vol 1, No 1 <ajt>)
2. Slavoj Žižek’s work is indispensable to any effort to break out of the present political impasse, an impasse in which not only English speaking and European countries are caught but which threatens the entire world (not least because of the English speaking countries’ global war on/of terror). Žižek’s version of dialectical materialism (a combination of Hegel, Marx, and Lacan) enables political theorists to think better about passionate attachments to domination and anxiety in the face of freedom. I begin by approaching this impasse as a barrier to thought, particularly Left thought as it remains unable to think through or out of the current hegemony.

Contemporary Left theorists worry about dogmatism and fundamentalism. That is, they see fundamentalism as the primary political problem today. In response, some emphasize diversity and tolerance. They may approach diversity from the perspective of democratic debate, presenting a conception of politics premised on ideals of participation, inclusion, equality, and mutual respect. Others emphasize the multiplicity of ways of being in the world and the importance of an ethos of generosity towards those ways that may differ, radically, from our own.

None provides an adequate response to right wing fundamentalists, nationalist ideologues, and neoliberal capitalist globalizers. This motley crew of bad guys eschews debate and respect. It throws generosity back up against the generous, forever accusing them of not being respectful and generous enough. Its capitalist wing finds ever more creative and ingenious ways to profit. Diversity becomes multiculturalism™: parents can buy colorful multilingual dolls; producers can make action films with global appeal; educators can buy multicultural teaching kits designed to insure that their students are well-prepared to compete in a global economy. Likewise, democratic debate is easily capitalized: citizens seeking information are ready eyeballs for advertisers; politicians can champion the role of the Internet in keeping their constituencies connected, while telecoms, ISPs, chip, hardware, and software providers wisely nod their heads and pocket their vastly increased revenues. Against, this motley crew, generosity and tolerance won’t work. More precisely, as long as left intellectuals reject anything that smacks of dogmatism, as long as we reject a politics of conviction, as long as we refuse to draw a line in the sand and say enough is enough, the right will continue its exploitation and repression of most of the world’s peoples. The problem of Left political thought, then, is trying to theorize a politics that includes everything and everyone. But this isn’t politics. Politics involves division, saying “yes” to some options and “no” to others. A willingness to take responsibility for the divisions inseparable from politics seems to have been lost, or relegated to small, local, struggles. Particularly odd in radical pluralists’ and deliberative democrats’ focus on fundamentalism is its alliance with the central tenets of the bad guys themselves. Neoconservatives and neoliberals agree that fundamentalism is the most important political problem. Fundamentalism, they chorus, opposes the unfolding of freedom in the world.

## AT: Robinson

### Robinson misreads the role of violence in Zizek’s theory – even if its part of the revolution it is not a defining feature of a transcendent society

Thomassen**,** Department of Government, University of Essex, 2004

(Lasse, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations Volume 6 Issue 4 Page 558 - November <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00157.x?cookieSet=1>)
(3) According to Robinson, Lacanian political theory is inherently conservative. 'Lacanians', Robinson writes, 'urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these' (p. 260). And, about Mouffe, he writes that, 'as a Lacanian, Mouffe cannot reject exclusion; it is, on a certain level, necessary according to such a theory' (p. 263). Such assertions are only possible if we believe in the possibility of opposing exclusion to a situation of non-exclusion, which is exactly what post-structuralists have challenged. Moreover, the post-structuralist (and Lacanian) view does not necessarily preclude the removal of any *concrete* exclusion. On the contrary, the acknowledgement of the constitutivity of exclusion shifts the focus from exclusion versus non-exclusion to the question of *which* exclusions we can and want to live with. Nothing in the post-structuralist (and Lacanian) view thus precludes a progressive politics. Of course, this is not to say that a progressive politics is guaranteed—if one wants guarantees, post-structuralist political theory is not the place to look.
There are similar problems with Robinson's characterisation of Žižekek's 'nihilistic variety of Lacanianism': 'the basic structure of existence is unchangeable ... [Žižekek's] Lacanian revolutionism must stop short of the claim that a better world can be constructed' (p. 267). This, according to Robinson, 'reflects an underlying conservatism apparent in even the most radical-seeming versions of Lacanianism' (p. 268). Again, the constitutivity of exclusion and violence does not necessarily mean that 'the new world cannot be better than the old' (p. 268). The alternative to guaranteed progress is not necessarily conservatism or nihilism, and the impossibility of a perfect society does not exclude attempts at improvement—with the proviso that what counts as improvement cannot be established according to some transcendental yardstick.

## AT: Universal Bad

### They cannot win uniqueness – Capital will constantly annihilate the particular

Dean**,** Associate Professor of Political Theory at Hobart & William Smith, 2005Jodi, Zizek against Democracy, jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/files/zizek\_against\_ democracy\_new\_version.doc –
To summarize: Zizek argues that the democratic form runs up against a stain or non-universalizable kernel. Using Lacan, he understands this kernel as a stain of enjoyment, of an irreducible attachment to an intense pleasure-pain. The empty place of democracy is never fully empty. It comes up against points of non-universalizability—founding violence, ethnic particularity, the national Thing. Indeed, insofar as democracy has been a project of the Nation, its very starting point, its position of enunciation, requires this non-universalizable kernel. To the extent that liberal democracy tries to eliminate this stain, tries to exclude ethic fundamentalism and nationalist attachment, it necessarily fails. And, under conditions of late capitalism, the problem is even worse. Like liberal democracy, Capital wants to eliminate particular attachments. Liberal-democratic attacks on ethnic fundamentalism, then, serve capitalist ends at they attack some of the few remaining sites of opposition to capitalism. Nationalist, ethnic, racist violence thus persists today at the intersection of two modes of failed universalization—democracy and capitalism. The question is whether a new political universality is possible.

### Their criticism of universal politics is only possible within the space opened by an ethics of universalism

Zizek in 2000 Slavoj Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, page 102
So when we criticize the hidden bias and exclusion of universality, we should never forget that we are already doing so *within* the terrain opened up by universality: the proper critique of ‘false universality’ does not call it into question from the standpoint of pre-universal particularism, it mobilizes the tension inherent to universality itself, the tension between the open negativity, the disruptive power, of what Kierkegaard would have called ‘universality-in-becoming’, in the fixed form of established universality. Or – we have, on the one hand, the ‘dead’, ‘abstract’ universality of an ideological notion with fixed inclusion / exclusions and, on the other, ‘living’, ‘concrete’ universality as the permanent process of questioning and renegotiation of its own ‘official’ content. Universality becomes ‘actual’ precisely and only be rendering thematic the exclusions on which it is grounded, by continuously questioning, renegotiating, displacing them, that is, by assuming the gap between its own form and content, by conceiving itself as unaccomplished in its very notion. This is what Butler’s notion of the politically salient use of ‘performative contradiction’ is driving at: if the ruling ideology performatively ‘cheats’ by undermining – in its actual discursive practice and the set of exclusions on which this practice relies – its own officially asserted universality, progressive politics, should precisely openly practice performative contradiction, asserting on behalf of the given universality the very content of this universality (in its hegemonic form) excludes.

