# Communicative Rationality Supplement

## Intro

This file is part of the Hoya-Spartan Scholars’ First Wave of research and is a supplemental file to the Transportation Rationality Kritik. Because my personal interest in this research assignment was to become better at researching answers to the K, I focused more on researching affirmative responses to the K that did not overlap too much with the existing answers (for example, the stakeholders argument in the Mohammadi cards is a pretty common argument against this K in the literature.)

## Notes—Aff

The best aff argument in this supplemental file is the Polarization disad to the alt because it impact turns Habermasian deliberation. This is distinct from the stakeholders argument (Mohammadi) in that Hook and Rienstra argue the *public*, even without co-option from stakeholders, will cause deliberation to fail.

In general, the Hook and Rienstra article is pretty powerful on empirical and psychological warrants. At the moment, there isn’t a particularly convincing warrant for why people would change in a communicative setting apart from Wilson and Habermas asserting it and quoting “empirics,” which are really “deliberative polls.” The best answer to people changing their behavior is psychological reasons people just won’t change (the first card on the A2 People Change block.)

If they attempt to quote “empirics,” the second card *usually* applies. From what I’ve seen, any evidence of people changing their minds relies on “deliberative polling” where people’s initial views are polled and their views during or at the end of deliberation and discourse are polled. However, these deliberative polls involve government experts and transportation planners debriefing the public and informing them; Habermas would certainly reject this, meaning their “empirics” don’t support their specific alt which (unless they frame it differently) puts experts at the same level as the public.

There’s also a decent antipolitics card in here. It doesn’t go quite as far as it should ideally, but it could be spun as a decent antipolitics link. Another good use of that card is to make the argument that a true Habermasian alt would require the people at the communicative meeting to take responsibility for building the aff and that they cannot simply give the project back to planners and experts. Thus, even if they win that the alternative would result in the public endorsing the plan through communicative rationality, the plan would never be implemented, eliminating the floating PIK and making case a disad to the alt.

## Notes—Neg

Be careful with the Rottengatter evidence. He believes that civic input is a good idea generally, but argues that power can often interfere with the success of civic input. On the whole, Rothengatter believes that while we should make every effort to get civic input, power in the context of megaprojects (where multiple lobbies and interests are at stake) can interfere. I’m not fully sure what the strategic utility of the Rothengatter evidence is, but it’s available if you wish to use it.

# \*\*\*AFF\*\*\*

## Alt Fails / Disads to Alt

### 2AC Alt Fails

#### People rationalize to draw conclusions supporting their preconceptions—causes fighting and the discussion goes on forever—empirics and psychology prove

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

In Pronin, Puccio and Ross’s examination of misunderstanding, the social psychological aspects of interpersonal and intergroup communication are reviewed with respect to rationality. The authors conclude that ‘People and groups who disagree about matters of mutual concern not only interact in conflictual ways; they also interpret, and frequently misinterpret, each other’s words and deeds’ (Pronin, Puccio and Ross, 2002, p. 636). Moreover, as suggested above, ‘the recipients of persuasive arguments often prove to be rationalizing rather than rational agents, and as such are influenced less by logical rigor or objective evidence than by the interests and preconceptions that they bring to their task’ (Pronin, Puccio and Ross, 2002, p. 636). During deliberation, during communicative interactions, participants might assume they are being rational, but empirical evidence points very much to processes of the mind demonstrating that they are in fact merely rationalizing, explaining away their newfound beliefs, or explaining away their refusal to drop their old beliefs. Rationalizing agents, persons who bring reasons to explain what they do, are not the agents that Habermas wants: he needs agents to give public reasons that are rational in Habermasian sense. Furthermore, the agent needs to be reflexive enough to understand the difference between public reasons for ‘the good’, versus reasons given publicly to defend any good. What’s more, there are psychological effects in play that encourage agents to understate other people’s rationality, and overstate their own. The study highlights the difficulty of consensus: ‘blindness about the role that … biases play in shaping our own political views, and a penchant for seeing self-serving or ideologically determined biases in other’s views … exacerbates group conflict’ (Pronin, Puccio and Ross, 2002, p. 637). Using Piaget as a point of departure, the authors explain that people do indeed develop ‘skill at anticipating specific sources of perceptual, cognitive and motivational bias’ but what rationalists tend to then overlook is that in Piaget’s account the ‘process never reaches fruition… adults continue to show important limitations in perspective taking’ (Pronin, Puccio and Ross, 2002, pp. 641-642). The ‘lay epistemology’ that limited perspective-taking results in is termed naïve realism and leads people to assume that their world view enjoys ‘particular authenticity’ and that other agents will share exactly that worldview ‘if they are attentive, rational, and objective perceivers of reality and open-minded seekers of the truth.’ As a result, misunderstandings and disagreement grow from agents’ ‘failure to recognize the operation of such biases in their own judgements and decisions’. Agents then even more firmly clinging to ‘misguided notion’ that that they themselves ‘see the world, and evaluate divisive issues, in a uniquely clear, unbiased, and “unmediated” fashion’ (Pronin, Puccio and Ross, 2002, p. 641). The end result pushes Habermasian agency further from empirical reality: Cognitive biases [lead agents] to see and remember a reality that is consistent with their beliefs and expectations, while motivational biases cause them to see what is consistent with their needs, wishes and self-interest. Through such information-processing biases, two opposing partisans who encounter the same facts, historical accounts, scientific evidence, or even witness the same events can find additional support for their preconceptions (Pronin, Puccio and Ross, 2002, p. 649). How does an agent, who must meet the agency stipulations spelled out above counter the evidence offered here?

#### That takes out every assumption of your K

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

3.6 Rationality – careful conclusions If we feel comfortable accepting that agents are ‘often controlled by emotions and desires that do not fit the model of calculating rationality’, that individual agency is ’bounded by limitations on memory and computational capabilities’ and that the ‘experimental analysis of inference and choice has revealed that … human judgement and decision making is often inconsistent with the maxims of rationality’ then we might see problems with deliberative outcomes, and universal assumptions of communicative rationality (Quattrone and Tversky, 2000, p. 452). Rationality sceptics might assume this means that human agency is completely capricious and irrational, that such questioning takes us one step too far. Indeed, certain normative principles do not seem to hold in certain circumstances, such as invariance and coherence; the safe conclusion is merely ‘that judgement and choice – like perception and memory – are prone to distortion and error.’ The significance here is that errors are common and systematic, not idiosyncratic and random, and thus ‘there is little hope for a theory of choice that is both normatively acceptable and descriptively adequate’ (Quattrone and Tversky, 2000, p. 472). Habermas’s expectations of his agents are both conceptually and psychologically heroic. While he may not have attended sufficiently to the available empirical research at the time of outlining his preconditions for communicative rationality, such a defence remains untenable for contemporary theorists. After all, the purpose of social science is to provide better theories, with more predictive explanations of social behaviour. Although, admittedly, this survey of empirical findings is not exhaustive, it is nevertheless instructive. Quite simply, and worryingly for Habermas: voluntary action can proceed without accompanying conscious intending. As recent research demonstrates, thoughts, feelings, and behaviour that carry features of goal-directedness can emerge directly without a person’s conscious intent (Maasen, Prinz, and Roth, 2003, p. 103).

#### Communicative rationality never results in the best or dominant opinion—empirics

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

How does a Habermasian agent fulfill their duty and at the same time acknowledge the cognitive impossibility of achieving the ‘view from nowhere’? Further evidence pointing towards the limitations of the agent is not difficult to compile. Tversky and Kahneman (2000, p. 210) argue that ‘the logic of choice does not provide an adequate foundation for a descriptive theory of decision making … deviations of actual behaviour from the normative model are too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative system.’ Here it is important to point out that two of the four substantive assumptions associated with utility theory qua individual rationality are dominance and invariance. Dominance is an obvious principle of rational choice, and one relevant to Habermasian communicative reason. It simply states that if one option is better than another in one state and at least as good in all other states, the dominant option should be chosen. Dominance ‘serves as the cornerstone of the normative theory of choice’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 2000, p. 211). The next essential condition for a theory of choice is invariance, ‘which states that the relation of preference should not depend on the description of the options (description invariance) or on the method of elicitation (procedure invariance)’ (Slovic, 2000, p. 490). Tversky and Kahneman conducted a series of experiments from which they concluded that failures of invariance and dominance were explicable with reference to the framing of prospects, the evaluation of outcomes and the weighting of probabilities. Essentially their series of experiments found that people’s preferences, their rationality, was different in outcome to what the normative theory of choice predicted. In judgements of probability, or visual assessments, how the problem was framed impacted greatly on how experimental participants responded in the ranking of their preferences. The significance to communication derivative theories cannot be understated in these empirical reports; particularly the framing and certainty effects. As Tversky and Kahneman (2000, p. 211) argue, ‘the framing of decisions depends on the language of presentation, on the context of choice, and on the nature of the display’. As questioned by the deliberative theorists discussed above: how does an agent know if they are deliberatively competent? How does an agent know if the agreement being elicited from them is based on the fundamentals of a better argument, or merely a better arguer?

### 2AC Anti-Politics

#### Alt cedes the political—and alt can’t implement the plan even if deliberation supports it

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

The danger involved in taking Habermas’s earlier approach to communicative action and applying it in literal fashion to deliberative politics is that we end up with a political theory that has little to say about political structure – except to condemn it as an agent of distortion. For under communicative rationality – especially in its counterfactual extreme of the ‘ideal speech situation’ – the only force that applies is that of the better argument. Decision is ideally secured by consensus; implementation of the decision is secured only by the commitment of the individuals involved to the content of the consensus; and subsequent compliance relies on free consent. Such a sequence is not easily related to real-world political institutions and processes, especially those in complex and plural societies (Dryzek, 2000, p. 24). The Habermasian agent is clearly not meant to operate in the environment of deliberative polls. Whether or not theorists and psychologists want to support deliberative forums, the agent within these forums is not the Habermasian agent that adheres to the conditions outlined above.

### 2AC Polarization DA

#### Alt kills reasoned discourse—group polarization

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

Another empirical problem Habermas has extends from what Sunstein (2003, p. 81) refers to as the law of group polarization, the phenomenon that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point of view in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies.’ It is a phenomenon that Sunstein (2003, p. 82), in an investigation pointed toward deliberative democracy, refers to as a ‘striking but largely neglected statistical regularity’. It is also ‘among the most robust patterns found in deliberating bodies, and it has been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks.’ Pronin also mentions this tendency, explaining that when ‘people earnestly attend to the facts and arguments offered by those on the “other side,” their opinions became even more polarized. Polarization, he notes, ‘reflects the tendency for partisans to accept at face value arguments and evidence congruent with their interests and beliefs, while critically scrutinizing arguments and evidence that threaten those interests and beliefs’ (Pronin, Puccio and Ross, 2002, p. 637). Two principal mechanisms underlie group polarization. The first relates to social influences on behaviour and agents’ desires to retain reputations and self-perceptions. The second relates to the limited argument pools within groups. This is exceptionally problematic for deliberation, and therefore for communicative rationality generally, particularly from the normative perspective. ‘If deliberation predictably pushed groups toward a more extreme point in the direction of their original tendency, whatever it may be, do we have any reason to think that deliberation is producing improvements?’ (Sunstein, 2003, p. 82). The polarization sees a shift, ‘not toward the middle of the antecedent dispositions, but toward a more extreme position in the direction indicated by those dispositions.’ The effect is to both decrease variance, and to produce convergence on a ‘relatively more extreme point among predeliberation judgements’ (Sunstein, 2003, p. 83). Habermasian agents are certainly required to decrease variance, but not through convergence upon an extreme perspective. Indeed, increased homogeneity within the group tends ‘to suppress dissent’ and ’lead to inferior decisions’ (Sunstein, 2003, p. 85). The normative preconditions that Sunstein suggests be instituted to avoid the problems of group polarization are demanding: there needs to be social spaces for deliberation by like-minded persons, but differences need to be sought also. Conversational goals must promote the interests of groups inside and outside the relevant enclaves, and views must be exchanged in a group-neutral manners ensuring that the wider society ‘does not marginalize, and thus insulate itself from, views that may turn out to be right, or at least informative’ (Sunstein, 2003, p. 91). Although the institutional demands are extensive, so too are the agent demands implicit in such institutions. Given the empirical evidence that ‘people are shifting their position to maintain their reputation and self-conception’ why might Habermas conclude that ‘deliberation is making things better rather than worse?’ (Sunstein, 2003, p. 91). Sunstein (2003, p. 92) drives the point home: Perhaps group polarization could be reduced or even eliminated if we emphasized that good deliberation has full information as a precondition…But this precondition is extremely stringent…In any case the group polarization phenomenon suggests that in real-world situations, deliberation is hardly guaranteed to increase the likelihood of arriving at truth. Another set of related empirical data for communicative rationally is presented by Kahneman and Tversky (2004, p. 729), who engage the topic of conflict resolution from a cognitive perspective. They focus on three relevant phenomena: ‘optimistic overconfidence, the certainty effect, and loss aversion’.

### 2AC Exclusion DA

**Turn – the alt fetishizes procedure increasing exclusion**

**Cochran 99** (1999, Molly Cochran, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, chapter 8, “Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach, Published by Cambridge U. Press,” ngoetz)

However, from the perspective of pragmatic critique, this procedural formality is a liability because rules cannot ensure either approximations of authentic critique or convergence around ethical criteria. In the first place, rules cannot ensure authentic critique because the **formality** and the incontrovertibleness with which they are put forward **may be seen as an external imposition**. This concern is not dissimilar from that which, as we saw in chapter 7, feminists express with regard to the formalistic and rationality-bound elements of liberalism. Secondly, convergence around ethical criteria cannot be guaranteed merely by positing the incontrovertibility of a rule, particularly if it is seen as an external imposition, because, as I have already pointed out, moral inclusion through coercion can potentially generate more **social tensions and morally problematic situations** in the future. An externally imposed rule can only sanction convergence if it is sustained by force, and this hardly constitutes a case of moral inclusion. For example, Habermas relies on universal pragmatics as the ground rule which not only justifies his **separation of communicative action** (motivated by the aim of reaching moral agreement and the focus of discourse ethics) **from strategic action** (consent to one’s will arrived at by threat) (1984: section 3), but suggests why persons are, in the main, concerned to engage in communicative action. It states that one has to accept the guiding principle of discourse ethics (D) if one engages in rational argumentation, or else slip into a performative contradiction which denies one’s own expectation to be allowed free and fair representation and consideration (Habermas 1990: 82-94). Such a rule, and Habermas's elaborate attempts to maintain it, are a form of Archirnedean contrivance which from the perspective of pragmatic critique, artiﬁcially separates the individual from her interests and ends in **fetishizing the ideal of the procedures themselves**, despite Habermas's insistence that there is no discourse apart from interests. Indeed, such a contrivance is likely to be felt as an imposition, particularly if, as critics of Habermas suggest, it cannot be guaranteed that its procedures are not tainted by semantic structures of power that obstruct the ability of certain groups to participate.7

An interesting point of comparison and contrast which illustrates the kind of artiﬁcial separation called for in discourse ethics is that Habermas suggests the need for ‘the universal exchange of roles’ - what a pragmatist, G. H. Mead, has called ‘ideal role taking’ - which assists persons in complying with condition (U) that ‘[a]ll affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests’ (Habermas 1990: 65). This kind of role playing activity, as suggested above, is important to the growth and learning function of moral imagination, but it operates in a very different way. Where Habermas intends this role playing to facilitate impartiality of judgement through adopting the perspectives of others, moral imagination does not expect participants to divide themselves from their interests and ends as part of this exercise. Instead, maintaining an awareness of one's own ends is vital to finding workable solutions to problematic situations and thus, the purpose of the exercise is to imagine oneself in the role of another so as to compare the fit between that role and one's own life, to run back and forth between the two, looking for what might be learned from such an exchange. Admittedly, interests and aims have to be foregrounded for Haberrnas, but because his aim is consensus for the purposes of legitimation, my concem is that interests get lost in the procedures and the impartiality they assume leading to that consensus. Since pragmatic critique is concerned with possibilities for convergence for purposes of social cooperation and growth, this requires that interests are not only foregrounded, but referred to throughout the process of critical intelligence and moral imagination that is employed in the solving of problematic social tensions.

In sum, the irony is that Habermas resorts to outlining how universal agreement or consensus can be reached via the standards assumed within language because he shares the same concern as pragmatic critique: we cannot leave the formulations of genuinely open and morally inclusive normative criteria to what historical communities might provide internally. However, pragmatic critique would add that we cannot leave these standards to the procedural narrowness or potential impositions that discourse ethics suggests either. Moral imagination is required to project thought about such evaluative standards beyond the strictures of both community tradition and formal, rule-bound procedures.

### 1AR Fails for Megaprojects

#### Communicative rationality fails for megaprojects—can’t address power

Rothengatter et al 3 (Werner Rothengatter, President of the World Conference on Transport Research, Head of the Institute of Economic Policy Research at the Unit of Transport and Communication at the University of Karlsruhe, was Head of the Transport Division at the German Institute for Economic Research, has been involved in several transportation research projects, Bent Flyvbjerg, Professor of Major Programme Management at Oxford University, Founding Director of the Cambridge University’s BT Centre for Major Programme Management, previously Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, and Nils Bruzelius, B.A., Executive Editor for the Environmental Working Group, was a science editor at the Washington Post, medical reporter for the Boston Globe. Text taken from article titled, “Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition,” published by the Cambridge University Press in 2003. Text found by Hirsh)

We find, nevertheless, that deliberative approaches to risk, based as they are on communicative rationality and the goodwill of participants, can take us only some of the way towards better decisions and will frequently fail for megaprojects. This is so because the interests and power relations involved in megaprojects are typically very strong, which is easy to understand given the enormous sums of money at stake, the many jobs, the environmental impacts, the national prestige, and so. Communicative and deliberative approaches work well as ideals and evaluative yardsticks for decision making, but they are quite defenseless in the face of power. And power play, instead of commitment to deliberative ideals, is often what characterizes megaproject development. In addition to deliberative processes, we also focus, therefore, on how power relations and outcomes may be influenced and balanced by reforming the institutional arrangements that form the context of megaproject decision making.

### A2 People Change

#### People don’t change—empirics and three cognitive biases: overconfidence, certainty affect, and loss aversion

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

3.4a Optimistic overconfidence. Overconfidence in agent judgements is ‘indicated by a cluster of robust findings’, essentially assignments of probability that are objectively unreasonable given the agent’s actual knowledge. According to Kahneman and Tversky (2004, p. 732)., the inability to appropriately judge missing or indeterminate information ‘entails a bias that is likely to hinder successful negotiation’. The effect is ‘not restricted to laboratory studies’ and the study provides references of ‘real world data’ pointing to the same phenomenon. How are agents to reconcile whether their own confidence in a judgement is founded, or overstated, if those they intersubjectively compare with are in a similar psychological situation? 3.4b Certainty effect. Research on decision making has ‘identified a major bias in the weights that are assigned to probabilistic advantages and to sure things’. A phenomenon most widely known as the Allais paradox indicates that people are not normatively rational in the way they view matters of chance, choices can be, often dramatically, at odds with the objective utility associated with agents’ subjective probability assertions (Kahneman and Tversky, 2004, pp. 734-735). For deliberation, and the discussion of means-ends comparisons, the implications are obvious. ‘Most decisions [made]…under uncertainty…involve vague contingencies and ambiguous probabilities. The evidence suggests that the certainty effect is further enhanced by vagueness and ambiguity’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 2004, p. 735). Habermasian agents, it would seem, cannot avoid operating in environments of indeterminateness, particularly given the requirement for intersubjectivity. 3.4c Loss aversion. This last conflict related phenomenon speaks to the intuitive concerns of earlier critics who wondered whether Habermas expected too much of his agents; whether he forgot their humanity. Loss aversion is an empirically robust finding that a cognitive bias exists ‘toward the retention of the status quo.’ Individuals act in a manner that is not logically rational in wanting to hold what they have, instead of trading it for something that is empirically and transparently of higher utility (Kahneman and Tversky, 2004, p. 742). As Kahneman and Tversky study conclude, the three above phenomena ‘represent systematic departures from the standard rational theory … these biases in the assessment of evidence and the evaluation of consequences can hinder the successful resolution of conflict…’ And the phenomenon might not be an exhaustive survey of conflict related psychological considerations, ‘they represent serious obstacles that often stand in the way of successful negotiation’. For Habermas, the conclusion runs even deeper when the authors state finally that the ‘…literature on judgement and choice … indicates that biases and cognitive illusions are not readily eliminated by knowledge or warning’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 2004, pp. 743-44). Habermas’s assertion that the elimination of agent-relative concerns, through discussion, informational improvements or better argumentation, runs counter to such empirical evidence.

#### If they read polls or empirics prove people change:

#### Deliberative polling doesn’t apply—polled citizens are de-briefed by experts

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

4. Conclusion We conclude this paper by pre-empting a major objection. The objection will come from social psychologists active and optimistic in the domain of deliberation research: if one looks at deliberative polling research where individuals are tested on their opinions before and after a deliberative and informational programme, one can draw positive conclusions. Researchers are comfortable determining that deliberation results provide on aggregate, ’a better informed and more thoughtful public opinion’ (Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, 2002, p. 484). The data is encouraging for deliberation as a forum. The evidence, robust and compelling, indicates that people will change their preferences, will become more knowledgeable, and are quite likely to surrender their prior preference orderings under the weight of the better argument. Yet the research is ‘not what might be expected of an ideally informed and thoughtful citizenry’ (Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, 2002, p. 484). The ideal citizenry is not the place to critique these deliberative results. Whether or not there is a superior political outcome post-deliberation is immaterial to this thesis. Deliberative polling requires sessions with experts, sessions with politicians, and most significantly, it requires administrators who go into the programme with the agent-centric goal of achieving deliberation. Habermas allows none of these, and thus positive deliberative results from these programmes are not supportive of Habermas’s requirements. The heroic preconditions of the Habermasian agent means deliberation must occur in a symmetrical, non-coercive, naturally occurring forum where there is no ‘expert’ status assigned to particular members of the deliberative forum and only the force of better arguments. As Dryzek (2000, p. 162) notes: the ‘authenticity of deliberation requires that communication must induce reflection upon preferences in a non-coercive fashion.’

## Perm

### 2AC Perm Best

#### Only the perm creates successful deliberation—experts are required

Hook and Rienstra 6 (Derek Hook, Ph.D., senior lecturer in Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for the Study of Public Culture at Emory University, research fellow at both universities, received the LSE Teaching prize for outstanding performance, and Byron Rienstra, Head of Learning and Talent Development for Standard Chartered Bank’s Wholesale Banking division, masters in Change Management, Philosophy, and Social Psychology. Text taken from article titled, “Weakening Habermas: the undoing of communicative rationality,” published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006 in the Politikon: South African journal of political studies, pages 313-339. Text found at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/955/1/Weakening\_Habermas\_(LSERO).pdf] by Hirsh)

Ideally new research programmes could point more precisely to the deficiencies of Habermas’s rationality requirements. Where empirical data currently needs to be abstracted, novel research programmes like ethnographies in community settings could directly test the effectiveness of Habermasian-required communicative rationality assumptions. Our prediction, as deflationary as this seems, is that for deliberative success to ensue, groups need experts to mitigate and reconcile the psychological and informational phenomenon outlined above. Yet, as mentioned in the introduction, this incurs a Habermasian paradox. To attain the institutional requirements of successful deliberation one must break from Habermas’s procedural preconditions concerning power and communicative symmetry. To ensure deliberative success, non-neutral agendas are required, and expert communication is demanded. The conclusion for this paper is an opening for further study. Deliberative democracy has freshly problematized the nature of communicative rationality; successful deliberation requires heroic agents. Habermas has always demanded exceptionally stringent conditions for agents in communicative interactions, and for communicative rationality these conditions are not idealisations. Habermas sees the heroic elements of communicative rationality as given in his agents. Contemporary psychological research however, makes the story a difficult one to accept. Although humans are not manifestly irrational, a full range of psychological phenomenon supports the deliberative theorists problems with Habermasian agents. Habermas should expect neither normative nor descriptive validity for the agents of his communicative rationality.

### 1AR Your Author Agrees

#### Perm solves—your author agrees

Khisty 5 (Jotin Khisty, Professor Emeritus at the Department of Civil Engineering of the Illinois Institute of Technology, internally citing Habermas, text taken from article titled, “Possibilities of Steering the Transportation Planning Process in the Face of Bounded Rationality and Unbounded Rationality,” published in 2005. Text found at

[http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.138.4770] by Hirsh)

If by rationality we mean a self-conscious process of using reasoned arguments to make and defend claims, there are indeed many choices available. There are three principal rationalities available with the means-ends framework. Instrumental (or technical) rationality has been used extensively, and is geared for controlling technical problems in an efficient and scientific way. On the other hand, communicative rationality, guides communicative action, meeting the validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, rightness, and sincerity, so necessary for mutual understanding and agreement. In more recent years communicative rationality is finding its way in transportation planning, when we deal with complex and messy open-ended problems, represented by cells B, C, and D of Figure 1. Indeed, a combination of both instrumental and communicative rationality, directed by emancipatory interests is needed for decision making to be an enlightened social process (Habermas 1987).

# \*\*\*NEG\*\*\*

## Alt Solves

### A2 Stakeholders Lie (Mohammadi)

#### Stakeholders lying is a reason to involve the public—only way to have their voice heard

Rothengatter et al 3 (Werner Rothengatter, President of the World Conference on Transport Research, Head of the Institute of Economic Policy Research at the Unit of Transport and Communication at the University of Karlsruhe, was Head of the Transport Division at the German Institute for Economic Research, has been involved in several transportation research projects, Bent Flyvbjerg, Professor of Major Programme Management at Oxford University, Founding Director of the Cambridge University’s BT Centre for Major Programme Management, previously Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, and Nils Bruzelius, B.A., Executive Editor for the Environmental Working Group, was a science editor at the Washington Post, medical reporter for the Boston Globe. Text taken from article titled, “Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition,” published by the Cambridge University Press in 2003. Text found by Hirsh)

We do not believe risk can be eliminated from risk society. We believe, however, that risk may be acknowledged much more explicitly and managed a great deal better, with more accountability, than is typically the case today. Like Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler and others, we hold that risk assessment and management should involve citizens and stakeholders to reflect their experience and expertise, in addition to including the usual suspects, namely government experts, administrators and politicians. We here define stakeholders as key institutional actors, such as NGOs, various levels of government, industrial interests, scientific and technical expertise and the media. Some of these stakeholder groups will claim to be speaking legitimately on behalf of the public good and some, but not all of them, will be doing so. Given that such stakeholders do not always adequately represent publics, we recognize the need, on both democratic and pragmatic grounds, to properly involve publics in decision making. Such involvement should take place in fatefully designed deliberative process from the beginning and throughout large-scale projects. Like Renn and Webler, we believe that one should go as far as possible with the participatory and deliberative approach in including publics and stakeholders and that the result will be decisions about risk that are better informed and more democratic.

## Perm

### Input Throughout Key

#### Perm fails—true democracy requires public input during implementation too

Engel 10 (Martin Engel, writing for High-SpeedTrainTalk, text taken from entry titled, “Habermas: Stuttgart and the Peninsula,” published October 31st, 2010. Text found at [http://high-speedtraintalk.blogspot.com/2010/10/habermas-stuttgart-and-peninsula.html] by Hirsh)

In the background, however, there is a deeper conflict brewing over our country’s understanding of democracy. The state government of Baden-Württemberg, where Stuttgart is located, sees the protests narrowly, as simply a question of whether government is legally permitted to plan such long-term megaprojects. In the midst of the turmoil the president of the Federal Constitutional Court rushed to the project’s defense by arguing that the public had already voted to approve it 15 years ago, and thus had no more say in its execution.

But it has since emerged that the authorities did not, in fact, provide sufficient information at the time, and thus citizens did not have an opportunity to develop an informed opinion on which they could have based their votes. To insist that they should have no further say in the development is to rely on a formalistic understanding of democracy. The question is this: Does participation in democratic procedures have only the functional meaning of silencing a defeated minority, or does it have the deliberative meaning of including the arguments of citizens in the democratic process of opinionand will-formation?