# China Disadvantages

# \*\*\*Shells\*\*\*

# US-China Relations 1NC Shell

**Uniqueness - US-China relations high- cooperation among leadership rising**

**BBC, 6/28/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>, “Chinese vice-president praises US ex-secretary of state’s role in building ties.” Access: July 2011//SL]

Beijing, 28 June: Vice-President Xi Jinping met with visiting former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Beijing on Monday [27 June], speaking highly of the veteran's remarkable contributions in building and promoting China-US relations. "Over the past four decades, Dr Kissinger, as a pioneer of China-US relations, have travelled back and forth across the Pacific dozens of times," Xi said during their meeting at the Great Hall of the People. "You have set up good working relations and personal friendships with several generations of Chinese leaders, and made great contributions toward improving and developing China-US relations," Xi said. This year marks the 40th anniversary of Kissinger's first "secret" visit to China. In July of 1971, Kissinger, as national security adviser to then-US President Richard Nixon, secretly flew to Beijing from Pakistan. His visit paved the way for a groundbreaking 1972 summit in Beijing between Nixon and the late Chairman Mao Zedong. This summit eventually led to the normalization of US-China relations. "The Chinese people will never forget the historic achievements you have made together with Chinese leaders from older generations," Xi said. Kissinger said he has been glad to see sound growth in US-China relations in past years. "I have worked with four generations of Chinese leaders and eight US presidents to promote relations between our two countries," said the 88-year-old Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He told Xi the US side is determined to cooperate with China to build a stronger cooperative partnership, adding that he will stay focused on boosting US-China relations and make his own contributions to this end. Xi said that President Hu Jintao's state visit to the United States in January of this year ushered in a new era for China-US relations. Kissinger agreed that Hu's visit was of fundamental importance in charting the future of relations between the two countries. "As we face a dramatically changing world, win-win cooperation should be the essential feature of China-US relations," Xi said. "Cooperation benefits both, while contention hurts both," he said, adding that China and the United States should bear in mind their common interests as they map out the long-term development of their relations. Xi urged both countries to maintain close high-level exchanges, enhance win-win cooperation and strategic trust and seek common ground while putting aside differences. He hopes both sides will properly handle their differences on sensitive issues and cement cultural exchanges and friendship in order to boost the growth of the China-US cooperative partnership. Kissinger was invited to Beijing by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs to attend the Second Global Think Tank Summit, which was held in the city on Saturday and Sunday.

**[INSERT SPECIFIC LINK HERE]**

**AND/OR**

**China doesn’t like US *any* increase in space activity – they think it threatens their economy**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

The global economy is intimately tied to assets in space.63 During the last two decades or more, China has participated in bilateral, regional, multilateral, and international space cooperation in different forms, such as commercial launching services, and these have yielded significant achievements. In 1985, the Chinese government opened the “Long-March” rockets to the international commercial launching market. Since then, China has a growing list of customers in the international satellite-launch markets,64 and seeks to acquire a greater share of the international commercial launching market. China’s space launch complexes are relatively large and comprehensive. Three different facilities provide the capability to launch objects into LEO, geosynchronous, and polar orbits. With these launch complexes, China has positioned itself to support any requirement for a space launch, commercial, military, or scientific. Though these matters are not linked explicitly in official public documents, China perceives itself as a developing space power, in need of free access to space for its own economic growth. The U.S. pursuit of space control would threaten China’s civilian and commercial space activities, and even deny China access to space.

**[ ] U.S.-China cooperation key to stabilization of global economy, ecosystem and security**

**URJHS 2011 Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences** [Ruby Yanjie Chen, Robert Guang Tian, 4/5/11 Medaille College “The Economic Connections between China and the U.S.: How to Benefit Both Players through International Trading” <http://www.kon.org/urc/v10/chen.html> Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

Today’s world is undergoing tremendous development and change; how China and the United States define their relations means much, not only to each other but it means a lot to the rest of the world. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said U.S. and China relations would decide whether the 21st century international relationship is hostile or peaceful. U.S. President Barack Obama has also stated that China **relations would shape the 21st century**. This means that **however China and the U.S. get along with each other is how the 21st century will run** (BBC News, 2010). “Bilateral communication has been expanded geographically against globalization, and the contacts involving China and the United States occur every day at almost every corner of the world, not just between the two countries. The **major challenges of the 21st century, from climate change to nuclear proliferation to economic recovery, are challenges that touch both our nations and challenges that neither of our nations can solve by acting alone**. Both Obama and Clinton pointed [this] out . . . . , under the circumstances of the international situation undergoing intense and complex changes” (Xinhua News, 2009). The **United States and China now have to look each other straight in the eyes, recognizing that the core of their relationship rests on the strategic foundation of stabilization—stabilization of the global economy, global ecosystem, and global security**. They need to face challenges together, not just having their own problems. China and the U.S., as the world’s largest developing and developed country respectively, are taking the leading role in international business and the trends of global dynamics.

**[ ] US-China conflict over Taiwan draws in regional powers - leads to extinction**

**Straits Times 2000** [The Straits Times, “No One Gains in War over Taiwan,” 6/25/00, Lexis accessed: 7/18/11//AG]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.

# Chinese Militarization 1NC Shell

**[ ] China not militarizing now – changes in BMD, Taiwan and national space policy reassure**

**Zhang 11 PH.D. From the University of Texas** [Spring 2011. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China

Military Space Relationship.” The Prospects of Arms Control. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=The%20Security%20Dilemma%20in%20the%20US-China%20Military%20Space%20Relationship%20The%20Prospects%20for%20Arms%20Control&rft.auinit=B&rft.aulast=Zhang&rft.date=2011&rft.epage=332&rft.genre=article&rft.issn=0004-4687&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=311&rft.stitle=ASIAN%20SURV&rft.title=ASIAN%20SURVEY&rft.volume=51&rfr_id=info:sid/www.isinet.com:WoK:UA> //TD]

Despite the pessimism about the U.S.-China military space relationship, this article suggests that the security dilemma is susceptible to changes in the strategic environments of the different parties. Perceptions that threats from other countries are rising or declining could intensify—or mollify—the security dilemma. Indeed, recent and important developments in the strategic environments of both countries have created conditions to ease tensions. These developments include the current strategic adjustment of the U.S. under the Obama administration, which has endorsed the banning of weapons in space; the recent U.S. willingness to curb missile defense; and the altered situation in the Taiwan Strait. These developments have significantly changed the strategic landscape between China and the U.S. and moderated the major factors contributing to the space security dilemma. This new strategic landscape may offer a window of opportunity for arms control in outer space. U.S. STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them.40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. 39. For Yao’s comments, see Edith M. Lederer, “China’s WEF Envoy Sees Space Weaponizing,” Washington Post, January 26, 2007. 40. Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007). 324 • ASIAN SURVEY 51:2 The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.”42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely.43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment.

**[ ] Further US space weaponization spur Chinese development and space arms race**

Kenneth S. **Blazejewski 2008** – master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law (“Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55 http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf Accessed on 7/14/11//KH)

First, I argue that if the United States proceeds with space weaponization, China will respond with some form of its own military buildup. The extent of such a response is not certain, but a new arms race revolving around space warfare is not unthinkable. Second, China has already developed the means to attack some US satellites, and there is no guarantee that China does not seek to develop the means to launch a more robust space weapons or ASAT program. Members of Congress and the Department of Defense have responded to China’s increased space capacity and its January 2007 ASAT test by calling for renewed focus on US space policy and defense. Last fall, Cong. Terry Everett, the Ranking Republican member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, in an article previously published in this journal entitled “Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy,” referred to China’s ASAT test as a “clear wakeup call for the Administration, Congress, and the American people.” 4 I agree with the congressman that China’s actions require a clear response from the United States. This response must include some of the unilateral defensive actions that the congressman calls for, including the development of a comprehensive space protection strategy and improvement of space situational awareness. However, unilateral defensive actions must not come at the cost of multilateral diplomatic progress. I argue that the United States should take a proactive role in developing international rules for the military use of outer space. The United States can use its significant international influence to shape rules that preserve its national interests, such as deploying a limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) system but placing a ban on the testing of ASAT weapons. To maximize US long-term security, however, I would argue that the United States not deploy space weapons as part of a multilayered BMD shield or otherwise. Space weapons would not contribute to US security in the way that many proponents suggest. Ultimately, space weapons deployment is likely to expose US satellites to greater threat by encouraging foreign states to develop more advanced ASAT technology and expedite nuclear proliferation. Even when considered in isolation, the decision to forgo space weaponization is a wise one; when considered within the larger context of arms control negotiations, it clearly presents an opportunity to advance US long-term security. The United States should concede to negotiate on space weaponization with China in return for Chinese cooperation in other more critical areas of counterproliferation, such as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

**[ ] US-China Space race causes economic collapse and full-scale war**

**Martel, 3- Professor, Naval War College** [William, National Security Affairs,with Toshi Yoshihara doctoral candidate , Fletcher School of Law, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2003, http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn\_martel.pdf, “Averting a Sino-China Space Race”, Accessed July 12, SH]

What exactly does such an action-reaction cycle mean? What would a bi- lateral space race look like? Hypothetically, in the next 10 years, some criti- cal sectors of China’s economy and military could become increasingly vulnerable to disruptions in space. During this same period, Sino-U.S. rela- tions may not improve appreciably, and the Taiwan question could remain unresolved. If Washington and Beijing could increasingly hold each other’s space infrastructure hostage by threatening to use military options in times of crisis, then potentially risky paths to preemption could emerge in the policy planning processes in both capitals. In preparing for a major contin- gency in the Taiwan Strait, both the United States and China might be com- pelled to plan for a disabling, blinding attack on the other’s space systems before the onset of hostilities. The most troubling dimension to this scenario is that some elements of preemption (already evident in U.S. global doc- trine) could become a permanent feature of U.S. and Chinese strategies in space. Indeed, Chinese strategic writings today suggest that the leadership in Beijing believes that preemption is the rational way to prevent future U.S. military intervention. If leaders in Beijing and Washington were to position themselves to pre- empt each other, then the two sides would enter an era of mutual hostility, one that might include destabilizing, hair-trigger defense postures in space where both sides stand ready to launch a first strike on a moment’s notice. One scenario involves the use of weapons, such as lasers or jammers, which seek to blind sensors on imaging satellites or disable satellites that provide warning of missile launches. Imagine, for example, Washington’s reaction if China disabled U.S. missile warning satellites or vice versa. In that case, Sino-U.S. relations would be highly vulnerable to the misinterpretations and miscalculations that could lead to a conflict in space. Although attacks against space assets would likely be a precursor or a complement to a broader crisis or conflict, and although conflicts in the space theater may not generate many casualties or massive physical destruction, the economic costs of conflict in space alone for both sides, and for the international com- munity, would be extraordinary given that many states depend on satellites for their economic well-being.

# \*\*\*UNIQUENESS/BRINKS\*\*\*

# Generic Relations Good

**[ ] US-China relations- cooperation among leadership**

 **BBC, 6/28/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>, “Chinese vice-president praises US ex-secretary of state’s role in building ties.” Access: July 2011//SL]

Beijing, 28 June: Vice-President Xi Jinping met with visiting former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Beijing on Monday [27 June], speaking highly of the veteran's remarkable contributions in building and promoting China-US relations. "Over the past four decades, Dr Kissinger, as a pioneer of China-US relations, have travelled back and forth across the Pacific dozens of times," Xi said during their meeting at the Great Hall of the People. "You have set up good working relations and personal friendships with several generations of Chinese leaders, and made great contributions toward improving and developing China-US relations," Xi said. This year marks the 40th anniversary of Kissinger's first "secret" visit to China. In July of 1971, Kissinger, as national security adviser to then-US President Richard Nixon, secretly flew to Beijing from Pakistan. His visit paved the way for a groundbreaking 1972 summit in Beijing between Nixon and the late Chairman Mao Zedong. This summit eventually led to the normalization of US-China relations. "The Chinese people will never forget the historic achievements you have made together with Chinese leaders from older generations," Xi said. Kissinger said he has been glad to see sound growth in US-China relations in past years. "I have worked with four generations of Chinese leaders and eight US presidents to promote relations between our two countries," said the 88-year-old Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He told Xi the US side is determined to cooperate with China to build a stronger cooperative partnership, adding that he will stay focused on boosting US-China relations and make his own contributions to this end. Xi said that President Hu Jintao's state visit to the United States in January of this year ushered in a new era for China-US relations. Kissinger agreed that Hu's visit was of fundamental importance in charting the future of relations between the two countries. "As we face a dramatically changing world, win-win cooperation should be the essential feature of China-US relations," Xi said. "Cooperation benefits both, while contention hurts both," he said, adding that China and the United States should bear in mind their common interests as they map out the long-term development of their relations. Xi urged both countries to maintain close high-level exchanges, enhance win-win cooperation and strategic trust and seek common ground while putting aside differences. He hopes both sides will properly handle their differences on sensitive issues and cement cultural exchanges and friendship in order to boost the growth of the China-US cooperative partnership. Kissinger was invited to Beijing by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs to attend the Second Global Think Tank Summit, which was held in the city on Saturday and Sunday.

**[ ] Relations moderating – China likes Obama’s missile defense shift**

**Zhang 11 PH.D. From the University of Texas** [Spring 2011. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China

Military Space Relationship.” The Prospects of Arms Control. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=The%20Security%20Dilemma%20in%20the%20US-China%20Military%20Space%20Relationship%20The%20Prospects%20for%20Arms%20Control&rft.auinit=B&rft.aulast=Zhang&rft.date=2011&rft.epage=332&rft.genre=article&rft.issn=0004-4687&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=311&rft.stitle=ASIAN%20SURV&rft.title=ASIAN%20SURVEY&rft.volume=51&rfr_id=info:sid/www.isinet.com:WoK:UA> //TD]

NEW DIRECTION IN U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE The space security dilemma could also be moderated if the U.S. is willing to restrain its missile defense, which has been a key driver of China’s military space programs. Now, the Obama administration’s willingness to curb missile defense for both financial and diplomatic reasons offers new hope. The administration has reduced the budget for missile defense and cancelled potentially controversial weapons systems. For the 2010 budget year, the administration has asked Congress for $7.8 billion to fund missile defense, a cut of about $1.2 billion from 2009. More important, the Obama government has cancelled the development of new weapons systems, including Northrop’s Kinetic Energy (KEI) program and Lockheed Martin’s Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program. The KEI system was being designed for boost-phase interception of ballistic missiles and would have constituted a key part of a multilayered missile defense system. This multilayered approach presents a great threat to China and Russia because it improves the probability of successful interception. Moreover, the system requires forward deployment to achieve boost-phase 44. Chen Yixong, “Meiguo Junshi Tiaozheng di Hong Hei” [The U.S. military adjustment], Xiandai Junshi, June 2006, p. 37. 45. Zhou Hui, “Meiguo Taikong Zhanlue Kaishi Zhuanxiang?” [Is the U.S. space policy changing directions?], ibid., p. 31. 326 • ASIAN SURVEY 51:2 interception, which could generate controversies with China and Russia. Although the Obama administration’s official justification for cancelling the program was its high cost and potentially limited combat effectiveness, concerns about Chinese and Russian reactions may have played a role in the decision. Chinese and Russian concerns were certainly important in the cancellation of the MKV program, which was being designed to use independently guided submunitions to intercept not only warheads but also decoys or other countermeasures during a missile attack. The system was once considered vital for countering potential actions by China or Russia to overwhelm U.S. missile defense. Indeed, the system was designed “to restore balance between offense and defense.” Chinese nuclear deterrence experts were gravely concerned by the emerging MKV program, calling it “a snake with nine heads” for its ability to intercept multiple targets. If deployed, the MKV program certainly would have triggered strong protests from both China and Russia. The official cancellation for strategic reasons was explained by Secretary Gates in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on May 13, 2009. Gates stated that MKV was cancelled because it “was designed to deal with a more complex threat that would have potentially come from either China or Russia.”46 Thus, the message to China and Russia was that they should not overly worry about U.S. missile defense. Indeed, the Obama administration has stated that missile defense will now focus on threats from rogue states like Iran and North Korea.

**[ ] US-China relations good now – moderation on missile defense, Taiwan straits and US grand strategy**

**Zhang 11 PH.D. From the University of Texas** [Spring 2011. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China

Military Space Relationship.” The Prospects of Arms Control. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=The%20Security%20Dilemma%20in%20the%20US-China%20Military%20Space%20Relationship%20The%20Prospects%20for%20Arms%20Control&rft.auinit=B&rft.aulast=Zhang&rft.date=2011&rft.epage=332&rft.genre=article&rft.issn=0004-4687&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=311&rft.stitle=ASIAN%20SURV&rft.title=ASIAN%20SURVEY&rft.volume=51&rfr_id=info:sid/www.isinet.com:WoK:UA> //TD]

Important changes in U.S. strategic posture, missile defense, and the Taiwan Strait situation may now allow Washington and Beijing to extricate themselves from their space security dilemma, paving the way for arms control. In fact, these changes have already led to rising optimism among Chinese security experts with regard to the possibility of arms control in outer space. Zhao Kejin, a space security expert at Qinghua University, argues that there is no need for China to “engage the U.S. in a space arms race.” Instead, “Facing the possibility of emerging anarchy in outer space, China and the U.S. can work together to push for arms control negotiations, with the aim of establishing effective mechanisms for the monitoring and management of outer space.”50 This upbeat mood among Chinese experts represents a big change from the pessimism of the Bush era. The challenge for China and the U.S. is to seize the opportunity and forge a realistic approach to space arms control.

**[ ] Good relations now - The current Obama policy will cause multilateralism in space**

**Zhang 11 PH.D. From the University of Texas** [Spring 2011. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship.” The Prospects of Arms Control. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=The%20Security%20Dilemma%20in%20the%20US-China%20Military%20Space%20Relationship%20The%20Prospects%20for%20Arms%20Control&rft.auinit=B&rft.aulast=Zhang&rft.date=2011&rft.epage=332&rft.genre=article&rft.issn=0004-4687&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=311&rft.stitle=ASIAN%20SURV&rft.title=ASIAN%20SURVEY&rft.volume=51&rfr_id=info:sid/www.isinet.com:WoK:UA> //TD] Indeed, in February 2008 China and Russia jointly proposed such a treaty at the U.N. Conference on

Disarmament in Geneva. Chinese experts have repeatedly emphasized that arms control for outer space remains China’s top priority, though it is prepared for an arms race if necessary. President Hu’s statement on the issue in November 2009 effectively reaffirmed this position. Therefore, the current strategic adjustment by the U.S. and President 56. The White House, “National Space Policy of the U.S. of America,” p. 2, June 28, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national\_space\_policy\_6-28-10.pdf>. 57. Johnston-Freese and Nichols, “Space, Stability, and Nuclear Strategy,” p. 16. 332 • ASIAN SURVEY 51:2 Obama’s new space policy could make a multilateral approach feasible. According to a PLA strategist assessing the new directions in U.S. space policy: If Obama, who champions the theme of change, forsakes the longtime U.S. strategy for space hegemony and is willing to pursue arms control in outer space through an international treaty, then, with effective mechanisms for monitoring and verification, the world community will be able to walk on the right track toward peaceful use of space, eradication of [the] arms race, and realization of permanent peace.58

**[ ] Relations high- Soybeans improve economic interdependence**

**MENAFN, 6/23/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.asp?storyid=1093423755>, “Soybeans to provide seed for improved US-China relations.” Access: July 2011//SL]

(MENAFN) Alan Kemper, American Soybean Association president, said that China, which already imports 25 percent of soybeans produced in the US, is predicted to import over 5 percent more of the beans than last year, Xinhua reported. This trade increase will help level the trade balance between the two counties, possibly improving US-China relations, both Kemper and Zhang Monan, an Economic Forcast Department of the State Information Center researcher said.

**[ ] Relations High- Chinese vice foreign minister and president**

**Xinhua 6/21/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/21/c_13941904.htm>. “Vice FM expresses confidence in future of China-U.S. relationship.” Access: July 2011//SL]

BEIJING, June 21 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai on Tuesday said he expected China-U.S. ties to continue to warm, saying that both parties can build their cooperative partnership through enhancing mutual trust and deepening cooperation. "I am confident about the future of China-U.S. ties," Cui told reporters in an interview on the first round of consultations on the Asia-Pacific region between the two countries. Cui and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell will co-host the consultations in Honolulu, Hawaii on Saturday. The two countries will exchange views on the situation of the Asia-Pacific region, their respective policies on the area, as well as other issues of common concern. As long as China and the United States abide by the principles of the three China-U.S. joint communiques and the China-U.S. Joint Statement, enhance dialogue and communication, strengthen mutual trust and cooperation and properly handle the differences, the two countries can continue to improve ties, Cui said. Since President Hu Jintao visited the United States in January, China-U.S. relations have entered a new phase in which both parties are committed to working together to build a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, Cui said.

**[ ] Relations high-President Hu visit**

**New York Times, 1/19/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world/asia/20assess.html?_r=1>. “Subtle Signs of Progress in U.S.-China Relations.” Access: July 2011//SL]

WASHINGTON — The Chinese have striven to lend this week’s state visit by President Hu Jintao the aura of a fresh start, from feel-good displays of friendly Chinese in Times Square to a Washington newspaper insert that declared on Wednesday that his meeting with President Obama could open a new chapter in a relationship between the world’s two economic giants that had been troubled. At a news conference with President Obama at the White House on Wednesday, President Hu Jintao said that China “recognizes and also respects the universality of human rights.” After a 2010 notable mostly for Chinese acrimony toward the United States and its policies, Mr. Hu came to the White House not only saying that constructive relations between the two powers were essential, but also offering some modest concessions to demonstrate it. In a joint statement issued Wednesday, the Chinese for the first time expressed public concern over North Korea’s recent disclosure of a modern uranium-enrichment plant, a small but ardently sought step in American efforts to press Kim Jong-il to roll back his nuclear weapons program.

**[ ] Relations good- military and economy**

**CBS 1/20/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/20/politics/main7265918.shtml>, “Hu Jintao: China Not a Threat to U.S. Power.” Access: July 2011//SL]

WASHINGTON - Chinese President Hu Jintao sought to assure U.S. business leaders on Thursday that his country is an economic partner and not a military threat to America or anyone else. But he rejected foreign interference on issues such as Tibet and Taiwan. "We will remain committed to the path of peaceful development," Hu told a U.S.-China Business Council luncheon. "We do not engage in an arms race, we are not a military threat to any country. China will never seek to dominate or pursue an expansionist policy."

**[ ] Relations good- military and economy**

**CBS 1/20/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/20/politics/main7265918.shtml>, “Hu Jintao: China Not a Threat to U.S. Power.” Access: July 2011//SL]

WASHINGTON - Chinese President Hu Jintao sought to assure U.S. business leaders on Thursday that his country is an economic partner and not a military threat to America or anyone else. But he rejected foreign interference on issues such as Tibet and Taiwan. "We will remain committed to the path of peaceful development," Hu told a U.S.-China Business Council luncheon. "We do not engage in an arms race, we are not a military threat to any country. China will never seek to dominate or pursue an expansionist policy."

**[ ] Relations Good - dialogue, communication, and mutual trust**

**Xinhua, 6-21-11**, [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/21/c_13941904.htm>, “Vice FM expresses confidence in future of China-U.S. relationship.” Access: July 2011//SL]

"I am confident about the future of China-U.S. ties," Cui told reporters in an interview on the first round of consultations on the Asia-Pacific region between the two countries. Cui and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell will co-host the consultations in Honolulu, Hawaii on Saturday. The two countries will exchange views on the situation of the Asia-Pacific region, their respective policies on the area, as well as other issues of common concern. As long as China and the United States abide by the principles of the three China-U.S. joint communiques and the China-U.S. Joint Statement, enhance dialogue and communication, strengthen mutual trust and cooperation and properly handle the differences, the two countries can continue to improve ties, Cui said.

**[ ] Relations high – Hu visits US**

**Xinhua, 6-21-11**, [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/21/c_13941904.htm>, “Vice FM expresses confidence in future of China-U.S. relationship.” Access: July 2011//SL]

Since President Hu Jintao visited the United States in January, China-U.S. relations have entered a new phase in which both parties are committed to working together to build a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, Cui said.

**[ ] US-China Relations rising- common interests, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and global spheres**

**Xinhua, 6-21-11**, [Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/21/c_13941904.htm>, “Vice FM expresses confidence in future of China-U.S. relationship.” Access: July 2011//SL]

The sound and steady development of China-U.S. relations is beneficial to both parties and the world, Cui said. There will be good chances to further develop China-U.S. ties in the further, he said. China and the United States should enhance mutual trust through conducting dialogues at different levels, Cui said. The two countries, which shoulder broad common interests, as well as deepen cooperation in the bilateral, multilateral and global spheres. They also should properly handle differences and sensitive issues based on the principle of equality and mutual respect, he said. Besides, people-to-people exchanges should be enhanced to solidify the social and civil basis for the development of China-U.S. ties, he said.

**[ ] US-China cooperation - committed to international partnership**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

2. The two Presidents reviewed the progress made in the relationship since President Obama's November 2009 state visit to China and reaffirmed their commitment to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century, which serves the interests of the Chinese and American peoples and of the global community. The two sides reaffirmed that the three Joint Communiques issued by China and the United States laid the political foundation for the relationship and will continue to guide the development of China-U.S. relations. The two sides reaffirmed respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Presidents further reaffirmed their commitment to the November 2009 China-U.S. Joint Statement. 3. China and the United States are committed to work together to build a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit in order to promote the common interests of both countries and to address the 21st century's opportunities and challenges. China and the United States are actively cooperating on a wide range of security, economic, social, energy, and environmental issues which require deeper bilateral engagement and coordination. The two leaders agreed that broader and deeper collaboration with international partners and institutions is required to develop and implement sustainable solutions and to promote peace, stability, prosperity, and the well-being of peoples throughout the world.

**[ ] Strong relations- Peace, stability and prosperity**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

5. The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Working together, both leaders support efforts to build a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region for the 21st century.

**[ ] Relations high- Taiwan cooperation**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

6. Both sides underscored the importance of the Taiwan issue in China-U.S. relations. The Chinese side emphasized that the Taiwan issue concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and expressed the hope that the U.S. side will honor its relevant commitments and appreciate and support the Chinese side's position on this issue. The U.S. side stated that the United States follows its one-China policy and abides by the principles of the three China-U.S. Joint Communiques. The United States applauded the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and welcomed the new lines of communications developing between them. The United States supports the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and to develop more positive and stable cross-Strait relations.

**[ ] Relations High- Human Rights Agreements**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

[8. China and the United States agreed to hold the next round of the resumed Legal Experts Dialogue before the next Human Rights Dialogue convenes. China and the United States further agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of law and exchanges on the rule of law. China and the United States are actively exploring exchanges and discussions on the increasing role of women in society.

**[ ] Relations High- military**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

9. China and the United States affirmed that a healthy, stable and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of President Hu's and President Obama's shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship. Both sides agreed on the need for enhanced and substantive dialogue and communication at all levels: to reduce misunderstanding, misperception, and miscalculation; to foster greater understanding and expand mutual interest; and to promote the healthy, stable, and reliable development of the military-to-military relationship. Both sides noted the successful visit of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to China earlier this month, and that the United States welcomes Chief of the PLA General Staff General Chen Bingde to the United States in the first half of 2011. Both sides reaffirmed that the Defense Consultative Talks, the Defense Policy Coordination Talks, and the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement will remain important channels of communication in the future. Both sides will work to execute the seven priority areas for developing military-to-military relations as agreed to by Secretary Gates and General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in October 2009.

**[ ] China-U.S. agreement-space cooperation**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

10. China and the United States agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space. The United States invited a Chinese delegation to visit NASA headquarters and other appropriate NASA facilities in 2011 to reciprocate for the productive visit of the U.S. NASA Administrator to China in 2010. The two sides agreed to continue discussions on opportunities for practical future cooperation in the space arena, based on principles of transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit.

**[ ] Relations high- Extension of Bilateral Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

11. China and the United States acknowledged the accomplishments under the bilateral Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, one of the longest-standing bilateral agreements between the two countries, and welcomed the signing of its extension. China and the United States will continue to cooperate in such diverse areas as agriculture, health, energy, environment, fisheries, student exchanges, and technological innovation in order to advance mutual well-being.

**[ ] Relations high- Strengthening law enforcement**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

12. China and the United States welcomed progress by the China-U.S. Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation (JLG) to strengthen law enforcement cooperation across a range of issues, including counterterrorism. China and the United States also agreed to enhance joint efforts to combat corruption through bilateral and other means.

