# **Capitalism Kritik**

# Negative

## **Links**

### Generic

#### **Transportation infrastructure creates spatial barriers – differing modes of transport separate people based on class and race.**

Lobao et al ’07 [Dr. Linda M. Lobao is a professor of Geography, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Sociology at Ohio State University, Dr. Gregory Hooks is a professor at Washington State University, Ann R. Tickmayer is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at OSU, “THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY”, 2007, State University of New York Press, AD]

Spatial dimensions to social organization arise because society exists upon and across the land. Even where physical barriers to interaction are minimal, spatial boundaries often mark social divisions and delimit the overall nature and frequency of daily interactions. For either reason, there are distances beyond which regular daily social interaction do not extend. Where these barriers occur, social organization coalesces into cohesive sociospatial units and the structure of human activity is more oriented within a geography than outside a geography (White and Mueser 1988). This cohesive unit character justifies the use of certain sociospatial units for summarizing aspects of social organization. As objects of study, they represent superindividual social units with emergent characteristics. For instance, a place may be characterized as racially segregated or diverse, rich or poor. These place characteristics have tangible effects upon individuals that transcend personal characteristics. An individual raised in a poor, segregated, African American neighborhood has fewer opportunities than an individual raised in a wealthy, white, professional neighborhood. For this reason, analyses at the individual level often use classifications of places, such as urban-rural or metropolitan-nonmetropolitan location, as contextual attributes of individuals assumed to represent place characteristics. However, such classifications are only as good as the match between territorial units and actual spatial cohesion of social organization. The choice of territorial units to represent social concepts is as much a theoretical issue as an empirical one. Different theoretical assumptions lead to different notions of the boundaries of social cohesion and to different spatial units for analysis. Consider sociology’s classical theorists. Marx (1867) focused on national units to understand the nature of capitalism. He recognized that as the geographic scope of production and consumption expands, so does the geographic scope of competition. This expanded geographic competition for capital drew together the common interests of capitalists within an area. In this sense, economic interaction became the bounding force in differentiating individual societies from each other. Conversely, Weber’s (1889) view of trade and transportation as external limitations on internal forms of social organization led him to focus on more tightly bounded spatial units. Here cultural cohesion became the mechanism for place formation in space. The city particularly was a central arena of social interaction and agreements arising from trade relations (Weber [1921] 1978a:1218–1219). Ecological approaches have an interest in other place-based units. These approaches stress that social-organizational linkages are inextricably interwoven with space through transportation and communications technology (Hawley 1981, 1986). Organizational functions locate in places providing maximum access to and control of interarea flows of products and information. This gives rise to regional geographical formations such as metropolitan areas, the bounds of which readily supersede governmental spatial jurisdictions associated with cities, states, and nations (McKenzie 1933). Here the friction of space comprising the material conditions creates social cohesion for place formation.

#### **And, current transportation infrastructure favors the well-off.**

Lobao et al ’07 [Dr. Linda M. Lobao is a professor of Geography, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Sociology at Ohio State University, Dr. Gregory Hooks is a professor at Washington State University, Ann R. Tickmayer is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at OSU, “THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY”, 2007, State University of New York Press, AD]

Similarly, the national and urban bias of welfare reform policy is manifest in the lack of attention to spatial variation in the numerous impact studies attempting to assess its success or failure (CLASP 2001; Jones et al. 2003; Loprest 1999; Moffitt 2002). There are studies that document state differences in policy and program formation (Burt, Pindus, and Capizzano 2000; Lieberman and Shaw 2000; Nathan and Gais 2001; Soss et al. 2001), but little effort has been made to determine whether spatial factors influence outcomes. Some national-level research distinguishes between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan locations where differences are few, most likely because of the lack of adequate geographic detail (Lichter and Jayakody 2002; Weber et al. 2002). The metro/nonmetro distinction obscures variation within each of these categories, most notably the difference between central city and suburban locations and between adjacent and nonadjacent rural locations. The most comprehensive review of existing studies either permitting finer geographic distinction or comparing research conducted in different locations shows that the biggest differences are not between rural and urban or metro and nonmetro but between disadvantaged places within metro and nonmetro places compared to more affluent areas in each. Specifically, central cities and nonadjacent rural counties share similar problems in contrast to suburban and adjacent rural counties (Fisher and Weber 2002). Limited evidence suggests caseload declines have occurred disproportionately in the suburban areas with cases becoming more concentrated in central urban places and rural counties (Katz and Allen 2001; Weber 2001). Residents of both remote rural and central city locations groups face similar barriers to employment including lack of jobs, transportation, and child care (Fisher and Weber 2002). Numerous questions remain about spatial variation in devolution and welfare reform outcomes.

#### **Urban development creates inequality.**

Lobao et al ’07 [Dr. Linda M. Lobao is a professor of Geography, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Sociology at Ohio State University, Dr. Gregory Hooks is a professor at Washington State University, Ann R. Tickmayer is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at OSU, “THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY”, 2007, State University of New York Press, AD]

Similar parallels can be drawn with inequality research at the urban scale. Two sets of work, each focusing on how the urban context molds stratification, can be delineated. One is more concerned with inequality processes internal to cities, reflected in research on intracity segregation, poverty, and other social exclusion (Brooks-Gunn et al. 2000; Wilson 1987), and also in research on local development such as through urban growth machines (Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch et al. 2000). The second body of work is concerned with inequality processes across cities, reflected in research on comparative urban development (Sassen 2000; Zukin 1991). From the Chicago school onward, sociologists have theorized urban development (Feagin 1998; Soja 1989; Walton 1993). They also have long identified specific social forces creating inequalities across and within cities. For example, forces internal to the city, such as class actors and labor market, racial/ethnic, political, and cultural attributes as well as external forces such the global economy and state policy, are often implicated (Molotch et al. 2000; Walton 1993; Zukin 1991). The urban literature has a set of inequalities commonly addressed, typically poverty, unemployment, housing, education, segregation, and crime (Charles 2003; Gottdiener 1994; Jargowsky 1997; Logan et al. 2004; Massey and Denton 1993; O’Connor et al. 2003; Small and Newman 2001; Wilson 1987). There are established methodological protocols (Brooks-Gunn et al. 2000; Sampson et al. 2002; Small and Newman 2001). Research questions are framed with a city or locally centered resolution in mind, with cities and neighborhoods as concrete testing grounds. In sociology, the city is virtually synonymous with place as seen in recent books (Frazier et al. 2003; Jargowsky 1997; Orum and Chen 2003). The subnational scale tends to be defined by omission in both the crossnational and urban inequality traditions, but some interest has always been evident. Some development sociologists turn downward to examine regional inequalities (Bunker 1985; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Cardoso and Falleto 1979). Contemporary urban researchers have reached beyond city limits. Some argue for a view of the city as a “metropolitan region” whose political economy influences hinterland development (Feagin 1998; Gottdiener 1994). Researchers studying poverty in the urban core link it to suburbanization processes and labor market mismatches (Fernandez and Su 2004) and to regional political economic forces denoted in the “metropolitics” literature (Dreier et al. 2001; Orfield 1997). For both the cross-national and urban traditions, however, attention to inequality broadly across subnational space remains outside their customary domains of concern. The former provides a nation-state and globally centered view of inequality where subnational variation is typically taken into little account; the latter provides a city-centered view that while illuminative in its own right, runs the danger of reducing subnational territory to a network of large cities and obscuring inequality processes outside these areas.

## Impacts

### Queer Democracy

#### The isolation of queers reinforces the false freedom to choose in elections and undermines democracy

Penney ’04 (James Penney, Assistant Professor in the Cultural Studies Program at Trent University, “(Queer) Theory and the Universal Alternative” pgs. 3-4, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)

When I rediscovered the leaflet in the chaos of my move away from Ithaca, I realized that my relation to it had been hysterical: I was reluctant to address its traumatic content, unwilling to excavate my multiple frustrations at the apparent impossibility of being a homosexual and a socialist in America. And yet I couldn't really forget about it either: though not an American citizen and therefore unable to vote, I found myself equally unable simply to dismiss the leaflet as a mere inconsequential symptom of the pseudo-democracy that America has always been, or unequivocally to endorse the snooty CBC/Queen Street condescension of my fellow Canadian Lefties toward the primitive, superficial, liberal (in the worst psychologistic sense), irremediably ideological, and thoroughly depressing state of American political discourse. "Those poor Americans," the far-from-irrelevant logic goes. "They either unquestioningly submit to the individualistic fantasy of the American Dream in order to participate in the 'political process,' or they become hermetically imprisoned in their pseudo-political anti-statist minoritarianism, too cool and too radical to condescend to the public sphere." After six years in the United States, I've now become aware that my inability to swallow much of contemporary queer theory—authored overwhelmingly by young, elite-educated Americans with relatively narrow political horizons—is mostly due to the manner in which it articulates numerous political assumptions fundamentally alien to my own socialization in a country whose political differences from the US are insufficiently appreciated in that nation, and in which extremes of climate and geography have engendered a collectivist ethos in many ways fundamentally hostile to the American-style extreme individualism with which I had lived for so many years.¶ But the interest of this sort of political autobiography is in this context undoubtedly limited. What—you might now find yourself impatiently wondering if you don't already [End Page 3] know—were the contents of this famous pamphlet? And what exactly was my problem with it? Published by a coalition of queer voters in New York called the Empire State Pride Agenda, the pamphlet presented extremely selective profiles of the main candidates, both Democrat and Republican, running for the offices of President, US Senator, State Senator, and Member of the State Assembly. Each profile summarized the history of a candidate's positions with respect to rights issues of concern to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons. The profiles made no concerted effort to represent the candidates' perspectives on any other issue: gun control, education, foreign policy, the death penalty, taxation, health care (generally speaking, that is to say above and beyond the issues related to AIDS-related illness and reproductive rights); only policies directly concerning civil rights for nonheterosexual citizens were thoroughly broached.¶ I should confess that once I got the general idea I threw the pamphlet away in disgust: "Am I supposed to feel interpellated," I asked myself in full hysterical Althusserian mode, "by this utterly pseudo-political claptrap?" Is this what it means to be gay and political in America? "What kind of political subject is this piece of political literature presupposing?" I further wondered to myself as my anger began to give way to cool radical-democratic rationalism. Does it not implicitly suggest, I further mused, that I vote for the fiscally conservative homosexual or queer-friendly Republican in favor of capital punishment and low corporate taxes instead of the Democrat pushing a patients' bill of rights and the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry who spoke out against gay marriage and domestic partnership benefits? And more fundamentally, is there not something even more disturbingly wrong with the picture the pamphlet paints; does it not commit a sin more fundamentally original: that it simply rehearses the already existing binary of Democratic or Republican political "options," rather than systematically uncovering how this apparent "choice" represents a tragic caving-in to the logic of capital; how it utterly wimps out on the only truly critical alternative, which is to create an authentic political choice, to insist that the liberal-multiculturalist/identitarian-postidentitarian framework might not in fact be the only possible, as they say, game in town?1 [End Page 4]

### Colonialism

**Capitalism reinforces imperialism, racism, and colonialism**

**Strong ‘7** (Edward Strong, Writer for Free Pacific Press, “American Ideology: Racism Welded into Capitalism” Pacific Free Press, January 26, 2007, http://www.pacificfreepress.com/news/1/806-american-ideology-racism-welded-to-capitalism.html)

