**Domestic issues**

**MacDonald 11** – US Institute of Peace (11, Bruce W., Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs, pdf)

In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions. China seeks to be able to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case, we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States – China has come too far to want to place their substantial economic achievements at risk unless they faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one- child policy), which further underscores China’s need for stability and continued economic growth for years to come. China also has additional needs, and vulnerabilities: • Growing environmental problems and water shortages with no obvious solutions that are growing irritants to the public; • A relentless search for new sources of manufacturing inputs; • An increasingly restive working class that is making new demands for higher wages and political freedoms; • A non-democratic one-party system that leaves its senior leadership constantly looking over its shoulder at possible challenges to its authority, especially in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”; • Growing citizen anger against corruption and cronyism that seems impossible for the CCP to root out; and many more. These factors are reasons why China is probably not looking for war with the United States, though they also could inadvertently become factors in China’s stumbling into a conflict they would ordinarily not want, through miscalculation or distraction.

**It doesn’t go nuclear**

**Mulvenon 6**

James Mulvenon, Deputy Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at the RAND Corporation, Vice-President of the Intelligence Division at Defense Group Inc. (DGI), Director of DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, 2006**,** “Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense,” RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\_MG340.pdf, [Zheng]

When Chinese strategists contemplate how to affect U.S. deployments, they confront the limitations of their current conventional force, which does not have range sufficient to interdict U.S. facilities or assets beyond the Japanese home islands. Nuclear options, while theoretically available, are nonetheless far too escalatory to be used so early in the conflict. Theater missile systems, which are possibly moving to a mixture of conventional and nuclear warheads, could be used against Japan or Guam, but uncertainties about the nature of a given warhead would likely generate responses similar to the nuclear scenario. According to the predictable cadre of “true believers,” both of the centers of gravity identified above can be attacked using computer network operations (CNO). In the first case, the Chinese information operations (IO) community believes that CNO will play a useful psychological role in undermining the will of the Taiwanese people by attacking infrastructure and economic vitality. In the second case, the Chinese IO community envisions CNO effectively deterring or delaying U.S. intervention and causing pain sufficient to compel Taipei to capitulate before the United States arrives. The remainder of this section outlines how these IO theorists propose operationalizing such a strategy.

**Relations and deterrence**

**Art 10**- Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's Seminar XXI Program

(Robert J., “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political Science Quarterly)

The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.-China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest America's maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each state's homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a seconds trike capability vis-A-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically.