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China QPQ CP 1

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Say yes - Space 6

Say yes - Space 7

Say yes - Space 8

Say yes – Tech Affs 9

Say yes – Development Affs 10

Say yes - Demilitarization 11

Say yes - Demilitarization 12

Say yes - Demilitarization 13

Say yes - Demilitarization 14

Say yes - Demilitarization 15

Say yes - Demilitarization 16

Say yes - Cooperation 17

Say yes - Cooperation 18

Say yes - Cooperation 19

Say yes - Cooperation 20

Say yes – U.S. Unilateralism 21

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1NC (1/2)

Counterplan text: The United States federal government will [plan] if and only if The People's Republic of China signs the PAROS negotiations.

The CP solves militarization

Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth, received his master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law, " Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Spring, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf, AD 6/29/11) AV

Third, the United States should demand greater transparency in Chinese military planning, especially with regard to ASAT and space-focused programs. Such transparency, long sought by US defense officials, would reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts over speculative intelligence and give the United States greater insight into how military decisions are made (and whether China indeed suffers from a stovepiped bureaucracy). I argue that progress in each of these three areas would represent a greater security gain than proceeding with the weaponization of space. If the United States is able to negotiate a quid pro quo in one or all of these areas in return for a commitment not to weaponize outer space, the agreement would represent a clear US net security gain.

China will say yes – The plan is a bargaining chip for tech modeling and free-riding

Tellis 8 (Ashley, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, " China’s Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests." October, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=22595, AD 7/1/11) AV

Third, China’s space efforts are focused in multiple ways. To begin with, although some Chinese activities are intended to procure symbolic benefits that enhance the control or legitimacy of Communist rule, these gains are usually conceived of as positive externalities that derive from some other material benefits of exploiting space for specific economic, political or military aims. To that degree, Beijing’s space investments are in fact conservative. Given its relative under-development, China has consistently sought to avoid frittering its resources on showcase projects that provide few tangible gains, preferring instead to invest in those activities that provide highest value within what are acknowledged fiscal constraints. Given the desire to secure the most while spending the least, even more controversial initiatives such as the manned space program have been authorized mainly because it is expected that this effort would push the frontiers of innovation, create a new quality control culture across the space program, generate new demands for technical education, and produce spin-offs that would benefit the economy more generally. China’s space program is focused in other ways as well. Beijing abundantly recognizes that for all its impressive space achievements in recent years, it still operates in a milieu characterized by emerging political competition with a technologically dominant United States. Consequently, given the differences in cultural ethos, political systems and comparative advantage, the Chinese space program has deliberately avoided either replicating the American endeavor or attempting to compete with it across the board. Rather, Beijing’s space efforts have been characterized by two different orientations in this regard. To the degree that raising its technological standards to American levels is judged necessary, China has embarked on a quite calculated “buy, copy, or steal” approach in regards to procuring various critical technologies. Where competing with the United States is deemed necessary, China has focused its space programs not on mustering any comparable superiority but by aiming at Washington’s "soft ribs and strategic weaknesses ". In any event, and irrespective of the endeavor in question, Beijing’s space efforts have been marked by deliberation and purposefulness.

1NC (2/2)

A China agreement would solve globally

Van Ness 10 (Peter, Asian Perspective, " The Time Has Come For A Treaty

To Ban Weapons In Space." November, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf, AD 7/2/11) AV

We should begin, at the unofficial level, bringing together specialists on the many dimensions of this problem, especially people who are committed to finding a way to avoid an arms race in space. I think it should be a joint U.S.-China group of experts that would include others who may have good ideas. It should not be an official-level negotiating group—at least not yet—but rather a Track II meeting of people who have the skills and experience to work together to design an agreement that just might work. The Russians need not be included at the outset, because they have neither the political will nor the resources to engage in an arms race in space. But as an important spacefaring nation Russia would obviously want to participate in any future treaty. If China and the United States, the two countries most in contention about weapons in space, can reach agreement for a ban, I think it would be easier to include Russia and other countries in a subsequent treaty or code of conduct. In conclusion, Australia and all countries have a stake in helping China and the United States find agreement to avoid an arms race in space. Australia is particularly fortunate to have good relations with both countries and many opportunities to debate, discuss, and possibly help design agreements of mutual benefit.

Fourth, continued Chinese space militarization will trigger a global space arms race - causes global economic collapse which causes extinction and renders space unusable which turns the case

Moore 9 (Mike, author, journalist, speaker, and research fellow at the Independent Institute, and former editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and former editor of Quill. "An Agenda for Obama: End America's Counterproductive Pursuit of Space Dominance," January 12th, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics\_online/0029.html, AD 6/29/11) AV

If the United States continues to push forward its de facto space dominance policy, China will almost surely continue to challenge it by developing space-related weapons. If that happens, India and Japan will likely follow suit. And if Pakistan does not disintegrate as functioning state, it will likely follow. Israel will be in the mix too. And so it goes—an all-out ASAT race triggered by the United States. Unfit for any Use A common argument: a space-related arms race would be unfortunate but hardly as dangerous as the arms race of European nations a century ago and certainly not as nightmarish as the nuclear arms race that shadowed the latter part of the 20th century. If a shooting conflict in space ever broke out, the targets would be satellites—machines, not people. That argument is misguided. Orbital space is a fragile environment, a natural resource whose usefulness can be easily damaged or destroyed by human activity. A worst-case shooting conflict in space might cause untold millions of deaths, albeit indirectly. Virtually everything launched into space, whether it is a new communications satellite or a planetary probe, is first inserted into a low-earth orbit, where its orbital parameters are fine-tuned before sending it on. Most space systems are predominantly civil in function and they contribute immensely to the well-being of all. If a space-related arms race got seriously out of control, many satellites—perhaps a dozen or more—might be shattered in low-earth orbits. The resulting debris fields in these low-earth orbits could render space unfit for further use—commercial, scientific or even military. The global economy is greatly dependent on the continued functioning of satellites: communication, global positioning, weather, earth observation, and the like. If space becomes unfit for use because of debris, the global economic system would likely collapse. It might not happen overnight; satellites in higher orbits would continue functioning for months, even years, until they came to the end of their design lives. But if low-earth orbits are heavily salted with debris, these satellites could not be reliably replaced. Economic collapse would not merely take humankind back to the hard times that affected much of the world during the Great Depression. During the 1930s, the world sustained roughly two billion people; today, the figure is more than six billion and heading for eight billion by mid-century. A global economic collapse combined with the needs of some six billion-plus people? One does not need to be a pessimist to understand what might follow: Massive unemployment; food shortages and starvation: pandemic disease; and armed conflict over diminishing resources.

\*\*Solvency\*\*

Say yes – General

China expects quid pro quos despite corrupt actions

Currie 10 (Kelley, Weekly Standard, 4-5, https://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-administrations-passive-aggressive-china-policy, accessed 7-2, JG)

Now, one could look at the events of the past few months and conclude that recent Chinese efforts to seem less obstreperous might be the result of the White House getting tougher (or appearing to) with the Chinese and/or the Chinese recognition that they overreached with their recent aggressiveness. This would seem to be a politically sensible message for the White House on an issue that is increasingly a domestic political concern. But the administration is instead bending over backwards to send the opposite, somewhat implausible, message that Obama's (and/or Steinberg's) dogged personal efforts to maintain friendly relations with Beijing despite all this drama have led to China's sudden "helpfulness" in reaching a lame quid pro quo whereby the U.S. doesn't name China a currency manipulator in exchange for Hu Jintao's RSVP to the no-nukes pep rally and some underwhelming sanctions on Iran (that China will either be exempt from or ignore).

China generally expects & wants quid pro quos

Panda 11 (Jagganath, CN World Focus, 6-8, http://www.cnfworldfocus.org/index\_files/327.htm, accessed 7-2, JG)

But in the event, as it became clear that the UN role would be minimal and that the US intended to proceed even without releasing conclusive evidence to the public, and as civilian causalities mounted, China moderated this position and chose not to criticize the US publicly. China’s position on the concessions it expected in return for its support has also shifted over time. Some early statements indicated the expectation of a quid pro quo, whereby the US would offer “support and understanding” for China’s own anti-terrorism and anti-separatism activities. In other words, China expected the US to moderate its position on issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Falun Gong.

China is empirically looking for QPQ’s

Taipei Times 4 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/11/09/2003210334

Of late China believes it has acquired some leverage in the matter by its cooperation with the US on global terrorism, and by being not difficult on Iraq. More importantly, Washington needs China's active help to put a lid on North Korea's nuclear program. The US is not going anywhere much with North Korea on the nuclear question. China is believed to be the key to any kind of progress on the subject. But what is in it for China? It obviously wants a quid pro quo. And that quid pro quo is Taiwan. Beijing is not happy that its help on a range of US strategic objectives is not appreciated and rewarded. It has let known its displeasure, even hinting that this is not a blank check.

Say yes - Space

They'll say yes - China needs U.S technology designs to actualize their space exploration aspirations. They've modeled our technology in the past.

Wortzel 5 (Dr. Larry, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies of The Heritage Foundation, "The Rules of Engagement: The Russia Model." May, http://www.space.com/1102-rules-engagement-russia-model.html, AD 6/30/11) AV

China's state council has issued a space policy declaring that its space exploration will be for peaceful purposes, with a view towards commercial applications and technology development. This is a grand declaration, but really an empty one. After all, we know that both the Soviet Union and the United States consider the military use of space and military applications integral to their respective space programs. China has done the same and will continue to do so. Indeed, Dean Cheng, a researcher at the U.S. Virginia-based Center for Naval Analyses, in an October 2004 report, maintains that "China's entire space infrastructure is controlled by the People's Liberation Army." Two American companies were indicted for transferring controlled technology to China, with the intention of assisting with their civil satellite launch programs, but resulted in improving China's ability to release multiple warheads in space. Ultimately, these companies negotiated plea agreements with the United States government. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is designing a new generation of missiles with multiple warheads and penetration aids. China's military is also experimenting with directed-energy weapons that can kill satellites. In the realm of theoretical research, China is working on particle-beam weapons that can engage missiles in flight, as well as space bodies. Such weapons could operate from space. China has also assembled the elements of what could form a system of "microsatellites" capable of being used as kinetic energy weapons to destroy enemy satellites or jam them. Official Chinese publications such as the PLA's Jiefangjun Bao and the space industry's Zhongguo Hangtian have reported the research and development of what can constitute the elements of such a system. These are just a few of the reasons why careful technology controls are needed in dealing with China's space exploration and space programs. China has significant goals in space, devoting about a billion dollars between 2001 and 2005 to aerospace research and development. Beijing launched an ocean resource satellite {JC: WHEN?} and has a series of satellites that can conduct military reconnaissance, meteorology and communications missions. Although China has only one manned space flight to its credit so far, its manned orbital program aims to put two astronauts into space for three to five days within the next year. And China's long-term goals are to put people on the moon.

They will agree - modeling American space programs is necessary for their space aspirations.

SCCST 4 (Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, " Testimony of James Oberg: Senate Science, Technology, and Space Hearing: International Space Exploration Program." April, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12687, AD 7/1/11) AV

A major problem for China is that their top-down and tightly-focused space management strategy is extremely brittle, and vulnerable to unpleasant surprises and unpredicted constraints. This is because space technology often cross-fertilizes, and difficulties in one area find solutions in seemingly unrelated disciplines, in a manner that top level management is usually incapable of foreseeing. Although methodical and incremental approaches to programs such as Shenzhou have been successful, more advanced projects - particularly the CZ-5 booster - will require longer strides and may reveal the shortcomings of narrowly aimed management. That in turn may encourage more aggressive efforts to find the required technologies overseas. Beyond mere technology acquisition, China has implemented an extremely effective policy of extracting all usable lessons from other countries space experiences. This is the fundamental issue of engineering judgment, the day-to-day decision-making that propels a program to success - or, if not done properly, to frustration and disaster. The Chinese have studied the Soviet, the American, the Japanese and European and other programs intently, with the explicit goal of learning from them. NASA's culture in recent years, on the other hand, has looked overwhelmingly arrogant towards any outside expertise (even, or especially, from other US agencies, and sometimes actually between different NASA centers). Worse, it has shown itself incapable of even remembering fundamental lessons (such as flight safety) that an earlier generation of NASA workers had paid a high price to learn - only to have it forgotten and eventually (hopefully) re-learned.

Say yes - Space

The Chinese have an incentive to encourage U.S space exploration - they've copied foreign space exploration models in the past to improve their own space program

SCCST 4 (Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, " Testimony of James Oberg: Senate Science, Technology, and Space Hearing: International Space Exploration Program." April, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12687, AD 7/1/11) AV

China's Use of Foreign Space Technology A significant factor in China's success, and a major influence on its future space achievements, is the degree to which its program depends on foreign information. The manned Chinese spaceship used the same general architecture of both the Russian Soyuz and the American Apollo vehicles from the 1960s. The cabin for the astronauts, called a Command Module, lies between the section containing rockets, electrical power, and other supporting equipment (the Service Module) and a second inhabitable module, in front, to support the spacecraft's main function (for the Soviets, the Orbital Module, and for Apollo, the Lunar Module). So despite superficial resemblances and widespread news media allegations, the Shenzhou is in no way merely a copy of the Russian Soyuz - nor is it entirely independent of Russia's experience or American experience. Its Service Module, for example, has four main engines, whereas Apollo's service module had only one, and Soyuz has one main and one backup engine. Also, Shenzhou's large solar arrays generate several times more electrical power than the Russian system. And unlike Soyuz, the Chinese orbital module carries its own solar panels and independent flight control system, allowing it to continue as a free-flying unmanned mini-laboratory long after the reentry module has brought the crew back to Earth. On the other hand, one clear example of outright Chinese copying is in the cabin pressure suits, used to protect the astronauts in case of an air leak during flight (A much more sophisticated suit is used for spacewalks.) The Chinese needed a suit with similar functions, so after obtaining samples of Russia's Sokol design they copied it exactly, right down to the stitching and color scheme. Other hardware systems that are derived from foreign designs include the ship-to-ship docking mechanism and the escape system that can pull a spacecraft away from a malfunctioning booster during launching. Chinese officials have made no secret of such technology transfers. A lengthy article on Chinese space plans appeared in the Xinhua News Agency's magazine Liaowang in 2002: "After China and Russia signed a space cooperation agreement in 1996, the two countries carried out very fruitful cooperation in docking system installations, model spaceships, flight control, and means of life support and other areas of manned space flight. Russia's experience in space technology development was and is of momentous significance as enlightenment to China."

Modeling foreign space technologies is the most important focus of the Chinese space program - funding constraints and both profit and technological incentives.

SCCST 4 (Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, " Testimony of James Oberg: Senate Science, Technology, and Space Hearing: International Space Exploration Program." April, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12687, AD 7/1/11) AV

China's long-range strategy was laid out in a White Paper issued in 2000 by the Information Office of the State Council. It stated that the space industry is "an integral part of the state's comprehensive development strategy." And instead of developing a wide variety of aerospace technologies, China will focus on specific areas where it can match and then out-do the accomplishments of other nations. Further, China would develop all the different classes of applications satellites that have proven so profitable and useful in other countries: weather satellites, communications satellites, navigation satellites, recoverable research satellites, and earth resources observation satellites. It also will launch small scientific research satellites. A unique and highly significant feature of the Chinese space plan is its tight control from the top. As described by space official Xu Fuxiang in February 2001, "China's various types of artificial satellites, in their research and manufacture, are all under unified national leadership..." that will "correctly select technological paths, strengthen advanced research, and constantly initiate technical advances. We must constantly select development paths where the technological leaps are the greatest." Strict funding constraints require selecting "limited goals and focus[ing] on developing the ... satellites urgently required by our country," and on determining which satellites "are most crucial to national development." The Maoist-style "ideological idiom" for this is: "Concentrating superior forces to fight the tough battle and persisting in accomplishing something while putting some other things aside." The value of tackling difficult space technology challenges was explicitly described in Xiandai Bingqi magazine (June 2000): "From a science & technology perspective, the experience of developing and testing a manned spacecraft will be more important to China's space effort than anything that their astronauts can actually accomplish on the new spacecraft. This is because it will raise levels in areas such as computers, space materials, manufacturing technology, electronic equipment, systems integration, and testing as well as being beneficial in the acquisition of experience in developing navigational, attitude control, propulsion, life support, and other important subsystems, all of which are vitally necessary to dual-use military/civilian projects."

Say yes - Space

China will comply - given the lack of resources, the Chinese space program maintains a development approach that copies U.S technologies

Tellis 8 (Ashley, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, " China’s Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests." October, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=22595, AD 7/1/11) AV

Third, China’s space efforts are focused in multiple ways. To begin with, although some Chinese activities are intended to procure symbolic benefits that enhance the control or legitimacy of Communist rule, these gains are usually conceived of as positive externalities that derive from some other material benefits of exploiting space for specific economic, political or military aims. To that degree, Beijing’s space investments are in fact conservative. Given its relative under-development, China has consistently sought to avoid frittering its resources on showcase projects that provide few tangible gains, preferring instead to invest in those activities that provide highest value within what are acknowledged fiscal constraints. Given the desire to secure the most while spending the least, even more controversial initiatives such as the manned space program have been authorized mainly because it is expected that this effort would push the frontiers of innovation, create a new quality control culture across the space program, generate new demands for technical education, and produce spin-offs that would benefit the economy more generally. China’s space program is focused in other ways as well. Beijing abundantly recognizes that for all its impressive space achievements in recent years, it still operates in a milieu characterized by emerging political competition with a technologically dominant United States. Consequently, given the differences in cultural ethos, political systems and comparative advantage, the Chinese space program has deliberately avoided either replicating the American endeavor or attempting to compete with it across the board. Rather, Beijing’s space efforts have been characterized by two different orientations in this regard. To the degree that raising its technological standards to American levels is judged necessary, China has embarked on a quite calculated “buy, copy, or steal” approach in regards to procuring various critical technologies. Where competing with the United States is deemed necessary, China has focused its space programs not on mustering any comparable superiority but by aiming at Washington’s "soft ribs and strategic weaknesses ". In any event, and irrespective of the endeavor in question, Beijing’s space efforts have been marked by deliberation and purposefulness.

China will say yes – solves for weaponization

Walsh 7 (Frank, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld, "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System.", LexisNexis, accessed 7-2, JG)

Beijing would likely be willing to engage the United States if Washington was to seriously address the issue of banning ASAT weapons. The onus is thus on the United States to take China up on its offer to negotiate. The 2006 National Security Strategy correctly argues that the United States "seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people[.]" With respect to American space policy, this means that Washington should encourage Beijing to refrain from deploying ASAT weapons and to avoid a costly space arms race. The best way to do this is through a treaty that allows both China and the United States to cooperatively break out of the space weapons security dilemma.

Say yes – Tech Affs

China will say yes - they will trade militarization for access to U.S technology that will result from the plan

Stokes 3 (Mark A., Country Director for the PRC and Taiwan within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, " The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Space and Missile Development." http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=eb06339b-2726-928e-0216-1b3f15392dd8&lng=en&size582=10&ord582=grp2&id=100625, AD 7/2/11) AV

China’s space and missile industry and the PLA have been able to absorb lessons from the past that will guide its future development. China understands that it can not rely solely on indigenous development in order to achieve significant technological breakthroughs. After years of isolation, Beijing has opened up to the West and states of the former Soviet Union in the hope of attaining access to critical technologies. Organizationally, the PRC understands that reliance upon a sole source for R&D and production does not produce significant incentives for quality control and advancement in technology. For the PLA, the Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE provided valuable lessons on the utility of space for command and control, reconnaissance, weather, navigation, and other combat support functions.

Modeling foreign space technologies is the most important focus of the Chinese space program - funding constraints and both profit and technological incentives.

SCCST 4 (Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, " Testimony of James Oberg: Senate Science, Technology, and Space Hearing: International Space Exploration Program." April, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12687, AD 7/1/11) AV

China's long-range strategy was laid out in a White Paper issued in 2000 by the Information Office of the State Council. It stated that the space industry is "an integral part of the state's comprehensive development strategy." And instead of developing a wide variety of aerospace technologies, China will focus on specific areas where it can match and then out-do the accomplishments of other nations. Further, China would develop all the different classes of applications satellites that have proven so profitable and useful in other countries: weather satellites, communications satellites, navigation satellites, recoverable research satellites, and earth resources observation satellites. It also will launch small scientific research satellites. A unique and highly significant feature of the Chinese space plan is its tight control from the top. As described by space official Xu Fuxiang in February 2001, "China's various types of artificial satellites, in their research and manufacture, are all under unified national leadership..." that will "correctly select technological paths, strengthen advanced research, and constantly initiate technical advances. We must constantly select development paths where the technological leaps are the greatest." Strict funding constraints require selecting "limited goals and focus[ing] on developing the ... satellites urgently required by our country," and on determining which satellites "are most crucial to national development." The Maoist-style "ideological idiom" for this is: "Concentrating superior forces to fight the tough battle and persisting in accomplishing something while putting some other things aside." The value of tackling difficult space technology challenges was explicitly described in Xiandai Bingqi magazine (June 2000): "From a science & technology perspective, the experience of developing and testing a manned spacecraft will be more important to China's space effort than anything that their astronauts can actually accomplish on the new spacecraft. This is because it will raise levels in areas such as computers, space materials, manufacturing technology, electronic equipment, systems integration, and testing as well as being beneficial in the acquisition of experience in developing navigational, attitude control, propulsion, life support, and other important subsystems, all of which are vitally necessary to dual-use military/civilian projects."