### We find universal politics in the space that justifies exclusion of particularity – annihilation is a symptom of the system of domination not universal politics

Zizek in 2000 Slavoj Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, page 104
The theoretical task is not only to unmask the particular content of inclusions / exclusions involved in the game, but to account of enigmatic emergence of the space of universality itself. Furthermore – and more precisely – the real task is to explore the fundamental shifts in the very logic of the way universality works in the socio-symbolic space: premodern, modern and today’s ‘post-modern’ notion and ideological practice of universality do not, for example, differ only with regard to the particular contents that are included / excluded in universal notions – somehow, on a more radical level, the very underlying notion of universality functions in a different way in each of the epochs. ‘Universality’ as such does not mean the same thing since the establishment of bourgeois market society in which individuals participate in the social order not on behalf of their particular place within the global social edifice but *immediately*, as ‘abstract’ human beings.

## AT: Universal Bad

### We do not erase particularity – our ethic embraces the particular as the gap which defines the universal

Zizek in 2000 Slavoj Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, page 216-217
Against these assertions, I am tempted to claim that, on the contrary, *the concept of universality emerges as the consequence of the fact that each particular culture is precisely* never *and for* a priori *reasons simple particular, but is always – already* in itself *‘crossed the linguistic borders it claims’.* In short, while Butler emphasizes that there is no universality without translation, I am tempted to claim that, today, it is crucial to emphasize the *opposite* aspect: *there is no* particularity *without translation.* This also means that the alternative ‘either the direct imposition of Western human rights as universal or the patient work of translation’ is ultimately a false one: the work translation has *always-already* begun, linguistic borders are *always-already* crossed – that is to say, every assertion of particular identity always-already involves a disavowed reference to universality. Or, to put it in Laclau’s terms: *prior to being the neutral link or common thread between a serious of particular entities, the “universal” is the name of a gap that forever prevents the particular itself from achieving its (self-)identity.*

### Universality does not exclude the other – it erases the existing edifice of domination

Zizek in 2000 Slavoj Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, page 217
Here, again, I think it is crucial also to emphasis the *opposite* aspect: what universality excludes is not primarily the underprivileged Other whose status is reduced, constrained, and so on, but *its own* permanent founding gesture – a set of unwritten, unacknowledged rules and practices which, well publicly disavowed, are none the less the ultimate support of the existing power edifice. The public power edifice is haunted also by its own disavowed particular obscene underside, by the particular practices which *break its own public rules* – in short, by its ‘inherent transgression’.

## AT: Grayling

### Grayling totally misses the boat – he is presumptuous and ignores objective violence

Leggett psychoanalytic psychotherapist 2008 Andrew Philosophy: Violence by Slavoj Žižek 6/21http://reviews.media-culture.org.au/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2696

Grayling berates Žižek for writing about violence but not dictating what should be done about it. In doing so, he misses Žižek’s argument entirely. Grayling’s review was so mistakenly presumptive, I found myself doubting whether he had actually read Žižek’s book. It was clear that Grayling wanted a book on violence to pretend to be a manual for how to stamp out violence, without noticing the violence of the boot that does the stamping.

Žižek’s critique is not one that universally condemns violence. He argues for the necessity of the revolutionary violence that arises when ‘individuals no longer fully identify the kernel of their being with their particular social situation’ (127-128), instead experiencing themselves as ‘forever “out of joint” with regard to this situation’ (128). Those who ‘lack a proper place’ (128) within a social structure may bring about ‘an abstract universality, its entering into actual existence, this produces violence: it violently disrupts a preceding organic poise’ (128).

Žižek anticipates Grayling by shouting his answer from the last page of his text: ‘The threat today is not passivity, but pseudo-activity, the urge to “be active”, to “participate, to mask the nothingness of what goes on’ (183). Žižek concludes this work at a point that is about to be tested in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Morgan Tsvangirai’s withdrawal from the presidential election run-off, on the grounds that his participation would unleash violent reprisals against all who supported him, is an act that would fit Žižek’s view of abstention as ‘a true political act: it forcefully confronts us with the vacuity of today’s democracies’ (183). If violence as ‘a radical upheaval of the basic social relativities’ is what the situation demands, then ‘sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do’ (183).

## AT: Race / Sex 1st

### Attempts to propose sex or class as the primary foundational difference engages in a requilting of signifiers where we mark sex or class as successful symbolizations – neither category transcends symbolization – they only testify to the existence of the real

Butler Senior Lecturer in the Department of English, Media Studies and Art History at the University of Queensland 2010 Rex International Journal of Zizek Studies 4.1 http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/228/321

It is something like this that explains Zizek’s break with Ernesto Laclau and Judith Butler in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. The terms of the dispute between the three thinkers here can often be misunderstood. Both Laclau and Butler in their different ways are relativist or historicist, for whom such things as class and the phallus do not operate as any kind of “original and final” instance (Butler 2000: 145). However, against this, Zizek does not assert some underlying real, like the old-fashioned class and sexual difference. If anything, he goes further than his opponents in doing away with any such transcendental signified. Indeed, Zizek’s point is that it is Laclau and Butler themselves who end up having to posit some ahistorical real in order to explain the endless “requilting” of signifiers they otherwise observe. It is they who end up having to resort to some ahistorical “Rock” that successive hegemonisations fail to symbolise, even though this is the position that Zizek is often associated with and indeed what they accuse Zizek of arguing for in their exchanges with him. So what then does Zizek oppose to Laclau and Butler? How does he not himself end up thinking class and sexual difference as some immoveable real that a series of symbolic rearticulations arises as the (necessarily failed) response to? Zizek often jokes that everything stands in for sex and class, except sex and class themselves. This can be understood as a version of that post-modern “transcoding” or “figural reading”, in which there is no ultimate motivation or explanation of things, but only a series of metaphorical substitutions of one explanation for another. But Zizek’s position is not quite this.

Rather, his exact point is that it is true: sex and class are never seen as such, do not function as any transcendental signified or ultimately determining instance. Every attempt to propose sex or class as a final explanation does only produce another requilting, another metaphorisation. But this only because of sex and class. Zizek agrees neither with a simple relativism without any transcendental signified or space outside of signification nor with the notion that sex and class are unchanging ahistorical rocks on which successive symbolisations founder. On the contrary, sex and class, in that manner we have seen before with Hegel’s critique of Kant’s transcendental subject of apperception, just are those successive symbolisations, what allows us to remark them as successive symbolisations. Any attempt to erect sex or class as a transcendental signified, what successive symbolisations stand in for, would reveal itself to be just another symbolisation; but this is sex and class, this is the effect of sex and class. In the manner of Hegel’s concrete universal – but, of course, also Zizek’s parallactic object – sex and class exist as both species and genus, only one of a potentially infinite number of master- signifiers and what all of these master-signifiers stand in for. It produces a split not between the symbolic and the real in terms of what can and cannot be symbolised, but within the symbolic itself. Sex and class are precisely Zizek’s parallactic objects: in attempting to think the real before the symbolic they produce a split within the symbolic, and thus testify to the real. To rephrase Zizek’s joke, we might say that not only does the “presence of the penis indicate the absence of the phallus” (Butler 2000: 131), but the very presence of the phallus indicates the absence of the phallus.

## AT: Psychoanalysis Bad

### The criticism is a necessary precondition for politics – their notion of the political relies on a post-modern detachment which makes political subjectivity impossible

Vighi & Feldner Cardiff University UK 2010 Fabio & Heiko International Journal of Zizek Studies 4.1 http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/239/325

Zizek argues that the self must embrace its own absolute otherness (negativity) to become subject, thus endorsing Hegel’s view that ‘tarrying with the negative’ is ‘the magical power’ through which the subject comes into being (Hegel 1977: 19). The Hegelian equation between Substance and Subject on the basis of their common ground in negativity is crucial to grasp Zizek’s view of our immersion in the socio-symbolic arena. In Hegel, the axis Substance-Subject is predicated upon a ‘disparity between the “I” and its object’, which should be intended reflexively as ‘the defect of both [...] or that which moves them’ (Hegel 1977: 21). This captures in a nutshell the passage from Kant to Hegel appropriated by Zizek: ‘the fissure between us (the subject) and the Absolute, is the very way the Absolute is already with us’ (Zizek 2008a: 91). In other words, what brings Substance to coincide with Subject is the very splitting that prevents each of the two notions from fully coinciding with themselves: ‘the Hegelian “subject” is ultimately nothing but a name for the externality of the Substance to itself, for the “crack” by way of which the Substance becomes “alien” to itself’ (Zizek 1993: 30).

This reading of Hegel belies the cliché that individuals and society are organic wholes forever prevented from truly connecting. Quite on the contrary, Zizek tells us, we are always connected with the social precisely because we are split, i.e. because we are never really connected with ourselves. Ultimately, there is no difference between my self-alienation (the fact that my unconscious prevents me from accessing the truth about myself) and my alienation in society, and the point is that precisely this shared impasse allows me to communicate (though, of course, communication never fully succeeds). Social and cultural exchanges are correlative to our attempts to deal with the impossibility of true communication, which is why the fundamental limit of the human condition is also its condition of possibility.

These considerations are at the heart of Zizek’s damning analysis of postmodern subjectivity. Increasingly at the mercy of capitalist ideology, the postmodern individual is fundamentally solipsistic and narcissistic, perceiving himself as detached from the socio- symbolic field. In today’s dominant form of subjectivity, existential self-fragmentation is conducive to aggressive individualism, which obfuscates the transformative potential of the subject. While the other is increasingly branded as a potential encroachment upon our fragile narcissistic balance (the other as “smoker”, “stalker”, “voyeur”, etc.), we tend to withdraw more and more into proto-psychotic solipsism.

The problem is, evidently, a political one, since breaking down the solipsistic wall of postmodern subjectivity should be seen as the first step towards the re-configuration of a collective political subject. Such a collective subject beyond fragile individualistic apathy, of course, would not be uncomplicatedly self-transparent. Instead, it would be deeply informed by its self-alienation, Zizek’s wager being that only the endorsement of our “lack to ourselves”, our radical finitude, can lead us not merely to make authentic contact with others, but also, more crucially, to imagine a true political intervention. Zizek’s “subject” thus re- appropriates the utopian urge inherent in what Lacan called ‘subjective destitution’ (see Lacan 1995: 8): the traumatic “fall of knowledge”, the assumption of the non-existence of the big Other and consequent evacuation of all subjective ideals and points of identification.3

In political terms, then, self-alienation is not a problem but the key to the solution. When Zizek claims that ‘[t]he leftover which resists “subjectivation” embodies the impossibility which “is” the subject: in other words, the subject is strictly correlative to its own impossibility; its limit is its positive condition’ (Zizek 1989: 209), he means not only that our being split is what guarantees our identity through its (the split’s) disavowal, but also that this explosive antagonism is simultaneously what makes us subjects. If the first step is the acknowledgement of the internal antagonism that divides us, the next one is its full assumption. As we shall explore below, this is decisive to map out Zizek’s attempt to politicise subjectivity as opposed to subjectivation, which is its necessary obverse, signalling our successful entrance in the socio-symbolic network through the swipe of (symbolic) castration.

## Capitalist Epistemology

### Their truth claims are trapped in a capitalist ontology which predetermines how knowledge is produced

Schiwy**,** PhD Candidate in Romance Studies at Duke, & Ennis**,** PhD Candidate in Lit at Duke, 2002

Freya and Michael, Nepantla: Views from the South 3.1 project muse

The essays gathered in this dossier respond to issues raised during the workshop “Knowledges and the Known: Capitalism and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” held at Duke University in November 2000. They address concerns about the possibilities for critical knowledge production at a moment when national state structures are reconfiguring into global institutions and when technologies (like gene prospecting) and epistemic regimes (like property rights and human rights) are installing the particular as a new universal, following the legacy of Enlightenment philosophy and Western political theory. They ask how knowledge production is linked to location and subjectivity and what the importance of these critical perspectives can be when neoliberal capitalism increasingly instrumentalizes and commodifies knowledge, reinforcing the growing dependence of universities around the world on corporate money. It is precisely within this context that Oscar Guardiola-Rivera engages current critical theory from the perspective of coloniality. Although the essays by Catherine Walsh and Javier Sanjinés address contemporary indigenous uprisings in the Andes, these movements are not their object of study. Instead of being about knowledge production *in* the Andes, all three of these articles are efforts to think about epistemology *from* the Andes.[1](http://proxy.lib.wayne.edu:2128/journals/nepantla/v003/3.1schiwy.html#endnote:1)

### Their argument divides the world into those who are capable and incapable of producing knowledge – this predetermines the questions we ask and the answers we formulate

Schiwy**,** PhD Candidate in Romance Studies at Duke, & Ennis**,** PhD Candidate in Lit at Duke, 2002

Freya and Michael, Nepantla: Views from the South 3.1 project muse

From these basic concerns we identified three broader topics to guide our workshop discussion. The first concerned the relationship between knowledge and subjectivity. The legitimization of the known as knowledge is one aspect of the modern need to designate subjects and [End Page 2] objects of knowledge in geopolitical terms, inscribing them with social, racial, and gendered characteristics. The Cold War reconfiguration of the division between theory and objects in terms of area studies implied and extended the definition of subjectivities and places that could legitimately partake in knowledge production and the definition of the concerns and questions to be addressed by it. What are the legacies of the connections between these social inscriptions, on the one hand, and the geopolitical and institutional locations of subjects and objects of knowledge, on the other? How can we evaluate the impact of the subject's deconstruction when facing what seem like renewed affirmations of “identity politics” in the North and South? How do we evaluate the epistemic capital of recent theorists emerging from the “South,” women and men of color whose theories are marketed, elaborated, and appropriated within the centers of economic and academic power? Does this favorable market situation indicate a change in the relation between social inscription and knowledge production within modernity/coloniality or is it a continuation of hegemonic structures that no longer require “identities” or “positionings”?

