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#### The repair of transportation infrastructure is necessary for the perpetuation of capital

Bryant, 2011 (Dec 1, Levi, Philosophy Professor at Collin, “Onticology and Politics,” <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/12/01/onticology-and-politics/>)

So if I consider myself a Marxist materialist then why am I embracing realism? Part of the reasons arise from the very sort of critical historical meditation you bring up in your remarks. In my view, the move beyond Fordist modes of production consisted in a shift to media/knowledge/information production roughly at the behest of biopower. Nonetheless, this form of production– while itself tarrying with the incorporeal –is grounded in a physical infrastructure. Flows of capital and the ability of capital to exercise its power literally needs highways, satellites, trains, farms, land, fiber optic cables, ocean going ships, and so on. Without these channels of transportation and information transfer, coupled with sources of calories and energy to run these engines, capital is unable to continue itself for, as Harvey points out, capital only exists in the motion of capital. For me this Marxist thesis about motion and being is true of all objects. Consequently, if you wish to smash an object you have to find a way to halt its internal motion or the process by which it sustains, continues, and propagates itself. Now, for whatever reason, it seems to me that there’s a strange way in which this shift from factory production under Fordism to immaterial knowledge-production in a post-Fordist regime has simultaneously been seen in most variants of Marxism while nonetheless remaining unseen (in much the same way that a neurotic, and especially an obsessional like Hamlet, might endlessly talk about his symptom without quite seeing it or moving to the act). Here I have in mind the shift in much Marxist theory to cultural Marxism or critique of ideology, largely forgetting the physical world or things like fiber optic cables and soil conditions. However, while I believe that ideology critique and cultural critique are absolutely indispensable, I also feel that they often lack any political efficacy because they simply tarry at the level of signs and discourses, ignoring the material infrastructure upon which this form of production relies to perpetuate, continue, and sustain itself. Thus what I’m trying to do is both retain cultural critique while also drawing attention to this material infrastructure. If we ignore that dimension, I think, we leave the basic coordinates within which this system functions intact. We need better cartography so we develop better strategy. This cartography and the practice that accompanies it is what I’ve called “terraism”. To get a sense of what I’m talking about, take the example of OWS. I am absolutely on the side of the OWSers, but I also find myself frustrated as it seems to me that much of it is unfolding at the level of an ideology critique (cultural Marxism) and a desire to persuade these governmental and corporate forces that is doomed to fall on deaf ears. Occupations are taking place everywhere except, I think, in the places where they would have a chance to make a real difference and produce real results. If we think of capitalist social systems as being akin to an organic body, then these social systems will have a circulatory system and a nervous system. The nervous system of a capitalist social system would be the various mediums through which information is transmitted (internet, phones, television, newspapers, etc) as well that the events that take place in those systems (images, songs, reports, narratives, articles, etc), while the circulatory system would be the various paths of distribution and production the system requires to produce this sort of social structure such as highways, trains, airports, portions of the internet used for monetary exchange, farms, shipping lanes, etc. The political goal of the critic of capitalism requires causing capitalism to have a stroke or a heart attack (continuing with the metaphor of circulatory systems). But if that’s to be done, it’s necessary to occupy not a park in front of Wall Street or a governors office, but rather the arteries capitalism needs to survive. Why not occupy the highways? Why not occupy the ports (Oakland was a good move)? Why not occupy the internets, finding ways to block commerce traffic? My view is that if all focus is on the nervous system, these infrastructural dimensions are entirely missed and we end up with a form of political engagement that is merely one more form of information production leaving the basic structure of the system intact. This is why I’m an object-oriented ontologist.

#### Failure to take responsible for our role in the circulation of capital makes global violence inevitable

Žižek & Daly ‘4 (Slavoj, Prof. of European Graduate School, Intl. Director of the Birkbeck Inst. for Humanities, U. of London, and Senior Researcher @ Inst. of Sociology, U. of Ljubljiana, and Glyn, Professor Intl. Studies @ Northampton U., “Risking the Impossible” <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm>)

It is in the light of this more subtle perspective on the real that zizek has also revised his approach to the question of ideology. In the sublime object of ideology, zizek developed his famous inversion of the classical 'false consciousness' thesis. Thus ideology does not conceal or distort an underlying reality (human nature, social interests etc.) But rather reality itself cannot be reproduced without ideological mystification (zizek, 1989: 28). What ideology offers is the symbolic construction of reality – the ultimate fantasy – as a way to escape the traumatic effects of the real. Reality is always a 'virtual' take on the real; virtualization that can never fully overcome the real or achieve homeostasis. In the language of laclau and mouffe, this means that society as an integrated unity is universally impossible precisely because of the constitutive excess of the real qua the unmasterable negativity upon which every positivization finally depends. And it is here that ideology performs its supreme conjuring trick. What ideology aims at is a fantasmatic re-staging of the encounter with the real in such a way that the impossibility of society is translated into the theft of society by some historical other. In nazi ideology, for example, it is the contingent figure of the jew who is made directly responsible for the theft/sabotage of social harmony – thereby concealing the traumatic fact that social harmony never existed and that it is an inherent impossibility (1989: 125-7; 1993: 203-4). By imputing the status of the real to a particular other, the dream of holistic fulfilment – through the elimination, expulsion or suppression of the other – is thereby sustained. More recently, however, Zizek has developed a new twist to this perspective. Ideology not only constructs a certain image of fulfillment (Plato's City of Reason, the Aryan Community, multiculturalist harmony etc..), it also endeavours to regulate a certain distance from it. [4](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#4) On the one hand we have the ideological fantasy of being reconciled with the Thing (of total fulfilment), but, on the other, with the built-in proviso that we do not come too close to it. The (Lacanian) reason for this is clear: if you come too close to the Thing then it either shatters/evaporates (like the frescoes in Fellini's Roma) or it provokes unbearable anxiety and psychical disintegration. Crucial here is the status of the category of the impossible For Zizek impossibility is not the kind of neutral category that we tend to find in Laclau and Mouffe (as in their impossibility-of-Society thesis) where it tends to connote a basic constitutive frontier of antagonism. Like the immanent markers of the Real, impossibility gets caught up in ideology and is configured in such a way that it both structures reality and determines the coordinates of what is actually possible. As Zizek argues in this book, beyond the prima facie ideological operation of translating impossibility into an external obstacle there is a further deeper stage to the operation: that is, the "very elevation of something into impossibility as a means of postponing or avoiding encountering it". Ideology is the impossible dream not simply in terms of overcoming impossibility but in terms of sustaining that impossibility in an acceptable way. That is to say, the idea of overcoming is sustained as a deferred moment of reconciliation without having to go through the pain of overcoming as such. The central issue is one of proximity; of maintaining a critical distance by keeping the Thing in focus (like the image on a screen) but without coming so close that it begins to distort and decompose. A typical example would be that of someone who fantasizes about an ideal object (a sexual partner, promotion, retirement etc.) and when they actually encounter the object, they are confronted with the Real of their fantasy; the object loses its ideality, The (ideological) trick, therefore, is to keep the object at a certain distance in order to sustain the satisfaction derived from the fantasy "if only I had x I could fulfil my dream". Ideology regulates this fantasmatic distance in order to, as it were, avoid the Real in the impossible: i.e. the traumatic aspects involved in any real (impossible) change. This allows for a more nuanced reading of ideologies. Let us take the case of an international crisis: the so-called "liberation of Kuwait" during the 1990s Gulf conflict. Here the ideological discourse tended to operate along the following tines: "we must achieve the liberation of Kuwait ... while recognizing that any true liberation (i.e. abolishing Kuwait's feudal dynasty and setting up democratic structures) is currently impossible." And do we not have something similar with the so-called New World Order? Any real (or indeed Real) attempt to establish such an order would inevitably require traumatic far-reaching changes: global democracy based on universal rights, popular participation, the eradication of poverty and social exclusion (etc.) as part of a genuine "reflexive modernization". However, what we actually have is the routine invocation of the New World Order in term of an indefinite ideal that functions precisely as a way of preventing any real movement towards it. In the Kantian terms of the sublime, any convergence with what might be called the Bush-Blair "axis of Good" would become an unbearable evil. So we have the same type of ideological supplement at work: "we are moving towards a New World Order that will not tolerate the Saddam Husseins of this world... while recognizing that a true New World Order (one that would be intolerant of all the autocrats, royal families and the corporate dictatorships of global capitalism) is currently/always impossible . . ." In this way, impossibility loses its innocence and, far from comprising a simple repressed dimension, is rather something that can be seen to function as an implicit-obscene ideological supplement in today's realpolitik. There is a further potential danger. This concerns especially orthodox trends in politically correct multiculturalism and their distortion of a certain type of alliance politics that seeks to establish chains of equivalence between a widening set of differential struggles around gender, culture, lifestyles and so on. While there is nothing wrong in principle with establishing such forms of solidarity, the problem arises where this type of politics begins to assume, in a commonsense way, a basic levelling of the political terrain where all groups are taken to suffer equally ("we are all victims of the state/global capitalism/repressive forces..."). In other words, there is a danger that equivalential politics becomes so distorted that it becomes a way of disguising the position of those who are truly abject: those who suffer endemic poverty, destitution and repressive violence in our world system. In this way, the abject can become doubly victimized: first by a global capitalist order that actively excludes them; and, second, by an aseptic politically correct "inclusivism" that renders them invisible inside its postmodern forest; its tyranny of differences. For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture - with all its pieties concerning "multiculturalist" [6](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#6) etiquette - Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called "radically incorrect" in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions [7](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#7) and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. There is a further potential danger. 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That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian- Lacanian twist, the few of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the fives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals; such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose "universalism" fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded "life-chances" cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the "developing world"). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek's universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a "glitch" in an otherwise sound matrix. Risking the impossible The response of the left to global capitalism cannot be one of retreat into the nation-state or into organicist forms of "community" and popular identities that currently abound in Europe and elsewhere. For Zizek it is, rather, a question of working with the very excesses that, in a Lacanian sense, are in capitalism more than capitalism. It is a question, therefore, of transcending the provincial "universalism" of capitalism. To illustrate the point, Zizek draws attention to the category of "intellectual property" and the increasingly absurd attempts to establish restrictive dominion over technological advances - genetic codes, DNA structures, digital communications, pharmaceutical breakthroughs, computer programs and so on - that either affect us all and/or to which there is a sense of common human entitlement Indeed, the modern conjuncture of capitalism is more and more characterized by a prohibitive culture: the widespread repression of those forms of research and development that have real emancipatory potential beyond exclusive profiteering; the restriction of information that has direct consequences for the future of humanity; the fundamental denial that social equality could be sustained by the abundance generated by capitalism. Capitalism typically endeavors to constrain the very dimensions of the universal that are enabled by it and simultaneously to resist all those developments that disclose its specificity-artificiality as merely one possible mode of being. The left, therefore, must seek to subvert these ungovernable excesses in the direction of a political (and politicizing) universalism; or what Balibar would call égaliberté. This means that the left should demand more globalization not less. Where neo-liberals speak the language of freedom - either in terms of individual liberty or the free movement of goods and capital - the left should use this language to combat today's racist obsessions with "economic refugees", "immigrants" and so on, and insist that freedoms are meaningless without the social resources to participate in those freedoms. Where there is talk of universal rights, the left must affirm a responsibility to the universal; one that emphasizes real human solidarity and does not lose sight of the abject within differential discourses. Reversing the well-known environmentalists' slogan, we might say that the left has to involve itself in thinking locally and acting globally. That is to say, it should attend to the specificity of today's political identities within the context of their global (capitalist) conditions of possibility precisely in order to challenge those conditions. Yet here I would venture that, despite clearly stated differences (Butler et al., 2000), the political perspective of Zizek is not necessarily opposed to that of Laclau and Mouffe and that a combined approach is fully possible. While Zizek is right to stress the susceptibility of today's "alternative" forms of hegemonic engagement to deradicalization within a postmodern-p.c. imaginary - a kind of hegemonization of the very terrain (the politico-cultural conditions of possibility) that produces and predisposes the contemporary logics of hegemony - it is equally true to say that the type of political challenge that Zizek has in mind is one that can only advance through the type of hegemonic subversion that Laclau and Mouffe have consistently stressed in their work. The very possibility of a political universalism is one that depends on a certain hegemonic breaking out of the existing conventions/grammar of hegemonic engagement. It is along these lines that Zizek affirms the need for a more radical intervention in the political imagination. The modem (Machiavellian) view of politics is usually presented in terms of a basic tension between (potentially) unlimited demands/appetites and limited resources; a view which is implicit in the predominant "risk society" perspective where the central (almost Habermasian) concern is with more and better scientific information. The political truth of today's world, however, is rather the opposite of this view. That is to say, the demands of the official left (especially the various incarnations of the Third Way left) tend to articulate extremely modest demands in the face of a virtually unlimited capitalism that is more than capable of providing every person on this planet with a civilized standard of living. For Zizek, a confrontation with the obscenities of abundance capitalism also requires a transformation of the ethico-political imagination. It is no longer a question of developing ethical guidelines within the existing political framework (the various institutional and corporate "ethical committees") but of developing a politicization of ethics; an ethics of the Real. [8](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#8) The starting point here is an insistence on the unconditional autonomy of the subject; of accepting that as human beings we are ultimately responsible for our actions and being-in-the-world up to and including the construction of the capitalist system itself Far from simple norm-making or refining/reinforcing existing social protocol, an ethics of the Real tends to emerge through norm-breaking and in finding new directions that, by definition, involve traumatic changes: i.e. the Real in genuine ethical challenge. An ethics of the Real does not simply defer to the impossible (or infinite Otherness) as an unsurpassable -horizon that already marks every act as a failure, incomplete and so on. Rather, such an ethics is one that fully accepts contingency but which is nonetheless prepared to risk the impossible in the sense of breaking out of standardized positions. We might say that it is an ethics which is not only politically motivated but which also draws its strength from the political itself. For Zizek an ethics of the Real (or Real ethics) means that we cannot rely on any form of symbolic Other that would endorse our (in)decisions and (in)actions: for example, the 'neutral' financial data of the stockmarkets; the expert knowledge of Beck's 'new modernity' scientists; the eco­nomic and military councils of the New World Order; the various (formal and informal) tribunals of political correct­ness; or any of the mysterious laws of God, nature or the market. What Zizek affirms is a radical culture of ethical iden­tification for the left in which the alternative forms of mili­tancy must first of all be militant with themselves. That is to say, they must be militant in the fundamental ethical sense of not relying on any external/higher authority and in the development of a political imagination that, like Zizek's own thought, exhorts us to risk the impossible.

#### The alternative: vote negative to block the flow of capital

#### Intervening into the ballot economy to block any from approving capitalist projects is essential – we must stifle the circulation of capital wherever possible to create new sites of solidarity

Gharavi, 2012 (May 19, Maryam Monalisa, Ph.D. candidate in Comparative Literature and Film & Visual Studies at Harvard University, “In Defense of Spontaneous Contestation and/or Beauty,” The New Inquiry, <http://thenewinquiry.com/blogs/southsouth/in-defense-of-spontaneous-contestation-andor-beauty/>)

His starting point: design is a marker and site for neoliberal markets. One might choose to read ‘design’ broadly as self-enclosed, highly produced spaces, ergo your basic mall, museum, amusement park, or sports arena. If design is a repository for obscured market power, Ricardo reasoned, then those lacking power could intervene with ‘microgestures’ that allow power to stage itself. In 1985 he performed such a microgesture at a site he viewed as part of an ‘exit culture’ of Disneyfied commodity exchange. He bought various packaged commodities—toys and electronics and so forth—but instead of going home he opened them at the exit door of a mall and began displaying and playing with them. Soon a crowd would gather, which inevitably set off mall security and then the police. The kind of person who acquires packaged goods but doesn’t go home is typically a war vet, drug dealer, or homeless person, all of whom invite police attention because they are perceived to be trespassers. Bodies that deny the process of flow—by now it is as common to hear move along, there’s nothing to see here in colloquial form as it is to read it in a volume of French theory—are considered a blockage. Ricardo’s body became an instant site of blockage as a community of people formed around him at precisely the designated exit point at a shopping mall. He describes this—completely seriously, I might add—as an act of sabotage, accounting for the origin of the word ‘saboteur’ as women factory workers who wore wooden sabots at the mill so they could stick them in the machines (Fr. saboter, ‘kick with sabots, willfully destroy’). During the Industrial Revolution, machines replaced workers at an alarming rate throughout Europe, and the once stable economy of guild and craft shop members who had performed manual labor for generations found their very welfare threatened. To protest machine replacement of workers, the workers would toss their shoes into the machine works to make them stop—sabotage. Since his work in the 1980s with the Critical Art Ensemble and the Electronic Disturbance Theater Ricardo and his cohort have explained streets as dead capital. The streets’ primary design is to aid the flow of people and traffic, and even minor blockages such as the mall exit experiment are bound to perk up the antenna of even the laziest squad patrol. If flesh-and-blood bodies are being subjected to unprecedented curbs on freedom of movement and assembly, then a virtual alliance with data-bodies retains the possibility to return some power back to the disenfranchised: ‘[W]e put forth our idea that all digital actions must be part of parallel street action. That via transparency and simulations data bodies and real bodies could act in unison.’ This seems inarguable, especially given how (1) activists have at least since the 2004 DNC and RNC conventions coordinated their real-bodies via TXTMobbing, a technology developed for communicating and reporting in real-time in 160 characters, a direct predecessor to Twitter, Inc., and continue to do so on an exponential level, (2) popular awareness about virtual networks of hackers, hacker cultures, and the liquid potential of the web (e.g. Anonymous, LulzSec, Wikileaks) seems more diffuse than ever, and (3) allegiance and retaliation for the wrongs done to real-body activists by police, the FBI, the Justice Department, among others, have often been exacted by data-body activists—in fact, sometimes those wrongs are so egregious and the inculcated parties so powerless that appealing to collectives like Anonymous has became a foreseeable form of real-body/data-body solidarity.

## Block

### Framework

#### Reject all truth claims not consistent historical materialism – the alternative is empirically proven to be serial policy failure

Harvey ’10 (David, Distinguished Prof. of Anthropology @ Graduate Center of City U. of New York, Top-20 Most Cited Authors in the Humanities, The Enigma of Capital, pgs. 235-239)

When her Majesty the Queen paid a visit to the London School of Economics in November 2008, she asked how was it that no economists had seen the financial crisis coming. Six months later, the economists in the British academy sent her a somewhat apologetic letter. ‘in summary, your Majesty,’ it concluded, ‘the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole.’ it is ‘difficult to recall a greater example of wishful thinking combined with hubris,’ they observed of the financiers, but went on to admit that everyone – presumably including themselves – had been caught up in a ‘psychology of denial’. On the other side of the Atlantic, Robert Samuelson, a columnist for the Washington Post, wrote in a somewhat similar vein: ‘here we have the most spectacular economic and financial crisis in decades ... and the one group that spends most of its waking hours analyzing the economy basically missed it.’ Yet the country’s 13,000 or so economists seemed singularly disinclined to engage in ‘rigorous self-criticism to explain their lapses’. Samuelson’s own conclusion was that the economic theorists were too interested in sophisticated forms of mathematical model-building to bother with the messiness of history and that this messiness had caught them out. The Nobel Prize-winning economist and columnist for The New York Times Paul Krugman agreed (sort of!). ‘[T]he economics profession went astray,’ he wrote, ‘because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.’ The British economist Thomas Palley, in a follow-up open letter to the Queen, was even less generous: the profession of economics had become ‘increasingly arrogant, narrow and closed minded’, he wrote, and was completely unable ‘to come to grips with its sociological failure which produced massive intellectual failure with huge costs for society’. I do not cite these examples to single out the economists. First off, not all of them failed. Current chair of the White house’s National Economic Council Larry Summers, in a telling analysis of the effects of government bail-outs on financial behaviour in the wake of the stock market crash of 1987, clearly saw where the problems of moral hazard might lead, but concluded that the effects of government not standing behind financial institutions would be far worse than the effects of always bailing them out. The policy problem was not to avoid but to constrain moral hazard. Unfortunately, when Treasury Secretary in the late 1990s he forgot his own analysis and promoted exactly the kind of unconstrained moral hazard that he had earlier shown might wreck the economy (a clear case of denial in action). Paul volcker, past chair of the Federal reserve, warned of a financial crash within five years back in 2004. But majority opinion sided with Ben Bernanke, before he became chair at the Fed, when he said in 2004 that ‘improvements in monetary policy’ had reduced ‘the extent of economic uncertainty confronting households and firms’, thus making recessions ‘less frequent and less severe’. Such was the view of the Party (and what a party it was!) of Wall Street. But go tell that to the indonesians or the argentinians. it is devoutly to be wished that Bernanke’s prognosis in august 2009 that the worst of the crisis is over turns out to be more reliable. Ideas have consequences and false ideas can have devastating consequences. Policy failures based on erroneous economic thinking played a crucial role in both the run-up to the debacle of the 1930s and in the seeming inability to find an adequate way out. Though there is no universal view among historians and economists as to exactly which policies failed, it is agreed that the knowledge structure through which the crisis was understood needed to be revolutionised. Keynes and his colleagues accomplished that task. But by the mid-1970s it became clear that the Keynesian policy tools were no longer working, at least in the way they were being applied, and it was in this context that monetarism, supply-side theory and the (beautiful) mathematical modelling of micro-economic market behaviours supplanted broad-brush macro-economic Keynesian thinking. The monetarist and narrower neoliberal theoretical frame that dominated after 1980 is now in question. We need new mental conceptions to understand the world. What might these be and who will produce them, given both the sociological and intellectual malaise that hangs over knowledge production more generally? The deeply entrenched mental conceptions associated with neoliberal theories and the neoliberalisation and corporatisation of the universities has played more than a trivial role in the production of the present crisis. For example, the whole question of what to do about the financial system, the banking sector, the state– finance nexus and the power of private property rights cannot be broached without going outside of the box of conventional thinking. For this to happen will require a revolution in thinking, in places as diverse as the universities, the media and government, as well as within the financial institutions themselves. Karl Marx, while not in any way inclined to embrace philosophical idealism, also held that ideas are a material force in history. Mental conceptions constitute, after all, one of the seven spheres in his general theory of co-revolutionary change. Autonomous developments and inner conflicts over what mental conceptions shall become hegemonic therefore have an important historical role to play. It was for this reason that Marx wrote The Communist Manifesto (with Engels), Capital and innumerable other works. These works provide a systematic critique, albeit incomplete, of capitalism and its crisis tendencies. But as Marx also insisted, it was only when these critical ideas carried over into the fields of institutional arrangements, organisational forms, production systems, social relations, technologies and relations to nature that the world would truly change. Since Marx’s goal was to change the world and not merely to understand it, ideas had to be formulated with a certain revolutionary intent. This inevitably meant a conflict with modes of thought more convivial to and useful for the ruling class. The fact that Marx’s oppositional ideas have been the targets, particularly in recent years, of repeated repressions and exclusions (to say nothing of bowdlerisations and misrepresentations galore) suggests that they may still be too dangerous for the ruling classes to tolerate. While Keynes repeatedly avowed that he had never read Marx, in the 1930s he was surrounded and influenced by many people like his economist colleague Joan Robinson who had. While many of them objected vociferously to Marx’s foundational concepts and his dialectical mode of reasoning, they were acutely aware of and deeply affected by some of his more prescient conclusions. It is fair to say, I think, that the Keynesian theory revolution could not have been accomplished without the subversive presence of Marx lurking in the wings. The trouble in these times is that most people have no idea who Keynes was and what he really stood for, while understanding of Marx is negligible. The repression of critical and radical currents of thought – or to be more exact the corralling of radicalism within the bounds of multiculturalism and cultural choice – creates a lamentable situation within the academy and beyond, no different in principle to having to ask the bankers who made the mess to clean it up with exactly the same tools as they used to get into it. Broad adhesion to postmodern and post-structuralist ideas which celebrate the particular at the expense of big picture thinking does not help. To be sure, the local and the particular are vitally important and theories that cannot embrace, for example, geographical difference are worse than useless (as I have earlier been at pains to emphasise). But when that fact is used to exclude anything larger than parish politics, then the betrayal of the intellectuals and abrogation of their traditional role become complete. Her Majesty the Queen would, I am sure, love to hear that a huge effort is underway to put the big picture into some sort of copious frame such that all can see it. But the current crop of academicians, intellectuals and experts in the social sciences and humanities are by and large ill equipped to undertake such a collective task. Few seem predisposed to engage in that self-critical reflection that Robert Samuelson urged upon them. Universities continue to promote the same useless courses on neoclassical economic or rational choice political theory as if nothing has happened and the vaunted business schools simply add a course or two on business ethics or how to make money out of other people’s bankruptcies. After all, the crisis arose out of human greed and there is nothing that can be done about that! The current knowledge structure is clearly dysfunctional and equally clearly illegitimate. The only hope is that a new generation of perceptive students (in the broad sense of all those who seek to know the world) will clearly see that it is so and insist upon changing it. This happened in the 1960s. At various other critical points in history student-inspired movements, recognising the disjunction between what is happening in the world and what they are being taught and fed by the media, were prepared to do something about it. There are signs, from Tehran to Athens and on to many European university campuses of such a movement. How the new generation of students in China will act must surely be of deep concern in the corridors of political power in Beijing. A youthful, student-led revolutionary movement, with all of its evident uncertainties and problems, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to produce that revolution in mental conceptions that can lead us to a more rational solution to the current problems of endless growth. The first lesson it must learn is that an ethical, non-exploitative and socially just capitalism that redounds to the benefit of all is impossible. It contradicts the very nature of what capital is about.

#### If you have any doubt about the affirmative’s ability to solve their advantages you should err heavily neg- all of their risk calculus occurs against a background of capitalism that creates and shapes how policymakers reach conclusions

Bristow ‘5

(School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University)

(Gillian, Everyone’s a ‘winner’: problematising the discourse of regional competitiveness, Journal of Economic Geography 5 (2005) pp. 285–304)

This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-deﬁned content has become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute ‘the only valid currency of argument’ (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative discourses based around co-operation can be conceived (e.g.  see Hines, 2000; Bunzl, 2001), they have as yet failed to make a signiﬁcant impact on the dominant view that a particular, quantiﬁable form of output-related regional competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and ultimately beneﬁcial.  The answer appears to lie within the policy process, which refers to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the public sector. This therefore includes ‘the ideas which inform policy conception, the talk and work which goes into providing the formulation of policy directions, and all the talk, work and collaboration which goes into translating these into practice’ (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major debate exists in the policy studies literature about the scope and limitations of reason, analysis and intelligence in policy-making—a debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis upon evidence-based policy-making (see Davies et al., 2000). Keynes is often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he argued that policy-making should be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However, Majone (1989) has signiﬁcantly challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective, rational, technical assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge and evidence selectively to justify policy choices which are heavily based on value judgements. It is thus persuasion (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy process, not the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather than ideas that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the language of the business community.  Thus, critical to understanding the power of the discourse is ﬁrstly, understanding the appeal and signiﬁcance of the discourse to business interests and, secondly, exploring their role in inﬂuencing the ideas of regional and national policy elites.

### A2: Perm

#### The perm eliminates the point of antagonism from which resistance is possible – pure fidelity to the alternative is critical to success

Dean ‘9 (Jodi, Prof. of Political Theory, “Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics,” pgs. 7-10)

The 2000 presidential election is not the only instance when the American left failed to acknowledge victory. The left also won the culture wars fought throughout the universities, arts, and media during the eighties and nineties. Slavoj Žižek helps explain how such a victory functions. He writes: “The true victory (the true ‘negation of the negation’) occurs when the enemy talks your language. In this sense, a true victory is a victory in defeat. It occurs when one’s specific message is accepted as a universal ground, even by the enemy.” 12 Zizek uses the example of British prime minister Tony Blair to make his point. Blair secured the victory of the battle fought by his seeming opponent Margaret Thatcher in her attack on the British welfare state. Bill Clinton is the U.S. equivalent of Blair. Clinton achieved a dismantling of social services surpassing the right’s wildest dreams. Speaking a neoliberal language that made the state just another market actor, Clinton realized the victory of Reaganism. The victory of the academic left in the culture wars should be understood along similar lines: the prominence of politically active Christian fundamentalists, Fox News, and the orchestrations of Bush advisor Karl Rove all demonstrate the triumph of postmodernism. These guys take social construction – packaging, marketing, and representation – absolutely seriously. They put it to work. The right’s will to construct (and deconstruct) reality to fit their interests reached new extremes during the Bush administration: it paid the conservative commentator Armstrong William to endorse the president’s No Child Left Behind program, that is, to impersonate a journalist while promoting a specific political agenda. Similar fake news was distributed by the Transportation Security Administration (a report praising airport security), the Department of Health and Human Services (television spots advertising the Medicare prescription drug benefit), and the State Department (segments of good news from U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq). As the New York Times columnist Frank Rich writes, “The same conservatives who once deplored postmodernism and moral relativism were now eagerly promoting a brave new world in which it was a given that there could be no empirical reality in news, only a reality you wanted to hear (or they wanted you to hear).” Is it so surprising, then, that when empirical reality is up for grabs many may start to doubt any claim made by the administration, even one as seemingly basic as its account of the events of 9/11? Corporate capitalism similarly embodies the triumph of postmodernism. Wink and guerrilla marketing, targeting specific groups, and identifying potential “tipping points,” not to mention more basic advertising strategies around branding, apply to consumers insights into the generation of affect and desire celebrated by scholar in critical theory, philosophy, and cultural studies. Amplifying this point, Zizek calls Gilles Deleuze the “ideologist of late capitalism” Is not the intense circulation of affects in ways that bypass persons in a multiplication of intensities that Deleuze celebrates a key feature of communicative capitalism? What about toys like Transformers that can be reshaped as dinosaurs or machines and the prominence of morphed images throughout the media sphere? These morphings exemplify the continual transmutation of divides between machine and organism, human and animal, animal and computer. They are virtual enactments of Deleuzian becoming. In a similar vein, Thomas Frank describe the underlying consensus between cultural studies and corporations that consolidated during the 1990s. He notes the challenges confronting marketers when consumers are fickle and styles change rapidly. Because consumers are already skeptical, he explains, The intellectual task at hand is not just legitimation, it is infiltration, and suddenly questions like the oppositional or subversive potential of The Simpsons aren’t quite as academic as they once seemed. Given the industry’s new requirements, the active-audience faith of the cult stud becomes less an article of radical belief and more a practical foundation for the reprioritized audience research being done by the new breed of marketing experts, who can be found commenting lucidly on the postmodern condition in highbrow business publications like the Journal of Consumer Research, laying out plans to “reenchant” the brand with a “liberatory postmodernism,” and warning advertisers to create with the active, emancipation-hungry consumer in mind. Enthusiasm for diversity, multiplicity, and the agency of consumers actively transforming their lifetstyles unites left academics and corporate capital. For many on the academic and typing left assertions of difference, singularity, and the fluidity of modes of becoming are radical. Yet insofar as they ignore their common cause with neoliberalism (a willful ignorance on the part of many left supporters of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential campaign), they miss the truth of this radicality – the radical redistribution of wealth to the very, very rich and the radical reconstruction of the state into the authoritarian tool for their protection. Capitalism is more revolutionary than the left has ever been. Ideological victory can look just like ideological defeat. When one’s enemy accepts one’s terms, one’s point of critique and resistance is lost, subsumed. The dimension of antagonism (fundamental opposition) vanishes. Other, smaller conflicts emerge. Conflicts that are less significant, less crucial, become sites of intensity, sucking up political energies. Confusions arise as the multiplicity of small antagonisms, each seemingly central, make finding the key division difficult. Confronting the implications of ideological victory is what many of us who identify as leftists fail to do. Some academics repeat terms from old battles, as if the problem of the contemporary right is its investment in essentialism and origins, as if the right doesn’t already accept (and benefit from) the impact of representations and mediations. Some feminists continue to think that exposing pornography as sexist male domination is radical and insightful. They fail to recognize that this is part of pornography’s appeal – Why are you telling me this is domination when I know it’s domination? That’s why I like it! That’s what gets me off! Some new media activists celebrate, even fetishize, the latest communication gadgets, unaware that their message is indistinguishable from Apple’s. Too often what passes for left politics is little more than the denunciation of all possibility of knowledge and truth, as if communicative capitalism was not already implicated in fundamental changes to the conditions of possibility for credibility, changes that activism for 9/11 truth demands that we confront. Perhaps the most difficult instance of the contemporary problem of left victory, though, is left enthusiasm for democracy, as I explore in chapter 3. The aggressive war waged in Iraq has been fought in the name of democracy, seemingly taking left desire for democratic governance at its word: You want democracy? That is what democracy looks like! Not Post-Political When one’s opponent takes over one’s position, one is confronted with its realization, with its repercussions. This is what many of us don’t like; this is what we want to avoid. So we say, “No! That’s not it,” but because our enemy has taken over our language, our ideals, we’ve lost a capacity to say what we want, even to know what we want. We can’t even dream something else. Zizek writes: “In a radical revolution, people not only have to realize their old (emancipatory, etc.) dreams’; rather, they have to reinvent their very modes of dreaming.” Such a reinvention is an enormous, perhaps impossible task. It’s not furthered, though, by the diagnosis of “depoliticization,” a diagnosis offered by political theorists the increased currency of which calls out for critique. If depoliticization means anything, it is the retreat into cowardice, the retroactive determination of victory as defeat because of the left’s fundamental inability to accept responsibility for power and to undertake the difficult task of reinventing our modes of dreaming. Depoliticization is a fantasy, an excuse whereby the left says “We know collective action is possible theoretically, but we don’t believe we exist.” The term marks the gap between the commitment to common approaches to systemic problems constitutive of left thought for over two centuries and the isolating individualism of consumption and entertainment-driven communicative capitalism. The very diagnosis of depoliticization functions fetishistically to prevent the left from confronting the truth of its victor.

