# Framework Agreement CP

## 1NC—Framework Agreement CP

### Text: The United States federal government should engage in a “Framework Agreement” with the People’s Republic of China.

### The plan is a band aid solution while the counterplan treats the underlying disease—a Framework Agreement solves undercurrents of security, politics, and economics.

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Washington prepares for future conflict with a rising China, and uses that preparation as a deterrent against challenges to its dominant geopolitical position in East Asia. While this security strategy may appear sensible, it is, in fact, provocative and misguided. Through strategic measures that include significantly building up military forces in the Pacific and encouraging Japan to take a more active military role in “Taiwan contingency” planning, the administration magnifies the risk of military conflict and undercuts important American interests. the flaws in current U.S. policy become starkly evident from a close analysis of the major security, political and economic benefits that would accrue to the United States and its Asian allies from sharply improved relations with China. Realizing these benefits will require a fundamental shift in U.S.-China relations. this new paradigm can be achieved through a “Framework Agreement” which addresses major points of dispute with China in security, politics, and economics and puts this crucial relationship on a far sounder footing for the long term.

## General Solvency

### CP solves democracy, Taiwan, and Human Rights and China— China will perceive it as worth it for decreased military pressure

Gross 2007 [Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Under a Framework Agreement, China would agree to guarantee the independence of Taiwan’s political system – its democracy, rule of law and human rights standards – in looking forward to future reunification. Although Taiwan’s government would not be required to endorse this agreement, its impact would strengthen the pan-blue faction that seeks reconciliation and rejects de jure independence. obtaining China’s guarantee for the continuity of Taiwan’s democracy is eminently feasible. In keeping with the “one country, two systems” principle that it applied to Hong Kong, China has already agreed to this if Taiwan accepts eventual reunification. By negotiating firm guarantees and obtaining China’s verifiable agreement to draw down its military forces facing Taiwan, the U.S. would greatly foster democracy and protect Taiwan against military threats from China. Beyond guaranteeing Chinese respect for democracy and the rule of law on Taiwan, a Framework Agreement would also increase China’s adherence to principles that strengthen political rights, the rule of law and the growth of democracy on the mainland. For example, this agreement could be framed as mutual adherence in practice by China and the United States to principles enshrined in the universal declaration of human Rights. such a formula may be valuable in overcoming China’s traditional objection to any external discussion of its domestic political system as “interference in its internal affairs.” obtaining agreement on human rights practices would be quite feasible in the context of significantly relaxing U.S. military pressure. A greatly reduced threat perception from China’s perspective, as noted earlier, would weaken the legitimacy of one-party rule and broadly encourage greater democracy. Political factions, both inside and outside the communist party, that favor the expansion of democracy could be expected to support the Framework Agreement.

### Solving democracy and human rights is key— blocks U.S. policy action in the status quo

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

China’s one-party communist regime and its legacy of cold War enmity inspire deep skepticism and some outright hostility across the American political spectrum. Many U.S. critics object to a more robust political relationship with China until it adopts far more democratic practices and upholds international human rights standards. While the U.S. state department’s annual “country Reports on human Rights Practices” continue to cite China’s shortcomings, in recent years Washington has generally abandoned any major effort to foster greater democracy and respect for human rights in China.6 this serious failing has its own particular irony: if China adopts democratic practices and implements human rights standards to a much greater extent, this would allow for more stable and amicable relations between the two countries. China’s increasingly democratic character would dissolve considerable opposition to improved relations with China in the United States.

## Economic Plank Solvency

### The counterplan solves the economic relationship intrinsic to the overall relationship with an FTA

Gross 2007 [Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

It would be desirable to include economic issues within a Framework Agreement, even if this amounted largely to an endorsement of agreed principles, with the details to be worked out in subsequent negotiations. A primary principle which would effectively guide the economic relationship for the future is that the two countries should reach a broad bilateral free trade agreement, conditioned on China achieving Market economy status. A U.S.-China FTA would lower both tariff and non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports to the maximum extent possible. Based on a much improved security relationship, the FTA would also significantly reduce restrictions on ownership that each country imposes on the other in certain “sensitive” sectors – including telecommunications and national security-related industries. In an overall sense, the FTA would significantly scale-down protectionist measures on both sides and open each country’s market to maximize mutual trade and investment.

### Solving the economic relations is key to solving relations— Leaders perceive protectionism as discriminatory creating resentment

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

In recent years, the U.S. government has responded, in part, to China’s economic success by implementing protectionist measures of various kinds. According to data from the World trade organization (WTO), China has been the object of more U.S. “anti-dumping” actions in the last ten years than any other country.8 Beyond anti-dumping measures and quota agreements, the U.S. has sought to block Chinese companies from purchasing U.S. companies in some commercial fields based on the alleged threat to U.S. national security. Efforts to deny China access to the U.S. market inevitably inspire a nationalist backlash. Chinese critics correctly believe they are penalized for “competing too well” after following the advice preached to them by the U.S. for many years. Blocking access to the U.S. market in whatever form – through anti-dumping actions, quota agreements or unfairly applied national security requirements – is perceived in China as discriminatory protectionism, which creates hostility and resentment.

### Solving the economy and trade solves war— Key internal link to East Asian Security

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

In early 2006, the U.S. trade Representative adopted an even more protectionist approach. Previously, the U.S. concentrated mainly on lowering trade barriers and addressing points of conflict in the trade relationship. In a February 2006 report,9 however, the trade Representative recommended a much more combative posture, apparently on the premise that China has benefited “unfairly” from liberalized trade. The danger of this policy goes well beyond angering a few Chinese companies. history demonstrates that open trade and the free pursuit of international commerce reduce the chance of conflicts between states. countries that have a stake in an open and fair trading system stay committed to the stability and peace that normal commerce entails. For this reason, the longstanding U.S. policy of integrating China into the international economic community has a very specific national security objective. helping China reap significant benefits from WTO membership and extensive access to the U.S. market is perhaps the most important way of ensuring China’s support for the international system as a whole. conversely, a policy that seeks to stymie successful Chinese companies by imposing tariffs and erecting non-tariff barriers conveys another clear message: international trade is a “mercantilist zero-sum game”10 that the U.S. intends to win.

## Security Plank Solvency

### The Counterplan solves relations and military tension— Results in U.S. and China Quid Pro Quo reductions

Gross 2007 [Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

First, a Framework Agreement would relax military pressure on China, a step that is not easy from a U.S. domestic political standpoint. doing so requires confidence that raising the level of U.S.-China relations is in the best interests of the United States and offers significant benefits. Under a Framework Agreement, the U.S. would consolidate, pull back and reduce its forces in Asia so that China no longer perceives an immediate military threat. this decision would drastically curtail close U.S. surveillance and patrolling of the Chinese coast by the navy and Air Force. It would scale down U.S. forces, which currently maintain a robust deterrence posture in the Pacific, to a level consistent with normal peacetime needs – such as protecting sea lines of communications. With China no longer regarded as a potential major security threat, deterrence would no longer be the operative principle guiding U.S. strategy or regional deployments. As part of a military quid pro quo, China would agree to radically reduce and redeploy the missile, naval and air forces that now threaten Taiwan (and, by extension, the U.S. military forces that would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of war). China would no longer need this force level because the Taiwan issue would be resolved to a great extent within the Framework Agreement. In return for curtailing close U.S. patrols of its coast, China would also agree to pull back, permanently and verifiably, all its forces that are engaged in surveillance and patrolling Japanese territory.

### The Counterplan’s resolution of Taiwan is key to relations

Gross 2007 [Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

It is likely that the main elements of a prospective Framework Agreement with China would concern security and political issues. Adjusting security relations and reaching consensus on the status of Taiwan would go a long way to putting the overall diplomatic relationship on a qualitatively better track. As a practical matter, diplomats might find it difficult to approach this large, but bounded, set of security and diplomatic issues within a single Framework Agreement. so a series of agreements, one building progressively on the other, might be more easily negotiated.

### While the plan may increase relations, it doesn’t solve points of contention that the CP does— It is key to change status quo barriers to harmony

Gross 2007 [Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Under a Framework Agreement, the U.S. could address major points of dispute with China – in the security, political and economic spheres – and put this critical relationship on a far sounder footing. Beginning with security, the U.S. would agree to relax its military pressure against China in the context of a Taiwan settlement, which guarantees the preservation of the island’s autonomy and its democratic political system. through this negotiation, the U.S. would obtain specific security benefits for itself and its regional allies as well as Chinese flexibility on both political and economic issues. A Framework Agreement would thus allow the U.S. to achieve a critical security goal – a secure and democratic Taiwan. the U.S. could do so without a costly military confrontation. Following this settlement, the U.S. would no longer need the same extent of deployments in the Pacific as it does now. the immense savings in both dollars and military personnel could be devoted by the Pentagon to areas of greater need. security would derive from an Agreement that fundamentally adjusts and harmonizes political and strategic goals. U.S. forces could assume a lower profile in an acknowledged peacetime environment without preparing constantly to go to war with China on a moment’s notice, as they do now.

### Only the Counterplan changes how policymakers evaluate China— This is a solvency deficit to the plan

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Ironically, many U.S. conservatives who highlight the threat that China poses to long-term U.S. interests accept its political system as a given. they stress U.S. vigilance in countering China’s military modernization but they pay little attention to how the U.S. can best foster greater democracy and human rights practices in China. As a consequence, the soundest long-term basis for amicable relations between the two countries – greater consonance of political norms and values – appears all the more unattainable. A new Framework Agreement with China could fundamentally change this calculus.

## A2: YouCan’t Solve China Militarization

### Non-Unique and Turn— Only drawdowns in East Asia solves status quo weaponization— China will develop ASATs as long as the U.S. is militarily superior

Hill 2011 [Matthew, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Space: The Final Frontier of Strategic Competition?”, 3/2/11, <http://www.pnyxblog.com/pnyx/2011/3/2/space-the-final-frontier-of-strategic-competition.html> TT]

Washington was shocked when, in 2007, the People’s Liberation Army shot down its own weather satellite with a modified ballistic missile. China has subsequently demonstrated an interest in a wider range of ASAT and counter-space capabilities, including the ability to blind or destroy an adversary’s satellites with lasers, and jam their signals and data links. Indeed, late in 2010 it emerged that China may have conducted a test of a co-orbital ‘hunter’ satellite, potentially capable of destroying other satellites in orbit. To some extent, Washington is merely reaping the strategic consequences of its own precedents. Following the development of kinetic ASAT capabilities in the 1980s, the Pentagon promoted research into laser and electro-magnetic counter-space capabilities. Under the Bush Administration, multilateral efforts to demilitarize space were ignored for fear of constraining US strategic latitude. Furthermore, the pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) has provided an implicit ASAT system, as demonstrated in 2008 when Washington destroyed a satellite utilising its own ship-launched interceptor. China’s pursuit of ASAT capabilities is motivated by its overwhelming military weakness relative to Washington. Over the past twenty years, the US has demonstrated its superiority in conventional warfare, leveraging space-based communications, positioning, and reconnaissance assets to project power unimpeded. At the same time, the US development of BMD is perceived by China as a threat to its limited nuclear deterrent. If it is to contest this military dominance – especially amidst a confrontation over Taiwan – it is in Beijing’s interest to develop asymmetric capabilities to complicate US access to space. A mature ASAT system could compromise Washington’s ability to contest Chinese military action in East Asia. Degrading the Pentagon’s satellites would greatly impede the US ability to pursue in joint warfare and deep strike operations. By ‘blinding’ or destroying Washington’s missile early warning satellites, Beijing could threaten the effectiveness of BMD during an escalating military crisis. The very possibility of these capabilities is of deep concern to US defence planers.

### China Space development is a direct response to U.S. Presence— Only the CP solves

Hill 2011 [Matthew, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Space: The Final Frontier of Strategic Competition?”, 3/2/11, <http://www.pnyxblog.com/pnyx/2011/3/2/space-the-final-frontier-of-strategic-competition.html> TT]

Nonetheless, China’s is showing signs of embracing these and other risks. Over the past year, Beijing has attempted to promote a reputation for hard-line behaviour amidst strategic crises ranging from escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula to economic brinksmanship with Japan over the Senkaku-Daioyutai Islands. In developing an ASAT capability to threaten US conventional and nuclear confidence - while embracing the huge potential costs - Beijing is merely extending this logic to impose uncertainty on the US’ position in Asia. By setting itself up to link the threat of uncontrollable nuclear escalation to Washington’s intervention over Taiwan, Beijing is exploiting deterrence as an instrument of its political will: forcing the US to contemplate its interest in maintaining its status quo regional influence against the potential costs of enforcing that stability. As the US faces this possibility, it is increasingly seek ways to ameliorate its exposure to a developed Chinese ASAT capability. What little is known of recent developments in Washington’s space-based capabilities suggests a strategy of deterrence through denial – attempting to create resilience against the threats posed by Beijing through stealth, miniaturization, and rapid replacement, and by developing worst-case alternative capabilities to compensate key informational functions through an attack. The success of such a strategy is contingent on whether or not China is willing to intensify its own ASAT program. The possibility of an escalating arms race in space, with potentially disastrous consequences for both strategic stability and the sustainability of humanity’s presence in orbit, cannot be ruled out. While Asia analysts remain focused on the strategic competition on land and sea, they must increasingly spare a thought for the nascent contest occurring in the heavens.

## A2: Security DAs

### No impact to drawdown in East Asia— The U.S. ahead of China in every major category of military power— Prefer our evidence citing studies

Gross 2007 [Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

The ill-conceived nature of the current U.S. security strategy is revealed by a comparison of the actual military capabilities of the two countries. the U.S. outclasses China by a large margin in every military category, as well as the most critical technological capabilities of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Consequently, the threat from China that the U.S. is preparing against is purely speculative in the long term. (Although some experts suggest that China is seeking to acquire so-called “asymmetric capabilities” for inflicting serious damage on U.S. forces, China’s asymmetric capabilities are relatively poor and are not a credible threat to the United States). 2 In an extensive report on “Chinese nuclear Forces and U.S. nuclear War Planning,” the natural Resources defense council (NRDC), recently found that “the Chinese-U.S. nuclear relationship is dramatically disproportionate in favor of the United States and will remain so for the foreseeable future.”3 (some key findings are summarized in Figure 2). Beyond this telling comparison of U.S. and Chinese nuclear forces, the NRDC study concluded that the U.S. currently spends more than four times as much as China on defense.4 on the conventional side, U.S. power projection capabilities are similarly far superior to those of China. (see Figure 3).

### No impact— Number of troops doesn’t matter and NATO can aid the U.S.

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

The only area where Chinese military strength exceeds the U.S. is in manpower, the least important measure of modern military capability. China has approximately 2.25 million troops in uniform while the U.S. has approximately 1.47 million. Even in this area, NATO and U.S. manpower, taken together, total approximately 3.81 million, far exceeding China.5

### No impact—China has no motive to fight the U.S. now or in the future

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Ironically, even most members of the so-called China threat school in the United States acknowledge that China has no current plan to broadly confront the U.S. militarily in Asia. they know that most Chinese strategists accept a status quo in which the U.S. dominates the region from a military standpoint. Yet instead of giving weight to China’s largely benign stance, China threat school theorists focus on China’s military capabilities, noting that intentions can change over time. these U.S. experts inevitably concentrate on future potential capabilities, precisely because the U.S. dwarfs China in critical military and technological fields. In short, those with an irrational fear of China in certain U.S. circles have to discount both China’s currently benign intentions and its relatively weak capabilities to justify their case for ramping up preparations against a possible threat.

### No war over Taiwan— 3 reasons

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Another major security benefit to the united states of greatly improved relations with China is that it could significantly reduce, if not eliminate entirely, the chance of a military conflict between the two countries for the foreseeable future. Although the U.S. and China have successfully managed the Taiwan issue for more than 25 years, the risk of conflict over Taiwan arguably increases the longer that Taiwan serves as a focal point for military contingency planning by both powers. A war over Taiwan is clearly not in U.S. interests because a conflict would: 1) put at risk the U.S. geopolitical position in the Pacific; 2) severely disrupt U.S.-China relations; and 3) potentially cause great destruction of property and loss of human life in Taiwan.

### No impact— Strong relations with China mean strong alliances in East Asia ending incentives for war

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Finally, radically improved relations between China and the U.S. would improve collective security by enhancing the effectiveness of a prospective multilateral security cooperation organization in northeast Asia. such a forum would strengthen rather than weaken U.S. bilateral alliances. It would significantly lessen South Korea and Japan’s concern that their alliances with the U.S. will lead to inevitable conflict with a rising China. By facilitating greater regional collaboration and lowering the chance of conflict, a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation would encourage Japan and South Korea to retain their alliances with the U.S. over the long term.

### Link Turn— U.S. drawdown and benevolent perception solves Chinese Aggression— Status quo policies of deterrence lead to war

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

China Threat School proponents get away with their breathtakingly flimsy arguments because of a single geopolitical issue – Taiwan. On the subject of Taiwan, the Chinese government is paranoid and intemperate. The mere possibility that Taiwan’s political status could become a flashpoint for confrontation gives credence to fear mongering by some theorists. Although relations between China and Taiwan are more stable than they have been for years, being prepared to counter a Chinese attack on Taiwan has been a focal point of U.S. military planning and the impetus for the military build-up in the region. Planning for a cross-strait Chinese attack is also a key basis for restructuring the U.S.-Japan alliance in favor of a more active role for Japan. Besides magnifying the risk of conflict, the policy recommendations of the China threat school undercut important U.S. interests in Asia. It would benefit the U.S. to have China view the U.S. as a relatively benign power that maintains stability and thereby benefits a rising China. A second U.S. interest is engendering cooperation between China and the U.S. in identifying and pursuing common foreign policy goals. During the last several years, the two main fields of security cooperation between China and the United States have been intelligence-sharing on the threat from Islamic terrorists and collaboration on negotiating a settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue in the six Party talks. The more that cooperation of this kind generates concrete security, economic and other benefits, the more likely it is to create stability and strengthen the faction in China that supports positive ties with the United States. It is easier to shape China’s military development in directions conducive to U.S. security interests when China’s leaders feel comfortable with the United States. The less that China regards the U.S. as a potential adversary, the less likely China will invest in long-term military programs – including procurement of new weapons systems – that are designed to defeat or threaten the U.S. in a future confrontation.

### Non-unique and turn— U.S. drawdown is inevitable due— Congressional pressure and international perception— Only the CP solves perception of U.S. drawdown and war

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/./copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

To begin with, fundamentally improved relations with China would be the best means of ensuring an ongoing security role for the United States in Asia for the foreseeable future. the current deployment of U.S. forces in northeast Asia is not a stable basis for a long-term presence – and the U.S. congress will not support that deployment indefinitely. At present, only the tension in the Taiwan Strait lends substance to the fearful claims of China threat school theorists. If the pan-blue Kuomintang-led faction in Taiwan comes to power, it could quite possibly reach an agreement with China that would considerably lower the risk of war. this could well entail a reunification of Taiwan with China at a future time. Were such an agreement to emerge, the practical justification for building up U.S. forces in the Pacific would collapse. the defense department would be unable to maintain the force levels it previously deployed in Asia, in the face of congressional pressure. More significantly from a political and diplomatic standpoint, once U.S. allies and friends perceived that a major U.S. military presence is not necessary, the main rationale for a leading U.S. role in Asia would be seriously undermined.11 Rather than see its influence in Asia reduced in this way, the U.S. should strive to stabilize U.S.-China relations for the long-term by achieving radically improved cooperation with China. the political, military, economic and diplomatic value of a leading U.S. role in Asia – one not based on countering an immediate threat from China – would then become apparent and advance U.S. interests over the long term.