### The circulation of knowledge is a key byproduct of capital

Schiwy**,** PhD Candidate in Romance Studies at Duke, & Ennis**,** PhD Candidate in Lit at Duke, 2002

Freya and Michael, Nepantla: Views from the South 3.1 project muse

Our third topic was our need to address technology's role in the current processes of reshaping knowledge production in neoliberal capitalism. Capitalism not only allocates the funds for the creation of new academic and information centers, it also reproduces the structures and characteristics of the difference between places where investigation is articulated and places that are investigated. At the same time, capitalism is changing (fundamentally or qualitatively?) from a system that produces goods to one that creates value through financial transaction and the electronic circulation of information. New technologies are integral to this transformation, just as writing and print technology have accompanied capitalist-colonialist processes since the conquest of the Americas. Recent innovations in information technology (computers, internet, video), however, are opening new means and spaces of communication that allow participants to circumnavigate not only the state but also universities and, to a certain degree, the limitations of place. What is the impact of these processes on the production of knowledge?

# \*\*\*AFF ANSWERS\*\*\*

## Capitalism Good - War

### Imperial wars pre-date capitalism by centuries, war is illogical under capitalism because it destroys wealth

MacKenzie 3D.W. MacKenzie graduate student in economics at George Mason University Does Capitalism Require War? Monday, April 07, 2003 http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=1201

Perhaps the oddest aspect of these various, but similar, claims is that their proponents appeal so often to historical examples. They often claim that history shows how capitalism is imperialistic and warlike or at least benefits from war. Capitalism supposedly needs a boost from some war spending from time to time, and history shows this. Robert Higgs demonstrated that the wartime prosperity during the Second World War was illusory[i]. This should come to no surprise to those who lived through the deprivations of wartime rationing. We do not need wars for prosperity, but does capitalism breed war and imperialism anyway? History is rife with examples of imperialism. The Romans, Alexander, and many others of the ancient world waged imperialistic wars. The Incan Empire and the empire of Ancient China stand as examples of the universal character of imperialism. Who could possibly claim that imperialism grew out of the prosperity of these ancient civilizations? Imperialism precedes modern industrial capitalism by many centuries. Uneven wealth distribution or underconsumption under capitalism obviously did not cause these instances of imperialism. Of course, this fact does not prove that modern capitalism lacks its own imperialistic tendencies. The notion that income gets underspent or maldistributed lies at the heart of most claims that capitalism either needs or produces imperialistic wars. As J.B. Say argued, supply creates its own demand through payments to factors of production. Demand Side economists Hobson and Keynes argued that there would be too little consumption and too little investment for continuous full employment. We save too much to have peace and prosperity. The difficulty we face is not in oversaving, but in underestimating the workings of markets and the desires of consumers. Doomsayers have been downplaying consumer demand for ages. As demand side economist J.K. Galbraith claimed, we live in an affluent society, where most private demands have been met. Of course, Hobson made the same claim much earlier. Earlier and stranger still, mercantilists claimed that 'wasteful acts' such as tea drinking, gathering at alehouses, taking snuff, and the wearing of ribbons were unnecessary luxuries that detracted from productive endeavors. The prognostications of esteemed opponents of capitalism have consistently failed to predict consumer demand. Today, consumers consume at levels that few long ago could have imagined possible. There is no reason to doubt that consumers will continue to press for ever higher levels of consumption. Though it is only a movie, Brewster's Millions illustrates how creative people can be at spending money. People who do actually inherit, win, or earn large sums of money have little trouble spending it. Indeed, wealthy individuals usually have more trouble holding on to their fortunes than in finding ways to spend them. We are never going to run out of ways to spend money. Many of the complaints about capitalism center on how people save too much. One should remember that there really is no such thing as saving. Consumers defer consumption to the future only. As economist Eugen BÃ¶hm-Bawerk demonstrated, people save according to time preference. Savings diverts resources into capital formation. This increases future production. Interest enhanced savings then can purchase these goods as some consumers cease to defer their consumption. Keynes' claim that animal spirits drive investment has no rational basis. Consumer preferences are the basis for investment. Investors forecast future consumer demand. Interest rates convey knowledge of these demands. The intertemporal coordination of production through capital markets and interest rates is not a simple matter. But Keynes' marginal propensities to save and Hobson's concentration of wealth arguments fail to account for the real determinants of production through time. Say's Law of Markets holds precisely because people always want a better life for themselves and those close to them. Falling interest rates deter saving and increase investment. Rising interest rates induce saving and deter investment. This simple logic of supply and demand derives from a quite basic notion of self interest. Keynes denied that the world worked this way. Instead, he claimed that bond holders hoard money outside of the banking system, investment periodically collapses from 'the dark forces of time and uncertainty, and consumers save income in a mechanical fashion according to marginal propensities to save. None of these propositions hold up to scrutiny, either deductive or empirical. Speculators do not hoard cash outside of banks. To do this means a loss of interest on assets. People do move assets from one part of the financial system to another. This does not cause deficient aggregate demand. Most money exists in the banking system, and is always available for lending. In fact, the advent of e-banking makes such a practice even less sensible. Why hoard cash when you can move money around with your computer? It is common knowledge that people save for homes, education, and other expensive items, not because they have some innate urge to squirrel some portion of their income away. This renders half of the market for credit rational. Investors do in fact calculate rates of return on investment. This is not a simple matter. Investment entails some speculation. Long term investment projects entail some uncertainty, but investors who want to actually reap profits will estimate the returns on investment using the best available data. Keynes feared that the dark forces of time and uncertainty could scare investors. This possibility, he thought, called for government intervention. However, government intervention (especially warfare) generally serves to increase uncertainty. Private markets have enough uncertainties without throwing politics into the fray. The vagaries of political intervention serve only to darken an already uncertain future. Capital markets are best left to capitalists. Nor is capital not extracted surplus value. It comes not from exploitation. It is simply a matter of people valuing their future wellbeing. Capitalists will hire workers up to the point where the discounted marginal product of their labor equals the wage rate. To do otherwise would mean a loss of potential profit. Since workers earn the marginal product of labor and capital derives from deferred consumption, Marxist arguments about reserve armies of the unemployed and surplus extraction fail. It is quite odd to worry about capitalists oversaving when many complain about how the savings rate in the U.S. is too low. Why does the U.S., as the world's 'greatest capitalist/imperialist power', attract so much foreign investment? Many Americans worry about America's international accounts. Fears about foreigners buying up America are unfounded, but not because this does not happen. America does have a relatively low national savings rate. It does attract much foreign investment, precisely because it has relatively secure property rights. Indeed, much of the third world suffers from too little investment. The claims of Marxists, and Hobson, directly contradict the historical record. Sound theory tells us that it should. The Marxist claim that capitalists must find investments overseas fails miserably. Larry Kudlow has put his own spin on the false connection between capitalism and war. We need the War as shock therapy to get the economy on its feet. Kudlow also endorses massive airline subsidies as a means of restoring economic prosperity. Kudlow and Krugman both endorse the alleged destructive creation of warfare and terrorism. Kudlow has rechristened the Broken Window fallacy the Broken Window principle. Kudlow claims that may lose money and wealth in one way, but we gain it back many time over when the rebuilding is done. Kudlow and Krugman have quite an affinity for deficits. Krugman sees debt as a sponge to absorb excess saving. Kudlow see debt as a short term nuisance that we can dispel by maximizing growth. One would think that such famous economists would realize that competition does work to achieve the goal of optimum growth based on time preference, but this is not the case. While these economists have expressed their belief in writing, they could do more. If the destruction of assets leads to increased prosperity, then they should teach this principle by example. Kudlow and Krugman could, for instance, help build the economy by demolishing their own private homes. This would have the immediate effect of stimulating demand for demolition experts, and the longer term affect of stimulating the demand for construction workers. They can create additional wealth by financing the reconstruction of their homes through debt. By borrowing funds, they draw idle resources into use and stimulate financial activity. Of course, they would both initially lose wealth in one way. But if their thinking is sound, they will gain it back many times over as they rebuild. The truth is that their beliefs are fallacious. Bastiat demonstrated the absurdity of destructive creation in his original explanation of the opportunity costs from repairing broken windows. Kudlow is quite clear about his intentions. He wants to grow the economy to finance the war. As Kudlow told some students, "The trick here is to grow the economy and let the economic growth raise the revenue for the war effort"[ii]. Kudlow also praises the Reagan Administration for growing the economy to fund national defense. Here Kudlow's attempts to give economic advice cease completely. His argument here is not that capitalism needs a shot in the arm. It is that resources should be redirected towards ends that he sees fit. Kudlow is a war hawk who, obviously, cannot fund this or any war personally. He instead favors using the state to tax others to fund what he wants, but cannot afford. He seems to think that his values matter more than any other's. Why should anyone else agree with this? Kudlow tarnishes the image of laissez faire economics by parading his faulty reasoning and his claims that his wants should reign supreme as a pro-market stance. Unfortunately, it is sometimes necessary to defend capitalism from alleged advocates of liberty, who employ false dogmas in pursuit of their own militaristic desires. Capitalism neither requires nor promotes imperialist expansion. Capitalism did not create imperialism or warfare. Warlike societies predate societies with secure private property. The idea that inequity or underspending give rise to militarism lacks any rational basis. Imperialistic tendencies exist due to ethnic and nationalistic bigotries, and the want for power. Prosperity depends upon our ability to prevent destructive acts. The dogma of destructive creation fails as a silver lining to the cloud of warfare. Destructive acts entail real costs that diminish available opportunities. The idea that we need to find work for idle hands in capitalism at best leads to a kind of Sisyphus economy where unproductive industries garner subsidies from productive people. At worst, it serves as a supporting argument for war. The more recent versions of the false charges against capitalism do nothing to invalidate two simple facts. Capitalism generates prosperity by creating new products. War inflicts poverty by destroying existing wealth. There is no sound reason to think otherwise.

