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### 1. China is turning into a leading global space power-U.S. is backing down and China is pushing their space program

Kislyakov 11-Andrei Kislyakov, RIA Novosti political commentator, May 22, 2011, “China gaining ground in space,” <http://english.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/36564197/50403764.html>

China recently unveiled its 2011 plans for manned spaceflight development, taking further steps to approach the establishment of its first space station. The strong interest China holds in its space program, together with billions worth of investment in the field, is interpreted – by a NASA advisor – as a “potent political symbol” that can impact the current space power balance among space industry-pursuing countries.

China’s Manned Space Engineering Office announced in its media briefing on April 24 that the country will place its focus on the rendezvous and docking project this year, and plans to launch the first piece of its space station – the Tiangong-1 Space Module – into orbit by the end of the year. In general, China wants to push its space station program into reality during the next decade, as the country already fired its first human being into space in 2003 and saw its first spacewalk in 2008.

Although the 60-ton space station is only one-seventh the weight of the International Space Station (at 419 tons), it will still bring China to the center of the international space arena. The progress is even more significant given the U.S. plans to withdraw its space shuttle fleet from the International Space Station. Furthermore, the International Space Station is only expected to be operational through 2020, or 2028 at the latest.

The space station program is the final phase of China’s space development Project 921, which it began in 1992. If the Tiangong-1 Module is launched later this year as planned, an unmanned spacecraft will also be launched in an attempt to dock with the Module, and then two piloted spacecraft will follow.

Although China has been following the initiatives of world leaders in space exploration, it has been making new technological breakthroughs. Three successful manned flights have inspired Beijing to build its own orbital laboratory. At the same time Beijing is making progress in developing a new generation of carrier rockets, a program of outer space exploration, including launching an artificial Moon satellite and preparing for a manned expedition to the Moon.

China's success in space exploration and its leadership in the Asia-Pacific region are evident. If backed up by the potential of APSCO, Beijing may turn into a leading global space power.

### 2. China views US space policy as threatening

### Don’t want US superiority

### See US policy as a threat

Chase 11- Michael S. Chase is an Associate Research Professor and Director of the Mahan Scholars Program at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, March 25, 2011, “Defense and Deterrence in China’s Military Space Strategy”, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 5, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=37699&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=e3f0fcd233f563e2364ad7bc49425244

A review of Chinese writings on military space operations indicates that Chinese strategists are concerned about a wide variety of perceived threats to Chinese space systems. In particular, Chinese analysts characterize U.S. space policy as inherently threatening to China’s interests because of its emphasis on space dominance. As Zhang Hui of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs writes, "Many Chinese officials and security experts have great interest in U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision the control of space through the use of weaponsin, or from, space to establish global superiority" [7]. Similarly, according to BaoShixiu, a senior fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others" [8]. Given that China must protect its own interests, Bao argues, "China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country." Consequently, he asserts that U.S. space policy "poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes" [9]. Chinese writers also assert that U.S. space war exercises reflect the growing militarization of space. Yet Beijing’s concerns are not limited to the realm of policy statements and war games. Indeed, some Chinese strategists appear to believe that other countries are actively developing counter-space capabilities that could threaten Chinese satellites.

Some Chinese writers discussed what they characterize as a long history of ASAT research, development, and testing in the United States and Russia dating back to the Cold War [10]. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese writers divide these potential threats into two major categories: "soft kill" and "hard kill" [11]. Soft kill threats can cause temporary loss of the effectiveness of space systems, causing them to be unable to carry out operational functions. According to Chinese military researchers, the main methods of soft kill anti-satellite attack include electronic warfare and computer network attacks [12]. In contrast to soft kill threats such as jamming, hard kill capabilities are intended to cause permanent damage to spacecraft. Chinese writers identify kinetic energy weapons and directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers as the main hard kill ASAT threats. Other Chinese writings offer more detailed discussions of perceived threats from a wide range of systems, such as kinetic energy interceptors, laser ASAT systems, nuclear ASAT systems, microwave weapons, and space planes that could be used to disable or destroy an adversary’s satellites [13]. In addition, some Chinese authors assert that U.S. missile defense interceptors provide the United States with an inherent ASAT capability [14].

In all, according to Chinese analysts, as a result of the actions of the world’s major space powers, space war is no longer the stuff of science fiction. Indeed, they argue that it is already more a reality than a myth. Consequently, they conclude that China must be prepared not only to degrade an adversary’s ability to use space, but also to protect its own space capabilities. Chinese writings suggest that Beijing would consider doing so through a combination of defensive measures and deterrence.

### 3. China U.S. space policy is zero-sum-advance made by one perceptually threatens the security of the other

Blair et. al 06-Bruce G. Blair is the president of the World Security Institute, a nonprofit organization that he founded in 2000 to promote independent research and journalism on global affairs. He is an executive producer of Countdown to Zero, a documentary film on nuclear weapons, which was released in 2010. He also created and was the executive producer of the PBS weekly television series Superpower: Global Affairs Television, “China’s space ambitions,” 2006, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china\_security2.pdf

Out of this uncertainty, inconsistency, and unpredictability springs the near-universal tendency to err on the side of caution. The prevailing view on both sides, Johnson-Freese concludes in her hard-hitting critique of the state of Sino-American discourse on space, holds that space progress is a zero-sum game in which any advance made by either side is harmful to the security of the other side. In this psychological climate, it is unclear what if any space activity would be considered non-threatening, and the unfortunate effect is to foster an almost irreversible momentum of escalating tensions over space. Before the momentum propels the antagonists across the Rubicon, she recommends that they redouble their effort to convey clear and consistent messages, improve the dialogue, and step lightly into cooperation in the non-threatening area of space science through strategic-level talks about the Bush Moon-Mars Initiative.

### 4. Space contributes to Chinese Soft power

### Gives other countries engineers

### Weapons treaties

### Co-operation with europe

Moltz 11- James Clay Moltz, PHD in political science from California-Berkeley, assosciate director and research professor with Center For Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2011, "China, the United States, and Prospects for Asian Space Cooperation", Journal of Contemporary China Volume 20, Issue 68, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2011.520847#tabModule>

China's economy suffered from severe underdevelopment and internal conflict through much of the Cold War. While it had deployed the medium-range, military-purpose Dong Feng 2A missile by the late 1960s, political factors—including the effects of the Cultural Revolution—limited funding for space activity and greatly reduced the training of qualified scientists and engineers.5 Its unique security dilemma, characterized by hostile relations with both of the two superpowers, also limited its incentive (and ability) to reach out to other countries. As Brian Harvey summarizes, ‘From 1956–1977, with the exception of the brief period of the Sino-Soviet accord, China developed its space programme relying almost entirely on its indigenous resources’.6 It finally emerged as a major space player in 2003, with its first manned flight. Consistent with its self-identification during the Cold War, China has recently taken the lead in using space for ‘soft power’ purposes,7 providing space technology and training to scientists and engineers from less-developed countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. But China has not neglected other national goals in these initiatives, often reaching out specifically to those countries that possess energy or other resources of interest to China, such as Nigeria and Venezuela. Another key area of emphasis in Beijing's international space policy—despite its January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test—has been its steady rhetorical support for efforts to prevent an arms race in space. China has long backed an annual UN resolution on this issue and, with Russia, has co-sponsored a proposed treaty at the UN Conference on Disarmament on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space.8 Although the United States has opposed this initiative—due to a belief that it could limit US missile defenses, neglects verification issues, and exempts China's own ground-based ASAT system—China has scored points internationally for being one of the leaders of the UN movement to keep weapons out of space. Broader Chinese cooperation with the United States in civil and commercial space since the late 1990s has been almost non-existent, largely due to US distrust and associated export control restrictions. By contrast, China has cooperated extensively in satellite development with the United Kingdom and France.

### Chinese soft power’s key to resource access

Hunter 9-Alan Hunter, Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies,

Coventry University,

“Soft Power: China on the Global Stage,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, 2009, 373–398, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/373.full.pdf

Competition for resources is now a key issue for all major powers. As the largest in population among all developing countries, and with the fastest growing manufacturing base, China’s need for natural resources is truly enormous. One analyst recently showed that among 10 countries with populations of over 100 million, China is second from bottom as regards indigenous natural resources: only Japan is worse off. As population growth puts even more pressure on resources, effective political handling of resource issues is thus essential, because shortages could threaten the future of the country. Maintaining stable resource supplies, therefore, is a factor crucial to determining whether or not China can continue its development trajectory in the 21st century.23

The West now fears competition from China for access to global resources, particularly oil and gas.24 Henry Kissinger has mooted competition over hydrocarbon resources in coming years as the most likely cause of international conflict.25 As Hu Jintao showed at an Asian summit in 2005, Beijing leaders are also well aware of the issue. Hu stated that achieving balanced and orderly growth through proper handling of the energy issue is a Chinese priority: China would focus on energy conservation and effective use of resources, as well as fresh exploration and new imports. But to satisfy its demand for oil and other resources China must explore many different options on every continent.26 The government announced in 2002 a new policy encouraging its three major national oil corporations to ‘go out’ (zouchuqu) and ensure secure overseas energy supplies: through direct purchases, exploring and drilling programmes, constructing refineries, and building pipelines.27 The Chinese oil demand between 1993 and 2002 grew by almost 90%, and now stands at around 6 million barrels a day, some 40% of which has to be imported. Conversely, about 40% of oildemand growth worldwide from 2000 to 2004 is attributable to China.28 In November 2004, Chinese President Hu signed 39 commercial agreements with Latin American countries; investments in Argentina alone amounted to US$ 20 billion. On a later visit in 2005, Vice-President Zeng signed a key agreement with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on oil and gas explorations; China also announced it would extend favourable trade credits to Cuba. By 2005, China had offered more than US $ 50 billion of investment to countries within the US ‘backyard’, and has pursued a similar strategy in sub-Saharan African countries. Chinese businesses are participant in many projects, including major infrastructure development; corporations also invest heavily in oil production, notably in the Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria.29 An online newspaper report in December 2005 evidenced the fierce competition between China and the USA for African ‘black gold’.30

China’s potential competition with the USA in West Asia and North Africa could be an even more sensitive issue than that in Latin America and East Asia. ‘The potentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept US leadership and the prospect of competition between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East.’31 Frequent high-level exchange visits between Beijing and West Asian leaders endorse economic ties. Altogether, reflecting the title of a recent study, China is a future hegemon whose rise inevitably engenders new transnational dynamics. We have therefore explored China’s need to avoid military conflict, its massive economic development, and its need to secure resources as important contexts for Chinese soft power in the 21st century.32 The author believes that the climate change is another factor which will become even more urgent and prominent in the immediate future.

### Nuclear war

Plate 3, Tom, East Asia Expert, Adjunct. Prof. Communications @ UCLA, 6-28-2003,

Neo-cons a bigger risk to Bush than China, Strait Times

But imagine a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don’t’ want them and cant handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied by Japan- into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia style. That’s why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth – the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

## Uniqueness

### With the U.S. lagging behind in space policy, China maintains space leadership position

Paris Post 11-Paris Post, July 12, 2011, “Space Leadership may not continue,” http://www.parispi.net/articles/2011/07/13/opinion/editorials/doc4e1c6d4a08bb5717848639.txt

A dozen years from now, or maybe less, China could surpass the United States as the world’s leader in space exploration.

Would that be a sad day, or is it high time to let someone else take the lead for a while?

International bragging rights no doubt carry considerable practical benefits, and we’re very used to bragging.

We have become accustomed to being the world’s leader in this area or that, and we no doubt will continue to be No. 1 in a variety of fields for a long time yet.

But it is not reasonable to expect that we can remain king of the hill in virtually every aspect of science and commerce for as long as we please.

The current economic crisis has taught us that we are vulnerable. Recovery calls for sacrifice, and part of what we will sacrifice is our status in such areas as space exploration.

China, meanwhile, has taken a carefully planned path toward space domination.

“They are taking a step-by-step approach, taking their time and gradually improving their capability,” a major space writer said. “They are putting all the pieces together for a very capable, advanced space industry.”

China plans to open its own space station about 2020, the year the International Space Station is scheduled to close. Sometime after that, it plans to put a man on the moon.

Can the United States learn to play second fiddle, or has world leadership become too ingrained into the national psyche?

Staying on top would be costly, and the current budget impasse demonstrates how difficult it can be to pay the high cost of leadership.

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### China is dominating space-“long march,” launched satellite, conducted first manned space flight

Young, Anderson, and Bien 08-Thomas Young, Edward Anderson, and Lyle Bien, Thomas Young is the former Director of NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center and President and Chief Operating Officer of Martin Marietta, General Lester Lyles retired from the U.S. Air Force following a distinguished career at the rank of four-star general. In his 36 years of service, General Lyles gained tremendous experience in space and logistics. He served as Commander of Ogden Air Logistics Center, Commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Vice Chief of Staff and Commander, Air Force Material

Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force, He commanded the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff, and was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Space Command and

Northern Command. July 2008, “Leadership, Management, and Organization

for National Security Space,” Base.http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National\_Security\_Space\_Study\_Final\_Sept\_16.pdf

The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management

and Organization (referred to in this report as the 2001 Space Commission) alerted us to

growing threats to our NSS assets. Since then, U.S. dependency on those assets has

grown while comparatively little has been achieved to make them more secure. Further,

a host of world and national events have “changed the landscape” in which NSS must

operate. Several threat-related developments have occurred: the September 11, 2001

(9/11), attacks on the U.S. homeland and the resultant Global War on Terror; Operations

Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom; the rapid emergence of China as a space power, to

include substantial development in the areas of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and anticyber

technologies; as well as the growing potential for conflict in space.

Several organizational developments have also occurred since 2001: (1) China is clearly on the path to developing the capability to conduct sophisticated space operations. In 1964, they detonated their first nuclear weapon. This was followed

by the “Long March” series of missiles, built first to carry nuclear weapons and then to

achieve the capability to reach Earth orbit. Since 1999, China has initiated a national

navigation system, launched a 3-meter-resolution imagery satellite, conducted its first

manned space flight, exported a satellite to Nigeria, and launched its first lunar probe.7

China also demonstrated the capability of an anti-satellite weapon when it destroyed one

of its aging weather (Fengyun 1-C) satellites on January 11, 2007.

### China is in transition of controlling space while the U.S. declines-they have a step by step plan

Watt 11-Lousie Watt, Associated Press, July 11, 201, “China's space program shoots for moon, Mars, Venus,” http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-07-moon-mars-venus-china-aims.html

While the United States is still working out its next move as the space shuttle program winds down, China is forging ahead. Some experts worry the U.S. could slip behind China in human spaceflight - the realm of space science with the most prestige. "Space leadership is highly symbolic of national capabilities and international influence, and a decline in space leadership will be seen as symbolic of a relative decline in U.S. power and influence," said Scott Pace, an associate NASA administrator in the George W. Bush administration. He was a supporter of Bush's plan - shelved by President Barack Obama - to return Americans to the moon. "One of the biggest advantages of their system is that they have five-year plans so they can develop well ahead," said Peter Bond, consultant editor for Jane's Space Systems and Industry. "They are taking a step-by-step approach, taking their time and gradually improving their capabilities. They are putting all the pieces together for a very capable, advanced space industry." China's space station is slated to open around 2020, the same year the International Space Station is scheduled to close. If the U.S. and its partners don't come up with a replacement, China could have the only permanent human presence in the sky. The U.S. has no plans to return to the moon. "We've been there before," Obama said last year. "There's a lot more of space to explore." He prefers sending astronauts to land on an asteroid by 2025 and ultimately to Mars. But those plans are far from set. "The lunar probe is the starting point for deep space exploration," said Wu Weiren, chief designer of China's moon-exploring program, in a 2010 interview posted on the national space agency's website. "We first need to do a good job of exploring the moon and work out the rocket, transportation and detection technology that can then be used for a future exploration of Mars or Venus." There may also be economic reasons to explore the moon: It contains minerals and helium-3, a potential rich source of energy through nuclear fusion. "But that's way ahead," said Bond, the Jane's editor. "A lot of it would be prestige, the fact that every time we went out and looked at the moon in the night sky we would say the Chinese flag is on there."

### China is dominating space-other countries are lagging behind them, even the U.S.

Moskowitz 10-Clara Moskowitz, space.com Senior Writer, “China's Lofty Goals: Space Station, Moon and Mars Exploration,” December 2010, http://www.space.com/10431-china-lofty-goals-space-station-moon-mars-exploration.html

China is shifting its space program into high gear, with recently announced goals to build a manned space station by 2020 and send a spacecraft to Mars by 2013 ? all on the heels of its second robotic moon mission this year.

Yet some space analysts worry that China's ascendancy in space means the waning of American superiority in spaceflight. The United States is retiring its storied space shuttle fleet in 2011 and plans to rely on commercial spaceships for orbital flights, once they're available, while planning future deep-space missions.

"Certainly [the Chinese] see it as an opportunity to garner prestige at a time when the U.S. space program is in what some people call turmoil, and what others call regrouping," said Joan Johnson-Freese, chairwoman of the department of national security studies at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., and an expert on China's space program. Among Americans, she said, "there is the perception that China is somehow getting ahead, that the U.S. is sliding behind."

Space station plans

China has announced an ambitious program for the coming years.

The planned Chinese space station will be the centerpiece of the country's manned space program, which has seen three crews ? each larger than the next ? launch aboard Chinese Shenzhou spacecraft starting in 2003.

China hopes to launch its first unmanned space station module, Tiangong 1 (Chinese for "Heavenly Palace"), in 2011, the state news organization Xinhua has reported. Over time, other modules will be added on and astronauts will eventually take up residence on the station to conduct research.

The new space station will be constructed using China's Shenzhou capsules and Long March carrier rockets. These spacecraft established China as only the third country, after Russia and the United States, to independently launch people to space.

China recently celebrated the success of its second lunar probe, Chang'e 2, which launched in early October and arrived in orbit around the moon. The first photos from China's second moon mission marked the Chang'e 2 probe's success, revealing details of an area in the moon's northern hemisphere known as Sinus Iridium (Bay of Rainbows).

"The success of Chang'e 2 in accomplishing its mission marks another great achievement after the country successfully launched its first lunar probe," Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang said after the photos were released, according to Xinhua. "The Chinese people will unswervingly develop technologies for the exploration of deep space and the peaceful use of outer space."

Chang'e 2 is on a mission to scout out possible landing sites for a planned Chinese unmanned spacecraft to touch down on the lunar surface, possibly in 2013. China's first moon orbiter, Chang'e 1, launched in October 2007 and conducted a 16-month observation mission before crash-landing on the moon as planned in March 2009.

China's larger space goals

Although the country has not officially announced plans to send people to the moon, many experts say that's where they're heading, and that the space station project, lunar surveyors and robotic landers are merely the setup for that goal.

"They're very conservative about laying out their goals," Johnson-Freese told SPACE.com. "They have not announced an official manned lunar program. They want to have all the building blocks in place for success before that's announced."

In addition to its moon programs, China has also drawn up a technical plan for a spacecraft to orbit Mars, Xinhua reported. That mission would build upon the technology developed for the two moon missions. The earliest possible launch date for the Mars orbiter is 2013.

Meanwhile, the country has launched a record total of 14 rockets in 2010 so far, beating the record for most Chinese space missions in a single year. A number of these payloads were Chinese Beidou navigation satellites and Yaogan military spacecraft.

Global partnerships

All in all, China's space accomplishments are gaining worldwide notice.

"To the rest of the world, China's working very eagerly and aggressively," Johnson-Freese said. "Canada, Europe and Russia are all banging on the door for China to work with them. I certainly have a concern that the U.S. is going to end up the odd man out in terms of the globalization of space."

### China is a rising space superpower

Maethner 06-MAJOR SCOTT R. MAETHNERM, Maethner began his military career as a physicist and program manager at the Phillips Laboratory at Kirtland AFB, NM. In 1995, he attended the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson AFB, OH, where he studied space operations, systems engineering, and optics. After graduating from AFIT, in 1997 Maj Maethner reported to the 4th Space Operations Squadron, Schriever AFB, CO where he served as Chief, Orbital Operations, Crew Commander, and Operations Support Flight Commander for the Milstar satellite system, June 2006, “A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS”

One could say the US reached the peak of space-mindedness about the time of the Apollo lunar landings. If one were to ask a child then “what do you want to be when you grow up?,” the top answers likely included “astronaut.” Children played with space toys in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Movies also reflected an optimism of man’s conquest of space. What happened to this future? Today many engineers and scientists inspired by the promise of the Space Age are retiring form the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Defense, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Does the next generation approach space with as much zeal and passion as their predecessors? In January 2004, President Bush announced a return to the moon and manned missions to Mars. The American response to that vision was underwhelming to say the least. Equally underwhelming was the public response to China’s recent success with manned space missions. It appears that China is a rising space power and the US is a space power in decay. In addition to these internal factors, the success of US space systems has not been without external challenge and competition. Although the US lost a peer competitor in space with the demise of the Soviet Union, other nations are clearly rising to challenge America’s mantle as the world’s leading space-faring nation. Recent developments in the Chinese and European Union (EU) space programs demonstrate this claim. China’s space program is taking giant strides with the completion in October 2005 of its second manned mission. James Oberg said, “China's ability to do what it promises in space is an affirmation of its reliability in fulfilling other technology-related promises. The perceived effectiveness of Chinese high-tech weapons—from missiles to jets to submarines—is elevated by these visible successes in related space hardware.”48 Furthermore, the EU recently launched the first satellite of a proposed constellation of 30 Galileo navigation satellites in “a bid to enhance the world’s growing reliance on satellite navigation and break the U.S. monopoly on space-based networks.”49

### China is making significant advancements in space-they are beating America in controlling space

Wolf 11-Rep Frank Wolf, US House, “Wolf Statement At U.S. - China Commission Hearing On Military and Civil Space

Programs in China,” May 14th, 2011 http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.rss.html?pid=37024

"It should not be surprising that many countries have taken notice of the tremendous benefits that the American space program has yielded. It is clear that we are now entering an era of much greater civil, defense and commercial competition in space.

"Most countries expanding their space programs are strong U.S. allies that are primarily interested in advancing science research or building a commercial space industry. The Chinese, however, do not fall into this category. Over the last decade, China has developed its space program at a surprising pace. In less than 10 years the Chinese have gone from launching their first manned spacecraft to unveiling plans last week for an advanced Chinese space station designed to rival the International Space Station.

"However, the Chinese are not only focusing on establishing a significant presence in Low Earth Orbit. In March, the Chinese state news agency announced its plans for 'a powerful carrier rocket for making a manned moon landing and exploring deep space.' This announcement confirms what space experts have long believed: the Chinese have their sights set on the pinnacle of American achievement - landing a man on the moon.

### China is leading in the competition for space domination-American space programs are falling and China’s is gearing up

Branigan 11-Tania Branigan, China correspondent for the Guardian, “China seems to be running in space race on its own,” April 28th, 2011

(http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/china-seems-to-be-running-in-space-race-on-its-own-20110427-

1dwrj.html)

BEIJING: China has laid out plans for its future in space, unveiling details of an ambitious new space station to be built and in orbit within a decade.

The project, unveiled yesterday, was described as a ''potent political symbol'' by one NASA adviser. It is the latest phase in China's rapidly developing space program, less than a decade since China put a human into orbit.

The space station will weigh about 60 tonnes and consist of a core module with two laboratory units for experiments, says the state news agency, Xinhua.

Officials have asked the public to suggest names and symbols for the unit and for a cargo spacecraft that will serve it.

Professor Jiang Guohua, from the China Astronaut Research and Training Centre, said the facility would be designed to last a decade and support three astronauts working on microgravity science, space radiation, biology and astronomy.

John Logsdon, a NASA adviser, said China's plans would give it homegrown expertise in human space flight. ''China wants to say: 'We can do everything in space that other major countries can do,''' he said. ''A significant, and probably visible, orbital outpost transiting over most of the world would be a potent political symbol.'' The project heralds a shift in the balance of power among spacefaring nations. In June, NASA will mothball its fleet of space shuttles, in a move that will leave only the Russians capable of ferrying astronauts to and from the International Space Station. The outpost is due to fly until 2020, but may be granted a reprieve until 2028.

Bernardo Patti, head of the space station program at the European Space Agency, said: ''China is a big country … They are getting richer and richer. They want to establish themselves as key players.''

The agency, with other nations, is discussing a next-generation space station that would operate as a base from which to explore space beyond low-Earth orbit. Future missions could return astronauts to the moon, land them on asteroids, or venture further afield to Mars.

''Another country trying to build its own infrastructure in space is competition, and competition always pushes you to be better,'' Mr Patti said.

### China is leading in space-grand ambitions

Lim 11-Louisa Lim,NPR foreign correspondent, July 13, 2011, “China Seeks To Carve Out A Space Of Its Own,” http://www.npr.org/2011/07/13/137815962/china-seeks-to-carve-out-a-space-of-its-own

As the U.S. winds up its space shuttle program, Beijing is shooting for the moon.

Chairman Mao once said China would never be a great nation if it couldn't even shoot a potato into space. But in 2003, it became only the third country to send a man into orbit, and since then it's launched five more astronauts — or "taikonauts" as they've been christened here, showing how China is even trying to leave its own mark on space vocabulary.

EnlargeLi Gang/AP

In this photo released by China's Xinhua News Agency, taikonaut Zhai Zhigang waves after getting out of Shenzhou-7 re-entry module after its landing in 2008. Zhai conducted the country's first-ever spacewalk during the mission.

"I feel very good," were Zhai's first words, transmitted live to the anxious television audience as he tested his $4 million Chinese-made Feitian spacesuit. This moment was another step toward the realization of China's grand ambitions in space.

Beijing hopes to put a rover on the moon by 2013, and then a man on the moon, as well as opening its own space station by around 2020. But its ambitions could be greater still than those being publicly announced.

"What we have seen again in reporting, as opposed to official documents, seems to be a group of Skylab-type Tiangong stations to be followed by a Chinese version of the International Space Station, which would suggest that China is aiming for a long-term human presence in [inner] Earth orbit," says Dean Cheng, an expert in China's space program at the Heritage Foundation. "Given past Chinese history — which is that their missions always last longer, weigh more, achieve more [than U.S. missions] — it is quite likely that the Chinese would try to set up some kind of longer-term presence on the moon, measured in weeks or maybe months."

Practicing Blastoff In Beijing

Nowadays, money is being invested not just in space exploration but also in space education. That much is clear at a brand new $6 million space center for kids in southern Beijing's Fengtai district, where elementary school kids sit in a miniature launch control room.

EnlargeLouisa Lim/NPR

Pint-sized would-be astronauts in a miniature simulated rocket launch center at a brand new space education center for kids in southern Beijing.

They're carrying out a simulated rocket launch, complete with their own miniature astronaut ensconced in a minicapsule, being watched on-screen by his classmates. He was chosen from the group for his lack of dizziness after spinning around on the three-axis astronaut training machine downstairs. Some of the tinier kids are confused and are even heard to ask, "Are we really sending him to space?"

With its patriotic films about heroic spacefarers backed with stirring music, this center is certainly stoking pride in the space program. "China's space program will be better than America's," says 10-year-old Ding Ruizhe.

But the man in charge of educational outreach, Zhang Guan, isn't so sure. "China's only just figured out how to send people up to space and bring them back safely," he says. "There's still a huge difference between us and space powers like the U.S. and Russia."

### China has taken over space leadership position and will develop weapons in retaliation to the United States expanding in outer space

New York Times 07-New York Times, Jan. 21, 07, “China shatters American dream of space domination,” http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Soc/soc.culture.iranian/2007-01/msg02825.html

The nation[s star warriors, frustrated that their plans to arm the heavens went nowhere for two decades despite more than $100 billion in blue-sky research, felt a shiver of hope last week with news that China had conducted its first successful test of an antisatellite weapon. Having long warned of the Chinese threat, they now said their fears were vindicated and expressed optimism for their own projects, which range from new kinds of defensive satellites to flotillas of space weapons and orbital battle stations able to shatter all kinds of enemy arms. China, a group of 26 "Star Wars" supporters warned in a recent report, has "begun to erode American space dominance" and will accelerate that slide with "both lasers and missiles capable of destroying satellites". A Heritage Foundation analysis of such diplomacy says China is charging ahead to build space arms while "seeking to block the United States from developing its own anti-satellite weapons and space-based ballistic missile defense systems". China's strategy, the analysis says, is clear: "Work on public opinion in the United States to make moral arguments against weapons in space, develop international coalitions to limit the way that the United States can use space, and develop China's own weapons systems and tactics to destroy American satellites and space-based weapons".

## Links-Zero Sum

### U.S. China space policy is zero sum

Shixiu 07-Bao Shixiu, is a senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China. He formerly served as director of the Institute. He recently was a visiting scholar at the Virginia Military Institute in the United States. His research focuses on China-U.S. relations in the field of comparative security strategies and the application of deterrence theory, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space,” 2007, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=8

The NSP presents a number of challenges to China’s security environment. First, it grants the United States with exclusive rights to space: the right to use any and all necessary means to ensure American security while at the same time denying adversaries access to space for “hostile purposes.” This sets up an inequitable environment of “haves” and “have-nots” in space, raising suspicion amongst nations. For instance, the NSP declares that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as “interference” by other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity). With its significant space assets and military space capabilities, this situation gives the United States an obvious and unfair strategic advantage in space. Second, it refutes international restrictions and undercuts potential international agreements that seek to constrain America’s use of space. This effectively undermines any potential initiatives put forth by the international community to control space weaponization – initiatives that China supports. This U.S. position leads the global community to suspect U.S. unilateralist intentions in space. Lastly, while the policy may not state it explicitly, a critical examination of its contents suggest its intention to “dissuade and deter” other countries, including China, from possessing space capabilities that can challenge the United States in any way– a parameter that would effectively disallow China to possess even a minimum means of national defense in space. The resultant security environment in space is one with one set of rules for the United States and another set of rules for other nations. In such a context, only U.S. security concerns are taken into account with a result of the reinforcement of a zero-sum dynamic to which space is already prone and threatens to pressure others into a military space race.

### China U.S. space policy is zero-sum-advance made by one perceptually threatens the security of the other (In 1NC)

Blair et. al 06-Bruce G. Blair is the president of the World Security Institute, a nonprofit organization that he founded in 2000 to promote independent research and journalism on global affairs. He is an executive producer of Countdown to Zero, a documentary film on nuclear weapons, which was released in 2010. He also created and was the executive producer of the PBS weekly television series Superpower: Global Affairs Television, “China’s space ambitions,” 2006, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china\_security2.pdf

Out of this uncertainty, inconsistency, and unpredictability springs the near-universal tendency to err on the side of caution. The prevailing view on both sides, Johnson-Freese concludes in her hard-hitting critique of the state of Sino-American discourse on space, holds that space progress is a zero-sum game in which any advance made by either side is harmful to the security of the other side. In this psychological climate, it is unclear what if any space activity would be considered non-threatening, and the unfortunate effect is to foster an almost irreversible momentum of escalating tensions over space. Before the momentum propels the antagonists across the Rubicon, she recommends that they redouble their effort to convey clear and consistent messages, improve the dialogue, and step lightly into cooperation in the non-threatening area of space science through strategic-level talks about the Bush Moon-Mars Initiative.

### China perceives U.S. taking an action in space as threatening-their relationship is zero sum

Blair and Yali 08- Bruce Blair is the president of the World Security Institute (WSI) in Washington D.C. He was a project director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution from 1987-2000. Mr. Blair is the author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces/Chen Yali is the editor-in-chief of the Washington Observer Weekly. She is also a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group based in Beijing. Ms Chen worked for China Daily, China's national English-language daily newspaper, as a reporter and opinion writer on politics and international affairs between 1994 and 2000, 2008, “The Space Security Dilemma,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=243

For fortress America, embracing space collaboration with China would also incur domestic political risks. In the current political climate, military unilateralism and superiority, however questionable or counter-productive, is the politically safer approach to national security. For China, the prevailing worldview sees a superpower striving for absolute security, a quest driven by fear or hegemonic ambitions that are impervious to reason. U.S. space policy might be the best illustration of America’s drive for security at the expense of others’ security. China’s fear of becoming contained and ‘encircled’ by a hegemonic state and its allies is constant. Through the eyes of the Chinese military, space is the heart of an ongoing revolution in military affairs and has demonstrably served this ‘containment’ stratagem of the United States. The United States has enforced an unprecedented ban on exporting any space-related technology and commodities to China since 1999, but has steadfastly refused to have any meaningful dialogue with China either through an international forum or bilateral channels. This comprehensive isolation of China’s space program confirms the belief and fear of many Chinese military strategists that the United States seeks to arrest China’s progress in space in order to thwart its ability to revolutionize its warfighting technologies and win on the high-tech battlefields of the future.

A zero-sum mindset toward space is hardening in China as a result of this apprehension, as amply illustrated in the public media. Space is eyed in China as an area of resources and possibilities to be acquired before it’s too late. Shu Xing, whose book is reviewed later in this journal, likens the grabbing of satellite orbits to the “Enclosure Movement” in late 18th Century England in which the more capability one has, the more resources one can seize. Another reviewed author argued that countries scramble into space to fight for the tremendous resources found there and “once this fight for resources causes irreconcilable conflicts, it may lead to radical space confrontations.” A space war seems to many Chinese to be another form of resource war. Such urgency in seeking control over resources is not unique to space, but also applies to energy and other areas. Given China’s population and rapid economic growth, controlling resources is understandably a paramount concern. Regarding space, however, a zero-sum (‘win-lose’) attitude is narrow-minded and misguided. If feverish competition for resources in space causes Sino-American relations to deteriorate or leads to the outbreak of war between them, then both parties lose.

### U.S. China space relationship is zero-sum and they perceive U.S. space dominance as a major threat to its interests

Martel and Yoshihara 03-William C. Martel is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Rhode Island. Toshi Yoshihara is a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and a research fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts, Autumn 2003, “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race,” Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn\_martel.pdf

At the same time that the United States views space dominance as a fundamental tenet of its national security, China evidently views U.S. space dominance as a major threat to its geostrategic interests. These views inevitably breed a zero-sum competition, in which one side perceives any loss as a gain for the other, and could ultimately prove destabilizing for Sino-U.S. relations. First, Beijing perceives the proposed U.S. missile defense system, which will be supported by an array of space systems and sensors, as a strategic menace to China and to international security.15 Many China watchers contend that this perception stems from anxieties that any conceivable system of missile defenses being developed by the Bush administration will undermine China’s small nuclear deterrent.16 Beijing remains wary of the joint research program on missile defense by the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which the PRC sees as a potential partnership for blocking Chinese regional aspirations or, in broader terms, for containing China. Of particular concern for Beijing is the possibility that Tokyo’s decision formally to join U.S. plans for deploying missile defense in Northeast Asia will significantly increase Japan’s military capabilities by providing an opportunity for Japanese forces to enjoy unprecedented military integration with U.S. forces in the areas of spacebased intelligence and communications.

## Links-Space Weapons

### Space weapons link

### China wants to ban space weapons

### Probably as a check on the United States

NIDS 2008- The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2008, “East Asian Strategic Review 2008”, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2008/01452.pdf>, p. 26-27

China has consistently advocated a ban on weapon deployment in space in its statements at past sessions of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as exemplified by its 1999 call for the establishment of a special committee for developing a treaty against space weaponization. In addition, China presented a series of working papers titled “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” at conference sessions in 2000, 2001, and 2002. The recommendations of the 2001 and 2002 papers were jointly submitted with Russia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Belarus, Syria, and Zimbabwe. In 2004, China and Russia began distributing a joint working paper containing the same elements as the earlier papers, all of which propose a treaty comprehensively banning weapon deployment in space. Specifically, the treaty would prohibit placing in orbit any objects carrying weapons, installing such objects on celestial bodies, and using or threatening force against objects in space. The proposal, however, allows for military satellites currently in common use that do not possess explicit destructive power. As such, it accepts the current usage of space for security purposes while strictly forbidding future attempts to place any weapons in space. More recently, Chinese Ambassador to the UN in Vienna Tang Guoqiang made a similar proposal at a March 2007 meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna (COPUOS).