#### We must politicize the ballot economy – the aff’s approach to debate is fundamentally inconsistent with ours. Affirming the plan, even contingently, view capital within debate as a neutral field to be exploited

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2K (Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject pg. 351-355)

What one should bear in mind, however, is that both acts, that of *Brassed Off* and that of *The Full Monty,* are the acts of losers – that is to say, two modes of coming to terms with the catastrophic loss: insisting on the empty form as fidelity to the lost content ('When there's no hope, only principles remain'); heroically renouncing the last vestiges of false narcis­sistic dignity and accomplishing the act for which one is grotesquely inadequate. And the sad thing is that, in a way, this is our situation today: today, after the breakdown of the Marxist notion that capitalism itself generates the force that will destroy it in the guise of the proletariat, none of the critics of capitalism, none of those who describe so convincingly the deadly vortex into which the so-called process of globalization is drawing us, has any well-defined notion of how we can get rid of capitalism. In short, I am not preaching a simple return to the old notions of class struggle and socialist revolution: the question of how it is really possible to undermine the global capitalist system is not a rhetorical one - maybe it is not really possible, at least not in the foreseeable future.So there are two attitudes: either today's Left nostalgically engages in the ritualistic incantation of old formulas, be it those of revolutionary Communism or those of welfare state reformist Social Democracy, dismiss­ing all talk of new postmodern society as empty fashionable prattle that obfuscates the harsh reality of today's capitalism; or it accepts global capitalism as 'the only game in town', and follows the double tactics of promising the employees that the maximum possible welfare state will be maintained, and the employers that the rules of the (global capitalist) game will be fully respected and the employees' `irrational' demands firmly censored. So, in today's leftist politics, we seem in effect to be reduced to the choice between the 'solid' orthodox attitude of proudly, out of principle, sticking to the old (Communist or Social Democratic) tune, although we know its time has passed, and the New Labour `radical centre' attitude of going the 'full Monty' in stripping, getting rid of, the last vestiges of proper leftist discourse.... Paradoxically, the ultimate victim of the demise of Really Existing Socialism was thus its great historical opponent throughout most of our century, reformist Social Democracy itself. The big news of today's post-political age of the 'end of ideology' is thus the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy: the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to respon­sible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the 'cultural' issues of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made. In short, the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital's freedom, the subordination of the process of production to social control – the radical repoliticization of the economy*.* That is to say: if the problem with today's post-politics (`administration of social affairs') is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today's post-politics cannot attain the properly political dimension of universality: because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization. The domain of global capitalist market relations is the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of 'identity politics' and other postmodern forms of politicization: all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues (gay rights, ecology, ethnic minorities . ..), all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building multiple ad hoc coalitions, and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what really matters – will not be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized.35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the `second modernity', it is much more crucial to focus on what remains the same in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital. The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodi­ments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today's subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life. The irony of history is that, in the Eastern European ex-Communist countries, the 'reformed' Communists were the first to learn this lesson. Why did many of them return to power via free elections in the mid 1990s? This very return offers the ultimate proof that these states have in fact entered capitalism. That is to say: what do ex-Communists stand for today? Due to their privileged links with the newly emerging capitalists (mostly members of the old nomenklatura 'privatizing' the companies they once ran), they are first and foremost the party of big Capital; further­more, to erase the traces of their brief but none the less rather traumatic experience with politically active civil society, they as a rule ferociously advocate a quick deideologization, a retreat from active civil society engagement into passive, apolitical consumerism – the very two features which characterize contemporary capitalism. So dissidents are astonished to discover that they played the role of 'vanishing mediators' on the way from socialism to capitalism, in which the same class as before rules under a new guise. It is therefore wrong to claim that the ex-Communists' return to power shows how people are disappointed by capitalism and long for the old socialist security – in a kind of Hegelian 'negation of negation', it is only with the ex-Communists' return to power that socialism was effectively negated – that is to say, what the political analysts (mis)perceive as 'disappointment with capitalism' is in fact disappointment with the ethico-political enthusiasm for which there is no place in 'normal' capital­ism.36 We should thus reassert the old Marxist critique of 'reification': today, emphasizing the depoliticized 'objective' economic logic against allegedly 'outdated' forms of ideological passions is the predominant ideological form, since ideology is always self-referential, that is, it always defines itself through a distance towards an Other dismissed and denounced as 'ideological'.37 For that precise reason – because the depolit­icized economy is the disavowed fundamental fantasy' of postmodern politics – a properly political act would necessarily entail the repoliticization of the economy: within a given situation, a gesture counts as an act only in so far as it disturbs (`traverses') its fundamental fantasy.

### Impact Calc

#### It’s try or die – capitalist territorialization causes the death of the biosphere and nuclear conflicts over resource optimization – that’s extinction

Massumi 92, (Brian, pHD in Philosophy @ Yale, A user’s guide to capitalism and schizophrenia 1992. P 137-8)

"Postmodernity" is not nothing; it constitutes a limited becoming-supermolecular that can increase some bodies' degrees of freedom beyond anything seen before. The fact that society has reached the point that it can forego both interiority and belief and embrace creation is not to be lamented. A real cause for concern is that it has done so in a framework that restricts mutation. The forced movement of liberal "democracy" (parodic verisimilitude) has re-become real movement (simulation), 67 but within limits: a body's transformational potential is indexed to its buying power. This means that the privilege of self-invention will never extend to every body. Not only do most bodies not have infinite degrees of freedom, alarming and increasing numbers are starving or malnourished. Mere survival is a privilege in the brave new neoconservative world. Capitalism's endocolonial expansion has made the law of unequal exchange that is written into its axiomatic an inescapable and lethal fact of life. Its outward surge of expansion has nearly exhausted the earth, threatening to destroy the environment on which all life depends. Capitalism has not ushered in an age of universal wealth and well-being and never will. All it can do is displace its own limits.68 The limits of capitalism used to be external boundaries falling between its formations and non- or precapitalist ones: between molarity and molecularity, the capitalist class and the proletariat, the "First World" and the "Third World," resource depletion and technological progress. These boundaries were overtaken by capitalism as it grew to saturate its field of exteriority: Molarity/molecularity has been counteractualized as a distinction between commercialized codes and equally commercialized subcodes (the identification of the "Other" replaced by trafficking in affects for use in becoming-other). Some proletarians have been integrated as corporatist workers who are both commodities on the ''job market" and consumers (Fordism), while growing numbers have been relegated to a "permanent underclass" locked out of steady employment and thus restricted to participating in the economy as consumers — of the inadequate social services still available after the gutting of the welfare state.69 The inclusion of all nations in the international debt economy and the creation of "peripheral" areas of underdevelopment in the very heart of the Western world's largest capitals have blurreesd the boundaries between the "First" and "Third" Worlds. The first three limits have been internalized by capitalism, in the sense of being subsumed by its axiomatic. The last limit, between resource depletion and technological "progress," not only remains but has become absolute — the death of the planet. This limit cannot be internalized by capital (although the nuclear arms race of the Cold War period that transformed the "advanced" nations into permanent war economies based on postponed conflagration was a delirious attempt to do just that). It can, however, be crossed. It is capitalism's destiny to cross it. For although capitalism has turned quantum in its mode of operation, it has done so in the service of quantity: consumption and accumulation are, have been, and will always be its reason for being. Capitalism's strength, and its fatal weakness, is to have elevated consumption and accumulation to the level of a principle marshaling superhuman forces of invention — and destruction. The abstract machine of consumption-accumulation has risen, Trump-like in all its inhuman glory. Its fall will be a great deal harder. What the final deterministic constraint that is the capitalist relation ultimately determines is global death. The virtual pole of capitalism turns out to be no less suicidal than fascism-paranoia, though in a very different way — by virtue of its success, not because of an irresolvable contradiction endemic to its dynamic. Capitalism is not defined by its contradictions. 70 It is the social tendency to overcome contradiction. The four fundamental dense points of its axiomatic grid constitute a creative tension, a real differential, the unmediated operation of a mode of transpersonal desire. Fascism-paranoia is a desire for unity that is applied to a body by an interceding agency whose operation consists in carrying a body outside of itself in order to find its identity. It is also a transpersonal desire, or abstract machine, but one that is mediated by a detour through molarity. The logical contradictions haunting fascist-paranoid formations are indirect expressions of a forcibly personalized desire to transcend matter. Capitalism's limits are a direct result of its more successful desire to make itself immanent to matter (in the process of which, as a side effect, it frees some bodies to transcend forced personification).

#### Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Reject their attempt to submit the criticism to calculation – it is intrinsically valuable as a project of emancipation

Ranciere, 2011 (“Against an Ebbing Tide: An Interview with Jacques Rancière,” in “Reading Ranciere,” ed. Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp, p. 247-248)

The ‘thwarting’ [‘contrariété’] that Film Fables speaks about is the tension between two logics: a logic of linkage and a logic of suspension. I show that for cinema as for literature this tension is a productive force and not an obstacle. The most beautiful films like the most beautiful novels are the result of this tension. It’s not a matter of failure, except for those specialists in literary theory or film semiotics who will endeavour, until the end of the world, to maintain the illusion that literature or cinema are arts solely the concern of their own concept, employing their own language, etc. And the fact that universal teaching **doesn’t ‘take’** marks not the failure of intellectual emancipation, but of those who want to transform into a social institution a thought and a practice that cuts across the logic of social institutions. In fact, there are a vast number of things that ‘don’t take’, but which are no less those that have changed our lives and those worth living for. Men live and die for words that never entirely keep their promise. This excess of words is itself the object of pleasure [jouissance] and is the energy source for the creation of individual works like collective uprisings or forms of community. This is what I meant by saying that ~~man~~ is a political animal because he is a literary animal. It is this capacity to be disappointed, to bear the disappointment and if needs be enjoy it that I tried to show in the thought and the practice of these men and women of the people that the learned always wanted to confine within a positive story of gains and losses, and it is precisely this that allows them to create works and forms of community. I have constantly tried to challenge the simplistic way in which success and failure, faith and disillusion are conceived. I’ve attempted to show that a movement of emancipation is never simply an instrument for ends that might be objectively judged according to whether or not they’ve been reached, but already a way of transforming the forms of what is thinkable and possible in the present. Many have enjoyed the communist fraternity far more than they were saddened not to have founded a dictatorship of the proletariat. The great hopes of workers’ emancipation have often met with failures, sometimes ending in social reforms by which the learned claim that capitalism has only been adjusted. But for many militants the failures, on the one hand, and the limits of success, on the other, have contributed towards maintaining the very meaning of the struggle between two worlds that their movement brought to life. Dominant thought, including its ‘progressive’ and ‘radical’ variants, always operates according to a caricatural logic of ends to come and means to attain, of expectations and balance sheets. This logic spends its time blocking any experimentation with life, in art or knowledge, in the name of an entirely imaginary knowledge that it grants itself over what is possible and what is impossible, as well as over the means to realize the possible. In the past it functioned as a means of submitting every emancipatory aspiration to pseudo-scientific strategies. Today it functions as a way of crushing them beneath the endless and acrimonious stocktaking of dead illusions. I’ve always insisted on the contrary upon the ambiguity of these expectations that one opposes to results, and upon the precise difficulty of knowing what is success and what is failure.

### Enviro !

#### Globalization makes extinction inevitable- social and environmental factors build positive feedbacks create a cascade of destruction - only massive social reorganization of society can produce sustainable change and save the planet

Ehrenfeld ‘5, (David, Dept. of Ecology, Evolution, and Natural Resources @ Rutgers University, “The Environmental Limits to Globalization”, Conservation Biology Vol. 19 No. 2 April 2005)

The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of globalization—climate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)—are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book *The Arrogance of Humanism* (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn’t work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book *Normal Accidents*, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today’s complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system’s processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmental—events that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, “There is nothing in today’s global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within and between the world’s diverse societies.” The result, Gray states, is that “The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions” has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people.... It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: “The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime.” How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the non- human residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusual—rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book *The Collapse of Complex Societies,* the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom line—concern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilization’s very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here ( Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will not be sufficient—or may not even occur— without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated—any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b). If such integrated change occurs in time, it will likely happen partly by our own design and partly as an unplanned response to the constraints imposed by social unrest, disease, and the economics of scarcity. With respect to the planned component of change, we are facing, as eloquently described by Rees (2002), “the ultimate challenge to human intelligence and self-awareness, those vital qualities we humans claim as uniquely our own. *Homo sapiens* will either. . .become fully human or wink out ignominiously, a guttering candle in a violent storm of our own making.” If change does not come quickly, our global civilization will join Tainter’s (1988) list as the latest and most dramatic example of collapsed complex societies. Is there anything that could slow globalization quickly, before it collapses disastrously of its own environmental and social weight? It is still not too late to curtail the use of energy, reinvigorate local and regional communities while restoring a culture of concern for each other, reduce nonessential global trade and especially global finance (Daly & Cobb 1989), do more to control introductions of exotic species (including pathogens), and accelerate the growth of sustainable agriculture. Many of the needed technologies are already in place. It is true that some of the damage to our environment—species extinctions, loss of crop and domestic animal varieties, many exotic species introductions, and some climatic change— will be beyond repair. Nevertheless, the opportunity to help our society move past globalization in an orderly way, while there is time, is worth our most creative and passionate efforts. The citizens of the United States and other nations have to understand that our global economic system has placed both our environment and our society in peril, a peril as great as that posed by any war of the twentieth century. This understanding, and the actions that follow, must come not only from enlightened leadership, but also from grassroots consciousness raising. It is still possible to reclaim the planet from a self-destructive economic system that is bringing us all down together, and this can be a task that bridges the divide between conservatives and liberals. The crisis is here, now. What we have to do has become obvious. Globalization can be scaled back to manageable proportions only in the context of an altered world view that rejects materialism even as it restores a sense of communal obligation. In this way, alone, can we achieve real homeland security, not just in the United States, but also in other nations, whose fates have become so thoroughly entwined with ours within the global environment we share.

### War !

#### Ideological belief that ‘interdependence is peace’ whereas ‘disconnection is war’ prompts military interventions to ensure smoothness of neoliberal trading

Roberts et al ‘3 (Susan Roberts, Anna Secor and Matthew Sparke, Depts. of Geography, U. of Kentucky and Washington, “Neoliberal Geopolitics,” http://faculty.washington.edu/sparke/neoliberalgeopolitics.pdf)

Barnett’s work is our main example in this paper of a more widespread form of neoliberal geopolitics implicated in the war-making. This geopolitical world vision, we argue, is closely connected to neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration. Yet, linked as it was to an extreme form of American unilateralism, we further want to highlight how the neoliberal geopolitics of the war planners illustrated the contradictory dependency of multilateral neoliberal deregulation on enforced re-regulation and, in particular, on the deadly and far from multilateral re-regulation represented by the “regime change” that has now been enforced on Iraq. Such re-regulation underlines the intellectual importance of studying how neoliberal marketization dynamics are hybridized and supplemented by various extraeconomic forces. Rather than making neoliberalism into a totalizing economic master narrative, we therefore suggest that it is vital to examine its interarticulation with certain dangerous supplements, including, not least of all, the violence of American military force. We are not arguing that the war is completely explainable in terms of neoliberalism, nor that neoliberalism is reducible to American imperialism. Instead, the point is to explore how a certain globalist and economistic view of the world, one associated with neoliberalism, did service in legitimating the war while simultaneously finessing America’s all too obvious departure from the “end of the nation-state” storyline. Armed with their simple master narrative about the inexorable force of economic globalization, neoliberals famously hold that the global extension of free-market reforms will ultimately bring worldwide peace and prosperity. Like Modernity and Development before it, Globalization is thus narrated as the force that will lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy. In the most idealist accounts, such as those of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1999:xviii), the process of marketized liberalization is represented as an almost natural phenomenon which, “like the dawn,” we can appreciate or ignore, but not presume to stop. Observers and critics of neoliberalism as an emergent system of global hegemony, however, insist on noting the many ways in which states actively foster the conditions for global integration, directly or through international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Gill 1995). Under what we are identifying as neoliberal geopolitics, there appears to have been a new development in these patterns of state-managed liberalization. The economic axioms of structural adjustment, fiscal austerity, and free trade have now, it seems, been augmented by the direct use of military force. At one level, this conjunction of capitalism and war-making is neither new nor surprising (cf Harvey 1985). Obviously, many wars—including most 19th- and 20th-century imperial wars—have been fought over fundamentally economic concerns. Likewise, one only has to read the reflections of one of America’s “great” generals, Major General Smedley Butler, to get a powerful and resonant sense of the long history of economically inspired American militarism. “I served in all commissioned ranks from Second Lieutenant to Major General,” Butler wrote in his retirement, [a]nd during that period, I spent most of that time being a high-class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was part of a racket at the time. Now I am sure of it. I helped make Honduras “right” for American fruit companies in 1903. I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested.(quoted in Ali 2002:260). If it was engaged in a kind of gangster capitalist interventionism at the previous fin-de-siècle, today’s American war-making has been undertaken in a much more open, systematic, globally ambitious, and quasi-corporate economic style. Al Capone’s approach, has, as it were, given way to the new world order of Jack Welch. To be sure, the Iraq war was, in some respects, a traditional national, imperial war aimed at the monopolization of resources. It was, after all, partly a war about securing American control over Iraqi oil. Russia’s Lukoil and France’s TotalFinaElf will thereby lose out vis-à-vis Chevron and Exxon; more importantly, the US will now be able to function as what Christian Parenti (2003) calls an “energy gendarme” over key oil supplies to East Asia and Europe. Other, still more narrowly national circuits of American capitalism benefited from the war—including, for example, Kellogg Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Vice President Dick Cheney’s Halliburton that, having helped the Pentagon orchestrate the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, is now receiving generous contracts to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure using proceeds from Iraq’s “liberated” oil sales. But these classically imperial aspects of the hostilities are not our main focus here. Instead, our central concern is with how a neoliberal world vision has served to obscure these more traditional geopolitics beneath Panglossian talk of global integration and (what are thereby constructed as) its delinquent others. In the neoliberal approach, the geopolitics of interimperial rivalry, the Monroe doctrine, and the ideas about hemispheric control that defined Butler’s era are eclipsed by a new global vision of almost infinite openness and interdependency. In contrast also to the Cold War era, danger is no longer imagined as something that should be contained at a disconnected distance. Now, by way of a complete counterpoint, danger is itself being defined as disconnection from the global system. In turn, the neoliberal geopolitical response, it seems, is to insist on enforcing reconnection—or, as Friedman (2003:A27) put it in an upbeat postwar column, “aggressive engagement.” It would be wrong, of course, to suggest that even this vision is brand new. Much like the broken neoliberal record of “globalization is inexorable,” the vision can be interpreted as yet another cover for the century-old package of liberal development nostrums that critics (eg Smith 2003) and apologists (eg Bacevich 2002) alike argue lie at the defining heart of “American Empire.” But what distinguishes this moment of neoliberal geopolitics is that the notion of enforced reconnection is today mediated through a whole repertoire of neoliberal ideas and practices, ranging from commitments to market-based solutions and public-private part- nerships to concerns with networking and flexibility to mental maps of the planet predicated on a one-world vision of interdependency. Thomas Barnett merely represents one particularly audacious and influential embodiment of this trend.