## Capitalism Good – War - Ext

### Capitalism is key to peace – markets decrease the potential for war

Bandow**,** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, 11/15/2005Doug, Spreading Capitalism is Good for Peace, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5193>

In a world that seems constantly aflame, one naturally asks: What causes peace? Many people, including U.S. President George W. Bush, hope that spreading democracy will discourage war. But new research suggests that expanding free markets is a far more important factor, leading to what Columbia University's Erik Gartzke calls a "capitalist peace." It's a reason for even the left to support free markets.

The capitalist peace theory isn't new: Montesquieu and Adam Smith believed in it. Many of Britain's classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden, pushed free markets while opposing imperialism.

But World War I demonstrated that increased trade was not enough. The prospect of economic ruin did not prevent rampant nationalism, ethnic hatred, and security fears from trumping the power of markets.

An even greater conflict followed a generation later. Thankfully, World War II left war essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized - and democratic - states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanual Kant, that republics are less warlike than other systems.

Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict. This contention animated some support outside as well as inside the United States for the invasion of Iraq.

But Gartzke argues that "the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states.

Thus, while "democracy is desirable for many reasons," he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom in the World, created by the Fraser Institute, "representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." Capitalism is by far the more important factor.

The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches.

Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends.

### Capitalism is key for peace – business prevents conflict

Bandow**,** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, 11/15/2005Doug, Spreading Capitalism is Good for Peace, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5193>

If market critics don't realize the obvious economic and philosophical value of markets - prosperity and freedom - they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest; globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war.

Nothing is certain in life, and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that peace is good business. And capitalism is good for peace.

## Capitalism Good – Warming

### Capitalism is key to solving global warming

Whitman 8 (Janet, February 19, pg. http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=317551)

Global warming may soon get a saviour more effective than Al Gore and his doomsday Power-Point presentations: capitalism. The former U.S. vice-president, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year for his work on climate change, is credited with bringing widespread attention to the issue. But the huge moneymaking opportunity in going green will be the big driver that leads to the reining in of the release of greenhouse gasses, experts say. Money already is pouring into environmental initiatives and technologies in the United States. Experts expect investment in the area to explode over the next few years if, as anticipated, the government here imposes restrictions on the release of gases believed to be behind climate change. "Capitalism will drive this," said Vinod Khosla, founding chief executive of Sun Microsystems and a longtime venture capitalist. Mr. Khosla, speaking on a panel at a recent investment summit on climate change at United Nations headquarters here, said getting consumers to curb their energy use has never worked -- unless they've had a financial incentive. "If we make it economic, it will happen," he said. The expected government-mandated cap on carbon emissions already is fueling innovation. Venture capitalists, for instance, are investing in new technologies that would make cement -- a major producer of carbon emissions -- actually absorb carbon instead. Cement makers could practically give the product away and reap the financial reward from government carbon credits.

### Global warming leads to extinction

Oliver Tickell, Climate Researcher, 8/11/2008, On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction, The Guardian, Proquest

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

## Capitalism Good – Transition Wars

### U.S. transition from cap sparks great power wars and omnicide

**Nyquist 5**

J.R. renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, WorldNetDaily contributing editor, “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash,” February 4, www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html

Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of anti-capitalist majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold millions would die of starvation. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be waged with mass destruction weapons and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs. But we cannot do this. As one observer recently lamented, “We drank the poison and now we must die.”

### **So would a global transition**

Kothari 82

Professor of political science at the University of Delhi, *Towards a Just Social Order*, p. 571

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major of powers – and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression – producing in their wake an intensification of the old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for eventual **global holocaust**.

## Capitalism Good – Poverty

### Capitalism decreases poverty – we’ll be the only ones with uniqueness because poverty is rapidly decreasing in the world of globalization

Norberg**,** author of In Defense of Capitalism, 2003

Johan, September 15, <http://www.cato.org/special/symposium/debate.html>

This is the revolution that is transforming the world today. As the United Nations Development Programme has observed, in the last 50 years global poverty has declined more quickly than in the previous 500. If we allow globalization to continue, this trend will continue as well. The World Bank has calculated that a substantial free trade agreement would add as much as $520 billion to global incomes by 2015, lifting 144 million people out of poverty.