## A2: US-Japan Alliance DAs

### Link turn— A Framework Agreement ensures a trilateral relationship— Decreasing the “China Threat” and negotiation solves

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

Japan: the U.S. should exert every possible effort to obtain Japan’s support for a new Framework Agreement with China and negotiate this new Agreement, to the extent possible, with the full cooperation of Japan. By giving due consideration to Japan’s leadership role and by underscoring the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to American security, the U.S. is likely to obtain Japan’s support. no doubt Japan would benefit as much or more than the U.S. from the long-term peace and stability that a Framework Agreement entails. however, a new agreement of this kind is so important to the future U.S. position in Asia that the U.S. should move toward it even in the absence of initial Japanese endorsement. By so doing, the U.S. would strongly induce Japan’s support for this initiative. the benefits to Japan of a new Framework Agreement with China are numerous. Most importantly, the agreement would mitigate, if not resolve, many of the long-standing historical conflicts between Japan and China. By creating a long-lasting basis for peace and stability, a Framework Agreement would dramatically ease these past disputes. As a third party possessing good relations with both countries, the united states is in a better position to foster greater harmony between Beijing and Tokyo than any other regional or global actor. With a new Framework Agreement in place, there is every reason to believe that the U.S. Japan alliance can be maintained on the basis of its traditional underpinnings, which have appealed to a consensus of Japanese public opinion for more than fifty years. the current U.S. effort to transform Japan into a bulwark against a future security threat from China has, in fact, upset this consensus, pitting supporters of the traditional alliance against those who would like Japan to acquire more offensive military capabilities. once it appears that a Framework Agreement has largely allayed any security threat from China, Tokyo would no longer feel a need to build up its military to counter a future “China threat.” Provision of the long-standing U.S. nuclear umbrella and increased cooperation between Japanese and U.S. military forces will stand the U.S.-Japan alliance in good stead for the indefinite future.

## A2: U.S.—SK Alliance DAs

### Link Turn— The CP is key to the collapsing alliance— gets rid of fears about North Korea and their forced choice between the U.S. and China

Gross 2007[Donald G., senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, “Transforming the U.S. Relationship with China”, Global Asia Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 2007, www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/../copy\_of\_07035Gross.pdf//TT]

The Framework Agreement would also resolve a major tension in South Korea’s relations with the United States and strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance for the long term. During the cold War, this alliance protected against aggression by both North Korea and China, since an attack from North Korea would likely only have occurred with China’s support. Over the past decade, however, South Korea has significantly improved its economic and diplomatic relations with China. China is now South Korea’s leading trade partner and Seoul (as well as Washington) relies increasingly on Chinese diplomacy to resolve the outstanding nuclear issue with North Korea in the six Party talks. south Korea recognizes that China’s influence over North Korea will be crucial in achieving its long-term diplomatic goals, especially reunification of the Korean peninsula. Radically improved relations between the U.S. and China would effectively eliminate the possibility of south Korea running afoul of the united states in the context of a Taiwan “contingency.” It would end the prospect of Seoul being caught between two major powers with which it seeks to maintain good relations. By resolving this fundamental geopolitical dilemma, a new Framework Agreement would significantly strengthen the case in South Korea for maintaining a long-term alliance with the United States – in part, to prevent China from seeking to dominate Korea, as China’s economy and influence expands. A Framework Agreement would also significantly lessen China’s need to maintain North Korea as a buffer state against the United States and its South Korean ally. China would likely become far more willing to allow the reunification of Korea on terms that Seoul supports since it would no longer regard south Korea or U.S. forces stationed there as potential security threats.

# Tech Transfer DA

## 1NC—Tech Transfer DA

### Space cooperation with China will end up being a ONE-WAY transfer of technology—the plan surrenders to China.

Chang, ’09 [Gordon G. Chang, lawyer and author of *The Coming Collapse of China*, “The space arms race begins”, 11/6/09, http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html]

The United States, therefore, will be at the complete mercy of Moscow when the last shuttle is grounded--unless we are willing to hitchhike with the only other nation that will be able to put a human into space then. "I think it's possible in principle to develop the required degree of confidence in the Chinese," said John Holdren, President Obama's science advisor, in April. And he is not alone in this view. According to the just-released report of the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, better known as the Augustine report, "China offers significant potential in a space partnership." In one sense, this statement is correct. After all, China has put a man into space three times. Moreover, the Chinese have said on numerous occasions that they are prepared to work with us. So what is the problem with doing so? First, even though the United States will soon find itself without a way to put humans into orbit, any partnership would essentially be a one-way transfer of technology from us to the Chinese. Second, the Chinese did not respond favorably to past American efforts--made during the administration of George W. Bush--to involve them in cooperative space efforts. Third, there is no such thing as a civilian space program in China. The China National Space Administration is really a military operation. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves a question: Should we transfer technology to a potential adversary so that it can improve its war-fighting capabilities? General Kevin Chilton, the chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, called for a dialogue with his Chinese counterparts the day after General Xu's space-race declaration. "Where they're heading is one of the things a lot of people would like to understand better," Chilton said. But do we really need to talk to the Chinese to figure out their intentions? In August 2006, the Chinese lasered at least one American satellite with the apparent intention of blinding it, a direct attack on the United States. In the following January, the People's Liberation Army destroyed one of its old weather satellites with a ground-launched missile, sending more than 35,000 fragments into low-earth orbit. The Chinese want to dominate space. General Xu did the United States a favor by removing any doubt about where his country stands. Whether we like it or not, there is now a brutal competition between the United States and China to control the high ground of space.

### World War III

Robb 99 — Senator Charles S. Robb, Senate committees on armed services, foreign relations and intelligence, Washington Quarterly, 1999 Winter

**In a second, more likely scenario, the United States deploys the same capabilities, but** other nations do not simply acquiesce. Understanding the tremendous advantages of military space operations, **China deploys nuclear weapons into space that can either be detonated near U.S. satellites or delivered to the earth in just minutes. Russia fields ground-based lasers for disabling and destroying our satellites, then deploys satellites with kinetic-kill munitions for eradicating ground targets. It also reneges on the START** treaties, knowing that, rather than trying to replicate America's costly defensive systems, its incremental defense dollar is better spent on offensive warheads for overwhelming American defenses. Other **rogue nations**, realizing that their limited missile attack capabilities are now useless against our new defense screen, **focus on commercially available cruise missiles, which they load with chemical and biological warheads** and plan to deploy from commercial ships and aircraft. Still **others bring to fruition the long-expected threat of a nuclear weapon in a suitcase**. If history has taught us anything, it is that a future more like the second scenario will prevail. It defies reason to assume that nations would sit idle while the United States invests billions of dollars in weaponizing space, leaving them at an unprecedented disadvantage. This second scenario suggests three equally troubling consequences. The first is that Americans would, in a relative sense, lose the most from a space-based arms race. The United States is currently the preeminent world military power, and much of that power resides in our ability to use space for military applications. A large percentage of our military communications now passes through space. Our troops rely on weather satellites, our targeteers on satellite photos, and virtually all of our new generations of weapons on the Global Positioning System satellites for pin-point accuracy. By encouraging potential adversaries to deploy weapons into space that could quickly destroy many of these systems, a space-based arms race would render many of these more vulnerable to attack than they are today. Even if our potential adversaries were unable to build a competing force, they could still position deadly satellites disguised as commercial assets near or in the path of our most vital military satellites. And even if we could sustain our space advantage, the costs would be extraordinary. Why pursue this option when there is no compelling reason to do so at this time? Why make a battlefield out of an arena upon which we depend so heavily? The second consequence would be that **a space-based arms race would be essentially irreversible** -- we would face the difficulty, if not impossibility, of assessing what is being put into space. Under the START regime, signatories currently cooperate in inspecting and monitoring each other's intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines, all of which operate within a narrow band above and below sea level. Most space payloads, however, are built and launched with great secrecy and can operate at any distance from the earth, even on celestial bodies such as the moon. Most satellites would operate up to geostationary orbit, or about 22,000 miles from the earth's surface, yielding a total operational volume millions of times greater than that now occupied by missiles, bombers, and submarines. Attempting to monitor weapons in this vast volume of space would be daunting. We would no longer be counting with reasonable confidence the number of concrete silos at missile wings or submarine missile tubes at piers or bombers on airfields. In many cases we would have no idea what is out there. Military planners, conservative by nature, would assume the worst and try to meet enemy deployments in space with an equal or greater capability. Of course, for about $ 400 million per launch, we could use the space shuttle to make closer inspections, assuming that other nations would be willing to tolerate our presence near their critical space assets. Due to orbital constraints, however, the shuttle could reach only a fraction of the total number of satellites in orbit. Another option would be to expand and improve our space monitoring assets -- but only at a cost of tens of billions of dollars. Once this genie is out of the bottle, there is no way to put it back in. We could never afford to bring all these systems back to earth, and destroying them would be equally unfeasible, because the billions of pieces of space debris would jeopardize commercial satellites and manned missions. The third consequence of U.S. space weaponization would be the heightened probability of strategic conflict. Anyone familiar with the destabilizing impact of MIRVs will understand that **weapons in space will bring a new meaning to the expression "hair trigger." Lasers can engage targets in seconds. Munitions fired from satellites in low-earth orbit can reach the earth's surface in minutes**. As in the MIRV scenario, **the side to strike first would be able to destroy much of its opponent's space weaponry before the opponent had a chance to respond**. The **temptation to strike first during a crisis would be overwhelming**; much of the decisionmaking would have to be automated. **Imagine that during a crisis one of our key military satellites stops functioning and we cannot determine why. We -- or a computer controlling our weapons for us -- must then decide whether or not to treat this as an act of war and respond accordingly. The fog of war would reach an entirely new density,** with our situational awareness of the course of battle in space limited and our decision cycles too slow to properly command engagements. **Events would occur so quickly that we could not even be sure which nation had initiated a strike.** We would be repeating history, but this time with far graver consequences. In the absence of explicit evidence that another nation with the economic and technical means is developing weapons for space, we should forgo our advanced prototyping and testing of space weapons. We should seek to expand the 1967 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space to prohibit not just weapons of mass destruction in space, but all space-based weapons capable of destroying space, ground, air, or sea targets. We should also explore a verification regime that would allow inspection of space-bound payloads. During the Reagan years advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative ran an effective television spot featuring children being saved from nuclear attack by a shield represented by a rainbow. **If we weaponize space, we will face** a very different image -- **the image of hundreds of weapons-laden satellites orbiting directly over our homes** and our families **24 hours a day, ready to fire within seconds. If fired, they would destroy thousands of ground, air and space targets within minutes**, before there is even a chance of knowing what has happened, or why. This would be a dark future, a future we should avoid at all costs.

## Link

### Plan takes out export control regulations – that allows tech transfers

Ressler, ’09 [Aaron R. Ressler, Air Force major, “Advancing Sino-US Space Cooperation”, April 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539619>]

Space cooperation between the U.S. and China would not be an easy process to initiate and there would certainly be challenges. While space cooperation is not new, the 2007 Chinese ASAT test has made the idea of working with the PRC even more controversial.91 One area of increased concern is technology transfer. This is especially true of civil space technology being applied for military use (dual-use technology).92 For this specific reason, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) limits space cooperation with China.93 With the intention of preventing the transfer of “sensitive technologies” to other governments, ITAR even makes “normal science exchanges and visits” challenging.94 If there were to be increased space cooperative efforts between the U.S. and China, ITAR restraints would need to be reexamined and changed.

### China will use cooperation efforts to steal our tech

Cheng, ’09 [Dean Cheng, research fellow in Chinese political and security affairs at the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs than Benefits”, 10/30/09, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/US-China-Space-Cooperation-More-Costs-Than-Benefits]

According to the discussions between Presidents Bush and Hu Jintao, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin's groundbreaking visit to China in 2006 (the first by a NASA administrator to the PRC) was supposed to be matched by a visit to the U.S. by the head of China's Second Artillery. Yet the PRC has never agreed to that visit, despite Hu's commitment and repeated invitations from the U.S. If reciprocity in terms of basic leadership visits cannot be obtained, it is even more problematic how either side would achieve reciprocity in other areas. There is a general disparity in technology between the U.S. and the PRC. Under such circumstances, reciprocity would likely benefit the Chinese side far more than the U.S. side. And if the U.S. holds back, it only undermines the case for cooperation. Yet well-founded reticence on the part of the U.S. to share information could also jeopardize the missions and safety of the crews. These are the high costs of cooperation with the Chinese on manned space flight. Covering funding shortfalls seems to be the only tangible motivation for the U.S., and even that prospect is not promising. If U.S. decision-makers conclude that a manned-space capacity is important to American interests, they should find a way to properly fund it -- and not rely on the one country in the world likely to emerge as a peer competitor for global influence. By contrast, reaching out to the Chinese from a position of strength and independence in the cause of a broader diplomacy and development of space is appropriate. But even then, such engagement must be strongly conditioned to demand transparency, limit expectations, and involve America's allies and partners.

### Empirically proven – China will steal space tech

Seedhouse, ’10 [Erik Seedhouse, Aerospace scientist and fellow of British Interplanetary Society, The New Space Race, 2010, http://www.springerlink.com/content/978-1-4419-0880-3#section=685117&page=3&locus=69]

China has a long history of acquiring technology by nefarious means. A good example is the launch of China’s lunar satellite, Chang’e, which appears to have been adapted from the design of DFH-3, a Chinese communications relay satellite. The DFH-3 was developed in record speed thanks to a large number of Western components used. These components included elements such as the Matra Marconi-manufactured central processor, the infra-red Earth sensor built by Officine Galileo, and parts of the solar panel built by Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm. When the Chinese decided to build the lunar probe, it simply adapted the Western DFH-3 components, enabling them to proceed quickly and reliably. More recently, the FBI, in conjunction with other US counter-espionage agencies, have tagged more than 100 people and companies allegedly involved in clandestine aerospace technology transfer benefitting China’s space program. For example, physicist Shu Quan-Sheng, a naturalized US citizen, was arrested on September 24th, 2008, on charges of illegally exporting space launch technical data and services, in addition to offering bribes to Chinese officials concerning the Long March (LM)5. Shu, a president of a NASA subcontractor, provided technical assistance and foreign technology acquisition expertise to several of China’s government entities involved in the design and development of the LM-5 space launch facility, an activity that the US alleges began in 2008.4 In another recent case, US citizen, Ping Cheng, and Singaporeans, Kok Tong Lim and Jian Wei Ding, were charged with conspiracy to violate export administration regulations by attempting to illegally export high-modulus carbon fiber to China. The material, known as Toray M40 and Toray M60, is a corrosion-resistant material used for electromagnetic shielding in rockets and spacecraft.

## Impact—Space Pearl Harbor

### Joint space activities cause a dual-use tech transfer to China, resulting in a space Pearl Harbor

Logan, ’08 [Jeffrey Logan, previous China program manager at International Energy Agency, “China’s space program: options for US-China Cooperation”, 9/29/08, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf]

Challenges of Cooperating with China. Some of the most important challenges of expanding cooperation in space with China include: Inadvertent technology transfer. From this perspective, increased space cooperation with China should be avoided until Chinese intentions are clearer. Joint space activities could lead to more rapid (dual-use) technology transfer to China, and in a worst-case scenario, result in a “space Pearl Harbor,” as postulated by a congressionally appointed commission led by Donald Rumsfeld in 2001.22 Moral compromise. China is widely criticized for its record on human rights and non-democratic governance. Any collaboration that improves the standing of authoritarian Chinese leaders might thus be viewed as unacceptable. Ineffectiveness. Some argue that increased collaboration will not produce tangible benefits for the United States, especially without a new bilateral political climate.

### China uses this tech to spark a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ conflict over Taiwan

Steele, ‘07

[David Steele, “The Weaponization of Space: Next Arms Race?”, 2007, http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/publications2010/Publctns\_ShedPaper\_050310\_TheWeaponisationofSpaceNextArmsRace.pdf]

In July 2000, an article emanating from China was published entitled ‘The US Military’s Soft Ribs and Strategic Weaknesses’ which analysed a future confl ict with the US. The article suggests that developing countries could use information and electronic warfare and create a ‘space Pearl Harbour’ thus toppling a technologically advanced adversary. The article, in part replicated by the Arms Control Association, goes on to say: ‘For countries that could never win a war with the US by using methods of tanks and planes, att acking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice’.66 Similarly, it has been proposed that any threat that the US faces now and into the future, can only be (by default) asymmetric in nature, as the US has become so dominant militarily. This is not to discount nation-states. A threat can also be a state player that possesses, or is developing, military capability, and demonstrates intent to use that capability against another. China possesses a capability (albeit a prototype) that could threaten US space dominance, whilst the ambiguous Chinese tactic of ‘attacking whilst negotiating’ could be being used to mask an emerging intent. The possibility of a future confrontation between the US and China in the Taiwan Straits in the 2015-2030 timeframe is now being debated by informed commentators and is referred to as a ‘space Pearl Harbour’. Despite the predictions of continued growth in the Chinese economy and the modernisation program being undertaken by the PLA, China is still unlikely to have a military that could challenge the US in a traditional ‘force on force’ contest for several decades.

## Impact—China Modernization

### Tech transfer leads to Chinese military modernization.

Pollpeter, ’08 [Kevin Pollpeter, China project manager for DGI Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis and previously served in research position at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the RAND corporation, “Building for the future: China’s progress in space technology during the tenth 5-year plan and the U.S. response”, March 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478502&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

A policy that treats China as a friend, however, has its own shortcomings. Because China’s strategy is designed to further its own national interests and because its interests are often not aligned with U.S. interests, it is unlikely that assisting China in increasing its space power will eliminate these differences and may, in fact, exacerbate them. Moreover, cooperation in space is of limited value in advancing U.S.-China ties considering the secondary role of space diplomacy, and cooperation in space will not help resolve differences over Taiwan, human rights, or Chinese economic practices. The most important argument against cooperation is the possibility of the transfer of sensitive technology. Most space technology is dual-use in nature and could assist the Chinese in developing advanced weaponry that could be used against U.S. forces. Nearly any transfer of space technology directly improves China’s military capabilities not just because space technology is inherently dual-use, but also because China’s space program is inherently military in nature. While cooperation does exist between NASA and the U.S. military, the Chinese space program lacks the bureaucratic walls which make NASA a predominantly civilian organization in both focus and culture. Indeed, China’s space program is a military-civilian joint venture in which the military develops and operates its satellites and runs its infrastructure, including China’s launch sites and satellite operations center. The China National Space Administration, often incorrectly referred to as China’s NASA, mainly functions as a civilian front for international cooperation and as a liaison between the military and the defense industry. In fact, CNSA does not even manage important space cooperative activities like cooperation with Europe on Galileo, which is run by the Ministry of Science and Technology.

### That causes China-Taiwan conflict

Carter and Perry, ’07 [Ashton B. Carter (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs) and William J. Perry (Senior fellow at Hoover Institution, Professor in Engineering and International Studies Departments at Stanford), “China on the March”, 3/1/07, <http://sites.google.com/site/huychina/China_on_the_march_NI.pdf>]

THE UNITED States and most countries in the region might prefer to see China stuck in the Maoist People’s War tradition. But the reality is, barring an economic slowdown or other catastrophe, China will develop its military power in parallel with its financial and political power, seeking to accomplish the missions its strategy dictates. This has serious consequences for the U.S. military, U.S. policy in the region and other regional states. They are not welcome developments, but they are broadly consistent with the growing power of a “responsible stakeholder.” As Chinese forces become more deployable, effective and experienced, they can also become more useful in countering international disorder, including terrorism—should China choose the “responsible stakeholder” model. But other effects will alter the military landscape of east Asia profoundly. Japan, Russia, India and others will soon face a Chinese military much more formidable than in the past. China will slowly go from being a continental power to a regional (though not global) power by: modernizing its tactical air capability, airborne warning and control, mid-air refueling and airlift; acquiring more capable surface combatants (though not rivaling those of the U.S. Navy’s blue-water force) and a fledgling carrier force; and bolstering the “informationalization” and joint capabilities of the military branches. Newer, mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs, solid-fueled ICBMs, and Jl-2 SLBMs, if not accompanied by a large jump—tens rather than hundreds and no MIRV’d missiles—in numbers of warheads, will not alter significantly the long-standing Chinese strategic nuclear threat to the United States. The sheer weight of China’s military investments will inexorably shift the balance between China and Taiwan in China’s favor. China is fielding more numerous and accurate ballistic missiles, drone aircraft, mine-laying craft, diesel submarines and other capabilities that are clearly aimed at the Taiwan contingency rather than general growth of comprehensive military power. Taiwan is not spending nearly enough to counter these efforts, specifically the missile and blockade threats. (Taiwan’s island geography, more than its military, counters the invasion threat.) As Taiwan’s ability to defend itself declines, its dependence on the United States increases. This power shift is mirrored economically and politically. Taiwan was once thought the gateway through which foreign investment would flow into China; now Taiwan is bypassed in favor of China. Politically, Chen Shui-bian’s DPP is weak, and the Pan-Blue alliance is flirting with the mainland. But alongside these developments are additional modernization efforts by the PLA to counter selected areas of U.S. military advantage. These developments are highly likely to continue. They are not natural ingredients of a post-Maoist general upgrade of China’s military power; they are specifically aimed at U.S. forces and fueled by the Taiwan contingency.

