## \*\*\* File Explanation

This file contains evidence that can be used to support arguments on both sides of debates about conditionality. It was used during the summer as a springboard for discussions about conditionality, but the evidence can be powerful when read in debates to support particular interpretations/arguments.

## \*\*\* Evidence

### Ideological Flexibility Good

#### Cocooning prevents adequate scrutiny—testing ideas against opinions from all sides of the political spectrum is crucial to determining the best arguments.

Barone 12 — Michael Barone, Senior Political Analyst for the *Washington Examiner*, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, contributor to Fox News, 2012 (“Cocooned Liberals Are Unprepared for Political Debate,” *TownHall.com*, May 24th, Available Online at http://townhall.com/columnists/michaelbarone/2012/05/24/cocooned\_liberals\_are\_unprepared\_for\_political\_debate/page/full/, Accessed 07-15-2012)

It's comfortable living in a cocoon – associating only with those who share your views, reading journalism and watching news that only reinforces them, avoiding those on the other side of the cultural divide.

Liberals have been doing this for a long time. In 1972, the movie critic Pauline Kael said it was odd that Richard Nixon was winning the election, because everyone she knew was for George McGovern.

Kael wasn't clueless about the rest of America. She was just observing that her own social circle was politically parochial.

The rest of us have increasingly sought out comfortable cocoons, too. Journalist Bill Bishop, who lives in an Austin, Texas, neighborhood whose politics resemble Kael's, started looking at national data.

It inspired him to write his 2009 book "The Big Sort," which describes how Americans since the 1970s have increasingly sorted themselves out, moving to places where almost everybody shares their cultural orientation and political preference – and the others keep quiet about theirs.

Thus professionals with a choice of where to make their livings head for the San Francisco Bay Area if they're liberal and for the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex (they really do call it that) if they're conservative. Over the years the Bay Area becomes more liberal and the Metroplex more conservative.

But cocooning has an asymmetrical effect on liberals and conservatives. Even in a cocoon, conservatives cannot avoid liberal mainstream media, liberal Hollywood entertainment and, these days, the liberal Obama administration.

They're made uncomfortably aware of the arguments of those on the other side. Which gives them an advantage in fashioning their own responses.

Liberals can protect themselves better against assaults from outside their cocoon. They can stay out of megachurches and make sure their remote controls never click on Fox News. They can stay off the AM radio dial so they will never hear Rush Limbaugh.

The problem is that this leaves them unprepared to make the best case for their side in public debate. They are too often not aware of holes in arguments that sound plausible when bandied between confreres entirely disposed to agree.

We have seen how this works on some issues this year.

Take the arguments developed by professor Randy Barnett of Georgetown Law that Obamacare's mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Some liberal scholars like Jack Balkin of Yale have addressed them with counterarguments of their own.

But liberal politicians and Eric Holder's Justice Department remained clueless about them. Speaker Nancy Pelosi, asked whether Obamacare was unconstitutional, could only gasp: "Are you serious? Are you serious?"

In March, after the Supreme Court heard extended oral argument on the case, CNN's Jeffrey Toobin was clearly flabbergasted that a majority of justices seemed to take the case against Obamacare's constitutionality very seriously indeed.

Liberals better informed about the other side's case might have drafted the legislation in a way to avoid this controversy. But nothing they heard in their cocoon alerted them to the danger.

### Information Overload Good

#### Simulating information overload best prepares students to cope—most valuable skill.

Head and Eisenberg 11 — Alison J. Head, Co-Director and Co-Principal Investigator of Project Information Literacy—a large-scale study about early adults and their research habits, Research Scientist in the Information School at the University of Washington, Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society and the Library Innovation Lab at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Library and Information Science from the University of California-Berkeley, and Michael B. Eisenberg, Co-Director and Co-Principal Investigator of Project Information Literacy—a large-scale study about early adults and their research habits, Dean Emeritus and Professor in the Information School at the University of Washington, holds a Ph.D. in Information Transfer from the School of Information at Syracuse University, 2011 (“College students eager to learn but need help negotiating information overload,” Seattle Times, June 3rd, Available Online at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2015227485\_guest05head.html, Accessed 09-07-2011)

All is not lost! Most of the students we studied across all types of higher-education institutions in the U.S. still attend college to learn, but many are afraid of getting lost in a thicket of information overload they cannot dodge.

Our research tells us information literacy is a critical component of the larger concerns facing higher-education institutions today, along with challenges of multiculturalism, massive budget cuts, helicopter parents, grade inflation, limitations of K-12 education and preparation for college, and adapting to an ever-changing information-technology landscape.

Since 2008, we have been studying the information-literacy skills of students — the ability to recognize when information is needed, then locate, evaluate and put that information to effective use. As information scientists, we believe these skills are essential to critical thinking, lifelong learning and succeeding in life, the work force and in a democratic society.

We surveyed and interviewed more than 10,000 U.S. students at 31 U.S. colleges and universities, including undergraduates enrolled at UW, Harvard, Ohio State University, University of Michigan and community colleges, such as Shoreline Community College. We found no matter where students are enrolled, no matter what information resources they have at their disposal, and no matter how much time they have, the abundance of information technology and the proliferation of digital information resources have made research uniquely paradoxical.

