# Competitiveness K

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#### The affirmative’s language is not neutral – their framing of the global economy as zero sum makes violence invisible under the guise of market rationalism

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(Gillian, “Everyone's a ‘winner’: problematising the discourse of regional competitiveness.” Journal of Economic Geography, June 2005 5(3): 285-304)

This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-defined content has become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute ‘the only valid currency of argument’ (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative discourses based around co-operation can be conceived (e.g. see Hines, 2000; Bunzl, 2001), they have as yet failed to make a significant impact on the dominant view that a particular, quantifiable form of output-related regional competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and ultimately beneficial. The answer appears to lie within the policy process, which refers to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the public sector. This therefore includes ‘the ideas which inform policy conception, the talk and work which goes into providing the formulation of policy directions, and all the talk, work and collaboration which goes into translating these into practice’ (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major debate exists in the policy studies literature about the scope and limitations of reason, analysis and intelligence in policy-making—a debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis upon evidence-based policy-making (see Davies et al., 2000). Keynes is often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he argued that policy-making should be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However, Majone (1989) has significantly challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective, rational, technical assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge and evidence selectively to justify policy choices which are heavily based on value judgements. It is thus persuasion (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy process, not the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather than ideas that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the language of the business community. Thus, critical to understanding the power of the discourse is firstly, understanding the appeal and significance of the discourse to business interests and, secondly, exploring their role in influencing the ideas of regional and national policy elites. Part of the allure of the discourse of competitiveness for the business community is its seeming comprehensibility. Business leaders feel that they already understand the basics of what competitiveness means and thus it offers them the gain of apparent sophistication without the pain of grasping something complex and new. Furthermore, competitive images are exciting and their accoutrements of ‘battles’, ‘wars’ and ‘races’ have an intuitive appeal to businesses familiar with the cycle of growth, survival and sometimes collapse (Krugman, 1996b). The climate of globalisation and the turn towards neo-liberal, capitalist forms of regulation has empowered business interests and created a demand for new concepts and models of development which offer guidance on how economies can innovate and prosper in the face of increasing competition for investment and resources. Global policy elites of governmental and corporate institutions, who share the same neo-liberal consensus, have played a critical role in promoting both the discourse of national and regional competitiveness, and of competitiveness policies which they think are good for them (such as supportive institutions and funding for research and development agendas). In the EU, for example, the European Round Table of Industrialists played a prominent role in ensuring that the Commission's 1993 White Paper placed the pursuit of international competitiveness (and thus the support of business), on an equal footing with job creation and social cohesion objectives (Lovering, 1998; Balanya et al., 2000). This discourse rapidly spread and competitiveness policies were transferred through global policy networks as large quasi-governmental organisations such as the OECD and World Bank pushed the national and, subsequently, the regional competitiveness agenda upon national governments (Peet, 2003). Part of the appeal of the regional competitiveness discourse for policy-makers is that like the discourse of globalisation, it presents a relatively structured set of ideas, often in the form of implicit and sedimented assumptions, upon which they can draw in formulating strategy and, indeed, in legitimating strategy pursued for quite distinct ends (Hay and Rosamond, 2002). Thus, the discourse clearly dovetails with discussions about the appropriate level at which economic governance should be exercised and fits in well with a growing trend towards the decentralised, ‘bottom-up’ approaches to economic development policy and a focus on the indigenous potential of regions. For example, in the UK:‘*the Government believes that a successful regional and sub-regional economic policy must be based on building the indigenous strengths in each locality, region and county. The best mechanisms for achieving this are likely to be based in the regions themselves*’ (HM Treasury, 2001a, vi). The devolution of powers and responsibilities to regional institutions, whether democratic or more narrowly administrative, is given added tour de force when accompanied by the arguments contained within the regional competitiveness discourse. There is clear political capital to be gained from highlighting endogenous capacities to shape economic processes, not least because it helps generate the sense of regional identity that motivates economic actors and institutions towards a common regional purpose (Rosamond, 2002). Furthermore, the regional competitiveness discourse points to a clear set of agendas for policy action over which regional institutions have some potential for leverage—agendas such as the development of university-business relationships and strong innovation networks. This provides policy-makers with the ability to point to the existence of seemingly secure paths to prosperity, as reinforced by the successes of exemplar regions. In this way, the discourse of regional competitiveness helps to provide a way of constituting regions as legitimate agents of economic governance. The language of regional competitiveness also fits in very neatly with the ideological shift to the ‘Third Way’ popularised most notably by the New Labour government in the UK. This promotes the reconstruction of the state rather than its shrinkage (as under neo-liberal market imperatives) or expansion (as under traditional socialist systems of mass state intervention). Significantly, this philosophy sees state economic competencies as being restricted to the ability to intervene in line with perceived microeconomic or supply-side imperatives rather than active macroeconomic, demand-side intervention—an agenda that is thus clearly in tune with the discourse around competitiveness. The attractiveness of the competitiveness discourse may also be partly a product of the power of pseudo-scientific, mathematised nature of the economics discipline and the business strategy literature from which it emanates. This creates an innate impartiality and technicality for the market outcomes (such as competitiveness) it describes (Schoenberger, 1998). Public policy in developed countries experiencing the marketisation of the state, is increasingly driven by managerialism which emphasises the improved performance and efficiency of the state. This managerialism is founded upon economistic and rationalistic assumptions which include an emphasis upon measuring performance in the context of a planning system driven by objectives and targets (Sanderson, 2001). The result is an increasing requirement for people, places and organisations to be accountable and for their performance and success to be measured and assessed. In this emerging evaluative state, performance tends to be scrutinised through a variety of means, with particular emphasis placed upon output indicators. This provides not only a means of lending legitimacy to the institutional environment, but also some sense of exactitude and certainty, particularly for central governments who are thus able to retain some ‘top-down’, mechanical sense that things are somehow under their control (Boyle, 2001). The evolutionary, ‘survival of the fittest’ basis of the regional competitiveness discourse clearly resonates with this evaluative culture. The discourse of competitiveness strongly appeals to the stratum of policy makers and analysts who can use it to justify what they are doing and/or to find out how well they are doing it relative to their ‘rivals’. This helps explain the interest in trying to measure regional competitiveness and the development of composite indices and league tables. It also helps explain why particular elements of the discourse have assumed particular significance—output indicators of firm performance are much easier to compare and rank on a single axis than are indicators relating to institutional behaviour, for example. This in turn points to a central paradox in measures of regional competitiveness. The key ingredients of firm competitiveness and regional prosperity are increasingly perceived as lying with assets such as knowledge and information which are, by definition, intangible or at least difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. The obsession with performance measurement and the tendency to reduce complex variables to one, easily digestible number brings a ‘kind of blindness’ with it as to what is really important (Boyle, 2001, 60)—in this case, how to improve regional prosperity. Thus while a composite index number of regional competitiveness will attract widespread attention in the media and amongst policy-makers and development agencies, the difficulty presented by such a measure is in knowing what exactly needs to be targeted for appropriate remedial action. All of this suggests that regional competitiveness is more than simply the linguistic expression of powerful exogenous interests. It has also become rhetoric. In other words, regional competitiveness is deployed in a strategic and persuasive way, often in conjunction with other discourses (notably globalisation) to legitimate specific policy initiatives and courses of action. The rhetoric of regional competitiveness serves a useful political purpose in that it is easier to justify change or the adoption of a particular course of policy action by reference to some external threat that makes change seem inevitable. It is much easier for example, for politicians to argue for the removal of supply-side rigidities and flexible hire-and-fire workplace rules by suggesting that there is no alternative and that jobs would be lost anyway if productivity improvement was not achieved. Thus, ‘the **language of external competitiveness…provides a rosy glow of shared endeavour and shared enemies which can unite captains of industry and representatives of the shop floor in the same big tent’** (Turner, 2001, 40). In this sense it is a discourse which provides some shared sense of meaning and a means of legitimising neo-liberalism rather than a material focus on the actual improvement of economic welfare.

#### The impact is extinction and widespread exploitation

**Schandorf 8** - B.A. in English, 1999. M.A. in English (Rhetoric & Composition), 2008. (Michael, A RHETORIC OF RESOLUTION: THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION, May 2008, p. 1-3, https://www.mhsl.uab.edu/dt/2008m/schandorf.pdf)

An overreliance on a foundational conceptual model of competition exacerbates and, all too often, creates unnecessary conflict. This is a problem that permeates Western culture but is particularly evident in large-scale social conflict between differing cultural and value systems. “Difference” does not inherently entail conflict, but “Competition” seems to underlie most all Western cultural practices as a god term that makes conflict inevitable. For example, sports metaphors have long infused even peace-time political discourse to such an extent that sport and war metaphors have become essentially interchangeable and selfreinforcing: games are battles and battles are games. The common tendency to regard all aspects of life in competitive terms is demonstrated in the (perhaps more disturbing) contentedly traditional use of military imagery in religious discourse ostensibly concerned with peace and universal love (e.g., “soldiers of God”)—again, combining the ideas of “war” and “game,” in this case with the object of “winning” the most “souls.” Such apparent inconsistencies make more sense in light of the cognitive linguistic contention that language use shapes conceptualization. If this is true, at least two millennia of competitive, militaristic metaphor in Western religious discourse may help to explain such incongruities as the use of popular violent computer games to lure children and teenagers to evangelistic activities (Ritchel). The concern here is that by understanding the world in terms of constant, perpetual competition, social and cultural conflict becomes not only inescapable, but extremely limited in its ability to produce lasting, adaptive, and constructive results. Kenneth Burke used the idea of the “god term” to describe any concept that came to fulfill all of the roles in his pentad of aspects of human motives: act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. “Competition” certainly fulfills these criteria in Western culture. Many Americans define their very lives by the act of competition even outside the realm of business—devotion to a particular sports team being only perhaps the most obvious example (a phenomenon not confined to American culture as news surrounding nearly any World Cup soccer event will easily demonstrate). The scene or “field of competition” is regularly applied (in practice, if not in verbal reality) to such mundane events as the daily commute (e.g., “jockeying for position,” “the Lexis cut me off”). At a larger scale, the reigning Western political and economic theory metaphorically embodies competition quite clearly as the “invisible hand.” Tellingly for my purposes here, the “invisible hand” concept is both metaphorical and metonymic; the more complete idea is the “invisible hand of competition.” Here competition is both agent and agency—it becomes an instrument used by itself to further its own goals, which is, of course, more competition. This self-referentiality is consistent with Burke’s “god term” and demonstrates his assertion in A Grammar of Motives that agency implies purpose. It also illustrates my point: Western culture is motivated by competition for the sake of competition. And, despite rare and meager references to “how you play the game,” the purpose of competition is understood to be “winning.” A reasonable response to this possibly obvious assertion might be, what’s wrong with winning? Competition ideally results in the best competitors succeeding. Competition in the market ideally results in the success of the best products and services. Competition in the work place ideally results in the most able work force. Competition in academia ideally results in the most able thinkers producing the most useful, productive, and fecund ideas. Competition in politics ideally results in the survival of the most able candidates and policies. Even life itself is maintained through competition, in Herbert Spencer’s famous “survival of the fittest.” A society and culture that encourages competition insures the propagation of values necessary for continuing progress. The “losers” adapt to create novel challenges (the results of which necessarily entail further progress through further competition) or are eliminated so as not to clog the system. The short answer to this objection is that in practice all but one of these examples involve actual goals, actual purposes, and actual results—they entail specific ends, and competition is a method for reaching those ends with the best possible results. Ideally, competition should serve, in Burke’s terms, as an agency, an instrument or tool, functioning as a means of quality control: competition provides the vital function of eliminating the weaker, the less useful, and the less fecund, and promoting the stronger, the more useful, and the more productive. A misused instrument, however, can be worse than detrimental A hammer can be used to build; it can also be used indiscriminately for blunt-force destruction. When “Competition” functions as a god term, the goals, purposes, and results of competition are “Competition” itself—motivations and intentions are subsumed into “play,” or worse “battle,” and what “progress” occurs is merely a happy or convenient by-product that allows further opportunities for conflict. In a world where technological progress and the increased cultural interaction it makes possible can and do allow the escalation of human conflict to nuclear annihilation, ethnic cleansing, and the elimination of entire cultures and large-scale ecosystems through the excesses of economic globalization, this is a problem.

#### Our alternative is to: *reject the affirmatives competitive ideology in favor of cooperative economics.*

Schandorf 8 - B.A. in English, 1999. M.A. in English (Rhetoric & Composition), 2008. (Michael, A RHETORIC OF RESOLUTION: THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION, May 2008, p. 98-100, https://www.mhsl.uab.edu/dt/2008m/schandorf.pdf)

Epistemology and ethics are functions of the conceptual frames generated through and constituted by metaphor and language. And those frames inevitably change and shift in response to experience and social pressures: for most of human history, slavery was considered perfectly natural and good; the worst problems of the twentieth century were arguably the legacy of colonial beliefs concerning the “natural” superiority of the European “race,” culture, and civilization; and arguably the most significant contemporary problems are the legacy of those twentieth-century conceptualizations combined with the “obvious truth” that individual humans can have little impact on the systems in which they exist and the world as a whole. The medium and catalyst of such changes in orientation is communication, specifically rhetoric. Rhetoric, as a means of promoting social cooperation, works to shift orientations – actively or subtly, through two primary aspects. First, identification is a cooperative, inclusive process based on metaphor and, ultimately, empathy; identification emphasizes commonalities to create and strengthen social bonds. Second, dissociation, and what Kenneth Burke called “scapegoating,” builds identification negatively through exclusion and competition. These aspects of communication bond individuals and groups together through the generation and communication of shared conceptualizations and values. In a Western culture dominated by an overarching orientation of Competition – where there are understood to be “two (and only two) sides to every story” – the tension between identification and dissociation is almost inescapable. This tension is clearly present, for example, in George Lakoff’s recent work. Lakoff began his examination of US political rhetoric in an effort to better understand those with whom he disagreed and with the rhetorical goal of “beginning a conversation” and developing “a meta-language” capable of leading to what is herein recognized as a shift of orientation and the resolution of intractable social conflicts. His theories, however, rely on the diametric opposition of two ideal conceptions of authority (and therefore ethics). Lakoff acknowledges that these frames are ideal and that few people actually adhere solely to either of the frames exclusively. Between the academic description of Moral Politics and the rallying of the progressive troops in Whose Freedom?, however, Lakoff would seem to have discovered that description is not enough to provoke the change he is looking for: the shifting of frames is a rhetorical act, and the process of identification is far stronger when combined with dissociation, which is more than just a call to action—it can be a call to self-defense. Hence, the subtitle of the latter work, The Battle Over America’s Most Important Idea, and the acceptance of the “Culture War” frame. There is another reason why Lakoff may have understood the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor to be a necessity. The STRICT FATHER frame of AUTHORITY that Lakoff opposes is a conservative frame in which resisting change (particularly change in the form of challenge to authority) is built into the frame as a moral obligation. Furthermore, Lakoff’s NURTURANT PARENT frame of AUTHORITY requires the dialectical questioning of authority in order to achieve “progress.” Here we have the tension between Competition as a god term and competition as a tool. Conflict is unavoidable, and if you must fight, fight to win. Which Lakoff does by polarizing these two frames, minimizing the middle ground, identifying “progressive values” as “real American values,” and dissociating “conservative populism” as an attack on “traditional American values” (reversing the charges of his opponents). This strategy is similar to the Yang’s (Chapter 3) in that Lakoff has identified his own interests with those of the nation and the public interest. However, the great strength of the Yang’s rhetorical strategy was that it allowed a resolution amenable to all of the interests involved. Lakoff’s is a rallying of the troops, a situation analogous to the Yangs addressing only those who had been displaced by economic development or who already agreed with them – which would have done little but inflame existing tensions. While Lakoff’s analysis is valuable, it does little for “the Culture War” but add fuel to the fire. Any attempt to move beyond such diametric oppositions is certainly a tremendous challenge. In the US context it is arguably even more difficult because of the understood foundation of competition and a predominant conceptual frame that actively resists change as part of its fundamental value system. And therein lies a considerable problem because, as I have argued, change is inevitable. An orientation that denies change, that views change as a challenge to morality and moral authority, and that finds competition necessary to justify moral action, will find itself in – and even seek, as recent history has shown – perpetual conflict. Moreover, that conflict will be justified as the “good fight”: there is always a hero, the hero (despite his flaws) is always right, and the hero always wins (even if he has to take the bad guys out with him) – which proves that he’s “right.” When this orientation constitutes the conceptual frame in which all social interaction takes place, conceptual development (shift in orientation) is actively limited, at best – and denied where it exists.

