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\*\*Containment DA

Containment DA Shell (1/2)

US containment strategies are dissuading China from pursuing hegemonic aspirations

Lam 10 (Willy, Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Bejing Sees shift in Geopolitics, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=36120) MAH

There are indications, however, that the Hu leadership’s assessment of China’s unprecedented power projection has been less than satisfactory – and that the foreign-policy establishment has at least temporary switched back to a more moderate if not conciliatory stance. For example, Beijing has so far not announced specific punitive measures against U.S. corporations. And while military-to-military exchanges have been suspended, the Foreign Ministry last month allowed the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Nimitz to make a port call on Hong Kong (Wall Street Journal, February 19; AFP, February 11). More significantly, senior officials have sought to reassure the global community that China is not harboring “hegemonic” aspirations. On his recent European tour, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reiterated the familiar doctrine that China’s rise will not upset the global order. “The logic that ‘a strong country will become hegemonic’ is contrary to China’s history,” Yang said. “This is also against the intention of the Chinese people.” Citing Confucius’ famous dictum, Yang added that “‘maintaining harmony in the midst of differences’ is a value much treasured by the Chinese people” (China Daily, February 8; China News Service, February 6). A likely factor behind the apparent softening of Beijing’s diplomatic gambit could be fears of a backlash from countries that have been burnt by the fire-spitting dragon. General Yang Yi has warned of the danger of the emergence of an “anti-China coalition” in the West. “Some Western nations may adopt the formula of ‘making individual moves to produce the effect of concerted action’ – and join the ‘contain China’ camp one after the other,” he said. Under this scenario, the well-known strategist added, “[anti-China] measures may come one after the other the rest of the year.” A late February commentary by the Beijing-run Hong Kong journal Bauhinia also drew attention to the possible worsening of the international climate this year. The monthly magazine noted that Western countries’ dependence on China might lessen in the wake of the global economic recovery. “It is possible the West will put more pressure on China over issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, human rights, the value of the Renminbi as well as trade protectionism,” the commentary said. “Forces calling for the ‘containment of China’ may also rear their head” (China News Service, February 27; Xinhuatimes.net, February 4).

Strong US military presence prevents Chinese hegemony and expansionism

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

The main findings of this work are: · China is rising in influence in Asia, the part of the world where China always has exerted greatest influence; but China also has major limitations and weaknesses and has a long way to go to compete for regional leadership. · The power and interests of the United States and most Asian governments work against China ever achieving dominance in Asia. · The US image in Asia has declined in recent years and US foreign policy continues to be widely criticized. However, US ability and willingness to serve as Asia’s security guarantor and its vital economic partner remain strong and provide a solid foundation for continued US leadership in the region. Overall US influence in the region has not declined, according to every Asian official interviewed in 2006. · Most Asian governments maneuver and hedge against China’s rise, and they find a strong US presence in Asia fundamentally important and reassuring.

Containment DA Shell (2/2)

China’s expansion causes a war over Taiwan which escalates to nuclear war

**Straits Times, 00** [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into **a full-scale war between the US and China**. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale **would embroil other countries far and near and** -- horror of horrors -- **raise the possibility of a nuclear war.** Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, **east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order**. With the US distracted, **Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.** Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. **Beijing** also **seems prepared to go for the nuclear option.** A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said **military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.** Gen Ridgeway said that **should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.**

UQ – Containment Now

US- China containment policy is on the rise: US-led military exercises prove

China Matters 7/9/10. (“It's Official: America Has a China-Containment Policy.” China Matters. July 9, 2010). LRH.

The submarines aren't the only new potential issue of concern for the Chinese. Two major military exercises involving the U.S. and its allies in the region are now under way. More than three dozen naval ships and subs began participating in the "Rim of the Pacific" war games off Hawaii on Wednesday. Some 20,000 personnel from 14 nations are involved in the biennial exercise, which includes missile drills and the sinking of three abandoned vessels playing the role of enemy ships. Nations joining the U.S. in what is billed as the world's largest-ever naval war game are Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Peru, Singapore and Thailand. Closer to China, CARAT 2010 - for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training - just got under way off Singapore. The operation involves 17,000 personnel and 73 ships from the U.S., Singapore, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.... China is absent from both exercises, and that's no oversight. Many nations in the eastern Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam, have been encouraging the U.S. to push back against what they see as China's increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea. And the U.S. military remains concerned over China's growing missile force - now more than 1,000 - near the Taiwan Strait. The Tomahawks' arrival "is part of a larger effort to bolster our capabilities in the region," Glaser says. "It sends a signal that nobody should rule out our determination to be the balancer in the region that many countries there want us to be." No doubt Beijing got the signal.

US containment policy is on the rise: China’s refusal to go along with the Cheonan campaign has created a containment atmosphere

Lee 7/2/10. (Peter, writer for the Asia Times. “China smarts at US slap.” Asia Times. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG02Ad02.html>). LRH

Chosun Ilbo, the South Korean daily newspaper, piled on, making the counter-intuitive, at least to China, point that heightening tensions with a denunciation was the best way to reduce tensions - while making it clear that South Korea believed that China was forfeiting its position as regional leader - and even "bringing the Cold War atmosphere back" - by not going along on the Cheonan campaign: If China had boosted international condemnation of the sinking, the security situation on the [peninsula](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG02Ad02.html) would have been markedly different. A firm stance by Beijing could have even improved stability. In other words, China is also responsible for bringing the Cold War atmosphere back to the region ...  As long as China insists on standing by North Korea, which continues to produce nuclear weapons and attack South Korea, the South has no choice but to consider other options. If China continues to take the short-sighted approach of rallying behind a belligerent North Korea, Asian countries and the international community will grow increasingly suspicious of [Beijing's](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG02Ad02.html) role on the global stage. [2] Amid this storm of criticism, it undoubtedly did not escape Beijing's attention that the other superpower that has so far declined to endorse the Cheonan findings - Russia - was excused from public humiliation.  China riposted promptly with a People's Daily editorial pointedly entitled "Blindness to China's efforts on the Peninsula", which labeled Obama's remarks as "irresponsible and flippant" and continued: Without China's involvement, there would not have been the six-party talks, and the outbreak of yet another Korean War might well have been a possibility.  Ultimately, the solution to tensions on the Korean Peninsula hinges on eliminating the last vestiges of the Cold War. This is the time for all sides involved to break the old, hardened pattern and think of new ways of dealing with North Korea. This is China's constructive proposal that deserves serious consideration by all parties involved.  The US cannot ignore the fact that China remains the most important channel of effective communication in this situation. [3] It would appear that the [Obama administration's](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG02Ad02.html) efforts to sideline China and promote South Korea and the US to central stage in managing the North Korea issue have created a perverse incentive for Beijing and Pyongyang to cooperate and even raise tensions in the peninsula in order to demonstrate their indispensability.

Containment Link - Presence

Asian leaders are concerned that the United States may fail to respond to a growing Chinese military

Mahnken 9 (Tom, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, Why the U.S. should keep an eye on China's military, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/16/why\_the\_us\_should\_keep\_an\_eye\_on\_chinas\_military)

One topic that is likely to arise during President Obama's trip to Asia, if not in his meetings in Beijing, is the continuing modernization of the Chinese military. Asian leaders are privately, and increasingly publicly, concerned about China's growing military might and what they see as a failure of the United States to respond. This year's Australian [defense white paper](http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf), for example, portrays a future in which China contests American primacy in Asia and beyond. When one of the United States' closest allies expresses such concerns, Washington should listen. According to at least one high-ranking official, the United States has systematically underestimated the pace and scope of Chinese military modernization for years. On Oct. 21 in an interview with the Voice of America, the incoming Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, [told reporters](http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-10-21-voa8.cfm) that, "In the past decade or so, China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability and capacity, every year. ... They've grown at an unprecedented rate in those capabilities. And, they've developed some asymmetric capabilities that are concerning to the region, some anti-access capabilities and so on." Willard should know. Prior to becoming the USPACOM commander, he was in command of all U.S. naval forces in the Pacific; before that, he was Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Willard's observation should be cause for concern, but is not a surprise. Intelligence organizations have a tendency to underestimate rising powers. As I discuss in my book, [Uncovering Ways of War](http://www.amazon.com/Uncovering-Ways-War-Intelligence-Innovation/dp/0801475740/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1258374459&sr=8-1), U.S. Army and Navy intelligence in the period between the two world wars underestimated the growth of the Japanese military power not because of racial bias or ethnocentrism, but rather because of the very real tendency to look back on Japan's modest military capabilities and project them into the future. As a result, American intelligence organizations overlooked a number of areas where the Japanese military innovated, failures that cost the United States and its allies dearly in World War II. I suspect that the same pathologies may be at work today regarding China. The People's Liberation Army of the 1980s and 1990s was hardly first-rate. In recent years, however, China has made real strides, including the testing of an anti-satellite weapon in July 2007 and the development of an anti-ship ballistic missile designed to attack U.S. carrier strike groups. Outside a small circle of cognoscenti, however, perceptions of Chinese military power have failed to keep pace with this reality.

Containment Link - Asia

US Allies throughout the region are demanding that the US increase presence in Asia to counter China

Solomon and Hayashi 2010

(Jay Solomon and Yuka Hayashi, Asia News Correspondents, “As China Swaggers, Neighbors Embrace U.S”, Wall Street Journal, May 25, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266333652277148.html>)

Further afield, countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam have also been seeking closer ties to the U.S. in recent months, according to U.S. and Asian diplomats. These countries are quietly voicing fears about China's expanding military and economic power. Analysts say that the more China has sought to assert its regional authority, the more many Asian leaders have pressed Washington to maintain, if not increase, its military and diplomatic presence.

Containment Link - Asia

A decline of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific would enable China to expand, causing instability in the region

Holmes 9 (Kim, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Heritage Foundation, Sustaining American leadership with Military Power, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/Sustaining-American-Leadership-with-Military-Power)

The consequences of hard-power atrophy will be a direct deterioration of America's diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defense White Paper that is concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and the implications that this decline would have for Australian security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders' commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. Only by retaining a "big stick" can the United States succeed in advancing its diplomatic priorities. Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support.

In order to check Chinese military expansion, the US needs to preserve its position as the dominant military power and reinvigorate ties in Southeast Asia

Tkacik 7(Jack, Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy, Executive Summary: China's Quest for a Superpower Military, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/05/Executive-Summary-Chinas-Quest-for-a-Superpower-Military)

Geostrategic Implications. China's military expansion is extravagantly in excess of anything required by a responsible stakeholder in the existing international system and is even beyond that needed to "liberate" Taiwan. China shares land borders with 14 nations, none of which is a threat to it, yet China still has contentious territorial claims against India and Japan and in the South China Sea. China's gathering geopolitical punch portends a 21st century that may well become the Chinese century in Asia-a new century of China's support for illiberal forces that will buttress the legitimacy of Beijing's regime at home. What the Administration and Congress Should Do. Asia does not believe that Washing ton-preoccupied with Iraq-is concerned about China's spreading influence, much less that it has a strategic vision for the Pacific Rim. Managing the emerging security challenge requires a new U.S. partnership with democratic Asia and a new attitude in Washington. The U.S. should: List China as the top U.S. challenge. The entire bureaucracy must prepare to implement a coherent China policy to address defense, global, and regional issues, using coun­terintelligence and export control strategies as needed. Commit resources to preserving the U.S. position as the world's preeminent military power. America cannot bluff its way out of this challenge. America's most urgent needs are increasing its submarine fleet, enhancing its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and ensuring the survivabil ity of its space platforms (e.g., satellites). Reinforce eroding alliances, eschew inclinations to take China's rhetorical side against Japan or against Taiwan, reinvigorate ties in Southeast Asia, build on new ties with India, and reengage the Atlantic Community in dialogue on shared global interests and values of human dignity and freedom. Conclusion. The Asian perception that the United States is a declining Pacific power may or may not prove prescient, but China is clearly emerging as the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific. Faced with this reality, an engaged America can strengthen the current robust trans-Pacific alignment, knitting together the democracies of the Americas and the Western Pacific Rim, or a disengaged America can allow a Sino-centric continental axis to crystallize as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Taiwan, Korea, and eventually Japan, Australia, and South and Central Asia band wagon with China. The choices made in Washington on how to manage the emerging Chinese superpower will determine not only the direction of Asian democracy, but also the prospects for global political and economic freedoms in the 21st century.

Containment Link - Asia

US presence in Asia protects against instability caused by China

Cossa 98 (Ralph, Senior editor of Comparitive Connections, Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict, http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.ChinaSea.pdf)

The clearest and most effective symbol of America's commitment to regional stability and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea is the continued forward presence of U.S. military forces in Asia. The U.S. protective umbrella over Asia not only protects the security interests of regional friends and allies, it also protects and promotes America's political, economic, and security interests as well. U.S. forward-deployed forces help promote regional stability while guarding against unilateral acts of aggression, they increase the U.S. ability to respond to crises throughout the region, they demonstrate a U.S. commitment to friends and allies, they serve as a hedge against uncertainty, and they avoid a "power vacuum" that others who do not necessarily share our interests might be tempted to fill. In short, a continued U.S. military presence puts the "active" in any policy of active neutrality in the South China Sea. Region-wide, U.S. forward deployed forces provide a low cost insurance policy that helps guard against future regional instability while protecting and promoting American and broader regional security interests . . . and, they are seen as such by most, if not all nations in the region, perhaps including (begrudgingly) the PRC.

Containment Link - Japan

US withdrawal from Japan promotes China’s interests in the region, and weakens the ability of the alliance to check China

Solomon and Hayashi 2010

(Jay Solomon and Yuka Hayashi, Asia News Correspondents, “As China Swaggers, Neighbors Embrace U.S”, Wall Street Journal, May 25, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266333652277148.html>)

Mr. Hatoyama entered office last year pursing a policy line very much in China's interest—a more "equal" relationship between Tokyo and Washington, and the reduction of U.S. troops on Okinawa. Japan's leader has also repeatedly discussed the idea of creating an "East Asia" community modeled after the European Community. Still, China-Japan relations have soured significantly in recent months. In early May, Japan filed a formal protest to Beijing after a Chinese ship chased a Japanese coast guard vessel that Tokyo says was conducting marine surveys within a Japanese zone. Japan filed another protest a month earlier after a Chinese helicopter buzzed a Japanese ship sailing near the location of Chinese military exercises. On May 15, Japanese and Chinese diplomats publicly sparred at a meeting in South Korea, after Tokyo's Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada pressed Beijing to shrink, or at least not increase, its nuclear-weapons arsenal. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi countered that Beijing's nuclear strategy was clear and its position on disarmament widely recognized. But Mr. Okada repeated his remarks at a trilateral meeting with South Korea's chief diplomat. According to people familiar with the exchange, Mr. Yang became so upset that he started yelling at Mr. Okada. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman later called Mr. Okada's remarks "irresponsible." Mr. Okada said such accusations were groundless. "The Chinese side stated various things during our exchange," he said. "But I didn't hear them say once they weren't building up" their nuclear arsenal. U.S. officials acknowledged this week that while China's actions have likely played a role in Japan deciding to extend the U.S. military presence on Okinawa, they added that Washington remains worried that rising China-Japan tensions pose a longer-term security threat to U.S. interests. "No one benefits if things deteriorate further," said a senior U.S. official.

Containment Good - Restraint

US leadership in Asia prevents conflict with China, increasing Chinese leadership will lead to an aggressive pursuit of national interests

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

On balance, this writer judges that US policy makers in the Congress and the US administration would be prudent to assume that China’s recently more cooperative approach to the United States in Asia is based on an assessment of the costs and benefits of this approach for Chinese interests. China’s preference remains a multipolar world where the United States would be less prominent than it is today and would not be the leading power in Asian and world affairs. China’s goals for its own power and influence in Asia seem hazy, even to Chinese leaders. China’s recent maneuvering against Japan and India regarding permanent membership in the UN Security Council, in ASEAN and in other Asian multilateral organizations, and other steps strongly reinforce a judgment that China seeks advantage over these powers in the emerging Asian order. To assume that China seeks to be the leading Asian power as it seeks diminishing US leadership in Asia would appear to be a prudent course for US policy makers. One lesson that flows from this line of analysis is that China’s approach to the United States in Asia depends on circumstances that determine the costs and benefits of China’s approach. If the circumstances were to change, the perceived costs and benefits would change, and likely would lead to change in China’s approach to the United States in Asia. For example, if China were to grow in power and influence in Asian and world affairs relative to the United States, China’s leaders might see less cost associated with a policy of stronger opposition to the US position and interests in Asia. Also, if the United States were to adopt strong support for Taiwan independence or to seriously restrict access to US markets for Chinese, these moves could trigger a reevaluation by China’s leaders of the cost and benefits of the recent generally accommodating Chinese approach toward the United States in Asia, resulting in a tougher stance against US leadership and interests in Asia.

Containment Good – Checks Expansionism

Western containment strategies dissuade China from pursuing hegemonic aspirations

Lam 10 (Willy, Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Bejing Sees shift in Geopolitics, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=36120) MAH

There are indications, however, that the Hu leadership’s assessment of China’s unprecedented power projection has been less than satisfactory – and that the foreign-policy establishment has at least temporary switched back to a more moderate if not conciliatory stance. For example, Beijing has so far not announced specific punitive measures against U.S. corporations. And while military-to-military exchanges have been suspended, the Foreign Ministry last month allowed the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Nimitz to make a port call on Hong Kong (Wall Street Journal, February 19; AFP, February 11). More significantly, senior officials have sought to reassure the global community that China is not harboring “hegemonic” aspirations. On his recent European tour, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reiterated the familiar doctrine that China’s rise will not upset the global order. “The logic that ‘a strong country will become hegemonic’ is contrary to China’s history,” Yang said. “This is also against the intention of the Chinese people.” Citing Confucius’ famous dictum, Yang added that “‘maintaining harmony in the midst of differences’ is a value much treasured by the Chinese people” (China Daily, February 8; China News Service, February 6). A likely factor behind the apparent softening of Beijing’s diplomatic gambit could be fears of a backlash from countries that have been burnt by the fire-spitting dragon. General Yang Yi has warned of the danger of the emergence of an “anti-China coalition” in the West. “Some Western nations may adopt the formula of ‘making individual moves to produce the effect of concerted action’ – and join the ‘contain China’ camp one after the other,” he said. Under this scenario, the well-known strategist added, “[anti-China] measures may come one after the other the rest of the year.” A late February commentary by the Beijing-run Hong Kong journal Bauhinia also drew attention to the possible worsening of the international climate this year. The monthly magazine noted that Western countries’ dependence on China might lessen in the wake of the global economic recovery. “It is possible the West will put more pressure on China over issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, human rights, the value of the Renminbi as well as trade protectionism,” the commentary said. “Forces calling for the ‘containment of China’ may also rear their head” (China News Service, February 27; Xinhuatimes.net, February 4).

Containment Good – Checks Expansion

Taiwan and Japan will depend on the United States to check Chinese military expansion

Wall Street Journal 6-8 (Gates on China, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704183204575289743788180892.html?KEYWORDS=Defense+Secretary+Robert+Gates+made+a+notable+contribution+to+the+free+world's+d)

Defense Secretary Robert Gates made a notable contribution to the free world's defense this weekend, and it didn't involve money, missiles or troops. He talked frankly about how China's military expansion threatens peace and security in the Pacific. "The South China Sea is an area of growing concern," Mr. Gates told fellow defense officials Saturday at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The U.S. supports "stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic development," and the Pentagon objects to "any effort to intimidate U.S. corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate economic activity." This is a welcome rhetorical shift. The Obama Administration spent its first year in office bending over backward to please China on everything from human rights to Beijing's support for rogue regimes in North Korea and Burma. Meanwhile, the Chinese military has begun to push into other nations' territorial waters, from Japan to Vietnam, to the extent of harassing naval vessels. Chinese officials have begun calling the South China Sea a "core interest," implying sovereignty over international waters. Mr. Gates's comments combined with tougher rhetoric from new Pacific Command chief Robert Willard, suggest the Pentagon thinks it's time to draw brighter lines around this kind of misbehavior. That will come as a relief to such U.S. treaty allies as Taiwan and Japan, which depend on the U.S. security umbrella to counter China's military buildup, and to every country that uses the South China Sea's busy shipping lanes. It's also appropriate given that China has once again cut off lines of communication with the U.S. military—a policy Mr. Gates criticized Saturday. "Chinese officials have broken off interactions between our militaries, citing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as the rationale," he said, adding the policy makes "little sense" and risks "miscommunication, misunderstanding and miscalculation." Those risks were immediately obvious Saturday when a participant asked Mr. Gates why America considers the Chinese to be "enemies." The normally quiet Defense Secretary bristled "for the record that the United States does not consider China as an enemy but as a partner in many areas." The clearer the U.S. is in responding to Chinese military assertiveness, the less likely China will miscalculate and become an enemy.

Containment Good – Checks PRC Hegemony

A perception of US weakness in Asia is just hype, political leaders view the US as strong as long as the military presence remains strong

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

US weaknesses in Asia are widely publicized. They center on the decline in the US image in Asia amid widespread criticism of the US war in Iraq, the US position on North Korea, unilateral US actions on significant international issues, and perceived inattentive US policies regarding the economic development, multilateral regional organizations, and other concerns in Asia. These weaknesses dominate the media and public discourse in most of Asia. Nevertheless, Asian government officials interviewed during the 2006 research trip were almost uniform in emphasizing the positive importance of the US leading role as Asia’s security guarantor and vital economic partner. The main exceptions were a Communist Party of India (Marxist) official, and to a degree, some Chinese officials, who criticized the US security role in Asia. Asian government officials are well aware that Asian governments generally don’t trust each other. The kind of suspicion and wariness one sees today between China and Japan characterizes most relationships between and among Asian governments. And yet the Asian governments need stability in order to meet their nation-building priorities. In this context, the United States looms very large in their calculations. Unlike their Asian neighbors, the United States does not want their territory and does not want to dominate them. It too wants stability and, in contrast with China’s reluctance to undertake major risks and commitments, the United States is seen to continue the massive expenditure and major risk in a US military presence in Asia, viewed as essential in stabilizing the often uncertain security relationships among Asian governments. Not only does the United States continue to occupy the top security position as Asia’s “least distrusted power,” the United States also plays an essential economic role in the development priorities of Asian governments, most of which are focused on exportoriented growth. It continues to allow massive inflows of Asian imports essential to Asian economic development despite an overall US trade deficit over $700 billion annually. Against this background, when asked if overall US power and influence in Asia were in decline, Asian officials were uniform in saying no. Asian Maneuvering and Hedging All Asian government officials consulted agreed that China’s rise adds to incentives for most Asian governments to maneuver and hedge with other powers, including the United States, in order to preserve their independence and freedom of action. A Singapore official said that “hedging is the name of the game” in Southeast Asia, while an Indian official said that Asian governments “are not going to put all their eggs in one basket.” Asian governments hedge against the United States and other powers as well, but their recent focus has been on China’s rise. The governments tend to cooperate increasingly with China in areas of common concern, but they work increasingly in other ways, often including efforts to strengthen relations with the United States, to preserve freedom of action and other interests in the face China’s rise. In an Asian order supported by undiminished US security and economic power and influence, such hedging by Asian governments adds to factors that are seen to preclude Chinese leadership or dominance in Asia and that reinforce US leadership in Asia. The majority of Asian government officials assumed that China sought eventual “preeminence” in Asia; Chinese officials said no, though Chinese foreign policy specialists said that secret Chinese Communist Party documents over the years have continued to refer to a general goal of Asian leadership. As noted above, when asked whether China sought leadership or domination in Asia, a senior Chinese official acknowledged the complications of US power and influence and the role of many independent-minded Asian governments. He responded that “China can’t dominate Asia; there are too many governments in Asia.”

Containment Good – Checks PRC Hegemony

Strong US security presence in Asia prevents Chinese leadership

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

The main findings of this work are: · China is rising in influence in Asia, the part of the world where China always has exerted greatest influence; but China also has major limitations and weaknesses and has a long way to go to compete for regional leadership. · The power and interests of the United States and most Asian governments work against China ever achieving dominance in Asia. · The US image in Asia has declined in recent years and US foreign policy continues to be widely criticized. However, US ability and willingness to serve as Asia’s security guarantor and its vital economic partner remain strong and provide a solid foundation for continued US leadership in the region. Overall US influence in the region has not declined, according to every Asian official interviewed in 2006. · Most Asian governments maneuver and hedge against China’s rise, and they find a strong US presence in Asia fundamentally important and reassuring.

Containment Good - SCS

China is equipping itself to expand into the South China Sea

Fisher 8 (Richard, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs, China's Naval Secrets, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.185/pub\_detail.asp)

Experts attempting to understand the strategic aims behind China's aggressive military expansion have generally focused on Taiwan. But a new naval base points at Beijing's significant and growing interest in projecting power into waters far from the Taiwan Strait. China, in fact, is equipping itself to assert its longstanding and expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, and this plan could raise tensions well beyond the region. The new base is near Sanya, a city on the southern tip of Hainan Island. It's an ideal place for a naval base, and a significant expansion compared to the nearby naval base in the port city of Yulin. Sanya features much larger piers for hosting a large fleet of surface warships, a new underground base for submarines and comfortable facilities that would attract technically proficient soldiers and sailors. Its location will allow China to exert greater dominance over disputed territories of the South China Sea; to place a much larger naval force closer to sea lanes crucial to Asia's commercial lifeblood; and to exercise influence over the critical Straits of Malacca. While construction of this new base has only recently been visible via commercial satellite imagery, since 2002 military and security officials in three Asian governments have conveyed to this analyst details, and at times concerns, about China's construction of a major naval base at Sanya. It's not just a matter of the base's existence, but of what Beijing appears to intend to do with it. Officials in two of these governments have pointed to a unique feature of this base: a large new underground facility designed to house nuclear and non-nuclear submarines. In a conversation at an academic confernece in late 2004, a general in China's People's Liberation Army admitted that Beijing was building a new base on Hainan, but denied there was an underground facility.

China is developing its military in order to project power beyond its coastal area

Lin 10 (Joseph, Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies of Tamkang University in Taipei, Reorientation of China’s Armed Forces: Implications for the Future Promotions of PLA Generals , [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx\_ttnews[any\_of\_the\_words]=china%20military%20expansion&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=36531&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=143ab7e129](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5bswords%5d=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5bany_of_the_words%5d=china%20military%20expansion&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=36531&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=7&cHash=143ab7e129))

The advent of the PLAN’s “far sea defense” (yuanyang fangyu) strategy calling for the development of China’s long-range naval capabilities, appears to be one of the major drivers behind the push to transform the composition of the Chinese armed forces (New York Times, April 23). Yin Zhuo, a retired PLAN rear admiral who is now a senior researcher at the navy's Equipment Research Center, stated in an interview with People’s Daily Online that the PLAN is tasked with two primary missions: preservation of China’s maritime security (including territorial integrity) and the protection of China’s burgeoning and far-flung maritime economic interests. And while the former is still the PLAN’s chief concern, the PLAN is beginning to prioritize more attention to the latter (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], February 26). Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the PLAN's East Sea Fleet argues that, “With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes” (New York Times, April 23). The rear admirals' statements present a legitimate rationale behind the PLAN’s new strategy. The far sea defense strategy is significant for two reasons. First, it declares that China’s naval ambitions extend beyond its traditional coastal area or “near sea” (jinyang). Secondly, it expands the PLAN’s defense responsibilities to include the protection of China’s maritime economic interests—which China’s latest defense whitepaper did not explicitly address [2]. It stands to reason then that a possible key motivation behind the reorientation of China's armed forces stems from China’s perceived need to project power beyond its coastal area to where the PLAN is required to carry out the newly expanded far sea defense duties.

Containment Good - SCS

China will expand into the South China Sea if it begins to perceive the region as a weak link in US containment

Ott 5 (Marvin, Professor, National Security Policy, Presentation to the U.S.-China Commission)

The natural focus of China’s strategic ambition is south toward Southeast Asia and the South China Sea – the “Nanyang” or southern seas; the “golden lands” in traditional Chinese parlance. Northeast Asia is a difficult and dangerous region where China is basically playing strategic defense – trying to prevent adverse 8 populations of ethnic Chinese. There is little doubt that the leadership in Beijing seeks to establish a classic sphere of influence in which China has a security monopoly – a region where non-Chinese external military forces are excluded and where Beijing acts as regional arbiter on matters of high politics and strategy. Chinese strategists see Southeast Asia as the weak link in what they perceive as an emerging US containment of China. Government-linked publications identify the region as the point where China can “break through” containment.

US military presence will deter Chinese advancement into the South China Sea

To 3 (Lee, Head of the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore, China, the USA and the South China Sea Conflicts, http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Lee%20Lai%20To,%20China,%20USA,%20and%20the%20South%20China%20Sea%20Conflicts.pdf)

Receptivity to the USA’s military presence and assistance in the ASEAN region is undoubtedly of concern to the Chinese. Thus, in terms of its southward advancement in the South China Sea, Beijing will have to watch out for US military activities that partly have been made possible by some of the Southeast Asian states in these waters and nearby areas. It should be noted that China probably feels quite comfortable working with ASEAN in forums like the Asia–Europe Meetings or ASEAN Plus Three meetings, where the USA is not present. While it is difficult to expect ASEAN to forgo its US ties in the near future, China still considers it important to cultivate the support of ASEAN in order to dilute the latter’s dependence on the USA. Thus, gestures like its refusal to devalue the Renminbi after the Asian financial crisis and, more importantly, the proposal by Premier Zhu Rongji in 2001 to establish a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area are meant to allay ASEAN’s worries about a rising China and to cement closer economic and political cooperation between China and ASEAN. As far as the South China Sea is concerned, China and ASEAN have agreed ‘not to allow existing differences to hamper the development of friendly relations and cooperation’ (BBC, 1997). As always, China’s hope is that the issues will be settled through a gradualist approach within a general framework of shelving the disputes and entering into joint developments with the claimants. As a result, it has agreed to work with ASEAN on a regional code of conduct for the South China Sea. In addition, some progress has also been made bilaterally in discussions with Vietnam, at least in terms of demarcating the land boundary and the Gulf of Tonkin. While progress in resolving the South China Sea disputes is slow, it seems that ASEAN and China do not want to inflate the issue out of proportion. Both would like to concentrate on the big picture of working on areas where each side can cooperate, notably over economic issues. The fact is that Sino-ASEAN relations are much better now than previously (for details, see Lee Lai To, 2001). Consequently, China hopes that ASEAN will be more inclined to see that there is no need to bring in the USA to settle issues among Asian claimants and that the Spratly question could be settled amicably without the need for external interference.

Containment Good - African Oil

China’s involvement in the African oil industry de-industrializes the region and discourages democracies

Kasozi 9. (Prof. A.B.K. Kasozi, writer for The New Vision: Uganda’s leading website. “[Africa:](http://allafrica.com/africa/) China's Entry Into the Scramble for Oil Could Benefit Continent.”

December 23, 2009. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200912240163.html>). LRH.

However, it would be naïve, if not foolish, for Africans to sit back and think that China, or for that matter any other external nation or power will, unlike earlier surplus extractors from Africa, work for the interests of Africa. China will, and came to Africa to, work for, and advance its own national interests.

This is natural. There are a number of examples to certify that this is the case:

First, China, like the earlier seekers of value from Africa, is investing mainly in extractive industries. Minerals are taken out of Africa before they are fully processed. Oil, copper, cobalt and other minerals are mined and exported before value addition. In this way, China is just another importer of African primary goods-Africa's term of trade with Asia are unlikely to be different with those of the west. This is the crux of the matter.

Secondly, China's entry contributes to the de-industrialisation of Africa by flooding African markets with cheap mass produced goods.

Its projects are reported to contribute to the slowing of the training of an African skilled labour force and its trade policies are said to discourage the development of a local African middle and entrepreneur class that is the basis of the growth of democracy.

China will prop up repressive regimes in order to gain access to oil: Darfur proves

Chellaney 10. (Brahma, the author of Asian Juggernaut. “China's latest export innovation?; Send your convicts overseas.” The Washington Times. July 7, 2010.) LRH.

Similarly, despite the State Council's 2006 nine good-conduct directives to Chinese companies engaged in overseas operations, the government and corporate priority still is to boost exports aggressively, even if such a push results in environmental and social costs for local communities. Indeed, as part of the government's "going global" policy, Chinese companies are offered major incentives and rewards for bagging overseas contracts and boosting exports.

The use of convict laborers adds a disturbing new dimension to the "going global" strategy, which was first unveiled in 2001.

As it is, some Chinese projects, especially dam-building schemes, have been embroiled in disputes with local communities in several countries, including in Botswana, Burma, Pakistan, Ghana and Sudan. In fact, several small bombs went off less than three months ago at the site of Burma's Myitsone Dam, whose construction by a Chinese company in the insurgency-torn, northernmost Kachin state is displacing thousands of subsistence farmers and fishermen by flooding a wide swath of land.

China is not only the world leader in building dams at home but also the top dam exporter. It has no qualms about building dams in disputed territories like Pakistan-held Kashmir, in areas torn by ethnic separatism or in other human rights-abusing countries. But its use of convict laborers at dams and other infrastructure projects will create new rifts with local communities.

China's declaratory policy of ''non-interference in domestic affairs'' serves as a virtual license to pursue projects that benefit governments known to repress their citizens. For example, in Sudan, where China has emerged as the principal backer of a regime accused of committing genocide in the arid western region of Darfur, 13 of the 15 largest foreign companies operating are Chinese, with Beijing making huge investments in the Sudanese economy - from hydropower to oil. It also has sold hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons, including tanks and fighter-jets, to help prop up President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Darfur.