**Capitalism uses racism to justify slavery and war, and to legitimise military occupations and colonialism.** **It seeks to create division in the working class, to turn us against each other when we should be uniting and fighting the system as whole**. ¶ Racism and Settler Colonies¶ **The US was born a settler colony, that unique product of largely British (but also European) migration during the era of empire, which was to leave a permanent Anglo-Saxon footprint in such disparate lands as North America and Australia.¶ The settler colony produced a quite different dynamic and mentality from that of Europe and Asia, both of which were characterized by the relative continuity of their native populations.¶ The establishment of settler colonies meant the conquest and brutal destruction of the native populations.** ¶ It is impossible to understand the psychology of the Americans, without understanding what they did to the Indians. This was not ethnic cleansing but something closer to ethnic extermination. One of the myths that surrounds American history is that it has been relatively non-aggressive and, of course, anti-colonial. **¶ The new colonial settler society was by its very nature expansionist and aggressive, with an insatiable appetite for territory**. ¶ **It was characterized by aggressive expansionism, acquisitive materialism, and an overarching ideology of civilization that encouraged and justified both.** ¶ It bred both a particularly abhorrent form of racism and a new kind of capitalism.¶ With a seemingly limitless supply of land, every white male settler could ultimately fulfill their dream of becoming a landowner.¶ America's restless and constant desire for expansion is rooted in its settler origins. ¶ The settlers constantly set the agenda of government when it came to the theft of Indian land, irrespective of the treaties that the government had solemnly agreed with the Indians. [1]¶ Britain: The Founder of Modern Racism¶ **Capitalism causes racism, it uses it to justify slavery and war, to legitimise military occupations and colonialism**.¶ Capitalism seeks to create division in the working class, to turn us against each other and waste our energies fighting other workers when we should be uniting and fighting the system as whole.¶ Racism is a centuries old theory that is used to justify a global system of discrimination against ethnic minorities.¶ It stems from Britainâ€™s role as a colonial power - seizing control of Africa and India and looting them of food, minerals and precious stones.¶ In Africa the **British ruling class found a massive supply of cheap manpower waiting to be tapped. 115 million Africans were forcibly removed and taken to work against their will in America on cotton, tobacco and sugar plantations.¶** At home, the British ruling class attempted to present themselves as democrats and "good christians".¶ To justify this system of cruel and despicable exploitation the capitalists developed the theory of modern racism.¶ Today, **imperialism has not died**. **The advanced capitalist states are still imperialists that exploit the former colonies and keep billions of people below the poverty line. [**2] ¶ America: Racism Is in Your [White] Mother's Milk¶ **America is a colonial society**. **This is reflected the brutal racism that was a major factor in the founding of modern America.¶ All capitalist colonial-settler societies, such as the USA, and Israel, have been founded on such attitudes towards indigenous peoples.¶** Racism â€” treating and judging people on the basis of superficial physical attributes, particularly skin colour â€” is endemic to capitalism.¶ Its pervasiveness under capitalism leads many to think that it is a â€œnaturalâ€ if unfortunate aspect of human history. However, the above examples suggest that racism is tied to particular social interests.¶ **Capitalism Bloomed on Cheap and Slave Labour¶ The European colonial expansion into the Americas that was the basis for the development of capitalism posed the problem of creating a cheap labour force in the new colonies.¶** It is not well known that the forced labour that was essential to the commercial plantations of North and South America and the Caribbean initially consisted not just of kidnapped Africans but also of indentured white European servants.¶ However, early class struggles such as the 1676 â€œBaconâ€™s rebellionâ€ in Virginia in which black and white labourers launched an armed insurrection convinced the colonial rulers and plantation owners they needed an ideological prop to divide the labouring poor.¶ Racist ideas are fostered not just by the conscious use of â€œdivide and ruleâ€ by the ruling class, the paranoia of small business people under economic insecurity, and the xenophobic nationalism of reformist labour misleaders.¶ They are also fostered by the relative advantages that have gone to all people socially categorised as â€œwhiteâ€. Indeed, that has helped racism to continue even after it has ceased to be official policy.¶

#### Coloniality guarantees permanent global war; Modern Subjectivity is Based on A Naturalization of Radical Skepticism about The Humanity of Racialized Others.  The Justification of Colonial War and Enslavement builds the need for structural violence into the very structure of the subject.

Maldonado-Torres 2007 (Nelson, asst. professor Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, “On the Coloniality of Being.” Cultural Studies 21 2&3, pp. 243-8.)

 Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations.[14](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0014) Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and everyday. The project of colonizing America did not have only local significance. Quite the contrary, it became a model of power, as it were, or the very basis of what was then going to become modern identity, inescapably framed by world capitalism and a system of domination structured around the idea of race. This model of power is at the heart of the modern experience. Modernity, usually considered to be a product of the European Renaissance or the European Enlightenment, has a darker side, which is constitutive of it.[17](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0017) Modernity as a discourse and as a practice would not be possible without coloniality, and coloniality continues to be an inevitable outcome of modern discourses.How did the coloniality of power emerged? Quijano locates it in discussions about whether the Indians had souls or not. New identities were created in the context of European colonization: European, white, Indian, black, and mestizo.[18](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0018) A characteristic feature of this type of social classification is that the relation between the subjects is not horizontal but vertical in character. That is, some identities depict superiority over others. And such superiority is premised on the degree of humanity attributed to the identities in question. The 'lighter' one's skin is, the closer to full humanity one is, and viceversa.[19](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0019) As the conquerors took on the role of mapping the world they kept reproducing this vision of things. The whole world was practically seen in the lights of this logic. This is the beginning of 'global coloniality'.[20](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0020) It is true that in 1537 the Pope declared the Amerindians as human. Yet as Quijano points out 'from then on, the idea that non-Europeans have a biological structure that is not only different from that of Europeans but also inferior, was imprinted on intersubjective relations and social practices of power'.[21](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0021) It is clear that the meaning of race has changed throughout the centuries, and that 'raza' did not mean in the sixteenth century what it came to mean at the height of the biological revolution in the nineteenth century that produced taxonomies based on a formal biological category of race. Yet, there was a commonality between nineteenth century racism and the attitude of the colonizers in regard to differences in degrees of humanity. In some ways, scientific racism and the very idea of race were the most explicit expressions of a widespread and general attitude regarding the humanity of colonized and enslaved subjects in the Americas and Africa in the sixteenth century. I'd like to suggest that what was born in the sixteenth century was something more pervasive and subtle than what at first transpires in the concept of race: it was an attitude characterized by a permanent suspicion. Enrique Dussel states that Hernán Cortés gave expression to an ideal of subjectivity that could be defined as the ego conquiro, which predates RenéDescartes's articulation of the ego cogito.[22](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0022) This means that the significance of the Cartesian cogito for modern European identity has to be understood against the backdrop of an unquestioned ideal of self expressed in the notion of the ego conquiro. The certainty of the self as a conqueror, of its tasks and missions, preceded Descartes's certainty about the self as a thinking substance (res cogitans) and provided a way to interpret it. I am suggesting that the practical conquering self and the theoretical thinking substance are parallel in terms of their certainty. The ego conquiro is not questioned, but rather provides the ground for the articulation of the ego cogito. Dussel suggests as much: 'The 'barbarian' was the obligatory context of all reflection on subjectivity, reason, the cogito'.[23](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0023) But the true context was marked not only by the existence of the barbarian, or else, the barbarian had acquired new connotations in modernity. The barbarian was a racialized self, and what characterized this racialization was a radical questioning or permanent suspicion regarding the humanity of the self in question. Thus, the 'certainty' of the project of colonization and the foundation of the ego conquiro stand, just like Descartes's certainty about the cogito, on doubt or skepticism. Skepticism becomes the means to reach certainty and provide a solid foundation to the self. The role of skepticism is central for European modernity. And just like the *ego conquiro* predates and precedes the *ego cogito*, a certain skepticism regarding the humanity of the enslaved and colonized sub-others stands at the background of the Cartesian certainties and his methodic doubt. Thus, before Cartesian methodic skepticism (the procedure that introduced the heuristic device of the evil demon and which ultimately led to the finding of the cogito itself) became central for modern understandings of self and world, there was another kind of skepticism in modernity which became constitutive of it. Instead of the methodical attitude that leads to the ego cogito, this form of skepticism defines the attitude that sustains the ego conquiro. I characterize this attitude as racist/imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism. It could also be rendered as the imperial attitude, which gives definition to modern Imperial Man.[24](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0024)Unlike Descartes's methodical doubt, Manichean misanthropic skepticism is not skeptical about the existence of the world or the normative status of logics and mathematics. It is rather a form of questioning the very humanity of colonized peoples. The Cartesian idea about the division between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* (consciousness and matter) which translates itself into adivide between the mind and the body or between the human and nature is preceded and even, one has the temptation to say, to some extent built upon an anthropological colonial difference between the ego conquistador and the ego conquistado. The very relationship between colonizer and colonized provided a new model to understand the relationship between the soul or mind and the body; and likewise, modern articulations of the mind/body are used as models to conceive the colonizer/colonized relation, as well as the relation between man and woman, particularly the woman of color.[25](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0025) This difference translates itself into European and non-European and into lighter and darker peoples, or what W.E.B. Du Bois refers to as the color-line.[26](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0026) If the ego conquiro anticipates in some ways the subjective turn and solipsism of the eg*o cogito*, then Manichean skepticism in some ways opens the door and shapes the reception of Cartesian skepticism. This point of view also leads to the idea that it would be impossible to provide an adequate account of the crisis of modern Europe without reference, not only to the limits of a Cartesian view of the world, but also to the traumatic effects of Manichean misanthropic skepticism and its imperial ethos. Misanthropic skepticism doubts in a way the most obvious. Statements like 'you are a human' take the form of cynical rhetorical questions: Are you completely human? 'You have rights' becomes 'why do you think that you have rights?' Likewise 'You are a rational being' takes the form of the question 'are you really rational?' Misanthropic skepticism is like a worm at the very heart of modernity. The achievements of the ego cogito and instrumental rationality operate within the logic that misanthropic skepticism helped to established. That is why the idea of progress always meant in modernityprogress for a few and why the Rights of Man do not apply equally to all, among many other such apparent contradictions.Misanthropic skepticism provides the basis for the preferential option for the ego conquiro, which explains why security for some can conceivably be obtained at the expense of the lives of others.[27](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0027) The imperial attitude promotes a fundamentally genocidal attitude in respect to colonized and racialized people. Through it colonial and racial subjects are marked as dispensable. When the conquerors came to the Americas they did not follow the code of ethics that regulated behavior among subjects of the crown in their kingdom.[31](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0031) Their actions were regulated by the ethics or rather the non-ethics of war. One cannot forget that while early Christians criticized slavery in the Roman Empire, later Christians considered that vanquished enemies in war could legitimately be enslaved.[32](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0032) Indeed, in the Ancient world and the Middle Ages it was for the most part legitimate to enslaved some people, particularly prisoners of war and the vanquished. What happens in the Americas is a transformation and naturalization of the *non-ethics of war*, which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries, to a more stable and long-standing reality of*damnation*. Damnation, life in hell, refers here to modern forms of colonialism which constitute, a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very physical and ontological constitution of people - by virtue of 'race' - and not to their faith or belief.[33](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0033) That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas to the suspicion that the conquered people, and then non-European peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery and serfdom. Sepúlveda draws on Aristotle to justify this position, but he was more than anything translating into categories ideas that were already becoming common sense. Later the idea was going to be solidified in respect to the slavery of people from Africa and become stable until today under the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Joshua Goldstein complements this account by depicting conquest as an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime.[37](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a776417611&fulltext=713240928#NOTE0037) He argues that to understand conquest one needs to examine: (1) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; (2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination, and (3) dependence on exploiting women's labor. My argument is that these three things come together in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas.Misanthropic skepticism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects. Once vanquished, they are said to be inherently servants and their bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control. The ethics of the ego conquiro ceased to be only a special code of behavior for periods of war and becomes in the Americas - and gradually the modern world - by virtue of misanthropic skepticism, the idea of race, and the coloniality of power, a standard of conduct that reflects the way things are - a way of things whose naturalization reaches its climax with the use of natural science to validate racism in the nineteenth century. The way things supposedly are emerge from the idea of how a world is conceived to be in conditions of war and the code of behavior that is part of it. What happens in modernity is that such a view of the world and code of conduct is transformed - through the idea of race - and becomes naturalized. Thus, the treatment of vanquished peoples in conditions of war is perceived as legitimate long after war is over. Later on, it won't be their aggression or opposition, but their 'race'which justifies continued serfdom, slavery, and rape. This represents a break with the European medieval tradition and its ethical codes. With the initial exploitation of Africa and the colonization of the Americas in the fifteenth century, the emerging modernity comes to be shaped by a paradigm of war.¶

## Alternatives

### Martin/Non-Violence

Read before running this alternative:

Martin presents 5 key principles for an alternative to capitalism through nonviolence.

It is very important to fully read through all the cards to understand the alternative. You should use the 5 principles and the checklist for campaigning (presented in the card that extends the alternative) to articulate why the perms and aff can’t reject capitalism and engage in your form of nonviolent rejection of capitalism. Martin also explains how a concrete policy action to rejecting capitalism is bad. We have to discuss capitalism and our strategy to reject it before we can actually give a plan. In fact, Martin further explains that having a concrete plan like the aff to reject capitalism will fail, because we have to constantly change our goals and ways of thinking as new information is accessible to us. The cards have imbedded answers to vague alternatives bad and how certain vagueness is actually key to education and including everyone in the critical discussion. Also, you DO provide 5 principles and a checklist for your alternative, so at least you aren’t as vague as other alternatives are. The WRIGHT 10 cards also works very well with this alternative, because they explain how capitalism groups the laborers together and allows them to communicate and come together for this discussion of rejecting capitalism. The cards also present an ultimatum: we either have the alternative where we completely reject capitalism and come together for a nonviolent alternative, or the proletariats will come together in violence instead and revolt against capitalism. In the violent alternative, we will eventually fall back to capitalism and elitism (Martin 01)

**Alt: reject capitalism through nonviolence led by 5 key principles**

**Martin 01** (Brian Martin, Professor at the University of Wollongong in Australia, PhD in theoretical physics from the University of Sydney, Published by London: War Resisters’ International, 2001, “Nonviolence Versus Capitalism” <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/01nvc/nvcp05.pdf>)

To develop a nonviolence strategy against capitalism, **it is essential that there be a nonviolent alternative: a system for economic production and distribution, including methods for making decisions.** **It is no good just being against capitalism without an idea of what is going to be better.** From a nonviolence point of view, **the trouble with the conventional socialist strategies is that they depend ultimately on violence, via reliance on state power, to both end capitalism and bring about a socialist alternative.** **A useful way to proceed is to spell out** **the principles that the alternative should fulfill and then** to examine some proposals and visions **to see how well they measure up**. The principles in the box were presented in chapter 3, where it was noted that capitalism does not satisfy any of them. **Principle 1: Cooperation, rather than competition**, should be the foundation for activity. **Principle 2: People with the greatest needs should have priority in the distribution of social production**. **Principle 3: Satisfying work should be available to everyone who wants it**. **Principle 4: The system should be designed and run by the people themselves, rather than authorities or experts**. **Principle 5: The system should be based on nonviolence**. The principles are simply a device for helping to think about what is desirable. There are other principles that could be proposed. Principle 5 alone is quite sufficient to rule out most economic systems, real or ideal. Actually, the first four principles can be interpreted as aspects of principle 5, interpreted in an expansive fashion. **Nonviolence as a tool for social struggle allows maximum participation, and therefore any system that is run by a few people is open to nonviolent challenge**. **The logical outcome of** a process of **nonviolent struggle over system design is a participatory system**, which is in essence principle 4. **If the system is participatively designed, then opportunity for satisfying work** (principle 3) **is** almost **certain** to be built in, since satisfying work is something widely recognised as worthwhile. **Serving those in need is an integral part of the nonviolence** constructive programme, thus leading to principle 2. **Finally, nonviolent action is a method for engaging in dialogue and seeking a common truth, which in essence is a process built around fostering cooperation rather than one person or group beating another.** To illustrate nonviolent alternatives to capitalism, in this chapter four models are examined: sarvodaya, anarchism, voluntaryism and demarchy. Each of these satisfies most or all of the principles, but they are different in a number of respects. In the following, each alternative is briefly described and assessed in relation to the principles, with some additional comments about background, strengths, weaknesses and implications for strategy.