### China-Taiwan war goes nuclear—MAD doesn’t apply

Solomone, 06 — Stacey, Ph.D. in Futures Studies at the University of Hawaii, “China's Space Program: the great leap upward,” Journal of Contemporary China, rmg

First, the PLA is suspected of making great strides in counterspace weapons systems. The PLA is believed to have made efforts in ASAT weapons such as groundbased lasers and other directed energy weapons, small-sized missiles designed to target foreign satellites, parasite satellites, micro- and nano-satellites, nuclear and non-nuclear EMP weapons, EMP satellite shielding, and stealthy satellites. As long as the PLA is successfully making progress in developing these weapons, it will continue to do so. A Taiwan crisis, the foremost threatening issue toward destabilizing peace in the region, could spark a terrible event. During the Cold War, the United States and the former Soviet Union used mutually assured destruction as a deterrent to dissuade the use of nuclear weapons in space which would destroy all satellites and, with them, all satellite command, control, and communications. 41 However, should the United States become engaged in a struggle over Taiwan independence, it is regrettably feasible that China could use such a horrible means to prevent Taiwan from gaining independence. In the case of China, nuclear weapons in space are not just a means of deterrence or a means of merely producing fear; it simply is a last-effort strategy that is at China’s disposal. 42

### China-Taiwan conflict goes nuclear

Glaser 2011 (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War? Subtitle: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism, Foreign Affairs, March/April, lexis)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China -- whatever they might formally agree to -- have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### Tech transfers to China spills over to their ICBM program and other rogue nations

Chambers, ’09 [Rob Chambers, “China’s space program: a new tool for PRC ‘soft power’ in international relations?”, March 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497039&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

A study by U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. J. Barry Patterson looked at China’s space program from the perspective of the threat posed to the United States in two main areas: economic impact and security. He argues that since the Chinese space program is subsidized by the government (exaggerated further by the generally lower comparative wages for its space scientists as well the undervalued renminbi), Beijing is in a position to “dump” space launch services onto the world market.4 He also cites security concerns that any assistance given to the Chinese in increasing launch reliability and apogee kick motor technologies would be directly transferable to their ICBM program and, worse yet, possibly exported to “rogue nations” and used against American interests.5 Given that the paper was written in 1995, some of the data are not as relevant today, especially given the growing number of Chinese commercial and non-strategic (space science) launches since the Loral-Hughes scandal. However, the potential for dual-use, civilian-military space technology transfer has been consistently raised as one of main objections to Chinese- U.S. space cooperation, and the issue will likely remain a thorny issue for some time to come.

### China’s used US tech for their military program in the past – will happen again

Chambers, ’09 [Rob Chambers, “China’s space program: a new tool for PRC ‘soft power’ in international relations?”, March 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497039&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

Steven Lambakis sees China’s growing commercial space capabilities as having an important role to play militarily as well. He highlights Chinese recognition of space as a “new arena for competition” and a “strategic frontier” that needs to be defended.6 Citing a number of Chinese Army generals, defense professionals, and numerous FBIS translations from Chinese military journals dating mostly from the mid-1990s, he draws the conclusion that that China fully understands and appreciates the wide array of military advantages that space offers, especially in a Taiwan Strait scenario. He asserts that “military satellites are now legitimate targets in war...and thus ASATs are legitimate weapons”.7 Three events in recent history have shaped a decidedly negative view of the Chinese space program: the Cox Commission Report, the Wen Ho Lee scandal, and the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. The Cox Commission Report, released in 1999, painted China as a direct threat to the United States, especially with regard to space-based as well as ground-based anti-satellite systems.8 Its genesis was the botched Chinese Long March 2E rocket launches of Hughes satellites in 1992 and 1995 and the failed Long March 3B launch of Loral’s Intelsat 708 and the subsequent efforts by these U.S. companies to help the Chinese analyze and overcome their technical problems. Although several chapters of the Cox report are concerned with possible transfers of high performance computers and U.S. nuclear weapons designs, the bulk of the report investigates Chinese acquisition of American technology for their missile and space forces and satellite launches. It details Chinese efforts to use U.S. technology to enhance their ICBM and military space program through advances in missile airframe fairing (shroud) design and reliability, improved guidance and control, staging mechanisms and associated kick motors and “smart” dispensers, stress & load tests, launch failure anomaly analysis & diagnostics, coupled loads analysis, and modeling and simulation.9 Although there is the larger theme of Chinese technology stealing through various schemes, the report’s conclusion is that American space technology wrongfully ended up in Chinese hands.

### China will use transfer of technology for its weapons program

BBC, ’05 [BBC News, “The dawn of a new space race?”, 10/14/05, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4208176.stm]

While India's space programme is relatively small, it has made considerable strides in recent years, putting a number of satellites into orbit. Dr Rodham Narasimhan, the director of India's Space Commission, said the aim of the programme had always been to develop practical civilian applications from the spacecraft. He described these aims as "developmental - communications, remote sensing, agricultural crop production." But, perhaps because of this, India has also been able - unlike the Chinese - to buy in expertise of other space agencies where necessary. "We could have India and Japan pooling their resources, because the Japanese have got far more capable launch vehicles than the Indians have," Mr Clark explained. "But the Chinese are having to basically do everything on their own," he said. Another reason for this is the view of the Americans towards China. Although they agreed to join forces with the Russians in the 1990s in developing the International Space Station, the Americans, Mr Clark said, still see China as a rival, not an ally. "It's not space as such that's the problem... it's what's the Americans see as technology transfer," he said. "They don't want the Chinese to have access to American technology, because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that any technology that the Chinese get access to will immediately be applied to the Chinese weapons programme."

## Impact—Proliferation (NK/Iran/Pak)

### China space cooperation leads to tech transfers that fuel illicit Chinese military modernization, tech sales to Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan- S.Q. levels of cooperation are sufficient

Sterner 09 (Eric, Eric R. Sterner is a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He held senior staff positions on the House Armed Services and Science committees, served in the Defense Dept. and was NASA associate deputy administrator for policy and planning., “Viewpoint: Be Wary Of China Space Ties”,<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/Vwpt112309.xml&headline=U.S.%20Wary%20Of%20Space%20Cooperation%20With%20China//sb)\>

This autumn, China and the U.S. began moving toward greater cooperation in space. As China lifted a little more of the veil covering its space program, U.S. officials expressed a greater desire to work together in exploring space. Presidential science adviser John Holdren floated the idea of increased cooperation in human spaceflight last spring. The Augustine committee raised the idea again, and Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao pledged to deepen space cooperation last week (see p. 33). **Unfortunately, there are ample reasons for the U.S. to keep its distance.** While the U.S. explicitly decided to separate its space exploration activities from the military, China’s human spaceflight program is a subsidiary of the People’s Liberation Army. In that context, **the risks of illicit technology transfer are considerable.** Closer relations create greater opportunities for China to acquire sensitive technology. In 2007, the U.S. launched the inter­agency National Export Enforcement Initiative, designed to combat illegal trafficking in sensitive technologies. Within a year, charges were filed against 145 criminal defendants. Iran and China were the intended destinations for most of the known illegal exports. The Justice Dept. noted, “The illegal exports to China have involved rocket launch data, space shuttle technology, missile technology, naval warship data, [UAV] technology, thermal imaging systems, military night-vision systems and other materials.” This is consistent with other Chinese activities, including a massive 2005 cyber-raid on NASA’s computers that exfiltrated data about the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter’s propulsion system, solar panels and fuel tanks. The U.S. should be concerned about such transfers for two reasons. First, they will aid Chinese military modernization, particularly in areas where the U.S. holds an advantage (see p. 29). The Defense Dept.’s 2009 annual report on the Chinese military concludes, “The pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces.” China has already lased U.S. satellites, demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic anti-satellite weapon, and is working on advanced microsatellites and formation flying. Collectively, these present a significant threat to the space systems upon which the U.S. depends for its conventional and strategic military advantages—advantages that Chinese theorists clearly want to hold at risk. Chinese access to advanced U.S. civil and commercial space technologies and experience, whether illicit or approved, reduces the cost and increases the speed at which China can climb the military research and development learning curve. **Second, China is a serial proliferator**. Some **technologies could make their way to** countries of even greater concern, including **Iran and North Korea.** The deputy director of national intelligence for analysis submits an unclassified annual proliferation report to Congress, known as the “721 Report.” The most recent report states, “**Chinese companies have been associated with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran;** Chinese entities—which include private companies, individuals and state-owned military export firms?**continue to engage in [weapons of mass destruction]-related proliferation activities.”** Remaining wary of China’s intentions does not mean the U.S. should opt for isolation, but it does argue against close space cooperation. Instead, the U.S. should seek to increase transparency about China’s intentions and capabilities through military channels, share scientific data about the solar system (but not the technology that collected the data), establish standards (such as limiting orbital debris creation) that serve mutual interests, and possibly coordinate some activities such as lunar or Earth science missions. Existing international frameworks enable all of this, but China has resisted accepting the responsibilities that come with membership as a great space power. Aerospace technologies are high on China’s illegal shopping list. Until China’s intentions are clearer and its behavior has verifiably and persistently changed, **close cooperation entails risks that far exceed the potential benefits**.

### China will use tech transfers to overcome technology lags in its own military programs & export them to North Korea and Iran.

Petterson, ’95 [J. Barry Petterson, “China’s space program and its implications for the United States”, 4/19/95, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/patterjb.pdf]

Although China has developed a robust space system, they do not have as sophisticated systems as the U.S. China has not developed the systems that allow precise orbit insertion, nor do their rockets have capabilities to control the rates of burn. Finally, China has not refined the capability to measure and control levels of stress placed on satellites. Controlling these forces would allow more sophisticated satellites to be placed in orbit. Because satellites provided by U.S. companies do possess these types of technology, the U.S. was concerned with the potential transfer of technology that might accompany China launching any U.S.-made satellites. The U.S. concern is divided into two areas, although they are somewhat intertwined; the first concerns advances China might make to its own civilian launch systems. The second is the applications these advances could have to military systems that China might not only use, but also export to rogue nation-states such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Launching a satellite is a very technically complicated activity. China has not independently developed all of its competence in this area. China’s technology transfer process has taken on added urgency and a new form with the current windfall of Russian scientists and engineers now working in large numbers for various Chinese interests. By standing on the shoulders of Russia, the United States, Japan, and others, China hopes to more quickly overcome what remains a huge technology lag.45 To counter just this type of transfer, the U.S. has restricted the types of satellites that can be launched by China and placed restrictions on how even those satellites must be safeguarded. The U.S. is concerned that China might make technology advances that would allow them to compete more strongly in the space market, further impacting the U.S. space launch business. Of more a national security concern is the impact pirated U.S. technology might have on China's military rockets.

### North Korean nuclearization leads to extinction

Hayes and Hamel-Green ’09 (Peter Hayes, Professor of International Relations @ RMIT University, “The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, December 14th 2009, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3267>)

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions.   The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison.  How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes.  There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community

### Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon destabilizes the Middle East

The Heritage Foundation Iran Working Group6/4/09 (“Iran’s Nuclear Threat; The Day After,” http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0053.cfm)

Once it acquires a nuclear weapon, Iran’s radical regime will pose a much greater threat to the U**nited** S**tates, to  U.S. allies,** and to the stability of the Middle East than it does today. In particular, an Iranian nuclear capability  would pose an existential threat to Israel, a key U.S. ally that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other  Iranian leaders repeatedly have promised to destroy.  The United States’ unrivalled military power would be a powerful deterrent against an Iranian direct nuclear  attack, but relying on the threat of massive retaliation could be risky. The Iranian hard-liners could miscalculate **and  misperceive**; they **are profoundly ignorant about the outside world and** have shown a tendency to gamble recklessly.  They frequently proclaim their conviction that the United States would not or could not attack them. In addition,  there are legitimate questions about whether Ahmadinejad, who reportedly harbors apocalyptic religious beliefs  regarding the return of the Mahdi, or others in the Iranian regime like him would have the same cost-benefit calculus  about a nuclear war that other leaders would have. Moreover, Tehran could pass nuclear weapons on to terrorist sur-  rogates in hopes of escaping retaliation for a nuclear surprise attack launched by an unknown attacker.

### Global nuclear war

Steinbach 02 (John, Center for Research on Globalization, 3-3, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

## Impact—U.S. Competitiveness

### China will steal tech for its space capabilities – that guts American economic competitiveness

Springut et al, ’11 [Micah Springut et al, “China’s program for science and technology modernization”, Jan 2011, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/USCC\_REPORT\_China%27s\_Program\_forScience\_and\_Technology\_Modernization.pdf]

Quite opposed to these instances of collaboration are instances of Chinese technology theft and espionage. Due to US export restrictions and licensing requirements on dual civilian and military use technologies and the reluctance of many firms to share certain technologies with China, PRC R&D entities—public and private—often find it necessary to fill capability gaps through illicit means. Chinese intelligence agencies, military research institutions and civilian corporations all target American technology for acquisition. When China illegally acquires technology from the United States, it free rides on the US’s scientific investments and threatens its advantages in valuable commercial and military technology. It is not clear the extent to which outright theft, versus legal technology acquisition and the cross-breeding of ideas and technology inherent in the globalization of science education and research, is driving China’s technological rise. Nevertheless, the fact that the targets of Chinese acquisition are often those controlled technologies deemed crucial to American business and military dominance means the threat must be taken seriously. US counterintelligence officials believe that China is the largest and most aggressive espionage threat in the world.370 In terms of military technology, in just the last few years Chinese entities have been implicated in attempts to acquire protected space shuttle technology, missile technology, radar and electronic warfare technology, naval warship data, unmanned aerial vehicle technology, thermal imaging systems, and military night vision systems, according to the Department of Justice.371 Such technologies, as well as others desired by the Chinese military, are crucial elements in military systems that could challenge the military predominance of the United States. Illicit acquisition of technology is also a threat to the technological engine of the American economy. Federal officials say that Chinese entities are among the most active in corporate espionage, and that these efforts are often directed against companies in Silicon Valley.372 Technology companies Google, Cisco Systems, Motorola, Siemens and General Electric have voiced concerns or filed lawsuits over China’s aggressive activities in trying to acquire their advanced technology, which undercut these companies’ ability to secure ownership of their intellectual property.373 Estimates of the cost of such activities to US businesses are difficult to obtain, particularly because American firms do not always come forward when their technology has been stolen, and the loss of intellectual property cannot be easily enumerated. A US Government report estimates that the combined cost of all foreign and domestic economic espionage in 2001 was $300 billion, a figure that has likely risen substantially since then.374

### Inadvertent tech transfers through cooperation will destroy economic competitiveness

Pollack, ’03 [Herman Pollack, Research professor of international affairs at George Washington Univ., “International relations in space: A US view”, 2/12/03, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/026596468890094X]

From the commercial perspective, it should be realized that the process of technology diffusion and its ever-faster pace is historic. There is little point in bemoaning the inevitable. Cooperation does result in the transfer of technology, sometimes intentionally so, but technology diffusion is also facilitated by education of foreign students, sale or licensing of technologies, intercountry movement of multinational corporation personnel, technical journals, trade fairs and so on. The main vehicle is international commerce in technology. Placing the onus for unwanted technology transfer on cooperation is to miss the mark by a wide margin. On the other hand, refusal to cooperate would not prevent or delay development of competitive space technologies, and indeed would stimulate moves towards space independence by other nations. Moreover, it would mean the loss of important contributions to foreign policy and would ignore the reality that the total capability of the West represents an asset for use in the common benefit. Nevertheless, maintaining US economic competitiveness is a national priority, and the economic consequences of technology transfer through cooperation should be continually assessed. Transfers of potentially significant adverse economic impact should obviously be avoided. In this connection, President Reagan's opposition to trade protectionism is relevant. In a TV address to Europe he said 'protectionism is like the evil of drugs: it will end up destroying those who use it... All it does is slow growth, wipe out jobs, and close the doors on progress'.

Competitiveness is key to hegemony – keeps us ahead of challengers

Dabney 10 (Michael, Starr Writer for the Epoch Times, The Epoch Times “U.S. Competitive Edge in Jeopardy” 4-24, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/34041/)

In his seminal 2002 best-seller “The Creative Class,” author Richard Florida had a thing or two to say about America’s diminishing leadership in innovation. He wrote: “The United States appears to have thrown its gearshift into reverse. At all levels of government and even in the private sector, Americans have been cutting back crucial investments in creativity—in education, in research, in arts and culture—while pouring billions into low-return or no-return public projects like sports stadiums … If these trends continue, the U.S. may well squander its once-considerable lead.” It is America’s declining hegemony in high-tech innovation and research that has got decision makers in the U.S.—from the Oval Office and the National Science Foundation in Washington to researchers, business leaders, and educators across the country—concerned. “For more than half a century, the United States has led the world in scientific discovery and innovation. It has been a beacon, drawing the best scientists to its educational institutions, industries and laboratories from around the globe,” The Task Force on the Future of American Innovation wrote in the report “The Knowledge Economy: Is the United States Losing Its Competitive Edge?” “However, in today’s rapidly evolving competitive world, the United States can no longer take its supremacy for granted. Nations from Europe to Eastern Asia are on a fast track to pass the United States in scientific excellence and technological innovation,” the report said. Indeed, there are warnings on the horizon. Here are just some of them: Fewer graduates in science and engineering: America’s educational system was once at the forefront of producing the best scientists and engineers; but today, undergraduate science and engineering degrees in the United States are being awarded less frequently than in other countries. For example, according to the Council on Competitiveness, the ratio of first university degrees in natural sciences and engineering to the college-age population in the United States is only 5.7 degrees per 100. Some European countries, including Spain, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, and Finland, award between 8 and 13 degrees per 100. Japan awards 8 per 100, and Taiwan and South Korea each award about 11 per 100. Stagnant growth: Although the United States remains a competitive leader in innovation, it has made the least progress of all developing nations in competiveness and innovation capacity over the last decade, according to a 2009 report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation titled “The Atlantic Century: Benchmarking EU & U.S. Innovation and Competitiveness.” A fall from grace in key high-tech sectors: From 1998 to 2003, the balance of trade in the manufacture of aircraft—which for years was one of the strongest U.S. export sectors—fell from $39 billion to $24 billion, a loss of $15 billion, reflecting increased sales of foreign-made commercial aircraft to U.S. carriers. In areas of information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and fusion energy science, the United States is also losing ground to Asia and some countries in the European Union (EU). “‘Can America compete?’ is the nation’s new No. 1 anxiety, the topic of emotional debate,” wrote Fortune magazine’s Geoffrey Colvin. “We’re not building human capital the way we used to. Our primary and secondary schools are falling behind the rest of the world’s. Our universities are still excellent, but the foreign students who come to them are increasingly taking their educations back home. As other nations multiply their science and engineering graduates—building the foundation for economic progress—ours are declining, in part because those fields are seen as nerdish and simply uncool.” To be sure, experts are quick to point out that despite these challenges, no one is saying that Americans can’t adapt and get back on track. The Task Force on the Future of American Innovation report stated: “The United States still leads the world in research and discovery, but our advantage is rapidly eroding, and our global competitors may soon overtake us.” To remain competitive in the global arena, the task force said, the United States must redirect its attention to the factors that have driven American innovation for years: research (especially that which is funded through federal and private entities for science and engineering), education, the technical workforce, and economic growth. Columbia University professor Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, cited in Colvin’s article, underscores this point. In a competitive global market, he said, it is science and technological breakthroughs that fundamentally influence economic development, and in an economy where technology leadership determines the winners, education trumps everything. That’s a problem for America, Bill Gates told Fortune magazine. He said while American fourth-graders are among the world’s best in math and science, by ninth grade they’ve fallen way behind. "This isn’t an accident or a flaw in the system; it is the system,” said Gates. That is why America’s decline in producing top-notch scientists and engineers is such a serious concern, experts say. While America lags, “low-cost countries—not just China and India but also Mexico, Malaysia, Brazil, and others—are turning out large numbers of well-educated young people fully qualified to work in an information-based economy,” said Colvin. For example, he said, China in 2005 produced about 3.3 million college graduates, India 3.1 million (the majority of them English-speaking), and the United States just 1.3 million. In engineering, China’s graduates numbered over 600,000, India’s 350,000 and the United States’ only about 70,000, making it highly probable that the United States may be required to outsource its research and development overseas eventually if this trend is not addressed. “Americans who thought outsourcing only threatened factory workers and call-center operators are about to learn otherwise,” Colvin warned. While many studies exploring the competitiveness of America in science and technology indicate that America still leads other countries in key areas of these fields, the 2009 report from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation found cause for both the United States and the EU to be concerned in the face of increasing Asian competition. The report evaluated and rated global innovation-based competitiveness in science and technology of 40 nations and regions (including the EU-10 and the EU-15) as they currently stand, and in terms of the progress they have made over the last decade. In it, the United States was rated fourth place in global competitiveness among all nations, and the EU 18th place. However, the study found that the United States has made the least progress of the 40 nations and regions in improvement in international competitiveness and innovation capacity over the last decade, while China was rated first in this category.