Information is now as infinite as the universe, but finding the answers needed is harder than ever.

Our ongoing research confirms proficiency in information problem solving is urgent, given the dauntingly vast and complex wilderness of information available digitally. As one student in humanities said during one of our focus groups, "What's so frustrating to me about conducting research is the more you know, the more you realize how little you know — it's depressing, frustrating and suffocating."

### Pedagogy of Paradox Good

#### Forcing students to cope with contradictions is valuable—a pedagogy of paradox increases critical thinking and reflexive learning.

Lewis and Dehler 2k — Marianne W. Lewis, Associate Professor of Management at the University of Cincinnati, and Gordon E. Dehler, Associate Professor of Management at the University of Dayton, 2000 (“Learning through Paradox: A Pedagogical Strategy for Exploring Contradictions and Complexity,” Journal of Management Education, Volume 24, Number 6, December, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 709-710)

Writing in the context of diversity, Gallos (1997) referred to the “power of paradox and contradiction,” contending that a “missing ingredient” in teaching about diversity is “paradox work,” and that effective (diversity) “teaching requires a strong pedagogy of paradox [italics added]—methods to engage the incongruities and contradictions of the work itself” (pp. 152-153). As management educators, our charge is to “teach others to embrace paradox” (p. 153). This challenge, of course, extends beyond the realm of diversity education into the broader arena of management education. For paradox is not only endemic to organizations and management, it may also provide a “lens through which we can learn” (Palmer, 1998, p. 66).

This premise is certainly not new, as paradox has long been linked to learning. Philosophers from ancient Greeks to Taoists to Existentialists have viewed human existence as inherently paradoxical. Lao-tzu (Barrett, 1998), for instance, instructed his students that “all behavior consists of opposites . . . . Learn to see things backward, inside out, and upside down” (p. 18). Similarly, Kierkegaard praised paradox for providing a space for learning, inspiring his insights into the dualities of human nature—love/hate, birth/death, self/other. In his classic study of creativity, Rothenberg (1979) claimed that great scientists and artists share a capacity for paradoxical thinking, an ability to explore this space and shift from either/or toward both/and understandings that make sense of opposites and their interplay. For example, [end page 709] Mozart and Beethoven explored tensions between harmony and discord for inspiration, and Einstein forever altered perceptions of physics by envisioning a man falling off a building at rest relative to things falling beside him and moving relative to sights he passed on the way down.

As “it’s a paradox” becomes the management cliché of our time (Handy, 1994), how can management educators help students develop a capacity for paradoxical thinking? How can we enable students to become comfortable with tensions, view contradictions in a new light, and find truths and rationality in the seemingly absurd? Thinking paradoxically requires working through paradox by exploring conflicting feelings, practices, and perspectives in search of more encompassing understandings. Rarely, however, is there any elaboration of what is meant by “working through” (Smith & Berg, 1987, p. 207). Due greatly to the limitations of written language, most work on paradox resorts to mere telling about paradox. Yet, the classroom offers an opportunity to help students experience paradox and learn to recognize, transcend, and manage contradictions, expanding notions of management from prediction, planning, and control toward more critical, reflective, and complicated understandings.

In this article, we propose learning through paradox as a pedagogical strategy for exploring contradictions and complexity. We begin by describing elements of paradox and by modeling their roles in the learning process. We then suggest three approaches aimed at helping students expand conceptual polarities, recognize their personal contradictions, and manage paradoxical predicaments. Last, we highlight that “paradoxes are paradoxical” (Cameron & Quinn, 1988, p. 13). This strategy requires educators to intentionally generate some degree of uncertainty and confusion, using paradoxical contradictions to foster creative tension while simultaneously maintaining a level of comfort and order that enables students to explore and learn.

### Argumentative Engagement Good

#### Reducing cognitive overload facilitates deeper engagement with opposing arguments—studies prove.

Kuhn and Udell 7 — Deanna Kuhn, Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University, and Wadiya Udell, Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington-Bothell, 2007 (“Coordinating own and other perspectives in argument,” *Thinking & Reasoning*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Available Online at http://www.educationforthinking.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07-02%20Coordinating%20Own%20and%20Other%20Perspectives%20in%20Argument.pdf, Accessed 07-15-2012, p. 91-92)

The two forms of development can be predicted to reinforce one another. Progress in use of discourse strategies is propelled by a better understanding of discourse goals. At the same time, exercise of these strategies in discourse promotes more refined understanding of the goals of argumentive discourse. Several recent studies (Felton, 2004; Felton &Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003) provide evidence indicating that younger and less skilled arguers concentrate argumentive discourse on arguments that support their own position, paying relatively little attention to the claims and arguments of their opponent. It is as if they understand the objective of argumentive discourse to be no more than presenting the most compelling case possible as to the merits of one’s position: If I do this better than my opponent, the arguer believes, my position will prevail and my opponent’s position will simply fade away, without my ever having had to address it. The novice arguer thus fails to embrace the dual objectives of argumentive discourse—to identify weaknesses in the opponent’s arguments and to secure commitments from the opponent that can be used to support one’s own claims (Walton, 1989). Both of these, as we have noted, require attention to the opponent’s assertions and the use of strategies to influence them.