### Link – TI

#### Transportation infrastructure is founded in competitive ideology – encourages nationalist economics

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For most recent authors, nationalism is tied to economic development and vice versa. Developing or transitioning modern industrial economies are quite unique in their individual models of development, restricting generalizations about a single set of economic conditions in each. Thus, to define how economic nationalism has emerged in these states, it is worth examining the importance of nationalist sentiments as a common attribute of them. Although development patterns are diverse and thus hotly debated, several authors have asserted that uniting a populace under a national symbol has a strong influence on the rate of development. This link between national identity and growth lays the foundation for the contemporary conception and implementation of economic nationalism. In The Spirit of Capitalism, Liah Greenfeld asserts the centrality of nationalism in industrializing and advancing the major world powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: nationalism necessarily promotes the type of social structure which the modern economy needs to develop. Being inherently egalitarian, nationalism has as one of its central cultural consequences an open-or class-system of stratification, which allows for social mobility, makes labor free, and dramatically expands the sphere of operation of market forces.[7] Greenfeld thus connects the needs of capitalism with the origins of nationalism. She further argues for the importance of nationalism in economic development as long as “economic achievement, competitiveness, and prosperity are defined as positive and important national values.”[8] Similarly, shared economic development can serve as a national symbol with which individuals identify, along with identity markers such as shared language, culture, and territory. Once a strong sense of national purpose supports economic development, a nation-state must appeal to popular sentiments in order to organize collective effort. Takeshi Nakano writes in “Theorizing Economic Nationalism” that “in order to mobilize economic resources, create an integrated national market and effectively implement economic policies,” [9] state elites must draw upon shared cultural resources and national allegiances. The confidence derived from allegiance to a strong national identity can strengthen economic growth by rallying a citizenry around a set of national objectives. According to Nakano, “a large part of the national market is historically shaped by the state through the monetary system, legal system, system of education, transportation and information networks, trade policies and so forth.”[10] Therefore, in modern history, the centrality of the state as an agent of economic change involves a sociological component, which nationalistic ideologies can complement and even bolster. The Origins and Goals of Economic Nationalism Upon examining the relationship between nationalism and economic development, one next must select a definition of economic nationalism and its goals and purposes. The definition offered by Rawi Abdelal in his article “Nationalism and International Political Economy in Eurasia” is useful due to its concise nature and its consideration of most of the important factors discussed above. Abdelal states simply that economic nationalism involves the implementation of “economic policy that follows the national purpose and direction.”[11] In other words, economic nationalism prioritizes national interests above private property and profit motives. Instead of pursuing opportunities solely to increase capital, policymakers make economic decisions with the intention of uniting and strengthening the nation-state. Clearly, the definition of economic nationalism is connected with a broader conception of nationalism, but the two are not exactly the same. Whereas contemporary concepts of nationalism posit that for every nation, there should exist a corresponding state that protects and vitalizes this nationality, economic nationalism goes one step further. Economic nationalism draws on the foundations of national identity, but concentrates on using economic means to unite a populace and increase the power of the nation-state in the world order. This emphasis on economic security may entail the nationalization of key industries, or simply the restriction of foreign influence and the protection and promotion of domestic labor and products. Nationalist sentiments are mobilized to ensure the economic autonomy of the nation-state. The emergence of economic nationalism in a state generally occurs as a result of several conditions. First, the expansive processes of globalization may elicit strong reactions by ethnic nationalities which fear the eradication and subordination of their cultural identities. As promises of economic security and happiness remain unfulfilled by ineffective, selective, or uneven development and progress, individuals may blame groups or specific people that they see as responsible. Increases in movement and contact between states create both internal groups such as immigrants and external groups such as world powers, which can be seen as responsible for economic hardship or the destruction of traditional ways of life.[12] Nationalist tendencies can reemerge as a reaction to these “enemies.” Thus, economic and cultural grievances play a large role in precipitating nationalist sentiment under globalization. Second, a set of elites and policy makers set nationalist goals of autonomy, unity, and identity to appeal to this sentiment and achieve several aims. Nationalism can be used as a political instrument by elites attempting to concentrate their hold on political power and increase the global status of their nation-state. These elites identify economic prowess as an effective means for protecting culture, promoting national power, and winning the support of citizens who feel disenfranchised and powerless as a result of the processes of globalization.[13] Recent explosions in nationalist sentiments, such as those in Russia, conform to Gellner’s theory that when “class” and “nation” combine, political activism erupts.[14] Pressure to conform to the models described by Meyer forces governments to adopt measures that promote the advancement of the economic security of national citizens.[15] As shown above, nationalism and the state have historically played crucial roles in economic development, prompting elites to strive to reinvigorate nationalism as a driving force for the economy.

### Link – Competitive Ideology

#### Competitive ideology forces *uneven* economic growth – zero-sum mindset ensures widespread exploitation

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By enshrining the notion of utility maximisation as universal and unbending across time and space, economic rationality could be represented as transcending history, culture and difference. It was posed as a universal characteristic of humanity prior to the particular social institutions that might be superimposed upon it. For neoliberals the existence of difference in the way that societies or communities organised social production and consumption, and the specific ends that these processes were oriented towards, were indicative of political or cultural constraints upon individual and, ultimately, social rationality. This essentialism, moreover, facilitated the representation of historically specific capitalist institutions—from private property and the rule of law, to the division of labour—as technical instruments to facilitate the innate rationality of individuals and the natural evolutionary trajectory for all societies.8 The divergence between neoclassical theory and reality was therefore conceptualised as a policy challenge and reformers prescribed the necessity of profound social engineering in order to coerce society into the rational axioms of neoclassical theory. The initial target of the neoliberal reformers, however, was not the absence of capitalist social institutions within the global South but the perceived inadequacy of existing ones. In particular, they attributed the failures of capitalism in the postcolonies to the institutional forms that had coalesced historically around what has been termed the ‘national-developmentalist’ state. From industrial policy and trade protectionism through to price subsidies and tripartite labour institutions, the national-developmentalist state form was chided for simultaneously restricting and distorting the rational calculation of economic agents. By interrupting equilibrating market signals, such misguided institutions politicised the technical sphere of the market and gave rise to a suffocating cycle of cronyism, inefficiency, stagnation and debt. As a response, structural adjustment programmes were established under the auspices of the international financial institutions to initiate a process of creative destruction by which the dull compulsion of economic forces could, in the form of shock therapy, be transformed into the heavy artillery of social engineering to obliterate the ossified institutional forms of national developmentalism. Despite the recognition that such programmes would involve short-term pain while market forces redistributed resources in accordance with economic rationality, they were nonetheless heralded as a singular cure for societies that had for too long, and to their great detriment, been treated as qualitatively distinct social formations. Notwithstanding the claims of their proponents, however, the spontaneous rise of competitive market economies that could drive sustained growth and poverty reduction failed to emerge from the ashes of the nationaldevelopmentalist state. While structural adjustment programmes rapidly liberalised trade and financial flows and retrenched various state functions, this led not to a rational reordering of society but to a period of intensely uneven development. Across Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa income polarisation and impoverishment was exacerbated over the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s and such features proved largely intractable during the 1990s.9 Furthermore, a number of the outcomes of reform stood in direct opposition to the predictions of its proponents. Not least of these was that, far from an increase in formal employment and wages for unskilled labour, restructuring programmes tended to create greater cleavages between skilled and unskilled work, and were accompanied by mounting underemployment and a dramatic expansion of the informal sector.10 Similarly, structural adjustment undoubtedly reshaped the distribution of resources among social classes and class fractions, yet it did little to curtail the forms of corruption, patronage and clientelism that had been represented as failures intrinsic to import-substitution strategies and the institutions of national developmentalism.11 The disjuncture between the rhetoric of strong and stable growth and the realities of profoundly uneven development led to a shift in the theoretical traditions mobilised by the World Bank. Drawing heavily on the new institutional economics, as pioneered by Douglass North and others, the emphasis of policy prescription moved from liberalisation to building institutions that provide the appropriate legal, political and social foundations for competitive market societies. In distinction to the early neoliberal reformers, neo-institutionalists argued that the achievement of an efficient market society could not be entrusted to the spontaneous advance of individual rationality because ingrained institutional structures could impede the necessary calculative practices and social values.12 While individuals could indeed be assumed to act rationally in order to maximise utility, the specific actions that such optimising individuals undertake are framed by the natural and institutional constraints that structure their incentives.13 Differences between socioeconomic structures, therefore, could be related to the path-dependence of institutional structures and the incentives they provide for social action. In turn, the question of development became the question of why certain societies had failed to adopt efficient institutional frameworks that provided incentives for efficiency, competitiveness and growth.14 To explain such disjunctures, North mobilises the concept of ‘culture’. Facing the uncertainties of the human and natural worlds, individuals construct belief systems as a way of representing and ordering these domains. Institutions—both formalised and informal norms and codes of conduct—congeal as the external manifestation of these belief systems and ‘culture’ emerges as the inter-generational transfer of beliefs and associated institutional structures. As such: Culture is more than a blending of different kinds of knowledge; it is valueladen with standards of behavior that have evolved to solve ‘local’ exchange problems (be they social, political, or economic). In all societies there evolves an informal framework to structure human interaction. This framework is the basic ‘capital stock’ that defines the culture of a society.15 ‘Culture’ therefore exists in this framework as durable yet informal norms and codes of conduct. While all institutions are conceptualised as the initial product of rational individuals who face specific natural and social constraints, the constant flux of social and economic environments requires that institutions must adapt. However, for North, certain belief systems and associated institutions have proved more responsive to change than others. As such ‘culture’ interrupts the neoclassical assumption that social institutions spontaneously evolve towards efficiency as societies rationally choose institutional forms that maximise aggregate well-being. Institutional inertia results from the formation of beliefs and structures that are impervious to change and which therefore inhibit the types of social entrepreneurialism necessary for rational institutional evolution.16Moreover, even when societies might be expected to adopt the enlightened innovations of others in a process of continual institutional diffusion, existing frameworks persist because they give rise to powerful organisations whose reproduction rests on the perpetuation of those very institutions. On this basis North explains the process of economic change as the uneven development of belief systems and institutional structures that either facilitate or inhibit the formation of new, more rational, institutional forms. Hence North is able to claim that: The failure of the Muslim world to continue its dynamic expansion after the twelfth century evidently reflected the rigidities that evolved in that culture in contrast to the dynamic changes in western Europe. And in the modern world, Muslim conformity in the context of an ever widening gap . . . has at times hardened into fanaticism.17

#### Economic competitiveness fosters manifest destiny, placing the US as the supreme protector of the west leading to war

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It is doubtful whether neoconservatism represents a break from neoliberalism that is significant enough to distinguish the two perspectives within the power bloc. An intrinsic incompatibility is not expressed if, for example, the ideal of the (laissez faire) state is conceptualized differently in Chicago School economic theory (in which the state's proper role is reduced to maintaining a rudimentary system of rules that can guarantee access to "free" markets) and Straussian political philosophy (which stresses the requirement of a nationally cohesive authoritarian state -led by a beneficial tyranny -that must establish a solid moral order and ensure the defense of Western civilization). The relationship between the two positions is revealing in that the chief intellectuals identified with the neocons (e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Samuel R Huntington, Robert Kagan, and William Kristol), though they frequently disagree in public on matters of philosophy and policy, are united by their enthusiasm for neoliberal economics. Giving continuity to the U.S. ruling class is a belief in a neoliberal market standard of civilization and in the leading role of the U.S. in securing this standard of civilization, by force if necessary. The more brutal and coercive form of capitalist rule that is currently being reconfigured, then, is less concerned with liberal tropes of prosperity, representation, and freedom than with asserting a universal (neoliberal) market standard of civilization. Since the birth of the U.S. state, the central legitimating myth has been the assumption that the U.S. had adopted the mantle of the guardian of Western civilization. The genocides of indigenous populations that enabled European colonization of the Americas, particularly in North America, were committed with reference to a "chosen people" mythology derived from the Christian Bible. Central to this mythology is the idea that the U.S. inherited from the Europeans the guardianship of Western civilization. As Amin (2004: 63) notes, "thereafter, the United States extended to the whole planet its project of realizing the work that 'God' had commanded it to carry out" The chosen-people myth formed the basis of the Manifest Destiny doctrine; it was particularly influential in the post-World War II period, especially in George Kennan's writings. Recent neocon texts express this view, by contrasting the willingness with which the U.S. defends Western civilization with the spinelessness of "old" Europe (see Kagan, 2003). The core legitimating narrative for U.S. imperialism, then, is the claim that the U.S. is uniquely placed to guarantee peace and stability, and to provide leadership for the weak, backward, wayward rest of the world; this "chosen people" myth allows the U.S. to stake claims to global economic leadership and American exceptionalism (Said, 1993: 343-349). The program first set out by the neocon pressure group-the Project for the New American Century-has now been fully realized in Afghanistan and Iraq and has taken American exceptionalism to new heights. Seeking to use a full complement of diplomatic, political, and military efforts to preserve and extend "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles," the program represents a profoundly nationalist stance that expresses U.S. preemptive strategy in terms derived from a "chosen people" myth. Legitimacy for U.S. global hegemony at this juncture is based upon a patriotism that reasserts the U.S. as the guardian of Western civilization. Two features of hegemonic rule, the economy and nationhood, characterize the political moment at the heart of the Imperium that is often "blamed" upon a neocon cabal. It is the neoliberal economic doctrine, wedded to a strengthening of patriotic allegiances to the United States. This moment of political leadership in the U.S. invokes loyalty to the nation-state as an explicit means of strengthening a particular form of market capitalism and uses the market to strengthen allegiance to particularly violent and authoritarian forms of state power. It seeks a commitment to supporting the coercive responses of national states and the uninterrupted progress of the global market as twin bulwarks against terrorism.

#### Economic nationalism legitimizes global imperial violence

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(Dave Whyte, “Market Patriotism and the "War on Terror"”, in Social Justice, vol 34 iss 3/4, Proquest, IWren

 A combination of economic and cultural-racial supremacy underpins all forms of imperialism. Rarely is it represented as explicitly as it is in Rhodes' cherished idea. Imperial powers have tended to sugar the pill of colonial domination with the promise of social advancement or humanitarian assistance. Although the British historically laid claim to a "civilizing mission," U.S. imperialism during the Cold War more crudely promised "liberation" through the opening up of "free markets" (legitimized by a generalized defense of human rights, of liberal democracy, etc.). The racist and economically egotistical motives of Empire (the economic subordination of populations, the capture of resources, and the development of markets) are typically masked by the promise of the cultural/social/political advantages for subordinate populations. Thus, techniques of neocolonialism that emerged in the 20th century sought to discipline and control populations with the promise of economic incorporation or the threat of economic exclusion. More recently, the legitimating narrative for U.S. imperialist military interventions has been constructed around a doctrine of preemption/prevention in which "axis of evil" states represent a legitimate target for reasons of the "liberation" of their people and for a much more nakedly egotistical defense of U.S. national interests. This article will explore how **the current U.S. imperial project combines an increasingly naked economic rationale with a more overt nationalist one**. It will point to the ideological mobilization of "market patriotism," which is welding notions of "national security" and the "national interest" to the (neoliberal) market. "Market patriotism" is emerging to play an increasingly important role in engineering political legitimacy for the mobilization of the coercive apparatuses of the state domestically and internationally under conditions of a so-called war on terror.

### Link – Hegemony

#### The strive for hegemonic dominance fuels competitive economics

**Ciccantell 1** – Ph.D in sociology from University of Wisconsin (Paul, “NAFTA and the Reconstruction of U.S. Hegemony: The Raw Materials Foundations of Economic Competitiveness.(Statistical Data Included)”, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-79030076.html)//RK

The nature of hegemony has been the subject of significant debate in the social science literature (see, e.g., Krasner, 1978; Vernon, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Wallerstein, 1984; Kennedy, 1987; Modelski and Thompson, 1988; ChaseDunn, 1989; Arrighi, 1994). This analysis follows the definition of hegemony developed by Arrighi (1994: 27): "the power of a state to exercise functions of leadership and governance over a system of sovereign states." This definition emphasizes the multidimensional character of hegemony, encompassing economic, political, military and cultural power. Some analyses of hegemony examined the role of raw materials in hegemonic rivalry in earlier eras (Krasner, 1978; Vernon, 1983; Keohane, 1984; and Arrighi, 1994). However, none systematically incorporated raw materials and, more broadly, the critical relationship between capitalist economic growth and natural production systems, and discussions of hegemony in the current era of globalization focus on political and cultural dimensions of hegemon y and largely ignore material processes. Globalization increasingly links economies, polities and societies (Boxill, 1994; Harvey, 1995; Holm and Sorenson, 1995; Sunkel, 1995; Amin, 1996; Arrighi, 1998; Woods, 1998). Although some analysts argued that this integration reduces the role of the state (Harvey, 1995; Holm and Sorenson, 1995; Strange, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1998; Yaghmaian, 1998), a more accurate conceptualization of the role of the state in the current era focuses on the transformation of the role of the state (Shaw, 1997; Garrett, 1998; Robertson and Khondker, 1998; Swank, 1998; Ciccantell, 2000). States still strategize and act in support of national economic and political interests, especially as sites of production, consumption and capital accumulation (see Ciccantell, 2000). In particular, states retain their role as battlegrounds between competing interests of a variety of social classes and groups, even though these interests have been reshaped by globalization (Biersteker, 1998; Hobsbawm, 1998; Sklair, 1998). New historical materialism (Bunker and Ciccantell, 1995a and 1995b; Ciccantell and Bunker, 1998 and 1999; Ciccantell, 1999 and 2000) focuses on the natural and social material processes that underlie economic ascent and hegemonic maintenance and how these material processes shape social processes of establishing and maintaining models of state-firm relations in core nations, institutional and technological innovations to promote economic growth in rising economies, and core-periphery relations to support economic ascent. Analysing the role of raw materials in efforts to reconstitute U.S. hegemony in the current era extends the new historical materialist model.

#### The discourse of American hegemony to produce good is a fallacy – it masks our imperialism that justifies genocide

Moers 6 - Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University

(Colin, “The New Imperialists”,2006, pg 2-3)

Times have changed, but not nearly enough. The old colonial imperialism, of which Algeria was a remnant, had its roots in the nineteenth century. Its apologists could still employ a language redolent of the racial and cultural superiority of the time; the “civilizing mission” of the Christianized West was still thought by many to constitute the “white man’s burden” in the non-European world. Although a similar “civilizational” rhetoric exists today, it is no longer as easy to justify imperial conquest by resort to the overtly racist pieties of the past. If American generals still study French counter-insurgency methods in Algeria for pointers on how to combat the Iraqi insurgency, 3 they have had to find new methods to vie for the hearts and minds of those they wish to subdue. This is largely an achievement of the anti-colonial struggles of the second half of the last century. One of the many advantages of living in a “postcolonial” world is that the collective memory of the anticolonial struggle is deeply ingrained in the consciousness of millions throughout the world. Because of this fact, contemporary imperialism has had to drape itself in new ideological clothes; its defenders must now speak the language of democracy and human rights; of freedom and dignity; of inclusiveness and respect for difference; of gender equality and the alleviation of poverty; of good governance and sustainable development. Alongside these decidedly modernist tropes, others have appealed to the timeless verities of human nature or culture to justify the inevitability of war and empire. Still others have touted the supposedly beneficent legacy of older imperialisms. Such juxtapositions are in keeping with “a deep and perplexing doubleness” of the new imperialism: a primal military atavism reminiscent of older forms of empire combined with the “spectacular” deployment of up-to-the-minute technologies of mass deception and distraction. 4 Taken as a whole, the new ideologies of empire express the same contradictory combination of the retrogressive and the modern: of civilizational clashes and democratic ideals; of virulent racism and postmodern multiculturalism; of gender equality and religious oppression; of old-fashioned propaganda and newfangled forms of “soft power”; of torture and human rights. Against this backdrop, it would be easy to lose sight of the difference between ideologies and lies. However, ideologies are different from lies even if they are sometimes (as in the case of Iraq) bolstered by lies. For ideologies to work, they must speak to some genuine longing on the part 2 The New Imperialistsof those who believe in them, however distorted these desires have become by the realities of exploitation and domination. Hence the talk of democracy and freedom. But, like lies, ideologies often involve a good deal of self-delusion on the part of those who traffic in them – how else to explain the debacle of post-invasion Iraq? The systematic character of imperial self-delusion is perhaps best captured in U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s tortured explication of military ignorance: As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also the unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know. 5 As Slavoj Zizek observes, the one category that Rumsfeld failed to mention were the “unknown knowns”: beliefs or practices – like the horrors of Abu Ghraib – which must be quickly repressed since their knowledge is too much for consciousness to bear. Zizek contends that the real danger for the American empire lies not in the threats which lie undiscovered, but “in the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about.” 6 Be that as it may, a good deal of conscious effort has been expended to justify and normalize the “new imperialism.” It is a mark of the times in which we live that the discourse of empire and imperialism – not so long ago considered an antique preoccupation of the Left – has been embraced by mainstream intellectuals from across the political spectrum. But, before examining these apologias in detail in the essays that follow, we need to ask: what has prompted this sudden desire to reclaim the language of empire? What changes in the global balance of forces account for this momentous ideological shift?

### Link – Neutral Economics

#### The affirmative’s conception of economics as neutral leads to instrumentalization and exploitation

Arnsperger 96- Ph.D. in Economics 1995 (Christian, Competition, consumerism, and the "Other". A philosophical investigation into the ethics of economic competition, 01 May 1996, <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvir/1996014.html>)

The consequences of this are quite sizeable. The race for consumers (I am assuming throughout that, roughly, a firm’s profits are positively related to its market share) obviously provides the fundamental impetus for rivalry between firms (as exemplified by example 2). This inter–firm rivalry, in turn, fosters intra–firm rivalry between individuals (as exemplified by example 1). Moreover, there is clearly a constant attempt of producers to control this consumer–impusled process by taking over the formation of needs and shaping them through advertising and through the creation of “fashions.” This means that there is quite clearly, in the eyes of firms, an anonymization of customers, which balances the anonymization operated by the customers themselves among the firms from which they buy products. This virtually total anonymity, which is a well–kown feature of capitalist competition, is what makes the sudden consequences of competitive pressures so systemic and so devoid of any necessary connection to actual desert—except insofar as a firm succeeds in re–shaping consumer tastes to its own advantage. Desert appears mainly in this ability to innovate whereas, as I argued earlier, there is to me no convincing reason to say that a producer who did not match all his competitors’ performances on an existing market. So there are two groups facing each other on markets: the group of firms within which competitors are anonymously facing one another and which is anonymous from the viewpoint of the group of consumers, and this group of consumers which is in turn anonymous from the viewpoint of the group of firms. The word “group” should not mislead us here; no large group of firms and/ or consumers is necessary as is the case in markets with “strong” competition: Oligopolies and oligopsonies are also anonymous in the sense discussed here to the extent that they rely on intermediation. (The only case which lies outside my present analysis is the—very rare—one of a monopoly facing a market with very few consumers. All other cases display anonymity in the sense discussed here.) Moreover, competing firms are simply anonymous entities facing one another in a contest the very nature of which they fail to control. And it is all these modalities of anonymity which truly lie at the very root of the instrumentalization operated by competitive forces. Competition by its very constitution generates a negation of individual exteriority, in the sense that it “covers up” individual selves with a totality inside which persons exist only as substitutable entities. The other is certainly exterior to me in the sense that he is not myself, but the other’s fundamental exteriority, his being a person never defined by his belonging to any totality, is inevitably denied in the interaction organized by competition. Moreover, since this totality is always a content of consciousness, the other becomes “part of me” through this totality to which I ascribe him. Thus the other’s “other–ness” is fundamentally negated. (See e.g. Wyschogrod, 1992.) This is simply a phenomenological statement embodying per se no value judgment. It is in the fundamental nature of economic competition to operate such an occultation of individual identities. As within any contest, in competition the “other” is nothing but an entity standing in the way of, or being at hand as a tool for, “my” achievement—if this were not so there would be no “com–petition,” which etymologically means the common pursuit of a common goal. The other is no longer a person with his own specific subjectivity, aspirations, fears, hopes, etc., but only one of the “things” which might bar my own passage or serves my own goal. The other has become part of the totality which I am facing, and which I fear or use. Is this, beyond the phenomenological description, also a moral problem? I think it is, although many might disagree. In particular, persons defending conception A will deny that any moral problem is involved, whereas in fact I think the necessary negation of exteriority is the single most important moral problem connected with competition, because I do not believe—at least not as much as some political philosophers in the analytic tradition, or as most economists—that “society” is just a composite magnitude made up of entities called “individuals.” One might object that in the competitive system everyone engages in the game voluntarily; while I disagree with this, I could even grant it and still reply that voluntarisness does not mean that any two participants in the game are not denying each other’s exteriority. (Again, I should insist: Individual x of course sees individual y as physically exterior to himself, but throughout the competitive process x views y as interior to a totality called, for example, “my competitors” or “my opponents,” and since this totality is always already apprehended by x’s consciousness, in fact y becomes “part of” x, no longer fully exterior.) In the discussion of this question, I will rely extensively on the work of Emmanuel Levinas­(1982a, 1990) who has tried to argue that there is much more going on in the notion of “sociality” than merely a juxtaposition of individuals. There is, or there ought to be if the very notion of a relationship is to be upheld, a unicity in every person which cannot be erased by any systemic or totalizing mode of thought. This may sound like a rather unorthodox idea to many, but I think in the reflexion on competition and its ethical value it holds great promise. For the necessity of my present argument, I will—because I think there are good reasons for this—identify competition with warfare, and the “victory” in the competitive race as a form of “killing.” This may be considered extreme, but it is intimately connected with the idea that competition ontologically violates exteriority. Pushing the other aside as I would a material obstacle as part of the “totality” which obstructs my passage is, ontologically speaking, a form of killing, even if biological life is not in all cases threatened. In a metaphorical sense, firms can “kill” one another on a market; customers can “kill” a firm by arbitraging away from it in favor of another firm; and people can “kill” one another in competing for jobs or positions. In a much more litteral sense, a firm can kill people if it decides to relocate and to move from one country to another almost overnight, leaving all its former employees with the choice between being jobless and uprooting their current way of life by moving.­4

### Impact – Conflict

#### Competitive ideology leads to war

NIEMINEN 6 - Principal Lecturer, PhD at Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Ari, Critique of Competitiveness - Theoretical Points of Departure, September 2 2006, http://www.elisanet.fi/ari\_nieminen/competitiveness.pdf)

After describing the constellation of competitiveness, its social and political role can be further clarified by analysing its diverse functions in social practises. In the following pages, these functions are approached by using Robert Merton’s differentiations among manifest, latent and dysfunctions. However, when using these notions, it must be kept in mind that what is a manifest function to one actor may be a latent function to another person. The following presentation is based on my current understanding of the above forms of functions. As pointed out in the previous section, the level of political regulation of the economy reveals the true character of a politico-economic configuration. In a fully liberal system, the units of economic competition would be individuals (workers and entrepreneurs) and singular firms. In such a system political regulation would only offer frameworks for economic activities and there would be no public discussion concerning the competitiveness of other socio-economic units. In a truly liberal world competitiveness would be a fact of life to firms and individuals but it would not be a policy objective The most important units of competition have for a long time been national economies. In recent decades also the European Union has strengthened its role in this respect. Hence, the most important manifest function of the ideology and policies of competitiveness is that they constitute a firm frame of reference that ties all social and political actors under a single hegemonic project. This kind of a project constitutes also strong frames for regulation of class relations in general and industrial relations in particular. Of course, the role of the content of national competitiveness policy differs from nation to nation and over time. For instance, “innovation systems” (the idea exists foremost in the Nordic countries) refers to a competitive constellation of capital, academia and public authorities. It is one variation of Nordic corporatism in service of national competitiveness. National variations notwithstanding, policies of competitiveness seem to have been very important policy objectives in most of the EU member states. And it is certainly one of the cornerstones the present EU policy making. Both at the national and at the EU level this hegemonic ideology realises itself in diverse political practices aimed to enhance national and EU competitiveness. (See Nieminen 2005, Chapter 5 and Section 9.1.) One example of such practices is how diverse measurements of competitiveness are used as policy tools both at the national and trans-/international level. For example, the Swiss-based think-tanks, the World Economic Forum (WEF) and Institute for Management Development (IMD) 1, produce yearly world-wide rankings concerning the competitiveness of the world’s nations. In political and in ideological practice high-ranking countries can be used as models of “best practices” to be followed by the others. A second manifest function of the competitive ideological framework is that it intensifies social life according to its mode of action. The present day winners of socio-economic competition are worried about their future position and the losers are keen to take their places. This function was already mentioned in the above section of this essay, and it is the one that is normally held up as a positive function of competition. Competition is assumed to enhance economic efficiency and boost economic development. Political and economic leaders use this function consciously to boost the efficiency of by creating diverse competitive situation; a firm may make its divisions to compete with each other, a ministry of education may force universities to compete with each other and so on. There are at least two latent functions of competitiveness. First, the definition of a competing unit functions as a strong uniting force within that same unit: All those actors who belong to one competing team are seen as belonging to the same socio-economic unit and sharing fundamentally the same interest and destiny. The ideology of competitiveness is therefore a good mean to hide all kinds of conflicts of interest. An ultimate example of this situation is the war-time national unity. From the point of view of industrial relations, the ideology and political practices of competitiveness are used to hide class relations between labour and capital. Secondly, even if the ideals of competitiveness are presented as goals of collectives (firm’s, region’s, nation’s, EU’s etc. competitiveness) they give substantial powers to the specific groups of capital owners and managers (see Miller 2005; Kels & Vornbusch 2005). This is so because ultimately it is owners and management of firms that define what is and what is not competitive. To be able to analyse this situation better it is fruitful to divide competitiveness into two subcategories. Objective competitiveness means that a firm or an individual is competitive when it is able to reproduce its activity in a medium term time-frame. This kind of competitiveness is a fact of life in liberal market economy. However, one encounters objective competitiveness as such seldom. This is so because a firm’s economic figures belong to the realm of business secrets; owners and management do not normally reveal them to the workers or to the public. Therefore, the objective facts of economic success or failure are hidden and demands of subjective competitiveness are voiced. A firm or another economic unit is subjectively competitive when it satisfies subjective needs of its owners (capital) and subjective expectations concerning the returns from invested capital. Because – unlike sometimes believed – money does not talk, an analyst is normally encountering a mixture of objective and subjective competitiveness when observing competitiveness of a politico-economic unit. An every-day observation may clarify the above distinction between objective and subjective competitiveness. Often in public and in social scientific literature it is presented as a self-evident truth that in the present globalizing world the economic competition has became much harder than before and this situation demands sacrifices from all. At the same time when reading the economy sections of newspapers one often encounters news about substantially heightened profits of firms and substantial increases of management’s wages (for calculations of profits, see Nieminen 2005, Section 4.5). Now, how is it possible that in a situation of hardened competition capital is able to increasing its profit rate? Should not the situation of hard competition lead to a profit squeeze? Or might it be that what we are dealing with here is a matter of subjective and not objective competitiveness? Lastly policies and practices of competitiveness have also dysfunctions. In the case of socioeconomic competition these include at least those material and spiritual resources that are invested in competition between humans instead of using these resources to improve human conditions (for instance arms race, investments restricted to narrowly defined units of competition). In some cases, competition may amount to construction of several production systems (for instance, several mobile phone networks) even if one system could be enough to satisfy needs in question. The most severe dysfunction of competitive social orientation is that in cases when this orientation begins to rule social life, it will reduce human relations into suspicious striving for competitive advantages and undermine all other forms of human coexistence. Socio-economic competition would exclude all those individuals and groups that lack money and other economic resources leading to divided societies and most likely social and political problems and protests. In the worst case, competition transforms to violent struggles such as wars among nation-states.

#### Competitive economics directly increase the risk of large scale conflict—profit seeking, alliance breaking, and empirics prove

**Spector 10** - **Associate Professor of Sociology at Purdue University Calumet**

(Alan J Spector, “Neoliberal Globalization and Capitalist Crises in the Age of Imperialism” in “Globalization in the 21st Century: Labor, Capital, and the State on a World Scale”, pg 48-51, IWren)

How might this impact international relations? One might assume that the biggest, wealthiest nations will see a need to cooperate to solve their common problems, and indeed, in the short term, we can see meetings and conferences designed to encourage cooperation. But underlying this whole process are serious potential problems as the advanced capitalist countries **compete with each other for profits** and control over the less developed countries (what Lenin called “interimperialist rivalry”), and **that can set the stage for sharper conflicts among the imperialist countries themselves** (Lenin 1969). This intense economic crisis puts even greater strains on these capitalist economies and pressures them into finding more international sources of profits, and this, in turn, increases the possibilities for various types of conflicts, not just with smaller countries but with larger ones as well. World War I appeared to have been started by a conflict between two different factions from small countries in the Balkans, but these countries were proxies for the powerful nations that were battling for much bigger prizes, including Arabian oil. More recently, the U.S. war in Iraq, begun in 2003, has been characterized by some as a war for democracy. This has been critiqued by those who point out U.S. military inaction in the many other areas of the world where the lack of democracy has hurt many more people. Others see it as a war for oil. This has been critiqued by those who point out that the United States has vast quantities of oil, and, in fact, imports very little oil from Iraq. A more subtle but still economically based analysis sees the war as largely motivated by the need to control the flow of oil to Europe, China, and other rivals of U.S. imperialism. Stabilizing a regime in Iraq that would be friendly to U.S. corporate interests is seen as providing a military base to protect U.S. oil company interests in the whole region. It is seen as a way to neutralize Iran, perhaps turning it into a U.S. ally, as it had been for a part of the twentieth century. It would protect the profits that U.S. corporations reap as middlemen, resellers of the region’s oil to others (e.g., Europe). It is not so much the actual oil that the U.S. needs, but rather the huge profits that are made acquiring and then reselling that oil to others who need it. Finally, controlling that oil has other important politicaleconomic benefits. Neither France, nor Germany, Japan, Italy, or Spain own significant sources of oil. Russia has huge amounts of natural gas, but also eyes the clean, inexpensive Arabian and Iranian oil. China has growing needs and is fervently seeking new sources of oil from the Sudan, Eastern Ethiopia, and Nigeria to Venezuela and Mexico. India, too, will have growing needs. If the U.S. corporations can maintain tight control on the oil resources of Iraq, and by extension parts of that region, they can maintain an advantage over those competing oil importers and thus assure U.S. control and domination over the oil resources of the Middle East. It might seem counterintuitive to see allies such as the United States, France, Germany, India, and Japan as rivals to be outmaneuvered by each other, but **in a capitalist world, all alliances are ultimately temporary while competition is fundamental.** Wallerstein, among others, has argued that there was a sizeable faction within the erstwhile Bush administration that was motivated not just by the so-called Clash of Civilizations between the United States and the radical Islamic movement, but by the economic and political power of Western Europe, Russia, and China as well. More recently, President Obama has sent a force of over 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. While Afghanistan may seem to be a poor country with few resources, the reality is that it is strategically located for gas and oil pipelines and for military positioning near Russia, China, and the oil-rich areas in that region. When the USSR collapsed and much of Eastern Europe pushed aside the various Soviet-style regimes, many mainstream politicians and political theorists postulated that the United States would be the sole superpower for many years to come, the premier world power in a world that was embracing free market capitalism. Even China was opening up its economy to U.S. investments. Within a few years, however, various regional nationalists, especially in the Islamic world, were working to expand their political and economic influence. It was not only the United States that would gain from the collapse of Soviet influence in much of the world. Meanwhile, much of Western Europe moved toward closer economic and political integration, with a unified currency, political alliances, and more coordinated international cooperation on environmental and other policies. This unity might appear to help stabilize the global political situation, but it also creates pressure on some political and economic interests within the United States. The Euro is being used in place of the U.S. dollar in parts of the world, the opposition to U.S. foreign policy, military action, and human rights and environmental policy seems to be growing, and European investments in areas formerly secure for U.S. investments, such as Latin America, are competing with U.S. interests. The European Union, much of which President Bush derided as “Old Europe” in decline, has helped bolster the Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela and continues to trade with Cuba, as well as lending support to other political movements that are at odds with U.S. imperialism. Currently, the European Union is investing heavily in Mexico. China, too, is rapidly increasing its investments in Latin America. The recent war of words between Russia and the United States, because Russia sees U.S. missiles near its border as a threat, is another example of increased tensions among the great powers. This has been further intensified by the recent conflict between Russia and the former Soviet republic of Georgia, where the United States has been propping up a regime to stir up trouble along the Russian border. No one is predicting a massive inter-imperialist World War in the near future. The big powers have much to gain from cooperation and much to lose from a major war. However, the increased rivalry among the major capitalist powers in a shrinking world, combined with the rise in economic, technological, and political power of China and India, will create more pressure on all the major capitalist powers. World War I was unthinkable in the early 1890s, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the big influence that the Soviet government had over hundreds of millions of people over the next seventy years was not imagined by anyone twenty years earlier, the rise of defeated Germany to world power status just twenty years after its crushing defeat in World War I was not predicted by many, and the rather sudden collapse of the Soviet Bloc around 1990 and the very different world that has developed since then were also unexpected just twenty years earlier. How the increased economic pressures of today will be resolved cannot easily be predicted, but history should caution us against predicting one hundred years of world peace, especially as today’s pressures and crises have become globalized in this shrinking world.

### Impact – Protectionism / Trade Wars

#### Competitive ideology leads to trade wars and conflict

Krugman 1994- American economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University (Paul, March/ April 1994, Foreign Affair volume 73 NO 2, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, Proquest)

Thinking and Speaking in terms of competitiveness poses three real dangers. First, it could result in the wasteful spending of government money to enhance U.S. Competitiveness. Second, it could lead to protectionism and trade wars. Finally, and most important, it could result in bad public policy on a spectrum of important issues.

During the 1950’s, fear of the Soviet Union induced the U.S. government to spend money on useful things like highways and science education. It also, however, lead to considerable spending on more doubtful items like bomb shelters. The most obvious if least worrisome danger of the growing obsession with competitiveness is that it might lead to a similar misallocation of resources. To take an example, recent guidelines for government research funding have stressed the importance of supporting research that can improve US international competitiveness. This exerts at least some bias toward inventions that can help manufacturing firms, which generally compete on international markets, rather than service producers, which generally do not. Yet most of our employment and value-added is now in services, and lagging productivity in services rather than manufactures has been the single most important factor in that stagnation of U.S. living standard.