**Further clarification of the alternative- we’ll give you another filter for what solves and what doesn’t (must read the Martin 01 alternative for this), AND this checklist means the perms don’t solve**

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The five principles are quite general. Furthermore, they were formulated for assessing nonviolent alternatives to capitalism and so may not be ideal for assessing strategy. **On a day-to-day basis, activists are involved in campaigning.** For practical purposes, **a check list for assessing campaigns can be helpful. Here is one** possible **check list**. Check list for nonviolent campaigns against capitalism **1. Does the campaign help to \* undermine the violent underpinnings of capitalism, or \* undermine the legitimacy of capitalism, or \* build a nonviolent alternative to capitalism**? **2. Is the campaign participatory**? **3. Are the campaign's goals built in to its methods**? **4. Is the campaign resistant to cooption**? The first point grows out of the analysis of capitalism from a nonviolence perspective in chapter 3, which pinpointed three key ways in which capitalism is maintained: by ultimate resort to violence, through supportive belief systems and by crushing or coopting alternatives. An effective nonviolent campaign could be expected to address one (or possibly more) of these three key areas. Point 2, that **a campaign is participatory, can be seen as an outgrowth of the principle of nonviolence, given that any nonparticipatory approach is open to challenge by nonviolent action**. Point 3 about the compatibility of methods and goals also can be interpreted as an aspect of the principle of nonviolence, in that **both the methods and goals are nonviolent**. Point 3 also applies to participation, which is part of the goals and methods. **Point 4 grows out of the analysis of capitalism and especially of the failures of conventional anticapitalist strategies. Leninist strategies are now largely discredited. The dominant mainstream strategies, which involve working through the system to promote reform or gradual transformation, are highly susceptible to cooption: they become taken over by the system itself, so that there is little or no change in the structure of capitalism.** Therefore, it is wise to pay special attention to a campaign's ability to resist cooption. Others may wish to revise the points on the check list or add their own. There may be points that are specific to a particular country, issue or action group. The aim here is not to provide a definitive list, but rather to illustrate how such a list can be used. It is important to remember that **check lists and sets of principles** are simply tools to use to try to improve effectiveness. They should not be treated as rigid prescriptions or as means to end debate. Quite the contrary: they **should be used to encourage discussion.** If they are a good choice, they will encourage discussion of things that make a difference.

Capitalism will inevitably destroy itself, dynamic contradictions of consumption outweighing reproduction makes capitalism unsustainable

**Wright 10** (Erik Olin Wright, Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, President of the American Sociological Association, American analytical Marxist sociologist specializing in social stratification and egalitarian alternative futures to capitalism; Published by Verso 11/2/10; “Envisioning Real Utopias”)

This is a proposition about the long term trajectory of capitalist development. It is a prediction of the future, indeed a very strong prediction: **the trajectory of capitalist development will culminate in the demise of capitalism itself**. **Capitalism is a** historically specific form of economic organization that came into being as a **result of the internal dynamics of the previous form of economy** **and will eventually cease to exist. Capitalism is an integrated system, not just an assemblage of parts, and it thus contains coherent mechanisms for its own reproduction**. **But it is a specific kind of system – a system which contains dynamic contradictions which, over time, undermine these mechanisms of reproduction, eventually making the system unsustainable**. The claim here is not simply that capitalism, as a human construction, can be transformed into something else through deliberate human initiative. Rather, the claim is that **capitalism will be transformed into something else because of its inherent contradictions**. **This proposition does not itself imply that capitalism will be replaced by something better from the point of view of human welfare, just that its self-destructive dynamics insure that it will be a historically time-limited form of economy.**

Capitalism will inevitably destroy itself, snowball crisis means expansion of capitalism makes the system more susceptible to larger catastrophes

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The empirical trends are these: **First, in the course of capitalist development the level of productivity increases enormously,** particularly because of the productivity gains from the increasing capital intensity of production. **Second, capitalism expands relentlessly** in a double sense: more and **more domains of production are commodified and organized by capitalist firms, and capitalist markets extend to ever-wider reaches of the world.** Capitalism thus develops both intensively and extensively – deepening its penetration of society and extending its reach geographically. **Third, capitalist development tends to increase the concentration and centralization of capital:** over time capitalist firms become larger and larger, and the percentage of production in the market controlled by those large firms steadily increases. **This means that not only does the world become ever-more organized through capitalist markets, but these markets become ever-more dominated by giant firms**. **Fourth, the economic crises that periodically disrupt capitalist markets and production tend to become more serious and prolonged as capitalism develops**. This final observation is linked to the first three: **as a broad generalization, the more developed are the forces of production, the more comprehensive is the market in a capitalist economy, and the more the market is dominated by giant corporations, the more severe are economic crises when they occur.**

Capitalism will destroy itself- growing exploitation and condense proletarianization of laborers creates collective action and opposition to the capitalist system, their turns assume that peoples have economic benefits in the capitalist system, that’s not true with the working class, deskilling of labor and increasingly poor working conditions means they have nothing to lose

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Thesis 2. The intensification of anticapitalist class struggle thesis. **The dynamics of capitalist development systematically tend (a) to increase the proportion of the population – the working class – whose interests are pervasively hurt by capitalism, and** at the same time **(b) to increase the collective capacity of the working class to challenge capitalism.** **The result is an intensification of class struggle directed against capitalism.** Thesis 1 is a proposition about the structural tendencies of capitalist development. Thesis 2 is a proposition about agency. It postulates that **capitalism produces a collective actor with both an interest and capacity to challenge capitalism**. To use a metaphor popular in the Marxist tradition, capitalism produces its own gravediggers. The first part of this proposition concerns the creation of the working class, generally referred to as the process of proletarianization. **Proletarianization involves two kinds of social changes. First there is the process through which an increasing proportion of the population is brought into the capitalist employment relation and thus subjected to capitalist exploitation.** This involves the large-scale destruction of various kinds of noncapitalist types of work, most notably in Marx’s time small holder self-employed agricultural workers and other kinds of “petty bourgeois” self-employed producers. More recently this aspect of proletarianization has centered on the entry of married women into the paid labor force. **Second, there is the process through which the autonomy and skills of workers within the capitalist employment are reduced through the process of work routinization and “deskilling.” Taken together, these two processes of social change mean that over time the working class increases in size and in homogeneity of working conditions. Proletarianization by itself, however, would not be enough to generate the intensification of anticapitalist class struggle** postulated in Thesis 2, since **the intensity of social conflict depends** not only on the intensity of opposing interests but also, **crucially, on the capacity of people to engage in collective actions in pursuit of those interests**. **Grievances are never sufficient to explain overt conflicts, since it is often the case that people lack the capacity to act on their grievances.** The second part of thesis 2 argues that the dynamics of capitalist development also tend to solve this problem. In particular: **the growth of large work sites as a result of increasing capital intensity and increasing scale of production means that the physical concentration of workers increases, which facilitates the communication and coordination needed for collective action; increasing homogenization of working conditions means that cleavages of interests based on skill differences among workers decline**; and the destruction of the petty bourgeoisie and small firms means that the prospects for individual escape from the working class becomes less likely, thus increasing the sense of sharing a common fate. **If these trends were to continue, the clarion call “workers of the world unite -- you have nothing to lose but your chains and a world to win” would increasingly make sense to people.**

Analysis and strategic thinking is a prerequisite to a concrete alternative, only a constantly changing and revised strategy can ensure participation in our educational discussion and bring about an actual alternative that solves (empirics of this working are in the card)

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**A strategy is essentially a plan of action for getting from a current situation to a desired future situation.** So **a nonviolence strategy against capitalism is a plan of nonviolent action for transforming capitalism into a nonviolent alternative.** Note that **strategy is something in the realm of ideas. Its implementation involves action. To think about strategy, it can be helpful to distinguish between the realm of actions and the realm of ideas, though in practice they are interlinked**. Consider first the realm of actions. Figure 6.1 shows **capitalism -- itself composed of actions such as producing, selling and consuming -- becoming something else: an actual nonviolent alternative.** The means for this transformation is nonviolent action. **Capitalism being transformed into an alternative system through nonviolent action** Figure 6.2 shows how the realm of ideas applies to this picture. **Analysis is a way of conceiving or thinking about capitalism, while a goal is an imagined and desired alternative. Strategy is the way of planning a way to get between the current reality and the goal. To develop a strategy, it is necessary to have some analysis of reality as well as some goal. To implement the strategy, methods are needed.** The top level portrays capitalism being transformed into an alternative system through nonviolent action. The lower level portrays thinking about this transformation. **To develop a nonviolence strategy against capitalism, it makes sense that all components of this process are consistent with a nonviolence framework**. **The analysis of capitalism should be one developed from a nonviolence perspective**. That was the task in chapter 3. The goal -- an alternative to capitalism -- should be a nonviolent alternative. Some possibilities were discussed in chapter 5. Finally, of course the methods should be nonviolent. These were covered in chapter 2. Figure 6.2 shows a static picture, but actually all components are subject to change. **The analysis can change due to new information or new perspectives.** Also, **the analysis depends to some extent on the goal: because the goal is a nonviolent alternative, the analysis should be from a nonviolence point of view. Similarly, the goals depend in part on the analysis**. By examining what works and what goes wrong, such as the conventional anticapitalist strategies covered in chapter 4, goals can be revised or rejected. Most importantly, **the strategy needs to be constantly reexamined and revised as the analysis and goals change and as more people become involved and contribute**. **A strategy is much more than a collection of methods. It involves organised goal-directed activities, typically having roles for groups, campaigns and visions, tied together to some extent. Examples are the Third World Network, the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and a vision of support for poor peoples (rather than exploitation). How can strategies be assessed? One way is to use the principles for assessing nonviolent alternatives to capitalism, applying them in this case to strategy.** Here are the principles as stated in the previous chapter, adapted to deal with strategy. These principles can be applied to both the formulation and implementation aspects of strategy, namely both the thinking and doing aspects. Principle 1: Cooperation, rather than competition, should be the foundation for the strategy. Principle 2: People with the greatest needs should have priority in the strategy. Principle 3: A satisfying role in developing and using strategy should be available to everyone who wants it. Principle 4: The strategy should be designed and run by the people themselves, rather than authorities or experts. Principle 5: The strategy should be based on nonviolence.