Are less skilled arguers really unaware of the relevance of the other’s claims to the discourse task? An alternative hypothesis is that they do [end page 91] possess some such awareness. However, the discourse context in which they must construct and express relevant justifications for the position to which they have committed themselves, while at the same time negotiating the social conventions of discourse, is sufficiently demanding to create cognitive overload if they were at the same time to attempt to attend to the other’s ideas.

If this explanation is correct, reduction of the cognitive demands created by the discourse context should produce a setting in which individuals are more inclined to appreciate the relevance of noting and arguing against the other’s claims, rather than focusing solely on one’s own claims and the arguments in support of them, as we have observed them to do in argumentive discourse (Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). In the studies presented here, we in fact eliminate the actual discourse context entirely, reducing the situation to the statement of two opposing claims, with all other cognitive complexity and response demands minimised. In other words, employing a subtractive logic, by removing discourse from the situation, we seek to isolate and better identify the specifically cognitive demands that contribute to the challenge that argumentive discourse poses, and thereby better understand that challenge. We compare performance across the age range from middle childhood through early adulthood, the period during which the earlier argument research has suggested the relevant skills are developing (Felton& Kuhn, 2001). The specific question we begin with in Study 1 is whether there exist developmental differences in preference for arguments that undertake to strengthen one’s own position versus ones that undertake to weaken the opponent’s position.

#### Engaging in opponents’ arguments is essential to effective critical thinking and decision-making—this is a practical, everyday skill.

Kuhn and Udell 7 — Deanna Kuhn, Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University, and Wadiya Udell, Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington-Bothell, 2007 (“Coordinating own and other perspectives in argument,” *Thinking & Reasoning*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Available Online at http://www.educationforthinking.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07-02%20Coordinating%20Own%20and%20Other%20Perspectives%20in%20Argument.pdf, Accessed 07-15-2012, p. 90-91)

The ability to appreciate and engage in sound argument is central to what educators refer to as critical thinking and is essential to skilled decision making (Byrnes, 1998; Klaczynski, 2004). It is among the most widely valued educational objectives for students of middle-school age and beyond. Educators frequently lament students’ weaknesses in producing both oral and written arguments, and considerable research exists documenting such weaknesses (Brem & Rips, 2000; Keating, 2004; Keefer,Zeitz, & Resnick, 2000; Klaczynski, 2000; Knudson, 1992; Kuhn, 1991;Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; Moshman, 1998; Orsolini, 1993; Perkins,1985; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; Voss, 2001; Voss & Means, 1991;Weinstock, Newman, & Tabak, 2004). Argument, however, can be both product and process. An individual constructs an argument to support a claim. The dialogic process in which two or more people engage in debate of opposing claims can be referred to as argumentation or argumentive discourse to distinguish it from argument as product. Most of the empirical [end page 90] research on argument has been devoted to argument as product. Yet it is argumentive discourse that figures more importantly in the everyday contexts of most people’s lives. People’s skill in this respect very often has important practical implications. Yet we know relatively little about the nature of these discourse skills and what is entailed in their development.

The skills involved in argumentive discourse appear to be complex. At the same time that one is processing and evaluating input from the conversational partner, one must be formulating an effective response that meets discourse goals. According to Walton (1989), skilled argumentation has two goals. One is to secure commitments from the opponent that can be used to support one’s own argument. The other is to undermine the opponent’s position by identifying and challenging weaknesses in his or her argument. Both of these goals, note, require attention to the opponent’s position and claims.

Drawing on Walton’s analysis, Felton and Kuhn (2001) identify two potential forms of development in argumentive discourse skills. One is enhanced understanding of discourse goals, and the other is application of effective strategies to meet these goals. Strategies, in turn, can be divided into two major categories—those addressed to construction and exposition of one’s own argument and those addressed to the opponent’s position and claims (including securing commitments from the opponent).

#### Students *can* engage opposing arguments—creating incentives for them to do so is key.

Kuhn and Udell 7 — Deanna Kuhn, Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University, and Wadiya Udell, Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington-Bothell, 2007 (“Coordinating own and other perspectives in argument,” *Thinking & Reasoning*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Available Online at http://www.educationforthinking.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07-02%20Coordinating%20Own%20and%20Other%20Perspectives%20in%20Argument.pdf, Accessed 07-15-2012, p. 101-102)

In the present context, we see in addition the more specific importance of epistemological understanding in the need to recognise the relevance of the other’s position. Young adolescents, we saw, are able to attend to the other’s position, and even to generate an argument against it, when explicitly asked [end page 101] to do so. Yet they infrequently choose the option of attending to that position when this option is offered, and they infrequently include attention to it in their own freely constructed arguments. The challenge in this case, then, is less one of executing the skill (of addressing the opposing position) than it is one of recognising the need to do so. This recognition goes to the very heart of argument. If the opponent’s position is not relevant, the process through which one achieves victory over the opponent cannot be regarded as one of argument.