Say yes – Development Affs

China will say yes - the only purpose of their ASAT research was to have the U.S develop space, which would allow China to rationalize their space development

Quam 7 (Erik, Graduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, " Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise?" February, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_85.html, AD 7/3/11) AV

Prior to the January 2007 test, much of the chatter by foreign analysts with regards to the then-suspected Chinese ASAT program revolved around China's reported use of ground-based lasers. In late 2006, U.S. government officials accused China's military of using a laser to blind U.S. satellites. Chinese analysts responding to these claims tended to attack the U.S. space weapons programs, without ever refuting the story. While discussing allegations of Chinese laser tests, Chinese analysts and writers focused heavily on the fact that the U.S. military had been working on a ground-based laser, and that such a system was already deployed in New Mexico, where a large space observatory is being used to research ground based ASAT laser systems.[5] One article goes as far as to say that "American criticism of Chinese ASAT technology is a pretext for [the U.S.] developing its own space weapons."[6] Chinese analysts have also cited the U.S. air force budget as evidence of U.S. ASAT and ground-based laser research, saying that the goal of ASAT research is for the U.S. to develop "highly capable laser weapons."[7] These accusations appeared aimed at not only bringing attention to the U.S. military space program, but also providing justification for China's development of similar systems.[8]

Say yes - Demilitarization

China wants bilateral militarization concessions – fears U.S. leadership

Martel & Yoshihara 3 (William, national security affairs @ Naval War College, Toshi, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn\_martel.pdf, accessed 6-29, JG)

Some Chinese observers point to U.S. efforts to militarize space as evidence of the U.S. ambition to establish unilateral hegemony. For example, in 2001, Ye Zhenzhen, a correspondent for a major daily newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that, “[a]fter the Cold War, even though the United States already possessed the sole strategic advantage over the entire planet, and held most advanced space technology and the most satellites, they still want to bring outer space totally under their own armed control to facilitate their smooth ascension as the world hegemon of the 21st century.” 11 Diplomatically, China has urged the use of multilateral and bilateral legal instruments to regulate space activities, and Beijing and Moscow jointly oppose the development of space weapons or the militarization of space. 12 The Chinese leadership’s opposition to weaponizing space provides evidence of China’s growing concern that the United States will dominate space. The United States’ avowed intention to ensure unrivaled superiority in space, as exemplified by the Rumsfeld Commission report, increasingly defines China’s interests in space. Chinese anxieties about U.S. space power began with the 1991 Gulf War, when the PRC leadership watched with awe and dismay as the United States defeated Iraq with astonishing speed. Beijing recognized that the lopsided U.S. victory was based on superior command and control, intelligence, and communications systems, which relied heavily on satellite networks. China’s obsession with national prestige, which forms the backdrop for its commercial and military interests, also animates the country’s space policy.13 The PRC government has long boasted about its status as one of the few major space-faring nations. Indeed, its manned space program has been driven largely by the desire to become the third nation, after the United States and the former Soviet Union, to launch humans into space. Success in China’s manned space program will confer a strong sense of national dignity and international status on the country, which are viewed as crucial elements to sustain the legitimacy of the Communist Party and replace its declining ideological appeal. This intangible yet powerful expression of Chinese nationalism partially explains why Beijing invests substantial national resources into its space program.14 Sources of Competition At the same time that the United States views space dominance as a fundamental tenet of its national security, China evidently views U.S. space dominance as a major threat to its geostrategic interests. These views inevitably breed a zero-sum competition, in which one side perceives any loss as a gain for the other, and could ultimately prove destabilizing for Sino-U.S. relations.

China will say yes if the United States proposes it – empirically proven

Hagt 6 (Eric, Director of the China Program @ CDI, 3-21, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2\_8.pdf, accessed 6-29, JG)

Assuming it is the former, the United States must engage China. It is true that if the United States sees China as a ‘bad actor’ or military peer competitor, the pressure not to engage is surely high. Yet, since the mid-1990s, China has shown itself increasingly receptive and even proactive in participating in arms control and nonproliferation regimes. Again, given China’s growing stakes in space as a tool of economic development, there is no reason to doubt China would not undertake a correspondingly earnest attempt to reach agreement and accommodation on military space.

**China wants agreement – feels threatened by space weapons**

Hitchens 3 (Theresa, Secretary General, "Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization.", accessed 6-29, JG)

Indeed, China has been pushing for a treaty on the non-weaponization of outer space since the late 1980s, driven in part by the United States Strategic Defense Initiative and its follow-ons. Chinese military officials also expressed concerns following the Persian Gulf War about the American military's ability to use satellites to amplify American military superiority on the ground in a way not seen before. According to Li Bin, director of CDI-Tsinghua Program on Cooperative Security in Beijing, Chinese arms control officials say they believe space weapons would be detrimental to world security, not just Chinese security.

Say yes - Demilitarization

China will agree to space weapon preventative negotiations as long as the U.S reciprocates.

Moore 9 (Mike, author, journalist, speaker, and research fellow at the Independent Institute, and former editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and former editor of Quill. "An Agenda for Obama: End America's Counterproductive Pursuit of Space Dominance," January 12th, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics\_online/0029.html, AD 6/29/11) AV

Over the past ten years, Russia and China in particular have expressed deep suspicion of America's drive toward space dominance, and they have repeatedly warned in diplomatic circles that they would not stand idly by as the United States builds a space-dominance capability. Will America's pursuit of space dominance trigger a space-related arms race? The conventional hard-line answer is that one is already underway, although evidence for this is weak. It centers on China's ASAT test in January 2007. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, China has been regularly identified in military circles and in certain influential think tanks as the Next Great Threat. To hardliners, the ASAT test proves that the Chinese talk peace while preparing for possible armed conflict. And yet, the Chinese test was of a relatively primitive "kinetic-kill" device, similar to one the United States tested in 1985 and then abandoned. China's test was more likely a shot across the bow. The United States had been dismissing Chinese efforts to get PAROS negotiations underway for years; the Chinese test may have been a warning: Get on with treaty talks or we will challenge you in space. In fact, the assertion that China seeks to challenge the United States in national-security space—or in any military field—doesn't pass the smell test. China learned a lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union: In a direct arms competition with the United States, the United States wins. Moreover, manufacturing consumer goods for export to the West drives China's economy and provides employment for tens of millions in a nation in which systemic unemployment is at dangerously high levels. A Cold War-style confrontation would sap China's economic vitality by diverting huge amounts of capital from manufacturing to China's arms industries, thus threatening China's main business, the Wal-Marting of America.  A quid pro quo relationship exists between Washington and Beijing. Washington is generally comfortable with the idea that China will continue to supply inexpensive products to U.S. consumers; in turn, China continues to help finance the growing U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of low-interest U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. Nonetheless, old habits of thought persist. China is forever suspicious of the United States; American "hegemonism" remains a powerful concern.

China will cooperate - they've consistently opposed space weaponization.

AFP 5 (Global News Agency, Beijing, " China Says It Opposes Militarization Of Outer Space." 5/19, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-05za.html, AD 6/29/11) AV

China Thursday said it is opposed to the militarization of space, and supports international legal documents ensuring its peaceful use. "Space is our shared treasure and we have consistently maintained the need for the peaceful use of space so as to benefit all of mankind," foreign ministry spokesman Kong Quan told a regular briefing. "We are opposed to the militarization of outer space. We support preventive measures, including the adoption of international legal documents to guarantee the peaceful use of outer space," he said. Kong's remarks came a day after the White House said it was updating its space policy while denying a report that the changes under consideration could lead to the fielding of offensive and defensive weapons in space.

China wants bilateral militarization concessions – fears U.S. leadership

Now is key – Ignoring an agreement forces China to challenge U.S. weaponization

Zhang 8 (Hui, Nuclear Expert @ Harvard, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/militarySpace.pdf, accessed 6-29, JG)

To respond to the move by the United States to deploy space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent space weaponization, as it now advocates. A feasible, focused agreement would ban the deployment of weapons in space and the testing of weapons in ASAT mode. If this effort fails and if the security threats China perceives to be legitimate are ignored, China would likely develop responses to neutralize these threats. Possible responses might include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defenses, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China’s commitments to arms control including participation in the FMCT and ratification of the CTBT.

Say yes - Demilitarization

China empirically wants a ban on militarization – same for over 20 years

Zhang 5 (Hui, Nuclear Expert @ Harvard, December, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943, accessed 6-29, JG)

Given the possibility of effective and cheap countermeasures, it seems foolish to many Chinese that the United States would bother to deploy highly expensive space-based weapons or anti-satellite technologies. If Washington really wants to reduce the potential vulnerability of its space assets, there are a number ways to improve space security, including technical approaches, rules of the road, and arms control agreements. By contrast, weaponizing space can only further worsen space security. As Hu emphasized recently, “[F]or ensuring security in outer space, political and legal approaches…can still be effective, while resorting to force and the development of space weapons will only be counter-productive.” In China’s view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be to agree on a ban on space weaponization. As its working paper to the CD emphasizes, “Only a treaty-based prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of the threat or use of force against outer space objects can eliminate the emerging threat of an arms race in outer space and ensure the security for outer space assets of all countries which is an essential condition for the maintenance of world peace.” China’s stance on banning weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985 when it first introduced a working paper to the CD on its position on space weapons. China’s most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasizes three basic obligations: Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects. Not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states, and international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this treaty.

China will agree to preventative conflict measures - they are seeking additional space treaties and they host peaceful space cooperation organizations.

Embassy of the PRC in the U.S 7 (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States, "Envoy: China committed to peaceful use of outer space," June 6th, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t327670.htm, AD 6/7/11) AV

China will as always continue to make its contributions to the peaceful uses of outer space, said Tang Guoqiang, head of the Chinese Delegation at the 50th Session of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), on June 6. It will also support and participate in the work of the committee under various items, said Tang, who is also the Chinese permanent representative to the UN and other international organizations in Vienna. Recognizing the exploration and use of outer space should serve peaceful purposes and seek benefits for mankind, Tang stressed the need to "adopt further measures to prevent an outer-space weaponization and an arms race." The year of 2007 marks the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as well as the 50th anniversary of the launch into orbit of the first man-made earth satellite. Hailing the 1967 treaty and four other outer space treaties, Tang said they "jointly constitute the existing international legal regime governing outer space" and have played a "positive and effective" role in "regulating national space activities, safeguarding national rights and interests in outer space, maintaining order in outer space and promoting international space cooperation". But these treaties have "apparent deficiencies" in "regulating the commercialization and privatization of space activities" as well as in preventing outer space weaponization and an arms race, he added. China is "in favor of making additions and improvements to the existing outer space framework through proper means without jeopardizing the basic principles of the existing space law," said Tang. In his speech, the Chinese envoy also elaborated on the latest developments and progress in China through international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Concerning China's role in the Asia-Pacific region in this field, Tang said that "as the host country to the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), China has been working to promote the convention of the organization." China will work closely with signatories to "make sure that APSCO is up and running at an early date so as to contribute to improving space cooperation among and the well-being of the people of Asia-Pacific countries," he added. "China stands ready to join with others in continued efforts in exploring and promoting ways and means of sustainable development in the peaceful uses of outer space," the Chinese envoy said.

Say yes - Demilitarization

**Both the U.S. & China want a treaty – economic incentives**

Walsh 7 (Frank, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld,"Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System.", LexisNexis, accessed 6-29, JG)

For the United States, maintaining the status quo condition of having no ASATs deployed is the optimal space policy. As described supra, the United States has a vested interest in protecting its satellites, and non-diplomatic solutions cannot protect America's space assets. An ASAT treaty, on the other hand, could prevent unrestricted space warfare and the indiscriminate targeting of American satellites. The benefits to the United States are not only military but economic as well, because the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into its civilian and commercial satellites. These benefits, when obtained via an ASAT treaty, would secure America's conventional dominance at a fraction of the cost of a space arms race. Thus, a policy of no ASAT deployment is America's optimal policy because it is the cheapest way to achieve the most beneficial space policy. China's optimal space policy is also the status quo because the current situation: (1) contains no deployed ASATs, and (2) space access is not challenged. The lack of an operational American ASAT benefits China because Beijing has invested heavily in satellites over the past fifteen years. In November 2000, China issued a White Paper on space policy saying: "the Chinese government attaches great importance to the significant role of space activities in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country ... The development of space activities is encouraged and supported by the government as an integral part of the state's comprehensive development strategy." The Chinese government followed up on this pledge with an ambitious plan that launched thirty-nine satellites in the past eleven years to give China the world's fourth largest satellite space program. With such an extensive investment in space, China stands to lose billions of dollars if it ever engaged in satellite warfare with the United States.

China will eschew militarization of space, but the U.S must agree to a space weapon prevention treaty as a quid pro quo.

Bowring 7 (Philip, writer for the New York Times and the Herald Tribune, "Beijing's satellite blast reverberates in Washington - Opinion - International Herald Tribune," January 21st, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/opinion/21iht-edbowring.4278807.html, AD 6/29/11) AV

HONG KONG — China's growing pride and self-assertion have over-reached themselves dangerously. Future historians may well see Beijing's use of a missile to destroy an old weather satellite as having more lasting global impact than the Iraq war. For the present, China's action has focused attention on a potential threat to U.S. security at least as great as any emanating from the Middle East. For now, the response of the United States and its allies will be confined to public statements and diplomatic protests. But the longer-term reaction in terms of threat perceptions and the technological and spending answers to them will be crucial and could be huge. Meanwhile, the missile event will not make it any easier for the United States and China to find a way out of tensions arising from their huge trade imbalance. In a narrow sense, China had every right to use one of its own rockets to destroy its own obsolete satellites. Beijing could argue that it was exercising its own right to unilateral action to protect its national interests in the same way that the United States has so often done during the Bush administration. The United States itself once destroyed old satellites and in August reiterated its opposition to a formal ban on space weaponry or on any restrictions on its space activities. But that is not the point. In the first place, China's action offends against the informal international understanding that had long existed to desist from sending weapons into space, and to avoiding filling space with the debris of exploded satellites that could put other satellites out of action. More important, it is awakening the United States to the vulnerability of its own assets in space and the economic as well as military dependence on their effective functioning. In other words, this could be the start of a new space race similar to that which followed the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 or the missile race of the 1980s, which ultimately bankrupted the Soviets. Of course, China is still far behind the United States in space capability. But why then tweak the American nose in this way? Was this just an exercise in national self-assertion? Or was it designed to show China's capability in order to extract U.S. concessions on other issues? Washington was aware of the potential to carry out such an action. What is new is the willingness of China to use that publicly. Of course, it may be that China will eventually agree to a moratorium on such actions — but presumably it would expect the United States to back down from its "star wars" missile-shield program or agree to an international treaty banning weapons in space as a quid pro quo. Some voices in the United States favor an international agreement.

Say yes - Demilitarization

China will agree - they strictly believe space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

NTI 3 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nonprofit organization committed to global security by reducing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, "China's Attitude Toward Outer Space Weapons." November, http://www.nti.org/db/china/spacepos.htm, AD 6/29/11) AV

According to China's public position, outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. China is officially opposed to any militarization of space, including (and perhaps especially) space-based missile defense systems. China has also made strong statements against any type of arms race, including arms races in space. In both the 1998 and 2000 white papers on national defense, China called for the creation of a multilateral mechanism to prevent an arms race in outer space. The 1998 White Paper stated that: "Outer space belongs to all mankind, and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes to benefit mankind. To this end, China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons deployed in outer space. It opposes the development of anti-satellite weapons. China maintains that the international community, the big powers with the capacity to utilize outer space in particular, should take the following realistic steps to prevent a weaponized outer space: A complete ban on weapons of any kind in outer space, including anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons, so as to keep outer space free of weapons; a ban on the use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from or to outer space; and all countries should undertake neither to experiment with, produce or deploy outer space weapons nor, to utilize outer space to seek strategic advantages on the ground, for example, using disposition of the important parts of ground anti-missile systems in outer space for the purpose of developing strategic defensive weapons. In addition, negotiations should be held as soon as possible for the conclusion of a legally-binding international agreement with the above-mentioned contents." The 2000 White Paper expressed similar opposition to the weaponization of outer space, adding that: "At present, there are intentions, plans and actions to pursue unilateral military and strategic superiority in, and control of, outer space. They are not only real but also growing. Therefore, it is realistic and urgent that the international community takes effective measures to stop such negative developments." Over a period of years, the international community has, for the purpose of promoting the peaceful uses of outer space and preventing an arms race there, drawn up a series of multilateral or bilateral legal instruments regulating State Parties' space activities. However, these instruments have not reflected the development of the most advanced aerospace technology today, and therefore are unable to effectively prevent the militarization of or an arms race in outer space. China believes that the most direct and effective way to achieve this purpose in the new century is to negotiate and bring into being a new international legal instrument, in addition to continued strict compliance with the existing ones.

China says yes - they are actively pushing anti-space militarization legislation.

NTI 3 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nonprofit organization committed to global security by reducing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, "China's Attitude Toward Outer Space Weapons." November, http://www.nti.org/db/china/spacepos.htm, AD 6/29/11) AV

China views current international legal instruments, such as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as inadequate to prevent an arms race in outer space. Consequently, China has proposed on numerous occasions the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc committee on the Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) at United Nations' Conference on Disarmament (CD). China wants the Ad Hoc Committee to be "an open-ended and all embracing mechanism within which all sides can freely express their own views." In a February 2000 Working Paper presented to the CD, China proposed that a legal instrument on PAROS include the following points: "Purposes: to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and to use outer space for peaceful purposes." "Basic obligations: not to test deploy or use weapons, weapon systems or components. Consideration could also be given to an article on 'permissible activities' thus helping to distinguish between activities that are prohibited and those that are not, and thereby safeguarding States Parties' lawful right to utilize outer space for peaceful purposes." "An article on definitions, providing clear definitions of the concepts mentioned, e.g. 'outer space', 'space weapons', 'weapon systems' and 'components of weapon systems'." "Provision for appropriate national implementation measures and the designation or establishment of organizations to ensure that States Parties implement the instruments consistently and effectively." "An article on international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space promoting international exchanges, technical assistance and cooperation for peaceful purposes so that all countries can share in the economic and technological benefits of scientific advances in outer space, and outer space truly serves all mankind." "Verification: we must first consider fully how technically feasible it is, and on that basis determine whether to use inspections or alternative means to prevent treaty violations." "Establishment of an appropriate mechanism for consultations, clarifications and resolution of possible disputes in order to appropriately address such suspicions and disputes as might arise among States Parties." "Appropriate, rational and workable confidence-building measures to enhance mutual trust among States Parties and forestall unnecessary suspicion about particular activities." "The procedural articles commonly found in international legal instruments dealing with amendment, length of validity, signature, ratification, entry into force, depository and authentic texts. These may of course also have to resolve some sensitive and key issues."

Say yes - Demilitarization

They'll say yes - they conditioned the ASAT deployment on the U.S' ability to engage in peaceful space missions.

Kulacki 7 (Gregory, Senior Analyst and China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists." February, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear\_weapons\_and\_global\_security/international\_information/us\_china\_relations/statement-on-chinas.html," AD 6/29/11) AV

Not only do isolated quotations from Chinese authors often tell little about the intentions of China's military and political leaders, they frequently fail to accurately convey the intentions of the Chinese authors themselves. For example, a quote from junior Chinese military officer that appears in a 2005 report by the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) was mistranslated in a way that made it appear that the author advocated deployment of ASAT weapons, when the officer's intention was to condition ASAT deployment on the outcome of international space arms control negotiations. In many cases, presenting quotes out of context distorts the meaning and loses information that is important for understanding the author's intent. Any action taken by the United States to address the threat posed by Chinese interest in anti-satellite technology should be preceded by an assessment of that interest that is as thorough and accurate as possible. For that to occur, policy-makers must recognize the limits of our current knowledge about China's military space programs and take steps to address it. It must adopt measures to create a significantly larger cadre of linguistically proficient and culturally competent analysts who can read Chinese language documents and interpret them correctly. It needs those analysts to look systematically beyond press reports and PLA writings to take advantage of the large amount of relevant Chinese-language literature on anti-satellite technology that is available. And, most importantly, it needs to require that analysts look not only at content but carefully assess the credibility and context of that content, and make that assessment part of their reporting of information. Regular exchanges between the U.S and Chinese government analysts responsible for collecting and analyzing information about their respective space policies and program could help facilitate the flow of accurate information. Personnel in these positions serve as gatekeepers who decide what information should be passed up the chain of command and how this information should be interpreted. Exchanges can play a critical role in developing the linguistic and cultural competence American analysts need to make accurate judgments, especially if they include significant periods of time in China. Even in the absence of a formal agreement with China regarding exchanges, the United States can make use of existing academic and professional exchange programs, as well as the funding mechanisms already in place, such as the National Security Education Program (NSEP) grants, to give more analysts more time in country.

They'll agree - the only reason they are weaponizing space is as a response to U.S offensive military capabilities

Sieff 7 (Martin, journalist for the United Press Internationalist, " BMD Focus: China`s ASAT shock." January, http://www.warandpeace.ru/en/commentaries/view/7809/, AD 6/29/11) AV

A report issued last month by the State Council, China`s Cabinet, said the country`s air force was giving priority to the development of new fighters as well as air and missile defense weapons. We have previously noted in these columns the complacency by almost all U.S. analysts about the development of China`s space war and asymmetrical warfare capabilities designed to neutralize the U.S. dominance in information technology and space-based military assets. China has been systematically organizing hundreds of factories, possibly thousands, in an immense missile-industrial complex to boost its manned space program and also its space military capabilities. There has been a strong tendency in the United States to dismiss that effort because in the short term it did not appear to be delivering any significant achievements. The Jan. 11 test, however, has shown that the Chinese tortoise may yet prove to be a significant challenger in these fields to the American hare. The Chinese ballistic missile, civilian space and asymmetrical warfare ASAT programs have all been marked by relatively, slow development punctuated by dramatic breakthroughs in capability after extensive preparations. This week`s successful ASAT test fits that well-established pattern. The test shook American doves too. Their argument that the United States could prevent the militarization of space by refraining from deploying its own space assets rested in large part on the assumption that China favored the diplomatic route. But now, as analyst Victoria Samson of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington think tank, noted in a CDI report this week, 'Due to the recent test, China now has lost much of its credibility in the international arena.' The Chinese do not appear to mind. They are clearly following the old principle that it is better to be respected and even feared for displaying one`s strength, than liked but despised for acting idealistically and well-meaning in a condition of weakness. The Jan. 11 test was a display of strength and defiance towards Washington. It was also a warning that China intends to work hard to dramatically expand the ASAT capabilities it has already displayed.

Say yes - Cooperation

China will agree - they are willing demilitarize space for U.S-Chinese cooperation

Cheng et. al 6 (Dean, Chinese Affairs, 8-6, http://www.highfrontier.org/Archive/hf/Finkelstein%20China's%20Space%20Program.pdf, accessed 6-30, JG)

Despite much recent talk of Chinese development of ASATs, the speaker noted that no ASAT facilities have been publicly identified. The speaker wondered whether this is because such facilities exist hut are hidden, or whether it is because they do not, in fact, actually exist. In this regard, it was observed that China is actively supporting efforts to prohibit ASAT technology, and at international negotiations and conferences has generally opposed the weaponization of space. The speaker further suggested that China's interests in space arms control were linked to preventing further advances in US missile defense capabilities, and that China is more concerned about forestalling US development of an ABM capability (especially one that had space-based components) than about necessarily limiting current space technologies and capabilities. In light of this, it was proposed that the United States and the PRC might find common ground in stopping the development of ASAT capabilities and promoting mutual transparency. Cooperation in this area would simultaneously protect US assets and help Chinese commercial efforts. Another suggestion was that the United States cooperate with the PRC in developing international norms, perhaps in such areas as orbital crowding and controls on debris. The speaker also raised the possibility of joint satellite tracking and joint development of space surveil-lance data. Given the American lead in space surveillance, the speaker suggested that the US might forestall Chinese development of an indigenous space surveil-lance system by sharing such data with Beijing… Moreover, US-Chinese space cooperation is unlikely to occur on its own terms. Rather, it likely would occur only as part of a "grand bargain" (a phrase that was specifically used) marking a broader, strategic-level change in US-Chinese relations. This change would require the perception that cooperation would he mutually beneficial—i.e., that the United States would gain something from the Chinese, as well as vice versa. From the US Government's perspective, it was suggested, space cooperation with the PRC is possible only if there is a quid pro quo. That has been a hallmark of both major ongoing US cooperative space efforts: those with Russia, and those with India.

Now is key – China views cooperation has an incentive to ban weaponization

Blair & Yali 10 (Bruce, President of the World Security Institute, Chen,Washington Observer, 5-24, http://www.chinasecurity.us/pdfs/Issue2full.pdf, accessed 6-30, JG)

Conversely, the continuing isolation of China’s space sector has the opposite effect, and may rejuvenate military influence. And although “China does not have the luxury to engage in a military competition with superpowers in space or in other areas,” Wu believes that “we now stand at the threshold of space weaponization” and urges the international community to act quickly “to establish a system of rules to manage and coordinate space activities.” The deployment of space weapons by any nation would cast a dark cloud over the future security of China and the world. The Chinese authors in this volume seem quite united in their view of the need to avoid crossing this threshold, and instead revive a spirit of international cooperation in space. That call, we believe, is sincere and places the ball in America’s court for now. China bears some responsibility, however, for clarifying its program, making its technologies as well as intentions more transparent, and encouraging both military and civilian policy analysts to study and debate publicly. China needs to address squarely how space will be used to strengthen its national security, and explain how exchanges and cooperation with the United States and others in space projects will not be exploited to obtain potential advantage over those partners. China and the United States should open new venues for dialogue at different levels, and build confidence through cooperation in apolitical matters such as data sharing in debris monitoring. The Chinese view of the paramount importance of the politico-strategic intentions behind space cooperation has merit. If China and other space-faring nations intend to pursue the peaceful use of space and seek cooperation for the benefit of mankind, then the time is ripe to reopen a constructive agenda of action as well as talk.

Say yes - Cooperation

Cooperation and banning space weapons go hand in hand

Gargasz 10 (Michael, U.S. Air Force, April, “We’ve Rattled Our Sabers…Now What?

The Future of US/China Space Relations”, accessed 6-30, JG)

Perhaps a change in strategy is necessary to prevent space war between the Chinese and the US and to avoid the crippling economic ramifications of such an endeavor. An alternative to a deterrent strategy is a strategy based on cooperation and engagement. This involves working together, interacting to understand each other’s desires and intentions, and negotiating future course of actions that are mutually beneficial. Actions that could take place in a cooperative US/China relationship include: negotiating bans on space-weaponry, agreeing to “rules of the road” or “codes of conduct” for operations in space20, cooperative programs, and military or civilian exchange programs. Certainly not all encompassing, these few examples each have obvious advantages and disadvantages for the US if a cooperative strategy was pursued. If the US were to negotiate a ban on space-weaponry, it would be a significant departure from historical behavior. The US has long maintained that it will not approve any “restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space.”21 So, what would the US gain from reversing course? One advantage of such an action would be the departure from the aggressive, unilateral path which the US is currently on.22 While viewed as the hegemon bent on dominating all warfighting mediums, the US has a very difficult time dealing with matters that require international collective action as its intentions are often viewed suspiciously. It addition to this bit of face saving in the international community, such an action presents the possibility of stemming escalation as well as potential cost savings.

Space cooperation is a key bargaining chip for an agreement with China

Moltz 6 (James, Department of National Security Affairs @NPS, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/109126/ichaptersection\_singledocument/73287b5d-6bb4-47d6-8fe6-72f0c25bc00b/en/Chap9.pdf, accessed 6-30, JG)

Civilian space cooperation between key space-faring nations—and especially between the United States and China—is critical to reduce the perceived “demand” for space weapons. A strict convention on the reduction of civilian- and military-produced debris is also essential. The CD should follow up on the efforts of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in this regard to ensure that a catch-all agreement is reached and that all states support these efforts, including existing holdouts such as India. With these initial steps in place, a treaty may well be possible in future years. The evolving Russian and Chinese position could be a useful starting point for such an agreement. The possible inclusion of an exception to allow for non-destructive interference with satellites during wartime (jamming) might help attract greater support from key constituencies within the US military, and thereby pave the way for future political acceptance by the US Senate and future US presidents. In conclusion, the above points demonstrate that there is a strong need for substantive international discussions on these and other issues affecting space security. With focused effort, the members of the CD can assist in creating new forms of space diplomacy, even in this difficult and uncertain period. Such cooperation and consensus building could lay the foundation for more formal space negotiations within the near future.

Say yes - Cooperation

China wants cooperation – would say yes to stopping weaponization of space

Lewis 9 (Lt. Col Brendan, Harvard, 4-23, “Aligning United States and Chinese Space Policies”, accessed 6-30, JG)

China is willing to ask for help. For example, a China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation official openly requested cooperation in Chinese space programs during the International Association of Space Safety in October 2005, and so did a China National Space Agency delegation during a presentation at the annual meeting of the National Space Society in Colorado in April 2006.366 The United States and China have both demonstrated sophisticated, anti-satellite capabilities within 13 months of each other. The Chinese ASAT demonstration in January 2007 and the U.S. anti-ballistic missile test, which shot down an errant satellite in low earth orbit in February 2008, described as a safety measure to keep the hydrazine fuel tank on board from poisoning anyone who might come in contact with it, if it struck the ground. Both countries have strong military incentives to deploy offensive counterspace capability. But the deployment would destabilize the space environment and in the long run is advantageous to no one. Although several countries possess the capability to participate in space warfare, this type of operation has never been exercised. Any attack against a satellite not owned by the attacker would be a first, and it is unlikely to be an isolated attack. The consequences of engaging in such a battle would be severe. It is possible that many low-Earth orbit assets could be affected, 72 depending on the scale of the attack, denying both military and civilian users the use of the satellites and their services, and the U.S. would be the biggest loser. For this reason, the United States is obliged to discourage hostile international parties from advancing anti-space capabilities, to deter them from using them if they do develop them, and to be prepared to both take action and minimize the consequences, should deterrence fail.367 Of the options available to the United States in dealing diplomatically with the growing influence of China in the space realm, cooperation has the best potential to increase the transparency of the Chinese program, and the resulting trust built between the two countries can reduce the competitive aspects that may lead to armed conflict. Cooperation was successful in giving the U.S. a view into the Chinese space program at the end of the 1990s, and could be productive again.

Cooperation is a reason to ban weaponization bilaterally

Krepon 5 (Michael, Space Scholar @ Univ. of Virginia, 4-11, http://www7.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/journal/Issues/sf04/Forum%20Krepon.pdf, accessed 6-30, JG)

Transparency measures must be sufficient to alleviate concerns over worrisome activities, particularly that military capabilities designed for other purposes are not being tested in ways that are virtually indistinguishable from preparations for space warfare. If states are sufficiently concerned about the weaponization of space, they will agree to significant, intrusive, and broad-ranging cooperative and transparency measures. Cooperative behavior could be codified in bilateral or multilateral executive agreements as well as in treaty form. Alternatively, cooperative behavior might result from quiet consultations that do not yield written accords of any kind. It makes sense to accomplish what is politically feasible and useful first, while still pursuing other avenues of cooperation in space that are not yet ripe for accomplishment.

Say yes - Cooperation

China will maintain a peaceful use of outer space with renewed U.S-China cooperation.

The White House 9 (Office of the Press Secretary, "U.S.-China Joint Statement." November, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement, AD 6/29/11) AV

The United States and China believe that bilateral cooperation on common global challenges will contribute to a more prosperous and secure world.  They reaffirmed their commitment made on 27 June 1998 not to target at each other the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control.  The two sides believed that the two countries have common interests in promoting the peaceful use of outer space and agree to take steps to enhance security in outer space.  The two sides agreed to discuss issues of strategic importance through such channels as the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and military-to-military exchanges. The United States and China agreed to handle through existing channels of consultations and dialogue military security and maritime issues in keeping with norms of international law and on the basis of respecting each other’s jurisdiction and interests.

China will stop space militarization for space cooperation with the U.S.

CNA 6 (CNA Corporation, Project Asia, "China's Space Program: Civilian, Commercial, & Military Aspects." May, http://www.highfrontier.org/Archive/hf/Finkelstein%20China's%20Space%20Program.pdf, AD 6/28/11) AV

US-Chinese space cooperation would have to be part of a strategic-level "grand bargain". Moreover, US-Chinese space cooperation is unlikely to occur only as part of a "grand bargain" (a phrase that was specifically used) making a broader, strategic-level change in US-Chinese relations. This change would require the perception that cooperation would be mutually beneficial - i.e., that the United States would gain something from the Chinese, as well as vice versa. From the US Government's perspective, it was suggested, space cooperation with the PRC is possible only if there is a quid pro quo. That has been a hallmark of both major ongoing US cooperative space efforts: those with Russia, and those with India

China is bargaining peaceful uses of space for U.S-China space cooperation

Cheng 9 (Dean, senior analyst at a not-for-profit think-tank who has been analyzing Chinese military and space developments for nearly two decades, "Beginning the journey of a thousand miles?." March, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1335/1, AD 6/30/11) AV

Given these pitfalls, what are the prospects for space cooperation between Beijing and Washington? If there is to be any chance of success, there are working-level and strategic level prerequisites that first must be satisfied. In the first place, it will require both sides to understand the other’s approach to negotiations. These are substantially different. The American approach, in the broadest sense, is one in which negotiations begin by establishing specifics or creating precedents. This is integral to the idea of confidence-building measures, with small steps leading up to larger, more encompassing efforts. The whole intent is the exact opposite, with American negotiators generally trying to avoid generalities in order to not become entangled in political differences. For Chinese negotiators, it is precisely the political and the ideological which must be first established. Thus, in general, Chinese negotiators seek first to establish sets of principles that will then govern and guide all subsequent efforts. One staple of Chinese international bargaining, for example, is the “five principles of peaceful co-existence”: Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty Mutual non-aggression Mutual non-interference in internal affairs Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence Once these principles are agreed upon, specific details are often left to lower-level officials—with the principles invoked whenever the specifics are seen as running counter to them. In essence, Chinese negotiators tend to adopt a “top-down” approach, with senior leaders focusing on broad principles, whereas American negotiators more frequently adopt a “bottom-up” approach, with working level officials focusing on concrete measures. Given the fundamental issues of trust (linked to opacity), these differences in approach to negotiations, and the lack of precedent in space cooperation between the two states, any effort at expanding cooperation will entail a strategic level decision on both sides to commit substantial political capital to this end. Moreover, in light of the concerns about technology transfer, industrial and military espionage, as well as the uncertainty of military-to-military relations, high-visibility projects, such as cooperation in manned space efforts, is likely to arouse substantial opposition. The recent incident involving a US Navy vessel south of Hainan will only exacerbate concerns and raise doubts about the desirability of extensive cooperation. It would seem, then, that setting the bar too high too early is only a formula for disappointment on both sides. And a failed effort at cooperation will only deepen suspicions on each side of the other’s intentions and viability as a future partner. Instead, it is far more likely to serve the interests of both sides to learn to crawl together before striving to (space)walk jointly. In light of the limited interactions between the two sides’ space programs, establishment of additional working groups between the two sides to foster dialogue is far more likely to create a payoff without engendering nearly the same level of opposition. Establishing common standards and procedures, for example, to facilitate interaction is less likely to entail revelations about manufacturing procedures and industrial processes. Such discussions would also allow each side to gain more familiarity with both the individuals and bureaucracies that constitute their counterpart. If the United States, in particular, is to engage in extensive, extended cooperation with the PRC in space, then it will be essential to know who their opposite numbers are, and where they fit into the larger scheme of the Chinese bureaucracy.

Say yes – U.S. Unilateralism

China wants the U.S to develop space infrastructure - it would allow them to rationalize developments of their own programs.

Pollpeter 5 (Kevin L., CNA Corporation and consistent writer for the Space Review, "The Chinese Vision Of Space Military Operations." December, http://www.defensegroupinc.com/cira/pdf/doctrinebook\_ch9.pdf, AD 7/3/11) AV

The similarity of the Chinese and U.S. visions of the military use of space suggests that at the same time that the U.S. Defense Department makes very public statements about threats to the U.S. space infrastructure, the need to control space, and the inevitability of space weaponization, 819 these statements are then used by the Chinese to justify the militarization and weaponization of their own space program. In a 7 February 2001 Liberation Army Daily article, one author writes that the United States “maintains that a space war is inevitable” and that through the use of space the “United States can occupy a commanding height in issuing a threatening signal to opponents to make them stop their threat of armed force, and thus reach its goal of ‘forcing the enemy to surrender without a fight.’” The author concludes: Space fighting is not far off. National security has already exceeded territory and territorial waters and airspace and territorial space should also be added. The modes of defense will no longer be to fight on our own territory and fight for marine rights and interests. We must also engage in space defense as well as air defense. 820 Consequently, the U.S. Defense Department may unwittingly be producing a security dilemma where its own efforts to protect its systems may be driving others to develop systems to counter U.S. space efforts. This may suggest, at the least, that Defense Department pronouncements about its vision for the use of space should not be made so public and, at the most, may require the U.S. Defense Department to examine how its actions may affect U.S. security

China says yes – They desire U.S. unilateralism as a pretext for their own expansionism

Hansel and Potter 9 (Cristina, Director of the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program and an adjunct professor at the Monterey Institute, and William, Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, "Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament." April, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op15/op15.pdf, AD 7/3/11) AV

Our analysis indicates that nuclear policy is at a critical juncture in both China and Russia. Both countries are engaged in modernization programs and are either considering (China) or have recently modified (Russia) their nuclear strategies to enhance reliance on nuclear weapons. The main drivers of these policies are associated with concerns over U.S. actions: • The overwhelming U.S. superiority in conventional weapons (particularly advanced precision-guided munitions) undermines traditional nuclear deterrence. • The United States is seen as having used force in a variety of circumstances over the past decade, often without UN Security Council authorization; this has created some unease in Russia and China over a possible U.S. role in existing or potential regional conflicts (for example, a clash over Taiwan or a conflict similar to Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia over South Ossetia). • Russia and China perceive U.S. missile defense plans as potentially harming their ability to deter a U.S. strike. The U.S. justification for missile defenses—the need to intercept missiles launched by “rogue” states such as Iran and North Korea—is not regarded as credible in Beijing or Moscow. • The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review issued by the George W. Bush administration created the impression that the United States plans to integrate nuclear weapons into an array of other military assets and lower the nuclear threshold.

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves

A bilateral treaty or a formal code of conduct are the only effective methods to promote peaceful cooperation in space

Van Ness 10 (Peter, Asian Perspective, " The Time Has Come For A Treaty

To Ban Weapons In Space." November, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf, AD 7/2/11) AV

An arms race in space among the major powers would be immensely dangerous, destabilizing, and expensive. Russia, which has a long history in space technology dating back to Sputnik in 1957, does not today have the resources or the political will to sustain such a race. But China does. This is principally an issue between the United States and China. Some analysts say that it is too late to conclude a treaty to ban weapons in space, but others argue that if a treaty cannot be negotiated, then perhaps a code of conduct might work. It is in the interests of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China—and the world, for that matter—that the weaponization of space be stopped. On June 28, President Obama announced a New National Space Policy with a central goal “to promote peaceful cooperation and collaboration in space,” and he invited arms control proposals to help make that happen. 1 We must take advantage of this opportunity.

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Bilateral legal agreements are necessary to prevent weaponization - and China will say yes

Hui 5 (Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, " Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective." http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?focusid=94&charid=1, AD 7/2/11) AV

In China's view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be to agree on a space weaponization ban. Ambassador Hu stated, "If any country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the prevention of space weaponization, as suggested by China… Such a legally binding international treaty will be the best tool to safeguard the interests of all sides."23 China's stance on banning weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985, when it first introduced a working paper to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD). China's most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasizes three basic obligations: (1) Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; (2) Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; and (3) Not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.24 In recent years, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for the CD to begin negotiations on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) with an overwhelming majority of support. However, John Bolton, then U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and non-proliferation, told the CD: "the current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. We see no need for new agreements."25 Many Chinese leaders believe Bolton is wrong. There are no existing treaties that effectively prevent the testing, deployment and use of weapons, other than those of mass destruction, in outer space. In addition, none of these instruments covers the threat or use of force from Earth (land, sea and air) against objects in outer space. The history of proliferation has taught us that banning the testing and deployment of weapons from the outset is much more effective than attempting disarmament and nonproliferation after the fact.

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves

A formal agreement is necessary to prevent a conflict in space

Van Ness 10 (Peter, Asian Perspective, " The Time Has Come For A Treaty

To Ban Weapons In Space." November, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf, AD 7/2/11) AV

Here are some preliminary thoughts about a design. A Global Commons in Space A Sino-American agreement might begin with a joint declaration to protect and to sustain what is currently a global commons in space, one to be enjoyed by all the world’s people. The Union of Concerned Scientists reports that, as of April 2010, there are some 928 operating satellites in space, 437 of which are U.S.-owned, fifty-eight are owned by China, and ninety-five are owned by Russia. 13 At least 115 countries own a satellite or a share in one. The United States is obviously the greatest beneficiary, but virtually all countries benefit from the communication, surveillance, or geo-positioning functions of the existing earth satellites. However, the present arrangement in space is vulnerable to disruption or even destruction if there were ever to be a serious conflict in space. Debris from destroyed satellites might create a “collisional cascading effect” that could endanger the entire system. 14 Estimates of current space debris run as high as 600,000 objects of larger than l centimeter in diameter. As an example of the continuing dangers of space debris, Russian officials in July 2010 were reported to be warning about the threat to astronauts in the International Space Station from debris produced by the 2007 Chinese ASAT some three and a half years earlier. 15 So from a positive perspective, we should propose to affirm a global-commons approach, keeping in mind that, if an agreement cannot be reached, a conflict in space could destroy the major benefits, both commercial and military, that we now enjoy, plus the potential benefits of future development. This would be an immense loss: all the ways that we communicate with each other today, the way that we navigate, and of course the way that governments spy on each other. Proponents of weaponizing space have not yet taken into account the full dimensions of this serious risk.

Cooperation to avoid an escalatory U.S-China conflict will have to begin with a formal bilateral agreement.

Lewis 7 (Jeffery, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Hit-To-Kill” And The Threat To Space Asset." April, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2673.pdf, AD 7/2/11) AV

Several partial measures have been proposed which would mitigate the danger to space assets from the spread of hit-to-kill technology without attempting to prevent what appears now to be an inevitable development in military affairs. • One proposal, under discussion at the Union of Concerned Scientists, is a ban against debris-creating kinetic energy tests, which would limit hit-to-kill testing against sub-orbital objects. • A second proposal, raised initially by Donald Hafner and Bhupendra Jasani in the late 1980s, would be to ban “high-altitude” ASAT testing. 2 • A third proposal, by Geoff Forden, would places limits on the speed at which one object in orbit may approach another. 3 These proposals might not eliminate latent ASAT capability, but they could improve the security of the most vulnerable assets—reducing the escalatory potential of any Chinese–US crisis. An agreement would very likely require a parallel discussion between Washington and Beijing on broader issues concerning the relative impact of strategic modernization programmes in both states. These agreements have three other practical advantages that are worth considering: • First, each proposal avoids the problem of restricting US missile defence programmes. Just as ASAT technologies were once seen as a way to circumvent the now-defunct ABM Treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) negotiations have become seen in the United States as a way to resurrect the ABM Treaty and block the deployment of missile defences. Although I believe the United States should take steps to address concerns among China’s leaders about our missile defence programmes, using PAROS as an agenda item is likely to result in agreements on neither the military uses of outer space nor missile defence. • Second, a ban on debris-creating ASAT tests would be verifiable without intrusive measures. Indeed, US policy makers believe that the US intelligence community was able to monitor the development of China’s ASAT programme quite effectively. • Third, a ban on debris-creating ASAT tests avoids thorny problems of definition that emerge when we conceive of the problem much more broadly. Although such an agreement resembling one of the proposals listed here would do little to address the underlying security dynamics that often prove decisive in such matters, even a partial agreement would initiate the process of dialogue upon which we could work together to build a more sustainable space environment, perhaps in the form of a code of conduct or “rules of the road”

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves

A formal code of conduct is the necessary first step towards banning space weaponization

Van Ness 10 (Peter, Asian Perspective, " The Time Has Come For A Treaty

To Ban Weapons In Space." November, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf, AD 7/2/11) AV

A viable agreement would have to be built on the realities of the existing situation in which neither China nor the United States would be willing to give up its ICBMs, and the United States would be most unlikely to close down its existing missile defense systems. The initial focus should be on banning spacebased weapons, and if reaching agreement on a treaty would seem to be too difficult at his point, we should then, as several analysts have suggested, try to identify the key elements of a “code of conduct” as a first step.

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves

Only a bilateral, reciprocal reduction solves – Ad hoc cooperation is too risky and chaotic

Krepon et. al 8 (Michael, Space Scholar @ Univ. of Virginia, Eric Hagt, Shen Dingli, Bao Shixiu, Michael Pillsbury & Ashley Tellis, 9-8, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396330801899512, accessed 6-30, JG)

However, China's good intentions do not mean the United States can continue to treat Beijing as an unequal partner, especially when national sovereignty is in jeopardy. Dependence is mutual and respect has to be reciprocal. When China's national security is seriously undercut, Beijing has to respond. America helped found the United Nations, but has been violating its Charter by not respecting China's sovereignty, and by many other actions, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan. So China's development of national defence to defend its legitimate security is completely warranted. China is weaker than America, in economic size and defence spending, but it can take action when its vital security interests are at stake. Beijing sent its voluntary force to the Korean Peninsula half a century ago, after the United States first bombed Manchuria. When the United States voiced threats of a nuclear strike, China responded by developing its own nuclear weapons, despite its scarce resources in the 1950s. China's nuclear weapons have provided defence for China (at least the mainland) for decades. China has campaigned for the total elimination and complete destruction of such deadly weapons. Obviously, the United States is not in a position to dismantle its nuclear weaponry and China's call is futile. But, if all nuclear weapons on Earth were destroyed, China might gain more security than it loses, as it has invested far less than America and its nuclear technical abilities are less competent. China would still suffer conventional inferiority in a nuclear-weapons-free world, but the technical gap with America is narrower now than during the Korean War, when Beijing's less technically capable voluntary force held its own. When Beijing creates the right institutions, the talents of 1.3 billion people can be formidable. Now comes the age of missile defence and space weaponisation. No nation should be deprived of the right to self-defence, whether through missile defence or otherwise. The United States is lucky to have such a patient partner as China, but Beijing can not depend for its security on the mercy of another. When an America with both superior nuclear and conventional arsenals aspires to build missile defence, China's response is first to oppose it verbally, then counter it with action if the United States refuses to stop. China cannot afford to lose the effectiveness of its still-limited nuclear deterrent. The cost should never be a worry for Beijing, as Washington might eventually lose a defence-offence race; effective defence is far more costly on the ground. This picture could be blurred if the United States militarises space. With space-based sensors and weapons platforms, US military capability will be many times amplified. For a benign and peace-loving country to acquire this capacity might be acceptable, if it truly upholds ‘peaceful purposes’ and ‘benefits of all humanity’, but US actions regarding Taiwan lead a majority of Chinese to reject the idea, and the invasion of Iraq has alienated the United States from many other countries. The world respects America's right to national security, but cannot accept its militarisation of space for its security, as there would be no way to stop it if it decided to promote its security at the cost of another. Therefore, absent an agreement to contain space weaponisation, there needs to be a space balance of force to assure a new type of security stability. A China that can preserve its deterrence, whether from the surface of the Earth or outer space, is an asset to the world, if there is no way to dissuade America. It is understandable that others suspect China's long-term strategic intentions, but China welcomes others to check and balance it through a multipolar structure. The world can rest assured that China does not aspire to be a new sole superpower; the rise of China reinforces peace as it checks and balances other actors if they behave irresponsibly. The recent reports on US space policy and its equivalent often declare that the United States ought to have the capacity to bar other states from access to space should Washington decide to do so. Such rhetoric is imperialistic. To be sure, the United States deserves legitimate security, as does any country. But the United States, as any other state, should not get its security at the cost of others. America is welcome to tap space for peaceful purposes; but so are all other states. If the United States finds value for its security from the use of space, it is not entitled to disallow others from using space the same way. If the United States considers that its military use of space is for peaceful purposes, as it has a right to self-defence and it is a benign country, then other states are entitled to the same reasoning and to access space militarily for peaceful purposes, especially when their legitimate national interest are already undermined by America. Countries are equals; neither the United States nor China nor any other nation is superior. On the surface of the Earth, the United States has hurt China's legitimate interests rather than the other way around. China has responded with a moderate nuclear deterrent to attain a certain assurance and has tried to emphasise where it can cooperate with America for the global good. The United States tends to have a short memory: when it bluffed China with nuclear weapons, China responded in kind. Though China is still far behind America, Beijing is a little wealthier these days. If Washington aspires to dominate space, it may discover that Moscow, Beijing and perhaps New Delhi will stand it its way. All of them would join Washington in its professed fundamental goal: the use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. But if America deviates from this noble task, and this is not unlikely, they will help America stick to its previous benign objectives. So, welcome Beijing. Space arms control remains a goal for Beijing. The next US administration could also be more cooperative internationally. Nevertheless, if it or any other government refuses to cooperate for collective security, Beijing will insist that space is for all, and China has an equal right to use it for peaceful purposes. China will not threaten others, but will develop means for being less threatened itself.