**Concrete policy plans fail- multiple reasons (inability for full participation, actions are centered on the individual, susceptibility to cooption, and monopolization and corruption of the plan)**

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Principle 5 is the easiest to deal with. Because the strategy relies entirely on nonviolent methods, then the strategy is based on nonviolence, at least in the narrow sense of absence of physical violence. **The** other **principles bring in other dimensions of nonviolence in the wider sense**. Principle 4 is very important. **There can be no presumption of formulating a grand plan for bringing about an alternative, since that would be incompatible with the full participation of those involved.** **The actual strategy has to be worked out by participants, and that is yet to occur. Therefore, any discussion of strategy by an individual**, such as in this book, **can at most be a small contribution to a much wider process.** Indeed, **any overarching plan is vulnerable to attack or cooption, precisely because it is something that can be observed and targeted**. **Far more threatening to capitalism is a wide variety of challenges and alternative practices, each contributing to a general change of belief and behaviour**. Nevertheless, it is not wise to leave everything to spontaneous and uncoordinated initiative. **Thinking strategically is essential so that actions are effective**. The goal should be that strategy is democratised. **All sorts of individuals and groups need to think about and debate visions, methods and paths, so that the "big picture" is not left to a few high-level theorists or key activists.** Principle 3 -- providing satisfying roles in developing and using strategy -- can be interpreted as an extension of principle 4. Not only is strategy democratised, but **satisfying participation is available to all.** That means that **the prestige roles and tasks should not be monopolised by a few intellectual elites, experienced activists or pioneer organisers**. On the other hand, it is essential to recognise that skills and experience are crucial in every aspect of social change, including nonviolent obstruction, engaging in dialogue with strangers, organising meetings, writing media releases and analysing capitalism. To achieve principle 3 requires a process for involving interested people in thinking and doing, developing their skills and experience while not succumbing to the illusion that every committed person can do everything equally well. **Principle 2 is a useful reminder to keep the focus on those most in need. There have been many revolutions made in the name of "the people" that only ended up replacing one elite group by another.** Finally, principle 1 is that the strategy should be developed and implemented cooperatively. That seems obvious enough but the reality is that social movements and action groups can become involved in competitions of various sorts, including for recognition, priority or purity. One of the longest standing conflicts is between those who think class struggle must take priority over all other struggles, and those who think it should be treated as one struggle among many. Whether or not a nonviolence strategy against capitalism can be truly cooperative, it is a worthwhile goal. However, this should be subordinate to other principles such as being nonviolent. For capitalism to be replaced or transformed into a better social system will take decades or centuries. To imagine that a brief revolutionary struggle can bring about lasting change can be a dangerous delusion. It is far better to think of strategies that bring short-term improvements while contributing to long-term change. If things proceed more quickly than expected, so much the better. But it is quite possible that capitalism will become more powerful and pervasive in spite of all efforts to the contrary. A strategy needs to be viable in that circumstance too.

### Zizek/Do Nothing

#### We don’t have to provide a blueprint for the world post alternative – that only serves to skew and harm the natural progression of history - which Marx says will culminate in the end of capital – our alternative steps back and allows history to take its course.

Kilman ‘4 (Andrew Kilman, professor of economics at Pace University, “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens after the Revolution” The Commune, 9/5/04)

There is a great chasm between such blueprints, which Marx rejected, and what Dunayevskaya, in her final presentation on the dialectics of organization and philosophy, called “a general view of where we’re headed.” As Olga’s report suggests, the difference is not essentially a matter of the degree of generality, but a matter of the self-development of the idea. ¶ Dunayevskaya wrote that once Capital was finished and Marx was faced with the Gotha Program in 1875, “There [was] no way now, now matter how Marx kept from trying to give any blueprints for the future, not to develop a general view of where we’re headed for the day after the conquest of power, the day after we have rid ourselves of the birthmarks of capitalism” (PON, p. 5). Nor did Marx remain silent about this issue until that moment. For instance, in this year’s classes on “Alternatives to Capitalism,” we read the following statement in his 1847 Poverty of Philosophy (POP). “In a future society, in which … there will no longer be any classes, use will no longer be determined by the minimum time of production, but the time of production devoted to different articles will be determined by the degree of their social utility.” ¶ Even more important than Marx’s explicit statements about the new society is the overall thrust of his critique of political economy. Although it is true that he devoted his theoretical energy to “the critical analysis of the actual facts, instead of writing recipes … for the cook-shops of the future” (Postface to 2nd ed. of Capital), critique as he practiced it was not mere negative social criticism. It was a road toward the positive. He helped clarify what capital is and how it operates, and he showed that leftist alternatives will fail if they challenge only the system’s outward manifestations rather than capital itself. By doing this, he helped to clarify what the new society must not and cannot be like – which is already to tell us a good deal about what it must and will be like. “All negation is determination” (Marx, draft of Vol. II of Capital).¶ I believe that there are two reasons why Marx rejected blueprints for the future. As this year’s classes emphasized, one reason is that he regarded the utopian socialists’ schemes as not “utopian” enough. They were sanitized and idealized versions of existing capitalism: “the determination of value by labor time – the formula M. Proudhon gives us as the regenerating formula of the future – is therefore merely the scientific expression of the economic relations of present-day society” (Marx, POP, Ch. 1, sect. 2). But this simply means that Marx rejected a particular kind of attempt to concretize the vision of the new society, not that he rejected the task itself. ¶ The other reason was that Marx, who aligned himself with the real movement of the masses, held the utopians’ schemes to be obsolete, or worse, once the working class was moving in another direction. I believe that this perspective remains valid, but that the subjective-objective situation has changed radically. Today, “what masses of people are hungering for[,] but which radical theoreticians and parties are doing little to address[, is] the projection of a comprehensive alternative to existing society,” as we stated in our 2003-04 Marxist-Humanist Perspectives thesis. Two months ago, Anne Jaclard spoke to a class of college youth. Many of them were eager for a concrete, well articulated vision of a liberatory alternative to capitalism, and they rejected the notion that its concretization should be put off to the future. Visitors to our classes, and participants in the “Alternatives to Capital” seminar on Capital in New York, have also demanded greater concreteness. How do we align with this real movement from below? Given the direction in which the masses’ thinking is moving, hasn’t resistance to concretizing a liberatory alternative become obsolete? ¶ I do not mean to imply that we should accommodate demands for easy answers. Like the Proudhonists and utopian socialists with whom Marx contended, many folks seem to think that concretizing an alternative to capitalism is simply a matter of articulating goals and then implementing them when the time comes. What we need to do when easy answers are demanded, I think, is convey the lessons we have learned – that the desirability of proposed alternatives means nothing if they give rise to unintended consequences that make them unsustainable, that political change flows from changes in the mode of production, and so forth – while also saying that which can be said about the new society, as concretely as it can be said. ¶

# Affirmative

## Perm (Queer Theory)

#### Perm solves: rejecting the plan simply out of queer theory justifies the corruption of politics and irrational thinking

Penney 02 (James Penney, Assistant Professor in the Cultural Studies Program at Trent University, Published 2002 by Johns Hopkins University Press, “Queer Theory and the Universal Alternative”)

But the interest of this sort of political autobiography is in this context undoubtedly limited. What—you might now find yourself impatiently wondering if you don't already know—were the contents of this famous pamphlet? And what exactly was my problem with it? Published by a coalition of queer voters in New York called the Empire State Pride Agenda, the pamphlet presented extremely selective profiles of the main candidates, both Democrat and Republican, running for the offices of President, US Senator, State Senator, and Member of the State Assembly. Each profile summarized the history of a candidate's positions with respect to rights issues of concern to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons. The profiles made no concerted effort to represent the candidates' perspectives on any other issue: gun control, education, foreign policy, the death penalty, taxation, health care (generally speaking, that is to say above and beyond the issues related to AIDS-related illness and reproductive rights); only policies directly concerning civil rights for nonheterosexual citizens were thoroughly broached. I should confess that once I got the general idea I threw the pamphlet away in disgust: "Am I supposed to feel interpellated," I asked myself in full hysterical Althusserian mode, "by this utterly pseudo-political claptrap?" Is this what it means to be gay and political in America? "What kind of political subject is this piece of political literature presupposing?" I further wondered to myself as my anger began to give way to cool radical-democratic rationalism. Does it not implicitly suggest, I further mused, that I vote for the fiscally conservative homosexual or queer-friendly Republican in favor of capital punishment and low corporate taxes instead of the Democrat pushing a patients' bill of rights and the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry who spoke out against gay marriage and domestic partnership benefits? And more fundamentally, is there not something even more disturbingly wrong with the picture the pamphlet paints; does it not commit a sin more fundamentally original: that it simply rehearses the already existing binary of Democratic or Republican political "options," rather than systematically uncovering how this apparent "choice" represents a tragic caving-in to the logic of capital; how it utterly wimps out on the only truly critical alternative, which is to create an authentic political choice, to insist that the liberal-multiculturalist/identitarian-postidentitarian framework might not in fact be the only possible, as they say, game in town?

Let us go to the heart of the matter. Of all Wright's claims I find the one that science and revolution are antithetical the most disturbing. Certainly the unity of science and revolution, has traditionally been seen as the core of Marxism and symbolized by the lives of all the great Marxists: Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Lukacs, Lenin, and Gramsci. Wright comes to a different conclusion. "Revolutionary militancy requires true believers; scientific method rejects the possibility of absolute truth ... Marxism as Ideology provides certainties. It has a ready explanation for everything. Its rhetoric, at least in certain historical situations, is powerful in campaigns of mobilization. When Marxism becomes an Ideology in this sense, it is no longer at odds with revolutionary praxis and commitment, but it also ceases to be a scientific theory capable of producing new explanations and understandings of the world." These characterizations of revolution and science strike me as odd. Revolutionary activity requires true believers to be sure but it also requires a willingness to change one's views, to adopt new strategies at critical conjunctures. Was not a certain revolutionary skepticism the secret of Lenin's success and that it was sometimes found wanting the secret of Trotsky's ultimate demise? Equally, as I shall be at pains to show, the skepticism of the scientist is ineffective without passionate commitment not just to the scientific enterprise but also to a given theoretical framework. A certain dogmatism is necessary to discipline and channel the readiness to abandon one set of beliefs for another. Without dogmatism there is only chaos. Given then that the opposition of science and revolution is far from obvious, indeed arbitrary, what are we to make of Wright's insistence on that opposition? It permits a shift of commitment away from revolution toward science. As individuals we have to make a choice, he seems to be saying, either we take the high road of science with its inherent skepticism toward final truth or we take the low road of revolution with a religious commitment to a mobilizing ideology. Society also has to make a choice: at the extremes we have the repression of science—the Stalinist solution—and on the other side we have the repression of revolution—the liberal solution. Wright appears to be more inclined to opt for the latter.

## Alternative Bad

### Worse than Capitalism

#### Alternatives are far worse to the environment than capitalism

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The easiest defense of capitalism is simply to contrast it with existing and recently existing examples of marxian socialism. As is now abundantly clear, marxism's record is dismal on almost every score, be it economic, social, or environmental. These failures cannot be dismissed as errant quirks; marxian regimes have come to power in numerous countries, and everywhere the results have been disheartening. From impoverished African states like Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, and the Congo to highly industrialized, once-prosperous European countries like the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia, all marxist experiments have ended in disaster. Chapter six will address the failings of marxism in the Third World; the present discussion is concerned with the formerly communist industrial states of Eastern Europe. For convenience sake, the analysis focuses on conditions that pertained before the democratic revolutions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Radical greens admit that environmental conditions in Eastern Europe are as bad as those found in the West. But such admissions are far from adequate; by almost every measure, the communist environment is more severely degraded than the capitalist environment. Only with the recent downfall of marxian regimes has the ecological debacle of the East come to light. As our knowledge increases, the environmental conditions of Eastern Europe are revealed as ever more horrific. And when one considers the poor performances of the economies that have wreaked such destruction, the comparison between capitalism and communism becomes one-sided indeed. Although the general state of environmental devastation in Eastern Europe is now well known, a few specific examples are still in order. It is quite possible that the world's most industrially devastated landscape is that of Poland's Silesia, an area in which the soil is so lead-impregnated as to render farm products virtually poisonous. Nor are conditions much better in other Polish regions. Many Polish rivers are so filthy that their waters cannot even be used for industrial purposes. As Fischoff (1991: 13) reports, "by U.S. and European standards, the country has virtually no potable water." In Poland's industrial belt, air pollution, especially sulfur dioxide contamination, far exceeds anything found in the West. Many buildings in Cracow are simply melting away in an acid bath. Devastation of similar magnitude may be found in many regions within the former Soviet Union. Latvia, for example, is burdened by many poorly regulated and constantly oozing toxic waste pits, and its Baltic shores are heavily contaminated with bacteria, heavy metals, and even chunks of phosphorus (in 1988 the Soviet army dropped 403 bombs containing 20 tons of phosphorus into-the Baltic Sea [Burgelis n.d.:7]). The transformation of the once-rich Aral Sea into a shrunken, almost lifeless sump is now a virtual international emblem of the powers of human destructiveness (Kotlyakov 1991). Everywhere one looks the stories are the same, recounting one ecological disaster after another. Equally telling are comparative figures on energy use. One of the principle reasons for Eastern Europe's environmental catastrophe is its appallingly inefficient use of energy. As The Economist (February 17, 1990) reports: "On average, the six countries of Eastern Europe . . . use more than twice as much energy per dollar of national income as even the more industrialized countries of Western Europe. Poland, with on some counts a GDP smaller than Belgium's, uses nearly three times as much energy; Hungary, whose GDP is supposedly only a fifth of Spain's, uses more than a third as much energy." Here one can appreciate the environmental consequences of an economy that has approached the vaunted steady-state; lacking economic vitality, the East has been forced to retain an antiquated, inefficient, and highly polluting set of industrial plants. Factories have remained in operation that would have been shuttered decades ago in the West.

#### The alternative is far worse for laborers and will eventually collapse

Taylor 10 (Bron Taylor is Professor of Religion and Nature at The University of Florida. He is also an Affiliated Scholar with the Center for Environment and Development at Oslo University. As an interdisciplinary environmental studies scholar, and trained in ethics, religious studies, and social scientific approaches to understanding human culture, Professor Taylor’s publications appear in articles, books, and a multi-volume encyclopedia. His central scholarly interest and personal passion is the conservation of the earth’s biological diversity and how human culture might evolve rapidly enough to arrest and reverse today’s intensifying environmental and social crises, and all the suffering, that flows from these trends. An academic entrepreneur and program builder, he led the initiative to create an academic major in Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, later initiated and was elected the first president of the International Society for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture, while also founding its affiliated journal and becoming its editor. Recruited to fill the Samuel S. Hill Ethics Chair at the University of Florida and appointed in 2002, he played a leading role in constructing the world's first Ph.D. program with an emphasis in Religion and Nature. Most recently, he has been involved in an international think tank exploring ways to more effectively promote an environmentally sustainable future; Published 1/5/10, “The Capitalist Imperative”)

The social failure of marxian socialism is probably best illustrated by examining the working and living standards of its own laborers-the supposed beneficiaries of the whole system. Simply put, socialist workers lived in penury when compared to their counterparts in industrial capitalism. Polish steelworkers, for example, could hope to earn roughly the equivalent of $100 a month; if one were to factor in the loss of time entailed in queuing, their remuneration would have to be reduced still further. But such deprivation is utterly mild when contrasted with the lot of Soviet coal miners-men who labored under such appalling conditions that their average longevity was a mere forty-seven years (The Economist, "Dark Satanic Mills,"October 13,1990, p. 56). Indeed, industrial safety standards have been virtually nonexistent through much of the Eastern bloc. Because of this failing, up to 80 percent of Polish steel workers were disabled and thus forced to retire early (Fischoff 1991: 14). According to marxist ideology, these Polish and Soviet workers were not exploited-even if their political leaders and party bosses were able to live in aristocratic splendor. ("Exploitation," one will recall, is defined in terms of the surplus extraction that occurs only under a capitalist mode of production.] Such reasoning, evidently, held little appeal for the Polish and Russian proletariat; despite the long years in which it has held absolute political, social, and cultural mastery, marxism was never able to achieve intellectual hegemony in eastern Europe. What seems inevitable now is the collapse of communism, not capitalism.

### Alt. Solvency Deficit

#### **Alt: Accounting for the discrimination of women labor key to solve**

Karat 11 (Prakash Karat, Jawaharlal Nehru Universitym founder of the Students Federation of India, Central Committee of the CPI, General Secretary of CPI, published by The Marcxist, October-December 2011, “Marxism in the 21st Century: Alternative to Neoliberal Capitalism and Imperialism” <http://www.cpim.org/marxist/201104-Prakash.pdf>)

The theory and practice of Marxism in the 21st century also requires the integration of gender issues into the mainstream analysis of class exploitation and social oppression. Even the most advanced capitalist countries have been unable to address in any substantive way, the unequal division of labour that is detrimental to women. On the contrary, the severe cutbacks in the social sector under the neoliberal regime have meant that the burden of the care economy is borne disproportionately by women. At the same time, the exploitation of cheap female labour continues to be an important source of extraction of surplus value. Discrimination against women, reflected in unequal wages, discriminatory labour practices and the political economy of the reproduction of labour power shows that it is systemic and embedded in the capitalist production system. The invisibilisation of women’s work, the devaluation of their labour and the predominance of patriarchal modes of life reinforce the exploitation of women under neoliberal capitalism. The Left alternative to imperialist globalisation must recognise and give prominence to the liberation of women from patriarchal and class based exploitation.

## Framework

### Vague Alternative Bad

#### The vague alternative kills education- Marxists jargon excludes a wider audience, even Marxist academics eventually abandon it

Taylor 10 (Bron Taylor is Professor of Religion and Nature at The University of Florida. He is also an Affiliated Scholar with the Center for Environment and Development at Oslo University. As an interdisciplinary environmental studies scholar, and trained in ethics, religious studies, and social scientific approaches to understanding human culture, Professor Taylor’s publications appear in articles, books, and a multi-volume encyclopedia. His central scholarly interest and personal passion is the conservation of the earth’s biological diversity and how human culture might evolve rapidly enough to arrest and reverse today’s intensifying environmental and social crises, and all the suffering, that flows from these trends. An academic entrepreneur and program builder, he led the initiative to create an academic major in Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, later initiated and was elected the first president of the International Society for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture, while also founding its affiliated journal and becoming its editor. Recruited to fill the Samuel S. Hill Ethics Chair at the University of Florida and appointed in 2002, he played a leading role in constructing the world's first Ph.D. program with an emphasis in Religion and Nature. Most recently, he has been involved in an international think tank exploring ways to more effectively promote an environmentally sustainable future; Published 1/5/10, “The Capitalist Imperative”)

Contemporary midst academics shield themselves from many of the problems explored above by leaving their own ultimate aims unstated. Marxism's own traditions unambiguously uphold violent revolution as the only way to usher in socialism, although the numerous democratic communist parties of Western Europe show that many marxists evidently now consider a democratic "gradualist path" possible. American academic marxists, however, are seldom inclined to reveal their own larger designs. One can only assume that many admire Lenin and Trotsky not merely for their scholarly works but also for their activities in the Russian Revolution. The "scholar-revolutionary" seems to be an irresistibly romantic figure for academics humiliated by their drudge like popular image. But this is never mentioned in polite company; theirs' is indeed a hidden agenda. A more immediate question is how academic marxists view their own roles within capitalist society. The obvious answer is as intellectual workers whose job it is to lift the veils of mystification and thus allow others to comprehend the reality of their own oppression. But they communicate these truths largely to each other; with a few notable exceptions, marxist works are so theoretically heavy and jargon laden as to be completely inaccessible to the proletariat. Academic marxists do reach a wider audience through teaching, but most of their students are destined for the managerial rather than the working class. ,This is especially true for those employed by elite universities, institutions to which most young marxists seemingly aspire. But marxist theory explicitly holds that nothing revolutionary can come from the bourgeoisie, at least once it has triumphed over the aristocracy. The most one would hope to accomplish would be to subvert the minds of budding managers, lawyers, and engineers, thereby making them less effective capitalist functionaries. Once students leave academia, however, few retain the subversive tendencies they may have acquired from their marxist professors. But no matter how one hopes to achieve it, the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society remains the centerpiece of marxist philosophy, the driving force behind the entire effort. Without the prospect of a socialist future, the voluminous marxian critiques of capitalism lose most of their power and much of their relevance.

### Kritik Bad

#### **Capitalism is not perfect, but it’s the best we have, kritiking capitalism shifts away from the root cause of economic crisis, that’s why a policy framework is key**

Nash and Chakraborty 08 (Dr. Timothy G. Nash is Vice President of Graduate and Specialty Programs at Northwood University and Associate Professor of Business and Economics at the Richard DeVos Graduate School of Management; Dr. Debasish Chakraborty is a Professor of Economics at Central Michigan University; published by NORTHWOOD UNIVERSITY WHITE PAPER NUMBER ONE ON THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS, FALL 2008, “American History, Capitalism and the Crisis on Wall Street”)

One simply needs to watch the Sunday news shows on television or read a wide range of internet, newspaper or magazine articles to find that there is no “common sense” agreed to an explanation for the root cause of the ”crisis” burdening Wall Street. There are numerous alleged unfounded ‘causes’ including the many explanations that point to the failure of capitalism or even more disturbing pronouncements that capitalism has simply run its course in economic history. To this we stand as a clear and dissenting voice in opposition to this uninformed and misguided logic. Capitalism is not nor has it ever been positioned to be a perfect economic system. It is simply the best that humankind has been able to devise to date. According to Nobel Laureate Friedrich von Hayek, “I very seriously believe that capitalism is not only a better form of organizing human activity than any deliberate design, any attempt to organize it to satisfy particular preferences, to aim at what people regard as beautiful or pleasant order, but it is also the indispensable condition for just keeping that population alive which exists already in the world. I regard the preservation of what is known as the capitalist system, of the system of free markets and the private ownership of the means of production, as an essential condition of the very survival of [hu]mankind.” Capitalism (1776 AD to date) is an ethical economic system based on private ownership of and responsibility for the means of production with the allocation of goods, services, and assets taking place through a voluntary, free market pricing system. Capitalism as an economic system has been responsible for the greatest leap forward in global human progress in the history of the world. Capitalism has also been the ”intellectual godfather” of the decline of Communism in Eastern Europe and China and has guided the United States from infancy to an economic position that has been the envy of the world. What is often lacking in students of history, and in many of those trying to frame the debate over today’s financial crisis, is the knowledge that government, well‐intended as it usually is, has often been the source of economic instability and hardship in American history. Also absent is the knowledge that markets are efficient and self‐correcting when left alone.

### Must Provide Blueprint

#### **The negative must provide a blueprint for a future without capital – otherwise there can be no hope for the “revolution”**

Kilman ‘4 (Andrew Kilman, professor of economics at Pace University, “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens after the Revolution” The Commune, 9/5/04)

Resistance to concretizing a liberatory alternative to capitalism has been and continues to be defended principally in the name of anti-vanguardism. An anarcho-syndicalist named “marko” recently put forth this argument in opposition to Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel’s “parecon” (participatory economics): “Anarcho-Syndicalism demands that the detailed thinking about a future economy is to be decided by the liberated working class itself, not by a prior group of intellectuals. That is working class ‘self-emancipation’.” In our own organization, a member of the clique that abandoned Marxist-Humanism put forth a very similar argument. It has sometimes been suggested that Marx rejected blueprints for the same reason, but I know of no evidence for this. The evidence sketched out above indicates that he labored to concretize a liberatory alternative to capitalism throughout his life, and did not regard this work as antithetical to working-class self-emancipation. ¶ In any case, marko confuses and conflates thinking with policy-making in a quite telling way. It is generally unfair to nitpick at unknown authors’ internet posts, but marko’s phraseology – “detailed thinking about the future economy is to be decided” – is too peculiar to be merely an accidental slip. All proponents of workers’ self-emancipation agree that the policies of the future economy are to be decided upon by the working people themselves, but thinking simply cannot be shoehorned into the old problematic of “who decides?” Once again, a well-meaning attempt to posit spontaneity as the absolute opposite of vanguardist elitism ends up by placing the entire burden of working out a liberatory alternative to capitalism on the backs of the masses. And the newly liberated masses must somehow do this from scratch, having been deprived of the ability to learn from the theoretical achievements and mistakes of prior generations.

## AT – Impact

### No Root Cause

#### **Capitalism is not the root cause of war – Statism Is!**

Binswanger 86 (Dr. Binswanger, a longtime associate of Ayn Rand, taught philosophy at Hunter College (City University of New York) from 1972 to 1979, and at the University of Texas, Austin, Spring 2002. During the 1980s, he was editor of The Objectivist Forum, a bimonthly journal devoted to Ayn Rand's philosophy. Since 1994, he has been professor of philosophy at the Objectivist Academic Center of the Ayn Rand Institute. He is the author of The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts (ARI Press, 1990) and editor of The Ayn Rand Lexicon (New American Library) and of the second edition of Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (New American Library). Dr. Binswanger moderates and writes for HBL, an email list discussing Objectivism. A regular speaker at universities, he has given more than 70 talks at some 40 universities on a wide variety of topics in philosophy and politics. Dr. Binswanger is currently writing a book on the causal nature of consciousness; published 1986 the New American Library, “War” http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/war.html)