**[ ] US China Cooperation- eight consecutive administrations**

**U.S. Department of State, 8/5/10** [Organization to advance education of the world for American people, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm#relations>, “U.S.-China Relations.” Access: July 2011//SL]

U.S. China policy has been consistent. For eight consecutive administrations, Democratic and Republican, U.S. policy has been to encourage China's opening and integration into the global system. As a result, China has moved from being a relatively isolated and poor country to one that is a key participant in international institutions and a major trading nation. The United States encourages China to play an active role as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, working with the United States and other countries to support and strengthen the international system that has enabled China's success. In the words of Secretary Clinton, the U.S. wants to “develop a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China.” Senior State Department officials engage in regular and intensive discussions with their P.R.C. counterparts through the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. China has an important role to play in global, regional, and bilateral counterterrorism efforts, and has supported coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9-11) in New York City and Washington, DC, China offered strong public support against terrorism and has been an important partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Shortly after 9-11, the United States and China also commenced a Counterterrorism Sub-Dialogue, conducting its seventh round of talks in September 2009. Inspections under the Container Security Initiative (CSI) are now underway at the major ports of Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. China has also agreed to participate in the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, a critical part of U.S. efforts to detect the flow of nuclear materials. China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on counterterrorism, publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban. China participated in both the Iraq Neighbors and International Compact with Iraq meetings in 2007 and voiced strong support for the Government of Iraq following the country's December 2005 parliamentary elections. China has pledged $25 million to Iraqi reconstruction and taken measures to forgive Iraq's sovereign debt to China. The United States and China have cooperated with growing effectiveness on various aspects of law enforcement, including computer crime, intellectual property rights enforcement, human smuggling, and corruption. The most recent meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on law enforcement cooperation took place in Washington in October 2008. The next meeting will be the eighth meeting of the JLG and will take place in November 2010 in Beijing.

**[ ] US-China relations healthy – common interests now but mutual communication and consultation key to preserve relations**

**Xuecheng; 2009, Executive V.P at China Institute for International Studies** [Liu. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member). Robert Oxnam. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign February 13. “The Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. <http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china> accessed: 7/13/11//AG]

China’s Expectations The United States is the largest developed state and China is the largest developing state in the world. The China-U.S. relationship has become the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. The two countries share multiple common interests such as global financial stability, energy security, climate change, counter-terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. Globalization has made us increasingly interdependent. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and the United States shoulder the common responsibility of world peace and development. Since the establishment of our bilateral diplomatic relations, great progress has been made in developing our current positive and constructive relationship. More than 30 government-to-government agreements have been signed and over 60 mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation have been created—of special note are the high-level strategic dialogue mechanisms that were institutionalized between the two governments during the Bush presidency. The United States and China are constructive partners rather than competing rivals. The global financial crisis and recession further highlights the absolute necessity of Chinese-U.S. cooperation. To push forward bilateral constructive cooperation, we need to shake off the partisan mindset and build on what has been achieved by past Republican and Democratic administrations. Our leaders have always advocated that our two countries should treat our bilateral relations from the long-term and strategic perspective. The importance and effect of China-U.S. interactions go far beyond bilateral relations. Given that our two countries have different political systems, different levels of socio-economic development, and different cultural traditions, we also need to observe the principles of mutual respect and consultation on an equal footing and pursue win-win cooperation. As two responsible powers in the world, we need to work together to meet de velopmental challenges and combat security threats. Dialogue, consultation, and cooperation need to be the core of our constructive partnership. Any differences and disputes in bilateral, regional, or global fields should be put into the diplomatic process and not be politicized. The differences in a specific field should not be allowed to affect our general constructive relationship. Of particular concern to the Chinese leadership is that the Obama administration continues to strengthen the existing dialogue mechanisms—such as the Strategic Economic Dialogue and the Senior Official Dialogue. The biannual Strategic Economic Dialogue, begun in 2006, has become an important platform for the economic leaders of both countries to exchange views on bilateral economic and trade relations. The China-U.S. Senior Official Dialogue mechanism was suggested by President Hu. Launched in 2005, this dialogue provides a forum for the two powers to discuss issues of mutual concern. In the six meetings to date, the topics included economics and trade issues, energy security, counterterrorism cooperation, nonproliferation, and pandemic diseases. The two dialogue mechanisms have achieved productive results and we welcome any proposal for broadening and strengthening such mechanisms. How the United States works with emerging powers will be crucial, since the pressing problems facing the world today cannot be resolved without the participation of these emerging powers, China first and foremost. The U.S.’s efforts to fight the global financial crisis have evolved from a G-8 focus to the G-20 with key developing countries invited. China is an indispensable player in addressing the current challenges the United States and the world are facing. The Obama administration is clearly aware of this situation.

**[ ] US-China relations high - Obama multilateral focus fixing Bush-era suspicions**

**Xuecheng; 2009, Executive V.P at China Institute for International Studies** [Liu. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member). Robert Oxnam. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign February 13. “The Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. <http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china> accessed: 7/13/11//AG]

When Chinese President Hu Jintao congratulated President (then Senator) Obama on his electoral victory, the resulting conversation gave Hu direct insight into Obama’s thinking on the U.S.-China relationship. From the comments that Obama gave directly to Hu, in the course of the campaign, and as a Senator, Chinese expectations are emerging. Among the messages that China has heard are: .. During the congratulatory call, Obama told Hu that China’s development and success and U.S. interests are related. Obama stated that he hoped that the United States and China would strengthen cooperation and develop bilateral relations further. Hu also emphasized that developing a constructive partnership is in the fundamental interests of the two countries. The two great nations should increase exchanges, deepen mutual trust, expand co3 operation, and promote durable bilateral partnership. The cordial goodwill and firm commitments expressed by Obama and Hu bode well for continuing constructive cooperation in the years ahead. The .. core of Obama’s diplomatic strategy is renewing America’s global leadership. In his view, U.S. national security strategy should respond to the challenges posed by Islamic fundamentalism and the rise of emerging powers, including China. He has vowed to rebuild America’s global alliances and partnerships. When he explains his Asia policy priorities, President Obama notes that the United States needs an inclusive infrastructure with the countries in East Asia that can promote stability and prosperity and help confront transnational threats. He believes that the United States should first of all maintain robust relations with its allies and deepen its partnership with India, which Obama regards as a “natural strategic ally” of the United States. At the same time, Obama has pledged to deepen America’s relations with China. As he points out, “[A]n Obama administration will look for opportunities to work with China and others in the region to foster an environment where regional stability and prosperity flourish.” .. President Obama believes that China has grown into a major power. It is unreasonable to deny its participation in efforts to stabilize financial markets and combat terrorism. During his presidential campaign, Obama described China as neither friend nor enemy but competitor. But in other remarks, Obama has characterized China as a partner. While addressing the Senate in May 2008, Obama pointed out that China’s rise is both a challenge and an opportunity for the United States. The United States should welcome China’s peaceful rise and at the same time be prepared to prevent it from developing in a problematic direction. .. In his article published in Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007), Obama encouraged China to play a responsible role as a growing power—to help lead in addressing the common problems of the 21st century. He emphasized that “our essential challenge is to build a relationship that broadens cooperation while strengthening our ability to compete.” The United States and China will face challenges that require the United States to change its policy. “How the United States and China meet these challenges, and the extent to which we can find common ground, will be important both for our own countries and for others in Asia and beyond.”

**[ ] Cooperation between the US and China in space now – they’ve made public assurances**

**CNET 11/17/09**

[Associated Press Staff Writerhttp://news.cnet.com/8301-19514\_3-10399964-239.html, “U.S. and China agree to explore space cooperation.” Access: July, 2011//SL]

JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, Houston--The United States and China have agreed to discuss expanded cooperation in space science and to start a "dialogue" on human space flight and exploration, according to a joint statement released in Beijing on Tuesday. The U.S.-China Joint Statement said both nations looked forward to reciprocal visits by the NASA administrator and appropriate Chinese space leaders in 2010. "The United States and China look forward to expanding discussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialogue on human space flight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit," the joint statement said. "Both sides welcome reciprocal visits of the NASA administrator and the appropriate Chinese counterpart in 2010." President Obama visits the Forbidden City in Beijing. (Credit: Pete Souza/White House) John Logsdon, a space policy analyst at George Washington University, said expanded cooperation makes sense, but only if both sides are open with each other and share the technical data necessary to ensure safe operations. "I think it's great," he said in a telephone interview. "It opens the door to see whether, in fact, there's a basis for cooperation. I think the operative word in there is 'transparency.' If China is willing to provide the information we need to work with them and vice versa--they were the ones who have been somewhat reticent to do that--I think it makes total sense." The future direction of the U.S. manned space program is unclear as NASA waits for the Obama administration to make a decision on how the agency should proceed after the space shuttle is retired next year. The Bush administration directed NASA to finish the space station and retire the shuttle by the end of 2010 and to develop a new family of safer, less expensive rockets to service the International Space Station and to help launch manned moon missions by the early 2020s. NASA developed the Constellation program and the Ares family of manned and unmanned rockets to meet that challenge, but the agency has not been given the funding needed to carry out the program under the original schedule. An independent review of manned space options was carried out this summer at the request of the Obama administration. The panel concluded NASA would need an additional $6 billion a year to fund the Constellation program and extend the International Space Station program through 2020. The panel presented four other options as well, including one to encourage private industry to take over launching astronauts to low-Earth orbit while NASA focuses on long-term deep space exploration.

**[ ] Stable relations now – Obama stressing cooperation despite currency and human rights issues**

**Xuecheng; 2009, Executive V.P at China Institute for International Studies** [Liu. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member). Robert Oxnam. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign February 13. “The Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. <http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china> accessed: 7/13/11//AG]

During his presidential campaign, Obama complained about China’s currency policy and trading practices and said he would, once in office, try to bring about a change in Chinese policy through diplomatic means. Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner, during his confirmation hearing, even accused China of currency manipulation. Geithner’s comment was not unexpected in China as many anticipated the new Obama administration would take a relatively protectionist and populist stance toward China. The White House, however, tried to play down Geithner’s accusation by noting that the United States wants to establish a “comprehensive” economic relationship with China, and stating that it will not make a determination about China’s currency until Treasury provides a report to Congress in the spring. .. In its election platform, the Democratic Party promises to adhere to its “one China” policy and the Taiwan Relations Act and support “peaceful resolution of cross-straits issues that is consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.” It emphasizes that its “one China” policy is based on the Taiwan Relations Act without mentioning the three Sino-U.S. communiqués— the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), the China-US Communiqué on Arms Sale to Taiwan (1982), and the China-U.S. Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1979). Obama welcomed the $6.5 billion arms package for Taiwan announced by the Bush administration on October 3, 2008. He has also not given short shrift to “human rights in Tibet” in his articles and policy statements. Obama’s position on Taiwan and Tibet could cast an unpleasant shadow over the future relationship between China and the United States. In sum, the remarks made by President Obama to date have emphasized that the United States and China should work together to meet the global and regional challenges. He is unlikely to demonize China, and he sees China as a partner rather than as a competitor in pushing forward the bilateral constructive cooperation. There are some areas where common ground needs to be developed—the currency issue and Tibet come immediately to mind—but overall Chinese expectations are based on the positive and constructive call for partnership and cooperation.

**[ ] US-China relations good – they’re not mad about Bush unilateralism anymore and accept status-quo US power**

**Zhang, 2007; Associate Professor at Shanghai Institute for Internation Studies** [Tiejun,. a Senior Researcher at Shanghai Institute for International Studies. He got his

Ph. D degree in Peace and Development Studies from Goteborg University, Sweden. 2007. “China’s Role in East Asian Community Building: Implications for Regional and Global Governance.” [http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK\_FileContainerByKey)/ADMR-7BBFVT/$FILE/Tiejun-Zhang\_China's\_Role\_in\_East\_Asian\_Community\_Building.pdf?Open](http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_FileContainerByKey%29/ADMR-7BBFVT/%24FILE/Tiejun-Zhang_China%27s_Role_in_East_Asian_Community_Building.pdf?Open) accessed:7/13/11//AG]

Sino-U.S. relations have been improving to a great extent so far when compared with the initial period of George Bush’s first presidential term. China has now tactically accpeted the notion of unipoalrity, for reasons specified earlier. Nonetheless, with continuous high economic growth and the accompanying shortage of energy and other natural resources, while on the rehtoric level, there seems to be, at the moment, no real Chinese challenge to the U.S. hegemony, the Chinese recently formulated Greater Neighborhood Strategy bears some attention. It seems to me that China is actually extending its scope of international activities in various regions that seem to be defined as within the scope of the Chinese Greater Neighborhood, the Middle East is seemingly one of such, and Oceania probably another. At the same time, China also actively inviolving business in Africa, to the degree that Western media are now discussing the Chinese return to Africa. To a lesser extend, it is also the case for Latin America. The U.S. has still not been in an alert to the Chinese extending international activities so far, partly for this kind of Chinese behavior is primarily driven by market needs. But what about the future U.S. response if China’s international economic activities ever extending. A more immeiate dangerous issue in Sino-U.S. relations is the Taiwan question. At the moment, the Taiwan question can be seem as a “manageed business“. How long the two countries can manage the issue is a question remain to be answered.

# Generic Relations Brinks

**[ ] Relations on Brink- Chinese experts have nuanced perceptions about US weaponization efforts**

**Podvig and Zhang, 3/08**

[Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom. Pavel Podvig, Hui Zhang. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18178/russian_and_chinese_responses_to_us_military_plans_in_space.html>, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space.” Access: July 2011//SL]

Chinese officials have expressed a growing concern that U.S. missile defense and “space control” plans, particularly the development of space weapons, will stimulate a costly and destabilizing arms race. In April of 2002, Vice For- eign Minister Qiao Zonghuai summarized the official Chinese view of U.S. plans: Considerable progress has been made in outer space-related weapons research and military technology. It will not take long before drawings of space weapons and weapon systems [are] turned into lethal combat instruments in outer space. Meanwhile, military doctrines and [con- cepts] such as “control of space” and “ensuring space superiority” have been unveiled successively, and space operation [command] headquar- ters and combatant troops are in the making. If we should remain in- different to the above-mentioned developments, an arms race would very likely emerge in outer space in the foreseeable future. Outer space would eventually become the fourth battlefield besides land, sea and air. If such a scenario should become reality it would be virtually im- possible for mankind to continue their anticipated exploration, devel- opment and utilization of outer space, and all economic, cultural and social activities in connection with the utilization of outer space would be severely interrupted.1 Although those in the Chinese scientific community have more nuanced perceptions than many officials, particularly regarding the feasibility and ulti- mate result of U.S. space plans, they share in the widespread concern over U.S. ambitions. The prevailing view in China is that U.S. space weaponiza- tion plans will have disastrous consequences for international security and the peaceful use of outer space. Through space weaponization, the United States seeks to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Many in China worry that this would free the United States to intervene in China’s affairs and to undermine efforts at reunification with Taiwan. These concerns have prompted China to clearly express—with sufficient frequency to merit an acronym—that the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is an urgent and realistic objective. A 2004 white paper on China’s national defense emphasized, “Outer space is the common property of mankind. China hopes that the international com- munity would take action as soon as possible to conclude an international legal instrument on preventing the weaponization of and arms race in outer space through negotiations, to ensure the peaceful use of outer space.”

**[ ] Brink-relations high-Taiwan acting as stressor**

**China Daily, 3/7/11.** [Associated Press Staff Writer. <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/07/content_12129360.htm>. “Good atmosphere” in China-US relations – FM.” Access: July 2011//SL]

BEIJING - Beijing firmly opposes Washington's arms sales to Taiwan, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said Monday. "We urge the United States to strictly abide by the principles and spirits of the three Sino-US joint communiques and the China-US Joint Statement," Yang told reporters, calling on the US to stop arms sales to Taiwan. The US should "take concrete actions to support the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations", he said, noting that it is important in upholding overall interests of China-US relations. Yang said there is now "good atmosphere" in China-US relations, but it is "an objective reality that China and the United States have some differences or even frictions over some issues." "What is important is to properly handle these differences on the basis of mutual respect," he said.

**[ ] China and America developing but relations on brink**

**The Telegraph 2/2/11** [Associated Press Staff Writer [[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8299495/WikiLeaks-US-and-China-in-military-standoff-over-space-missiles.html](%5BAssociated%20Press%20Staff%20Writer%2C%20http%3A//www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8299495/WikiLeaks-US-and-China-in-military-standoff-over-space-missiles.html), “WikiLeaks: US and China in military standoff over space issiles.” Acess: July 2010//SL]

A month after the Chinese strike, America shot down one of its own satellites, ostensibly to stop it returning to earth with a toxic fuel tank which would pose a health hazard. The Chinese did not believe the explanation. In secret dispatches, US officials indicated that the strike was, in fact, military in nature. Immediately after the US Navy missile destroyed the satellite, the American Embassy in China received “direct confirmation of the results of the anti-satellite test” from the US military command in the Pacific, according to a secret memo. The strike marked the high point of tensions between Washington and Beijing over the issue of ballistic missile defence. The cables show that China was deeply concerned about America’s plans to place missile defence radars in Japan. Another document discloses that the US was allegedly developing an “airborne laser system” to counter the threat from “Chinese military build up”. The Chinese government was said to be “angry” about the US satellite exercise in February 2008. For months after the US strike, the two countries engaged in tense talks over the issue. At a summit on defence in June 2008, the American delegation told the Chinese that Washington did not regard China as “an enemy”. China replied that it saw the two powers “as neither allies nor adversaries”. The Chinese assistant foreign minister complained that the US missile defence programme was not simply “defensive” but also “offensive” because “it includes lasers that attack a missile in launch phase over the sovereign territory of the launching country”.

# Answers To: Currency Fights

**[ ] Currency issues won’t destabilize relations now - China recognizes economic interdependence**

**Hachigian 09 senior fellow of the Center for American Progress** [1/28/09. “The Importance of U.S.-China Relations.” The American Center for Progress. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/01/importance_china.html> //TD]

In more good news, China’s leaders recognize this interdependence, as most recently displayed by their constructive steps to address the global economic crisis. In November, China announced a 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package to re-ignite its economic growth. At that same time, China announced that it would lend Pakistan $500 million to avert a balance of crisis. Notably, Chinese leaders worked through the established system, encouraging “Pakistan to seek assistance from the IMF first in order to introduce some discipline to payment economic management.” China could show even more leadership along these lines, offering funds to more countries, earning more credibility for being a “responsible stakeholder,” and garnering good will from developing and developed countries alike. A partnership with China on addressing the global economic crisis is critical, and ongoing disagreements on issues such as currency should not preclude cooperation and collaboration toward that ultimate goal wherever possible.

# US/China Cooperation on Space Now

**[ ] Cooperation between the US and China in space now – they’ve made public assurances**

**CNET 11/17/09**

[Associated Press Staff Writerhttp://news.cnet.com/8301-19514\_3-10399964-239.html, “U.S. and China agree to explore space cooperation.” Access: July, 2011//SL]

JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, Houston--The United States and China have agreed to discuss expanded cooperation in space science and to start a "dialogue" on human space flight and exploration, according to a joint statement released in Beijing on Tuesday. The U.S.-China Joint Statement said both nations looked forward to reciprocal visits by the NASA administrator and appropriate Chinese space leaders in 2010. "The United States and China look forward to expanding discussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialogue on human space flight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit," the joint statement said. "Both sides welcome reciprocal visits of the NASA administrator and the appropriate Chinese counterpart in 2010." President Obama visits the Forbidden City in Beijing. (Credit: Pete Souza/White House) John Logsdon, a space policy analyst at George Washington University, said expanded cooperation makes sense, but only if both sides are open with each other and share the technical data necessary to ensure safe operations. "I think it's great," he said in a telephone interview. "It opens the door to see whether, in fact, there's a basis for cooperation. I think the operative word in there is 'transparency.' If China is willing to provide the information we need to work with them and vice versa--they were the ones who have been somewhat reticent to do that--I think it makes total sense." The future direction of the U.S. manned space program is unclear as NASA waits for the Obama administration to make a decision on how the agency should proceed after the space shuttle is retired next year. The Bush administration directed NASA to finish the space station and retire the shuttle by the end of 2010 and to develop a new family of safer, less expensive rockets to service the International Space Station and to help launch manned moon missions by the early 2020s. NASA developed the Constellation program and the Ares family of manned and unmanned rockets to meet that challenge, but the agency has not been given the funding needed to carry out the program under the original schedule. An independent review of manned space options was carried out this summer at the request of the Obama administration. The panel concluded NASA would need an additional $6 billion a year to fund the Constellation program and extend the International Space Station program through 2020. The panel presented four other options as well, including one to encourage private industry to take over launching astronauts to low-Earth orbit while NASA focuses on long-term deep space exploration.

# China Not Militarizing Now

**[ ]China doesn’t wish to weaponize space-drafting treaty with Russia**

**Rozoff 09** [political analyst, wordpress.com (Stop NATO) http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/31/militarization-of-space-threat-of-nuclear-war-on-earth/ July 12//BP] On June 17, immediately after the historical ninth heads of state summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Yekaterinburg, Russia on the preceding two days,

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that their nations were drafting a joint treaty to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space to be presented to the United Nations General Assembly. A statement by the presidents reflected a common purpose to avoid the militarization of space and said: “Russia and China advocate peaceful uses of outer space and oppose the prospect of it being turned into a new area for deploying weapons. “The sides will actively facilitate practical work on a draft treaty on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, and of the use of force or threats to use force against space facilities, and will continue an intensive coordination of efforts to guarantee the security of activities in outer space.” [1] The statement also addressed the question of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its global expansion as well as an integrally related danger, the U.S.-led drive to development a worldwide – and more than worldwide – interceptor missile system aimed at neutralizing China’s and Russia’s deterrence and retaliation capacities in the event of a first strike attack on either or both.

**[ ] China doesn’t want to militarize now- They’ve been trying to reach agreements.**

**Listner 11 Legal and Policy analyst for the Space Review** [4/25/11. “An Exercise in the Art of War: China’s National Defense White Paper, Outer Space, and the PPW.” The Space Review. Accessed 7/13/11. <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1828/1> //TD]

On March 31, 2011, the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China issued a white paper on national defense titled China’s National Defense in 2010.1 The white paper is a comprehensive public statement of the PRC’s stance on matters relating to its national defense. Chapter X of the report, Arms Control and Disarmament, states the PRC’s position on the prevention of an arms race in space. Specifically, the section states that: [t]he Chinese government has advocated from the outset the peaceful use of outer space, and opposes any weaponization of outer space and any arms race in outer space. China believes that the best way for the international community to prevent any weaponization of or arms race in outer space is to negotiate and conclude a relevant international legally-binding instrument. In February 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). In August 2009, China and Russia jointly submitted their working paper responding to the questions and comments raised by the CD members on the draft treaty. China is looking forward to starting negotiations on the draft treaty at the earliest possible date, in order to conclude a new outer space treaty.

**[ ] China wants peace in space now- They’re trying to correct flaws in the OST.**

**Listner 11 Legal and Policy analyst for the Space Review** [4/25/11. “An Exercise in the Art of War: China’s National Defense White Paper, Outer Space, and the PPW.” The Space Review. Accessed 7/13/11. <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1828/1> //TD]

The PRC white paper extols the PPWT jointly submitted with the Russian Federation as the means to achieve the PRC’s purported policy goal of preventing the weaponization of outer space. In an indirect reference to the PPWT, Cheng Jingye, director-general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made a comment early in 2011 that references the policy enunciated in the PRC white paper. Cheng, doubtless referring to the PPWT, said that the negotiation and conclusion of a new international legal instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space is the best way to ensure outer space’s peace and security.5 The proffered purpose in the preamble of the PPWT6 by the Russian Federation and China is to address the deficiency of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.7 Article IV bans the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of the earth, but it is silent concerning weapons that are non-nuclear or otherwise do not reach the destructive potential of a weapon of mass destruction.

**[ ] Chinese military advancements peaceful-manned space mission proves**

**Lewis, 4- Center for Strategic and International Studies** [James A., China as a Military Space Competitor, http://dev.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/040801\_china\_space\_competitor.pdf, Accessed July 12, SH]

Public recognition of China’s long-standing and ambitious space program increased dramatically with the orbit of a taikonaut around the earth. The orbital mission was an assertive step into what many have lately seen as an American province. China’s motives for going into orbit are similar to those that drove Russia and the U.S. to undertake manned missions – to gain national prestige, and to signal wealth, commitment and technological prowess. Manned space flight is primarily a political act. While China gains real political benefit from orbiting a human, the military benefits are small. China is already among the leading space powers and is developing a full range of space capabilities. Its manned program is one of these capabilities and in some ways is the least interesting militarily. This paper puts Chinese military space efforts in perspective and considers how the U.S. might respond. Manned platforms have little military utility. When Russia and the U.S. began manned space exploration, some thought that human space flight might provide military benefit and that a capsule and its pilots could act as an extension of air operations. This proved to be an illusion. The ability to put humans in space shows a level of technical proficiency, but a manned program provides only indirect benefits to national security. These benefits result from applying the abilities and the confidence that manned space flight brings to unmanned programs with greater military utility. In fact, by taking resources away from space programs with greater military utility, the manned space effort may slow China’s progress in military space activities. Since the 1970s, China’s leaders have seen space programs as a tool to speed technological modernization and recognition of China as a great power. China’s long- standing national space program is relatively advanced. It includes an indigenously developed family of liquid-fueled space launch vehicles that are competitive with western launchers, a large space research effort, and an extensive satellite industry. This satellite industry lags behind those of the U.S. and Europe, but joint ventures with foreign firms over the last decade have helped China improve its satellite manufacturing capabilities. China has made space remote sensing a priority and has developed its own communications and navigational satellites. The range of Chinese space-related activities indicates a commitment to self-sufficiency and, perhaps, a desire to play a leading role in space.

# China Space Weaponization Brinks

**[ ] Brink - China’s space weapon capabilities growing – Application of tracking satellites prove**

**Reuters, 6/11 2011** [Ben Blanchard, Reuters Staff Writer <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/china-satellites-idUSL3E7I902220110712>, (China ramps up military use of space with new satellites-report ) acceses 7/13// RC]

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned earlier this year that advances by China's military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare technology could challenge the ability of U.S. forces to operate in the Pacific. "STRATEGICALLY DISQUIETING" China's need to use satellites to up its military game became apparent during the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis, when the U.S. dispatched a carrier group after China menaced the self-ruled island with war games, the report said. Beijing realised it could neither track nor respond to the U.S. ships. The incident also led China to realise it needed the means to keep Washington from using its navy to intervene in a war over Taiwan. Beijing regards the island as a rebel province. "The most immediate and strategically disquieting application (of reconnaissance satellites) is a targeting and tracking capability in support of the anti-ship ballistic missile, which could hit U.S. carrier groups," the report said. "But China's growing capability in space is not designed to support any single weapon; instead it is being developed as a dynamic system, applicable to other long-range platforms. With space as the backbone, China will be able to expand the range of its ability to apply force while preserving its policy of not establishing foreign military bases." More broadly speaking, satellites will be able to help China project power. "As China's capabilities grow, with space reconnaissance as an example, it will be increasingly hard to reconcile the rhetoric of a defensive posture and a more expansive capability." (Editing by Brian Rhoads and Yoko Nishikawa)

**[ ] China military space development surpassing US – Concerns about Taiwan conflict motivate them**

**Reuters, 6 /11 2011** [ Ben Blanchard, Reuters Staff Writer <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/china-satellites-idUSL3E7I902220110712>, (China ramps up military use of space with new satellites-report ) acceses 7/13// RC]

 China is developing cutting-edge satellites that will allow it to project power far beyond its shores and deter the United States from using aircraft carriers in any future conflict over its rival Taiwan, a report said. The piece in October's Journal of Strategic Studies, a U.K.-published defence and security journal, runs at odds with China's stated opposition to the militarization of space. But the report, an advance copy of which was obtained by Reuters, said that the rapid development of advanced reconnaissance satellites to enable China to track hostile forces in real time and guide ballistic missiles has become a key to the modernisation of its forces. While the United States used to be unrivaled in this area, China is catching up fast, it added. "China's constellation of satellites is transitioning from the limited ability to collect general strategic information, into a new era in which it will be able to support tactical operations as they happen," the report said. "China may already be able to

match the United States' ability to image a known, stationary target and will likely surpass it in the flurry of launches planned for the next two years."

**[ ] Brink - China’s space weapon capabilities growing – Application of tracking satellites prove**

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**[ ] Now key time to determine if China will militarize – new leadership provides brink**

**Kulacki 2008 Senior Analyst of Union of Concerned Scientists**[Gregory, Senior Analyst and China Project Manager of Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, “A Space Race with China” <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/HAPRKulacki.pdf>, Accessed 7/12/11//DL]

An ironic consequence of the concerted US eff ort to isolate the Chinese space community and inhibit Chinese access to advanced space technologies may be an acceleration of China’s ability to produce these technologies on their own. China made significantly more progress in the eight years since the Cox Report then they did in the eight years prior. Chinese space technology is still less advanced than technology they could have purchased from the United States and Europe in the absence of restrictions, and Chinese scientists and engineers acknowledge there is much they could learn through commercial and scientifi c collaboration. At the same time, the new Chinese leadership now believes that reliance on acquisitions from abroad tends to retard the development of innovative indigenous technology, insuring China will always be one or more steps behind more advanced nations.