Containment Good – African Oil

China strengthens the militaries of repressive regimes in Africa where they have an interest in oil

Volman 9. (Daniel, Dir. of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC. “CHINA, INDIA, RUSSIA AND THEUNITED STATES: The Scramble for African Oil and the Militarization of the Continent.” p10. Nordic Africa Institute. October 19, 2009). LRH.

China has used military programs to strengthen the military capacities of key Af­rican allies and to expand its influence in Africa, particularly in major oil-producing countries. Sudan has received F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, T-62 light tanks, anti-aircraft systems, trucks, and other weapons. Zimbabwe has received at least nine J-7 fighter aircraft, six K-8 trainer aircraft, 10 T-69 tanks, 30 T-59 tanks, and as many as 100 T-63 armored transport vehicles. Angola has ordered eight Su-77 fighter aircraft. China sold over $1 billion worth of sophisticated weaponry to Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000 – including Su-77 fighter aircraft for Ethiopia – in violation of the U.N. arms embargo imposed during the bloody border war between the two countries. China has also supplied military equipment to Algeria, Zambia, Namibia, and Mauritania, including C-802 ship-to-ship missiles for Algeria as well as K-8 trainer aircraft for Zambia (which received eight) and Namibia (which received four).1

Nigeria, another oil-exporting country facing massive resistance in the oil-rich Niger Delta, has significantly expanded its arms purchase from China, including 15 F-7 fighter aircraft from China in 2005 for a reported $251 million. In addition, Chinese military ties with the Nigerian Government were significantly expanded in September 2004 when the Chinese arms producer Poly Technology announced that it would enter into a partner­ship with the government-owned Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) to modernize Nigeria’s domestic arms industry. After years of neglect, the Nigerian government wants to revive DICON and expects to resume production of small arms, grenades, ammunition, and other light weapons for the Nigerian military.2

These actions have led to criticism of China’s role in Africa, particularly from “alarmists” in the United States who emphasize China’s ties with repressive regimes and its willingness to invest without imposing the types of conditions imposed by the World Bank and other international financial institutions or by Western governments. While these critiques are valid, China’s practices are not unique. The United States has used the same means to build ties with repressive African regimes – particularly in oil producing countries like Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea – and has noticeably reduced its pressures for democ­ratization, respect for human rights, and financial transparency in recent years.

Containment Good – Expansion Goes Global

China is building a military to expand beyond Asia

Gertz 10 (Bill, geopolitics editor and a national security and investigative reporter for The Washington Times, Admiral: China's buildup aimed at power past Asia http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/26/admiral-chinas-buildup-aimed-at-power-past-asia/?page=2

The commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific said Thursday that the buildup of Chinese armed forces is continuing "unabated" and Beijing's goal appears to be power projection beyond Asia. "China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region," said Adm. Robert F. Willard, the Pacific Command leader. "Of particular concern is that elements of China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region." The comments in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee are likely to fuel an ongoing debate inside the U.S. government among military, policy and intelligence officials over whether China's military buildup is limited to a future conflict with Taiwan or whether China harbors global military ambitions. Some U.S. officials insist China's buildup of both conventional and nuclear forces is aimed solely at a Taiwan conflict, in which U.S. forces likely would intervene in support of the island. Other officials have said China is seeking global hegemony through a combination of military, economic, political and intelligence power projection that seeks to diminish U.S. influence around the world. "The United States remains the pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific, though China's rising influence is changing regional power dynamics in ways that create both challenges and, I think, opportunities," Adm. Willard said. He also disclosed for the first time in the testimony that China is moving ahead with a new anti-ship ballistic missile capable of attacking aircraft carriers hundreds of miles from China's coasts. China also will deploy its own aircraft carrier by 2012 and currently has more than 60 submarines, he said. China is "developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile designed specifically to target aircraft carriers," Adm. Willard said in his prepared statement. It was the first time a U.S. official had disclosed that the unique precision guided missile was being tested. Rep. Howard McKeon, California Republican and ranking member of the committee, questioned the admiral about the new space-transiting anti-ship missile and other weapons designed to attack U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. "The China military capacity has been growing by and large unabated for the past 10 to 20 years," Adm. Willard said. "The past 10 years have been pretty dramatic, and as you suggest, this has included investments in what has broadly been termed anti-access capabilities. Area-denial capability is another way to think about it." The new missile is designed to hit targets at extended ranges from the Chinese mainland, and other anti-access weapons include a large number of submarines, new integrated air- and missile-defense capabilities and cyberwarfare and anti-space weapons, Adm. Willard said, noting "all of which we have been monitoring very closely for some years." Adm. Willard said he is confident that U.S. forces would be able to penetrate the new Chinese forces in a conflict and noted that the Pacific Command is working to identify and address shortcomings in countering China's area-denial weapons. China cut off military relations with the Pentagon in October 2008 and again earlier this year to protest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Adm. Willard recently formed a special task force to address China's military buildup. Last year, he told reporters that China's military buildup exceeded U.S. intelligence estimates every year for more than a decade, an indirect criticism of what other defense officials have called weak intelligence reports on Beijing's military buildup.

I/L – Containment Perception = Balancing

US presence near China’s borders causes a perception of containment, and pushes Pakistan and into an alliance with China to counterbalance the US

Vanetsov 2008

(Georgi, “CHINA AND PAKISTAN CONFIRM THEY ARE READY TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION”, The Voice of Russia, October 17, <http://english.ruvr.ru/2008/10/17/218797.html>)

The Sino-Pakistani summit in Beijing confirmed the high level of cooperation existing between the two countries and their interest in the strengthening and broadening of bilateral political, military, economic, cultural and trade contacts. China has always regarded as a top priority its relations with Pakistan, which is its important neighbour and strategic partner, Hu Jintao stressed after the talks. For his part, while in Beijing, Asif Ali Zardari stressed the importance of strengthening the Pakistani-Chinese ties. Commenting on the successful results of the visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China, analysts pay attention to what can be termed as its international aspect, including its positive impact on the situation in the region. It is well known that one of the main factors for the instability in Pakistan and in the region at large is the U.S. policy, the U.S. military presence in Iraq, continued military actions of the USA and its allies in the NATO bloc in Afghanistan, and Washington’s attempts to spread its military operations from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The missile firing of the border villages in Pakistan from the American non-piloted planes has become more frequent in recent times. It was several times that the U.S. commando unit had carried out military raids deep into the Pakistani territory. Washington is trying to motivate its actions by the fact that Islamic extremists and terrorists have allegedly found shelter in Pakistan, whose territory they use for carrying out military attacks on the allied forces in Afghanistan. However, there’re many facts confirming that it is exactly peaceful civilians in the Pakistani villages, bordering on Afghanistan, that, as a rule, are killed in the missile strikes and raids. Sharp protests in Pakistan over such violations of its sovereignty are rudely ignored by Washington. Such firings continued during the visit of Asif Ali Zardari to China as well. Beijing does not conceal its concern over the developments in the region. The U.S. military presence in Iraq, the USA’s threats to deliver a military strike on Iran and attempts to spread the U.S. military operation to Pakistan — the nuclear-armed country — really make a big fire to be kindled near the borders of China, India and Russia, a serious threat. And this should be prevented by all means possible.

Link Helper – Iraq

China has become heavily invested in Iraqi oil in the wake of the US invasion

AP 6-8 (MSN, 2010, China reaps benefits of Iraq war, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37577656/ns/business-oil\_and\_energy/ )

“For China, oil security is largely about avoiding disruption to supplies and cushioning the effects of dramatic fluctuations in oil prices," said Barclays Capital oil analyst Amrita Sen. "Iraq has become an obvious target to secure the barrels of oil for future consumption." From among the most outspoken of critics of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, China has emerged as one of the biggest economic beneficiaries of the war, snagging five lucrative deals. While Western firms were largely subdued in their interest in Iraq's recent oil auctions, China snapped up three contracts, shrugging off the security risks and the country's political instability for the promise of oil. The quest for crude has left a heavy Chinese footprint in a number of countries where others have shied away, whether because of violence, human rights violations or sanctions. In the broader Middle East, China has helped develop and expand the oil industry in Sudan, a nation whose president is under international indictment for war crimes. It has also signed deals in Iran, where the hardline government is facing a potential fourth round of U.N. sanctions over its controversial nuclear program. Iran has denied claims by the U.S. and others that its nuclear efforts are geared to weapons production.

Iraq is a game changer for China’s oil industry

Reed and Roberts 10 (Stanley, London bureau chief of Business Week, Dexter, BA in political science from Stanford University, Red Star Over Iraq, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10\_05/b4165044386657.htm)

BP is the largest partner in the venture, but only by a dipstick: It has a 38% stake, while the Chinese hold 37% (the rest is owned by an Iraqi company). The media focus has been on BP's decision to take up the Rumaila challenge for a low fee of only $2 for every barrel the venture produces. But the more important story could be China's role. "CNPC's involvement brings together the country with the most rapid growth in energy demand in history with the country that plans the greatest buildup of production capacity ever," says Alex Munton, an Iraq specialist at Edinburgh-based oil consultants Wood Mackenzie. China has moved fast. In a little over a year, CNPC, China's main oil producer with revenues of more than $188 billion and a 1.5 million-worker payroll, has won large stakes in three Iraqi oil fields. The total production target for those fields is around 3.5 million barrels per day—close to China's domestic output. In two of the ventures, China is the controlling partner. Over two decades or so, CNPC may spend some $20 billion on the fields, the most of any oil company in Iraq since Saddam Hussein fell. For China's oil industry, "Iraq is a game-changer," says Wenrang Jiang, an authority on the country's energy thirst who teaches at Canada's University of Alberta.

China is expanding its business presence in Iraq

Tomio 7-6 (Philip, sponsored by US Department of Defense, China Cashes In on Iraq’s Postwar Recovery, http://www.defensestudies.org/?p=2871)

China is also expanding its business presence in Iraq beyond the oil sector, venturing into construction, government services, and even tourism. The Chinese have made inroads into Iraq’s cement industry, a critical and very profitable business sector in a country where large infrastructure projects remain up for grabs. They have built a billion-dollar power plant in southern Iraq and entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government to construct large residential facilities for laborers—a key step in maintaining compliance with Iraq’s restrictive investment laws. Earlier this year, it emerged that China had canceled 80 percent of the $8.5 billion-dollar debt it is owed by Iraq and that, in 2009 China and Iraq had agreed to a series of bilateral trade deals worth $3.8 billion. Although the official announcement did not specify the timing of China’s decision to cancel Iraq’s debt, it is safe to assume that China’s business interests in Iraq featured prominently in the debt agreement.

Link Helper – Iraq

China is invested in Iraqi oil

New York Times 8 (Iraq Signs Oil Deal With China Worth Up to $3 Billion, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/world/middleeast/29iraq.html)

BAGHDAD — In the first major oil deal Iraq has made with a foreign country since 2003, the Iraqi government and the China National Petroleum Corporation have signed a contract in Beijing that could be worth up to $3 billion, Iraqi officials said Thursday. Under the new contract, which must still be approved by Iraq’s cabinet, the Chinese company will provide technical advisers, oil workers and equipment to help develop the Ahdab oil field southeast of Baghdad, according to Assim Jihad, a spokesman for Iraq’s Oil Ministry. If the deal is approved, work could begin on the oil field within a few months, Mr. Jihad said. He said that Iraq had agreed to provide security for Chinese workers and that the Chinese company would also bring its own security team. The 22-year contract is a renegotiated version of a 1997 agreement between China and Iraq under [Saddam Hussein](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/saddam_hussein/index.html?inline=nyt-per). The original contract included production-sharing rights, but under the new contract China will be paid for its services but will not share in profits. The oil produced from the Ahdab field will help Iraq, a nation where electricity is in short supply, fuel a planned power plant that would be one of the largest in the country. For China, the deal offers a lucrative foothold in one of the most oil-rich countries in the world.

Link – Iraq/Kuwait

US obsession with the middle east and the war on terror has allowed China to become the regional leader in Asia

Christensen 6 (Thomas J., President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia, 31(1) ) KGL

Other observers concerned with the United States’ recent poor showing in its competition for power with China focus on the period following the terrorist attacks of September 11. They argue that Washington has become distracted in the global war on terror, while China has quickly and dramatically gained leverage in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and even Australia with impressive economic and diplomatic initiatives. For example, especially in the years immediately following the September 11 attacks, a widespread impression in the region has been that when the United States does engage with countries in Southeast Asia, it often sounds monotone and obsessed with terrorism at the expense of other issues. In the meantime, the Chinese leadership has kept an eye on the great power prize, has created strategic dependencies on China among its neighbors, and has prevented balancing coalitions from forming by embracing regional multilateralism. Lamenting perceived U.S. inaction during this process, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell writes, “The demands, mostly unanticipated, of the martial campaigns in the Middle East have had the additional consequence of diverting the United States away from the rapidly changing strategic landscape of Asia precisely at a time when China is making enormous strides in military modernization, commercial conquests, diplomatic inroads, and application of soft power. Rarely in history has a rising power made such prominent gains in the international system largely as a consequence of the actions and inattentiveness of the dominant power. Indeed, Washington has been mostly unaware of China’s gains within the past few years, many of which have come at the expense of the United States.” Campbell continues by critiquing the lack of coordination between a U.S. hedging strategy toward China and the U.S. engagement policy, stating that the latter “has succeeded so well that China is beginning to best the United States in open political and commercial contests.”

Link Helper - Turkey

China is interested in Turkey for its oil

The Straits Times 10. (“Now Iran has to deal with Chinese factor.” The Straits Times. June 12, 2010.) LRH.

Far from seeing its standing diminished in the Muslim world, as Mr Salehi speculates, China will likely continue to find oil and other commodity sources in Arab and other Islamic countries open to it. Trade ties have endured despite even more fundamental political differences, as with Taiwan. China has also dealt deftly with Turkey and Brazil by joining in rejecting a uranium swop agreement the two nations reached with Iran last month in an attempt to pre-empt this week's Security Council vote. Instead, the two emerging powers found China has displaced them in deal brokering.

China’s interest in Turkey is increasing: their economic ties are growing

Xinhua News Agency 9. (“China, Turkey to see closer ties, says ambassador.”Xinhua News Agency. June 22, 2009. <http://www.chinaembassy.org.tr/eng/dsxx/t572763.htm>). LRH.

ANKARA, June 21 (Xinhua) -- China and Turkey have great potentials to boost ties in economic, political and cultural areas, said Chinese ambassador to Turkey on Sunday.

"The two countries will definitely see closer cooperation in various fields and push their relations to a new level," said Chinese ambassador Gong Xiaosheng in an interview with Xinhua ahead of a state visit by Turkish President Abdullah Gul to China.

Despite concerns about Turkey's trade deficit with China, economic ties will stay healthy as long as the two sides expand cooperation in such areas as technology, tourism and education to pursue a general trade balance, Gong said.

China and Turkey saw bilateral trade surge more than 12 times to over 12 billion U.S. dollars in 2008 from 900 million U.S. dollars in 2001, official data showed.

Gong said the energy and tourism sectors have huge potentials to tap as part of Sino-Turkish economic cooperation for Turkey boasts rich wind and solar energy resources and unique landscapes.

China’s interests in Turkey are growing: China looking into greater energy and economic cooperation in Turkey

Invest in Turkey 10. (“Turkey and China set to increase bilateral trade.” Invest in Turkey. March 2, 2010. <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/turkey.china.trade.boost.aspx>). LRH.

AA - Turkey and China will cooperate to further develop trade relations. Husnu Ozyegin, Chairman of the Turkey-China Business Council under the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK), met with Chinese Ambassador to Ankara, Song Aiguo, to discuss ways of developing trade ties between the two countries.

Ozyegin called for bilateral visits of executives from both countries to assess the investment opportunities available and stated that he would like to host a Chinese delegation in Istanbul and give a briefing about Turkey’s commercial opportunities.

He also told Aiguo that Turkish-Russian energy cooperation will be boosted substantially over the next five years and suggested developing similar relations between China and Turkey in the same field. Meanwhile, Ozyegin added that work is ongoing to open a representative office for DEIK in China.

Currently 67 Turkish companies have offices in China, while some 305 Chinese companies are operating in Turkey. The Turkey-China trade volume stood at USD 12.6 billion in 2008.

Link Helper – Turkey

The uygher movement is politicaly devisive in Turkish relations with China

Shichor 9 (Yitzhak, research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Policy Studies (53) EBSCO)

On January 14, 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdo.gan, the leader of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk.nma Partisi, or AKP), landed in China for an official visit, hastily organized before he officially became prime minister. Heading a sizable delegation of more than one hundred officials and businessmen, Erdo.gan aimed at improving the political climate between the two countries, which had been cool for some time, in order to boost economic relations. He reiterated that Ankara upholds the One-China principle, respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and opposes terrorism and separatism. Long concerned about Turkey’s sympathy toward and support of Eastern Turkestan and Uyghur “separatist” organizations and activities, Beijing was quick to applaud Erdo.gan’s “recognition” of Xinjiang as an inseparable part of China and his “commitment” not to allow anyone in Turkey to engage in separatist activities against the PRC. To deliver this message, which reflects a change in the rules of the game, a conference entitled “The Past and Present State of the Uyghur Turks,” which was scheduled to take place in Ankara on January 16–17, 2003 (and to which I was invited), was cancelled at the last minute, as soon as Erdo.gan set foot in China. 1

China has a vested interest in cooperation with Turkey to put down the Uygher movement

Shichor 9 (Yitzhak, research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Policy Studies (53) EBSCO)

On July 28, 1995, Erdo.gan, then mayor of Istanbul, had named a section of the Sultan Ahmet (Blue Mosque) Park, in the heart of his city, after İsa Yusuf Alptekin, the leader of the Eastern Turkestan independence movement and Beijing’s arch Uyghur enemy since the late 1940s. To add insult to injury, after Alptekin’s death a memorial had been erected in the park to commemorate the Eastern Turkestani şehitlerinin (shahids, or martyrs) who had lost their lives in the “struggle for independence.” Those mentioned on the memorial included Şehit Osman Batur (who had been executed in China in 1951) and Mehmet Emin Bu.gra, leader of the Eastern Turkestan movement until his death in 1965. On a wall near the memorial were the words “Pray for Muslim Citizens of East Turkestan that have been oppressed and assimilated by Communist Chinese Regime!” along with a quote by İsa Yusuf Alptekin: “Now it’s time for liberation of east Turkestan!” Inaugurating the park in 1995, Erdo.gan said: In order to express our deep gratitude to the great leader of Eastern Turkestan we have decided to name this park after İsa Yusuf Alptekin. Now almost 95 years old, İsa Yusuf Alptekin has spent his life working for the cause not only of Eastern Turkestan, but of the entire Turkic world. With his tireless struggle İsa Yusuf Alptekin not only inspired us, at the same time he became a symbol of independence, justice and peace in the Turkic world. … Eastern Turkestan is not only the home of the Turkic peoples, but it is also the cradle of Turkic history, civilization and culture. To forget that would lead to the ignorance of our own history, civilization and culture. … The martyrs of Eastern Turkestan are our own martyrs. In order to perpetuate their memory and merry their souls [sic] we have set up this memorial to the Martyrs of Eastern Turkestan. May their struggle always be remembered. Today the culture of the people of Eastern Turkestan is being systematically sinocized [sic]. 2 Eight years later, Erdo.gan may have wished that he had never delivered that speech and authorized the memorial. His change of heart undoubtedly reflects his interest in benefiting from China’s emergence as a global economic powerhouse since the mid-1990s. Yet his recent association with China has come at a cost. Under pressure from Beijing, Ankara had chosen to kowtow to 2 Yitzhak Shichor [Erdo.gan’s] recent association with China has come at a cost b Ethno-Diplomacy 3 China and reduce its identification with and support of Uyghur nationalism. The Uyghurs, a Turkic nationality that claims independence from the PRC, where it has been systematically oppressed, abused, and discriminated against, had regarded Turkey not only as a source of nationalist inspiration but also as a protected base of operation. For more than a century Turkey has provided a model for Uyghur nationalism as well as served as a shelter for Uyghur migrant and exiled communities and a headquarters for Uyghur refugee organizations. Turkey’s patronage of the Uyghurs began in the late nineteenth century, long before the establishment of the PRC. This association, and Turkey’s perceived role in Central Asia in general, have affected Sino-Turkish relations ever since. Mutual suspicions, if not outright hostility, have also been fed by Turkey’s participation in the Korean War and integration into the U.S.-led Western defense alliances, primarily the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Baghdad Pact, and later the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Yet, while Cold War terminology has become irrelevant, and while China and Turkey maintain friendly relations, the Uyghur predicament is still alive. According to an article in the Turkish Daily News, “The plight of the Uyghurs living in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of western China…and Beijing’s increased sensitivity over the strong interest in the region…remains an issue of tension between the two countries.” 3 This view is shared by other observers, who claim that “the obvious obstacle to the…geopolitical opportunity in Sino-Turkish relations is the Xinjiang terrorist issue” (Dellios and Yilmaz 2008: 29). The question is whether Uyghurs are a real problem in China’s foreign policy in general, and in the case of Turkey and Central Asia in particular, or are they just a means for Beijing to intimidate and coerce other governments?

Link Helper - Turkey

China is interested in Turkey: Turkey helps them meet their economic and energy needs

Önen 10. (Şanlıurfa deputy Abdulkadir Emin, chairman of the Turkish group in the Asian Parliamentary Assembly and deputy chairman in charge of external affairs of the AKP. “[OPINION] Turkey-China: Toward energy cooperation.” Today’s Zaman. March 10, 2010. <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-203864-109-opinion-turkey-china-toward-energy-cooperation.html>). LRH.

China is Turkey’s biggest trade partner in the Far East and Turkey’s third-biggest export market in the world. When we examine bilateral trade relations, we see that despite the global financial crisis, the trade volume between the two countries increased by 40 percent in 2008 compared to the year before. Moreover, when we analyze data on trade volume between Turkey and China, we develop a better understanding of the improvement that has taken place under the AK Party government. According to the figures, while the trade volume between the two countries was $1.4 billion in 2002, it increased tenfold between 2002 and 2008. It is currently around $14 billion to $15 billion. In brief, this agreement is an outcome of the increasing business ties between Turkey and China and is in line with developing business relations.

It is evident that the agreement signed between Turkey and China will contribute to the development, diversification and consolidation of bilateral relations and facilitate the development of relations in the area of cooperation. The cooperation agreement is also significant because it will provide an opportunity for bilateral relations to advance to a more strategic level. We can especially see from Turkey-Russia relations that developing energy relations facilitates the development of political relations. Strategically, cooperation between China, which is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power and a candidate for the role of superpower, and Turkey in the field of energy could yield opportunities to develop cooperation in global and regional policy as well.

Another crucial point is that once China makes investments in Turkey in line with this agreement, the trade balance between the two countries, which is against Turkey, will improve in Turkey’s favor. When we consider that Turkey has a trade deficit with China, which is one of the biggest markets in the world and is a global manufacturing center, encouraging Chinese capital to invest in Turkey will play a major role in closing the trade deficit.

On the other hand, when we consider the situation from China’s perspective, developing energy cooperation with Turkey will give China the opportunity to use Turkey as a logistic hub for its Middle East initiative. Turkey’s involvement in projects with a superpower candidate like China in the Middle East, which is the most strategic location for global energy, will provide major advantages for Turkey not only in the energy sector but also in global policy.

\*\*Aff Answers

N/U – No Containment Now

China doesn’t feel threatened by U.S.- relations are high now.

Xinhua 10 (“China, U.S. Leaders Meet, Strike New ‘Common Ground’” Xinhua, June 27, http://imarketnews.com/?q=node/15575) MKB

Chinese **President** **Hu** Jintao **established new "common ground" in a meeting with his U.S. counterpart** on the sidelines of the Group of 20 leaders' summit in Canada at the weekend, the official Xinhua News Agency reported over the weekend.

**The conciliatory tone** of the Xinhua **report is in keeping with a shift in China's official approach to the U.S. after a spate of issues**, including Barack Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama and arms sales to Taiwan, raised tensions between Beijing and Washington earlier in the U.S. President's administration.

The two presidents met a week after the People's Bank of China signalled the end of the yuan's de facto peg to the U.S. dollar and the start of greater exchange rate flexibility, a move seen aimed at defusing possible tensions in Canada and satisfying demands on Capitol Hill that Beijing take concrete steps to address what Congress believes to be an unfair trade subsidy.

Xinhua **said the two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on the Sino-US relationship and major regional and international issues of shared interest**, arriving at "new and important common ground."

In the meeting, Chinese President Hu said the current world economy is recovering but warned of uncertainties and that systemic risks to financial system haven't been fully eliminated. The negative impact from the European sovereign debt crisis to the world ecnomic recovery shouldn't be under-estimated either, Hu said.

"Under such conditions, **both China and the US should continue to enchance macro-economic policy cooperation and properly handle trade frictions through negotiation," Hu was** quoted as **saying.**

Recent developments mean China perceives no military threat from U.S.

Graham- Harrison (Emma, staffwriter, “China general says open to U.S. defense boss visit” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6601MN20100701?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews) MKB

**Chinese general said** on Thursday that **U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates was welcome to visit China** at an "appropriate" time, possibly **signaling a desire to soften military tensions** between the two powers.

The comments from General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of general staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), reported by the official Xinhua agency, come weeks after Gates said China's decision to curtail military-to-military contacts could undercut regional stability.

Gates also said the PLA was the main obstacle to improved relations and suggested its position was at odds with that of the country's political leadership.

China scaled back military ties with the United States after the Obama administration notified Congress in January of a plan to sell the self-ruled island of Taiwan, which is claimed by Beijing, up to $6.4 billion worth of arms.

Other issues, from Tibet to trade, also contributed to souring ties between the superpower and rising Asian giant at the start of the year. **But while the political relationship has since warmed, there has been little progress on military relations.**

In what American officials took as a snub, **China turned down a proposed visit by Gates aimed at mending fences during his trip to Asia in early June. Ma said China would be willing to host the U.S. defense chief in the future.**

**"We still welcome him to visit China at a time which is workable for both sides,**" Ma said when asked whether it would be possible for Gates to visit China, according to Xinhua.

Reductions Good – Peaceful Rise

Reductions of military presence in Asia keeps China on the path of “peaceful rise” and leads to stable Sino-US relations

Bandow 2009

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Balancing Beijing”, The National Interest, February 24, <http://nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20906>)

Yet the question is, what balance of power? Beijing poses no threat to America’s homeland or even Pacific possessions and will not do so for decades, if ever. The United States possesses a far stronger military to start—eleven carrier groups to none, for instance—spends five or more times as much as the PRC on defense (excluding the costs of Afghanistan and Iraq) and is allied with most important industrial states in Asia and Europe. There is no Chinese threat or potential threat to America. At issue is relative influence in East Asia and the security of Washington’s friends in that region. Yet the PRC so far has been assertive rather than aggressive and those nations, particularly Japan and South Korea, could do much more individually and collectively for regional security. Washington should not hesitate to sell arms to friendly states, including Taiwan, despite Chinese protests, but should leave them with responsibility for their own defense. Of course, a policy of continued restraint by Beijing will make it far easier for the United States to back away. In any case, there is little that Washington can do, at least at acceptable cost, to maintain U.S. dominance along China’s borders, as the PRC—whose economy already ranks number two or three, depending on the measure, in the world—continues to grow. Washington would have to devote an ever larger amount of resources to the military, in the midst of economic crisis, to ensure its ability to overcome far more limited Chinese capabilities. Even then, Beijing is unlikely to forever accept U.S. hegemony. Confrontation if not conflict would be likely. The better option would be to temper America’s geopolitical pretensions and accept a more influential PRC in its own region. China will grow in power, irrespective of Washington’s wishes. America’s chief objective should be to ensure that this rise is peaceful, as Beijing has promised. U.S.-China diplomatic relations passed the thirty-year mark last fall. The relationship has survived great challenges and is likely to face even greater ones in the future. But despite inevitable differences between the two nations, much depends upon strengthening their ties. The twenty-first century will turn out far differently—and positively—if America and the PRC prove willing to accommodate each other’s economic and geopolitical ambitions.

Reductions Good – Offshore Balancing

Removal of military presence in Asia in favor of offshore balancing increases US influence in Asia while decreasing tensions with China

Wu 2000

(Wu Xinbo is currently a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, “Managing U.S.-China Relations”, IR China Global Beat, November, <http://www.irchina.org/en/xueren/china/view.asp?id=843>)

As the international environment changes, Washington should try to find new ways to bolster its influence. Base-access arrangements will be more sustainable politically and less expensive financially. Also, the revolution in military affairs and improvement of rapid-reaction capability will make it unnecessary for the U.S. to retain current deployment levels abroad. In this era of growing economic interdependence and deepening regional integration, it is more sensible for the U.S. to lead by shaping the rules of the game and building security communities rather than seeking influence via its military muscle. As Washington redefines its security ties with Japan and others, it has alarmed and alienated those like China who have become very suspicious of U.S. strategic intentions. Threatened countries naturally respond by aligning with each other. The China-Russian partnership, although still far from an alliance, has become more substantive over the past several years in response to U.S. security policy in Asia and Europe. Washington should lay more stress on the political rather than the military function of its alliance structure; it should seek closer diplomatic consultation and coordination among allies in dealing with regional issues and abstain from rattling the alliance saber.

Link Turn - Iraq

American military presence in Iraq frees up diplomatic space for China to expand their influence

Hughes 2007

(John Hughes, a former editor of the Monitor, is currently a professor of communications at Brigham Young University, “Consequences of US commitment to Iraq”, Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0131/p09s01-cojh.html>)

Meanwhile, this American preoccupation with Iraq and the Middle East is permitting China and Russia to extend their influence in other crucial areas of the world with little fear of US reaction. China has lately been waging an economic offensive in Latin America and Africa, partly to tie up oil supply in these regions for use by the fast-growing Chinese economy. Last week, Beijing announced that President Hu Jintao would take an unusual diplomatic initiative in Sudan to help settle the genocidal killing of some 200,000 people in the Darfur region of that country. The killings have been mainly of black tribal people at the hands of government-supported Arab militias known as the janjaweed. China has a vested interest in Sudan, buying the bulk of its oil exports. While there has been much hand-wringing in the West over the violence in Darfur, there has been little effective action. As part of its increasing activity on the world stage, China now seeks to fill that vacuum. Although Russia has been occupied with internal political and economic problems, it, too, is seeking more stature on the international scene. President Vladimir Putin was busy in New Delhi last week consolidating his country's relationship with India. India is a country that the US has been wooing as a counterweight to China in Asia. Bush, in an unusual move, recently signed an agreement permitting India, which has tested nuclear weapons, to buy new nuclear technology for civilian nuclear development. It signaled US recognition of India's importance as an ally in Asia. Both China and Russia have been the most protective members in the UN Security Council of Iran, blocking US attempts to take more punitive steps against Iran for continuing its nuclear development program. Says one US diplomat: "While the cat [the US] is away [in Iraq], the mice [China, Russia, Iran] feel free to play."

Link Turn - Japan

Reducing presence in Japan decreases Sino-Japanese tensions

Harris 2009

(Tobias Harris is a Japanese politics specialist who worked for a DPJ member of the upper house of the Diet 2006-2007, “What is Ozawa's angle?”, Observing Japan, February 26, <http://www.observingjapan.com/2009/02/what-is-ozawas-angle.html>)

Speaking with reporters Wednesday, Ozawa indicated that under a DPJ government Japan would seek to build an equal partnership with the US, which he said would entail reducing the US military presence in Japan to the Seventh Fleet, based at Yokosuka in Kanagawa prefecture. It would also mean Japan's taking greater responsibility for its own defense, while the US military focused on providing stability in East Asia. MTC wonders whether Ozawa, in calling for this drastic reduction in the US forward presence, is bargaining with China, with a drastic reduction of US forces in Japan a means of taking Japan out of China's line of sight. In this sense one should pair these remarks with Ozawa's remarks earlier this week about China-centered foreign policy.