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves

Bilateral measures are best – confidence building

Zhang 6 ([Hui,](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/13/hui_zhang.html?back_url=%2Fpublication%2F754%2Fspace_weaponization_and_space_security.html%3Fbreadcrumb%3D%252F%253F%28none%29&back_text=Back%20to%20publication) Harvard University's, Project on Managing the Atom, "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective", China Security, Vol 2, Issue 1, accessed 6-30, JG)

At this stage, it would be difficult to persuade the United States to alter its ballistic missile defense plans, as the GMD system is already being deployed. The United States would, no doubt, refuse such a broad ban. In fact, it is unrealistic to expect that the United States will accept any negotiations on space weapons in the near future. The United States is unlikely to return to anything like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – instead, it will seek to retain the right to build and operate at least a ground-based missile defense system. If China wants to move beyond mere complaints towards an actual agreement, then it will have to consider proposals that might conceivably be acceptable to the United States. To overcome the deadlock at CD and to reduce the concerns of both the United States and China, a minimum-scope space weapons ban (the “focused approach”) with some bilateral confidence-building measures could be a practical first step. This approach could include the following two core elements: Banning the testing and deployment of any weapons in outer space, including space-based kinetic energy weapons, space-based directed energy weapons, and any other space-based weapons for attacking space-, ground-, sea-, or air-based targets. This would rule out space-based missile defense and ASAT systems. Banning the testing and deployment of any “dedicated” ASAT weapons. This would include any strike system – whether ground-based, sea-based, air-based or space-based – against orbiting satellites. Subsequently, what is the likelihood of both the United States and China considering a “focused approach” to space weapons? The U.S. Side The United States would likely find a focused approach more acceptable than a broad approach. While it bans space-based weapons and ASATs, the former would allow deployment of the GMD system that composes the central part of the Missile Defense Agency’s current budget and development efforts. In practice, as a number of studies show, there is no rationale for the U.S. to deploy space weapons and ASATs.28 For example, an enormously expensive space-based interceptor system for missile defense would be intrinsically vulnerable to a number of cost-effective ASAT attacks and be overwhelmed by the simultaneous launch of several missiles from a compact area.29 Moreover, the negative impacts of using space weapons for other military missions – protecting satellites, denying the hostile use of space to adversaries and projecting force – would far outweigh the benefits, since the utility of space weapons is limited by three main factors: high cost, considerable susceptibility to countermeasures, and the availability of cheaper, more effective alternatives.30 Furthermore, a space-based BMD system would inevitably encourage other countries to pursue ASATs as countermeasures. Thus, a space weapon ban would reduce the proliferation of ASATs. It would reduce the risk of a “space Pearl Harbor” for other military and civilian satellites. As many experts in the U.S. point out, given the heavy dependence of the United States on its space assets, “the United States has more to lose than to gain by opening the way to the testing and deployment of ASATs and space weapons.”31 The United States is now more dependent on satellites to perform important military functions than any other state. By placing weapons in space, the United States could stimulate others to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against U.S. space assets. It would be very difficult for the United States to maintain unchallenged hegemony once space is weaponized. The current U.S. military advantage in space instead would be lost, or at a minimum degraded, by weaponization. Further, space weaponization would threaten U.S. civilian and commercial assets by making them far more vulnerable than they are today. The U.S. economy and society are highly dependent on the applications of commercial satellites. In short, as Richard Garwin and his co-authors point out: “A regime that effectively prohibits the deployment of space weapons and the use of destructive ASATs before they can destroy U.S. or other satellites would be a smart, hardnosed investment in U.S. national security, but would require U.S. leadership.”32 It is clear that the United States still has time for serious re-consideration of its space activities. While current funding requests from the Bush administration show continued interest in space-based weapons systems, the actual level of funding is small and these weapons remain in the conceptual and research stages. At the current speed of development, for example, the planned space-based BMD system would not reach fruition until around 2020. China’s Point Of View From the Chinese perspective, a non-space-based BMD system would be less threatening to national security than a space-based one. Countermeasures for mid-course missile defense systems would be less expensive and easier for China to develop. These include decoys, anti-simulation measures33 and an increase in warheads capable of penetrating such a defense system. However, as many scientists point out, a robust, global-coverage BMD system would have to include boost-phase missile defense.34 From the Chinese perspective, a U.S. space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would pose the greatest threat of all. This is due to the fact that at boost phase, the missile defense system would have fewer targets; the target ICBM would be much larger than the normal re-entry vehicle; the target would be much more fragile than a re-entry vehicle; and the target would be easily detectable due to the bright plumes of the burning booster. A non-space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would not be able to cover China’s ICBMs. In fact, an ICBM at an altitude of 200km can be detected within a range of 1,600km by a sensor on the ground, and within 2,000km by a sensor at an altitude of 15km. Because of China’s vast area, the United States would have to destroy a Chinese missile in boost-phase from space.35 As such, even a limited ban on space weapons would significantly reduce the threat for China from U.S. missile defense systems, assuming that Chinese military planners have confidence in countermeasures for midcourse missile defense systems. Other bilateral confidence-building measures between the United States and China would facilitate China’s consideration of a “focused approach” to space weapons negotiations. These measures might include: (1) A U.S. acknowledgment of the seriousness of China’s concerns, including an assurance that a U.S. missile defense system will not target China; (2) A U.S. pledge to adopt a bilateral no-first-use policy toward China, following the example of similar Chinese and Russian policies; such a policy would ease China’s major concern about the possibility of a U.S. preemptive strike; (3) The clear exclusion of Taiwan in the U.S.-Japan joint theater missile defense plan, and a U.S. move to block the sale of such systems to Taiwan; (4) A limitation on the scale and scope of the envisioned U.S. non-space-based BMD architecture, including placing a limit on the number of missile defense interceptors and restricting the scope of the overall system to the minimum required for dealing with rogue threats.

A2: Plan = Modelling – Transparency Solves

Only transparency solves miscalc conflicts

Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth, received his master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law, " Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Spring, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf, AD 6/29/11) AV

Third, the United States should demand greater transparency in Chinese military planning, especially with regard to ASAT and space-focused programs. Such transparency, long sought by US defense officials, would reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts over speculative intelligence and give the United States greater insight into how military decisions are made (and whether China indeed suffers from a stovepiped bureaucracy). I argue that progress in each of these three areas would represent a greater security gain than proceeding with the weaponization of space. If the United States is able to negotiate a quid pro quo in one or all of these areas in return for a commitment not to weaponize outer space, the agreement would represent a clear US net security gain.

A bilateral and transparent U.S-China treaty is necessary to prevent weaponization - the U.S must act first.

Hagt 6 (Eric, director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, " Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities in Space." www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2\_8.pdf, AD 7/1/11) AV

China’s consideration of hedging strategies to counter the United States in space in turn further drives U.S. military space plans in the direction of a weaponization strategy – thus entrenching a security dilemma. This impasse can be ameliorated by greater transparency regarding both capabilities and intention. Transparency, however, is conceived differently by the Chinese and American sides, with the former focusing on underlying strategic objectives, and the latter, capabilities. It is vital that both countries work to enhance communication regarding their programs, bilaterally and within international forums. However, as the nation with vastly superior capabilities in space, America must first confront the central issue upon which the possibility of transparency and greater cooperation with China rests: Does the United States intend to control space?

A2: Plan = Modelling – Spillover

Formal Sino-American space cooperation spills over - allows scientific and commercial cooperation which increases trade and solves disease.

Wortzel 5 (Dr. Larry, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies of The Heritage Foundation, "The Rules of Engagement: The Russia Model." May, http://www.space.com/1102-rules-engagement-russia-model.html, AD 6/30/11) AV

Sino-American Space Cooperation There are a couple of natural constituencies in the United States for Sino-American space cooperation. Within the government, the Department of Commerce would probably argue that such cooperation is a natural component of existing scientific and commercial cooperation protocols between the United States and China. The Department of Commerce would probably find natural allies in some of the bureaus of the Department of State for this generous position with respect to China. In U.S. industry, satellite manufacturers would likely want to take advantage of the cheaper launch services China offers, as they did in the 1990s. And technology research and development firms might seek outside markets by supplying hardware or services to China. These constituencies would probably seek to weaken any export controls placed on space technology by the Department of Defense or U.S. intelligence agencies. But the best approach is a cautious one. Some of China's actions on the earth's surface, and below the sea, are worrisome. China has violated the territorial waters of Japan in undersea exploration. China has challenged the nations of Southeast Asia on the delineation of borders and undersea resources. It would be foolhardy to design a program with China that would alarm friends and allies in Asia. Nonetheless, within the context of the existing ISS program, there are a number of things that can be done with China. Research on the nature of proteins and enzymes useful for possible disease treatments and new drug development can be carried out in cooperation with China. Here, China must demonstrate that it will honor intellectual property rights agreements if it is to be allowed to participate in such programs. The same is true of the types of tissue culture and flames, fluids and metal interaction experiments that are carried out in the ISS. Basic research in these areas--provided China is a contributor and not a consumer of research--is something the ISS partners, including the U.S., could explore. The ISS project already involves Canada, Japan, the European Space Agency, the United States and Russia. Brazil and Italy are also contributing to the station. Thus, there is room here to include China when its own programs are ready to permit cooperation with others. Cooperation with China in space also offers unique opportunities to observe China's intentions in space, monitor its activities, and develop international legal protocols.

**A formal agreement ratchets up defense cooperation**

Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth, USAF, Spring, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf, accessed 6-29, JG)

I recommend that the United States accept a commitment to forgo placement of weapons in outer space. The costs of space weaponization simply outweigh the benefits. Above, I argue that China would respond to US space weaponization with some level of military buildup. In the least, this response would include the deployment of a more robust ASAT system capable of attacking and potentially eliminating space weapons. 52 After all, space weapons, like military satellites, make for vulnerable military targets. 53 The use of space-based weapons in a conflict must be discounted by the likelihood that they would be eliminated by Chinese ASAT attack. More importantly, increased ASAT deployment would have the counterproductive effect of exposing US satellites to greater threat. Aside from ASAT issues, Chinese response to US space weaponization would include an increase in China’s ICBM fleet and nuclear arsenal. Vertical proliferation cannot be in the interests of the United States, if only for the increased peacetime risks of accidental launch or the terrorist risk associated with increased availability of weapons technology and components. Finally, the United States should not discount the possibility, often cited by opponents of space weaponization, that the deployment of US space weapons would instigate a space arms race. These costs must be weighed against the benefits of space weapons championed by advocates of space weaponization. Despite their relatively open exposure to ASAT attack, some space weapons do provide significant military capability. One question, however, is whether the military benefit of space weapons, for example a long rod penetrator, is much greater than the benefit provided by terrestrial or Air Force weapons. A second reason for US commitment not to place weapons in space is the negotiating leverage such a concession would provide. Of course, such leverage cannot be taken for granted. Rather, agreement not to weaponize outer space could be loosely conditional on making progress in other areas of US security.

CP Solves – Militarization

Bilateral agreement checks space conflict

Shen 9 (Dingli, MIT, Winter, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower\_Center\_for\_Space\_and\_Defense\_Studies/Journal\_Vol\_2\_No\_2\_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202\_3.pdf, accessed 6-30, JG)

At political level, China and the U.S. should re-affirm that space will be preserved only for peaceful purpose of all mankind. At present, both sides shall freeze space weapons programs at current levels in a transparent way. Such a commitment would not cut U.S space defense programs and would help assure that China would not make progress in this regard. The U.S. has been worrying that China could challenge America’s space dominance by laser blinding of space sensors, disrupting space-based communications, and launching ASAT weapons to destroy orbital satellites. China shall benefit in a similar fashion. President Obama would run a major risk in his Presidency if he would push American missile defense and space weapons programs forward. In doing so, Obama could pressure countries like China to respond in kind and they could afford such response financially and technically. Eventually, America would not end with a safer world, but open up outer space as a new frontier to militarily compete. This would be a strategic mistake as America might not be able to sustain its space dominance in the new century anymore

Only the CP solves

Hays 11 (Peter, senior policy analyst supporting the plans and programs division of the National Security Space Office, "Space Law and the Advancement of Spacepower." June, http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch28.html, AD 7/2/11) AV

History suggests there is a very important role for militaries both in setting the stage for the emergence of international legal regimes and in enforcing the norms of those regimes once they are in place. Development of any TCBMs for space, such as rules of the road or codes of conduct, should draw closely from the development and operation of such measures in other domains such as sea or air. The international community should consider the most appropriate means of separating military activities from civil and commercial activities in the building of these measures because advocating a single standard for how all space activities ought to be regulated or controlled is inappropriately ambitious and not likely to be helpful. The U.S. Department of Defense requires safe and responsible operations by warships and military aircraft but they are not legally required to follow all the same rules as commercial traffic and sometimes operate within specially protected zones that separate them from other traffic. Full and open dialogue about these ideas and others will help develop space rules that draw from years of experience in operating in these other domains and make the most sense for the unique operational characteristics of space. Other concerns surround the implications of various organizational structures and rules of engagement for potential military operations in space. Should such forces operate under national or only international authority, who should decide when certain activities constitute a threat, and how should such forces be authorized to engage threats, especially if such engagements might create other threats or potentially cause harm to humans or space systems? Clearly, these and a number of other questions are very difficult to address and require careful international vetting well before actual operation of such forces in space. Finally, consider the historic role of the Royal and U.S. Navies in fighting piracy, promoting free trade, and enforcing global norms against slave trading. Should there be analogous roles in space for the U.S. military and other military forces today and in the future? What would be the space component of the Proliferation Security Initiative and how might the United States and others encourage like-minded actors to cooperate on such an initiative? Attempts to create legal regimes or enforcement norms that do not specifically include and build upon military capabilities are likely to be divorced from pragmatic realities and ultimately be frustrating efforts.6

CP Solves – Verification

The ban has a technologically feasible verification process – studies prove

Baines & McDougall 2 (Phillip & Robert, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, " http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/38953/ichaptersection\_singledocument/6A4C39D3-7429-42BB-8FBB-FB1C9E051FB7/en/04\_McDougall.pdf., accessed 7-1, JG)

One option within the range of possibilities in this regard is a convention to ban space-based weapons - defined as damage causing mechanisms (not associated elements such as sensors or command and control) actually based in space (not just transiting, like missiles or space planes). Space-based weapons as thus defined are not the only threat to space assets (as noted earlier), but a ban on such weapons represents a useful place to start and a fairly straightforward expansion from the current prohibitions in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Considerable work has also been done on the issue of verification of such a ban, including the Canadian PAXSAT study in the mid-1980s, leading to the conclusion that the technical means for such verification existed -- given the necessary political will. The passage of time since then has only reinforced this observation; recent developments in space surveillance and situational awareness linked to non-weapons missions in space have already greatly enhanced the means available to distinguish a weapon from an otherwise benign space object.

CP Solves – Globally

Strengthening formal space treaties and employing a formal code of conduct will ensure that others model U.S space policy

Krepon 5 (Michael, Project Director at the Henry L. Stimson Center, "Space Security or Space Weapons." http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Stimson\_Space\_brief.pdf, AD 7/2/11) AV

The United States is the world’s most powerful standard setter. If Washington takes the lead in testing and deploying space weapons, others will surely follow. Then we will have no assurance that satellites will be available when needed. Space Assurance requires continued respect for the sanctuary of space. But there are no guarantees of good behavior by others if the United States exercises restraint. So US restraint must be accompanied by a hedging strategy to encourage others to follow our lead. First, by maintaining conventional military superiority to clarify our ability to punish those who mess with our satellites. Second, by improving our intelligence capabilities in space and on the ground, so that we can detect when our satellites are placed at risk. Increased “situational awareness” in space can help deter our adversaries. Third, by not testing and deploying space weapons since they will undermine Space Assurance. Fourth, by carrying out research and development — but not flight-testing — of space weapons. These hedges help clarify to potential adversaries that we can and will respond if they make bad choices. Finally, by strengthening existing standards that promote the peaceful uses of space for all humankind. An important way to do this is by championing a Code of Conduct that sets responsible rules of the road for space-faring nations.

Strengthening formal space treaties and employing a formal code of conduct will ensure that others model U.S space policy

Krepon 5 (Michael, Project Director at the Henry L. Stimson Center, "Space Security or Space Weapons." http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Stimson\_Space\_brief.pdf, AD 7/2/11) AV

The peaceful uses of outer space can be promoted by a Code of Conduct to clarify “rules of the road” for responsible nations. Codes of conduct exist to prevent dangerous military practices on the ground, in the air, and at sea. For example, during the Cold War, Washington and Moscow negotiated an agreement to prevent incidents at sea. This agreement requires both navies to avoid collisions and not to interfere with each other’s ships. More than thirty other navies adopted similar agreements. The United States has been wise to set standards to prevent dangerous military practices on the sea, on the ground, and in the air. Space also deserves "rules of the road" to help prevent incidents and dangerous military activities. The Henry L. Stimson Center has drafted a Model Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations. It can be found at www.stimson.org/space. Why is a Code of Conduct for space-faring nations needed? Because agreed rules can make us safer and better off by promoting national security and global commerce. Agreed rules also make it easier to identify and build coalitions against those who choose to violate them. ? But rules do not matter to bad actors. And laws are frequently broken. That doesn’t make the laws irrelevant or unimportant. Rules still matter. We also need to take action against rule breakers. How do we punish rule breakers if we can’t send police to outer space? The United States is the strongest nation on Earth. We don’t have to go into space to punish rule breakers.

Impact—Extinction

Continued Chinese space militarization will trigger a global space arms race - causes global economic collapse which causes extinction and renders space unusable which turns the case

Moore 9 (Mike, author, journalist, speaker, and research fellow at the Independent Institute, and former editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and former editor of Quill. "An Agenda for Obama: End America's Counterproductive Pursuit of Space Dominance," January 12th, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics\_online/0029.html, AD 6/29/11) AV

If the United States continues to push forward its de facto space dominance policy, China will almost surely continue to challenge it by developing space-related weapons. If that happens, India and Japan will likely follow suit. And if Pakistan does not disintegrate as functioning state, it will likely follow. Israel will be in the mix too. And so it goes—an all-out ASAT race triggered by the United States. Unfit for any Use A common argument: a space-related arms race would be unfortunate but hardly as dangerous as the arms race of European nations a century ago and certainly not as nightmarish as the nuclear arms race that shadowed the latter part of the 20th century. If a shooting conflict in space ever broke out, the targets would be satellites—machines, not people. That argument is misguided. Orbital space is a fragile environment, a natural resource whose usefulness can be easily damaged or destroyed by human activity. A worst-case shooting conflict in space might cause untold millions of deaths, albeit indirectly. Virtually everything launched into space, whether it is a new communications satellite or a planetary probe, is first inserted into a low-earth orbit, where its orbital parameters are fine-tuned before sending it on. Most space systems are predominantly civil in function and they contribute immensely to the well-being of all. If a space-related arms race got seriously out of control, many satellites—perhaps a dozen or more—might be shattered in low-earth orbits. The resulting debris fields in these low-earth orbits could render space unfit for further use—commercial, scientific or even military. The global economy is greatly dependent on the continued functioning of satellites: communication, global positioning, weather, earth observation, and the like. If space becomes unfit for use because of debris, the global economic system would likely collapse. It might not happen overnight; satellites in higher orbits would continue functioning for months, even years, until they came to the end of their design lives. But if low-earth orbits are heavily salted with debris, these satellites could not be reliably replaced. Economic collapse would not merely take humankind back to the hard times that affected much of the world during the Great Depression. During the 1930s, the world sustained roughly two billion people; today, the figure is more than six billion and heading for eight billion by mid-century. A global economic collapse combined with the needs of some six billion-plus people? One does not need to be a pessimist to understand what might follow: Massive unemployment; food shortages and starvation: pandemic disease; and armed conflict over diminishing resources.

Impact—Heg

U.S. offering the ban on weaponization ensures a global leadership position

Briggs 10 (Michael, Major USAF, March, “Policy Recommendation For The United States Regarding The Weaponization Of Space”, 6-29, JG)

The significant developments in space exploration in the last fifty years have not been reflected in international space law. Just as benefits of space exploration have been realized in many fields including medicine, nutrition, metallurgy, textiles, and consumer products; military applications have advanced as well around the world and cannot be ignored. Today, weapons technology makes space a viable staging arena for not only defensive but offensive systems. With this in mind, and the efforts around the world to increase presence in and exploitation of space, the United States should actively pursue a treaty codifying and restricting space weapons in accordance with a coherent national space policy. An active policy of leadership through engagement, consensus building through diplomacy, and carefully crafted control measures, should result in a clearly defined treaty advantageous to US national interests and sustainable for decades to come.