**[ ] ASAT proliferation on the brink – China proves ability – others may follow depending on US action**

**Hoffman** **12/18/09** [Carl Hoffman, 12/18/09, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/satellites/4218443>, Popular Mechanics, Carl Hoffman is a journalist who writes for numerous magazines, including Outside, Men’s Journal, Smithsonian, and National Geographic Adventure. //JL]

For China, a nation that has already sent humans into space and developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the technology involved in the test was hardly remarkable. But as a demonstration of a rising military posture, it was a surprisingly aggressive act, especially since China has long pushed for an international treaty banning space weapons. "The move was a dangerous step toward the abyss of weaponizing space," says Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, an independent defense research group in Washington, D.C. "China held the moral high ground about space, and that test re-energized the China hawks in Congress. If we're not careful, space could become the new Wild West. You don't just go and blow things up there." In fact, after the Chinese test, India publicly stepped up its development of antiÂ­satellite technology. And some Israeli officials have argued that, given China's record of selling missile technology to Iran, Israel should develop its own program.

**[ ] China not developing now but is on the brink – ASAT tests prove**

**Hoffman** **12/18/09** [Carl Hoffman, 12/18/09, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/satellites/4218443>, Popular Mechanics, Carl Hoffman is a journalist who writes for numerous magazines, including Outside, Men’s Journal, Smithsonian, and National Geographic Adventure. //JL]

The long-term ramifications of the test will take years to play out, but, for now, few observers think China scored any gains. "It was a mistake," O'Hanlon says. It fueled American hard-liners who want to restrict American technological cooperation with China. And, "It doesn't help China's case saying it isn't a threatening military power," Vick says. "It is a threat, and the test showed that." Whether the United States suddenly accelerates its ASAT capability beyond the testing phase remains to be seen. The country is in the midst of a war; budgets are already tight. Russia is not perceived as a threat and China has only 60 satellites -- few of these are worth shooting down. America's most robust ASAT weapons were not designed for destroying satellites at all -- they are missiles developed and operated by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), formerly known as the Strategic Defense Initiative. All U.S. ballistic missiles are actually dual-use, and while their ability to shoot down incoming rockets has been proven only in tests, it would be easy to direct them against any low Earth orbit satellite. Twenty-four MDA missiles are operational in Alaska and California, far more than would be needed, Pike says, to handle any immediate ASAT needs. There is, he says, "just nothing to shoot at." For now, that is. The militarization of space has long been debated. With one blown-up old weather satellite, China has made the prospect of a new arms race far more likely. It showed the world that it is willing to go toe-to-toe up in the final frontier.

**[ ] China catching up to U.S. quick – billions of dollars put into their space program**

**Ritter 2/13/2008** [Peter Ritter, 2/3/2008, [http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1712812,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/printout/0%2C8816%2C1712812%2C00.html), Times, Reporter at Time //JL]

China's manned space program, codenamed Project 921, is indeed a matter of considerable national pride for a country that sees space exploration as confirmation of superpower status. China is pouring substantial resources into space research, according to Dean Cheng, an Asian affairs specialist at the U.S.-based Center for Naval Analysis. With a budget estimated at up to $2 billion a year, China's space program is roughly comparable to Japan's. Later this year, China plans to launch its third manned space mission — a prelude to a possible lunar foray by 2024. With President George W. Bush vowing to return American astronauts to the moon by 2020, some competition is perhaps inevitable. China's space program lags far behind that of the U.S., of course. "They're basically recreating the Apollo missions 50 years on," says Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Studies Department at the U.S. Naval War College and an expert on China's space development. "It's a tortoise-and-hare race. They're happy plodding along slowly and creating this perception of a space race." But there may be more at stake than national honor. Some analysts say that China's attempts to access American space technology are less about boosting its space program than upgrading its military. China is already focusing on space as a potential battlefield. A recent Pentagon estimate of China's military capabilities said that China is investing heavily in anti-satellite weaponry. In January 2007, China demonstrated that it was able to destroy orbiting satellites when it brought down one of its own weather satellites with a missile. China clearly recognizes the significance of this capability. In 2005, a Chinese military officer wrote in the book Joint Space War Campaigns, put out by the National Defense University, that a "shock and awe strike" on satellites "will shake the structure of the opponent's operations system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent's policymakers." Such a strike could hypothetically allow China to counterbalance technologically superior U.S. forces, which rely heavily on satellites for battlefield data. China is still decades away from challenging the U.S. in space. But U.S. officials worry espionage may be bringing China a little closer to doing so here on Earth.

**[ ] US losing Space Race interest but China filling in – Children not interested, and programs stopped**

**Metzler 5/14/11** [John J. Metzler, 5/14/11, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/john-metzler/2011/05/14/302265/p2/US-risks.htm, US risks losing edge by abandoning space program, John J. Metzler is a United Nations correspondent covering diplomatic and defense issues. He is the author of Trans-Atlantic Divide; USA/Euroland Gap //JL]

But beyond the politics of the space race, what have we mortals gained on the practical level from space technology? Amazingly a few generations have now grown up without realizing the direct cause and effect between the space program and current, affordable and off the shelf technology. The miniaturization of circuits and electronics in general and the original breakthroughs in computer technology are but a few. Affordable high-tech products ranging from the computer you are using to your cell phone are among others. Less obvious are advances in medicine and aircraft metal standards and safety. Now after two final missions by the Shuttle Endeavor and later Atlantis, the U.S. Space Shuttle program will be shut down ending thirty years of manned flight. The Obama Administration moreover has canceled the follow-up program to the Shuttle, Project Constellation, and thus effectively taken the U.S. out of the running when it comes to manned space exploration. According to Congressman Pete Olsen of Texas, “The administration's 2011 budget will shut down America's ability to continue human space flight by killing the Constellation program within NASA. Constellation is the best option to get to the Moon and beyond.” The Constellation program already has seen US$9 billion in funding; now the Administration is using US$2.5 billion to kill the project. The Texas Republican continued, “If the United States abandons human space flight, we are, without question, placing America in the second tier at most with other nations.” Neither Russia nor the People's Republic of China harbor such hesitations to push the scientific frontiers of outer space. Indeed Moscow's “Roscosmos” has been an active player in partnering with foreign countries as to serve as the key conduit to the cosmos.

**[ ] China matches the U.S’ and will pass them soon – developing satellites prove**

 **Reuters 7/13**/11 – (“ China advancing military capability in sky and at sea ”http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/23520/china-advancing-military-capability-in-sky-and-at-sea Accessed on 7/14/11//KH)

China is also working on a ballistic missile that could pose a serious threat to US aircraft carriers, which Washington could deploy to seas around Taiwan in the event of a crisis with the self-ruled island, which China claims as its own territory. “The missile is still undergoing experimental testing and will be used as a defensive weapon when it is successfully developed, not an offensive one,” Chen was quoted as saying. Use of such missiles would leverage China’s growing prowess in developing more advanced satellites, according to a report in October’s Journal of Strategic Studies, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters. Satellites These reconnaissance satellites would enable China to track hostile forces in real time and guide ballistic missiles, enabling Beijing to project power far beyond its shores. “China’s constellation of satellites is transitioning from the limited ability to collect general strategic information, into a new era in which it will be able to support tactical operations as they happen,” the report said. “China may already be able to match the United States’ ability to image a known, stationary target and will likely surpass it in the flurry of launches planned for the next two years.” China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei reiterated China’s stance that it is opposed to the militarization of space. “We believe that space should only be used for peaceful purposes, and to benefit all of mankind,” Hong told a regular news briefing. Reuters

**[ ] China on brink of space mil – many recent technological advances**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

Kinetic-energy weapons. China might employ various types of KEWs, ground or space-based, to attack satellites. All would be relatively cheap and technically easy in comparison with a missile defense system. The most optimal ASAT system for China would comprise ground launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, which destroy their targets by colliding with them at extremely high velocities. These vehicles can reach a satellite in LEO and, if mated with a larger booster, might be capable of reaching higher orbits. Another easy and inexpensive ground-based ASAT would be a pellet cloud delivered to LEO by a missile.115 Space mines with conventional charges could also be used as space-based ASATs. All these kinetic energy ASATs are within China’s technological capability.116 Effective non-nuclear ASATs require good space surveillance capabilities. China’s satellite tracking system includes a domestic network, two foreign sites, and four tracking ships. China has also delivered satellites into geosynchronous orbit. As scientists have discussed, space-faring countries with the ability to place objects in orbit or lift them to geosynchronous orbit should also have the ability to closely track space objects and to develop homing ASATs to attack satellites in both LEO and geosynchronous orbit.117 China should be able to use ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds, or space mines to attack SBI satellites. As Richard Garwin noted, “the same countermeasures would be even more cost-effective against…the space-based laser, which would be larger and more vulnerable than the interceptors.”118 High-energy laser weapons. High-energy laser (HEL) weapons are devices that produce intense beams of electromagnetic radiation capable of damaging a satellite permanently or, at lower power levels, jamming optical communication and sensor systems. HEL weapons can be ground-, space-, air-, or seabased. Since the 1980s, mainly encouraged by the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, many types of HEL weapons for ballistic missile defense or ASAT purposes have been proposed, such as ground-based deuterium fluoride chemical lasers and free-electron lasers (FEL); and space-based hydrogen fluoride chemical lasers, and nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers. Since the 1980s, China has made a great progress in research on and development of HELs, perhaps prompted in part by the U.S. program on DEWs, and partly funded under China’s “National 863” program for high-tech development. However, not all HELs would have ASAT capabilities—solid and gas lasers would not. Of HEL research in China, the technologies with potential ASAT applications are the FEL and chemical oxygen-iodine laser. Given the advantage the United States has in space, it might be expected that if China pursues HEL ASAT weapons, it would likely develop ground-based instead of space-based systems.

**[ ] On the brink- Chinese updating space tech, currently peaceful**

**Lewis, 4- Center for Strategic and International Studies** [James A., China as a Military Space Competitor, http://dev.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/040801\_china\_space\_competitor.pdf, Accessed July 12, SH]

China has also identified space activities as an area where it could erode the U.S. military advantage. Beginning with the 1991 Gulf war and again in the recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the Chinese learned that space power is essential for effective military action. China’s leaders undoubtedly wish to no longer to depend on CNN to learn when U.S. carrier battle groups are approaching Taiwan. Given U.S. reliance on space assets, the Chinese believe that space may be an area where the U.S. may be vulnerable. Public accounts of China’s military planning indicate that it does not wish to leave the U.S unchallenged in the use of space in the event of a conflict. However, the Chinese are not mirror-image competitors for the U.S. This could change as China’s GDP increases and if relations between the two countries grow worse, but for now, China seems to want to avoid what some perceive as the Soviet error of spending themselves into bankruptcy in an arms race with the U.S. Reacting to a vigorous discussion in Chinese military journals, many analysts assert that what the Chinese seek, while upgrading their military capabilities, is asymmetric advantage, and to find areas where the U.S. and its style of warfare is more vulnerable to attack, an approach sometimes captured in a phrase used in PLA writings: “overcoming the superior with the inferior.” If China’s goal is asymmetric advantage, some military space activities are more valuable for achieving this than others. Although China is exceptionally secretive about many aspects of its space programs (and this in itself helps generate suspicion), and although it frequently blurs the line between civil and military space activities, enough information about its programs has been made public to allow us to begin to assess the implications for U.S. military operations and national security. An initial conclusion from this information is that China does not concentrate its space efforts on the programs that could provide asymmetric advantage and it is not a competitor in military space. A review of what China builds and launches suggests that China’s military space efforts is often more a demonstration of technological prowess and sophistication across a broad range of space activities rather than an effort to build an operational military space capability. China has not assembled nor does it maintain the full range of capabilities in space needed for intelligence and military benefit. In some cases, China appears to build a satellite in order to show what it can do rather than to meet an operational need. A desire to demonstrate self-reliance (an important factor of Chinese policy in many areas beyond space) often seems to drive military space activities.

# \*\*\*LINKS\*\*\*

# US-China Relations Links

# Generic Links

**[ ] Any development of space destroys relations – China wants to keep economic, military and energy power in space from the US**

**Krepon 08, et. Al** [“ China's Military Space Strategy: An Exchange”Access 7/12/2011. “http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx\_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx\_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr\_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft\_val\_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=China%27s+Military+Space+Strategy%3A+An+Exchange%2FResponse&rft.jtitle=Survival&rft.au=Eric+Hagt&rft.au=Bao+Shixiu&rft.au=Michael+Pillsbury&rft.au=Michael+Krepon&rft.au=Shen+Dingli&rft.au=Ashley+J+Tellis&rft.date=2008-04-01&rft.issn=0039-6338&rft.volume=50&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=157&rft.externalDBID=FSUR&rft.externalDocID=1440910071”//FK]

In fact, China's strategic considerations toward the United States are influenced and constrained by factors beyond a direct militarily antagonistic relationship. They range from China's profound domestic development challenges; its precarious geopolitical relations with regional players; and its deep dependence on global commercial and energy markets. China also has a unique set of historical experiences (colonialism, foreign occupation, border wars) as well as the lessons learned from current events, not the least of which is the US quagmire in Iraq. These point to conditions for China and an international environment significantly different than were extant during the Cold War.

# Perception Key

**[ ] Perception of actions by each government key- Suspicions high**

**Martel, 3- Professor, Naval War College**

[William, National Security Affairs,with Toshi Yoshihara doctoral candidate , Fletcher School of Law, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2003, http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn\_martel.pdf, “Averting a Sino-China Space Race”, Accessed July 12, SH]

Nevertheless, the costs of competition are mounting, and the risks are getting steeper in the current atmosphere of mutual suspicion. Indeed, the absence of mutually understood perceptions and capabilities is compelling each government to assume the worst about the other and to respond ac- cordingly in their planning and behavior. In the language of defense plan- ning, the United States and China are seeking to minimize risk and uncertainty about the other. Thus, it is far more preferable for Washington and Beijing to formulate their assessments in the open than to wander aimlessly in the dark. Whether they will succeed depends on the answers to three interre- lated questions that require further exploration.

# Unilateral Action Links

**[ ] U.S. unilateralism scares China and prevents development of space law framework**

**Blazejewski 08 J.D. from New York University , B.A. from Harvard** [2/7/08. “Space Weaponization and U.S.-China Relations.” Strategic Studies Quarterly Spring 2008. accessed 7/12/11. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf> //TD]

The US refusal to engage in discussions on the weaponization of outer space imposes two significant costs. First, it increases Chinese uncertainty and suspicion, leading China to assume its worst-case scenario about US space weaponization. Second, it prevents the international community from developing new rules and norms in areas such as advancing situational awareness, coordinating launches, and deterring the further development and proliferation of ASAT weapons that could benefit US space assets. There is broad consensus that the United States can no longer afford to remain silent in the international debate on the weaponization of outer space. The Rumsfeld Commission, the US-China Commission,51 and many spacearmscontrol advocates all recommend greater US participation in setting rules for the use of outer space beyond the existing legal framework.

# Space Dominance Relations Links

**[ ] US pursuit of space dominance shatters relations**

**Zhang 11 PH.D. From the University of Texas** [Spring 2011. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China

Military Space Relationship.” The Prospects of Arms Control. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=The%20Security%20Dilemma%20in%20the%20US-China%20Military%20Space%20Relationship%20The%20Prospects%20for%20Arms%20Control&rft.auinit=B&rft.aulast=Zhang&rft.date=2011&rft.epage=332&rft.genre=article&rft.issn=0004-4687&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=311&rft.stitle=ASIAN%20SURV&rft.title=ASIAN%20SURVEY&rft.volume=51&rfr_id=info:sid/www.isinet.com:WoK:UA> //TD]

Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to China’s national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for “absolute security” jeopardizes other countries’ security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, “In recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord.”

**[ ] Link- China rejects a strategy that establishes US space dominance**

**Brown 9- political science author at Indiana University.** [Trevor is interested in economic and military strategy for the medium of space who is affiliated with Indiana University, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and Nanyang Technological University "Soft Power and Space Weaponization.” Air & Space Power Journal 23.1 (2009): 66-73. Research Library, ProQuest. Accessed 7/12/11 http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?index=7&did=1708121081&SrchMode=1&sid=9&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310495809&clientId=17822 //NG]

Analysts have argued that the rest of the world accepts US space supremacy, but the Bush administration was claiming space dominance - a condition that other countries will not accept.22 Evidently the world can tolerate the notion that the United States will possess space supremacy, which implies the ability to dominate, yet finds insufferable the idea that America could actually exercise this dominance. Perhaps the world believes that "dominance" connotes an oppressive, unilateral, or dictatorial position, while "supremacy" suggests merely a position of leadership. What, then, do nations believe that future US space dominance would mean? Retired Chinese military officer Bao Shixiu, a research fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing, has stated that "the monopolization of space by a single country . . . cannot be accepted."23 Maybe the rest of the world is inclined to share this conception of a "monopoly" due to analysts' concern "that the U.S. government might pursue a strategy that would aim to maintain a veto over other countries' ability to access space."24 The fact is that space is now a great "commons" for space powers, much as the sea was for sea powers centuries ago, not because of any international law or treaty but because of the nature of the space medium. Similar to maritime communications long ago, space assets must conduct all of the surveillance and reconnaissance, attack warning and assessment, communications, signals interception, navigation, munitions guidance, meteorology, and so forth, in a neutral or "common" zone. According to Sir Julian S. Corbett, 'You cannot conquer sea because it is not susceptible of ownership, at least outside territorial waters. You cannot, as lawyers say, 'reduce it into possession,' because you cannot exclude neutrals from it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second place, you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy's territory."25

# Mining

**[ ] China won’t like US mining - Chinese economy depends on rare earth metals - Middle East empirics prove**

**Richardson** 10 [ Michael Richardson, senior research fellow. “ Unmindful US allows its dominance to slip in rare earths, required by high technology” Access 7/17/2011. <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-rare-earth-minerals//FK>]

China dominates mining of rare earths used in an increasingly wide array of civilian and defense applications. Rare earths are essential for hundreds of commercial as well as military applications: electric motors and batteries for hybrid cars, wind-power turbines and solar panels, mobile phones, cameras, portable x-ray units, energy-efficient light bulbs and stadium lights, fiber optics, glass additives and polishing In a technology-intensive world, these rare earths have become some of the most sought-after materials in modern manufacturing, even though they’re used in relatively small amounts. The late paramount leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, once said that rare earths would be to China what oil was to the Middle East. Now policymakers and corporate leaders in the United States, Japan, Europe and other advanced economies watch with mounting concern as China exerts market dominance by restricting exports and driving prices higher.

**[ ] Decreased world reliance on Chinese minerals ruins relations—they want to preserve their monopoly**

**IBtimes 11** [Staff Reporter. “ US says dependence on China for rare earth is economic, national security risk” Access 7/17/2011. <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/109216/20110205/rare-earth-american-security-project-research-emily-coppel.htm>//FK]

A report by an American think tank says that U.S. dependence on China for rare earths is extremely problematic and poses both economic and national security risks. The report by American Security Project Research Assistant, Emily Coppel, released Tuesday, noted that the United States has the "second-biggest deposit of rare earth minerals in the world. North American mines alone could supply U.S. rare earth needs." China industry leaders call for rare earth metal consolidation Related Articles China rare earth prices explode as export volumes collapse Facts of China's rare earth reserves China January rare earth export surges five fold Related Topics Rare Earth Metals Coverage Get World Emails&Alerts Get summaries of the top business news from a global perspective Sample "The U.S. will need to develop new technologies and invest in mining operations to solve the long-term supply problem," Coppel suggested. "In the short-term, stockpiling rare earths metals is one of the best ways to prepare for a future shortage until these new mines and technologies become available." Rare earth metals have a wide variety of applications. They are used in hybrid car motors, computer hard drives, cell phones, and wind turbines. They are also essential for military equipment. Jet engines, smart bombs and guided missiles, lasers, radar, night vision goggles, and satellites all depend on rare earth metals to function. The report also asserts that the first nation or defense company which is able to develop "an effective and reliable substitute for rare earths" or "new and more efficient technologies" will gain a competitive advantage. "This is one area where the U.S. has a significant advantage, having the most robust defense industry in the world," the report noted. "The U.S. needs to capitalize on this advantage and regain its position as a producer and supplier of rare earth metals." The report also notes that the Pentagon claims that the U.S. only uses 5 percent of the world's supply of rare earth metals for defense purposes,5 the fact is that the U.S. is completely reliant on China for the production of some of its most powerful weapons. "The Pentagon has been incredibly negligent...there are plenty of early warning signs that China will use its leverage over these materials as a weapon," Peter Leiter, a former trade advisor at the Department of Defense was quoted as saying in the report. Coppel suggested the U.S. has gone from being the world's top producer to being completely dependent to China for its rare earth mineral supply. "The U.S. helped guarantee China's position at the top of the rare earths market when it removed American mining and production capabilities. With the closure of the Mountain Pass mine and the sale of domestic production facilities, the U.S. became almost completely import-dependent for its supply of rare earth metals," the report noted. China's monopoly of the rare earths market has allowed it to manipulate this market by restricting production, using export quotas to limit global supply, and increasing taxes on rare earth metals. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has estimated that non-Chinese producers pay at least 31 percent more for raw rare earth metals than Chinese producers.10 As a result; a black market in rare earths has developed.

# Pursuit of US Hegemony

**[ ] China views any U.S. advancement in space as a step toward domination- they fear u.s. heg**

**GSIC** 12/0**8** – [ Michael Caldararo; Jason Cantone; Jonathan Cowin; Rachel Huggins; Hailey Rademacher; Drew Sendelbach; STRATEGIC COMMAND OMAHA NE GLOBAL INNOVATION AND STRATEGY CENTER. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA499438>. Accessed 7/17/11// KH]

Despite U.S. professions of peaceful intentions, Chinese leaders and strategy analysts have “overall perceived a consistent and malign United States strategy of global domination and consider United States hegemony to be predatory in nature.” Chinese scholars, too, generally perceive U.S. actions as part of a “coherent grand strategy of global domination.” The prevailing view throughout many Chinese articles concludes America’s “court and commonality have reached the mainstream consensus that the United States should seek world hegemony and establish a unipolar system based on the further strengthening of America’s economic and military superiority.” “Beijing’s predilection to attribute to the United States a highly coherent global strategy bent on power expansion defines how Beijing perceives American China policy. Such a perception breeds a conspiratorial view, which in turn predisposes China to see ill intentions and sinister moves in every United States act.” From this perspective, language in the unclassified U.S. National Space Policy such as “the United States will . . . deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to United States national interests” signals aggressive U.S. intentions. Moreover, U.S. rejection of “any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space” and opposition to “the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit United States access to or use of space” solidify Chinese fears of “a powerful and domineering state which imposes its will on others.”

**[ ] Re-establish of US hegemony angers China—their rise is inevitable and they don’t want to be blocked**

**Garrett 03, Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council** [Banning, ““Strategic Straightjacket”: The United States and China in the 21st Century,” accessed 7/14/11//HK]

Thus, China's primary concern is to pursue a successful engagement strategy toward the United States and the international community while avoiding provocative behavior toward Taiwan. Should Beijing conclude that the United States is pursuing a realist strategy aimed at keeping China weak and divided, this would become justification for a Chinese strategy that fulfilled the expectations of the American realists. This could lead China to accumulate military power with the aim of dominating East Asia and compelling the United States to withdraw its military forces from the Western Pacific and to terminate its alliances with Japan, South Korea and other Asia Pacific states. For the United States, the strategic objective of preventing the emergence of China as a world power is both impractical and highly counterproductive to U.S. strategic, economic and political interests. It would damage the health of the global economy and international institutions and regimes, weaken support for other U.S. objectives among U.S. allies and friends, and decrease the chances of avoiding potentially dangerous hostility with China.

# Space Weapons

**[ ] U.S. space development angers China – they perceive it as missile defense – destroys their nuclear deterrent**

**Zhang 11 PH.D. From the University of Texas** [Spring 2011. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China

Military Space Relationship.” The Prospects of Arms Control. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=The%20Security%20Dilemma%20in%20the%20US-China%20Military%20Space%20Relationship%20The%20Prospects%20for%20Arms%20Control&rft.auinit=B&rft.aulast=Zhang&rft.date=2011&rft.epage=332&rft.genre=article&rft.issn=0004-4687&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=311&rft.stitle=ASIAN%20SURV&rft.title=ASIAN%20SURVEY&rft.volume=51&rfr_id=info:sid/www.isinet.com:WoK:UA> //TD]

Chinese strategists believe that the U.S. military space program, to a significant extent, is driven by missile defense. For example, in a study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, Major General Xu Hezhen charges that the U.S. is developing space-based laser weapons for missile defense. According to him, “A total of 14–24 satellites deployed on different orbits will constitute a defensive system. Relying on data from early warning systems, it can intercept ballistic missiles launched from anywhere in the world.”26 In another study, Major General Ling Yongshun argues that the U.S. is implementing a coherent plan to neutralize other countries’ strategic deterrence through the deployment of space-based missile defense. As he observes: Using space weapons to attack ballistic targets is a major goal of space weapon development. The U.S. believes that others’ ballistic missiles pose significant threats to its security. To be immune from this threat, the U.S. is putting major efforts into ballistic missile defense, with space-based weapons being one of the important intercepting platforms.27 In October 2008, the U.S. Congress approved $5 million for an independent study of possible space-based missile defense. This move gravely alarmed the Chinese military, which believed that the deployment of space-based missile defense could become inevitable. In fact, some PLA experts have claimed in Ba Zhongyan, ed., Zhanlue Jiyu Qi Di Bawuo He Liyong [Seizing the strategic opportunity] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006), p. 23. 25. Charles L. Glasner and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security 26:1 (Summer 2001), p. 58. 26. Xu Hezhen, Zuozhan Fangshi di Geming Xing Bianhua, p. 249. 27. Ling Yongshun, Wuqi Zhongbei di Xinxi Hua [The digitization of weapons] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2006), p. 363. 320 • ASIAN SURVEY 51:2 that “Star Wars has come back.”28 Li Daguang even charged that this decision by the U.S. Congress amounted to “declaring a new Cold War against China.”29 Chinese military strategists believe U.S. missile defense poses a real threat to China’s nuclear deterrent. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that U.S. missile defense could not effectively deter a major nuclear power like China or Russia. It was thought that a range of countermeasures, such as deploying decoys and multiple warheads, could be employed to deceive and overwhelm U.S. missile defense. Now, however, with the maturing of a multilayered missile defense system by the U.S. and its allies, Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’s offensive capabilities. This pessimism was illustrated in a 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. Wang, credited with being the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles, expressed grave pessimism about China’s offensive nuclear capability against U.S. missile defense. He said, “I have done research: Facing a multi-tiered missile defense system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then 100 single warhead missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.”30 This is why Wu Tianfu—arguably the most important deterrence strategist of the Second Artillery of the PLA, which runs China’s strategic nuclear forces—charges that the U.S. has “forced China to engage in a space arms race.”31 More specifically, U.S. missile defense has forced China to integrate space war with its strategic nuclear deterrence. China must possess the ability to weaken American space-based assets such as early-warning satellites, to ensure the credibility of its own offensive nuclear forces. Thus, space war and nuclear war are now intertwined in Chinese strategic thinking. Indeed, China’s official media have credited Wu with establishing the PLA’s first space war research institute.32

**[ ] China hates the aff - Chinese officials believe US will spark a war and render space unusable**

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Chinese officials have expressed a growing concern that U.S. missile defense and “space control” plans, particularly the development of space weapons, will stimulate a costly and destabilizing arms race. In April of 2002, Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Zonghuai summarized the official Chinese view of U.S. plans: Considerable progress has been made in outer space-related weapons research and military technology. It will not take long before drawings of space weapons and weapon systems [are] turned into lethal combat instruments in outer space. Meanwhile, military doctrines and [concepts] such as “control of space” and “ensuring space superiority” have been unveiled successively, and space operation [command] headquarters and combatant troops are in the making. If we should remain indifferent to the above-mentioned developments, an arms race would very likely emerge in outer space in the foreseeable future. Outer space would eventually become the fourth battlefield besides land, sea and air. If such a scenario should become reality it would be virtually impossible for mankind to continue their anticipated exploration, development and utilization of outer space, and all economic, cultural and social activities in connection with the utilization of outer space would be severely interrupted.1 Although those in the Chinese scientific community have more nuanced perceptions than many officials, particularly regarding the feasibility and ultimate result of U.S. space plans, they share in the widespread concern over U.S. ambitions. The prevailing view in China is that U.S. space weaponization plans will have disastrous consequences for international security and the peaceful use of outer space.

**[ ] China against weaponization – fears about space debris and environmental problems**

Hui **Zhang** 12/0**5**-- research associate at Harvard

 (in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China” <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr> accessed on 7/12/11//KH)

China also fears the increasing population of space debris. Such debris, resulting from 50 years of space activity, already poses a considerable hazard to spacecraft. Under U.S. space weaponization plans, this crowding problem could worsen as a large number of space weapons could be deployed in LEO. The launching and testing of weapons would also increase space debris. Moreover, deploying space-based weapons in the increasingly crowded realm of LEO would leave less room for civilian systems.

Those problems would also occur during periods of peace. If a number of satellites were to be destroyed during the course of a war, some scientists warn, they would create so much debris that it would prevent future satellites from being stationed in space and generally limit space access. Indeed, pointing to the debris problem, Chinese scientists and officials have said that space weaponization should be considered an environmental threat as well as a security problem.

**[ ] China dislikes weaponization -they perceive it as an attempt to limit and contain Chinese civilian and commercial space activity**

Hui **Zhang** 12/0**5**-- research associate at Harvard

(in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China” <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr> accessed on 7/12/11//KH)

China is particularly concerned that space weaponization could limit its civilian and commercial space activities and negatively affect its economic development. Today, China has various operational civilian satellites in space, a family of launchers, a modern space-launch complex, and a growing list of customers in the international satellite-launch market.[17] Since launching its first satellite in 1970, China has made steady progress both in launch vehicle design and in other areas of space technology development for civilian and commercial purposes. China has developed manned spacecraft and a high-reliability launching vehicle. Between November 1999 and December 2002, China launched four unmanned experimental Shenzhou (Magic Ship) spacecraft. In October 2003, China successfully launched the Shenzhou-5 manned spaceship and, in October 2005, the Shenzhou-6 manned spaceship. China is now planning to explore the moon with unmanned spacecraft. The U.S. pursuit of space control would threaten China’s civilian and commercial space activities and perhaps even deny China access to space.

**[ ] China sees militarization as nuclear blackmail - challenges their nuclear deterrent**

Hui **Zhang** 12/0**5**-- research associate at Harvard

(in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China” <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr> accessed on 7/12/11//KH)

Historically, China’s stated purpose for developing nuclear weapons was to guard itself against nuclear blackmail. Beijing’s official statements do not discuss potential responses to U.S. space weaponization, but many Chinese officials and scholars argue that China must ensure that U.S. efforts do not negate the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. As one Chinese official stated: China is not in a position to conduct an arms race with the United States and it does not intend to do so, particularly in the field of missile defense. However, China will not sit idly by and watch its strategic interests being jeopardized without taking necessary measures. It is quite possible and natural for China to review its military doctrine and a series of policies on the relationship with big powers, Taiwan issues, arms control and nonproliferation, etc. Certainly, the best option for China is to reach an arms control agreement to prevent space weaponization, as it is advocating now. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, China would very likely develop other responses to neutralize the perceived threat. Because it is not clear what type of missile defense system the United States will finally deploy or whether the U.S. space control plans will be implemented, it is difficult to identify conclusively China’s specific countermeasures. Yet, there are certain options that it would be likely to consider. It should be noted that these discussions are based on China’s capabilities and do not characterize China’s intentions.

**[ ] China dislikes weaponization - fears increased US space weaponization will interfere with Taiwan reunification**

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Through space weaponization, the United States seeks to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Many in China worry that this would free the United States to intervene in China’s affairs and to undermine efforts at reunification with Taiwan. These concerns have prompted China to clearly express—with sufficient frequency to merit an acronym—that the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is an urgent and realistic objective. A 2004 white paper on China’s national defense emphasized, “Outer space is the common property of mankind. China hopes that the international community would take action as soon as possible to conclude an international legal instrument on preventing the weaponization of and arms race in outer space through negotiations, to ensure the peaceful use of outer space.”2

**[ ] China doesn’t like space weapons – they think Space mil cripples deterrence and harms the NPR and FMCT**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

It should be stressed that efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and those on nuclear disarmament go hand in hand. In this perspective, it is of crucial importance for nuclear disarmament that a missile defense system undermining strategic stability should not be developed, and that no weapons should be deployed in outer space. It is hard to imagine that once a full-fledged missile defense system is put in place or weapons have been introduced into outer space there can be business as usual in nuclear disarmament. At best, such moves would never be conducive to nuclear disarmament.60 If China, or any other nation, felt a need to build new warheads to enhance deterrent capabilities in response to perceived provocation in space, this would increase demand for plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. The process could harm the chances of negotiating a successful Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which has long been seen as a key building block for controlling nuclear weapons proliferation and for eventual disarmament. Failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process, to which the nuclear weapon states are committed under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would undermine the already fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime. In short, China, as evidenced in Chinese statements at the CD, is concerned that the deployment of space weapons “will disrupt strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security and do harm to the existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles, thus triggering new arms races.”61

**[ ] US weaponization provokes China—nationalist views prove**

**MacDonald 2008 Independent Consultant in National Security Policy Management** [Bruce W., 9/2008, Prior assistant director for national security for White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and prior defense and foreign policy advisor to Senator Dale Bumpers and prior nuclear weapons weapons and technology specialist in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Council-Foreign Relations “China, Space Weapons and U.S. Security” Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

Such a dominant stance could theoretically convince a competitor like China that it should not even attempt to develop the capability to attack U.S. space systems, much less put such capabilities in space, **but in reality such a result is highly unlikely**. China’s burgeoning economy, its nonmilitary space programs, and its **strong nationalist streak make it far more likely to continue to spend considerable resources on its satellites and counterspace capabilities. China would see such a U.S. doctrine as provocative, and it would likely stimulate a more determined Chinese response**. Attempting to maintain space dominance would thus be very costly, destabilizing, and ultimately unsuccessful, compromising U.S. ability to pursue other military and nonmilitary priorities in the meantime.

# Missile Defense

**[ ] BMD antagonizes China - status quo nukes are for deterrence but BMD would change China’s threat perception**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi expressed China’s concerns about an arms competition in space: The country that takes the lead in deploying weapons in space will enjoy an advantage for a period, but it will not be able to monopolize space weapons. Other states, when they find it affordable economically, scientifically and technically, will follow suit at a different pace and scale. This may not generate a space arms race in its strict sense (because other states are not really competing with the leading power), but the space weapon arsenal will inevitably develop and increase both qualitatively and quantitatively. As soon as the weapons are deployed in outer space, the international community will have to change its efforts from preventive ones to the aim of space disarmament. Soon afterwards, as a few other countries (major powers) also have put their weapons in the arena of outer space, there will be an attempt towards space weapon non-proliferation—that is, let the haves continue their privileged position, while prohibiting other have-nots from accessing space weaponry. In other words, an old story will unfold in a new form.43 A loss of strategic nuclear deterrent capability. China developed its nuclear weapons to break up the nuclear monopoly of the two cold war superpowers and to prevent nuclear blackmail. China’s nuclear policy is clearly expressed in its 2002 defense white paper: “China has always exercised utmost restraint on the development of nuclear weapons, and its nuclear arsenal is kept at the lowest level necessary for self-defense only.”44 The PRC has one of the smallest nuclear arsenals of all the nuclear weapons states. On the day it declared its possession of nuclear weapons, China adopted a nuclear no-first-use policy, and a nuclear no-use policy against non-nuclear weapons states or nuclear weapons free zones. China has consistently urged all nuclear weapon states to arrive at a nuclear no-first-use agreement. It is reported that China has about twenty ICBMs with a range of 13,000 km, capable of reaching the United States. Unlike the warheads of other nuclear powers, as reported, China’s nuclear warheads are not on launch-on warning status because China does not have an effective early-warning system. Thus, China’s nuclear deterrence is based on the retaliatory capability it retains after absorbing a nuclear attack. Unless it could confidently eliminate China’s twenty ICBMs in an initial strike, the United States would in theory be deterred from initiating a nuclear attack. If the United States were to deploy missile defense systems, this situation would change completely. A spacebased, boost-phase defense would be particularly threatening.

**[ ] China perceives BMD as hostile – don’t believe it’s only for rogue states**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

Within China, it is widely believed that U.S. missile defense and space planning targets China. Many Chinese are skeptical of U.S. statements that the purpose of missile defense is to protect against “rogue” states. Even if North Korea successfully deployed a small number of nuclear-tipped ICBMs— a principal U.S. concern—it is highly unlikely that it would use them. What leader would risk national suicide by launching a nuclear attack on the United States? From China’s perspective, it seems untenable that the United States would expend massive resources on a system that has only “rogue” states in mind.45 Some missile defense advocates in the United States have not minced their words about the utility of the system for addressing Chinese capabilities. For example, Peter Brookes, advisor on East Asian affairs to the international relations committee of the U.S. Congress, said that the major motive that drives the United States to develop and deploy missile defense systems is China’s missile capability.46

# ASATs

**[ ] China empirically suspicious of US ASAT tests – don’t believe our statements that they’re not the target**

**Hagt 8 – Director of for Center for Defense Information's China Program**

[Eric Hagt The director of the Center for Defense Information's China Program, Hagt is also the editor of China Security, a quarterly English-language policy journal with offices in Washington and Beijing that express diverse Chinese views on a range of security issues pertinent to China, Asia, and U.S.-Chinese relations. He has studied and worked in Taiwan and China for eight years, including from 1996 to 2000, when he served as the chief representative of a consulting firm in Beijing. Previously, he worked as a visiting researcher at the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The bulletin “The U.S. satellite shootdown: China's response” 3/5/08 <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-us-satellite-shootdown-chinas-response> //NG]

After the shootdown, Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the cryptic remark, "[T]he question of whether this capability works has been settled, [rather] the question is against what kind of threat, how large a threat, and how sophisticated a threat." He was referring to the shootdown as proof that the missile defense system is successful and not a waste of money, while presumably, trying to assure China that the incident wasn't intended to demonstrate a capability to negate Beijing's strategic missile force. But interpretation of the event disproves this reasoning. The shootdown didn't answer the biggest question about the system's effectiveness--the ability to circumvent a warhead's countermeasures (See "No, It Doesn't Prove That Missile Defense Works.") In addition, China does suspect the system is useful against missiles, and more importantly, its satellites; softer targets with predictable orbits and no countermeasures (See "China's Military Experts Analyze U.S. Plan to Down the Uncontrolled Satellite" [in Chinese].) While the USA-193 satellite was intercepted at an altitude of approximately 130 miles, the range of the SM-3 Aegis enabled platform that downed it can potentially hit targets at least 300 miles high. That's the lower end of low Earth orbit, but satellites do pass through that altitude. 1 Furthermore, upgrades and next generation systems will increase the interceptor's speed, allowing it to reach satellites throughout low Earth orbit up to 1,200 miles. With the credibility of the Pentagon's explanation for the shootdown in doubt, Washington's contention that this action was fundamentally different from the Chinese test loses persuasiveness. China's incident certainly created far more, longer-lasting space debris. (See "Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of Its Debris on the Space Environment" PDF and "Space Debris from Antisatellite Weapons.") But U.S. characterizations that its action was more transparent than Beijing's test are false. As one Chinese blogger asked, "What's the point of transparency when the justification given doesn't hold up?"

# Spaced-Based Solar Power

**[ ] Plan wrecks US-China relations- Chinese rely on renewable energy dominance for economy**

**New York Times, 10**

[Keith Bradsher, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-environment/31renew.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1310934705-5UGPm2IYyqUZZaqrDovQqQ, “China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy”, Accessed July 17, //SH]

Yet renewable energy may be doing more for China’s economy than for the environment. Total power generation in China is on track to pass the United States in 2012 — and most of the added capacity will still be from coal. China intends for wind, solar and biomass energy to represent 8 percent of its electricity generation capacity by 2020. That compares with less than 4 percent now in China and the United States. Coal will still represent two-thirds of China’s capacity in 2020, and nuclear and hydropower most of the rest. As China seeks to dominate energy-equipment exports, it has the advantage of being the world’s largest market for power equipment. The government spends heavily to upgrade the electricity grid, committing $45 billion in 2009 alone. State-owned banks provide generous financing. China’s top leaders are intensely focused on energy policy: on Wednesday, the government announced the creation of a National Energy Commission composed of cabinet ministers as a “superministry” led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao himself.

# Answers To: One-Shot Link Turns

**[ ] Single policies do nothing to improve relations—casual negotiations needed**

**Kennedy 07, Assistant Professor at Australian National University**

[Andrew Bingham, Policy and Governance Program at the Crawford School of Economics and Government, Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March/April 2007), pp. 268-287, “China's Perceptions of U.S. Intentions toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?,” accessed 7/12/11//HK]

The U.S. should thus communicate its assurances through casual exchanges that recur over time, rather than via formal pronouncements that will likely be dismissed as diplomatic niceties. Indeed, the interviews for this study suggest that such casual interactions are extremely important. All of the Chinese observers with more sanguine views had either spent time in the U.S. or had considerable experience interacting with American interlocutors in less formal settings. 61 In the future, the U.S. should work to expand such contacts, particularly with the relatively isolated Chinese military.

# China Militarization Links

# US Militarization Generic Links

**[ ] Plan leads to arms race- Empirics prove China always reacts to US space initiatives**

Theresa **Hitchens** **and** David **Chen** 8/**08 –** leads CDI’s Space Security Project in cooperation with the Secure World Foundation

 (director of research at the British American Security Information Council, CDI director, leads CDI’s Space Security Project in cooperation with the Secure World Foundation, on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies . Chen: Independent researcher of international studies, affiliated with International Relations and Pacific Studies. Space Policy, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 128-131, Aug 2008. Accessed 7/12/11//KH)

China's incentive to develop anti-satellite weapons results largely from the US military presence in the western Pacific and the US military's reliance on satellites for its doctrine of net-centric warfare. As Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has argued, “The near-term objective of preventing what Beijing would call Taiwanese secession from the mainland—and defeating any US expeditionary forces that may be committed in support—remains the dominant consideration for China's military modernization” [2]. To wit, the Pentagon has noted China's diversified portfolio of anti-satellite technologies, including “kinetic energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons for counterspace application” [3]. Some US researchers studying Chinese military doctrine have written that counter-space operations are seen as an increasingly necessary component of China's military concept of “future ‘informationalized’ warfare”, including hacking into satellite systems and other electronic attacks [4]. The logic of China's investment in counter-space operations follows from what it sees as a regional security environment that, in the foreseeable future, will be dominated by an asymmetric balance of power vis-à-vis the USA. Unless altered by domestic political will from the highest echelons of leadership, anti-satellite technologies will probably remain a part of its larger access denial strategy against the USA. Add to that a bilateral relationship peppered with crisis incidents, and often fueled by mutual misunderstanding, and the potential for a crisis situation to spiral out of control should give pause to any responsible leader. Since the Reagan era, US interest in on-orbit and anti-satellite weapons has stemmed from three intertwining strategic concerns: the threat of ballistic missile strike, protecting the space systems upon which the US military depends, and preventing an adversary from using space in the same way as the US military does to enhance its conventional military prowess. After President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, “China began a program to modernize its strategic missile forces because of doubts about the survivability of its small nuclear deterrent” [5]. The Pentagon notes that the Chinese Navy is developing the necessary technologies to field a nuclear submarine fleet, a key to increasing the survivability of China's nuclear deterrent in the face of a second-strike-nullifying ballistic missile shield [6]. The current US strategic policy of “space dominance” aims at ensuring US freedom of action in space, as well as the ability to deny the use of space to adversaries [7]. China, with some good reason, sees itself as particularly vulnerable to such space doctrine, and in response may feel compelled to develop countervailing measures, in order to counteract the proscriptions of US policy. The USA cannot reasonably be expected to abandon its space capabilities, but a more constructive modus vivendi can surely be found by demonstrating that both the USA and China are “responsible stakeholders” in the realm of space.

**[ ] Space weapons kill US-China relations and cause space and arms race – they really want their nuclear deterrent**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

There is evidence to suggest that the Bush administration’s move toward space weaponization is gaining momentum. A number of U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years reveal the intention to control space by military means. In practice, the United States is pursuing several space weapons programs that could be used to attack ballistic missiles in flight and also satellites and targets anywhere on Earth. Chinese officials have expressed a growing concern that U.S. space control plans would stimulate a costly and destabilizing arms race in space and on Earth. In particular, Beijing is concerned that the United States seeks to neutralize China’s strategic nuclear deterrence capabilities, freeing itself to intervene in China’s affairs and undermine efforts at reunification with Taiwan. To respond to the move by the United States to deploy space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent space weaponization, as it now advocates. A feasible, focused agreement would ban the deployment of weapons in space and the testing of weapons in ASAT mode. If this effort fails and if the security threats China perceives to be legitimate are ignored, China would likely develop responses to neutralize these threats. Possible responses might include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defenses, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China’s commitments to arms control including participation in the FMCT and ratification of the CTBT. Failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process eventually would undermine the already fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime. Consequently, U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country’s security interests. If Washington wants to reduce the potential vulnerability of its space assets, there are a number of ways to improve space security, including satellite hardening, accepting modest “rules of the road,” and agreeing to more comprehensive arms control measures. Weaponizing space can only erode space security, which is in no one’s interest. China believes that the most effective way to secure space assets is to agree to an international ban on space weaponization. In recent years, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for the CD to start a negotiation on PAROS by an overwhelming majority. Washington has opposed these resolutions. If the history of nuclear weapons tells us anything, it is that banning the testing and deployment of weapons from the outset is much more effective than attempting disarmament and non-proliferation after the fact.

**[ ] China will backlash- weaponization causes a litany of reactions**

Kenneth S. **Blazejewski 2008** – master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law (“Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55 http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf Accessed on 7/14/11//KH)

No state is more keenly interested in US policy towards outer space than China. To avoid unnecessary conflict, the United States should pay close attention to the implications of space weaponization for US-China relations. Unfortunately, much like the United States, China’s behavior and stated policy do not produce a clear picture of its true intentions in outer space. Officially, China adamantly opposes the weaponization of outer space. At the CD, China spearheads the quest for an agreement on PAROS. Partnering with Russia, China calls for confidence-building measures in outer space, dialogue on appropriate actions in outer space, and, ultimately, the negotiation of an international treaty designed to prevent an arms race in outer space. However, China’s recent ASAT test creates doubts about its sincerity in seeking to limit the weaponization of space. On 11 January 2007, China launched a mid-range ballistic missile and destroyed an outdated Chinese weather satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO). If combined with a larger booster, such a weapon could reach satellites in higher orbits. 16 Many states at the CD noted the obvious tension between China’s official position on PAROS and its ASAT test. China stated simply that it continued to support an agreement on PAROS. Blazejewski.indd 37 2/7/08 8:16:59 AMStrategic  Studies  Quarterly ♦ Spring 2008 Kenneth S. Blazejewski [ 38 ] China’s contradictory actions and statements provide some support for many interpretations and yet are wholly consistent with none. I offer four possible interpretations of China’s behavior towards the weaponization of space. One interpretation is that China seeks only to maintain its defensive military position vis-à-vis the United States. Although long a member of the nuclear club, China has never sought to match the United States or Russia in nuclear military might. The best estimates of China’s nuclear arsenal are that China has roughly 80 operationally deployed nuclear warheads 17 and less than 40 liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBMs. 18 According to this view, China’s “minimalist” nuclear program reflects the Chinese conception of nuclear deterrence as insensitive to variations in the relative number of nuclear weapons. 19 China is more interested in directing state resources towards economic development, industrial growth, and conventional military modernization than in competing with the United States in nuclear or space weapon systems, and China’s nuclear policy focuses on maintaining its deterrent capability. On this account, China’s primary concern with US space weaponization is its contribution to a US multilayered missile defense shield. Indeed, China’s campaign for PAROS negotiation at the CD seems to intensify after each new development in United States BMD plans. 20 Although China could respond to a BMD shield with effective countermeasures, 21 future technological developments may permit the BMD system to vitiate China’s nuclear deterrent. 22 In the case of a conflict over Taiwan, for example, a US space-based BMD system could prove very valuable to the United States. According to this view, if the United States decides to advance with such a BMD program, China will respond so as to maintain its nuclear deterrence. It will modernize its ICBM fleet (a program it has already initiated), develop further countermeasures to circumvent the BMD shield, and develop the means to launch multiple ASAT attacks. Ultimately, an arms race could ensue. This, however, would not be China’s chosen outcome. Its development of space weapons is merely a counterstrategy to what it views as likely US space weaponization. 23 China would much prefer that the United States negotiate a PAROS agreement not to build the BMD shield. 24 If this were the case, China’s January ASAT test would appear to be an attempt to get the United States to the negotiating table. By launching the ASAT, China sought to put the United States on notice that any attempt to weaponize outer space would lead to this mutually undesirable path. Blazejewski.indd 38 2/7/08 8:16:59 AMSpace Weaponization and US-China Relations Strategic  Studies  Quarterly ♦ Spring 2008 [ 39 ] A second interpretation, not wholly inconsistent with the first, is that China is concerned that the United States seeks to deny Chinese use of outer space. As China continues down the path of economic development and technological advancement, it seeks to grow its outer space programs. China seeks to launch new satellites for commercial and military purposes. 25 For instance, China has plans to launch a GPS-like satellite system called Beidou-2. From 2006 to 2010, China plans to launch up to 100 satellites. 26 It also has an interest in developing a space science program much like NASA. Although the United States has officially stated that it supports the peaceful use of outer space by all space-faring nations, so-called US “space controllers” or “space hegemonists” 27 argue the United States should carefully police the use of space to assure that no country uses it in a manner inconsistent with its interests. In response to such a US policy, China seeks to deny the US denial of outer space. 28 One means of doing so would be through the ratification of an international treaty that precluded the United States from putting in place the instruments or means to control outer space. Since the diplomatic approach does not seem likely to produce any concrete results, China is moving forward with its ASAT program in order to hedge the risk of US space domination. A third interpretation is that China’s statements at the CD are nothing more than empty rhetoric and that its real intention is to develop the means to launch its own space weapons. China only seeks to pursue PAROS as a means of buying time to catch up to the United States in research and development of its space program. The Department of Defense views China’s advances for negotiation with skepticism, noting “the traditional roles that stratagem and deception have played in Chinese statecraft.” 29 The Rumsfeld Commission noted that “the Xinhua news agency reported that China’s military is developing methods and strategies for defeating the U.S. military in a high-tech and space-based future war.” 30 Many China experts outside the Pentagon share the Department of Defense’s skepticism about China’s willingness to negotiate arms control agreements. 31 In a report to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Michael Pillsbury, a former defense official with expertise in Asian affairs, reported that no less than three Chinese colonels have advocated covert development and deployment of ASAT weapons to be used against the United States in a surprise attack. 32 In his Fall 2007 article, Congressman Everett seems to adopt this interpretation of China’s ASAT test. “Apparently, this single test is part of a broader effort to mature their direct-ascent ASAT capability and to Blazejewski.indd 39 2/7/08 8:16:59 AMStrategic  Studies  Quarterly ♦ Spring 2008 Kenneth S. Blazejewski [ 40 ] develop a spectrum of counterspace capabilities.” 33 Fueling these fears is the belief among some US defense experts that if China deploys space weapons before the United States, China will have gained a large, perhaps insurmountable advantage. 34 Finally, a fourth interpretation is that China’s seemingly contradictory actions are not the product of a single coherent policy but the result of “stovepiped bureaucracies” that do not sufficiently coordinate their actions and policies. 35 The appeal of this explanation is that it does not require a reconciliation of China’s two positions. The negotiation of PAROS is the objective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the development of ASAT weapons is the objective of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which conducted the January ASAT test. 36 Insufficient policy integration, information sharing, and leadership have allowed these two objectives to develop simultaneously. If true, this interpretation would raise serious questions about China’s ability to develop a coherent foreign policy necessary to building a working relationship with the United States. Although each of these four interpretations of China’s policy on space weaponization diverges from the others, each is largely consistent with China’s foreign policy behavior. Each has been adopted and vigorously argued by its own camp of China watchers. Despite the uncertainty, however, two conclusions emerge from the above interpretations. The United States must adopt a foreign policy that is consistent with both of these conclusions. First, if the United States proceeds with space weaponization China will respond by bolstering its own military capabilities. 37 China’s response will seek to preserve the asymmetric threat it poses to US space assets and maintain its nuclear deterrent. Under each of the interpretations considered, China is not willing to allow the United States to build up its space weapons program unchallenged. In the least, China would develop additional ASAT weapons to which the United States would seek to develop effective countermeasures. 38 Alternatively or in addition, China could invest in more ICBMs and nuclear warheads, 39 acquiring the capacity to overwhelm a BMD shield. An option less likely in the near future, China could counter US space weaponization by deploying its own space weapons. Other potential Chinese responses include adopting a “launch on warning” policy or abandoning its no-first-use pledge. 40 Each of these strategies would seek to counter the effectiveness of US space weapons. The United States, of course, could always respond to China’s response, but such tit-for-tat policy making risks devolving into an arms race. Chinese officials claim that an arms race would “likely emerge” unless a negotiated solution can be reached on PAROS.

It is noteworthy, however, that under at least two interpretations, this is not China’s preferred outcome. Under the first and second interpretations, China will only proceed with further developing ASAT technology and acquiring additional weapons if it cannot be assured that the United States does not plan to weaponize outer space.

**[ ] Plan causes backlash- China will pursue space militarization in response to US action**

**Zhang, 11- Associate Professor and Director for the Center of Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University**

[Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, Number 2, pp. 311-332, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=B&aulast=Zhang&atitle=The+Security+Dilemma+in+the+US-China+Military+Space+Relationship&title=Asian+survey&volume=51&issue=2&date=2011&spage=311&issn=0004-4687, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Accessed July 12, SH]

The U.S.-China military space relationship has been driven by the security dilemma in international relations. China pursues military space capabilities in part to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, the current strategic adjustment by the Obama administra- tion and the altered situation at the Taiwan Strait have moderated the bilateral secu- rity dilemma, offering an opportunity for arms control in outer space.

# Space Dominance Links

**[ ] US space dominance leads to US-Sino arms race --- U.S. policy proves**

**Eisendrath 10, Senior Professor at the Center for International Policy.**

[Craig Eisendrath, 2010. senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., is an adjunct professor of American Studies at Temple University, Philadelphia, and co-author of War in Heaven. “ WHY IS THE U.S. WEAPONIZING OUTER SPACE? “ Access 7/14/2011. http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx\_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx\_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr\_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft\_val\_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=WHY+IS+THE+U.S.+WEAPONIZING+OUTER+SPACE%3F&rft.jtitle=USA+Today&rft.au=Craig+Eisendrath&rft.date=2007-01-31&rft.issn=0161-7389&rft.volume=135&rft.issue=2740&rft.spage=53&rft.externalDBID=GUSA&rft.externalDocID=1193566801//FK]

The future of outer space also is a topic of national discussion in China, which is concerned that space security be maintained, declares Hui Zhang, research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. As in Canada and Russia, Zhang confirms that China is disturbed by the U.S. development of space weapons, as well as by its missile defense system and abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Space domination would allow the U.S. to interfere in Chinese foreign policy, particularly its relations with Taiwan, which China considers part of China. Hegemony, unilateralism, and exceptionalism are too often the themes of American foreign policy, Zhang laments. Eventually, U.S. policy will lead to an arms race in outer space. A low-tech approach would be the development of ground-based weapons to neutralize weapons based in space. Other possibilities are space-based interceptors and lasers. Zhang charges that the biggest threat is the American ground-based antimissile system; the U.S. believes this can neutralize China's nuclear firepower. China has 2,000 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles that could target the U.S. A first strike by America could reduce this number vastly. China is considering converting its fixed silo-based system into mobile units, but the U.S. already is boasting of creating the capacity to destroy this system as well. These type of aggressive statements, coupled with America's talk of cooperating with Taiwan on tactical missile defense, have heightened Chinese concern.

# ASATs Links

**[ ] US ASAT development stimulates China’s weaponization – they suspect duel use**

**Hagt 8 – Director of for Center for Defense Information's China Program**

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How will all of this affect China's actions? The answer is mixed. Like the United States, some in China support developing military space assets to safeguard national security interests. (See my Winter 2007 China Security article, "China ASAT Test: Strategic Response" PDF.) And regardless of U.S. guarantees to the contrary, the downing of USA-193 is being perceived in China as a riposte to Beijing's ASAT test. As such, the U.S. shootdown will increase the incentives (and internal pressure) to stimulate China's ASAT program. 2 Already, there have been increased signs that Beijing intends to develop its own missile defense system. (See "China's Missile Defense State of Affairs" [in Chinese].) The dual anti-missile/ASAT capability of such a system, explicitly demonstrated by the U.S. shootdown, makes this an especially attractive option. That said, as in the United States, there are strong diplomatic and institutional constituencies in China with a deep interest in averting a renewed military space race. Evidenced by its commercial and civilian programs, China clearly has huge ambitions in space, which a military competition would jeopardize. (See "Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities in Space" PDF.) And considering China's stance at the CD to negotiate a ban on space weapons, its repeated chirping that a military space race is unaffordable, and that any such competition will harm Beijing's larger strategic relationship with Washington, there are powerful drivers against China developing ASAT weapons.

# Missile Defense Links

**[ ] BMD causes Chinese modernization – massive numbers of new warheads to counter anti-missile threat**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

One could still project the potential changes in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal based on a few simple assumptions. Assume that China keeps its nofirstuse policy and that the survival rate of Chinese ICBMs after a U.S. first strike is expected to be about 50 percent. With no U.S. missile shield, this would leave China with 10 ICBMs for retaliation, a sufficient number to kill at least several hundred thousand people and to deter a first strike attempt by the United States. However, as the United States proceeds with deployment of its limited ground-based missile defense—for example, a deployment of 100 interceptors and a follow-up deployment of up to 250 interceptors, as envisioned by the Clinton administration88—China’s nuclear force would need to grow to maintain a credible deterrent. Assuming a U.S. missile defense system would operate under a firing doctrine of two-on-one, shoot-lookshoot, which means that two interceptors would be first launched to hit every incoming warhead, and if these fail then another two interceptors follow, then one might assume that four interceptors would be deployed for every expected warhead. A Chinese military planner, however, would assume the worst case, i.e., that the first two interceptors would successfully hit their target warhead. Thus, if the United States deployed 100 interceptors, and if China wished to preserve for the purpose of deterrence its current retaliatory capability of 10 surviving ICBMs, then it would need a force of 120 ICBMs. Half of these would be wiped out in an initial strike, and the missile shield would intercept 50 of the remaining 60 missiles once they were launched in retaliation. This would leave 10 to find their targets. In the case of 250 interceptors, China would need at least 270 ICBMs. Of course, many other factors could affect the survival rate of China’s nuclear force, e.g., the ratio of mobile to silo-based missiles, the number of U.S. warheads targeted on each silo, the quality of U.S. intelligence on Chinese nuclear deployments, and the size and effectiveness of the missile defense system. In short, China could need between 100 and 300 ICBMs to defeat even a limited missile defense system. These numbers correspond roughly to the August 2000 NIE on the foreign response to U.S. national missile defense, which reportedly concluded that China would expand its arsenal in order to overwhelm a limited missile defense system and could deploy up to 200 ICBM warheads by 2015.89 Others have offered similar estimates.90 Some arms control experts in China believe that adding several hundred ICBMs to China’s arsenal would be economically feasible. It is estimated that building 200 ICBMs would cost China about $2 billion. This expenditure could be spread over several years and would represent less than 2 percent of China’s current foreign currency reserve. The cost would be less than onetenth of the expense to the United States of maintaining parity between Chinese missiles and U.S. missile interceptors.91

# Perception of US Key to Chinese Militarization

**[ ] Chinese will react to American single instances of militarization---Empirics prove**

**Johnson-Freese 08, chair of Department of National Security Studies**

[ Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval War College since August 2002. “ Strategic Communication with China: What message about space?” Access 7/14/2011. http://chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=246//FK]

With an authoritarian government in place, Chinese public opinion is not a force comparable to that in the United States, but it is increasingly becoming a force with which the Chinese leadership must contend. A full spectrum of attitudes toward the United States can be found, as evidenced in the June 2005 Pew study. 22 Clearly, however, the Chinese are influenced by single events. Chinese citizens reacted virulently, for example, to both the accidental Strategic Communication~48 ~ U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999 and the death of the Chinese pilot in the EP-3 incident over Hainan Island in 2001. If the Chinese are negatively impacted by events, perhaps they can be positively impacted too. The current U.S. approach to strategic communication seems to understate the importance of positive “singular opportunities” and images, though the increase in favorable opinion toward the United States after its 2004 tsunami relief efforts clearly demonstrated that opportunities exist. A single bold act, such as allowing a Chinese taikonaut on a shuttle flight, could general a powerful, positive effect on Chinese public opinion. Such a shuttle flight would generate tangible images and news coverage much the same as Apollo-Soyuz did in 1975. If one’s goal with strategic communication is, in part, to alter Chinese public opinion, these images could be very potent.

**[ ] China will only militarize space if the U.S. does** - **they think we’re defensive now but are uncertain**

**Zhang 11 PH.D. From the University of Texas** [Spring 2011. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China

Military Space Relationship.” The Prospects of Arms Control. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=The%20Security%20Dilemma%20in%20the%20US-China%20Military%20Space%20Relationship%20The%20Prospects%20for%20Arms%20Control&rft.auinit=B&rft.aulast=Zhang&rft.date=2011&rft.epage=332&rft.genre=article&rft.issn=0004-4687&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=311&rft.stitle=ASIAN%20SURV&rft.title=ASIAN%20SURVEY&rft.volume=51&rfr_id=info:sid/www.isinet.com:WoK:UA> //TD]

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional advantages, this article suggests that China’s military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing military capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence. In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”10

# Militarization CTBT Pullout Internal Links

**[ ] Plan causes Chinese pullout of the CTBT - doesn’t want to be vulnerable**

Hui **Zhang** 12/0**5**-- research associate at Harvard

(in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China” <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr> accessed on 7/12/11//KH)

U.S.-led space weaponization might also lead China to reconsider its participation in some multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. As Ambassador Sha Zukang stated, “ China cannot afford to sit on its hands without taking the necessary measures while its strategic interests are being jeopardized. China, inter alia, may be forced to review the arms control and nonproliferation policies it has adopted since the end of the Cold War in light of new developments in the international situation.” For example, a need for more weapons would mean a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel those weapons and thus likely hurt China’s support for a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). My conservative estimate is that China’s existing stockpile contains about two tons of weapons-grade HEU and one ton of separated plutonium, which could fuel approximately 300 warheads. Thus, this existing stockpile would be sufficient for its current modernization program. However, if China were driven to expand its ICBM arsenal significantly because of missile defense deployments, it might feel compelled to be able to retain the option to restart production of fissile materials and be unwilling to join an FMCT. Indeed, China has linked these issues since 2000, contending that the space weaponization issue “is just as important as fissile material cut-off, if not more.” For several years, China demanded that FMCT and PAROS talks be launched at the same time. But the United States opposed any negotiations on the outer space issue, and the disagreement prevented the CD from continuing any arms control negotiations for several years. Aiming to break the deadlock at the CD and to promote the international arms control and disarmament process, China dropped in 2003 its linkage between an FMCT and the PAROS negotiations and agreed to a negotiation of an FMCT. China is still seeking PAROS talks, however. A U.S. move into space could also lead China to reconsider its support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China signed the CTBT in 1996 and has not yet ratified it, partly because it was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999. However, U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans would make Chinese ratification even more difficult. China may feel the need for additional nuclear tests if the need to counter a missile defense drives Beijing to develop new warheads that include decoys or maneuverable warheads. Already, China faces concerns from some experts who think that the CTBT will put more direct constraints on China’s nuclear weapons program than on the weapons programs of other states.

# Chinese Nuclear Modernization Internal Links

**[ ] US Space militarization causes China nuclear modernization**

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The timing of such measures is still being debated. Because it is not clear what type of missile defense system the United States will finally deploy, or whether U.S. space control plans will be implemented, it is difficult to identify conclusively China’s specific countermeasures. China’s options for response include: building more ICBMs; adopting countermeasures against boost, mid-course, and terminal phase missile defense; developing ASAT weapons; and reconsidering China’s commitments on arms control. In the discussion below, I examine the types of countermeasures that could be used effectively to neutralize U.S. missile defense and space control plans; China’s technical capabilities in applying those countermeasures; and the other responses, diplomatic or legal, that might be expected. It should be noted that these discussions are based on China’s capabilities, and should not be understood as a characterization of China’s intentions. Build More Warheads- One optimal countermeasure for China is to build more ICBMs.80 Although some supporters of U.S. missile defense claim that China’s nuclear modernization will go forward whether or not the system is deployed, many Chinese analysts believe that U.S. missile defense efforts will encourage an acceleration of China’s nuclear modernization and influence its force both quantitatively and qualitatively.

# \*\*\*IMPACTS\*\*\*

**[ ] US-China cooperation key over Asia-Pacific – Laundry List**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

16. The two sides believe that China and the United States have a common interest in promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and agreed to enhance communication and coordination to address pressing regional and global challenges. The two sides undertake to act to protect the global environment and to work in concert on global issues to help safeguard and promote the sustainable development of all countries and peoples. Specifically, China and the United States agreed to advance cooperation to: counter violent extremism; prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery; strengthen nuclear security; eliminate infectious disease and hunger; end extreme poverty; respond effectively to the challenge of climate change; counter piracy; prevent and mitigate disasters; address cyber-security; fight transnational crime; and combat trafficking in persons. In coordination with other parties, China and the United States will endeavor to increase cooperation to address common concerns and promote shared interests.

**[ ] China-U.S. cooperation key- nuclear weapons and proliferation**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

17. China and the United States underlined their commitment to the eventual realization of a world without nuclear weapons and the need to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime to address the threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. In this regard, both sides support early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), reaffirmed their support for the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, and agreed to work together to reach these goals. The two sides also noted their deepening cooperation on nuclear security following the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and signed a Memorandum of Understanding that will help establish a Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in China.

**[ ] China-U.S. cooperation key- Korean Peninsula**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

18. China and the United States agreed on the critical importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as underscored by the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Both sides expressed concern over heightened tensions on the Peninsula triggered by recent developments. The two sides noted their continuing efforts to cooperate closely on matters concerning the Peninsula. China and the United States emphasized the importance of an improvement in North-South relations and agreed that sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue is an essential step. Agreeing on the crucial importance of denuclearization of the Peninsula in order to preserve peace and stability in Northeast Asia, China and the United States reiterated the need for concrete and effective steps to achieve the goal of denuclearization and for full implementation of the other commitments made in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. In this context, China and the United States expressed concern regarding the DPRK's claimed uranium enrichment program. Both sides oppose all activities inconsistent with the 2005 Joint Statement and relevant international obligations and commitments. The two sides called for the necessary steps that would allow for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks process to address this and other relevant issues.

**[ ] China-U.S. cooperation key- Iran’s nuclear program**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

19. On the Iranian nuclear issue, China and the United States reiterated their commitment to seeking a comprehensive and long-term solution that would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Both sides agreed that Iran has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that Iran should fulfill its due international obligations under that treaty. Both sides called for full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. China and the United States welcomed and will actively participate in the P5+1 process with Iran, and stressed the importance of all parties -- including Iran -- committing to a constructive dialogue process.

**[ ] China-U.S. cooperation key- Sudan peace process**

**China Embassy, 1/19/11** [Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t788934.htm>, “China-U.S. joint statement.” Access: July 2011//SL]

20. Regarding Sudan, China and the United States agreed to fully support the North-South peace process, including full and effective implementation of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The two sides stressed the need for all sides to respect the result of a free, fair, and transparent referendum. Both China and the United States expressed concern on the Darfur issue and believed that further, substantive progress should be made in the political process in Darfur to promote the early, comprehensive, and appropriate solution to this issue. Both China and the United States have a continuing interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the wider region.

# US-China Relations Impacts

# US-China Impact Laundry Lists

**[ ] China-U.S relations solve a litany of global problems –crime, piracy, econ collapse, environmental destruction and terrorism**

**Graham and Kelley 2009, Professors at University of S. California and School of International Service in International Studies** [Sarah Ellen, Department of International Relations, University of Southern California; John Robert, John Robert Kelley is an assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. January 2009. “U.S Engagement in East Asia.” Orbis. Volume 53. Issue 1. Pgs. 80-98. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1465772&>Accessed 7/14/11//AG]

Regional Security: The United States has a substantial and ongoing interest in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and track two diplomacy has several applications over the medium and long term that can contribute to this sphere of US interests. In the short term, Washington is committed, both by preserving the regional balance of power and through diplomatic commitments, to ensuring flashpoints on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait do not erupt into war. To this end, the United States maintains the forward-posturing of its conventional military forces and the nuclear umbrella under the terms of existing bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea (ROK) and its tradition of declared support for Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. But in acknowledging the ongoing salience of existing strategic alignments, it is also in America’s interest to pursue peaceful relations with China over the medium-term, which entails shaping China’s strategic perceptions as a rising regional and global power. Washington must find ways to discourage the view from Beijing that America regards a strong China as a ‘strategic competitor’ and is seeking to contain it, and at the same encourage China to do the same in relation to its immediate neighbors. China will be the preeminent military power within Asia within 10 to 20 years if it sustains current spending on the modernization and diversification of its military. America should not necessarily fear a militarily strong China, provided that shared Sino-American strategic goals and expectations can be fostered. In working toward this ultimate objective, it is in Washington’s interest to seek possible dialogues and CSBMs with Chinese officials and foreign policy experts in order to better understand Chinese strategic intentions. Improving confidence and establishing constructive, ongoing security dialogues on a second track with China could be especially beneficial in enabling Washington to address perhaps its most substantial security challenge in Northeast Asia: the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang’s October 9, 2006, nuclear test inadvertently highlighted Beijing and Washington’s shared interest in seeking to prevent additional provocations of this kind when, on the basis of US intelligence, Beijing tried and failed to dissuade the DPRK regime from undertaking the test, and then publicly branded Pyongyang’s move as ‘brazen’ after the event. Since this catalyzing moment, and with Washington continuing to regard China as a broker to Pyongyang, diplomatic avenues toward reaching a workable framework for disarmament on the Peninsula appear promising. In February, 2007, a ‘joint agreement’ issued by the Six Party states affirmed the common goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and signaled the willingness of all parties to work toward the normalization of diplomatic relations where they do not exist. More recently, the August 2007 posting of American experts to oversee the dismantling of parts of the DPRK’s Yongbyon nuclear complex, and the February, 2008 concert of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Pyongyang, attest to the Bush administration’s departure from an ‘axis of evil’ hard-line stance toward embracing diplomacy as an instrument for moving forward with the DPRK. The incoming administration will thus inherit some promising and creative diplomatic apertures on the first, second and third tracks that should not be left languishing. The orchestral event, for example, was a public diplomacy initiative that incorporated an important track two element. Several former US government officials joined the Philharmonic on its visit, including the former US Secretary of Defense William Perry who sat at the concert with DPRK deputy nuclear negotiator Ri Gun. Track two events such as these should be encouraged, as they will help Washington ensure, in line with its short-term objectives in relation to the DPRK, that incremental gains in confidence can be transmitted from the semi-official to the official sphere, giving the 2007 joint agreement its greatest ultimate chance of success. Track two events could also serve as gestures of good faith by Washington that will encourage Beijing, which is often exasperated by Washington’s hard-line stance and maintains highly beneficial economic ties with the DPRK, to remain constructively engaged in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Many Northeast Asian analysts currently argue that the US’s ultimate long-term objective- peaceful regime change- will come about only via diplomatic engagement and not through the isolation of the Kim Jong Il regime. Chadwick I. Smith uses the metaphor of ‘strategic entanglement’ to describe the kinds of cross-cutting ties and agreements that will be necessary in order to peacefully draw the Hermit Kingdom into the international community. Track two diplomacy has a substantial role to play in affecting ‘strategic entanglement.’ Non-binding dialogues and events will be instrumental in fostering a political climate conducive to the opening of the DPRK, and for parlaying steps forward in one sphere of relations, such as disarmament, into discussions about advancing ties in others, such as economic investment or cultural relations. The authors of a recent Atlantic Council report on US-DPRK relations note that the establishment of a multilateral regional security framework will also be vital to ensuring the DPRK’s peaceful entry into the regional and international community by providing an environment in which, among other things, the DPRK will be socialized into adopting the security norms of the international community. In this context, our discussion now turns to the Northeast Asian security order at large, to assess the prospects for engaging China in substantive dialogue on the prospects for a multilateral regional security architecture with the US and its regional allies with the goal of engaging the DPRK and other substantive benefits in mind. Given the shared goal in moving forward on the DPRK issue, track two dialogues should open between the US and China at the bilateral level as a basis for moving beyond the hedging dynamic currently at play in the bilateral relationship. Here the traditional ‘conflict management’ functions of track two, focusing on confidence building, bringing awareness of shared goals (eg. Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula) and the normative socialization if elites, are salient. Given the closeness of its existing bilateral security relationships in Asia, Washington can also act as a broker for confidence-building events and dialogues involving China and Japan/ROK, both also deeply suspicious of Chinese military spending and strategic intentions. The US has a long tradition of shared military exercises with both Japan and the ROK, which have hitherto been instrumental in sustaining the alliances. While Chinese participation in these symbolic events is some time away, dialogue concerning the conditions under which military collaboration might take place should be initiated. Frameworks such as the NEACD constitute a mechanism through which the kinds of outcomes that support US interests in relation to China and the DPRK can be fostered at a multilateral level. As an existing track two framework, the NEACD already brings Chinese policy-makers into discussions with its neighbors on strategic issues. The Six Party Talks attest the point that at the track one level multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia can be sustained, and the routine interactions between diplomats from China, Japan, the ROK and the US should move toward a joint effort to “enhance[e] the potential effectiveness of the Six Party Talks process and, in turn, the viability of any Northeast Asian collective security mechanism.” The permeability between track one and track two diplomacy can be exploited in order to generate the epistemic conditions under which a durable regional security structure, incorporating China, can be planned. An institution akin to a Northeast Asian NATO would deliver significant dividends to the US in the form of coordinating expectations, facilitating cooperative responses to regional security challenges such as regime change in the DPRK, and enhancing strategic burden sharing. The likelihood of future pressures from the US electorate to draw down Washington’s military commitment in Northeast Asia thus adds a further incentive for Washington to sponsor a regional security architecture built out of the NEACD that binds China to common security goals and at the same time assures the security of Japan and ROK. A further way in which the next administration should advance US objectives in Northeast Asia is to adopt track two as a strategy for mitigating tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Although Washington adheres to the one-China policy, it also has an interest in seeing Taiwan’s democratic system and open economy remain vibrant, and most importantly in ensuring that any future unification with China will occur peacefully. Consequently, Washington’s current position consists of advocating ‘dual restraint’ and sponsoring multiple channels of dialogue between Taipei and Beijing. As the April, 2007, controversy sparked by Taiwanese objections to being included in the ‘domestic’ leg of China’s Olympic flame relay and China’s repeated blockage of Taiwanese attempts to join the United Nations as ‘Taiwan’ indicate, symbolic and rhetorical factors can easily inflame cross-Strait antagonisms. At the same time, the underlying trend of Taiwan’s domestic politics is toward moderation on the independence issue. The election of the Ma Ying Jeou to the Taiwanese Presidency in May was greeted internationally as a highly promising step for cross-Strait relations. Ma has pledged to improve ties with the US; has Chinese government contacts and signaled a willingness to forge party-to-party contacts between his Party, the KMT, and the CCP; and has shown a commitment to ‘flexible methods’ for improving cross-Strait relations such as commercial ties, tourism, and a more accommodating nomenclature for membership in international organizations. So too, arguably, do trends within China’s own domestic political scene such as its search for international prestige as Olympic host signal that the time is right for a renewed effort tackle the problem. Track two channels provide an opportunity for Washington to encourage collaboration in non-government and even government sectors across the Taiwan Strait. Areas of common interest between China, Taiwan and the US that lie beyond the reunification issue should be identified and leveraged to extend dialogue and cooperation. In particular, events and joint projects in areas such as transnational health protocols, including through the World Health Organization (to which Taiwan has repeatedly sought membership), should be sponsored as a primer for sustained dialogue and political engagement. Economy: The United States has extensive economic interests in Northeast Asia and will inevitably be high on the agenda for the incoming administration’s foreign policy planners. US trade with China, Japan and the ROK is substantial, however as the Armitage and Nye report observes, a regional framework to promote free trade and financial stability remains absent in Northeast Asia, and they argue that it is in US interests to foster multilateral regimes for trade and investment as well as fiscal governance that accord with the norms and institutional principles that America has traditionally endorsed. As is the case in the security realm, promoting an economic order conducive to US interests in Northeast Asia requires regional coordination based on the realization of common interests, the generation of stable expectations, effective persuasion, and the building of trust. Track two diplomacy constitutes an important tool to further all of these objectives in the economic sphere. Trade liberalization, for example, remains a thorny issue in Sino-American relations, and must, as C. Fred Bergsten recently argued, be taken up by the US in a persuasive way at the bilateral level. The US trade deficit to China topped $233bn in 2005, and US pressure to increase imports and lower export subsidies have had yet not had much obvious impact on Beijing. Friction has developed over Beijing’s lack of transparency on export subsidies and reluctance to increase the value of the yuan, which has allowed it to accumulate more than $1 trillion in US dollar reserves. Yet the US also depends on trade with China: cheap imports keep prices low and real incomes high, China’s dollar reserves create downward pressures on US interest rates, and possible retaliatory measures by China against US economic demands would seriously impact US consumers. Washington thus has a strong interest in ensuring that policy tensions are resolved and that China takes on international trading norms without seriously destabilizing overall trade patterns. The Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) between China and the US, established in 2006, constitutes an important step for coordinating trade and monetary policy that can help address these points of tension over time. Its function is to engage “multiple and diverse government officials in both countries to facilitate more inclusive interactions… [seeks] to break down bureaucratic stovepipes that hinder effective communication.” As a track two framework, the SED already serves as a vital supplement to high level interchanges as a forum for debate, transparency, and confidence building. The latter function is particularly significant in the case of the SED: it communicates a message that America “welcome[s] the rise of a confident…and prosperous China.” Track two can also enhance the Sino-American economic relationship in confronting two of the US’s key concerns in relation to Chinese economic development: endemic corruption and systematic intellectual property (IP) violation. The costs of corruption in China are substantial: direct costs were estimated at US$86 billion in 2003, roughly 3% of China’s GDP. Corruption, furthermore, has large social and political costs: “efficiency losses, waste, and damage to the environment, public health, education, the reliability of…public institutions, and the morale of the civil service- are incalculable…corruption has lowered the quality of China’s economic growth” and exacerbates social tensions. Opportunities for dialogue between US experts and Chinese anti-corruption officials on best practices for corruption monitoring and prosecution should be created. The establishment in September 2007 of a Chinese National Bureau of Corruption Prevention represents a positive step in CCP efforts to address the problem, as does Chinese support for the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, which held its first Annual Convention in Beijing in October 2006. Both initiatives signal the CCP’s willingness to tackle corruption, and should be enriched through US and regional participation. There are also recent indications of greater willingness on the part of the CCP to crack down on IP infractions: in 2006-7 convictions rose by 52% and seizures of pirated goods by nearly 100%. Washington could fruitfully enhance international IP law enforcement through the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and by building on past cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. Track-two diplomacy constitutes a mechanism at once policy-relevant and non-antagonistic to supplement steps already take by Beijing to address corruption and IP problems, both for their own sake and as platform for extending cooperation in economic governance into others such as the maintenance of the existing international trade regime. Politics: The United States has an ongoing interest in promoting democracy and human rights within Northeast Asia. With China’s increasing wherewithal and ability to exercise influence at a regional and global level, the pace of internal reform and the extent to which China becomes a ‘responsible’ stakeholder in the international community are matters of significant interest to Washington. China has traditionally exercised a strong influence on the political norms within the wider region and will thus be decisive in determining whether Northeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region as a whole enjoys a democratic peace dividend. Human rights and democratization are a source of tension within the US-China relationship, however, with charges of hegemonism frequently leveled at Washington for its public support for human rights reforms, media freedom and democratization. Against this fractious high-level tension, track two diplomacy should be assessed as a potential conduit for debate on democracy, legal reform and human rights in China. By targeting track two and public diplomacy efforts at provincial governments, educational institutions, and Chinese civil society, Washington has an opportunity to promote democracy and human rights in a less risky and controversial manner than through high-level or public admonishments. In this context, track two functions should be supplemented by enhanced public diplomacy efforts, particularly Fulbright and youth exchanges, journalist training, and the work of non-Government institutions that promote democracy and human rights. In this case, track three initiatives could pave the way for track two events in which Washington can express its support for the democratization of China’s political system. Transnational Issues: Track two diplomacy is an instrument through which Washington should promote Northeast Asian regional cooperation to address transnational crime and environmental degradation. Unilateral initiatives can, by definition, only ever pose a partial solution to problems that transcend national borders. Consequently, track two diplomacy can be highly effective in areas of international concern where ongoing regional coordination, transparency and cooperation are needed. Given that Northeast Asia already encompasses several regimes tied to transnational issue areas, the challenge facing the next administration will be to sustain the commitment of parties to these initiatives and ensure they remain effectively embedded in policy channels. Transnational crime, including drugs smuggling, counterfeiting, maritime piracy and activities linked to terrorism are beginning to be effectively addressed at the regional level in Northeast Asia. US participation, through track one and track two, will help boost initiatives such as the Shanghai International Maritime Forum, established in November 2007 to set standards for maritime security in shipping routes subject to piracy and drug smuggling such as the Malacca Straits. The Forum has served as a track two framework for debate on establishing protocols for oil spills and the transportation of hazardous materials in Asia. The environment will be a crucial determinant of Asia’s future stability and prosperity, and the United States has an interest in ensuring that coordinated and effective solutions that both ensure energy security and address climate change are found. Frameworks such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum already serve as a framework to develop a regional response to climate change, and track two diplomacy can supplement these encouraging first steps within an established regime. The Asia Pacific Partnership on Energy and Climate, spearheaded by the US and Australia, and incorporating China, Japan, India and the ROK, represents a positive step toward a coordinated regional response focusing on clean technologies. In ensuring that existing agreements are adhered to, Washington should build confidence through track two mechanisms for monitoring of emissions and sharing of best practices. Washington should harness Beijing’s efforts to brand the 2008 Olympic Games as the ‘green games’ to encourage greater Chinese leadership in environmental initiatives focusing on the Asia Pacific and developing nations. As the foregoing analysis has indicated, there are numerous frameworks and opportunities for track two instruments to be recognized and further utilized as part of a renewed US commitment to statecraft in China and Northeast Asia. While contingencies and setbacks on some issues can be expected in a rapidly-changing region like Northeast Asia, enhancing America’s diplomatic instruments on all three tracks would be inexpensive relative to the long-term benefits in rebuilding of American legitimacy and establishing a more stable strategic, economic, and political order in Northeast Asia. To conclude, we make specific policy recommendations based on our analysis, and revisit the track two concept.

**[ ] U.S.-China relationship key to currency, trade, North Korea and Iran proliferation, and climate change**

**BBC News 2009** [7/27/09, BBC News “U.S.-China Ties To Shape Century” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8169869.stm> Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

The relationship between the US and China will shape the 21st Century, President Barack Obama has said, as top officials met in Washington for talks. "Co-operation, not confrontation" was the way forward, he said, with climate change, security and the economy all areas where common ground existed. His comments opened two days of talks at a new forum between the two nations. The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue is expected to focus on working towards economic recovery. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are co-hosting the talks. China has sent Vice Premier Wang Qishan and State Councillor Dai Bingguo to the forum. 'Strong coordination' The **talks will cover a range of issues, including halting the spread of nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran, and creating clean and secure energy sources.** But the main focus will be the economy. **Values of dollar and yuan. The US will press China to rely less on exports and more on domestic consumption. China will push for the US to make a priority of curbing inflation. Both sides will seek reassurances over accusations of trade protectionism North Korea and Iran's nuclear programmes Climate change and clean energy** "The current crisis has made it clear that the choices made within our borders reverberate across the global economy - and this is true not just of New York and Seattle, but Shanghai and Shenzhen as well," Mr Obama said. "That is why we must remain committed to strong bilateral and multilateral coordination." Mr Wang said the opening up of China's economy could help the US recovery. "With the furthering of China's reform and opening up, China and the United States will have even closer economic cooperation and trade relations and (the) China-US relationship will surely keep moving forward," he said.

 **[ ] U.S.–Sino Relations can solve the NoKo threat, prolif and terrorism**

**Zoellick, 2006, Depart of State Deputy Secretary of State** [Robert B. Department of State Deputy Secretary of State. Winter 2006. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” The DISASM Journal. <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Vol%2028_2/Zoellick.pdf>. Accessed: 7/15/11//AG]

Through the IEA we can strengthen the building and management of strategic reserves. We also have a common interest in secure transport routes and security in producing countries. All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests. Responsible stakeholders go further, they recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system. In its foreign policy, China has many opportunities to be a responsible stakeholder. The most pressing opportunity is North Korea. Since hosting the Six-Party Talks at their inception in 2003, China has played a constructive role. This week we achieved a Joint Statement of Principles, with an agreement on the goal of “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner.” But the hard work of implementation lies ahead, and China should share our interest in effective and comprehensive compliance. Moreover, the North Korea problem is about more than just the spread of dangerous weapons. Without broad economic and political reform, North Korea poses a threat to itself and others. It is time to move beyond the half century-old armistice on the Korean peninsula to a true peace, with regional security and development. A Korean peninsula without nuclear weapons opens the door to this future. Some thirty years ago America ended its war in Viet Nam. Today Viet Nam looks to the United States to help integrate it into the world market economic system so Viet Nam can improve the lives of its people. By contrast, North Korea, with a fifty year-old cold armistice, just falls further behind. Beijing also has a strong interest in working with us to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver them. The proliferation of danger will undermine the benign security environment and healthy international economy that China needs for its development. China’s actions on Iran’s nuclear program will reveal the seriousness of China’s commitment to nonproliferation. And while we welcome China’s efforts to police its own behavior through new export controls on sensitive technology, we still need to see tough legal punishments for violators. China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism. Chinese citizens have been victims of terror attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. China can help destroy the supply lines of global terrorism. We have made a good start by working together at the United Nations and searching for terrorist money in Chinese banks, but can expand our cooperation further. China pledged $150 million in assistance to Afghanistan, and $25 million to Iraq. These pledges were welcome, and we look forward to their full implementation. China would build stronger ties with both through follow-on pledges. Other countries are assisting the new Iraqi government with major debt forgiveness, focusing attention on the $7 billion in Iraqi debt still held by Chinese state companies.

**[ ] U.S.-China relations key to global stability, resources, regional conflicts – Britain Germany analogy proves**

**Bennhold 2010 Correspondent for the International Herald Tribune** [Katrin, 9/13/10, Prior senior economist writer for Bloomberg News, The New York Times “Mutual Trust Called Crucial to U.S. China Relations” <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/world/europe/13geneva.html?ref=katrinbennhold> Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

“There is no more consequential bilateral relationship for the U.S. than that with China,” Mr. Steinberg said. “The test of the future,” he said, will be whether Washington and Beijing can have differences without fundamentally destabilizing their relationship. He pointed to the numerous times the United States and European capitals had disagreed in recent decades, “but at the end of the day there was strategic trust.” China’s rise as a major economic and political player is forcing governments across the world to adapt their strategic thinking on everything from energy security to regional conflict resolution and economic policy much faster than many had anticipated. Simmering tension between Washington and Beijing has been recurrent. China resented the joint naval exercises America conducted with South Korea after Seoul accused North Korea of sinking one of its warships in March, killing 46 sailors. American policy makers and analysts regularly criticize China for not allowing its currency to rise further against the dollar. And the standoff between the Chinese government and Google early this year over censorship has come to symbolize growing difficulties many U.S. companies experience in China. Avoiding such disagreements will be impossible, experts and officials in Geneva said, but **ensuring that such differences do not fundamentally undermine the relationship is key to global stability in the decades ahead, they said.** Mr. Kissinger **drew an analogy between China’s emergence as a great power and potential rival of the United States, and Germany’s rise in Europe a hundred years ago. At the time, the inability of the then dominant international power, Britain, to integrate Germany ultimately ended in two devastating world wars.** “The DNA of both countries could generate a growing adversarial relationship, much as Germany and Britain drifted from friendship to confrontation, unless their leadership groups take firm steps to counteract such trends,” Mr. Kissinger said. Neither Washington nor Beijing “has much practice in cooperative relations with equals,” he said. “Yet their leaders have no more important task than to implement the truths that neither country will ever be able to dominate the other and that conflict between them would exhaust their societies and undermine the prospect of world peace.” Mr. Steinberg called Mr. Kissinger’s analogy an “important cautionary tale,” but expressed confidence that **both countries recognized that cooperation was ultimately in their interest**. Strategic competition was no long-term “sustainable strategy,” he said, arguing for **cooperation on everything from access to natural resources to pacifying regional conflicts, like the war in Afghanistan.**

**[ ] China relations solve econ, terrorism – bilateral talks prove**

**Yuming and Hegao 04**

[Che and Chen, senior reporters, 11/20/04, Xinhua News, “Chinese, US presidents discuss ties, Korean nuclear issue, Taiwan,” accessed 7/12/11//HK]

Santiago, 20 November: Chinese State President Hu Jintao met with US President George W. Bush in Santiago, the capital of Chile, on 20 November on the sidelines of the informal meeting of APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders. With regard to Sino-US relations, Hu Jintao said that in the past four years, positive progress has been made in Sino-US constructive and cooperative relations Chinese: jian she xing he zuo guan xi . High-level dialogue and exchanges at various levels between the two sides have increased, new progress has been made in coordination and cooperation in economy, trade, anti-terrorism, the reconstruction of Iraq, law-enforcement, and other areas, and exchanges between the two armed forces have basically been resumed. Facts have fully shown that China and the United States share extensive common interests and can entirely carry out mutually beneficial cooperation in a large number of areas to benefit the people of China and the United States and the people of all other countries in the world.

**[ ] US-China cooperation targets 15 major world issues**

**Xinhua News 06**

[4/21/06, “Chinese, US presidents hold "pragmatic", "constructive" talks,” accessed 7/12/11//HK]

They agreed to jointly push forward their reciprocal and win-win economic and trade relations, and properly resolve existing differences and frictions through equal consultations while taking into consideration the fundamental interests of the two countries and their peoples. They also agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in a variety of fields, such as the military, law-enforcement, science and technology, education, culture and youth affairs, and continue to conduct dialogues and cooperation on major issues such as anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, bird flu control, energy, environmental protection, disaster relief and maintenance of security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides will continue to push forward the process of the six-party talks on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and endeavour to help settle the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically.

**[ ] Cooperation with China solves several global/regional conflicts**

**Xuecheng; 2009, Executive V.P at China Institute for International Studies** [Liu. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member). Robert Oxnam. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign February 13. “The Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. <http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china> accessed: 7/13/11//AG]

.. In his article on China for the monthly magazine China Brief (of the American Chamber of Commerce), President Obama stated that the United States and China can accomplish much when the two countries recognize their common interests. He points out that U.S.-China cooperation in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue over the past few years makes clear that “we can work together constructively, bilaterally and with others, to reduce tensions on even extraordinarily sensitive issues.” He also noted that “finally, and critically, we need a strong foundation for a longterm positive and constructive relationship with an emerging China.” .. Against the background of the financial crisis and economic recession, trade protectionist sentiment continues to grow. This means that the trade deficit, currency exchange rate, environmental issues, intellectual property rights, and labor standards could continue to be prominent issues in our bilateral relations in the years ahead.

# Terrorism 2NC Impact Module

 **[ ] Relations key to combating terrorism – key to Security Council approval**

**Dumbaugh 03, Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service** [Kerry, “China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues for the 108th Congress,” published through the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, accessed 7/14/11//HK]

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the subsequent campaign to dis-arm Iraq, and renewed hostility from North Korea have changed the international priorities of the United States and much of the world. A number of U.S. international relationships have been affected accordingly, including relations with the PRC and with countries important to PRC interests, such as Pakistan. The United States, for instance, has now established cooperation with and a military presence in Central Asian countries, with whom the PRC had formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the 1990’s. U.S. officials quickly saw the war against terrorism as the nation’s principle priority, and one in which the PRC, perhaps, could be helpful. U.S. officials, for instance, welcomed what support the PRC could give toward antiterrorism initiatives, particularly in measures put before the United Nations Security Council, where the PRC is a permanent member and has veto power. But the White House also has shown itself willing to take unilateral U.S. action and, early on signaled that only limited Sino-U.S. cooperation would be possible. Thus, it is not clear yet to what extent U.S. anti-terrorism goals may have affected the Administration’s PRC policy other than to reinforce the lower priority it had already assigned to U.S.-China relations.CRS-4 3 For more on the 16 th Party Congress decisions, see CRS Report RL31661, China’s New Leadership Line-up: Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh. 4 In the initial days after the September 11 terrorist attacks, PRC President Jiang Zemin offered condolences, promised “unconditional support” in fighting terrorism, and, on September 25, sent a group of PRC counter-terrorism experts for consultations in Washington. In a U.N. Security Council meeting on September 12, the PRC voted in favor of both Resolution 1368, to combat terrorism, and Resolution 1441, on Iraqi compliance. On the heels of the anti-terror campaign, the U.S. government’s current preoccupation with Iraq has led to greater pressure on the United Nations, in which the PRC has veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council. PRC cooperation, or at least acquiescence, in anti-Iraq initiatives thus has become another U.S. objective. The Bush Administration’s commitments in Iraq have also led to the beginning of apparent fractures in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, whose EU member countries the PRC has assiduously courted in recent years. Finally, North Korea’s renewal of its nuclear program has created a crisis on the Korean peninsula which Administration officials believe enhances the need for PRC cooperation on initiatives involving the North. These new tensions in and possible re-shuffling of international relationships have created a fluid and complex international atmosphere. Although the implications for future U.S.-China relations remain uncertain, some observers have suggested that the uncertainty itself has favored more stable U.S.-China relations by ensuring a degree of caution and nonprovocation in how bilateral policies are crafted. Constraints on PRC Policy. Some believe that yet another factor in smoother U.S.-China relations is the PRC’s current preoccupation with its own domestic problems and agenda. Internal social stability in the PRC has become more problematic, including greater labor unrest, growing unemployment, and more assertive public disaffection with official corruption. Also, the PRC has been undergoing a significant leadership transition.

**[ ] Nuke terror causes extinction through Chinese preemption – impact supercharged by low US-China relations**

**Ayson, 2010 Professor of Strategic Studies** [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Senior Research Associate with Oxford’s Centre for International Studies. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, pages 571-593 accessed: 7/17/11//AG]

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the ﬁrst place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in signiﬁcant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-ﬁrst century might bring would fade into insigniﬁcance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be ﬁngered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the ﬁssile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science ﬁction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identiﬁable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efﬁciency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American ofﬁcials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be deﬁnitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would ofﬁcials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conﬂict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conﬂict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a signiﬁcant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of inﬂuence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ . . . long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”

# Global Warming 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] U.S-China relations key to global warming – advancements with track II prove**

**Oxnam; 2009, Was President of The Asia Society** [Robert. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign. Liu Xuecheng. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member) February 13. “The Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. <http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china> accessed: 7/13/11//AG]

Seeking a “Green Relationship” No cluster of issues clouds global concerns and Asian anxieties more than environmental degradation/global warming. China and the United States now have the dubious distinction of being the world’s two leading states in emissions of carbon gasses. Why not bring these issues center stage in Sino-American relations, committing both sides to dramatic environmental changes, thus creating the world’s first “green relationship”? At the heart of any global warming agreement must be the creation of a workable and enforceable model for capping and reducing carbon emissions on both sides. Fortunately, several prominent figures in China, as well as a number of appointees in the Obama administration, have made global warming a central domestic and foreign policy issue for the years ahead. And influential Track II initiatives have laid the groundwork for the two governments to move ahead. But two factors are crucial: 1) an agreement on appropriate capping targets and methods of verification and enforcement (a potentially tricky issue because China claims it deserves more latitude as a “developing country”); and 2) statesmanship at the highest levels culminating in an Obama-Hu summit. Presuming a carbon emissions agreement, the two sides could expand their environmental agenda considerably to make for a genuinely inclusive “green relationship.” Extensive cooperation between the two governments, as well as the business and nongovernmental sectors, could occur in developing and sharing alternative energy sources and technologies. The availability of clean water, already a crisis in China and a deep concern in the United States, offers extensive possibilities for collaboration in research and development. Both countries face considerable challenges with deforestation and desertification, offering the chance to share information and best practices. Crop management techniques, geneticallymodified food production, and new seed strains and non-toxic fertilizers all offer real potential for U.S.-China collaboration. If the United States and China embark on a genuine effort to create a “green relationship,” the world will surely have a new model for linking geopolitics to global environmental issues. And it would allow the United States and China to play leadership roles in international meetings, protocols, and treaties dealing with energy and the environment. All of this would amount to a peaceful revolution in Sino-American relations, with truly earth-shaking consequences.

**[ ] Global warming causes extinction**

**Cummins and Allen 2010, director at organic consumers association and policy adviser** [Ronnie, Int’l. Dir. – Organic Consumers Association, and Will, Policy Advisor – Organic Consumers Association, February 14. “Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6>. Accessed 7/17/11//AG]

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation.

# US-China Solves Global Warming Extensions

**[ ] U.S.-China key to new energy resources and spills over – working together now**

**URJHS 2011 Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences** [Ruby Yanjie Chen, Robert Guang Tian, 4/5/11 Medaille College “The Economic Connections between China and the U.S.: How to Benefit Both Players through International Trading” <http://www.kon.org/urc/v10/chen.html> Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

To safeguard energy sources, **President Barack Obama and president Hu Jintao agreed that U.S. and Chinese scientists and engineers will work together to speed up the widespread use of electric cars, construct buildings that need less energy, and develop coal-fired power plants that don’t produce gases that cause global warming** (Schoof, 2009). Such measures would be excellent because researchers would not have to find a new energy source for cars. Everyone could drive electric cars and eliminate emissions. In addition, the collaboration runs two ways. The U.S. stands to gain not only from an expanded market for exports and more jobs at home but also from demonstration projects in China that serve as large experiments for working out problems in new technology. The work will be anchored through the new U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center. The $150 million funding over five years will be shared equally between the countries. The **research center and other clean-energy projects could demonstrate to international negotiators working on a global climate protection treaty that the U.S. and China, the world’s two largest sources of greenhouse gases, are serious about reducing emissions**. Because both countries put out the most greenhouse gases, if **they implement the great idea of switching to electric cars, they could show the world how they both are working together to cut their carbon footprint**. Lastly, the mutual collaboration will help scientists work out problems that may emerge. Experience shows that when all these things are strung together there are going to be lessons and surprises to learn (Schoof, 2009).

**[ ] US-China cooperation limits CO2 emissions—both lead in clean energy**

**Yang 09**

[Weng, staff writer, 11/18/09, Zhongguo Xinwen She News Agency, "Consensus Increases, Bright Spots Are Conspicuous - Experts Analyse Economic and Trade Accomplishments of 'Hu-Obama Meeting”,” accessed 7/12/11//HK]

He Weiwen, president of the China-US Economic Institution, said during an exclusive interview with our reporter that to deal with global climate change, a bright spot at the current China-US summit was initiating a complete cooperation roadmap in the field of clean energy. This is also a substantial result. The United States is technologically leading in the areas of energy saving constructions, clean coal, modern electric grid comprehensive settlement programme, and electric vehicles. Both sides' cooperation has major significance for the world to move towards a low-carbon economic era.

As two large carbon emission countries in the world, China and the United States say in the joint statement that they will work with other countries to make a success of the Copenhagen conference. He Weiwen said that this should be confirmed. But as developed and developing countries so far have not reached unanimous views on "common yet differentiated responsibilities" and the detailed emission reduction arrangements, all parties need to make great efforts for the success of the Copenhagen conference.

**[ ] The US and China are key to worldwide climate change efforts—their co-op has most environmental impact**

**Goldenberg 09**

[Suzanne, reporter, 2/14/09, The Guardian International Pages, pg. 31, “Clinton tries to build China climate pact: Global warming at heart of proposed Sino-US coalition Asia to be secretary of state's first destination,” accessed 7/12/11//HK]

In a policy address ahead of her first trip as secretary of state, Clinton said climate change was a crucial area for US-Chinese co-operation and would be a common thread in her meetings with officials in China and elsewhere. "Climate change is not just an environmental nor an energy issue, but also has implications for our health, our economies and our security," Clinton said. Clinton's tour, which starts tomorrow, will take her to Japan, Indonesia and South Korea, with China as her last stop. She described China and America, the world's biggest polluters, as natural partners in efforts to reduce global warming. "Our nation has been the largest historic emitter of greenhouse gases and we acknowledge that we must lead efforts to cut harmful emissions and build a lower carbon economy," she said. Todd Stern, Clinton's special envoy on climate change, will accompany her on the trip, underlining the issue's importance to the Obama administration. Officials said yesterday that Clinton was "keenly focused" on how co-operation on energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy sources could help to redefine America's ties with China. A partnership between the world's two biggest polluters would significantly increase the prospects of a global climate change deal at a crucial UN meeting in Copenhagen in December. "We certainly need to start talking in a constructive and hopefully productive way with the Chinese" in the run-up to Copenhagen, an administration official said. Clinton set out her ideas for the climate change partnership at the Asia Society in New York. The choice of venue was telling: experts from the Asia Society and the Pew Centre for Climate Change produced a report this week setting out a road map for a US-Chinese partnership in tackling climate change.

**[ ] China-US relations solve warming—share green tech**

**Xueli and Lu 07**

 [Lu and Chang, reporters, 7/31/07, Xinhua News, “US treasury secretary calls for cooperation with China on clean energy,” Paulson=treasury secretary, accessed 7/12/11//HK]

Paulson said: "During today's tour, I was very happy to see local villagers using new type energy - methane - for cooking and warming, and to see the extensive utilization of clean energy in Qinghai. I also saw China's efforts in utilizing clean energy." Paulson indicated that China-US strategic economic dialogue involves many strategic issues, and the technology to utilize new type energy is one of them. For example, a new type carbon burn-out technology is one of the ways to resolve global warming. To better deal with climate change, the US side hopes to strengthen cooperation with the Chinese side in the technological field, particularly in the field of clean energy. Besides, Paulson also indicated that economic development and environmental protection do not contradict each other; they are the two sides of a coin, linked to each other, therefore we should handle well the relationship between economic development and environmental protection. Song Xiuyan said: Qinghai is the source of the Yangtze River, Yellow River, Lancangjiang, Heihe River, and Tatong River. It is also an important ecological functional region in China and has an important bearing on global climate. The Chinese Government and Qinghai Provincial Government take serious account of ecological protection and have in recent years implemented an ecological protection and harnessing project including returning husbandry to the grassland, artificial precipitation, prohibition on husbandry and fishery, and clearing rat damage on the grassland; adopted comprehensive measures of combining protection with management over the Sanjiangyuan, Qinghai Lake, and Qilian Mountains. This has promoted the self-restoration of the ecological environment.

**[ ] U.S.-China relations are needed to solve warming – they’re the largest emitters**

**Hachigian 09 senior fellow of the Center for American Progress** [1/28/09. “The Importance of U.S.-China Relations.” The American Center for Progress. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/01/importance_china.html> //TD]

In the long run, President Barack Obama will be judged on the whole bilateral relationship, but especially on his ability to bring China into a regime to address global warming. This is the issue that has the potential to define and animate our bilateral relationship. Together, the United States and China account for 40 percent of global emissions. Breaking this inadvertent “suicide pact” is the epic challenge of our era.

**[ ] Relations allow energy cooperation—largest greenhouse gas emitters have the incentive**

**McElroy 97, chairman, Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences @ Harvard** [Michael B. with Chris P. Nielsen, contribution to “Living with China: U.S./China relations in the twenty-first century” by Ezra F. Vogel, “Energy, Agriculture, and the Environment: Prospects for Sino-American Cooperation” (chapter 7), pp. 217-254, accessed 7/13/11//HK]

In political terms, dialogue and cooperation in the relatively value-neutral fields of energy and environment could offer some welcome counterweight to the disputes on human and intellectual property rights, Taiwan, Tibet, arms proliferation, and trade that currently dominate relations between the two countries. The tenor of cooperation in energy, environment, and agriculture could diverge significantly from the contentiousness of Sino-American politics-as-usual. Overall U.S. --China relations could gain from a major new conduit of economic, technological, and scientific engagement promising benefits to both nations. There is ultimately an even more powerful reason to advocate cooperative Sino-American relations in these fields. The hazards of the intellectual disconnect between science and policy making are growing ever more acute as the challenges posed by atmospheric pollution expand to planetary scale. A potent though undervalued time bomb in Sino-American relations, as in the international order at large, ticks quietly: the threat of global climate change. The United States and China, the two largest contributors to emissions of the gases responsible for the threat to climate stability; will encounter international pressures to lead equitable but effective global strategies to respond to the threat. Taken in isolation, forging U.S.-Chinese engagement on climate change appears difficult and unlikely. But cooperation in energy development pursued on other environmental, economic, and political grounds can simultaneously yield benefits for protection of global climate stability and would be a major step in the right direction.

# Asian Stability Extensions

**[ ] Relations solve east Asia, south Area and the Middle East– military trust and cooperation key**

**Xuecheng; 2009, Executive V.P at China Institute for International Studies** [Liu. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member). Robert Oxnam. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign February 13. “The

Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. <http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china> accessed: 7/13/11//AG]

The notion of reframing the United States and China as a “pivotal relationship” has special significance in terms of bilateral, regional, and global security. The strength of Sino-American relations is pivotal to the stability of the AsiaPacific region. Of course, we have ongoing interests in two potentially hot issues: North Korea, where the Six Party Talks must continue and where both Beijing and Washington must press for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and Taiwan, where the current situation has eased in the wake of Ma Yingjeou’s election, but also where both the United States and China must work assiduously to avoid crises and facilitate peaceful relations. But we also have interests around the world, sometimes in agreement, often with conflicting outlooks; thus we need to think globally about Sino-American security deliberations. Two hot spots deserve special mention. South Asia (especially Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) is an area of acute mutual concern to both China and the United States where we could benefit from sharing differ15 ing perspectives and intelligence. Similarly, in the Middle East (from the IsraelPalestinian situation to the questions of Iraq and Iran), Beijing and Washington have been pursuing quite distinct strategies while failing to engage in deep discussions until global crises emerge (such as UN debates over sanctions concerning Iran’s nuclear program). Put differently, if we are the “most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century world,” then our bilateral dialogue must encompass the most important global issues of our time and must occur at the highest levels on a frequent basis.

**[ ] Cooperation key to south and east Asian stability—common goals in three major conflicts**

**Xinbo 2k, Vice-President, Shanghai Institute of American Studies** [Wu, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs, Dec2000, Vol. 22 Issue 3, p479, 19p., “U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations,” accessed 7/13/11//HK]

The United States has been playing a key role in maintaining a generally stable security environment in East Asia since the end of the Vietnam War, and China has been both a significant contributor to, and a major beneficiary of, peace and stability in the region. The United States policy towards Japan, albeit experiencing some problems, has so far helped to ensure that Japan remains a pacifist country, serving the interests of both Japan and the entire region. On the Korean peninsula, China and the United States share three policy goals: that war does not break out between the North and South; that there are no nuclear weapons on the peninsula; and that North Korea does not collapse. In fact, China and the United States are the two major countries that have helped North Korea to tide over its food shortages during the past several years. Looking into the future, both Beijing and Washington welcome the reconciliation and peaceful integration of the two Koreas. In South Asia, both China and the United States would like to see the peaceful settlement of the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and a halt to the nuclear arms race between New Delhi and Islamabad. Even on the Taiwan issue -- a highly contentious one between China and the United States -- Washington’s "one China" policy since the late 1970s has contributed to stability across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, Washington’s opposition to Taiwan’s development or procurement of nuclear weapons also serves China’s interests.

# Taiwan War Extensions

**[ ] US-China war is possible despite economic interdependence—tensions over Taiwan overwhelm**

**MacDonald 2008 Independent Consultant in National Security Policy Management** [Bruce W., 9/2008, Prior assistant director for national security for White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and prior defense and foreign policy advisor to Senator Dale Bumpers and prior nuclear weapons weapons and technology specialist in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Council-Foreign Relations “China, Space Weapons and U.S. Security” Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

War between China and the United States seems unlikely, given their increasing economic interdependence and ongoing efforts in both countries to improve relations. Looming in the background, however, is the **possibility of war over Taiwan**, a plausible if unlikely scenario that **could** **bring the United States and China into conflict**. **China might then be tempted to attack U.S. military satellites as a casualtyfree way to signal resolve**, dissuade Washington from further involvement in a Taiwan conflict, and significantly compromise U.S. military capabilities if such dissuasion failed. Such **Chinese actions could well escalate any conflict between the United States and China**. As a result, both countries have interests in avoiding the actual use of counterspace weapons and shaping a more stable and secure space environment for themselves and other spacefaring nations, which could easily be caught in the undertow of a more militarily competitive space domain.

# North Korea 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] U.S.-China relationship crucial to North Korean conflict and Asian peace – regional hegemons must cooperate**

**Zhu 2010, Chair in East Asian politics** [Zhiqun, 12/13/11 Associate professor in political science and international relations at Bucknell University, The Korea Times “North Korea Tests US-China relations” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/02/198_77935.html> Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

Few in China still consider North Korea an ally. Secret cables made open by WikiLeaks, if reliable, confirm that the Chinese leadership is ready to abandon North Korea. However, all things considered, it seems that maintaining the Korean Peninsula status quo is in the best interest of China, and arguably of all other parties involved. After all, South Korean people are not enthusiastic about unification now, let alone sharing the hefty economic costs of taking over North Korea. A unified and pro-West Korea also means that it will be difficult for the United States to justify its forward troop deployment in Korea and Japan. Even Japan will have second thoughts about having a nuclear-equipped and historically anti-Japan neighbor with over 70 million people. The United States and China are suspicious of each other’s long-term intentions. The U.S. will continue to be a major Asian power in the years ahead and will maintain troops in the region as an insurance against a potentially aggressive China. Beijing is deeply concerned about a quick South Korean and U.S. takeover of North Korea with U.S. troops at China's doorsteps. Beijing and Washington seem to be sliding into a vicious cycle of mutual strategic mistrust. The deeper the mistrust, the more valuable North Korea is to China. **Clearly, the key to solving the North Korea problem lies in cooperative U.S.-China relations.** Beijing and Washington must make sure that their long-term interests in Asia do not clash. **A strong relationship between Beijing and Washington is crucial for untying the North Korea knot and achieving long-lasting peace in Asia.**

**[ ] North Korean prolif causes nuclear strikes and broad Asian prolif**

**Hayes and Hamel-Green 2009—Professor of International Relations**, [RMIT University, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, degree in History, PhD from Berkeley—AND—Michael Hamel-Green, Professor, Executive Dean, Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development @ Victoria University, BA MA Melb, DipEd Hawthorn, PhD La Trobe (Peter, 14 December 2009, The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia," The Asia-Pacific Journal,<http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel_Green/3267>, accessed: 7/18/11//AG]

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

# North Korea Impact Extensions

**[ ] US-China relations key to denuclearize Northeast Asia -sets example for other countries**

**Peng, 11** [Director of the Institute of American Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Globalasia.org, // http://www.globalasia.org/V6N2\_Summer\_2011/Yuan\_Peng.html July 13th//BP]

The other obvious issue requiring China-US collaboration is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the rest of Northeast Asia. In this regard, the Six-Party talks have proven to be the most successful and effective mechanism for dialogue. Premised on Pyongyang’s readiness to return to the negotiating table, China and the US should reinvigorate the talks by moving beyond the Cheonan incident and temporarily setting aside the issue of abductions of Japanese hostages by North Korea. Gaining control of the North Korean nuclear issue is the first step toward encouraging Pyongyang to abandon nuclear weapons altogether. At the same time, China and the US should try to prevent Japan and South Korea from pursuing their threats to “go nuclear” in response to North Korea’s nuclear program. Indeed, only denuclearization can genuinely safeguard peace, stability and development in the region. While the original source of the faltering progress toward a regional security mechanism is Pyongyang’s unwillingness to abandon its nuclear ambitions, the situation has since become far more complicated. The regional security landscape has expanded beyond the North Korean nuclear issue to include strategic disputes among nearly all states in the region. The complex setting of Northeast Asia requires that China and the US abandon the legacies of the Cold War and embrace an innovative mechanism for security co-operation that considers the security concerns and interests of all the parties in the region. This would usher in a future-oriented political atmosphere of enduring peace and prosperity. In light of this, it is perhaps worth concluding with an ancient Chinese verse that captures both the current challenges and opportunities for Northeast Asia: “The hills and mountains have no end, there seems to be no road beyond; but dim with willows, bright with flowers, another village appears: one has a sudden glimpse of hope in the midst of bewilderment.”

# Bioweapons 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] China-U.S. relations key to global elimination of bioweapons – key to reaching international agreements**

**Chinese Embassy 1998** [6/27/1998 Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the United States of America, “Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement on the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention” <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zysj/kldfh/t36230.htm> Accessed 7/17/11]

**Recognizing the threat posed by biological and toxin weapons, China and the United States reaffirm their strong support for the complete global elimination of biological weapons**. As States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, the two sides stress the importance of the Convention to international peace and security, fully support the purposes and objectives of the Convention, and favor comprehensively strengthening the effectiveness and universality of the Convention. China and the United States each reaffirms that they are determined to strictly abide by the provisions of the Convention, to earnestly and comprehensively fulfill the obligations each has undertaken, shall not develop, produce or stockpile biological weapons under any circumstances and shall oppose the proliferation of biological weapons and their technology and equipment. Both **China and the United States support efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention,** including the establishment of a practical and effective compliance mechanism. In this connection, the two sides positively appraise the work of the Ad Hoc Group set up for this purpose in negotiating a Protocol to the Convention. The two sides believe the Protocol must include efficient, practical, and cost-effective measures to deter proliferation or violation of the Convention and improve transparency. Appropriate measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner that takes into account protection of sensitive commercial information and legitimate security needs, and in light of relevant national laws and regulations. The two sides expressed their desire to cooperate in the negotiations and work together to further accelerate an early conclusion of the negotiations on the Protocol. **China and the United States agree that they shall strive to enhance bilateral cooperation in the field of bio-technology and vigorously engage in and promote the peaceful use of bio-technology.**

[ ] Successful attack causes extinction.

Ochs MA in Natural Resource Management 02 –from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park [Richard, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Jun 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or ourConstitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.

# World Economy 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] Maintaining economic ties is key to trade and recession- the strategic economic dialogue proves**

**Oxnam; 2009, Was President of The Asia Society** [Robert. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign. Liu Xuecheng. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member) February 13. “The Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. <http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china> accessed: 7/13/11//AG]

Reaffirming and Bro adening the “Strategic Economic Dialo gue” Sometimes the best change is no change at all, or rather, making what we now have a bit better. That’s my third hope—that the Obama administration will keep a significant policy of the Bush administration: the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), but broaden its membership and its mandate. The SED has become a centerpiece in the relationship over the past eight years, coping with a wide range of trade and investment issues, helping make the two-way SinoAmerican interaction a crucial growth factor in the world economy. Now here’s the rub: the SED was an outgrowth of the pro-business Republican Bush administration and now it is being handed over to the Democratic Obama administration. While Obama administration strongly supports international trade, it also hopes to manage and regulate trade in ways that do not undercut American jobs, do not sustain considerable U.S. trade deficits, and do not ignore environmental standards or human rights issues. What is required is a careful balancing act between two extremes: unfettered free trade and unthinking trade protectionism. That’s a balance that was struck during the Clinton years and, hopefully, will be preserved in the Obama administration. It is important to note that a similar balance is at the heart of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which China joined in 2002 after agreeing to abide by its principles and regulatory framework. So the SED will have to show considerable flexibility in the years ahead, not only to continue the Bush administration agendas, but also to include the new issues that the Obama team will bring to the table. Fortunately, President Obama’s economic team consists of real professionals in international trade issues, especially Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who spent many of his formative years in Asia and who speaks Chinese. My hope is that the SED can adapt to this new era and allow both sides to talk privately about the “politics of economics”: the domestic pressures that shape, and often limit, the economic policy options in Beijing and Washington. In this respect, it would be valuable for both sides to bring into their deliberations some representatives from their respective private sectors and labor organizations. Inevitably, the SED will be reshaped by the global economic crisis that is buffeting both the United States and China. The downturn in American consumer spending is now having an immediate whiplash effect in China, causing the closure of factories and the rise in the number of unemployed workers. In many ways, we are in the same boat, often considering similar strategies: dramatic interest rate adjustments, mortgage guarantees, and bailout packages. How we 13 handle this new era, and how we communicate about our strategies while still in the planning phase, will be a crucial determinant of the economic and political sides of the U.S.-China relationship. And how we manage our bilateral economic dialogue, now that we have left the fatter years and entered a new era of leanness, will be a key determinant of Chinese and U.S. interactions with other key actors in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet again, we need to realize that apparently bilateral concerns really have significant regional consequences and ultimately create ripples around the world.

**[ ] Economic collapse causes nuke war – empirics prove**

**O'Donnell 2009, Graduate from University of Baltimore** [Sean, Baltimore Republican Examiner, a graduate student at the University of Baltimore studying law and ethics, B.A. in History from the University of Maryland, a Squad Leader in the Marine Corps Reserve, Will this recession lead to World War III? February 26, <http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this-recession-lead-to-World-War-III#comments> accessed 7/17/11//AG]

Could the current [economic crisis](http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m3d18-Financial-crisis-storyline-told-through-video) affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will [competition for resources](http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m3d20-New-book-by-finance-veteran-Michael-Panzner-full-of-gloom-and-doom) and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes [history repeats itself](http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d10-Maryland-Democrats-dont-learn-economic-lessons-from-the-past).

# World Economy Impact Extensions

**[ ] U.S.-China relations critical to a successful economy – working together to solve trade imbalances**

**URJHS 2011 Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences** [Ruby Yanjie Chen, Robert Guang Tian, 4/5/11 Medaille College “The Economic Connections between China and the U.S.: How to Benefit Both Players through International Trading” <http://www.kon.org/urc/v10/chen.htm//l> Accessed 7/15/11//DL]

New business start-ups in America would benefit both the U.S. and China. More jobs mean less unemployment and production at high output rate. It would be helpful to institute more fine-tuned regulations and rules on what the U.S. imports from China, especially toys and tires. The current situation does nothing but put Americans in danger by letting China produce products that are defective. If China wants to export to the U.S., then they both parties need to come to an agreement on what types of regulations should be put in place. Last, the nations need to get together and talk about their exchange rates. An expenditure-switching effect might help improve the U.S. current account deficit with China, as well as other Asian nations. Nevertheless, the income-reducing effect of currency appreciation is more powerful than expenditure switching. If the Asian economies slow down, improvement in the overall U.S. current account deficit would not be considerable. Furthermore, there would always be a delayed adjustment due to the currency pass-through effect of currency realignment. By lowering the appreciation of the yuan, products from China could become cheaper and easier for countries to buy. It is not fair to the United State or other countries that are trying to produce the same exact product but have no way of competing with China because of extremely low prices. **If we can fix these problems, then together successful economy can emerge** (Forbes, 2010). **Trade between the United States and China can increase the standard of living in both countries**. Moreover, as two of the world’s strongest economic powers, the win-win strategy can promote the overall growth in the global economy. Because both countries have a comparative advantage over certain products, exports can increase. When exports increase, then the respective GDPs will increase accordingly. This will eventually boost consumers’ real income, which, in turn, can strengthen their ability to improve goods, services, and purchasing power. Consumers will benefit from China's cheap labor and relatively low-priced goods, because they will have more money to spare from buying cheap products. China needs the U.S. in terms of investments and services. As jobs are being outsourced, there is a short-term negative effect of people losing jobs. Nevertheless, in the end, there will be many more jobs created. In the modern world, technology plays a great role in countries' development. Outsourcing also offers an opportunity for countries to learn new technology. Technology is one leading factor for countries to gain a comparative advantage. Firms that engage in international trade pay their employees more and have high production rates. The **U.S. and China need to come to terms with the imbalance of trade**. The United States and China also need to come up with different regulations in order to break the trade barrier between the two countries. **In order to improve life for the people in both countries, attention must be paid to innovation and technology, thus coming out with advanced goods and services** to satisfy the needs of people in both countries. Both sides should strengthen the regulations on the quality of goods produced. Many recalls have been harmful to living standards and trade relations in the past couple of years. **Both countries need to meet** to develop rules and regulations that must be met before selling goods. Last of all, the United States is faced with the enormous challenge of figuring out how to get itself out of such a big deficit, both for its own sake and to **maintain a good relationship with China.**

**[ ] US-China relations essential for financial reform—key to management mechanism reform**

**Yang 09**

[Weng, staff writer, 11/18/09, Zhongguo Xinwen She News Agency, "Consensus Increases, Bright Spots Are Conspicuous - Experts Analyse Economic and Trade Accomplishments of 'Hu-Obama Meeting”,” accessed 7/12/11//HK]

China and the United States reiterated their joint efforts for more sustainable and balanced bilateral and global economic growth and agreed to continue the current measures to ensure strong and sustainable global economic recovery. Both sides welcomed the consensus recently reached by G20 on reforming the management mechanisms of international financial institutions so as to improve their trustworthiness, legality, and efficiency, and stressed the need to fulfil the goal of reform on international financial institutions' sharing and voting rights, increase the rights to speak and representations of newly emerging markets and developing countries in these institutions.

**[ ] US-China relations solve currency conflict—they allow for investigation and regulation**

**Dumbaugh 03, Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service** [Kerry, “China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues for the 108th Congress,” published through the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, accessed 7/14/11//HK]

A more recent issue in U.S.-PRC bilateral economic relations involves the PRC’s continued decision to keep the value of its currency low with respect to the dollar. Since 1994, the PRC has pegged its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to the U.S. dollar at a rate of about 8.3 RMB to the dollar. In 2003, many U.S. policymakers have increasingly concluded that this RMB/dollar peg is keeping the PRC’s currency artificially undervalued, making PRC exports artificially cheap and making it harder for U.S. producers to compete fairly. U.S. critics of the PRC’s currency valuation have charged that the PRC is unfairly manipulating its currency and they have urged Beijing either to raise the RMB’s value vis-a-vis the dollar or to make it freely convertible, with its value determined by market forces. Legislation has been introduced in the 108 th Congress (H.R. 3058) that would require the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to analyze the PRC’s exchange rate policies and, depending on the results of that analysis, to impose appropriate tariffs on PRC products to offset the percentage of price advantage the PRC gains from its currency policies.

**[ ] US-China cooperation solves econ—key to successful G8 talks**

**Garrett 03, Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council** [Banning, ““Strategic Straightjacket”: The United States and China in the 21st Century,” accessed 7/14/11//HK]

For the United States, what another nation “brings to the table” is, at least in some cases, more important than whether or not it is an ally. For example, China may at times be more important to the United States than Japan and South Korea, as demonstrated by China’s role in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons threat. Moreover, the United States and China have a common interest in managing their bilateral economic relationship and in working together to manage the global economy, including through multilateral institutions such as the WTO and the G-8. As Richard Haass suggested, “we can turn our efforts from containment and deterrence to consultation and cooperation. We can move from a balance of power to a pooling of power.”xviii The United States and China can move toward “pooling” of their power to address the real challenges and threats to U.S. and Chinese security that emanate not from each other but from weak, failing and rogue states as well as economic dislocations and instabilities produced by globalization. Closer coordination and cooperation with the United States would serve the interests of both countries and could also dramatically strengthen mutual trust and confidence in the bilateral relationship. U.S.-China cooperation on these issues could provide a crucial strategic complement to the growing U.S.-China economic relationship, thereby underpinning long-term stability in U.S.-China relations. But Washington and Beijing need to avoid a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan that would undermine the new Sino-American strategic relationship and could even lead to military conflict between China and the United States.

# Middle East 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] U.S.-China Relations key to middle east stability- They’re the two largest oil importers**

**Chu 07 -** **professor in political science and international relations at the School of Public Policy and Management** [12/13/07. “Iran’s Nuclear Act and U.S.-China Relations: The Veiw From Bejing.” The Jamestown Foundation. Accessed 7/14/14. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=4612 //TD]

The first is stability in the Middle East—including the Persian Gulf. China and the United States share a common interest in Middle East stability, since the two countries are the biggest consumers of Middle East oil. The majority of oil imports by the United States and China come from the region; with China importing nearly 60% of its overseas oil imports from the Gulf. In order to ensure stable and reasonable energy supply abroad, especially from the Middle East, is a realistic and indispensable party to any national economic and strategic security for the two countries now and in the future. Thus, the peace and stability of Iran and other parts of the Middle East are a common economic, security, and strategic interests of the United States and China.

**A Middle East war escalates globally and causes every major impact – terrorism, economic decline, human rights abuses, collapse of democracies and free trade**

**Forest 7** (James, the director of terrorism studies at the U.S. Military Academy and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, “War Is a No-Win Scenario”, September 1, <http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html>)

A regional war in the Middle East would bring a variety of negative consequences for the United States. First, and most obvious, the global security environment would shift in a most unfavorable direction. The death and destruction would transcend geopolitical boundaries and possibly spill over into neighboring regions. The humanitarian crisis would overwhelm the unprepared regimes throughout the Middle East. Calls for intervention and relief could result in allies of the United States becoming involved. Meanwhile, the asymmetric nature of much of the fighting will offer new opportunities for many young, motivated men and women to acquire the skills of guerrilla warfare, making them attractive recruits for al-Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations. Wars bring an enabling environment for arms trafficking and other sorts of criminal activity, as well as human rights abuses--in some cases, even atrocities like genocide. It is also highly doubtful that, should such a war take place, the victors of the bloodshed will be inclined to establish the sort of liberal, open democratic societies that were fostered and nurtured in Europe and Asia following World War II. The impact of a regional war on the world's increasingly interdependent economy would go beyond the price we pay to heat our homes and fuel our cars, which will increase dramatically. (Of course, this could force more serious private and personal investment in alternative energy sources, which is not a bad thing.) Key shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Suez, will become hazardous for all types of commercial vessels. We have already witnessed how instability in the Middle East--punctuated by brief skirmishes like the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006--negatively affects global commodity prices, foreign exchange rates, and other facets of the global economy. A full-blown regional war would naturally exacerbate this.

# Proliferation 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] Understanding between U.S and China can solve terrorism and WMD proliferation**

**Friedberg 05, Professor of Politics and International Affairs** [Aaron L., Woodrow Wilson School, former security adviser for V.P. Cheney, International Security, Volume 30, Number 2, Fall 2005, pp. 7-45, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations Is Conflict Inevitable?,” accessed 7/12/11//AG]

Recent events may prove to be little more than a passing chill. Whatever their ultimate significance, however, these developments raise fundamental questions about the future direction and underlying determinants of U.S.China relations. What is likely to be the character of the relationship between the United States and the PRC over the next two or three decades? Will it be marked by convergence toward deepening cooperation, stability, and peace or by deterioration, leading to increasingly open competition, and perhaps even war?

The answers to these questions are of enormous importance. If tensions between the two Pacific powers worsen, the whole of Eastern Eurasia could become divided in a new cold war, and the prospects for confrontation and conflict would seem certain to rise. On the other hand, a deepening U.S.-China entente could bring with it increased possibilities for sustained worldwide economic growth, the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional disputes, and the successful management of pressing global problems, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Whether for good or ill, the most signiªcant bilateral international relationship over the course of the next several decades is likely to be that between the United States and the PRC.

[ ] Proliferation leads to extinction

Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division 02 of Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor A., Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90 Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

# Proliferation Impact Extenions

**[ ] The U.S. and China have a common interest in preventing global proliferation**

**Chu 07 -** **professor in political science and international relations at the School of Public Policy and Management** [12/13/07. “Iran’s Nuclear Act and U.S.-China Relations: The Veiw From Bejing.” The Jamestown Foundation. Accessed 7/14/14. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=4612 //TD]

Second, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is already an established common interest of both the United States and China. The spread of nuclear weapons is a long-term threat to the international community. The more states or non-state actors possess nuclear weapons, the higher the possibility that some nation, regime, non-state actor or politician may wave the nuclear card and heighten existential risks in unstable conflict situations.

# Iran Prolif Impacts

**[ ] China relations prevent Iranian proliferation- Iranian “Six Party Talks” will solve**

**Chu 07 -** **professor in political science and international relations at the School of Public Policy and Management** [12/13/07. “Iran’s Nuclear Act and U.S.-China Relations: The Veiw From Bejing.” The Jamestown Foundation. Accessed 7/14/14. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=4612 //TD]

China would like the see “Six-Party Talks” model used on the Iranian nuclear issue. Although the six-party framework for the North Korean nuclear issue is not a perfect one and even the Chinese are not too confident on the final destination of the process to resolve the North Koran nuclear problem in the future. The Chinese, however, do believe that the six-party talks is the best approach available to deal with the problem peacefully, and insist it should be given a chance, even though it might last for years. On the Iranian nuclear issue, the Chinese believe in another “six-party” process: the European Union (the UK, France, Germany), the U.S., Russia, China, the UN, and Iran on the Iranian nuclear issue, may be successful in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Just as it can get approval now the UN inspection for more than ten years prevented Iraq from actually having nuclear weapons after the 1991 Gulf War. China may go along with some sanctions on Iran, but that will only be when Iran walks away and refuses to come back to the negotiation table of the six-party talks, or actually tests nuclear weapons. Before that, every opportunity that the issue can be resolved peacefully, and nuclear weapons can be prevented in Iran should be seized. That is the reason why the Chinese leaders and the Foreign Ministry continue to state that China still hopes to resolve the disputes on the Iranian nuclear issue comprehensively “through continuing diplomatic negotiation,” even after the release of the NIE report on Iran. China indicates it would continue to hope that Iran implements those UN resolutions, cooperates with IAEA, and continues to engage with the EU on the issue. China will continue to work with all the other parties, including the United States and Iran, to try to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully. If the peace process fails, then China will be ready for other options, including more comprehensive and serious UN sanctions against Iran. Nevertheless, before forfeiting to the “doomsday scenario,” if there is a chance then no efforts should be spared to prevent it through dialogue, negotiation and engagement.

IMPACT NEEDED

# Space Debris Impacts

**[ ] Cooperation with China good combats debris – bilateral solutions essential**

**Johnson-Freese 7/1/11** [Joan Johnson-Freese 7/1/11, “China in Space: Not Time for Bright, Shiny Objects” http://defense.aol.com/2011/07/01/chinas-in-space-not-time-for-bright-shiny-objects/, AOL Defense, Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese assumed the position of Chair, Department of National Security Studies, at the Naval War College in August 2002. Prior to that, she was: Chair of the Transnational Studies Department, a faculty member at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, and the Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law at the University of Central Florida. Her doctorate is in political science //JL]

Remember that one of the goals behind the Apollo program was to convince Cold War non-aligned countries that working with the United States, in general and on high-tech issues specifically, was a better bet than working with the then Soviet Union. The United States already has a veto power over who other countries can sell space hardware to if that hardware contains any US parts, through US ITAR regulations, which - accompanied by considerable resentment -- has resulted in multiple foreign companies moving from being niche providers to developing full satellite industries. We should want countries to work with us. Beyond driving other countries away from the United States (and potentially toward China) there are areas - important areas - where the United States should be encouraging both more bilateral and multilateral interaction with China, not less. Debris mitigation is one of them. Space debris is a real threat. China created the biggest space debris mess to date with its 2008 ASAT test, so it behooves the United States to have them at all meetings where the importance of not doing it again and best practices for monitoring and cleaning up the debris already existing is discussed.

# Code of Conduct Impacts

**[ ] US China Relations are key to an international code of conduct in space solving an international war in space.**

**Hitchens 07 Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense**

**Information** [Winter 2007. “U.S.-China Relations. From ‘War of the Worlds’ to Cold War in Space?” World Security Institute. Accessed 7/12/11. <http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_2.pdf>. //TD]

Finally, the United States and China need to recognize that they must make an effort to manage their emerging competition in military space in a manner that does not undercut their own national security, as well as the security of others. Breaking off nascent discussions about space cooperation in favor of launching a kind of Cold War in space is bound to backfire on both Washington and Beijing in the long run. Instead, a frank and open dialogue about each side’s national security concerns in space is called for – along with serious consideration of how a new code of conduct for behavior in space might be drafted to clearly demark the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior in space. A code of conduct for space is not a radical, or even new, idea. Indeed, the administration of Ronald Reagan, while pursuing space-based missile defenses and an ASAT program, also was considering the value of pursuing a code of conduct that might include measures such as barring attacks on early warning satellites.53 Pursuit of a space code more recently has been endorsed by a number of international media outlets, including The Economist, a libertarian-oriented British magazine, and U.S. trade journal Aviation Week & Space Technology.54 China and the United States should take heed, and seek to shape rules of the road that can help ensure mutual security in space for all. Failure to act to restrain unfettered military competition in space is bound to result in a “Wild West” environment that raises the risks not only to Chinese and U.S. uses of space, but to the peace and prosperity of the entire world.

# Chinese Militarization Impacts

# Economy 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] US-China Space war causes economic collapse – the whole world relies on satellites**

**Martel, 3- Professor, Naval War College** [William, National Security Affairs,with Toshi Yoshihara doctoral candidate , Fletcher School of Law, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2003, http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn\_martel.pdf, “Averting a Sino-China Space Race”, Accessed July 12, SH]

What exactly does such an action-reaction cycle mean? What would a bi- lateral space race look like? Hypothetically, in the next 10 years, some criti- cal sectors of China’s economy and military could become increasingly vulnerable to disruptions in space. During this same period, Sino-U.S. rela- tions may not improve appreciably, and the Taiwan question could remain unresolved. If Washington and Beijing could increasingly hold each other’s space infrastructure hostage by threatening to use military options in times of crisis, then potentially risky paths to preemption could emerge in the policy planning processes in both capitals. In preparing for a major contin- gency in the Taiwan Strait, both the United States and China might be com- pelled to plan for a disabling, blinding attack on the other’s space systems before the onset of hostilities. The most troubling dimension to this scenario is that some elements of preemption (already evident in U.S. global doc- trine) could become a permanent feature of U.S. and Chinese strategies in space. Indeed, Chinese strategic writings today suggest that the leadership in Beijing believes that preemption is the rational way to prevent future U.S. military intervention. If leaders in Beijing and Washington were to position themselves to pre- empt each other, then the two sides would enter an era of mutual hostility, one that might include destabilizing, hair-trigger defense postures in space where both sides stand ready to launch a first strike on a moment’s notice. One scenario involves the use of weapons, such as lasers or jammers, which seek to blind sensors on imaging satellites or disable satellites that provide warning of missile launches. Imagine, for example, Washington’s reaction if China disabled U.S. missile warning satellites or vice versa. In that case, Sino-U.S. relations would be highly vulnerable to the misinterpretations and miscalculations that could lead to a conflict in space. Although attacks against space assets would likely be a precursor or a complement to a broader crisis or conflict, and although conflicts in the space theater may not generate many casualties or massive physical destruction, the economic costs of conflict in space alone for both sides, and for the international com- munity, would be extraordinary given that many states depend on satellites for their economic well-being.

**[ ] Economic collapse causes nuke war – empirics prove**

**O'Donnell 2009, Graduate from University of Baltimore** [Sean, Baltimore Republican Examiner, a graduate student at the University of Baltimore studying law and ethics, B.A. in History from the University of Maryland, a Squad Leader in the Marine Corps Reserve, Will this recession lead to World War III? February 26, <http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this-recession-lead-to-World-War-III#comments> accessed 7/17/11//AG]

Could the current [economic crisis](http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m3d18-Financial-crisis-storyline-told-through-video) affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will [competition for resources](http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m3d20-New-book-by-finance-veteran-Michael-Panzner-full-of-gloom-and-doom) and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes [history repeats itself](http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d10-Maryland-Democrats-dont-learn-economic-lessons-from-the-past).

# Economy Impact Extensions

**[ ] Space war with China destroys the economy—closely linked to military power**

**Weeden 08, consultant with the Secure World Foundation** [Brian, China Security, Vol. 4 No. 1 Winter 2008, pp. 134-147, 2008 World Security Institute, “How China “Wins” a Potential Space War,” accessed 7/17/11//HK]

While it is true that space power is an important foundation of overall U.S. military power, it is also true that U.S. prowess in power is closely linked to America’s economic power and, in turn, the world’s economy as a whole. Any permanent degradation or damage to critical space systems, such as GPS or commercial communications satellites, would have a devastating impact on the American economy, the global economy, and thus the economy of the very nation that brought conflict to outer space.

# Militarization Chemical-Biological Attacks 2NC Impact Module

**[ ] US-China space race causes CBW attacks – non-space powers will seek asymmetric responses**

**Hitchens 01** [ Director of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Arms Control Today, http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security\_Space\_Volume.Final.pdf July 13th//BP]

Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities – raising the proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial – with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.30 Many experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemming from the need to counter other asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors might well look to terrorism using chemical or biological agents as one alternative.

IMPACT NEEDED

# Answers To: Taboo Prevents Space War

**[ ] Space weapons will be used despite taboo – perception of less destruction than nukes**

Bao **Xhixiu 2007** -- senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of Chin (China Security. (Winter 2007) <http://www.wsichina.org/%5Ccs5_1.pdf> Accessed on 7/14/11)

Space weapons and their use are unique from other types of weapons, whether nuclear or terrestrial conventional weapons. Although there will be a taboo on the use of space weapons, the threshold of their use will be lower than that of nuclear weapons because of their conventional characteristics. Space debris may threaten the space assets of other “third party” countries, but the level of destruction, especially in terms of human life, could be far less than nuclear weapons or potentially even conventional weapons. Therefore, the threshold of force capability required to launch an effective deterrent will inevitably be higher than for that of nuclear weapons. This unique nature of Chinese deterrent policy in space will vigorously maintain the “active defense” strategy.

# Readiness Impacts

**[ ] China space attacks crush US readiness—destroys satellites**

**Weeden 08, consultant with the Secure World Foundation** [Brian, China Security, Vol. 4 No. 1 Winter 2008, pp. 134-147, 2008 World Security Institute, “How China “Wins” a Potential Space War,” accessed 7/17/11//HK]

There is no reason to think that China would rely solely on its demonstrated direct ascent ASAT as the only weapon in its counterspace arsenal. Indeed, it is only logical that China would employ a full spectrum of capabilities – and it has shown hints at what some of those are. The same concept of jamming for GPS can be applied to communication satellites as demonstrated by the jamming of a Thuraya satellite in 2006 and the (likely) unintentional recent jamming of satellite TV over Lebanon. 12 Lasing satellites to either blind optics or overload the satellite’s thermal control system are also feasible. There is also the alleged 2006 dazzling of a U.S. spy satellite by China. 15 But the real doomsday weapon in counterspace warfare is the electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) – a side effect of certain nuclear detonations. The effects of EMP were first widely noticed following the STARFISH PRIME high-altitude nuclear detonation (NUDET) over a Pacific island. 16 Simply put, a nuclear detonation can generate a pulse which can damage, and in some cases destroy, sensitive satellite electronics. While these electronic components can be hardened against EMP, it requires significant additional costs and added weight. If China really wanted to remove the U.S. communication ability in a conflict over Taiwan, a relatively small nuclear weapon lofted into geosynchronous orbit, maneuvered to position over Asia and then detonated would have devastating consequences. The only known geosynchronous communications satellites designed with survivability in a nuclear environment are the U.S. Milstar satellites. Theoretically, they could withstand such a blast but would be of little benefit. Six Milstar satellites were designed and built but one failed to achieve orbit. 17 As they are intended to provide global secure satellite coverage, it can be assumed that the five remaining satellites are spread out along the equator, meaning that at most only two or three are positioned in the area of Asia. With maximum data rates of 2,400 bps (satellites 1 and 2) or 4.8 kbps (satellites 4 thru 6) there is no way for these to possibly handle the gigabits of bandwidth needed.

**[ ] Chinese ASATs could impair our military- can easily destroy GPS**

**Saunders 07 –Senior Fellow at the National Defense University** [June 07. “China’s ASAT Tests: Motivations and Implications.” Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Accessed 7/14/11. <http://blackboard.jfsc.ndu.edu/ajpme_lessons/lesson57/s057/sco010/assets/doc/inss_sr_jun07.pdf> //TD]

A recent Department of Defense report suggests that China appears to be developing a “ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.”6 According to a news article, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office confirmed that a Chinese laser illuminated a U.S. satellite.7 In addition, jamming could disrupt U.S. military communications and Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation and targeting signals. The exact performance characteristics of Chinese systems are unknown, but deployment of a range of ASAT capabilities could provide flexible options to temporarily or permanently deny U.S. space capabilities. The Chinese direct-ascent ASAT program appears to be in the research and development phase, and the intent or timing of operational deployment remains unknown.

# Debris Impacts

**[ ] China space war proliferates debris—ASAT test proves**

**Weeden 08, consultant with the Secure World Foundation** [Brian, China Security, Vol. 4 No. 1 Winter 2008, pp. 134-147, 2008 World Security Institute, “How China “Wins” a Potential Space War,” accessed 7/17/11//HK]

The concept of “winning” in the above hypothetical scenario should be understood only in the most Pyrrhic sense. We have already seen the damage done by the destruction of just one SSO satellite (Chinese test). If that were repeated a half dozen times or more over a short period the effects would be disastrous, to say nothing of what the space environment would look like if a NUDET were to occur in populated orbits. This counterproductive maxim holds true for any destructive counterspace activity by any nation, including the United States. It is a fact of physics that the permanent disabling of a satellite’s ability to maneuver, or the ability of controllers on the ground to command maneuvers, by any means, transforms that satellite into a piece of debris and increases its chances of a collision in space. Collisions generate more pieces of debris, which in turn increases the probability of additional collisions, creating a feedback loop that we currently do not know how to stop.

# Counterplan Ideas

# Non-Space BMD Counterplan Solvency

**[ ] Non-space BMD avoids the disadvantage – China’s deterrent less threatened**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

From a Chinese perspective, a non-space-based BMD system would be less threatening to national security than a space-based missile defense system. As discussed above, countermeasures for mid-course missile defense systems would be less expensive and easier for China to develop. However, a space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would pose more threat than a non-space-based BMD system, because a boost-phase missile defense would have fewer targets, the target ICBM would be much larger and more fragile than the normal re-entry vehicle, and the target would be easily detectable due to the bright plumes of the burning booster. Moreover, a non-spacebased, boost-phase missile defense system would not be able to cover ICBMs launched from China’s interior. In fact, an ICBM at an altitude of 200 km is only detected within 1600 km by a sensor on the ground, and within 2000 km by a sensor at an altitude of 15 km. Because of the vastness of China’s land holdings, the United States would have to destroy a Chinese missile in boost phase from space.175 As such, even a limited ban on space weapons would significantly reduce the threat to China posed by U.S. missile defense systems, assuming that Chinese military planners have confidence in countermeasures for midcourse missile defense systems.

# Treaty Counterplan Solvency

**[ ] U.S.-China arms control treaty solves relations**

**Blazejewski 08 J.D. from New York University , B.A. from Harvard** [2/7/08. “Space Weaponization and U.S.-China Relations.” Strategic Studies Quarterly Spring 2008. accessed 7/12/11. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf> //TD]

Even when considered in isolation, the decision to forgo space weaponization is a wise one; when considered within the larger context of arms control negotiations, it clearly presents an opportunity to advance US long-term security. The United States should concede to negotiate on space weaponization with China in return for Chinese cooperation in other more critical areas of counterproliferation, such as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Proliferation Security Space Weaponization and US-China Relations Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2008 [ 35 ] Initiative (PSI). Finally, the United States should continue to push for increased transparency in China’s military and space programs.

**[ ] Treaty counterplan solves the disadvantage – China thinks it’s the best tool to solve**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

In China’s view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be a ban on space weaponization. Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi stated, “If any country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the prevention of space weaponization, as suggested by China… Such a legally binding international treaty will be the best tool to safeguard the interests of all sides.”153

**[ ] Treaty counterplan solves the disadvantage – China’s position has been unequivocal for decades**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

Many Chinese believe that China should pursue a complete ban on any kind of space weapons system to effectively prevent space weaponization. China’s stance on this issue has been consistent since 1985, when it first introduced a working paper to the CD describing its position on space weapons.161 China’s most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasized three basic obligations: 1) “Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner”; 2) “Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects”; and 3) “Not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.”162 In order to advance the CD work on PAROS, China (with Russia) prepared two “non-papers” in August 2004 on “verification aspects of PAROS” and “existing international legal instruments and the prevention of the weaponization of outer space.”163 The non-paper on verification argues that the verification regime of a future outer space treaty will be highly complex and will encounter great technological and financial challenges. The non-paper cited the 1967 OST to show that even without a verification mechanism, the treaty is still effective, and therefore, for the time being, a legal instrument for outer space can be formulated without a verification mechanism.164 However, it does not exclude the addition of a verification protocol when conditions are ripe. The proposal attempts to bypass the problem of verification so that it does not become the principal obstacle to the urgently needed work on PAROS. The non-paper on existing international legal instruments emphasizes that there are no existing treaties that effectively prevent the testing, deployment, and use of weapons other than those of mass destruction in outer space. In addition, none of these instruments covers the threat or use of force from the Earth (including the land, the sea, and the atmosphere) against objects in outer space.

**[ ] Disad is a net benefit to the treaty counterplan – China wants weapons ban**

Hui **Zhang** 12/0**5**-- research associate at Harvard

 (in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China” <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr> accessed on 7/12/11//KH)

Given the possibility of effective and cheap countermeasures, it seems foolish to many Chinese that the United States would bother to deploy highly expensive space-based weapons or anti-satellite technologies. If Washington really wants to reduce the potential vulnerability of its space assets, there are a number ways to improve space security, including technical approaches, rules of the road, and arms control agreements. By contrast, weaponizing space can only further worsen space security. As Hu emphasized recently, “[F]or ensuring security in outer space, political and legal approaches…can still be effective, while resorting to force and the development of space weapons will only be counter-productive.” In China’s view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be to agree on a ban on space weaponization. As its working paper to the CD emphasizes, “Only a treaty-based prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of the threat or use of force against outer space objects can eliminate the emerging threat of an arms race in outer space and ensure the security for outer space assets of all countries which is an essential condition for the maintenance of world peace.” China’s stance on banning weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985 when it first introduced a working paper to the CD on its position on space weapons. China’s most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasizes three basic obligations: Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects. Not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states, and international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this treaty. In order to advance the CD work on the PAROS issue, in August 2004 China together with Russia prepared two nonpapers on the issues of “verification aspects of PAROS” and “existing international legal instruments and the prevention of the weaponization of outer space” and in June 2005 one more nonpaper on the issue of “definition issues regarding legal instruments on the prevention of weaponization of outer space.”

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# Uniqueness Answers

# US Space Weapons Now

**[ ] Non-unique- China already perceives US as a threat**

**Zhang, 11- Associate Professor and Director for the Center of Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University**

[Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, Number 2, pp. 311-332, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=B&aulast=Zhang&atitle=The+Security+Dilemma+in+the+US-China+Military+Space+Relationship&title=Asian+survey&volume=51&issue=2&date=2011&spage=311&issn=0004-4687, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Accessed July 12, SH]

Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.” He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.” One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.”21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth:

**[ ] Non-unique - US space weaponization already spurring opposition from China- security dilemmas now**

**Brown 9- political science author at Indiana University.** [Trevor is interested in economic and military strategy for the medium of space who is affiliated with Indiana University, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and Nanyang Technological University "Soft Power and Space Weaponization.” Air & Space Power Journal 23.1 (2009): 66-73. Research Library, ProQuest. Accessed 7/12/11 http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?index=7&did=1708121081&SrchMode=1&sid=9&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310495809&clientId=17822 //NG]

THE UNITED STATES has plans to weaponize space and is already deploying missile-defense platforms.1 Official, published papers outline long-term visions for space weapons, including direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, ground-based lasers that target satellites in low Earth orbit, and hypervelocity rod bundles that strike from space.2 According to federal budget documents, the Pentagon has asked Congress for considerable resources to test weapons in space, marking the biggest step toward creating a space battlefield since the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Cold War.3 Although two co-orbital escort vehicles - the XSS-1 1 experimental microsatellite and the Autonomous Nan osate Hite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space - are intended to monitor the space environment and inspect friendly satellites, they possess the technical ability to disrupt other nations' military reconnaissance and communications satellites.4 These developments have caused considerable apprehension in Moscow, Beijing, and other capitals across the world, resulting in a security dilemma. Russia and China believe that they must respond to this strategic challenge by taking measures to dissuade the United States from pursuing space weapons and missile defenses. Their response will likely include developing more advanced ASAT weapons, building more intercontinental ballistic missiles, extending the life of existing ballistic missiles, adopting countermeasure s against missile defenses, developing other asymmetric capabilities for the medium of space, and reconsidering commitments on arms control.5

**[ ] China already fears US space dominance- fears space race**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

Although there has been no formal public change in U.S. space policy, many Chinese are convinced by official statements and visible activity that U.S. policy is driving toward space weaponization—the development of weapons able to destroy targets in or from space. These weapons would presumably provide the United States with control over access to space and activity in space. Professor Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, said that the 2003 Transformation Flight Plan indicated that “many types of space based weapons will be developed” and that “the tendency of space weaponization is obvious and serious.” He further pointed out that achieving military supremacy on Earth is not enough, as “the U.S. also seeks to dominate space.”11 Ambassador Li Daoyu, President of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, recently stated, “As we cheer for every success of peaceful exploration and use of outer space, we also hear the approaching bugling of war. The space military technology is advancing rapidly. New military and combat concepts and theories like ‘control of space’ and ‘occupation of space’ are emerging. Research and development programs of space weapons are in implementation. The danger of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is ever more imminent.”12

**[ ] China already perceives militarization – ABM withdrawal and GMD system development**

**Podvig & Zhang 8- research** **associates at Stanford and Harvard (respectively)** [Pavel Podvig is a Research Associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His research focuses on missile defense, space security, and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is an independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems. -American Academy of Arts & Sciences “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” accessed 7/12/11 http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf //NG]

In addition to the U.S. space control theory and doctrine, other U.S. actions suggest to China that the move toward space weaponization is real. For example, as discussed in detail below, the United States is developing and deploying missile defense systems, and has a number of active space weapons programs. Moreover, the U.S. has withdrawn from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Though not a party to the treaty, China viewed it as a cornerstone of strategic stability and an important legal instrument for preventing the deployment of weapons in space. Since withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the United States has had free reign to accelerate its space weaponization plans if it so chooses. It is expected that the Bush administration will soon issue a new statement on military space policy—providing strategic guidance to the armament of the U.S. forces and the development of military technology in the foreseeable future. Missile defense is one important step toward U.S. space control. The United States has promoted the development and deployment of missile defense, particularly of an integrated, layered system, and it has increased the budgets for missile defense programs. Since 2004, the United States has begun deployment of a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system. The system—comprised of seven interceptors in Alaska and another two in California—was activated in the summer of 2006. As many scientists and experts in the United States have pointed out, this initial GMD system would likely be ineffective against a real attack by long-range ballistic missiles13; however, from a Chinese perspective, there is no guarantee that the system would not someday, with the help of a breakthrough technology, become effective. Moreover, this GMD system could be the first step toward a more robust, layered system, capable of targeting missiles at various points in their flight trajectories. Some Chinese observers view this GMD system as a space weaponry system. The scope of space weaponry, as generally defined in China, includes not only space-based weapons, but also any weapons that target objects in outer space, regardless of where they are based. Objects in outer space would include satellites as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) traveling through outer space.14 Because this GMD system would intercept its target at an altitude that China has defined as outer space (above 100 km), it would be considered space weaponry. Many Chinese feel that the U.S. plan to deploy a missile defense system is an intentional first step toward space weaponization.

# China Space Weapons Now

**[ ] China is currently militarizing space –new developments show**

**Time** 7/13 20**11** [ Time staff writer, Wednesday, July 13, 2011 <http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/07/13/china%E2%80%99s-rapid-space-ascent/#ixzz1S6XAhoIX> ( China's Rapid Space Ascent) access date 7/15//RC]

Having acquired significant real-time space support of real-time military operations, China has moved substantially closer to its paramount goal of acquiring the ability to prevent the United States from operating with near-impunity close to China's shores. And it has laid the spacework for further expanding military operations to wider swaths of Asia and beyond. China can now peer down from space at stationary targets in and around Taiwan for a significant chunk of the day – some five hours of daily live surveillance. This coverage practically matches U.S. capacity, a stunning advance that doubles China's coverage in only 18 months and pushes its military capability into a new era in which tactical war-fighting missions can be carried out with timely support from reconnaissance platforms in space. This newfound capability brings China to the threshold of fulfilling its ambition of acquiring the ability to target moving platforms, notably U.S. aircraft carriers and their escorts. China lags the United States in the ability to find and monitor moving targets but is fast catching up as a result of progress it has made in radar and electronic intelligence satellites. China's rapid ascent in space militarization, particularly in spy satellite operations, builds on its exploitation of mature technologies and serial production, a formula that emulates China's broader strategy of technological innovation. The United States still dominates the high-tech frontier. China has concentrated on proven ‘good enough' technology that can be reliably and affordably put into mass production. While China's states military ambitions are largely focused on regional contingencies, its space revolution is conferring capabilities to expand its horizons and support global military missions if that becomes necessary, or just desirable.

# US-China Relations Low

**US sparks diplomatic conflict-Wolf Legislation blocks all cooperation**

**CBS News, 7/7/11**

[Associated Press Staff Writer, <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20077462-503543.html>, “Can U.S. afford to snub China in space quest?” Access: July 2011//SL]

Beijing was deeply offended when two journalists from China's state-run Xinhua news agency were barred from covering the historic launch of the shuttle Endeavour in May, the second-to-last mission for the U.S. shuttle program. Endeavour blasted off from Florida's Kennedy Space Center on May 16, carrying an Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-2 particle detector - a $1.5 billion apparatus developed, in part, by Chinese scientists. It became a source of national pride in China. Banned from covering the launch, the government mouthpiece lashed out in a report two days blasting "discriminative" new U.S. legislation which bans any of NASA's government-apportioned funding being used in partnership with, to support or host any entity of the Chinese government. The Xinhua article refers to a clause added by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House committee which oversees NASA's budget - and a fierce critic of China's human rights record, to an emergency national budget bill passed in April to keep the U.S. government running for six months. Xinhua's article claimed "even Americans themselves" viewed the so-called "Wolf Clause" as discriminatory. The emergency budget averted a government-wide shutdown, and it was passed in spite of vocal objections by members of both parties to many of the restrictions included. However, there has been little talk in Washington specifically about the clause on space cooperation with China, and no U.S. lawmakers have publicly labeled it "discriminative," as Xinhua suggested.

**[ ] Wolf Clause makes Perception of the US terrible – China sees discrimination**

**Space Daily 5/18 2011**  [ Staff Writers Washington DC (XNA) May 18, 2011 <http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Wolf_Clause_betrays_China_US_cooperation_999.html> ( "Wolf Clause" betrays China-U.S. cooperation)//RC ]

U.S. space shuttle Endeavor blasted off from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida on Monday, kicking off its 25th and the last space mission in history, which draws great attention from media worldwide. The event, of course, is also catching the eyes of media and scientists in China because the shuttle carries the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-2 (AMS) particle detector, the mankind's most ambitious effort to date to explore the universe' origin with Nobel laureate physicist Samuel Ting as the program's principal scientist. The 7,000-kg AMS worth 2 billion U.S. dollars will be placed in the International Space Station (ISS) and an international team of more than 600 scientists, including many from China's mainland and Taiwan, have joined Ting's exhausting but respectable AMS program. China's scientists have played a crucial role in designing and manufacturing some core parts of the device. However, Chinese journalists who hoped to cover the launching of Endeavor were simply denied entry to the site by a ban initiated by Frank Wolf, chairman of the Committee of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies in the House of Representatives. The United States' National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revoked the media passes granted to journalists from China due to the ban, or the "Wolf Clause", which was regarded as "discriminative" by even Americans themselves. On April 15, U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law the budget bill for fiscal year 2011 which will end on Sept. 30 after the House of Representatives passed it. The bill included a clause which bans any China-U.S. joint scientific research activities related to NASA or coordinated by the White House's Science Policy Office. Under the clause in the budget bill, none of the Congress-approved funds for the U.S. government "may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company." It also applies the limitation "to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized" by NASA. As a result, Chinese journalists were denied the opportunity to make live coverage of the shuttle's blast-off, just as their peers from other countries have done. The Chinese journalists were also kept away from NASA's press conferences. Obviously, the "Wolf Clause" runs counter to the trend that both China and the United States are trying to push ahead their exchanges and cooperation in science and technology. During the third round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S and ED) held in Washington earlier this month, the two sides published accomplishments of the dialogue, which includes the cooperation in science and technology. Moreover, China and the U.S. this year renewed their bilateral agreements on scientific and technological cooperation. The Obama administration also attached importance to the current development and trend of scientific and technological cooperation between China and the U.S. and realized the nature of mutual benefit brought about by such cooperation. John P.Holdren, director of the Science and Technology Policy Office of the White House, has told Xinhua that the cooperation on science and technology was one of the most dynamic fields in bilateral relations between China and the United States. The "Wolf Clause" exposed the anxiety of hawkish politicians in the United States over China's peaceful development in recent years, and it also demonstrated their shortsightedness to the whole world. The "Wolf Clause" was a result of compromise made by Obama to Republicans to avoid possible bankruptcy of the U.S. government. It is also a concession between U.S. Republicans and Democrats, but the "clause" will not in any way change the trend of the increasingly closer scientific and technological cooperation between China and the U.S. In fact, the "Wolf Clause" has incurred criticism, even from some U.S. scientists. Richard Milner, director of Laboratory for Nuclear Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), thought China's contribution to the project was "crucial". The professor believed that the "Wolf Clause" was a "discriminative decision" and it would eventually hurt the U.S. itself. As the unpopular clause came into effect, China's journalists became the first victims of the discriminative legislation by being turned away from the Kennedy Space Center. Although the clause will terminate as the fiscal year 2011 ends in September, Wolf seemed unreconciled and claimed he will work to extend the ban to next year. Today, while the Chinese and U.S. governments are deepening their cooperation, Wolf acted against the trend with a cold war mentality. This is something that should raise the vigilance of peace-loving people in the world.

**[ ] Relations low now- US suspects Chinese satellites’ dual use capabilities**

**New York Times** **, 7** [Jim Yardley, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/world/asia/24satellite.html?\_r=1&hp&oref=slo%20gin, Snubbed by U.S., China Finds New Space Partners, Accessed July 12, SH]

But China’s focus on satellites has also brought suspicions, particularly from the United States, since most satellites are “dual use” technologies, capable of civilian and military applications. Currently, China is overhauling its military in a modernization drive focused, in part, on developing the capacity to fight a “high tech” war. Analysts say China’s determination to develop its own equivalent to the Global Positioning System, or G.P.S., is partly because such a system would be critical for military operations if a war were to erupt over Taiwan. Most alarmingly to Western countries, China conducted an antisatellite test in January by firing a missile into space, destroying one of its own orbiting satellites and scattering a trail of dangerous debris despite its oft-stated opposition to the use of weapons in space. Four months later, Washington is still trying to parse China’s motivations, while China has offered little explanation. Space relations between the powers were already frosty. Washington, responding to scandals over stolen technology, has tried for nearly a decade to isolate the Chinese space program through export restrictions that prohibit the use of American space technology on satellites launched in China. Washington also has prevented China from participating in the International Space Station and, in some cases, stopped Chinese scientists from attending space conferences in America. Michael D. Griffin, [NASA](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_aeronautics_and_space_administration/index.html?inline=nyt-org)’s administrator, did signal a thaw in relations when he visited China last fall. But critics say the American strategy has backfired. A recent critique of the Bush administration’s space policy blamed Washington for alienating space allies with a “go it alone” philosophy. It also blamed the export restrictions for damaging American competitiveness and helping foreign competitors like China gain an advantage in the commercial market. China, meanwhile, eyes the United States warily. Earlier this year, Eric Hagt, director of the China program for the World Security Institute, testified in Washington that China’s increasing investment in space has made it feel more vulnerable at a time when the United States is advocating missile defense programs in the name of protecting against terrorist states. China believes the United States is determined to dominate space, even as China’s own national interests are increasingly tied to space, Mr. Hagt said. “The United States needs to come to grips with the reality that China will demand more ‘strategic room’ in space,” he told the federal U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

# Space Race Inevitable

**[ ] Collapse of relations inevitable - ASAT test makes irreversible decline**

**Hitchins, 7- Director of Defense Information, World Security Institute** [Theresa, China Security, Winter 2007, U.S.-Sino relations in Space: From “War of Worlds” to Cold War in Space, Accessed July 12, SH]

On the civil space side, Beijing is also likely to feel repercussions in its ef- forts to spur cooperation with NASA on planetary exploration. Considering that there were strong voices in the U.S. national security establishment, and in Congress, opposing last year’s visit to China by NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and accusing China of wanting nothing except access to technology it could supply to its military programs, it is almost inconceivable that any new progress can be made in the wake of the ASAT test. And since civil cooperation in space is largely a political exercise for the United States, withholding cooperation is also a method of political punishment. Indeed, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters on Jan. 18 that “The United States believes China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area.”18 Likewise, military-to-military cooperation in space as a means of confidence-building – as called for by Gen. James Cartwright, head of U.S. Strategic Command last year19 – is now unlikely to get anywhere fast. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., the chairman of the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee that oversees military space spending, called a closed-door hearing on the Chinese test on Jan. \_\_, and reminded reporters that he has long been concerned about the transfer of U.S. technology to China that could allow it to become a space competitor.\_0 Christopher Padilla, assistant secretary for export administration at the U.S. Commerce Department, told reporters in Beijing on Jan. \_\_ that the test had contributed to distrust between the U.S. and Chinese governments. Padilla, who was in China to explain a proposed U.S. plan to heighten export controls on high technology to China, said: “I raised the point that the test is one more example of how a lack of transparency and clarity requires the U.S. to hedge its relations with China.”\_1 This is too bad, for both sides, in that such cooperation and confidence-building – even if baby steps – would work to improve understanding between Chinese and American space officials and help mitigate against future misunderstandings.

**[ ] China-US conflict inevitable – both countries have already decided this internally**

**Hitchins, 7- Director of Defense Information, World Security Institute** [Theresa, China Security, Winter 2007, U.S.-Sino relations in Space: From “War of Worlds” to Cold War in Space, Accessed July 12, SH]

Finally, recent remarks by senior PLA Col. Yao Yunzhu at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, who directs the Asia-Pacific Office at the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing, lead toward the “mirror im- age” explanation: the Chinese and American militaries have come to the same pessimistic conclusion about the future of space and have decided to prepare for the worst, including a competition with each other. “My prediction:” said Yao, “Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime.” She added, in an indirect allusion to the United States, that if there is going to be a “space superpower, it’s not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one.”

**[ ] Space race and prolif inevitable - Both countries feel threatened by others actions**

**Hitchins, 7- Director of Defense Information, World Security Institute** [Theresa, China Security, Winter 2007, U.S.-Sino relations in Space: From “War of Worlds” to Cold War in Space, Accessed July 12, SH]

However, if the intent of the Chinese test was to deter the United States from building space-based missile defenses, it may well backfire. Advocates of space-based missile defenses have leaped upon the Chinese ASAT test as proof of the urgent need for such a system to counter the Chinese threat. An email press release by the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a pro-missile defense lobby group funded by a number of U.S. defense companies, stated: “China has proven, especially to Iran and North Korea that ballistic missile capability represents power, self defense and an ability to deter. This model of international behavior will only encourage proliferators to develop their ballistic missile capability. … The vulnerability of space assets to Chinese ballistic missile attacks or threats of that capability now exists and has been demonstrated.”

**[ ] Space race inevitable - India and Japan’s ASAT efforts speed up the possibility**

**Hitchins, 7- Director of Defense Information, World Security Institute** [Theresa, China Security, Winter 2007, U.S.-Sino relations in Space: From “War of Worlds” to Cold War in Space, Accessed July 12, SH]

And the most worrisome question of all – beside the potential for spark- ing a Sino-U.S. ASAT race – is whether China’s other rival nations, most specifically, India, will seek to react in kind. India’s media, predictably, has been harshly denouncing the Chinese test as a threat to India. “It threatens our own expanding civilian space assets, undermines the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and exposes New Delhi's lack of a military space strategy,” the *Indian Express* newspaper said in an editorial on Jan. 1 M. Natarajan, science advisor to India’s Defense Ministry, said the government would be especially concerned if such Chinese missiles could “disable” satellites with military and/or navigation capabilities and told reporters that the Indian government is assessing “steps we need to initiate in this direction.” Unfortunately, the Chinese test comes amid a renewed push by the Indian Air Force to establish a military hold on Indian space policy and funding; a push that has been underpinned by Air Force lobbying regarding the “China threat.” There has been a steady drum-beat for a number of years regarding India’s need to compete in military space, including the development of ASAT weaponry. In April , Chief Air Marshall S. P. Tyagi told reporters in New Delhi that India intends to set up a Strategic Air Command, in part to lay the groundwork for counter-space capabilities. His remarks echoed those of his predecessor, Srinivaspuram Krishnaswamy, made in October, telling reporters that work on the command was aimed at deploying weapons in space: “Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapon platforms in space and killer satellites.” While up to now, the Indian government has largely turned a deaf ear to Air Force advocacy, the Chinese ASAT test may turn the tide in its favor. When asked about India’s anti-satellite capabilities, Natarajan refused comment, but noted: “Maybe we need to talk to ISRO [Indian Space Research Organisation].” Likewise, the Chinese action may spur Japan not only to speed its efforts at developing missile defenses but possibly to develop military space capabili- ties. “It may fuel the argument that Japan should develop space technology for national defense, especially as it came in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis,” said Yasunori Matogawa, a professor of space engineering at the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, part of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Tokyo had demanded an explanation from the Chinese government; while Foreign Minister Taro Aso criticized Beijing for failing to give advance notice of the test which he doubted was for “peaceful use” of space. Japanese officials have continued to charge that the Chinese government has yet to give a full and credible account of the test and future plans.

**[ ] Space race inevitable- Countries too competitive**

**Zhang, 11- Associate Professor and Director for the Center of Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University**

[Baohui, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, Number 2, pp. 311-332, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=B&aulast=Zhang&atitle=The+Security+Dilemma+in+the+US-China+Military+Space+Relationship&title=Asian+survey&volume=51&issue=2&date=2011&spage=311&issn=0004-4687, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Accessed July 12, SH]

China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the United States. In fact, China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,” General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly advancing military space program.1 Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA. In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capa- bilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capa- bilities of the United States.” Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conven- tional forces.” This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superi- ority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly.

**[ ] China space war inevitable, --- demolition of satellite proves**

**Space and Missile Defense Report 7** [space and missile defense report 2007, “ China Will Attack U.S. Space Assets In Any War;” Access 7/14/2011.http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx\_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx\_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr\_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft\_val\_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=China+Will+Attack+U.S.+Space+Assets+In+Any+War%3B+Pentagon+Must+Field+Defenses&rft.jtitle=Space+%26+Missile+Defense+Report&rft.date=2007-10-22&rft.issn=1529-7209&rft.volume=8&rft.issue=40&rft.spage=n.a&rft.externalDBID=SMDF&rft.externalDocID=1369933861//FK]

China will drop its adherence to rules barring war in space, in any future conflict with the United States, and attack U.S. space assets, so American forces need to field space defense systems, a noted analyst reported. And Chinese leaders are taking actions signaling they may take on U.S. forces in active combat. "In event of conflict with China, we can expect to see [Chinese] military operations carried out across all the domains of war: land, sea, air, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum" with information warfare and cyber warfare, according to Larry M. Wortzel, a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (but these views are his own), and a retired Army colonel. Wortzel spoke at a forum of the American Enterprise Institute conservative think tank, a session that focused on his report. The United States must be able to defend itself against such attacks, he continued. "There are ... sound reasons to prepare to defend American interests in space," as well as to attempt to negotiate mutual threat reduction measures, "and to pursue programs that will ensure that the U.S. military will have access to space -- and space-based logistical support -- in any future conflict," Wortzel stated. His comments came after China early this year used a ground-based missile to demolish one of its own aging weather satellites, an impressive demonstration of anti-satellite capability, and also "painted" and temporarily disabled a U.S. military satellite with a ground-based laser.

# Link Answers

# Economic Interdependence Overwhelms Link

**[ ] US China relations will withstand disruption –economy will draw them together**

**Friedberg 05**, [Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 03-05 was Deputy Assistant for Ntional Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President, International Security Vol 30 No 2, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=AL&aulast=Friedberg&atitle=The+Future+of+USChina+Relations:+Is+Confict+Inevitable%3F&id=doi:10.1162/016228805775124589&title=International+security&volume=30&issue=2&date=2005&spage=7&issn=0162-2889 July 14th //BP]

Liberal optimists believe that bilateral economic exchange creates shared interests in good relations between states. The greater the volume of trade and investment flowing between two countries, the more groups on both sides will have a strong interest in avoiding conflict and preserving peace. Liberal optimists note that economic exchange between the United States and China has increased dramatically since the onset of market reforms in China in the late 1970s. From the start of reform in 1978 to the end of the twentieth century, the value of the trade moving between the two countries grew by more than two orders of magnitude, from $1 billion to almost $120 billion annually.11 By 2004 that figure had doubled to a reported total of $245 billion.12 [End Page 12] Capital flows have also risen, with U.S. investors pouring significant resources each year into China.13 As China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO) and opens its markets even wider to foreign goods and capital, the density of commercial linkages between the United States and the PRC will increase.14 Economic interdependence has already helped to create a strong mutual interest in peace between the two Pacific powers. Barring some major disruption, economic forces will probably continue to draw them together, constraining and damping any tendencies toward conflict.15

# Impact Answers

# Space War Won’t Escalate

**[ ] US-China space war has extremely low impact-conflict not likely to escalate**

**Weston 09** [graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, Air & Space Power Journal http://www.lib.umich.edu/articles/details/FETCH-proquest\_dll\_17081210911 July 15th //BP]

The RAND study also pointed out that China would likely contract commercial thirdparty space assets to provide needed capabilities, complicating repercussions from US attacks. All told, counterspace operations would probably prove as discriminate as possible to prevent strategic escalation. Both sides would hesitate to utilize kinetic-kill ASATs against anything but very low-altitude satellites for fear of incurring international condemnation and increasing debris hazards for their own resources.38 In all likelihood, the United States would not use its kinetic ASAT capability, preferring to utilize its limited number of seabased Standard Missile 3s for ABM defense of forward-deployed forces. Thus, the number of satellites destroyed or permanently disabled would be very low.

**[ ] China satellite strike won’t start global nuclear war –just limited attacks**

Blazejewski 08 [master’s degree in public fairs from Princeton, Strategic Studies Quarterly

http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf July 15th//BP]

First, as the world’s most technologically advanced country, the United States owns a highly disproportionate share of the world’s space assets and satellites. These satellites play a vital role in US economic activity and military operations.45 Foreign states have certainly taken note. “The politi- cal, economic, and military value of space systems makes them attractive targets for state and non-state actors hostile to the United States and its interests.”46 Unfortunately, satellites also make relatively easy targets for foreign antagonists. Satellites move in predictable patterns, cannot remain over friendly territory, and are easily located by other states.47 While most

commercial satellites are in geosynchronous Earth orbit, beyond the reach of existing Chinese ASAT weapons, China could reach US satellites in LEO with its current basic ballistic missile technology. In the case of a limited US-China conflict, perhaps over Taiwan, US military satellites, most of which orbit in LEO, would make for a tempting target. Strategic elimination of US military satellites could effectively blind US forces. China might consider such a limited attack especially attractive since it would be unlikely to incite a full-scale nuclear response.