#### The trade as war metaphor creates discursive conditions for literal warfare and creates an expectation of conflict

Eubanks 2k (Philip, Associate Prof. and Acting Chair, Dept. of English, NIllinois Univ., A War of Words in the Discourse of Trade: The Rhetorical Constitution of Metaphor, Southern Illinois UP, 1st ed., p. 58-60)

Trade Is War as Harbinger of War The final move back to the literal is not the same as Trade Is War's first link with the literal. It is not that Trade Is War entails a literal trade is peace, but that Trade Is War pushes the discourse of trade from a dis­cussion of aggressive trade practices into a discussion of literal war. Brookes nudges the discussion in this direction by mentioning that “Mr. Mosbacher [is] emboldened by his success in substantially modifying the FSX agreement (to build a fighter plane with Japan).” Inevitably, it seems, the topic widens to include World War II, with images of Japanese Ze­ros easily called to mind, and reviving the lingering U.S. fear that Japan cannot be trusted with military power. The discussion of trade war thinly conceals a discussion of actual war—one of the main reasons that Trade Is War is so often ascribed to others, and one of the reasons its mappings are so often attenuated. Trade Is War's push toward the literal is especially evident when the discussion involves Japan. For example, when trade writers describe a dispute involving Canadian and American beers as “a longstanding trade war,” the contiguity of literal war does not show itself (French). Instead the metaphor remaps into a dispute among families: “the heart of the feud” (French). But literal war with Japan remains easily evoked. In Cross­fire's discussion of Super 301 (see chapter 1), John Sununu jabs, “You keep asking why we don't put the focus on the Japanese. We are putting the focus on Japan. But we also read history. And what happened in the world before World War II is a trade war that cost everybody.” Similarly, Mitsubishi chairman Akio Morita, during an earlier time of trade fric­tion, is quoted, “Things appear to have gotten as bad as they were on the eve of World War II” (Jameson). Sometimes the literalizing maneuver is reversed, going from literal to metaphoric—underscoring the irony of current war metaphors. Sean O'Leary, tongue-in-cheek columnist for Visual Merchandising and Store Design, makes deft use of the Trade Is War metaphor with such locutions as, “The Japanese citizenry, foot solders of the economic miracle, is get­ting the imperial shaft at the retail level.” This comes, however, on the heels of a textual progress from literal to metaphoric. The article begins with a discussion of the Japanese Shogunate and moves to a burlesque of Perry's opening of relations: “'Listen,' said Commodore Perry. 'We'd like you to do business with us.' He came back a year later with a larger fleet, to hear the decision.” Next, O'Leary specifies the link between war and trade: “The rapid growth of Japan's world economic empire rivals the flowering of our own military machine.” Only then does he move to the metaphoric realm of Japanese economic foot soldiers and an Ameri­can counterinvasion of McDonald's and shopping malls. Finally, Trade Is War comes into intercourse with the literal as the metaphor itself becomes literalized. That is, the metaphor Trade Is War stands side-by-side with the literal notion that trade is war (really). This literalization occurs when people believe that economic warfare is part and parcel of military war. Economic warriors extend the category of war to include acts of economic aggression ranging from predatory pricing to industrial espionage—or sabotage. More typically, the literalization of the metaphor occurs in ascriptions of Trade Is War to others, usually the Japanese. In Rising Sun, Michael Crichton ascribes Trade Is War/trade is peace to the Japanese in order to accuse them of out-of-bounds trade practices. Likewise, and yet more dramatically, Tom Clancy's Debt of Honor casts the Japanese as aggressors who use both military and eco­nomic techniques to attack the United States. In Clancy's novel, Japan militarily occupies the American-owned Mariana Islands, while simul­taneously sabotaging computer records on Wall Street. Both acts culmi­nate a nefarious investment scheme through which the Japanese under­mine the value of American currency. It is perhaps a testimony to the attractiveness of Japan-bashing that Clancy's novel has enjoyed consid­erable success. But it is also testimony to the deep entrenchment of Trade Is War that it can be literalized as the plot of popular fiction.

### A2: Cede the Political

#### “We should” is a tried and failed strategy – the government pursues empire and destruction on purpose, and we must re-orient our political strategy to account for this fact

Herod 2001 (James, “A Stake, Not a Mistake: On Not Seeing the Enemy”, October, <http://www.jamesherod.info/index.php?sec=paper&id=9> Accessed 6/27/10)

So what has been the response of the 'progressive community' to the bombing of Afghanistan? As usual, they just don't get it. They just can't seem to grasp the simple fact that the government does this stuff on purpose. Endlessly, progressives talk as if the government is just making a mistake, does not see the real consequences of its actions, or is acting irrationally, and they hope to correct the government's course by pointing out the errors of its ways. Progressives assume that their goals -- peace, justice, well-being -- are also the government's goals. So when they look at what the government is doing, they get alarmed and puzzled, because it is obvious that the government's actions are not achieving these goals. So they cry out: "Hey, this policy doesn't lead to peace!" or "Hey, this policy doesn't achieve justice (or democracy, or development)!" By pointing this out, they hope to educate the government, to help it to see its mistakes, to convince it that its policies are not having the desired results.[2]       How can they not see that the US government acts deliberately, and that it knows what it is doing? How can they not see that the government's goals are not peace and justice, but empire and profit. It wants these wars, this repression. These policies are not mistakes; they are not irrational; they are not based on a failure of moral insight (since morality is not even a factor in their considerations); they are not aberrations; they are not based on a failure to analyze the situation correctly; they are not based on ignorance. This repression, these bombings, wars, massacres, assassinations, and covert actions are the coldly calculated, rational, consistent, intelligent, and informed actions of a ruling class determined at all costs to keep its power and wealth and preserve its way of life (capitalism). It has demonstrated great historical presence, persistence, and continuity in pursuing this objective. This ruling class knows that it is committing atrocities, knows that it is destroying democracy, hope, welfare, peace, and justice, knows that it is murdering, massacring, slaughtering, poisoning, torturing, lying, stealing, and it doesn't care. Yet most progressives seem to believe that if only they point out often enough and loud enough that the ruling class is murdering people, that it will wake up, take notice, apologize, and stop doing it.       Here is a typical expression of this naiveté (written by an author, Brian Willson, who was in the process of introducing a list of US interventions abroad!): "Many of us are continually disturbed and grief stricken because it seems that our U.S. government does not yet understand: (a) the historical social, cultural, and economic issues that underlay most of the political and ecological problems of the world; (b) the need to comply with, as legally agreed to, rather than continually defy, international law and international institutions established for addressing conflict; and (c) that military solutions, including production, sale, and use of the latest in technological weapons, are simply ill-equipped and wrong-headed for solving fundamental social and economic problems." [3] He is wrong on all three counts. (a) The US government has an intimate, detailed knowledge of the social, cultural, and economic characteristics of every country it intervenes in. It is especially familiar with the ethnic, linguistic, political, and religious divisions within the country. It is not interested in how these issues "underlay most of the political and ecological problems of the world", since it is not interested in those problems, certainly not in solving them, since it is the main creator of those problems. Rather, it uses its expert knowledge to manipulate events within the country in order to advance its own goals, profit and empire. (b) The US government understands perfectly that it expressly needs not to comply with international law in order to maintain its ability to act unilaterally, unfettered by any constraints, to advance its imperial aims. The claim that the US defies international law because of a misunderstanding is absurd. (c) Who says that the US government is trying to solve "fundamental social and economic problems"? These are not its aims at all. The objectives that it does pursue, consciously and relentlessly, namely profit and empire, are in fact the causes of these very "social and economic problems". Furthermore, for its true aims, military solutions, far from being "ill-equipped and wrong-headed", work exceptionally well. Military might sustains the empire. Arming every little client regime of the international ruling class with 'the latest in technological weapons" is necessary, and quite effective, in maintaining the repressive apparatus needed to defend empire, in addition to raking in lots of profit for the arms manufacturers. But evidently Mr. Willson "does not yet understand" any of these things.       Let's take another example. Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, otherwise very sensible writers, complain that "bombing a desperately poor country under the yoke of a repressive regime is a wrongheaded response [to the "unspeakable acts of violence" committed on Sept. 11]. "The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan should cease immediately," they say. They discuss three reasons: "1. The policy of bombing increases the risk of further terrorism against the United States. 2. The bombing is intensifying a humanitarian nightmare in Afghanistan. 3. There are better ways to seek justice." All three statements are true of course, but irrelevant, because seeking justice, avoiding humanitarian nightmares, and reducing the risk of terrorism do not enter into the calculations of US policy makers. Quite the contrary, US policy makers create injustice, humanitarian nightmares, and terrorism, throughout the world, in pursuit of the imperial objective of making profit, and this has been thoroughly documented in thousands of scholarly studies. So for Mokhiber and Weissman to talk in this way, and phrase the problem in this way, exposes their failure to really comprehend the enemy we face, which in turn prevents them from looking for effective strategies to defeat that enemy, like so many other opponents of the "war". Hence all the moralizing, the bulk of which is definitely directed at the rulers, not at the ruled. That is, it is not an attempt to win over the ruled, but an attempt to win over the rulers. [4] It's what I call the "we should" crowd -- all those people who hope to have a voice in the formation of policy, people whose stances are basically that of consultants to the ruling class. "We" should do this, "we" shouldn't do that, as if they had anything at all to say about what our rulers do. This is the normal stance among the bootlicking intelligentsia of course. But what is it doing among progressives and radicals? Even if their stance is seen to be not exactly that of consultants, but that of citizens making demands upon their government, what makes them think that the government ever listens? I think this attitude -- the "we should" attitude -- is rooted in part at least in the fact that most progressives still believe in nations and governments. They believe that this is "our" country, and that this is "our" government, or at least should be. So Kevin Danaher says that "we should get control of the government." They identify themselves as Americans, or Germans, or Mexicans, or Swedes. So they are constantly advising and making demands that 'their' government should do this and that. If they would reject nationalism altogether, and states and governments, they could begin to see another way. A variation of the 'this is a mistake' theme has appeared in commentaries on the present "war", on Afghanistan. Progressives argue that the US is "falling into a trap". They argue that Osama bin Laden had hoped to provoke the US into doing just what it is doing, attacking Afghanistan. In their view, the US government is being stupid, acting blindly, responding irrationally, and showing incompetence. That is, it is "making a mistake". It never seems to occur to these analysts that the government may actually be awake, even alert, or that it jumped at the opportunity offered it by the attacks of September Eleven to do what it had wanted to do anyway -- seize Afghanistan, build a big new base in Uzbekistan, declare unending war on the enemies of Empire everywhere, and initiate draconian repression against internal dissent in order to achieve "domestic tranquility". I saw yet another variation on the theme just recently. John Tirman writes about "Unintended Consequences".[5] He thinks that "No matter how cautious generals and political leaders are ... unseen and unintended [results] occur, at times as a bitter riptide which overwhelms the original rationales for engaging in armed combat. This unpredictable cycle of action and reaction has thwarted U.S. policy in southwest Asia for 50 years." It's the usual mistake: Tirman imputes policies to the US government which it does not have. US policy has not been thwarted, it has been highly successful. The US has succeeded in keeping control of Middle Eastern oil for the past half century. This is what it wanted to do, and this is what it did. Tirman however reviews the history of US intervention in the Middle East, beginning with the overthrow of Mossedegh in Iran in 1953, and sees it as one long blunder, nothing but bumbling incompetence, complicated further by 'unintended consequences' which thwart the goals of American foreign policy. He seems to think that the US was (or "should be") trying to reduce US dependence on Middle Eastern oil, fighting Islamic fundamentalism, reducing human suffering, assisting in economic development, promoting democracy, and so on -- anything and everything except what it is actually doing, keeping control of Middle Eastern oil, and using any means necessary to do so. Tirman is aware of course that this (oil) is the true aim of US policy, because he quotes directly from US officials who state this objective explicitly, but somehow this doesn't sink in. Instead, he finally asks in exasperation: "What will be next in this series of haunting mistakes?"

### A2: Capitalism Inevitable

#### Human nature can be changed- it’s not set in advance and pedagogical transformation in this debate can change economic preference formation

Schor ’10 (Julie, Prof. of Economics @ Boston College, Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth, pgs. 11-12)

And we don't have to. What's odd about the narrowness of the national economic conversation is that it leaves out theoretical advances in economics and related fields that have begun to change our basic understandings of what motivates and enriches people. The policy conversation hasn't caught up to what's happening at the fore- front of the discipline. One of the hallmarks of the standard economic model, which hails from the nineteenth century, is that people are considered relatively unchanging. Basic preferences, likes and dislikes, are assumed to be stable, and don't adjust as a result of the choices people make or the circumstances in which they find themselves. People alter their behavior in response to changes in prices and incomes, to be sure, and sometimes rapidly. But there are no feedback loops from today's choices to tomorrow's desires. This accords with an old formulation of human nature as fixed, and this view still dominates the policy conversation. However, there's a growing body of research that attests to human adaptability. Newer thinking in behavioral economics, cultural evolution, and social networking that has developed as a result of interdisciplinary work in psychology, biology, and sociology yields a view of humans as far more malleable. It's the economic analogue to recent findings in neuroscience that the brain is more plastic than previously understood, or in biology that human evolution is happening on a time scale more compressed than scientists originally thought. As economic actors, we can change, too. This has profound implications for our ability to shift from one way of living to another, and to be better off in the process. It's an important part of why we can both reduce ecological impact and improve well- being. As we transform our lifestyles, we transform ourselves. Patterns of consuming, earning, or interacting that may seem unrealistic or even negative before starting down this road become feasible and appealing. Moreover, when big changes are on the table, the narrow trade-offs of the past can be superseded. If we can question consumerism, we're no longer forced to make a mandatory choice between well-being and environment. If we can admit that full-time jobs need not require so many hours, it'll be possible to slow down ecological degradation, address unemployment, and make time for family and community. If we can think about knowledge differently, we can expand social wealth far more rapidly. Stepping outside the "there is no alternative to business-as-usual" thinking that has been a straitjacket for years puts creative options into play. And it opens the doors to double and triple dividends: changes that yield benefits on more than one front. Some of the most important economic research in recent years shows that a single intervention-a community reclamation of a brownfield or planting on degraded agriculture land-can solve three problems. It regenerates an ecosystem, provides income for the restorers, and empowers people as civic actors. In dire straits on the economic and ecological fronts, we have little choice but to find a way forward that addresses both. That’s what plenitude offers.

#### Current movements are different- crumbling economies in the global north have created material solidarity between the first and third world- creates an effective mindset shift

Harvey 10/27 (Ryan, writer, an organizer with the Civilian-Soldier Alliance, “Globalization” Is Coming Home: Protests Spread as Financial Institutions Target Global North”, Thursday 27 October 2011, http://www.truth-out.org/world-finally-fighting-infection-neoliberalism/1320164620?q=globalization-coming-home-protests-spread-financial-institutions-target-global-north/1319721791)

Shortly before the once-prized economy of Argentina collapsed at the end of 2001, a “European Summer” saw massive protests across Europe against “neoliberalism”, the corporate economic system behind what is commonly called “globalization.” Emphasizing the privatization of public services and resources and the removal of environmental and human rights regulations deemed “barriers to trade”, neoliberal globalization was widely recognized as the key factor exacerbating the gulf between rich and poor on a global scale. These protests were the largest and most brutal events that this movement experienced in the Global North; with In Gothenburg, three protesters would be shot by the police, and in Genoa, 21 year-old Carlo Giuliani would be shot twice in the face and then run over by a police truck, killing him instantly. The echoes of these events can still be heard throughout Europe, especially among those who experienced the traumatic police repression or served jail time for their role in the events. A few weeks ago, I saw a beautiful stencil memorial to Carlo in a hallway of one of Austria’s last political squats – just one reminder that the political memory of these uprisings is very much part of the fabric of the European autonomous left. But there’s a much louder echo being heard in Europe right now, the echo of corporate-globalization itself. And as in the last decade, a rage that has built up over many years is beginning to emerge in the form of a mass, loosely coordinated social movement. In Europe, young and old alike have been facing the dissolution of what had long been considered staples of western European countries; England’s health care system is on the privatization block; the right to squat abandoned houses is being stripped in England and The Netherlands; the International Monetary Fund has tightened its grip on Greece, Ireland, and Portugal with increasing austerity measures, and tuition rates for students across the continent are rising dramatically. Alongside these economic conditions, increasingly militarized restrictions to immigration into what has been dubbed “Fortress Europe” stand as a drastic reminder that money and products, but not people, travel freely into and out of neoliberal economies. What is happening is that “globalization” is coming home to the countries that helped create it. The rich economies of the global north, which long relied on the exploitation of southern peoples and economies, are coming under the same restrictions they once imposed on the rest of the world. Though many poor people in these countries have long suffered from domestic exploitation, the present wave of budgets cuts threatens to expose both the poor and middle-classes to harsher realities, unifying them in a social movement that is now attempting to maintain this often-fragile alliance. What we are seeing now is the emergence of a similar political discussion to the days after Seattle, only this time we have turned inward in the Global North: we are now not just talking about solidarity with the Global South, rather we are addressing issues both global and local, as we are feeling the harsh effects of a global economy designed for a minority of the world’s wealthiest people.