A much more serious risk is that the obsession with competitiveness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a world trade war. Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness have not been old- fashioned protectionist. They want their countries to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably suggests that to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners take away high-wage jobs and high-value sectors. At the very least, the focus on the supposedly competitive nature of international economic relations greases the rails of those who want confrontational if not frankly protectionist policies.

#### Competitive ideology makes protectionism and trade conflicts inevitable

Boddy 98 - Professor of Urban and Regional Studies, at the University of Bristol, School for Policy Studies (Martin, Geographical Economics and Urban Competitiveness: A Critique, 1998, Scholar)

A major theme in Krugman’s work has been his critique of those who maintain that competitiveness in the global economy is vital to the continued economic success of the ‘developed’ countries and that their position is seriously threatened by the transfer of production to low-wage economies which would then flood the domestic market with cheap imports, destroying domestic industry and employment. Trade deficits in manufactured goods have pushed up domestic unemployment and forced workers into much lower-paying service-sector jobs. The economic problem, according to this view “is essentially one of competiting on world markets” (Krugman, 1997, p. 4). The argument is potentially significant in terms of what it might imply for the nature of competition between cities and urban agglomerations—particularly given Krugman’s emphasis on the close relationship between international trade and the sub-national concentration of economic activity. According to Krugman, however, this view of competitiveness is ‘flatly wrong’: competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies. And the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous (Krugman, 1997, p.22). Similarly: It is simply not the case that the world’s leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failure to compete on world markets (Krugman, 1997, p. 5). A country, he argues, is not a corporation and has no financial bottom-line, making competitiveness at the outset hard to define. Growth in real income or living standards, he argues, essentially equals rates of growth in domestic productivity—by domestic factors rather than by some form of competition for world markets. In part this is because trade is relatively small compared with production for the domestic market—around 10 per cent of value added in the U.S. More fundamentally, while companies with similar product lines may compete, trade between the major industrial countries is essentially beneficial providing both export markets and useful imports often at lower prices and of better quality than those produce domestically: International trade is not a zero-sum game…while competitive problems could arise in principle, as a practical, empirical matter the major nations of the world are not to any significant degree in economic competition with each other (Krugman, 1997, p. 10). The manufacturing trade deficit argument, he argues, falls on the basis of simple arithmetic—any possible reduction in real wages falling far short of the observed shift in the US in recent years. He is also critical of the common association made between competitiveness and high-technology industry—capital and labour need to flow into high value-added sectors (meaning value added per worker) which are commonly believed to be synonymous with high technology. Krugman argues however, using US statistics, that ‘high value-added’ sectors are those with a large volume of fixed capital relative to labour. They include, for example, oil refining and cigarettes. Even steel and car-making are significantly ahead of aircraft and electronics where value added is around the average for manufacturing as a whole. The obsession with competition, he argues, reflects a combination of the exciting images conjured up, the attractions of blaming other nation-states for domestic concerns, the relatively simple policy agenda such arguments seem to offer, and the political convenience of such arguments. They reflect as well the misguided application of corporate strategy concepts, with their emphasis on head-to-head competition, to national industrial policy. Such arguments have been promoted by a range of policy advisers and supposed experts—who are the target for much of Krugman’s critique. One proponent, he argues: asks us to accept ‘competitiveness’ as a kind of ineffable essence that cannot be defined or measured. Data that seem to suggest the importance of the essence are cited as ‘indicators’ whatever that means, while those that do not are dismissed as unreliable (Krugman, 1997, p. 32). The danger, he argues, is of the misallocation of resources, protectionism and trade wars combined with failure to recognise the gains in terms of international trade from specialization. The key reason for the stagnation in US living standars, he argues, is lagging productivity gain in the now-predominant service sector.

### Impact – Imperialism

#### The competitive economic system uses our military as its global policeman – forcing us to be a permanent state of war.

Mooers 6 – Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University

(Colin, “The New Imperialists”,2006, pg 5-6)

The current round of imperialism, therefore, has as its goal the export and entrenchment of capitalist social-property relations throughout the world; it is about the universalization of capitalism. And just as in earlier phases of capitalism, state military power has been central to the imposition of this new stage of primitive accumulation and enclosure. However, if state military power is still essential for the imposition of capitalism in some parts of the world, and if its spectacular display remains vital to U.S. global hegemony, there is an important sense in which the dynamics of imperialism have changed markedly. Unlike its earlier forms, imperialism today no longer relies on direct colonization. Nor does military rivalry between states over resources and territory exist on the scale that it did in the time of Lenin and Bukharin. But if imperialism is no longer defined by formal empire and military competition, how have militarism and capitalist imperatives become so closely linked in the new imperialism? The simple answer is that in a world comprised of limited territorial states and the global reach of capital,the use of overwhelming military might becomes the only way of policing capitalist interests. When terrorist violence beyond the state is thrown into the mix, the problem becomes even more intractable. For these reasons, a more or less permanent state of warfare – war without end – has become definitive of twenty-first-century capitalism: “Boundless domination of a global economy, and of the multiple states that administer it, requires military action without end, in purpose or time.” 12 If a state of permanent war has become the “new normal” of our time, it is clear why the discourse of empire has become so vital to those who defend this new order of things: the domestication of war and imperial conquest has become an urgent ideological imperative.

#### Conflicts will only get worse—the new world order will become stronger—soon these created threats turn into self-fulfilling prophecy

Bienefeld 94 – PHD in Economics at the London School of Economics

(Manfred, “The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, The South in the New World (Dis)Order <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993022>)

The result has been an increasingly unstable and unmanageable world in which economic imbalances have grown to a point where they are inhibiting investment and generating increased social and political conflict. And those conflicts will intensify as people's expressed political wishes are continually disappointed by almost powerless governments; as people feel more economically, socially and politically threatened in a volatile and patently unfair world in which loyalty, hard work and effort count for much less than luck, ruthless- ness and power; and as people become more cynical about the political process. In such a world the good intentions of the soft optimists will be even more grievously disappointed than in the 1970s or 1980s. Chronic economic and financial problems will continue to relegate such idealistic concerns to the half empty pews of our places of worship. Those who persist in demanding a different ordering of priorities will be dismissed as dinosaurs or dreamers, either unmindful or unaware of the 'facts of economic life'; and social democratic parties will continue to be decimated at the polls as people see their limited ability to deliver on their promises, so long as the NWO has to be taken as 'given'. Received wisdom remains that these things do have to be taken as given. Globalisation is inevitable! Globalisation is technologically determined! Global- isation is part of the inexorable rise of the global village! In another age they would have pronounced it an act of God. These false and fatalistic slogans provide the cover under which the NWO is being constructed. As it nears completion, we increasingly become its prisoners. In time, the promise of powerlessness may yet become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

### Impact – Extermination

#### US desire for consumption leads to mass extermination and violence – be skeptical of their evidence because it’s produced by war profiteers

Whyte 7 – a Reader in Sociology at the University of Liverpool (David, “Market Patriotism and the “War on Terror””, Proquest)//RK

It has become unfashionable to look to the nation-state as an organizing category of analysis. Yet the alliances and competing national interests revealed in the prelude to the Iraq invasion bring into sharp relief that it is insufficient to discuss the replacement of imperialism by a generalized notion of Empire. Of course, the brutal tum in U.S. imperialism is related to the internationalization of the neoliberal market form. But insofar as there is a struggle for dominance over the international economy and the U.S. is the leading economy in this struggle-with this occurring at the level of competing varieties of capitalist economies-an understanding of how the internationalization of the neoliberal market is constructed around a simultaneous reconfiguration of national and transnational interests is more crucial than ever. If market patriotism is an ideological marker that the nation-state remains the key site of economic policy formation, certainly for the strongest states, this is not to say that the "globalizing" tendencies of markets and the emergence of key transnational institutions (intergovernmental and those of transnational capital) have had no lasting effect on nation-states. Indeed, the probability of pressures from above and below upon the integrity of national states means that market patriotism is unlikely to remain a stable source of legitimacy. Further instability stems from the paradox at the heart of market patriotism. State-market symbiosis, the source of the material strength of the ruling fraction, is also a source of neoliberalism's vulnerability. Market patriotism seeks to provide an alibi for a remarkably intricate web of personal interconnections between state servants, the most senior politicians, and a growing number of war profiteers. Yet this openness lays bare the real consequence of state-capital symbioses: the corruption of political authority and the untrammeled violence of imperial wars. At the openly violent frontiers of the neoliberal market, consensus is both less likely and more necessary; moreover, the readiness with which the U.S. ruling class resorts to violence to promote its own economic advantage undermines its own political legitimacy. The potential for mobilizing market patriotism as an ideological support varies considerable across neoliberal economies. Although Tony Blair appealed for people to "keep shopping" in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks upon the U.S., the official response to the July 7 bombings contained little in the way of economic jingoism. Discussions in official publications on how best to allow business to continue uninterrupted no longer exhorted the public to "keep shopping" or made a discernible bid for market patriotism. The ideology and practice of counterterrorism has become a key location for mobilizing ideological support for neoliberalism. Beyond this, a new market patriotism is surfacing in a range of policy areas. We find it in the new state racism in Western democracies that supplants asylum policy with managed "economic" migration. We also find it in welfare policy in the U.K., whereby the right to welfare is increasingly linked to a new politics of "economic citizenship." In those cases, there is a complex interplay between race, economy, and nationalism. Neoliberal governments are set to resort to market patriotism more frequently to legitimize profligate corruption, the intensification of state attacks upon individual liberties, and the extreme violence against subordinate populations that is necessary to secure the Imperium at home and abroad. Just as in Rhodes' late British Empire, the corresponding interests of private profiteers and the state-expressed most clearly in the new market patriotism-will continue to shape the struggle for hegemony in the late American Empire.

#### Militaristic interventions conducted on behalf of US economic imperialism culminate in extinction

**Mészáros 3** (István, Hungarian Marxist philosopher, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Sussex. He held the Chair of Philosophy at Sussex for fifteen years and

was earlier Professor of Philosophy and Social Science for four years at York University. The Monthly Review, “Militarism and the Coming Wars” June 2003. http://monthlyreview.org/0603meszaros.htm 7/9/09)

The dangers and immense suffering caused by all attempts at solving deep-seated social problems by militaristic interventions, on any scale, are obvious enough. If, however, we look more closely at the historical trend of militaristic adventures, it becomes frighteningly clear that they show an ever greater intensification and an ever-increasing scale, from local confrontations to two horrendous world wars in the twentieth century, and to the potential annihilation of humankind when we reach our own time. It is most relevant to mention in this context the distinguished Prussian military officer and practical as well as theoretical strategist, Karl Marie von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who died in the same year as Hegel; both of them killed by cholera. It was von Clausewitz, director of the Military School of Berlin in the last thirteen years of his life, who in his posthumously published book—Vom Kriege (On War, 1833)—offered a classic definition of the relationship between politics and war that is still frequently quoted: “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” This famous definition was tenable until quite recently, but has become totally untenable in our time. It assumed the rationality of the actions which connect the two domains of politics and war as the continuation of one another. In this sense, the war in question had to be winnable, at least in principle, even if miscalculations leading to defeat could be contemplated at the instrumental level. Defeat by itself could not destroy the rationality of war as such, since after the—however unfavorable—new consolidation of politics the defeated party could plan another round of war as the rational continuation of its politics by other means. Thus the absolute condition of von Clausewitz’s equation to be satisfied was the winnability of war in principle, so as to recreate the “eternal cycle” of politics leading to war, and back to politics leading to another war, and so on ad infinitum. The actors involved in such confrontations were the national states. No matter how monstrous the damage inflicted by them on their adversaries, and even on their own people (just remember Hitler!), the rationality of the military pursuit was guaranteed if the war could be considered winnable in principle. Today the situation is qualitatively different for two principal reasons. First, the objective of the feasible war at the present phase of historical development, in accordance with the objective requirements of imperialism—world domination by capital’s most powerful state, in tune with its own political design of ruthless authoritarian “globalization” (dressed up as “free exchange” in a U.S. ruled global market)—is ultimately unwinnable, foreshadowing, instead, the destruction of humankind. This objective by no stretch of imagination could be considered a rational objective in accord with the stipulated rational requirement of the “continuation of politics by other means” conducted by one nation, or by one group of nations against another. Aggressively imposing the will of one powerful national state over all of the others, even if for cynical tactical reasons the advocated war is absurdly camouflaged as a “purely limited war” leading to other “open ended limited wars,” can therefore be qualified only as total irrationality. The second reason greatly reinforces the first. For the weapons already available for waging the war or wars of the twenty first century are capable of exterminating not only the adversary but the whole of humanity, for the first time ever in history. Nor should we have the illusion that the existing weaponry marks the very end of the road. Others, even more instantly lethal ones, might appear tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Moreover, threatening the use of such weapons is by now considered an acceptable state strategic device. Thus, put reasons one and two together, and the conclusion is inescapable: envisaging war as the mechanism of global government in today’s world underlines that we find ourselves at the precipice of absolute irrationality from which there can be no return if we accept the ongoing course of development. What was missing from von Clausewitz’s classic definition of war as the “continuation of politics by other means” was the investigation of the deeper underlying causes of war and the possibility of their avoidance. The challenge to face up to such causes is more urgent today than ever before. For the war of the twenty first century looming ahead of us is not only “not winnable in principle.” Worse than that, it is in principle unwinnable. Consequently, envisaging the pursuit of war, as the Bush administration’s September 17, 2002 strategic document does, make Hitler’s irrationality look like the model of rationality.

### Impact – VTL

#### Destroys value to life

Group of Lisbon – 95 Nineteen members from Japan, Western Europe, and North America with different educational backgrounds and experience in business, government, international organizations, and academia (Group of Lisbon, Joao Caraca, Hpilippe de Woot, Gianfranco Dioguardi, Luois Emmerij, Emilio Fontela, Seiko Hirata, Pierre-Mar Johnson, Claude Julien, Terry Karl, Daniel Latouche, Robert McCormic-Adams, Riccardo Petrella, Ken Prewitt, Saskia Sassen, Joel Serrao, Luc Tissot, Taizo Yakushiji, Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, Aristide Zolberg, *Limits to Competition*, 1995)

Despite its popularity, competitiveness is far from being an effective answer to the present problems and opportunities of the new global world and society. Excess competition is even a source of adverse effects. The most striking result of the competition ideology is that it generates a structural distortion in the functioning of the economy itself, not to mention its devastating social effects. First, it has become increasingly evident to many Americans that “the international economic competition of the past decade has proved a competition in terminating jobs and reducing living standards. Europeans are only now beginning to realize that the search for international competitiveness is being conducted at an unacceptable human cost.” Productive economic competition comes from technological improvement and rationalized industry. Increasing the number of jobless is not the way for a country to grow richer. Nor is impoverishing those with jobs by cutting wages and benefits a socially acceptable form of productivity increase. The first result of the competitive war ideology is that the “North Americans, Europeans and Japanese are all competing by sacrificing the interests of the most vulnerable peoples in their societies.” Recently a supporter of the ideology of competitiveness expressed the same idea in a different way. He questioned how British firms could be competitive vis-à-vis South Korea, Indonesia, or China if social protection in Europe were not further reduced and wages remained thirty, forty, or fifty times higher than those in the Asian countries. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the answer given by economic and political leaders has been to favor the reduction of social protection and real wages. How is it possible, however, to believe that there is a reasonable solution to competition between one country in which the average person works 2,200 hours per year for $1000 and another in which individuals work 1,600 hours for $30,000? Under these conditions, it is simply demagoguery to claim that the competitiveness of the latter will be increased by a reduction in labor costs. The second result is that if everyone is competing against everyone else, the value of competitiveness is ultimately lost. As Emile Van Lennep, the former secretary general of the OECD, correctly pointed out a decade ago in rejecting competitiveness as the only solution, “against whom should the OECD as a whole be more competitive? Against the developing world? Against the moon?” “We cannot,” Samuel Brittan argues today, “all be competitive against each other.” If everyone competes against each other, sooner or later the system will collapse. To survive, the system needs a diverse multiplicity of players. The logic of competitiveness leads to reducing diversity within the system by eliminating all those who are unable to resist the dominant forces. In this sense, it contributes to the development of social exclusion: the noncompetitive people, firms, cities, and nations are left behind. They are no longer the subject of history. The third effect of the ideology of competitiveness is that it is blinkered. It sees only one dimension of human and social history, that is, the spirit of competition. The spirit of competition and aggression is a powerful engine for action, motivation, and innovation. It does not, however, act in isolation nor is it disconnected from other engines such as the spirit of cooperation and solidarity. Cooperation is also fundamental phenomenon in human history, produced and determined by society. Competition and cooperation as well as aggressiveness and solidarity are two coexisting, very often conflicting, dimensions of the human condition. The ideology of competitiveness either ignores or devalues cooperation, or it instrumentalizes it to its own logic, as is the case in the great majority of interfirm strategic alliances. The fourth result is reductionism and sectarian fundamentalism. The ideology of competitiveness not only has just one eye, but it is a bad eye. It does not view at the right scale even the limited things it does see. Competitiveness reduces the entire process of the human condition to the perceptions, motivations, and behavior of Homo economicus as Homo competitor. All the perceptions, motivations, and behaviors either have no value—unless they are subordinated and legitimized by competitiveness—or they are irrelevant for the economy. The typical magic formula of the ideology of economically dominated competitiveness is “Let’s get back to business.” This formula assumes that when people get back to business, they only talk or do the correct, relevant things.

#### Indian slums prove

Taylor 10 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Global Development Studies (Marcus, Conscripts of Competitiveness: culture, institutions and capital in contemporary development, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2010, pp 561–579)

Outside the positive sum games of the neoclassical cannon and the institutional fetishisms of the new institutional economics, these manifestations of uneven development breed the conditions for violence. In a context in which the urban centres of the global South have become the collecting ground for the dispossessed, struggles inevitably erupt over what David Harvey, following Henri Lefebvre, terms the ‘right to the city’.61 The urban bourgeoisie—vanguard of competitiveness—seek spatial segregation from the disorder and insecurity of the slums through their own self-enclosures. They travel, as Arjun Appadurai evocatively puts it, ‘from guarded homes to darkened cars to airconditioned offices, moving always in an envelope of privilege through the heat of public poverty and the dust of dispossession’.62 Yet beyond the fences of these gated communities, the worlds of competitiveness and dispossession overlap. Conflict over the uses and abuses of urban space is inevitable as the high modernity of the formal economy is interspersed within an uneven urban environment of rapidly expanding slums and a proliferating informal sector incorporating the internal migrants from impoverished rural areas who desperately strive to avoid being a segment of surplus humanity unable to integrate into the circuits of capital. Violence resides at the heart of this contradiction between the pursuit of competitiveness and those people rendered impossible under its dictates. These dynamics, for example, are captured in the coercive street and slum clearances that are currently occurring in advance of the hosting of the 2010 Commonwealth Games in New Delhi. Desired by the Indian government as a showpiece for Indian modernisation, the imagery of an international sporting competition is readily reworked to project a broader image of international competitiveness. In particular, the New Delhi authorities have harnessed the Games to project an image of a ‘World Class City’, a refrain that readily resuscitates the previous slogan of ‘shining India’.63 The trouble facing the architects of this image, however, is that the ambivalences of competitiveness are written into the urban space of New Delhi, where the passage from a ‘competition state’ of high modernity to a ‘failed state’ of capital’s wastelands can be as minimal as crossing a street. As a consequence, the lead-up to the games has been characterised by concerted infrastructural investment across the city to reconfigure Delhi’s urban landscapes in ways that either remove or hide manifestations of its ingrained uneven development. Such trends are not new. Indeed, the city’s slums have been continuous targets for reform, renovation or relocation since colonial times, when concerns over congestion and disease were the pretexts for coercive urban restructuring.64 Moreover, they fit closely into the ongoing project that Sanjay Srivastava terms ‘the making of a new culture of consumption’ in and through transformations of New Delhi’s urban space that reorganise space for the high consumption lifestyles of India’s entrepreneurial elite and new middle classes.65 To accomplish these goals, around $1 billion has gone towards renovating the city centre, including building an athletes’ village, with full provision of electricity and water, on the east bank of the Yamuna river. This area first had to be cleared of informal slum settlements and, over the past two years, more than two million people have been forcibly removed from such informal settlements as the city attempts to coercively purge itself of those unable to conform to the dictates of competitiveness.66 For other slums, visible from the roads leading to the primary venues of the Games, the municipal authorities have resigned themselves to planting bamboo to cover over the blemishes of ‘Incredible India’.67 As a synchronised dimension of this housecleaning, the state authorities have simultaneously targeted the presence of tens of thousands of beggars, most of whom are migrants from the countryside across central and northern India. As New Delhi’s Social Welfare Minister Mangat Ram Singhal commented, ‘We Indians are used to beggars but Westerners are not and so we need to clean up’ before adding that ‘We’ll catch them all’.68 To do so, the state has introduced mobile courts, housed in the backs of vans operated by a special police task force, in order to speed up convictions for begging. Bylaws allow beggars to be sent to a special home for a year, while habitual offenders can be jailed for 10 years. Furthermore, officials have suggested a biometric database to identify repeat offenders so that they can be locked up or expelled from the city.69 To reconcile the contradictions of competitiveness, civil society has attempted to obliterate the ambiguities of political society by deploying the coercive apparatus of the state to clearly delineate the boundaries of where informality is rendered illegal. As a coercive expression of the contradictions at the heart of global capitalism, the marginalised masses of the streets of New Delhi have been criminalised in the name of competitiveness.

### Impact – Root Cause

#### The aggressive economic system is the root cause of war.

**Harvey 4 – Professor @ CUNY**

(David,David Harvey Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkele, 2004, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Harvey/harvey-con4.html)

There are several ways in which you can configure the opposition, and these aren't necessarily the ones that I would favor. There's a lot of nationalist opposition around the world to U.S. global domination, and some of that is beginning to provoke certain alliances amongst forces which are very resistant to what the U.S. is up to around the world. You can see this increasingly with alliances like the one that is emerging between Brazil and India and China and Russia, which is becoming quite nationalistic as well. So what we're seeing is a zone of resistance to what the U.S. is trying to do globally, which I don't think is progressive at all. I think in many ways it's regressive and I think it's dangerous. But nevertheless, it is a very strong force of opposition. An alliance between, say, Russian, China, India, and Brazil against the United States, or against Europe, seems to me to be quite a fierce global battle which I would not like to see unfold, but I think it's there**.** Then there are many other forms of opposition at a much more local level. There's one wing of anti-globalization, alternative globalization, which I already mentioned, which says all the solutions lie at the local level, and is trying to construct local solutions. In some cases these can be very helpful, in the sense that the local solution can spill out and become general if people find a way to make something work in a particular place, in a particular way. There's a lot of experimentation at that level. What worries me right now is that there's not a very coherent general opposition with a very good plan against what's happening both globally and locally. For example, I'm absolutely amazed that there is a great deal of discontent in this country over things like education, health care, public services, failing infrastructure, and yet there is no political movement which is articulating those ideas and saying that these have to be part of a new progressive politics in this country, and that anybody who comes to power must address those issues. I see the Democrats beginning to address those issues, not because they want to but because the base is forcing them. But I don't think they're speaking to the anger that exists amongst large groups in the population over what is happening to them in terms of their life -- having health care problems and insurance problems, and the lack of resources in the midst of tremendous wealth that is being accumulated by this plutocracy, the upper classes.

#### The aggressive nature of our economic system forces military expansion – root cause of your impacts

 Mooers 6 – Chair of the Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University

(Colin, “The New Imperialists”,2006, pg 3-4)

To answer these questions we must begin with what is “new” about the “new imperialism.” First, it would be a mistake to view the recent U.S. turn to “preemptive” military action solely in terms of a reaction to the events of September 11th, or, more sinisterly, as the pre-planned goal of bellicose neoconservatives. That the Bush administration is more willing to resort to large-scale military intervention than previous administrations is undoubtedly true. However, to see this as a fundamental change in the nature of U.S. imperialism would be an exaggeration. The U.S.A. has a long and unbroken history of imperial conquest stretching back more than two centuries. It would be equally MOOERS: Introduction 3one-sided to see the invasion of Iraq as only about oil. Control of Middle Eastern oil reserves would give the U.S.A. an indisputable advantage over potential rivals, notably the fast rising powers of Asia. But if oil is a crucial part of the equation, the Iraq war is also part of a much wider “radical, punitive, ‘extra-economic’ restructuring of the conditions necessary for expanded profitability – paving the way, in short, for new rounds of American-led dispossession and capital accumulation … a new form of military neoliberalism.” 7 But, while America is still the preeminent military power on the planet, its superiority in firepower vastly exceeds its economic supremacy. 8 It is this imbalance between its economic and its military might that helps account for the shift to a more aggressive military posture. Thus, the drive of neoconservatives toward a more coercive orientation in international relations is intended to send a message not only to so-called “rogue” regimes and “failed” states, but also to its major economic competitors. In other words, while proximate causes are important in accounting for the emergence of the new imperialism, we need to situate these changes within the deep structural shifts in global capitalism that have occurred over the past two decades

### Impact – Ethics

#### Ethical obligation to reject competitive ideology

**Schandorf 8** - B.A. in English, 1999. M.A. in English (Rhetoric & Composition), 2008. (Michael, A RHETORIC OF RESOLUTION: THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION, May 2008, p. 103-105, https://www.mhsl.uab.edu/dt/2008m/schandorf.pdf)

But this doesn’t answer my previous question. Is true, developmental re-solution possible in a conflict that involves an agent or agents who claim a monopoly on “truth” and who understand change (i.e., any shift in orientation or conceptual frame) as “immoral”? In fact, the above argument could be interpreted as a form of dissociation and dehumanization through the demonization of those with different frames of authority – because an attack on a person’s orientation is a personal attack by virtue of being an attack on their values. And I am attacking values – the same values that Lakoff challenges. However, I am basing my position on the identification of shared values rooted in common humanity with the goal not of dominance (“winning”) but of resolving conflict and extending conceptual frames. As I have argued throughout this thesis, however, language shapes cognition. People are limited by the boundaries of their conceptual frames, which are instantiated in conceptual metaphors that are generated and communicated rhetorically. A person who interprets his or her experience predominantly through the frame of Competition will have a very difficult time in understanding my actions as being anything other than trying to win the argument (or the “Culture War”). Furthermore, he or she may feel a moral responsibility to fight back against my perspective, not in order to extend and ultimately improve both of our understandings, but because successful competition (“winning”) recursively justifies the Competition frame. Is there any opportunity to productively confront a self-reinforcing conceptual frame that relies on the unlimited use of power to defend and sustain itself? Previous acknowledgment of ideological evolution aside, even the nail house example must ultimately confront this question. The facts of the case are clear: an agreement was announced and the redevelopment project went forward. Rhetorically this is a clearly mutually beneficial resolution for all parties involved: adequate compensation, project continuance, urban renewal, peaceful resolution, and the appearance of greater government acknowledgment of individual rights. The problem, of course, is the potential disparity between “appearance” and the exercise of power. The exact terms of the agreement were never released. The Yangs’ cell phones were disconnected the night the agreement was reached and the house torn down, and (to my knowledge) the couple was never heard from again – and therefore the agreement announced via the state-controlled media was never confirmed. These are rather ominous facts in the face of an ideal rhetorical resolution. One of Chinese Premier Hu Jintao’s great rhetorical programs is that of the “harmonious society,” alluded to repeatedly by Wu Ping. In response to the Chinese government’s notorious suppression of dissidence and cases of questionable “resolution” such as the Yang’s, a new twist on the “harmonious society” has recently emerged in the Chinese lexicon: to be harmonized. Despite the theoretical nature of this thesis and the emphasis on conceptualization and language, rhetorical action cannot be divorced from the exercise of power. Those who have gained power will inevitably struggle to maintain that power. And within an orientation dominated by Competition, the only consistent responses are to either identify with that power or challenge it through dissociation – and both sides lay claim to fighting “the good fight” based on mutually exclusive orientations. Is there another option? Is true, developmental re-solution possible in a conflict that involves an agent or agents who claim a monopoly on “truth” and who understand any shift in orientation as “immoral”? Is there any opportunity to productively confront a self-reinforcing conceptual frame that relies on the unlimited use of power to defend and sustain itself? The methodology outlined in Chapter 3 presents my best answer to these questions at this time: understand the larger context and emphasize specific, shared goals while minimizing and focusing (not eliminating) competition. Such a method cannot address the exercise of power or the dominance of an agent or agents bent on maintaining power, but it does have scale (i.e., time) on its side: change is inevitable. Despite the plethora of historical recourses to “absolute” truths, all such truths have, in the very least, been significantly modified from their early formulations. The question is not whether change will happen, whether orientations will evolve, or whether conceptual frames will shift, it is what those changes should be and how that “should” is to be defined and judged. Such determinations are rhetorical and ethical processes. The truly unethical act is the refusal to communicate.

### Impact – Turns Growth

#### Turns the aff—even if the plan brings short term gains, it’s economic framework makes the economy unstable and inevitably gives rise to competitors

**Spector 10 – Associate Professor of Sociology at Purdue University Calumet**

(Alan J Spector, “Neoliberal Globalization and Capitalist Crises in the Age of Imperialism” in “Globalization in the 21st Century: Labor, Capital, and the State on a World Scale”, pg 47, IWren)

 This phase of globalization sets in motion unintended consequences and contradictory outcomes even for the large corporations that initially benefit from this globalization. As a national economy relies more and more on banking and less on domestic industrial production, the potential for wealth increases, but the vulnerability to economic instability also increases. The higher rates of profit are accompanied by the more unstable variables associated with becoming so dependent on overseas investments. Utilizing cheap labor in other countries allows corporations to reap huge profits, but it also lays the basis for rising capitalist groups in other countries to eventually run their own industries and compete with that of the advanced capitalist countries. Furthermore, if, for example, the U.S. corporations deindustrialize at home because they find it more profitable to operate in other countries, or even to just buy from other countries and serve as highly profitable middlemen who do not need to have their capital tied up in material infrastructure assets, the country becomes extremely vulnerable to political developments in other countries and could find itself without the means for needed industrial production in the future. The strong currency that comes from being an imperialist power results in other countries’ choosing to invest in that country—in effect, loaning money to the United States and other countries in similar situations. This brings quick profits to some banks and corporations, and temporary cash flow and prosperity to some segments of the society, but it is prosperity based on debt. If that debt is pulled back, it can lead to higher interest rates, a slowdown of the economy, or even a serious economic depression. The very low rate of savings in the United States, widening gap between the wealthy and especially the middle and lower income working class, the pending crisis in health care costs, the increase in educational costs, and rising debt are all pressures building toward serious problems in the future, as evidenced by the stock market collapse of 2000, which has taken seven years to get back to its previous level, as well as the real estate crisis and the increase in home foreclosures in 2008 and 2009. While it might seem difficult to predict precisely how and when these problems will intensify, it is clear that the so-called boom economy of late capitalism and neoliberal globalization/imperialism bring lots of quick cash to some sectors of the economy, while laying the basis for serious problems for the rest in the future (Brenner 2003).

#### Organizing the economy around innovation creates economics of speed- leads to rapid investment shifting and product development- that’s unsustainable and makes financial collapse inevitable

Goldman et al. 6 - Professor of Sociology at Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Oregon

(Robert Goldman, Stephen Papson, Noah Kersey, Landscapes of the Social Relations of Production in a Networked Society, Fast Capitalism 2.1, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2\_1/SocialRelations.html)

These representations resemble what Thomas Friedman (1999) dubs the “Electronic Herd” in The Lexus and the Olive Tree. His metaphor embraces the volatility of markets in conjunction with the diffusion of capital across the electronic circuits of finance. According to Friedman, no corporation or nation-state can risk losing the favor of the Herd. In the global economy this can be catastrophic to market values. Those who comprise the Herd compete to maximize the rate of return on investments, which translates into manically scouring the planet for opportunities or cutting losses as quickly as possible when it is time to sell. The manic need to invest is matched by panic selling. Combined with the ability to transfer funds and monies electronically, a stock can be cut in half in hours, or a country’s currency thrown into crisis with a rapidity hitherto unknown. Friedman’s metaphor of the electronic herd pictures an economic elite dashing about in a global free market economy fueled by technological innovation and the liquidity of capital forms (currency, stocks, commodities). The figures who compose this grouping are constructed as dynamic, mobile, and technologically sophisticated. They fluidly traverse the world of nonplaces and occupy office suites in corporate towers surrounded by personal communication technologies. And yet, even in these idealized abstractions, uncertainties and anxieties seep through. Narratives of success are sprinkled with hints of impending crisis, or stories of those who made the wrong choices - the wrong office equipment, the wrong software, the wrong package delivery service. The exhilaration associated with accelerated social, economic, and technological change mixes with an undercurrent of apprehension. Speed may mean winning, but it can also lead to crashing. There are more losers than winners in casino capitalism. The landscape of risk is omnipresent.

#### Economics of Speed leads to flawed innovation and ensures products are rushed to the market, that Turns the Case

**Wise et al 10**

[Raul Delgado Wise et al 2010 “reframing the debate on migration, development and human rights: fundamental elements October 2010, http://rimd.reduaz.mx/documentos\_miembros/ReframingtheDebate.pdf; WBTR]

The view promoted by key migrant-receiving countries and aligned with that of some international organizations posits a positive link between international migration and development in countries of origin. 8 • red internacional de migración y desarrollo Migration Development in countries of origin Migrants Remittances The analytical framework that supports this restrictive model compounds a mixture of neoclassical and neoliberal elements (Glick Schiller, 2009; De Haas, 2010; Kapur, 2004) that portray the free market as the culmination of capitalist modernity, an inevitable process with no alternatives. Development concerns are overlooked, since it is assumed a free market economy will operate as an endless source of economic growth and social welfare. Importantly, most of these theoretical approaches have been crafted in developed, northern countries and have been assimilated without critical examination by many southern researchers who have failed to acknowledge the rich and creative legacy of development studies from Latin America and other hemispheres. The dominant discourse on the link between migration and development is based on the following precepts: • Remittances as an instrument for development. In the absence of effective development policies in peripheral countries, which provide the largest source of migrants, migrants themselves are portrayed as agents and catalysts of development in their places of origin; remittances are their tools. • Financial democratization. The vast flow of remittances across the globe (316 billion dollars in 2009—Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal, 2010) constitutes an attractive market for financial enterprises offering banking services to marginalized population groups. Remittance-based savings and credit are seen as an adequate backdrop for fostering development under microfinance schemes. • The economic power of the poor. Remittances provide migrants and their dependents with access to resources that can bring them out of poverty, transforming them into agents of development. • The formation of human capital. Remittances contribute to investments in health, food and education, all of which benefit migrants and their families. In addition, it is suggested that governments should reform their education systems so that migrants can acquire the kind of technical abilities that will facilitate their employment abroad. • Temporary and return migration. Migration policies in receiving nations privilege temporary worker programs as a tool for regulating labor markets; allegedly, this benefits all stakeholders. At the same time, return policies assume places of origin will benefit from the abilities, skills and values acquired by migrants in receiving societies. • Migration management. From a geostrategic standpoint, developed receiving countries seek to control undocumented migration on the basis of national security and the articulation of regional economic blocs, but fail to address or even consider the root causes of the phenomenon. international network on migration and development • 9 Paradoxically, this positive approach to the link between migration and development generates divergent views of migrants in origin and destination countries. For the former, migrants have become the new face of development; once a forgotten population, they are now portrayed as national heroes. This view has a political, exploitative raison d’être: cordial relations with the diaspora ensure the flow of remittances. Conversely, receiving governments discursively paint migrants as a burden and, at times, a negative and polluting cultural and racial influence on the receiving society (Huntington, 1997). Despite the claims made by certain international bodies and governments, there is no empirical evidence of the alleged positive effects of migration and remittances as catalysts of development in countries of origin. The worst stigmas attached to foreigners are those of illegality and criminality. In extreme cases, migrants are linked to terrorism and drug trafficking. Furthermore, in periods of economic depression, migrants are often made responsible for the economic decline. One the one hand, a type of extractivism identifies migrants as heroes; on the other, a punitive approach paints them as criminals. These, however, are two sides of the same coin: migrants are cheap labor merchandise, disposable population that contributes to the dynamics of accumulation. Extractivism is therefore also present in the stance taken by receiving nations: the more vulnerable migrants are, the more their employers benefit; their social exclusion leads to increased profits and fiscal gains for both employers and host governments. Both of these portrayals demean migrants with a specific political intent. They also nullify them as social, rights-bearing subjects.