These proposals possibly represent one element of the Chinese government’s policies regarding arms control, disarmament, and prevention of proliferation. This interpretation is supported by the September 1, 2005, white paper China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Proliferation, in which the Chinese government specifically mentions as one of its basic policies the prevention of space weaponization and a space arms race.

It is not clear, however, whether China will maintain this stance as part of its space policy in the years ahead. China is aware of the United States’ resolve, as the leading military space power, to maximize its freedom of action in space. In order for China to catch up with the United States’ advanced space capabilities, it needs to place a check, even if limited, on the further expansion of those capabilities. Seen in this light, China’s call for a space weaponization ban may just be an expediency designed to contain the United States.

### China will weaponize if we weaponize

Bao 7- BaoShixiu is a senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China, Winter 2007, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space\*”, China Security, p.9, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5\_1.pdf

In short, while China resolutely opposes the weaponization of space, it will develop its own space weapons if the United States does so first. The guiding principle for the development of new weapon systems is the following: if an adversary has developed a new weapon and is prepared to use it in the future battlefield, China will attempt to develop the same kind of weapon. This holds true regardless of whether the battlefield is on land, sea, air or space.

### PLA already perceives US as weaponizing

Zhang 11- Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March/April 2011, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, “Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR, 317-318

Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.” He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.” 20 One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.” 21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth: The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes. These capabilities make it impossible for enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target anywhere on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century. 22

## Links-General

### China wants to limit US Space advantage

### China want to counter US capabilities

### China wants to buy time to develop own capabilities

### China wants to deny US access to space

### China wants to limit US action in space

Bellflower 10- Major John W. Bellflower, LL.M, with honors, McGill University, is a space law instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School and National Security Space Institute, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, 2010, “THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON COMMAND OF SPACE”, The Air Force Law Review, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, 65 A.F. L. Rev. 107, Lexis p. 133-135

Potential adversaries, such as China, may also employ strategic lawfare to limit U.S. command of space. Recognizing its current technological inferiority in space as compared to the United States, China has focused its military efforts on "developing capabilities that target potential vulnerabilities of the United States." n150 This is particularly the case with American dependence on space assets, something China views as America's "soft ribs and strategic weakness." n151 Aware that military options are not a viable choice at this time given the financial, military, and technological gap between it and America, China is beginning to use international law as a means of countering American space power, in part to buy itself time to develop capabilities to take advantage of America's space vulnerabilities.n152 To justify its future military actions in space, China is continually developing doctrine and legal justifications to garner support within the international community. n153 It has, in essence, taken Machiavelli's advice n154 and not only sought to achieve its military objectives through resort to law, but also to legitimize its military actions in case resort to military means become necessary.

A. Chinese Lawfare

The Chinese view space as an essential arena for future warfare. n155 Rather than attempt to achieve parity and directly compete with U.S. space capabilities, China appears focused on an asymmetric strategy "to deny its opponent use of [space] as much as possible." n156 Thus, China is pursuing means to inhibit American freedom of action in [\*134] spacethrough the development of capabilities to destroy, damage, and interfere with American satellite systems in an effort to blind and deafen the U.S. military in the event of conflict. n157 Complementing its increase in military capabilities, China has embraced asymmetric warfare at a level previously unimagined. n158 Chinese doctrine views warfare as not only "a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy, and law." n159 Thus, China appears to eschew the tactical use of lawfare in favor of its strategic use as an "active defense" to be employed in advance of actual conflict and across the spectrum of human activity. n160

The Chinese formulation of full-spectrum warfare is contained in the concept of "Three Warfares" that combines and incorporates psychological, media, and legal components into a coordinated strategy. n161 The legal component describes "the use of international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China's military actions" n162 and advocates seizing "the earliest opportunity to set up regulations." n163 Further, Chinese military doctrine closely intertwines public opinion warfare--media and psychological warfare--and lawfare. Media warfare seeks to manipulate the news media to achieve a propaganda victory and break an enemy's will to fight. n164 Psychological warfare employs the use of "selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals . . . to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to [China]." n165 Thus, China blends lawfare and public opinion warfare in order to achieve international legitimacy for its actions. n166 This strategy [\*135] finds current expression in China's actions regarding the sea--a use of lawfare that has enormous implications for its projected activities in the space domain.

### China views vertical air space as its own

### Lack of ilaw is making some in china to advocate vertical sovereignty in space

### PLA deputy chief of staff advocates veritclesoveignty

### ILAW doesn’t prohibit the view

### Some on china say China has “consent and control” of satellites over its airspace

Bellflower 10- Major John W. Bellflower, LL.M, with honors, McGill University, is a space law instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School and National Security Space Institute, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, 2010, “THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON COMMAND OF SPACE”, The Air Force Law Review, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, 65 A.F. L. Rev. 107, Lexis p. 138-140

C. Chinese Assertions of Vertical Sovereignty in Space

Absolute national sovereignty over the airspace above a state's territory has "been claimed and exercised as far back into history as proof may exist of the creation and protection by state law of exclusive private property rights in such place." n187 Land and airspace, therefore, were viewed as inseparable; a rule that can be traced to Roman times. n188 This right of absolute vertical sovereignty continued to prevail until the Chicago Convention of 1944 when, despite the convention's failure to define airspace, it defined an aircraft as "any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of air against the earth's surface." n189 By indicating that the convention would apply "only to those parts of the atmosphere where gaseous air is sufficiently dense to support balloons and airplanes," the convention set a de facto limit on airspace. n190 This proposition was reinforced when no nations objected to the overflight of satellites above their territorial airspace at the dawn of the space age. n191 However, the lack of a definitive resolution of this issue in international law has permitted some in China to advocate vertical sovereignty in space. n192

Consistent with China's seamless view of warfare, a number of Chinese authors n193 are exploring the nexus between traditional notions [\*139] of state sovereignty and space, with particular emphasis on attempting to establish a legal foundation for potential military operations in space. Although such apparent assertions of Chinese vertical sovereignty may only be in their formative stages, the United States must respond and counter them now or risk permitting China to gain credibility, regarding potential military operations, which would restrict freedom of movement in the space domain.

1. The Chinese Position and Its Implications

China's most prominent advocate for vertical sovereignty is Major General CaiFengzhen, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army Air Force. n194 General Cai contends that the space above ground, including airspace and space, is inseparable and integrated. n195 Thus, General Cai reaches back to the Roman-based doctrine of cujusestsolum, ejusestusqueadcoelum, n196 which essentially means "he who owns the soil, owns up to the sky." n197 Absent a clear demarcation between airspace and space, international law does not directly contradict or prohibit this view. n198 Indeed, Bin Cheng warned in 1997 that "States which object to certain types of satellites, such as those that engage in remote sensing, [may] claim sovereignty over national space above the usual heights at which such satellites orbit so as to subject them to the consent and control of the States overflown but not necessarily to exclude them." n199

This is precisely the position taken by BaoShixiu, a Senior Fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation [\*140] Army of China. n200 In his critique of the U.S. 2006 National Space Policy (NSP), Bao advances the notion of vertical sovereignty with the following curious statement: "[t]he NSP declares that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as 'interference' by other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity)." n201 However, the statement in the NSP to which Bao refers is not limited solely to U.S. space systems. It reads: "The United States considers space systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in space without interference." n202 Thus, the rights recognized in the U.S. space policy are applicable to all space systems, which is compatible with the Outer Space Treaty. However, the principal concern vis-a-vis potential Chinese claims of vertical sovereignty over portions of space above their territory liesnot with a claim of complete sovereignty, but rather with the assertion that satellite navigation above Chinese territory is subject to Chinese "consent and control"as articulated by Professor Cheng. n203

### China is focused on control of space

### Want parity with Russia and US

### Want national prestige

Kaufman 8- Marc Kaufman is a Washington Post science writer, July 9, 2008, “US Finds It's Getting Crowded Out There”, Washington Post, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/152/25824.html

China has sent men into space twice in the past five years and plans another manned mission in October. More than any other country besides the United States, experts say, China has decided that space exploration, and its commercial and military purposes, are as important as the seas once were to the British empire and air power was to the United States.

The Chinese space program began in the 1970s, but it was not until 2003 that astronaut Yang Liwei was blasted into space in a Shenzhou 5 spacecraft, making China one of only three nations to send men into space. "The Chinese have a carefully thought-out human spaceflight program that will take them up to parity with the United States and Russia," Griffin said. "They're investing to make China a strategic world power second to none -- not so much to become a grand military power, but because deals and advantage flow to world leaders."

### China views US space policy as threatening (In 1NC)

### Don’t want US suprioriority

### See US policy as a threat

Chase 11- Michael S. Chase is an Associate Research Professor and Director of the Mahan Scholars Program at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, March 25, 2011, “Defense and Deterrence in China’s Military Space Strategy”, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 5, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=37699&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=e3f0fcd233f563e2364ad7bc49425244

A review of Chinese writings on military space operations indicates that Chinese strategists are concerned about a wide variety of perceived threats to Chinese space systems. In particular, Chinese analysts characterize U.S. space policy as inherently threatening to China’s interests because of its emphasis on space dominance. As Zhang Hui of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs writes, "Many Chinese officials and security experts have great interest in U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision the control of space through the use of weaponsin, or from, space to establish global superiority" [7]. Similarly, according to BaoShixiu, a senior fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others" [8]. Given that China must protect its own interests, Bao argues, "China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country." Consequently, he asserts that U.S. space policy "poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes" [9]. Chinese writers also assert that U.S. space war exercises reflect the growing militarization of space. Yet Beijing’s concerns are not limited to the realm of policy statements and war games. Indeed, some Chinese strategists appear to believe that other countries are actively developing counter-space capabilities that could threaten Chinese satellites.

Some Chinese writers discussed what they characterize as a long history of ASAT research, development, and testing in the United States and Russia dating back to the Cold War [10]. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese writers divide these potential threats into two major categories: "soft kill" and "hard kill" [11]. Soft kill threats can cause temporary loss of the effectiveness of space systems, causing them to be unable to carry out operational functions. According to Chinese military researchers, the main methods of soft kill anti-satellite attack include electronic warfare and computer network attacks [12]. In contrast to soft kill threats such as jamming, hard kill capabilities are intended to cause permanent damage to spacecraft. Chinese writers identify kinetic energy weapons and directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers as the main hard kill ASAT threats. Other Chinese writings offer more detailed discussions of perceived threats from a wide range of systems, such as kinetic energy interceptors, laser ASAT systems, nuclear ASAT systems, microwave weapons, and space planes that could be used to disable or destroy an adversary’s satellites [13]. In addition, some Chinese authors assert that U.S. missile defense interceptors provide the United States with an inherent ASAT capability [14].

In all, according to Chinese analysts, as a result of the actions of the world’s major space powers, space war is no longer the stuff of science fiction. Indeed, they argue that it is already more a reality than a myth. Consequently, they conclude that China must be prepared not only to degrade an adversary’s ability to use space, but also to protect its own space capabilities. Chinese writings suggest that Beijing would consider doing so through a combination of defensive measures and deterrence.

### China wants to explore space for national security

### Cant trust another country in space

### Cant accept monopolization of space

### Hurt national defense and civilian stuff

Bao 7- BaoShixiu is a senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China, Winter 2007, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space\*”, China Security, p.3, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5\_1.pdf

This position operates on several faulty premises. The first is that the United States is the only country that has national interests at stake in space, implying that China does not have deep national security interests in space or that China’s space assets do not need to be protected. The Chinese government has expressed its desire to develop space peacefully on many occasions, and has pursued treaties to ban weapons and weapon-testing in space. But China also has deep interests, both now and in the future, to exploit space, which are vital to its comprehensive national power and its economic and scientific development and therefore its greater national security. Leaving aside the issue of using space for military purposes, China cannot entrust the protection of its interests in space to another country, no matter their rhetoric or intentions. If the security of the United States requires the absence of that same security for China, then the logic is inherently imbalanced, unfair and one that China cannot accept. The peaceful use of space should not be confused with a lack of national security interests or the deep underlying need to protect them.