Containment Bad - Taiwan

Attempts to counter Chinese nationalism through containment will lead to a collapse in relations and war over Taiwan

Wu 2000

(Wu Xinbo is currently a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, “Managing U.S.-China Relations”, IR China Global Beat, November, <http://www.irchina.org/en/xueren/china/view.asp?id=843>)

The U.S. faces a most daunting foreign policy task in managing its relations with a rising China. Only by adapting themselves to a changing regional political and security landscape will the U.S. and China be able to peacefully coexist. Given the relative power imbalance, Washington has far greater leeway to adjust its security policy in Asia. The Taiwan question lies at the crux of U.S.-China security entanglements. It is probably the only issue that can ignite a major military conflict between Beijing and Washington. To untie this knot, the United States should take a fresh look at the issue. It has to understand that this is basically a matter of nation-building for China, not an American geopolitical or ideological issue. Much has been said about China’s budding nationalism, which is actually a rediscovery and ardent pursuit of China’s national interests, developing alongside a decline in ideological attraction. If there is any issue that can fan the tinder of China’s nationalism into raging flames, it is the Taiwan question. The past has shown that when the United States confronts nationalism in other countries, it seldom succeeds. For Taiwan to gain security, international space and more economic opportunities, it has to accept some form of association with the mainland while preserving the greatest possible political autonomy. If Taiwan seeks formal independence, it is almost certain that Beijing will have to resort to the use of force. Even if the PRC is not able to take over Taiwan, it certainly can throw the island into chaos. Compared with such a horrible scenario, peaceful unification across the Taiwan Strait is in the best interests of Beijing, Taipei and Washington. As long as its current U.S. Taiwan policy continues, Washington will remain unable to stabilize its relations with a rising China. Beijing will remain suspicious of the U.S. security presence in East Asia, and U.S. leadership and strategic initiatives in both regional and global affairs will not receive Beijing’s due endorsement. If the Taiwan issue can be resolved peacefully, however, then China will become a status quo power in the political-security sense and Sino-U.S. relations will be far more stable, healthy and constructive. China-U.S. cooperation would thus stand as a strong force for regional security and prosperity. As Mao Zedong told Richard Nixon in 1972, "the world is a big thing, and Taiwan is a small thing." The U.S. must thus take a broader strategic view of the Taiwan issue. Based on such an understanding, Washington should encourage Taipei to sit down and negotiate with Beijing about a reasonable unification arrangement. On the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. should adopt a more sensible and responsible approach, taking into account the negative impact on Taiwan’s political dynamics, and should avoid either focusing on the military balance across the Strait or being tempted by commercial incentives. Instead, Washington can play an honest broker role by coming up with some useful and creative ideas about Cross-Strait reconciliation. As to U.S. alliances, it is understood that this arrangement has awarded the U.S. unparalleled strategic influence in the region. However, the rationale for maintaining a substantive military deployment in Northeast Asia is fading away. With the forthcoming reconciliation and ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula and resumption of "normal state" status for Japan, U.S. military presence on a large scale will not be politically sustainable either domestically or in Asia.

Containment Bad – Political Costs

Chinese politicians cannot afford to be perceived as acting lenient towards US deterrence strategy – there would be domestic political costs to ignoring nationalist voices

Bodeen 10 (Christopher, The Seattle Times, Chinese nationalists increasingly strident, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2012206131\_apaschinanationalism.html?syndication=rss) MAH

Uniformed officers have spoken out publicly as well. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the PLA's general staff, took a swipe at Washington at a security conference earlier this month in Singapore, complaining of "the threat to use force in international relations, and interference in other countries' internal affairs." Senior officers make such statements knowing they will be well received both among the public and with a significant portion of the political elite, said Michael Swaine, an expert on Chinese civil-military relations at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "And the senior (Chinese) leadership is probably either unaware of or does not actively suppress such views as long as they do not strongly attack the party's basic pro-reform and opening line or the authority of the party, or openly argue for conflict with the US," Swaine said. Chinese politicians ignore nationalist voices at their peril, especially with a looming leadership transition set to begin in 2012. At such times, no aspiring leader can afford to appear soft toward the U.S., particularly on an issue as sensitive as Taiwan. Such a stance does not come without costs, however, as nervous neighbors look to shore up their ties with the U.S. and hedge their bets against a more assertive China. Beijing needs to bear that in mind and resist the urge to swagger just because it can, said Oxford University China scholar Steve Tsang. "If the top leadership allows its formal policy of rising peacefully to be breached because they just cannot resist wanting to feel good in asserting China's right to be respected properly, it can easily lead to miscalculation in policy," Tsang said.

Containment Bad – African Oil

Chinese involvement in African oil is good: they invest and build infrastructure. Western involvement is far worse.

Jing 10. (Fu, writer for China Daily. “Chinese investment benefits Africa: Yang.” China Daily. March 8, 2010. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010npc/2010-03/08/content_9551176.htm>). LRH.

Yang also said it is unreasonable for some Western countries to oppose the expansion of China's investment in Africa, holding that China is encouraging other countries to boost energy cooperation with African countries on the basis of mutual benefit. "I have noticed that some (in the international community) are unwilling to see the sound development of the Sino-African relationship and always play up our energy cooperation," said Yang at a press conference. China accounts for just a small part of global energy investment in the continent. "The United States and Europe have invested far more than us," Yang said. Africa's oil exports to China accounted for only 13 percent of its total oil exports, lower than the amounts exported to Europe and the US, which both surpassed 30 percent. China's investment in Africa's oil sector accounted for only one-sixteenth of the world's total, which is much less than the amount invested by either Europe or the US. In addition, Yang said China's relations with African countries entail more than just cooperation in the energy field. The two sides have already implemented long-lasting cooperation in improving local infrastructure by building roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and other public undertakings. Commenting on China's performance in Africa, President of the Republic of Zambia, Rupiah Banda, said: "Chinese investors are the real helping hands for us and their contribution to Africa's economic development is evident." In a recent interview, Rwandan President Paul Kagame said: "The Chinese bring what Africa needs: investment and money for governments and companies. China is investing in infrastructure and building roads." In contrast, the West's involvement "has not brought Africa forward," the president was quoted as saying. "Western firms have, to a large extent, polluted Africa and they are still doing so. Think of the dumping of nuclear waste in the Ivory Coast or the fact that Somalia is being used as a garbage can by European firms," he added.

China’s investment in African oil industries is good for the African economy

China Daily 10. (“Energy industry at forefront of foreign investment.”

China Daily. March 23, 2010. <http://www.chinadaily.net/regional/2010-03/23/content_9627705.htm>). LRH.

Capital and expertise from China create wide range of opportunities in Nigeria With Nigeria's upstream oil industry generating an estimated $600 billion in revenues since the 1960s, the sector is the most important component of the country's economic engine.

The government is keen to ensure that the industry develops at a sustainable rate and provides jobs as well as encouraging more foreign investment.

Despite problems in the Niger Delta region, foreign companies remain committed to the industry's development. Nigeria expects total domestic gas demand to jump more than 20 percent a year to 10 billion cubic feet per day by 2015 from around 500 million in 2000. In addition, the proposed new Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) will increase transparency across the sector if approved by the national assembly.

"With the PIB, Nigeria will move from being one of the most opaque petroleum nations in Africa to one of the most open and transparent in the world," said former Minister of Petroleum Resources Rilwanu Lukman. "The texts of all licenses, leases and contracts and any of the changes to such documents will no longer be confidential," "China will be our most important market. They need the energy, and we have it, so what better partner for us than someone who needs our resources?" The insurance sector is a relatively new industry in Nigeria as increasing levels of risk awareness among leaders of public corporations and directors of private enterprises generates business for a host of insurers, reinsurers, brokers, agents and loss adjusters. The National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) is the industry watchdog and compiles annual insurance policy and operational guidelines to operators as part of its regulatory and supervisory tools.

Containment Bad – African Oil

China’s investment in African oil has promoted economic development in Africa  
BBC 10. (“Comparison of text of Chinese foreign minister's news conference 7 Mar.” British Broadcasting Corporation. March 8, 2010). LRH.

Moreover, China's cooperation with Africa covers both resource-rich countries and non-resource countries. I want to point out that Africa belongs to the African people. African people are the masters of Africa. All other people are only guests. We should respect the will and freedom of the hosts in their choosing their cooperation partners and friends. I believe to become friends and cooperative partners of the African people, the most basic thing is to do more concrete things and good things, and less of saying empty words. China's cooperation with Africa has helped translate its latent advantages in energy and resources into real advantages in development. We cooperate with the African people in building railroads, roads, bridges, and to improve their infrastructure, and to bring benefits to the people of Africa. Not long ago, Zambian President Banda said, "All can see China's investors have promoted Africa's economic development. They are the people who really help us." President Kagame of Rwanda s aid, "China's investment and loans have brought things that Africa needs." I believe these are fair evaluations.

Our evidence assumes theirs: China has been doing an increasing amount of infrastructure projects in Africa in response to criticisms about how they get their oil

Volman 9. (Daniel, Dir. of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC. “CHINA, INDIA, RUSSIA AND THEUNITED STATES: The Scramble for African Oil and the Militarization of the Continent.” p9. Nordic Africa Institute. October 19, 2009). LRH.

It is also important to recognize that China and India do invest in projects besides resource extraction and that many of these projects can or may contribute significantly to the economic development of African countries. The Chinese investment plan for the DR Congo, for instance, includes the rehabilitation of the mining industry and the construction of major infrastructure projects including transportation and power pro­duction projects. China’s increasing willingness to fund these projects demonstrates that China has been sensitive to criticism of its initial focus on resource extraction and that China does respond to pressure for the reform of its investment practices in Africa.

China’s ability to access African oil is good: the increased competition gives Africans more choices

Kasozi 9. (Prof. A.B.K. Kasozi, writer for The New Vision: Uganda’s leading website. “[Africa:](http://allafrica.com/africa/) China's Entry Into the Scramble for Oil Could Benefit Continent.”

December 23, 2009. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200912240163.html>). LRH.

China's entry into the African market, especially the oil market, is advantageous to the African continent as it increases demand for African resources and gives Africans more choices. The competition should positively reduce the traditionally unequal trading relations the continent has had with her former colonial masters-cum-trading partners.

China Heg Good – US Alliances

Chinese assertiveness strengthens the commitments of Asian allies to the US

Solomon and Hayashi 2010

(Jay Solomon and Yuka Hayashi, Asia News Correspondents, “As China Swaggers, Neighbors Embrace U.S”, Wall Street Journal, May 25, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266333652277148.html>)

BEIJING—The Obama administration's talks with China this week won few new commitments from Beijing on global security challenges, particularly in looming showdowns with North Korea and Iran. But Beijing's increasing diplomatic and military assertiveness is unnerving its Asian neighbors in ways that could bolster the U.S.'s strategic position in the region. Fears that China is siding with Pyongyang over North Korea's alleged sinking of a South Korean naval vessel has rattled South Korea's and Japan's governments and re-energized their commitments to military alliances with the U.S., officials from both countries said.

China Heg Good – US Alliances

Increases in China’s influence and assertiveness lead to Asian countries seeking alliances and improved relations with the US

Solomon and Hayashi 2010

(Jay Solomon and Yuka Hayashi, Asia News Correspondents, “As China Swaggers, Neighbors Embrace U.S”, Wall Street Journal, May 25, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266333652277148.html>)

Further afield, countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam have also been seeking closer ties to the U.S. in recent months, according to U.S. and Asian diplomats. These countries are quietly voicing fears about China's expanding military and economic power. Analysts say that the more China has sought to assert its regional authority, the more many Asian leaders have pressed Washington to maintain, if not increase, its military and diplomatic presence. The U.S. "should be sending China thank you notes" for its handling of the North Korea issue, said Ralph Cossa, a former U.S. Air Force colonel who heads the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Hawaii-based think tank. China, he said, "very much played into the hands of both the U.S. and Hatoyama's interests." South Korea's strong ties with Beijing have been tested by China's reaction to Pyongyang's alleged torpedoing of the South Korean vessel, the Cheonan. China waited nearly a month to send condolences to South Korea for the loss of 46 of its servicemen. Chinese President Hu Jintao rankled Seoul by hosting North Korean leader Kim Jong Il this month in a string of meetings in Beijing. South Korea President Lee Myung-bak had visited China just days earlier and hadn't been told of Mr. Kim's visit, South Korean officials say. China's government has continued to indicate skepticism toward South Korea's formal accusation last week, backed by an international probe of the Cheonan's wreckage, that North Korea attacked the ship. North Korea has denied any involvement in the attack. China has "taken note of the result of the South Korean investigation," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said Tuesday. "We have also taken note of the [North Koreans'] response." Chinese scholars say Beijing's caution is warranted, in part to avoid the possibility that the North could be wrongly accused. China's growing assertiveness has rattled the region, as recent tensions between Beijing and Tokyo illustrate.

China Heg Good – US Alliances

Chinese assertiveness draws new countries into alliances with the US, increasing US leadership

Solomon and Hayashi 2010

(Jay Solomon and Yuka Hayashi, Asia News Correspondents, “As China Swaggers, Neighbors Embrace U.S”, Wall Street Journal, May 25, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266333652277148.html>)

China's growing confidence is also raising fears in Southeast Asia, and stimulating a new courtship of the U.S. Muslim-majority Malaysia has often had rocky relations with Washington in recent decades. Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad openly sought to challenge U.S. economic policies during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Kuala Lumpur has regularly attacked U.S. foreign policy in the Islamic world. Under new Prime Minister Najib Razak, however, Malaysia has increasingly sought to reorient itself toward the U.S., Malaysian and U.S. officials say. The two sides have been discussing the possibility of Kuala Lumpur's sending a reconstruction team to Afghanistan, which would make Malaysia one of the few Muslim countries to deploy troops. And Mr. Razak's government just passed a draconian law regulating the export of dual-use technologies to countries such as Iran. U.S. officials have regularly complained that Malaysia has served as one of the primary conduits for military equipment entering Iran. Malaysian officials have said in interviews that its foreign policy shift has been driven, in part, by its desire to offset China's growing power. "We can't afford right now not to be on good terms with the U.S.," said a senior Malaysian official.

China Heg Good – US Leadership (Comparative)

Increasing Chinese power increases US leadership in Asia, Chinese dominance of Asia is impossible, and all of their evidence on this question is wrong.

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

“China can’t dominate Asia; there are too many governments in Asia.” This response by a senior Chinese official to my question during an interview in Beijing last year reflects some of the realities of power in Asia that make Chinese ability to seriously challenge US leadership in Asia unlikely under foreseeable circumstances. The findings of my private discussions with Chinese and other Asian government officials about China’s rise and its implications for US leadership in Asia contradict much media and other public discourse in the United States and some parts of Asia that depict a rising and powerful China coming to the leading position in Asia at a time of US decline in the region. In contrast to these media and other commentaries, which focus on Chinese strengths and US weaknesses, government officials in Asia in private conversations and interviews show an equal awareness of Chinese weaknesses and US strengths in the region. They also are aware of how the many independent-minded governments in Asia “hedge” in reaction to China’s rise. These governments work quietly among themselves and with the United States to insure that their independence and freedom of action will not be negatively affected as China’s rises in prominence in the region. Such actions reinforce US leadership in Asia as China rises. US policy makers in the Congress and elsewhere can choose to adopt the one-sided view of those US media and other commentators who predict China’s dominance and US decline in Asia. US policy makers tended to do the same thing in the late 1970s when the United States was indeed weak and divided after the defeat in Vietnam and prevailing US media and other predictions said the rising power, the Soviet Union, would dominate Asia. The same kind of pattern prevailed in the late 1980s when respected US media and commentators said that Japan would dominate Asia as US influence in the region declined. Of course, those earlier predictions were dead wrong; they focused on the strengths of the rising powers, the USSR and Japan, and did not adequately consider their weaknesses; and they focused on the weaknesses of the United States and did not adequately consider its strengths. A more sensible path, in my view, is for US policy makers to listen carefully to the more balanced and carefully calibrated views of Asian government officials. While media, vocal non-government elites, and public opinion matter in some Asian countries, at the end of the day it is the government officials who make the foreign policy decisions. There are few failed states in Asia; most governments are strong and are expected by their constituents to lead.

China Heg Good - NK

China leadership good, prevents North Korea from using nuclear bombs

Christensen 6 (Thomas J., President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia, 31(1) ) KGL

Rather than merely following the lead of others, China is championing some multilateral initiatives in the region and has sought to catalyze existing trends through economic diplomacy. One factor that might help secure China’s leading role in the ASEAN economies is the China-ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA), signed in 2001 and due to take effect in 2010.33 This FTA supplements agreements reached in multilateral forums such as the Asia Paciªc Economic and Cooperation forum (APEC), the Asian Development Bank, and the World Trade Organization (which China joined in 2001); and it promises to accelerate trade and investment between China and its southern neighbors. In 2003 China helped create and hosted the six-party talks on North Korean denuclearization and, in the fall of 2005, not only helped revive those talks but drafted the joint statement presented on September 19, 2005. That statement calls for the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs in exchange for security guarantees and energy assistance. In addition, it promises future U.S. consideration of both diplomatic normalization of relations with Pyongyang and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to the North Koreans.34 China also has been advocating trilateral functional cooperative meetings with South Korea and Japan, including discussion of security issues.

No Expansion – Peaceful Rise

China will maintain peace with its neighbors for the sake of its economy

Hellyer 9 (Marcus, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Australian Defence College, Is the Expansion of Chinese Military Capability a Threat to the Stability of the Western Pacific, http://www.defence.gov.au/jetwc/docs/publications%202010/Publctns\_050310\_IstheExpansionofChinese.pdf)

China under the Communist Party has not been a pacifist power and has been willing to use force even beyond its borders.10 Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that China is developing its military power in order to use it against its neighbours with the potential exception of Taiwan noted earlier. China has been very active in presenting a peaceful image of itself to the world. President Hu Jintao has used the term ‘harmonious world’ to describe China’s model of international relations and Zheng Bijian developed the term ‘peaceful rise’ to describe China’s development.11 The latest Chinese defence White Paper adopts this terminology stating that ‘China is unswervingly taking the road of peaceful development…endeavouring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.12 While Chinese statements should not be taken at face value, they should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. There is considerable incentive for China to avoid conflict that would interfere with its continued economic growth. The need to maintain the international conditions necessary for economic growth has become a central goal of Chinese foreign policy. China has shown itself quite willing to peacefully resolve – or at least manage – disputes with its maritime neighbours. Indeed, its focus on avoiding conflict to permit development predates Hu Jintao and motivated its moderate behaviour over the South China Seas territorial disputes with ASEAN members in the 1990s. China acceded to the ASEAN code of conduct for the South China Sea and has embarked on joint resource development projects there with ASEAN members.14 Similarly, while China’s territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea have not been fully resolved, the two countries have declared East China Sea a sea of ‘peace, stability and cooperation’ and reached agreement on the joint development of gas fields.15 China has taken considerable efforts to demonstrate that it is a good international citizen, for example in approving and participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Increasingly, China has come to realise that it needs to contribute to the maintenance of the peace and stability that serves China’s interests so well.

No Risk of PRC Hegemony

There is no risk of China challenging the US in Asia, too many neighbors oppose Chinese nationalism and will counterbalance, and economic and diplomatic factors prevent conflict

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

Heading the list of limitations and weaknesses of China’s rise in Asia is strong Chinese nationalism; this seriously complicates Chinese relations with Japan and Taiwan, and causes significant difficulties with South Korea, Singapore, and India, among others. Chinese territorial claims are a serious concern in the East China Sea, a major drag on improving relations with India, and an underlying concern in Southeast Asia. China’s authoritarian political system is unattractive to many, though certainly not all, of China’s neighbors. Chinese economic and diplomatic strengths also reflect significant limitations and complications. More than half of Chinese trade with Asia and the world is processing trade, which leads to double and triple counting as a product crosses borders, sometimes several times, before completion and (often) export from China to the United States and Europe. The value added by China in this trade is frequently low, and the trade depends heavily on US and European consumers. The majority of the trade is carried out by foreign invested enterprises in China. Reflecting theses realities, Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2005 said that China is “a major trading country” but has not yet become “a major trading power.” Chinese economic competitiveness means that Asian manufacturers often cannot compete directly with China. In response, Asian entrepreneurs increasingly invest in and integrate their businesses with China, but Asian workers cannot move to China and often suffer. Investment in Asian economies declines and Chinese investment and foreign assistance in Asia remain small and do not offset these negative implications. China’s “win-win diplomacy” focuses on common ground, which receives great positive publicity but does little to resolve differences or deal with issues. With few exceptions, China does not do hard things; it carefully avoids major international commitments or risks.

AT: Economic Retaliation

China cannot use economic retaliation strategies against the U.S., any effective response would constrain China’s economy as well.

Thompson 10 (Drew, Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at Nixon Center, “China’s temper tantrum ” The National Interest, February 2, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22832) MKB

Following the White House’s low-key Friday afternoon announcement that it had notified Congress of its intent to sell a weapons package to Taiwan, China responded with a level of outrage that was predictable and expected. The mainland’s English and Chinese media blasted the decision, labeling Washington as “arrogant” and claiming that the decision would do “serious harm” to the U.S.-China relationship. China’s anger is palpable and it is tinged with frustration at being unable to coerce Washington, but any assertion that the decision to sell arms to Taiwan will somehow wreck the overall U.S.-China relationship is wrong. It is unlikely that either side has yet or will soon miscalculate and send the U.S.-China relationship into a complete tailspin. The American sale of short-range, defensive weapons and even the decision to notify Congress on a quiet Friday afternoon indicate that the United States is seeking to avoid provoking Beijing. The package itself, containing antimissile batteries and helicopters that China also wants to acquire leaves out the most “offensive” weapons that Taiwan seeks—F-16’s with ground attack capabilities and diesel-electric submarines—further indicating American restraint. China, having recently demonstrated its own antiballistic missile capabilities, has a hard time arguing against the sale of Patriot batteries, which are politically attractive to the Taiwanese people who live in the cross hairs of 1,400 PLA missiles pointing at them. China is particularly frustrated with its limited options to effectively coerce the United States to stop providing for Taiwan’s defense. As expected, Beijing announced a cessation to military-to-military contacts with the Washington. But this will likely have little impact, as it is apparent that mil-mil relations were not meeting the expectations of Pentagon officials and flag officers in the services. In the brief intervals when mil-mil relations were in full swing, they did little to shed light on Chinese military decision-making or other aspects of transparency. Mil-mil talks also failed to make progress on U.S. priorities, such as an agreement to prevent collisions at sea between U.S. and Chinese vessels known as an “incidents at sea agreement,” something the United States successfully negotiated with the Soviets in 1972 at the height of the Cold War. Additional Chinese threats (made mostly by nongovernment analysts) that China will no longer help America on “its” issues, such as North Korea, Iran, or climate change because America will not bend on “their” issues of Taiwan and Tibet, are also a sign of frustration. Getting the DPRK back to the nuclear negotiating table has proven beyond Beijing’s ability thus far, and China’s response to U.S. and European proposals to increase pressure through sanctions on a truculent Iran have not met international expectations. Many climate-change experts feel that China snubbed the United States in Copenhagen this December, despite agreeing to the outcomes at the very end, leaving some in the U.S. government to question’s China’s commitment to taking meaningful responsibility for curtailing future CO2 emissions. By selling arms to Taiwan, what “cooperation” is the United States really giving up? Nonproliferation and climate change are not bilateral issues but global and regional ones. China can not refuse to cooperate in these areas without becoming diplomatically isolated from the rest of the world. China’s threat to sanction American companies who provide arms to Taiwan is a new wrinkle to China’s response, but one that will likely have little impact. First of all, China has long opposed the use of sanctions in principle, particularly sanctions unilaterally declared outside of the UN Security Council. It is unlikely China will raise the issue in the Security Council and risk having a debate about something it considers a domestic issue becoming part of the UN’s agenda. For the individual companies involved by and large, their bread is buttered by the Pentagon, not some hope that China represents a large future market for their high-tech products. For companies like United Technologies and Boeing, which have significant investments in and trade with China, they might be more vulnerable to Chinese threats. But Beijing has to tread a fine line and not scare away the international business community upon which China’s economy still depends. Threats and sanctions will possibly dampen global enthusiasm for future investments in China, particularly conglomerates that fear being coerced to provide sensitive technologies to the country. Refusing to buy Boeing civilian aircraft leaves the Chinese government vulnerable to a virtual monopoly by Airbus. Shuttering China-based factories owned by different divisions of conglomerates involved in the arms sales hurts Chinese workers. China has few palatable options for economic coercion; even selling large quantities of U.S. Treasury bills would have negative consequences for the Chinese economy.

AT: PRC SP Decreases Heg

Chinese expansion of power is no threat to the US

Bandow 2009

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Balancing Beijing”, The National Interest, February 24, <http://nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20906>)

Washington also should look on benignly as the PRC expands its commercial and diplomatic ties around the world. Even a sober military analyst like Tom Ricks of the Washington Post recently warned: “I am not sure what China is up to in Africa. But I have the nagging thought that we will figure it out in 15 years and be sorry.” Yet the United States and Soviet Union spent most of the cold war sparring for influence in the Third World to little meaningful effect. Money was spent and lives were lost, but in the end it didn’t much matter who was numero uno in Vientiane, Kinshasa, Luanda or Managua. It matters even less today. As my Cato colleague Ben Friedman puts it, “There is little that China can do in Africa to make it stronger or to damage U.S. interests.” If Beijing wishes to invest heavily in places with little geopolitical heft, why should the United States object?

\*\*Taiwan Impacts

Taiwan Goes Nuclear

A China/ Taiwan war may draw the US in and could escalate to nuclear war

Federation of American Scientists 6. (“Report:  Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.” Ch. 1, p. 20. Federation of American Scientists. November 30, 2006. <http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-15-34.pdf>) LRH.

The “immediate” contingency referred to is a potential conflict over Taiwan, which is what most analysts fear could trigger a U.S.- Chinese military clash. As the NPR was nearing completion, the Pentagon wrote up a new war plan (Operations Plan (OPLAN) 5077) for defending Taiwan against a Chinese attack. Between 2003 and 2005, the Pentagon fine-tuned OPLAN 5077 to include maritime interception operations in the Taiwan Straits, attacks on targets on the Chinese mainland, information warfare and non-kinetic options, and even the potential use of U.S. nuclear weapons.36 In February 2006, for the first time OSD elevated China to the top of the list (above Russia) of large-scale military threats facing the United States. According to the QDR: Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies.37

China wants to lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons in attempt to reunify Taiwan with the PRC

Chase et. al 9. (Michael S, Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. Andrew S. Erikson, Assistant Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College. Christopher Yeaw, Associate Professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College. “The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy.” China Brief. 9(5). March 4, 2009. [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=34661&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=8df75e4936](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=34661&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=25&cHash=8df75e4936)). LRH.

The second possibility is a crisis-driven change in China’s declaratory nuclear policy. Specifically, Chinese authors have suggested that Beijing could lower the nuclear threshold to deter intervention in a Taiwan crisis or conflict. According to Zhang Peimin's article in Military Art, a Chinese military journal, “When we are under the pressure of circumstances to use military force to reunify the motherland’s territory, we may even lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons to deter intervention by external enemies” [16]. The third scenario is when Chinese leaders believe that territorial integrity is at stake. Some Chinese strategists seem to hint at the possibility of first use under particularly dire circumstances, such as a scenario in which the PLA is on the verge of suffering a politically catastrophic defeat in a conventional military conflict over Taiwan.

Taiwan Goes Nuclear – AT: NFU

The No-First-Use Policy argument is irrelevant: China has deployed weapons despite it

Federation of American Scientists 6. (“Report:  Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.” Ch. 1, p. 33-34. Federation of American Scientists. November 30, 2006. <http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-15-34.pdf>) LRH.

The ‘active defense’ guideline posits a defensive military strategy and asserts that China does not initiate wars or fight wars of aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.... Beijing’s definition of an attack against its territory, or what constitutes an initial attack, is too vague to clarify matters to outsiders, however. In cases where Chinese use of force involves core interests, such as sovereignty or territorial claims (including Taiwan), Beijing could claim military preemption as a strategically defensive act. For example, China refers to its intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Similarly, border incursions and conflicts against India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam (1979) are referred to in authoritative texts as ‘Self-Defense Counter Attacks.’ This logic could also add ambiguity to the dimension of China’s policy of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons.81\

The logic of this hypothesis seems to be that because China considers Taiwan to be a part of China, the no-first-use policy does not apply to a Taiwan scenario. This logic is poor analysis, however, because it ignores the fact that China has deployed theater nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in the region for four decades without changing its no-first-use policy. Besides, the logic ignores the important question of whether China would be willing to risk a much wider nuclear war with the United States over Taiwan. China’s extensive deployment of short-range conventional ballistic missiles in the Taiwan region suggests an effort to avoid escalation to nuclear war.

AT: Taiwan Goes Nuclear

China won’t initiate nuclear war: they are strongly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons

Yao 5. (Yunzhu, Senior Colonel of the People’s Liberation Army in China, and Dir. of the Asia-Pacific Office and Dpt. of World Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science. “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.” Strategic Insights. 4(9) September 2005. <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html>)  LRH.

It can be safely said that of all the nuclear states, the nuclear policy of China has so far been the most consistent. From the day China first exploded an atomic bomb, its nuclear policy-related statements have remained unchanged. Five major components can be derived from these statements: No First Use Policy No first use (NFU) has been most frequently and consistently repeated in numerous Chinese government statements ever since China became a nuclear weapon state in 1964. By conceding the first use option, China has limited itself to retaliatory nuclear use only. China has also called all nuclear weapon states to commit themselves to a NFU policy at any time and in any circumstances. Security Assurance to Non Nuclear Weapons States and Nuclear Free Zones China has been very critical of the use of nuclear threats against non-nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapons zones. It has repeatedly called on all the nuclear weapon states to agree to a legally-binding, multilateral agreement under which they would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear free zones. This policy component limits China’s potential nuclear adversaries to just the few nuclear weapon states. Apart from the negative security assurance, which China gives unconditionally to all non-nuclear weapon states, China issued its first formal positive security assurance with the other four declared nuclear weapon states in April 1995, promising to come to the aid of any non-nuclear weapon state subject to nuclear attack and pursue appropriate punishment against the attacking state, under the auspices of the UN Security Council. This policy has become part of the UN Security Council Resolution 984. Limited Development of Second Strike, Retaliatory Capability China has repeated its intention to maintain a very small nuclear arsenal on many occasions. In its 2003 Defense White Paper, China states that it “has always exercised utmost restraint on the development of nuclear weapons, and its nuclear arsenal is kept at the lowest level necessary for self-defense only.”[[1](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] However, to make this small arsenal a credible deterrent, China has to make it survivable to a first nuclear strike, even that strike is overwhelming and devastating. In Chinese literature, “few but effective” (jinggan youxiao) are the words most frequently used to describe its necessary arsenal. Opposition to Nuclear Deployment outside National Territories China is opposed to the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, or the policy of providing "nuclear umbrellas" by nuclear weapon states to their allies. In consistence with China’s long standing policy of not sending or stationing any troops outside China, it is also officially opposed to the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories, and has stated that China will never deployed nuclear weapons on any foreign soil. Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Thorough Nuclear Disarmament China first called for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons in its proposal for a world summit in1963, before its first nuclear explosion. On the same day of China’s first nuclear explosion, it again stated that “the Chinese government hereby solemnly proposes to the governments of the world that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the questions of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as the first step, the summit conference conclude an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons either against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones or against each other."[[2](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] This has evolved into China’s basic position on nuclear disarmament and it has never given up its efforts to promote an international convention to ban nuclear weapons.

China won’t initiate a nuclear war: all the tenets of Chinese nuclear policy are defensive

Yao 5. (Yunzhu, Senior Colonel of the People’s Liberation Army in China, and Dir. of the Asia-Pacific Office and Dpt. of World Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science. “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.” Strategic Insights. 4(9) September 2005. <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html>)  LRH.

However, Chinese forces have managed to turn from being the weaker into the stronger party in the course—usually a protracted course—of previous conventional wars. When applied to nuclear policy, this Guideline simply means a rejection of preemptive thinking. The renunciation of the first-use option, the willingness to accept vulnerability, the confinement to retaliatory nuclear use, the principle of attacking only after being attacked (hou fa zi ren), the focus on second strike capabilities, and the reservation of nuclear means as the last resort to protect only the most vital national interests, all point to the defensiveness of China’s nuclear policy. Although nuclear weapons are inherently offensive weapons, when deterrence strategies are applied in the way China does, they acquire a pure defensive posture.

AT: Taiwan Goes Nuclear

China’s believes nuclear weapons should only be used for deterrence: they will not initiate nuclear war

Yao 5. (Yunzhu, Senior Colonel of the People’s Liberation Army in China, and Dir. of the Asia-Pacific Office and Dpt. of World Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science. “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.” Strategic Insights. 4(9) September 2005. <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html>)  LRH.