Hegemony prevents extinction

Khalizad 11 (Zalmay, United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations, The National Review, “The Economy and National Security” 2-8, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?page=1

If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.

## A2: Cooperation Prevents Tech Theft

### Cooperation doesn’t solve – secrecy hides China’s motivations

Pollpeter, ’08 [Kevin Pollpeter, China Project Manager at DGI Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, “Building for the future: China’s progress in space technology during the tenth 5-year plan and the U.S. response”, March 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478502&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

Increasing trust in regards to space activities appears to be difficult when space operations, in particular counterspace operations, may figure prominently in Chinese efforts to strike asymmetrically at the United States in the event of an armed conflict.100 In the past, cooperative efforts with China’s military have been difficult. The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), designed to reduce the risk of accidents and miscommunication in the air and on the sea, has been bogged down since the collision of a Chinese fighter with a U.S. reconnaissance plane due to Chinese insistence on using the venue to claim sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone. Even when the United States transferred military technology to China during the 1980s, the Chinese were reluctant to provide the United States with the basic motivations for certain technologies.101 Secrecy surrounding the Chinese space program is similarly tight, and Chinese space experts appear to be under strict guidelines and normally only divulge information that has already come out in the Chinese press. China’s space experts also appear to function as a conduit for disinformation. One prominent Chinese space expert concludes in an English language publication that “It is obvious that assertions judging China’s manned spacecraft program as a military threat are baseless.”102 Yet, in an internal military publication the same author argues that human spaceflight technology “can carry a large amount of effective military payload” and can be used for information support missions as well as function as a weapon or as a weapons platform.

### Lack of transparency destroys any reciprocity in cooperation

Seedhouse, ’10 [Erik Seedhouse, Aerospace scientist and fellow of British Interplanetary Society, The New Space Race, 2010, http://www.springerlink.com/content/978-1-4419-0880-3#section=685117&page=3&locus=69]

Transparency refers to a condition of openness, allowing nations to signal their intentions and capabilities by obtaining or exchanging information on items or activities of interest to the parties involved. Transparency permits international counterparts to increase their confidence about whether an activity is taking place and also provides warning of suspicious behavior - a particularly important consideration for any nation deliberating on doing business with Beijing. But transparency isn’t just about sharing perceptions about risks and threats. It requires several important steps, including exchanges between laboratories, information concerning space budgets, operations, research and development programs, and agency-I0-agency contacts. Ultimately, transparency requires each counterpart to declare all activities. Such an agreement enables each nation to engage in reciprocal and observable actions that in turn signal a commitment to enforcing predictable rules of behavior. Transparency is a feature notably absent from China’s secrecy-bound space program - a situation exacerbated by the control by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of virtually all Chinese space development. Such control is clearly a counterproductive factor in any potential agreement with international counterparts. However, even if the PLA wasn’t involved, neither Washington nor Beijing believes it confronts a common problem in space that demands mutual collaboration. Furthermore, even if Washington and Beijing investigated the possibility of cooperation and engaged in measures to build transparency into their respective space programs, such an attempt would be futile given the disparity in the technological capabilities between the two countries. Other transparency barriers to collaboration include the obsessive culture of secrecy surrounding the Chinese space program and the reticence of Beijing to reveal just how technologically mature their space hardware is. This reluctance towards efforts in transparency and the insular nature of China’s security apparatus have resulted in US efforts to encourage greater bilateral exchanges failing miserably. Furthermore, as long as the US maintains its tremendous technological lead and overwhelming reliance on satellites for military operations and commerce, and as long as China continues to seek parity, the incentives for information exchange will remain slim to non-existent.

### Transparency failures mean tech transfers would be one-way and used for military purposes

Cheng, ’09 [Dean Cheng, research fellow in Chinese political and security affairs at the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs than Benefits”, 10/30/09, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/US-China-Space-Cooperation-More-Costs-Than-Benefits]

Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with China, therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages. Moreover, Beijing is likely to extract a price in exchange for such cooperation. The Chinese leadership has placed a consistent emphasis on developing its space capabilities indigenously. Not only does this ensure that China's space capabilities are not held hostage to foreign pressure, but it also fosters domestic economic development -- thereby promoting innovation within China's scientific and technological communities -- and underscores the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the PRC will require that any cooperation with the U.S. provides it with substantial benefits that would balance opportunity costs in these areas. What's the Point? So what would be the purpose of cooperation from the Chinese perspective? To sustain the ISS? China is hardly likely to be interested in joining the ISS just in time to turn out the lights. There is also the question of whether the other partners in the international station, such as Russia and Japan, are necessarily interested in including China, especially now that the most expensive work has already been completed. There is also the issue of transparency. While it seems logical that the principal partners for cooperation would be the Chinese and American civil space agencies, the reality is that the China National Space Agency is, in fact, nested within the Chinese military-industrial complex rather than being a stand-alone agency. Indeed, China's space program is overwhelmingly military in nature. And nowhere more so than in the manned space program, the "commanders" or "directors" of which include the head of the General Armaments Department, one of the four general departments responsible for day-to-day management of the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA). The challenges presented by the Chinese space program's strong ties to the PLA are exacerbated by the generally opaque nature of China's space program on issues ranging from who the top decision-makers are to the size of their budget. Any effort at cooperation is likely to be stymied so long as the PRC views transparency as a one-way affair.

# Politics Links

## Plan Unpopular—General

### Congress hates cooperation with China on Space— distrust and human rights questions— Rhetoric around Wolf Clause proves

Epoch Times 7/15 [Matthew Robinson is a staff writer for the Epoch Times, “Wolf’s Clause Imperils (Some of) Administration’s China Plans Bill blocks U.S.-China cooperation on science, space”, 7/15/11,TT]

WASHINGTON—Two Chinese journalists were supposed to watch the U.S. space shuttle Endeavour take off from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida in mid-May. The shuttle was using the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-2 particle detector, a component developed by Chinese scientist Samuel Ting, and their story would have made useful provender for China’s state media apparatus. But they were turned away at the gates. Their employer, Xinhua, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), went into high dudgeon. A scornful editorial made no bones about the man and the law responsible: “‘Wolf Clause’ betrays China-U.S. cooperation,” the headline read. It was the doing of Rep. Frank Wolf, a long-term critic of the CCP, after he became chairman of the House Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Subcommittee in January. The language he inserted into the spending bill for those agencies in April prevents NASA and the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy The agencies are not allowed to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” Additionally, it prevents NASA from hosting "official Chinese visitors." “I think the Chinese are shocked,” said one of Wolf’s staffer’s in a telephone interview, responding to the Xinhua counterattack. “They're so used to the administration caving to them and bending over backward. I think they’re truly taken aback that this policy was put in place.” The clause is part of a larger debate about how the United States should deal with a Chinese communist regime that, while gathering ever more global clout, engages in state sanctioned human rights abuses, technology theft, and persistent cyber warfare against the U.S. government and American companies. While none of that is new to Rep. Frank Wolf, the straw that broke the camel’s back was the suggestion by the Obama administration—first made when the president went to Beijing in November 2009, and reiterated when Chairman of the Communist Party Hu Jintao visited Washington in January—that the United States cooperate with China in human space flight. The scope of the cooperation would have extended to “hands-on, bilateral, human space flight technology sharing, training sharing, and critical national secrets or expertise, giving that to the Chinese,” according to Wolf’s staff member, who was not authorized to speak publicly. “We look at this and say: 'How does that administration not get this?'” Wolf made his position clear in his testimony to the U.S.-China Commission in May: “The U.S. has no business cooperating with the PLA to help develop its space program.” Cooperation with China on human space flight, would, according to Richard Fisher, an analyst and author on the Chinese military, “In essence .. constitute a free transfer of technology.” The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leads China’s space efforts, and there is no real difference between China’s military and civil space programs, experts say. Wolf thus asserts, “There is no reason to believe that the PLA’s space program will be any more benign than the PLA’s recent military posture.” His clause to combat this cooperative venture and others like it was passed as part of the budget negotiations, and is valid until Sept. 30. The item will have to stand on its own merits in new legislation to be introduced into the House. Though the area of acute concern was human space flight cooperation, Wolf made the language cover OSTP as well “to send a signal to the White House and NASA” that “this is unacceptable,” according to Wolf’s staffer. “To engage China increasingly in bilateral areas is not appropriate until we see some changes in China,” the staffer added. The administration and Congress have locked horns on the issue already, and they may do so again.

### Plan unpopular— The Wolf Clause is just the start— Anti-China rhetoric is gaining ground thanks to the media

Epoch Times 7/15 [Matthew Robinson is a staff writer for the Epoch Times, “Wolf’s Clause Imperils (Some of) Administration’s China Plans Bill blocks U.S.-China cooperation on science, space”, 7/15/11,TT]

After Holdren’s performance in front of Wolf’s subcommittee, the latter asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to open an investigation into how the White House has allegedly been violating the law. “Clearly they’ve shown a willingness to brazenly break the law this year,” the Wolf staffer said. “It’s pretty much an ironclad provision. It’s very clear to us, and GAO is interested in whether they’ve taken a far too broad interpretation.” Such tug-of-wars have always taken place between the executive and Congress. “This is standard constitutional law competition,” says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. “Who will bluff whom into what?” But as news continues to splash across newspapers detailing ever more brazen cyber Wolf’s concerns start to look weightier. “The brief against China misusing U.S. technology is not a null set: You give them a computer it turns into something they put in their weapons program,” Sokolski said. “Congress exercising its power of the purse over technology transfers to countries they see as despicable is legitimate. We used to have such a policy to Soviet Union; I don’t think it’s unprecedented.” Cooperation with China’s space program is particularly risky, according to experts. “There is no ‘civilian’ Chinese space program—every facet is controlled by the PLA,” Richard Fisher, the Chinese military expert, wrote in an e-mail. “They are developing multiple space weapons .. as such, any and all interactions between Chinese space people and those of any other country ultimately will redound to the benefit of the PLA.” “We have a civil [space] program separate from our military program,” Wolf’s staffer said. “This administration has a hard time understanding that they're not dealing with a Chinese civil program.”

### 2 warrants— Cost and distrust of China

Whittington 2011 [Mark, syndicated columnist, White House and Congress Clash Over NASA Funding, Space Cooperation with China, 5/8/11, <http://news.yahoo.com/white-house-congress-clash-over-nasa-funding-space-184200148.html>, TT]

Another indication that President Barack Obama's 2012 NASA funding request was in trouble occurred when at a hearing of the House Appropriations commerce, justice, science subcommittee on May 3. White House science czar John Holdren came under some sharp questioning by Rep. Frank Wolf chairman of the subcommittee. The questioning revolved around the belief by Wolf that the administration is short changing the development of a heavy lift launcher and the Orion spacecraft that congress views as vital for the long term human exploration of space. The priorities of the administration include subsidies to commercial space firms, Earth science, and technology development. Wolf also questioned why NASA has not gotten a request for an increase of funding, even though some other science oriented agencies have gotten such requests. According to the account of the hearings on Space News, Wolf did not find Holdren's answers to be satisfactory. That suggests that there will be a renewed clash between the congress and the White House on space policy. The clash is not limited to funding and of space policy priorities. Space News also reports that the following day, on May 4, Holdren told members of the subcommittee that cooperation with China is seen as critical for prospects for long-term space exploration, such as to Mars. This, mildly speaking, was not welcome news to members of the subcommittee. The problem is that China is currently ruled by a tyrannical regime that violates the human rights of its own people and is engaged in an imperial drive toward super power status at the expense of the United States. Congress has, in fact, passed a law prohibiting most forms of space and science cooperation with the People's Republic of China. The distrust Congress holds toward the administration where it comes to space policy is palatable. Members of Congress have expressed the view that NASA is slow walking the heavy lift launcher. Many are also pretty sure that the White House is trying to circumnavigate the law and is trying to find ways to cooperate with China despite the law. All of this points to the very real possibility that congress will use the power of the purse to restrict White House space policy options and to impose its own will on the future direction of NASA and space exploration. That this clash is happening at all is a direct result of a series of political blunders made by the administration dating back to the cancellation of the Constellation space exploration program and a lack of leadership on the part of the president.

## Plan Unpopular—Wolf Clause

### Opposition is strong – Wolf amendment has been approved by both chambers

Smith 2/13 [Marcia. “House CR Cuts NASA, Prevents Cooperation with China, Allows Constellation to be Terminated”. 2/13/11. <http://spacepolicyonline.com/pages/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1413:house-cr-cuts-nasa-prevents-cooperation-with-china-allows-constellation-to-be-terminated&catid=67:news&Itemid=27>]

The House Appropriations Committee's version of the next Continuing Resolution (CR) does more than cut NASA's budget. It prohibits spending money on anything that would lead to space cooperation with China, and releases NASA from the prohibition against cancelling the Constellation program that was in an earlier appropriations bill. The cuts to NASA are shown in a new SpacePolicyOnline.com Fact Sheet that will track NASA's FY2011 appropriations as they continue to be considered in the 112th Congress. An earlier version of the House Appropriations Committee's recommendations, released last Wednesday, called for cutting NASA $379 million from its FY2011 request as part of an overall $74 billion cut to federal spending for FY2011. Conservative "Tea Party" Republicans rejected the committee's recommendations because they had pledged a $100 billion cut during their campaigns. The committee members regrouped and on Friday issued their revised recommendations that total $100 billion. The reduction is to the FY2011 President's request for government spending, but the bill introduced by the appropriations committee, H.R. 1, uses FY2010 spending as its baseline. When reading the bill, one must compare its budget recommendations with what is in the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), not the President's FY2011 request. NASA would be cut $303 million compared to its 2010 spending level, but $578.7 million from the FY2011 request. Details are in our fact sheet. The committee's bill also prohibits spending any funds appropriated for NASA or the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for space cooperation with China unless specifically authorized by Congress. The exact language is - SEC. 1339. (a) None of the funds made available by this division may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate in anyway with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this division. (b) The limitation in subsection (a) shall also apply to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), chairman of the Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations subcommittee, is a long standing opponent of U.S. cooperation with China on space activities. Separately, the bill would relieve NASA of the prohibition in the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act against cancelling the Constellation program or initiating a replacement program. NASA currently is caught between that law and the 2010 NASA Authorization Act (P.L. 111-267), which directs NASA to proceed with a different program. NASA and all other government agencies are currently funded, most at their FY2010 levels, by a CR that expires on March 4. Congress must pass another appropriations bill before then or the government will shut down. The Senate has reacted cooly to the House-proposed cuts, and talk about passing another short-term CR to give the House and Senate time to reach a compromise is growing. Both chambers will be on recess during the week of February 21, so very few legislative days remain before the current CR runs out.

### Plan is unpopular – Wolf amendment and committee politics

Freese 6/10 [Joan Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. 6/10/11. China Focus. “US-China Space Cooperation: Congress’ Pointless Lockdown”. <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-china-space-cooperation-congress%E2%80%99-pointless-lockdown/>]

In early May when the US government was scrambling to pass a budget, a provision was slipped into the NASA appropriations bill that while counter to Obama Administration policy of expanded space cooperation, was not as important as getting a continuing resolution passed and so allowed to slide through. Section 1340 of NASA’s budget prohibited NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” It also prohibited the hosting of “official Chinese visitors” at any NASA facility. Clearly, a comprehensive ban on US-China space cooperation was intended. Just as clearly, ban supporters are under the impression that Chinese space officials are anxiously banging on the proverbial US door, waiting and hoping for the opportunity to work with the United States – which just isn’t the case. China has energetically and broadly moved out on their own in space, and based on watching on-going US political kabuki dances about its future space plans, and seeing how difficult and tenuous it can be for other countries to partner with the US – on the International Space Station (ISS), for example – most Chinese space officials consider working with the United States as a potential liability to their own already-underway plans. In fact, many countries consider that they can afford only so much US friendship, though Congress continues to act as though the US is the only game in town if countries want to develop a robust space program. Rarely do US attempts at isolating countries – ally or competitor - succeed without unexpected, and negative, consequences. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 restricted data sharing from the Manhattan Project with allies including Britain, resulting in a significant wartime rift and leading to Britain developing their own bomb. After the infamous Cox Commission Report in 1999 which investigated charges of theft and illegal satellite technology transfer to China, the US attempted to block dual-use satellite technology from sale or launch there. As a result, European space industries that had been niche providers developed much broader capabilities so they could circumvent US prohibitions. US companies have lost business and the globalization of technology marches on. For many years, Chinese politicians considered there would be geostrategic benefits to be derived from being a partner on the ISS, symbolic of the “international family of spacefaring nations.” The United States stiff-arming them from involvement is a factor behind China now developing its own space station. So what does a legislative prohibition such as this achieve? It is pile-on evidence that the United States, or at least some of the **Congress, is oblivious** to the state of the world and the US position in it. That is not a declaration of US “decline,” another popular though misplaced cry frequently heard. It simply says that, realistically, the gap between the US and countries such as China (and India, and Brazil) that were once “developing” and are now increasingly “developed” world has shrunk – which is to the benefit of the US if one believes that security risks largely originate in underdeveloped areas not connected to the globalized world. It will likely be read internationally with a certain degree of bemusement; Congress now declaring who NASA can talk to and who it can’t, as though snubbing China will either result in a change in the Chinese domestic policies (such as human rights) of concern to Congressional supporters of the ban, or inhibit its space plans. While the ban only covered expenditures through September 30, 2011, it could be an issue in Fiscal Year 2012 as well since Representative Frank Wolk (R-VA), a fierce critic of China and chair of the House spending committee that oversees NASA and several science agencies, and other committee Republicans, are clearly focused on the issue. Tetchy exchanges between ban supporters and presidential science advisor John Holdren occurred at subsequent Congressional hearings on the FY 2012 budget when Holdren stated that the ban did not apply to the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy. Wolf and company pushed back against anything that would provide a loophole for presidential discretion in working with China, **tacitly threatening future NASA funding if the intent of their ban were to be evaded.** After a hiatus following the Cox Commission Report, small gestures of space outreach between the US and China began with NASA Administrator Mike Griffin’s 2006 trip to China during the Bush Administration, though the overall US policy toward China on cooperation remained largely negative. While the Obama Administration has been much more generally positive about cooperation, including with China, there have been no US-China cooperative programs put on the table by either side to consider, nor are any apparently in the works. Since 2006, US-China space cooperation has been treading water at best, so why the need now to make this bold, and pointless, political statement is unclear. Perhaps supporters were just waving a “pay attention to us” flag at NASA regarding any potential future plans, though if that was the case there were certainly other ways to send that message while still considering the broader aspects of US strategic communication. What is clear, however, is that other countries have no such compunction as the US about working with China – indeed many are anxious to have the opportunity to work with a country they see as more open to partnerships, rather than the sub-contractor status some ISS “partners” have felt the US afforded them. There may be little need to bar the door to countries wanting to work with the US on space activities, as there may soon be fewer and fewer countries knocking. Congress and the Administration working together to refocus the US space program, including realistic cooperation, would go further to maintain US space leadership than pointless isolation gestures.