Impact – Relations

A treaty is the lynchpin of overall relations – spillovers to other areas of cooperation

Walsh 7 (Frank, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld, "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System.", LexisNexis, accessed 7-2, JG)

The ASAT security dilemma is a microcosm of Sino-American relations as a whole. Just as the United States and China would be better off pursuing a cooperative ASAT treaty instead of a costly arms race, the two countries would also be better off pursuing cooperative national security policies instead of an antagonistic zero-sum game. The major impediments to breaking out of this bigger security dilemma are the same impediments to cooperative action in the ASAT context: the United States and China must communicate and trust each other. Both are difficult. But maybe the first steps in a fundamental change in Sino-American relations could begin with a single space treaty - perhaps protecting the satellites that are vital to both countries could be the beginning of a recognition of Beijing's and Washington's similarities. Reengaging China on the issue of ASAT weapons would represent a breakthrough in Sino-American relations. This kind of diplomatic coup is not unlike President Ronald Reagan's call for nuclear abolition at the 1985 Reykjavik Summit with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, an unprecedented move that shocked the world and a number of Reagan's advisors. While negotiations on nuclear abolition broke down after Reagan refused to concede on BMD, Reagan's maverick diplomacy set the stage for future diplomatic engagement with the Soviet Union. As Reagan's Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, explained, "the world was not ready for Ronald Reagan's boldness. What happened at Reykjavik seemed almost too much for people to absorb, precisely because it was outside the bounds of conventional wisdom... . We were ... contemplating the notion of a world without nuclear weapons." The time for "boldness" and thinking "outside the bounds of conventional wisdom" in the field of arms control may have come once again, but this time in the context of ASAT abolition.

Relations & cooperation prevent extinction – economic collapse, prolif, disease, & terrorism

Wenzhong 4 (Zhou, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2-7, http://china-japan21.org/eng/zxxx/t64286.html, accessed 7-3, JG)

China's development needs a peaceful international environment, particularly in its periphery. We will continue to play a constructive role in global and regional affairs and sincerely look forward to amicable coexistence and friendly cooperation with all other countries, the United States included. We will continue to push for good-neighborliness, friendship and partnership and dedicate ourselves to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Thus China's development will also mean stronger prospect of peace in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. China and the US should, and can, work together for peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Given the highly complementary nature of the two economies, China's reform, opening up and rising economic size have opened broad horizon for sustained China-US trade and economic cooperation. By deepening our commercial partnership, which has already delivered tangible benefits to the two peoples, we can do still more and also make greater contribution to global economic stability and prosperity. Terrorism, cross-boundary crime, proliferation of advanced weapons, and spread of deadly diseases pose a common threat to mankind. China and the US have extensive shared stake and common responsibility for meeting these challenges, maintaining world peace and security and addressing other major issues bearing on human survival and development. China is ready to keep up its coordination and cooperation in these areas with the US and the rest of the international community.

A2: Politics Link

Here’s the rest of their evidence – the counterplan avoids the link through loopholes

Space Politics 11 (News source, 5-5, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/05/05/whats-the-future-of-us-china-cooperation-in-space/, accessed 7-2, JG)

However, in testimony before the CJS subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on Wednesday, OSTP director John Holdren suggested that the administration has found a “loophole” in that ban, according to ScienceNow. The White House has concluded, he said, that the provision doesn’t extend to “prohibiting interactions that are part of the president’s constitutional authority to conduct negotiations.” That includes, he said, a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation between the two countries that dates back to 1979. Holdren, Space News reported, has pragmatic reasons for seeking cooperation with China on space exploration in particular, including a future human expedition to Mars. “If China is going to be, by 2030, the biggest economy in the world… it could certainly be to our benefit to share the costs of such an expensive venture with them and with others,” he said.

CP is popular - weaponization is political suicide

Mitchell 1 (Gordon, Associate Professor and Director of Debate – University of Pittsburgh, et al., ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense, July, [http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html](https://mail.msu.edu/cgi-bin/webmail?timestamp=1155773646&md5=nbdSk8IggXVhlJHMdBeJkw%3D%3D&redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.isisuk.demon.co.uk%2F0811%2Fisis%2Fuk%2Fbmd%2Fno6.html), AD 7/2/11) AV

Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer space would likely stir up massive political opposition both home and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that 'the means by which the placement of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second US space policy directive — that of ballistic missile defense… This could preempt any political umbrage from most of the world's influential nations while positioning the US as a guarantor of defense from a universally acclaimed threat'. 32 In this scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted under the guise of missile defence, functions as a tripwire for unilateral US military domination of the heavens .

CP is popular - belief that space should be used for peaceful purposes.

Sheenan 7 (Mike, prof of IR at the University of Swansea, "The International Politics of Space" Page 121, AD 7/2/11) AV

While there may be clear military rationales in favour of the weaponisation of space by the United States, it is a decision that would have considerable political implications. It is also true that to date there have always existed powerful cultural and political domestic obstacles in the United States to such a development. Even at the outset of the space age leading US politicians speculated on the idea of space as a force for peace rather than a theatre of war. House Majority Leader McCormack suggested in 1958 that the exploration of space had the potential to encourage a revived understanding ‘of the common links that bind the members of the human race together and the development of a strengthened sense of community of interest which quite transcends national boundaries’.84 President Kennedy similarly suggested that it was ‘an area in which the stale and sterile dogmas of the Cold War could be literally left a quarter of a million miles behind’.85 US National Space Policy states that the United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space ‘by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefi t of all humanity’.86 US national space policy does allow for the use of space for the purpose of national defence and security, but nevertheless, the weaponisation of space would seem to run counter to a very long-standing national policy. Similarly, the US National Security Strategy declares that uninhibited access to space and use of space are essential to American security. Space policy objectives include protecting US space assets, ‘preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to space, and enhancing global partnerships with other space-faring nations across the spectrum of economic, political and security issues’.87 It is also notable that the US armed forces are aware of the need to respect the concept of space as a ‘global commons’, so that if ‘the United States impedes on the commons, establishing superiority for the duration of a confl ict, part of the exit strategy for that confl ict must be the return of space to a commons allowing all nations full access’.88 Current US military space doctrine is careful to emphasise the political implications of military operations in space and the need to be sensitive to legal issues. USDD 2-1.1, Counterspace Operations, insists that ‘in all cases, a judge advocate should be involved when considering specifi c counterspace operations to ensure compliance with domestic and international law and applicable rules of engagement’. 89

A2: Politics Link

Space weaponization causes Congressional backlash --- there’s broad bipartisan opposition

Moltz 2 (James Clay, Research Professor and Associate Director at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control” April, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/moltzapril02>, AD 7/3/11) AV

The same Congress that boosted funding for missile defenses by 57 percent to $8.3 billion last year also cut significant chunks out of Bush proposals for space-based elements of national missile defense. Indeed, the final House-Senate conference committee eliminated $120 million from the president’s proposed $170 million appropriation for the Space-Based Laser. It also eliminated funds entirely for the Space Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low), a satellite-based early-warning system. These actions suggest that space weapons are vulnerable to congressional challenges. Also, the full impact of the change in the Senate’s leadership has not yet been felt. Key Democrats have come out in strong opposition to space weapons, including Senators Tom Daschle (SD), Joseph Biden (DE), and Carl Levin (MI). Except for the unprecedented budget unity brought on by the September 11 events, cuts would likely have been made in the missile defense budget for fiscal year 2002,[9](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/moltzapril02#notes) forcing even harder choices regarding space defenses. Such debates are beginning for fiscal year 2003. Conservative Democrat Robert Byrd (WV) warned on the Senate floor against “a headlong and fiscally spendthrift rush” to deploy space weapons, concluding, “That heavy foot on the accelerator is merely the stamp and roar of rhetoric.” In addition, a strong contingent within Congress still supports NASA and the International Space Station, which, despite problems, continues to resonate as a worthwhile endeavor with the American public. Introducing weapons into space is abhorrent to many Americans, raised to view space as the realm of the Apollo astronauts, the moon landing, and the shuttle missions. Even conservatives such as Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) have emphasized the continued importance of manned space research to the nation’s economy and the development of spin-offs for furthering our technological base. Despite Weldon’s support for missile defense, he and other NASA supporters may modify their stances when they recognize that aggressive deployment of space weapons could jeopardize other U.S. space priorities. Tests of ASAT weapons, for example, could create debris that might threaten astronauts on the International Space Station. They might also cause costly litigation in which commercial providers seek restitution from the U.S. military for damage caused to their satellites. Foreign claims could create international incidents harmful to U.S. foreign and defense policies, as well as commercial interests. Ten to 20 years down the line, multiple states responding to U.S. weapons in orbit could create an unlimited test range in low-Earth orbit, to the great harm of U.S. space interests, including for military assets. It is not surprising, therefore, that risks associated with weaponizing low-Earth orbit do not sit well with many members of Congress, who want to see U.S. military, scientific, and commercial leadership in space protected. According to defense analyst Theresa Hitchens, U.S. satellite providers are already nervous about possible future U.S. government decisions to try to shut off foreign access to U.S. communications satellites in times of crisis and to shoot down U.S. and foreign satellites providing such access.[10](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/moltzapril02#notes) They fear that this may lead foreign customers to develop their own satellite industries to ensure the availability of spares, thus stimulating competition and cutting into existing U.S. market share. A liberal House Democrat introduced H.R. 2977 in fall 2001 and a revised bill (H.R. 3616) in January entitled the “Space Preservation Act of 2002.” This legislation would prohibit U.S. funds from being spent on space-based weapons, terminate all research associated with such systems, and instruct the president to participate in international negotiations toward completion of a treaty banning such weapons worldwide. Although the bill is unlikely to pass in the Republican-controlled House, it does set down a marker of opposition to current administration policies. More indicative of chances for creating a bipartisan consensus on limiting space weapons was a speech in late September 2001 by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), a highly respected Republican foreign policy beacon. In an address to the National Press Club, Lugar rejected the idea of moving forward with a multitiered national missile defense and instead called upon the Bush administration to reorient missile defense programs to focus on the existing, short-range missile threat and to redouble efforts to fight terrorism and provide for homeland security. He argued that longer-range missile defenses and space systems should be put off indefinitely, suggesting a significant difference of opinion with the Bush administration. Other concerned Republicans are echoing such thoughts in this spring’s congressional budget debates, particularly as politically risky deficit spending looms. Thus, although arms controllers may despair about current plans, there are good reasons to think that cooler heads can still prevail in the space weapons debate. Although missile defense of some sort may be inevitable, those who doubt the utility of space weapons represent a majority in Congress.

A2: Heg Turn

Declining China's request for Sino-American space cooperation will result in balancing of U.S power

Johnson-Freese 11 (Joan, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, " US-China Space Cooperation: Congress’ Pointless Lockdown." June 10th, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-china-space-cooperation-congress%E2%80%99-pointless-lockdown/, AD 7/2/11) AV

In early May when the US government was scrambling to pass a budget, a provision was slipped into the NASA appropriations bill that while counter to Obama Administration policy of expanded space cooperation, was not as important as getting a continuing resolution passed and so allowed to slide through. Section 1340 of NASA’s budget prohibited NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” It also prohibited the hosting of “official Chinese visitors” at any NASA facility. Clearly, a comprehensive ban on US-China space cooperation was intended. Just as clearly, ban supporters are under the impression that Chinese space officials are anxiously banging on the proverbial US door, waiting and hoping for the opportunity to work with the United States – which just isn’t the case. China has energetically and broadly moved out on their own in space, and based on watching on-going US political kabuki dances about its future space plans, and seeing how difficult and tenuous it can be for other countries to partner with the US – on the International Space Station (ISS), for example – most Chinese space officials consider working with the United States as a potential liability to their own already-underway plans. In fact, many countries consider that they can afford only so much US friendship, though Congress continues to act as though the US is the only game in town if countries want to develop a robust space program. Rarely do US attempts at isolating countries – ally or competitor – succeed without unexpected, and negative, consequences. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 restricted data sharing from the Manhattan Project with allies including Britain, resulting in a significant wartime rift and leading to Britain developing their own bomb. After the infamous Cox Commission Report in 1999 which investigated charges of theft and illegal satellite technology transfer to China, the US attempted to block dual-use satellite technology from sale or launch there. As a result, European space industries that had been niche providers developed much broader capabilities so they could circumvent US prohibitions. US companies have lost business and the globalization of technology marches on. For many years, Chinese politicians considered there would be geostrategic benefits to be derived from being a partner on the ISS, symbolic of the “international family of spacefaring nations.” The United States stiff-arming them from involvement is a factor behind China now developing its own space station. So what does a legislative prohibition such as this achieve? It is pile-on evidence that the United States, or at least some of the Congress, is oblivious to the state of the world and the US position in it. That is not a declaration of US “decline,” another popular though misplaced cry frequently heard. It simply says that, realistically, the gap between the US and countries such as China (and India, and Brazil) that were once “developing” and are now increasingly “developed” world has shrunk – which is to the benefit of the US if one believes that security risks largely originate in underdeveloped areas not connected to the globalized world. It will likely be read internationally with a certain degree of bemusement; Congress now declaring who NASA can talk to and who it can’t, as though snubbing China will either result in a change in the Chinese domestic policies (such as human rights) of concern to Congressional supporters of the ban, or inhibit its space plans.

A2: Heg Turn

**China won’t use an agreement to its advantage – it wants to avoid a conflict in space**

Elhefnawy 6 (Nader, Space @ Univ. of Miami, 11-27, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/755/1, accessed 6-29, JG)

Arms control skeptics typically reply that even if an agreement could be useful, the compliance of other nations would be difficult to verify, and at any rate an agreement may be just a tactic to hamper American efforts while they secretly develop their own capabilities. (See “Space weapons: hardware, paperware, beware?”, The Space Review, November 13, 2006) It is considerably more difficult to inspect for biological and chemical weapons than monitor a space weapons program, however, and as the United Nations’ inspections in Iraq proved, even these can be effective. Additionally, given the inability of any likely rival to compete with the United States in this realm, it seems very unlikely that an arms control proposal would be a realistic way of secretly gaining an advantage. Rather than trying to cheat at the game to secure an advantage, they may be trying to minimize their disadvantage by avoiding the game as much as possible.

Their authors are biased conservatives who are just stating their opinions

Blair & Yali 6 (Bruce & Chen, World Security Institute, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china\_security2.pdf, accessed 6-29, JG)

American threat assessments, however, focus almost exclusively on real or potential capabilities. Because intentions can be easily changed, asserting peaceful aims carries little weight for Americans. Such assurances do little to assuage suspicions or downgrade threat projections. Also, since the late 1990s, the predominance of “hawkish” American attitudes toward potential threats has pushed the U.S. intelligence community to adopt extremely conservative criteria for projecting threat – for instance, by assessing an adversary’s ‘possible capabilities’ instead of ‘likely capabilities.’ This is a throwback to the early Cold War habit of using ‘greater-than-expected’ threats as the basis for building up U.S. nuclear forces. ‘Possible’ threat is even more extreme than ‘greater-than-expected’ threat. In any case, there is nothing China can do to convince American worst-case analysts that China could not possibly adapt its dual-use space capabilities for ‘possibly’ posing military threats to the United States. There is no escape from this logic trap.

The counterplan is on-balance better for leadership - space development isolation destroys U.S credibility

Johnson-Freese 11 (Joan, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, " US-China Space Cooperation: Congress’ Pointless Lockdown." June 10th, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-china-space-cooperation-congress%E2%80%99-pointless-lockdown/, AD 7/2/11) AV

After a hiatus following the Cox Commission Report, small gestures of space outreach between the US and China began with NASA Administrator Mike Griffin’s 2006 trip to China during the Bush Administration, though the overall US policy toward China on cooperation remained largely negative. While the Obama Administration has been much more generally positive about cooperation, including with China, there have been no US-China cooperative programs put on the table by either side to consider, nor are any apparently in the works. Since 2006, US-China space cooperation has been treading water at best, so why the need now to make this bold, and pointless, political statement is unclear. Perhaps supporters were just waving a “pay attention to us” flag at NASA regarding any potential future plans, though if that was the case there were certainly other ways to send that message while still considering the broader aspects of US strategic communication. What is clear, however, is that other countries have no such compunction as the US about working with China – indeed many are anxious to have the opportunity to work with a country they see as more open to partnerships, rather than the sub-contractor status some ISS “partners” have felt the US afforded them. There may be little need to bar the door to countries wanting to work with the US on space activities, as there may soon be fewer and fewer countries knocking. Congress and the Administration working together to refocus the US space program, including realistic cooperation, would go further to maintain US space leadership than pointless isolation gestures.

\*\*Aff work\*\*

Say no – Space

China will say no - they oppose international space cooperation and they don't have to model U.S programs anymore.

Kulacki 11 (Gregory, Senior Analyst and China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, " Engaging China on Space." January, http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/2826515287/engaging-china-on-space, AD 7/1/11) AV

China no longer needs to import foreign technology and expertise. Moreover, many of the scientists and engineers in China’s space sector believe they make more rapid progress by pursuing a policy of self-reliance without the complications of joint programs. As a result, a significant number within China’s space community actively oppose increased international cooperation or is disinclined to support it. In addition, many in China’s space community resent U.S. policies, such as China’s exclusion from the International Space Station, export controls that have severely restricted China’s ability to participate in the international launch services market, and highly restrictive visa policies for Chinese space professionals. China’s space scientists and engineers are content with the status quo. Any impetus for change will need to come from outside the space sector. Unlike in the past, cooperation with the United States or other countries is no longer valued as a technical or economic necessity. Today, cooperation with other countries in space is likely to take place for political reasons. It will need to be imposed on China’s space sector by the political leadership, and this can only happen if Chinese leaders see cooperation as a high priority.

China would not agree to demilitarization - they need space weapons to have a strategic advantage over the U.S

Tellis 7 (Ashley, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, " Punching the U.S. Military’s “Soft Ribs”: China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective." June, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf, AD 7/1/11) AV

Many arms-control specialists believe that China’s counterspace programs are driven primarily by its desire to accumulate bargaining chips that could be traded for an eventual ban on space weapons. In reality, however, Beijing’s investments in space denial technology are driven by strategic concerns that have little to do with arms-limitation agreements of any kind. In the near term, China is heavily focused on developing all possible means of defeating the superior U.S. conventional forces it expects to encounter in any war over Taiwan. And over the longer term, China is seeking to prepare for a prospective geopolitical rivalry with the United States. To achieve these goals, China must be able to exercise sufficient control over its land and sea borders to prevent U.S. forces from mounting attacks on the Chinese heartland from them. It must also be able to protect its nuclear deterrent from being neutralized by U.S. theater and national missile defenses. And it must be able to construct a sufficiently secure regional system within which it can shape the political choices of its major neighbors and prevent any local adversaries from challenging it under the cover of American protection. The near-term objective of preventing what Beijing would call Taiwanese secession from the mainland—and defeating any U.S. expeditionary forces that may be committed in support—remains the dominant consideration for China’s military modernization. The resulting capabilities would then become the nucleus for servicing more ambitious geostrategic aims as the country’s economic strength increases over time. For the moment, both objectives converge admirably in that they require Beijing to develop all the capabilities required to prevent superior U.S. forces from being able to enter the relevant theater of operations and, if that goal should prove unsuccessful, deny them the freedom to operate. Whether the theater of action is the limited geographic area around Taiwan or a wider expanse like the western Pacific, the tasks facing the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) therefore remain the same in the short to medium terms: It must be able to successfully prosecute antiaccess and battle-spacedenial operations against all threatening American military forces. Because China is confronted by America’s formidable military dominance, any effort to defeat the United States through an orthodox force-on-force encounter would be doomed to a sorry ending. Consequently, ever since the dramatic demonstration of American prowess in Operation Desert Storm, Chinese strategists have struggled to find ways of overcoming the conventional might of the United States. Drawing on both China’s indigenous military traditions—which emphasize stealth, deception, and indirect approaches to warfare—and the opportunities offered by emerging technologies—which permit effective asymmetric strategies focused on attacking an adversary’s weaknesses rather than its strengths—the PLA has concentrated on developing those material and nonmaterial capabilities that would make possible “defeating the superior with the inferior.”

Say no – Space

China will say no – strategic investments & interests

Tellis 7 (Ashley, Senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment, June, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/19/punching-u.s.-military-s-soft-ribs-china-s-antisatellite-weapon-test-in-strategic-perspective/f60, accessed 7-2, JG)

First, because Chinese counterspace investments are deeply rooted in strategic necessity and not capricious state choices, the suggestion that President Bush ought to move urgently to guarantee the protection of American space assets by initiating an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons ought to be approached cautiously by his administration. Although well intentioned, such recommendations are illusory because China—its rhetoric notwithstanding—will not conclude any space-control agreement that eliminates the best chance it may have of asymmetrically defeating U.S. military power and thereby protecting its interests.

Won’t agree – military & competitive edge against the U.S.

Tellis 7 (Ashley, Senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment, June, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/19/punching-u.s.-military-s-soft-ribs-china-s-antisatellite-weapon-test-in-strategic-perspective/f60, accessed 7-2, JG)

The implications of this logic devastate the hopes of arms-control theorists who believe that Chinese counterspace investments are primarily bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime. In fact, they are just the opposite; they represent China's best hope for prevailing against the superior conventional military power deployed by the United States. For China to give up its emerging counterspace capabilities -- whether through unilateral abnegation or a negotiated arrangement -- would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power. This would mean, among other things, to risk the "loss" of Taiwan with all its attendant consequences for the unity of China and the survival of its Communist leadership. It would be equally unthinkable for Chinese leaders to abandon their efforts to stave off American forward-operating forces in the western Pacific or to allow the Chinese nuclear deterrent to be neutralized by emerging U.S. strategic defenses. Because these goals -- which are relatively conservative from Beijing's point of view -- are so critical to China as a rising power, it cannot be expected to trade away its counterspace capabilities for any arms-control regime that would have the effect of further accentuating the military advantages enjoyed by its competitors

China is unpredictable and will say no – NPR proves

Kan 10 (Shirley, Asian Security Affairs, 7-22, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2139.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG)

Under the Obama Administration, at a summit in Beijing in November 2009, President Obama repeated what President Clinton said about non-targeting of nuclear arms. In the first U.S.-PRC “Joint Statement” since 1997, Obama and Hu Jintao issued a “Joint Statement” which reaffirmed the U.S-PRC “commitment” of June 27, 1998, “not to target at each other the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control.” The two countries also claimed “common interests” in promoting the peaceful use of outer space. While in India in January 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the United States sought to start a routine, in-depth dialogue with the PRC on strategic intentions and plans, in order to avoid miscalculations or misunderstandings and safeguard global stability. He cited his experience with the value of strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union. In April, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell also lamented that lagging behind a number of dialogues with the PRC has been the military dialogue, and lagging further beyond overall military talks has been a nuclear dialogue. The next month, Campbell said that the U.S. side proposed that Defense Department officials going to the S&ED in Beijing brief the PLA on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (of February and April 2010). 86 However, the PLA did not accept such DOD briefings on the agenda of the S&ED. The NPR called for a dialogue with China on “strategic stability” to provide a mechanism for each side to communicate its views about the other’s strategies, policies, and programs on nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities, thereby enhancing confidence, improving transparency, and reducing mistrust. A model for U.S.- PLA discussion could be the PRC-Russian agreement of October 2009, on mutual notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

Say no – Space

Unstable leadership proven in the past to reject negotiations and meetings

Kan 10 (Shirley, Asian Security Affairs, 7-22, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2139.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG)

The Bush Administration invited General Jing to visit the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), as discussed during a summit between Presidents Bush and Hu Jintao in Washington in April 2006. Two months later, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman visited Beijing for the DCT and discussed the invitation to the 2nd Artillery Commander. In October 2006, the STRATCOM commander, General James Cartwright (USMC), expressed interest in engaging with the PLA on space issues, including how the two sides could avoid and handle collisions or interference between satellites, and perceptions of attacks on satellites. 81 However, General Jing declined to schedule a visit. 82 On January 11, 2007, the PLA conducted its first successful direct ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapons test by launching a missile with a kinetic kill vehicle to destroy a PRC satellite. 83 On June 13, 2007, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless testified to the House Armed Services Committee that the PLA would not set a date to hold a dialogue on nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine. Lawless said that PLA strategic forces have improved the capability to target the U.S. mainland. 84 General Jing Zhiyuan has traveled outside of China, but not to the United States, including a trip to Sweden and Bulgaria in November 2007. The PLA’s refusal raised questions about China’s intentions and Hu Jintao’s control over the PLA.