### Alternative

#### Vote negative to participate in global civil society – this re-orients competitive economics into a *democratic* and *accountable* egalitarian system

Group of Lisbon – 95 Nineteen members from Japan, Western Europe, and North America with different educational backgrounds and experience in business, government, international organizations, and academia (Group of Lisbon, Joao Caraca, Hpilippe de Woot, Gianfranco Dioguardi, Luois Emmerij, Emilio Fontela, Seiko Hirata, Pierre-Mar Johnson, Claude Julien, Terry Karl, Daniel Latouche, Robert McCormic-Adams, Riccardo Petrella, Ken Prewitt, Saskia Sassen, Joel Serrao, Luc Tissot, Taizo Yakushiji, Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, Aristide Zolberg, Limits to Competition, 1995)

It is difficult to say whether these changes will favor peaceful interaction among cultures and ultimately benefit the promotion of local and regional identities and the development of a new global civilization. They could, conversely, engender new forms of cultural domination at the global level based on nonmaterial goods produced by Coca-Cola or Sony. Recent developments information and communication technology have also contributed to the emergence of another significant phenomenon: the rise of a global civil society. This phenomenon is linked to the new wave of democratization of previously discussed as well as to the explosion of major social problems and challenges worldwide and the perception of their commonality among today’s 5.6 billion people. Banal but typical examples of this perception are reflected in a global consciousness of living in a common “spaceship earth” and sharing “a common future.” In addition to environmental problems, globalization is increasingly associated with demographic explosion, mass unemployment, mass immigration flows, growing organized crime (particularly the drug trade), insecurity linked to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ethnic and religious conflicts as well as new epidemics (such as AIDS) and the resurgence of once-defeated traditional epidemics (such as malaria). Above all, globalization is nourishing the fear of a clash between the strictly limited number of “haves” and the “have nots.” The gap is impressive between the powerful process of economic globalization at the level of finance and firms and the weakened capability of national public authorities to cope with the explosive nature of most social, economic, environmental, and political problems across countries and regions of the world. Despite the new wave of democratization, the absence of organized forms of socially accountable and democratic political governance at the global level emerges as the fundamental weakness of the present world configuration. This absence has two major consequences. First, it significantly reduces the ability of local, national, and regional forms of political governance to exert control over economic, social, and political events and processes—a fact that political leaders are increasingly admitting. Second, it makes it impossible to reconcile the interests and operations of economic globalization (led by competing forces seeking to maximize their profit and influence) and the interests and operations of the globalization of human affairs (as represented by the comparatively weak networks of nongovernmental and voluntary associations and goodwill from a minority of people in academia, labor, industry, and government). Furthermore, new dangers characterized the present situation. Just when democratization is spreading, so are inequality, the destruction of the environment, the concentration of power, and the rise of nationalism. Most important, unmanaged competition strengthens these adverse tendencies just as democratization is beginning to create the conditions necessary (such as the rise of global civil society and the growing consensus among international organizations) to do something about it. The result, especially in the traditional parliamentary democracies, is a fundamental crisis of legitimization of the state that is not balanced by an increase in legitimization of new forms of world governance based on liberalized and deregulated forces.

#### The alt solves – an ethical stance of cooperativism can revolutionize economics

Gibson-Graham 3 – pen name shared by feminist economic geographers Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson (J.K., “Enabling Ethical Economies:

Cooperativism and Class” sage)//RK

As part of an ongoing project committed to exploring the potentialities and possibilities of building sustainable community economies I have been concerned to challenge the way ‘economy’ is thought and to identify what we are up against when attempting to think differently (especially ethically) about the economic realm. One problem is that, in contrast to previous periods, the economy is no longer seen as a sphere of decision (Lemke 2001; Gibson-Graham 2003). With the resurgence of neo-liberalism in the second half of the 20thcentury we have seen renewed faith in the hidden (almost mystical) hand of the free market, and the active aspect of management associated with the term ‘economy’ has been subordinated to a notion of systemic self-regulation. Naturalization of the view that we have no (longer a) role in making and managing the economy by which we live has had limiting effects on economic imaginaries. A reluctance to engage in economic experimentation because of its perceived futility, or for fear of repression by the all powerful economy, has become a form of unfreedom, a discursive enslavement, a refusal to explore economic power as unstable and fluid, as potentially reversible “strategic games between liberties” that are always available (Foucault 1988:19; Hindess 1997:97-8). It is this depoliticization of the economic terrain that must be challenged if any space for enabling ethical economic practices is to be opened up. Another problem is the representation of the economy as ‘capitalist.’ Deconstructing the hegemony of capitalocentrism involves representing the diversity of the ‘complex unity’ we know as ‘economy,’ that is, highlighting the multiple registers of value and modes of transaction that make up our heterogeneous economic world, sustaining livelihoods in communities around the world.3The diverse modes of remunerating labor, appropriating and distributing surplus and establishing commensurability in exchange, for example, all allow for specific enactments of economic freedom, some more circumscribed than others (Community Economies Collective 2001). As is increasingly apparent competitive individualism is not the only ethical principle involved. In a growing number of intentional and unintentional economies variously enacted ethics of social, cultural and environmental sustainability are actively shaping transactions and performances. I have been particularly interested in community economies in which the material well-being of people and the sustainability of the community are priority objectives. Indeed it is through articulating these ethical and political stances that ‘community’ is called into being. I would like to argue that this project of deconstructing the hegemony of capitalism and elaborating multiple axes of economic diversity is an emancipatory project of repoliticizing the economy. It refuses to pose economic power as already distributed to capitalist interests and opens up the possibility for non-capitalist practices to be the focus for an invigorated economic politics. It reinstates the importance of making and managing economy – aspects of the meaning of the word that have been increasingly washed away – by placing the politico-ethical decisions that make our economies at the center of analysis. Ernesto Laclau notes that The role of deconstruction is ... to reactivate the moment of decision that underlies any sedimented set of social relations. The political and ethical significance of this first moment is that by enlarging the area of structural indeterminacy [eg of the economy] it enlarges also the area of responsibility – that is, of the decision. (Laclau 1995:93, bracketed comment added) A vision of the economy as diverse, multiply identified and complexly overdetermined and economic power as diffuse, segmented, and in motion opens up the possibility for local non-capitalist practices to be the focus for an invigorated economic politics. The project of mapping diverse economies as a way of imagining and enacting non-capitalist futures has taken encouragement from Father Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta’s vision of a pluralistic society and economy:4 In the mind of the co-operators is the idea that future society probably must be pluralistic in all its organisations including the economic. There will be action and interaction of publicly owned firms and private firms, the market and planning, entities of paternalistic style, capitalist or social. Every juncture, the nature of every activity, the level of evolution and the development of every community, will require a special treatment but not limited to one form of organisation, if we believe in and love man, his liberty, and justice, and democracy. (Arizmendiarrieta, cited in Mathews, 1999:186 quoting from Whyte and Whyte 1991:255) This vision of plurality can be likened to Laclau’s vision of structural indeterminacy, which has the effect of opening up the field of responsibility and decision. It is the issue of decision that provides a focus for the discussion of this paper. Writing and living as he did with daily involvement in the Mondragon cooperatives, economic diversity was, for Arizmendi, a visible presence, not a utopian dream or smashed hope, but also something that had to be built and given ‘special treatment.’ The title of Roy Morrison’s book We Build the Road as We Travel (1991) reminds us that when building sustainable, socially equitable and culturally distinctive community economies there are no pre-given pathways to follow, no economic models that can be pulled down from the shelf and set in place to ensure success.5The process of enabling such economies to develop involves continual debate over economic and ethical considerations at every step of the way, and the making of difficult decisions that will direct future pathways and crystallize community values. It is through this process that economic imaginaries are made into concrete, actually existing practices and institutions.6 The history of leftist politics can be seen as a series of debates about strategic interventions by which a ‘better’ society is to come into being. Politico-ethical discussion has focused on questions of economic control, ownership and organization of industry and the benefits of cooperativism or state socialism as well as on mechanisms of income and wealth distribution. In the first half of the paper I revisit the historical debate about the limits of the cooperativist ‘way’ in an attempt to understand the basis of the longstanding antagonism between working class politics and worker cooperativism. In the second half of the paper I focus on the politicoethical decisions around markets, wages, technology, surplus appropriation, and distribution that have been inscribed in the Mondragon economic experiment.7This discussion is structured around the criticisms that have largely been accepted as undermining the potential for longevity and success of worker cooperativism. My aim here is to promote debate about economic ethics and the realms of freedom that are open to us in theory and in practice.

#### Individual rejection matters

Petrella 2000, Catholic University ofLouvain. (Riccardo, Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 82, No. 2, Development of Settlements (2000), pp. 67-72, JSTOR)

(2) Democracy. More and more oligarchic and technocratic forms of decision-making processes and institutions are limiting the democratic functioning of our societies. People from the less competitive and peripheral regions have less to say in public, common affairs than those in the "core islands". "Power to local communities" is the road to follow. This means that we have to promote a new political agenda aimed at "restoring" democratic institutions and/or generating new forms of local/regional democracy. People want to be "participants". People do not want to be just passive consumers of "bread and pleasure". Most cities and regions that are given as examples of success stories in public transport, environmental management, education and health services are precisely those where high forms of direct and participating democracy have been experienced. (3) Priority to the common good, which means that local people act in such a way that priority is given to the development of local/regional social capital (in terms of infrastructures, goods, services) with the aim of supporting and strengthening people cohesion and integration. In principle, it is not an impossible task to achieve this aim. History shows that a welfare society has been possible in the years 1950s, 1960s and 1970s; much depends on the extent local population will resist the pressure for privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation in the first decade of the twenty-first century. If all domains are privatised, there will be little room left for social cohesion, integration and solidarity

### Alternative – Rejection Key

#### The institutions that propagate the ideological hegemony underlying globalization are still founded at the national level—challenging these are key to disrupting broader structures of power

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(Dave Whyte, “Market Patriotism and the "War on Terror"”, in Social Justice, vol 34 iss 3/4, Proquest, IWren)

The securing of political legitimacy is a complex process in which the battle for ideas, in a Gramscian, sense, is related to underlying struggles between social classes or competing power blocs. The process of building ideological hegemony involves the dominant social group making a bid to have a view of the world, set of beliefs and morals, or "system of ideas" gain widespread acceptance throughout civil society (social institutions such as the political parties, churches, NGOs, trade unions, and so on) (Gramsci, 1996). This does not necessarily mean that the construction of one "worldview" inevitably predominates over all others. There is room for difference, or for a plurality of ideas. The effect of ideological hegemony is to ensure that a "plurality of ideas" can be defined within certain parameters. Thus, although this process may have the appearance of an open and "democratic" one that encourages debate, ultimately such debates are conducted within boundaries of what may be deemed "acceptable" or "legitimate." In this sense, ideology can be understood as the cement of a society-a force that binds and reinforces social organization under capitalism (Poulantzas, 1978). For Gramsci, the development of ideological hegemony is always grounded hi the material realities of human social relations. In other words, ideas do not develop independently from inter- and intra-class struggles for power. As the dominant ideas of a society are promoted, disseminated, and reproduced, they reach popular consciousness through a variety of means (not least through the institutions of civil society such as trade associations, educational institutions, churches, etc.). When these ideas are broadly accepted by the populous, they become "common sense." That is, the aim of ruling groups in any given society is to establish their ideas, no matter how flawed, as an accurate view of the world such that they acquire the status of accepted "truths" or "realities." Ruling groups then use those ideas as a resource to seek consensual support for political rule. Political rule in capitalist social orders uses a mix of ideological hegemony (consent) and force (coercion). There is not a zero sum relationship between the two forms of power, but a more complex dialectical interplay. It is misleading to project a rise or fall of consensual forms of rule that correlates directly to an intensification or weakening of coercive techniques to which governments resort. Instead, ideological mechanisms adapt to the conditions required by a particular form of political rule. If political rule becomes more coercive, the result is not that consent automatically diminishes, but that the ideas disseminated by the ruling bloc must adapt to support and stabilize those coercive forms of power. An often overlooked point about the Gramscian notion of hegemony by those who describe the current period as an "era of globalization" is that despite the emergence of new locations of inter- and tram-national decision-making, and despite the extension of political rule through transnational institutions such as the various United Nations organizations, international financial institutions (IFIs), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), in liberal democracies **ideological hegemony remains a process that requires an understanding of the extent to which the nation-state is the starting point and the point of departure for understanding how hegemony operates internationally** (Showstack Sasoon, 2001). The mechanisms through which state power operates (elected parliaments, administrative centers of power, legal apparatuses, police forces, military units, mass media, etc.) and the loci for the constitution of capital (trade associations, stock markets, regulatory mechanisms) remain organized at the level of national states and remain significant for organizing a national, collective project. This is the case in spite of the intense pressures from above and below experienced in the current period of late capitalism, not least formations at an international level that are capable of organizing ruling fractions. Thus, no matter how much the exigencies of the global market discipline states, this does not obliterate the fact that **the struggle for hegemony is a process of political rule located at the level of the national state**. In this context, although securing popular consent generally involves some form of hegemonic compromise, the borders of a particular nation-state do not always strictly limit the process. Thus, universalist forms of reasoning, rooted in liberal political theory and philosophy, have provided key ideological supports for capitalism, proposing that it will yield political and economic benefits for all, regardless of "nation" or "race." Both "particularist" and "universalist" claims are always present in capitalist social orders. Thus, contemporary Western governments characteristically make the (particularist) claim that neoliberal policies will improve the competitiveness of the national economy-and therefore benefit the population within a particular nation-state-while making the (universalist) claim that neoliberalism can, on a global level, create the conditions for other, weaker economies to become stronger.

### Epistemology

#### The federal government uses market patriotism to mobilize the public to support its neoliberal wars of oppression

**Whyte 7** – a Reader in Sociology at the University of Liverpool (David, “Market Patriotism and the “War on Terror””, Proquest)//RK

In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, market patriotism found popular expression in the renaming of "French fries" to "freedom fries," a much-hyped and exaggerated phenomenon that was intended to symbolize national disgust at French government opposition to U.S. military aggression. The hyperbole around "freedom fries" emerged not from a popular movement, but literally from deep inside the belly of the political establishment. As Ashby (2006) notes, this "campaign" was fueled by the decision of three House of Representatives office cafeterias to sell "freedom fries." The subsequent highly localized refusals to buy French products never seriously threatened a national boycott, but they did briefly serve to express popular loyalty to the U.S. war effort through the market. In terms of popular legitimacy, the 2003 invasion of Iraq could never have been justified simply through the symbolism of the U.S. consumer market or with reference to an abstract notion of the "market" A successful campaign in Iraq might be important for the long-term economic stability of the U.S., but if those economic benefits do come to fruition, they will not be immediately obvious to the American people. They are more likely to be aware of, and be made to pay, the immediate social and economic costs of the war. Therefore, it was not likely that economic reasoning alone could justify the killing of thousands of Iraqis and hundreds of U.S. military personnel in the initial period of invasion. Some level of support for the invasion had to be sought from the American public and from a coalition of state and international actors before and after the invasion. Alternative justifications (liberation from a tyrannical dictator, the doctrine of preemption, etc.) were thus required for this purpose, no matter how far fetched they now appear. Although ideological support in the form of market patriotism played a secondary role in the bid for popular support for this war, it played a significant role in mobilizing public and private resources behind the war effort. In other words, despite its lesser role in securing popular consent, market patriotism played a key role in developing intra-class support for the war. The Bush administration laid important groundwork to forge a commonality of interests or "unity of purpose" between corporate and political leaders. In 1998, Vice President Dick Cheney commissioned a think tank, the Baker Institute for Public Policy, to write a report on "energy security." Set up by James Baker (the Secretary of State under George Bush, Sr.), the Baker Institute assembled a team including Enron chief executive Kenneth Lay, Luis Giusti, a Shell Oil non-executive director, John Manzoni, regional president of British Petroleum, and David O'Reilly, chief executive of ChevronTexaco (now Chevron Corporation). Oil-rich companies, the report argued, had to figure more centrally in U.S. military strategy, and the Bush cabinet accepted its findings (Mackay, 2002). The U.S. Department of Commerce released documents produced by the "Cheney Energy Task Force" to the pubic domain in the summer of 2003 due to a court application under the Freedom of Information Act by the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch. The documents contained a map of Iraqi oilfields, pipelines, refineries, and terminals, plus two charts detailing Iraqi oil and gas projects and "Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts." In the autumn of 2002, with U.N. inspectors still scouring Iraq for weapons of mass destruction, Phillip Carroll drafted the next installment of the plan. A former CEO of the U.S. division of Shell Oil Company in Texas and the head of Fluor Corp (one of six companies the Department of Defense hired before the war in a closed bid for Iraq reconstruction projects), Carroll was commissioned to produce a Pentagon strategy that set out detailed plans for the development of the Iraqi oil industry. Key figures in the oil industry, then, were recruited to play a pivotal role in supporting U.S. military expansionism. This instance of market patriotism sought to build a coalition of support for the Iraqi invasion. After U.S. and U.K. corporations assisted in the invasion, they entered the postwar economy on an unprecedented scale. Kellogg Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Dick Cheney's Halliburton, contracted to secure the oil infrastructure and accompanied coalition forces as they seized the oilfields, along with BP personnel, to assess the damage and advise the coalition. Early in the occupation, the U.S. military used private consultants to plant "good news" stories about the occupation's successes as the media industry fell compliantly into the new system of embedded journalism. Western private contractors were escorted by thousands of armed, private security companies and mercenaries. A private company, Bearing Point, was contracted to write the blueprint for the Iraqi economy. The direct participation of CEOs in the government of occupation consolidated the coalition of interests formed in the early days of the invasion. Senior appointees to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi ministries were, to a person, known to be affiliated with the Bush administration. Many were senior figures from large U.S. corporations or were trusted pro-corporate neoliberal enthusiasts. The following is a selection of some of the key appointees. Chief finance advisors included David Oliver] former director of technology and business development for naval systems at Northrop Grumman, and Marek Belka,Â° formerly Polish deputy prime minister and minister of finance, as well as a senior advisor to JP Morgan for Central and Eastern Europe since 2002. Peter McPherson,9 a former group executive vice president of Bank of America, managed the Central Bank of Iraq. Among the three oil advisers were Phillip Carroll (his invasion planning role was noted above) and Robert E. McKee III,"˜Â° a former ConocoPhillips executive and chair of Houston-based Enventure Global Technology (a Shell-Halliburton joint venture). Among the five agricultural advisers were Trevor Flugge, chairman of the Australian Wheat Board, and Dan Amstutz, former vice president of the U.S. agribusiness giant and genetically modified food profiteer Cargill." In charge of policing was Bernard Kerick, former chief of police in New York and a senior vice president with Giuliani Partners, the private firm run by former Mayor Rudy Giuliani, which sells "professional guidance to leaders." U.S. corporations were well rewarded for their loyalty. After the invasion, the U.S. declared that CPA reconstruction contracts would only go to countries that had contributed to the coalition invasion of Iraq. To the victors go the spoils of war! By design, the reconstruction of Iraq's economy conferred structural advantages to U.S. capital, at immeasurable cost to indigenous industry and infrastructure (Whyte, 2007; 2008). The impunity from prosecution U.S. contractors received from George Bush’s Executive Order for corrupting the Iraqi oil revenue process was important symbolically and in terms of providing an incentive to U.S. corporations to generate profits by any means necessary (Ibid.). In Abu Ghraib, the only distinction between the crimes committed by private contractors and regular military employees was that the former were exempt from legal proceedings; their contracts were even renewed. Windfall profits immunity guarantees for U.S. companies are but one aspect of the neoliberal reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. Of greater strategic significance for U.S. capital as a whole was that the economic transformation was explicitly planned around a model of Anglo-American neoliberal capitalism. According to arch-neoconservative Richard Perle (chair of the Pentagon Defense Advisory Committee during the run-up to the 2003 invasion), it was important at the outset "not to tum [Iraq] over to institutions incapable of seeing this through to a successful conclusion .... The last thing the Iraqis need is French statism or German labor practices" (Vulliamy and Islam, 2003). In essence, the "freedom fries" Hap meant that the Iraqi economy was to be constructed in the image of the leading neoliberal economy, with those structural advantages to be enjoyed by U.S. capital for a long time to come. The 2003 invasion of Iraq represented a remarkable moment of solidity between state and corporate institutions. The planning of the military operation, its execution, and the ongoing occupation are best characterized as a movement of statecorporate symbiosis in which public and private resources were mobilized behind a unified purpose. It clearly illustrates how far the U.S. is prepared institutionally to support military operations that explicitly guarantee markets and allow markets to become, more legitimately, a means of achieving military goals. In short, the logic of market patriotism can be deployed directly as an ideological support for aggressive capital accumulation.