The above major components of Chinese nuclear policy, if interpreted through the lens of Western deterrence terminology, can be characterized as: Strategic Rather than Operational and Tactical Deterrence Mao Zedong, in elaborating China's reason to develop nuclear weapons, said “we will not only have possession of more aircraft and artillery pieces, but also atom bombs. In today’s world, we must have this thing if we don’t want to be bullied by others.”[[3](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] The original purpose of nuclear development in China was to “break up the nuclear threat and smash the nuclear blackmail (dabuo he weixie, fensui he ezha).” As a political instrument, nuclear weapons are to be utilized mainly at the level of grand strategy, not as a winning tool in military operations. The military value of nuclear weapons lies only in its deterrent effect against nuclear attack. The officially declared missions of the Second Artillery Force are twofold: To deter the use of nuclear weapons against China, and To launch an effective nuclear counter-attack in the case of such an attack.[[4](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] No distinction has been made in categorizing nuclear operations. A nuclear strike against China—whether conducted at strategic, operational or tactical level, with high or low yield warheads, or deadly or tolerable lethality—is perceived as the utmost form of warfare in Chinese war categorization, which must be responded strategically. In Chinese strategic literature, we only see the discussion on how to deter a nuclear war from happening, on how to prevent a conventional conflict from escalating into a nuclear war, and how to retaliate after suffering a nuclear attack—but never how to win a nuclear war. The primary Chinese perception is that nuclear wars are not to be won, but to be prevented.  Retaliatory—Rather than Denial—Deterrence[[5](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] Many Chinese cite Deng Xiaoping when explaining China's nuclear thinking. He explained, in a meeting with foreigners in 1983: "While you have some deterrence force, we also have some; but we don't want much. It will do just to possess it. Things like strategic weapons and deterrence forces are there to scare others. They must not be used first. But our possession will have some effect. The limited possession of nuclear weapons itself exert some pressure. It remains our position that we will develop a little (nuclear weapons). But the development will be limited. We have said repeatedly that our small amount (of nuclear weapons) is nothing. It is only to show that we also have what you have. If you want to destroy us, you yourself have to suffer some punishment at the same time."[[6](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] Deng’s statement echoed Mao’s nuclear thinking in several aspects: Nuclear weapons are desirable only for its deterrent value, not for battlefield utility. Nuclear weapons, if ever used, will be used to cause the enemy as much pain as possible, so as to enhance its deterrent value in the first place. Therefore, China has to adopt counter-value as opposed to counterforce targeting strategies, in order to strengthen its deterrence posture. Only a small number of nuclear weapons will satisfy China’s deterrent needs—to convince potential nuclear adversary of a possible nuclear retaliation. Both Mao and Deng are very explicit that the deterrent effectiveness does not increase in proportion with numbers of nuclear weapons. A survivable and invulnerable small arsenal can be equally effective in terms of deterrence. Deterrence effect depends on invulnerability to nuclear strikes, not on large amount of nuclear attack capabilities. Accordingly, what China has been seeking is a nuclear arsenal that is small in size but good in quality. As confined by its adherence to NFU policy, China has to focus its nuclear development efforts on “second strike capabilities” which must be credible and survivable in order to have deterrent effect. Central Rather than Extended Deterrence[[7](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] By declaring to counter-attack with nuclear weapons only after being attacked by nuclear weapons, China has preserved nuclear capabilities to protect its own most vital interests—that is, the existence of the nation. Even during the Cold War years, China has never provided nuclear umbrella to any other country in the world. For China, the concept of extended deterrence has simply not entered into it nuclear calculus—yet. General Rather than Immediate Deterrence The mutual deterrence exercised by the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War had been directed at one another. They were both the ones to deter, and the ones to be deterred. They formed a bilateral deterrent relationship, in which each side was very clear whom it wanted to deter, and what it wanted to deter them from. Their deterrence was more of an immediate nature. China had never comfortably fitted into the bipolar context. It had been in one of the poles for some time, then outside of both poles for some time, and then it tried to be closer to the other pole. In addition, China had not had the luxury of a nuclear umbrella for most of the Cold War years. Therefore, China’s nuclear deterrence had been more of a general nature—in which China tried to form a multilateral deterrent relationship with all the nuclear powers, which only made clear what China wanted to deter. Defensive Rather than Offensive Deterrence One famous tenet laid down by Chairman Mao Zedong is the Sixteen Character Guideline for the use of force—“We will never attack unless we are attacked; and if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack” (ren bu fan wo, wo bu fan ren; ren ruo fan wo, wo bi fan ren). Behind this guideline is a sober headed analysis of power balances. The PLA and its predecessors entered and won most wars as an inferior side against great odds. So a defensive posture had always been preferred to an offensive one.

AT: Taiwan Goes Nuclear

China only uses nuclear weapons for defensive strategy: they wouldn’t use them offensively

Federation of American Scientists 6. (“Report:  Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.” Ch. 1, p. 31. Federation of American Scientists. November 30, 2006. <http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-15-34.pdf>) LRH.

Whether or not the policy would constrain China in a war, the declaratory policy in fact does seem to influence China’s acquisition and employment policies, with the result that the country keeps its nuclear forces relatively small. A more ambitious strategy would require larger forces as well as much improved command and control and early warning capabilities. But words mean little to U.S. nuclear war planners, who are tasked to plan and deploy forces based on China’s actual capabilities (the so-called capability-based planning).

China will not initiate nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict

Yao 5. (Yunzhu, Senior Colonel of the People’s Liberation Army in China, and Dir. of the Asia-Pacific Office and Dpt. of World Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science. “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.” Strategic Insights. 4(9) September 2005. <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html>)  LRH.

With the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has somewhat committed itself to the defense of Taiwan. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released (or leaked) by the U.S. Department of Defense even implies the use of nuclear weapons in “military confrontation over the status of Taiwan.” Such confrontation is categorized as “immediate contingencies” for which the United States has to set “requirements for nuclear strike capabilities.”[[10](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] So far, China has never—in any government statements or official documents—threatened nuclear use in the cross-strait conflict.[[11](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] Taiwan is China’s top security concern,[[12](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html#references)] and the only scenario for which China seriously considers the use of force. Do nuclear weapons really play a role in such a scenario? My judgment is “no.” If what we are talking about is a “local war under the conditions of internationalization,” it would be useless for China to try to deter U.S. conventional intervention with nuclear weapons. It is the United States, not China that has the nuclear capabilities to control or even dominate conflict escalation. To win a nuclear war over the United States is quite different from deterring a nuclear war with the United States. China is definitely the much weaker side, so far as the nuclear balance is concerned. Faced with a similar situation, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had decided the option for China decades ago—that is to use nuclear weapons only as a deterrent against all nuclear uses, be it strategic or operational. To prevent the opponent’s nuclear use is the only way to neutralize his nuclear superiority. China’s long standing nuclear policy still serves China’s national interests even today.

NFU Prevents Escalation

The Chinese No-First-Use Policy will prevent China from launching a nuclear strike

Federation of American Scientists 6. (“Report:  Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.” Ch. 1, p. 30-31. Federation of American Scientists. November 30, 2006. <http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-15-34.pdf>) LRH.

Official Chinese statements continue to ascribe to a no-first-use policy, but leave some confusion about the scope of the policy and its conditions. A 2005 Chinese Foreign Ministry white paper reiterated the pledge by stating that the “Chinese government has solemnly declared that it would not be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstance,” and that this policy “will remain unchanged in the future.” In addition, the paper reiterated that “China has committed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”73 This language is consistent with earlier declarations made by China, including the security assurances statement issued at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in April 1995 and the working paper issued to the Conference on Disarmament in August 1981. Interestingly, in the 1995 statement China appears to have avoided the temptation to place conditions on its security assurances by saying that the “commitment naturally complies” to members of the NPT or others that have made similar binding commitments.74 Yet the Chinese policy raises several questions.

Beijing is against the use of nuclear weapons and the nature of their force is too defensive to pose a threat

[National Intelligence Council](http://www.odci.gov/nic/index.htm) 99. (“China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States.” National Intelligence Council. November 5, 1999. <http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/china_wmd.html>). LRH.

The small, defensive nature of China's nuclear force and China's general opposition to nuclear blackmail and intimidation are reinforced by the public enunciation of a supposed commitment never to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict and never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or nuclear free zones.[432](http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/china_wmd.html" \l "rft432) Hence, China formally opposes offensive-based nuclear deterrence doctrines and extended nuclear deterrence guarantees, and is against the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories.[433](http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/china_wmd.html" \l "rft433) The Chinese explicitly oppose doctrines based on "war-winning" nuclear war strategies,[434](http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/china_wmd.html" \l "rft434) in favor of the above summarized self-defense stance purportedly designed to oppose and check the outbreak of a nuclear war. This so-called NFU principle is valued for its political effect, both on the superpowers and toward lesser powers. Specifically, Beijing intends to show its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons by any power, in an attempt to politically coerce or subjugate other nations. This stance reinforces, in the public arena at least, the impression that China does not pose a WMD threat to the superpowers. The latter objective is particularly important, given the absolute WMD superiority of the superpowers over China. The NFU principle also is intended to support the above-mentioned effort at the total abandonment of nuclear weapons, by indicating China's apparent refusal to develop the type of large, offensive, warfighting WMD arsenal possessed by Russia and the United States.

\*\*Nationalism DA

Nationalism DA Shell (1/2)

Central government reforms are currently maintaining stability in China, but further reforms are needed

Freeman 10 (Will, analyst at GaveKal Dragonomics, “The accuracy of China’s ‘mas incidents’ ” Financial Times (London), March 2, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a,dwp\_uuid=9511df10-6d6b-11da-a4df-0000779e2340.html?nclick\_check=1) MKB

The central government is adapting to the challenge, to some extent. Beijing used to deny the existence of social unrest or blame it on foreign conspirators, but now accepts that social frictions stem from domestic problems will inevitably intensify. But since most complaints are against local officials or businesses, the central government argues that the chief problem is petty corruption stemming from bad eggs at the local level rather than systemic flaws that would undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Indeed, the sharp rise in petitions to Beijing about local abuses testifies to a widespread belief that the central government is more a potential solution to the problem, not its ultimate source. But this belief may be changing. Anecdotal evidence over the last five years suggests a rise in “anger-venting” mass incidents – large scale, often violent, riots that erupt from seemingly minor incidents and reflect general discontent rather than specific rights violations. In June 2008, over 10,000 rioters set fire to a police station in Guizhou province when police allegedly covered up a murder perpetrated by relatives of local government officials – the latest in a string of alleged misdemeanors. The party-state is in no danger of crumbling. But if the central government is serious about reducing growing social unrest, it must do three things: increase the accountability of local officials; break those officials’ grip on the courts; and improve the systems of public redress.

US military presence provides poltical cover to reformers in China while silencing hardline nationalists

Shirk 2007

(Susan Shirk is a professor in the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at UC San Diego and former Assistant Secretary of State for relations with China, *China: Fragile Superpower,* Oxford Press, pg. 263)

Maintain a strong U.S military presence Keeping U.S forces deployed in the Asia-pacific region to deter potential aggression is all the more necessary once we are aware of the domestic pressures that could drive China’s leaders to behave rashly. We want Chinese decision makers, when faced with a crisis to look out to the Pacific and see a U.S military with the will and capacity to defend Taiwan, our allies in Japan and south Korea, and our other Asian friends. Because restraining themselves may cost Chinese leaders domestic popularity, we need to balance that cost with the even greater cost they will pay if they act belligerently internationally and are defeated by our forces. To quote Henry Kissinger again, “the challenge to American foreign policy is how to deal with Chinese nationalism without inflaming it while standing firm when it turns to threats.” Maintaining our overwhelming military superiority also helps the doves in China argue that if the country tries to compete militarily with United States just as the Soviet Union did, then it will collapse from within just as the Soviet Union did.

Nationalism DA Shell (2/2)

China is on the brink of massive social unrest, action that alienates hardliners will collapse the regime

Garnaut 2010

(John, Sydney Morning Herald, “China insider sees revolution brewing”, February 27, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-insider-sees-revolution-brewing-20100226-p92d.html>)

BEIJING: China's top expert on social unrest has warned that hardline security policies are taking the country to the brink of ''revolutionary turmoil''. In contrast with the powerful, assertive and united China that is being projected to the outside world, Yu Jianrong said his prediction of looming internal disaster reflected on-the-ground surveys and also the views of Chinese government ministers. Deepening social fractures were caused by the Communist Party's obsession with preserving its monopoly on power through ''state violence'' and ''ideology'', rather than justice, Professor Yu said. Disaster could be averted only if ''interest groups'' - which he did not identify - were capable of making a rational compromise to subordinate themselves to the constitution, he said. Some lawyers, economists and religious and civil society leaders have expressed similar views but it is unusual for someone with Professor Yu's official standing to make such direct and detailed criticisms of core Communist Party policies. Professor Yu is known as an outspoken insider. As the director of social issues research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Rural Affairs he advises top leaders and conducts surveys on social unrest.

Collapse triggers a nuclear civil war and regional conflicts

Yee and Storey 2002

(Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002 (The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, RoutledgeCurzon, pg 5)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.'2 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

Hu Reform: Will Pass

Currency reform will pass

AlJazeera.net 10. (“US lashes out at China over Yuan.” JUNE 11, 2010. <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/06/2010610195112993956.html>) LRH.

The US has renewed call on China to revalue its currency, the yuan, saying its refusal to do so is impeding global economic reforms and hurting domestic demand in the world's most populous country. The call was made by Timothy Geithner, the US treasury secretary, as China posted unexpectedly strong exports, and a $19.5bn trade surplus in May, according to data released on Thursday. "The distortions caused by China's exchange rate spread far beyond China's borders and are an impediment to the global rebalancing we need," Geithner told a congressional hearing on the  US-China economic relationship on Thursday. "Reform of China's exchange rate is critically important to the United States and to the global economy," he said. Congress fury Both Democrats and Republicans on the Senate Finance Committee warned Geithner that Congress' patience was wearing thin. One critic said if China does not move soon to allow its currency to rise in value against the dollar, Congress is likely to pass legislation that would impose tough trade sanctions on China.

The currency reform bill will pass: the US will force China to pass it

Talley 10. (Ian, writer for the Dow Jones Newswires. “Schumer: Senate To Move Soon On Bill To Push China On Currency Reform.” Wall Street Journal. June 10, 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100610-709252.html>) LRH.

WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.) said Thursday that the Senate would act "soon" on a bill that seeks to force China and other countries to reform their currencies.

In a hearing on U.S. trade relations with China, Schumer told Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner the Senate would move forward on the bipartisan bill that outlines punative measures against China---and other countries--if they don't allow their currency to adjust in line with market forces.

Lawmakers, responding to outcries from constituents and U.S. companies that are disadvantaged by Beijing's decision to keep its currency artificially low, criticized Geithner at the hearing for what they perceive as a lack of aggressive action by the Obama administration.

Geithner has expressed confidence that Chinese officials will resume appreciation of the yuan halted in mid-2008 during the worsening global financial crisis, while stressing that it is their decision to make. However, the recent flare-up of troubles in the euro zone has raised the prospect of further delays in removing the currency peg.

Currency reform will pass: US- Chinese relations have been improving, which will allow Washington to exert more influence over Beijing

Hon 10. (Chua Chin, US Bureau Chief. “No big news is good news for Sino-US ties;   
Agreements modest at latest dialogue but the atmosphere is positive.” The Straits Times (Singapore)

May 27, 2010.) LRH

Considering the rocky start to bilateral ties this year, however, and the simmering anxieties over Europe and the Korean peninsula, a 'no-drama' meeting between the two major powers is not a bad outcome at all.

'At the very least, the two countries have been able to sit down and talk calmly, and as equals,' said Professor Ding Xinghao, of the Shanghai Association of American Studies.

'That's what both sides have gained most from the talks, and the overall atmosphere is now a more positive one.'

A positive atmosphere had been far from certain, given long lists of grievances on both sides going into the strategic talks. Washington wants Beijing to move faster on its currency reforms and commit to tougher action against Iran and North Korea. Beijing, for its part, wants Washington to stop selling weapons to Taiwan, lift restrictions on technology exports, and recognise China as a market economy.

Presence Checks Nationalism

Strong US presence prevents the rise of an assertive Chinese nationalism

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

2. Even if China’s leaders might not have a deliberate plan to dominate the region, will they most likely be driven to attempt to do so eventually? Chinese nationalism, China’s national security concerns, and longstanding opposition to hegemonism are among factors that could drive China’s leaders in this direction. However, as argued above, China’s leaders’ decision making will be influenced by the perceived costs and benefits of such a change in policy for Chinese interests. As argued above, persisting US power, if handled in ways that don’t fundamentally challenge China’s core interests regarding Taiwan and the Chinese political system, and pervasive hedging among Asian governments, are likely to sustain a regional environment that will make it very difficult for China to see strong, assertive or coercive efforts for regional dominance as in the best interests of China.

Strong US military presence in Asia prevents China’s leaders from taking aggressive stances to appeal to nationalists, the only risk of war is with decreased US presence

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

3. What would be the most significant (and threatening) indicators of a Chinese quest for predominance in Asia, from the perspective of the United States and its allies in the region? These indicators would involve use of military force or coercive economic and political actions seeking to compel regional powers to follow Chinese wishes or dictates. As noted above, these Chinese actions seem likely not to be seen in Chinese interests so long as US power in the region remains strong and does not fundamentally confront core Chinese interests; and Asian powers remain determined to sustain independence and find the United States and others as useful sources in hedging against China’s rise. Chinese leaders may come under pressure because of deteriorating conditions at home and might choose to adopt tough and assertive positions in Asia as a means to shore up nationalistic support at home. A key indicator for US policy makers to watch seems to be US willingness and ability to sustain the costs associated with the twin pillars of US leadership in Asia—the US security presence in the region and the open US market to Asian imports. If US policy pulls back substantially in these areas, it will change regional dynamics in Asia and reduce US power and influence. This will erode the check US power currently exerts against coercive or assertive Chinese approaches to Asia.

Hu Link – Sino-US Relations

Debates about Sino-US relations and cooperation are politically costly for the Hu Administration

Godement 2009

(François Godement is Director of the Asia Centre at Yale, “Obama in Asia – Part I“, YaleGlobal Press, November 16, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/obama-asia-part-i>)

In sum, beyond praise about Barack Obama from high-brow Chinese experts, and a blanket call by the new administration for a “comprehensive relationship”, there is simply no basis for a strategic convergence between the US and China. So why is it that the G2 is such a specter in the room, mentioned at every conference and by many officials outside the United States? Well, for one, appearances matter. At the Pittsburgh G20 summit, President Obama usually addressed President Hu Jintao before anybody else during the leaders’ meeting. And when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Beijing, the Chinese government upgrades the relations with the US as “our most important relationship”. But the talk about G2 is also fuelled by their own angst about their weakness. Europe is on temporary hold because of its eight year long institutional debate. Japan is suffering through a dual crisis – economic recession and political uncertainty. Russia is still resource-rich, but its financial crisis has instilled a new modesty. India hasn’t ridden the crisis as China did. Only Brazil, besides China, is clearly gaining ground in these testing times. Not only does this create feelings of helplessness about global trends, but both China and the US sense this weakness in their partners and use it to their own advantage. For America, whose exit from the financial crisis depends on trust from the world’s investors, to show undisputed leadership is essential. For China, two factors count. The crisis is a golden opportunity to use its financial resources and its strong government to make decisive gains in all directions. Never has the People’s Republic been so assertive towards its partners. This holds true not only for Europe – viewed with increasing irony for its disunity – but also for Japan or India. Premier Hatoyama’s call for an East Asian Community is met with cool detachment. India, in principle the other rising giant, is mercilessly tested on territorial and other symbolic issues. But a second factor is also at work – the need for China to hide its acceptance to support the US’ bloated monetary policy. China’s leaders can’t afford a domestic political debate on their relationship with America. They can’t be seen publicly to be doing exactly what they are doing – which is an intense monetary cooperation to save their debtor, and with it their own outstanding claims. It is all the more important for China’s leaders to keep some political distance from Washington.

Link – North Korea/Iran

PRC leaders must balance domestic stability and foreign policy interests, cooperation with the US over Iran or North Korea would be seen as domestically disruptive.

Lam 9 (Dr. Willy Wo-Lap, Sr. Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation and an Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita Int’l University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “Hu Jintao Unveils Major Foreign-Policy Initiative.” Jamestown Foundation China Brief. 9(24).December 3, 2009 [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=35792&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=414&no\_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35792&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=414&no_cache=1)) LRH.

Of course, there are limits regarding the extent to which this country with $2.2 trillion worth of foreign-exchange reserves and a population of 1.3 billion can do for global harmony and development. One of the five theories under “Hu Jintao’s Viewpoints” is that “various parties must observe the principle of mutually shared responsibilities.” This refers to Beijing’s insistence that its contributions to the global commonwealth be conditional upon commensurate inputs by other nations, especially developed countries and regions such as the United States and the European Union. Moreover, the Outlook Weekly article cited Hu as asking cadres to strike a balance between China’s internal development and its national interests on the one hand, and its globalization commitments on the other. Thus, Beijing has to to ensure that its international contributions will not adversely affect the country’s “core interests” in both the economic and diplomatic arenas. For example, given China’s reliance on smokestacks industries, the CCP leadership can only do so much to curb carbon emissions. Moreover, in light of China’s dependence on exports as an engine of growth, do not expect a significant appreciation of the renminbi in the foreseeable future (People’s Daily, November 17; Ming Pao, November 14; Wall Street Journal, November 26; Reuters, November 30).  
These considerations will also form the parameters of Beijing’s international commitments regarding Iran and North Korea. Given China’s traditional quasi-alliance relationship with Iran—and its hefty investment in the latter’s oilfields—it may be unrealistic to assume that Beijing will go the distance in pressuring Tehran to jettison its nuclear ambitions. How the Hu leadership will draw the line between China’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil and its cooperation with the Western alliance will become clearer when the UN Security Council debates possible sanctions on Tehran early next year. It is also significant that Beijing has flatly refused to heed repeated requests from the United States, Japan, South Korea and other nations to use its clout with North Korea regarding Pyongyang’s equally ambitious nuclear gambit. The November visit to the DPRK by Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie, which came hot upon the heels of the North Korean tour of Premier Wen, has highlighted the “lips-and-teeth” relationship between the two socialist neighbors (Reuters, November 25; Washington Post, November 3).

Link Helper – Popular Nationalism

Election pressures guarantee negative responses to the plan, opposition to American goals is extremely popular in China.

Pomfret 10 (John, BA and MA East Asian Studies Stanford University and Nanjing University and Senior Asia Correspondent “Chinese assert new power, in defiance of the West ” Washington Post, March 15, A- Section; Page A01, lexis) MKB

BEIJING -- China's government has embraced an increasingly anti-Western tone in recent months and is adopting policies across a wide spectrum that reflect a heightened fear of foreign influence. The shift has accelerated as China has emerged stronger from the global financial meltdown, with a world-beating economic expansion rate and a growing nationalist movement. China has long felt bullied by the West, and its stronger stance is challenging the long-held assumption shared among Western and Chinese businessmen, academics and government officials that a more powerful and prosperous China would be more positively inclined toward Western values and systems. China's shift is occurring throughout society, and is reflected in government policy and in a new attitude toward the West. Over the past year, the government of President Hu Jintao has rolled back market-oriented reforms by encouraging China's state-owned enterprises to forcibly buy private firms. In the past weeks, China announced plans to force Western companies to turn over their most sensitive technology and patents to Chinese competitors in exchange for access to the country's markets Internally, it has carried out more arrests and indictments for endangering state security over the past two years than in the five-year period from 2003 to 2007, according to a report released Friday by the Dui Hua Foundation, a San Francisco-based human rights organization. China has also reined in the news media and attempted to control the Internet more vigorously than in the past. This month, it announced regulations designed to make it harder for China's fledgling community of nongovernmental organizations to get financial support from overseas. In foreign affairs, after years of playing down differences, it has reverted to a tone not heard in more than a decade, condemning recent U.S. decisions to sell weapons to Taiwan and to have President Obama meet the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama. "This is a fundamental shift, and I've been here a long time," said James L. McGregor, a senior counselor with the public affairs firm Apco China. "It's a change in national attitude." For their part, senior Chinese leaders bristle at the notion that China is turning away from reforms or is reluctant to cooperate with Western nations. In a news conference on Sunday, Premier Wen Jiabao said he was aware of "theories about China's arrogance, toughness and triumphalism," but rejected them. Asked about widespread criticism of China's hard-line position at the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, for example, Wen replied: "It still baffles me why some people continue to try to make an issue about China." Nonetheless, China's legislature, whose annual session ended this weekend, also showed the trend toward toughness. With a reported 700,000 security personnel posted throughout the city for the 10-day session, Beijing was in a virtual lockdown. Inside the Great Hall of the People, the proposals -- albeit spurious -- put forward by the delegates to the National People's Congress included calls for all Internet cafes to be taken over by the government and a declaration that all cellphones should be equipped with surveillance cameras. The shift does not bode well for U.S.-China relations. The Obama administration entered office with an ambitious China agenda comprising plans to cooperate on climate change, curbing the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea, and stabilizing the global financial system. In China, those plans are generally viewed by the party leadership as a trap to overextend and weaken the country, according to a Chinese official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he would lose his job if his name were published. In his news conference, Wen also seemed disinclined to bend to another American demand -- that China allow its currency, the yuan, to appreciate against the dollar, which (theoretically) would boost U.S. exports. Wen countered that he didn't think the yuan is undervalued and that the U.S. method of seeking to enlarge exports through tweaking currency exchange rates is "protectionist." The change comes during what a leading Chinese economist, Hu Angang, in an interview called "the longest golden era in China since the opium wars" of the 1840s, when British warships forced China to open to trade. From its position as an impoverished, developing country, it has jumped into the ranks of the powerful. But the closer China gets to a variety of firsts -- No. 1 exporting nation and even No. 1 economy in the world -- the more its government seems to exhibit a nagging insecurity and opposition to the West. "The Chinese people are no longer embarrassed about being Chinese," said Wang Xiaodong, a leading nationalist writer who has co-authored a series of popular books with titles such as "China Is Unhappy," which capitalized on the growing anti-Western trend. "The time when China worshipped the West is over. We have a rightful sense of superiority." "People are now looking down on the West, from leadership circles to academia to everyday folk," said Kang Xiaoguang, a professor at Renmin University who studies NGOs and Confucius. The turn away from the West is evidenced within China's leadership. China's previous president, Jiang Zemin, is widely thought to have been pro-American. He was fond of reciting the Gettysburg Address and crooning American songs. During a trip to the United States in 1997, he took the politically risky move of announcing that China welcomed continued U.S. engagement in Asia -- including the stationing of American troops. On the other hand, Hu, who took power in 2002, is the first Communist leader with no experience outside the current system. Other factors are at play. It is campaign season in Beijing. In two years, the leadership of the Communist Party will undergo a huge transition, with as many as seven of the nine seats of the Standing Committee of the Politburo -- the center of power -- up for grabs. Nothing looks better in China than being tough on the West.

Nationalism Up

A new wave of anti-western Chinese nationalism has emerged, instigated by new communication technology

Shen 10 (Simon, associate professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong Institute of Education, When China Plugged In: Structural Origins of Online Chinese Nationalism, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/06\_china\_internet\_shen.aspx) MAH

Indeed, the Chinese authorities have actually been relatively liberal in allowing online debate and discussion that can be very critical of government policy and action. But rather than creating a new political “space” where the promotion of liberalism flourishes, this new “space” has tended to be primarily a forum for the discussion of national interests and the promotion of what might bluntly be called “nationalism”. This is not to say that there is a clear and coherent expression of ideology or indeed a clear and coherent set of policy preferences and options, but simply that there is a dominant sentiment that defending national interests in the face of a largely hostile international environment should be the government’s main task – and that in some ways the government is not fulfilling this task effectively. Crucially, we argue that there is not a single voice, a single response and a single demand. Rather, there are different responses on a case-by-case level, and the purpose of this book as a whole is to tease these out by the provision of an empirically rich set of case studies. Furthermore, there are also different voices within individual case studies, and this will be a key component of the individual chapters. These features alone are sufficient to convince ourselves against seeing the online Chinese nationalists as a monolithic group. Instead, no matter how patriotic they appear to be, as Peter Hays Gries concludes, “China’s cyber-nationalists, armed with PCs and cell phones, are increasingly contesting party claims to nationalist legitimacy.”[24] In a departure from the first wave of the nationalist movement, which was confined to debates by (public) intellectuals of numerous incidents, the “second wave” of online nationalism has emerged from BBS groups such as the Strong Nation Forum (Qianguo Luntan). The grass-roots version of nationalism, while being equally anti-Western, has at the same time also challenged the official propaganda. Contemporary online Chinese nationalism was first embarked upon in 1999 after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; the precedent of the Strong Nation Forum was exactly the “BBS bulletin forum Protesting Against the Violence of NATO”. The second wave can be regarded as building momentum in 2005, when the first online nationalistic campaign was mobilized into physical movements against Japan. As various communicative theorists argue, speedy communication has been crucial for the creation of this new form of Web 2.0 nationalism, showing that the netizens can be anti-Western on one hand while still being critical of the party-state.[25] As Shih-Diing Liu has commented, such nationalism is different from the officially propagandized nationalism; it is bottom-up in nature and has emerged from the people (renmin minzu zhuyi)

Political Capital K/T Agenda

Hu’s low political capital ensures that his own agenda won’t be passed because of concessions.

Yongnian 9 (Zheng, Professor of Chinese Culture, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political IMplications”, China: an International Journal, Volume 7 Number 1 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/china/v007/7.1.zheng.html) MKB

**The political capital of the central leadership figure in Chinese politics** since the founding of the PRC in 1949 **has been diminishing with each generation**.[20](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/china/v007/7.1.zheng.html" \l "f20) **Mao ruled like a God, and Deng Xiaoping,** while nowhere near as autocratic as Mao, drew on a long history as a revolutionary and had massive credibility in the Party and with the public.[21](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/china/v007/7.1.zheng.html" \l "f21) Conversely, **Jiang Zemin [End Page 8] took years to be taken seriously, while Hu Jintao is the weakest** compared with Mao, Deng or Jiang.[22](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/china/v007/7.1.zheng.html" \l "f22) **The farewell to the strong-man politics has pushed forward China's leadership structure in an increasingly power-sharing direction that facilitates intra-party consultations, bargaining or even polls in secret behind closed doors. The weaker the top leader is, the more he will rely on "collective decision-making"** (*jiti juece*) when appointing successors and enacting national strategies**. Certain informal rules and institutions based on balance of power among different factions and restriction of top leaders' power have come into being in China's elite politics, ensuring that candidateship of future successors is not solely the reflection of the incumbent top leader's own will, but an outcome of compromises among different groups and one step further**, the result of polls in a limited range. **This** way of producing future leadership **guarantees policy continuation and stability while forestalls individual dictatorship**. As the Party chooses rather than the public, future **leaders**, no matter who they are, will be committed to preserving the CPC power and **represent the extensive interest of different groups inside the Party instead of one faction.**

Hu’s increased popularity increases his political capital and allows him to pursue his agenda.

News Max 5 (“China’s Grip on Dissidents Tightening, Dimming Tiananmen Square Legacy”, Newsmax.com, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/6/3/145733.shtml) MKB

**Hu** has also shown little patience for public dissatisfaction, said David Zweig, director of the Hong Kong-based Center on China's Transnational Relations. "He **certainly has not shown himself to be the liberal that people thought he would be**," Zweig said. "**He has responded quite forcefully to challenges to the party's authority. They are very nervous about social unrest. They want to hold on tight to their power."** Aside from favoring one-party rule, Hu's agenda is unclear. "The difference between Jiang and Hu is that **Hu is far more popular than Jiang among the Chinese public**," said Cheng Li, a professor of political science at Hamilton College in New York. "**Hu has more political capital. The message is a mixed one. Hu wants to promote political reforms, as he states, but these political reforms should not be out of control**."

Hu Agenda – Nationalist Support Key

Hu needs to feel secure in pushing reforms now, if he bows to conservative opposition the country will collapse.

Garnaut 10. (John writer for the Sydney Morning Herald “China insider sees revolution brewing.” Sydney Morning Herald. February 27, 2010. <http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-insider-sees-revolution-brewing-20100226-p92d.html>) LRH.

BEIJING: China's top expert on social unrest has warned that hardline security policies are taking the country to the brink of ''revolutionary turmoil''. In contrast with the powerful, assertive and united China that is being projected to the outside world, Yu Jianrong said his prediction of looming internal disaster reflected on-the-ground surveys and also the views of Chinese government ministers. Deepening social fractures were caused by the Communist Party's obsession with preserving its monopoly on power through ''state violence'' and ''ideology'', rather than justice, Professor Yu said. Disaster could be averted only if ''interest groups'' - which he did not identify - were capable of making a rational compromise to subordinate themselves to the constitution, he said. Some lawyers, economists and religious and civil society leaders have expressed similar views but it is unusual for someone with Professor Yu's official standing to make such direct and detailed criticisms of core Communist Party policies. Professor Yu is known as an outspoken insider. As the director of social issues research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Rural Affairs he advises top leaders and conducts surveys on social unrest. He previously has warned of the rising cost of imposing ''rigid stability'' by force but has not previously been reported as speaking about such immediate dangers. ''Some in the so-called democracy movement regard Yu as an agent for the party, because he advises senior leaders on how to maintain their control,'' said Feng Chongyi, associate professor in China Studies at the University of Technology, Sydney. ''I believe Yu is an independent scholar. This speech is very significant because it is the first time Yu has directly confronted the Hu-Wen leadership [President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao] and said their policies have failed and will not work.'' Pointedly, Professor Yu took aim at the policy substance behind two of Mr Hu's trademark phrases, ''bu zheteng'' [''stability'', or ''don't rock the boat''] and ''harmonious society''. His speech was delivered on December 26, the day after the rights activist Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to 11 years in jail for helping to draft a manifesto for constitutional and democratic government in China, called Charter '08. The sentence, which shocked liberal intellectuals and international observers, followed a tumultuous year during which the party tightened controls over almost all spheres of China's burgeoning civil society, including the internet, media, legal profession, non-government organisations and business. Professor Yu's speech has not been previously reported but has recently emerged on Chinese websites. He cited statistics showing the number of recorded incidents of ''mass unrest'' grew from 8709 in 1993 to more than 90,000 in each of the past three years. ''More and more evidence shows that the situation is getting more and more tense, more and more serious,'' Professor Yu said. He cited a growing range and severity of urban worker disputes and said Mafia groups were increasingly involved in state-sponsored thuggery while disgruntled peasants were directing blame at provincial and even central government. ''For seeking 'bu zheteng' we sacrifice reform and people's rights endowed by law … Such stability will definitely bring great social disaster,'' he said. Professor Yu's speech reflects deep disillusionment among liberal thinkers in China who had hoped Mr Hu and Mr Wen would implement political reforms. Dr Feng said he still hoped the two would ''do something'' to leave more than a ''dark stain'' on China's political development before stepping down in 2012. ''The conservative forces are currently very strong,'' he said. China's security-tightening and potential for future loosening were linked to a leadership succession struggle between Mr Hu and the Vice-Premier, Li Keqiang, on the one hand, and the former president, Jiang Zemin, and the current Vice-President, Xi Jinping, on the other. ''I haven't given up the hope that the Hu-Li camp may make some positive political changes to mobilise public support.'' . The latest edition of the newspaper Southern Weekend broke a two-decade taboo by publishing a photo of a youthful Mr Hu with his early mentor, former party chief Hu Yaobang, who was purged in 1987 for his liberal and reformist leanings. But Chinese internet search results for the names of both leaders were yesterday blocked for ''non-compliance with relevant laws''. A Beijing political watcher said such crackdowns were being led by officials who had the most to hide, which did not include Mr Hu or his allies. ''Corrupt officials have such a high and urgent interest in controlling the media and especially the internet,'' he said. ''The more they feel that their days are numbered due to the internet and free information, the more ferocious and corrupt they become, in a really vicious circle leading to final collapse.''

Hu Agenda – Popularity Key

Hu and the Communist Party are losing popularity: they need support to pass reforms

Li 9. (Cheng, Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center. “China’s Team of Rivals.” Foreign Policy. February 16, 2009. <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/03_china_li.aspx>) . LRH.

MARCH/APRIL 2009 —The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried. What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.” With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive the political challenges it will bring. 

Reforms Key – Nationalism, Instability

Failure of reforms creates internal instability and leads to expansionism.

Krawitz 10 (Howard M., “China’s trade opening and implications for regional stability” Strategic Forum, page 3) MKB

Ongoing debate holds that as economic power gives China the means to build military might, it will encourage military adventurism and feed the new nationalism already on the rise in China. Recent boosts in Chinese military spending hint this may already be happening. This danger cannot be ignored. China’s leaders are walking a tightrope. WTO-man- dated changes and reform policy failures could engender widespread domestic discontent, nationwide strikes, riots, and other serious social disorder. Leaders, believing themselves in danger of losing control or of being marginal- ized by economic forces and social changes, might try to redirect domestic anger by rekindling Chinese xenophobic sentiments and turning to foreign adventurism as a means of recapturing power and reestablishing primacy. The new breed of Chinese capitalist could become the new breed of Chinese ultranationalist, equating wealth and power with the right to erase past national shame by establishing and enforcing a “Beijing Doctrine” in Asia. Or China might just interpret its own rise in terms of its neighbors’ declines and simply push to see what it could get away with.

Hu Agenda – Nationalist Support Key

Princelings are key to China policymaker’s agenda

Li 8 (Cheng, director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, China’s fifth generation: is diversity a source of strength or weakness, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia\_policy/Free/Asia\_Policy\_6\_Li.pdf) MAH

Chinas decisionmakers are by no means a monolithic group of elites who share the same views, values, and visions; nor are they always engaged in a ferocious zero-sum struggle for power in which the winner takes all. The grolving diversity within Chinas leadership and the dynamic interdependence among competing factions are particularly evident in the fifth generation. 'Ihe fact that the two most powerful camps in the fifth generation-tuanpai and princelings-have been allotted an equal number of seats in Chinas supreme decisionmaking organs indicates the intensity of factional competition. Yet these competing factions are willing to cooperate, partly because they are in the same boat and partly because their expertise and leadership skills are complementary Consequently negotiation, compromise, consensus-building, and behind-the-scenes lobbying will likely occur more often in the future. 'Ihe emerging bipartisan balance of power will further contribute to the diversity of outlooks and stances on major issues, such as economic globalization, social justice, political democratization, and environmental protection.

Nationalist Backlash = Collapse

The Party must appeal to nationalist sentiment to survive, going against nationalism would collapse the Party

Bandow 2007

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “China: Fragile Superpower”, Antiwar.com, September 8, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/09/07/china-fragile-superpower/>)

To this challenging economic environment must be added an even more difficult political environment. Shirk persuasively contends that Beijing’s actions today must be understood in the context of the Tiananmen Square crisis. She explains: “For more than six weeks, millions of students demonstrated for democracy in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and 132 other cities in every Chinese province. The Communist Party leadership split over how to deal with the demonstrations. And the People’s Republic just barely survived.” However, there is no more important goal for today’s communist gerontocracy than survival. As a result, the regime’s leadership is determined to avoid public splits, suppress social unrest, and ensure military support. This doesn’t mean that there are no political differences: “Marxist critics of Western economic and market practices have launched a fierce onslaught against the [economic] reforms, blaming them for inequality, social unrest, and corruption. The critiques appear to have some official sponsorship.” Moreover, fear of unrest has made Chinese officialdom unusually sensitive to public attitudes. This, in turn, has resulted in ever stronger nationalistic upsurges in Chinese society: “The leaders recognize that popular nationalism is intensifying as the country grows stronger. In fact, they have been largely responsible for the trend. In schools and the mass media, they have promoted nationalistic themes as a way to bolster the legitimacy of the Communist Party, now that almost no one believes in Communist ideology anymore.”

Domestic Problems = Lashout

Domestic problems lead to Chinese adventurism

Shirk 2007

(Susan Shirk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for relations with China from 1997 to 2000, “An Interview with IGCC Director Susan Shirk”, <http://igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/books/shirkinterview.php>)

BJ: From the general public's perspective China looks like an economic powerhouse. Yet in your book you argue that from the inside China is actually a weak country. How can these two opposite perceptions be reconciled? Shirk: China has lots of economic and political internal problems. It has growing inequality. It has frequent protests in the countryside, and the cities, over a whole range of issues and the political system doesn't have a way for these grievances to be channeled. It has massive environmental problems. The public health system and the educational system are greatly underfunded. To the extent that these problems translate into social unrest they become political problems, raising questions of poor leadership. The leaders' domestic predicament could drive them into risk taking vis-à-vis the issues of Taiwan and Japan.

Infighting Bad - Economy

Infighting will destroy the Chinese economy. Hu will make concessions if resistance increases.

Richmond 10 (Jennifer, staff writer, “China’s Challenge ” Right Side News, http://www.rightsidenews.com/201003098978/politics-and-economics/chinas-challenge.html) MKB

For years, China's leaders have recognized the risks of the current economic model. They have debated policy ideas to shift from the current model to one that is more sustainable in the long run and incorporates a more geographically equitable growth and a hefty rise in domestic consumption. While there is general agreement on the need for change, top leaders disagree on the timing and method of transition. This has stirred internal debates, which can lead to factionalization as varying interests align to promote their preferred policy proscription. Entrenched interests in urban areas and the export industry - along with constant fears of triggering major social upheaval - have left the government year after year making only slight changes around the margins. Often, Beijing has taken one step forward only to take two back when social instability and/or institutional resistance emerge. And this debate becomes even more significant now, as China deals simultaneously with the aftermath of the global economic slowdown and preparations for a leadership transition in 2012. The Hu Agenda Chinese President Hu Jintao came into office eight years ago with the ambitious goal of [closing a widening wealth gap](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/global_market_brief_sorting_out_chinas_economic_conundrum) by equalizing economic growth between the rural interior and coastal cities. Hu inherited the results of Deng Xiaoping's opening and reform, which focused on the rapid development of the coastal areas, which were better geographically positioned for international trade. The vast interior took second billing, being kept in line with the promise that in time the rising tide of economic wealth would float all ships. Eventually it did, somewhat. But while the interior saw significant improvements over the early Mao period, the growth and rise in living standards and disposable income in the urban coastal areas far outstripped rural growth. Some coastal urban areas are now approaching Western standards of living, while much of the interior remains mired in Third World conditions**.** And the faster the coast grows, the more dependent China becomes on the money from that growth to facilitate employment and subsidize the rural population. Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin, also recognized these problems. To address them, he promoted a ["Go West" economic policy](http://www.stratfor.com/china_acknowledging_economic_inconsistencies) designed to shift investment further inland. But Jiang faced the same entrenched interests that have opposed Hu's efforts at significant change. While Jiang was able to begin reform of the bloated state-owned enterprises, he softened his Westward economic drive. Amid cyclical global economic downturns, China fell back on the subsidized export model to keep employment levels up and keep money flowing in. Concern over social instability held radical reform in check, and the closer Jiang got to the end of his term in power, the less likely he was to make significant changes that could undermine social cohesion. No Chinese leader wants to preside over a major economic policy that fails out of fear of being the Chinese Mikhail Gorbachev. For those like Hu who have argued that rapid reform is worth the risk of potential short-term social dislocation, the global downturn was seen as validating their policies - and as confirming that the risks to China of not changing far outweigh the risks of changing now. The export industry's drag on GDP [has forced Beijing to enact a massive investment and loan program](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090522_china_problems_stimulus_plan). By some accounts, fixed investments in 2009 accounted for more than 90 percent of GDP. Those arguing for faster reform have noted that the pace of investment growth is unsustainable in the long run, and that the flood of money into the system has created new inflationary pressures. Much of this investment came in the form of bank loans that need to be serviced and repaid. But as [the government tries to cool the economy](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100120_china_reserve_requirements_and_beijings_predicament), the risk of companies defaulting on their loans looms. Cooling the economy also [threatens to burst China's real estate bubble](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100304_china_real_estate_bubble). This not only compounds problems in related industry sectors, it could also trigger massive social discord in the urban areas, where housing has taken the place of the stock market as the investment of choice. Beijing's Ongoing Dilemma Chinese leaders face the constant dilemma of needing to allow the economy to maintain its three-decade long export-oriented growth pattern even though this builds in long-term weaknesses, but shifting the economy is not something that can be done without its own consequences. Social pressures are convincing the government of the need to raise the minimum wage to keep up with economic pressures. At the same time, misallocation of labor and new job formation incentives in the interior are causing shortages of labor in some sectors in major coastal export zones. If coastal factories increase wages to attract labor or appease workers, they run the risk of going under due to the already razor-thin margins. But if they don't, the labor fueling these industries at best may riot and at worst might simply move back home, leaving exporters with little option but to close shop. Looming demographic changes around the globe also impact the Chinese situation, and the government can no longer rely on an ever-increasing export market to drive the Chinese economy. Some international companies operating in China already are beginning to consider relocating manufacturing operations to places with cheaper labor or back to their home countries to save on transportation costs Chinese wages are no longer mitigating. With its export markets unlikely to recover to pre-crisis levels any time soon, competition and protectionism are on the rise. [The United States is growing bolder in its restrictions on Chinese exports](http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20090914_chinese_tire_tariffs_and_u_s_plans), and China may no longer avoid having the U.S. government label it a currency manipulator. While this may be an extreme measure in 2010, the pressures for such a scenario are rising. Amid its domestic and global challenges, Chinese leaders are engaged in economic policy debates. It appears that internal criticism is being directed against Hu as social tensions over issues like rising housing prices and inflation grow. In some ways, this is not unusual. National presidents often bear the brunt of dissatisfaction with economic downturns no matter whether their policies were to blame. In China, however, criticism against economic policy falls on the premier, who is responsible for setting the country's economic direction. The focus on Hu reflects both the depth of the current crisis and the underlying political tensions over economic policy in a time of both global economic unpredictability and preparations for the end of Hu's presidency in 2012.

Infighting Bad - Economy

Infighting will destroy the Chinese economy, Hu will make concessions if resistance increases

Richmond – March 9, 2010

(Jennifer, “China's Challenge”, Right Side News, <http://www.rightsidenews.com/201003098978/politics-and-economics/chinas-challenge.html>)

Institutional and local government resistance to re-centralization has hounded the policy from its inception, and resistance has grown with the economic crisis. Money is now pouring into the economy via massive government-mandated bank lending to stimulate growth through investments as exports wane. Consequently, housing prices and inflation fears now plague the government - two issues that could lead to increased social tensions and are already leading to louder questioning of Hu's policies. With just two years to go in his administration, Hu already is looking to his legacy, weighing the risks and rewards between promoting long-term economic sustainability or short-term economic survival. The next two years will witness seemingly incongruent policy pronouncements as the two opposing directions and their proponents battle over China's economic and political landscape.

Infighting Bad - Economy

Political tensions and internal conflicts would collapse the Chinese economy

Bandow 2007

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “China: Fragile Superpower”, Antiwar.com, September 8, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/09/07/china-fragile-superpower/>)

At least, that’s the conventional wisdom. And it is likely correct. But not necessarily, suggests Susan Shirk, a professor at the University of California (San Diego). China suffers from important weaknesses as well as enjoying significant strengths. The result is potential danger for America. Shirk worries that “unless we understand the fears that drive China’s leaders’ international behavior and craft our own policies accordingly, the historical odds predict war, not peace.” Shirk’s challenging summary of China is simple: “Strong abroad but fragile at home.” Her analysis ably backs up that conclusion. Beijing’s economic miracle is beyond doubt. Shirk, who first visited the PRC in 1971, describes a China which is unrecognizable today. From 1978 to 2004 “China’s GDP grew at an average rate of 9.5 percent,” she explains. Despite the PRC’s growing population, China’s per capita GDP jumped eight percent annually. Incomes lag outside of Beijing, Shanghai, and other leading cities. Nevertheless, vast numbers of Chinese peasants and laborers have escaped poverty. China’s growth has transformed that nation in another way. Once as isolated as it was poor, the PRC now is highly dependent on other nations, demonstrating what Shirk calls “an unusually high degree of openness to the world economy – foreign trade is 75 percent of its GDP.” She points to the slogan in the PRC that “China needs the world,” and especially the U.S., which, Shirk writes, “is China’s largest overseas market and the second-largest source of its foreign direct investment on a cumulative basis.” Washington and Beijing have much at stake in their relationship. Nevertheless, Shirk asks: “How long can the Chinese economic miracle last?” Chinese officials have much to fear. Their nation might be headed to great power status. Or to economic or social implosion. Although the PRC’s potential is great, its pitfalls also are many. For instance, Beijing is a rapidly aging society, with demographic trends accelerated by China’s coercive attempt to limit population growth. Under present trends, writes Shirk, “in 2065, 54 percent of the population will be over sixty and only 22 percent will be working.” That is not a prescription for a economic power. Beijing’s most important economic partner is the U.S., but tensions remain high. Complaints over high trade deficits, Chinese currency valuation, and extensive intellectual piracy have led to frequent calls in America for retaliation. Observes Shirk: “Chinese officials are growing increasingly nervous about the risk of a protectionist backlash,” which would harm both economies. China’s most serious domestic economic problem may be its shaky banking system. But there is much more. Writes Shirk, “the greatest risks to the Chinese economy, however, are more political than economic. The biggest question hanging over China is its political stability.” Threats to the existing communist autocracy are many. Impoverished egalitarianism has given way to pervasive economic inequality. Rampant corruption has generated extensive public anger. “Social” goals, particularly environmental protection and health care, remain unmet.

Infighting Bad – Party Legitimacy

Economic problems and social tension during the succession will deadlock the government and destroy Party legitimacy.

Li 9 (Cheng, Dir. of Research, John L. Thornton China Center, “China’s Team of Rivals ” Brookings Foundation Article series,Marcy http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/03\_china\_li.aspx) MKB

The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried. What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.”With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive the political challenges it will bring. This year marks the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic, and the ruling party is no longer led by one strongman, like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Instead, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, China’s most powerful body, are run by two informal coalitions that compete against each other for power, influence, and control over policy. Competition in the Communist Party is, of course, nothing new. But the jockeying today is no longer a zero-sum game in which a winner takes all. It is worth remembering that when Jiang Zemin handed the reins to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002, it marked the first time in the republic’s history that the transfer of power didn’t involve bloodshed or purges. What’s more, Hu was not a protégé of Jiang’s; they belonged to competing factions. To borrow a phrase popular in Washington these days, post-Deng China has been run by a team of rivals. This internal competition was enshrined as party practice a little more than a year ago. In October 2007, President Hu surprised many China watchers by abandoning the party’s normally straightforward succession procedure and designating not one but two heirs apparent. The Central Committee named Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang—two very different leaders in their early 50s—to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, where the rulers of China are groomed. The future roles of these two men, who will essentially share power after the next party congress meets in 2012, have since been refined: Xi will be the candidate to succeed the president, and Li will succeed Premier Wen Jiabao. The two rising stars share little in terms of family background, political association, leadership skills, and policy orientation. But they are each heavily involved in shaping economic policy—and they are expected to lead the two competing coalitions that will be relied upon to craft China’s political and economic trajectory in the next decade and beyond.

Infighting Bad - Collapse

Factional infighting leading up to the 2012 succession will collapse the country

Li 9 (Cheng, Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center. “China’s Team of Rivals.” Foreign Policy. February 16, 2009. <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/03_china_li.aspx>) . LRH.

But China’s new game of elite politics may fail. What will happen, for instance, if economic conditions continue to worsen? Factionalism at the top might grow out of control, perhaps even leading to deadlock or outright feuding. Different outlooks over many issues—including how to redistribute resources, establish a public healthcare system, reform the financial sector, achieve energy security, maintain political order, and handle domestic ethnic tensions—are already so contentious that the leadership might find it increasingly difficult to build the kind of consensus necessary to govern effectively.

Hu Agenda = Sino-US Relations

Hu wants China to cooperate with the US on many issues, including the environment and non-proliferation

Xinhua News Agency 10. (“Hu: China, US should improve win-win co-op.”Xinhua News Agency. May 24, 2010. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010sinousdialogue/2010-05/24/content_9885625.htm>). LRH.

Addressing the opening ceremony of the second round of China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Hu said China and the United States should step up macroeconomic policy coordination and promote sustained world economic recovery.

He called on closer bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the areas including economy and trade, energy, environment, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, law enforcement, science and technology, education, agriculture, health and quality inspection.

He also urged the two countries to develop cooperation in new areas such as civil aviation, high-speed railway, infrastructure construction and space exploration.

"In this way, we will lend fresh impetus to the growth of China-US relations and enable our peoples to reap tangible benefits from China-US cooperation," he added.

China will cooperate with the US over small issues: they want to improve US-China ties

IANS 10. (“[Hu Jintao reaffirms importance of China-US ties](http://blog.taragana.com/politics/2010/05/24/hu-jintao-reaffirms-importance-of-china-us-ties-38308/).” Indo Asian News Service. May 24th, 2010. <http://blog.taragana.com/politics/2010/05/24/hu-jintao-reaffirms-importance-of-china-us-ties-38308/>). LRH.

BEIJING - Chinese President Hu Jintao Monday reaffirmed the importance of developing China-US ties, saying that sound bilateral ties contribute to peace, stability andprosperity in the Asia Pacific region and the world. “As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the largest developing country and the largest developed country, China and the US face common tasks and shoulder important responsibilities ranging from promoting sustainable growth of the world economy to managing regional hot-spots, meeting global challenges and safeguarding world peace and security,” Xinhua reported quoting Hu. Addressing the opening ceremony of the second China-US strategic and economic dialogue here, he said the world is in the midst of major developments, changes and adjustments. The trend toward a multi-polar world and economic globalization is gathering momentum, he said, adding global issues are becoming more pronounced, and regional and international hot-spot issues keep cropping up. “To further advance mankind’s noble cause of peace and development requires greater cooperation among people of all countries,” the president added.

China is calling for US cooperation on numerous issues

Gaoette and Christie 10. (Nicole and Rebecca, writers for Bloomberg. “Clinton Calls for China Cooperation on North Korea (Update1).” Bloomberg Businessweek. May 24, 2010. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-24/clinton-calls-for-china-cooperation-on-north-korea-update1-.html>) LRH.

May 24 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised China for supporting tougher United Nations sanctions against Iran, and said the same cooperation was necessary against North Korea. “North Korea is also a matter of global concern,” Clinton said at the opening of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing. “We must work together again to address this challenge.” The U.S. is seeking China’s backing to punish North Korea for the deadly attack on a South Korean ship in March, an issue that has eclipsed other items on the agenda for the high-level talks. South Korea today said it will seek UN action against North Korea after a report concluded last week that it was behind the torpedoing of a warship that killed 46 sailors. China is North Korea’s closest ally. Clinton yesterday met with senior Chinese officials to convey how seriously the U.S. views developments on the Korean peninsula, an Obama administration official said. The U.S. and its allies have not faced such a serious regional incident in decades, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. In today’s remarks, Clinton called for cooperation that creates “win-win solutions, rather than zero-sum rivalries” with China. Hu’s Warning Chinese President Hu Jintao, speaking minutes later, echoed the call for cooperation on issues of security, financial matters and climate change, while cautioning against unilateral foreign policy decisions.

Hu Agenda Good – Economy/Stability

The Hu agenda is key to preventing global economic meltdown and the collapse of China.

Hutzler 10 (Charles, Staff writer, “China PM defends assertive trade, foreign plicy ” ABC News, March 14, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10095619) MKB

With these storm clouds brewing, Wen said more coordination was needed among economic powers to prevent the world economy from sagging into a "double-dip" recession. He cited high unemployment rates, debt crises in nations such as Greece and high government deficits abroad, while at home, he said, there are worries about inflation and businesses' over-reliance on the massive stimulus and loans China used last year to keep the economy running**.** "I believe that free trade not only promotes growth of the world economy. At the same time, it promotes harmony in the world and changes and improves people's lives," Wen said. Wen spoke following the closing of the annual session of the party-dominated national legislature, which earlier Sunday approved a blueprint to keep government spending high, though at half the rate of last year, to buffer any economic turbulence. Sizable increases were given to education, pensions and low-cost housing — part of a yearslong effort by Wen and President Hu Jintao to more fairly spread the benefits of growth among rural and working-class Chinese. Wen spoke frankly that economic ills left untended could threaten Communist rule. A particularly toxic combination, he said, were inflation, the rich-poor income gap and corruption — all current problems. "These will be strong enough to affect our social stability and even the stability of state power," he said. Normally high security in Beijing was tightened further in the past two weeks for the National People's Congress and a meeting of the top government advisory body. After Wen's news conference, police dragged away and put into a van at least two people — one of whom was complaining about a housing dispute — as they tried to get the attention of officials and reporters outside the hulking Great Hall of the People. A third person, who said he was a teacher, was led away separately. Turning the tables on the U.S., Wen renewed appeals for assurances from Washington about the safety of China's $800 billion in foreign exchange reserves invested in U.S. Treasury securities. Wen said the value of the U.S. dollar was a "big concern" and asked Washington to take unspecified steps to reassure investors. Wen also fired back at critics of China's performance at the last year's Copenhagen climate change conference. Asked why he skipped a meeting of some foreign leaders, including Obama,Wen said he was snubbed, having never been formally invited, and so sent a vice foreign minister instead. "So far no one has given us any explanation about this and it still is a mystery," he said. When asked if China would play a bigger role in international affairs, Wen said China is still a developing country, focused on improving living standards, and even when rich and powerful, it would not seek to dominate others.

Hu Reform: Good for Econ

Chinese currency reform is good for both sort term financial stability and long term growth in China

Oliver 10. (Chris, MarketWatch's Asia bureau chief, based in Hong Kong. “China's president stresses willingness to reform currency.” MarketWatch. May 24, 2010. <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hu-stresses-chinas-willingness-to-reform-yuan-2010-05-23>). LRH.

"Allowing the exchange rate to reflect market forces is important, not just to give China the flexibility necessary to sustain economic growth with low inflation, but also to reinforce incentives for China's private sector to shift resources to more productive, higher-value-added activities that will be important to future growth," Geithner said. Hu's comments basically reiterated statements Chinese officials had made on earlier occasions, though he appeared to go out of his way to highlight U.S. concerns about China's currency. Hu also said he hoped the dialogue would "build a foundation of mutual trust" between the two sides. Zhang Xiaoqiang, vice chairman on the National Development and Reform Commission, was cited in newswire reports as saying later Monday there had been no change in the basic principles of China's exchange-rate reform. Other Chinese officials echoed those sentiments, telling reporters that Monday's talks had focused on the global economy and didn't touch on issue of the yuan's exchange rate. Meanwhile, Geithner also urged freer trade between the two countries, part of an expected push to improve the U.S. trade account with the Chinese. "China has benefited enormously from the open and rules-based global system of trade and investment, as have we," he said. "Continued, reliable access to the large and growing United States market is an important underpinning of China's prosperity and growth." [See story on U.S. side's hope to improve trade with China.](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-goes-to-beijing-to-give-exports-a-lift-2010-05-23)

Gradual reform of Chinese currency will help maintain financial stability in China

The People’s Bank of China 10. (“Further Reform the RMB Exchange Rate Regime and Enhance the RMB Exchange Rate Flexibility.” The People’s Bank of China. June 19, 2010. <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6400&id=1488>). LRH.

China´s external trade is steadily becoming more balanced. The ratio of current account surplus to GDP, after a notable reduction in 2009, has been declining since the beginning of 2010. With the BOP account moving closer to equilibrium, the basis for large-scale appreciation of the RMB exchange rate does not exist. The People´s Bank of China will further enable market to play a fundamental role in resource allocation, promote a more balanced BOP account, maintain the RMB exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level, and achieve the macroeconomic and financial stability in China.

Hu Agenda Good - Collapse

There is no risk of collapse now, but continued central government reforms are necessary to keep it that way.

Freeman 10 (Will, analyst at GaveKal Dragonomics, “The accuracy of China’s ‘mas incidents’ ” Financial Times (London), March 2, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a,dwp\_uuid=9511df10-6d6b-11da-a4df-0000779e2340.html?nclick\_check=1) MKB

The central government is adapting to the challenge, to some extent. Beijing used to deny the existence of social unrest or blame it on foreign conspirators, but now accepts that social frictions stem from domestic problems will inevitably intensify. But since most complaints are against local officials or businesses, the central government argues that the chief problem is petty corruption stemming from bad eggs at the local level rather than systemic flaws that would undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Indeed, the sharp rise in petitions to Beijing about local abuses testifies to a widespread belief that the central government is more a potential solution to the problem, not its ultimate source. But this belief may be changing. Anecdotal evidence over the last five years suggests a rise in “anger-venting” mass incidents – large scale, often violent, riots that erupt from seemingly minor incidents and reflect general discontent rather than specific rights violations. In June 2008, over 10,000 rioters set fire to a police station in Guizhou province when police allegedly covered up a murder perpetrated by relatives of local government officials – the latest in a string of alleged misdemeanors. The party-state is in no danger of crumbling. But if the central government is serious about reducing growing social unrest, it must do three things: increase the accountability of local officials; break those officials’ grip on the courts; and improve the systems of public redress.

Rich/ Poor Gap = Instability

Income inequality in China is at a dangerous level, there is risk of massive social unrest

Qiang 10 (Guo, Journalist, “Income Gap Rings Alarm” Global Times, http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2010-05/535803.html) MKB

Cong Yaping and Li Changjiu, **economic analysts with Xinhua's Center of World Studies, warned that China's Gini Coefficient - an indicator of income inequality - has exceeded 0.5, threatening poor economic security, a weaker development outlook and social instability**, the Xinhua-owned Economic Information Daily newspaper reported last week. **The warning threshold**, as commonly recognized by the international community, **of the Gini Coefficient is 0.4.** A World Bank report said the index for China surged to 0.47 last year. **Income inequality in the country was also highlighted by a widening income ratio between urban and rural residents, which is at 3.33:1 this year**, compared with 2:56:1 in 1997, according to the latest figures from the National Bureau of Statistics. Yang Yiyong, **director of the Social Development Research Department at the NDRC, warned that China can't afford any further rises in the Gini Index, as growing disparity could result in social unrest and "could even cause distrust in the country's public-ownership economic system."** "**Social problems, including migrant workers consecutively taking their lives and serial attacks on schoolchildren, are related to conflicts stemming from the income gap**," Yang said. Yang's words referred to seven unrelated attacks on primary school and kindergarten students in less than two months, in which more than a dozen children were killed. Also this week, the number of apparent suicides at Taiwanese company Foxconn hit 10. The rural-urban income gap constituted a major part in the overall gap, Yang said, urging the free mobilization of labor and the implementation of equal pay for equal work, both of which are hindered by the current household registration system, or hukou. People's Daily reported that the existing hukou system has helped push up the gap between the rich and poor. Citizens with rural hukou cannot generally enjoy the same social benefits as urban residents, even though they live and work in cities. **The increasing gap between the rich and the poor has also raised concerns that China will follow some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, where the Gini index once reached 0.69.**

Rich/ Poor Gap = Instability

The rising gap in between the rich and poor creates social instability, culminating in social meltdown within the next few monthes.

Zweig 5 (David, Professor at Hong Kong University, “Wealth Gap Threatens Stability in China” Center on China’s Transnational Relations, August 23 2005, http://blog.ust.hk/cctr/2009/03/16/wealth-gap-threatens-stability-in-china/) MKB

**China risks social meltdown within five years** because of the stresses provoked by its economic boom, government officials were warned yesterday. **The country was now in a “yellow-light” zone, the second most serious indicator of “social instability”, according to an official report focusing on the growing gap between rich and poor**. **“We are going to hit the red-light scenario after 2010 if there are no effective solutions in the next few years,” said the report**, commissioned by the labour and social security ministry. As if to bear out its warnings, **police admitted that rioting had broken out in a town in the eastern province of Zhejiang, the latest in a wave of violent protests** in the region. Buildings and police cars were set alight in clashes led by parents who accused a battery factory of giving their children lead poisoning. **Such unrest is now common in many Chinese towns**, often triggered by protests against the mixture of corruption and environmental degradation that the dash for development has brought. The increased publicity given to them - the labour ministry’s findings were reported in the state-owned China Daily - is a sign of growing government anxiety. **The national leadership**, under President Hu Jintao, which came to power two years ago made the plight of the poor its rallying cry and announced the abolition of rural taxes. But it **has proved unable to prevent the exploitation of China’s manufacturing boom by local officials eager to bolster both their standing and their bank balances**. Han Dong-fang, a Chinese labour rights activist in Hong Kong, said Beijing’s prophecies of doom appeared to be exacerbating local corruption. “For the moment, the officials have positions and economic power,” he said. “They feel they have to hurry up, because otherwise they will lose their last chance to grab what they can.” **Ever since market-oriented economic reforms were launched more than 25 years ago, the old Maoist notions of equality have disappeared**. Ironically, standard measures of wealth disparity now rank “communist” China as far more unequal than its old adversary, capitalist Taiwan. The National Bureau of Statistics says that rural incomes last year averaged ￡200 a head, less than a third of average urban incomes. And **the wealth gap appears to be widening**. Figures released yesterday showed that **while China’s gross domestic product grew by more than nine per cent last year, rural incomes rose by only four to five per cent.** In the latest local protest, **up to 70 people in Mei-shan, Zhejiang, were reported injured after police waded into protesters with batons and tear gas. When police later returned to arrest ringleaders, some locals went on a rampage, setting light to the battery factory, breaking into government offices and burning police cars.** The public security ministry recently admitted that **there were 74,000 protests of this sort last year**, up from 30,000 the year before. Ominously, **Chinese authorities announced last week the setting up of special riot squad units to counter local protests, which officials bracketed with terrorism as an enemy of stability.**

Rich/ Poor Gap = Instability

The rising gap in between the rich and poor creates social instability, risking regime collapse

Sainsbury 10

(Michael, Chinese specialist, “Stability, byword of the Tiananmen Tyrants, on even shakier ground in China”, The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/stability-byword-of-the-tiananmen-tyrants-on-even-shakier-ground-in-china/story-e6frg6so-1225875408279) MKB

**Twenty-one years ago** today, **tensions reached breaking point and the Chinese government called in troops and killed hundreds of people in the name of stability. Today a range of social and economic ills,** headed by corruption**, a widening income gap** and forced home removals, **are once more testing the world's most populous country**. Zhou, now an independent commentator and constitutional academic, tells Inquirer **the prospect of stability in China is becoming more uncertain, with "economic reform only half-way and political reform stuck**". The situation is grabbing headlines even in the tightly controlled state media. Government news agency Xinhua released a report last month that said **income disparity was weakening economic security and development potential, endangering social stability**. According to a World Bank report, while 5 per cent of Americans hold 60 per cent of US assets, in China, 1 per cent of the population holds 41.4 per cent of the assets. **China's wealth polarisation is the most severe in the world. As the income gap** between the rich, the struggling middle class and the poor **continues to widen** and avenues for redress shrink, **protest by individuals and groups have become widespread and multifaceted in their causes. In the past three months there has been a spate of attacks, often with knives on school children, that has left 21 people dead and more than 100 injured**. In November, **Tang Fuzhen**, a 47-year-old businesswoman**, burned herself to death in Sichuan while holding a red national flag in a last, vain attempt to halt the demolition of her house.** In March, in the southern city of Kunming, a dispute between unlicensed street vendors and law enforcement officers escalated into a full-blown rampage by angry citizens. This week, 46-year-old Zhu Jun, head of security at the Lingling district post office in Yongzhou, broke into a court office in Hunan and shot six people, murdering three judges before killing himself. Electronics maker Foxconn, which makes Apple's iPhone near Shenzhen, has been hit with a spate of 10 worker suicides. Nearby, at a Honda plant in Foshan, workers have staged one of the biggest public strikes in decades, seeking better wages.At the heart of Beijing's battle to keep its populace under control is the shadowy but powerful Stability Preservation Office, which is controlled directly by the country's ruling nine-man Politburo Standing Committee. China's acknowledged expert on social stability, senior thinktank researcher Yu Jianrong from the China Academy of Social Sciences, believes individual and group outrage are being spurred by unfair and unclear rules. "Uncertainty about the rules tends to cause people a kind of terror, a fear of the future, which in some people manifests as weakness and mediocrity, while in others it may turn into hatred, and the hatred by generated fear is sporadic," he told China's progressive Southern Weekend newspaper. David Kelly, a professor at the China Research Centre at the University of Technology, Sydney, tells Inquirer: "Economic growth has left some people and groups completely disenfranchised. "They are unable to represent their own interests. Most Chinese believe that rich people can get away with anything." Tiananmen veteran Zhou says: "The fundamental problem with the political system of China is the four cardinal principles, (namely, adhere to the socialist road; adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship; adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China; adhere to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought) which are written in the constitution, is completely against rule of law. "It doesn't insure the basic rights of people, and makes the government beyond any containment and supervision. "Running a country by suppression and an iron wrist can't last long. "The stability maintenance measures, with rising investment in it, can only work as plaster: it covers the surface, but not heal the root." The Stability Preservation Office was founded in the late 1990s, when workers were laid off during a period of privatisation. Its local offices extend to provincial, city, county and street level (the lowest government level) as well as into important institutes and enterprises. So-called mass events or public disturbances provide routine work for the office. It also works to prevent petitioners from lodging their complaints in Beijing, an ancient Chinese practice. Says Du Guang, a professor at major think-tank The Central Party School:"It's a political system protecting the interests of powerful interest groups . . . officials protect officials, power protects power." Guang says: "So when deprived, exploited, ordinary people stand up to protest, the institute with power naturally stands together with the exploiters to crack down on the public." Stability is also costing the country a small fortune. The report says public security cost 514 billion yuan ($90bn) in 2009, an 8.9 per cent increase over 2008.