Laissez-faire capitalism is the only social system based on the recognition of individual rights and, therefore, the only system that bans force from social relationships. By the nature of its basic principles and interests, it is the only system fundamentally opposed to war. [People] who are free to produce, have no incentive to loot; they have nothing to gain from war and a great deal to lose. Ideologically, the principle of individual rights does not permit a [person] to seek [his/her] own livelihood at the point of a gun, inside or outside his country. Economically, wars cost money; in a free economy, where wealth is privately owned, the costs of war come out of the income of private citizens—there is no overblown public treasury to hide that fact—and a citizen cannot hope to recoup [her/his]] own financial losses (such as taxes or business dislocations or property destruction) by winning the war. Thus [her/his] own economic interests are on the side of peace. In a statist economy, where wealth is “publicly owned,” a citizen has no economic interests to protect by preserving peace—[she/he] is only a drop in the common bucket—while war gives [her/his] the (fallacious) hope of larger handouts from [her/his] master. Ideologically, [she/he] is trained to regard [people] as sacrificial animals; [she/he] is one [herself/himself]; [she/he] can have no concept of why foreigners should not be sacrificed on the same public altar for the benefit of the same state. The trader and the warrior have been fundamental antagonists throughout history. Trade does not flourish on battlefields, factories do not produce under bombardments, profits do not grow on rubble. Capitalism is a society of traders—for which it has been denounced by every would-be gunman who regards trade as “selfish” and conquest as “noble.” Let those who are actually concerned with peace observe that capitalism gave [humankind] the longest period of peace in history—a period during which there were no wars involving the entire civilized world—from the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Statism—in fact and in principle—is nothing more than gang rule. A dictatorship is a gang devoted to looting the effort of the productive citizens of its own country. When a statist ruler exhausts [her/his] own country’s economy, [she/he] attacks [her/his] neighbors. It is [her/his] only means of postponing internal collapse and prolonging his rule. A country that violates the rights of its own citizens, will not respect the rights of its neighbors. Those who do not recognize individual rights, will not recognize the rights of nations: a nation is only a number of individuals. Statism needs war; a free country does not. Statism survives by looting; a free country survives by production. Observe that the major wars of history were started by the more controlled economies of the time against the freer ones. For instance, World War I was started by monarchist Germany and Czarist Russia, who dragged in their freer allies. World War II was started by the alliance of Nazi Germany with Soviet Russia and their joint attack on Poland. Observe that in World War II, both Germany and Russia seized and dismantled entire factories in conquered countries, to ship them home—while the freest of the mixed economies, the semi-capitalistic United States, sent billions worth of lend-lease equipment, including entire factories, to its allies. Germany and Russia needed war; the United States did not and gained nothing. (In fact, the United States lost, economically, even though it won the war: it was left with an enormous national debt, augmented by the grotesquely futile policy of supporting former allies and enemies to this day.) Yet it is capitalism that today’s peace-lovers oppose and statism that they advocate—in the name of peace. If [people] want to oppose war, it is statism that they must oppose. So long as they hold the tribal notion that the individual is sacrificial fodder for the collective, that some [people] have the right to rule others by force, and that some (any) alleged “good” can justify it—there can be no peace within a nation and no peace among nations. Just as, in domestic affairs, all the evils caused by statism and government controls were blamed on capitalism and the free market—so, in foreign affairs, all the evils of statist policies were blamed on and ascribed to capitalism. Such myths as “capitalistic imperialism,” “war-profiteering,” or the notion that capitalism has to win “markets” by military conquest are examples of the superficiality or the unscrupulousness of statist commentators and historians. The essence of capitalism’s foreign policy is free trade—i.e., the abolition of trade barriers, of protective tariffs, of special privileges—the opening of the world’s trade routes to free international exchange and competition among the private citizens of all countries dealing directly with one another. During the nineteenth century, it was free trade that liberated the world, undercutting and wrecking the remnants of feudalism and the statist tyranny of absolute monarchies. Capitalism wins and holds its markets by free competition, at home and abroad. A market conquered by war can be of value (temporarily) only to those advocates of a mixed economy who seek to close it to international competition, impose restrictive regulations, and thus acquire special privileges by force. Remember that private citizens—whether rich or poor, whether businessmen or workers—have no power to start a war. That power is the exclusive prerogative of a government. Which type of government is more likely to plunge a country into war: a government of limited powers, bound by constitutional restrictions—or an unlimited government, open to the pressure of any group with warlike interests or ideologies, a government able to command armies to march at the whim of a single chief executive? It is true that nuclear weapons have made wars too horrible to contemplate. But it makes no difference to a man whether he is killed by a nuclear bomb or a dynamite bomb or an old-fashioned club. Nor does the number of other victims or the scale of the destruction make any difference to him. If nuclear weapons are a dreadful threat and mankind cannot afford war any longer, then mankind cannot afford statism any longer. Let no man of good will take it upon his conscience to advocate the rule of force—outside or inside his own country. Let all those who are actually concerned with peace—those who do love man and do care about his survival—realize that if war is ever to be outlawed, it is the use of force that has to be outlawed.

#### **Capitalism not the root cause of inequality, government policy and differences in skills, incentives, and opportunities creates the rich/poor divide.**

Port 98 (Michael E. Porter is the Bishop William Lawrence University Professor at Harvard Business School. A university professorship is the highest professional recognition that can be awarded to a Harvard faculty member. A leading authority on company strategy, the competitiveness of nations and regions, and strategic approaches to societal problems, Professor Porter's work is widely recognized in governments, corporations, non-profits, and academic circles across the globe. A sought after teacher, he also chairs Harvard Business School's program for newly appointed CEOs of multibillion dollar corporations. Professor Porter has founded three major non-profit organizations: The Initiative for a Competitive Inner City (ICIC) in 1994, which addresses economic development in distressed urban communities; the Center for Effective Philanthropy, which creates rigorous tools for measuring foundation effectiveness; and FSG, a leading non-profit strategy firm serving NGOs, corporations, and foundations in the area of creating social value; Published 1998 Gale, Cengage Learning; “The Adam Smith address: location, clusters, and the “new” microeconomics of competition”)

Another troubling problem confronting us today is inequality, which has been rising in the recent decade in parallel with the opening of competition in the world economy. Some see inequality as an inevitable flaw in capitalism. Through the lens of these ideas about competition among locations, however, inequality is more a failure of government policy and institutions than a failure of capitalism. The focus should be on addressing the root causes of inequality, not stopping or distorting the competitive process in the vain hope of achieving equal outcomes. In a global economy, it is clear that individuals with high skills will prosper because of the widening market for their services, while individuals with low skills will have to "compete" with lower-wage workers in other nations for mobile jobs. At the root of inequality, then, is differences in skills, incentives, and opportunities available to individual citizens. Poor education and training systems are not the fault of capitalism but of public policy. The lack of equal opportunity facing many citizens is not inevitable but a failure of society and government as well. Inequality is also exacerbated by two other causes, both addressable by appropriate policy. One is limits to competition -- collusion, monopoly, and artificial restrictions on entry -- that gives business owners too much power to appropriate returns. The other is distortions to capital markets that penalize long-term investment in capital equipment, technology, and workforce development.(3) Capitalism is not the root cause of inequality, then, but rather the particular context for capitalism that has been created in countries such as the United States.

## AT – Epistemology First

#### Thought plays an inconsequential role in causing or shaping our actions

Wegner ‘3 (Daniel M. Wegner, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, “The Minds Best Trcik: How We Experience Conscience Will” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, February 2003, http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/trick.pdf)

Does all this mean that conscious thought does not cause action? It does not mean this at ¶ all. The task of determining the causal relations between conscious representations and actions is ¶ a matter of inspection through scientific inquiry, and reliable connections between conscious ¶ thought and action could potentially be discerned [38]. The point here is that the mind’s own ¶ system for computing these relations provides the person with an experience of conscious will ¶ that is no more than a rough-and-ready guide to such causation, one that may be misled by any ¶ number of circumstances that render invalid inferences. We should be surprised, after all, if ¶ cognitive creatures with our demonstrably fallible self-insight were capable of perceiving the ¶ deepest mechanisms of our own minds [39,40]. The experience of conscious will is a marvelous ¶ trick of the mind, one that yields useful intuitions about our authorship—but it is not the ¶ foundation for an explanatory system that stands outside the paths of deterministic causation.

# Links from Cap to T-SC

#### **Globalization decreases the significance of space and ties territories to the state.**

Elden ’05 [Dr. Stuart Elden is a professor in the Department of Geography at Durham University, “Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the World”, March 2005, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar.,2005), pp. 8-19, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Accessed through JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3804526.pdf> AD]

The title sounds provocative, I know. But the reason for it is precisely its excuse. The contention here is that many studies of globalization literally, and consequentially figuratively, miss the point. My concern is not with those studies that look at globalization in terms of the internationalization of trade, the homogenization of culture or the evaporation of the power of the nation-state. Instead, it is with how the concept of globalization has been thought geographically, that is spatially, both within and without the discipline of geography itself. At times this has even led to the suggestion that geography is less significant, or even that spatial considerations are not important at all. The French theorist Paul Virilio has gone so far as to argue that the acceleration of communication has led to a replacing of geographical space with time (1986 1999), and has suggested that 'deterritorialization is the question for the end of this century' (Virilio and Lotringer, 1983, 142). The particular targets therefore are those studies which claim that globalization is a form of deterritorialization, or that concomitantly claim that we have moved beyond the Westphalian model of state politics. This essay therefore investigates the interrelation of the four terms space, place, territory and deterritorialization. The key argument is that space and place should not be distinguished on the basis of scale, but that space emerges in Western thought through a particular way of grasping place. This way of grasping is as something extensible and calculable, extended in three dimensions and grounded on the geometric point. The claim made here is that territory is not merely a political way of conceiving land, but the political corollary of this emergent concept of space. Although it is integrally related to the state, in that both the modern state and the modern concept of territory emerge at the same historical juncture, this is not to say that territory is inherently tied to the state. The historical moment we call globalization demonstrates that the calculable understanding of space has been extended to the globe, which means that even as the state becomes less the focus of attention territory remains of paramount importance. The essay therefore takes issue with understandings of globalization as deterritorialization, which claim that territory no longer occupies the foundational geographical place, claiming that they misconceive the very basis of this crucial term. Although this essay does not intend to trace the historical origins of the term 'globalization', there is one issue worth noting. Globalization derives from the world 'global', of much older provenance, which is concerned with the 'whole world', something related to, covering or influencing the world taken as a whole. There is a double process going on here: first, the seizing or comprehending of the world as a whole; and second the way in which political, economic or cultural acts apply to that. In other words, globalization is in some sense dependent on what Lefebvre calls mondialisation, becoming worldly. Lefebvre suggests we must look for the conditions of possibility of this mondialisation, but this cannot be reduced to linear causality or mechanistic determinism (1978, 23; see Elden, 2004a, 231-5). As he cautions, 'each mode of production has its space; but the characteristics of space cannot be reduced to the general characteristics of the mode of production' (1978, 291). It is this question of condition of possibility that is at stake here. The argument is that beyond the straightforward we get to the point.

#### **Globalization causes deterritorialization – our views of geography create conflict and are flawed.**

Elden ’05 [Dr. Stuart Elden is a professor in the Department of Geography at Durham University, “Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the World”, March 2005, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar.,2005), pp. 8-19, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Accessed through JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3804526.pdf> AD]

Deterritorialization in its most useful sense therefore forces us to think anew on the notion of territory, and to recognize how its logic is both played out and challenged in a period of globalization (see 6 Tuathail 1998, 82; Cox 1997; Brenner 1999a 1999b). This goes beyond merely assuming territory as a given and examining to what extent things remain in place. Rather its position and status is itself in question (O Tuathail 2000, 139-40). Globalization has been explicitly seen as deterritorialization by Scholte (2000a, 46), but despite the importance of this definition the term plays a relatively minor role in the book as a whole, and disappears from the forthcoming second edition entirely. Rather Scholte proposes a view of supraterritorialization, which 'entails a reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders' (2000a, 96; see 2000b, 179). Important though this reconfiguration of geography undoubtedly is, I am reluctant to accept his straightforward understanding of territory, and would push the point further: work proposing an idea of deterritorialization requires an explicit theorization of what territory is, in order that we are not blinded to the parallels between then and now in the changing nature of spatial relations. In other words, what is it we have supposedly gone beyond or seen revised in significant ways? For such a crucial issue, territory is undertheorized to a remarkable degree. The standard approach, in political science as much as geography and international relations, is to take it for an unproblematic given, which is then fought over, redistributed and redrawn, without any conceptual problematization. In other words, there are disputes over territory, but none over 'territory'. This is despite the stress on its importance in Max Weber's famous definition of the state: The state is that human community, which within a certain area or territory [Gebietes] - this 'area' belongs to the feature - has a (successful) monopoly of legitimate physical violence. (1971, 510-11; 1994, 311, translation modified) As is beginning to be realized (Brenner et al. 2002, 2), the territorial part of this - in distinction to community, legitimacy and violence - has been largely neglected, both by Weber himself and social science in general. But as Michael Mann recognizes, the territorial aspect is not minor, but crucial: 'the state is, indeed a place - both a central place and a unified territorial reach' (1985, 198). For Mann this puts it in distinction to churches and companies. Jean Gottman, who has written some of the most productive works on this subject, proclaims that 'amazingly little has been published about the concept of territory, although much speech, ink, and blood have been spilled over territorial disputes' (1973, ix). How much has this changed in the last thirty years? For Gottman, it is all too easy to assume the modern, or legal sense of territory as a 'portion of geographical space under the jurisdiction of certain people' (1973, 5). Similarly Friedrich Kratochwil suggests that 'territoriality, like property, is not a simple concept, but comprises a variety of social arrangements that have to be examined in greater detail' (1986, 27-8).

# Time-Space Compression Kritik

# Negative

## Links

### Speed

#### Speed destroys the concept of place.

Hanes ’96 [Mark Hanes is a member of the Department of Philosophy, Fordham University, “Paul Virilio and the Articulation of Post-Reality”, JSTOR, Human Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 185-197, April 1996, Springer, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20011104.pdf> AD]

His basic insight finds that the conceptual dimensions of time and space have become fundamentally destabilized due to modern technology's strategic urge to produce better results and more complete knowledge at an increasingly faster pace. Technology's architectonic structure reaches virtual totalization, swallowing both time and space (that is, if one can move fast enough one is concurrently everywhere bringing about a speed-induced/Jux so far-reaching and totalizing as to be static). Speed allows the power of the real, a fixed location in time and space, to disappear. "Speed suddenly becomes a primal dimension that defies all temporal and physical measurements" (1991 b: 18). The real, the point in time and space, is replaced by the "reality effect," the vector hanging in no-time, no-space ready to follow (more so, to be) any possible trajectory. That is, speed makes potentiality or possibility actuality ? what may come about or appear is given equal standing to what does appear. At every level, social, political, or military, speed has resulted in what Virilio calls "dromological" violence,1 which does not allow for a time or place to appear in which this trend could then be evaluated and questioned. While at first this observation may strike one as an essentially modernist complaint against the standard-less aporia of postmodernity, Virilio intends it otherwise. Modern progress has not been defeated by its relativist enemies: progress has destroyed itself by fulfilling its goal only too well, i.e., by improving its technological abilities until those abilities went beyond any effective control. He writes: "It is speed as the nature of dromological progress that ruins progress... .Western man has appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because he appeared more rapid'' (1986: 46-7). That is, when speed voids time and space, any Western-style notion of progress becomes impossible to situate - positive movement suffers from a type of regen? erative obsolescence in which the novel never even has its day to shine since 187 speed renders it superfluous even before its very occurrence. Thus, while the appearance of improvement may be maintained constantly, without actual in? stantiation the superiority of the technological West remains at a hypothetical or theoretical level. For example, Virilio would point to the economic shifts which threaten the 'American dream' such as the replacement of corporate middle managers with swift, efficient computers. The system has 'improved' but those it was designed to serve and benefit have been devastated or ruined by this 'advance.' And the survivors work longer hours with less leisure time than the workers of previously less advanced stage

## **Internal Links**

#### **Our view of space creates inequality – it ignores the social relationships in other places.**

Lobao et al ’07 [Dr. Linda M. Lobao is a professor of Geography, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Sociology at Ohio State University, Dr. Gregory Hooks is a professor at Washington State University, Ann R. Tickmayer is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at OSU, “THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY”, 2007, State University of New York Press, AD]

Spatial scales, along with spaces and places, illuminate key issues in subnational inequality as well as gaps in sociology’s spatialization project. As noted in the introduction, rather than viewing any of these as fixed concepts, it is useful to consider the spaces, spatial scales, and places conceptualized by analysts. Space can be brought into the study of inequality in different ways. Subfields such as cross-national, rural, and urban sociology have an inherent spatial focus. But others remain underspatialized. For example, chapters in this volume explain how taking a spatial approach to political and economic sociology enriches these fields. Bringing in space requires attention to the scale at which social processes occur. Addressed widely in geography (Gough 2004; Smith 2003), the concept of spatial scales has received little direct attention in sociology. It refers to the territorial resolution at which social processes work out, are conceptualized and studied (Smith 2003:228). Social scientists privilege certain scales in understanding social processes. The urban and national scales have generated distinct explanatory discourses which Swyngedouw (1997) calls “scalar narratives.” Scalar narratives tend to assert the primacy of their scales of focus while crowding out others. For example, discourse about large, world cities may be directed upward to explain global paths of development, or it may be directed downward, so that subnational development is reduced to a network of large cities. Generalizations about the nation-state may be uncritically assumed to apply at lower scales, leaving regional level processes and explanations unquestioned. Privileging certain geographic scales creates an unbalanced view of inequality (Lobao 2004). For the most part, ordinary, unexceptional places, such as slow-growing or marginal regions and the subnational scale at large, are left out of discussion. Neglecting these areas and focusing on propulsive urban centers contributes to over-emphasis of globalization as opposed to localization processes (Cox 1997) and change over stasis in inequality and development. Social processes are also fluid and cut across spatial scales. Any one scale provides but a snapshot of a causal moment in studying inequality (Swyngedouw 1997:140). In different historical periods, different geographic scales emerge as significant to social processes. The subnational scale, for example, is increasingly important for understanding the allocation of inequality in part due to decentralization. States and counties have greater responsibility for economic growth and social welfare today relative to the past and the federal government (Lobao and Kraybill 2005). Finally, the scale at which one chooses to direct theory and research affects conceptualization of places. In our introduction, we discussed two traditions, the place-in-society approach, more conventional to sociology, and the society-in-place approach, more articulated in geography, which sees place in an array of conceptualized territories. Much work on subnational inequality takes the second approach. Here the intrinsic character

of places is of less interest, but places still require conceptualization based on the social processes earmarked for attention. Since social processes cut across scales, one way to view place is as a “particular articulation” of those processes (Massey 1994:5). That is, a place represents a particular mix of social relationships originating from sources at different scales, both internal and external to that place. The literature on spatial scales challenges confining inequality research to cities and nation-states. It opens up the subnational scale as worthy of investigation and increasingly important under neoliberal governance. It cautions against fixing the study of place itself at any particular scale. Finally, it provides an alternative way of thinking about places, as nodes of intersecting relationships involving power and inequality from different scales (Massey 1994).

## Impacts

### Extinction

#### **The loss of place endangers the human race.**

Walljasper ’05 [Jay Walljasper is a writer for the New Statesman, a current affairs magazine published in Britain, “The future of the human race depends on public spaces. They are the starting point for all community, commerce and democracy': People have withdrawn from the public realm in this era of rampant traffic and overblown security measures. A vibrant street life would bring them back into the open and make them feel they belong”, Lexis Nexis, August 15, 2005, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/> AD]

"Cultures and climates differ all over the world," notes the architect Jan Gehl, "but people are the same. They will gather in public if you give them a good place to do it." Gehl, an international consultant and professor of urban design, has charted the progress of Copenhagen's central pedestrian district since it opened in 1962. At that time, cars were overrunning the city, and the pedestrian zone was conceived as a way to revitalise the declining urban core. It has been expanded a bit each year ever since, with parking spaces gradually removed, and biking and transport facilities improved. Cafes, once thought to be exclusive to the Mediterranean, have become the centre of Copenhagen's social life. Gehl's research documents how people's use of the area has more than tripled over the past 40 years. The pedestrian district is now the thriving heart of a reinvigorated city.

Copenhagen's comeback gives hope to growing numbers of citizens around the world who want to make sure that lively public places don't disappear in this era of rampant traffic, heightened security measures and the general indifference of many who think the internet and their own families can provide all the social interaction they need. While only a century ago public spaces almost everywhere were crowded with people, many are nearly empty now. Walking through certain communities can be a profoundly alienating experience, as if the whole place had been evacuated for an emergency that no one told you about. The decline of public places represents a loss far deeper than simple nostalgia for the quiet, comfortable ways of the past. Public spaces are favourite places to meet, talk, sit, look, relax, play, stroll, flirt, eat, drink, smoke, sunbathe and feel part of a broader whole. They are the starting point for all community, commerce and democracy. Indeed, the future of the human race depends on public spaces - they are, after all, where young men and women meet and court. Numerous studies have proved that nothing grabs people's attention more than other people. We are hard-wired with a desire for congenial places to gather. That is why it is particularly surprising how often we overlook the importance of public places today.

### Value to Life

#### **Place defines human existence.**

Withers ’09 [Charles WJ Withers is a professor of historical geography at the University of Edinburgh, “Place and the "Spatial Turn" in Geography and in History”, 2009, Journal of the History of Ideas, Accessed through Project Muse, <http://muse.jhu.edu.turing.library.northwestern.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_ideas/v070/70.4.withers.html> AD]

Place is one of the most fundamental concepts in human geography. It is also one of the most problematic.5 Place, or small-scale regional space, features as a subdivision within the Classical tripartite division of cosmography (the earth in relation to other planetary bodies), geography (the earth as a whole) and chorography (parts of the earth or regional geography). So, too, does the distinction between chorography and chronology as the twin eyes of history with, by convention, chorography being the left eye of history.6 As the philosopher of place Edward Casey has shown in his The Fate of Place:A Philosophical History (1997), the ideas of place as chora, locality, in the work of Plato and of place as a container and of placedness, the where of something as a basic metaphysical category in the work of Aristotle are enduring elements in Classical discussions of the topic.7 In these terms, the notion of place is long-run, disputed, and in at least one sense in Western intellectual history, central to the very definition of geography and of history. For political geographer John Agnew, there are three fundamental aspects of place: place as location, place as locale, and the sense of place.8 By location is meant the absolute location, the grid references we attach to portions of the earth's surface by conventional latitudinal and longitudinal positioning. By locale, Agnew means the material setting for social relations, the actual morphometry of the environments (domestic, daily, and so [End Page 639] on) in which people conduct their lives. Sense of place is taken to embrace the affective attachment that people have to place. These distinctions are helpful as a preliminary modern typology. But since the later 1960s and the 1970s, they have received varying attention within human geography. At the same time as new forms of mathematically-oriented spatial science were being advanced, humanistic geographers turned increasingly to ideas concerning the sense of place. They did so partly as a rejection of the emphasis upon space as a matter of depersonalized power geometry, from distaste for the related law-like generalizations with which geography sought scientific status and from increased attention to place as a lived particularity, and not space as an abstract generality. For humanistic geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan, Anne Buttimer, David Seamon, and Edward Relph, place was not to be studied as a fractional unit of space but was much more an idea, a concept, a way of "being in the world."9 Where Tuan defined place in relation to space: space as an arena for action and movement, place as about stopping, resting, becoming, and becoming involved, Relph emphasized a more experiential notion of place, and drew upon Edmund Husserl's work in phenomenology in doing so. Place in this sense had an almost spiritual dimension, having to do with dwelling, with being in the world. This might be seen as place as "place consciousness" but, for Relph, it was something more: The basic meaning of place, its essence, does not therefore come from locations, nor from the trivial functions that places serve, nor from the community that occupies it, nor from superficial or mundane experiences. . . . The essence of place lies in the largely unselfconscious intentionality that defines places as profound centers of human existence.10 This is close to the views of Edward Casey, who argues that to live as a human is to live locally, and, further, that to know at all is first of all to [End Page 640] know the place one is in.11 It echoes too the views of other geographers who see place as different from space and from territory by virtue of the emotional responses inherent in place.12 From the later 1980s, geographers concerned with notions of place began to engage with work in social theory and in cultural studies and to consider the connections between place and identity, between place and meaning. In his In Place/Out of Place, for example, Timothy Cresswell argued that the description and ascription of people, things, and social practices was strongly linked to particular places: that places and the social practices within them had a strongly normative and moral component. When people acted "out of place," or did not "know their place," they had committed a transgression. Place identity came in cultural geography to be a matter of identity politics and differential access to power in given locales. In much of this work, place was understood, as Cresswell later put it, "through the lens of social and cultural conflict. Issues of race, class, gender, sexuality and a host of other social relations were at the center of this analysis." 13 Place thus came to be seen not as the locale (and never just the location of given social events) but as the consequence of social processes. Place—and, in parallel, space—was a social construction, produced by social agency as Henri Lefebvre has it.14 As the Marxist urban geographer David Harvey put it, "Place, in whatever guise, is like space and time, a social construct. This is the baseline proposition from which I start. The only interesting question that can then be asked is: by what social process(es) is place constructed?"15

### Violence

#### **Speed breeds violence: the artificial simulation of things justifies wars – the fastest nations are able to wage war against slower nations with little fear.**

Der Derian ’90 [James der Derian, philosopher extraordinaire, “The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed”, September 1990, Wiley-Blackwell publishing on behalf of the International Studies Association, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language ofExile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 295-310Published, Accessed through JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2600571.pdf> AD]