### Plan risks severe political backlash from Republicans

Messier 10 [Doug. Parabolic Arc. http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/05/07/congress-white-house-spar-ban-space-cooperation-china/]

The White House and Congress is having a Constitutional tussle over an effort by lawmakers to prohibit any cooperation between NASA and China on space without the the legislature’s specific approval. Science Now explains that the conflict pits the Obama Administration’s prerogative to conduct foreign policy vs. Congress’s power of the purse: The ban is part of the 2011 budget approved last month to avert a government shutdown. It was crafted by Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), a fierce critic of China who chairs a House spending committee that oversees several science agencies. The ban says that no funds can be used by NASA or the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) “to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” It also prevents any NASA facility from hosting “official Chinese visitors.” Appearing today before that panel to defend the Administration’s 2012 budget request for science, presidential advisor John Holdren told Wolf that, in effect, the ban doesn’t apply to the president’s ability to conduct foreign policy. That authority, Holdren explained, extends to a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation that Holdren and China’s science minister signed in January that builds upon a 1979 pact that has spawned activities between many U.S. agencies and their Chinese counterparts. Representative John Culberson (R-TX) warned Holdren that **any effort to circumvent the ban would have severe consequences**: You need to remember that Congress enacts these laws and it’s the chief executive’s job to enforce them. … Now if anyone in your office, or at NASA, participates or collaborates or coordinates in any way with China, you’re in violation of the statute. And frankly, you’re endangering your funding and NASA’s funding … and it’s up to the chairman and this committee to decide how to enforce the law or what remedies are available. … You have a huge problem on your hands. It’s not entirely clear what Culberson has in mind, but one imagines that it involves cutting funding to OSTP, whose office is in Washington, D.C., and NASA programs that are being largely done outside of Texas like commercial crew. Otherwise, Culberson would just be shooting himself in the foot. I’m with the Administration on this one. If Congress passed these restrictions every time it got angry at a foreign country, our foreign policy would be at the mercy of a disparate group of 535 people who can’t even pass a budget on time. Nothing would ever get done. Prohibitions like this one should be rare and limited in scope. This one is just a bit too restrictive.

## Plan Unpopular—ASAT Test

### US-China cooperation in space is extremely controversial – ASAT tests, and aggressive foreign policy

Reuters 1/2 [Written by Jim Wolf. “Analysis: Space: a frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation”. Reuters. 1/2/11. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/02/us-china-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102]

The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are fading even as proponents say working together in the heavens could help build bridges in often-testy relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space, including spacewalks, explorations and symbolic "feel good" projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on both sides. Efforts have gone nowhere over the past decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies. U.S. domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on January 19. Washington is at odds with Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China's help to deter North Korea and Iran's nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks, among other matters. Hu's state visit will highlight the importance of expanding cooperation on "bilateral, regional and global issues," the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now, partly due to U.S. fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in any event, reckoning it does not need U.S. expertise for its space program. New obstacles to cooperation have come from the Republicans capturing control of the U.S. House of Representatives in the November 2 congressional elections from Obama's Democrats. Representative Frank Wolf, for instance, is set to take over as chairman of the appropriations subcommittee that funds the U.S. space agency in the House. A China critic and human rights firebrand, the Republican congressman has faulted NASA's chief for meeting leaders of China's Manned Space Engineering Office in October. "As you know, we have serious concerns about the nature and goals of China's space program and strongly oppose any cooperation between NASA and China," Wolf and three fellow Republicans wrote NASA Administrator Charles Bolden on October 15 as he left for China. SPACE EXPLORATION Obama and Hu, in a statement in November 2009, called for "the initiation of a joint dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit." The statement, marking a visit by Obama to China, also called for reciprocal visits in 2010 of NASA's chief and "the appropriate Chinese counterpart." Bolden, who went to China as head of a small team, said discussions there "did not include consideration of any specific proposals for future cooperation" -- a statement apparently designed to placate Wolf, who will have a big say in NASA's budget. The Chinese visit to NASA did not materialize in 2010 for reasons that have not been explained. NASA representatives did not reply to questions but a Chinese embassy spokesman, Wang Baodong, said he suspected it was "mainly a scheduling issue." China is an emerging space power. Over 13 years starting in August 1996, it ran up 75 consecutive successful Long March rocket launches after overcoming technical glitches with the help of U.S. companies. China launched its second moon orbiter in October. In 2008, it became the third country after the United States and Russia to send astronauts on a spacewalk outside an orbiting craft. Beijing plans an unmanned moon landing and deployment of a moon rover in 2012 and the retrieval of lunar soil and stone samples around 2017. Chinese scientists have talked about the possibility of sending a man to the moon after 2020 -- more than 50 years after U.S. astronauts accomplished the feat. ANTI-SATELLITE TESTS Possible U.S.-Chinese cooperation became more controversial after Beijing carried out a watershed anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based missile to knock out one of its inactive weather satellites in high polar orbit. No advance notice of the test was given. Thirteen months later, the United States destroyed a malfunctioning U.S. spy satellite using a ship-launched Raytheon Co Standard Missile 3 after a high-profile buildup to the event. The U.S. interception was just outside the atmosphere so that debris would burn up promptly. U.S. officials say China's capabilities could threaten U.S. space assets in low orbit. The Chinese test also created a large cloud of orbital debris that may last for 100 years, boosting the risk to manned spaceflight and to hundreds of satellites belonging to more than two dozen countries. China's work on anti-satellite weapons is "destabilizing," Wallace Gregson, assistant U.S. secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in December, also citing its investment in anti-ship missiles, advanced submarines, surface-to-air missiles and computer warfare techniques. "It has become increasingly evident that China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military buildup that could upend the regional security balance," Gregson told a forum hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, called on members of the incoming Congress to be wary of any space cooperation with China on the grounds it could bolster Beijing's knowledge and harm U.S. security. "Congress should reject (the Obama) administration attempts to curry favor with the international community while placing U.S. advantages in space at risk," Dean Cheng, a Heritage research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs, and two colleagues said in a December 15 memo to lawmakers. Proponents of cooperation say even symbolic steps, such as hosting a Chinese astronaut on the International Space Station, might help win friends in Beijing and blunt hard-liners. Gregory Kulacki, China project manager for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a group often at odds with U.S. policy, said cooperation would be more of a political project than a technical one. "We need to get past the idea that the Chinese need us more than we need them," he said.

### ASAT test guarantees a fight with Congress over the plan

Hitchens et al 07 [Theresa. “U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From “War of Words” to Cold War in Space?”. 2007. China Security Journal. http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=186.]

The Chinese test has raised the question of U.S. space security to a new level of political concern, with a fever pitch of activity gripping Washington policy-making circles and Congress. The vulnerability of U.S. satellites has been starkly highlighted and the need to seriously address those vulnerabilities is now being recognized. “This is a wake-up call,” said Robert Joseph, the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. “A small number of states are pursuing capabilities to exploit our vulnerabilities,”14 he said. If the ASAT test was a display of PLA sword rattling intended to drive home U.S. vulnerability in space, it has been successful. Indeed, the Chinese action has spurred the already growing consensus around improving space-situational awareness (the ability to “see” and understand what is going on in space), ensuring that satellite systems have passive protections to the extent feasible, and building redundant capabilities – both in space and in other mediums – to guarantee back-up in case of loss.15 While the U.S. Air Force has long been advocating such activities, investment has not been in line with the rhetoric – something that may well change when Bush’s fiscal year 2008 budget begins to be debated in Congress this spring, according to congressional aides from both Republican and Democratic offices. However, if the intent of the Chinese test was to deter the United States from building space-based missile defenses, it may well backfire. Advocates of space-based missile defenses have leaped upon the Chinese ASAT test as proof of the urgent need for such a system to counter the Chinese threat. An email press release by the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a pro-missile defense lobby group funded by a number of U.S. defense companies, stated: “China has proven, especially to Iran and North Korea that ballistic missile capability represents power, self defense and an ability to deter. This model of international behavior will only encourage proliferators to develop their ballistic missile capability. … The vulnerability of space assets to Chinese ballistic missile attacks or threats of that capability now exists and has been demonstrated.”16 Jeff Kueter, director of the conservative George C. Marshall Institute in Washington, said: “If the international community is truly worried about the debris-generating effects of ASAT weapons, then it ought to embrace, indeed demand, development and deployment of boost-phase missile defense capable of intercepting ASAT missiles long before they reach their satellite targets.”17 While the shift in Congress to Democratic control had raised the prospect that the Bush administration plans for space-based missile defenses would be derailed over the next two years – with many Democrats in power positions on record in opposition – Democratic congressional aides say that the Chinese test will make holding the line more difficult from a political point of view. On the civil space side, Beijing is also likely to feel repercussions in its efforts to spur cooperation with NASA on planetary exploration. Considering that there were strong voices in the U.S. national security establishment, and in Congress, opposing last year’s visit to China by NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and accusing China of wanting nothing except access to technology it could supply to its military programs, **it is almost** **inconceivable that any new progress can be made in the wake of the ASAT test**. And since civil cooperation in space is largely a political exercise for the United States, withholding cooperation is also a method of political punishment. Indeed, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters on Jan. 18 that “The United States believes China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area.”18 Likewise, military-to-military cooperation in space as a means of confidence-building – as called for by Gen. James Cartwright, head of U.S. Strategic Command last year19 – is now unlikely to get anywhere fast. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., the chairman of the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee that oversees military space spending, called a closed-door hearing on the Chinese test on Jan. 25, and reminded reporters that he has long been concerned about the transfer of U.S. technology to China that could allow it to become a space competitor.20 Christopher Padilla, assistant secretary for export administration at the U.S. Commerce Department, told reporters in Beijing on Jan. 25 that the test had contributed to distrust between the U.S. and Chinese governments. Padilla, who was in China to explain a proposed U.S. plan to heighten export controls on high technology to China, said: “I raised the point that the test is one more example of how a lack of transparency and clarity requires the U.S. to hedge its relations with China.”21 This is too bad, for both sides, in that such cooperation and confidence-building – even if baby steps – would work to improve understanding between Chinese and American space officials and help mitigate against future misunderstandings. Further, if the ASAT test was part of an effort to drive the United States into space-related negotiations with China, again it may backfire – at least in the near term. It is true that there has been a chorus of calls for the United States to now undertake efforts to ban ASATs, or at a minimum, ASATs that create debris. For example, Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., stated: “American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security, and it is urgent that President Bush move to guarantee their protection by initiating an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite systems.”22 Industry weekly Space News also urged the Bush administration to change course and consider “whether new and verifiable accords – such as a ban on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space,” noting that it “only makes sense to ban an activity that increases debris that threatens the satellites of multiple countries.”23 However, there are no signs that the administration intends to heed such advice. Rather, quite the opposite. An unnamed State Department official told Space News in the immediate wake of the Chinese test: “We do not think there is an arms race in space. …. Arms control is not a viable solution for space.”24 Similarly, attitudes among congressional hard-liners are expected to harden even more; while some moderates may be pushed into more hard-line stances. For example, Rep. Terry Everett, R-Ala., former chairman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee and long a moderate Republican voice on the issue of space weapons, issued a statement condemning the Chinese test and noting: “We cannot afford to stand idly by and not address these threats immediately.”25 At the same time, it is unclear that the up-tick in U.S.-Sino tensions spurred by the test will result in an all-out U.S. drive for an arsenal of offensive counter-space weapons – including similarly destructive ASATs. As most space experts recognize, ASATs cannot protect U.S. space assets because there are myriad terrestrially-based ways to threaten space systems including satellites. It is also highly unclear that ASATs would serve to deter potential adversaries from seeking to target U.S. space assets, as most other nations (including China) are not as dependent on space. Certainly, the China test has raised questions about whether U.S. policy to keep its options open regarding space weapons, and to “dissuade or deter others from either impeding [U.S.] rights or developing capabilities intended to do so,”26 has already failed. On the other hand, U.S. National Space Policy also states that the United States will take action to “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests”27 – and the Chinese ASAT test seems to be a sign that Beijing intends to do just that, raising the issue of how the United States might opt to implement, and possibly use, counter-space capabilities. The problem for the U.S. Air Force, which is the “keeper of the keys” on this “space control” policy, is that a build up of counter-space weapons will require major investment (not to mention time to develop technology) at a time when the Pentagon budget is under severe pressure from the ongoing costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And as noted above, the first priorities for space are programs to improve space situational awareness and to protect U.S. satellites, commercial and military, from attack. These two factors suggest that funding for development of a counter-space arsenal may be difficult to garner, at least in the short-term. Nonetheless, the specter of a U.S.-China space weapons race cannot be ruled out, and certainly the Chinese ASAT test has raised the profile of those who would take the United States down the same path. “I hope the Chinese test will be a wake up call to people,” said Hank Cooper, former director of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and chairman of the politically-connected missile defense advocacy group High Frontier. “I’d like to see us begin a serious anti-satellite program. We’ve been leaning on this administration. This argument to prevent weaponization of space is really silly.”28 Sen. John Kyl, R-Ariz., addressing the right-wing Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 29 similarly called for the U.S. resumption of ASAT weapons testing and the development of a space-based arsenal of defensive and offensive counter-space capabilities.29 Perhaps more worrying, Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of U.S. Northern Command, told the Associated Press that “there are a number of things that are on the list of potential military options”30 if China decides to undertake similar follow up tests.

## Plan Unpopular—Empirics

### Cooperation with China over space is empirically unpopular – fear of tech theft, mistrust, ASAT tests, and persistent Republican opposition

Associated Press 7/15 [“US lawmaker wields budget ax over China space ties.” 7/15/11. http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/cae69a7523db45408eeb2b3a98c0c9c5/Article\_2011-07-15-US-China-Space/id-d44ca08a25904203a0f584e88297f259]

A Republican lawmaker is looking to make the Obama administration pay a price for what he sees as its defiance of Congress in pursuing cooperation with China in science and space technology. A proposal by Rep. Frank Wolf, a fierce critic of Beijing, would slash by 55 percent the $6.6 million budget of the White House's science policy office. The measure was endorsed by a congressional committee this week, but faces more legislative hurdles, and its prospects are unclear. President Barack Obama has sought to deepen ties with China, which underwrites a major chunk of the vast U.S. national debt and is emerging a challenge to American military dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Among the seemingly benign forms of cooperation he has supported is in science and technology. Last year NASA's administrator visited China, and during a high-profile state visit to Washington by China's President Hu Jintao in January, the U.S. and China resolved to "deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space." Wolf, R-Va., argues that cooperation in space would give technological assistance to a country that steals U.S. industrial secrets and launches cyberattacks against the United States. He says Obama's chief science adviser, John Holdren, violated a clause tucked into budget legislation passed this year that bars the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and NASA from technological cooperation with China. He says Holdren did so by meeting twice with China's science minister in Washington during May. "I believe the Office of Science and Technology Policy is in violation of the law," Wolf told The Associated Press, adding that cutting its budget is the only response available to him. Wolf chairs a House subcommittee that oversees the office's budget. The punishment he proposes reflects his deep antipathy toward China, which he accuses of persecuting religious minorities, plundering Tibet and supporting genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan by backing Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. He described the Obama administration's policy toward the Asian power as a failure and railed against the president for hosting Hu at the White House. Caught at the sharp end is Holdren's office, whose mandate is to develop sound science and technology policies by the U.S. government and pursue them with the public and private sectors and other nations. Holdren told a Congressional hearing chaired by Wolf days before his May meetings with Chinese Science Minister Wan Gang that he would abide by the prohibition on such cooperation with China, but then spelled out a rather large loophole: that it did not apply in instances where it affected the president's ability to conduct foreign policy. At another Congressional hearing shortly afterward, Wolf's annoyance was clear. He threatened to "zero out" Holdren's office. Space cooperation between the two world powers like the U.S. and the Soviet Union pursued in the Cold War still seems a long way off. NASA Administrator Charles Bolden Jr. visited China in a little-publicized trip in October and discussed "underlying principles of any future interaction between our two nations in the area of human space flight," but no specific proposals. China sent an astronaut into space in 2003, and plans to send the first building block of a space station into orbit this year, but it still has comparatively limited experience. Another constraint on cooperation is that its manned space program is dominated by its military, whose other capabilities — most clearly demonstrated by a 2007 test that destroyed an orbiting satellite — have alarmed American officials. But one benefit of basic forms of cooperation, such as sharing data and basic design criteria, could be to learn a little more about China's opaque space program. Since 1999, the U.S. effectively banned use of its space technology by China. That also has a commercial downside for American producers in an increasingly globalized marketplace. "Renewing civil and commercial space cooperation with China ... is not a blank check and need not provide China with sensitive technologies," wrote James Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School in testimony at a congressional hearing on China's civilian and military space programs in May. Wolf has included the prohibition on cooperation with China by NASA and the White House science policy office in the bill approved Wednesday by the House Appropriations Committee. The bill budgets $50.2 billion for a raft of federal agencies involved in law enforcement, trade promotion, space and science for the fiscal year starting in October. The 55 percent reduction faced by the science policy's office far exceeds the overall 6 percent cut in spending across all government agencies covered by the bill. Holdren's office could not be reached for comment Friday. The bill now goes to the Republican-led House of Representatives for approval. A version also must pass the Democrat-led Senate, and the two bills would have to be reconciled before legislation can be sent to Obama to be signed into law.

### Strong congressional opposition regardless of political climate – Cox report

Day 05 [Dwayne. “Mysterious dragon: myth and reality of the Chinese space program”. 11/7/05. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/492/1.]

Perhaps the most important conclusion reached by the speakers was that prospects for space cooperation between China and the United States are remote because the two countries have fundamentally different ideas of what is necessary for cooperation to occur. The Chinese believe that space cooperation could help improve relations between the two countries. They view it as a steppingstone toward better understanding. In contrast, the American government believes that cooperation can only occur after the political relationship between the two countries has improved. Space cooperation would then be a reward and/or a symbol of closer ties. Several of the speakers revealed that after the Chinese launched their first manned spacecraft into orbit in 2003, they were shocked and disappointed to learn that the Americans had no interest in space cooperation. In 2000, China had made an overture to the United States about flying their spacecraft to the International Space Station and were rebuffed. The Chinese believed that the reason was because they had not yet demonstrated their technological capabilities in space. They believed that launching a human into orbit would prove that China was now a serious power worthy of cooperation and the Americans would agree. The Chinese were dismayed to learn that other issues, such as Taiwan, China’s military buildup, and human rights, were the real impediments to cooperation in space. The bottom line for the speakers was that absent a dramatic policy change in either Washington or Beijing, international cooperation in space is not going to happen in the near future. Either Beijing will have to change its military, foreign policy, and human rights policies, or Washington will need an entirely new presidential administration and Congress. After the Chinese launched their first manned spacecraft into orbit in 2003, they were shocked and disappointed to learn that the Americans had no interest in space cooperation. Several of the speakers—not known as critical of White House policy—suggested that the United States was missing an important opportunity to engage China. Fly a single taikonaut aboard a space shuttle to the ISS, one of them suggested, and instantly the United States is back in a clear leadership position regarding China. Another indicated that cooperating with China would give the United States access to Chinese rocket and space experts, and give the Chinese an incentive to “play nice” internationally. Cooperation could take place on several levels. The lowest would be data sharing and cooperation on robotic scientific missions. Higher level cooperation could be commercial efforts and human spaceflight. However, ever since the 1998 “Cox Report” from Congress, there has been strong opposition within Congress to even the most basic space cooperation with China.

## Plan Unpopular—GOP

### Plan alienates the GOP- fears over tech transfers

Reuters 11 (“US-China space cooperation fades”, http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/2011/01/03/china-usa-space-2//sb)

US domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on Jan. 19. Washington is at odds with Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China’s help to deter North Korea and Iran’s nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks, among other matters. Hu’s state visit will highlight the importance of expanding cooperation on “bilateral, regional and global issues,” the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now, partly due to US fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in any event, reckoning it does not need US expertise for its space program. New obstacles to cooperation have come from the Republicans capturing control of the US House of Representatives in the Nov. 2 congressional elections from Obama’s Democrats. Representative Frank Wolf, for instance, is set to take over as chairman of the appropriations subcommittee that funds the US space agency in the House. A China critic and human rights firebrand, the Republican congressman has faulted NASA’s chief for meeting leaders of China’s Manned Space Engineering Office in October. “As you know, **we have serious concerns about the nature and goals of China’s space program and strongly oppose any cooperation between NASA and China,”** Wolf and three fellow Republicans wrote NASA Administrator Charles Bolden on Oct. 15 as he left for China.

# Solvency

## 1NC—Solvency Frontline

### The plan is illegal—Wolf Clause means no cooperation until next year

O’Neill, 5/10 [Ian, Space Science Producer for Discovery News, Ph.D. in Solar Physics from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, “NASA Banned From Working With China”, 5/10/11, [http://news.discovery.com/space/denied-nasa-banned-from-working-with-China-110510.html](http://news.discovery.com/space/denied-nasa-banned-from-working-with-china-110510.html), TT]

To push mankind deeper and deeper into space, more expensive and ambitious missions are needed. Therefore, international collaboration is sought after to share the load. For NASA, however, China won't be a part of any joint scientific endeavor for the next fiscal year, at least. As noted by Forbes blogger William Pentland last week, and reported by the American Association for the Advancement of Science's (AAAS) Science Insider blog in April, a clause included in the U.S. spending bill approved by Congress to avert a government shutdown a few weeks ago has prohibited NASA from coordinating any joint scientific activity with China. The clause also extends to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). The short two sentence clause was included by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) to prevent NASA and OSTP from using federal funds "to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company." This clause would also prevent NASA facilities from hosting "official Chinese visitors." Wolf, a long-time critic of the Chinese government, chairs a House spending committee that oversees several science agencies. This clause comes at a time of heightened tensions surrounding accusations of cyber-attacks and espionage from the People's Republic of China on U.S. Government agencies and U.S. companies. Wolf's office computers were hacked in 2006 and the FBI confirmed the hacking source was located in China, so he has personal experience of this vulnerability.

# U.S.-Sino Relations

## Status Quo Solves

### Squo solves— U.S. and China have taken the initiative to shore up relations, especially militarily

Northam 2011 [Jackie, Foreign Affairs correspondent for NPR news, “U.S. Seeks To Revitalize Ties With China”, 1/12/11, <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/12/132842681/u-s-seeks-to-revitalize-ties-with-china>, TT]

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates wraps up his three-day visit to China Wednesday, a trip that was seen as a small step toward building and stabilizing relations between the two countries. The Obama administration considers that particularly important given China's growing dominance — politically, economically and militarily. There are many efforts under way — beyond Gates' visit — to help define the constantly shifting U.S.-China relationship. Next week, presidents Obama and Hu Jintao will meet in Washington, and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is expected to unveil the administration's vision for relations in the 21st century. A 'Reset' In Ties Dean Cheng, a China expert with the Heritage Foundation, said all of this activity is taking place because the U.S. and China are at a pivotal junction in their relationship. "I think that what we're seeing is an administration that is trying to reset China policy along the lines of the previous reset regarding Russian policy," he said. Cynthia Watson, a professor of strategy at the National War College, said the Obama administration has made clear it wants a stable relationship with China. "The president has said several times we want to have an ongoing relationship with China, we want to have a military-to-military relationship with China," she said. Watson said the U.S. wants to understand better what China is doing, and assumes China wants to understand better what the U.S. is doing.

### Obama and the private sector are pushing for improved relations— Efforts have gotten relations in the right direction

Rusling 5/8 [Matt, Correspondent to Xinhua news, “U.S.-China relations on "right track," but challenges lie ahead: former U.S. defense secretary”, 5/8/11, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-05/08/c_13864034.htm>, TT]

WASHINGTON, May 7 (Xinhua) -- In the lead up to next week's U.S. -China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), ties between the two countries remain solid, said former U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen in a recent interview with Xinhua. "It's still on a very positive track at the executive level," the former Clinton administration official said of relations in recent months. "President Obama and his economic and security team are focused on building a better economic and security relationship with China." Those statements came not long after a period of strained relations between the two countries, who were last year at odds over some issues such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the value of the Yuan or RMB. Washington wanted the Chinese currency to rise, for example, while Beijing maintained that a sharp rise would hurt China's economy, although China has allowed the currency to increase somewhat. The relationship, however, was back on track in January when Chinese President Hu Jintao was welcomed to Washington in an official state visit and the two sides agreed to cooperate on a number of issues and declared their commitment to build a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit. Discussions of "becoming more of a consuming nation than an export nation, of developing the internal parts of China and building a consumer class, and focus on higher and higher technology, all of that is taking place in China," Cohen said. "Hopefully that will translate into more opportunities for American companies and international companies to do business in China, because China will have a very large consuming class," he said. But while the White House and Chinese leaders have emphasized cooperation, the U.S. Congress could be on a different page, Cohen said. "Congress may not be on the same path as the (Obama) administration in looking for these economic ties," he said. "We are going to have a more challenging time in the next couple of years by virtue of the fact that China continues to grow at a significant pace ... and the United States economy has been flagging," he said. "So the disparity between the growth pattern in China and the growth in the United States (could) become a political issue, and Congress, in turn, (could) look for ways to blame our economic troubles upon China, saying that (China) has manipulated their currency, that they are pursuing policies that are adverse to the United States," he said. In that scenario, however, the U.S. business community could step up in favor of better U.S.-China ties. "That's where the business community really comes into play, to say 'wait, there are issues where we are going to disagree ... but there are many more in which we can cooperate,'" he said. But the possibility of Congress politicizing U.S.-China relations is no foregone conclusion. Whatever happens in Congress, China may not become a central issue for U.S. lawmakers in the next year or 18 months, as the United States places the majority of its focus on issues surrounding the U.S. budget and deficit, he said.

## Relations Inevitable

### U.S. China relations inevitable— cyberspace

Fidler 7/6/11 (David P, James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law at the Maurer School of Law at Indiana University and a fellow at the IU Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research., China & US Focus, “U.S.-China Relations and the Security Dynamics of Geo-Cyberpolitics”, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/u-s-china-relations-and-the-security-dynamics-of-geo-cyberpolitics//sb)

Although weighty for both countries, geo-cyberpolitics affect them differently. China is the rising power, and is perceived in the United States as a challenger. The dominant role the United States has played in creating, developing, and expanding the Internet deepens the perception that China is challenging the political and cyber status quo. Part of the problem with Sino-American relations is that neither side seems sure what the "Chinese challenge" means. However, in the cyber realm, the differences between the United States and China are becoming more stark, **making cyberspace a contentious center of gravity for U.S-China relations**. As such, both countries are increasingly concerned about their security capabilities in cyberspace, particularly their abilities to engage in intelligence, covert, and military cyber-operations. U.S. concerns about "cyber attacks" originating in China and Chinese worries about the creation of U.S. Cyber Command reflect this cybersecurity dilemma. The nature of cyberspace exacerbates this dilemma because characterizing cyber incidents (was it an "attack" or merely espionage?) gets politicized and identifying perpetrators is difficult (plausible deniability in cyberspace is undeniably plausible). Both countries realize that they have to explain their behavior in political and global terms, which gives cybersecurity ideological importance. Here, the Obama administration has embraced "Internet freedom" as a universal value and launched programs to help dissidents censored by authoritarian governments to network for democracy. China has stressed respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, and equality between states, which extends its preference for the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence into cyberspace. These visions for cyberspace are not compatible, which fuels the mistrust brewing in the cybersecurity realm. Thus, concerning both security capabilities and normative concepts, cyberspace reflects with more clarity than other policy contexts the rivalry between the United States and China. What makes people, such as Henry Kissinger, nervous is that, on its current trajectory, the cybersecurity rivalry is becoming, if you will, binary because Chinese and American cyber power and principles are diverging and their positions are hardening.

## Relations Resilient

### US-China relations are flexible and strong enough to withstand disputes – strong mutual interests

Reid 10 [Tim. The Sunday Times. “The US-China relationship is strong enough to withstand disputes like this”. 1/22/10. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us\_and\_americas/article6997481.ece]

As with all recent presidents Barack Obama views America’s relationship with China as one of the most important for US interests abroad, and was careful not to discuss human rights in public when he visited Beijing in November. Mrs Clinton’s criticism of China over the Google cyber attacks is at first sight surprising, given that China is the greatest holder of US debt and plays a critical role in Mr Obama’s efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Mr Obama received much criticism in the US after his three-day visit, with allegations that he ignored human rights, had been tightly controlled by Beijing and had been too supine toward President Hu. Privately officials in Obama’s Administration felt that the trip had produced results: despite disagreements over climate change that surfaced at the Copenhagen summit in December, and impending US arms sales to Taiwan that is angering Beijing, the White House believes that dialogue with China is in good shape. It think that the relationship is strong enough to withstand disputes. Beijing appeared to be trying to play down Mrs Clinton’s comments. The wellbeing of the US economy — the world’s biggest importer of Chinese goods — is critical to job creation in China, so the two have strong mutual interests. But the Obama Administration is also a big supporter of freedom of the internet because it has begun to play such a vital role in democracy movements abroad. Sites such as Facebook, Flickr and Twitter have helped protesters in Iran to spread news and images. Mrs Clinton was reflecting a desire in Washington to fight for such freedoms. John Huntsman, the new US Ambassador to Beijing, said that the two countries would continue to have disagreements but the health of the relationship would be based on the their ability not to be distracted by such disputes.

### US-China relations are complex and multifaceted – a decline in one aspect of the relationship doesn’t mean collapse

Hamilton 03 [Lee. “The state of US-China relations”. The China Business Review, suppl. Special Anniversary Issue, 30. 2 (Mar/Apr 2003): 30-34. Accessed by ProQuest.]

The US-China relationship is the most complex bilateral relationship for the United States. Over the last 30 years, Sino-American relations have undergone an impressive transformation from animosity and conflict to candid dialogue and constructive cooperation. These two vast and complicated countries have found common ground on issues of trade, investment and, more recently, security. But key issues remain unresolved, and the potential for troubling divergence is real as China becomes an economic powerhouse, a military force in Asia, and a potential rival to US hegemony. The future of Sino-American relations is fraught with questions. Will Taiwan declare its independence, or will it be integrated into the People's Republic of China? Will American missile defense trigger a Chinese arms buildup, or will the two militaries strengthen their ties and cooperation? Can China's one-party system sustain itself in a market economy, or will China undergo drastic political change? Will China prove hospitable to human rights, or will it remain a rigid, state-controlled society? Uncertainty about these and other crucial questions is real, and momentous choices remain for Chinese and American leaders. If the last 30 years are taken as a guide, the leaders of tomorrow can best face these challenges by constructively engaging in pursuit of common interests. The economic ties that bind Overlapping interests between the United States and China have been predominantly in the economic sphere. China's drive to become an economic power has been simply astonishing. Growth rates have frequently approached 10 percent per year over the past 10 years, and in 2002 China was the recipient of more than $50 billion in foreign investment. There are now 2 million private companies in China, an emerging middle class, and ambitious infrastructure development projects. China is a global center for manufacturing and a regional economic power, particularly since the Japanese economy has stalled. This level of economic openness and growth in China was unthinkable 30 years ago and owes much to the relationship between the United States and China. On trade and investment, there has been considerable common ground and many areas of mutual interest between the two countries. The United States has pursued commercial opportunities, exports, and profits in China; China has sought US investment, technology, and support for Chinese accession into global trade regimes. US support for trade and investment in China has matured from Most Favored Nation status in the 1980s and 1990s to China's integration into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. China has in return demonstrated a willingness to open up its state-owned economy, dramatically reducing tariffs, overhauling laws and regulations, and permitting greater private ownership, property rights, and transparency. China still has a long way to go in reforming its economy, however. China's WTO compliance record so far is mixed, and it must continue to improve protection of intellectual property rights, remove import quotas on agricultural goods, eliminate regulations that discriminate against foreign products, and establish more efficient and vigorous independent regulatory agencies. China is also faced with ongoing problems with inflexible state-owned enterprises, bad loans in state banks, unfunded pension systems, and widespread corruption. But today's vibrant and developing China still bears little resemblance to the economy of the early 1970s. The ties afforded by this development have bolstered Sino-American relations beyond the balance sheet: Americans and Chinese now do business together, travel to each other's countries, indulge in common sports and entertainment, and shop for the same name brands. Though economic cooperation has been increasingly robust, the lack of political reform in China has proven to be an impediment to strengthening Sino-American ties. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has opened the economy while maintaining a one-party state in which power is concentrated in a few dozen individuals, and dissent has been repressed. China is undergoing a stunning modernization, but ordinary Chinese have very little say in the process. This balancing act has raised difficulties as the incompatibility between a free market and one-- party rule becomes evident; China could be approaching a crisis in governance, with a decay in the Party's authority, a deteriorating state capacity, and rising tensions between the regime and society. To many observers, it appears that China has to implement some strategy of political reform without delay, including legislative measures, legal system elections, and an empowerment of civil society. But the CCP is both determined and resilient, and the choice between working with a largely repressive entity or encouraging potentially destabilizing dissent has proven difficult for American policymakers. The United States has struggled to advance the cause of human rights and political reform in China. We have tried private diplomacy, public criticism, and economic sanctions-none of which have had particularly satisfying results. Human rights of all kinds in China-civil, political, women's, religious, and ethnic-remain among the most restricted in the world. The issue is a difficult one because Chinese and Americans approach it from different perspectives. Americans see a stultifying authoritarian government that denies-sometimes brutally-- universal rights and freedoms; many Chinese counter that economic and social rights are more important than political freedoms, and that the economic progress of the last 25 years therefore represents an impressive advance of human rights. The growth in economic openness presents an opportunity for human rights in China-as new people and ideas flow across the Chinese border, the potential for accompanying political and social change grows. But until there is real political change in China, human rights will persist as a glaring concern for Americans and American policymakers. Security Other areas of concern for Chinese and American policymakers are principally in the security arena. Chief among these is the future of Taiwan, which remains the most volatile point of tension in the US-China relationship. China has been persistent in its claim on Taiwan, simultaneously pursuing military buildups across the Taiwan Strait and closer links in commerce and trade with the island. The United States formally embraces a "one-- China" policy, and, despite statements made early in the Bush Administration, we have generally maintained strategic ambiguity with regard to Taiwan-we have dissuaded Taiwan from declaring independence, while keeping China guessing about a US response to an unprovoked Chinese offensive. Taiwan arouses passionate and historically rooted sentiment on both sides, and this has periodically led to inflamed rhetoric and escalated tensions. A principal goal on both sides has been-and should remain-the avoidance of military conflict over Taiwan. The United States should avoid provoking China over Taiwan, and China should not pursue military coercion in seeking to unify the island with the mainland. The future of Taiwan remains in question, but it is a question that should be worked out quietly-not through war, but through negotiation, commerce, and the passage of time. Another area of concern between the United States and China has been in weapons technology and proliferation. China is one of a few nations with the ability to inflict great nuclear harm on the United States, and has pursued a minimum nuclear deterrence capability. The United States has also accused China of exporting dangerous weapons and missile technology to countries like Pakistan and North Korea. Tensions have ebbed somewhat, as the 1990s saw the successful incorporation of China into several nonproliferation regimes, and China has recently announced a plan to limit its exports of missiles and other dual-use technologies. But US plans to build a missile defense system and China's goal of upgrading its nuclear capability ensure difficult times ahead. China will be provoked by any US attempt to eliminate its deterrence capability through a missile shield, while the United States will oppose a nuclear arms buildup in East Asia. Potential flashpoints such as the Korean peninsula and Taiwan could further complicate the situation. Dialogue between the military and civilian leadership of both nations is necessary to ensure that misunderstanding and mistrust do not escalate into something more dangerous. The potential for a successful and sustained dialogue has been somewhat strengthened since the war on terrorism recast the US-China relationship. The common strategic concern of terrorism has led to tangible cooperation: Chinese support for the US-led campaign in Afghanistan, intelligence-sharing, and US support for the Chinese crackdown on Islamic separatists in China's western territories. There is also a warmer tone between the two nations as of the end of 2002, as the United States has renewed military-- to-military ties, and China supported the United Nations resolution on Iraq and has pledged cooperation in defusing the crisis in North Korea. PRC President Jiang Zemin made it a priority to demonstrate enhanced relations and cooperation between the United States and China in the war on terror as China moved toward a change in leadership. In the coming months and years, incoming President Hu Jintao and the new Chinese leadership must resolve internal differences-if any-and formulate their own approach to the United States and foreign policy. It remains to be seen how this approach will differ from Jiang's approach, and to what extent Jiang will remain involved in diplomatic and security matters. For the time being, China seems to have accepted the reality of US preeminence, and the Bush Administration has decided to focus on working with China on areas of common concern. Building on a strong, yet uncertain, foundation The war on terror has put the Sino-American relationship on more solid footing, but the potential for a negative turn remains. One event, such as the downed spy plane or a statement by Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian in favor of independence, could swing relations in the other direction. This instability remains a flaw in the relationship, and in US policy toward China in general. The United States must have a multifaceted policy toward China because of the diversity of US interests regarding China. Too many Americans tend to think about the US-China relationship in terms of a single issue, such as trade, Taiwan, or human rights. Without diminishing the importance of these specific issues, American policymakers should not allow any one of these issues to dominate, drive, or derail the entire relationship. With so many questions ahead, there will surely be difficult times and differences of opinion. China is a vast and diverse country and economy, with a future that may be marked by both development and upheaval. If we pursue a policy that reflects the breadth of common interests between the two nations, then we can avoid the tumult that has afflicted relations between the two nations over the last 30 years. The United States should always speak up for its interests and values in dealing with China-- in commerce, international security, and human rights. But we should not fear a strong and prosperous China-the surest way to make China an enemy is to treat it as one. Despite serious and persistent differences, China and the United States have been able to construct a relationship that has benefited both countries and increased the stability of Asia and the world. Expanded ties and cooperation allow a flow of ideas that can break down mistrust and misunderstanding of China in the United States, while encouraging growth and, potentially, political change within China. The future of China is the great unknown of the twenty-first century. The vital task for the United States is to encourage China to move toward greater prosperity, freedom, and international cooperation, while acknowledging China's important and evolving role in the world. The United States and China continue to alternate between connecting and colliding on a great many issues. If both sides commit themselves to engagement, then the United States and China can build on the foundation of the last 30 years to forge a relationship characterized by depth, candor, and common interest.

## Relations High

### Cooperation is strong regardless of shifting political climates

People Daily 10 [“Obama: US-China talks a success, relations still strong”. 3/22/10. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6934917.html]

President Barack Obama held talks with Zhang Yesui, China's new ambassador to the United States, in the Oval Office on March 30. While meeting the ambassador, Obama said that U.S.-China relations are both comprehensive and important, reflecting the time-honored friendship and exchanges between the people in the two countries. Obama noted that the United States and China have witnessed robust and constructive growth in various aspects since the two countries established diplomatic ties 31 years ago. President Obama further added that the United States and China successfully held the first round of strategic and economic talks last year, and his meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao were hailed as fruitful. Hu and Obama unanimously agreed to established proactive and all-round bilateral ties in the 21st century and Washington welcomed a strong and prosperous China. The United States also promised to respect the one-China policy. At the meeting, Obama said the U.S.-China relationship was capable of reshaping the 21st century, and it was more important than any other bilateral ties in the world. China and the United States have made a concerted effort in combating regional and global issues such as nuclear proliferation, regional peace and stability and climate change. Ambassador Zhang expressed warm wishes to Obama on behalf of President Hu, and said a sound Sino-U.S. relationship reflected the fundamental interests of people in both countries. He said that strong ties would contribute to the peace, stability and development in Asia-Pacific region and world as a whole. Chinese leaders have attached great importance to Sino-U.S. relations, and are willing to work with the United States side-by-side to implement the joint communiqué the two countries have signed. China will continue to advance Sino-U.S. ties through dialogue, cooperation, mutual trust and respect.