Collapse – On Brink

China is on the brink of massive social unrest, action that alienates hardliners will collapse the country.

Garnaut 10 (John, Staff writer “China insider sees revolution brewing ” Sydney Morning Herald, February 27, http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-insider-sees-revolution-brewing-20100226-p92d.html) MKB

China's top expert on social unrest has warned that hardline security policies are taking the country to the brink of ''revolutionary turmoil''. In contrast with the powerful, assertive and united China that is being projected to the outside world, Yu Jianrong said his prediction of looming internal disaster reflected on-the-ground surveys and also the views of Chinese government ministers. Deepening social fractures were caused by the Communist Party's obsession with preserving its monopoly on power through ''state violence'' and ''ideology'', rather than justice, Professor Yu said. Disaster could be averted only if ''interest groups'' - which he did not identify - were capable of making a rational compromise to subordinate themselves to the constitution, he said. Some lawyers, economists and religious and civil society leaders have expressed similar views but it is unusual for someone with Professor Yu's official standing to make such direct and detailed criticisms of core Communist Party policies. Professor Yu is known as an outspoken insider. As the director of social issues research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Rural Affairs he advises top leaders and conducts surveys on social unrest. He previously has warned of the rising cost of imposing ''rigid stability'' by force but has not previously been reported as speaking about such immediate dangers. ''Some in the so-called democracy movement regard Yu as an agent for the party, because he advises senior leaders on how to maintain their control,'' said Feng Chongyi, associate professor in China Studies at the University of Technology, Sydney. ''I believe Yu is an independent scholar. This speech is very significant because it is the first time Yu has directly confronted the Hu-Wen leadership [President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao] and said their policies have failed and will not work.'' Pointedly, Professor Yu took aim at the policy substance behind two of Mr Hu's trademark phrases, ''bu zheteng'' [''stability'', or ''don't rock the boat''] and ''harmonious society''. His speech was delivered on December 26, the day after the rights activist Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to 11 years in jail for helping to draft a manifesto for constitutional and democratic government in China, called Charter '08. The sentence, which shocked liberal intellectuals and international observers, followed a tumultuous year during which the party tightened controls over almost all spheres of China's burgeoning civil society, including the internet, media, legal profession, non-government organisations and business. Professor Yu's speech has not been previously reported but has recently emerged on Chinese websites. He cited statistics showing the number of recorded incidents of ''mass unrest'' grew from 8709 in 1993 to more than 90,000 in each of the past three years. ''More and more evidence shows that the situation is getting more and more tense, more and more serious,'' Professor Yu said. He cited a growing range and severity of urban worker disputes and said Mafia groups were increasingly involved in state-sponsored thuggery while disgruntled peasants were directing blame at provincial and even central government. ''For seeking 'bu zheteng' we sacrifice reform and people's rights endowed by law … Such stability will definitely bring great social disaster,'' he said. Professor Yu's speech reflects deep disillusionment among liberal thinkers in China who had hoped Mr Hu and Mr Wen would implement political reforms. Dr Feng said he still hoped the two would ''do something'' to leave more than a ''dark stain'' on China's political development before stepping down in 2012. ''The conservative forces are currently very strong,'' he said. China's security-tightening and potential for future loosening were linked to a leadership succession struggle between Mr Hu and the Vice-Premier, Li Keqiang, on the one hand, and the former president, Jiang Zemin, and the current Vice-President, Xi Jinping, on the other. ''I haven't given up the hope that the Hu-Li camp may make some positive political changes to mobilise public support.'' . The latest edition of the newspaper *Southern Weekend* broke a two-decade taboo by publishing a photo of a youthful Mr Hu with his early mentor, former party chief Hu Yaobang, who was purged in 1987 for his liberal and reformist leanings. But Chinese internet search results for the names of both leaders were yesterday blocked for ''non-compliance with relevant laws''. A Beijing political watcher said **such** crackdowns were being led by officials who had the most to hide, which did not include Mr Hu or his allies. ''Corrupt officials have such a high and urgent interest in controlling the media and especially the internet,'' he said. ''The more they feel that their days are numbered due to the internet and free information, the more ferocious and corrupt they become, in a really vicious circle leading to final collapse.''

PRC Econ Collapse Impact – Taiwan, Collapse

Economic collapse causes the destruction of China and war with Taiwan.

Lewis 10 (Dan, Research Director of Economic Research Council, “The nightmare of a Chinese economic collapse” World Finance, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html) MKB

It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

PRC Econ Collapse Impact – List

China’s economy is key to maintaining stability in the region and checking Korea, piracy, terrorism, and proliferation.

Krawitz 10 (Howard M., “China’s trade opening and implications for regional stability” Strategic Forum, page 3) MKB

A strong services sector, and the millions of jobs it will create, would not only support a real middle class but also slow growth in China’s chronically unemployed underclass, a worrisome source of destabilizing social pres- sure. China must place over 10 million new workers into the economy every year. It must also find jobs for an estimated 150 million unemployed migrants, a number expected to swell by at least 5 to 6 million a year. Again, domestic stability is the issue. Domestic stability in China benefits America. Comfortable, prosperous Chinese citizens are more likely to share concerns similar to those Americans have and be more willing to cooperate on the range of issues relating to such concerns. For example, China already shows increased interest in working with U.S. officials and private experts on environmental problems (for example, pollution, hazardous waste, and transportation), drug trafficking, medicine, and public health. These are now issues of real concern for Chinese citizens in more prosperous areas of the country. They are also issues that transcend borders and have the potential to draw China into the international arena as a nation with a stake in making cooperation work. Dialogue on matters of mutual interest promotes communication, increased cooperation, and, ultimately, trust. A wealthy, stable China can serve U.S. regional security interests. A China that risks tangible loss from aggressive and confrontational behavior should be less likely to favor precipitous action and conflict. It should be more likely to be interested in preserving regional peace and stability, more open to consulting with Pacific Rim neighbors, and more willing to cooperate on regional security issues, strategies, and disputes. Speaking from a vantage point of growing economic strength and military capability would give Beijing the respect, prestige, and diplomatic stature it craves, making it easier for China to see itself as a player whose opinion is given serious weight by peers. This could calm Chinese fears of being marginalized or contained, making it easier for China to find common cause with the United States, Japan, and others in the region in maintaining calm and promoting dialogue on Korean Peninsula security issues, combating international terrorism and piracy, and perhaps even becoming more involved in curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

AT: Econ Resilient

Economic collapse of China is possible

Conway 9 (Edmund, Economics Editor, “China’s economic miracle is a fragile one” The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/edmundconway/6546582/Chinas-economic-miracle-is-a-fragile-one.html) MKB

China has grown to its current size, as do most "young" economies, by exporting cheap goods to richer countries. In its case, this has resulted in the biggest trade surplus in history. The proceeds of that surplus have to go somewhere but, rather than buying General Electric, the country's leaders have splurged it in the currency markets, doing whatever they can to keep their currency, the renminbi, down. Such a policy made sense when China had an economy that was relatively underdeveloped, and was trying to shield nascent exporters from volatility; but now, by keeping assets artificially cheap, it serves to exacerbate the bubble that is building up as a result of those low US interest rates. And while this approach worked when consumers here and in America would spend on Chinese exports, that is no longer assured. As if this weren't dangerous enough, the authorities have also taken to trying to pump up the economy further by channeling cheap credit to companies. There could hardly be a more reliable recipe for an asset bubble, and too many economists assume that the omn ipotent Chinese leaders know better. In reality, this bubble is being allowed to grow by a Communist party, which is well aware that, if economic growth drops below a certain level, their positions could become less secure; the authorities are also less in control than they would like to be.

China Key To Global Economy

China’s economy is key to stability and growth in the world economy.

People’s Daily Online 10 (“China, ‘stabilizer’ of the world economy” People’s Daily Online, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/6885536.html) MKB

**China acts as the new engine of the world economy** James Mirrlees, a professor from the University of Cambridge, said that when we look at the world economy, it would be of no significance without covering China, as China has become one of the world's most dynamic economies. **The impact of the growing Chinese economy** on the change in the world **economy is likely to last for another 2 decades**. This is also a universal view towards China held by many international institutions and overseas economists. Some experts hold that the rapid expansion of China’s demand over the past several years was clearly displayed in the international raw material and building machinery markets. China is now conducting urbanization construction at the pace of building 2 Bostons in 1 year. China's sufficient and cheap labor force has increased global potential for economic development and curbed inflation worldwide. In addition, **China's foreign exchange reserve has become an important power to support the U.S. bond market and maintain the operation of the U.S. economy** in which the savings rate is close to zero. **China imports more** and more **products and technology while exporting a huge amount of products around the world. Many developing countries have benefited from cooperation with China. “China's rise has not only created an impact on the global economy, but has also displayed a brand new economic growth mode and an economic interaction mode between China and other countries,"** said Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy. According to Long Yongtu, secretary-general of the Boao Forum for Asia, the importance of China's economy has not only changed the nature of the global economy and many countries' stances toward the global economy, but has also greatly affected many people's viewpoints about market economy. **China is a stabilizer in the world economy** President of the World Bank Robert Zoellick once said that China was becoming a steady force in the world economy. **Under the circumstances of the international financial crisis, the Chinese government timely launched a package plan to expand its domestic demand and to maintain a steady and rapid growth of its national economy**, successively implemented many industrial policies including the 10 main plans for China's industrial revival, further strengthened its policies for improving people’s livelihoods, actively coped with the impact of international financial crisis, **and is driving the world economy to recovery.** "If we suppose that China's GDP accounts for about 7 percent of the world's total GDP, **China's growth rate of 8.7 percent in 2009 could drive the world's economy to increase by 0.6 percentage points.** The world economic growth rate was -1.4 percent in 2009, and if China's economic growth rate was 0 in the same year, the world economic growth rate would be -1.96 percent. Therefore**, China's economic growth contributed about 29 percent to the world's economic growth rate in 2009**. In other words, **China's economic growth slowed the rate of decline of the world economy by about 30 percent** in 2009." Professor Sun said after analysis, "China's economy has rapidly recovered and it is expected to continue improving sustainability. This has led to the increase of China's bulk commodity import volume and the steady growth of China's service import volume, created external demand for relevant economic entities, and promoted the steadiness and recovery of their economy." Barclays Capital vice president John Varley thinks that as one of the main global fiscal stimulus policies, China's 4 billion yuan economic stimulus package created more market opportunities and development space for China's trade and investment partners. China not only achieved its economic growth in spite of last year's global recession but also embodied how to cope with the financial crisis. Furthermore, **it helped many other countries and regions cope with the crisis demonstrating its responsibility as a big country.** **China's abundant foreign exchange reserve brought new hope for international banks and enterprises** with fluid insufficiency. The Renminbi exchange rate's basic stability on a level of **reasonable balance also contributed to avoiding the upheaval of the international financial and monetary market**. "China's economic growth guaranteed the global energy demand to some extent. The prices of the resource products did not collapsed but steadily rose." said Li Daokui. In the second half of 2009, the growth in consumption owed significant thanks to powerful export response. In order to fuel its economy, China's power distribution on the "3 carriages," investment, consumption and export, became more rational making it better for China and the world economy to maintain strong growth this year. **China leads the world in economic recovery.**

PRC Politics = Only Risk of War

There is very little risk of China challenging the US in Asia or starting a war, only domestic political turmoil could cause Sino-US conflict

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

To answer the question, I follow a pattern used in my long professional career of providing information and analysis about China and Asia to congressional and executive branch policy makers. The pattern has involved providing relevant historical context and using balance in assessing contemporary developments. A major goal is to provide perspective that will moderate US excitement about China—either positive or negative. In my opinion, history seems clear about the lessons of US excitement about China—it leads to exaggeration about the opportunities or dangers posed by China, which in turn provides a poor basis for US policy and often leads to policy that is not well aligned with US interests. In sum, section 1 of this paper looks at relevant patterns and behavior of the United States and China in Asia since the start of the cold war. They show that the United States tends to exaggerate recent threats to its leadership in Asia, and that China remains determined to resist and reduce great power involvement along China’s periphery. Section 2 provides an assessment of Chinese leaders’ current intentions toward the United States in Asia, and argues that US policy makers would be prudent if they remained attentive for possible changes in the current comparatively moderate Chinese approach to the United States in Asia in favor of a more assertive Chinese stance. Section 3 foresees continued effective checks on a possibly more assertive or coercive Chinese approach to Asia. Those checks are based on the twin forces of effective US security and economic power in Asia and by pervasive hedging of independent-minded Asian governments.

Nationalism Destroys “Peaceful Rise”

Nationalism-fueled debates about opposition to US presence undermine the movement for “peaceful rise”

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

While still seeking a multipolar world, China’s leaders in recent years have seen their policy goals and interests best served by muting opposition to the United States and US leadership in Asian and world affairs. In general, China’s goals in Asia have been: · To promote stability and a “peaceful environment” conducive to domestic Chinese economic development and political stability. · To seek advantageous economic contacts and relationships. · To reassure China’s neighbors about the implications of China’s rise. · To isolate Taiwan. · To gain regional influence relative to other powers (e.g. Japan, India, and the United States). Over the past decade, China’s leaders have adjusted their policies and approach to Asia in ways that appear to accord with changing circumstances and the costs and benefits for Chinese interests: · Jiang Zemin in the mid-1990s enhanced his leadership stature in the lead up to China’s 15th Communist Party Congress in 1997 by modifying Deng Xiaoping’s injunction for China to maintain a low-profile in world politics. Jiang reached out to Asian and world powers seeking “strategic partnerships” that enhanced both China’s and Jiang’s international profile at this important time in Chinese domestic politics. · China at this time also endeavored to reassure Asian neighbors alarmed by Chinese military actions in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis by proposing a “New Security Concept” that promoted “good neighbor” relations with most in Asia—Taiwan and the United States were the main exceptions. · By mid 2001, before the terrorist attack on America, China decided to reduce sharply its rhetorical and political opposition to US “hegemony” in Asian and world affairs. The continued strong public opposition to the United States in Asia had not been popular with Asian governments unwilling to choose between China and the United States. It also ran the risk of significant push back from the newly elected George W. Bush administration that had a decidedly more wary view of China’s rise than its predecessor. · By late 2003, Chinese officials began formulating a new public approach focused on China’s “peaceful rise” in Asia that was designed to reassure most concerned powers—Taiwan remained the main exception—that China’s rise would not be adverse to their interests. Reassuring the United States seemed particularly important, and China remained remarkably discreet in dealing with most differences with the United States.

Nationalists= Expansion

The young nationalists in China are extremely violent and want to invade Taiwan. Only the current government can contain them.

Kurlantzick 8 (Josh, scholar in Carnegie Endowment’s China Program, “China’s Next-Generation Nationalists”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=20095) MKB

**The explosion of nationalist sentiment, especially among young people, might** **seem shocking**, but it's been simmering for a long time. In fact, Beijing's leadership, for all its problems, may be less hard-line than China's youth, the country's future**. If China ever were to become a truly free political system, it might actually become more, not less, aggressive. China's youth nationalism tends to explode over sparks like the Tibet unrest. It burst into violent anti-American protests after NATO's accidental bombing of China's embassy** in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1999. (**Most young Chinese I've met don't believe that the bombing was an accident.) Even after 9/11, a time when the governments of China and the United States were building a closer relationship, some young Chinese welcomed America's pain**. **"When the planes crashed into the World Trade Center, I really felt very delighted," one student told Chinese pollsters**. **Youth nationalism exploded again into anti-Japan riots across China in 2005, after the release of Japanese textbooks deemed offensive in China for their apparent whitewashing of World War II atrocities**. During the riots, I was working in Lanzhou, a gritty, medium-sized city in industrial central China. Day after day, young Chinese marched through Lanzhou and looked for shops selling Japanese goods to smash up -- though, of course, these stores were owned by local Chinese merchants. Hardly uneducated know-nothings, young **nationalists tend to be middle-class urbanites**. Far more than rural Chinese, who remain mired in poverty, these urbanites have benefited enormously from the country's three decades of economic growth. They also have begun traveling and working abroad. **They can see that Shanghai and Beijing are catching up to Western cities, that Chinese multinationals can compete with the West, and they've lost their awe of Western power.** Many middle-aged Chinese intellectuals are astounded by the differences between them and their younger peers. Academics I know, members of the Tiananmen generation, are shocked by some students' disdain for foreigners and, often, disinterest in liberal concepts such as democratization. University students now tend to prefer business-oriented majors to liberal arts-oriented subjects such as political science. The young Chinese interviewed for a story last fall in Time magazine on the country's "Me Generation" barely discussed democracy or political change in their daily lives. Beijing has long encouraged nationalism. Over the last decade, the government has introduced new school textbooks that focus on past victimization of China by outside powers. The state media, such as the People's Daily, which hosts one of the most strongly nationalist Web forums, also highlight China's perceived mistreatment at the hands of the United States and other powers. In recent years, too, the Communist Party has opened its membership and perks to young urbanites, cementing the belief that their interests lie with the regime, not with political change -- and that democracy might lead to unrest and instability. According to Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The party showers the urban intelligentsia, professionals and private entrepreneurs with economic perks, professional honors and political access." In the 1980s, by contrast, these types of professionals and academics were at the forefront of Tiananmen protests. The state media also increasingly highlight the problems of rural China -- China now has income inequality on par with many Latin American nations -- suggesting to urbanites the economic and political catastrophe that might befall them if these rural peasants swamped wealthy cities. Now, though, according to Chinese officials, it appears that the Chinese government actually wants to tamp down nationalism. Some officials privately worry that nationalist protests, even ones targeting other countries, ultimately will transform into unrest against Beijing, like previous outbursts of patriotism in China before communist rule in 1949, which eventually turned into nationwide convulsions. In 2005, Beijing initially fed the anti-Japan feelings with public statements. Then **Beijing -- which depends on Tokyo as a crucial trading partner and source of aid -- tried to tamp down tensions by keeping much of the protest details out of the state media. Ultimately, though, Beijing had to roll out riot-control police in large cities. Similarly, after a 2001 collision between American and Chinese military planes that killed the Chinese pilot, Beijing struggled to keep street protests from erupting into riots.** In the long run**, this explosive nationalism calls into question what kind of democracy China could be.** Many Chinese academics, for example, believe that, at least in the early going, a freer China might become a more dangerous China. Able to truly express their opinions, **young Chinese would be able to put intense pressure on a freer government to adopt a hard line against the West -- even,** perhaps, **to invade Taiwan. By contrast, the current Chinese regime has launched broad informal contacts with Taiwan's new rulers**, including an April meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and incoming Taiwanese Vice President Vincent Siew -- contacts denounced by many bloggers.

Nationalists= Expansion

A nationalist leader would try to expand Chinese territory.

Fravel 8 (M. Taylor, Assistant Prof of Political Science Security Studies, “China’s Territorial Future: Will Conquest Pay??”, MIT, page 10) MKB

**Nationalism and territory have always been interwined. Nationalism can result in expansion** for several reasons. First, **nationalist leaders might pursue expansion to rescue co-ethnics who reside in neighboring countries. They may pursue these goals to achieve unification of an ethnic group** or, when co-ethnics abroad face persecution, **to defend kinsmen by seizing the territory that they occupy. Second, nationalist leaders might also pursue expansion to realize a given national identity, to right past injustices to the nation or regain lost status. Such incentives can be especially strong for countries with historical legacies of territorial loss, such as China.**

AT: Link Turns – Domestic Ptix

Even if plan produces cooperation, there will be domestic political costs for Hu.

Paal – February 18, 2010

(Douglas H. Paal is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Obama Welcomes the Dalai Lama, Behind Closed Doors”, South China Morning Post, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=31002)

Proponents of a new bipolar order have made too much of the “G-2” concept, where the U.S. and China can be imagined to make the major decisions in the world together. Neither capital is ready for that. But on almost every major issue, from arms control to humanitarian assistance to peace keeping, there will not be progress if the U.S. and China cannot cooperate. For Chinese leaders, that will mean drawing a fine line between rhetoric and reality, limiting protests to gestures for their domestic audience even as they work with the United States on a number of fronts. For its part, the United States must maintain its principled commitment to human rights but also demonstrate some restraint on issues China considers “core interests.” President Obama must support the desires of disenfranchised groups for rights and representation, without raising unrealistic hopes, and recognizing that there are often real limits to what he can accomplish on their behalf. And he must appreciate that at times it is in everyone’s best interest -- even the disenfranchised themselves -- not to push China too far. His decision to meet the Dalai Lama quietly, as presidents did before 2007, suggests that he understands the balance.

\*\*Aff Answers

Hu Reform: Won’t Pass

China is spooked by the European debt crisis, so it’s unlikely they will move on currency reform

Baston 10. (Andrew, writer for the Wall Street Journal. “Beijing Remains Resolute on Yuan.” The Wall Street Journal. June 19, 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703438604575314103700266786.html>). LRH.

BEIJING—China appears increasingly unlikely to move on its currency before the Group of 20 summit next weekend, a prospect that threatens to restart a poisonous cycle of increasing criticism from U.S. lawmakers and increasing defensiveness from Beijing. In recent days, Chinese officials have forcefully pushed back against international calls for the country to relax its tightly controlled currency and are trying to rule out any discussion of the issue when President Hu Jintao meets President Barack Obama and leaders of other major economies at the summit in Toronto. Briefing reporters in Beijing Friday on China's positions for the G-20 meeting, Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai said the yuan "is China's currency and this is not an issue the international community should discuss." The shifting dynamics of China's currency policy, which economists until recently thought was ripe for change, have been driven mainly by the European debt crisis. Spooked by the turmoil in financial markets and the prospect of weaker global growth, China's leaders have repeatedly expressed concern about the strains in Europe. Their caution may well mean that the grace period the Obama administration tried to create for China will pass without a move.

China is refusing to be forced into currency reform agreements by other nations

Moxley 10. (Mitch, writer for the Inter Press Service. “U.S. Had the Last Word, But China Was the Winner at G20.” Inter Press Service. <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52031>). LRH.

Hu reiterated at the summit that China will not be bullied into relaxing currency controls.  "It is appropriate to address trade frictions appropriately through dialogue and consultation and under the principle of mutual benefit and common development," Hu said in Toronto.  For China, the biggest obstacle to global economic recovery is Western countries shielding their producers from competition from emerging economies. "We must take concrete actions to reject all forms of protectionism and unequivocally advocate and support free trade," Hu said.  Indeed, reforming the global financial regulatory system was the central focus of conversation at the summit.

Currency reform won’t pass: China is refusing to make commitments

Stock Markets Review 10. (“World stock markets daily report Stock Markets Review.” June 28, 2010. <http://www.stockmarketsreview.com/reports/world_stock_markets_daily_report_20100628_17635/>). LRH.

G20/China: Addressing a reporter’s question about the CNY, President Obama said “A strong and durable recovery also requires countries not having an undue advantage. So we also discussed the need for currencies that are market driven … as I told President Hu yesterday, the US welcomes China’s decision to allow its currency to appreciate in response to market forces”. However, any reference to commitment to currency reform was dropped from the statement at China’s request (it noted that it was a sovereign matter).

AT: Hu Reforms Help Economy

The currency reform bill won’t make much of a difference in the economy: it’s gradual and makes numerous assumptions

Dr. Richman 10. (Howard, co-author of Trading Away Our Future. “The Currency-Reform Bill Won't Work: What Should Replace It and Why.”July 4, 2010. <http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/336665-howard-richman/80015-the-currency-reform-bill-won-t-work-what-should-replace-it-and-why>). LRH.

Later in the commentary, Fletcher points out that the bill is seriously flawed because (1) it acts slowly and (2) it relies upon industries filing lawsuits with the Commerce Department: Would the ... currency-reform bill get us out of this trap, if it passed? As noted, it's definitely a positive move, but it's still just a start. Its key limitation is that its approach is gradualist and, above all, reactive, because it depends on victimized industries filing lawsuits under the trade laws. So it will ultimately need to be supplemented with a much more comprehensive strategy. Fletcher doesn't mention two other very serious flaws: Relies upon Obama administration. It relies upon the Treasury Department to declare the yuan to be an undervalued currency and upon the Commerce Department to act when a U.S. company is hurt because of an undervalued currency. But the Obama administration has been reluctant to take any action, whatsoever. Does not address Chinese barriers to U.S. products. It does not address China's many tariff and non-tariff barriers to American products.

Chinese currency reform won’t lead to significant changes in the economy

Parameswaran 10. (Parameswaran, writer for The Age. “China's yuan move too soon to judge: Obama.” The Age. June 25, 2010. <http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/chinas-yuan-move-too-soon-to-judge-obama-20100625-z885.html>). LRH.

In Beijing, foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang, reacting to lawmakers' demands for sanctions on China over the currency issue, said that a yuan appreciation would not solve the ballooning Chinese trade surplus with the United States. As part of a global rebalancing effort, G20 leaders have called for export-driven, surplus economies such as China to boost domestic consumption and for wealthier economies such as the United States to slash their massive debt and deficit. "We believe the appreciation of the yuan cannot bring balanced trade and cannot help the US solve its problems of unemployment, overconsumption and low savings," Qin told journalists. "We hope the US can reflect on the problems of its own economic structure, instead of playing blame games and imposing pressure on others."

Link Turn - Presence Angers Hardliners

US military presence in other countries angers hardliners in China

Godement 2009

(François Godement is Director of the Asia Centre at Yale, “Obama in Asia – Part I“, YaleGlobal Press, November 16, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/obama-asia-part-i>)

For their part, Chinese leaders and experts abstain from any emphasis on bilateral Sino-American cooperation. About global economic governance, for example, they either point out America’s responsibility in sparking the 2008 global crisis, or they encourage a more systemic reform of the international economic system. Neither they, nor the US, talk very openly of the role that the world’s two intertwined giants might take together in solving their mutual imbalances, and the implications for third parties. Beijing is still full of hard-line realists in think tanks or the press, who point out strategic disagreements with America. There is also a revival in China of the five principles of pacific coexistence as a guiding principle for foreign policy. This revival serves as a bulwark against what China feels are incessant calls for increased responsibilities and burden sharing. As China’s footprint widens, it is indeed called to take a leading role in resolving problems from North Korea to Iran, from climate change to public governance in Africa. On president Obama’s visit, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been added to this long list. So even if Chinese experts talk of a long-term decline of American influence and strategic leverage, they are the first to point out, defensively, that the US is still in the driver’s seat. Clearly, China prefers to sit back and eventually criticize from a distance. This is consistent with its long-standing strategic conservatism, but also with the view that the burden on the West is increasing with time. Offering good offices between parties, or perhaps whispering some realist advice to a rogue state, seems to be the extent of China’s strategic cooperation. On North Korea, China has simply not changed its basic stance, not even after two nuclear tests. On Taiwan, where America has rooted for a government that is now more in sync with Beijing than ever, there has been no let up in China’s missile deployment across the Taiwan straits. In South Asia and about AfPak – today’s hot war – there is no sign of movement by China beyond communiqués on terrorism. Quite the contrary, China criticizes some aspects of the US military presence, and has pushed on a U.N. enquiry into civilian deaths from aerial strikes in Afghanistan. On Iran, there remains political advocacy and shyness about sanctions, a cocktail not so different from the North Korean case, and with more business interests. On China’s forward deployment of ships to the Somali coast, it hasn’t led to more cooperation or coordination with other nations. Not be forgotten either the incident with the USS Impeccable in March 2009 off the coast of Hainan which served to remind that China disagrees with pervasive US military presence in its neighborhood.

Link Turn - Nationalists Hate Containment

Chinese nationalists are strongly opposed to U.S. forces aimed at containing them.

Bodeen 10 (Christopher, Journalist, “Chinese nationalists increasingly strident”, Yahoo News, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100625/ap\_on\_re\_as/as\_china\_nationalism) MKB

BEIJING – **Upcoming joint U.S.-South Korean naval drills have sparked an unexpected outcry from Chinese nationalists**, whose fiery rhetoric has been stoked by their country's rising economic strength and global clout. While North Korea often issues diatribes condemning the routine war games off South Korea, this time, it was **Chinese blogs and websites that exploded in anger at word that an American aircraft carrier might join the drills, bringing it close to Chinese waters. Some hawks even urged their country's military to make its own show of force.** "**China should cover the Yellow Sea with ships and missiles and open fire and drive them back should the American military dare invade our territorial waters," a commentary** on the popular ccvic.com news website **demanded,** though Beijing has given no sign it will make any military response. Such nationalist rhetoric jibes with a growing outspokenness among ranking members of the People's Liberation Army that is stirring concern abroad and could hamper China's quest to be regarded as a rising — and responsible — member of international society. **While Chinese nationalism has been growing for the better part of two decades, the unusually vociferous response this time reflected a sense among Chinese that their soaring economy and rising profile on the international scene deserve greater respect.** The challenge for the country's leadership: Find a way to assuage nationalistic sentiments and assert newfound global influence while maintaining stable ties with Washington and a placid regional environment. **The anti-submarine exercises in the Yellow Sea near China's eastern province of Shandong are expected to begin late this month**, although no official date has been given. **U.S. defense officials say the Navy is considering dispatching the massive nuclear-powered aircraft carrier** USS George Washington **to the waters where North Korea allegedly sank a South Korean warship** in a major show of force by the U.S., which has vowed to protect South Korea and is seeking to blunt aggression from North Korea. China's Foreign Ministry this week registered its concerns that the drills could prompt further rash behavior from North Korea's isolated and erratic communist regime. Many here, however, see more nefarious intentions behind the war games. "**The U.S. is directly threatening China by sailing an aircraft carrier into the Yellow Sea," wrote defense blogger** Brother Guangdong **on the Western Military Affairs site. "China must respond firmly and show the American imperialists we won't be pushed around."**

The nationalists are strongly opposed to current Chinese policy towards the U.S. They promise to be more violent towards policies of containment.

Seckington 9 (Ian, Senior Research Officier- North Asia and Pacific Research Group, “Nationalism, Ideology, and China’s Fourth Generation Leadership”, Page 3) MKB

Popular nationalism can be critical of official policy. It certainly calls for more decisive action in defence of China's interests, especially against the US than the Party may be willing to countenance. Take a passage from China Can Say No: "All thoughts of trusting to luck must be abandoned. Oppose containment, this is the grand strategy China must adopt in the course of Sino-US relations. Every step that the US takes to contain China, we must give tit-for-tat, we cannot have the slightest bit of indulgence or tolerance. For example, if some US Congressmen turn a resolution on America protecting Taiwan into effective action; for example if they succeed in putting the Taiwan Relations Act before the ShanghaiCommunicque and betray the basic principles of the Shanghai communiqué‚ raising the quality and number of weapons they export to Taiwan; if they continue to encourage Lee Teng-hui to visit the US for a second time; and if they continue to send special envoys to meet the Dalai Lama...then without any hesitation we must lower the level of our diplomatic relations”.

Link Turn - Nationalists Hate Containment

Chinese nationalists are strongly opposed to U.S. forces aimed at containing them.

Zhou 6 (Suisheng, Professor of Chinese Culture, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/06winter/docs/06winter\_zhao.pdf) MKB

Since 1989, both nativism and antitraditionalism have found their expressions in liberal nationalism. Nativism has become more acceptable to **liberal nationalists** as mainstream Chinese intellectual **discourse shifted dramatically in the 1990s in response to China’s deteriorating relations with major Western countries, particularly the United States, and the Western media’s ris- ing advocacy to contain China**. Many liberal **nationalists came to suspect that the Western powers, particularly the United States** and Japan, **were conspiring to prevent China from rising to the status of a great power and voiced strong criticisms in response.** In fact, liberal **nationalism propelled the anti-U.S. demonstrators** in May 1999 and the anti-Japanese demonstrators in April 2005. Because of **their vocal attacks on Western countries’ “evil” intentions**, some Western **observers have labeled liberal nationalists as neo-authoritarianists** who have argued that a centralized power structure must be strengthened to maintain China’s social stability and economic development. This label is simplistic, however, because**, even though the CCP regime and the liberal nationalists share the dream of a strong China, the latter group does not identify itself with the Communist stat**e, nor does it stop criticizing the government’s policies that limit personal freedoms and politi- cal participation. Qin Hui, a professor of history in Beijing, vividly described liberal nationalists’ split personality when he wrote that it is not right to be slaves of foreign powers, nor is it right to be slaves of their own state, reflecting parallel efforts to promote national interests in international politics and individual rights in domestic politics. In the arena of international com- petition, Chinese people should defend their national rights. In the domes- tic arena, they should fight for their personal rights of participation against the authoritarian Communist state.