China wants it’s weapons – key to it’s geopolitical aims

Tellis 7 (Ashley, Senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment, June, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

,accessed 7-2, JG)

This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they are right. Any “weaponization” of space will indeed be costly and especially dangerous for the United States, which relies most heavily on space for its military superiority, economic growth, and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are right when they emphasize that the advanced powers stand to gain disproportionately from any universal regime capable of protecting their space assets. Yet they are wrong in their belief that such a regime is attainable and, therefore, china understands that its best chance of successfully countering U.S. military power lies in being able to attack America’s relatively vulnerable eyes, ears, and voice. POLICY BRIEF ought to be pursued now. Weaker but significant challengers, like China, simply cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary. Even though a treaty protecting space assets would be beneficial both collectively and to Washington, Not surprisingly, then, Beijing has authorized counterspace programs on a scale that demonstrates that these capabilities are vital for the realization of its geopolitical aims.

China doesn’t care about diplomacy – all they want is to challenge the U.S.

Clark 9 (Dereck, Military Studies @ Hawaii Univ., 9-18, http://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/Graduate%20Degree/MADMS%20Theses/files/2/Dereck\_A\_ClarkThe\_Great\_Leap\_Upward\_HPU\_Masters\_Thesis.pdf, accessed 7-1, JG)

For years, China has publicly spoken out against the militarization of space and has been a proponent of a treaty' that would prevent the weaponization of space by the U.S. and all other space-faring nations. Whether or not the Chinese are sincere in their public statements and diplomatic efforts regarding this issue is yet to be determined. However, China's pursuit of a multi-dimensional counter-space arsenal, their 2007 test of a kinetic kill ASAT weapon, and their overall lack of transparency surrounding military applications of their space program makes four points abundantly clear that their public diplomatic initiatives do not: 1.) China views the space domain as the high-ground where aspects of all future conflicts will take place and is actively' preparing for this reality': 2.) China views the U.S. as dependent on its space systems as a facilitator of its military advantages and has highlighted this as an Achilles heel that must be exploited in any future war with the U.S. involving space assets; 3.) China has singled out the U.S. as its most likely and its most formidable opponent in any future space war and consequently, U.S. dominance in space is threatened as never before: 4.) As China's interests and capabilities in space continue to grow, it will look to develop ways to protect its interests and reduce its own growing vulnerabilities. As a result of this reality and after a decade of U.S. attempts to frustrate China's military space capabilities, it appears these attempts have reached a critical point of failure.

Say no – Space

China will say no – change in arms control policy and unreliable decision-making

Cheng 7 (Dean, Senior Asia Analyst @ CAN , Feb., http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/frv07v02.pdf, accessed 7-1, JG)

Questions about Chinese Decision-Making. Beyond purely military concerns, the Chinese handling of the ASAT test underscores how little we understand China’s decision-making processes, despite nearly thirty years of interaction. It is probably excessive to suggest, as some have, that the hesitant Chinese diplomatic response indicates a “rogue PLA,” acting on its own accord. The PLA’s 2006 Defence White Paper, unlike the 2002 and 2004 editions, made no mention of the PRC’s efforts at the United Nations to forestall space weaponization and militarization. Such an omission would not be made lightly, and suggests that the decision to undertake ASAT tests was reached sometime in advance, and was known to the top PRC leadership.

China is opposing the United States – no reason they would give up their weapons

EASR 8 (East Asian Strategic Review, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2008/east-asian\_e2008\_01.pdf , accessed 7-1, JG)

Today China appears determined to become a center of resistance against the United States, the post-Cold War world’s leader in many arenas. This opposition is seen in not only China’s economic activities, but also its national security efforts. Having minutely analyzed the United States’ current strengths and weaknesses, China is endeavoring to narrow its gap with US capabilities in established weapons systems by exploring such possibilities as construction of an aircraft carrier and reinforcement of its nuclear capabilities. At the same time, China is building up its cyber war capabilities. China is also countering US dominance in security-related space activities by developing technologies to exploit the vulnerabilities of US space assets. This capability was amply demonstrated by the success of the anti-satellite test described earlier. China’s resistance is further manifested in its proactive involvement in the Galileo Project, the European program aimed at developing a navigation satellite system that will not rely on the United States’ GPS. As such, the project serves as an opportunity for China to deepen its ties with Europe while challenging US supremacy. Moreover, China is carrying out its own initiatives, such as the Beidou system mentioned earlier. It also appears to be enhancing its optical reconnaissance satellites and developing SAR reconnaissance satellites; these projects, if successfully realized, will allow China to dramatically improve its capabilities in space asset use and space-based information gathering.

Say no – Space

China would never agree - space weapons are its asymmetrical response to U.S military superiority.

Uhalley 7 (Stephen, Analyst specializing in Chinese foreign affairs for the Hoover Institution at Stanford, " A China-U.S. Space Arms Race?" www.ccny.cuny.edu/aacs/.../Uhalley\_Steve\_Space-Arms-Race-Paper.doc, AD 7/1/11) AV

As is well known, the Chinese have been building their military capability for years. They are deeply concerned about American military superiority, something that for all the cash and determination China is unlikely to match head to head for decades. Thus Beijing focuses on an asymmetrical response, going for the dominant power’s Achilles’ heel, even as it concurrently expands its naval (particularly submarine) and aerospace capabilities. Knowing that American military effectiveness depends on certain space assets, they seek to neutralize these. In the event of a military conflict with the United States, possibly over Taiwan, Beijing thus might consider putting out of commission key American satellites, or at least suggest a credible threat that they might do so. Obviously, this possibility does now complicate the Taiwan Strait equation, affecting the calculus that determines what Washington is to do if Taiwan is attacked. China’s overall idea, it would appear, is to have a two-pronged approach in dealing with American dominance in space. One approach is to develop space weaponry of its own that can be used against American satellites. At the same time, it seeks diplomatically to maneuver the United States into a legal framework that would prevent Americans from developing the space assets or weapons necessary for adequate defense. At least, this latter prong is rhetorically present, and pushed, even if the Chinese themselves might actually have reservations about having restraints placed on what they might do in space. In this regard, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley Tellis argues: “The importance of space denial for China’s operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power.” Hence, he believes, “Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities.” In the event, finding itself in a very awkward situation, the Chinese government has decided not to provide any explanation of the ASAT test, probably because to do so would lead to further uncomfortable questions. It also recognizes that silence has its own eloquence. It has, after all, made an unmistakable statement regarding its capability to shoot down a satellite, and with greater precision than simply detonating a nuclear device in space. It can be seen, at base, a challenge to American dominance in space, in keeping with a tradition of possessing at least a modest deterrence capability. As Eric Hagt has plausibly pointed out, “It was a deliberate and strategic, but also defensive, act.”

Say no – Space

China doesn’t care about diplomacy – all they want is to challenge the U.S.

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For years, China has publicly spoken out against the militarization of space and has been a proponent of a treaty' that would prevent the weaponization of space by the U.S. and all other space-faring nations. Whether or not the Chinese are sincere in their public statements and diplomatic efforts regarding this issue is yet to be determined. However, China's pursuit of a multi-dimensional counter-space arsenal, their 2007 test of a kinetic kill ASAT weapon, and their overall lack of transparency surrounding military applications of their space program makes four points abundantly clear that their public diplomatic initiatives do not: 1.) China views the space domain as the high-ground where aspects of all future conflicts will take place and is actively' preparing for this reality': 2.) China views the U.S. as dependent on its space systems as a facilitator of its military advantages and has highlighted this as an Achilles heel that must be exploited in any future war with the U.S. involving space assets; 3.) China has singled out the U.S. as its most likely and its most formidable opponent in any future space war and consequently, U.S. dominance in space is threatened as never before: 4.) As China's interests and capabilities in space continue to grow, it will look to develop ways to protect its interests and reduce its own growing vulnerabilities. As a result of this reality and after a decade of U.S. attempts to frustrate China's military space capabilities, it appears these attempts have reached a critical point of failure.

China will say no – change in arms control policy and unreliable decision-making

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China is opposing the United States – no reason they would give up their weapons

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Today China appears determined to become a center of resistance against the United States, the post-Cold War world’s leader in many arenas. This opposition is seen in not only China’s economic activities, but also its national security efforts. Having minutely analyzed the United States’ current strengths and weaknesses, China is endeavoring to narrow its gap with US capabilities in established weapons systems by exploring such possibilities as construction of an aircraft carrier and reinforcement of its nuclear capabilities. At the same time, China is building up its cyber war capabilities. China is also countering US dominance in security-related space activities by developing technologies to exploit the vulnerabilities of US space assets. This capability was amply demonstrated by the success of the anti-satellite test described earlier. China’s resistance is further manifested in its proactive involvement in the Galileo Project, the European program aimed at developing a navigation satellite system that will not rely on the United States’ GPS. As such, the project serves as an opportunity for China to deepen its ties with Europe while challenging US supremacy. Moreover, China is carrying out its own initiatives, such as the Beidou system mentioned earlier. It also appears to be enhancing its optical reconnaissance satellites and developing SAR reconnaissance satellites; these projects, if successfully realized, will allow China to dramatically improve its capabilities in space asset use and space-based information gathering.

No Solvency – Cheating

China will cheat on a space treaty – inspection & empirically proven

Easton et. al 8 (Ian, Masters @ National Chengchi University, 7-4, http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/34911/6/503906.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG)

These include the sale of advanced and sensitive weapons and technologies, such as ballistic missile, nuclear and chemical weapon systems and technologies to the abovementioned states. 95 Beijing has also worked successfully to prevent the use of "national technical means," or spy-satellites, to verify compliance to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China made it considerably more difficult for countries to execute on-site inspections, and was the only country to conduct nuclear weapons tests through the final stages of the CTBT negotiations.99 This history suggests to many that China would either cheat outright or work to water down any outer space weapons ban treaty, presuming that the definition of' "space weapons" could even be agreed on, which is highly dubious. According to China's own defense white paper, released in the year 2000, "The Chinese government resolutely opposes the attempts of some countries to use arms control and disarmament to weaken other countries" such as China. 01 Clearly, a space weapons ban treaty is not an attractive or practical option when it comes to China, and China's diplomatic double-speak on the militarization of space and its ASAT weapons testing only underscores a deepening sense of mistrust. Para-phrasing one pundit: Like so many other treaties, it is not needed for the countries that would comply, and it will be of no use for those who cheat.

China flipped its stance on weaponization – no reason they will follow a treaty now

Easton et. al 8 (Ian, Masters @ National Chengchi University, 7-4, http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/34911/6/503906.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG)

Thus on January 11.2007 the PRC not only broke its stated policy that "China has every interest to avoid triggering a confrontation in outer space and it will never be a deliberate choice for China,"44 the PRC also broke one of the most basic obligations of the space treaty it had vocally helped table and defend for years. However, as the Chang Xiangi case indicates, the Chinese have been emphasizing the use of deception in their discussions of their own program. Colonel Jia Junming, in the 2005 book On Space Operations, urges: "Our future space weapons program should be low profile and intense internally but relaxed in external appearance to maintain our good 04 international image and position. 5 ' This "Janus-faced" policy on China's part, whereby Beijing sought to use disinformation and its diplomatic influence to limit the U.S.'s ability to defend itself in outer space while simultaneously expanding its own future weaponization of space, may have been paying off A U.S. Army War College professor wrote in his book Defending Space, that while "Chinese military space capability is growing.. .commercial demand may outstrip current and future systems" because the "PRC has turned" (away from its military space programs) "towards the exploding market for cell phones, weather.. .and other non-military applications."146 Before the events of January 11. 2007 were revealed, the idea that China was moving away from the military side of its space program in favor of the commercial was quite common, even in some U.S. military circles. Many were even arguing that the U.S. ought to cooperate more closely with the PRC in the commercial space business hinting that risking the loss of certain national security technologies might be worth it to avoid losing America's position of commercial space leadership.147 This underscores just how effective the PRC government was at using disinformation to cover up its counter-space weapons program. This point should become even clearer as the facts of China's counter-space weapons buildup are discussed.

No Solvency – Cheating

A space treaty will fail – China will cheat, the treaty is unreliable, it would be unverifiable, & China’s weaponization is inevitable

Kyl 7 (Jon, Arizona Senator, 1-29, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/chinas-anti-satellite-weapons-and-american-national-security, accessed 7-2, JG)

Third, arms control is not the path to security or stability. Arms control advocates naturally use the Chinese test to advance their agenda. Just to cite one, my colleague, Ed Markey of Massachusetts, said: "American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security, and it is urgent that President Bush move to guarantee their protection by initiat­ing an international agreement to ban the develop­ment, testing, and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite systems."[6] Advocates of such arms control put far too much stock in China's public statements that it has nothing but peaceful intentions and wants to avoid an arms race in space. A review of Chinese military doctrine and numerous writings makes it clear: China does not believe that space can, or should, be free of military capabilities. China believes that it must develop space weapons for its own security, specifically in preparation for a possible conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan. China is also concerned that its nuclear deterrent is at risk of being degraded by improving U.S. mis­sile defense capabilities. By having the ability to destroy the satellites that tie our ballistic missile defense system together, China hopes to seriously degrade its effectiveness as a deterrent. But even if arms control advocates are correct that the Chinese earnestly want to negotiate an arms control treaty for space, we should be highly skeptical of an arms control-first approach. As I already noted, space has long been militarized. Nations will neither un-invent capabilities nor be able to stop future technology. Attempts to "rebottle the genie" through treaties have a dismal history. The 1899 Hague Convention, for example, tried to keep the air free from weapons by banning the "launching of projectiles and explo­sives from balloons."[7] That effort failed because the strategic advantages of operating in the air over­whelmed the moral arguments against doing so. In 1928, the world even tried to ban war altogether under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as you might recall. The pact's signatories included every major belligerent of the Second World War, which began 11 years later. Even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, has proven incapable of preventing nations such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea of walking up to, and over, the nuclear brink. If anything, the treaty has encouraged responsible nations to sit by com­placently while their more ambitious or ruthless neighbors go nuclear. A space weapons ban would likely have the same effect. Another important argument here is that arms control would itself be dangerous. During negotiations, advocates would argue that we can't take any steps to defend ourselves. All the while, China will continue to develop its programs. This is a paradox that I will discuss in more detail later. Once signed, the treaty could lull us into a false sense of security. Like so many other similar treaties, you don't need it for the countries who would comply, and it will be of no use for those who will cheat. Perhaps most important, a ban on anti-satellite weapons would be unverifiable. There has been quite a bit of work done on this. The recent Chinese test illustrates the point. Are we going to propose a ban on medium-range ballistic missiles like the one that carried China's interceptor? Will we require comprehensive inspection of every payload prior to launch? These are clearly nonstarters. Even intrusive, comprehensive inspections of payloads would fail to address concerns over ground-based lasers, signal jammers, and other anti-satellite capabilities that never have to be launched at all. The Chinese are interesting in their discussion of their own program. They continually emphasize the deception that would continue to be a problem. To quote just one of them, Colonel Jia Junming, in the 2005 book On Space Operations, urges: "[Our future space weapons program] should be low profile and intense internally but relaxed in external appearance to maintain our good international image and position."[8] Finally, assuaging Chinese insecurities would require putting either our missile defenses or our conventional military superiority on the table for negotiation. Some might consider this an accept­able price to pay, but I would argue it is far too much to give for an agreement of inherently dubious value.

No Solvency – Cheating

Chinese space weaponization inevitable – even a bilateral treaty won’t solve

Easton et. al 8 (Ian, Masters @ National Chengchi University, 7-4, http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/34911/6/503906.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG)

Despite its rhetoric of peace and shared prosperity, China is aggressively seeking to defeat the Taiwanese people psychologically and trump the U.S. militarily through the use of counter-space weapons. It would be a great folly for the U.S. to limit itself in space because not only does it enjoy a great advantage there, any treaty limiting the weaponization of outer space would be impossible to verify given that China’s space program is opaque and military-controlled. It seems clear that American policymakers understand the importance of outer space to U.S. national security, and for that reason one can expect an increase (albeit a covert one) in the build-up of space control assets, especially those that would provide for better space awareness, in conjunction with terrestrial elements such as UAVs to provide a measure of redundancy in case orbital assets were to become disabled or destroyed. For the reasons illustrated in this study, China can be expected to continue down the road of space weaponization that it has already traveled for years, and space will ever more deeply become the realm of a cold-war-style strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC. This is undesirable given the current level of international cooperation enjoyed in outer space, however, the anarchic nature of international relations makes it unavoidable that great powers hedge against each other, and one can hardly think of two great powers with a greater need to hedge than the U.S. and the PRC.

China won’t follow up on its agreement – past treaties prove

Lewis 9 (Lt. Col Brendan, Harvard, 4-23, “Aligning United States and Chinese Space Policies”, accessed 7-1, JG)

Additionally, if a space weapons control treaty could be written, it is questionable whether China would adhere to its tenants, as they have signed treaties in the past while ignoring the restrictions defining the agreements, to include Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime agreements. Rather than writing new treaties or space agreements, all nations should adhere to the agreements which already exist. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) established the overarching principle that space should be free for all nations to explore and use.

No Solvency – Cheating – Impacts

Cheating rolls back all arms control credibility

Miller 3 (Steven, Director of International Security Program @ Harvard, May, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/miller\_paris.pdf, accessed 7-3, JG)

The conclusion that arms control is ineffective rests on several considerations. First, there is the inherent structural dilemma that arms control generally involves negotiations between states parties who are competitive with, if not hostile towards, each other. The overlap in their interests, and hence the scope for negotiated agreement between them, is often quite small and marginal. In bilateral negotiations, splitting the difference between the desirable and the unacceptable does not produce important or edifying results. Soviet-American strategic arms control, for example, was often criticized for merely codifying the status quo (which was particularly objectionable to arms control skeptics when they judged the status quo to be unattractive or unacceptable) or for mandating the elimination of systems that both sides intended to eliminate in any event on grounds of obsolescence. In multilateral settings, the need to settle for lowestcommon-denominator outcomes and to accommodate the self-interested concerns of multiple states results in agreements that are weak, or flawed, or ineffectual. The inclusion in multilateral regimes of the very states whose worrying or threatening behavior needs to be restrained and disciplined by the agreement raises, in the skeptics eyes, the proverbial concern about letting foxes into the chicken coops. Obviously, when the political context for arms control negotiations is more harmonious, this dilemma becomes much less acute – but arms control is also less significant. Thus the conclusion embraced by many (though not all) arms control skeptics: meaningful arms control is impossible when it would be important, but unimportant when it is possible. Second, there is the problem of cheaters. Arms control requires, and depends upon, a kind of cooperation with and a level of trust in hostile states, some of whom number among the most unsavory and despicable regimes on earth. Viewed in a clearsighted way, arms control skeptics believe, these regimes are simply not trustworthy. They are likely or even certain to cheat, their cheating will often be successful and undetected, and this means that the effect of arms control is to constrain the good guys while at most inconveniencing, but not really restraining, the bad guys. This line of argument was a powerful motif in Cold War criticism of arms control. There were endless allegations, some of them accurate, that the Soviet Union was cheating on US Soviet agreements, that arms control was facilitating, and providing cover for, adverse shifts in the balance of power, that US security was being jeopardized by the illicit capabilities Moscow acquired by cheating, and so on. 5 Similarly, as the protracted crises over Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated, the post-Cold War arms control agenda has been dominated by the problem of noncompliance by the most dangerous and most threatening regimes. Further, one of the characteristics of rogue states, says the US National Security Strategy, is that they “display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party.” 6 Commenting on the Bush Administration’s attitude toward the NPT, New York Times columnist Bill Keller wrote that “the administration accepts it as a bequest from the past but regards it as pointless. Only those who find it in their interest to obey will do so, Bush Administration officials say, and the rest will cheat.” 7 To the arms control skeptics, it is unrealistic, if not folly, to believe that arms control is an effective instrument for dealing with hostile states that are likely to be determined cheaters. This leads directly to the third large inadequacy that raises doubts about arms control. In the view of the skeptics, there appears to be little or no will in the international community to enforce agreements. If one believes that cheating is both likely and strategically significant, then having an effective ability to detect and deal with cheaters is essential. The record of the past decade is not heartening in this respect and the concerns raised by skeptics are far from baseless. American critics of arms control believe that the failure of the international community to confront and effectively address the challenge posed by two clear cheaters, Iraq and North Korea, raises fundamental questions about the efficacy of arms control. As Undersecretary of State John Bolton wrote in an article published before he assumed his post in government: “Saddam’s Iraq was the easy case. If the members of the Security Council cannot maintain their discipline against a state that systematically obstructed their own authority – after it had used weapons of mass destruction against its own population and committed unprovoked aggression against a small neighbor – what can they handle?” 8 The case of North Korea is similarly disturbing. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally declared Pyongyang to be in a state of noncompliance with its obligations under the NPT in 1993. North Korea has remained in a formal state of noncompliance ever since and none of the arrangements or deals made with the North Koreans – not the Agreed Framework signed with the United States nor the nuclear agreement signed with the South Koreans – restored Pyongyang’s good standing with the IAEA. Here, then, is a dangerous regime that has been continuously noncompliant for more than a decade, and the world has essentially just tolerated this. The denouement came in April 2003, when the North Koreans claimed that their years of illicit nuclear activity had resulted in a small nuclear weapons capability. This, in the view of the skeptics, is what happens when you rely upon arms control. What needs to be understood is that the protracted failure to cope effectively with these clear instances of cheating has done massive damage to the standing of arms control in the United States and has fired the skeptics with a firm belief that it is a deeply flawed instrument. Again, John Bolton puts the point with force and clarity: “America rejects the illusionary protections of unenforceable treaties.” 9 For America’s skeptics, it is perfectly obvious that the answer to the intractable problems of arms control is not more arms control.

No Solvency – Cheating – Impacts

Breakout will cause rapid prolif

Rocca 7 (Christina, U.S. Permanent Representative, 2-13, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/1session/Feb13USA.pdf, accessed 7-3, JG)

Some say that outer space arms control should be extended to ban all ASATs, including those terrestrially based, but years of discussions in this area have failed. In the 1970s, the United States engaged In ASAT arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. They failed for a number of reasons, including the determination that effectively verifying compliance was unattainable due to definitional problems and the difficulty of determining what constitutes an ASAT Negotiations became stymied over questions related to which so-called "space weapons" capabilities should be limited - CD-orbital interceptors, direct-ascent interceptors, ground-based, or Just space-based directed energy systems. The Soviet Union wanted to define the U.S. Space Shuttle as an ASAT weapon and ban i t It was also recognized that satellites already on orbit are capable of being maneuvered to destroy satellites simply by physically colliding with them. Beyond these Issues of definition and scope, It became clear that there was an unacceptable risk of "breakout" from the agreement from which the states parties could not rapidly recover.