#### Dozens of cultures show that capitalism isn’t inherent to the human condition – studies prove its a socially adopted system which can be abandoned

Kohn 86 (Alfie, M.A. from U Chicago, “No Contest: A Case Against Competition,” New Age Journal Sept/Oct, p 18-20)

As with a range of other unsavory behaviors, we are fond of casually attributing competition to something called "human nature." Since this account is so popular, you might expect that there is considerable evidence to support it. In fact, it is difficult to find a single serious defense of the claim--let alone any hard data to back it up. It is not difficult at all, however, to come up with reasons to doubt that competition is inevitable. We in the United States often assume that our desperate quest to triumph over others is universal. But half a century ago Margaret Mead and her colleagues found that competition was virtually unknown to the Zuni and Iroquois in North America and to the Bathonga of South Africa. Since then, cross-cultural observers have con­firmed that our society is the exception rather than the rule. From the Inuit of Canada to the Tangu of New Guinea, from kihbutzniks in lsrael to[and] farmers in Mexico, cooperation is prized and competition generally avoided. Working with seven to nine-year olds, psychologists Spencer Kagan and Millard Madsen found that Mexican children quickly figured out how to cooperate on an experimental game, while those from the United States could not. In fact, 78 percent of the Anglo-American children took another child’s toy away “for apparently no other reason than to prevent the other child from having it.” Mexican chil­dren did so only half as often. Such findings strongly suggest that competition is a matter of social training and culture rather than a built-in feature of our nature. Further evidence comes from classroom experiments in which children have been successfully taught to cooperate. Gerald Sagotsky and his colleagues at Adelphi Univer­sity, for example, trained 118 pairs of first- through third grade students to work together instead of competing at a variety of tasks. Seven weeks later a new experimenter introduced a new game to these children and found that the lesson had stuck with them. Other researchers have shown that children taught to play cooperative games will continue to do so on their own time. And children and adults alike express a strong preference for the cooperative approach once they see firsthand what it is like to learn or work or play in an environment that doesn't require winners and losers.

### A2: Capitalism Sustainable

#### Capitalism is financially unsustainable – 500 years of empirical data proves.

Wallerstein ‘10 (Immanuel, Senior Research Scholar @ Yale, Former Chair of Sociology Dept., Former President of Intl. Sociological Association, Chair of International Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences, “STRUCTURAL CRISES,” New Left Review)

The downturn into which the world has fallen will continue now for some time, and will be quite deep. It will destroy the last remaining pillar of relative economic stability, the role of the US dollar as reserve currency for safeguarding wealth. As this happens, the main concern of every government in the world will be to avert uprisings of unemployed workers and the middle strata whose savings and pensions are disappearing. Governments are currently turning to protectionism and printing money as their first line of defence. Such measures may assuage momentarily the pain of ordinary people, but it is probable that they will make the situation even worse. We are entering systemic gridlock, from which exit will be extremely difficult. This will express itself in ever wilder fluctuations, which will make short-term predictions—both economic and political—virtually guesswork. This in turn will aggravate popular fears and the sense of alienation. Some claim that the greatly improved relative economic position of Asia—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China and to a lesser extent India—will allow a resurgence of capitalist enterprise, through a simple geographical shift of location. One more illusion! The relative rise of Asia is a reality, but one that undermines further the capitalist system by over-extending the distribution of surplus-value, thus reducing overall accumulation for individual capitals rather than increasing it. China’s expansion accelerates the structural profit squeeze of the capitalist world-economy. Systemic overheads It is at this point that we must consider the secular trends of the world-systm, as opposed to its cyclcal rhythms. These rhythms are common to many kinds of systems, and are part of how they operate, how they breathe, if you will. But the B-phases never end at the point where the preceding A-phases began. We may think of each upturn as a contribution to slow-moving upward curves, each approaching its own asymptote. In the capitalist world-economy, it is not difficult to discern which curves matter most. Since capitalism is a system in which endless accumulation is paramount, and since one accumulates capital by making profits in the market, the key issue is how to make products for less than the prices for which they can be sold. We therefore have to determine both what goes into the costs of production and what determines prices. Logically, production costs are those of personnel, inputs and taxation. All three have been rising as a percentage of the actual prices for which products are sold. This is so despite the repeated efforts of capitalists to push them down, and despite the waves of technological and organizational improvements that have increased the so-called efficiency of production. Personnel costs may in turn be divided into three categories: the relatively unskilled workforce, intermediate cadres and top managers. The wages of the unskilled tend to increase in A-phases as a result of some kind of syndical action. When these rise too high for given entrepreneurs, particularly for the leading industries, relocation to historically lower-wage areas during the B-phase is the main remedy; if similar action takes place in the new location, a second move occurs. These shifts are costly but successful; however, worldwide there is a ratchet effect—the reductions never totally eliminate the increases. Over 500 years, this repeated process has exhausted the loci into which capital can relocate. This is evidenced by the deruralization of the world-system. The increase in the cost of workforce cadres is the result, first, of the expanded scale of productive units, which require more intermediate personnel. Second, the political dangers of syndical organization by relatively low-skilled personnel are countered by the creation of a larger intermediate layer, political allies for the ruling stratum and models of upward mobility for the unskilled majority. The rise in the costs of top managers, meanwhile, is the direct result of the increased complexity of entrepreneurial structures—the famous separation of ownership and control. This makes it possible for top managers to appropriate ever larger portions of the firm’s receipts as rent, thereby reducing what goes to the owners as profit or for reinvestment. This last increase was spectacular during the last few decades. The costs of inputs have been going up for analogous reasons. Capitalists aim to externalize costs, that is, to not pay the full bill for handling toxic waste, renewing raw materials and building infrastructure. From the sixteenth century to the 1960s, such externalization of costs had been normal practice, more or less unquestioned by political authorities. Toxic waste was simply dumped in the public domain. But the world has been running out of vacant public space—parallel to the deruralization of the world’s workforce. The health consequences and costs have become so high and so close to home as to produce demands for environmental clean-up and control. Resources have also become a major concern, the consequence of the sharp increase in world population. There is now widespread discussion about shortages of energy sources, water, forestation, fish and meat. Transport and communication costs have also gone up as these have become faster and more efficient. Entrepreneurs have historically paid only a small part of the bill for infrastructure. The consequence of all of this has been political pressure for governments to assume more of the costs of detoxification, resource renewal and infrastructural expansion. To do this, governments must increase taxes and insist on more internalization of costs by entrepreneurs, which of course cuts into profit margins. Finally, taxation has been going up. There are multiple levels of taxation, including private taxation in the form of corruption and organized mafias. Taxation has risen as the scope of world-economic activity has extended and state bureaucracies have expanded, but the major impetus has come from the world’s anti-systemic movements, which have pushed for state-guarantees of education, health and life-long revenue flows. Each of these has expanded, both geographically and in terms of the levels of services demanded. No government today is exempt from the pressure to maintain a welfare state, even if the levels of provision vary. All three costs of production have risen steadily as a percentage of the real sales prices of products, albeit in the form of an A–B ratchet, over 500 years. The most dramatic increases have been in the post-1945 period. Cannot the prices for which products are sold simply be raised, in order to maintain the margins of real profit? That is precisely what was tried in the post-1970 period, in the form of price rises sustained by expanded consumption, sustained in turn by indebtedness. The economic collapse in the midst of which we find ourselves is nothing but the expression of the limits to elasticity of demand. When everyone spends far beyond their real income, there comes a point at which someone has to stop, and fairly quickly everyone feels they have to do the same. Struggles for succession The conjunction of the three elements—the magnitude of the ‘normal’ crash, the rise in costs of production, and the extra pressure on the system of Chinese (and Asian) growth—means that we have entered a structural crisis. The system is very far from equilibrium, and the fluctuations are enormous. From now on, we will be living amidst a bifurcation of the systemic process. The question is no longer, ‘how will the capitalist system mend itself, and renew its forward thrust?’, but rather, ‘what will replace this system? What order will emerge from this chaos?’

### A2: Heg/Terror

#### Hegemony is the biggest source of international terrorism – we’ve killed over 6 million people and started the most wars – links turns their empiricism arguments

Trainer 2 - Senior Lecturer, School of Social Work, University of New South Wales (Ted, "If you want affluence, prepare for War," Democracy & Nature: The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy; Jul2002, Vol. 8 Issue 2, p281-299) [Non-listed examples – Germany – 40k. Japan – 1M. Laos – 1M. Iraq – 1M. Cambodia – 400k]

When things like this happen rich countries do not hesitate to support oppressive regimes willing to keep their countries to economic policies that will benefit local elites and rich countries, or to get rid of governments that threaten not to go along with such policies. Usually the rationale is in terms of the need to help a friendly government to put down a rebellion. Until recently this could always be labelled 'communist subversion', thereby eliminating any concerns about the legitimacy of the action. However in Colombia it has recently been labelled as a 'war on the drug trade', and in general it can now be labelled as a 'war on terrorism'. On many occasions governments of rich countries have waged ruthless war to install or get rid of regimes, according to whether or not they would facilitate the access of our corporations and the diversion of their resources and productive capacity to purposes that suited us. In other words the rich countries have an elaborate and powerful empire that they protect, extend and control mostly via their economic power, via the supply of military equipment and training to repressive regimes and via client regimes they support with money and arms, but often via the use of their own military force. Our living standards could not be as high as they are if a great deal of brutal repression was not being used to keep people to the economic policies that enrich us at their expense. As Herman says, there is a '… ruthless imposition of a neoliberal regime that serves Western transnational corporate interests, along with a willingness to use unlimited force to achieve Western ends. This is genuine imperialism, sometimes using economic coercion alone, sometimes supplementing it with violence.'13 Following are some illustrative references taken from the large literature documenting the nature and functioning of the empire. Much of this evidence indicts the USA but this is incidental. The core problem is the powerful acquisitive drive in the Western mentality which fuels the insatiable quest for greater personal wealth and higher 'living standards', greater corporate wealth and a rising GDP. Given this, nations will compete for scarce resources and one will emerge as dominant, and run the empire in its own interests. In our era, the dominant power just happens to be the USA. The fundamental long-term task is not to restrain US behaviour but to deal with the underlying motivation that comes from deep within Western culture and that generates imperialism and related problems, such as ecological destruction and resource depletion. In the early 1980s, approximately 40,000 people were killed by the ruling class in El Salvador, mostly via 'death squads' composed of off-duty military officers and police. 'The regime which presides over these measures would long since have collapsed were it not for the support of the USA. US-backed loans in 1981 amounted to US$523 million.14 The USA ensures '… the maintenance of a violent and undemocratic regime … which without American intervention would clearly fall within the next three months …'.15 Training by US military '… has directly aided the oligarchy to carry out its terror campaign against peasant and worker masses …'.16 'The US has unfailingly supplied the tools of terror and repression to the Salvadoran military, as well as training in their use.'17 After referring to similar massacres in Guatemala, Chomsky says '… this is international terrorism, supported or directly organised in Washington with the assistance of its international network of mercenary states.'18 In Indonesia in 1965, approximately 500,000 'communists' were slaughtered. The USA fuelled the climate which led to the bloodbath, supplied names, provided equipment and above all opted not to take steps to oppose the event it knew was coming.19 '… the US has undeniably launched major terrorist attacks against Cuba … including attempts to assassinate Castro. CIA trained Cuban exiles bombed a Cuban civilian airliner, killing all 73 aboard …'.20 George notes that most of these attacks of terrorism were organised by the Kennedy administration.21 Chomsky says '… the worst single terrorist act of 1985 was a car-bombing in Beirut on 8 March that killed 80 people and wounded 256. According to Woodward the attack "… was arranged by the CIA and its Saudi clients with the assistance of Lebanese intelligence and a British specialist …".22 In 1986 the major single terrorist act was the US bombing of Libya.'23 US efforts to crush the Sandinista government in Nicaragua constitute one of the clearest and most disturbing instances of sustained terrorism. The USA helped to install and then to maintain the Somaza regime for 46 years (the Somoza family ended up with 30% of the country's farmland).24 As Easterbrook says '… the US launched a war against Nicaragua. That was a terrible war. Tens of thousands of people died. The country was practically destroyed. The Nicaraguans went to the World Court … the World Court ruled in their favour and ordered the United States to stop its "unlawful use of force" (that means international terrorism) and pay substantial reparations … The United States responded by dismissing the court with contempt and escalating the attack. (Chomsky reports that US$100 million in military aid was immediately granted.25) At that point Nicaragua went to the UN Security council that voted a resolution calling on all states to obey international law … the United States vetoed it. Nicaragua then went to the General Assembly, which two years in a row passed a similar resolution with only the United States and Israel opposed.'26 The Contras were organised by the CIA to attack the Nicaraguan government. '… the documentation of the murder of civilians as standard operating procedure of the Contras was already massive in 1984.'27 Former CIA director Stansfield Turner stated to a House subcommittee that US support for the Contras '… would have to be characterised as terrorism …'.28 If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War During the 1980s, the USA assisted South Africa in the wars it initiated against neighbouring states in its effort to defend apartheit. Gervasi and Wong detail the activities that resulted in 1.5 million war related deaths.29 Some people, regions and countries have endured especially horrific consequences of this imperial situation and have abundant reason for violent hatred of the systems and nations that have inflicted intense and chronic suffering, and humiliation and indifference on them. This is most obvious in the case of the Palestinians, forced to live in squalid refugee camps for decades subject to periodic harassment and slaughter, while the US gives 40% of its foreign aid to Israel.30 Much of this has been military equipment used to kill Palestinian and other Muslim people. Some 20,000 were killed when Israel invaded Southern Lebanon. Israel has been frequently condemned by the UN for holding territory taken from the Palestinians and building settlements on it. When Iraq invaded Kuwait the USA retaliated with military force, killing hundreds of thousands, but the USA does not condemn Israel's invasions and acquisitions. Pilger says 'In Palestine the illegal occupation by Israel would have collapsed long ago were it not for US backing …'31 Of course, Israel's behaviour must be seen as a response to a problem of extreme insecurity and the death of many of its own citizens; the point of these illustrations is not to condemn Israel and exonerate the Arabs, it is to insist that the Palestinians like many other groups have abundant reason to be extremely discontented about the way they have been treated by the West and therefore to make events like 11 September somewhat less unintelligible . East Timor provides another of the most disturbing instances of recent Western state behaviour. Rich Western countries did not speak out, let alone condemn, let alone block the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, which they recognised as being in their interests. Instead they sold the Indonesians the weapons used to kill some 200,000 East Timorese people. US presidents Ford and Carter supported the takeover. Budiardjo quotes a US State Department official as saying Indonesia is '… a nation we do a lot of business with ... we are more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor.'32 Britain '… offered the Indonesian regime continuous and increasing military, financial and diplomatic support'.33 'It is well established that the Western powers … had already decided to give Indonesia a free hand'.34 In Iran '… the US installed the Shah as an amenable dictator in 1953, trained his secret services in "methods of interrogation" and lauded him as he ran his regime of torture'.35 The USA supported Saddam Hussein throughout the 1980s as he 'carried out his war (with Iran) … and turned a blind eye to his use of chemical weapons …'.36 'In Vietnam selected Vietnamese troops were organised into terror squads.'37 '… indiscriminate killing of civilians was a central part of a "counter-insurgency war" in which 20,000 civilians were systematically assassinated under the CIA's Operation Phoenix Program …'38 Pilger says this operation was the model for the later terror carried out in Chile and Nicaragua.39 In the 1960s, Kennedy instituted 'counterinsurgency, essentially the development of "special forces" trained in the use of terror to prevent peasants from supporting revolutionary groups'. For decades the US School of the Americas has provided this training to large numbers of Latin American police and military personnel, including many of the regions worst tyrants and torturers. As Monbiot says, 'The US has been training terrorists at a camp in Georgia for years—and it's still at it.'40 Training manuals include explicit material on the use of torture and terror.41 '… torture, "disappearance", mass killings and political imprisonment became the norm in many of the nations most heavily assisted by the United States …'42 Again, there is an extensive literature documenting these and many other cases.43 Herman and O'Sullivan present a table showing that in recent decades the overwhelming majority of terrorist actions, measured by death tolls, have been carried out by Western states. 'State terror has been immense, and the West and it's clients have been the major agents.'44 Any serious student of international relations or US foreign policy will be clearly aware of the general scope and significance of the empire that rich countries operate, and of the human rights violations, the violence and injustice this involves. Rich world 'living standards', corporate prosperity, comfort and security could not be sustained at anywhere near current levels without this empire, nor without the oppression, violence and military activity that keep in place conventional investment, trade and development policies. It should therefore be not in the least surprising that several hundred million people more or less hate the rich Western nations. This is the context in which events like those of 11 September must be understood. It is surprising that the huge and chronic injustice, plunder, repression and indifference evident in the global economic system has not generated much greater hostile reaction from the Third World, and more eagerness to hit back with violence. This is partly explained by the fact that it is in the interests of Third World rulers to acquiesce in conventional development strategies. Given the foregoing documentation it hardly needs to be added that in the modern era the USA is by far the greatest practitioner of terrorism in the world. Again space permits no more than a brief selection from the many summary statements to this effect. 'The US has rained death and destruction on more people in more regions of the globe than any other nation in the period since the Second World War … it has employed its military forces in other countries over 70 times since 1945, not counting innumerable instances of counter insurgency operations by the CIA.'45 '… the US state has long been using terrorist networks, and carrying out acts of terror itself.'46 The US '… is the greatest source of terror on earth'.47 'The greatest source of terrorism48 is the US itself and some of the Latin American countries.'49 '… the US is itself a leading terrorist state.'50 'There are many terrorist states, but the United States is unusual in that it is officially committed to international terrorism, and on a scale that puts its rivals to shame.'51 'We are the target of terrorists because in much of the world our government stands for dictatorship, bondage, and human exploitation. … We are the target of terrorists because we are hated. … And we are hated because our governments have done hateful things. … Time after time we have ousted popular leaders who wanted the riches of the land to be shared by the people who worked it. … We are hated because our government denies (democracy, freedom, human rights) to people in Third World countries whose resources are coveted by our multinational corporations. '52 'In 1998 Amnesty International released a report that made it clear that the US was 'at least as responsible for extreme violation of human rights around the globe as—including the promotion of torture and terrorism and state violence—as any government or organisation in the world.'53 'From any objective standpoint, Israel and the United States more frequently rely on terrorism, and in forms that inflict far greater quantums of suffering on their victims than do their opponents. '54 That this has been clearly understood for decades by critical students of American Foreign Policy is evident in the following quotes from the late 1970s and early 1980s. '… the US and its allies have armed the elites of the Third World to the teeth, and saturated them with counterinsurgency weaponry and training. … Hideous torture has become standard practice in US client fascist states. … Much of the electronic and other torture gear, is US supplied and great numbers of … interrogators are US trained …'.55 "Many of the world's most brutal dictatorships "… are in place precisely because they serve US interests in a joint venture with local torturers at the expense of their majorities".'56 After documenting supply of aid to 23 countries guilty of 'human rights abuses', Trosan and Yates say, 'Without US help they would be hard pressed to contain the fury of their oppressed citizens and US businesses would find it difficult to flourish'. Whenever their people have rebelled and tried to seize power, thereby threatening foreign investments, the USA has on every occasion actively supported government repression and terror, or has promoted coups to overthrow popular governments.57

### A2: Poverty

#### Poverty is rising now and capitalism is to blame – only transition can solve

Wolff, 2011 (11/10, Richard D., Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst and a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New York, “Capitalism and Poverty,” <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/wolff111011.html>)

The US Census Bureau recently reported what most Americans already knew. Poverty is deepening. The gap between rich and poor is growing. Slippage soon into the ranks of the poor now confronts tens of millions of Americans who long thought of themselves as securely "middle class." The reality is worse than the Census Bureau reports. Consider that the Bureau's poverty line in 2010 for a family of four was $22,314. Families of four making more than that were not counted as poor. That poverty line works out to $15 per day per person for everything: food, clothing, housing, medical care, transportation, education, and so on. If you have more than $15 per day per person in your household to pay for everything each person needs, the Bureau does not count you as part of this country's poverty problem. So the real number of US citizens living in poverty -- more reasonably defined -- is much larger today than the 46.2 million reported by the Census Bureau. It is thus much higher than the 15.1 per cent of our people the Bureau sees as poor. Conservatively estimated, about one in four Americans already lives in real poverty. Another one in four is or should be worried about joining them soon. Long-lasting and high unemployment now drains away income from families and friends of the unemployed who have used up savings as well as unemployment insurance. As city, state, and local governments cut services and supports, people will have to divert money to offset part of those cuts. When Medicare and if Social Security benefits are cut, millions will be spending more to help elderly parents. Finally, poverty looms for those with jobs as (1) wages are cut or fail to keep up with rising prices, and (2) benefits -- especially pensions and medical insurance -- are reduced. Deepening poverty has multiple causes, but the capitalist economic system is major among them. First, capitalism's periodic crises always increase poverty, and the current crisis is no exception. More precisely, how capitalist corporations operate, in or out of crisis, regularly reproduces poverty. At the top of every corporation, its major shareholders (15-20 or fewer) own controlling blocs of shares. They select a board of directors -- usually 15-20 individuals -- who run the corporation. These two tiny groups make all the key decisions: what, how, and where to produce and what to do with the profits. Poverty is one result of this capitalist type of enterprise organization. For example, corporate decisions generally aim to lower the number of workers or their wages or both. They automate, export (outsource) jobs, and replace higher-paid workers by recruiting domestic and foreign substitutes willing to work for less. These normal corporate actions generate rising poverty as the other side of rising profits. When poverty and its miseries "remain always with us," workers tend to accept what employers dish out to avoid losing jobs and falling into poverty. Another major corporate goal is to control politics. Wherever all citizens can vote, workers' interests might prevail over those of directors and shareholders in elections. To prevent that, corporations devote portions of their revenues to finance politicians, parties, mass media, and "think tanks." Their goal is to "shape public opinion" and control what government does. They do not want Washington's crisis-driven budget deficits and national debts to be overcome by big tax increases on corporations and the rich. Instead public discussion and politicians' actions are kept focused chiefly on cutting social programs for the majority. Corporate goals include providing high and rising salaries, stock options, and bonuses to top executives and rising dividends and share prices to shareholders. The less paid to the workers who actually produce what corporations sell, the more corporate revenue goes to satisfy directors, top managers, and major shareholders. Corporations also raise profits regularly by increasing prices and/or cutting production costs (often by compromising output quality). Higher priced and poorer-quality goods are sold mostly to working people. This too pushes them toward poverty just like lower wages and benefits and government service cuts. Over the years, government interventions like Social Security, Medicare, minimum wage laws, regulations, etc. never sufficed to eradicate poverty. They often helped the poor, but they never ended poverty. The same applies to charities aiding the poor. Poverty always remained. Now capitalism's crisis worsens it again. Something more than government interventions or charity is required to end poverty. One solution: production would have to be organized differently, in a non-capitalist way. Instead of enterprise decisions being made by directors and major shareholders, the workers themselves could collectively and democratically make them. Let's call this Democracy at Work (DAW), since it entails the majority making the key enterprise decisions about what, how, and where to produce and what to do with the profits. If the workers made those decisions, here are some likely results. Primary goals would no longer be to reduce their own numbers or their wages. If technological changes or reduced demand for their outputs required fewer workers, they would likely maintain the wages of workers and retrain them for other jobs meeting growing demands. Workers would not be fired and thereby pushed into poverty. Second, workers making democratic decisions would not likely allow today's huge differences between average wages and top managers' salaries, bonuses, etc. By eliminating concentrated income and accumulated wealth at the top, resources would be freed finally to end poverty at the bottom. A DAW system could produce and secure the vast "middle class" that this country pretended but never yet really had. Workers disposing of their enterprises' profits would no longer distribute a portion to politicians and parties to protect a rich minority against the envy and resentments of the majority. By establishing a far more egalitarian income distribution, a DAW system could also transform a political system now corrupted by the money of corporations and the rich. Third, a DAW system would be less likely to raise prices or reduce output quality. When workers are both decision-makers at work as well as consumers of their enterprises' outputs, they would more likely pass and sustain laws to outlaw the price gouging and quality deterioration common in capitalism. A serious commitment to end poverty and its costly social effects requires us to face that capitalism has always reproduced widespread poverty as the other side of profits for a relative few. No wonder such a system has provoked Occupy Wall Street and so many of its signature slogans and demands.

## Aff

### ! Turn laundry list

#### Capitalism is essential to wealth generation and poverty reduction; that solves disease, terrorism, and regional conflicts that go nuclear

Bill Emmott, Editor-in-Chief of The Economist, 2003, 20:21 Vision, pp. 265-266, 277-278

There are other self-serving reasons to be worried about inequality and its handmaiden, poverty. One is that a poorer country is more likely to have weak political and social institutions, which are then more likely to collapse into chaos or civil war. That is especially likely when the country is poor in terms of the direct economic activity of its citizenry but is nevertheless home to some valuable natural resources, such as the diamonds of Sierra Leone. Forces within, and forces from outside, are liable to fight to get their hands on those resources. Chaos and civil war are essentially local troubles that need not affect the rest of the world, but they are liable to draw in neighbors, risking a wider regional conflict as countries or factions vie to exploit the vacuum left in the collapsing state. Poorer, unstable countries are also likely to harbor and to foster two other ills: disease and terrorism. Disease may well contribute to poverty rather than being a consequence of it, but it is also the case that a poor country is likely to lack the infrastructure as well as money to be able to deal with epidemic diseases such as the human irumunodeficiency virus that causes AIDS, or Ebola, and those diseases might then be able to spread across other borders. The danger of terrorism is more obvious: discontented, otherwise hopeless people may wish to take out their sense of grievance on the luckier rich, and will be likely to find plenty of willing recruits for dangerous or even suicidal terrorist missions. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 confirm this only indirectly, since the terrorists concerned were neither poor nor hopeless. But they and their followers did, it seems, feel that Islamic countries in general were poor and lacking in hope, following centuries of humiliation at the hands of the West. And the argument applies directly to Afghanistan: if that country had not been dirt-poor, it would have been unlikely to have acted as a host to the al-Qaeda terrorists. Rich countries can give rise to terrorism too, even without the separatist movements found in the Basque Country and Northern Ireland; Germany had its Baader-Meinhof gang in the 1970s, Italy its Red Brigades, and even America had the Symbionese Liberation Front. But they have not been numerous enough to pose a danger to their governments or to any other country. Poverty and despair act as a more powerful recruiting sergeant for terrorists than do mere alienation or beliefs in anarchism. Other people worry about inequality because of a fear of war: the fear that countries which feel that they are unable to advance their living standards and sense of power by conventional economic means may be tempted to use military methods as a shortcut. As a general proposition, this argument is unconvincing, for a poorer country is also often militarily weak, though that still made the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact countries a formidable enemy to NATO during the cold war. By and large, however, the rich will always be able to defeat poor countries in anything other than a guerrilla war—and such fighting methods may be common in civil wars or m wars of liberation, but they do not put other countries themselves in physical danger, except from terrorism. But in some circumstances this argument may hold good. North Korea, for example, has long used the threat of military attack either on its southern compatriot, or on Japan or the United States, as a means by which to blackmail the rich. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 in order to grab its oil as well as merely to make a territorial point. Inequality, in other words, may lead to an increase in the number of unpredictable dictators— slightly euphemistically known as rogue states (even more euphemistically known, by America’s State Department, as “states of concern”). These rogues have become more dangerous as technology has advanced sufficiently to make long-range missiles cheap enough to buy and develop, and to use as a threat. They could become extremely deadly if any obtain the means to develop and deploy nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

The findings of history are quite simple, even if it is not becoming any easier to implement them. To believe them, however, one must first believe in capitalism and in the fact that it has been the only successful generator of sustained improvements in human welfare that has so far been discovered. The next thing is to work out what it is that makes capitalism tick. Or, put another way, one must find out what is different about the places where it ticks and the places where it doesn’t.

That is what an international study, Economic Freedom of the World, has sought to do every year since it was first published, in 1996, by eleven economic think tanks around the world led by the Fraser Institute in Canada. The correlations it finds between sustained economic success and aspects of capitalist circumstances

suggest that most of the explanations lie in how poor countries are governed, rather than in natural disadvantages or unfairness by the rich. Those suspicious of free-marketeers should note that conclusion: it is government, or the lack of it, that makes the crucial difference.

The aim of the study was to see whether countries in which people had more economic freedom were also richer and grew more rapidly. But the study also sought to define economic freedom, in the hope of capturing and measuring the things that matter in making capitalism work. Broadly, economic freedom means the ability to do what you want with whatever property you have legally acquired, as long as your actions do not violate other people’s rights to do the same. Goods and services do not, alas, fall like manna from heaven; their arrival depends on property rights and the incentives to use and create them. So the issues surrounding those are what matter: Are property rights legally protected? Are people hemmed in by government regulations and trade barriers, or fearful of confiscation? Are their savings under attack from inflation, or can they do what they want with their money? Is it economically viable for parents to send their kids to school?

The study’s authors initially found seventeen measures of these things, expanded in the 2001 update to twenty-one, and rated 102 (now 123) countries on each of them, going back, if possible, to 1975. They then had to find ways to weight the measures according to their importance, and used a panel of economists to do so. The conclusion was abundantly clear: the freer the economy, the higher the growth and the richer the people. This was especially so for countries that maintained a fairly free economy for many years, since before individuals and companies will respond to such freedom they need to feel confident that it will last.

### A2: VTL

#### There is an infinite value to life- your framework causes extinction

Kateb, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, ‘92 (George, The Inner Ocean, pg. 144)

To sum up the lines of thought that Nietzsche starts, I suggest first that it is epistemologically impossible for humanity to arrive at an estimation of the worth of itself or of the rest of nature: it cannot pretend to see itself from the outside or to see the rest, as it were, from the inside. Second, after allowance is made for this quandary, which is occasioned by the death of God and the birth of truth, humanity, placed in a position in which it is able to extinguish human life and natural life on earth, must simply affirm existence as such. Existence must go on but not because of any particular feature or group of features. The affirmation of existence refuses to say what worth existence has, even from just a human perspective, from any human perspective whatever. It cannot say, because existence is indefinite; it is beyond evaluating; being undesigned it is unencompassable by a defined and definite judgment. (The philosopher Frederick A. Olafson speaks of "the stubbornly unconceptualizable fact of existence.") The worth of the existence passed on to the unborn is not measurable but indefinite. The judgment is minimal: no human purpose or value within existence is worth more than existence and can ever be used to justify the risk of extinction. Third, from the moral point of view, existence seems unjustifiable because of the pain and ugliness in it, and therefore the moral point of view must be chastened if it is not to block attachment to existence as such. The other minimal judgment is that whatever existence is, it is better than nothing. For the first time, in the nuclear age, humanity can fully perceive existence from the perspective of nothing, which in part is the perspective of extinction.

### Capitalism Inevitable

#### Capitalism is too firmly entrenched – acceptance of alternatives is impossible

Comaroff, 2011 (September, John, Harold H. Swift Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, “The End of Neoliberalism? “What Is Left of the Left,” p. 142-146)