Link Turn - Nationalists Hate Containment

Chinese nationalists demand that their government deter US encroachment in regions around China

Bodeen 10 (Christopher, The Seattle Times, Chinese nationalists increasingly strident, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2012206131\_apaschinanationalism.html?syndication=rss) MAH

Upcoming joint U.S.-South Korean naval drills have sparked an unexpected outcry from Chinese nationalists, whose fiery rhetoric has been stoked by their country's rising economic strength and global clout. While North Korea often issues diatribes condemning the routine war games off South Korea, this time, it was Chinese blogs and websites that exploded in anger at word that an American aircraft carrier might join the drills, bringing it close to Chinese waters. Some hawks even urged their country's military to make its own show of force. "China should cover the Yellow Sea with ships and missiles and open fire and drive them back should the American military dare invade our territorial waters," a commentary on the popular ccvic.com news website demanded, though Beijing has given no sign it will make any military response. Such nationalist rhetoric jibes with a growing outspokenness among ranking members of the People's Liberation Army that is stirring concern abroad and could hamper China's quest to be regarded as a rising - and responsible - member of international society. While Chinese nationalism has been growing for the better part of two decades, the unusually vociferous response this time reflected a sense among Chinese that their soaring economy and rising profile on the international scene deserve greater respect. The challenge for the country's leadership: Find a way to assuage nationalistic sentiments and assert newfound global influence while maintaining stable ties with Washington and a placid regional environment. The anti-submarine exercises in the Yellow Sea near China's eastern province of Shandong are expected to begin late this month, although no official date has been given. U.S. defense officials say the Navy is considering dispatching the massive nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington to the waters where North Korea allegedly sank a South Korean warship in a major show of force by the U.S., which has vowed to protect South Korea and is seeking to blunt aggression from North Korea. China's Foreign Ministry this week registered its concerns that the drills could prompt further rash behavior from North Korea's isolated and erratic communist regime. Many here, however, see more nefarious intentions behind the war games. "The U.S. is directly threatening China by sailing an aircraft carrier into the Yellow Sea," wrote defense blogger Brother Guangdong on the Western Military Affairs site. "China must respond firmly and show the American imperialists we won't be pushed around.”

Hu Link Turn – South Korea

US withdrawal from South Korea is a win for Hu

Bandow 2008

(Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, “Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance”, June 9, The National Interest, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17812>)

Some analysts on both sides of the Pacific contend that the alliance is necessary to respond to North Korean nuclear developments. However, absent the U.S. military presence—which provides a convenient target for Pyongyang—the prospect of a DPRK bomb would be a regional rather than an American problem. Washington still would have an interest in encouraging a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, but withdrawing the troops would increase American flexibility. Supporters of the status quo also advocate giving the bilateral relationship a new purpose. After the Gates meeting, the two countries issued a press release which “expressed a shared perception of the need for stronger cooperation in order to develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a 21st Century Strategic Alliance and agreed to exert a joint effort for the creative development of the ROK-U.S. relationship.” Which means precisely what? Some Americans view South Korea as a key member of an anti-China alliance. But while the ROK might enjoy being protected from Beijing in the extraordinarily unlikely event of Chinese aggression, the South has no interest in joining with an American crusade against the PRC. Indeed, the ROK’s ties with Beijing continue to grow. Two-way trade between China and South Korea runs $145 billion, more than between the U.S. and the South. Popular South Korean attitudes towards the People’s Republic of China vary—recent thuggish behavior by Chinese students towards demonstrators protesting repression in Tibet was ill-received in the South, for instance. But it is hard to find a resident of the ROK enthused about confronting the PRC. Indeed, more young people fear the U.S. than either China or the DPRK. Moreover, in May South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited Beijing, where he and Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that they had “agreed to upgrade ties from a partnership of comprehensive cooperation to a future-oriented strategic partnership.” The most likely scenario for conflict between the United States and China involves Taiwan. However, the prospect that Seoul will turn itself into a permanent enemy of a likely superpower with a long memory to help defend Taiwan approximates zero. America’s East Asian allies might want Washington to stick around to counterbalance assorted feared states (variously China, Japan and Russia), but have little incentive to put themselves at risk to advance perceived U.S. interests. But if China was not the target of a revamped alliance, what would be the purpose? Aggression by Japan or anyone else is inconceivable. The most common sources of conflict are neither important for U.S. security nor amenable to U.S. military action—Burma, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands, for example. If South Korea or other nearby states want a local geopolitical policeman, let one or more of them perform that role. The pro-alliance mantra includes promoting regional stability, but the contention that East Asia would dissolve into chaos and war without Uncle Sam’s restraining hand is both arrogant and presumptuous. Everyone in the region has an interest in preserving peace and promoting prosperity. North Korea remains a problem state but the threat of war on the Korean peninsula has diminished dramatically; the result of the recent Taiwanese election has moderated fears about potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Beyond these two cases, there are no obvious bilateral controversies with much likelihood of flaring into violence. Still, does an American presence dampen geopolitical rivalries and arms races? Washington’s role as de facto security guarantor might discourage allied states from doing more for their own defense, but that is a dubious benefit since the belief that the United States will intervene encourages countries to be more belligerent in any disputes with other nations. Moreover, America’s presence virtually forces Beijing to upgrade its military, lest it remain permanently vulnerable to foreign coercion. That is the worst dynamic possible—weakening friendly nations and keeping them permanently dependent on Washington, while convincing China that only a sustained military buildup will enable it to deter U.S. intervention.

Link Turn – Nationalists Like Plan

China opposes US presence in Asia, US hegemony is a historical slight and affront to national pride

Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf>)

Chinese leaders have been pretty consistent in saying that China does not seek dominance in Asia. These declarations seem self serving and disingenuous to many foreign and some Chinese observers, and so it might be more useful to assess what China opposes in Asia in order to come up with insights on what China’s rise may actually mean for the Asian order and US leadership in Asia. Here the answer is pretty clear—China has long opposed large powers establishing strong positions along the periphery of China. This opposition appears to have its roots in a wary Chinese view of international powers and competition. This perception is a result in considerable measure of the widely held and officially reinforced view of China’s having been victimized and exploited by foreign powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Mao Zedong repeatedly confronted US and Soviet power in Asia for security and revolutionary reasons. Deng Xiaoping, while focused on pragmatic economic reform, saw opposition to Soviet dominance in Asia as China’s top foreign policy priority. In the post cold war period, China’s leaders saw opposition to US “hegemony” in Asian and world affairs as an important policy priority. They avoided costly confrontation with the United States but worked through diplomacy, rhetoric and other means to promote a “multipolar” regional and world order where US power and influence would be weaker than in the past.

Link Turn - Japan

US presence in Japan reduces domestic pressure on the PRC regime

Bandow 2007

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “China: Fragile Superpower”, Antiwar.com, September 8, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/09/07/china-fragile-superpower/>)

Where does the U.S. go from here? As is so often the case in international relations, responsible statesmanship is necessary on both sides of the Pacific. Moreover, she adds, “only by understanding the dangers of China’s domestic fragility and incorporating this understanding into their policies can Chinese and American decision makers avoid a catastrophic war.” She advocates a series of sensible steps – focusing on Chinese international behavior, downplaying American military power, demonstrating respect for China, working in Chinese-Taiwanese relations, and not overreacting to China’s economic rise. But that’s not enough. Shirk wants to maintain “a strong military presence” in the region and opposes building up Japan as a military power. As she notes, “Preventing war with a rising China is one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges our country faces.”

US Presence Unpopular

Opposing US presence is popular, and shapes the debate over China’s policy toward Taiwan

Bandow 2007

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “China: Fragile Superpower”, Antiwar.com, September 8, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/09/07/china-fragile-superpower/>)

China’s relations with Japan remain strained and, ironically, help push Tokyo to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. Far more dangerous is the issue of Taiwan. The island state, largely free of mainland control for more than a century, has created a separate identity, but is viewed as a constituent part of China by most Chinese. The intensity of feeling within the PRC reflects latent nationalism mixed with government propaganda. As Shirk explains, “The roots of the Chinese fixation on Taiwan are purely domestic, related to regime security, not national security.” Americans widely underestimate the importance of Taiwan to China. One poll found that three-quarters of Chinese believe conflict between the U.S. and PRC is likely over Taiwan. Shirk warns of a serious risk of war, a “danger compounded by the volatile mixture of domestic politics and of foreign policy in China and Taiwan.” Which naturally leads to relations with the U.S., the subject of the penultimate chapter of Shirk’s book. Beijing has an incentive to maintain good relations with the U.S. – the PRC would suffer greatly from American economic sanctions let alone military hostility, and “the best way for China to rise peacefully is to behave like a responsible power and accommodate to the current superpower, the United States.” If only life was so simple. Warns Shirk: “on the other hand, inside China, other leaders, the public, and the military expect Chinese leaders to stand up to the United States. Nationalist ardor runs high, fanned by government propaganda and the commercial media and Internet. The United States, as the dominant power in the world, is the natural target of suspicion and resentment in China, just as it is in many other countries, particularly after the American invasion of Iraq. A Chinese political leader who takes a principled stand against the United States always wins more points than one who gives in to it.”

AT: Internal Collapse

“Mass Incident” numbers overestimate the danger to the regime, there is no risk of internal collapse.

Freeman 10 (Will, analyst at GaveKal Dragonomics, “The accuracy of China’s ‘mas incidents’ ” Financial Times (London), March 2, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a,dwp\_uuid=9511df10-6d6b-11da-a4df-0000779e2340.html?nclick\_check=1) MKB

Readers of the international press could be forgiven for thinking that China is a cauldron of social unrest on the brink of boiling over. Reports of riots or protests invariably cite the growing number of official “mass incidents” to emphasise the point. But the accuracy of these numbers – which refer to anything from small, peaceful protests to the murderous ethnic riots that engulfed Xinjiang in 2009 – is questionable at best. Moreover, there is no evidence that social unrest poses an imminent threat to the Communist party’s grip on power. Foreign reports typically cite a figure of 80,000-100,000 “mass incidents” in China per year. Yet the definition of a mass incident is so broad and the official reporting so inconsistent that these numbers have little clear meaning. “Mass incidents” are officially defined as any kind of planned or impromptu gathering that forms because of “internal contradictions”, including mass public speeches, physical conflicts, airing of grievances or other forms of group behaviour that may disrupt social stability. In practice, there is no agreement on the definition of a “mass incident”. Police generally use a wider definition which enables them to document how effective their enforcement is; government officials tend to use a narrower definition to minimise the apparent scale of the problem. National statistics published by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) show slow growth in mass incidents from 1993 to 1997 followed by a period of much faster growth through 2004. MPS only considered these data points “estimates” – numbers were rounded to the nearest hundred or thousand – and stopped publishing the data in 2005. Journalists often cite a figure of 87,000 for 2005, which was published on the MPS website in early 2006. But this number refers to an even broader category of “public order disturbances”, that cover anything from riots and protests to participation in cults or organised crime, hacking, orgies, gambling, even insulting the national flag. In early 2007, Liu Jingguo, the vice-minister of public security, told a press conference that mass incidents fell 16.5 per cent year on year in 2006. But there were no further statements on mass incident numbers until after the Olympics in August 2008. After the Olympics passed and the media spotlight dimmed, the number of mass incidents mysteriously rose once again. Estimates by the China Academy of Social Sciences give a figure of “over 90,000” mass incidents in 2006 and further unspecified increases in 2007 and 2008. Most analysts agree that anecdotal evidence, such as a steady rise in the number of petitions submitted to the central government protesting about local government misbehaviour, supports this trend. The central government is adapting to the challenge, to some extent. Beijing used to deny the existence of social unrest or blame it on foreign conspirators, but now accepts that social frictions stem from domestic problems will inevitably intensify. But since most complaints are against local officials or businesses, the central government argues that the chief problem is petty corruption stemming from bad eggs at the local level rather than systemic flaws that would undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Indeed, the sharp rise in petitions to Beijing about local abuses testifies to a widespread belief that the central government is more a potential solution to the problem, not its ultimate source. But this belief may be changing. Anecdotal evidence over the last five years suggests a rise in “anger-venting” mass incidents – large scale, often violent, riots that erupt from seemingly minor incidents and reflect general discontent rather than specific rights violations. In June 2008, over 10,000 rioters set fire to a police station in Guizhou province when police allegedly covered up a murder perpetrated by relatives of local government officials – the latest in a string of alleged misdemeanors. The party-state is in no danger of crumbling.

China Econ Resilient

New policies in China ensure that its economy will remain resilient for over 30 years.

Boo 10 (Tan Teng, creator of Capital Dynamics Limited “China’s economy may be slowing, but remains resilient” The Star Online.http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/7/8/business/6624826&sec=business) MKB

A few months ago, investors were worried that China’s economy was overheating and the property bubble was about to get out of control. Now they are worried that China is slowing too fast. It is hard to please such fickle-minded investors. There is no doubt that China’s economy faces many shorter term challenges and the Chinese leaders need all the skills and experience they have to walk this socio-economic tightrope but the swing in sentiment from one end to the other has been overdone. The most important of these challenges is to achieve a soft landing for the economy in the next one to two quarters. This seems to be the direction the Chinese economy is heading even though investors are very sceptical about it. Some of the economic numbers from China are showing that growth is still running at a healthy rate. Lending growth, retail sales, etc continue to be healthy. Some of them are, however, showing slower growth. For example, the manufacturing sector, while still expanding, is showing signs of a slowdown. The Purchasing Managers’ Index fell to 52.1 in June from 53.9 in May. At the overall level, the Conference Board’s leading indicator for China is also pointing to a slowdown in growth. While the outlook for exports in the second half may not be that bright, it is hard to be convinced that China’s economy is slowing too fast and spinning out of control. The current slowdown was intended. Worries over inflation should dissipate. The property sector should be getting ready for a gradual easing in monetary policy. Capital is still convinced that economic growth in China will remain at a comfortable level of 8% to 9%. While this may not send commodity prices skyrocketing, it will be strong enough for China to achieve her shorter and longer term socio-economic objectives of stability and improvement in the standards of living in China. The longer term challenges facing China are no less demanding. To make China’s economy more internally resilient and less vulnerable to external factors is one of the major aims and this means that efforts to improve and sustain domestic consumption growth must succeed. At this level, while the time horizon stretches many, many years ahead, one can already see the efforts being made by China to move as quickly as is practically possible to achieve this aim. The hefty wage gains sparked by the protests and strikes in some high profile factories is one of the measures to move the Chinese economy in the right direction. The wage increase is pretty widespread and certainly helps to redistribute some of the gains of economic development to the working population. As this becomes nationwide and entrenched, private consumption growth can only expand at a faster pace. Many are concerned that this series of wage rises will make China not attractive as a manufacturing base. To these people, they have forgotten or overlooked the fact that many of the manufacturing firms have no way to relocate. These firms are not only serving the export markets. China’s domestic market is now so large that the manufacturing firms have to stay in China to serve this huge and fast growing market. Take the automobile industry for example. How can they serve the largest car market in the world by locating their plants in countries like Vietnam or Thailand ? The recent hefty increase in wages marks the beginning of another exciting and crucial phase in China’s economic development. Besides spurring higher private consumption through higher disposable income, it is also forcing many manufacturing firms to move to the less developed parts of China. This will help address the wide disparity between the developed and less developed regions in China. In the process, it will broaden and deepen China’s economic development, which can only lead to China being more resilient. A more resilient China means that her past three decades of economic development will continue for another 30 years and more.

China has retained sustainable growth even in the recession.

Curran 10 (Erran, economist, “RBA member warns of surging demand” The Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703636404575352210884880600.html)MKB

China in particular is moving toward a more sustainable growth path and is being helped by a weaker euro, which makes capital imports cheaper, he said, adding that China has become much more regionally integrated. "I'm confident China will pull through this quite well, so I think the issues are really in Europe," he said. "I am still very confident in the best guess of where the world is going."

China Econ Resilient

China has retained sustainable growth even in the recession.

Gang 10 (Dr. Fan, economist at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “China’s secret recipe” Business World Online, http://www.bworldonline.com/main/content.php?id=13453) MKB

BEIJING -- China’s GDP growth this year may approach 10%. While some countries are still dealing with economic crisis or its aftermath, China’s challenge is, once again, how to manage a boom. Thanks to decisive policy moves to preempt a housing bubble, the real-estate market has stabilized, and further corrections are expected soon. This is good news for China’s economy, but disappointing, perhaps, to those who assumed that the government would allow the bubble to grow bigger and bigger, eventually precipitating a crash. Whether or not the housing correction will hit overall growth depends on how one defines "hit." Lower asset prices may slow total investment growth and GDP, but if the slowdown is (supposedly) from 11% to 9%, China will avoid economic over-heating yet still enjoy sustainable high growth. Indeed, for China, the current annualized growth rate of 37% in housing investment is very negative. Ideally, it would slow to, say, 27% this year! China has sustained rapid economic growth for 30 years without significant fluctuations or interruption -- so far. Excluding the 1989-1990 slowdown that followed the Tiananmen crisis, average annual growth over this period was 9.45%, with a peak of 14.2% in 1994 and 2007, and a nadir of 7.6% in 1999. While most major economies in their early stages of growth suffered crises, China’s story seems abnormal (or accidental), and has elicited periodic predictions of an "upcoming crash." All such predictions have proved wrong, but the longer the story lasts, the more people forecast a bad end. For me, there is nothing more abnormal about China’s unbroken pattern of growth than effective macroeconomic intervention in boom times. To be sure, both economic development and institutional reforms may cause instability. Indeed, the type of central government inherited from the old planned economy, with its overstretched growth plans, causes fluctuations, and contributed significantly to instability in the early 1980s. But the central government must be responsible for inflation in times of overheating, lest a bursting bubble fuel unemployment. Local governments and state-owned enterprises do not necessarily have those concerns. They want high GDP growth, without worrying much about the macroeconomic consequences. They want to borrow as much as possible to finance ambitious investment projects, without worrying much about either repayment or inflation. Indeed, the main cause of overheating in the early 1990s was over-borrowing by local governments. Inflation soared to 21% in 1994 -- its highest level over the past 30 years -- and a great deal of local debt ended up as non-performing loans, which amounted to 40% of total credits in the state banking sector in the mid-1990s. This source of vulnerability has become less important, owing to tight restrictions imposed since the 1990s on local governments’ borrowing capacity. Now, however, the so-called "animal spirits" of China’s first generation of entrepreneurs have become another source of overheating risk. The economy has been booming, income has been rising, and markets have been expanding: all this creates high potential for enterprises to grow; all want to seize new opportunities, and every investor want to get rich fast. They have been successful and, so far, have not experienced bad times. So they invest and speculate fiercely without much consideration of risk. The relatively high inflation of the early 1990s was a warning to central government policymakers about the macroeconomic risks posed by fast growth. The bubble bursts in Japan’s economy in the early 1990s, and the Southeast Asian economies later in the decade, provided a neighborly lesson to stop believing that bubbles never burst. Since then, the central government’s policy stance has been to put brakes on the economy whenever there is a tendency toward over-heating. Stringent measures were implemented in the early 1990s to reduce the money supply and stop over-investment, thereby heading off hyperinflation. In the recent cycle, the authorities began cooling down the economy as early as 2004, when China had just emerged from the downturn caused by the SARS scare in 2003. In late 2007, when GDP growth hit 13%, the government adopted more restrictive anti-bubble policies in industries (steel, for example) and asset markets (real estate), which set the stage for an early correction. Economic theory holds that all crises are caused by bubbles or overheating, so if you can manage to prevent bubbles, you can prevent crises. The most important thing for "ironing out cycles" is not the stimulus policy implemented after a crash has already occurred, but to be proactive in boom times and stop bubbles in their early stages.

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Withdrawal from Afghanistan will allow the SCO to push the US out of Central Asia

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

SCO and U.S. Military Presence While gathering Afghanistan into its embrace, the SCO publicly expresses its unease at the U.S.'s military presence in the region. At its Astana summit, the SCO also called for the closing of U.S. bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Months later, Uzbekistan evicted the U.S. from its air base at Karshi-Khanabad, also known as K-2. At this summit Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov "essentially called on his SCO partners to make a choice between siding with the United States or 'with our neighbors in Russia and China.'"19 The United States, however, continues to keep another air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, which it has been using for humanitarian and combat operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. has 1,200 troops stationed there. Unsurprisingly, Kyrgyzstan balanced the U.S. military presence on its soil with the hosting of a Russian airbase nearby. As the Russian and U.S. air bases sit only a few miles apart, Russians use this proximity as a strategic vantage point to keep tabs on what goes on at Manas base. There are reports that China also is in talks with Bishkek to open up an airbase of its own in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, Bishkek, which hosted the SCO summit in 2007, has already stopped the U.S. from using Manas base for combat operations. It is now placing additional restrictions on Washington for using the base even for humanitarian relief supplies. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was elected with U.S. support, "called for the United States to start reducing its military presence in the country" as "situation in Afghanistan had stabilized."20 Bishkek also is under mounting persuasion by Iran to not let its base be used for any hostile action against Tehran.

SCO expansion leads to global instability culminating in WWIII

Stakelbeck 8 (Frederick, East Asia expert, Is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization a Military Confederacy, http://www.globalpolitician.com/21244-russia-china)

The SCO is a menacing confederacy of powerful nations arising out of the shadows of the Cold War that could cause tremendous global instability and even lead to world war. Geopolitics aside, the SCO has the potential to become the most powerful alliance on earth, combining Russia’s energy, military and technology expertise; China and India’s economic and human capital; and Iran’s enormous energy resources and growing military capabilities. This unique combination makes the SCO a formidable adversary for the U.S. In February, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chief of staff General Liang Guanglie said the Peace Mission 2005 exercises would, “protect the peace and stability in our region and the world.” The world? The world has been led to believe that the SCO is a regional alliance designed to address issues of mutual concern such as terrorism, separatism and extremism -- whatever they may mean at the moment for the members of the SCO. With military operations scheduled for 2006 and an expanded list of participating nations, the military threat posed by the SCO is starting to take shape.

SCO Link - Hegemony

US hegemony leads to increased Chinese alliance building and multipolar organizations

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

As U.S. unilateralism has asserted the role of the United States as the sole global superpower, the rest of the world is exploring a variety of ways of pushing back. One is the creation of several new regional security consortiums which are independent of the U.S. One of the most important is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security alliance led by Russia and China, with several non-voting members including India. Its rising economic, political and military profile this year can serve as a useful lens through which to view this geopolitical pushback. It is based on promoting a multipolar world, distributing power along multiple poles in the international system, such as the United States, Europe, Asia-Eurasia and the Middle East,1 while also promoting the multilateralism of international cooperation.2 In recent years, Russia and China have stepped up their advocacy for a multipolar-multilateral alternative.

SCO Link – Hegemony

Chinese support of an alliance with Russia and India in response to US hegemony is a key component of Hu’s foreign policy agenda

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

The growing convergence in the worldview of China, India and Russia brought them into a trilateral dialogue, which in Chinese President Hu's words would see "the three nations work together for further communication and coordination in major international and regional issues and promote the solution of disputes and differences through dialogue."9 Russian President Putin, while speaking at the first trilateral summit between China, India and Russia in St. Petersburg, Russia, in July 2006 echoed Hu: "...that discussions held in the trilateral meeting would promote mutual trust not only between India, Russia and China individually, but also at regional and global levels."10 Beijing and New Delhi accepted Russia's proposal to hold trilateral summit because "it was beneficial to boosting the cooperation among the three countries as well as maintaining multipolarity ... in the world."11 Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was the first leader to propose the trilateral relationship between China, India, and Russia during his visit to New Delhi in 1998. The first trilateral summit was followed by a meeting of the foreign ministers of three countries in New Delhi on February 14, 2007. In a joint communiqué, the foreign ministers "expressed their conviction that democratization of international relations is the key to building an increasingly multipolar world order."12 During his recent visit to New Delhi on January 25-26, 2007, as the guest of honor on India's Republic Day, President Putin further discussed trilateral cooperation with Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh. Later, standing shoulder to shoulder with Singh, he told a news conference in New Delhi: "We want to resolve regional problems in a way acceptable to all sides. We therefore think that there are good prospects for working together in a trilateral format."13 Indians who have long been beholden to Russia seems to embrace Putin's trilateral initiative, while remaining skeptical of the Indo-U.S. alliance that is currently in the works. K. Subrahmanyam, India's foremost observer of strategic affairs, gratefully speaks of Indian pull towards Moscow: "Russia has seen India as a key to Asian stability for the past 50 years, some four decades before George W. Bush's team reached that conclusion."14 The formation of trilateral dialogue has already been institutionalized. As part of this dialogue, Chinese, Indian and Russian foreign ministers held their first meeting in June 2005 in Vladivostok, Russia. As noted above, they met again in New Delhi in February 2007. Similarly, the leaders of three countries have been holding trilateral summits on the sidelines of G-8 meetings, of which Russia is a member and at which China and India have been regular invitees since 2006. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Parallel to the trilateral dialogue, China and Russia took the lead to institutionalize their strategic relations into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which India, together with Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan, is a non-voting member. The six-member SCO is widely seen as a collective security organization for nations in South, Central and West Asia. Some observers view the SCO as a counterbalance to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and its advance into the region. Others believe that "Beijing and Moscow...shared the common aims of...frustrating Washington's agenda to dominate the (Central Asian) region which had been an integral part of the Soviet Union for three generations."15 The recent SCO summit on August 16, 2007 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, however, emphasized in a joint communiqué that "modern challenges and security threat can only be effectively countered through united efforts of the international community."16 There is a range of events that signify the SCO's rising economic, political and military profile, but five events stand out in this regard: (a) post-Taliban Afghanistan; (b) U.S. military presence in central Asia; (c) SCO's rapid expansion; (d) the Caspian Sea Nations Summit; and, (e) "Peace Mission 2007."

SCO Link - Afghanistan

Withdrawal from Afghanistan is a win for the SCO, it will allow China to expand its influence in the region

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

As the SCO asserts for a role in post-Taliban Afghanistan, it wants to see the U.S.-led forces leave Kabul. At its annual summit in July 2005 in Astana, Kazakhstan, the SCO called on the U.S. to give a timetable for a pullout of its troops from Afghanistan. "As the active military phase in the antiterror operation in Afghanistan is nearing completion, the SCO would like the coalition's members to decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents' presence in those countries."17 The SCO's demands were based on the assumption that the Taliban has been defeated; hence, there is no need for the continued presence of U.S. and NATO troops in the region. The U.S., however, has since built several military bases across Afghanistan, to fight Taliban's insurgency and al Qaeda's terrorism. The U.S.' expanded military presence further fueld suspicions among SCO member states--especially China and Russia--that the U.S. and NATO are in the region for the long haul. The SCO has since begun developing its own Afghan policy with the founding of the Afghanistan Contact Group (ACG) to strengthen relationship between the SCO and Kabul. The Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who regularly attends the SCO's annual summits, has positively responded to the SCO's initiative. It is important to note that Karzai's political support base in the ruling Northern Alliance in Afghanistan continues to be beholden to Russia for the latter's critical support against the Taliban long before the 9/11 attacks. To this day, the Northern Alliance government kept up its warm relations with the Kremlin. Similarly, the Alliance's ethnic links with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), especially with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, two member-states of the SCO, also play out in making Afghanistan receptive to the SCO. In return, Afghanistan is showered with economic and military support by China and Russia. In the economic sector, China has become Afghanistan's anchor. In late November 2007, Kabul gave Beijing the largest-ever mining contract in Afghanistan's history. Under this 30-year deal, China would invest $3b in the development of copper mines, which are likely to go in production in the next five years, in Afghanistan's Logar province. This single-stroke Chinese investment of $3b comes close to the entire foreign investment in Afghanistan of just $4b since 2001.18 Militarily, Moscow has continued to be Kabul's main supplier of weapons and military hardware since 2001. Thus, Kabul's growing economic and military dependence on China and Russia is further binding it to these nations. That's why Afghanistan is now poised to become a member of the SCO.

SCO Link - Afghanistan

Withdrawal from Afghanistan will allow the SCO to push the US out of Central Asia

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

SCO and U.S. Military Presence While gathering Afghanistan into its embrace, the SCO publicly expresses its unease at the U.S.'s military presence in the region. At its Astana summit, the SCO also called for the closing of U.S. bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Months later, Uzbekistan evicted the U.S. from its air base at Karshi-Khanabad, also known as K-2. At this summit Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov "essentially called on his SCO partners to make a choice between siding with the United States or 'with our neighbors in Russia and China.'"19 The United States, however, continues to keep another air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, which it has been using for humanitarian and combat operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. has 1,200 troops stationed there. Unsurprisingly, Kyrgyzstan balanced the U.S. military presence on its soil with the hosting of a Russian airbase nearby. As the Russian and U.S. air bases sit only a few miles apart, Russians use this proximity as a strategic vantage point to keep tabs on what goes on at Manas base. There are reports that China also is in talks with Bishkek to open up an airbase of its own in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, Bishkek, which hosted the SCO summit in 2007, has already stopped the U.S. from using Manas base for combat operations. It is now placing additional restrictions on Washington for using the base even for humanitarian relief supplies. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was elected with U.S. support, "called for the United States to start reducing its military presence in the country" as "situation in Afghanistan had stabilized."20 Bishkek also is under mounting persuasion by Iran to not let its base be used for any hostile action against Tehran.

SCO Link - Afghanistan

Withdrawal from Afghanistan will draw all of Central Asia together in the SCO, draining allies and oil supplies from the US

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

As the U.S. presence in the region tends to contract, the SCO goes on expanding into an unparalleled Asian-Eurasian Security organization. Its current members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Among its members with observer status are included India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan. As noted before, Afghanistan also is now lining up to become a full-fledged member. So are Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan--two staunch U.S. allies and energy-rich nations. In recognition of the SCO's growing significance, even the U.S. applied for its membership.21 The application was, however, denied. Yet the SCO won global recognition with a United Nations Assistant Secretary General in attendance at the Bishkek summit this year. The SCO is now linking arms with the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is seen in the west as a Eurasian military pact, to further help advance mutual interests. Both organizations signed a cooperation agreement in 2007. By virtue of this agreement, China has become an unofficial member of the CSTO, which is made up of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Interestingly, all SCO members, except China, are also members of the CSTO. More importantly, Iran, which has applied for SCO membership, has also been invited to join the CSTO. The CSTO also wants a piece of action in Afghanistan, and insists to model the NATO in undertaking global peacekeeping, especially in its "region of responsibility." In parallel, China and Russia are ready to accept India as a voting member, which will be an upgrade on its current status as an observer. It is interesting to note that China, India and Russia all have made a massive investment in Iran's energy production sector, which further binds them together. Chinese and Indian oil and gas interests in Iran are respectively valued at $100b and $40b. Russia, for its part, is helping Tehran to build its flagship $1b nuclear reactor in Busher.

SCO Bad – PRC Expansion

China is using the SCO to expand its military influence in Central Asia

Cohen 6 (Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, What to Do About the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Rising Influence, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092106.shtml)

The cost to Washington of not actively addressing the issue of the SCO's expanding influence could be high. The Chinese-Russian strategic partnership poses a serious threat to the US geopolitical position in Central Asia. Indications of the Chinese-Russian partnership wanting to systematically reduce US influence in the region are evident in Uzbekistan's demand that American military forces leave the Karshi-Khanabad base in July 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Efforts by Moscow and Beijing to increase their influence in Kyrgyzstan also appear to have taken a toll in US interests. After prolonged negotiations, Washington and Bishkek finally managed to extend an agreement on the US military's use of an air base at Manas, outside the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek. To seal the deal, Washington had to agree to a massive rent hike: from an annual $2.7 million payment to $150-200 million per year. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. A Russian base in Kyrgyzstan operates rent-free. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, remarked recently; "The SCO is trying to ask us to leave the area in a hurry." China has been perhaps the most active country in using the SCO to remake Central Asia's order. Beijing is eager to expand its own regional military influence in Central Asia, going so far as to contact Kyrgyz officials to explore the possibility of Chinese military bases in Kyrgyzstan. The increasing militarization of the region raises the possibility of the use of militarily means to address regional issues, especially religious radicalism, terrorism, separatism and narcotics trafficking.

The SCO is focused on reducing US presence in Central Asia

Cohen 6 (Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, What to Do About the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Rising Influence, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092106.shtml)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a major vehicle for a Chinese-Russian strategic cooperation, is exerting increasing pressure on US strategic interests in Central Asia. Robust engagement with the SCO by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would offer Washington the best way of containing the group's rising influence. The SCO, now comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, formally came into being in 2001. Since then, the organization has admitted India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers. The SCO in recent years has promoted economic integration. At a meeting of SCO prime ministers, held September 15 in the Tajik capital Dushanbe, member states expressed an interest in expanding the region's trading infrastructure and engaging in joint efforts to develop energy export routes. However, the SCO is mainly focused on security issues, namely the Chinese tri-fecta of "terrorism, separatism and extremism." The SCO's security agenda is vast. The organization has been compared to the Warsaw Pact, and referred to as the "NATO of the East." Its agenda is infused with Chinese and Russian suspicion of US designs in Eurasia, and, more specifically, a desire to reduce US influence in Central Asia. This is evident in numerous SCO statements, including a declaration issued June 15 during the organization's fifth-anniversary summit.

SCO Bad - Leadership

SCO leadership will collapse US leadership

Stakelbeck 8 (Frederick, East Asia expert, Is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization a Military Confederacy, http://www.globalpolitician.com/21244-russia-china)

At this time, what steps need to be taken by the U.S. to prepare for a possible SCO military threat? First, the U.S. Congress, Department of Defense and U.S. intelligence community must recognize that the continued military modernization and integration involving Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran will directly threaten the U.S. and its allies within the next several years. This is an uncomfortable reality, but one which is taking shape right before our eyes. Second, calls by the SCO and others in the international community for an immediate withdraw of U.S. troops from the Middle East and Central Asia should be disregarded, due to the horrific consequences that the inevitable power vacuum would cause. Instead, strategic alliances should be strengthened with countries such as Georgia and the Ukraine to counter any regional threat. Third, recent calls by Iran for a Muslim seat on the UN Security Council should be viewed for what they are; an effort by Tehran to weaken U.S. legitimacy in the international community and diminish its influence in Central Asia and the Middle East. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s announcement that his country will sell “peaceful” nuclear technology to other Islamic countries is too chilling to contemplate. In short, the SCO is an immature, but potentially dangerous confederacy of countries with a mutual interest to dethrone the U.S. and if necessary, confront it militarily. Under the guise of economic partnership, regional alliances and friendship, China, Russia and the other members of the SCO are rapidly increasing their collective power. Recent Pentagon reports identifying China as a growing threat are indeed accurate, but don’t go far enough. The reports are deficient in that they base their analysis and predictions on countries such as China acting unilaterally. As a result, compulsory discussions concerning the rise of regional and global alliances that threaten the U.S. are not taking place. This could be a fatal mistake, since the SCO has become the perfect vehicle for coordinated military action in the future.

SCO Bad - WW3

The SCO has the potential to cause global instability culminating in WWIII

Stakelbeck 8 (Frederick, East Asia expert, Is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization a Military Confederacy, http://www.globalpolitician.com/21244-russia-china)

The SCO is a menacing confederacy of powerful nations arising out of the shadows of the Cold War that could cause tremendous global instability and even lead to world war. Geopolitics aside, the SCO has the potential to become the most powerful alliance on earth, combining Russia’s energy, military and technology expertise; China and India’s economic and human capital; and Iran’s enormous energy resources and growing military capabilities. This unique combination makes the SCO a formidable adversary for the U.S. In February, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chief of staff General Liang Guanglie said the Peace Mission 2005 exercises would, “protect the peace and stability in our region and the world.” The world? The world has been led to believe that the SCO is a regional alliance designed to address issues of mutual concern such as terrorism, separatism and extremism -- whatever they may mean at the moment for the members of the SCO. With military operations scheduled for 2006 and an expanded list of participating nations, the military threat posed by the SCO is starting to take shape.

SCO Bad – Central Asia

SCO promotes undemocratic regimes in Central Asia

Ambrosia 8 (Thomas, North Dakota University Europe-Asia Studies, Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, Routledge) KGL

Finally, the claim that the Central Asian states are moving towards democracy on their own accord in any substantive way is simply false. In fact, there has been a pattern over the past decade of increased autocracy and the tightening of political control. Without external pressure to liberalise, it is more likely that authoritarianism will be maintained. Instead of representing democratic openings, the SCO has directly connected the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to the ‘three evil forces’. Rather than criticising autocratic governments for how they handle situations in their own countries, Zhang argued that outside powers should actively support their efforts to ensure the status quo, just as the SCO members were doing themselves. Thus, when linked to stability, the language of diversity serves as a ready response against external criticism and uses the language of liberal democracies to undermine democracy promotion. The norm of diversity, along with its corollaries of non-interference and separate but equal paths of development, has been used by the SCO to reinforce the legitimacy of the autocratic regimes of Central Asia. This is nothing new, as the legacy of authoritarianism in ASEAN and elsewhere have illustrated. When reinforced by the perception that anti-regime activities are inherently tied to the ‘evils’ of instability, the organisation’s emphasis on maintaining order over political change allows little room for democracy promotion.

SCO has potential to foster an Iran, Russia, China alliance that causes regional instability in central Asia

**Cohen 6** (Ariel, Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation, The Dragon Looks West: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) KGL

The United States should also seek bilateral agreements with the larger organization. Given that the SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counter weight to the United States, American entrance into the organization is unlikely. The 2005 U.S. applica tion to join the SCO was rejected.[[38]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/The-Dragon-Looks-West-China-and-the-Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization" \l "_ftn38" \o ") Under such conditions, it is doubtful the United States and China can agree on terms for American membership with out conceding their respective interests. However, the United States does not necessarily need membership in the organization to work closely with Central Asian states. It should renew its application to join as an observer and look to friendly states, such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia, for support. Whether or not the U.S. is able to attain observer status, it should use every diplomatic tool in its arsenal to oppose Iran's intention to join as a full member. Should Iran be permitted to enter the SCO, this will be a clear indication that Russia and China side with Iran on the issue of nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, inclusion of Iran would give the SCO significant influence over one of the world's largest supplies of oil and gas reserves, in addition to potentially another nuclear arsenal. Russian President Vladimir Putin's suggestion of forming a "nat­ural gas OPEC" with Iran and Turkmenistan is of particular concern. These three countries are first, third, and fourth, respectively, in natural gas reserves, and will have the capacity to raise the global price of gas by regulating supply. If the United States hopes to gain observer status in the SCO, it should engage the Central Asian states specifically by balancing democracy promotion and democratization with its other national interests, including security and energy. With the exception of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, most of the Central Asian states continue to maintain links with the United States to balance Russian and Chinese power. The U.S. should use what remain ing contacts and leverage it has and continue to improve relations with friendly Central Asian states by providing economic, governance, and legislative reform assistance, and by enhancing military-to-military relationships. Working alongside these state governments in combating jihadists and terrorist organizations, the U.S. can appeal to common goals and secure American strategic and energy interests in the region.

SCO Bad - List

SCO expansion will shut out US leadership, democracy, and free trade

[Brookes](http://heritage.org/About/Staff/B/Peter-Brookes) 6. ([Peter,](http://heritage.org/About/Staff/peterbrookes.cfm) Sr. Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. “Club For Dictators: An ugly agenda for Asia.” The Heritage Foundation. June 12, 2006. <http://heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2006/06/Club-For-Dictators-An-ugly-agenda-for-Asia>). LRH.

As Beijing and Moscow see it, keeping authoritarians in power in Central Asia (and elsewhere) not only ensures stability along the two powers' periphery, it also helps silence those annoying calls for greater political and social freedom at home. Then there's the security angle. A quick glance at the map shows that Muslim Central Asia is in China and Russia's backyard. Some might even call it their soft underbelly - one that needs protecting, especially from Islamic extremism. In April, the SCO announced "anti-terrorism" exercises next year in Russia. According to Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of China's Central Military Commission, these will demonstrate the SCO's growing role in maintaining regional security. The $64,000 question - of course - is how much further will the Chinese-dominated SCO's regional-security role grow? But security interests extend beyond Central Asia, too. Beijing would like to use the SCO's "anti-separatist" provision, particularly with the backing of Russia, to dissuade Taiwan from declaring independence - and deter U.S. intervention. Russia's Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, is none too happy with Washington, democratic revolutions or NATO expansion (especially to include Ukraine). Russia may be looking to create a "new and improved" Asian Warsaw Pact, wielding large armies, big economies, nukes - and lots of oil/gas. Don't forget economics. Central Asia has massive oil and natural gas reserves - and with nervous consumers looking beyond the volatile Middle East, it's in Russia and China's interest that Central Asian oil/gas flows either east to China, or west through Russia. A 1,000-kilometer oil pipeline is already operating from Kazakhstan to China; a gas pipeline and joint ventures are under consideration. Non-SCO member Turkmenistan has just signed a similar oil-pipeline agreement with China. What's Uncle Sam to do? First, keep the SCO from cementing as a full-on alliance. Remind the smaller fry that their history includes long periods of Russian/Chinese domination - and that the embrace of the Bear or the Dragon can mean years of "unpleasantness." Next, become the region's "third big neighbor," cherry-picking SCO partners off through high-level visits, security assistance (e.g., joint exercises/training) and energy cooperation (e.g., opening Caspian transit routes). Moscow and Beijing are using the SCO to advance their influence across the Eurasian heartland, and to create a "new international political and economic order" to their liking - with little room for free markets and even less for free thought. If the United States (and other free nations - hello, India, Europe and Japan) don't answer up, it's not just U.S. influence that will get shut out, but democracy and economic access as well.

SCO expansion will exacerbate terrorism

[Brookes](http://heritage.org/About/Staff/B/Peter-Brookes) 6. ([Peter,](http://heritage.org/About/Staff/peterbrookes.cfm) Sr. Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. “Club For Dictators: An ugly agenda for Asia.” The Heritage Foundation. June 12, 2006. <http://heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2006/06/Club-For-Dictators-An-ugly-agenda-for-Asia>). LRH.

Some see it as a NATO counterweight. Others call it a Club for Dictators - or at least near-dictators. Some consider it an anti-American stalking horse for Chinese and or Russian hegemony, with the potential to become "OPEC with nukes." Whatever: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) - a so-called "anti-terrorism, anti-separatism, anti-extremism" grouping, including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which holds its fifth annual meeting this week - definitely reeks of trouble for Uncle Sam. Start with this: The "anti-terrorism" SCO has given observer status to Iran, the world's top state sponsor of terrorism - including an annual convention of just about every terror group on the planet. Then consider the wider strategic implications. Beijing and Moscow are using the SCO as a tool to eliminate U.S. influence in the Eurasian heartland - the home to half the world's population, a key front in the War on Terror and the location of key world energy supplies.

SCO Bad – AT: Fight Terrorism

China uses the SCO members as a tool against US counterterrorism operations

**Tkacik 6** (John, Heritage expert, Hedging Against China, The Heritage Foundation) KGL

China has attempted, with varying degrees of success, to hinder U.S. coalition forces supporting operations in Afghanistan. In June 2005, China pressured its Central Asian allies in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to demand that the U.S. set a timetable for withdrawal from U.S. bases. Within weeks, American officials accused China of "bullying" Uzbekistan to remove U.S. bases and cajoling neighboring Kyr gystan to agitate for increased U.S. funding to retain bases there.[[31]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/04/Hedging-Against-China" \l "_ftn31" \o ") Subsequently, American bases were closed in Uzbekistan and nearly shut tered in Kyrgyzstan. A number of U.S. officials have remarked about China's lack of enthusiasm for the global war on terrorism.[[32]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/04/Hedging-Against-China" \l "_ftn32" \o ") One reason for China's disinterest is ideological. Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin has cautioned against "unreserved support for the war on terror" lest it aid the United States in its quest for hegemony.[[33]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/04/Hedging-Against-China" \l "_ftn33" \o ") Another reason to hedge against China is its support for illiberal regimes, insulating them against criticism on human rights from the United States and other Western democracies. The Beijing regime views constant harassment from the West on human rights issues as undermining its own legitimacy. To the extent that it can defend despots around the world-such as the leaders of Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Burma-as only "exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions,"[[34]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/04/Hedging-Against-China" \l "_ftn34" \o ") it can claim that its own lack of civil and political rights is suited to China's national conditions.

\*\*Aff Answers

SCO Good – Separatism, Sino/Indo/Russian Relations

Expansion of the SCO is critical to China’s fight against separatism and domestic terrorism, as well as relations with Russia and India

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

The major manifestation of this deepening alliance was the SCO-wide military maneuvers, dubbed as "Peace Mission 2007." These maneuvers were conducted on August 9-17, 2007 in Chelyabinsk in Russia's Urals region, followed by its final phase carried out in Urumuqi, Xinjiang, China. The exercises involved 6,500 troops, 80 aircraft and 500 combat vehicles from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. China and Russia supplied all of the combat vehicles, as well as 3,700 troops. "For the SCO...the war games mark its most ambitious attempt yet to build an integrated military-security apparatus to complement expanding political and commercial collaboration."26 Some observers suspect that Peace Mission 2007 "resembles less of an anti-terrorism drill than a full-scale, state-on-state conventional fight."27 The SCO has never held a full-scale military exercise involving all member states, although China and Russia have held several joint exercises under the auspices of the SCO. In 2005, they held large-scale amphibious landings on China's Yellow Sea Coast, which many observers believed were intended for Chinese separatists in Taiwan.28 These maneuvers, however, were massive in their scope as they were conducted on land, in air, and at sea in southeast of the Shandong Peninsula in China. The stated goal of each drill--held in 2007 and 2005--was to fight separatism and terrorism. China faces problems of separatism in Tibet and Taiwan, and terrorism in Xinjiang, while Russia is confronted with the twin menace in the wide swath of its northern territories. Similarly, India is battling enduring separatist movements in its west and northeast. Although India, which is an observer at the SCO, sat out of the 2007 drills, it was scheduled to hold joint army exercises with China in December 2007 in its southwestern province of Yunnan.29 The planned exercises are being billed as "historic" since the two giants have come a long way from active hostilities to strategic partnership. In their luncheon meeting in Singapore on November 21, 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh further signified the import of these exercises by reiterating their commitment "to take their strategic cooperative partnership to a next level."30 Prime Minister Singh, in his statement, added that "India and China ties are beyond and above bilateral matters. They are related to peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world beyond...India and China are...friends and partners."31 The Indian Prime Minister, who has just returned from his state visit to Moscow, is now scheduled to visit China early next year.

SCO Good - Afghanistan

Withdrawal from Afghanistan would allow an SCO role in a multilateral peacekeeping force, improving relations with the US

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

Above all, the U.S. enjoys worldwide economic and military superiority that allows it to force its way through closed doors, if needed. As the world's strongest nation, multilateralists argue, the United States serves its interests best when it works in a multilateral framework on which China, India and Russia all agree. A starting point for multilateralism can be war-torn Afghanistan where the SCO and CSTO both want a piece of action. The U.S. should welcome both to share in counter-insurgency operations for which both China and Russia have a long-standing career. This will free up 25,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, which can be exclusively deployed for counter-terrorism; while NATO forces can undertake reconstruction work that has long remained frozen. If it happens, it will turn Afghanistan into the North Star of multilateralism. To the U.S.' further advantage, India's alliance with China and Russia would privilege multilateralism over multipolarism. The latter, as Indian Foreign Minister Sinha in his 2003 address cautioned, has the potential to reprise the cold war rivalries that could set the world on a dangerous course. Multilateralism, on the other hand, would further strengthen the continuing economic integration worldwide, and thus lay the foundation for political integration as well.

SCO Good – Asian Stability

China’s SCO alliance with other nations does not mean conflict with the US, but will promote multilateral solutions and create regional stability

Wu 2000

(Wu Xinbo is currently a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, “Managing U.S.-China Relations”, IR China Global Beat, November, <http://www.irchina.org/en/xueren/china/view.asp?id=843>)

Then what should China do? To be sure, China is far inferior to the U.S. in the regional and bilateral balance of power. This means Beijing does not have much leeway to adjust its posture. However, as a rising power, China needs to assure the U.S. (and others) that it has no intention to upset the existing regional order, and that as long as its legitimate security interests are accommodated, it can live with a regional security structure in which the U.S. plays a leading role. Beijing can also take the following steps as an adjustment of its policy. First, it should give due credit to Washington for its role in regional peace and stability. In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. played a significant role in resisting Soviet expansion in Asia. In the post-Cold War era, it is still an important force for stability. Due to ideological constraints and suspicion of U.S. strategic intentions, Beijing does not want to overtly give credit to U.S. influence in Asian security. However, acknowledgement of the positive aspect of the U.S. role will help dispel Washington’s concern that China’s long-term strategy is to drive the U.S. out of East Asia. It will also give more weight to Beijing’s criticism of the downsides of U.S. policy and make Beijing’s position on regional security more reasonable. Second, China should promote security community-building in the Asia-Pacific and encourage the U.S., along with some other countries, to take a leading role in such an endeavor. As a major power, China has a predictable preference for self-help in its security practice. However, evolving political and economic trends in the point toward greater regional integration. Although Beijing may be afraid of getting constrained in such a community, its experience with the ASEAN Regional Forum and security cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan should provide it with adequate confidence. The past several years have witnessed a positive change in Beijing’s attitude toward multilateral security. Yet Beijing has to make substantive efforts, both conceptually and practically, to advance security community-building and bring the U.S. along.

SCO Good - Terrorism

SCO expansion will help combat terrorism and foster economic growth in the Middle East

The Daily Times 10. (“EDITORIAL: SCO opens up new avenues.” The Daily Times, a Pakistani newspaper. June 14, 2010. <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\06\14\story_14-6-2010_pg3_1>). LRH.

India and Pakistan are said to get the SCO membership within a couple of years. From a Pakistani perspective, being a member of the SCO will go a long way, both economically and in countering terrorism. The SCO vowed to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation with its observers, and actively join regional anti-terrorism cooperation. This would benefit Pakistan as many of the Taliban members are from Central Asia. Terrorism is a menace that the world has to fight together. Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks no longer operate from one country alone and are not homogenous. By coming up with a better system of intelligence sharing, the SCO can help not only Pakistan but the region as a whole. This in turn will help Afghanistan, which can lead to overland trade in the region as well. In addition, SCO membership could also present Pakistan with the prospect of technology in the field of heavy industrial undertakings.   
In a world where economic deprivation has led many people to be seduced by terrorist networks, the SCO can play an integral role by opening up new avenues for trade. All in all the SCO may just be the perfect prescription for the economic progress of the region, and additionally a strong factor to resolve the global balance of power equation. \*

SCO expansion is key to checking terrorism in the Middle East

Noor 10. (Muhammad Asif, Executive Editor The Diplomatic Insight. “SCO Summit: Prospects & perspectives.” The Pakistan Observer. July 4, 2010. <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=39582>). LRH.

Here the role of Uzbekistan is commendable first of all of it’s hosting of this summit and on Pakistan’s perspective its bid to support Pakistan’s permanent member status in this grand regional grouping. For Pakistan SCO is also very much important, which has been reflected by the presence of President Asif Ali Zardari, to be part of since of its Counter Terror Strategy of Regional Anti Terrorism Structure (RATS) which has its headquarters in Tashkent. RATS is a permanent agency of SCO to counter the threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism and is designed for assisting, coordinating and interacting the competent agencies of member states to counter the relevant threats. Since Pakistan is a frontline state in War on Terror(WoT) and is not only facing the internal threat of terrorism and extremis but has work ahead of its capacity to fight the war against the insurgents while cooperated with International community Pakistan is the only country that has suffered more than any country in war on terror. 

SCO Good – Central Asia

The SCO is key to Central Asian stability  
Bhadrakumar 10. (Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar, a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, [Kuwait](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LF26Ag01.html) and Turkey. “US, Russia fail to grip Kyrgyz helm.” Asia Times. June 26, 2010. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LF26Ag01.html>). LRH.

The editorial made a specific suggestion that ''a meeting convened by foreign ministers of neighboring countries is not only an option but could be a first step to signal that China does not intend to sit back while the situation unravels in its neighborhood. A stable Central Asia is in China's interest.''  The influential daily pointed out that Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan is "but just a little over an hour by flight from Urumqi" and that a Balkan-type crisis "would be a nightmare to China". Urumqi is the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where Beijing is acutely sensitive over the possibility of unrest among the Uyghur population.  Beijing can be expected to counter the US strategy to project the OSCE into the security vacuum in Kyrgyzstan. Beijing's first choice lies in a Moscow-led CSTO initiative, while it also harps on a role for the SCO "to help stabilize the situation and bring order" to Kyrgyzstan.  The Global Times editorial concluded: Without any historical baggage of association and inability to influence the politics of nations in the region, China has been quite detached. But with economic cooperation gaining, whether China should stick to the policy of remaining detached and what would best ensure peace and stability in Central Asia are questions that need pondering. Viewed in the above perspective, the statement issued by the SCO on Monday assumes much significance.  The statement identified that the ethnic strife was engineered with the intent of arousing a Kyrgyz-Uzbek "confrontation". It was hopeful that the situation would stabilize "at an early date". More important, it banked on the "wise Kyrgyz people" to safeguard peace and stability - implying outside intervention isn't a crying need. Finally, it expressed grave concern over the situation and pointedly said that "the stability of the situation in Kyrgyzstan is of great significance for peace and stability in Central Asia".  The SCO has put its hat into the ring, reiterating its pivotal role in the collective security of Central Asia that no outside power can afford to overlook. 

SCO Good – AT: Lashout

China’s expansion of the SCO is purely defensive, even an expanded SCO would never risk conflict with the US

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

The SCO's geopolitical pushback to the unipolar-unilateral makeover of the world is, however, defensive. Both China and Russia are being protective of their turf. Their internal divisions caused by "extremism, splitism, and terrorism" further unnerve them at even a slight hint of U.S. or NATO proximity to their "near-abroad." They have created the SCO and CSTO, and formed the Caspian Sea Alliance to put distance between their respective "spheres of influence" and NATO-US presence. Many argue that this alliance-building is a reaction to U.S. unilateralism. These alliances, however, cannot threaten U.S. security interests in the region. The allied nations have been consistently reassuring the U.S. that their alliances are not directed at "third party." In fact, SCO member states have helped the U.S. to protect its security interests in the region. In the run-up to U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001, the Russian President Putin, according to Bob Woodward, stunned the top U.S. policy makers with his unsolicited offer to let U.S. combat jets use the Russian airspace to strike the Taliban government in Kabul.32 The Bush White House was not even sure if Russians would agree to U.S. airbases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for which it sought Putin's consent. More importantly, China, which shares a long border with Kyrgyzstan and is next door neighbor to Uzbekistan, went along with the U.S. bases in both countries. Besides, and it is noteworthy for American policy makers, the three nations that broke out in spontaneous outpouring of sympathy for 9/11 victims were not Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but Russia, Iran and China--in that order--where hundreds of thousands of marchers held candle-lit vigils and mourned the tragic deaths of 3,000 Americans in terrorist attacks. In strictly strategic sense, the U.S. by itself and together with its allies, especially Australia, Britain and Japan, continues to be the dominant force in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, which are the key sources and supply routes of energy shipments for China and trade goods for Central Asia. This makes China and the region vulnerable to U.S. retaliation in the event of any perceived or real threat to U.S. security interests.

SCO Good – No Challenge

No threat- SCO is small and insignificant, NATO checks any issues

**Cohen 6** (Ariel, Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation, The Dragon Looks West: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) KGL

Despite Russia's and Chi­na's joint denunciation of the American military presence in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has allowed the United States to maintain its base at Manas, and Kazakhstan will even host NATO's Steppe Eagle exercise in September. The SCO is not yet a cohesive entity in challenging the United States militar ily or economically. NATO may explore expanding relations with the SCO. Options for cooperative efforts may go beyond the existing NATO-Russia Council, and the Partnership for Peace, of which most Central Asian states are members. NATO members have a degree of cohesion and unity of values not yet present among SCO members and observer states, which often demonstrate considerable differences of approach and interest. Equally important, the SCO is a relatively small organization, still in its infancy, with an operating budget less than $30 million and a staff of a few dozen people. NATO, being larger, stronger, and more experienced in transnational security issues, can engage the SCO in discussions of strategic issues facing the region and develop paths for cooperation along the lines of the Partnership for Peace.

Asian Instability = War

Asian instability is the most probable scenario for war.

Manno 9 (Sharon, International Political Activist, “World War II Will Be Waged in the Asian Pacific” Analista Internacional, http://www.sharonmanno.com/world-war-iii-will-be-waged-in-the-asia-pacific/) MKB

Friedberg argued **that the probability for increasing tension in Asia seems high: there is a considerable concentration of military** and economic **capabilities, unsettled territorial disputes, and rivalry between major powers**. Likewise**, the absence of a solid sense of a shared identity and the lack of a multilateral structure to deal with these challenges effectively, make the region potentially very unstable and full of uncertaintie**s. Furthermore, China’s rapidly growing military capacity makes some scholars expect that it will soon become the dominant military power in the region, and its economic development ‘would make Chinese military expenditures far larger than those of any other country except for the United States of America’. This situation may affect the future balance of power in the region and encourage polarization in Asia.

The increased military capabilities of Asian nations do not have to make us presume that they will go to war just because of that. For instance, although **China’s rise and its concomitant increase in military expenditures may contribute to** generate fears in the region, at present arms competition is not significant in Asia Pacific. Great **powers are acquiring new military equipment to defend themselves and to use them as deterrent tools**; they are not engaged in a ‘race’ as were the USSR and the USA during the cold war.

**Another** perceived **possible reason for war is territorial disputes**. **They have brought Asian countries to the verge of war in the past,** but at present, countries are much more inclined to solve their border disputes by political and diplomatic means. No doubt**, the Kashmir issue is a major concern because two nuclear powers are involved**.

\*\*Pan K

Pan K: Shell

The depiction of China as a threat legitimize a power politics, making the “China threat” a self- fulfilling prophecy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

Construction of the “Chinese threat” results in an increase in the sense of vulnerability in China, thus making nuclear war more likely

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93)

For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely.

We must reject the threatening assumptions about China by questioning their motivations and accuracy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

Pan K: A2 “China Threat” is Real

The “China Threat” is merely imagined in order to justify Western liberalism.

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

At first glance, as the "China threat" literature has told us, China seems to fall perfectly into the "threat" category, particularly given its growing power. However, China's power as such does not speak for itself in terms of an emerging threat. By any reasonable measure, China remains a largely poor country edged with only a sliver of affluence along its coastal areas. Nor is China's sheer size a self-evident confirmation of the "China threat" thesis, as other countries like India, Brazil, and Australia are almost as big as China. Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the particular mode of U.S. self-imagination. As Steve Chan notes:

China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient legacy, or current or projected relative national power.... The importance of China has to do with perceptions, especially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source, or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cosmopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions of democracy and capitalism. China is a reminder that history is not close to an end. (39)

The “China threat” was created under the assumption China will follow the same path as the US and will thus eventually become the hegemon. These “threats” aren’t grounded in reality because China differs from the US.

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Needless to say, the United States is not unique in ethnocentric thinking. For centuries, China had assumed it was the center of the world. But what distinguishes U.S. from Chinese ethnocentric self-identities is that while the latter was based largely on the Confucian legacy, the former is sanctioned by more powerful regimes of truth, such as Christianity and modern science. For the early English Puritans, America was part of a divine plan and the settlers were the Chosen People blessed by covenant with God. (30) With the advent of the scientific age, U.S. exceptionalism began taking on a secular, scientific dimension. Charles Darwin once argued that "the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection." (31)

The United States has since been construed as the manifestation of the law of nature, with its ideas and institutions described not as historically particular but as truly universal. For example, in his second inaugural address in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson declared that U.S. principles were "not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of a liberated mankind." (32) In short, "The US is utopia achieved." (33) It represents the "End of History." (34)

What does this U.S. self-knowledge have to do with the way in which it comes to know others in general and China in particular? To put it simply, this self-knowledge is always a powerful analytical framework within which other societies are to be known. By envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the United States places other nations on a common evolutionary slope and sees them as inevitably traveling toward the end of history that is the United States. For example, as a vast, ancient nation on the other side of the Pacific, China is frequently taken as a mirror image of the U.S. self. As Michael Hunt points out,

we imagine ourselves locked in a special relationship with the Chinese, whose apparent moderation and pragmatism mirror our own most prized attributes and validate our own longings for a world made over in our own image. If China with its old and radically different culture can be won, where can we not prevail? (35)

Pan K– A2: “China Threat” is Real

The “China Threat” isn’t real: we fear China only because we are uncertain about its future

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China," (55) argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)." (56)

The “China Threat” was imagined to justify realist thought and establish American identity

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Indeed, the construction of other is not only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it. For example, by taking this particular representation of China as Chinese reality per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable of knowing the "hard facts" of international politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith" than in "historical experience." (41) On the other hand, given that history is apparently not "progressively" linear, the invocation of a certain other not only helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United States, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?" (42) In this way, it seems that the constructions of the particular U.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

Some may suggest that there is nothing particularly wrong with this since psychologists generally agree that "individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others." (43) This is perhaps true. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure tells us, meaning itself depends on difference and differentiation. (44) Yet, to understand the U.S. dichotomized constructions of self/other in this light is to normalize them and render them unproblematic, because it is also apparent that not all identity-defining practices necessarily perceive others in terms of either universal sameness or absolute otherness and that difference need not equate to threat.

Pan K: Link- China/ Taiwan War Scenario

The construction of China/ Taiwan war scenarios has empirically made the impacts more likely: the threats didn’t exist until the US created them

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

While the 1995-1996 missile crisis has been a favorite "starting point" for many pundits and practitioners to paint a frightening picture of China and to justify U.S. firm response to it, what is often conveniently overlooked is the question of how the "China threat" discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis. Limits of space forbid exploring this complex issue here. Simply put, the Taiwan question was created largely as a result of widespread U.S. perceptions of China as a "Red Menace" in the wake of the "loss of China" and the outbreak of the Korean War. To thwart what it saw as an orchestrated Communist offensive in Asia, the United States deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait as part of its Cold War containment strategy, thereby effectively preventing the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. While the United States abandoned its containment and isolation policy toward China in the 1970s and the two countries established full diplomatic relations in 1979, the conventional image of the "Red Menace" lingered on in the United States. To manage such a "threat," the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act shortly after the normalization of U.S.-China relations, renewing U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense even though diplomatic ties with the island had been severed. (73)

This confrontational policy serves not only to shore up Taiwan's defense capabilities but also to induce its independent ambition and further complicate cross-strait relations. As former U.S. defense official Chas Freeman remarked, "U.S. arms sales to Taiwan no longer work to boost Taipei's confidence that it can work out its differences with Beijing. Instead, they bolster the view that Taiwan can go its own way." (74) For instance, amid growing sympathy from the Republican-dominated Congress and the elite media as well as the expanded ties with the United States, Taiwan responded coolly to Beijing's call for dialogue in January 1995. In June 1995, Taiwan's flexible diplomacy, designed to burnish its independent image, culminated in its president Lee Teng-hui's high-profile visit to the United States. This in turn reinforced Beijing's suspicion that the real U.S. intention was to frustrate its reunification goal, leaving it apparently no other choice but to prepare militarily for what it saw as a worst-case scenario. All this constituted the major context in which the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile exercises took place.

Pan K: Link- Realism

The realist mindset proves the link to the K: rather than actually getting to know China, we view it as an “other” which only thinks in terms of strategy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism.

Pan K: Internal Links

The logic behind their construction of the “China Threat” is rooted in otherization

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated.

US placement of China in the “threat” category is a form of otherization

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Yet, in a world of diversity, contingency, and unpredictability, which is irreducible to universal sameness or absolute certainty, this kind of U.S. knowledge of others often proves frustratingly elusive. In this context, rather than questioning the validity of their own universalist assumptions, the people of the United States believe that those who are different should be held responsible for the lack of universal sameness. Indeed, because "we" are universal, those who refuse or who are unable to become like "us" are no longer just "others," but are by definition the negation of universality, or the other. In this way, the other is always built into this universalized "American" self. Just as "Primitive ... is a category, not an object, of Western thought," (36) so the threat of the other is not some kind of "external reality" discovered by U.S. strategic analysts, but a ready-made category of thought within this particular way of U.S. self-imagination.

Consequently, there is always a need for the United States to find a specific other to fill into the totalized category of otherness. In the early days of American history, it was Europe, or the "Old World," that was invoked as its primary other, threatening to corrupt the "New World." (37) Shortly after World War II, in the eyes of U.S. strategists, the Soviet Union emerged as a major deviance from, hence an archenemy of, their universal path toward progress via the free market and liberal democracy. And after the demise of the Soviet Union, the vacancy of other was to be filled by China, the "best candidate" the United States could find in the post-Cold War, unipolar world. Not until the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington had China's candidature been suspended, to be replaced by international terrorism in general and Saddam's Iraq in particular. (38)

Pan K: Alternative Solves

Our current mindset only serves to further otherize China and create the “China threat.” We can only solve the “China threat” by changing this mindset.

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate." (62)

At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. (63) "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly." (64)

It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China (65) or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. (66) Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy.

If we refuse to reflect on how threats about China actually create the threat, the threats will become a self-fulfilling prophecy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Rather than reflecting on how their new containment policy might have contributed to this incident in the first place, many U.S. realist analysts hastily interpreted it as further objective proof of the long-suspected "China threat." As Allen S. Whiting put it, the collision "focused attention anew on Beijing's willingness to risk the use of force in pursuit of political objectives." (84) It was as if the whole incident had little to do with U.S. spying, which was seen as "routine" and "normal." Instead, it was the Chinese who were said to be "playing a dangerous game," without regard to the old spy etiquette formulated during the Cold War. (85)

For other observers, China's otherness was embodied also in its demand for a U.S. apology. For example, Merle Goldman, a history professor at Boston University, said that the Chinese emphasis on apologies was rooted in the Confucian value system: "This kind of internalized consensus was the way China was ruled for thousands of years." (86) From this perspective, China's request for an apology was preordained by a fixed Chinese tradition and national psyche and had nothing whatsoever to do with the specific context of this incident in which China was spied on, its sovereignty violated, and one of its pilots lost.

Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the contrary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative columnists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] ... the only appropriate response to Chinese behavior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace." (87) Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, torpedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan--particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats--this is a sensible and timely package." (88)