As a sovereign state, China has an equal right to access space. As the 1967 Outer Space Treaty clearly articulates: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country. For that reason, the U.S. administration’s penchant for “exceptionalism” in space policy poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes.

### China wants to be on equal footing with the U.S.

NIDS 2008- The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2008, “East Asian Strategic Review 2008”, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2008/01452.pdf>, p. 28

China’s anti-satellite test was likely conducted with the intention of containing other nations’ military activity in space. The type of missile used in the test is certain to be capable of destroying not only US satellites, but also the informationgathering satellites recently launched by Japan. As mentioned earlier, China is also suspected of having irradiated a low earth orbit satellite with a ground-based laser, and it may possess a satellite jamming system. As such, it appears that China is simultaneously developing various forms of technology to boost its capabilities in satellite destruction and jamming across a wide spectrum. With the exception of satellites in geostationary orbit (an altitude of nearly 36,000 kilometers), most civilian satellites orbit at altitudes susceptible to the sort of attack carried out in China’s test, and hence China’s anti-satellite capability poses the potential for an even greater impact.

Satellites are an essential part of national security and civilized life for much of the world, especially developed nations. China’s anti-satellite test means that other nations’ satellites, whether military or civilian, may become gravely threatened in the event of escalated international tensions.

International law naturally allows the right of self-defense to be exercised in space as well, so there is the possibility that a destructive act like China’s test will be committed in space in the future. The Outer Space Treaty, which was inaugurated in 1967 and has as of January 1, 2007, been signed by 125 nations, 99 of which ratified it, states in its third article that the UN Charter and other international laws apply to space activity. On the other hand, the current space environment is not conducive to attempts to intentionally destroy satellites, given that many civilian satellites share, as noted earlier, the same orbital paths and altitudes as military satellites, and hence there is no distinction between “military space” and “civilian space.” Another reason is that a rapidly growing number of states and businesses possess and operate satellites or are dependent on satellite services. In fact, China itself has pledged to refrain from further destructive tests, and has supported the adoption of international guidelines banning the intentional creation of space debris, so there is ample potential that regulations against anti-satellite attacks will be implemented in the future.

Nevertheless, China’s National Defense in 2006indicates that China will actively seek to improve its military technology with respect to space. This stance may be an expression of China’s desire to enhance its international presence, as the country is also working hard to play a key role in space for non-military purposes as well.It has successfully accomplished human spaceflights in recent years, and is enlarging its vision to include space station activity and lunar exploration. These are all big steps in space development that have already been taken by the United States, including with regard to military-related space activity. China’s anti-satellite test can be interpreted as but another effort of China to increase its prestige by standing eye to eye with the United States. In addition, China is eager to expand its reach, so its pursuit of space activities may, like its endeavors to operate on the high seas, be an attempt to broaden the sphere of its interests.

### China resisting US

### Trying to counter US dominance now

### Helping develop non-US GPS

NIDS 2008- The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2008, “East Asian Strategic Review 2008”, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2008/01452.pdf>, p. 33

Today China appears determined to become a center of resistance against the United States, the post-Cold War world’s leader in many arenas. This opposition is seen in not only China’s economic activities, but also its national security efforts. Having minutely analyzed the United States’ current strengths and weaknesses, China is endeavoring to narrow its gap with US capabilities in established weapons systems by exploring such possibilities as construction of an aircraft carrier and reinforcement of its nuclear capabilities. At the same time, China is building up its cyber war capabilities. China is also countering US dominance in security-related space activities by developing technologies to exploit the vulnerabilities of US space assets. This capability was amply demonstrated by the success of the anti-satellite test described earlier.

China’s resistance is further manifested in its proactive involvement in the Galileo Project, the European program aimed at developing a navigation satellite system that will not rely on the United States’ GPS. As such, the project serves as an opportunity for China to deepen its ties with Europe while challenging US supremacy. Moreover, China is carrying out its own initiatives, such as the Beidou system mentioned earlier. It also appears to be enhancing its optical reconnaissance satellites and developing SAR reconnaissance satellites; these projects, if successfully realized, will allow China to dramatically improve its capabilities in space asset use and space-based information gathering.

### Link---China has deep concerns about U.S. space dominance-doing the plan provides justification for China to develop similar space systems

Quam 07-Erik Quam, Graduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Monterey Institute of International Studies, Feb. 2007, “Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise?” http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_85.html

Focus on U.S. Space Threat

The coverage of space security issues in the Chinese press in the last year or so gave a clear indication of China's concern about U.S. space dominance and its implications on Chinese security needs. A November 2006 article in the People's Daily criticized U.S. military space policy saying that "as of today, the only one who is truly putting space technology to military use is the United States."[3] The article continued that the United States had already utilized space for warfare in the first and second Gulf Wars, the Kosovo campaign and in Afghanistan.[4] In those conflicts the United States used space assets to enhance their war fighting capabilities in these campaigns.

Prior to the January 2007 test, much of the chatter by foreign analysts with regards to the then-suspected Chinese ASAT program revolved around China's reported use of ground-based lasers. In late 2006, U.S. government officials accused China's military of using a laser to blind U.S. satellites. Chinese analysts responding to these claims tended to attack the U.S. space weapons programs, without ever refuting the story. While discussing allegations of Chinese laser tests, Chinese analysts and writers focused heavily on the fact that the U.S. military had been working on a ground-based laser, and that such a system was already deployed in New Mexico, where a large space observatory is being used to research ground based ASAT laser systems.[5] One article goes as far as to say that "American criticism of Chinese ASAT technology is a pretext for [the U.S.] developing its own space weapons."[6] Chinese analysts have also cited the U.S. air force budget as evidence of U.S. ASAT and ground-based laser research, saying that the goal of ASAT research is for the U.S. to develop "highly capable laser weapons."[7] These accusations appeared aimed at not only bringing attention to the U.S. military space program, but also providing justification for China's development of similar systems.[8]

## Link-Missile Defense

### China fears US full-spectrum dominance

Zhang 11- Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March/April 2011, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, “Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR, 313

This article, citing firsthand Chinese military sources, identifies the major factors contributing to the security dilemma that is driving China’s military space program. The first is China’s attempt to respond to perceived U.S. military strategies to dominate outer space. Chinese strategists are keenly aware of the U.S. military’s plan to achieve so-called full-spectrum dominance, and the Chinese military feels compelled to deny that dominance. The second factor is China’s concern about U.S. missile defense, which could potentially weaken Chinese strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic missile defense system will inevitably compromise China’s offensive nuclear forces. China’s response is to attempt to weaken the U.S. space-based sensor system that serves as the eyes and brains of missile defense. Thus, U.S. missile defense has forced China to contemplate the integration of nuclear war and space warfare capabilities.

### Link-Missile Defense-China concerned about U.S.’s military activities in space

Hitches 03-Theresa Hitchens, one of the leading U.S. analysts on U.S. military space policy, “Monsters and shadows,” http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1884.pdf

At the same time, however, some influential thinkers in China have argued that the revolution in

military affairs requires China to now consider its options in space. Some maintain that space warfare

with a superpower should be a Chinese concern, and that China needs anti-ASAT technology, smaller

satellites to reduce vulnerability and first strike capabilities in space.45

According to the Pentagon, China already has jamming technology and may be developing ASAT

capabilities, including a ground-based high-energy laser and other lasers to blind optical satellites.46

However, as indicated, much of China’s interest in space seems to stem directly from concerns

about American military activities in space. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, China’s worries

about protecting its space-based assets are due to concern about American development of missile

defences and future American global dominance as a result of American space power.47 Indeed, at the

7 February 2002 meeting of the CD, Hu specifically mentioned American actions as a key reason that

negotiations on the weaponization of space should commence quickly. ‘Now that the ABM [Anti-

Ballistic Missile] Treaty has been scrapped and efforts are being stepped up to develop missile defence

and outer space weapon systems, there is an increasing risk of outer space being weaponized’, he

said.48df

## Link-ASATS

### The mere perception of U.S. developing ASAT systems in space causes china to start militarizing space

Quam 07-Erik Quam, Graduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Monterey Institute of International Studies, Feb. 2007, “Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise?” http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_85.html

Revealing Threat Perceptions

A careful examination of Chinese writings on military space developments in the latter part of 2006 reveals an assumption coming from Chinese analysts that the United States and Russia were both developing and deploying, or planning to deploy, ASAT systems. Some articles state that ASAT weapons systems are one of Russia's top priorities in the next 10 years of the Russian space plan.[14] One article further indicated that the Russian ASAT focus is on lasers and cluster munitions and that they will be ground-based, air based and space based.[15] It goes on to say that ASAT deployment by the United States and Russia will begin soon, possibly in the next year, and be effective by 2009-2010, and states explicitly that these two space powers are already engaged in a "fierce" race.[16] As a proclaimed space power, China has no intention of ceding outer space to Russian or U.S. control; therefore, based on these threat perceptions, China's development of military space assets is not surprising.

Chinese concerns about the use of military and reconnaissance satellites are not confined to U.S. and Russian programs. Analysts, and likely policy makers, in China have also recently shown significant apprehension about the development of military space assets by neighboring countries Japan and South Korea. In September 2006, China's official news agency Xinhua reported on the launch of a Japanese military reconnaissance satellite. The report noted that Japan will launch several more satellites with this system that will enhance its capabilities to communicate overseas, such as with its forces stationed in Iraq, and will allow Japan to better communicate with its forces anywhere near the Korean Peninsula, China, Russia and Taiwan.[17] This will greatly enhance the Japanese military's capabilities to deploy troops and to communicate with them in the event of military action in Northeast Asia. An August 2006 article posted on a website for Dongfang Junshi (Eastday's Military Column) discussed the South Korean launch of a reconnaissance satellite, noting that although this satellite was designed specifically to spy on North Korea, it gave Seoul the potential capability to spy on the entire world.[18] In further discussion of the South Korean satellite, one Chinese analyst wrote that in the twenty-first century all major powers will compete for the space battlefield, and that in launching the discussed reconnaissance satellite, South Korea had made a giant leap forward.[19] The concerns expressed by these analysts indicated a clear perception that the military use of space by other nations was a threat to China's security.

### If U.S. develops ASATS in space, China will be left with no option but to militarize space

Quam 07-Erik Quam, Graduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Monterey Institute of International Studies, Feb. 2007, “Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise?” http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_85.html

Chinese analytical writings and media coverage of the issue of space weapons in the year prior to the successful ASAT test clearly indicated the character of China's threat perception vis-à-vis the space programs of the United States and countries directly on its periphery, such as Russia, South Korea and Japan. Additionally, the discussion in the Chinese media about foreign ASAT development - particularly with regards to Russia's strategic need - appear to be a clear example of the use of a proxy to represent China in a discussion about strategic policies. It is important to note that it is often difficult to ascertain what expertise authors of these writings have, or to what extent they represent the views of the leadership in Beijing. However, articles in official media outlets such as Xinhua or the People's Daily would to some extent have to be vetted by China's central policy makers. In retrospect, it could be argued that Chinese writers were preparing a basis for rationalizing the subsequent test.

While impossible to prove conclusively, the build-up of interest in Chinese media on the issue of military space in the year prior to the test may have been a result of one of two scenarios. First, an open debate may be occurring within Chinese policymaking circles as the civilian and military leaderships, as well as well-placed scholars, argue what course China should take with regards to space development. This would not be the first time that differences of opinion on policy within the Chinese government have been debated in the media.[24] This existence of an on-going debate may help to explain the almost two-week delay between the test and the release of an official statement - indicating that some in the civilian leadership may have been left in the dark about the test. The success of this test may also indicate that those advocating the development of space weapons are becoming a more powerful voice within the government and military. Second, Chinese officials were well aware of the fact that governments, intelligence organizations and academics around the world would have been tracking what is being printed in China on this issue and analyzing those articles and debates. Additionally, China's leadership clearly knew that U.S. authorities would be able to track the earlier non-impact tests that began in April 2006. China has been pushing for negotiation on an international treaty banning weaponization of outer space. Publishing articles on these issues in the open media - as well as openly testing ASAT capabilities - could be Beijing's signal to the rest of the world that China sees an increasing threat to its security stemming from the militarization of space and that the international community needs to come together to settle these issues or China will be left with no options but to join the scramble for an increasingly militarized space.