Breakout destroys verification – disrupts national security & international stability

DeSutter 10 (Paula, State for Verification, 7-12, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/verification-and-the-new-start-treaty, accessed 7-3, JG)

Effectiveness of Verification Degree of verifiability must be then be weighed against a broader set of criteria to determine whether verification can be considered to be effective. Such “effectiveness” judgments are informed by a broader context, including: the compliance history of the parties to the potential agreement; the risks associated with noncompliance; the difficulty of responding to deny violators the potential benefits of their violations; and the impact of constraints imposed on U.S. freedom of action, particularly given the risk of undetected cheating prior to a “breakout” from a regime. Why do effectiveness judgments have to be informed by larger context, like the compliance history of the party with whom you are reaching the agreement? It is common sense. If you are reaching an agreement with the Brits, you are not going to be as concerned as if you are reaching an agreement with the North Koreans, the Iranians, or, let’s say, the Russians—who have violated every agreement we have ever had with them. Russia is currently not complying by policy, and they’ve said so, with regard to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. You also have to examine the risks associated with noncompliance. There are some agreements where it does not really matter very much if somebody cheats because the agreement is not very important, does not much constrain the United States, and the consequences for national security are limited if there is cheating, although violations can be politically significant. Another part of the assessment should be that if the other side is cheating, how difficult is it to respond either by changing your national programs and policies to redress the imbalance created by noncompliance or to bring that country back into compliance? Iran is the perfect example of why that can be so difficult. It’s Fred Iklé’s “After Detection—What?” argument. The best-case scenario from a national security standpoint is an agreement which has a high degree of verifiability, is reached with a good treaty partner with a record of compliance as scrupulous as our own, with clearly understood and readily implementable sanctions for noncompliance, but which does not constrain the United States’ freedom of action in pursuing unilateral measures to secure the nation. The worst-case scenario from a national security standpoint is an agreement with a low degree of verifiability, with parties with a history of intentional noncompliance, that significantly constrains U.S. freedom of action, and with only a low capability to deny a violator the benefits of its violation and restore at least the level of security that existed prior to the agreement. Such a worst-case scenario would be compounded if the ineffectiveness of verification was poorly understood, since this would inevitably lead to a false sense of security. Other tools and approaches to address the threat thought to be addressed by the agreement are unlikely to be pursued with the rigor and urgency that might be called for. In such situations an agreement can therefore damage, rather than enhance, national security and international stability.

No Solvency – Cheating – Impacts

Cheating is counterproductive & avoids larger problems

King 99 (David, USAF Security Studies, June, http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp26.pdf, accessed 7-3, JG)

Confidence-building measures are not a panacea. One disadvantage of confidence-building measures is that they try to embrace the status quo and can be used to deflect discussion of larger issues. 130 Also, merely relying on the benefits of negotiation without ensuring the outcomes of negotiations are implemented will be counterproductive. Confidence-building measures are as much work as any other international initiative and will require more than passing attention to be successful.

Transparency is key to stop arms races & future disarmament

Berkhout & Walker 5 (Frans & William, Federation of American Scientists, 4-6, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/2e-berkh.pdf, accessed 7-3, JG)

The demand for greater transparency about nuclear activities arises for a number of reasons. The first is the desire of states to understand the nuclear capabilities and policies of other states. Although opacity is the usual practice for weapon states, total opacity can be counterproductive. Indeed, arms control has always entailed the managed reduction of opacity. Trust in the intentions of others depends on the ability to be assured that these activities do not pose an unreasonable security or environmental risk. As the norm of transparency is embedded, so transparency itself becomes a control mechanism. Activities come to be designed which anticipate the need for openness, encouraging reciprocity and building confidence. The logic that transparency brings gains in security has become more compelling for both military and civil nuclear programmes. On the military side, arms reduction and disarmament processes have required greater transparency as a way out of the security dilemma that propels arms races. On the civil side, new demands for transparency have been driven by the need to strengthen and broaden the scope of nuclear safeguards, and by the continuing need to gain consent for civil programmes, in particular those entailing the separation and use of plutonium. Transparency is therefore a rational strategy in cases where the formation of trust and consent between states is an objective. Where relationships are characterized by confrontation (as in South Asia today), opacity and uncertainty remains the order of the day. Second, the demand for transparency arises when states must demonstrate that unilateral and multilateral commitments are being honoured. The more binding the commitments, especially if they are expressed in treaties, the more stringent the transparency measures imposed. With the accretion of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, nuclear transparency has been progressively extended over the past three decades. During the 1990s, this process has accelerated. In particular, the objective of making disarmament measures between the Russian Federation and the United States irreversible has led to important new efforts to make formerly opaque military nuclear programmes more transparent to other states. Greater transparency in NNWS has been sought to avoid a recurrence of clandestine acquisition programmes of the type conducted by Iraq. Third, nuclear transparency has increasingly been needed for reasons of internal security and confidence. In the post-Cold War period, physical security in military nuclear programmes has depended less on the control of people and more on the control of nuclear materials and technologies. This has entailed far greater internal transparency about fissile materials (primarily most forms of plutonium and uranium-235) 1 through the implementation of more effective materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) measures in nuclear weapon production systems. More is known to NWS themselves about the management and control of fissile material inventories. Similarly, the beginning of active nuclear disarmament has forced a full and accurate accounting to be made of fissile material production histories. The process of irreversibly removing weapons and materials from military use can only be placed into proper perspective when there is confidence about the initial military inventory. In the longer run, complete disarmament will require a comprehensive and verifiable initial inventory of past production prior to these materials being placed under international safeguards.

No Solvency – Verification

Weaponization ban isn’t feasible – can’t distinguish between attacks or accidents

Billick 1 (Thomas W. USAF Air University, May, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q\_mod\_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q\_act\_downloadpaper/q\_obj\_3d793de5-3916-40bf-a6f3-c23277362c03/display.aspx?rs=publishedsearch, accessed 7-1, JG)

Third, previous discussions in the CD have demonstrated that verifying compliance with any new space arms control agreement will be problematic at best. The U.S. believes that many states would be unwilling to accept international inspections of space payloads prior to launch. Yet without such an inspection or development of a prohibitively expensive international space monitoring system, interested states will have little confidence that any violations of military significance would be detected in time to permit a response if necessary. Even if such measures were put into effect, it would be extremely difficult to determine if a satellite anomaly or failure was the result of an accidental collision, solar radiation, aging equipment, or purposeful interference or attack.

No Solvency – Verification – Impacts

Arms controls fuels a false sense of security – increases prolif

Rudd 3 (David, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, May, http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/SD-112-Rudd.pdf, accessed 7-3, JG)

Moreover, arms control agreements can lull one into a false sense of security. North Korea has admitted that it was engaged in nuclear bomb-making despite an agreement with the Clinton Administration to cease and desist. All this suggests that the causal relationship between the President Bush’s plans and the spread of dangerous technologies in volatile regions of the world may have been greatly overstated.

Arms controls enhance false security & increase risk of nuclear attack

UCS 8 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 10-15, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/missile-defense/Damage-Limitation-Memo-12-15.pdf, accessed 7-3, JG)

Adopting a defensive posture that hinges on programs such as these is irresponsible. As many studies have concluded, damage limitation is unworkable. More than anything else, these systems and schemes provide a false sense of security that could lead to overconfidence in action and concomitantly increased risk of nuclear weapons use.

No Solvency – Arms Control Fails

Treaty fails – verification problems, dual use capabilities, & prohibitions

O’Hanlon 11 (Michael, Brookings Institution, 6-6,   
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/space-Ch21.pdf. Accessed 7-2, JG)

Overall, space arms control should not be a top priority for the United States in the future, contrary to what many arms control traditionalists have concluded. Some specific accords of limited scope, such as a treaty banning collisions or explosions that would produce debris above a certain (low) altitude, and confidence-building measures such as keep-out zones near deployed satellites, do make sense. But the inability to verify compliance with more sweeping prohibitions, the inherent antisatellite capabilities of many missile defense systems, and the military need to counter efforts by other countries to use satellites to target American military assets all suggest that comprehensive accords banning the weaponization of space are both impractical and undesirable. That said, the United States should not want to hasten the weaponization of space and indeed should want to avoid such an eventuality. It benefits from its own military uses of space greatly and disproportionately at present. It should take unilateral action, such as by declaring that it has no dedicated antisatellite weapons programs, to help buttress the status quo as much as possible.

Weaponization ban isn’t feasible – can’t distinguish between attacks or accidents

Billick 1 (Thomas W. USAF Air University, May, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q\_mod\_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q\_act\_downloadpaper/q\_obj\_3d793de5-3916-40bf-a6f3-c23277362c03/display.aspx?rs=publishedsearch, accessed 7-1, JG)

Third, previous discussions in the CD have demonstrated that verifying compliance with any new space arms control agreement will be problematic at best. The U.S. believes that many states would be unwilling to accept international inspections of space payloads prior to launch. Yet without such an inspection or development of a prohibitively expensive international space monitoring system, interested states will have little confidence that any violations of military significance would be detected in time to permit a response if necessary. Even if such measures were put into effect, it would be extremely difficult to determine if a satellite anomaly or failure was the result of an accidental collision, solar radiation, aging equipment, or purposeful interference or attack.

No Solvency – Arms Control Fails

Space weaponization treaties don’t solve – space warfare is inevitable even without weapons deployment in space

Stout 10 (Mark, Air force Space Center, 11-6, http://nationalspacestudiescenter.wordpress.com/2010/11/06/space-warfare-and-space-weapons/, accessed 7-2, JG)

Arms control efforts, as they pertain to the space domain, often attempt to constrain, control, or manage capabilities instead of behaviors. But this focus on capabilities instead of behaviors is misplaced. Consider the modest hammer: hammering a nail is a condoned and necessary task; hammering someone’s face isn’t. One example of misdirected concern regards the attempt to keep space from becoming “weaponized.” Ah, you ask, but just what is space weaponization? As a point of intellectual departure, the group Reaching Critical Will offers this: Space weaponization is generally understood to refer to the placement in orbit of space-based devices that have a destructive capacity. Many experts argue that ground-based systems designed or used to attack space-based assets also constitute space weapons, though they are not technically part of the “weaponization of outer space” since they are not placed in orbit. Space is one of the “global commons” which also include international waters, the associated sea bed and subsoil, and by some definitions, the Antarctic. The implied benefit of anti-space weapon campaigns is that those efforts will preserve the global commons of space for the benefit of all mankind. However, space weaponization–the capability–is not the driving issue. Rather, the concern is the behaviors–space warfare. Space warfare is the process of military struggle regarding information that’s delivered in, to, through, or from the space domain, and it can happen with or without space weaponization. While space weaponization gets all the headlines, it’s really a subset of space warfare which is both more common and more significant. Space warfare is characterized by purposeful behaviors which affect the delivery and availability of space domain products and services. As such, space warfare is concerned with the behaviors that are used to create particular outcomes. Space warfare might affect a space capability in a temporary and reversible manner, or as with a kinetic anti-satellite attack, it might be permanent and irreversible. The ability to conduct space warfare has become a pragmatic necessity for U.S. adversaries, and by extension, for the United States and its allies. However unlike Clausewitz’s definition of war, space warfare — as with cyber warfare — is generally going to be (but is not limited to) an act lacking physical force. Space warfare, even when it employs temporary and reversible methods, can still be used to compel an enemy to do our will. If someone intentionally jams a GPS or communications signal, the event doesn’t entail a weapon in space, but the intent and effect created is that of space warfare. Similarly, if an intelligence community spacecraft is laser-dazzled for the purpose of affecting its ability to gather information, this too is an act of space warfare. Finally, a satellite is just an information gathering and disseminating device until it runs into someone else’s satellite. At that point — depending on the intent of those controlling the satellite — it is at minimum a space debris dispenser or even a de facto space war machine. “Ramming speed,” to borrow from Ben-Hur, is easily enough achieved in space when objects are travelling in a nominal low earth orbit at seven kilometers per second. In all of these examples, space warfare is being purposefully used to deprive users of space domain delivered information. So why is it space weaponization and not space warfare is the issue that warrants so much of the arms controller’s attentions? The most compelling hypothesis is the anti-space weapon campaigns are largely an attempt to pre-empt space-based missile defense. Space-based missile defense would be exceedingly useful in countering attacking ICBMs before those ICBMs deploy countermeasures which can confuse and overwhelm defensive efforts. But why would anyone want to stop incoming ICBMs which would almost certainly be loaded with weapons of mass destruction, even if it requires the use of (gasp!) “space weapons”? Beyond consulting Freud, it may be because space-based missile defense upsets the arms control community’s sense of balance. This desire for balance often has the enduring and overarching goals of stability and equitability. Unfortunately, the results are security policies which support a stable “balance of nuclear terror” with a fair and equitable “mutually assured destruction.” Space warfare, whether it includes space weapons or not, is merely a political act; a Clausewitzian extension of competing terrestrial wills between political bodies.

No Solvency – Arms Control Fails

Efforts to construct space-arms control treaties in the past have failed - inevitable disagreements

Hays 11 (Peter, senior policy analyst supporting the plans and programs division of the National Security Space Office, "Space Law and the Advancement of Spacepower." June, http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch28.html, AD 7/2/11) AV

Beyond the OST, efforts to craft comprehensive, formal, top-down space arms control or regulation continue to face the same significant problems that have overwhelmed attempts to develop such mechanisms in the past. The most serious of these problems include disagreements over the proper forum, scope, and object for negotiations; basic definitional issues about what is a "space weapon" and how they might be categorized as offensive or defensive and stabilizing or destabilizing; and daunting concerns about whether adequate monitoring and verification mechanisms can be found for any comprehensive and formalized TCBMs. These problems relate to a number of thorny specific issues such as whether the negotiations should be primarily among only major spacefaring actors or more multilateral, what satellites and other terrestrial systems should be covered, and whether the object should be control of space weapons or TCBMs for space; the types of TCBMs that might be most useful (for example, rules of the road or keep-out zones) and how these approaches might be reconciled with the existing space law regime; and verification problems such as how to address the latent or residual antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities possessed by many dual-use and military systems or how to deal with the significant military potential of even a small number of covert ASAT systems.

Disagreements about approaches to develop space arms control make verifiable agreements ineffective

Hays 11 (Peter, senior policy analyst supporting the plans and programs division of the National Security Space Office, "Space Law and the Advancement of Spacepower." June, http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch28.html, AD 7/2/11) AV

There is disagreement about the relative utility of top-down versus bottom-up approaches to developing space TCBMs and formal arms control but, following creation of the OST regime, the United States and many other major spacefaring actors have tended to favor bottom-up approaches, a point strongly emphasized by U.S. Ambassador Donald Mahley in February 2008: "Since the 1970s, five consecutive U.S. administrations have concluded it is impossible to achieve an effectively verifiable and militarily meaningful space arms control agreement."12Yet this assessment may be somewhat myopic since strategists need to consider not only the well-known difficulties with top-down approaches but also the potential opportunity costs of inaction and to recognize when they may need to trade some loss of sovereignty and flexibility for stability and restraints on others. Since the United States has not tested a kinetic energy ASAT since September 1985 and has no program to develop such capabilities, would it have been better to foreclose this option in order to purse a global ban on testing kinetic energy ASATs, and would such an effort have produced a restraining effect on Chinese development and testing of ASAT capabilities? This may have been a lost opportunity to pursue legal approaches but is a complex, multidimensional, and interdependent issue shaped by a variety of other factors such as inabilities to distinguish between ballistic missile defense and ASAT technologies, reluctance to limit technical options after the end of the Cold War, emergence of new and less easily deterred threats, and the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

No Solvency – Space Law

There will be no support for agreeing to a space law – beauracracy and novelty

Hays 11 (Peter, senior policy analyst supporting the plans and programs division of the National Security Space Office, "Space Law and the Advancement of Spacepower." June, http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch28.html, AD 7/2/11) AV

While desires for better refined space law to advance spacepower may be clear, progress toward developing and implementing improvements is not likely to be fast or easy. Terrestrial law evolved fairly steadily and has operated over millennia. Space law, by contrast, is a relatively novel concept that rapidly emerged within a few years of the opening of the space age and thereafter greatly slowed. The objectives of space law must include not just aspirational goals such as structuring competition between humans and helping define and refine fundamental interactions between humanity and the cosmos but also more mundane issues such as property rights and commercial interests. It is likely there will be growing pressure for space law to provide greater predictability and structure in many areas despite the fact that it can be very difficult to establish foundational legal elements for the cosmic realm such as evidence, causality, attribution, and precedence. Moreover, any movement toward improving space law is likely to be slowed by discouraging attributes associated with spacepower that include very long timelines and prospects for only potential or intangible benefits. These factors can erode acceptance of and support for improving space law at both the personal and political levels, but they also point to the need for an incremental approach and reinforce the long-term value of law in providing stability and predictability. Other impediments to further developing space law are exacerbated by a lack of acceptance in some quarters that sustained, cooperative efforts are often the best and sometimes the only way in which humanity can address our most pressing survival challenges.

No Solvency – Formal Treaty Bad

Hard to verify and disarm

Borrie 6 (John, Disarmament Manager, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/109177/ichaptersection\_singledocument/40b46b92-caa5-473c-90fb-0f122ef862fc/en/Chap1.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG)

Although they are more formal terms than political will, disarmament, arms control and humanitarian assistance are, nevertheless, also concepts that have to reflect political imperatives and be elastic enough to be fitted around various contexts for the policymakers and negotiators using them. Consequently they are difficult to test by means of falsification: there are no hard-and-fast rules about what may or may not qualify for consideration within the disarmament, arms control and humanitarian spheres, apart from political acceptability. In a post-11 September world this has already proved more malleable than it was perceived to be previously.

Formal treaties fail -- verification, cheating, new systems, and empirically proven

Klotz 99 (Frank, Council on Foreign Relations, January, http://www.scribd.com/doc/292644/CFR-Space-Commerce-NationalSecurity, accessed 7-1, JG)

More recently, Clinton administration officials have emphatically stated that arms control discussions to ban antisatellite testing or systems are neither "underway, envisioned, or under consideration."66 In fact, upon closer examination, formal arms control agreements would not appear to hold much promise as an approach to protecting U.S. military and commercial satellites in the emerging space environment. The basic problem with limiting capabilities is determining just what capabilities to limit. During the Cold War, the major arms control initiatives dealt almost exclusively with fielded military capabilities and relatively mature technologies. Even so, there was considerable room for debate over the "units of account"-that is, what things should or could reasonably be subject to limits. For example, in the first strategic arms control talks, negotiators could not agree on ways to constrain intercontinental ballistic missiles directly, so they settled upon limiting their launchers, or silos. The problem is compounded in the case of antisatellite weapons. In the absence of an extant threat, an agreement aimed at weapons that could pose a threat to satellites can only speculate as to the types of systems, capabilities, or activities that should be subject to restriction. Space technology is developing so rapidly that entirely unforeseen threats could emerge within the life of a formal arms control treaty. Thus, limiting a particular kind of capability-such as the rocket-mounted satellite interceptors developed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War-would provide little protection against systems based on entirely new or different technology and could engender a false sense of security. Additionally, some of the systems that might be used to attack satellites, which would therefore be subject to limitation, might also have other, entirely legitimate civilian or military purposes. Reduction ad absurdum, any satellite that can be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with another satellite could theoretically be used for "antisatellite" purposes. While one might counter that the functions of individual satellites are generally widely known, not everyone will agree. The Soviet Union, for example, objected to the U.S. space shuttle as a potential antisatellite platform since it had the capability to "snatch" satellites in orbit.67 Even those future systems that have been popularly identified as having a possible antisatellite role-- such as space-based lasers or a military spaceplane--could also perform a variety of other missions. The former has in fact been most closely identified with defense against ballistic missile warheads. The latter could be used to perform routine but cost-effective logistical tasks, such as repair, refueling, or replacement of satellites in orbit. Thus, unless a system is unmistakably identified as an antisatellite weapon-- either by declaration or unequivocal action--it may be exceedingly difficult to apply an ASAT label to it. Limiting a system simply because it possesses a potential antisatellite capability would be unduly restrictive and could deny the nation capabilities that might prove militarily or economically important. Finally, attempting to place limits on multiple-use systems only if they were equipped for an ASAT role would pose obvious verification and enforcement problems or, conversely, opportunities for cheating by one or more parties. Likewise, restricting certain activities that ostensibly constitute deliberate interference or "attacks" on satellites would also add little value. The international legal regime already contains provisions for noninterference. As noted earlier, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty endorses the principle of noninterference in the peaceful exploration or use of space. Similarly, the 1973 International Telecommunications Convention states that all "space objects" must be operated in such a way as to avoid harmful interference to the radio services or communications of others.

No Solvency – Formal Treaty Bad

Formal treaties don’t solve anything – states enforce stability – Cold War proves

Hays 10 (Peter, National Security Space Office, 9-4,

http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower\_Center\_for\_Space\_and\_Defense\_Studies/Journal\_Vol\_2\_No\_3\_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202\_3.pdf, accessed 7-1, JG)

Second, the superpowers devoted considerable effort towards negotiations on ASAT arms control and on the Defense and Space Talks but were unable to come close to signing any treaties, agreeing to space “rules-of-the-road,” or even defining what constitute offensive or defensive space systems. Finally, all the ASAT testing, deployments, and deactivations show that some level of arms control and stability can be achieved without a formal treaty. For open, pluralist democracies like the United States, arms are always controlled as a part of normal debates over guns versus butter and open dialogue about the strategic utility of specific weapons systems. These mechanisms for controlling arms hold the potential to become increasingly important for China if it chooses to embrace democratic processes, publicly debate guns versus butter issues, and engage in transparent dialogue over the strategic utility of space weapons.