To break out of the inertia of the prison-state as well as the prisonhouse of language, the Futurists exalted in paintings of the masses in perptual motion, in race cars, airplanes, and city streets, and in poetry and manifestos of the emancipation of words from syntax, punctuation, the requirements of reason itself. Paintings and writings bore titles like Dynamic Expansion + Speed and Technical Manifesto of Futurism. The technology and "polyphony" of the urban space was their church and litany. The Futurists soon fell victim to their project of marrying an ideology of the avant-garde with art-in-action, which in Italy in the 1920s meant falling in with Mussolini's Fascist movement. But they burned brightly in that period, and they powerfully illuminated a new force in modern industrialized societies: speed. Paul Virilio has almost single-handedly brought the issue of speed back into political and social theory. Trained as an architect, Virilio (1975, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1986, 1988) has curated museum exhibitions, studied military strategy, and written several remarkable books on topics ranging from the deterritorialization of international politics to the relationship of war to cinematic practices. It is not possible to summarize Virilio's work in this article. However, given the obvious importance of speed in international relations-from the rapid increase in weapon delivery speed and concomitant decrease in human response time, to the appearance of real-time representation and surveillance of the enemy-it does seem strange that Virilio's work has gone largely unnoticed in the discipline of international relations.25 In a word, Virilio's project is to politicize speed. The politics and power of wealth, war, and media have been studied, but not their political relationship to speed. In our own sub-field of international political economy we have taken steps to under- stand the relation of national wealth to violence, empire, and military power. But we have not given serious consideration to the political effects of excessive or insufficient speed in our systems of weapons, communications, and decision-making. Virilio is concerned about the issue because he believes a revolution has taken place in the regulation of speed. He outlined this argument in an interview with Sylvere Lotringer: Up until the nineteenth century, society was founded on the brake. Means of furthering speed were very scant. You had ships, but sailing ships evolved very little between Antiquity and Napoleon's time. The only machine to use speed with any sophistication was the optical telegraph, then the electric telegraph. In general, up until the nineteenth century there was no production of speed. They could produce brakes by means of ramparts, the law, rules, interdictions, etc . . . Then, suddenly, there's the great revolution that others have called the Industrial Revolution or the Transportation Revolution. I call it a dromocratic revolution because what was invented was . . . a means of fabricating speed with the steam engine, then the combustion engine. And so they can pass from the age of brakes to the age of the accelerator. In other words, power will be invested in acceleration itself. (1983:44-45) Virilio is preoccupied with the violence of speed, and running through his various works is the common theme that speed is the essence of war. It is speed that trans- forms the hand into a dangerous fist, or as Napoleon applied the concept to military strategy, "Force is what separates mass from power" (Virilio, 1983:31). But speed coupled with the other technological changes has altered the battlefield: "Space is no longer in geography-it's in electronics. Unity is in the terminals. It's in the instantaneous time of command posts, multi-national headquarters, control towers, etc . There is a movement from geo- to chrono-politics: the distribution of territory becomes the distribution of time. The distribution of territory is outmoded, minimal" (Virilio, 1983:115). A radical claim, one that Virilio believes to be supported by the equally radical transformation of our visual representation of war. In Guerre et Cine'ma, Virilio gives a detailed history of the logistics of military perception and the use of cinematic techniques in warfare. As hand-to-hand combat gave way to long- range conflict, the enemy receded from sight. An urgent need developed to accurately see and verify the destruction of the enemy at a distance. The necessity of collapsing distance, of closing the geographical space between enemies, led to the joint development of modern techniques for war filming and killing.26 In modern warfare, as the aim of battle shifts from territorial, economic, and material gains to immaterial, perceptual fields, the war of spectacle begins to replace the spectacle of war.27 Virilio's analysis of the increasing strategic significance of battle-sight over the more traditional battle-site can be verified in articles from a variety of defense jour- nals.28 But what lies between the texts is particulary illuminating. For instance, an advertisement in Defense Review for General Electric's "COMPU-SCENE V" extolls the "visionic edge": "In combat, the eyes have it: you watch the environment; you stay in contact with the threat; you aim the weapon; you search for cover. The more you see, the more you win. You see without being seen; you see first; you have tactical vision" (November 1989:p 38). General Electric can provide this military advantage because it "builds the best visionics simulation and training systems in the world." It would seem that as the "real" arms race begins to slow down, a "simulation race" is winding up: "GE continues to set the pace with COMPU-SCENE V, the most powerful member yet of the COMPU-SCENE family of computer image generators. COMPU-SCENE V delivers true photo realism, it comes with a mission generation capability that translates raw photography into real-world databases and it simulates the full range of visionic devices-a major step toward full mission rehearsal capability. To read Virilio and then to read the technostrategic discourse provides an impor- tant message for students of war and peace: as the image becomes more credible than the fact, as time displaces space as the more significant strategic "field," and as the usefulness of our ultimate power, nuclear weapons, is increasingly called into question, the war of perception and representation deserves more of our attention and resources than the seemingly endless collection and correlation of data on war that goes on in the field of international relations. One does not need to look any further than the latest generation of weapons and strategy-Star Wars, the Stealth Bomber, the Lacrosse satellite, Discriminate Deterrence-to find ample proof that the empires of simulation, surveillance, and speed are growing in significance every day.

## Role of the Ballot

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must justify their epistemology before accessing their case. They can weigh their advantages so long as they prove that their mode of knowledge production is true.

#### Our Interpretation is the prerequisite to policy formation:

#### **1. Speed distorts the truth – we only get a fragmentary view of reality.**

Hanes ’96 [Mark Hanes is a member of the Department of Philosophy, Fordham University, “Paul Virilio and the Articulation of Post-Reality”, JSTOR, Human Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 185-197, April 1996, Springer, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20011104.pdf> AD]

Representation, whether modern or postmodern in conception, aims at creating a clearing for understanding, that is, aims at localizing (a) truth by means of an oral or written sign. Until now, debates regarding representation have centered on the ability of the sign to retain its referentiality both the Idea in Plato or Husserl, and even the trace of the Idea in Derrida, rely on there at least having been a time and space for the sign. The degree of 'truth' these concepts bestow remains the point of contention. But for either camp, truth needs time and a place to accrete to itself and become concretized. And for Virilio it is precisely this which is no longer possible: There was less to know in preceding centuries, and you'll notice that, paradoxically, knowledge then aimed at certainty and totality. The more knowledge grew the greater the unknown grew, we might conclude; or rather, the more information flashes by the more aware we are of its incomplete fragmentary nature (1991a: 45). The more speed eats away at a truth and reality which is supposed to be only communicated through the representational sign, the less the human perception of, for example the selfs existence as unitary subject can keep up and be kept up; one no sooner fixes on one thing and tries to move to the next than the former recedes to a vanishing point, leaving no foothold or foundation on which a chain of meanings can accumulate. Again, the leveling of any distinction between primary and secondary aspects of the sign, of even the chronological ordering of a concept's aspects, removes the dialectical sense in which meaning progresses: To deny the ideal hierarchy of the crucial and the incidental, because there is no incidental, only dominant cultures that exile us from ourselves and others, a loss of meaning which is for us not only a siesta of consciousness but also a decline in existence (1991a: 37). Similar to many contemporary post-linguistic turn thinkers, Virilio conceives reality through representation, but with a unique twist. Existence, the human conception of subject and object, changes with different modes of representation. Following the concurrent genealogies (as found in the various deconstructionist, hermeneuticist, or critical theory schools) of both semiosis and the conceptual effects of the study of semiosis, both history and historiography, Virilio outlines the descent of the visible and the simultaneous ascent of the invisible as the human barometer of what counts as reality. That which the human can see (light's refraction off an object over a period of time) loses conceptual importance to a reality impelled by speeds invisible to the human eye and the cognitive state dependent on visibility. His approach to the human condition is informed by the mutations in these human modes of representation: The enigma proposed by the Sphinx to Oedipus is a question on the strange being that moves through time, and it is really the diversity of techniques used by the being that is the basis for the interrogation; it is this very diversity that in turn designates man among other animals (1991 a: 85-6).

#### **2. Speed bends reality – information is perverted and leads to the accident.**

Hanes ’96 [Mark Hanes is a member of the Department of Philosophy, Fordham University, “Paul Virilio and the Articulation of Post-Reality”, JSTOR, Human Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 185-197, April 1996, Springer, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20011104.pdf> AD]

The second conceptual movement is the reification of this circular trend.2 Events such as the Cold War are the norm if nothing palpable occurs as past wars were understood to occur, this does not make them any less real. Simulation models are the new reality, and here speed breaks down previously entrenched notions of representation and misrepresentation, putting into question classic models of the real and irreal. Thus, speed allows endless counter-strat? egies to occur without any 'real' terrain ever being fought on. This is what Virilio calls 'pure war.' Battles, whether military or social, happen for us less as material and bloody collisions and more as distant computer or television based simulation: "The new unknown combatants, come from nowhere and no longer finding a strategic terrain, fight in strategic time, in the relativity of travel time" (19S6:121). Success is measured in the ability not to be found, to disappear before one's opponent, while retaining the ability to reappear on any vector: Basically, reality encounters the fate of modernity : it has always already happened-We live today in an ever-growing fault between the promptness of the broadcasts and our own capacity to grasp and measure the present moment. The question of modernity and post-modernity is superseded by that of reality and post-reality: we are living in a system of technological temporal? ity, in which duration and material support have been supplanted as criteria by individual retinal and auditory instants (1991 b: 84).The resulting aesthetics of disappearance, with the speed of light as its limit concept, brings about an inability to make distinctions or raise political or social criticisms because there is neither stable time nor space in which to register them. The representations which comprise life fold in on themselves as we make the leap into hyperspace, thus making "the derangement of the senses a permanent state" (1991 a: 92). We cannot react at the pace technology establishes as (hyper-)reality: Speed again ostensibly perverts the illusory order of normal perception, the order of arrival of information. What could have seemed simultaneous is diversified and decomposes. With speed, the world keeps on coming at us, to the detriment of the object, which is itself now assimilated to the sending of information. It is this intervention that destroys the world as we know it, technique finally reproducing permanently the violence of the accident; the mystery of speed remains a secret of light and heat from which even sound is missing (1991 a: 100-1). What has withered away is the lived time of the orderly and unified narrative. Virilio explains this displacement and replacement, as well as the illusion of stability, by drawing out Einstein's example of passing trains: "The moment when two trains seem immobile to travellers while they are really launched at top speed one beside the other" (1991 a: 108). It is this illusion of stability which indicates and accounts for our contemporary sense of 'static' reality. With wry irony Virilio notes that, "paradoxically, it's the extreme mobility which creates the inertia of the moment, instantaneity which would create the instant!" (1991a: 108).

# Affirmative

## Notes

#### To beat this Kritik, you will probably need to win policy making and pragmatism good. Also the alternative is really fuzzy, so some vague alts bad cards will be useful. The Agnew Card is a must against this Kritik. It’s a trippy K, so be prepared to uphold logic on the Affirmative.

## T-SC Theory Wrong

### Place Matters

**T-SC Theory Wrong – Place still matters in the world**

**Agnew ‘01** (John Agnew, Professor and Chair of Geography, University of California, “THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY: TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION, GEOPOLITICS, AND GLOBAL UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT” Los Angeles, Lecture presented at the Center for Globalization and Policy Research, UCLA, Wednesday, April 18, 2001)

**A rather different approach to time-space compression emphasizes more the role of speed in postmodernity than the enhanced importance of local places or lived space**. Indeed, in this understanding, ‘the power of pace is outstripping the power of place’ (Luke and  Tuathail 1998, 72). **Accepting the rhetoric of the gurus of the Internet world and the ‘Third Wave,’ this perspective sees the world as on a technological trajectory in which global space is being ‘re-mastered’ by a totally new geopolitical imagination in which accelerating flows of information and identities undermine modernist territorial formations.** Drawing on such writers as Paul Virilio (1986), ‘Places are conceptualized in terms of their ability to accelerate or hinder the exchanges of global flowmations’ (Luke and  Tuathail 1998, 76). **Space is reimagined not as ‘fixed masses of territory, but rather as velocidromes, with high traffic speedways, big band-width connectivities, or dynamic web configurations in a worldwide network of massively parallel kineformations’** (Luke and  Tuathail 1998, 76**). The main danger here, as McKenzie Wark (1994, 93) notes, is that of mistaking a trend towards massively accelerated information flow with a deterritorialized world in which where you are no longer matters. It still matters immensely. Some places are well-connected, others are not; media and advertising companies work out of some locations and cultures and not out of others. The simulations of the media are still distinguishable** (for some people) **from the perils and dilemmas of everyday life. Pace is itself problematic when the images and information conveyed lead to information overload and fatigue more than accurate and real-time decision-making. The much hyped televisual world must still engage with an actual world in which most people still have very limited daily itineraries that root them to very particular places.** To think that geopolitics is being replaced by chronopolitics is to project the desire for a boundaryless **world characteristic of an older utopianism onto an actual world in which the old geopolitical imagination is still very much alive and well. History has not yet ended in instant electronic simulation. History is not the same as the History Channel.¶**

## Perm – Do Both

**Perm Do Both Solves – Economic Globalization takes account of place.**

**Agnew ‘01** (John Agnew, Professor and Chair of Geography, University of California, “THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY: TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION, GEOPOLITICS, AND GLOBAL UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT” Los Angeles, Lecture presented at the Center for Globalization and Policy Research, UCLA, Wednesday, April 18, 2001)

In this strand, **a number of different territorial-organizational dynamics are distinguished so as to better monitor the trend towards globalization a**nd its challenge to established modes of regulation and governance. **In this understanding, local sources of advantage maintain a role that cannot produce complete locational substitutability for businesses moving investments from place to place.** Michael Storper (1997, 35), for example, distinguishes four dynamics that work differentially across economic sectors and world regions:¶ In some cases, the **opening up of interterritorial relations places previously¶ existing locationally specific assets into a new position of global dominance.¶ In a second set of cases, those assets are devalued via substitution by other¶ products that now penetrate local markets; this is not a straightforward¶ economic process, however; it is culturally intermediated**. In a third set¶ of cases, **territorial integration permits the fabled attainment of massive ¶ economies of scale and organization, devalues locationally specific assets and¶ leads to deterritorialization and widespread market penetration**. In a fourth set of cases, territorial integration is met by differentiation and destandardization of at least some crucial elements of the commodity chain, necessitating the reinvention of territory-specific relational assets. ¶ Globalization of trade, foreign direct investment, and production, therefore, is not just about an emerging geography of flows but how flows fit into and adapt to existing territorial or place-based patterns of economic development.¶ The point is that ‘**globalization does not entrain some single, unidirectional, sociospatial logic’ (Cox 1997, 16). Rather, place-specific conditions still mediate many production and trade relationships. For example, most multinational businesses still betray strong national biases in investment activity and the intersection of various external economies and ‘relational assets’ (to use Storper’s term) give different places different competitive advantages in expanding their economic base. Various modes of local regulation and governance evolve to handle the development process.**