#### Their authors are brainwashed by market capitalism, ignoring empirical evidence.

**Bienfeld 94** – Professor at the School of Public Administration, Carleton University, Ottowa (Manfed, “The New World Order: echoes of a new imperialism”, jstor)//RK

The views of the hard optimists thus provide a fertile soil for the more explicit and open imperialism that has begun to surface in the NWO and that has replaced the furtive and covert forms that were more typical of the Cold War era. Overt imperialism requires self-righteousness, supreme confidence and an utter conviction that one's actions are 'for the best'. It also requires security from the threat of serious retaliation. The NWO has brought us both. The zeal and the superficially plausible rationalizations come from the ranks of those whose faith in markets has overwhelmed their critical faculties, while the security from possible retaliation comes from the demise of the 'evil empire'. True faith in markets is immune to empirical evidence. Increased suffering is merely 'short-term pain'; delayed benefits indicate that policies have not been implemented forcefully or long enough, that implementing agencies were corrupt or incompetent, or that the problems created by earlier policies were underestimated. Ultimately, no matter how bad things get, it is always possible to claim that things would have been even worse otherwise. This moves the question firmly into the realm of theory since it is impossible to measure a hypothetical alternative empirically. In this way, the empirical evidence is disempowered and theory rules. This leaves the matter unresolved. It also leaves those who have supreme faith in markets free to cling to their security blanket. An early IMF study exploring the link between its structural adjustment policies and human welfare illustrates the point. After surveying the evidence and the methodological issues, it was obliged to conclude that even its estimates of short term welfare effects were 'primarily based on deductive reasoning and not on the evidence itself'. Estimates of long-term effects were so much more difficult that it chose to proceed on 'the axiomatic assumption that the impact of structural adjustment on welfare is subject to a J-curve effect' 2 Since axiomatic assumptions are made a priori, the empirical evidence was thereby declared irrelevant.

#### Their faith in economic theory to prove market logic is flawed – empirics demonstrate the market inevitably marginalizes the global South

**Bienefeld 94 – PHD in Economics at the London School of Economics**

(Manfred, “The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, The South in the New World (Dis)Order <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993022>)

The views of the hard optimists thus provide a fertile soil for the more explicit and open imperialism that has begun to surface in the NWO and that has replaced the furtive and covert forms that were more typical of the Cold War era. Overt imperialism requires self-righteousness, supreme confidence and an utter convic- tion that one's actions are 'for the best'. It also requires security from the threat of serious retaliation. The NWO has brought us both. The zeal and the su- perficially plausible rationalisations come from the ranks of those whose faith in markets has overwhelmed their critical faculties, while the security from possible retaliation comes from the demise of the 'evil empire'. True faith in markets is immune to empirical evidence. Increased suffering is merely 'short-term pain'; delayed benefits indicate that policies have not been implemented forcefully or long enough, that implementing agencies were corrupt or incompetent, or that the problems created by earlier policies were underesti- mated. Ultimately, no matter how bad things get, it is always possible to claim that things would have been even worse otherwise. This moves the question firmly into the realm of theory since it is impossible to measure a hypothetical alternative empirically. In this way, the empirical evidence is disempowered and theory rules. This leaves the matter unresolved. It also leaves those who have supreme faith in markets free to cling to their security blanket. An early IMF study exploring the link between its structural adjustment policies and human welfare illustrates the point. After surveying the evidence and the methodological issues, it was obliged to conclude that even its estimates of short term welfare effects were 'primarily based on deductive reasoning and not on the evidence itself'. Estimates of long-term effects were so much more difficult that it chose to proceed on 'the axiomatic assumption that the impact of structural adjustment on welfare is subject to a J-curve effect' 2 Since axiomatic assumptions are made a priori, the empirical evidence was thereby declared irrelevant.

### AT: Competitiveness Inevitable

#### Competitiveness is not inevitable, it’s rhetorical – the alternative exposes uncritical faith in contemporary economics

**Schandorf 8** - B.A. in English, 1999. M.A. in English (Rhetoric & Composition), 2008. (Michael, A RHETORIC OF RESOLUTION: THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION, May 2008, p. 32-34, https://www.mhsl.uab.edu/dt/2008m/schandorf.pdf)

In The Argument Culture, Deborah Tannen writes, “An agonistic response, to me, is a kind of programmed contentiousness—a prepatterned, unthinking use of fighting to accomplish goals that do not necessarily require it” (8). For millennia, the agonistic, oppositional nature of social discourse has been a part of everyday life, being built into our educational systems, our justice systems, and our pastimes. The drive to “win” and the inherent desire to defeat an opponent structures much of our social interaction and is prominent in the language that we use daily to describe our worlds and interact with one another. Tannen, however, argues that this dominant convention of polarization, while unarguably sometimes helpful, often results in overgeneralization and oversimplification that obscures “truth” and creates conflict (the need to win) where cooperative, collaborative effort would achieve far better results: when opposition becomes the overwhelming avenue of inquiry—a formula that requires another side to be found or a criticism to be voiced; when the lust for opposition privileges extreme views and obscures complexity; when our eagerness to find weaknesses blinds us to strengths; when the atmosphere of animosity precludes respect and poisons our relations with one another; then the argument culture is doing more damage than good… Labeling people left or right, liberal or conservative, obscures the complexity of their views and makes it harder for people to hear what others have to say: Once we see someone as bearing a label we don’t like, we stop listening. (2536) Language – how we formulate, receive, and interpret the majority of our experience of our worlds – is inherently orientational. And not only are our orientations necessary to understanding the world and communicating in it, our orientations are self-reinforcing due to the rhetorical process of identification/dissociation and to the conventional reliance on opposition and agonistic interaction. Andrew Goatly has traced competitive metaphors and language through the Western tradition, specifically through the roots of modern economic and social philosophies that rely on the interplay of economic and Darwinian competition. Renaissance and Enlightenment educational systems, following Cicero, were rooted in agonistic argument, and an emphasis on competition became foundational in the theories of Adam Smith (economics) and Thomas Malthus (social theory) which directly influenced Darwin (scientific). However, these orientations, which Goatly calls “metaphor themes” (emphasizing the linguistic nature of human conceptual systems), carry an inherent bias toward the individual at the expense of the social, environmental, and systemic. By assuming an inherent separation between the individual and reality (prioritizing the competing individual, a position reinforced by Cartesian duality), metaphors that rely on competition orient their users toward what Grassi identified as the “external” (subject/object relations as opposed to systemic interrelations). Goatly’s identification of the dualism inherent in these dominant, contemporary orientations mirrors Burke’s understanding that each orientation has its own inherent purposes and goals. Cognitive linguists like Goatly and George Lakoff argue that such underlying, often unstated, purposes and goals are identifiable in the language used to communicate and formulate them, and Goatly’s Washing the Brain as well as Lakoff’s recent work provide extensive examples of such analyses.

#### Reliance on the Existence of Competitiveness as An Ethical Justification Prevents Critique of Competitiveness itself

**Arnsperger 96** - Ph.D. in Economics 1995 (Christian, Competition, consumerism, and the "Other". A philosophical investigation into the ethics of economic competition, 01 May 1996, <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvir/1996014.html>)

Now economic theory will grasp most of these casualties under the heading of adjustment costs. The reason, it is said, why “market forces” fail to reach “equilibrium” instantly is that there are various forms of “sluggishness”—but in fact this sluggishness (for instance in the case of trade union resistance) is very often rooted in the attempts of individual human beings to survive to the pressures imposed by competition. It is symptomatic of the way economics deals with individual lives that the deep–rooted violence of competition—which we shall be further analyzing below—is covered up with the impersonal expression of “adjustment costs.” It is true that, in one way, competition most often does not eject its losers but merely transforms them: jobless iron workers become textile workers and then, when joblessness hits once more, they either go on pension or convert again into—say—low–grade computer technicians. Rather than being kept in their original jobs at all costs they might, upon reconversion, be “compensated” for the hardships imposed upon them by the demands of competition. However, such a compensatory scheme involves the very same reasoning as that involved in competitive reasoning itself: individual lives are and remain just “grist for the mill.” The violence inherent in competition is not put into question; it is merely softened. My present investigation of competition as a mode of behavior aims deeper. Levinas claims that if a criminal or a soldier were to really look his victim in the face, which would mean really being fully present to the other as a person who is not himself and is also not an object “eaten up” by his consciousness, then he could not possibly kill that person. By the same token, I think one could say that really entering in a face–à–face with a person would make competition with that person—whether as an opponent of as a tool—impossible, or unbearable. That is, in fact, precisely why competition is usually mediated by firms and other “anonymous” organizations, and why for instance personalized rivalry is so destructive from the personal point of view. It is as though we knew that we would not want to compete amongst ourselves openly, person to person, for jobs or anything else; so we do it via the whole economic structure. As I explained above, the positive effects of competition seem to be maintainable only at the cost of a strong “anonymization” of human interactions. But if this is so, is competitive behavior really (1) an inherent part of human nature, or even (2) a “mode of being–in–the–world” in the sense of Heidegger’s existentials (see Heidegger, 1927)? In section 2 above we saw that the answer to both questions was Yes. We saw that competition as a mode of human behavior could fine finalis be justified only ontologically, that is, in terms of an appeal to “the way things are” given the particular postulates that economics makes about human nature. Levinas argues that the reliance on ontology needs to be abandonned because, precisely, it prompts the constant interference of arguments about “the way things are” in ethical evaluation. His whole philosophical endeavor is aimed at ripping ethical thought from its ontological surroundings; ontology, according to Levinas, can never serve as the appropriate context for ethical evaluation. Levinas’s vision will not be used here out of mere exegetical interest. Rather, I will show that it leads us to apprehending competition as a negation of the Other as a heteronomous, “exterior” individual. This, as we shall see presently, will provide us with powerful concepts for a very radical critique of competition as an economic motive.

#### Every Person has the ethical responsibility to reject competitiveness. Its ontological existence cannot be its own ethical justification

Arnsperger 96- Ph.D. in Economics 1995 (Christian, Competition, consumerism, and the "Other". A philosophical investigation into the ethics of economic competition, 01 May 1996, <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvir/1996014.html>)

To understand the consequences of a Levinasian view for our investigation of competition, it is important to be clear about how Levinas views socio–political society in general. The “anonymization” of human life through competition flows from what Levinas sees as the fundamentally economic character of social coexistence. Roger Burggraeve (1985, pp. 120–121) puts it as follows: In the phenomenal, symbolic and “non–expressive” character of work lies its “market value.” The fact that the will escapes itself, that it does not contain or control itself in its work, implies that the others can subdue the work, can acquire it, buy and sell it, trade it. Here we (…) come up against the “intermediary meaning” or “mediatory value” of money. In a transaction via money, the work loses its “personal” meaning (i.e. its reference to its maker) in exchange for an instrumental or consumer meaning, which is general, i.e. which can be integrated into several projects of existence and receive meaning from them. Money, which makes trading works possible, concretely realizes man’s “quantification” and “generalization,” on which every socio–political society (both national and international) is based. Indeed, the socio–political order can only reach and treat subjects via the economic path of works. Neither the intimacy of interiority nor the “disinterestedness” of ethical unicity escape it. It can only be directed toward what the subjects do, towards their works! It can only occupy itself with the regulation of relationships between the subjects in so far as these relationships take place via the objective mediation of works. The socio–political society “realizes its essence through works.” This method of approaching subjects through their works makes possible the state’s rational universality as well as that of every socio–political society (both intra– and supra–national), since no thought need be given to the “most subjective intentions” of the unique individual: for these are no longer present in the work itself. Thus the socio–political order is directed towards a “humanity of mutually replaceable people, of reciprocal relations” (…) This (…) leads us to an important negative aspect of every socio–political society. For a society cannot take into consideration the most individual of needs, just because it approaches the individual, not on the basis of his individuality and unicity, but on the basis of his ability to be universalized to a replaceable part of the whole. Although Levinas does not discuss economic competition per se, it should be obvious from this interpretative passage that his thought leads directly into the very problem we are analyzing here. What Levinas’s view prompts is a deep questioning, going way beyond questions of efficiency, of the very foundation of economic interaction based on competition. Simply by being alive within an economic system, we are guilty; each of us bears responsibility—far beyond our own intentionality—for any of the undesirable consequences of economic competition because each of us upholds the system itself by participating in it as regal consumers. Levinas’s position is a radical rejection of arguments A, B and C together: ontology, even if indirectly present within the idea of a “common good,” can never justify the encouragement of competition. This carries significantly further, and broadens the philosophical scope of, Knight’s (1923) earlier conviction that “we appear to search in vain for any really ethical basis of approval for competition as a basis for an ideal type of human relations, or as a motive to action. It fails to harmonize either with the Pagan ideal of society as a community of friends or with the Christian ideal of spiritual fellowship.” Levinas even more radically leads us to reject any form of ethical justification, on the basis of a strict refusal both of an ontological basis of ethics and of a social ideal based fine finalis on the ontical fact of man’s being–in–the–world. How crucial the demand side is in this context is shown by Knight’s cogent remark about standard attempts to justify competition on grounds of efficiency and incentives: “Its only justification is that it is effective in getting things done; but any candid answer to the question, ‘what things,’ compels the admission that they leave much to be desired.” An ethical justification based on human desire– or even preference–satisfaction is decisively wanting because it remains short of the transcendental respect for the Face.

### AT: Perm

#### The Perm fails. Competitive Rhetoric Restricts The Possibility of Alternatives. Rejection is Key to Achieve a Policy of Cooperation.

**Schandorf 8** - B.A. in English, 1999. M.A. in English (Rhetoric & Composition), 2008. (Michael, A RHETORIC OF RESOLUTION: THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION, May 2008, p. 3-6, https://www.mhsl.uab.edu/dt/2008m/schandorf.pdf)

And this is not merely a human social phenomenon: complex life is not possible without cooperation. In the words of eminent biologist Ernst Mayr, “every individual of most species is actually a consortium of several species” (Margulis and Sagan xiv). More explicitly, the very idea of an “individual” is a generalization. But it is a generalization built into the contemporary idea of competition. The word compete derives from the earlier competitor, which is a borrowing from the Latin com-(together) petere (to aim at, go toward, try to reach, seek, etc.) (OED, Skeat). The etymology suggests two individuals in dialectical interaction toward a specific goal, and in fact, according to the OED, the modern sense of “to contend or strive,” while deriving from the 17th century Italian competere, is recognized as a 19th century “‘Scotticism’ and ‘an American discovery.’” Driven by the economic philosophies of the 18th century, the idea of competition evolved from a dialectical to a rhetorical sense and, with the cultural influences of Nietzsche and Darwin, came to metaphorically encompass any form of struggle. However, in an example of the overreliance on this anthropocentric metaphor of competition, the idea has been extended in the field of biology to include “indirect competition” in which supposedly competing species or individuals have no interaction at all, and occasionally no actual “competitors.”1 Feminist critics and others (e.g. Gross and Averill, Moulton) have explored the connections between the conceptualization of competition and the historical development of science in terms of patriarchy and dominance, but their arguments and conclusions have largely fallen on deaf ears. This is not surprising since “Competition” as a god term leaves no conceptual alternative, no space in which to reframe the understanding of the world. It is worth noting, however (since the elevation of competition as a god term is based in part on the concept of natural selection), that the very foundations of life, the bacterial realm that makes higher life possible, function on a very different paradigm from Darwinian natural selection. Not only is sexual selection rare (such as it is) at the microbiological level, horizontal gene transfer (which, by the way, makes a far more appropriate foundation for the “meme” metaphor of communication than sexual selection) involves the broadcasting of genetic material into the environment (as opposed to direct individual-to-individual transmission). This selective acquisition of widely broadcast genetic material problematizes traditional scientific understandings of evolution considering the intimate systemic and ecological relationships among bacteria, viruses, and more complex life (see Godenfeld and Woese, Hotopp, et al, and Woese). Furthermore, the best known and documented cases of actual speciation involve symbiosis—direct cooperation among different species and usually bacteria—which also led to the incorporation of mitochondria as well as to photosynthesis and nitrogen fixation in plants (see Margulis and Sagan). Symbiogenesis – not competition – may, in fact, be responsible for all plant and animal life; Margulis argues that eukaryotic cells are the result of an ancient collaboration and ultimately fusion of archaebacteria and eubacteria (Margulis and Sagan xii).2 Arguments in the hard sciences may at first glance seem external to the concerns of rhetoric and communication, but they are not. They demonstrate how natural human conceptualization, mediated by language, can direct the development and acquisition of knowledge into narrow channels and exclude conceptualizations that do not fit the frame, by the action of what Burke called “terministic screens”: a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing. In this case, a devotion to “Competition” as a guiding principle significantly restricts the capacity to acquire and understand information in terms that allow for cooperative and systemic interaction among individuals and groups. Furthermore, these ideas lead to realworld conflicts that involve highly developed competing rhetorics. Naturally occurring horizontal gene transfer, for example, is at the root of conflicts over genetically modified foods—perhaps those scientists who downplay safety concerns about genetically modified organisms are less susceptible to the commonly attributed motives of greed than to a blind adherence to a concept of competition through individual selection that regards speciation by horizontal gene transfer or symbiosis as, at best, minor curiosities. Similarly, Goatly has discussed how the medical metaphor DISEASE IS AN INVADER, while integral to the development of modern medicine and society through the development of antibiotics, has proven less than helpful in other areas of contemporary medicine, such as auto-immune disease and antibiotic resistance. In such cases, understanding disease as miscommunication among the body’s various networks is much more helpful than understanding the immune system as an army constantly fighting off attacking invaders. The metaphors we use to understand the worlds we live in shape the way we understand those worlds – and thereby limit the ways in which we are able to conceive responses to those worlds. When different perspectives conflict, those very perspectives, “regimes of truth” in Foucault’s terminology, or “webs of belief” in Quine’s, condition the possibilities for response to difference and conflict. And such conflicts, human conflicts, are the point.

#### 1ac framing taints the permutation

Bricker 11 – PhD Candidate @ University of Kansas, MA in Communication Studies

Brett, Salience over sustainability: Economic environmentalism of Barack Obama, Alta Select Conference Proceedings, Book

Theories of framing and definition provide insight into Obama’s rhetorical choice to emphasize non-environmental arguments for environmental policies. By not emphasizing the environmental justifications for his environmental policy, Obama allowed other justifications to become dominant frames. This rhetorical construction made the environmental impact of his policies (positive or negative) a secondary concern because environmental policies were judged based on their economic impact rather than on their environmental result. Since economics became the frame that “dominated the debate,” environmental arguments were adjusted “to the new frame” or were forced to “withdraw from the policy debate” (Miller & Riechert, 2003, p. 114). Consequently, environmental justifications were given less “credence in the media and public discourse” because economic benefits became the “prevailing definition of the situation” (Miller & Riechert, 2003, p. 114) In order to understand why Obama’s framing of pro-environmental policies in terms of economics effects (both positively and negatively) public support for the environment, it is important to consider rhetorical theories of definition and dissociation. Obama’s choice to primarily rely on non-environmental arguments when advocating environmental policy focused the policy debate on non-environmental issues, and dissociated environmentalism from the discussion. Zarefsky, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca and Burke provide a critical nexus of rhetorical scholars that support the claim that how an issue is defined greatly impacts how the audience perceives it. In making this argument, rhetorical theories of definition prove useful. Each of Obama’s rhetorical justifications for environmental policy acted to define both Obama’s environmental policy and environmental decline in the mind of the public. By using non-environmental justifications for the environment, Obama made “visible what had been invisible” (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 2). In this way, Obama’s justifications gave greater presence to the specific arguments he used, and, therefore, dissociated the justifications for environmental policy that were not emphasized (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 411). Rhetorical justifications are “not neutral” or purely additive; rather, each justification acts as both a “selection and a deflection of reality” (Burke, 1966, p. 45). Thus, any rhetorical construction is inherently limiting of other alternative constructions. In a practical sense, this may help explain why Obama’s environmental arguments were sidelined (even when he does mention them) because of more salient justification of economics. Zarefsky’s (1997) comment that “a definition of the situation commands wide adherence and hegemonically excludes alternative frames of reference” is certainly relevant in this case (p. 7). The audience perceived the benefits of environmental policy to be related to economic gains, however, environmental concerns were sidelined. Obama’s passing references to environmentalism likely produced a political situation where environmentalism was a secondary (possibly tertiary or quaternary) concern, but a concern nonetheless.

#### The Permutation Fails, Competitiveness Cannot be a Principle in the Transition Period to Cooperation

Group of Lisbon – 95 Nineteen members from Japan, Western Europe, and North America with different educational backgrounds and experience in business, government, international organizations, and academia (Group of Lisbon, Joao Caraca, Hpilippe de Woot, Gianfranco Dioguardi, Luois Emmerij, Emilio Fontela, Seiko Hirata, Pierre-Mar Johnson, Claude Julien, Terry Karl, Daniel Latouche, Robert McCormic-Adams, Riccardo Petrella, Ken Prewitt, Saskia Sassen, Joel Serrao, Luc Tissot, Taizo Yakushiji, Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, Aristide Zolberg, *Limits to Competition*, 1995)

By comparing the most probable scenarios of the new global world in the making, the survival scenario, based on the predominance of the principle of competitiveness, is not the most effective way to meet the needs and aspirations of the world’s population. Competitiveness cannot be the guiding principle governing the visions, strategies, and actions of people in this transition period. It is powerless vis-à-vis the major socioeconomic global problems confronting us today, including growing poverty, delinking between the rich countries and the rest of the world, and environmental degradation. Two scenarios emerge as the most desirable: the regionalized global scenario and the sustainable global integrated scenario. Both resort to the predominance of the logic of integration (rather than fragmentation) and of the principle of global governance by mixed cooperative mechanisms (rather than governance by market mechanisms only). Within the context of the two scenarios, the new global world will be the result of cooperative construction processes based on the enhancement of the principles, rules, and institutions—such as freedom, democracy, solidarity, social justice, economic efficiency—that have marked the history of the twentieth century and that have attempted to counteract the influence of other principles, rules and institutions such as autocracy, oligarchy, social Darwinism, economic alienation, cultural intolerance, and aggressive nationalism. Contrary to the survival scenario, which implies that only the winners will construct the new global world, cooperation will offer humankind improved opportunities to cope with the forces of fragmentation and delinking represented by the demographic explosion of the poor, drugs, nuclear proliferation, speculative monetary movements, ethnic and religious fundamentalism, AIDS, global warming, and massive population migrations. To Cope with such forces and promote a better governance of the world, there exists a considerable number of reasonable and constructive proposals, programs, and projects. The issue is not the absence of ideas on what should be done. Nor is there a shortage of specific, concrete programs for action. One may reasonably say that despite all that is known, there is always room for identifying new ideas. The issue at stake is the how: how to find the way(s) to define and agree on the central modalities and means that should guide the process toward an effective global governance and, more important, how to make the new values, instruments, and institutions work. Toward this end, two fundamental questions have to be answered: Which is (are) the most crucial process(es) that should be promoted? And what are the most promising approaches to follow with a view to finding the way(s)?

#### The Affirmatives attempt to legitimize their competitive rhetoric is a social construction grounded in the discourse itself.

**Harty et al 8** - BA in Sociology, History and English (First class, Northumbria), an MA in Contemporary Sociology (Lancaster University) and a PhD in Sociology (also from Lancaster) (Chris, Stuart Green, Abbas Ali Elmualim, Graeme D. Larsen & Chung Chin Kao, On the discourse of construction competitiveness, Building Research & Information, 36:5, 426-435, Aug 14 2008, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09613210802076666)

The legitimacy of ‘competitiveness’ amongst practising managers is undoubtedly derived from the broader rhetoric of the enterprise culture, as propagated widely in the UK and US since the early 1980s. Competitiveness in the global economy became the new mantra of both the Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher administrations as a means of achieving economic growth after the widespread failure of centralized state planning. Managerial sources on competitiveness both reflected and reinforced this new emphasis on ‘survival of the fittest’. Individual firms, and entire national economies, had to become competitive in order to survive. The espoused policies sought to extend the domain of the free market throughout the economy in the cause of competition. The shift to the political right denied legitimacy for the continued state support of ‘lame ducks’. National economies and individual firms were obliged to compete in the marketplace. Harsh medicine was advocated to overcome sluggish economies characterized by low productivity, overmanning and a lack of investment. Key policy dimensions of the espoused doctrine included privatization, deregulation and the reduction of trade union power. Taxation levels were reduced in an effort to encourage ‘enterprise’, with a consequent reduction in welfare benefits. The combination of policy initiatives, legislation and rhetoric has been characterized as the ‘enterprise discourse’ (Du Gay, 1991; Keat and Abercombie, 1991; Du Gay and Salaman, 1992). In this sense, the discourse of the enterprise culture includes a complex web of ideas, linguistic expressions, policies, social institutions and, importantly, material practices. And it has had a significant and lasting impact on the UK economy and society at large. The decimation of the manufacturing sector resulted in urban decay and widespread unemployment. Many firms in traditional heavy industries failed to survive exposure to the harsh winds of competition. In the UK, the discourse of enterprise was subsequently enthusiastically embraced – and even extended – by the Tony Blair Labour government elected in 1997. The end result is an economy oriented towards services rather than manufacturing, with consequent growth in part-time and temporary employment. The accepted euphemism for such trends is the ‘flexible economy’, which is too often characterized by a widespread reduction of employment protection; too many restrictive regulations are deemed ‘uncompetitive’. The discourse of the enterprise culture has shaped business education and practice to such an extent that it has since become accepted ‘common sense’.

#### Competitive ideology permeates

Petrella 2k Catholic University ofLouvain. (Riccardo, Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 82, No. 2, Development of Settlements (2000), pp. 67-72, JSTOR) Finally, the sixth commandment is there to provide a moral and practical legitimisation to the whole structure of the social fabric and dynamics governed by globalisation, liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and relentless technological in- novation. The last commandment is competitiveness: "You must be the best, the winner". If you are the best, the most competitive, you have the right to set the norms, the standards, the price, because by being competitive you have used available resources - especially knowledge, competence and information - in an intelligent way to reduce production costs and prices, to increase quality and variety of goods and services, and to strengthen the flexibility and adaptability of the "local" economy. Competition has been increasingly associated with the notion of "a contest between rivals". In real economic life, competition is assimilated with the act of defeating other competitors. Competition no longer describes a mode of functioning of a particular market configuration (a competitive market) as distinct from oligopolistic and monopolistic markets. To be competitive means "to kill the competitors". Furthermore, it has ceased to be an instrument and has become an end in itself. Even for government departments, competitiveness of the country (or of the region) is now the primary concern. To attract and retain capital within its territory is a means to maintain and strengthen competitiveness in the global economy.

### AT: Framework – Discourse First

#### Discourse first

Harty et al 8 - BA in Sociology, History and English (First class, Northumbria), an MA in Contemporary Sociology (Lancaster University) and a PhD in Sociology (also from Lancaster) (Chris, Stuart Green, Abbas Ali Elmualim, Graeme D. Larsen & Chung Chin Kao, On the discourse of construction competitiveness, Building Research & Information, 36:5, 426-435, Aug 14 2008, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09613210802076666)

Rather than accept established ideas of enterprise and competitiveness as necessarily representative of reality, an alternative approach would be to focus on the constituent discourses. In particular, to explore how such discourses impact and shape the contexts in which actors, and their ideas and actions, are grounded. But it is necessary to be precise in what is meant by discourse, as one of the problems with the term is the multiplicity of ways in which it is mobilized and interpreted. Some sources see discourses simply as narratives or storylines portraying certain series of events or interpretations of them.Others interpret discourses as rhetorical (and often implicitly furtive or diversionary) justifications of specific perspectives and activities. A further interpretation of discourse is to see them as deterministic mechanisms that set the very conditions in which society operates. The position adopted here is that a discourse is a body of ideas that has significant material effects and consequences as it ismobilized, reproduced and reconstructed in specific contexts. In this sense, it shares similarities with Foucault’s definition of discourses as highly ubiquitous deviceswhich not only constrain and enable the possibilities for action available to actors, but also actually constitute or configure the subjectivities of those individuals. Foucault’s definition, although both complex and contested, provides a way of seeing discourse as something other than just words. It goes beyond the position of discourse as smokescreen to look for thematerial consequences of its operation – the ‘formidable materiality of discourse’ (Foucault, 1981, p. 52). Notwithstanding the above, it is also important to make clear that the adopted perspective does not situate discourse as something separate from and a priori to some effect or end. Discourse and its consequences are seen as inseparable; discourse both instigates and mediates interaction and is recursively adapted and shaped in the process. Discourses include practices and courses of action, as well as beliefs and ideas, and indeed much of Foucault’s work is concerned with describing the ways that different discourses have been produced, reproduced and shaped through practice. By examining the discourse of enterprise as a multifaceted system of ideas, beliefs and activities, light can be shed not only on the appeal and influence of often ambiguous and tautological theories of competitiveness, but also on the broad ideological contexts in which they are grounded. From this perspective, new insights can be gained into the ways in which the discourse of competitiveness has shaped ‘common sense’ reality. And any such diagnosis must start with the basic parameters of the ‘enterprise culture’.

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### Affirmative

#### Other speech acts trigger the link

Group of Lisbon – 95 Nineteen members from Japan, Western Europe, and North America with different educational backgrounds and experience in business, government, international organizations, and academia (Group of Lisbon, Joao Caraca, Hpilippe de Woot, Gianfranco Dioguardi, Luois Emmerij, Emilio Fontela, Seiko Hirata, Pierre-Mar Johnson, Claude Julien, Terry Karl, Daniel Latouche, Robert McCormic-Adams, Riccardo Petrella, Ken Prewitt, Saskia Sassen, Joel Serrao, Luc Tissot, Taizo Yakushiji, Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, Aristide Zolberg, *Limits to Competition*, 1995)

A new competition era, however, has emerged in the last twenty to thirty years, and globalization has been a contributing factor. As we have seen, globalization has changed the setting of economic activities. As a result of the move from territorially defined national economies to the open space of global economies, globalization is raising the possibility that global competition could lead to global dominance. It also raises the stakes—as the economies and societies of the world became both more interdependent and concerned by uneven relationships of power, a major spillover effect in competition is taking place; that is, you cannot compete in one area without competing in all areas, an effect that in its turn amplifies the possibility of global dominance. Competitiveness has become the primary goal of industrialists, bankers, and governmental trade and industry departments. Industrialists, politicians, economies, financial leaders, technologies, and trade unionists have adopted the competitiveness metaphor as their credo. The imperative of competitiveness is the center of their discussions and propositions. No other word is used as frequently in political speeches, newspapers, books, and business management courses and seminars. The battle for competitiveness is the most discussed international economic conern of the last twenty years. How to address people’s concerns about employment? The answer is: “increase competitiveness.” (this explains the title of a 1994 British government paper, “Competitiveness and Employment.”) How should university curricula be modified and why? The answer is: “Adjust the curricula to the needs of industry in order to make it more competitive.” How to foster better development and use of technology? The answer is: “Focus on competitiveness.” Did the European Community approve a common Research and Technology Policy for the first time in its history in 1985? The sole objective of the new policy was “to improve the scientific basis of European industry with a view to strengthening its competitiveness at the international level.” “Competing with Technology” is the title of a report of the Dutch government to the parliament that was made public in June 1993, in which an outlook for the technology policy in the Netherlands is given. The main purpose is to improve the Netherlands’ position in the technology race. The same cultural background is behind “Train to Compete,” the slogan used by Berlitz-Belgium to promote its six-month intensive Japanese language program, “Apprender a Competir” (Learn to be Competitive), the motto used by the “Euroforum University” created by the Complutenses University in El Escorial, and the position supported by the Industrial R&D Advisory Committee of the Commission of the European Union. The supporters of the competitiveness credo are deeply convinced that the competitive market economy is the only efficient answer to the problems and challenges facing the economies and societies of the world. Their conviction applies not only to the most developed countries but to all countries, regions, and firms of the world. Accordingly, in their opinion, the increased participation in the free market by African countries and firms is considered the answer to the problems of growing impoverishment and sociopolitical dislocation of the African continent. The same solution is suggested for Latin America. Equally, they believe the fight against the ecological disruption of the planet can be won via greater freedom for competitive firms: if market forces are fully liberated to do their job, the mechanisms of competitiveness will ensure the necessary equilibria between costs and prices. Environmental costs, for example, will be internalized by firms. This will lead to real pricing, and gradually environmentally friendly processes and products will be preferred by consumers and investors.

#### Turn – competitive *decline* leads to economic nationalism

Teixeira and Molyneux – 93 (Ruy A. Teixeira - Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Wisconsin, Guy Molyneux - Member of the Board of Directors of the Commonwealth Institute, Economic Nationalism and the Future of American Politics, 1993, p. 2-3, http://epi.3cdn.net/ff724301ec5e9a36fd\_gam6bzoj8.pdf)

For the United States, the fall from a position of international dominance and the continuing competitive challenges from abroad are the central economic facts of recent history. There is of course sharp debate over the implications of these changes as well as the proper policy response. But no one doubts the real and profound impact of international competition, from the shopfloor to the boardroom. Less understood is the impact, also profound, that this change has had on America’s political life. The nation’s competitive decline has transformed Americans’ basic view of the world and generated a new and powerful political impulse which we call “economic nationalism.” By economic nationalism we mean something much broader than a “get tough on trade” sentiment, though that is certainly an element. It involves a recognition of the critical link between the country’s international competitive position and prosperity at home. More broadly, it represents deep concern over the country’s economic prospects, and a yearning for national renewal. For this report, we reviewed hundreds of survey questions from a wide variety of polling organizations. Our analysis of these data identifies four central themes to this emerging economic nationalism, each shared by a large majority of Americans: The nation’s economic future is dangerously insecure. America is losing ground economically, and -- worse still -- is losing control over its own economic destiny. . The greatest external threats to the United States are now economic rather than military. Because of this, the U.S. should take a tougher approach with its trading partners and give economic competitiveness as much priority as military preparedness. l U.S. leaders have been too concerned with other nations and their own narrow interests, and too little concerned with America. That emphasis, the public believes, is misplaced. It is time to concentrate on getting America’s house in order. . Increased competitiveness requires a commitment to investment. The U.S. must invest more in technology, infrastructure, and especially, the skills of the workforce. Economic nationalism, understood in this way, is much more than simple protectionism. It involves a new “map” in people’s minds of America’s place in a changed world -- a world where some threats have receded, but others have arisen. It is based on a conjoining of economics and foreign policy, which have been largely distinct aspects of Americans’ world view. This is what gives economic nationalism its great potential political significance -- it links activist economics and the fundamental values of patriotism and nationalism.