No Solvency – Formal Treaty Bad

Formal treaties fail -- verification, cheating, new systems, and empirically proven

Klotz 99 (Frank, Council on Foreign Relations, January, http://www.scribd.com/doc/292644/CFR-Space-Commerce-NationalSecurity, accessed 7-1, JG)

More recently, Clinton administration officials have emphatically stated that arms control discussions to ban antisatellite testing or systems are neither "underway, envisioned, or under consideration."66 In fact, upon closer examination, formal arms control agreements would not appear to hold much promise as an approach to protecting U.S. military and commercial satellites in the emerging space environment. The basic problem with limiting capabilities is determining just what capabilities to limit. During the Cold War, the major arms control initiatives dealt almost exclusively with fielded military capabilities and relatively mature technologies. Even so, there was considerable room for debate over the "units of account"-that is, what things should or could reasonably be subject to limits. For example, in the first strategic arms control talks, negotiators could not agree on ways to constrain intercontinental ballistic missiles directly, so they settled upon limiting their launchers, or silos. The problem is compounded in the case of antisatellite weapons. In the absence of an extant threat, an agreement aimed at weapons that could pose a threat to satellites can only speculate as to the types of systems, capabilities, or activities that should be subject to restriction. Space technology is developing so rapidly that entirely unforeseen threats could emerge within the life of a formal arms control treaty. Thus, limiting a particular kind of capability-such as the rocket-mounted satellite interceptors developed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War-would provide little protection against systems based on entirely new or different technology and could engender a false sense of security. Additionally, some of the systems that might be used to attack satellites, which would therefore be subject to limitation, might also have other, entirely legitimate civilian or military purposes. Reduction ad absurdum, any satellite that can be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with another satellite could theoretically be used for "antisatellite" purposes. While one might counter that the functions of individual satellites are generally widely known, not everyone will agree. The Soviet Union, for example, objected to the U.S. space shuttle as a potential antisatellite platform since it had the capability to "snatch" satellites in orbit.67 Even those future systems that have been popularly identified as having a possible antisatellite role-- such as space-based lasers or a military spaceplane--could also perform a variety of other missions. The former has in fact been most closely identified with defense against ballistic missile warheads. The latter could be used to perform routine but cost-effective logistical tasks, such as repair, refueling, or replacement of satellites in orbit. Thus, unless a system is unmistakably identified as an antisatellite weapon-- either by declaration or unequivocal action--it may be exceedingly difficult to apply an ASAT label to it. Limiting a system simply because it possesses a potential antisatellite capability would be unduly restrictive and could deny the nation capabilities that might prove militarily or economically important. Finally, attempting to place limits on multiple-use systems only if they were equipped for an ASAT role would pose obvious verification and enforcement problems or, conversely, opportunities for cheating by one or more parties. Likewise, restricting certain activities that ostensibly constitute deliberate interference or "attacks" on satellites would also add little value. The international legal regime already contains provisions for noninterference. As noted earlier, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty endorses the principle of noninterference in the peaceful exploration or use of space. Similarly, the 1973 International Telecommunications Convention states that all "space objects" must be operated in such a way as to avoid harmful interference to the radio services or communications of others.

Formal treaties don’t solve anything – states enforce stability – Cold War proves

Hays 10 (Peter, National Security Space Office, 9-4,

http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower\_Center\_for\_Space\_and\_Defense\_Studies/Journal\_Vol\_2\_No\_3\_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202\_3.pdf, accessed 7-1, JG)

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No Solvency – Bilateral Bad

Bilateral fails – many countries have offensive space capabilities

Tellis 7 (Ashley, Senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment, June, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

,accessed 7-2, JG)

In this light, should the United States agree to restraints on future military uses of outer space, in particular the weaponization of outer space? Any useful formal treaties would have to be multilateral in scope. It makes little sense to consider bilateral treaties because it is unclear what country should be the other party to a treaty. At this point, any space treaty worth the effort to negotiate would have to include as many other space-faring countries as possible, ranging from Russia and the European powers to China, India, and Japan. To be sure, that accords would be multilateral does not mean that they should be negotiated at the United Nations, where many space arms control discussions have occurred to date. There is a strong and perhaps ideological pro–arms control bias in the UN Conference on Disarmament, where these discussions have taken place. In addition, some countries may be using those fora to score political points against the United States rather than to genuinely pursue long-term accords for promoting international stability. The United Nations might ultimately be involved to bless any treaty, but it might be best to negotiate elsewhere.

No Solvency – No Multilateral Spillover

Even if the U.S. gave up its space weapons no countries would follow

Hitchens 10 (Theresa, Secretary General, 9-14, http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Hitchens\_Saving\_Space.pdf, accessed 7-2, JG)

Meanwhile, it remains unclear whether multilateral legal instruments to avoid the outbreak of a space arms race can be found. Although the CD has now broken out of its 13-year stalemate, largely due to the change of U.S. administration following the 2008 elections, there is no guarantee that real movement toward a PAROS-related treaty will be forthcoming. There remain serious differences within the CD over the viability of the “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT) tabled at the CD by Russia and China in 2008. The most important and widespread concerns hinge on the failure of that language to capture the most immediate military threat to satellites—the potential for the proliferation of ground-based destructive ASATs based on readily available missile technology. There also remain questions about the ability to verify a ban on weapons placed in space due to the inherently dual-use nature of space technology. At the same time, it is questionable whether those nations backing a space weapons ban treaty would agree to anything less—or even to a stepwise approach that attempted to address near-term threats first (whether through nonbinding confidence building measures, politically or legally binding codes of conduct, or a ban on ASAT testing and use.) The critical trade off to be made will involve U.S. willingness to give up its 20-year, on-again/off-again pursuit of space-based missile defenses—which many nations, particularly China which is worried about maintaining its nuclear deterrent, see as threatening—for some sort of agreement to stop destructive ASAT proliferation. Despite the fact that U.S. President Barak Obama’s campaign expressed interest in a treaty to prevent space weaponization, it is too early to judge whether the new administration will be interested enough in that goal to counter strong forces in the United States supporting missile defense and former U.S. policy of “freedom of action” for future offensive space operations. And even if the United States decided to support treaty negotiations, other nations such as India, Israel and France may be reluctant to move forward before ensuring that they have developed the same level of technology development applicable to offensive space capabilities as the United States, Russia and China.

No Solvency – Space treaties fail

US Policy because of OST makes space weaponization inevitable – leads to new cold war

Quinn 8

(Adam G. “The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and the Weaponization of Space.” *Minnesota Journal of International Law*, 17 Minn. J. Int'l L. 475, Summer 2008, lexis, AH)

The increasing dependence on space for self-defense has naturally brought the fear of weaponization of space to the forefront of the debate. n160 The modern understanding of "peaceful" is "non-aggressive," as permitted under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. n161 Consequently, space has already been weaponized in so much as it is crucial to the military operations of all developed nations. n162 As the United States moves forward with its 2006 Space Policy, space will be further weaponized, not only by military satellites, but by destructive weapons, leaving other countries no choice but to follow in step. n163 While no state wants to be the first to openly weaponize space, many are investing in dual-use technology. n164 Dual-use technologies are weapons designed for defensive action, and therefore considered "peaceful," but retain potent offensive capabilities. n165 Because there is no current bar against dual-use weapons, their placement in orbit will have the effect of weaponizing space. n166 The weaponization of space is inevitable because it is in every nation's best interest to weaponize space. This scenario is a classic prisoner's dilemma. n167 No matter what action is taken by other nations, every single nation is enticed by the benefit of being the first to weaponize space. n168 Although non-armament treaties can rectify the situation somewhat, n169 they are not a long-term solution because the incentive to defect will always remain. n170 Finally, the 2006 Space Policy also expressly [\*495] prohibits agreeing to arms control restrictions that impair United States objectives. n171 Given the inevitability of the weaponization of space, n172 it behooves every nation to weaponize as soon as possible to "stay ahead of the curve." n173 Even if a nation chooses not to aggressively restrict other nations from weaponizing space, it would be ensuring it could not be similarly exploited. n174 It is also in the best interests of every nation for a measured introduction of weapons to space by opposing nations at approximately the same time. The alternative would be a sudden discovery that one nation had secretly weaponized space. The former is likely to create an international tension while the later is likely to spark a new Cold War.

CP links to politics

The ban is unpopular – shifts set funding is NASA

Space Politics 11 (News source, 5-5, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/05/05/whats-the-future-of-us-china-cooperation-in-space/, accessed 7-2, JG)

One of the few specific space policy provisions included in the final continuing resolution that funds the federal government through the rest of fiscal year 2011 has to do with cooperation with China–or, rather, prohibiting cooperation with China. The CR prevents NASA and OSTP from using any funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company” unless specifically authorized in a future law. That also prevents NASA from using any funds “to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by” the space agency. That would appear to put the brakes on any prospects for cooperation with China, at least through this fiscal year.

Treaties concerning weaponization are politically controversial --- counterplan triggers partisan debates

McFaddin 98 (David W., Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force, “Can the Air Force Weaponize Space?”, Air War College Research Report, April, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/98-173.pdf AD 7/2/11) AV

In dealing with Congress on space programs, it became apparent to me that not everyone agreed on interpretation of laws and treaties, not to mention national intent/policy. Concurrent with partisan political debates over the legality of putting weapons in space was the Air Force’s movement toward the Nation’s Air and Space Force to be followed by a transition to a Space and Air Force. With this Revolution in Military Affairs type of move into space control, today’s Air Force finds itself working to fulfil a vague National Space Policy by developing programs for, and methods of, space control. The dilemma encountered is one of being told to accomplish this without being given the required tools and permission to accomplish the task – for political reasons. Therefore, the Air Force finds itself trying to please two masters, the Administration and Congress, who have opposing viewpoints.

Even minimal space cooperation with China triggers strong Congressional opposition

Day 5 (Dwayne A., Program Officer – Space Studies Board of the National Research Council, “Mysterious Dragon: Myth and Reality of the Chinese Space Program”, The Space Review, 11-7, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/492/1>, AD 7/2/11) AV

The bottom line for the speakers was that absent a dramatic policy change in either Washington or Beijing, international cooperation in space is not going to happen in the near future. Either Beijing will have to change its military, foreign policy, and human rights policies, or Washington will need an entirely new presidential administration and Congress. Several of the speakers—not known as critical of White House policy—suggested that the United States was missing an important opportunity to engage China. Fly a single taikonaut aboard a space shuttle to the ISS, one of them suggested, and instantly the United States is back in a clear leadership position regarding China. Another indicated that cooperating with China would give the United States access to Chinese rocket and space experts, and give the Chinese an incentive to “play nice” internationally. Cooperation could take place on several levels. The lowest would be data sharing and cooperation on robotic scientific missions. Higher level cooperation could be commercial efforts and human spaceflight. However, ever since the 1998 “Cox Report” from Congress, there has been strong opposition within Congress to even the most basic space cooperation with China.

CP links to politics

Massive Congressional opposition to space cooperation with China - not just republicans

Brown 10 (Peter J., Satellite Journalist – Asia Times, “Asia Takes Stock of New US Space Policy”, Asia Times, 7-16, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df02.html>, AD 7/2/11) AV

A new National Space Policy issued by United States President Barack Obama's administration in late June emphasized the important role of international cooperation in space and demonstrated the apparent willingness of the US to begin work on a space weapons treaty. [1]  As the three major space powers in Asia - China, India and Japan - assess the new policy, they must pay close attention not only to the details, but also to the harsh political winds that are buffeting Obama these days.  Some see China as the big winner in this instance, while others see India and Japan coming out on top.  "[The new US space policy] which lays out broad themes and goals, does not lend itself to such determination for a specific country," said Subrata Ghoshroy, a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Program in Science, Technology, and Society. However, he added, "countries like India and Japan are expected to benefit more".  From the start, however, Obama's overhaul of both the US space sector as a whole and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in particular has encountered stiff opposition in the US Congress. That opposition is likely to intensify as November's mid-term elections approach. In the US Senate, attempts are being made to toss aside Obama's domestic space sector agenda. [2]  Political infighting aside, it is not just US conservatives who do not want the US to embrace China in space.  "Many members of the Obama administration and a large majority of the members of Congress are opposed to cooperation with China in space. They want to deny China status as a member in good standing of the international community of space-faring nations," said Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists. "Many believe they have not earned that right. At the same time, however, they have not specified what China must do to earn it. Some tie cooperation in space to human rights. Others connect cooperation in space it to other troublesome issues in the bilateral relationship."

Defense industry supports space militarization

Tannenwald 3 – Nina, Associate Research Professor at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies Yale Journal of International Law. April. <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/tannenwald.pdf>, AD 7/2/11) AV

Similar dynamics operate in space. While many telecommunications and satellite firms will have an interest in preserving a stable environment in space in which to do business, other companies have a vested interest in the militarization of space. Large U.S. defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, the No. 1 and No. 2 U.S. military contractors respectively (Boeing is now the world’s largest space company), have a strong interest in the development of the multibillion-dollar U.S. national missile defense. They are the co-heads of the so-called national team being shaped by the Pentagon to integrate more effectively the dozen or so existing missile defense programs. The defense funding bill signed into law January 10, 2002, by President Bush includes a lucrative $8 billion for missile defense development. Other companies involved include Raytheon, TRW, Inc., General Dynamics Corp, and Northrop Grumman. 133 These companies can be expected to lobby heavily for the development of U.S. military capabilities in space, including weapons. Even commercial satellite operators may have a close relationship with the military. Starting in October 2001, the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) bought for $1.9 million per month the exclusive rights to all images acquired over Afghanistan by the IKONOS-2 satellite since the Afghanistan conflict began, to prevent the satellite company from selling its pictures elsewhere. IKONOS-2, the world’s highest resolution commercial satellite, was built by a U.S. firm, Space Imaging, and launched in September 1999. 134 The company called its deal with the U.S. government “a wonderful business transaction.” 135 During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. government relied on commercial satellite communications services and remote sensing imagery from the French company SPOT Image, while both the Coalition and Iraqi forces used channels on ARABSAT. 136 Imagery of the Gulf region from both SPOT Image and the U.S. Landsat satellite was embargoed during the conflict. 137 In 1996, the United States relied on INTELSAT for communications among field commanders in Bosnia, and in 1999 for Kosovo. 138 According to a report prepared for the Rumsfeld Commission, the Pentagon uses commercial satellite systems for about 60% of its satellite communications needs. The Air Force currently relies on commercial systems for about 50% of its military satellite communications needs, a number it estimates will rise to about 75%. The Air Force is also now the largest customer for commercial satellite imagery in the world. 139 The United States recently decided to make commercial satellites the primary source of data for the CIA’s mapping program, in order to free up the government’s own satellites for more specialized work. 140

CP links to politics

Space projects with China cause a strong GOP backlash --- Collapses support for long-term cooperation

Page 10 (Jeremy, China Correspondent – WSJ, “Orbital Paths of U.S., China Set to Diverge”, Wall Street Journal, 10-29, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303891804575575904021690456.html>, AD 7/2/11) AV

The Obama administration's space policy, released earlier this year, went further than any previous administration in emphasizing international cooperation and Gen. Bolden has frequently spoken about its importance, with aides suggesting China could play a key role. But with Republicans expected to regain control of the House of Representatives in next month's mid-term elections—and China looming large as a campaign issue—experts now deem it unlikely that there will be real progress on joint manned missions in Mr. Obama's first term, and possibly for the next decade. "In the short term, I think there is little chance of such joint missions. I don't think Congress would accept it," said Peter Bond, consultant editor of the Jane's Space Systems & Industry directory. Dean Cheng, an expert on China's space program at the Heritage Foundation, said: "Any effort to push manned spaceflight cooperation without the necessary groundwork and high-level support is far more likely to lead to disappointment and frustration, retarding future cooperation." The controversy highlights the volatility of U.S.-China relations over the last year, with overlapping disputes on the value of China's currency, U.S.arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing's territorial claims and U.S.support for a Chinese dissident who won the Nobel Peace Prize. It also speaks to the longer-term anxiety in Washington—compounded since the 2008 financial crisis—about how China plans to use its rapidly expanding economic, military and technological power, and whether it could one day become more powerful than the U.S. "Ambivalence about human space cooperation with China reflects the mixed view of China's role in the world," said Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute. "Any major cooperation with China will likely require a long period of building common understanding, transparency, and trust." China sent its first astronaut into space in 2003, launched its second unmanned lunar probe this month, and by 2025 plans to become the second country after the U.S. to land a man on the moon. The U.S., by contrast, canceled its manned lunar program in February and is due to ground its space shuttle fleet next year, relying entirely on Russia, at least through the first half of the decade, to take astronauts to the International Space Station. Yet opposition in the U.S. to space cooperation with China appears to be growing, even as the European Space Agency and other countries deepen their engagement with Beijing. ESA, for example, has helped China monitor its satellites, worked with it to explore the Earth's magnetic field, and advocated its participation in the ISS—currently run by the U.S., Russia, Canada, Japan, Brazil and ESA's 11 members. A Chinese astronaut is also participating in a joint exercise with Russia and ESA to simulate a 500-day flight to Mars and back. "Cooperation with Europe has been much better," said Huang Hai, a professor at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. "The biggest problem with the United States and China is that the two sides don't trust each other enough." He said some Chinese space experts had been refused visas to attend conferences in the U.S., and would often arrange to meet U.S. colleagues in Europe instead. U.S. antipathy stems in large part from the 1999 Cox Committee congressional report that alleged that China stole U.S. space technology, partly by launching U.S.commercial satellites, to help develop its nuclear missile program. Fears about China's intentions were exacerbated when it shot down one of its own weather satellites in 2007 to test its ballistic missile capability. President Obama tried to move past that when he met China's President Hu Jintao in Beijing in November last year and agreed that Gen. Bolden and his Chinese counterpart would exchange visits this year. A joint statement during Mr. Obama's visit included the line: "The United States and China look forward to expanding discussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialogue on human space flight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit." However, the letter ahead of Gen. Bolden's trip to China, from Republican lawmakers Frank Wolf of Virginia, John Culberson of Texas and Robert Aderholt of Alabama—all on the House Appropriations subcommittee responsible for the NASA budget—as well as Rep. Dana Rohrabacher of California, asked for his "personal assurance" that he wouldn't discuss cooperation on human space flights.

Turn – Relations

Consultation sets up a reciprocal binding framework - China’s hostile to perceived intervention in their affairs

McDonald, China correspondent, 04 [Hamish McDonald, The Age, “the problem of Taiwan” news; opinion; pg. 11, jan 5, late edition, l/n]

Both developments call for determined diplomacy by the many foreign countries with a strong interest in supporting democratic trends in these two Chinese outposts, in the face of intense hostility by Beijing to any outside "interference" in what it asserts to be purely domestic issues.

China rejects foreign interference

Xinhua News Agency 04 [sept 15, http://www.China.org.cn/english/2004/Sep/107050.htm, accessed 7-8-07, “US interference in hk affairs rejected”]

US Interference in HK Affairs Rejected The Office of Commissioner of China's [Ministry of Foreign Affairs](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/default.htm) in Hong Kong on Tuesday firmly rejected Washington's rude interference in China's internal affairs and the affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).

Consultation fosters anti-Americanism – China wants new ideas designed in China.

New York Times 05 [Nov 18, late edition – final, section c; column 2; business/financial desk; international business; pg. 1, “made in U.S., shunned in China” by keith bradsher, l/n]

''Putting explicit American symbols in advertising will be alienating, not because of anti-Americanism but because of Chinese nationalism,'' said Tom Doctoroff, the chief executive for greater China at the JWT Advertising Agency. Shopping at a store selling Coca-Cola merchandise in the same Tee Mall where Ms. Chan shopped, Estella Chong, an English teacher who has never lived outside China, said that attitudes had changed. ''Maybe some people thought American brands were better than Chinese brands or had better after-sales service,'' she said. ''Now they don't think so.'' Business hotels in China have a smattering of Americans and swarms of executives from China, the rest of Asia and often Europe, a sign of scant interest by small American companies. The American Chamber of Commerce in Guangzhou in southeastern China helped organize an import opportunities fair here last year and arranged for American and Chinese officials to make presentations. But the heavily promoted event had to be canceled when fewer than a dozen American companies signed up to attend. ''American brands are not actively attacking the Chinese market -- lazy, maybe,'' said Andrew Leung, a garment industry magnate who is the chairman of the Hong Kong Textile Council. ''You see all the Italian brands doing quite well.'' The biggest strength of the United States in many markets has been its innovation. At a conference in Beijing on Tuesday, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger of California held up a new solar cell that had been designed in Silicon Valley, though it was actually manufactured in China. But China's rampant copying of everything from movies to auto part designs makes it hard for American companies to profit even by licensing their ideas. The Chinese government is determined to move into higher- technology industries, moreover, and is hiring top scientists to be researchers. China wants new products to be ''not just 'made in China' but 'designed in China,' '' said Gov. Huang Huahua of Guangdong Province at a news conference here on Thursday evening.

Turn – Heg

The treaty weakens U.S. capabilities – makes China’s stronger

Tellis 7 (Ashley, Senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment, June, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/19/punching-u.s.-military-s-soft-ribs-china-s-antisatellite-weapon-test-in-strategic-perspective/f60, accessed 7-2, JG)

In this context, let me also reaffirm that I do not believe, as Krepon phrased it, that ‘Chinese space diplomacy serves entirely as a ruse to protect the PLA’s ASAT programmes’. China’s space diplomacy, like that of any other great power, has multiple objectives. One certainly is to protect Beijing’s space warfare capabilities. Another more important goal consists of constraining America’s emerging military advantages in strategic arenas such as missile defence. The support offered by China to Russian treaty drafts circulated in connection with the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament underscores this point. While I therefore wish the Stimson Center every success in its efforts to garner support for a code of conduct relating to space, it is worth noting that China has repeatedly rejected all US overtures to discuss space ‘rules of the road’ because the goal of constraining US missile-defence capabilities through the PAROS process has been far more important to Beijing than either protecting the peaceful uses of space for all or abjuring the employment of its own kinetic-energy counterspace systems.

Here’s more evidence – China has done it in the past

Brown 9 (Trevor, Airspace Journal, Spring, "Soft Power and Space Weaponization, LexisNexis, accessed 7-2, JG)

Despite China's repeated calls for a ban on all space weapons, historical evidence suggests that little separates Chinese and Russian motivations for such bans. "Because a broad interpretation of space weapons would rule out almost all U.S. missile defense systems, Chinese officials who want to limit U.S. missile defense deployments would advocate a ban that used this interpretation." Interestingly, after the Clinton administration scrapped the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1993, China redoubled its efforts in military space and gained ground on the United States. By 1999 "China's test of a spacecraft intended for manned flight demonstrated a low-thrust rocket propulsion system that could be used to make warheads maneuver to defeat a BMD [ballistic missile defense] system."

Treaty will be used to constrain the U.S. and make Chinese weapons stronger

Hagt 6 (Eric, Director of the China Program @ CDI, 3-21, http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?focusid=99&charid=1, accessed 7-1, JG)

However, going beyond China's diplomatic call for a weapons ban -- which appears increasingly unrealistic considering the present security environment -- there is no official policy addressing the real possibility that space does become weaponized. What if the United States (or other country) deploys ASATs or space weapons? What if China's diplomatic efforts fail? Does China have a Plan B? There is a growing body of academic discourse on this subject within China. There is also speculation within the United States about what direction China is taking, some of which assumes the worst. A number of politicians and analysts in the United States have claimed that China is already developing anti-satellite weapons that pose a direct threat to the United States.60 "China's offensive anti-satellite programs," it has been stated, indicate that "Beijing's strategy to confront the United States in this area is clear."61 Such analysis takes the view that China's official promotion of a multilateral treaty to ban space weapons is merely the gambit of a country still playing catch-up, with the purpose of constraining U.S. political freedom to act in space while China continues to develop its own weapon systems to destroy American space assets.

Turn – Heg

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China won’t follow up on its agreement – past treaties prove

Lewis 9 (Lt. Col Brendan, Harvard, 4-23, “Aligning United States and Chinese Space Policies”, accessed 7-1, JG)

Additionally, if a space weapons control treaty could be written, it is questionable whether China would adhere to its tenants, as they have signed treaties in the past while ignoring the restrictions defining the agreements, to include Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime agreements. Rather than writing new treaties or space agreements, all nations should adhere to the agreements which already exist. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) established the overarching principle that space should be free for all nations to explore and use.