## AT: Ethics - Util

### Evaluation of consequences is the utmost ethical act – their ethic allows infinite violence

Williams 2005 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth,

The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is **vital for self-reflection**, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. **Reducing the world** to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that **the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will.** But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the **precondition for freedom**. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

## Gibson-Graham

### Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance – the alternative never solves

J.K. Gibson-Graham, feminist economist, 1996, End of Capitalism

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can’t the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there’s no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there’s no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

## Robinson

### Their revolution cannot produce a better world because it replaces one system of violence for another – this makes it difficult for them to produce a reason to risk the violence they endorse

Robbinson**,** PhD, School of Politics U of Nottingham, 2004

(Andrew, ‘The Politics of Lack’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, May)

The centrality of the idea of betrayal and of the revolution which 'commits suicide' reveals another crucial problem with the nihilistic variety of Lacanianism. Since the basic structure of existence is unchangeable and the purpose of an Act is to accept (not to change) it, Lacanian revolutionism must stop short of the claim that a better world can be constructed. To be sure, an existing master-signifier can be replaced with a new one, but the basic structure of existence—including, crucially, the central role of violence, antagonism and exclusion—is **beyond question.** Žižek's failure to supplement his radical existential claims and his radical posturing with a substantive radical politics is not, therefore, an accident, as is often assumed. It reflects an underlying conservatism apparent in even the most radical-seeming versions of Lacanianism. For such theories, the crucial point is the celebration of lack, and specific political issues are subordinate to this goal. Even the specific policies of existing regimes are acceptable if they can be reformulated in a manner compatible with a belief in **the primacy of lack.** To take a recent example, Žižek denounced the American invasion of Afghanistan, but his demand for an alternative stops at the limits of the emotional investments of the participants: 'the punishment of those responsible' for September 11th should be done in a spirit of 'sad duty', not 'exhilarating retaliation' (2002, 244). Politics does not change, only its symbolic and libidinal inscription. The scathing denouncements Žižek makes of other theorists are therefore much like Mouffe's remarks on Rawls: because of Lacanians' tendency to establish themselves as a sect outside the mainstream, the remarks can involve a radical challenge to established categories, but the political issues at stake are rarely very substantial.
Since, furthermore, the Act or Event cannot establish a better world, the case for performing it becomes **extremely weak.** The point of the Russian and French revolutions for their participants and advocates was to build a new world which would overcome the exclusions and blockages of older systems. If, however, the new world cannot be better than the old, and if all the problems of the present must either return or be replaced by structurally similar problems, there seems **little reason to risk revolution**—especially the highly violent and dangerous kind preached by Žižek—rather than to tolerate the status quo. The case for the Act becomes almost religious: it is performed because it has a cleansing, freeing effect on the subject who undergoes it. This hardly seems, however, a solid basis for a political project. The problem is intensified when one takes into account the slippery manoeuvres required in order for the likes of Žižek and Badiou to keep their categories of a true Act/Event in line with their political preferences (for instance, to keep Lenin in and Hitler out).

### The concept of constitutive lack creates a stop gap in thinking – the negative is willing to ignore all of the consequences of their actions because it confuses a lack of rational sense with a politics of the void – you should reject their truth claims

Robbinson**,** PhD, School of Politics U of Nottingham, 2005 Andrew, [The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html), Theory & Event - V8, I1, project muse

The myth of constitutive lack, like all myths, has a closing role: it limits what can be said through an **"order not to think".**  On the other hand, the idea that creativity is motivated by a stance that "I-don't-know" has an opening effect.  As Callinicos puts it, 'what Badiou and Žižek calls the "void" in a situation is rather the set of determinate possibilities it contains, including that of transformation'[122](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn122).  If there is no irreducible "Real" beneath each blockage or lack, these can be overcome by creative action, as with the creative role of anomalies in paradigm-change in the sciences, and the creative role of "psychotic" philosophies such as those of Deleuze and Nietzsche.  The imperative in Lacanian theory is to "accept" lack, whereas the logic of a non-mythical idea of contingency is to use opportunities for openness as a **basis for creativity.**

## Robinson

The alternative is the ultimate act of black mail because it engages in blatant militarism and destruction of the other

**Robinson,** PhD, School of Politics, **and Tormey,** Prof Politics and Critical Theory at U of Nottingham, **2003**

(Andrew and Simon, What is *Not* to be Done! Everything you wanted to know about Lenin, and (sadly)

weren’t afraid to ask Zizek, <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeklenin.pdf> )
Zizek’s Lenin takes his place amongst the various elements in Zizek’s theory which operate as a conservative pull on the possibility of a transformative politics. Basically, Zizek is telling left radicals to abandon the notion of the state - even an authoritarian or totalitarian state - as a source of unwanted violence and oppression. Instead, he urges his readers to see the state as part of the solution to, rather than the problem of, reorganising social life. The state is a useful ally because it is the instrument through which to impose the Good Terror. Zizek denounces anti-statism as idealistic and hypocritical (RL 16, FA 171, DSST 271), and he attacks the anti-capitalist movement for its lack of political centralisation (RL 20). He does not offer **any alternative to the violence of the existing state,** or rather, the alternative he offers is (in his own phrase) a replacement of **Bad with Worse.** In Zizek’s world, to misquote an anarchist slogan, ‘whoever you fight for, the state always wins’. Opponents of imperialist war and the arms trade, of police racism and repression against demonstrators, will find **no alternative** in Zizek; while he may oppose the acts of existing states, his own preferred institutions look remarkably similar. He offers no alternative to statist violence, only a **new militarism,** a Good Terror and yet another Cheka. In this, he goes further even than Lenin, who in The State and Revolution committed himself, at least on paper, to the eventual elimination of the state. Here is one absolute Zizek never suspends, the universal which remains operative at the very heart of his own theory.
In a memorable cartoon, Wildcat insists: ‘I don’t just want freedom from the capitalists. I also want freedom from people fit to take over’ (ABC 24). This sums up what is wrong with Zizek’s position: for all his radical posturing, he restores the same kind of oppressive logic which operates in the present social system. Granted, he wishes it to operate under the banner of a new master-signifier, and to achieve such a displacement there needs to be a revolution. However, his entire project is geared towards the creation of people ‘fit to take over’, prepared to do what is necessary to restore order and make sure that the core dogmas of the Lacanian schema are not threatened by revolutionary energies which exceed ‘order’. In this way, Zizek acts as a representative of the strand of psychoanalysis which operates as a **normalising practice,** entrapping desire and existence within the Oedipal cage.
This places him firmly within the ‘party of order’, not within the ‘party of anarchy’, the proletariat (see Marx, 18th Brumaire p. 19). He may not be a ‘liberal’, but he still has little to offer politically, besides a politics of domination. Perhaps, then, there is a need to take up against Zizek the clarion-call he sounds against other theorists. He expects his reader to respond to his blackmail: stop shirking the Act, or you are not a committed revolutionary! He counterposes this to the rightist blackmail: stop supporting revolution, or you are a totalitarian! In this context, one should remember his call, during the Balkans wars, to reject the ‘**double blackmail’** (\*\*\*\*). The path to a committed radicalism, Zizek rightly observes, does not lead through the ‘moderation’ and ‘reasonableness’ of quasi-liberal politics. At the same time, however, it does not lead through the Zizekian Act either. It lies in the flows of desire and activity which exceed Zizek just as much as they exceed his opponents in their rejection of the traps of state, Party and master-signifier. It lies with a demand for the ‘impossible’ which is not a demand for Nothingness, but for new openings, greater

## AT: Violence K

### Their totalizing view of violence makes utilitarianism impossible – the provide no method to evaluate the magnitude of consequences

Grayling professor of philosophy at London University 2008 A.C. The Australian 6/28 http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23915460-16947,00.html

One disconcerting consequence of Zizek's take on violence is that this kind of moral imagination, which sees value in trying to rescue individuals from the danger and effects of violence, has to be seen not merely as beside the point or only a distraction from the real task, which is to "learn, learn and learn" about the true nature of violence, but as somehow complicit in its causes. That is why we must do nothing about it. The world may be in the midst of agonies, but we must be brave and not yield to the temptation to let any practicality sully the crucial task of theorising.

Zizek's main argument is that "subjective violence" -- demonstrators throwing stones at police, for example -- gets put into perspective when we switch viewpoint and see its background is not a neutral state of peaceful order but a far greater violence: the "objective violence" of the system, in particular the capitalist system, which is a monster feeding its gross appetites in blithe unconcern for people or the environment.

This is the "fundamental systemic violence" that the fat cats of the World Economic Forum, meeting annually at Davos, try to persuade themselves and us is in our interests. The leading figures among capitalists -- Bill Gates, George Soros -- go further and commit themselves to vast acts of philanthropy to prove the point, but the humanitarian mask conceals the face of exploitation that brought the surplus wealth into these philanthropic hands in the first place.

For Zizek, the philanthropists, whom he bizarrely calls "liberal communists", are "the enemy of every progressive struggle today". Terrorists, religious fundamentalists and corrupt bureaucrats are merely local figures in contingent circumstances, minor in comparison to these true enemies of progressive endeavour, who are the embodiment of the system that is itself the true violence in the world.

Zizek has much else to say, not least in analyses of media coverage of crime and unrest, and the role of fear in motivating attitudes in societies that think of themselves as liberal without being so. This is therefore and emphatically a topical book, whose approach to present preoccupations with terrorist attacks, Danish cartoons, the clash of civilisations and Islam is unconventional.

But the plausibility of its approach turns on the idea just described: that the main violence to which contingent acts of violence are a response is the globalised capitalist system itself and the apologetics that work on its behalf. The problem is not the rather wearisome invocation of views owed to Karl Marx, Jacques Lacan, Walter Benjamin, Alain Badiou and the other usual suspects who shape a certain (arguably implausible and certainly tendentious) way of thinking but the key logical fallacy in Zizek's premise, namely, the equivocation on the word violence.

You can, and should, complain vociferously about the harms and wrongs perpetrated by capitalism, but to describe them all as violence makes it impossible to distinguish between what happens when an multinational oil company raises its prices and when it pays to have people bullied off land above an oil deposit. **Being paid a low wage and being shot in the head are two different things**. If you use the same word for both you are muddling, weakening and misdirecting your argument.

This underlies the discussion in Zizek's book and it is why the discussion is not about the difference between the relatively infrequent situation in which, say, a small number of religious fanatics carry out mass murder and the standard situation in a Western liberal democracy in which security forces, existing at the implicit and occasionally explicit desire of its citizens, are maintained to enforce laws arrived at, and changeable by, non-violent political processes.

So there is no discussion here of the psychology of violence, or of the tensions and contradictions in non-totalitarian polities that occasionally express themselves violently, or of the forms of non-political violence (evidently this phrase has to be a contradiction for Zizek) that take place at football matches, with much greater frequency than politically motivated violence.

Can football violence be blamed on capitalism? Might Zizek think it is not really violence, despite broken heads and black eyes? On the evidence of this book, the answer to both would seem to be affirmative.

The least plausible idea is that the response to the systematic objective violence of the dominant ideology and its institutions, namely global capitalism, is to do nothing: "The first gesture to provoke a change in the system is to withdraw activity, to do nothing: the threat today is not passivity but pseudo-activity, the urge to 'be active', to 'participate'."

This is not consistent with the remark quoted earlier, that to oppose racism, sexism and religious obscurantism one has to compromise with the system, for to do any of these things is to be active and to participate; revealingly, the system's efforts to oppose these things have to be compromised with because they are tainted: presumably they are bad opposition to racism and so on, whereas non-capitalist anti-racism is ostensibly good anti-racism.

But such a view is altogether too self-serving, too precious. We have to fight on many fronts at once: against the system, with the individual, for the good whatever its shape and local name. The idea of the disengaged intellectual is an unappealing one, and lends weight to the distrust and suspicion that transfers to the intellectual's stock in trade, which is ideas. Moreover, ideas themselves are empty vessels unless applied, tested, connected with practice.

## Particular 🡺Universal (Perm Solves)

### Permutation solves their universal demands argument – universality only exists when particular struggles lay claim to universal politics

Butler**,** Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley 2004 Judith The Judith Butler Reader, page 339-340

My sense is that universality takes on its life precisely when it exceeds the strategic intentions of its speaker and that it is extremely mobile. What does and does not count as universal, as the universal reach of human obligation and right? That is a question that is constantly on the table. For instance, when the Vatican says that it is very interested in human rights but that homosexuality is an assault on “the human,” what it is in effect saying is that homosexual humans are destroying the human by virtue of their homosexuality, and the rights that pertain to humans do not pertain to them because they have in some sense disqualified themselves from the human by virtue of their homosexuality. If the homosexual then, nevertheless, gets up out of her or his abject state and says, “I am human, and I deserve some rights,” then in that moment there’s a certain paradox: universality is actually being asserted precisely by the one who represents what must be foreclosed for universality to take place. This is one who’s outside of the legitimating structure of universality but who nevertheless speaks in its terms and makes the claim without prior legitimation in order to assume legitimation as a performative consequence of the claim itself.

It seems to me that this is the position that gay rights activists are in time and time again, often in relation to other human rights activists groups. It took a long time, for instance, for Human Rights Watch or the ACLU or Amnesty International or other organizations to bring gay questions into human rights issues because they were afraid that they would lose the ability to have connections with certain countries, so they made the case for human rights on other grounds. So what does this mean? It means that the notion of universality is in crisis. As Laclau points out, any notion of universality is based on a foreclosure: there must be something that is not included within the universal; there must be something that is outside of it for the universal to make sense; there must be something that is particular, that is not assimilable into the universal. What happens when that particular – that particular identity that cannot lay claim to the universal and who may not – nevertheless lays claim to the universal? It seems to me that the very notion of universality is brought into an extremely productive crisis and that we get what might be understood as spectral invocations of the universal among those who have no established, legitimate right to make the claim.

So, I like the idea that universality is a discourse that is driven into crisis again and again by the foreclosures that it makes and that it’s forced to rearticulate itself. Where I agree with the project of hegemony that Laclau and Mouffe lay out is that for me the process of a universality that is brought into crisis again and again by what is outside of itself is an open-ended one. Universality, in that sense, would not be violent or totalizing; it would be an open-ended process, and the task of politics would be to keep it open, to keep it as a contested site of persistent crisis and not to let it be settled.

## Liberal Democracy Good (Perm Solves)

### The alternative 🡺 conservativism and fascism, liberal democracy key to anti-capitalist struggle only the permutation solves

McNaughton Global Studies, Social Science &Planning at RMIT 2008

Colm Capital & Class http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3780/is\_200807/ai\_n27901754/print?tag=artBody;col1

The limitations of Holloway's comprehension of the state are clearly apparent in his discussion of liberal democracy. He is scathing in his attacks on representative democracy, and writes that: 'through the ballot box resistance to class oppression is channelled into an act of individual, private choice between two or more oppressors' (Holloway, 1991: 243). Furthermore, he contends, 'to imagine that you can weaken the old forms of intercourse by working through them is nonsense' (Holloway, 1991: 258). While liberal democracy as practised in numerous states across the globe is often a barefaced example of class rule and manipulation, can we afford not to examine the nuances and levels of contestations that emerge and unfold historically? In being so dismissive, Holloway falls into the trap of mistaking his principles for strategy, which is a potentially dangerous, though common error. At the level of principle, Holloway is right that liberal democracy and its implicit illusions are essential to the efficient running of capitalism. But where does this understanding leave us? What spaces, discourses and resources are available for the facilitation of movement and struggle? At what level of political development do we find organised workers and others groups of the oppressed? What safeguards are available to defend civil society from the totalitarian left and right? And, perhaps most crucially, how are we to move from where we find ourselves now to where we want to be? In fashioning responses to these tactical and strategic questions, liberal democracy can and should not be so glibly dismissed. Laclau and Mouffe demonstrate that the left cannot merely dismiss the important political gains and spaces developed through liberal democracy, for to do so is merely to hand the baton to the far-right and fascist forces that want to do away with any semblance of democracy and accountability, permanently.

In the current context, the starting point for any emancipatory project must, at one level, be a defence of liberal democracy. The strategy must be grounded in a desire to defend and extend democracy to what I term 'deep democracy'. With that aim, we might press for more inclusive and participatory forms of democracy and globalisation. The language and nature of this articulation will depend very much upon the context. We must defend liberal democracy and the spaces it creates, wherever it exists, in order to create the time and space to be able to develop the people, communities, movements and alternatives that constitute an anticapitalist politics. The fundamental challenge for the foreseeable future, for those engaged in this process, will be that of co-option and compromise: that of how we are to relate to the liberal foundations of capitalist democracies, which work to exclude, in order to transform them into more inclusive forms.

## Universal Politics Bad

### Universal politics are the ultimate form of violence – exclusion of particular struggles assures literal death for persons who do not join the negatives struggle

Butler Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley 2000 Judith, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, page 21-22

Although the individual works and lives under a regime which calls itself ‘universality’ and ‘absolute freedom’, the individual cannot find **[themselves]** himself in the universal work of absolute freedom. Indeed, this failure of the individual to find a place in this absolute system (a critique of the Terror that anticipates Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel himself) exposes the limits to this notion of universality, and hence belies its claim to absoluteness. In Hegel’s view, to perform a deed one must become individuated; universal freedom, deindividuated, cannot perform a deed. All it can do is to vent its fury, the fury of destruction. Thus, within the condition of absolute terror, actual self-consciousness becomes the opposite to universal freedom, and the universal is exposed as qualified, which is to say that the universal proves to be a false universal. Because there is no room for self-consciousness or the individual under these conditions, and because no deed can be performed that conforms with the norm of mediated self-expression, any ‘deed’ that does appear is radically disfigured and disfiguring. For Hegel, the only deed that can appear is an anti-deed, destruction itself, a nothingness that comes of a nothingness. In his view, the sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death (para. 360).

Not only is the individual nullified and, therefore, dead, but this death has both literal and metaphorical meanings. That individuals were easily killed under the Reign of Terror for the sake of ‘absolute freedom’ is well-documented. Moreover, there were individuals who survived, but they are not ‘individuals’ in any normative sense. Deprived of recognition and of the power to externalize themselves through deeds, such individuals become nullities whose sole act is to nullify the world that has nullified them. If we are to ask: What kind of freedom is this?, the answer Hegel offers is that it is ‘the empty point of absolutely free self’, ‘the coldest and meanest of all deaths’, no more significant than ‘cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water’ (para. 590).

\*\*edited for gendered language \*\*

### The particularities that are excluded by their notion of the universal become less then human and open to annihilation

Butler Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley 2000 Judith, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, page 23

Although universality at first denoted that which is self-identical to all human beings, it loses that identification as a consequence of its refusal to accommodate all humans within its purview. It becomes not only split between an official and spectral universality, but it becomes dismembered into an estate system which reflects the divided character of the will and the discontinuities inherent in this version of universality. Those who are dispossessed or remain radically unrepresented by the general will or the universal do not rise to the level of the recognizably human within its terms. The ‘human’ who is outside that general will is subject to annihilation by it, but this is not an annihilation from which meaning can be derived: its annihilation is nihilism. In Hegel’s terms: “its negation is the death that is without meaning, the sheer terror of the negative that contains nothing positive…’ (para. 594).

## AT: Do Nothing Alt

### Even Zizek’s active nihilism destroys any meaningful politics of resistance to capitalism.

Robinson & Tormey**,** School of Politics @ the University of Nottingham**,** 2004(Andrew & Simon, “’Zizek is not a Radical,” <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf>, Kel)

What we want to suggest in this paper is that whilst Zizek’s recent work is intellectually ‘radical’ this is not, despite appearances to the contrary, a radicalism that left politics can draw sustenance or hope from. Zizek, that is, does not offer an alternative that is genuinely progressive or transformative, but only the empty negativity of what Raoul Vaneigem terms ‘active nihilism’.3 This negativity ‘breaks’ with the present but undermines, rather than generates a meaningful politics of resistance to the system. What Zizek delivers falls short of its promise. Zizek’s position should therefore be exposed and opposed by those concerned with advancing left-radical goals and anti-capitalist resistance.

## Psychoanalysis Bad

### Psychoanalytic critique causes passivity and destroys political struggle

Paul Gordon, psychotherapist living and working in London, Race & Class, 2001, v. 42, n. 4, p. 30-1

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation -- the evils of Stalinism in particular -- are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation -- as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human- kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only nonsense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understanding' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psychoanalysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.