### The relationship is strong – recent summits

NY Times 1/19 [Written by Michael Wines. “Subtle Signs of Progress in U.S.-China Relations”. 1/19/11. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world/asia/20assess.html?\_r=1&scp=2&sq=us%20china%20relationship%20strong&st=cse]

The Chinese have striven to lend this week’s state visit by President Hu Jintao the aura of a fresh start, from feel-good displays of friendly Chinese in Times Square to a Washington newspaper insert that declared on Wednesday that his meeting with President Obama could open a new chapter in a relationship between the world’s two economic giants that had been troubled. Enlarge This Image That much is doubtful. But for the first time in months, the two leaders may at least have started reading from the same book. After a 2010 notable mostly for Chinese acrimony toward the United States and its policies, Mr. Hu came to the White House not only saying that constructive relations between the two powers were essential, but also offering some modest concessions to demonstrate it. In a joint statement issued Wednesday, the Chinese for the first time expressed public concern over North Korea’s recent disclosure of a modern uranium-enrichment plant, a small but ardently sought step in American efforts to press Kim Jong-il to roll back his nuclear weapons program. More surprising, perhaps, Mr. Hu said at a White House news conference that “a lot still needs to be done in China in terms of human rights,” an unusual admission for a government that recently called the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to one of its dissidents a Western plot to embarrass Beijing. Words, of course, are easier than deeds. “I don’t equate new rhetoric with new reality in China,” said Kenneth G. Lieberthal, a Brookings Institution scholar who was President Bill Clinton’s national security adviser on China issues. “But at least new rhetoric is better than nothing.” So, in a sense, were the events of Wednesday. Neither side made any significant progress, much less any breakthrough, on the larger problems that have bedeviled relations ever since Mr. Obama made his state visit to Beijing in November 2009. On the American side, that includes revaluing China’s currency, leveling the playing field for American investors in China and establishing a serious discourse between the nations’ militaries. For the Chinese, the biggest thorns include American arms sales to Taiwan, its continued support of the Dalai Lama and what a Chinese journalist at Wednesday’s news conference called “strategic mistrust” — the fear that the United States is seeking to encircle China and suppress its rise. Still, each side came away from the meeting with something it could point to as an accomplishment, however modest. The White House had set out to keep relations from sliding even further downhill, and to establish a more personal relationship with Mr. Hu that could sustain ties during the next two years, when the political realities of choosing leaders in both countries will work against any significant improvement. Mr. Obama appears to have gotten that. For his part, Mr. Hu was, by American accounts, fixated on engineering a state visit that would portray China as an equal partner with the United States, and China’s president as a successful, internationally recognized statesman. He got that, too. Both leaders should also reap domestic political benefits from their meeting. Mr. Hu’s enhanced stature, American analysts say, should help him tamp down political forces that have driven a more aggressive foreign policy and hamstrung relations with the United States and China’s Pacific neighbors in the last year. Mr. Hu and China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, “realize this assertiveness based in the last year on nationalism and the belief that the U.S. is declining has gotten them into deep trouble,” said Joseph S. Nye Jr., the former dean at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and a State Department and Pentagon official in the Carter and Clinton administrations. Mr. Nye was in Washington for a luncheon with Mr. Hu at the State Department. “They think a summit which could be played as a success can give them ammunition to quiet down this rumbling below in the ranks.” For his part, Mr. Obama comes away from the visit with a new reputation for toughness in his China policy, something that is likely to please conservatives and some liberals alike. In the past week, the president’s cabinet members loosed a fusillade of speeches intended to lay out the administration’s differences with Beijing for all to see. And at Wednesday’s public sessions with Mr. Hu, Mr. Obama repeatedly raised concerns about China’s currency, its foot-dragging in stopping the pirating of American software and other intellectual property, its poor human rights record and, boldest of all, China’s refusal to talk to the Dalai Lama. Critics on Mr. Obama’s left have accused him of soft-pedaling human rights since the start of his presidency, when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton played down the need to raise rights concerns in public during a visit to Beijing. This time, Mr. Obama invited human rights advocates to the White House for a meeting on China in the days before Mr. Hu’s arrival, and raised the issue from the beginning on Wednesday, in his remarks welcoming Mr. Hu to the White House. Mr. Obama also had a “very serious” discussion on human rights with Mr. Hu during a private dinner in the White House on Tuesday, Mr. Lieberthal said. “The administration feels this is about managing a very complicated and very important relationship — and I stress ‘managing,’ ” he said. “This is not a relationship where everything is going to come out right.” Whether baby steps on human-rights language and other issues will show staying power after Mr. Hu returns to Beijing and the cauldron of domestic politics is an open question, Mr. Lieberthal and other experts said. But for now, “progress is progress,” said Nina Hachigian, a veteran analyst on United States-China relations at the Center for American Progress, a Democratic-leaning research group. “And even if it’s incremental progress, it’s better than no progress at all.”

## Alternate Causalities

### Alt causes that only the CP solve— Taiwan arm sales, military exercises, and human rights

Northam 2011 [Jackie, Foreign Affairs correspondent for NPR news, “U.S. Seeks To Revitalize Ties With China”, 1/12/11, <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/12/132842681/u-s-seeks-to-revitalize-ties-with-china>, TT]

One thing that is certain: As China's power increases, so too does its expectation that the U.S. will make certain accommodations, said University of Virginia professor Harry Harding, a longtime China watcher. "If the U.S. was going to ask things of China, China was now in a position to ask things of the United States — such things as agreeing to end arms sales to Taiwan, agreeing to stop having military exercises or reconnaissance missions close in to Chinese shoreline, near Chinese waters," Harding said. Harding said the U.S. hasn't agreed to do any of these things. Conversely, China hasn't addressed U.S. concerns over issues such as human rights, trade imbalance and the strength of its currency. Harding said he worries that those lingering, unresolved issues could fester. But he said that overall the U.S.-China relationship is resilient. He pointed to the economic turbulence of 2010, which many people speculated would lead to a breakdown in relations between the two countries. "I think many people thought that was going to be the result of the global downturn, resulting in [a] pretty open trade war," he said. "That didn't happen, and I think that it shows that despite all the differences and all the tensions, the two countries are highly interdependent." Still, Harding said he worries that other factors could cause a breach between the two nations, such as the collapse of North Korea or a conflict over Taiwan.

### No chance the plan solves relations permanently— previous diplomatic failures prove distrust inevitable

Auslin 7/14 [Michael, director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute, “The Trust Gap in U.S.-China Relations”, 7/14/11, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304911104576443553760800950.html>, TT]

It has become a ritual in Washington to "restart" military exchanges with China. Regular contact has been suspended a number of times over the past two decades and each new cancellation sparks a round of worrying over the causes of the rift. It's time to accept the continued, deep-seated mutual distrust China and the United States hold toward each other. Reducing expectations from these military ties will lead to a more mature relationship and one in which the United States begins a serious debate about how to define and protect its interests in the coming decades. Both China and America have canceled scheduled meetings and exchanges numerous times over the years. The latest freeze lasted for 18 months, beginning in January 2010 over proposed arms sales to Taiwan, and fully ending this week with the visit of Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to China. The roster of incidents that have caused cancellations reads like a list of persistent diplomatic sore spots: the Tiananmen massacre, Chinese harassment of U.S. reconnaissance planes, and the accidental 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

### Alt Causes— South China Sea and Taiwanese independence

Auslin 7/14 [Michael, director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute, “The Trust Gap in U.S.-China Relations”, 7/14/11, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304911104576443553760800950.html>, TT]

The main irritant, however, is Taiwan. America's continued support for Taiwanese security remains a major lever with which Beijing attempts to pressure Washington. Any mooted sale of advanced weaponry to Taiwan results in a rupture in military and sometimes political ties. Only with the Obama Administration making clear its opposition to such sales in the past month did the Mullen visit get approval. One would then think that ties should have warmed since then. Yet another major irritant has since been introduced into the relationship: the South China Sea. Months of fencing over China's increased rhetoric and assertive presence in the waters of Southeast Asia have resulted in no common ground. Indeed, during Adm. Mullen's visit, the Chinese defense minister led off his public remarks with a criticism of recent U.S. naval exercises with its longtime ally, the Philippines, and an assertion that the U.S. should spend less on its military.

## A2: Solves Warming

### U.S. Japan Alliance solves warming via Clean Tech

Denmark and Kliman 10 [Abraham M., Fellow with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Daniel M. a visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security contributing to the Asia-Pacific Security Program and other initiatives, “Cornerstone: A Future Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, Center for a New American Security, June 2010, [www.cnas.org/files/.../USJapanPolicyBrief\_DenmarkKliman\_June2010.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/.../USJapanPolicyBrief_DenmarkKliman_June2010.pdf), TT]

Lastly, the alliance can complement existing initiatives to address “natural security” threats – environmental challenges like global warming and resource competition. To date, the alliance agenda has yet to take up natural security concerns in any serious way. This is unfortunate. Although removed from the more traditional threats the alliance has traditionally countered, natural security threats pose a considerable challenge to the United States and Japan given their reliance on energy imports and the centrality of critical minerals to their high-technology sectors. Moreover, with two of the world’s leading science establishments, the United States and Japan have an unparalleled capacity to address natural security threats. Putting natural security squarely on the alliance agenda will ensure it receives adequate attention from high-level policymakers rather than languishes as one of many areas comprising the bilateral relationship. Under the auspices of the alliance, the United States and Japan should launch bilateral collaboration to develop clean energy technology, establish a common U.S.-Japan standard for mitigating greenhouse gases and work to devise substitutes for critical minerals. To be sure, natural security will never displace the many traditional security challenges the alliance confronts, but it constitutes an important future area for alliance cooperation.

## A2: Solves U.S.-China War

### No U.S. China War – economic interdependence

Gewirtz 1/18 [Paul. The New York Times. “What America and China Must Not Forget”. 1/18/11. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/opinion/19iht-edgewirtz19.html?scp=4&sq=us%20china%20relationship%20strong&st=cse>.]

Two starkly different paths for U.S.-China relations have become apparent as Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao hold their summit meeting in Washington this week. The first path is one of cooperation and actions that build trust and create mutual benefits. The second is continuing the current downward drift in relations with ever-expanding mistrust and conflict. However, the fact that the United States and China have many common interests does not mean that we will inevitably pursue them. Nor does China’s rising economic and military power mean inevitable conflict, as fatalistic doomsayers in both countries are arguing. The United States and China are now so entangled with each other economically that conflict — whether escalating trade protectionism or belligerent rivalry for spheres of influence or military provocation — inflicts major harm on both countries. And there are so many global problems that require U.S.-China cooperation if the world is to find solutions — including climate change, energy scarcity, nuclear proliferation, genocide and pandemics — that we have large incentives and responsibilities to cooperate. The central problem in the U.S.-China relationship right now is mutual mistrust. Large numbers of Chinese in and out of the government believe that the United States is out to stop China’s rise and is actively seeking to overthrow the government. Even as many Chinese see America as a declining power, they also see America’s strength and react to U.S. criticism of China through history’s lens of China’s occupation and “humiliation” by Western countries and Japan. Large numbers of Americans fear or feel frustrated by China’s rapid economic rise, particularly at a time of our own economic difficulties.

# China Weaponization/ASATs

## 1NC—China Weaponization Frontline

### No solvency— China realizes that they are in competition with the U.S.— They will do whatever they want because they know the U.S. wont respond— BMD theft proves

Auslin 2011 [Michael, director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute, “Reframe U.S.-China Relations”, 1/22/11, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703954004576089263226410434.html, TT]

President Hu Jintao's state visit has offered the White House a chance to reframe the U.S.-China relationship, but only if President Barack Obama and his top policy makers are bold enough to decide to recognize that the U.S. is indeed in a competition with China, whether it wishes it or not. This means pursuing American interests regardless of the fuss the Chinese will make and giving Beijing the responsibility of deciding whether it wants a more constructive relationship. If President Obama continues to pursue the same course as prior administrations, Chinese leader-in-waiting Xi Jinping will come into office in 2012 immeasurably strengthened compared to a fading United States. American allies and partners, too, are eagerly watching to see if the Obama team is confident enough to reframe policy so as to promote the interests of democratic, liberal nations. For over two decades, American presidents have been playing defense to China's steady moves to acquire power, influence and the ability to hinder America's defense of liberal interests. From ignoring the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 to downplaying China's clear cyber predations, American policy makers have sought instead to "engage" China and lead it seamlessly into becoming a "responsible stakeholder," in the once-popular words of World Bank President Robert Zoellick. In response, Beijing has carefully and smartly pursued its advantage at every turn. It has rapidly modernized its once-outmoded military. During Secretary of State Robert Gates's visit to China two weeks ago, the Chinese Air Force test flew its new fifth-generation prototype fighter-bomber, in a calculated insult to Mr. Gates's notion of improving military-to-military ties. Chinese warnings against U.S.-led naval exercises in the Yellow Sea last year are widely believed to have caused the White House to postpone the drills for months. China's ballistic missile forces grow in number every year, and the U.S. now believes that China has developed an anti-ship ballistic missile that will be able one day to target U.S. aircraft carriers. Meanwhile, Chinese fishing boats backed up by maritime patrol ships regularly intrude upon other nations' exclusive economic zones, leading to showdowns at sea. When Japan arrested the captain of one such fishing vessel that rammed Japanese ships last fall, Beijing responded by cutting off crucial industrial mineral exports, arresting innocent Japanese workers in China, and giving the cold-shoulder to the Japanese ambassador. As it has gained strength, Beijing has gained confidence. That confidence is leading to increasing assertiveness and pressure on smaller and democratic countries alike. Reframing is a tactic to seize the initiative. It is designed to shift the existing pattern of relations to one's advantage, in part by putting pressure on one's counterpart and in part by refusing to respond to their provocations. The United States has been struggling to respond to Beijing for years. Even during its so-called "unipolar moment" of the 1990s, Washington largely turned a blind eye to Beijing's theft of ballistic missile technology and nuclear warhead designs. The main goal of reframing is to set the contours of interaction, and thereby for Washington to protect its interests and prevent further instability in the Sino-American relationship.

### China weaponization is inevitable— They have the resources and technology now

Strategic Studies Quarterly 2008 [“China's Investment in Anti-Satellite Weapons may make Space Arms Race Inevitable Regardless of U.S. Decisions”, Spring 2008, <http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/3331>, TT]

Second, China has developed the means to attack some US satellites, and there is no guarantee that China does not ultimately seek to develop a robust space weapons program. China's ASAT test demonstrates that the Chinese have been working assiduously at developing their space weapons program. Although China made a decision in the early 1990s to focus its space resources on civilian programs, an annual official budget of $2.5 billion for space programs and a growing number of dual-use technology programs suggest that China's military space capacity is growing. For instance, China has long conducted research on the development of beam weapons that can be incorporated into ASAT weapons systems. China is known to have tested high-power microwave weapons for jamming satellite communication. If China is indeed pursuing a full-blown space weapons program, a space arms race may be inevitable despite a US decision not to launch the first space weapons program.

### The impact of ASATs are inevitable— India is developing the squo

Listner 2011 [Michael, Space Policy Examiner, “India's ABM test: proven ASAT capability or a paper tiger?”, 3/8/11, http://www.examiner.com/space-policy-in-national/india-s-abm-test-proven-asat-capability-or-a-paper-tiger?cid=parsely#parsely#ixzz1GMIpRWci,TT]

Any doubts about India's intentions were cleared up when V.K. Saraswat publically acknowledged that India was developing and bringing together the basic technologies that were already part of India's ABM program to create a system that could be used against satellites belonging to an adversary.[6] The decision to adapt India's existing ABM technologies to the ASAT role was doubtless encouraged by the ancillary capability demonstrated by the United States when it adaptated its ABM system to de-orbit USA-193. Dedicated weapon or capability? It is unclear whether India's purported ASAT capacity is intended to be a dedicated weapons program or a simply a capability. To illustrate, China's ASAT test in 2007 was likely the result of dedicated weapons program. The test against Fengyun 1C in 2007 not only demonstrated an anti-satellite capability but also a weapons program dedicated towards the creation of that capability. Critics argue that the United States demonstrated an ongoing ASAT program when it used assets from it ballistic missile defense program to de-orbit USA-193; however, the United States does not have an active program dedicated to develop and deploy ASATs. What the United States did demonstrate is that it has an ancillary capability to its ABM program that can de-orbit a satellite. The distinction is important because in the case of China the test was the result of an active effort to develop and deploy a dedicated weapon system. In the case of the United States, a viable capability ancillary to missile defense was demonstrated, but the means used were not the result of a dedicated ASAT program. India's public statements about the purported ASAT system seems to fit neither of these categories but rather they straddle the fence. On one hand, public statements made by India's officials indicate that their goal is to protect its space assets and deny the use of space to an adversary.[7] In the same vein India's ASAT capacity is described as strictly a deterrent and not meant to be used.[8] The statements made give the impression that India intends to field a dedicated ASAT along with the deployment of its ABM system, but at the same time it considers the ASAT role as an ancillary capability that it does not intend to use. It is perhaps this ambiguity and uncertainty where India's ABM program ends and its ASAT program begins that India is relying upon to make China wary of interfering with its outer space assets.

### India is watching closely- increased cooperation with China undermines India Relations

Cheng 09 (Dean B, “Reflections on Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation”, part of Space and Defense, Vol. 2, No. 3, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower\_Center\_for\_Space\_and\_Defense\_Studies/Journal\_Vol\_2\_No\_3\_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202\_3.pdf//sb)

Potentially further complicating this situation is India. With a burgeoning space program India constitutes yet another participant in a potential Asian space race. Fueled by a growing economy, India has steadily improved its space capabilities, launching the Chandrayaan-1 lunar probe in 2008, soon after the Japanese Kaguya and Chinese Chang’e-1 probes. Again, this is not to suggest that there is a space race underway, but it would be hard to deny that the major Asian powers are each watching the others carefully (or, more accurately, that China is being watched carefully by its neighbors). That space is a major potential arena for competition among these states is highlighted by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between Japan and India, initialed by the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers on October 22, 2008 in Tokyo. The final “mechanism of cooperation” listed in the agreement was for cooperation between the two nations’ space programs. “Cooperation will be conducted between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in the field of disaster management.” 38 For the United States, cooperating with China on space issues, when it is not yet doing so with India, could well send mixed messages to Delhi. In particular, there is a perception in many quarters that the United States is intent upon balancing China through India. 39 US space cooperation with China might allay such concerns and signal that the US is not seekin to counter China through India. It might, however, be seen as “double-dealing” by the Indian government, which has its own concerns about China stemming to at least the 1962

### Indian relations solve the impact— population size, democratic nature and geographic position means they’re more important than China

Auslin 2011 [Michael, director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute, “The Partnership of the Future”, 5/31/11, <http://www.aei.org/article/103661> TT]

As Washington braces for another $400 billion in defense spending cuts, the urge to find a strategic partner in Asia is gaining steam. In that search, India often seems like the dream option—almost by default. America's alliance with Japan, while remaining the linchpin of the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific, remains buffeted by political tension and an inability to resolve the long-standing Futenma airbase relocation dispute. South Korea, while playing an increasingly welcome global role, remains focused on the threat posed by Pyongyang. Washington has enhanced its engagement with Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia and Malaysia, but they remain limited in their capacity for regional action. That has left India as the great hope for many geopolitical thinkers in Washington. The world's largest democracy will soon overtake China as the most populous country, and its strategic location astride the Indian Ocean gives it direct access to China, Pakistan and much of Southeast Asia. India, for its part, has indicated a desire to play a greater regional role both politically and militarily

### China coop over space collapses U.S. soft power

Dinerman 09 (Taylor, The Space Review, “Just how soft is NASA’s soft power going to be?” 11/30/09, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1519/1//sb)

The Augustine committee report states: “If the U.S. is willing to lead a global program of exploration, sharing both the burdens and the benefits of space exploration in a meaningful way, significant benefits could follow. Actively engaging international partners in a manner adapted to today’s multipolar world could strengthen geopolitical relationships, leverage global financial and technological resources, and enhance the exploration enterprise.” **Nice words, but not a very substantial basis for policy.** The Bush Administration’s approach was arrogant. They said, in effect, “We’re going to the Moon, and eventually to Mars, if you want to come along, fine. Don’t get in the way and pull your own weight.” This may have disturbed some foreign space policymakers, but it at least had the virtue of being clear and reflecting financial and technical realities. Unless there is a radical change in both US policy and in the shape of the world’s economy these realities are not going to change for at least the foreseeable future; say twenty years. As of now the Obama Administration is still making up its mind what to do, where it wants to go, and above all what it wants to spend. There is at least a possibility that the next NASA budget will simply reflect the status quo. If there is a large cut to the budget then the plans may change, but it will be difficult to durably change the overall direction of the program. At some point, a little more than a decade from now, America will send humans beyond low Earth orbit. Atmospherics, however, are also important. **If the US is seen as meekly asking the rest of the world to please support the goals and ambitions of the exploration program, it will be treated with contempt.** This will not only make it exceptionally difficult to come up with acceptable international agreements, but it will almost certainly ensure that the next Congress or the next administration will seek to overturn any unfair, unequal, or humiliating deals made by the current leadership. NASA’s experience with major international exploration agreements has been mixed. The Apollo-Soyuz deal put together by Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972 and flown in 1975 was a bit of propaganda for the idea of “detente”. As Walter McDougall put it in his authoritative …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, “it gave Soviet technicians the chance to traipse through US space facilities and flight operations firsthand.” That’s something the Chinese can do today simply by going on the Internet. The Apollo-Soyuz flight was a dead end. Twenty years later, in February 1995, the Shuttle flew its first mission to Russia’s Mir space station. This was an early step in NASA’s second great international program, the International Space Station (ISS), and in spite of everything it has been a technological success. It has taught NASA and its partners invaluable lessons in building and maintaining large structures in space. The Clinton Administration, which created the program, and the George W. Bush administration, which largely built and paid for it, made sure that it was recognized as a US-led program. Neither of these projects represents a good or accurate model for the current situation. With Apollo-Soyuz the hardware already existed, so modifying it for the “Handshake in Space” that was intended to symbolize the end of the US-Soviet confrontation was not that difficult. The ISS project was based on previous work done by NASA on Space Station Freedom and above all on the need for Clinton to show some magnanimity towards the Russians. **Today Washington’s political motivation for a US-Chinese joint space project is pretty murky**. The Chinese have publicly laid out a path that does not require any international cooperation. They could change their plans, but this might upset delicate internal political or industrial arrangements that we know nothing about. There has been a lot of speculation about the exact motives that drive their human exploration program, but few hard facts have emerged. On the other hand, we know that the Obama Administration and Congress are chock-a-block full of motivations, many of them contradictory or confused, but all of them expressed with passion. There are political motivations: after all, Florida, Texas, and California are all big voter-rich states. There are questions of prestige and international power. There are industrial, scientific, and technological reasons why leaders in Washington think that this is important. There is a strong desire on the part of both parties to use NASA’s accomplishments as a way to inspire kids to study science and engineering. In all of NASA’s programs, ever since the Eisenhower days, there has been an element of “soft power”. Some administrations have used it more effectively than others, but it has always been there. Yet this kind of power is only a tool, not a goal in itself. **If the US presents itself as too eager for partnership agreements or too weak to explore the solar system without assistance, then the world and the American people will only see softness**

### Zero Spillover for space cooperation- Chinese coop efforts only hurt the U.S.

Pollpeter 08 (Kevin, China Program Manager at Defense Group Inc.’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. Previously, he was a researcher at the RAND Corporation. Mr. Pollpeter is widely published on China national security issues and focuses on the Chinese space program, RAND corporation, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE”, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub852.pdf//sb>)

**Good relations in space do not drive good relations on Earth**. International cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the overall relationship and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. It is more likely that China’s penchant to offer aid and investment to developing countries without conditions will increase its influence more than cooperation on space activities. Nevertheless, China’s space program does play a role in advancing China’s diplomatic agenda and China’s leadership in this area may contribute to its overall increase in diplomatic influence. China’s cooperative space activities present another avenue for countries to participate in space without the United States and increases multipolarity. The failed attempt by China to become a major player in the Galileo project is just one example of how attempts by China to promote a more multipolar world can impinge on U.S. security interest.