While the world economic crisis of 2008–2009 might have killed off neoliber- alism as a global ideological project—patently, in the noun form—it is highly likely to leave the capillaries of the beast, less Leviathan than Great White Shark, largely intact. Indeed, the “meltdown” and its aftermath may see the planet less, not more, open to alternatives to the neoliberal tendency, albeit with significant “corrections” as some economists were already calling them more than a year back. I am reminded here, simultaneously, of Reinhart Koselleck and the Manchester School of Anthropology in Central Africa. Koselleck, in his study of the Enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society, drew attention to the dialectics of crisis, critique, and correction; for its part, the Manchester School demonstrated the capacity of cycles of rupture and their repair to reproduce social systems and the order of values on which they are predicated (see, for example, Gluckman 2004; Turner 1996). Crisis, self-evidently, is always reproductive. But it frequently is. As Mike Davis (1995) once noted, “apocalypse” is often absorbed quickly into the history of the everyday, a process he describes as the “dialectic of ordinary disaster.” As talk has grown of “green shoots” sprouting in the wake of the economic devastation of the past two years or so, there have been signs of both crisis-driven critique in pursuit of “correction” and a return to the “ordinary.” Discourses of correction have come from both liberal and conservative sources. In a special edition of Harper’s in 2008, James Galbraith, Joseph Stiglitz, and others—most of them with impeccable liberal credentials—suggested a range of strategies to ensure that capitalism might reemerge relatively unscathed. They prescribed cures such as reforming the tax system, banning stock options as incentives, bringing into line the self-interest of the banking sector with those of the economy and society at large, and finding regulatory means to harness both the risk-laden excesses of the finance industry and the tendency to favor short-run profiteering over longer- term wealth production. Only one contributor to the debate, Eric Janszen— ironically, a venture capitalist—took a more radical line. He argued for a return to industrial capitalism, pointing out that all recent bubbles and busts are owed to government creating conditions for mammoth, “metastasiz[ing]” markets in financial speculation. Janszen apart, these efforts to “save capitalism” were symptomatic of a rush of similar liberal writings on the topic. Few of them—the notable exception being Gillian Tett’s extraordinary Fool’s Gold (2009)—delved deeply into the archaeol- ogy of the crisis itself or, more generally, into the inner workings of a global political economy whose complexity has increased exponentially over the past couple of decades. As a result, most have sought solutions along its outer surfaces. They have posited adjustments that might limit the material excesses of the neo- liberal tendency and, in particular, the market instabilities and conflicts of interest to which those excesses give rise. This, itself, is a function of the pervasive prac- tice of explaining all economic processes these days by recourse to one or another kind of utilitarian theory, which is why the four causes of the apocalypse, as John Lanchester (2009) has pointed out, are almost invariably taken to be “greed, stu- pidity, government, and the banks,” not anything in the structure of contemporary capitalism itself. The pursuit of explanations and panaceas in such terms, as we might expect, has its parallel on the Right, most notably perhaps in Richard Posner’s A Failure of Capitalism (2009), a salvo from the Halls of Friedmania. Note that Posner did not title the book “the failure”—using a definite article—but merely “a failure.” Posner, predictably and—in light of Tett’s account—spuriously, argues that individuals in the finance industry acted rationally in the years before the crisis. That crisis, in his view a fully fledged “depression,” is blamed, again predictably, on bad government and ill-considered, perfectible forms of deregu- lation. His “corrections,” though, belong to the same genus as those proffered by liberal economists: establish new forms of regulation that reduce the conflict between the rational self-interest of economic actors and the commonweal—the invisible old hand here, of course, being the economist of invisible hands, Adam Smith. In the final analysis, from this vantage, the point is to perfect free market economies by establishing the regulatory environment most conducive to a suc- cessfully deregulated world. In the meantime—and this is where the “dialectic of the ordinary” becomes salient—for all the talk of the urgent need for “correction,” we have seen a tangible return to business as usual, even bad-faith business. This is in spite of the fact that deeper crises appear inevitable, that employment statistics are worsening, that rates of poverty and inequality are rapidly rising, and so on. The buzzword in the City of London, in late June 2009, was “BAB”: “bonuses are back.” And, with them, the forms of finance capital from which they emanate. As Jonathan Freedland (2009), also commenting on Britain, wrote, “Nine months ago”—in 2008—“the financial crisis seemed certain to bring a revolution in our economy. . . . Change had to be on the way.” But now “look what has happened. . . . [Just] when the world seemed ready to bury the neoliberal regime . . . we have returned to [its ways and means].” In sum, despite the stream of assertions during 2010 that the crisis would have deep transformative effects, putting an end to the “neoliberal regime,” most indi- cators suggest otherwise. For one thing, the massive infusions of money into the banking industry and mega-business on the part of national governments have occurred without the regulatory initiatives that were promised to follow. Yet again, public funds are being diverted into the private sector, underscoring the fact that capital continues to take its profits but not shoulder its losses, a curious, perverse denouement to the rise of Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (1992). To be sure, state intervention in the U.S. economy after 2008 has never pointed in the direction of a “New New Deal,” as some Panglossian commentators on the Left thought it might. Just the reverse. It has been intended to save the corporate world, not secure civil society or ordinary citizens from the predations of the market; the pledge of measures that might protect those citizens immiserated by the crash, measures never substantial to begin with, has gone largely unrealized. We are plainly not witnessing a return to social democracy, let alone the genesis of a new age of nationalization; note, in this respect, how many of the nation-states of the global North are moving (further) to the right. Which may be why there have been so few legislative enactments anywhere promulgated to curb the practices that sparked the meltdown in the first place: per contra, while market forces have made it harder to negotiate toxic assets and to take some of the more extravagant gambles in the business of finance, the investment industry is widely reported not merely to have returned to its old ways, but to be inventing new “products” without palpable constraint. The derivatives trade, it seems, is rising again. So, too, are the ramparts around “economic liberalism.” A recent article in The Economist (2009) argues that, notwithstanding “the biggest economic calamity in 80 years . . . the free-market paradigm . . . deserves a robust defence.” These are not the only signs that the capillaries of the neoliberal tendency and the “free-market paradigm” continue to embrace us. There are many others. Some are obvious, like the continuing dominance of the corporate sector: its relative immunity from most legal challenge, even when its enterprises violate the being, bodies, belongings, or bioenvironment of ordinary citizens; its enjoyment of favor- able taxation regimes and, increasingly, the use of laws of eminent domain to expand its horizons; the protection of its physical, financial, and intellectual prop- erty, sometimes by recourse to police violence, as an ostensible function of the collective good; its capacity to influence the disposition of the public treasury and public policy and, reciprocally, to have insurgent action directed against it pros- ecuted as common crime—for example, in mass protests against the privatization of such “natural” assets as water and land. Other signs are less obvious, like the growing hegemony of legal orders, founded on constitutions of distinctly neolib- eral design, that favor individual rights over collective well-being; that limit the responsibility of government to protect or provision its citizens; that tend to criminalize race, poverty, and counterpolitics, in part by outlawing the salience of social cause or consequence; that subject what were once everyday democratic processes to the finality of judicial action, thereby juridifying politics to the exclu- sion of other forms of social action; that displace the “hot” sovereignty of the people into the “cold” sovereignty of the law; and that treat all citizens as rational, self-interested, rights-bearing actors and the world as a community of contract. (For more on neoliberal constitutionalism, see, for example, Schneiderman [2000] and Comaroff and Comaroff [2006].) I could go on in this vein. To do so, however, would be to risk stating the obvi- ous. But allow me one observation. Perhaps the most significant capillaries of the neoliberal that remain with us have to do with the state and governance. Foucauldians would prefer “governmentality” here; they have a point. Broadly speaking, neoliberal etatism seems to be surviving well, even strengthening, in most places. As Foucault explained in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), the rise of neoliberalism—his use of the noun—marked a radical transformation: whereas before, the state, among its various bureaucratic operations, “monitored” the work- ings of the economy, its “organizing principle” is now the market. Government actually has become business. And nation-states have become holding companies in and for themselves. In the upshot, the categorical distinction between politics and economics, that classical liberal fiction, is largely erased. Effective gover- nance, in turn, is measured with reference to asset management, to the attraction of enterprise, to the facilitation of the entrepreneurial activities of the citizen as homo economicus, and to the capacity to foster the accumulation—but not the redistribution—of wealth. Under these conditions, heads of state begin to resemble, and often actually are, CEOs who treat the population as a body of shareholders; vide the likes of Silvio Berlusconi, who explicitly speaks of Italy as a company, or Dmitri Medvedev, head of Gazprom, Russia’s mightiest business and a major instrument of the country’s foreign policy. There is a more profound point here. Once upon a time, antineoliberal theory posited an opposition between the state and the free market, arguing that the antidote to the latter lay in the active inter- vention of the former. But the opposition is false, just another piece of the detri- tus of the modern history of capital. As states become mega-corporations (Kremlin, Inc.; Britain, PLC; South Africa, Pty Ltd.; Dubai, Inc.)—all of them, incidentally, branded and legally incorporated—they become inextricably part of the workings of the market and, hence, no longer an “outside,” an antidote, or an antithesis from which to rethink or reconstruct “the neoliberal paradigm.” This, in part, is why government is increasingly reduced to an exercise in the technical management of capital, why ideologically founded politics appear dead, replaced by the politics of interest and entitlement and identity—three counterpoints of a single triangle. And this is why the capillaries of neoliberal governance seem so firmly entrenched in the cartography of our everyday lives, there to remain for the foreseeable future—to the degree that any future is foreseeable.

#### The alternative’s small elite resistance fails – structural impediments overwhelm

O'Callaghan, International Studies Prof at University of South Australia, 02 (International Relations and the "third debate:" Postmodernism and its critics, Darryl S. L. Jarvis, pg. 73)

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George’s scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George’s latent idealism and underscores how George’s schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George’s audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the “other,” to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that “listening” is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September 11 is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the “marginalized” and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic. Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George’s penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform. Indeed, George’s desire to move to a new “space beyond International Relations” smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution; of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production. George seems to have little appreciation of the **structural impediments** such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire consumer demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana.

### Alternative Fails

#### Alt causes backlash and transition wars

Anderson, professor of sociology – UCLA, ’84

(Perry, In the tracks of historical materialism, p. 102-103)

That background also indicates, however, what is essentially missing from his work. How are we to get from where we are today to where he point us to tomorrow? There is no answer to this question in Nove. His halting discussion of “transition” tails away into apprehensive admonitions to moderation to the British Labor Party, and pleas for proper compensation to capitalist owners of major industries, if these are to be nationalized. Nowhere is there any sense of what a titanic political change would have to occur, with what fierceness of social struggle, for the economic model of socialism he advocates ever to materialize. Between the radicalism of the future end-state he envisages, and the conservatism of the present measures he is prepared to countenance, there is an unbridgeable abyss. How could private ownership of the means of production ever be abolished by policies less disrespectful of capital than those of Allende or a Benn, which he reproves? What has disappeared from the pages of The Economics of Feasible Socialism is virtually all attention to the historical dynamics of any serious conflict over the control of the means of production, as the record of the 20th century demonstrates them. If capital could visit such destruction on even so poor and small an outlying province of its empire in Vietnam, to prevent its loss, is it likely that it would suffer its extinction meekly in its own homeland? The lessons of the past sixty-five years or so are in this respect without ambiguity or exception, there is no case, from Russia to China, from Vietnam to Cuba, from Chile to Nicaragua, where the existence of capitalism has been challenged, and the furies of intervention, blockade and civil strife have not descended in response. Any viable transition to socialism in the West must seek to curtail that pattern: but to shrink from or to ignore it is to depart from the world of the possible altogether. In the same way, to construct an economic model of socialism in one advanced country is a legitimate exercise: but to extract it from any computable relationship with a surrounding, and necessarily opposing, capitalist environment—as this work does—is to locate it in thin air.

#### That causes extinction

Kothari, profrssor of political science – University of Delhi, ’82 (Rajni, Towards a Just Social Order, Alternatives, p. 571)

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression – producing in their wake an intensification ofthe old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for eventual global holocaust.

#### Transition fails—causes war—consumption would reemerge even worse—try or die assessments are wrong

Monbiot, 9 George Monbiot, The Guardian, 2009, Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?, [www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change)

I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement. Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes. From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint. From the second and third observations, this follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth. To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing.

### A2: Structural Violence

#### The status quo is structurally improving

Indur Goklany 10, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)”, April 24, <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194>

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview, human well-being has advanced globally since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide emissions. In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO2 stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US. Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO2 emissions 8-fold. Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand. For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. As in the rest of the world, today’s U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred —crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs. The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy, And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.

### No Root Cause

#### Capitalism not the root cause of war and the alt doesn’t solve

Martin 90 Brian Martin, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia, Uprooting War, 1990 edition http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html

The discussion so far concerns capitalist firms within a particular state. The wider question is, what role does the world capitalist system play in the war system? When examining particular wars, the immediate role of profit and accumulation are often minimal. Examples are World War Two, the Indochinese War and the many Middle East wars. Even in many colonial empires, immediate economic advantages for the capitalist class have played a minor role compared to issues of expansion and maintenance of state power. The role of capitalism mainly entered through its structuring of economic relations which are supervised separately and jointly by capitalist states. The main military service of the state to capitalists in the international system is to oppose movements which threaten the viability of capitalist economic relations. This includes state socialism and all movements for self-management. At the same time, the way this state intervention operates, namely through separate and potentially competing state apparatuses, can conflict with the security of capitalism. Wars and military expenditures can hurt national economies, as in the case of US government expenditures for fighting in Vietnam. Only some struggles against capitalism have potential for challenging the war system. Efforts to oppose capital by mobilising the power of the state do little in this direction. In particular, promotion of state socialism (the destruction of capitalism within a state mode, with the maintenance of bureaucratic control and military power) does little to address the problem of war. The trouble here is that much of the socialist left sees capitalism as the sole source of evil in the world. This approach is blind to the roots of social problems that do not primarily grow out of class domination, including racism, sexism, environmental degradation and war. Because of this blindness, even the struggle against capitalism is weakened, since attention is not paid to systems of power such as patriarchy and bureaucracy which are mobilised to support capitalism as well as other interests.

#### No root cause to war

Goldstein, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, in ‘1 (Joshua, , 2001, War and Gender, p. 412)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice." Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.' So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enine suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression." The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate."'

### Empirics/epist

#### No prior questions—focus on critical theory makes it impossible to describe the world and act

David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton,  Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is notwholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitme nts. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, itis not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### FW/PMaking

#### Dozens of empirical examples prove that engaging the policy process is key to the success of radical politics

Themba-Nixon 2K – Makani Themba-Nixon, “Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing,” Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000. Vol. 3, Iss. 2; pg. 12

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, **this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world**. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the **shaping of demands**. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of **interaction with "the suits**," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply **can't afford to ignore**.

#### Refusing to play the game is why we’re losing – we need more administration and governance, not less

Dean, 2011 (Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “Politics without Politics,” in “Reading Ranciere,” ed. Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp, p. 75-78)

The criticisms of left embrace of democracy I raise here are part of a broadly shared frustration with and on the contemporary left. Indeed, left complaining or whining might even be the primary mode of left theorizing today. We wallow in misery, in the deadlock in which we find ourselves. But whereas my emphasis is on democracy as the name of left deadlock, of the fantasy of politics without politics, others view the current problem as a crisis of de-democratization (Wendy Brown) or de-politicization (Jacques Rancière). As Rancière makes clear in his writings from the 1990s, elements of the depoliticization thesis resonate with mainstream political discussions of the end of ideology, the rise of consensus politics, and even the neoliberal withering away of the state, that is, the revisioning of the state as just another contractor of economic services – we were told that the era of big government was over. Financial crises that manifest themselves in the United States in 2008 and led to what the Bush administration presented as a necessary 700 billion dollar bailout of banks and institutions ‘too big to fail’ quickly made this notion seem quaint and unconvincing. Nonetheless, the theme of depoliticization has been a pronounced one in the United States and Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It makes sense, then, to consider this theme more closely, interrogating its suppositions and their applicability in the contemporary setting. If the diagnosis of de-democraticization and de-politicization is correct, then left politics should seek more democracy, should attempt re-politicization. But if I am right about the contemporary democratic deadlock, then a politics that reasserts democracy as the solution to all our problems will continue to entrap us in the same old circuits of defeat. It will fail, moreover, to attend to the politicizations already conditioning the current conjuncture. In On the Shores of Politics (1992), Rancière offers a version of the end of ideology thesis that affiliates this end with a kind of triumph of democracy (a triumph he criticizes). Democracy, Rancière writes, is ‘no longer perceived as the object of a choice but lived as an ambient milieu, as the natural habitat of postmodern individuality, no longer imposing struggles and sacrifices in sharp contradiction with the pleasures of the egalitarian age’ (Rancière 1992: 22). Such lived democracy is habitat rather than struggle; it is the setting in which we find ourselves rather than a position requiring sacrifice and decision. As habitat, democracy is not itself political. Although this ‘becoming modest’ of the state appears as a quintessentially modern adoption of the ‘same modes of management, communication, and consultation as the business enterprise’ (1992: 106), depoliticization, Rancière argues, is actually the ‘oldest task of politics’ (19). Politics itself brings about depoliticization. Indeed, ‘politics is the art of suppressing the political’ (11). Rancière’s arguments here are elegant and persuasive. They result, however, in an analysis that hinders our ability to think clearly about the current conjuncture. Rancière accounts for the cause of depoliticization, politics itself, but he can’t explain the specificity of the present combination of neoliberalism and democracy as ambient milieu. Contemporary depoliticization, then, is but another appearance of the same old problem of politics. In Disagreement (1999), Rancière attends to some of these specificities. He claims that ‘the state today legitimizes itself by declaring that politics is impossible’ (1999: 110). The present is thus marked by more than politics’ paradoxical essence – the suppression of the political. It is characterized by the explicit acknowledgement of depoliticization as the contemporary state’s legitimizing ideal. Accordingly, Rancière identifies several elements of contemporary post-politics as they confirm the impossibility of politics and hence legitimize the state: the spread of law, the generalization of expertise and the practice of polling for opinion (Rancière 1999: 112). Polling, for example, renders the people as ‘identical to the sum of its parts’ (105). ‘Their count is always even and with nothing left over’, he writes, ‘And this people absolutely equal to itself can always be broken down into its reality: its socioprofessional categories and its age brackets’ (105). It is worth noting that Rancière’s emphasis on law repeats the ‘juridification’ thesis Habermas offered already in the 1980s. For Habermas, the problem was law’s encroachment on the lifeworld. Excess regulation risked supplanting the communicative engagement of participants in socio-political interaction. For Rancière, the problem is a legal resolution of conflict that forecloses the possibility of politicization. The arguments for post-politics and de-democratization are at best unconvincing and at worst misleading to a left seeking to undo 30 years of neoliberalization. The claim that we are in a post-political time, that politics has been foreclosed, excluded, prevented from emerging, is childishly petulant. It’s like the left is saying, ‘**if we don’t get to play what we want, we’re not going to play**’. The failure of left politics to win, or even score, is equated with a failure of politics as such, rather than acknowledged in the specificity of left defeat. Leftists assume that our lack of good ideas means the end of the political. If the game isn’t played on our terms, we aren’t going to play at all. We aren’t even going to recognize that a game is being played. To this extent, the claim for post-politics erases its own standpoint of enunciation. Why refer to a formation as post-political if one does not have political grounds for doing so? If one already has such grounds, then how exactly is the situation post-political? If one lacks them, then what is the purpose of the claim if not to draw attention to or figure this lack for the sake of political struggle? Given the successes of the right, moreover, the claim that we live in a post-political time doesn’t ring true. In the United States, the right has worked actively to reframe the constitution according to a theory of the unitary executive, to reverse the steps taken towards racial equality by undercutting Brown v. the Board of Education, to facilitate the redistribution of wealth to the top one percent of the population, to undermine the Geneva conventions as well as habeas corpus, to empower unwarranted state surveillance of the population, and to install a narrow, extreme, version of fundamentalist Christian doctrine into scientific discussions of evolution and climate change so as to disable any supposition of a common world or reality for which we might share responsibility. **These are political achievements**. To emphasize post-politics prevents us from understanding them as such. Far from affirming the identity of the people with itself, as Rancière argues, contemporary polls reveal a fundamental split, a fundamental uncertainty, and the excess of politics over attempts to identify the people with ‘the calculations of a science of the population’s opinions’ (Rancière 1999: 105). Since the 2000 U.S. presidential election, ultimately decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, conventional wisdom has affirmed a divide between red and blue states. Polls reveal this split. They express not indecision or variance among groups understood as parts of a whole but instead a fundamental division. Former president Bill Clinton’s quip following the election to the effect that ‘the people have spoken; we just don’t know what they said’ is thus misleading. What was clearly spoken was the division in the country. Likewise, polls taken daily, even hourly, during the long U.S. presidential campaign of 2008 differ from each other; consumers of political news ingest numbers that differ from each other, call each other into doubt, and render the very categories of polling unstable. The gap between polls and electoral outcomes, the failure of exit polls accurately to predict the votes tallied (an issue in both the 2000 and the 2004 elections) and the politicization of this gap as corruption, crime, theft and the racist disenfranchisement of African-American voters express a politics irreducible to the ‘postdemocratic metapolitics’ Rancière associates with the triumph of consensus. While it may well have been a compelling account of France in the 1990s, Rancière’s version of post-politics is inapplicable to the United States post-9/11. From the present vantage point, Rancière’s critique of the spread of law as a primary form of depoliticization appears as a **neoliberal argument** against governmental oversight and for privatization. Not only does it fail to acknowledge the collapse of regulation in the financial sector, but it also occludes forms of public/private partnership, the rise of private security forces, and contemporary practices of surveillance wherein state agencies rely on private databases. Rancière’s dismissal of law, administration and expertise thus cannot serve as a basis for a critique of the neoliberal state’s abolition of oversight and **neglect of basic governance**. I should add that it is also incompatible with the acknowledgement of the widespread scepticism towards science and expertise and the concomitant cultivation and embrace of amateur, ordinary and common opinion, a phenomenon Žižek associates with a general decline in symbolic efficiency (Žižek 1999: 322). Over the last decade, the United States has witnessed the supplanting of expert knowledge by gut instinct, by religious faith, by capacities to know simply by seeing or feeling, and by the rejection of detail and complexity as elitist, unnecessary and unwarranted. In this setting, techno-legal regulation and administration would be an improvement.

### A2: Environment !

#### Globalization solves environment—conscience shift, regulation, development, clean tech, and private property

Norberg 3 – Cato Institute Senior Fellow (Johan, In Defense of Global Capitalism, p 225-37

Although multinational corporations and free trade are proving good for development and human rights in the Third World, there still remains the objection that globalization harms the environment. Factories in the Western world, the argument runs, will relocate to poorer countries with no environmental legislation, where they can pollute with impunity. The West has to follow suit and lower its own environmental standards in order to stay in business. That is a dismal thesis, with the implication that when people obtain better opportunities, resources, and technology, they use them to abuse nature. Does there really have to be a conflict between development and the environment? The notion that there has to be a conflict runs into the same problem as the whole idea of a race to the bottom: it doesn't tally with reality. There is no exodus of industry to countries with poor environmental standards, and there is no downward pressure on the level of global environmental protection. Instead, the bulk of American and European investments goes to countries with environmental regulations similar to their own. There has been much talk of American factories moving to Mexico since NAFTA was signed. Less well known, however, is that since free trade was introduced Mexico has tightened up its environmental regulations, following a long history of complete nonchalance about environmental issues. This tightening up is part of a global trend. All over the world, economic progress and growth are moving hand in hand with intensified environmental protection. Four researchers who studied these connections found “a very strong, positive association between our [environmental] indicators and the level of economic development.” A country that is very poor is too preoccupied with lifting itself out of poverty to bother about the environment at all. Countries usually begin protecting their natural resources when they can afford to do so. When they grow richer, they start to regulate effluent emissions, and when they have still more resources they also begin regulating air quality. 19 A number of factors cause environment protection to increase with wealth and development. Environmental quality is unlikely to be a top priority for people who barely know where their next meal is coming from. Abating misery and subduing the pangs of hunger takes precedence over conservation. When our standard of living rises we start attaching importance to the environment and obtaining resources to improve it. Such was the case earlier in western Europe, and so it is in the developing countries today. Progress of this kind, however, requires that people live in democracies where they are able and allowed to mobilize opinion; otherwise, their preferences will have no impact. Environmental destruction is worst in dictatorships. But it is the fact of prosperity no less than a sense of responsibility that makes environmental protection easier in a wealthy society. A wealthier country can afford to tackle environmental problems; it can develop environmentally friendly technologies—wastewater and exhaust emission control, for example—and begin to rectify past mistakes. Global environmental development resembles not so much a race for the bottom as a race to the top, what we might call a “California effect.” The state of California's Clean Air Acts, first introduced in the 1970s and tightened since, were stringent emissions regulations that made rigorous demands on car manufacturers. Many prophets of doom predicted that firms and factories would move to other states, and California would soon be obliged to repeal its regulations. But instead the opposite happened: other states gradually tightened up their environmental stipulations. Because car companies needed the wealthy California market, manufacturers all over the United States were forced to develop new techniques for reducing emissions. Having done so, they could more easily comply with the exacting requirements of other states, whereupon those states again ratcheted up their requirements. Anti-globalists usually claim that the profit motive and free trade together cause businesses to entrap politicians in a race for the bottom. The California effect implies the opposite: free trade enables politicians to pull profit-hungry corporations along with them in a race to the top. This phenomenon occurs because compliance with environmental rules accounts for a very small proportion of most companies' expenditures. What firms are primarily after is a good business environment—a liberal economy and a skilled workforce— not a bad natural environment. A review of research in this field shows that there are no clear indications of national environmental rules leading to a diminution of exports or to fewer companies locating in the countries that pass the rules. 20 This finding undermines both the arguments put forward by companies against environmental regulations and those advanced by environmentalists maintaining that globalization has to be restrained for environmental reasons. Incipient signs of the California effect's race to the top are present all over the world, because globalization has caused different countries to absorb new techniques more rapidly, and the new techniques are generally far gentler on the environment.Researchers have investigated steel manufacturing in 50 different countries and concluded that countries with more open economies took the lead in introducing cleaner technology. Production in those countries generated almost 20 percent less emissions than the same production in closed countries. This process is being driven by multinational corporations because they have a lot to gain from uniform production with uniform technology. Because they are restructured more rapidly, they have more modern machinery. And they prefer assimilating the latest, most environmentally friendly technology immediately to retrofitting it, at great expense, when environmental regulations are tightened up. Brazil, Mexico, and China—the three biggest recipients of foreign investment—have followed a very clear pattern: the more investments they get, the better control they gain over air pollution. The worst forms of air pollution have diminished in their cities during the period of globalization. When Western companies start up in developing countries, their production is considerably more environment-friendly than the native production, and they are more willing to comply with environmental legislation, not least because they have brand images and reputations to protect. Only 30 percent of Indonesian companies comply with the country's environmental regulations, whereas no fewer than 80 percent of the multinationals do so. One out of every 10 foreign companies maintained a standard clearly superior to that of the regulations. This development would go faster if economies were more open and, in particular, if the governments of the world were to phase out the incomprehensible tariffs on environmentally friendly technology. 21 Sometimes one hears it said that, for environmental reasons, the poor countries of the South must not be allowed to grow as affluent as our countries in the North. For example, in a compilation of essays on Environmentally Significant Consumption published by the National Academy of Sciences, we find anthropologist Richard Wilk fretting that: If everyone develops a desire for the Western high-consumption lifestyle, the relentless growth in consumption, energy use, waste, and emissions may be disastrous. 22 But studies show this to be colossal misapprehension. On the contrary, it is in the developing countries that we find the gravest, most harmful environmental problems. In our affluent part of the world, more and more people are mindful of environmental problems such as endangered green areas. Every day in the developing countries, more than 6,000 people die from air pollution when using wood, dung, and agricultural waste in their homes as heating and cooking fuel. UNDP estimates that no fewer than 2.2 million people die every year from polluted indoor air. This result is already “disastrous” and far more destructive than atmospheric pollution and industrial emissions. Tying people down to that level of development means condemning millions to premature death every year. It is not true that pollution in the modern sense increases with growth. Instead, pollution follows an inverted U-curve. When growth in a very poor country gathers speed and the chimneys begin belching smoke, the environment suffers. But when prosperity has risen high enough, the environmental indicators show an improvement instead: emissions are reduced, and air and water show progressively lower concentrations of pollutants. The cities with the worst problems are not Stockholm, New York, and Zürich, but rather Beijing, Mexico City, and New Delhi. In addition to the factors already mentioned, this is also due to the economic structure changing from raw-material-intensive to knowledge-intensive production. In a modern economy, heavy, dirty industry is to a great extent superseded by service enterprises. Banks, consulting firms, and information technology corporations do not have the same environmental impact as old factories. According to one survey of available environmental data, the turning point generally comes before a country's per capita GDP has reached $8,000. At $10,000, the researchers found a positive connection between increased growth and better air and water quality. 23 That is roughly the level of prosperity of Argentina, South Korea, or Slovenia. In the United States, per capita GDP is about $36,300. Here as well, the environment has consistently improved since the 1970s, quite contrary to the picture one gets from the media. In the 1970s there was constant reference to smog in American cities, and rightly so: the air was judged to be unhealthy for 100–300 days a year. Today it is unhealthy for fewer than 10 days a year, with the exception of Los Angeles. There, the figure is roughly 80 days, but even that represents a 50 percent reduction in 10 years. 24 The same trend is noticeable in the rest of the affluent world—for example, in Tokyo, where, a few decades ago, doomsayers believed that oxygen masks would in the future have to be worn all around the city because of the bad air. Apart from its other positive effects on the developing countries, such as ameliorating hunger and sparing people the horror of watching their children die, prosperity beyond a certain critical point can improve the environment. What is more, this turning point is now occurring progressively earlier in the developing countries, because they can learn from more affluent countries' mistakes and use their superior technology. For example, air quality in the enormous cities of China, which are the most heavily polluted in the world, has steadied since the mid-1980s and in several cases has slowly improved. This improvement has coincided with uniquely rapid growth. Some years ago, the Danish statistician and Greenpeace member Bjørn Lomborg, with about 10 of his students, compiled statistics and facts about the world's environmental problems. To his astonishment, he found that what he himself had regarded as self-evident, the steady deterioration of the global environment, did not agree at all with official empirical data. He found instead that air pollution is diminishing, refuse problems are diminishing, resources are not running out, more people are eating their fill, and people are living longer. Lomborg gathered publicly available data from as many fields as he could find and published them in the book The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. The picture that emerges there is an important corrective to the general prophesies of doom that can so easily be imbibed from newspaper headlines. Lomborg shows that air pollution and emissions have been declining in the developed world during recent decades. Heavy metal emissions have been heavily reduced; nitrogen oxides have diminished by almost 30 percent and sulfur emissions by about 80 percent. Pollution and emission problems are still growing in the poor developing countries, but at every level of growth annual particle density has diminished by 2 percent in only 14 years. In the developed world, phosphorus emissions into the seas have declined drastically, and E. coli bacteria concentrations in coastal waters have plummeted, enabling closed swimming areas to reopen. Lomborg shows that, instead of large-scale deforestation, the world's forest acreage increased from 40.24 million to 43.04 million square kilometers between 1950 and 1994. He finds that there has never been any large-scale tree death caused by acid rain. The oft-quoted, but erroneous statement about 40,000 species going extinct every year is traced by Lomborg to its source—a 20-year-old estimate that has been circulating in environmentalist circles ever since. Lomborg thinks it is closer to 1,500 species a year, and possibly a bit more than that. The documented cases of extinction during the past 400 years total just over a thousand species, of which about 95 percent are insects, bacteria, and viruses. As for the problem of garbage, the next hundred years worth of Danish refuse could be accommodated in a 33-meter-deep pit with an area of three square kilometers, even without recycling. In addition, Lomborg illustrates how increased prosperity and improved technology can solve the problems that lie ahead of us. All the fresh water consumed in the world today could be produced y a single desalination plant, powered by solar cells and occupying 0.4 percent of the Sahara Desert. It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world. Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in presentday quantities, would not suffice for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw material consumption is not static. With more and more people achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials. Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw materials. A century and a half ago, oil was just something black and sticky that people preferred not to step in and definitely did not want to find beneath their land. But our interest in finding better energy sources led to methods being devised for using oil, and today it is one of our prime resources. Sand has never been all that exciting or precious, but today it is a vital raw material in the most powerful technology of our age, the computer. In the form of silicon—which makes up a quarter of the earth's crust— it is a key component in computer chips. There is a simple market mechanism that averts shortages. If a certain raw material comes to be in short supply, its price goes up. This makes everyone more interested in economizing on that resource, in finding more of it, in reusing it, and in trying to find substitutes for it. The trend over the last few decades of falling raw material prices is clear. Metals have never been as cheap as they are today. Prices are falling, which suggests that demand does not exceed supply. In relation to wages, that is, in terms of how long we must work to earn the price of a raw material, natural resources today are half as expensive as they were 50 years ago and one-fifth as expensive as they were a hundred years ago. In 1900 the price of electricity was eight times higher, the price of coal seven times higher, and the price of oil five times higher than today. 25 The risk of shortage is declining all the time, because new finds and more efficient use keep augmenting the available reserves. In a world where technology never stops developing, static calculations are uninteresting, and wrong. By simple mathematics, Lomborg establishes that if we have a raw material with a hundred years' use remaining, a 1 percent annual increase in demand, and a 2 percent increase in recycling and/or efficiency, that resource will never be exhausted. If shortages do occur, then with the right technology most substances can be recycled. One-third of the world's steel production, for example, is being reused already. Technological advance can outstrip the depletion of resources. Not many years ago, everyone was convinced of the impossibility of the whole Chinese population having telephones, because that would require several hundred million telephone operators. But the supply of manpower did not run out; technology developed instead. Then it was declared that nationwide telephony for China was physically impossible because all the world's copper wouldn't suffice for installing heavy gauge telephone lines all over the country. Before that had time to become a problem, fiber optics and satellites began to supersede copper wire. The price of copper, a commodity that people believed would run out, has fallen continuously and is now only about a tenth of what it was 200 years ago. People in most ages have worried about important raw materials becoming exhausted. But on the few occasions when this has happened, it has generally affected isolated, poor places, not open, affluent ones. To claim that people in Africa, who are dying by the thousand every day from supremely real shortages, must not be allowed to become as prosperous as we in the West because we can find theoretical risks of shortages occurring is both stupid and unjust. The environmental question will not resolve itself. Proper rules are needed for the protection of water, soil, and air from destruction. Systems of emissions fees are needed to give polluters an interest in not damaging the environment for others. Many environmental issues also require international regulations and agreements, which confront us with entirely new challenges. Carbon dioxide emissions, for example, tend to increase rather than diminish when a country grows more affluent. When talking about the market and the environment, it is important to realize that efforts in this quarter will be facilitated by a freer, growing economy capable of using the best solutions, from both a natural and a human viewpoint. In order to meet those challenges, it is better to have resources and advanced science than not to have them. Very often, environmental improvements are due to the very capitalism so often blamed for the problems. The introduction of private property creates owners with long-term interests. Landowners must see to it that there is good soil or forest there tomorrow as well, because otherwise they will have no income later on, whether they continue using the land or intend to sell it. If the property is collective or government-owned, no one has any such long-term interest. On the contrary, everyone then has an interest in using up the resources quickly before someone else does. It was because they were common lands that the rain forests of the Amazon began to be rapidly exploited in the 1960s and 1970s and are still being rapidly exploited today. Only about a 10th of forests are recognized by the governments as privately owned, even though in practice Indians possess and inhabit large parts of them. It is the absence of definite fishing rights that causes (heavily subsidized) fishing fleets to try to vacuum the oceans of fish before someone else does. No wonder, then, that the most large-scale destruction of environment in history has occurred in the communist dictatorships, where all ownership was collective. A few years ago, a satellite image was taken of the borders of the Sahara, where the desert was spreading. Everywhere, the land was parched yellow, after nomads had overexploited the common lands and then moved on. But in the midst of this desert environment could be seen a small patch of green. This proved to be an area of privately owned land where the owners of the farm prevented overexploitation and engaged in cattle farming that was profitable in the long term. 26 Trade and freight are sometimes criticized for destroying the environment, but the problem can be rectified with more efficient transport and purification techniques, as well as emissions fees to make the cost of pollution visible through pricing. The biggest environmental problems are associated with production and consumption, and there trade can make a positive contribution, even aside from the general effect it has on growth. Trade leads to a country's resources being used as efficiently as possible. Goods are produced in the places where production entails least expense and least wear and tear on the environment. That is why the amount of raw materials needed to make a given product keeps diminishing as productive efficiency improves. With modern production processes, 97 percent less metal is needed for a soft drink can than 30 years ago, partly because of the use of lighter aluminum. A car today contains only half as much metal as a car of 30 years ago. Therefore, it is better for production to take place where the technology exists, instead of each country trying to have production of its own, with all the consumption of resources that would entail. It is more environmentally friendly for a cold northern country to import meat from temperate countries than to waste resources on concentrated feed and the construction and heating of cattle pens for the purpose of native meat production.

### Perm

#### Improving public transporation infrastructure is critical to and consistent with a transition to communism

Pucher, 1990 (John, associate professor in the Department of Urban Planning at Rutgers University, “Capitalism, Socialism, and Urban Transportation Policies and Travel Behavior in the East and West,” Journal of the American Planning Association, 56:3)

A more basic difference among the countries compared here is the degree of public ownership of the means of production, which is-by the very nature of their socialist economies-extremely high in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and much lower in the capitalist economies of Western Europe and North America. It is not simply a large public sector that has engendered such a strong commitment to public transportation in socialist countries. Rather, this commitment is based on the fundamental ideological opposition to most private ownership, especially in the past, prior to the current attempts to increase economic efficiency by selectively introducing market incentives. Automobile-based transportation systems require high levels of private ownership, while public transport systems-both in socialist and capitalist countries-are almost always publicly owned. Thus, public policies toward transportation have not evolved exogenously, but rather have reflected the. very different social and economic contexts found in each country. In this respect, urban transportation systems and travel behavior mirror many aspects of society as a whole, indeed, perhaps more visibly than almost any other public service or institution. The automobile, for example, by enabling almost unlimited freedom of movement and location, embodies the principles of individualism, privatism, consumerism, and high mobility (Warner 1972, 113-49). By contrast, public transport depends on and fosters communalism, planned transportation and land use systems, restricted mobility, and less individual freedom of choice both in travel and location. Indeed, some might argue that socialist governments deliberately restrict mobility-just as they restrict telecommunicationsin order to keep the population under control. In their urban transportation policies, socialist countries sacrifice the personal freedom of the individual supposedly for the good of society as a whole, as indicated perhaps by the perceived environmental, social, and economic advantages of public transport over the automobile (Sankov 1986; Saitz 1988; Vlassov 1984; White 1979; Dumov 1985). Some socialist governments may even view public transport as an expression of social cohesiveness, solidarity, and-in some sense-perhaps of Communism itself (Bater 1980, 10-3 1 ; Blair 1985). This very notion is, of course, anathema to capitalist, market-oriented societies, where each individual is expected to maximize only his or her own well-being, without considering impacts on society as a whole (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985, 41-58). The designations of the various modes suggest this difference, with the automobile often being referred to as private or individual transportation, while public transport is variously termed mass transit, communal transport, or public transportation. The private-versuspublic aspects of the two modes are obvious; it is little wonder that governments in countries with different economic systems would prefer one or the other, expressing this preference through public policies (Bater 1980; Vlassov 1984; Sankov 1986).