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## Commission CP---1NC

### Text: The United States Federal Government should establish an external, independent review body to consult over whether the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should pursue [INSERT MODIFIED PLAN TEXT]. The United States Federal Government should implement the recommendations of the review body.

### eg.

### Text: The United States Federal Government should establish an external, independent review body to consult over whether the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should pursue a program of human colonization of space. The United States Federal Government should implement the recommendations of the review body.

### Solvency-

### Establishing an independent commission to pick research and tech priorities solves the whole case while avoid our policy churn net benefit.

Newton and Atkins 10 (Elizabeth, Director for Space Policy- U Alabama-Huntsville, and Chuck, former Chief of Staff-House Science Committee, Take the Chaos Out of U.S. Space Policy, 10 May, 2010, http://spacenews.com/commentaries/100510-take-chaos-out-space-policy.html)

Policy stability is not an unheard-of feat; examples exist where a prioritization process stabilizes long-term national plans while still enabling political accountability for public resources. For example, for the past 40 years, the space science community and, more recently, the Earth science community have managed an inclusive, deliberate process to determine the most important questions and missions of their disciplines for the decade to come. Their process sets 10-year research and technology priorities, taking the guesswork out of the scientific ends that the government should support, thereby reducing and even avoiding the annual churn otherwise created by the U.S. government’s legislative process or election cycles. The executive branch and Congress accept the scientific communities’ priorities and goals and determine the amount of public resources available. While funding and schedules can and do change with the budget process, the goals and destinations in space do not. It is time for human space exploration to be put on similar footing so that the political decisions are less about what the priorities, goals and missions are, and more about how many the country can afford at a given point in time, especially relative to other national needs. A managed and regular prioritization process should replace episodic, ad hoc presidential commissions in order to ensure that the compelling questions for human space exploration are asked and answered with an enduring consensus in an accountable way and that diverse and iconoclastic views are considered. Similar to the way the science community does it, an external, independent review body would be managed to assess human space exploration’s relevance to stakeholders and to develop priorities for a six- to 10-year span. The process would produce assessments of relevance and priorities, not instructions on how to execute them, and would be organized thematically around major, compelling questions about humans’ future in space. Central, compelling questions such as, “Can humans ‘live off the land’?” and “Are there commercially valuable resources?” could serve as organizing principles for the activity since a questions-oriented approach makes it easier to keep stakeholders engaged and committed to the undertaking. While year-to-year appropriations may vary, the human space exploration priorities would not change, and NASA would then develop programs and projects that would be responsive to those questions (thereby retaining civil leadership in the systems engineering and government-funded portion of space architectures). The outside group, selected by the president and Congress, would involve scientists, engineers and industry representatives, public interest, education and labor groups, as well as scientific, technical, national security and foreign policy organizations. In essence, this outside group, like the space scientists' peer-review community, would provide national representation and continuity of intellectual leadership for human space exploration, reduce churn and provide outside validation on NASA’s progress in human space exploration. Longer-term congressional authorizations embracing the results of this process would provide the legislative buy-in necessary to institutionalize these outcomes. The next NASA authorization bill provides a perfect opportunity. A process that bridges election cycles can be the prescription for ensuring that human space exploration priorities and goals are relevant to America’s broader national interests, consistent with our self-image, and, most of all, sustained for the long-term benefit of the nation.

### Net benefit:

### Top-down determination of space exploration policy causes policy churn, which tanks US aerospace industry and crushes space leadership, which turns the case.

Newton and Atkins 10 (Elizabeth, Director for Space Policy- U Alabama-Huntsville, and Chuck, Chief of Majority Staff-House Science Committee, Take the Chaos Out of U.S. Space Policy, 10 May, 2010, http://spacenews.com/commentaries/100510-take-chaos-out-space-policy.html)

Political choices about the space program today are not so obvious, and it is increasingly clear that the United States needs a better way of setting priorities, goals and missions for human space exploration than was used during Cold War conditions. By rough count, since 1969 there have been 24 presidential blue-ribbon panels and agency evaluations of NASA’s human space exploration direction, 22 attempts by Congress to terminate the international space station program and cancellations of at least 10 projects related to a space shuttle replacement. While NASA’s budget for human space exploration is approximately 0.5 percent of the total federal budget, these aborted projects represent billions of dollars that could have been spent achieving something for America. The programmatic churn results not only in a price tag for unrealized projects but also in the well-documented erosion of our aerospace industrial base, decaying infrastructure and the disengagement of our brightest young minds. We should add to this cost the country’s loss of credibility and stature when we derail the plans of our international partners and abandon leadership in one of the few remaining areas where we truly are pre-eminent. In short, churn carries many opportunity costs. The United States deserves a sustainable human space exploration effort that is responsibly planned and given the consistent support necessary for a complex technical effort to succeed. In this age of record deficits, unemployment and troubling geopolitics, we — or rather our elected leaders — could choose to proceed differently this time around, with a vision for policy stability. The key challenge is that reconsiderations of space policy seem to match the length of the presidential election cycle, or sometimes even the annual appropriations cycle. We need to provide greater intellectual continuity to these reviews if we are to have any hope of policy stability.

### Aerospace key to the economy.

ITA ’11 [International Trade Administration, “AEROSPACE INDUSTRY IS CRITICAL CONTRIBUTOR TO U.S. ECONOMY ACCORDING TO OBAMA TRADE OFFICIAL AT PARIS AIR SHOW,” <http://trade.gov/press/press-releases/2011/aerospace-industry-critical-contributor-to-us-economy-062111.asp>, DA 7/14/11]//RS

PARIS – Francisco Sánchez, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, addressed national and international groups at the 2011 Paris Air Show to reinforce the President’s National Export Initiative (NEI) and support the U.S. aerospace industry. “The U.S. aerospace industry is a strategic contributor to the economy, national security, and technological innovation of the United States,” Sánchez said. “The industry is key to achieving the President’s goals of doubling exports by the end of 2014 and contributed $78 billion in export sales to the U.S. economy in 2010.” During the U.S. Pavilion opening remarks, Sánchez noted that **the aerospace sector in the United States supports more jobs through exports than any other industry**. Sánchez witnessed a signing ceremony between Boeing and Aeroflot, Russia’s state-owned airline. Aeroflot has ordered eight 777s valued at $2.1 billion, and the sales will support approximately 14,000 jobs. “The 218 American companies represented in the U.S. International Pavilion demonstrate the innovation and hard work that make us leaders in this sector,” said Sánchez. “I am particularly pleased to see the incredible accomplishments of U.S. companies participating in the Alternative Aviation Fuels Showcase, which demonstrates our leadership in this important sector and shows that we are on the right path to achieving the clean energy future envisioned by President Obama.” The 2011 Paris Air Show is the world’s largest aerospace trade exhibition, and features 2,000 exhibitors, 340,000 visitors, and 200 international delegations. The U.S. aerospace industry ranks among the most competitive in the world, boasting a positive trade balance of $44.1 billion – the largest trade surplus of any U.S. manufacturing industry. It directly sustains about 430,000 jobs, and indirectly supports more than 700,000 additional jobs. Ninety-one percent of U.S. exporters of aerospace products are small and medium-sized firms.

Economic decline causes nuclear great-power war

Mead 9 – Walter Russell Mead, the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2-4, 2009, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2

If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

# Say Yes- SBSP

## Space based Solar Power

### SBSP has overwhelming support-Scientific consensus

SFF 11 (Space Frontier Foundation, “About Space Solar Power”, <http://spacesolarpower.wordpress.com/about/>, Last Edited 7/24/11) SV

Space-based solar power can be developed into a source of clean energy to augment power grids around the World, on the Moon, and anywhere else humans are likely to go. Solar power already energizes our satellites and space stations in orbit around Earth. The trick is to collect enough solar energy on orbit, convert it into a form of power that can be broadcast safely to Earth, and to do so economically. We are not there yet. Figuring out how to do this has been the subject of a number of studies over the past few decades. All of them concluded that space-based solar power as a source of safe, clean energy on the Earth is scientifically feasible, but not technologically or economically viable at the time of those studies, the last occurring in the late 1990s. However, the studies also find that space-based solar power is becoming more viable as time progresses because related technologies are making huge strides forward in many cases. In 2007 **we arrived at a general and growing consensus** among most of humanity that the global demand for energy will soon exceed our ability to produce it. Complicating matters is environmental contamination brought about by the consumption of our traditional carbon-based fuels. Many believe our consumption of these fuels has irreparably damaged the environment though global warming.

# Policy Churn Net Benefit

## Policy Churn Links

### NASA’s time is over – no policy stability

Foust 4/11 (Jeff Foust, Staff Writer at The Space Review, “Whither human spaceflight?”, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1822/1>, 4/11/2011) SV

Yet, particularly in the US, these anniversaries are met with a degree of melancholy. The shuttle program is 30 years old, but also nearing its end, with only two more launches scheduled; NASA will use the anniversary Tuesday to announce the locations that the remaining orbiters will be consigned to once the fleet is retired later this year. The end of the shuttle program also means the loss of thousands of jobs, adding to the angst. At the same time, what will “replace” the shuttle, at least in the sense of a traditional follow-on human spaceflight program, remains uncertain, with ongoing debates about the viability of commercial crew development and heavy-lift launch vehicles, destinations for human space exploration beyond Earth orbit, and schedules and budgets. That uncertainty about “what next” is arguably as great as it ever has been for human spaceflight since Gagarin’s flight 50 years ago. It’s tempting to blame NASA’s current plight on the decision by the White House over a year ago to cancel the Constellation program after a review by an independent committee. Yet, while that move did cause significant upheaval at NASA and the broader space community, that decision and the ensuing debate are arguably symptomatic of more fundamental forces driving human spaceflight policy. Moreover, those forces suggest that time might be running out for a conventional human spaceflight program like those of the last half-century. One of those forces is the simple fact that the Cold War is over. That competition between the United States and the Soviet Union kickstarted human spaceflight, as both countries poured massive resources into their respective programs in a quest to rack up a series of firsts and demonstrate their overall technological superiority. The momentum built up in the early years of the Space Age carried over into the following decades, shaping decisions like the development of the space shuttle and space station, and even, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War’s end, bringing Russia into the project so that its engineers could work on peaceful space projects rather than missiles for Third World nations. However, 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the momentum that propelled human spaceflight efforts has been spent. The International Space Station is now effectively complete, and the shuttle is now nearing its retirement. Cooperation with—even reliance on, in terms of human access to the station—Russia is now the order of the day. Efforts over the last several years to build up China as a new competitor with the United States in human spaceflight have failed to gain traction, perhaps because the Chinese government does not appear to be particularly interested in racing the United States to the Moon or elsewhere. While China does have plans for space stations and perhaps, much farther in the future, human missions to the Moon, their program has been proceeding at almost a glacial pace: the last crewed Chinese spaceflight, Shenzhou 7, was two and a half years ago. That lack of an external impetus makes it all the more vital to come up with compelling internal reasons for NASA to maintain a human spaceflight program. Yet, that has proven difficult. There’s no shortage of reasons, from scientific research to economic benefits to national prestige, but none of them, alone or in combination, have provided the desired policy stability for human spaceflight. The Augustine Committee, for example, concluded that “the ultimate goal of human exploration is to chart a path for human expansion into the solar system”—a noble goal, but one that is challenging to translate into nearer term objectives that fit into the decisionmaking cycles of the White House and Congress. “There have been three historic drivers for exploration on this particular planet,” Roger Launius of the National Air and Space Museum said in a speech at the Goddard Memorial Symposium outside Washington last month. Those drivers, he said, can be labeled “the three G’s”: god, greed, and glory. For human spaceflight, the first isn’t relevant—there are no natives to convert on the Moon or Mars—and for the second no one has yet demonstrated a compelling economic rationale. That leaves glory, which has driven human spaceflight to date. “The human spaceflight program has been predicated, in no small measure, on that particular agenda: prestige,” he said. But in an era where the superpower competition that kicked off human spaceflight has end, the influence of prestige as a motivating factor wanes. Today, in the grander scheme of things, space policy is a minor issue that grabs the attention of only a small fraction of members of Congress, most of whom have a parochial interest in the topic because of the presence of NASA facilities in their states or districts. It’s telling that the space-related issue that has attracted the broadest degree of interest among members of Congress is where NASA will transfer the shuttle orbiters upon their retirement. “If you want to understand space policy, the first thing you have to understand about it is that it’s not important,” said Rand Simberg, chairman of the Competitive Space Task Force, in a talk at the Space Access ’11 conference in Phoenix on Saturday. “Nothing bad happens to anybody if we don’t meet a schedule in human spaceflight. Nobody loses an election, nobody gets fired.” Despite these two problems—the loss of the external momentum built up during the Cold War, and the relative internal unimportance of space policy—NASA’s human spaceflight program might continue relatively unaffected by them but for the presence of a third problem: the nation’s looming fiscal crisis. For years some have warned that the growth of entitlements would force the nation to make some hard spending decisions (see [“The Vision for Space Exploration and the retirement of the Baby Boomers (part 1)”](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1106/1), The Space Review, April 14, 2008). But the recent recession and growth of federal spending have accelerated those concerns. As demonstrated by the negotiations last week on a fiscal year 2011 budget (more than six months after the year started), the question is no longer whether spending should be cut, but instead by how much, and where. Last week the House Budget Committee released [its budget blueprint](http://budget.house.gov/UploadedFiles/PathToProsperityFY2012.pdf), which includes a call to reduce non-security discretionary spending—the category that includes NASA—to below 2008 levels. While the nation’s budget woes won’t be resolved solely by cutting non-security discretionary spending, which accounts for about a fifth of the overall federal budget, it is a much easier target for near-term cuts than defense spending or entitlements. That suggests NASA will feel the budget pinch sooner rather than later. “In the next year or two or three, the reality that NASA cannot have a manned exploration program of traditional proportions within their budget is going to become obvious,” said XCOR Aerospace president Jeff Greason, who served on the Augustine Committee, at Space Access ’11. All that suggests that the window for a traditional government human spaceflight program, like those of the last 50 years, may be closing. Without a strong reason to do so, NASA may find it difficult to defend continued spending on human spaceflight in an era of budget austerity. That window is probably no longer than ten years, as NASA and other ISS partners have recently agreed to keep the station operating through 2020. Without some change in the status quo, it’s not difficult to imagine that, in an era of diminished budgets and lacking a compelling rationale, a future administration and Congress might decide at that time that human spaceflight is simply not worth the cost. The end of a NASA human spaceflight program would not mean the end of human spaceflight, of course. Russia and China have programs, and other spacefaring nations, including India, Japan, and Europe, have shown an interest in developing their own capabilities. Moreover, the commercial sector, while developing slower than some expected, is making progress towards having their own human space capabilities. Within the next few years several companies will have suborbital systems, with orbital systems—developed with or without NASA support—likely to follow.

### Differing approaches doom space exploration and development to policy churn

Patena 11 (Nathaniel J. Patena, Capstone Policy analysis at Perpperdine University, “Revisiting the Final Frontier: American Space Policy in the 21st Century”, <http://www.natepatena.com/downloads/space.pdf>, April 2011) SV

Take, for instance, the differing approaches of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush. Jimmy Carter was a Democrat from Georgia (a state without a large aerospace industry) who had a lifelong interest in social justice. Because he felt that the space shuttle and other existing NASA missions were absorbing money that could instead be used for domestic social programs, Carter tried to cancel the Shuttle and devote more space resources to satellite programs which examined the effects of climate change and deforestation on Earth. This policy partially reversed eight years of existing policy put in place by Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. However, after only four short years, Ronald Reagan assumed office. As a Republican from California (a state with a large, vibrant aerospace industry and multiple NASA and military facilities), Reagan was personally and politically committed to America's space program. Unlike the Earth-science centric policies of Carter, Reagan was far more committed to the military and commercial applications of space technology. As such, Reagan reversed much of Carter's space policy and replaced it with SDI and a renewed commitment to the Space Station and Hubble Space Telescope. By the time George H.W. Bush entered the Oval Office, NASA was confounded with another fundamental approach to space policy - a return to the manned space initiatives of the 1960s. Thus, in just over fifteen years, America's broad space policy assumed four different forms: (1) the near-Earth exploration programs of Nixon/Ford; (2) the Earth-science programs of Carter; (3) the military and commercial programs of Reagan; and (4) the long-range exploration programs of Bush Sr. Figure 5, above, graphically represents the variety and longevity of major manned and unmanned NASA missions since 1958. As the timeline shows, many of America's major space initiatives span several Presidential administrations and many Congresses. For example, the Apollo program was conceived at the end of the Eisenhower administration, took shape during the Kennedy and Johnson era, and lasted through much of the Nixon administration. Similarly, the Space Shuttle Program was appropriated during the Nixon administration, developed during the Ford and Carter years, and operated during the Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations before its dismantling in 2011. The inherent longevity of a successful mission drives NASA's need for political stability. Yet for every program that withstands the test of time, there are several which are altered, abbreviated, or ultimately abandoned. George H.W. Bush's Space Exploration Initiative and George W. Bush's Project Constellation are two prime examples of this unfortunate reality. When proposed, both programs were publicly applauded for their bold objectives and efficient budget proposals. However, Congress eradicated Bush Sr.'s plan long before implementation. And despite Congressional approval and support of NASA leadership, Bush Jr.'s Constellation program was canned only 5 years after development commenced. The inconsistent and unpredictable nature of Executive and Congressional commitment has continued to plague the long-term stability and operational effectiveness of major space initiatives.

### Contradictory unilateral decisions kill space policy effectiveness and doom space exploration to policy churn

Patena 11 (Nathaniel J. Patena, Capstone Policy analysis at Perpperdine University, “Revisiting the Final Frontier: American Space Policy in the 21st Century”, <http://www.natepatena.com/downloads/space.pdf>, April 2011) SV

The final challenge endangering current American space policy is the long-standing leadership vacuum within top political offices and mission agencies. During NASA's glory days of the 1960s, the space program benefitted from an historic wealth of leadership. As President, John F. Kennedy delivered direct and emphatic support, both rhetorically and financially, for American space exploration. Simultaneously, NASA and its operational teams were run by two titans of program history. James E. Webb, the agency's second Chief Administrator, was instrumental in actively lobbying for financial resources, facilities, and personnel. He is also widely credited with saving the Apollo program after the disastrous fire onboard Apollo I which killed three astronauts (National Aeronautics and Space Administration). Simultaneously, Program Director Wernher von Braun singlehandedly developed the American rocketry technology on top of which the Apollo spacecraft were launched. Von Braun, a former Nazi rocket scientist, was so vital to the success of Apollo that he became a household name across America. This combination of Kennedy's political leadership, Webb's organizational leadership, and von Braun's technical leadership drove NASA's unprecedented achievements during the 1960s. Today, America's space program does not benefit from the same outstanding leadership trifecta that existed during the Apollo era. Since the early 1990s, America has struggled to find the right balance of political, organizational, and technical leadership necessary to reignite the country's space program. As outlined in the previous section, political leadership has been intermittent and generally lackluster since 1990. Although George H.W. Bush had lofty goals for the space program, he lacked the political capital to push his plans through Congress. Despite his token support for the International Space Station, Bill Clinton was rather apathetic to space initiatives. George W. Bush was able to push the Constellation Program through Congress, but these achievements were short-lived, as Barack Obama cancelled the program five years after its adoption. In short, this dearth of political leadership can be attributed to insufficient political capital, disinterest, or contradictory movements. Finally, the President and Congress have also struggled to select the right organizational and technical personnel to lead NASA. Daniel Goldin served as NASA's Chief Administrator from the end of the Bush (Sr.) administration through the beginning of the Bush (Jr.) administration. Although Goldin succeeded in abating Bill Clinton's push to cancel key space programs, he was largely ineffective in developing and supporting new initiatives (Logsdon, 2008). Realizing the need for sound financial management, George W. Bush selected Sean O'Keefe as Goldin's replacement. O'Keefe served as a top White House budget advisor before being selected for the position (Logsdon, 2008). In 2003, an independent review board released its report on the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. In the document, the board cited a "failure of national leadership" for not providing "strategic vision" to guide America's space program (Logsdon, 2008). In response, George W. Bush revealed his Constellation Program, hoping to correct some of the aforementioned errors. In support of this highly technical initiative, he selected Michael Griffin, a top scientist and engineer, to replace Sean O'Keefe as NASA's chief. Since the end of the Constellation program, Barack Obama appointed Charles Bolden to the post. Obama hopes that Bolden, a retired astronaut, can bridge the gap between major space programs. In short, this high turnover rate of top NASA officials underscores the need for multi-faceted leadership that can fuse organizational management with technical expertise and political maneuvering.

## Top-down Mandate bad

### Top-down directives short circuit input from the scientific community.

Pace 09 (Scott, Director of the Space Policy Institute-George Washington, A Day Without Space: Economic Security Ramifications, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/728.pdf)

As to the question of how you would implement this, another thing the scientific community does is hold peer reviews. They have decadal surveys on science and astrophysics and people come in and beat each other up as to what the most important question is and what sequence they should ask them and so forth. Then you take those scientific priorities and create a program supporting those priorities in order. Those kinds of external peer-reviewed debates don’t normally happen in the human spaceflight community because the human space flight community is reacting to top-level directions from the president. One way the human space flight community might think about having an external review around the questions posed by the president and Congress would be to ask what the most appropriate way to answer them might be. For example, if that group met hypothetically, I would imagine that a lot of attention would be focused on living off the land with issues of resource utilization as the area making the most progress in the near term. You can imagine things you can do to answer that question. It is a lot harder to answer the question of what is economically possible in space because the commercial part of space economy is not as mature. So if you were doing a decadal survey on human space flight, you would probably be focusing on ISRU, but you would leave open a door for thinking about other activities incorporating the private sector as they develop.

### Top down mandates result in policy churn-education system proves

C.U.B.E . 7 (Council of Urban Boards of Education, Affiliate of the National Schools Boards Association, “Putting a stop to policy churn”, <https://ebssp.eboardsolutions.com/sites/sbgtask/Documents/B.%20PUBLIC%20EDUCATION%20-%20REPORTS/B.10%20Examples%20of%20how%20school%20boards%20are%20addressing%20problematic%20policies,%20policy%20development,%20consistency,%202007.pdf>, July-August 2007) SV

The takeover of the District of Columbia schools by Mayor Adrian Fenty this summer could bring a steadying influence to the longterm policy direction of the 55,000-student school system—and perhaps accelerate student performance gains. Then again, the takeover could prove yet another in a long line of leadership changes and long-term policy drift that, over two decades, has led to lost opportunities to move the district forward. The takeover could be just the latest example of what governance experts call “policy churn.” It will be years before the fate of the D.C. schools is clear. But Fenty’s choice for the city’s new schools chancellor, Michelle Rhee, is well aware of the risks inherent in this leadership change—and she says she intends to think carefully about the cost of any major policy shift. “I’m not coming at this with a sense that I’ve got to create something new from scratch,” she says. “People ask about what new things I’m going to do, but I’m not interested in thinking about what’s new. I’m looking at what is the most effective thing to do ... My goal is to build on the strong foundation of the work that came before.” Others have voiced similar intentions over the years—and found their efforts sabotaged by events. For policy churn is an all-too-real danger for urban school systems. It happens when districts experience a revolving door of superintendents, none staying long enough to provide leadership stability. It happens when school boards rubber stamp the initiatives of superintendents, who want to put their own marks on the school systems and discard the work of their predecessors. It happens when superintendents lose the support of their school boards, and districts are distracted by growing discontent, uncertainty, and conflict. It’s not always the superintendent at the center of such troubles, either, says Thomas Glass, a noted education professor at the University of Memphis. To some extent, the entire American system of governance is susceptible to policy churn. “Would you be surprised that board turnover is greater than superintendent turnover?” he asks. “Many new boards don’t agree with the actions of the previous boards, so that’s an issue. And there’s political churn in state capitals and at the federal level [where new education mandates arise]—and it all has immense effects on what these urban districts can do.” Frederick Hess, who wrote extensively on the issue in his 1999 book, *Spinning Wheels: The Politics of Urban School Reform*, has attributed part of the phenomenon to the glamour of school reform and its political benefits.

## Ext- kills Aerospace & Leadership

### Policy churn tanks the aerospace industry and US space leadership.

Dignan 11 (Larry, editor-in-chief of SmartPlanet, NASA in flux: Is U.S. space expertise being hollowed out?, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/smart-takes/nasa-in-flux-is-us-space-expertise-being-hollowed-out/15189)

The United States’ ever-fluctuating plans for NASA is threatening the science and engineering brainpower and workforce development needed to remain a space player. That worry was emphasized in a U.S. House Committee on Science Space and Technology subcommittee hearing devoted to NASA’s transition from a plan that revolved around going to the Moon to one focused on more scientific endeavors. Since the Constellation project was canceled 13 months ago, NASA hasn’t come up with a plan to come up with a Space Shuttle replacement. The witnesses for the hearing, which included a NASA scolding for turning in prepared testimony at the 11th hour, included: Douglas Cook, associate administrator, exploration systems mission directorate at NASA; Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University; James Maser, chairman of the corporate membership committee at the American Institute of Aeronautics. There’s a lot to digest in the hearing and the prepared remarks reveal that NASA is really just getting going on its new direction. The big picture, however, revolves around the brainpower behind NASA and the space economy. As NASA switches gears with every administration and Congress it gets increasingly difficult to recruit talent, innovate and create jobs. Without a comprehensive space strategy, how can businesses and the country plan ahead? Pace’s testimony reflected reality of a space strategy in flux. The history of U.S. human spaceflight over the past two decades is one of continual turbulence with occasional episodes of progress. There are many sources of policy instability – some internal to NASA, some embedded in the relationship between successive Administrations and Congresses. The net result has been a lack of human rated launch vehicle and spacecraft development experience while Shuttle operations continued and various R&D programs came and went. Unlike the scientific community at NASA, there was not a steady progression of spacecraft development programs in which both NASA and industry could gain and maintain expertise. The rebuilding of expertise was occurring on the Constellation program, notably with the Ares 1-X flight test, but that progress has not been followed up on. Pace followed up with the following stat: In the last 20 years, NASA has spent 7 percent of its budget on canceled space programs. This ebb and flow between NASA funding—as well as the priority changes between exploration and science—mean that you can’t effectively prepare a workforce. By time someone is trained, the NASA plan changes. Pace noted: There are many ways to monitor transition efforts, from workforce plans, to completion of hardware milestones. However, the most important consideration has always been people, both inside NASA and in industry. Government and industry cannot have coherent workforce transition plans if they cannot define what skill mixes they need today or in the future. Skill mixes cannot be defined absent a clear understanding of government roles and responsibilities (e.g., what work is to be done in will be contracted out) and a stable set of mission requirements that are part of a larger architecture and exploration strategy. The lack of a U.S. focus on human lunar return and an associated architecture is one of the most serious programmatic gaps that make transition planning difficult. In other words, the workforce lacks a space plan to rally around. Pace added that a lunar trip doesn’t have to be the only plan. But there needs to be some project to develop “intellectual capital for developing new spaceflight capabilities.” Maser added that the aerospace industry employs 800,000 people in the U.S., supports 2 million middle class jobs and 30,000 suppliers. A clear space strategy is needed to protect those jobs. Maser’s biggest worry: “If the highly skilled aerospace workforce in the U.S. is allowed to atrophy, it will have widespread consequences for our future wellbeing and success as a nation,” said Maser. Cooke noted that NASA is “excited about moving ahead.” NASA is “working to build a bridge between the past program and the future by transitioning previous and ongoing development work, best practices and lessons learned from the Constellation program,” said Cooke. The problem: NASA is still developing plans for the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). According to Cooke, civil servants in NASA “should be confident that there is exciting and meaningful work for them to do following the retirement of the Shuttle and transition from Constellation.” What that work is exactly remains to be seen.

## Ext- kills Aerospace confidence

Policy Churn and Budget Instability kills the Aerospace industry workforce and supplier base

Blakey 10 (Marion C. Blakey, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Aerospace Industries Association, “Tipping Point: Maintaining the Health of the National Security Space Industrial Base”, <http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/aia_report_tipping_point.pdf>, September 2010) SV

nt’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) – now known as the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) – there is a “significant shortfall in the [numbers of ] 30-40 year-old engineers and scientists supporting the space industry.” Seasoned employees in the 30-40 year-old range are not present in sufficient numbers to take the reins when older employees retire. A 2009 national security space study by CAIG provided detailed data on national security space budgets and their correlation to workforce levels. During the 1990s, flattening of national security space budgets hampered industry in attracting the best and brightest to its programs. CAIG data for 2008 showed a national security space workforce largely made up of individuals in the 50 year old range, with the remainder falling mainly in the under-30 range. This development points to potential retention issues, as well as a looming retirement crisis. When placed on a distinctive “U” shape, with pronounced spikes in the under-30 and over-50 age ranges and an equally pronounced trough in the age ranges between 30 and 50. Elsewhere, workforce levels are also less than robust. It is estimated that from 2006 through 2010 the average total NASA workforce was around 172,014.23 This is down significantly from the peak NASA workforce average of 222,012 from 1991 through 1995. Employment in the aerospace industry, specifically workers who develop missiles and space vehicles averaged 75,000 from 2004 through 2008, down from an average of 81,000 during the prior decade.24 Budget instability can often exacerbate workforce shortages. An updated version of CAIG’s 2009 national security space analysis shows significant budget instability in the national security space sector writ large. CAIG’s 2009 analysis shows that individual programs with stable budgets have executed well and retain healthy workforce levels. Conversely, programs with unstable budgets have executed poorly and did not retain a stable workforce. Budget instability not only causes challenges for prime contractors, but also harms subcontractors and contributes to cost increases in parts and components. Adding program terminations to the mix intensifies workforce challenges. For example, with the end of the Air Force’s Transformational Satellite Communications System – which was intended to be the military’s next generation satellite communications program – it will be important to ensure our nation does not lose the critical skilled workforce and suppliers associated with that effort. Without a robust pool of space professionals, we risk losing our nation’s edge in producing the world’s preeminent space technologies, especially as nations like China and India annually graduate thousands more engineers than U.S. universities.

### Policy Churn kills key Aerospace assets and kills confidence

Slazer 11 (Frank Slazer, Vice President of Space Aerospace Industries Association, “Frank Slazer Statement: Hearing on Contributions of Space to National Imperatives”, <http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.rss.html?pid=37101>, 5/18/2011) SV

Despite the clear bipartisan direction provided in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and in the fiscal year 2011 Continuing Resolution (CR), substantial uncertainty remains over the direction NASA will take--most specifically on the new heavy-lift space launch system. The impact of the long delayed fiscal year 2011 CR, the current budget climate and the impending gap in America's ability to launch crews into space--after decades of ever increasing capability--are causing ripple effects throughout the space industrial base and highly trained space workforce in both private and public sectors. Fluctuating budgets and delayed programs take their toll on schedule, production and maintaining a skilled workforce--exacerbated by the winding down of the space shuttle program. This funding and programmatic instability may result in the permanent loss of this highly skilled, unique human capital by reducing the options for retaining this specially trained and skilled workforce. Our nation's aerospace workforce is a perishable national treasure; experienced aerospace talent, once lost, may be unrecoverable and new workers without this critical experience may take years to train. Unfortunately, the on-again off-again plans for the Shuttle's replacement over the past decade have led to considerable uncertainty not only at NASA--where civil service positions are protected--but across the entire industrial base where firms are faced with wrenching decisions to let highly skilled personnel go because of the lack of clear direction.

### Policy Churn kills the Aerospace Industry-resources and workforce

Stein 11 (Keith Stein, Writer at DC Space News Examiner, “Critical juncture for U.S. human spaceflight”, <http://www.examiner.com/dc-in-washington-dc/critical-juncture-for-u-s-human-spaceflight>, 5/18/2011) SV

The U.S. aerospace industry sustains nearly 11 million jobs, including many high-skilled, high-technology positions. The U.S. aerospace manufacturing industry remains the single largest contributor to the nation’s balance of trade, exporting $80.5 billion and importing $27.2 billion in relevant products in 2010, for a net surplus of $53.3 billion. “Substantial uncertainty remains over the direction NASA will take—most specifically on the new heavy-lift space launch system,” Slazer told the committee. “The current budget climate and the impending gap in America’s ability to launch crews into space—after decades of ever increasing capability—are causing ripple effects throughout the space industrial base and highly trained space workforce in both private and public sectors.” “Fluctuating budgets and delayed programs take their toll on schedule, production and maintaining a skilled workforce—exacerbated by the winding down of the space shuttle program,“ he said. “The on-again off-again plans for the Shuttle’s replacement over the past decade have led to considerable uncertainty not only at NASA—where civil service positions are protected—but across the entire industrial base where firms are faced with wrenching decisions to let highly skilled personnel go because of the lack of clear direction,” Slazer said.

## Aerospace key to Econ

### Aerospace industry key to the economy.

Walker et al 02 (Robert, chair of the US Aerospace Commission, Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, http://trade.gov/static/aero\_rpt\_aero\_commission.pdf)

Our national security, economic growth, quality of life, and scientific achievements now depend on a myriad of aerospace products and services. These benefits we enjoy as a nation are the direct result of U.S. leadership in aerospace. Unfortunately, most Americans take the benefits of aerospace leadership for granted. Meanwhile, foreign nations clearly recognize the potential benefits from aerospace and are attempting to wrest global leadership away from us. Nevertheless, where we have the national will, such as in defense, we continue to be the world leader. Where we do not have the national will, such as in civil aviation and commercial space, our leadership position is at risk. National Security. Aerospace technologies form the strategic and tactical backbone of U.S. military capabilities, providing global mobility, space-based communications and intelligence, defense against airborne threats, sea and aerospace control, longrange precision strike, and protection and tactical mobility for ground forces. Aerospace capabilities provide unique contributions to U.S. national security as well as underwrite the capabilities of allied coalitions with whom we are involved in the vital work of maintaining international peace and security. Economic Growth. The aerospace industry is a powerful force within the U.S. economy and one of the nation’s most competitive sectors in the global marketplace. It contributes over 15 percent to our Gross Domestic Product and supports over 15 million high quality American jobs. Aerospace products provide the largest trade surplus of any manufacturing sector. Last year, more than 600 million passengers relied on U.S. commercial air transportation and over 150 million people were transported on general aviation aircraft. Over 40 percent of the value of U.S. freight is transported by air. Aerospace capabilities have enabled e-commerce to flourish with overnight mail and parcel delivery, and just-in-time manufacturing.

## Aerospace key to heg

### Strong aerospace industry is key to US leadership and national security.

Walker et al 02 (Robert, chair of the US Aerospace Commission, Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, http://trade.gov/static/aero\_rpt\_aero\_commission.pdf)

Aerospace will be at the core of America’s leadership and strength in the 21st century. The role of aerospace in establishing America’s global leadership was incontrovertibly proved in the last century. This industry opened up new frontiers to the world, such as freedom of flight and access to space. It provided products that defended our nation, sustained our economic prosperity and safeguarded the very freedoms we commonly enjoy as Americans. It has helped forge new inroads in medicine and science, and fathered the development of commercial products that have improved our quality of life. Given a continued commitment to pushing the edge of man’s engineering, scientific and manufacturing expertise, there is the promise of still more innovations and new frontiers yet to be discovered. It is imperative that the U.S. aerospace industry remains healthy to preserve the balance of our leadership today and to ensure our continued leadership tomorrow.

# Politics Link Differential

### Commissions make unpopular policies bipartisan

Glassman & Strauss 11 (Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011

Solutions to policy problems produced within the normal legislative process may also suffer politically from charges of partisanship.30 Similar charges may be made against investigations conducted by Congress.31 The non-partisan or bipartisan character of most congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations less susceptible to such charges and more politically acceptable to a diverse viewpoints. The bipartisan or nonpartisan arrangement can potentially give their recommendations strong credibility, both in Congress and among the public, even when dealing with divisive issues of public policy.32 Commissions may also give political factions space to negotiate compromises in good faith, bypassing the short-term tactical political maneuvers that accompany public negotiations.33 Similarly, because commission members are not elected, they may be better suited to suggesting unpopular, but necessary, policy solutions.34

### Commissions are bipartisan – make unpopular issues bipartisan

Glassman & Strauss 11 (Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011

Throughout American history, Congress has found commissions to be useful entities in the legislative process. By establishing a commission, Congress can potentially provide a highly visible forum for important issues and assemble greater expertise than may be readily available within the legislature. Complex policy issues can be examined over a longer time period and in greater depth than may be practical for legislators. Finally, the non-partisan or bipartisan character of most congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more politically acceptable, both in Congress and among the public.

### Commissions are bipartisan – Congressional Oversight

Schwinn 10 (Steven D. Schwinn, Associate Professor of Law at John Marshall Law School, “Obama Establishes Bi-Partisan Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform”, <http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/02/obama-establishes-bipartisan-commission-on-fiscal-responsibility-and-reform.html>. February 19, 2010) SV

President Obama signed an executive order yesterday establishing a bi-partisan commission to address federal spending and the federal debt. The move comes after the Senate rejected bi-partisan legislation to create a similar commission. Under the EO, President Obama will appoint the chairs (one from each party) and six members (no four of which may be from one party). The Speaker of the House, the Senate Majority Leader, the Minority Leader of the House, and the Minority Leader in the Senate will each appoint three members (who must be sitting members of their respective houses). President Obama appointed Erskine Bowles, President Clinton's Chief of Staff, and former Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY), the former Republican Senate Leader, as co-chairs. Minority Leaders Senator Mitch McConnell and Representative John Boehner said they'll cooperate and appoint members next week. President Obama gave the Commission the following task: Identifying policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long run. Specifically, the Commission shall propose recommendations designed to balance the budget, excluding interest payments on the debt, by 2015. . . . In addition, the Commission shall propose recommendations that meaningfully improve the long-run fiscal outlook, including changes to address the growth of entitlement spending and the gap between the projected revenues and expenditures of the Federal Government. The Commission obviously cannot have authority to bind Congress. Instead, it operates as an attempt to help solve a collective action problem--that every single member of Congress has an incentive to push for disproportionate spending in his or her home district, and therefore together the institution is ill-equipped to deal with a fiscal crisis. The Commission's recommendations can provide political pressure on Congress, even if they do not legally bind Congress. A model is the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, the BRAC, which helps to solve a similar collective action problem by studying and making recommendations about military base closures and moves. Unlike President Obama's Commission, however, the BRAC was created by Congress through legislation. This difference is unlikely to diminish the influence of the Commission, however: If both parties participate, its recommendations will or won't be politicized, whether it was established by statute or by EO.

# Solvency

## Perception Solvency

### Commissions are key to policy popularity and solve perception

Glassman & Strauss 11 (Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011

By establishing a commission, Congress can often provide a highly visible forum for important issues that might otherwise receive scant attention from the public.38 Commissions often are composed of notable public figures, allowing personal prestige to be transferred to policy solutions.39 Meetings and press releases from a commission may receive significantly more attention in the media than corresponding information coming directly from members of congressional committees. Upon completion of a commission’s work product, public attention may be temporarily focused on a topic that otherwise would receive scant attention, thus increasing the probability of congressional action within the policy area.40

### Commissions result in policy change

Morgan 10 (Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, “The Future of NASA: Space Policy Issues Facing Congress”, <http://www.tennessee.edu/govrelations/docs/NASA_future.pdf>, July 8, 2010)

To advise NASA on implementation of the Vision, President Bush established a Commission on the Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy, chaired by Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr.9 The Aldridge Commission issued its report in June 2004.10 In April 2005, NASA established an Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) to identify a strategy and technical architecture for implementing the Vision. The ESAS issued its final report in November 2005.11 Since then, the reports of the Aldridge Commission and the ESAS have been the baseline for NASA’s space exploration plans.

## Solves Space Leadership Adv

### Establishing an independent commission to determine space policy solves US space leadership.

Logsdon 11 (John, former Director-Space Policy Institute, and member-NASA Advisory Council, “Chapter 27: Emerging Domestic Structures: Organizing the Presidency for Spacepower,” http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch27.html)

The Space Commission also observed that "the President might find it useful to have access to high-level advice in developing a long-term strategy for sustaining the nation's role as the leading space-faring nation." Thus, the commission recommended the creation of a "Presidential Space Advisory Group" that would be "unconstrained in scope and provide recommendations that enable the nation to capitalize on its investment in people, technology, infrastructure and capabilities in all space sectors." Such an independent group could also "identify new technical opportunities that could advance U.S. interests in space."7 From the perspective of maximizing and making best use of U.S. spacepower, these organizational recommendations seem to have been particularly well conceived. But when the administration of George W. Bush came to the White House and the chairman of the Space Commission, Donald Rumsfeld, became Secretary of Defense, they were not implemented, and many of the problems pointed out by the Space Commission persisted or even worsened. In 2008, a congressionally mandated "Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space"—more frequently known as the Allard Commission, after its congressional sponsor, Senator Gordon Allard (R–CO), or the Young Committee, after the panel's chair, A. Thomas Young—reached similar conclusions to those of the Space Commission. The group recommended that "the President should establish and lead the execution of a National Space Strategy" and that "to implement the strategy, the President should reestablish the National Space Council, chaired by the National Security Adviser, with the authority to assign roles and responsibilities, and to adjudicate disputes over requirements and resources."8

# 2NC Blocks

## Theory

### CP is key to good space policymaking- must analyze whether or not our policy goals are being implemented efficiently.

Newton 11 (Elizabeth, Director for Space Policy- U Alabama-Huntsville, with Michael D. Griffin, United States space policy and international partnership, Space Policy 27 n 1, 2011)

Is the USA better off with the new (emerging) space policy? In some areas, yes, in some, no; and in some, it is too early to tell. In human spaceflight chronic under-funding and a political failure to persist toward goals have engendered a repetitive and distasteful cycle of churn that in the long haul is more expensive than if a plan had been committed to and executed. Policy changes on some fronts will be celebrated by international partners and rued on other fronts, where continued interdependence will be approached cautiously. We should be diligent in monitoring whether the risks and time-delays created by policy change are proven to be worth the benefits, that is, we need to create a ‘closed loop’ on the system, to gauge regularly and systematically whether we are achieving what we want. A vision of American excellence and leadership in security, political economy, and influence provides a framework for this evaluation and for the goals that we set for ourselves. While accountability and data are not beloved in the political process, we will not be able to move beyond debates that the majority of Americans view as arcane, unless we zero in on data-driven evaluations of policy’s performance. Magical thinking might make for good politics, but it makes poor policy.

## AT: Perm Do CP

### “Should” means “must” and requires immediate legal effect

Summers ‘94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16) [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti* means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or *immediately effective*, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective *in the future [in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

### “The” means whole

Webster’s ‘5 (Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary)

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

### “Government” is all 3 branches

Black’s Law ‘90 (Dictionary, p. 695)

“[*Government*] In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.”

# Aff Answers

## Top Down Mandates Good

### Presidential top-down leadership key to spacepower.

Logsdon 11 (John, former Director-Space Policy Institute, and member-NASA Advisory Council, “Chapter 27: Emerging Domestic Structures: Organizing the Presidency for Spacepower,” http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch27.html)

If there is to be a national strategy for space informed by a comprehensive theory of spacepower, it must come from the center of government: "The bureaucracy is no more equipped to manufacture grand designs for Government programs than carpenters, electricians, and plumbers are to be architects. But if an architect attempted to build a house, the results might well be disastrous."3 The White House must act as the "architect" for a U.S. space strategy and must persuade the various centers of spacepower within and outside the Federal Government that it is in their mutual interest to work together in turning that strategy into action. How best to achieve Presidential control over executive branch agencies is a classic problem of government organization, and it is basically no different in the space sector than in other areas of government activity.

### Setting mandates solve policy churn

Logsdon 11 (John, former Director-Space Policy Institute, and member-NASA Advisory Council, “Chapter 27: Emerging Domestic Structures: Organizing the Presidency for Spacepower,” http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch27.html)

A second observation is that a separate White House space policy organization, such as a space council, has not been successful in demonstrating its superiority as an organizational approach. Although the National Aeronautics and Space Council existed from 1958 to 1973, it never became the major, much less the sole, means for developing a national approach to what would now be called spacepower. With only a few exceptions, other Executive Office organizations, particularly the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council, not to mention the White House budget office, and the heads of the executive branch space agencies were not willing to defer to the council as the primary forum for developing space policy options for the President. Reestablishing the National Space Council in 1989 was an initiative forced on a reluctant White House by Congress. In its 4 years of operation, an activist council staff managed to alienate most executive agencies. Its major policy proposal, the Space Exploration Initiative, was stillborn; the council did not prove an effective mechanism for rallying broad support for a Presidential space initiative or for convincing the NASA leadership that the initiative was the proper course of action to follow. One possible reason for the space council's lack of influence is that it has been headed during most of its history by a Vice President who was not a close ally of the President, who had no strong Washington political base of his own, and thus could not call on either the President's or his own power to back up the guidance provided by the council and its staff. In addition, by operating outside of the National Security Council structure, the space council found it very difficult to exert influence on national security space issues.

## No Policy Churn

### No Major Policy Churn-Continuity of purpose

Buenneke et al 9 ( Richard H. Buenneke, senior policy analyst at The Aerospace Corporation, Richard Dal Bello, R. Cargill Hall and Roger D. Launius, The Washington Roundtable on Science and Public policy, “ National Space Policy: Does it Matter?”, <http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/439.pdf>, 12/19/2009) SV

There was broad continuity of purpose across the government and I guess this shouldn’t be too surprising, as there is actually broad continuity thinking on the space program. I had worked peripherally with the Reagan SIG (Senior Interagency Group) process, then run by Col. (soon to be General) Roger DeCook. I worked briefly with them and actually held a position in the first Bush administration and then ran space policy for the Clinton administration. There are probably a dozen other people I could name – some of them in this room – that have worked on space issues across admini-strations. Because there has been a lot of continuity in human beings, it is not surpris-ing that there has been policy stability.

## Commissions Fail

### Commissions cost too much and there’s no guarantee Congress will take the recommendation

Glassman & Strauss 11 (Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011

A third criticism of commissions is that they have high costs and low returns. Congressional commission costs vary widely, ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to over $10 million. Coupled with this objection is the problem of congressional response to the work of a commission; in most cases, Congress is under no obligation to act, or even respond to the work of a commission. If legislators disagree with the results or recommendations of a commission’s work, they may simply ignore it. In addition, there is no guarantee that any commission will produce a balanced product; commission members may have their own agendas, biases, and pressures. Or they may simply produce a mediocre work product.46 Finally, advisory boards create economic and legislative inefficiency if they function as patronage devices, with Members of Congress using commission positions to pay off political debts.47

### Commissions are vulnerable – partisan warfare

Andrews 10 (Edmond Andrews, Writer at the Fiscal Times, “Deficit Panel Faces Obstacles in Poisonous Political Atmosphere”, <http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2010/02/18/Fiscal-Commission-Faces-Big-Obstacles.aspx#page1>, February 18, 2010

With mid-term elections less than nine months away, and Republicans capitalizing on populist anger against Washington, the gridlock is only intensifying. With Republican backing necessary for the commission to advance recommendations, the GOP could deadlock the effort simply by withholding its support from any final plan. "In terms of pure politics, Republicans have no incentive to play," said Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office and the top economic adviser to Republican Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign. "The deficit is a problem that the Democrats own," Mr. Holtz-Eakin continued. "If you have a commission, it becomes the commission’s problem. Republicans look at this and say, why should we let Democrats off the hook?" But partisan warfare isn’t the only problem. The commission also faces suspicion and resentment from Democratic lawmakers, some of whom see it as an attempt to circumvent their power and others who fear that it will be used to rush through cuts in Social Security and Medicare.

## N/U

### Labs and Research Groups are already conducting scientific research on the best way to approach SBSP

NSS ’07 (National Space Society, “Report to the Director, National Security Space Office Interim Assessment” http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf. October 10, 2007)

For those applications that favor or rely upon liquid hydrocarbon fuels, America’s national labs are pursuing several promising avenues of research to manufacture carbon‐neutral synthetic fuels (synfuels) from direct solar thermal energy or radiated/electrical SBSP. The lab initiatives are developing technologies to efficiently split energy‐neutral feedstocks or upgrade lower‐grade fuels (such as biofuels) into higher energy density liquid hydrocarbons. Put plainly, SBSP could be utilized to split hydrogen from water and the carbon monoxide (syngas) from carbon dioxide which can then be combined to manufacture any desired hydrocarbon fuel, including gasoline, diesel, kerosene and jet fuel. This technology is still in its infancy, and significant investment will be required to bring this technology to a high level of technical readiness and meet economic and efficiency goals. This technology enables a carbon‐neutral (closed carbon‐cycle) hydrocarbon economy driven by clean renewable sources of power, which can utilize the existing global fuel infrastructure without modification. This opportunity is of particular interest to traditional oil companies. The ability to use renewable energy to serve as the energy feedstock for existing fuels, in a carbon neutral cycle, is a “total game changer” that deserves significant attention.