## Internal Link-Stability and Tech Innovation

### Space program for activities

### For military economic and internal stability

### Provides launching for other coutnires

### Spur chinese innovation and new tech

### Increases stability

Wortzel and Batholomew 8- LARRY M. WORTZEL is Vice-President for Foreign Policy and Defense Studies for the Heritage Foundation Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Hawaii and Carolyn Batholomew is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Congressional Staff Roundtable on Asian Political and Security Issues, former Chief of Staff to Nancy Pelosi, November 2008, “REPORT TO CONGRESS of the U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION”, Chapter 2, p. 156-157, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2008/annual_report_full_08.pdf>

China’s space program consists of a wide range of activities, including military intelligence and reconnaissance, earth monitoring, research and development, scientific exploration, communications and media, and military command and control. The program contributes to the country’s military power, economic development, and internal stability.159 One facet of the space program is providing increased capabilities to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to collect and exploit battlefield information.160 Other facets, such as China’s kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) system and a variety of nonkinetic space weapons, increase the offensive ability of China’s forces and consequently their ability to dominate the battle space.161

China’s space program earns revenue by providing launch services for other countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, and Nigeria. The investments China makes in its space program stimulate innovation, which in turn creates new technologies162 that can satisfy both domestic needs and the product needs of China’s exporting industries. Economic growth is viewed by the Chinese leadership as inextricably linked to its legitimacy and political monopoly. Additionally, the space program indirectly promotes internal stability by enhancing the prestige of the Chinese government and increasing national pride. Applications of the space program increase the government’s ability to respond to domestic unrest or natural disasters. 163 For example, through earth monitoring the government can map and track the impact of floods, typhoons, earthquakes, and other disasters and any resultant population movements.

## Internal Link-Economy

### Space is important for prestige

### Helped econ a lot

Wishnick 9- Elizabeth Wishnick is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Montclair State University and an Adjunct Associate Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Her research focuseson Chinese foreign policy and non-traditional security. Spring/Summer 2009, “Of Milk and Spacemen: The Paradox of Chinese Power in an Era of Risk”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, volume xv, issue ii, 209-210

Unlike the milk industry, which has proven to be woefully deficient in quality control and raised alarms about Chinese food safety practices in general, the space sector displays China’s economic and scientific strengths. In 1992, Jiang Zemin, China’s former top political and military leader, launched Project 921, China’s manned space program, at a time when China’s economy was just taking off.5 For Chinese officials, the space program has particular symbolic value in that it highlights their country’s comprehensive national power and prestige.

Although it is difficult to establish the cost of China’s space program (estimates begin at $2 billion annually), its benefits have been felt throughout the Chinese economy. The space program has served as a catalyst for training Chinese scientific and engineering personnel, encouraged technological innovation, and improved quality control standards to support manned missions.6 At the same time, the Chinese space program is centrally directed, reflecting the close integration of its military and civilian components.7

### Space program good for econ

### New products

### Attract investors

Solomone 6- Stacey Solomone works as a Chinese language translator and was pursuing a Ph.D. in Futures Studies at the University of Hawaii at time of publishing, May 2006, “China’s Space Program: the great leap upward”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 15 issues 47

China’s domestic economic environment also affects the space program. With a secure environment which allows the domestic economy to flourish, China can largely focus on maintaining an economic front with reliance on domestic economic developments. In this vein, funding for the space program has led to spin-off products entering the Chinese domestic market. For example, during his trip around the world 14 times, Yang Liwei drank tea from the ‘Outer Space Cup’, also called the Dislin Cup, manufactured by the Shanghai Wensu Industry Trade Company, Ltd. The cup was designed to withstand extreme temperatures and the rugged environment of space. It is also leak proof which alleviates problems in microgravity. After Yang Liwei’s safe return, the Outer Space Cup hit the domestic market like a flash flood, demonstrating how even low-tech goods from the space program can saturate the domestic market and provide further strength to the overall economy.

China’s space program continues to attract many high-tech and low-tech domestic investors. Therefore, as investors become more enmeshed in China’s space program, they are becoming a permanent fixture of the program and, thus, provide a steady monetary supply to the space budget.

As a final point of the economy’s influences on the space program, the Chinese people have accepted the space program and its long term benefits for the overall economy. As long as standards of living for the Chinese people are improving, albeit slowly and unequally, they will continue to support the economic aspects and high

### Space program good for econ

### -communication satellite

### - diff sectors

Sheehan 10- Michael Sheehan is Professor of International Relations at Swansea University. He is a former Director of the Scottish Centre for International Security at Aberdeen University and the Callaghan Centre for Conflict Studies at Swansea University, December 22, 2010, “RISING POWERS”, Royal United Services Institute Journal, Volume 155, Issue 6

Economic development remains the main driver of China's space programme, as indeed it does of all other Chinese policies. Chinese communication satellites, for example, are seen as crucial for achieving national economic development goals. China's tenth Five Year Plan (2001–05) was the first to make the development of satellite applications a national priority; and Chinese analysts have stressed the importance of satellites for ‘education, government, transport and the financial and commercial sectors of the economy’.6

## Internal Link-Prestige/National Pride

### Chinese space program good for prestige

### Manned flight shows significant

### National pride

### Assisted self image

Sheehan 10- Michael Sheehan is Professor of International Relations at Swansea University. He is a former Director of the Scottish Centre for International Security at Aberdeen University and the Callaghan Centre for Conflict Studies at Swansea University, December 22, 2010, “RISING POWERS”, Royal United Services Institute Journal, Volume 155, Issue 6

The new manned missions demonstrate that the Chinese programme has reached a new level of political and economic maturity where considerations of prestige have now come to the forefront. Human spaceflight is essentially a political enterprise. Manned platforms have no military utility and robotic systems can accomplish almost anything that humans can do in space. But they do not have the same emotional and political resonance with national populations as manned missions. They instead demonstrate that a country has a particularly sophisticated space programme – since the technological requirements of manned systems are far more demanding than unmanned missions – and that the country's programme is significantly driven by questions of national and international prestige.

National pride and international prestige are thus powerful drivers of the Chinese space programme.7 They serve to emphasise the message that China has now broken free of the weakness exploited by outside powers in the ‘century of shame’ and that the Chinese Communist Party should be the focus of renewed national pride of the Chinese people. This has assisted China's transition in its self-image from ‘victimised developing nation’ to ‘emerging great power’. The space programme is in part driven by the need to leave behind the imperialist legacy and be internationally recognised as a sophisticated and technologically advanced state.

### Prestige impact

### Others congradulate

### Established as Asian tech leader

### Used to show stature on world stage

Seedhouse 10-Erik Seedhouse is Ph.D. at the German Space Agency's Institute for Space Medicine, an aerospace scientist and manned spaceflight consultant , Master's degree in Medical Science at Sheffield University, in 1997 nominated as “Fittest Man in the World” by GQ magainze, Fellow of the British Interplanetary Society, 2010, “The New Space Race”, SPRINGER-PRAXIS BOOKS, p. 7

In techno-nationalist terms, none of the regional manned spaceflight contenders such as India and Japan has even come close to achieving the technical feat of launching humans into orbit. Apart from placing China alongside the spaceflight elite, the accomplishment of launching taikonauts into LEO confers a significant leadership connotation, as evidenced by all the congratulatory telegrams from around the world following Yang Liwei's historic flight, perhaps most notably that of Indian Prime Minister, AtalBihari Vajpayee. Although many countries offering their congratulations later downplayed the significance of China's first manned spaceflight, Beijing had at least established the perception of being Asia's space technology leader, and had regained what it considers as its rightful place among the technology leaders of the world.

China's manned spaceflight program strongly supports the country's national aspirations and is regularly used as a public instrument for securing China's stature on the world stage. Following the flights of Shenzhou 6 and Shenzhou 7, for example, China's taikonauts were transformed into political vehicles to promote an orgy of nationalist propaganda to publicize Beijing's rising influence as an independent and self-sufficient nation. The propaganda presented the missions as made in China from start to finish - a claim that ignored the fact Chinese taikonauts had received initial training in Russia in the 1990s. Similarly, the claim that China is independent and self-sufficient is nothing short of ludicrous, since the Shenzhou, in common with China's economic and technological development, is largely derivative. The brutal reality is that China functions as a huge cheap-labor platform for the global economy, and is completely dependent on foreign capital and its associated imported technologies, such as Russian space hardware. The reality of the made in China achievement promoted so vigorously by Beijing means subsistence wages, atrocious working conditions, unrelenting political repression, inefficient use of energy, and Armageddon-scale pollution.

## Internal Link-Econ

### Space good for China econ

### Secure raw materials and markets

### Africa and latin America

### Space trade

Pace 11- Scott Pace, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 22 July 2011, "How far – if at all – should the USA cooperate with China in space?", Space Policy magazine, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964611000427>

One possible use for Chinese human spaceflight would be to advance Chinese foreign policy objectives. The USSR and the USA both used flights of foreign astronauts as symbolic means of aiding allies and creating good will. China could do the same, as well as using such flights to support economic growth by securing supplies of raw materials and access to markets. Chinese space cooperation agreements in Africa (e.g. Nigeria) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela) have reportedly included offers of technology, training, loan guarantees, and other inducements to trade.

### Space helps econ

### Political connections/oil deals

### Domestic plans

Yardley 7- Jim Yardley is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, who currently serves as New Delhi Bureau Chief of the New York Times. He has also been a correspondent in the Beijing Bureau of the New York Times, and has traveled throughout China, May 24, 2007, "Snubbed by U.S., China Finds New Space Partners", New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/world/asia/24satellite.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slo>

“They want to play a leadership role for developing countries that want to get into space,” Dr. Johnson-Freese said in an interview earlier this year. “It’s just such a win-win for them. They are making political connections, it helps them with oil deals and they bring in hard currency to feed back into their own program to make them even more commercially competitive.”

Satellites also are becoming vital to Beijing’s domestic development plans. In the next several years, China could launch as many as 100 satellites to help deliver television to rural areas, create a digital navigational network, facilitate scientific research and improve mapping and weather monitoring. Research centers on microsatellites have opened in Beijing, Shanghai and Harbin, and a new launching center is under construction in Hainan Province.

## Internal Link-China Soft Power

### Space increases china's influence

### Symbolic aid to allies

### Many forums for space agency

Pace 11- Scott Pace, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 22 July 2011, "How far – if at all – should the USA cooperate with China in space?", Space Policy magazine, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964611000427>

China has achieved progressively more ambitious space capabilities over a longer period of time and with fewer missions than those of the USA or the USSR. It has proceeded cautiously but steadily without any sense of racing an adversary. While recognizing the experience gap with the partners on the International Space Station (ISS), there is a risk of underestimating how soon China will have comparable space capabilities to those of those same partners. It is not a question of whether China will have a full range of human spaceflight capabilities, but a question of when and what they intend to do with those capabilities.

One possible use for Chinese human spaceflight would be to advance Chinese foreign policy objectives. The USSR and the USA both used flights of foreign astronauts as symbolic means of aiding allies and creating good will. China could do the same, as well as using such flights to support economic growth by securing supplies of raw materials and access to markets. Chinese space cooperation agreements in Africa (e.g. Nigeria) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela) have reportedly included offers of technology, training, loan guarantees, and other inducements to trade.

As its space capabilities increase, China is becoming more active in international organizations such as the International Astronautical Federation and is hosting more space conferences. China leads an intergovernmental space cooperation organization, the AsiaPacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) that is similar in some respects to the European Space Agency. APSCO is based in Beijing with member space agencies from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey. China is also a member of a less formal association of space agencies, the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, led by Japan. The forum includes space agencies, governmental bodies and international organizations, as well as nongovernmental organizations such as companies, universities and research institutes. Japan is among the many Asian countries with their own space ambitions that are paying attention to China.

### Chinese space leadership drives Asian co-operation

### Leadership make it focal point

### Countries join because they want tech help

Moltz 11- James Clay Moltz, PHD in political science from California-Berkeley, assosciate director and research professor with Center For Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2011, "China, the United States, and Prospects for Asian Space Cooperation", Journal of Contemporary China Volume 20, Issue 68, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2011.520847#tabModule>

Overall, China's recent space accomplishments, exceptional drive, and recent military uses of space have made it the main focal point for regional measures of progress. While there is uncertainty within Asia about the desirability of Chinese space leadership, smaller countries have tended to bandwagon18 with Beijing because of its promises of ready technological assistance. For Japan, South Korea, and India the challenge is how to keep up in the emerging space race and in what areas. In this regard, recent cooperation with the United States (and to some extent Russia) has offered some definite advantages.