### ASAT attacks fail

Shachtman, ’08 [Noah Shachtman, citing Geoffrey Forden, physicist and Senior Research Scientist at MIT’s Security Studies Program, “How China loses the coming space war”, 1/10/08, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/]

You need a launch pad to attack a target in deep space, like an American GPS satellite. China has just three of these pads. This really restricts China’s offensive capabilities in space. Assuming that China devotes all its deep-space ASATs on GPS satellites, it could destroy at most 16 satellites. At the current time, with 32 functioning navigation satellites, that would still leave 16 satellites still working. Over a period of years, the debris from those collisions would represent a significant threat to more than those satellites immediately attacked. They would pass, time and time again, through the belts of debris that resulted from the interceptions. However, it would probably take longer than the military conflict China initiated with these attacks before additional satellites were destroyed by subsequent collisions. Usually, there are about nine GPS satellites over China at any given time. If China somehow managed to destroy all of these, it could eliminate America’s use of precision-guided munitions—for a few hours, until the orbits of other GPS satellites take them over the Taiwan Straits. Quite quickly, the constellation’s other 23 satellites would fill in the gap due to their normal orbital movement. Even if it destroyed 16 satellites, China could still only interrupt GPS over the Straits for about eight hours. During the other 16 hours there would be the four or more satellites present over the target area for bombing runs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights, and ship tracking. This pattern of eight hours off followed by 16 hours when GPS could be used would be repeated every day until new satellites are launched. This outage would certainly cause difficulties; GPS not only guides American precision bombs – it helps pilot UAV spy planes, and monitor ships. US casualties might increase , with air crews forced to fly missions during daylight hours – and conduct some of the "dull, dirty, and dangerous" missions now flown by robotic planes. It’s a situation no American commander would want to face. But it would not be a catastrophic one. And it would not eliminate precision weaponry, UAVs, or any other American activity that depends on GPS. Keep in mind, this is the worst of the worst-case scenarios. It is highly unlikely that China could remove all the satellites over the conflict area at the same time. After all, attacking 16 satellites, all in different orbits with ASATs launched on just four different rockets involves some fairly complex orbital maneuvers. A much more likely scenario is that, at best, China could destroy four GPS satellites in the initial wave followed roughly seven hours later by four more, a third wave at roughly 45 minutes after that, and the final wave two hours later. Thus, the GPS attack is spread over ten hours and never eliminates all the satellites visible over the area of conflict at the same time. This Chinese attack on US navigation satellites would not eliminate or even significantly degrade the US’s ability use precision-guided munitions..

## Weaponization Inevitable

### Chinese space modernization will continue to grow rapidly and hurt cooperation

Trivedi 6/23/11 (Sahiba, Sustainable Security, “SPACE: THE FINAL FRONTIER OF SINO-US RIVALRY?”, http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/space-final-frontier-sino-us-rivalry//sb)

China’s programme could have repercussions for the Sino-US relationship. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s recent US visit resulted in a number of trade and investment deals being inked between the two countries. However, space was not one of them even though according to Washington, the 4 main areas of potential cooperation with China include space alongside cyber-security, missile defense and nuclear weapons. **But since mutual trust is important for any kind of cooperation between the two nations, space is a ‘no-go**’. The US and Chinese space programmes cannot be compared directly. The American programme precedes China’s by at least 40 years and China has yet to land its first man on moon. The US satellite and spacecraft technology is still years ahead of China. **But China is on the fast track right now**. In 2011 alone, China aims to put more than twenty vehicles into space. Compared to this, the US space programme is in a state of inertia. It has had to scrap its ‘Constellation Program’ since the struggling American economy cannot afford the huge price tag attached to the programme at present. Details of the Chinese space programme remain undisclosed and even its civilian component is run primarily by its military. For the US, this limits strategic cooperation to a large extent. The US is also wary of China’s growing military ambitions. China has recently tested its first stealth fighter aircraft. Since space technology almost always has military uses like missile development and remote monitoring and control, it is likely that a successful space programme in China would bolster its military and naval prowess. Hence, the US is clearly uneasy about the programme even though the administration has downplayed reports of China’s goal of a manned moon mission. For China, the US skepticism over its space programme as well as its ban on high-tech exports to China is a hurdle to cooperation in space. The navigational system ‘Beidou’ is crucial for the Chinese military as presently it has to depend on the US GPS. The Chinese fear is that this GPS could be blocked or manipulated in case of a conflict. The US is also jittery because of fears of technology proliferation since China’s allies include countries like Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. Supremacy in space would also aid China in elevating it to the status of a global superpower. Commercially too, an advanced space programme could eventually result in China being first in the race to extract lunar resources like uranium and titanium. **Over the next few years, it is unlikely that the speed of China’s progress in its space programme will go down.** Also, as it achieves its goals, China’s programme will definitely make many countries around the world nervous. Hence, with each of China’s successes, the world will see other countries taking frantic action to catch up with it. It is also possible that with a robust and thriving space programme in its kitty, China may be the next nation to be included in International Space Station (ISS). Such a situation may lessen the atmosphere of mutual suspicion to a certain degree.

### Space race inevitable

Chambers, ’09 [Rob Chambers, “China’s space program: a new tool for PRC ‘soft power’ in international relations?”, March 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497039&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

Manned spaceflight has been the great human and technological achievement of the past 50 years. By launching astronauts and taikonauts into orbit, the US and China have stirred the imagination of the world while expanding and defining human experience. In the first few decades of the 21st century, manned spaceflight will continue to generate public enthusiasm and to embody the human drama of exploration. However, the distrust and lack of cooperation between Washington and Beijing suggest human spaceflight may be overshadowed by a competition in which the two main players seek to display their technological prowess and bolster national prestige. Since both countries recognize that space can provide one country with advantages, or at least avoid disadvantages, compared to the other, such a competition would seem inevitable. For its part, the US understands that the manned space arena can no longer be regarded as their backyard – a fact that is perhaps even more relevant militarily.

## No Spillover

### Space Cooperation doesn’t spillover- it just gets tangled up in bigger controversial issues

Foust 06 (Jeff, The Space Review, “US-China space cooperation: the Congressional view”, 7/17/06, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/661/1//sb)

Inevitably, any China-US space cooperation will get tangled up in bigger issues between the two countries, like economic policy and human rights, something that the congressmen said shouldn’t be avoided. “The fact is when you talk to the United States you have to talk democracy and human rights; it’s just part of who we are. We’re going to talk jobs, and we’re going to talk about the economy. We’re going to talk about military issues,” said Larsen. “They may be uncomfortable to talk about, but we’re going to have to address these issues if we’re going to even get to a point where we can talk about moving forward.” This gets back to the question of what each country has to gain by cooperating with one another in space exploration, an issue that arguably has not yet been convincingly answered in either country. Larsen, looking at the big picture, notes that China is working hard on a number of fronts to become more technologically advanced. “The space program is part of that economic development goal,” he said. “US policy needs to understand that, address it, and find ways to engage China on any number of issues because that country is thinking more strategically in terms of goal of competitiveness than I think we are.” How space fits into that big picture—or even if it does—has yet to be determined.

## No Impact to ASATs—No Tech

### Chinese ASATs fail – limited tracking and launch capabilities

Saunders et al, ’02 [Philip Saunders et al., “China’s space capabilities and the strategic logic of anti-satellite weapons”, 7/22/02, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020722.htm]

Despite numerous indications that China is interested in developing ASAT weapons and significant overall improvements in China's space program over the last two decades, China still lacks a number of capabilities that would be required for a viable ASAT program. These limitations include: \* Limited tracking capabilities. China continues to rely heavily on shared and leased space tracking facilities, which might not be available in the event of a conflict. Despite a domestic network, two foreign sites, and four tracking ships, the Chinese tracking system does not have a global reach. \* Limited launch capabilities. Although its launch capabilities have been improving, China still lacks the launch on-demand capability required for space warfare and for an effective ASAT system. \* Vulnerable infrastructure. China's immobile launch facilities, tracking facilities, space infrastructure, and possible ground-based laser sites would all be vulnerable to attack.

### No impact – lack of space architecture for ASATs

Lewis, ’04 [James A. Lewis, senior fellow and director of Technology and Public Policy Program at CSIS, “China as a military space competitor”, August 2004, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/040801\_china\_space\_competitor.pdf]

Secrecy and dissimulation complicates analysis of China’s space efforts26 and many questions remain about China’s military space capabilities. China is actively pursing military, civil and commercial activities in space. China has built and launched a broad range (albeit with varying degrees of sophistication and performance) of military satellites and its space reconnaissance and ASAT programs could pose a challenge for the U.S. Despite this, China’s military presence in space is sporadic. It does not have a coherent military space architecture. If an effective military space program entails continuous coverage by intelligence collection satellites and a network of communications satellites, China has not made the effort. This absence in space is not the result of a lack of technological capability, but reflects a national decision about how to spend resources for space.

### China’s ASAT sensors only work in bright daylight – far-infrared sensors remain decades away

Shachtman, ’08 [Noah Shachtman, citing Geoffrey Forden, physicist and Senior Research Scientist at MIT’s Security Studies Program, “How China loses the coming space war”, 1/10/08, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/]

Let’s start with what we know about China’s ASAT capabilities today. And we know quite a bit. Because there are few, if any, secrets in space. Amateurs around the world track most, if not all, of the classified US military satellites from their backyards, posting their positions on the internet. NORAD,is capable of tracking objects as small as four inches across. In fact, NORAD’s measurements of the debris caused by China’s January 2007 test were posted on the web. In the case of the Chinese test, the orbital tracks of that debris can be used to reveal the capabilities and limitations of China’s ASAT weapon by reconstructing the collision — much like forensic scientists reconstruct a crime scene. By backtracking the debris to the point where they all converge, we can determine the two most important aspects of the Chinese ASAT: how China destroyed that satellite, and just how capable its satellite-killer really is. The interception was almost head on at a combined speed of almost 18,000 miles per hour. The pieces of debris wound up with the greatest speeds—much higher than the original satellite. This means that China accomplished the most sophisticated of space maneuvers: a hit-to-kill interception, the equivalent of hitting a bullet with a bullet. This is equivalent to what the US is trying to develop in its national missile defense system and is much more sophisticated than the ASAT the Soviet Union was working in the 1980s: little more than a space mine that slowly snuck up on its target and detonated near by. We also know that the ASAT was highly maneuverable. Yes, the target satellite’s orbit was known well ahead of the interception. However, that does not mean that the satellite’s position was known well enough that the ASAT did not need to steer itself to hit the target. In fact, it is very likely that the interceptor needed to maneuver at high speeds, perhaps as much as six times the acceleration of gravity, to hit its target. The orbital speed of the target satellite, which is determined by its altitude, also provides us with significant insight into the interceptor’s capability. The closing speed of the interception, which is a combination of the target satellite’s orbital speed and the speed of the interceptor, determines how much time is available to make final adjustments. For instance, just one second before the collision on January 11th, the interceptor and target were five miles apart. During that one second, the interceptor had to make any final adjustments to its trajectory to hit a target smaller than six feet across. Any decrease in the closing speed makes the attack that much easier. Since orbital speeds decrease with increasing altitudes, the Chinese interceptor would find it considerably easier to hit a target in higher orbit. Finally, the interceptor needed to track its target, so that it could determine where it should move to place itself in front of the obsolete weather satellite; we have a good sense of how that was done, too. The most likely method it employed to track the oncoming satellite was an on-board telescope using visible light. Locking onto a target this way — as opposed to focusing on the infrared light emitted by the heat of the target, the way the US missile defense interceptor does — imposes significant limitations on the system. In particular, until it develops a far-infrared capability, which is probably decades away, its ASAT will be forced to attack satellites while they are in bright sunlight. Indeed, even though the site from which the interceptor was launched was cloaked in darkness, the target satellite was high enough to be brightly illuminated by the sun. Until China does develop better sensors, this imposes a very severe constraint on how and when it could attack other satellites: it must wait to attack low Earth orbit satellites when they are in bright sunshine. Attacks against satellites in significantly higher orbits, such as GPS or geostationary satellites, are less constrained by this requirement since they are almost always in direct sunlight.

## No Impact to ASATs—Status Quo Solves

### Easily changeable satellite velocities safeguard against attacks

Shachtman, ’08 [Noah Shachtman, citing Geoffrey Forden, physicist and Senior Research Scientist at MIT’s Security Studies Program, “How China loses the coming space war”, 1/10/08, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/]

At that point, however, the United States could effectively stop China’s attack simply by changing the remaining satellites’ orbital speeds by as little as 200 mph (they are typically moving at over 16,500 mph). This very small change will have a large effect in the position of the satellite the next time it crosses over China; effectively putting the satellite out of range of the pre-positioned ASAT launcher. This is not an excessive change in speed and, unless the satellite is very close to the end of its operational life, is well within the capability of its onboard fuel supply. Furthermore, it does not have to change its speed very rapidly the way a deep-space satellite would have to in order to avoid collision in its final moments. Instead, this relatively small velocity change has tens of minutes or even hours to change the position of the satellite before the next time it crosses over China. During this time, it is steadily moving away from its original position so that it could be hundreds of miles from where China thought it was going to be. While it is possible that the pre-positioned ASAT missiles could still reach their target even after it had changed, they would not know where, exactly, to aim the missile. Instead, they would have to perform a radar search for the satellite in an ever expanding volume of space. This volume quickly becomes too large for even the most powerful of mobile radars. In fact, it would take a fairly large (perhaps 50 feet in diameter) to detect the satellite during its next pass and China does not have a lot of those radars. So most, if not all, of the satellites remaining after the first hour would be safe for the next 24. During that time, the United States could try to destroy all of China’s fixed radars that are capable of tracking the satellites in their new orbits. (In other words, it does not matter how many additional ASATs China has to shoot at low Earth orbit satellites; a very different circumstance than the deep-space ASATs.)

## No Risk of Chinese ASAT Development

### ASAT threats unlikely

Shachtman, ’08 [Noah Shachtman, editor of national security blog for Wired magazine, “How China loses the coming space war”, 1/10/08, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/]

For years, the American armed forces have worried about an attack on US satellites; this could be how it begins. The United States military has become increasingly dependent on space. It uses photo-reconnaissance satellites to observe potential adversaries, GPS satellites to guide munitions with pin-point accuracy, communications satellites to handle the flow of information into and out of a theater of operations, and early warning satellites to detect and track enemy missile launches to name just a few of the better known applications. Because of this increasing dependence, many analysts have worried that the US is most vulnerable to asymmetric attacks against its space assets; in their view US satellites are “sitting ducks” without any sort of defense and their destruction would cripple the US military. China’s test of a sophisticated anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon a year ago, Friday — 11 January 2007, when it shot down its own obsolete weather satellite — has only increased these concerns. But is this true? Could a country—even a powerful country like China that has demonstrated a very sophisticated, if nascent, ability to shoot down satellites at all altitudes—inflict anything close to a knock-out blow against the US in space? And if it was anything less than a knock-out, how seriously would it affect US war fighting capabilities? The answers to these questions should influence how the US responds to the threats China’s ASAT represents. There is at least one way to answer these questions: “war-gaming” a massive Chinese attack on US satellites, where China is only limited by the laws of physics and the known properties of their ASAT, and see how much damage could be done. Such an exercise also reveals what the US could do, and what it could not do, to minimize the consequences. The results of my calculations are reported here. They assume that China launches a massive attack and that everything works exactly as planned: every ASAT launches, the US does not respond until after the attacks are launched even though it will have overwhelming evidence ahead of time, and every ASAT hits its target. Thus, this is a worst case scenario for the United States. In the end, we’ll show, the US would still has sufficient space assets to fight a major conventional war with China, even after such an attack. America’s military capabilities would be reduced, for a few hours at a time. But they would not be crippled. Back in 2001, a commission lead by Donald Rumsfeld warned of a "space Pearl Harbor," a single strike that could cripple America’s satellite network. It turns out, there is no such thing.

# Consult Japan

## Consult Japan Solvency

### Must Consult Japan first- failure to do so means Asian space race

Cheng 09 (Dean B, “Reflections on Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation”, part of Space and Defense, Vol. 2, No. 3, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower\_Center\_for\_Space\_and\_Defense\_Studies/Journal\_Vol\_2\_No\_3\_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202\_3.pdf//sb)

For Japan, whose “peace constitution” forbids it from using war as an instrument of state policy, the United States is an essential guarantor of its security. Any move by the US that might undermine this view raises not only the prospect of weakening US-Japanese ties, but also potentially affecting Japan’s security. Part of the “shock” was the fundamental nature of these shifts. Even more damaging, however, was the failure of the Nixon Administration to consult their Japanese counterparts, catching them wholly off-guard. It took several years for the effects of these shocks to wear off. **If the U**nited **S**tates **is intent upon expanding space relations with the PRC, then it would behoove it to consult Japan, in order to minimize the prospect of a “space shock.”** Failing to do so may well incur a Japanese reaction. The decision on the part of Japan to build an explicitly intelligence-focused satellite was in response to the North Korean missile test of 1999, suggesting that Tokyo is fully capable of undertaking space-oriented responses when it is concerned. 37 That, in turn, would potentially arouse the ire of China. The tragic history of Sino-Japanese relations continues to cast a baleful influence upon current interactions between the two states. **If there is not a “space race” currently underway** between Beijing and Tokyo**, it would be most unfortunate if American actions were to precipitate one.**