### Soft power link- APSCO

### Use organization with other countries

### Joint research and data exchange

### Portray itself as helping less states

Moltz 11- James Clay Moltz, PHD in political science from California-Berkeley, assosciate director and research professor with Center For Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2011, "China, the United States, and Prospects for Asian Space Cooperation", Journal of Contemporary China Volume 20, Issue 68, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2011.520847#tabModule>

China has played a leading role in the first of these organizations, which is formally based in Beijing. Its origins date to 1992, when a trilateral meeting of China, Pakistan, and Thailand proposed an initiative called the Asia–Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA).20 This group eventually began cooperating in several areas, including the development of the Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS), which was launched using Chinese technology. Members decided to supplement the AP-MCSTA process with a 2005 decision in Beijing to create the Asia–Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO): a formal, membership-only group with a dues-paying requirement.The APSCO organization now includes China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Thailand, as well as Peru. Two other countries—Indonesia and Turkey—have signed the convention but have not completed the domestic ratification procedures to formalize their memberships21; but China has not put all of its eggs in the APSCO basket. AP-MCSTA activities continue on a broader front. The group engages in joint research and data-exchange efforts, as well as formal training courses for scientists and engineers from the Asian-Pacific region in space technology and remote sensing provided at various Chinese universities and institutes. To date, some 200 trainees from both APSCO and AP-MCSTA countries have participated in this training.22 In this regard, China has been able to portray itself as a ‘purveyor’ of space know-how and technology to lesser-developed states in Asia and elsewhere.

### China space creates influence

### Exerts soft power

### Organized deals

Yardley 7- Jim Yardley is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, who currently serves as New Delhi Bureau Chief of the New York Times. He has also been a correspondent in the Beijing Bureau of the New York Times, and has traveled throughout China, May 24, 2007, "Snubbed by U.S., China Finds New Space Partners", New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/world/asia/24satellite.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slo>

For years, China has chafed at efforts by the United States to exclude it from full membership in the world’s elite space club. So lately China seems to have hit on a solution: create a new club.

Beijing is trying to position itself as a space benefactor to the developing world — the same countries, in some cases, whose natural resources China covets here on earth. The latest and most prominent example came last week when China launched a communications satellite for Nigeria, a major oil producer, in a project that serves as a tidy case study of how space has become another arena where China is trying to exert its soft power.

Not only did China design, build and launch the satellite for Nigeria, but it also provided a huge loan to help pay the bill. China has also signed a satellite contract with another big oil supplier, Venezuela. It is developing an earth observation satellite system with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand. And it has organized a satellite association in Asia. “China is starting to market and sell this technology to developing countries that need it,” said ShenDingli, a professor in international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai. Of the Nigeria deal, Mr. Shen added: “It gives substance to Sino-African relations. Not only does China buy raw materials, but also we sell some things.”

For China, the strategy is a blend of selfinterest, broader diplomacy and, from a business standpoint, an effective way to break into the satellite market. Satellites have become status symbols and technological necessities for many countries that want an ownership stake in the digital world dominated by the West, analysts say.

“There’s clearly a sense that countries like Nigeria want to have a stronger presence in space,” said Peter J. Brown, a journalist who specializes in satellite technology and writes frequently about the satellite market in Asia. “As you look around the map, more and more countries are moving to get satellites up.”

### China uses space as a means to develop soft power

Polpetter 08-Kevin Polpetter,Mr. Pollpeter has advanced Chinese language skills and holds a master’s degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 08Strategic Studies Institute, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE” March 2008 pg 23-24

Similarly, Dr. Evan Medeiros writes that China’s foreign policy goals are to “[maximize] its influence, leverage, and freedom of action while pursuing economic development to facilitate its reemergence as a great power.”59 China is implementing this strategy by establishing partnerships with other major powers in order to make China an attractive or indispensable actor whose interests must be taken into account. The second component of this strategy is an activist international agenda “designed to establish China’s reputation as a responsible member of the international community and mute widespread concerns about how Beijing is likely to employ its growing capabilities, thus reducing the incentives for others to unite in opposition to China.”60 This strategy is also designed to protect China’s core national interests against external threats as well as to shape the international system in which it operates. In addition, China’s activities are to help usher in a multipolar world in which China would be one of several great powers.61 In the short term, however, China’s foreign policy is concentrated on developing national capabilities and international partners while avoiding the provocative consequences of a more straightforward hegemonic or balancing strategy.62 This section examines the benefits of space power China uses to pursue these goals. 24 Space Power’s Contribution to China’s Comprehensive National Power.China’s space program furthers its grand strategy ambitions by adding to China’s comprehensive national power (CNP). Comprehensive national power is defined as the sum of a nation’s economic, political, military, scientific and technological, educational, and cultural strength. CNP can be divided into hard power, such as military force, and soft power, such as economic and cultural influence. While space power is not a main contributor to China’s CNP, it nevertheless is considered an important component. Space activities increase China’s hard power by improving China’s military capability and increase its soft power through its economic and political benefits.

### China uses its space industry for expanding its soft-power

Lele 09-Ajey Lele is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, Oct. 5, 2009, “Space Technology and Soft-Power: A Chinese Lesson for India,” http://www.idsa.in/node/3154/1620

This is what “Soft-Power” is all about. A term coined by Joseph Nye of Harvard University, Soft-Power could be defined as the ability of a state to get what it wants by attracting and persuading others to adopt its goals. India’s success in space is attracting others to emulate it. This is an opportunity that India should not waste. And this opportunity goes much beyond India’s existing commercial space policy.

For the last few years **China is using its space industry to extend its Soft-Power.** It is establishing linkages in the space arena with countries in Africa and South America, including Nigeria, Venezuela, and Brazil. China’s ultimate objectives are the natural resources and markets in these parts of the world. China is talking its friendship with Pakistan to a higher plane by helping the latter in the space field as well. It signed an agreement with Pakistan a fortnight back, granting a $200 million loan for satellite construction. China has also promised Bolivia help in developing its space programme within three years and in the launch of its first satellite. It has also been reported that China would be building and launching a communications satellite for Laos.

China is strategically positioning itself as a focal point for all space-related activities, from providing financial assistance to manufacturing, and launching facilities for states in Asia, Africa and South America. This approach has multiple benefits – an increase in China’s global footprint, flow of benefits to the Chinese space industry, experimentation with new technologies, and win friends.

International politics is thus more than the mere acquisition and use of “Hard-Power”. This is what India needs to learn from the Chinese example of collaboration in the space arena. India has a technologically superior and an economically affordable space programme. The growth of its commercial space sector is commendable. Many courtiers are depending on India for launching their satellites. It is essential that India begins to engage space have-nots at a different level, beyond technological and commercial interests. There is a need to influence states for political and strategic purposes by using space technology as a tool. India should steadily and subtly use its ‘space acumen’ to extend its Soft-Power status on earth.

### Chinese space program boosts soft power

Imran 10, Mara Imran, Masters candidate at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, September 2010,

“China's space program : a new tool for PRC "soft power" in international relations?” http://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/5473 pg21

Space has become another area where China is exerting its soft power. It is positioning itself as a space benefactor to the developing world-the same countries in some cases, whose natural resources China covets. China not only designed, built and launched a satellite oil rich Nigeria but also combined it with a major loan to help pay the costs. It has signed a similar contract with Venezuela and is developing an earth observation satellite system with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand. 50 In addition to serving national security and domestic civilian use of space, China’s space activities are also being used as a tool for diplomacy. The nation’s space related international cooperation efforts, which began with a bilateral arrangement for satellite development, have blossomed to include the establishment of satellite tracking stations and a leading role in multilateral frameworks. China’s pursuit of such international cooperation is expected to expand in the future, and will likely help the nation to secure its necessary supply of resources and energy. In light of this posture and China’s growing efforts to provide African nations with official development assistance and debt relief, projects like the China-Nigeria partnership in communication satellite development and launches can be seen as examples of China’s exploitation of space activities as a diplomatic tool.

## Internal Link-North Korea

### China space key to prevent Nokoprolif

### Six party talks

### Speculative

Pace 11- Scott Pace, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 22 July 2011, "How far – if at all – should the USA cooperate with China in space?", Space Policy magazine, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964611000427>

Chinese space capabilities could be of potential value in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. While the six-party talks (North Korea, South Korea, China, the USA, Japan and Russia) are currently suspended, future discussions will continue to deal with missile proliferation as well as de-nuclearization. If North Korea is to give up its long-range missile capabilities and suspend space launch activities, it is likely that the country’s leadership will require inducements or compensation of some sort. One such offset could be Chinese launch services for North Korean satellites as part of a broader agreement that eliminated North Korean strategic missiles. While highly speculative, it is possible to imagine constructive outcomes if China chose to pursue them.

## Impact-China Econ

China econ collapse impact

* Fracture party leadership
* Civil war
* Diversionary wars

Friedberg 10- Aaron Friedberg is a professor of international affairs at Princeton University who has served as a national security advisor, July 21, 2010, "Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US–China Rivalry", Survival Volume 52, Issue 4, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2010.506817>

At least for the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the next several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing's troubles will mount. The regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the party's leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societal discontent ‘might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage’ using ‘populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the party's seemingly unified upper ranks’.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a bloody civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime has been very careful to keep whatever differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012.

Short of causing the regime to unravel, a sustained economic crisis could induce it to abandon its current, cautious policy of avoiding conflict with other countries while patiently accumulating all the elements of ‘comprehensive national power’. If they believe that their backs are to the wall, China's leaders might even be tempted to lash out, perhaps provoking a confrontation with a foreign power in the hopes of rallying domestic support and deflecting public attention from their day-to-day troubles. Beijing might also choose to implement a policy of ‘military Keynesianism’, further accelerating its already ambitious plans for military construction in the hopes of pumping up aggregate demand and resuscitating a sagging domestic economy.15

In sum, despite its impressive initial performance, Beijing is by no means on solid ground. The reverberations from the 2008–09 financial crisis may yet shake the regime to its foundations, and could induce it to behave in unexpected, and perhaps unexpectedly aggressive, ways.

### China econ decline impact

### Part leadership fracture

### Vicious cycle of instability leading to destabalization

Pei 9-Minxin Pei was an adjunct senior associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment, regular contributor to the Diplomat, a leading online international affairs journal and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, March 12, 2009, "Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?", Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis?page=show>

The current Chinese leadership is a delicately balanced coalition of regional, factional, and institutional interests, which makes it vulnerable to dissension. To most Western eyes, China is blessed with strong, capable, and decisive leaders. But to the Chinese leaders themselves, the situation looks somewhat different. Their resumés are remarkably similar, as are their records as administrators. No single individual towers above the others in terms of demonstrated leadership, vision, or performance -- which means that no one is beyond challenge, and the stage is set for jockeying for preeminence.

So far, the real glue that has held the CCP together is a vast patronage system that has been underwritten by a long period of economic growth. The regime has used its financial resources to balance domestic interests, satisfy different constituencies, and purchase the contingent support of China's social elites. But this patronage system is extremely expensive -- administrative expenses alone consume more than 20 percent of China's government budget, and over 40 percent of China's GDP comes from fixed-asset investments such as factories and warehouses -- a sector that is state-dominated and stuffed with pork. In other words, China's nonideological ruling elites have stuck with the party because it has been paying them off.But when economic hardship ends the easy handouts, the elites' support and loyalty to the system can no longer be taken for granted.

Rising social discontent may not be enough to force the party out of power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage. Such political entrepreneurs could use populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open up divisions within the party's seemingly unified upper ranks.

Any of these sources of elite dissension could lead to confusion and turmoil within the Chinese state's repressive apparatus, rendering it less capable of containing social instability and thus creating a vicious cycle of events that could result in progressive destabilization.

### Chinese econ key to world econ

### Demand for capital good and commodities

### Developing and industrial world

Eichengreen et al. 11-Barry Eichengreen is George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley,a Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, United Kingdom, Kwanho Shin is a professor in the Department of Economics, Korea University, and Donghyun Park is Principal Economist at the Economics and Research Department of the Asian Development Bank, March 2011, "WHEN FAST GROWING ECONOMIES SLOW DOWN: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA", NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16919.pdf?new_window=1>

In addition, the large and fast-growing Chinese economy is increasingly viewed as a key engine of growth for the world economy. The advanced industrial countries, the traditional engines of global growth, have inherited serious problems from the crisis: weakened household balance sheets, increased public debts, and still troubled financial systems. In contrast, China experienced few problems as a result of the crisis. There were few bank and enterprise failures. At the height of the crisis in 2009, growth “slowed” just to 9.2 per cent. Both advanced and developing countries benefited from China’s resilience. Robust Chinese demand lifted capital goods exports from Germany and Japan and commodity exports from Africa and Latin America. In particular, demand from China contributed substantially to recovery in East and Southeast Asia, which has close trade linkages with China.

## Impact-China Soft Power

### Chinese soft power prevents Taiwan independence

Gill and Huang 06-Bates Gill, expert on Chinese foreign policy and the current director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and Yanzhong Huang**,** Senior Fellow for Global Health and the Council on Foreign Relations, 06

Survival, "Sources and limits of Chinese 'soft power'", June 2006, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a747985000&fulltext=713240928

A most intriguing example of China's soft power can be seen in its relations with Taiwan. In 2005, China launched a charm offensive against thepoliticians and people inthe island by inviting opposition party leaders to visit the mainland, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland universities, and**,** through a zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan's fruit, offering export incentive perks to farmersin the south of Taiwan(traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). This 'hearts-and-minds' policy not only aims to reduce the perception of military threat from China, but also gives the Chinese government leverage to exercise influence in Taiwan's political culture and society, and politically marginalise Taiwan's independence-oriented president, Chen Shui-bian. In part as a result of Beijing's manoeuvres in recent years- and Chen's increasingly frustrated but worrisome responses - the possibility for Taiwan independence seems more distant and difficult. Chen Shiubian has increasingly alienated American supporters in Washington who do not appreciate what they see as his provocative political stance on cross-Strait issues. In the meantime, some 1 million, or about 5%, of the Taiwan population lives and works in China, and Taiwan business has invested more than $100bn on the mainland. To be sure, some of China's influence over Taiwan is not so 'soft' at all: its military build-up along the Taiwan Strait, including the deployment of more than 700 ballistic missiles targeting the island, is a coercive threat aimed at thwarting independence moves by Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwan legislature's inability or unwillingness since 2001 to appropriate funding to purchase some $18bn worth of weapons offered by Washington- a seemingly wise course in the face of China's growing military clout - **is** another indication of the mainland's ability to shape policy decisions on Taiwan in its favor.Beijing's influence still falls far short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens prefer a status quo which neither invites Chinese coercion (or worse) nor requires unification with the Communist mainland. But a combination of Beijing's soft- and hard-power instruments in recent years appears to have stemmed the political fortunes of the pro-independence movement in Taiwan for the time being**.**

One could call this article a worst-case scenario for the new American century

### Taiwan Independence leads to nuclear war

Corpus 06-VictorCorpus,(Former Brigadier General, Former head of Army Intelligence), Asian Times, “If it comes to a shooting war”, 8-20-6, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD20Ad03.html

One could call this article a worst-case scenario for the new American century. Why worst case? Because of the hard lessons from history. The Romans did not consider the worst-case scenario when Hannibal crossed the Alps with his elephants and routed them; or when Hannibal encircled and annihilated the numerically superior Roman army at the Battle of Cannae. **Taiwan declares independence**! China has anticipated and long prepared itself for this event. After observing "Operation Summer Pulse –04" when US aircraft carrier battle groups converged in the waters off China's coast in mid-July through August of 2004, Chinese planners began preparing to face its own worst-case scenario: the possibility of confronting a total of 15 carrier battle groups composed of 12 from America and three from its close British ally. China's strategists refer to its counter-strategy to defeat 15 or more aircraft carrier battle groups as the "assassin's mace" or *shashaujian*. After proper coordination with Russia and Iran and activating their previously agreed strategic plan, troops and weapon systems are pre-positioned. China then launches a missile barrage on Taiwan. Command and control nodes, military bases, logistics centers, vital war industries, government centers and air defense installations are simultaneously hit with short and medium range ballistic missiles armed with conventional, anti-radar, thermo baric and electro-magnetic pulse warheads. The assassin's mace: China's anti-satellite weapons Glee and ecstasy soon turn to shock as monitor screens suddenly go blank. Then all communication via satellites goes dead. China has drawn its second "trump card" (the assassin's mace) by activating its maneuverable "parasite" micro-satellites that have unknowingly clung to vital (NORAD) radar and communication satellites and have either jammed, blinded or physically destroyed their hosts. This is complemented by space mines that maneuver near adversary satellites and explode. Secret Chinese and Russian ground-based anti-satellite laser weapons also blind or bring down US and British satellites used for C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). And to ensure redundancy and make sure that the adversary C4ISR system is completely "blinded" even temporarily, hundreds of select Chinese and Russian information warriors (hackers) specifically trained to attack their adversary's C4ISR systems simultaneously launch their cyber offensive. For a few precious minutes, the US and UK advancing carrier battle groups are stunned and blinded by the "mace", ie, a defensive weapon used to temporarily blind a stronger opponent. But the word mace has another meaning; one which is deadlier and used in combination with the first. Missile barrage on advancing carrier battle groups A few seconds after the "blackout", literally hundreds of short and medium-range ballistic missiles (DF7/9/11/15s, DF4s, DF21X/As, some of which are maneuverable) pre-positioned on the Chinese mainland, and stealthy, sea-skimming and highly-accurate cruise missiles (YJ12s, YJ22s, KH31A/Ps, YJ83s, C301s, C802s, SS-N-22s, SS-NX-26/27s, 3M54s & HN3s) delivered from platforms on land, sea and air race toward their respective designated targets at supersonic speed. Aircraft carriers are allotted a barrage of more than two dozen cruise missiles each, followed by a barrage of short and medium-range ballistic missiles timed to arrive in rapid succession. Chinese and Russian missiles cocked Both Chinese and Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the two countries' extensive air defense systems have been coordinated and ready to respond in the event that the US and UK decide to retaliate with a nuclear attack. America crippled on three major fronts In just a few hours (or days) after the outbreak of general hostilities, America, the world's lone superpower, finds itself badly crippled militarily in three major regions of the world: East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Impossible? Unfortunately, the answer is *no*. China now has the know-how and the financial resources to mass-produce hundreds, if not thousands, of Moskit, Yakhont and Granit-type supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and "squall"-type rocket torpedoes against which US and UK aircraft carriers and submarines have no known defense. Iran, on the other hand, already possesses the same supersonic cruise missiles that can destroy any ship in the Persia Gulf, including aircraft carriers. Russia and China, meanwhile, are operating on familiar grounds close to their territory, compared to the US, which needs to cross the Atlantic and Pacific to replenish troops and logistics. Grimmer scenarios There is a scenario grimmer than described above, however, and that is if strategic planners belonging to that elite group called the Project for the New American Century decide to launch a nuclear "first strike" against China and Russia and risk a **mutually-assured destruction:** 1)In defense of Taiwan ... or 2) In launching a "preventive war" to stop China from catching up economically and militarily. Or, if China decides to start an offensive against Taiwan with a one-megaton nuclear burst 40 kilometers above the center of the island. Or, if China and Russia decide to arm a number of their short and medium-range ballistic missiles and supersonic cruise missiles with tactical nuclear warheads in defending themselves against US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups. Land-attack versions of these supersonic cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads carried by stealthy Chinese and Russian submarines can also put American coastal cities at great risk to nuclear devastation. Strategic planners must also consider these worst-case possibilities.

## AT: China’s rise will be bad

### China using space diplomatically

### International space co-op expanding in future

### Use space for resources and energy

NIDS 2008- The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2008, “East Asian Strategic Review 2008”, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2008/01452.pdf>, p. 34

In addition to serving national security and domestic civilian use of space, China’s space activities are also being used as a tool for diplomacy. The nation’s spacerelated international cooperation efforts, which began with a bilateral arrangement for satellite development, have blossomed to include the establishment of satellite tracking stations and a leading role in multilateral frameworks. China’s pursuit of such international cooperation is expected to expand in the future, and will likely help the nation to secure its necessary supply of resources and energy. In light of this posture and China’s growing efforts to provide African nations with official development assistance and debt relief, projects like the China-Nigeria partnership in communication satellite development and launches can be seen as examples of China’s exploitation of space activities as a diplomatic tool.

### China’s rise in space will be peaceful

Quam 07-Erik Quam, Graduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Monterey Institute of International Studies, Feb. 2007, “Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise?” http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_85.html

The People's Republic of China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test at about 6 am January 12, 2007 local time, when it shot down a weather satellite in low-Earth orbit, more than 500 miles above the Earth. The test was the first ASAT test in space in more than two decades, when the United States and the former Soviet Union both conducted similar tests in the early 1980s. While many analysts and officials outside of China expressed surprise at the January test, a careful examination of recent literature coming out of China on the issue of space security gave a number of indications that a test was likely or at least under consideration.

Although this was the first test of its kind carried out by China, the debate over space weapons and the development of ASAT technology is not new to Beijing. Chinese writings on the issue of space weapons and the peaceful use of space have been prevalent over the course of the past several years. An examination of the Chinese literature on these issues has raised a number of questions, including why these analysts chose to write on these issues at this particular time and what, if any significance, can be afforded the opinions expressed by these writers.

Official policy statements from the Chinese government have consistently proclaimed that space exploration is the right of all mankind and that China always endeavors to utilize space for peaceful purposes.[1] Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Cheng Jingye said in June 2006 that: "It is in the interest of all countries to protect humanity from space weapons."

## AT- China space weapons inevitable

### Don’t have ambition

### Peaceful development

### Political and diplomatic doctines

### No tech

Bao 7- BaoShixiu is a senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China, Winter 2007, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space\*”, China Security, p.10, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5\_1.pdf

Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China’s space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China’s entrance to a space weapons race.1 Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets.1 So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries.

China has every interest to avoid triggering a confrontation in outer spaceand it will never be a deliberate choice for China. Equally important, however,is that China will not shrink from defending its core national interests.

## Aff-No Conflict

### Wont escalate militarily- aff card?

NIDS 2008- The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2008, “East Asian Strategic Review 2008”, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2008/01452.pdf>, p. 34-35

It is highly probable that competition between China and other advanced spacefaring nations will intensify with regard to space development and use in general. The use of space is certain to become an increasingly vital element of China’s security and civil needs. However, as a nation that operates in the globalized world, China is starting to realize that growth in science and technology cannot be achieved outside of that environment. Consequently, China and other nations might vie with one another to take the initiative in future space activities, but that rivalry is very unlikely to escalate into sharp military conflict.

## Aff-China Feels threatened now

### China feels threatened now-

### In context of 2006 NSP

Bao 7- BaoShixiu is a senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China, Winter 2007, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space\*”, China Security, p.6, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5\_1.pdf

How will China address these profound security concerns? Currently, China does not have a clear space deterrence theory to guide its actions for countermeasures. Still, the fundamental principles can be found by looking at the philosophy that Chinese leaders have long looked to when dealing with aggressive threats: “We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.”7 To launch any effective counterattack requires by definition a powerful military capability. But what such a capability and its strategy mean specifically for space is not clear. What is clear is that China is threatened by U.S. policies in space, a reality that is compelling China to make the decision to have its own space systems capabilities.

## Aff-China perceives weaponization now

### PLA already perceives US as weaponizing

Zhang 11- Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March/April 2011, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, “Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR, 317-318

Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.” He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.” 20 One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.” 21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth: The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes. These capabilities make it impossible for enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target anywhere on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century. 22

## Aff-China Weaponization Inevitable

### China weapoinization inevitable- aff answer

Zhang 11- Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March/April 2011, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, “Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR, 311-312

Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA. 2 In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.” 3 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.” 4 This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly.