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# Consult Japan 1NC Shell (1/3)

The United States federal government should enter into prior and binding consultation with the government of Japan over:

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The government of Japan will have the ability to modify or veto the result of the consultation. The United States federal government will implement the outcome of the consultation and advocate for the plan action in the consultation process.

## Observation 1 is competition:

## A) Substantially means “without qualification”: any permutation that places a condition on the plan severs the unconditional nature of the plan action

Don Blewett, 1976 (Chairperson California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, Young v. Laura Scudder’s Pet, Inc. January 29, 1976. www.cuiab.ca.gov/precedent/pb181.doc.) "Substantially: Essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially; in a substantial manner. Kirkpatrick v. Journal Pub. Co., 210 Ala. 10, 97 So. 58, 59; Gibson v. Glos, 271 I11. 368, I11 N.E. 123, 124; McEwen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 694, 139 P. 242, 243. About, actually, competently, and essentially. Gilmore v. Red Top Cab Co. of Washington, 171 Wash. 346, 17 P. 2d 886, 887."

## B) Resolved means to make a firm decision: the conditional nature of the consultation doesn’t make a firm decision:

The American Heritage Dictionary, 2009. Online. Accessed July 2, 2010 from: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved

 re·solve (rĭ-zŏlv') v. **re·solved** , re·solv·ing , re·solves v. tr. 1. **To make a firm decision about**.

# Consult Japan 1NC Shell (2/3)

## Observation 2 is Solvency:

## Genuine consultation solves opposition and ensures Japan will say yes quickly. It is the process that matters.

Yukio Okamoto, President of Okamoto Associates (Strategic and Business Consulting Firm), Special Adviser to the Cabinet and Chair of the Japanese Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations, Advisor to the Japan Foundation and Science and Technology Agency, and Former Director, North American Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Spring 2002 (“Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance” – The Washington Quarterly) p. lexis

Underlying the strong Japanese collaborative response to the current U.S. war against terrorism are the bitter memories of the attitude that the United States displayed toward the relationship during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The near-humiliation that Japan endured at that time filled the Japanese government with an undeniable sense of failure. So deep was the trauma to Japan's institutional memory that, to this day, policymakers remind themselves that they must never again allow the country to be subjected to the charge of "checkbook diplomacy."   Widespread U.S. criticism of Japan's refusal to send government personnel to the Persian Gulf in 1991 was misguided. Many Japanese engineers and sailors did serve in the Gulf in support of Operation Desert Shield. Japan provided huge amounts of noncombat materiel that was delivered to the war zone mostly by Japanese merchant ships. Japan sent six MSDF minesweepers and 500 personnel to the Gulf, albeit after hostilities had ended. Of all the countries in the world, only Japan raised taxes in order to pay for its contribution to the Persian Gulf War effort. Additionally, after enduring intense pressure and criticism, particularly from the U.S. Congress, Japan provided $10.8 billion to the total war cost of $60 billion (in 1991 dollars). Yet, because Japan had not sent its SDF vessels, planes, and personnel at the campaign's most dangerous time, Japan was treated like a second-class citizen of the world.  For Japan, the United States is the country's only ally. Japan concentrates all its attention on smoothing its relations with the United States, routinely making difficult political decisions to keep the alliance on an even keel. For the United States, however, Japan is one ally among many. Surrounded by so many supporters, the United States rarely feels pressured to make extraordinary sacrifices in order to preserve one particular relationship. Indeed, U.S. members of Congress and others have been unable to resist suggesting to allies that they copy one another's practices so that the United States can reap maximum benefit. In its relationship with the United States, Japan has craved respect. Treated with consideration, the Japanese government delivers on its promises. As former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger noted in his memoirs: I was surprised and pleased by the speed with which the Japanese agreed to share defense responsibilities with us, and add to their own defense capabilities. [The] agreement vindicated my view that we could make progress with the Japanese, if we approached them with the respect and dignity they deserve as a world power, and that defense was an issue we could discuss frankly with them as befits a true partnership.

## GENUINE AND BINDING CONSULTATION PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION STRENGTHENS AND RESTRUCTURES THE ALLIANCE

**Mochizuki,** Senior Fellow @ Brookings Institute, **1997** <Mike, Brookings Review, March 22, Lexis>

As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to say "yes" to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say "no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve toward something akin to America's strategic relationships with the major West European allies.

# Consult Japan 1NC Shell (3/3)

## Now is the key time to bolster the alliance:

**Michael J. Green 2010** (Senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University) “Mr. Kan Can Fix U.S.-Japan Ties”. June 13, 2010. Accessed from: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703433704575303592164774492.html?mod=wsj_india_main> on June 28, 2010.

**The new prime minister shows good instincts. Now President Obama needs a new strategy of his own. To say the United States-Japan alliance has been strained under the Democratic Party of Japan's leadership is an understatement.** Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama opened his term in September with promises to counterbalance American influence through a closed "East Asia Community" and sowed doubt about Japan's commitment to America's forward presence in Asia by blocking implementation of a plan to build a new air base to replace a Marine Corps facility on Okinawa. Mr. Hatoyama's successor, **Naoto Kan, has virtually no track record on foreign- and security-policy, but he appears keen to fix these mistakes. In his first week, he called the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy**; pledged to follow through on building the replacement for the Futenma air base; cancelled a trip to the Shanghai Expo so that he can meet President Obama before going to China; and presented plans at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade-ministers' summit for a Pacific free-trade area that includes the U.S. Even more encouraging, Mr. Kan has weakened the influence of Mr. Ozawa and shifted the party's center of gravity toward national-security realists associated with Land and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara. The last nine months have been hard on a White House overwhelmed by foreign policy challenges from Afghanistan to Iran. In the former Bush administration National Security Council, where I served, there was one high level strategy session on Japan relations early on and after that coordination with Tokyo fell smoothly to officials who understood the joint strategy and had confidence in shared values and interests with Japan. **The Obama National Security Council has apparently had numerous high-level sessions struggling to keep the alliance relationship with Japan on track.** Now that things appear to have stabilized, Japan fatigue in Washington is a real danger. **Things are looking better for the U.S.-Japan alliance**. Mr. Kan has taken important steps to remove uncertainty about Japan's foreign policy trajectory under the DPJ. **Now the rest of Asia—friends and foes alike—will be watching to see if the Obama administration has a strategy with Japan that goes beyond defense of the status quo.**

## US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ALLIANCE CAUSES JAPAN TO GO NUCLEAR RESULTING IN ARMS RACES, PROLIFERATION AND WORLD WAR.

**Khalilzad 1995** <Zalmay, Washington Quarterly, Spring, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War,” lexis>

The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. **Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons.** Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. **With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars i**n Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, **with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Consultation Solvency\*\*\*\*\*

# Consultation Solvency Extensions: Generic

## CONSULTATION MATTERS MORE THAN POLICY SPECIFICS – JAPAN WILL SAY YES

**Struck 2001** <Doug, Washington Post Foreign Service, 2/8, Washington Post, lexis>

Furthermore, Japan is eager to court American approval after eight years of a Clinton administration that the Japanese saw as China-centered and neglectful of Tokyo. "We don't need" a missile defense for Japan, said Hisahiko Okazaki, a longtime diplomat and now head of a research organization in Tokyo. "But America wants the cooperation, and we should always show we are reliable allies. If it costs money, we pay money. For Japan, the supreme target should be the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance."

# Consultation Solvency: Afghanistan

## Japan will back the US up in Afghanistan:

Kurt M. **Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

And I just want to say that one of the points that we tried to underscore when the Secretary was in Hawaii – was that we have seen over the course of the last several months many areas in which Japan has stepped up in important ways. Today, Japan is the largest supporter of our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, with the $5 billion commitment to a host of humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. In Copenhagen, it was Japan and Prime Minister Hatoyama that provided the most generous support for efforts in the developing world to deal with adaptation and the inevitable challenges that climate change will bring to the disadvantaged. Japan has been enormously supportive in various operations against piracy, and we have seen more recently Japanese support to Haiti communicated directly to the Secretary while we were in Hawaii.

## Japan willing to provide support for the US role in Afghanistan:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

At the same time, the party, when it was out of power, when it was campaigning, took a very strong view that this was something that they were going to need to look at. And as we have worked closely with our Japanese interlocutors, the new government, they’ve been very clear that they are determined to play a role in trying to bring peace and stability to South Asia, to Afghanistan, and to Pakistan. And so that’s one of the reasons that they’ve stepped up so substantially their assistance. And we’re grateful for that. So at the same time that this mission will be missed – refueling mission – it is also the case that Japan has now stepped up in a very important, major way in terms of providing assistance on the ground.

# Consultation Solvency: Defense Issues

## Defense issues should be a core component of US-Japan consultations—this is critical to help soothe tensions between the US & Japan:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (Senior Fellow, JCIE). “The US-Japan Alliance: Beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed on June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/5-1.pdf>

Naturally, such a commission could help soothe tensions that will inevitably arise in the aftermath of a final decision on the Futenma relocation plan. But its major contribution would be to encourage Japan to come up with a much clearer and more coherent national security policy. Japan has long avoided in-depth discussions of national security, in a sense closing its eyes and waiting for the United States to save the day. Japan and the world have changed, though, and this is no longer possible, so the time has come for a broader public discussion of Japan’s role in ensuring its own security and in contributing to international security. Defense issues should not be further politicized in Japan, but without defense policy being placed on the domestic political agenda, it will be difficult for Japan to escape the current pattern in which issues are taken up in an overly narrow manner—such as the Futenma relocation plan being examined merely from the perspective of the local burden—so this can instead be discussed in a healthier, broader context.

# Consultation Solvency: Futenma/Okinawa

## US should consult Japan on the question of the Futenma base in Okinawa—this is critical to minimizing friction in the alliance:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

Deepening the Alliance The US-Japan alliance is too important to be put at risk over politics, particularly over the fate of a single base. Instead, we need to handle issues such as the Futenma relocation in a way that does not damage the alliance. To do this, we should operate with a broader perspective and take a number of joint steps that are explicitly linked to one another**. Immediately Begin Joint Consultations** on Futenma Relocation Plan Fundamentally, both the US and Japanese governments understand that it is necessary to reduce the burden of bases on the local populations. Therefore, it is important for them to engage in an ongoing effort to reduce the size and footprint of the proposed new facility, which requires a thorough analysis of the operational requirements it fulfills. Even if it turns out that there is no other viable alternative to the current agreement, more thought needs to be given to reducing the facility’s scope and consolidating functions elsewhere. For example, it may be best to consider dropping the idea of a runway for fixed-wing aircraft in the planned new facilities, instead using existing runways elsewhere, while keeping a much smaller heliport in the plans. Having said this, one thing we cannot forget is that any solution to the Futenma problem has to be the product of joint work between two allies, not the product of confrontational negotiations. The US approach seems to be to wait for Japan to come up with a plan, as Prime Minister Hatoyama has promised to do, and then to respond to it. However, this may not be the right way to go. Once any country’s political parties publicly commit to a plan that is so high profile in nature, it is extraordinarily difficult to convince them to back down from their position. The creation of a plan cannot just be a case of Japan deciding what it wishes to do, then going back and forth with the US government. Instead, it needs to **be the product of joint work.** If we are to have a successful outcome that accommodates the interests of both countries, **it is crucial for the United States to enter into deep consultations with Japanese leaders as soon as possible,** before Japanese political leaders’ positions become entrenched.

## Failure to resolve Futenma location undermines the alliance:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

For instance, while the two countries agreed on the dialogue about how to deepen the U.S.-Japan alliance with a goal of reaching an agreement in time to commemorate the alliance’s 50th anniversary, this process has not shown noticeable progress due to differences over the Futenma relocation.

# Consult Solvency: Global Issues

## Washington should consult on major international actions with Japan—failure to do so undermines the reliability and effectiveness of the US-Japan alliance:

Michael **AUSLIN and** Michael **GREEN, 2007** (American Enterprise Institute and the CSIS). Asian Economic Policy Review, “Japan's Security Policy in East Asia.” Accessed via EBSCO host, July 2, 2010.

Finally, Japanese leaders must come to terms with the reality that is American hegemony – and will likely be so for decades to come, notwithstanding the difficulties in Iraq and the rise of Chinese power. Unlike Spain or Germany under Schroeder, Japan cannot afford gratuitous anti-Americanism given the multiple challenges it faces in Asia. Nor can Japan afford to build the kind of buffers against entrapment that characterized the Yoshida Doctrine. Japan needs instead to be an even more reliable and effective ally – essentially entrapping the USA by ensuring that the global partnership keeps America close by Japan’s

side and listening to Japan’s concerns as Washington shapes its strategy. Just as it is **unthinkable that Washington would act internationally without consulting London**, so Tokyo should want it to be in Japan’s bilateral alliance with the USA. That was the case during the Bush–Koizumi years, and can continue to be so into the future. Japanese leaders can and should speak their piece firmly to Washington, but in the counsels of government and between leaders **– not in the press or the election campaign to tap into latent anti-Americanism** for political points.

## Consultation on issues outside of the Asia-Pacific region crucial for a strong US-Japan alliance into the 21st century:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

This limitation is unfortunate. Maintaining a robust U.S.-Japan alliance is in the interest of both countries. It is true that the alliance has served purposes that are broader than strictly military. Indeed, for the alliance to be vibrant well into the 21st century**, it must be able to take on a wider range of security challenges in areas beyond the Asia-Pacific region.**

# Consult Solvency: Humanitarian Relief

## Japan and US joint cooperation on humanitarian disasters strengthens the US-Japan relationship:

**Michael Auslin 2010** (Resident scholar at AEI) “U.S.- Japan Relations”. April 15, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.aei.org/speech/100137> on June 29, 2010.

**Beyond such traditional security concerns, Japan and the United States continue to** be among the handful of countries that can **act as significant first responders to humanitarian disasters. We did so** jointly during the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 and **earlier this year in Haiti, and will remain the leading providers of such public goods well into the future.** For any such actions in the Asia-Pacific region, **our bases in Japan are indispensable to timely, effective intervention. It is clear,** however, **that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific and sends a signal of American commitment to the region.** From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the Asia-Pacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.

# Consult Solvency: Japan Troops

## Japan’s new government supports moving US troops out of Japan:

Mari **Yamaguchi, 2010 (**staff writer). Japan Today. “Japan balks at $2 billion bill to host U.S. troops.” Online. Accessed on July 1, 2010 from: <http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/japan-balks-at-2-billion-bill-to-host-us-troops>

In a country where land is a precious commodity, many U.S. bases in Japan boast golf courses, football fields and giant shopping malls whose food courts offer everything from Taco Bell to Subway and Starbucks. They are the most visible point of grievance in a sharpening debate about the cost to Japan of supporting the 47,000 American service members here—about $2 billion a year. That’s nearly a third of the total, and about three times what Germany pays to host U.S. forces on its soil. But facing economic woes and seeking a more equal relationship with the U.S., Japan’s new reformist government is questioning whether it should spend so much on U.S. troops—a topic that was taboo under the pro-Washington administrations that governed Japan for most of the post-World War II era.

## Japan will support moving US troops out of Japan—Okinawa and the budget deficit are the reasons why:

Mike **Mochizuki, 1997** (Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs @ George Washington) “Relations with the Great Powers: Japan.” <http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=MpQT8PlYFbGjk1vv1zph2KtQLhXp9zM7Swrhv8ytNp9qMKZmK5mM!547733517!427202863?docId=5000452886>

The post-World War II security relationship between Japan and the United States was based on a bargain inspired by the Soviet threat: the United States agreed to defend Japan in exchange for access to military bases in Japan. Since the Cold War's end, Washington and Tokyo have been inching toward updating that paternalistic relationship not only to make it more reciprocal but also to expand its focus to include regional peace and stability. Domestic pressures in both Japan and the United States argue for redefining the alliance. As is evident from the public reaction in Okinawa after the rape of the schoolgirl by American servicemen in September 1995, many Okinawans resent their burden in maintaining the bilateral security arrangements. And most of their countrymen strongly oppose transferring U.S. forces elsewhere in Japan. The burgeoning Japanese budget deficit also suggests that there are limits to Tokyo's host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan. The American public, for its part, may not be content for Japan to continue free-riding on U.S. security policy.

# Consultation Solvency—Landmines

## Japan would say yes to the plan-- it’s new policy strongly supports landmine clearance and consultation over the issue

UNGA 2005 (UN General Assembly; Department of Public Information; News and Media Division; New York; Sixtieth General Assembly; Fourth Committee; 18th Meeting (AM) “REMAINING LANDMINES SAID TO BE OBSTACLE IN MANY COUNTRIES TO HUMANITARIAN AID, REFUGEE RETURN, ECONOMIC PROGRESS” GA/SPD/329 General Assembly [**http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gaspd329.doc.htm**](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gaspd329.doc.htm)

YASUSHI TAKASE (Japan) said that the First Review Conference of the Ottawa Convention, held in Kenya in 2004, had made clear that much progress had been made, but that there were still many challenges ahead. At the Conference, Japan had announced its new policy on anti-personnel mines, which placed emphasis on the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and was based on three principles: consolidation of peace; human security; and close cooperation between governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector and academia. In this connection, he said, Japan had supported research and overseas filed tests though grant aid for scholarship and research. What was important for the future, he continued, was to apply Japan’s technological expertise to the development of more effective equipment for the detection and clearance of mines, in cooperation with end-users, private companies and researchers. It was also important to note the role of non-governmental organization and international organizations in assistance with mine action. In this regard, the Government of Japan would carry out mine-action activities by increasing dialogue and coordination with non-governmental organization, as well as by supporting their activities through grants and subsidies. For example, Japan had provided assistance to the project for supporting humanitarian mine action in Cambodia and a mine-clearance project in Sri Lanka through the grant aid for grass-roots human security projects. Japan took into account the need to integrate mine action into its developments programme, strategy and budget, he said. Mine action was a multi-faceted issue involving human security and development and, therefore, required a comprehensive and flexible approach. A mainstreaming approach would benefit both donors and mine-affected countries, and it would increase the opportunity to approach and consult with possible donors, including regional and international organizations.

## Japan would say yes to the plan- it already supports landmine removal along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border

Kawaguchi 02 (Yoriko, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the United Nations Conference Center, “Policy Speech by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi”, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, August 26, 2002. http://www.uneca.org/eca\_resources/Speeches/2002\_speeches/082602policy\_speech\_by\_japan\_s\_fm.htm)

In order to prevent a country in a post-conflict phase from stepping back into conflict, it is crucially important to promote social harmonization such as the promotion of dialogue among the parties in conflicts, efforts to deal with anti-personnel landmine issues that hamper restoration and reconstruction, assistance to refugees who are victims of conflicts and the reintegration of ex-soldiers into civil life. Japan has some advantages in addressing these efforts with its recent accumulation of expertise in such countries as Afghanistan. Also in Africa, Japan has already supported the activities for the demarcation of the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea and for the removal of landmines in the related areas with a view to assisting in the final settlement of the border dispute between the two countries. Japan is also assisting for the reintegration program of ex-soldiers in Sierra Leone.

# Consult Japan: North Korea/Iran

## Obama has promised consultation with Kan on North Korea and Japan—the plan backs away from that pledge while the counterplan reaffirms it

**AP News Network 2010** “Obama congratulates new Japanese leader” June 5, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jizONsT_BmKNLu0tTu2B43il5-nAD9G5E3M80>, on June 30, 2010.

WASHINGTON — **President Barack Obama telephoned Naoto Kan** on Saturday **to congratulate Japan's new prime minister and promised to consult with him on the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.** "**The two leaders agreed to work very closely together**," a White House statement said, adding **they share the conviction that warm ties between Japan and the U.S. benefit both countries — and the world.** Kan is Japan's sixth prime minister in four years. He was named to the post Friday, two days after Yukio Hatoyama stepped down. Their Democratic Party of Japan swept to power nine months ago, but Hatoyama swiftly lost popularity over a fundraising scandal and reversing a campaign promise to move a key U.S. Marine base off the southern island of Okinawa. The White House statement made no mention of the Okinawa base, but Kan's office quoted him as telling Obama he wants "to make strenuous efforts" on the issue. Obama and Kan look forward to meeting each other later this month at a meeting in Canada of the leading industrial nations, the White House said. An administration official added the leaders "hit it off well on a personal level." They have similar backgrounds: Kan was a civic activist before running for a seat in Parliament, while Obama was a community organizer. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly about the phone call.

# Consult Japan Solvency: North Korea

## Close consultation over North Korea key to continued stability and prosperity in the US-Japan alliance:

**Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 2010** “Background Note: Japan”. March 31, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm> on July 1, 2010.

**The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity.** Despite the changes in the post-Cold War strategic landscape, **the** U.S.-Japan **alliance continues to be based on shared vital interests and values**. These include stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, and securing of prosperity for the people of both countries and the international community as a whole. **Japan provides bases and financial and material support to U.S. forward-deployed forces, which are essential for maintaining stability in the region.** Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan hosts a carrier battle group, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the 5th Air Force, and elements of the Army's I Corps. **The United States currently maintains approximately 50,000 troops in Japan, about half of whom are stationed in Okinawa.** Over the past decade the alliance has been strengthened through revised Defense Guidelines, which expand Japan's noncombatant role in a regional contingency, the renewal of our agreement on Host Nation Support of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and an ongoing process called the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). The DPRI redefines roles, missions, and capabilities of alliance forces and outlines key realignment and transformation initiatives, including reducing the number of troops stationed in Okinawa, enhancing interoperability and communication between our respective commands, and broadening our cooperation in the area of ballistic missile defense. In February 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then-Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone signed the Guam International Agreement (GIA) in Tokyo. The GIA commits both nations to completing the transfer of approximately 8,000 U.S. Marines from bases in Okinawa to new facilities in Guam built with the assistance of Japan. Following the 2009 election, the DPJ-led government pledged to review the existing agreement. The United States continues to work constructively with the Government of Japan to find a solution to the Okinawa basing issue. **Because of the two countries' combined economic and technological impact on the world, the U.S.-Japan relationship has become global in scope.** **The United States and Japan cooperate on a broad range of global issues, including development assistance, combating communicable disease such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and avian influenza, and protecting the environment and natural resources.** Both countries also collaborate in science and technology in such areas as mapping the human genome, research on aging, and international space exploration. As one of Asia's most successful democracies and its largest economy, Japan contributes irreplaceable political, financial, and moral support to U.S.-Japan diplomatic efforts. **The United States consults closely with Japan and the Republic of Korea on policy regarding North Korea.**

# Consult Japan—Regional Issues Solvency

## US & Japan should consult on regional issues: this is the key to creating a strong and balanced US-Japan relationship:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has spoken frequently of two lofty concepts that arise out of a recognition that the regional context has changed: the desirability of forging an ‘East Asian community’ and the need to have a more equal US-Japan relationship. What is missing in this talk, however, is a clear articulation of how to link the goals of a strong and **more balanced US-Japan relationship with a vision of regional community** that is equipped to deal with the changes unfolding before us. Although some observers may see these aims as inconsistent or even mutually exclusive, they can be complementary. In fact, **effectively coordinating them** should be the focus of **intense and forward-looking discussions** between Japan and the United States.

## Regional consultation key to an effective US-Japan relationship:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (Senior Fellow, JCIE). “The US-Japan Alliance: Beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed on June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/5-1.pdf>

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# Consultation Solvency: South Korea

## Consultation on the Korean peninsula is important to the US-Japan alliance:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

At the same time, the party, when it was out of power, when it was campaigning, took a very strong view that this was something that they were going to need to look at. And as we have worked closely with our Japanese interlocutors, the new government, they’ve been very clear that they are determined to play a role in trying to bring peace and stability to South Asia, to Afghanistan, and to Pakistan. And so that’s one of the reasons that they’ve stepped up so substantially their assistance. And we’re grateful for that. So at the same time that this mission will be missed – refueling mission – it is also the case that Japan has now stepped up in a very important, major way in terms of providing assistance on the ground. The truth is in many respects, this is the first transfer in power in about half a century. We had short-term new governments in the 1990s, and it is completely natural and indeed expected that you’re going to go through periods in which both sides ask detailed questions and have a chance to look afresh at the commitments of previous administrations. That goes on in the American – on the American scene and we should expect it on the Japanese scene as well. I would say that in many respects, in terms of our interactions, we are finding an ability to discuss issues of mutual concern, whether they be regional or global, challenges on the Korean Peninsula, or issues associated with climate change, that there is, I think, very clearly a relationship that’s developing with new players across the Pacific, and I’m quite confident about the direction ahead. And so I think it’s important not to over-blow what – these challenges that we face and put them in a larger context and to recognize that our alliance is bigger than any one or two issues, and also appreciate that in the midst of very real challenges that we’re facing on Futenma and the like, it takes place within a context of cooperation and coordination that in many respects is unprecedented.

# Consult Solvency: Troops

## Okinawa troops proves: troop deployments in Japan are crafted in careful consultation with the United States:

Derek **Mitchell, 2010** (principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs). “Regional Security and Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” March 9, 2010. Accessed June 28, 2010 from: <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2010/march-9-regional-security-and-okinawa-in-the-us-japan-alliance/>

Dr. Auer recognized the burden that hosting American military bases in Okinawa places on the populace, but argued that the 2006 agreement had been carefully created in consultation between the United States, the Japanese government, and the people of Okinawa to develop a solution that both maintained the security of the Asia Pacific region while also reducing the impact on the lives of Okinawans. He argued that the decision by Japan’s new leadership to reexamine this agreement reopened doubts, and suggested that the only way for this problem to be resolved would be either for the Japanese government to support the original agreement or to propose a new agreement that could receive the support of all parties involved.

# Consult Solvency Now is Key Time

## Now is the key time to reinvigorate the US-Japan alliance—extend our Green evidence that assumes the rise of Naota Kan after the resignation of Hatoyama—the rest of Asia is watching to see if Obama moves beyond the status quo to bolster the alliance. Extend our Okamoto evidence—it says that Japan will say yes if we engage in prior and binding consultation…the terminal impact is Japanese prolif and instability throughout the world culminating in world war…thus outweighing and turning the case…

## Consultation on matters of the alliance should begin now—substantive consultations prior to November 2010 are important to smooth tensions in the alliance:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

President Obama’s scheduled visit to Japan in November 2010 provides excellent timing for a joint statement on the US-Japan security alliance, coming as it does during the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Any statement should be substantive in nature and forward looking, not merely consisting of platitudes, and for this reason **it is important that consultation on the broad outlines of it start right away**. Meanwhile, Japan is undergoing an important revision of its National Defense Program Guidelines that should be completed by the end of 2010. It is important to link this to American and Japanese consultations on their vision for regional security and on how to better share their defense burdens. For this purpose, the Japanese and American governments should consider launching a high-profile joint commission to examine the US-Japan alliance and chart a way forward for it. Japan has long been accustomed to dealing with security affairs in a closed room, but it has become clear that there is now a need for greater transparency and active public involvement in the national security debate. This can be aided greatly by a bilateral commission that involves not just government bureaucrats but also politicians, public intellectuals, and representatives of civil society. While the immediate rationale for this review is linked to the changes in governments in both countries and the desire to make the 50th anniversary of the alliance more forward looking—rather than a mere celebration of the past—fundamentally it is needed because the security situation in Asia is changing dramatically with the rise of powers such as China and India and the emergence of new non traditional challenges. Therefore, the **commission should have a broad mandate**, **covering issues running the gamut** from **basing facilities and the nuclear umbrella** to the **regional role** of the US-Japan alliance and the future of the regional security architecture. Ideally, its deliberations would start in the spring and could help set the general parameters for a November 2010 US-Japan statement on the alliance. Naturally, such a commission **could help soothe tensions** that will inevitably arise in the aftermath of a final decision on the Futenma relocation plan.

# Consult Solvency Now is Key Time

## (--) Consultation in upcoming months is critical to the US-Japan alliance:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

So I think overall, we’ve seen enormous indications of this new government of a desire to work closely with the United States, but it is also the case that the U.S.-Japan alliance is, at its core, a security partnership, and we believe that it will be critical in the coming months to make sure that our two governments are working closely together. There clearly are issues that require more work and more consultation, and from the U.S. Government perspective, we’re prepared to work with our Japanese interlocutors.

## (--) Reassessing US-Japan relations key to ensure the alliance is equipped to face the challenges of the 21st century:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

Over the past several years, and especially since September’s historic change of government in Japan, it has become clear that there is a need to reassess the US-Japan alliance to ensure that it is equipped to face the challenges of the 21st century. There have been changes in Japan that are now reflected in domestic politics, but we cannot ignore the fact that there have been important changes in the regional context as well. China’s rise is apparent to everyone, and there is now a consensus view that East Asia is becoming an engine of growth whose dynamism is benefiting the world.

## (--) Japan must play a more active role in the US-Japan alliance in order to address security challenges:

Derek **Mitchell, 2010** (principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs). “Regional Security and Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” March 9, 2010. Accessed June 28, 2010 from: <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2010/march-9-regional-security-and-okinawa-in-the-us-japan-alliance/>

In the first panel, Ambassador Rust Deming of the Johns Hopkins University, Professor Eiichi Katahara of Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies, and Professor Shinichi Ogawa from Japan’s Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University discussed the regional challenges to the Alliance, focusing on the changing role of Japan’s defense capabilities and the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for regional security. Professor Katahara argued that for the Alliance to **address the many challenges to regional security**, **Japan needs to play a more active role in the relationship**, formalizing its security strategy and taking more responsibility for its own protection. While he explained that the U.S.-Japan Alliance should remain a central focus of regional security, he described the need to develop more enhanced regional dialogues on traditional and non-traditional security issues with countries such as China and through the East Asian Community concept.

# \*\*\*\*\*Net Benefit Extensions\*\*\*\*\*

# Net Benefit Extensions: Consultation Saves the Alliance

## Genuine consultation with Japan is essential to maintaining leadership, preventing terrorism, and sustaining the alliance – only prior and binding consultation can solve and even if Japan says no, we still solve the net benefit

Ted Osius, Regional Environmental Affairs Officer for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and Former Senior Adviser on International Affairs to Al Gore, 2002 (The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Why It Matters and How to Strengthen It) p. 74-77

Separated from Asia and Europe by vast oceans, the United States through much of its history tended toward unilateralism. In the war against terrorism, however, collective action is essential. Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as well as the powerful forces of globalization, have shown that America's fate is also bound up in happenings across the oceans. Fortunately, the United States has vast experience over the past half-century in establishing collective security arrangements. This experience contributed to the Bush administration's successes in building a coalition to combat terrorism. One great lesson of post-Cold War diplomacy has been that, to cope with difficult global issues, the United States needs coalition partners. Even Henry Kissinger, for decades a student of balance of power, criticized the unilateral statements of the Bush administration's early months. He stated, "The U.S. should not be afraid of the process of translating its convictions into consensus. We have to find a balance between abdicating our convictions to multilateral institutions and imposing them on the world by fiat." After September 11, Washington must recognize that it needs the support of friends (and former foes) in the battle against terrorism and to achieve its other goals. As an integral part of the war against terrorism, the United States, its friends, and allies must define the kind of world they in-tend to create in the future. As one astute observer wrote, We will be making a strategic mistake to conclude that defenses alone can win this war for us. We also must have an affirmative plan for the future of the world, attractive to the citizens of many countries.... We must ask whether unchecked pandemics are not a security threat; whether environmental damage on a global scale is not a security threat; whether the continuing extreme poverty of billions isn't a security threat.... Hope destroys the resources of terror by denying it recruits. The United States—alone among nations—can represent hope in the armor of action. If we so will it. That choice remains uniquely ours. The Armitage report challenges the U.S.-Japan relationship to evolve from one of "burdensharing" into "power-sharing." Armitage's actions since joining the government suggest his sincerity in pursuing this goal. In Senate testimony, he reiterated themes from the autumn presidential campaign: "Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership.... To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of pretensions." The United States can, in fact, gain from power sharing, as long as it learns to tolerate it. America and the United Kingdom fought shoulder-to-shoulder in wars, share a language and cultural roots, and pursue democratic and free market values in many shared endeavors around the globe. The United States regularly takes British views into account when dealing with European matters. Although decades may pass before the U.S.-Japan relationship reaches that level of trust, Japan is the world's second-largest economy and a nation that shares America's commitment to democracy and a free market. Japan needs to make its views known, especially regarding Asia, and America must in return listen respectfully and with an open mind. Although it is difficult to imagine as effective a foreign policy partner as Prime Minister Tony Blair, in Asia the United States needs an Asian partner empowered, at times, to play a parallel role. **Consultation**, according to the Brookings Institution's Ivo Daalder, **implies "give-and-take, putting one view on the table, hearing the other view** and seeing if what emerges from the disagreement is a way forward that satisfies both sides.... Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you're willing to talk to people. It's whether you're willing to take their views into account. Japan can help the United States deal with its challenge, as the world's only superpower, in taking other views into account. Japan can also help the United States take advantage of the opportunities in Asia to engage in real consultation and to build coalitions to address today's complex global issues. Watching America's contradictory impulses, and its oscillations between support for multilateral solutions and unilateral approaches, gives Tokyo an excuse to hesitate about tightening the alliance. However, America's historical pattern as part of collective security and collective economic arrangements should provide significant reassurance. The United States led the way in building the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, APEC, and other regional and global institutions. In addition, America's allies in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia have shown that a U.S. partner can, in fact, say "no" and avoid entrapment. A country such as Saudi Arabia can decide when and if its bases will be used for specific operations and whether to continue hosting U.S. bases. On numerous occasions, the Saudis have refused American proposals to act against Iraq. America's partner says "no," and yet the alliance endures. As noted earlier, the United States withdrew from the Philip-pines in 1992 when the Philippine Senate failed to ratify an extension of the bilateral basing agreement. This, of course, gave rise to fears of "abandonment" by America's other Asian allies. Termination of a security relationship (and the Philippine-U.S. security relationship suffered an interruption, not a conclusion) is a drastic final resort, only to be pursued if all else fails. As long as U.S. and Japanese interests overlap significantly (and chapters 1 through 5 of this book demonstrate that they do), consultation, give-and-take, and even power sharing should result in the best possible outcomes for both alliance partners.

# Net Benefit Extensions: Consultation Saves the Alliance

## Close consultation with Japan is essential to further bilateral defense cooperation:

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Japan, 1996**. “JAPAN-U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY

- ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas. (a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is **a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance**, both governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements.

## Stronger US-Japan strategic relationship requires a change in attitude from the US side—giving Japan a more important role in world affairs is crucial to this shift:

Christopher A. **Preble 1991**(defense analyst) “Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 7:U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: Adjusting to Change”. March 14, 1991. Accessed from [http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb007.pdf on June 28](http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb007.pdf%20on%20June%2028), 2010.

**A prerequisite to a shift in the current U.S.-Japanese strategic relationship is a change in attitude on the U.S. side.** In spite of growing public sentiment demanding that Japan contribute more to its own defense and the defense of Western interests generally, **some U.S. policymakers have been extremely reluctant to allow the Japanese to assume a more significant role in world affairs.** In March 1990, Maj. Gen. Henry C. Stack pole, commander of Marine Corps bases in Japan stated: "No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan . . . so we are the cap in the bottle, if you will. . . . If we were to pull out of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, it would definitely be a destabilizing factor in Asia."[5] As long as America's policy toward Japan is based on such irrational and anachronistic assessments of Japanese intentions and abilities, no productive changes can take place. Simply put, **Americans must overcome their latent fears of Japan, and American leaders must appreciate the degree to which U.S. opposition to greater Japanese military power unnecessarily increases America's own security burdens.** Equally important, such reflexive obstructionism threatens to do irreparable harm to the relationship of trust and cooperation so carefully cultivated since the end of World War II.

# Net Benefit Extensions: Collapse Inevitable Without Consultation

## (--) Structure of the alliance makes collapse inevitable

**Mochizuki 97** <Mike, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, Brookings Review, March 22>

The time has come to strike a new strategic bargain between Japan and the United States. Under current arrangements, the alliance may not weather the test of a severe security crisis. The Persian Gulf crisis and war of 1990-1 provoked international criticism of Japan’s limited role, wounded Japanese pride, and proved the inadequacy of checkbook diplomacy. Hesitation from Japan in another crisis could severely stain the alliance. When shared vital interests are at stake, Japanese financtial contributions will be inadequate to convince Americans about the alliance’s importance. Preventing a rupture of the alliance during a crisis, therefore, requires altering the terms of the security relationship before such a crisis occurs.

# Net Benefit Extensions: Japan Willing to Burden-Share

## (--) Empirically, Japan is willing to burden-share:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

Shouldering the Burdens of Security The evidence is overwhelming that the security alliance continues to be justified by the benefits it provides to both countries. However, one vital issue that needs to be carefully managed is the distribution of the burdens of the alliance. On the one hand, there is a sense in the United States that Japan does not contribute as much to the security alliance as it should. Nevertheless, the reality is that Japan has taken important measures over the past two decades to assume a larger role. It expanded its role with the 1997 revision of the Japan-US Defense Guidelines and the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law. Then, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Diet passed the groundbreaking Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to allow the dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces outside of the region, and this was eventually used to enable them to be deployed to Iraq and to permit refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan has been moving in the right direction, although there is more it should do.

# Consultation Net Benefit: Consultation Spills Over

## (--) EXTEND MOCHIZUKI: COUNTERPLAN SOLVES BY TREATING JAPAN AS A TRUE ALLY AND MAKES GOOD ON OUR 1960 PROMISE, RESTRUCTURING THE ALLIANCE.

## (--) Issues spillover for Japan:

**Kelly**, President of Pacific Forum CSIS, **1995** <James A, Summer, Washington Quarterly, lexis>

Third, a related shortcoming would be the notion prevalent in Washington that the economic, political, and security spheres can be worked on by different officials using uncoordinated strategies without the effects of their work overlapping from one sphere into another. Although it would be a mistake to sacrifice trade interests blindly for security interests -- a failing often alleged but rare in practice since the 1970s -- it is equally wrongheaded to pretend that damaged relations in one sector do not cross to another, from, for example, trade or finance to politics or security. This is especially true for Japan, which is still the most important U.S. ally in the region. It has been seen recently that unresolved and bitter trade disputes with Japan can adversely affect the U.S.-Japan security relationship. n6 This does not mean that trade problems are not serious or should not be aggressively pursued: it does mean that a broader range of U.S. officials needs to be involved with each set of issues.

## NO IMPACT: COUNTERPLAN STOPS JAPANESE NATIONALISM FIGHTING FOR AN END TO THE ALLIANCE.

**Ishizuka**, 20**04** managing director of the Foreign Press Center/Japan, 2004 <Masahiko, Feb 23, The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), Lexis>

The self-image of the Japanese with regard to their security policy and government's behavior is almost automatically following the U.S. Some argue that Japan should trust America without any doubt. In an article for the Chuo Koron, another leading Japanese monthly magazine, Bill Emmott, editor of the Economist magazine, provided apparently contradictory advice to the Japanese to depend more on the U.S. but at the same time stand more on their own feet.

What really frustrates Japanese is not their dependence on the U.S., but a perceived inability to speak up to America in the way Emmott advises. Independence from the U.S. will continue to be an obsession, with the trauma of defeat in the last war lingering as an undercurrent. Unless some release is provided for this sentiment, dangerous nationalism could be brewed over a long run. What the Japanese need is self-confidence about their intellectual capacity to work out a grand design and define their world policies accordingly, regardless of whether they ally with the U.S.

# Consultation key to Alliance

## (--) Consultation on policy matters is key to the alliance: surprises only risk undermining the relationship:

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. [www.questia.com](http://www.questia.com))

### This sense of partnership should continue to be enhanced in policy circles as well as military ones. Surprising each other with diplomatic initiatives should not happen if both allies share multilevel forums for frequent and substantive strategy formulation and review. The August 2002 visit of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Tokyo for comprehensive strategy talks with Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi is hoped to be the first in a tradition of such exchanges. Similarly, the stops in Tokyo by President Bush in October 2003 and by Secretary of State Colin Powell in February 2003, before each headed into Asia for other talks, reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship. U.S. leaders and envoys to East Asia should continue to make it a practice to stop in Tokyo during important trips to the region. The symbolic value alone of such gestures is difficult to overestimate. [183](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038121) Likewise, both governments need to be more active in educating the public about the value of the relationship. [184](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038121) It is too easy for politicians to focus on irritants for short-run political gain, instead of the long term strategic benefits of the alliance to both countries' interests. Strengthening the alliance will require this heightened sense of policy coordination and accommodation―all the more so because of the widespread public sense that the Bush administration tends toward unilateralism. Armitage, in his confirmation hearings in the Senate in March 2001, spoke clearly of the long-term need to take into account the interests of Japan and other key allies. “Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership.... To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of pretenses.” [185](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038121) The joint Security Consultative Committee structure must be expanded and deepened to provide forums for substantive, bilateral strategic policy coordination. [186](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038121) Strategic policy discussions must be routinized and deepened on multiple levels to achieve this sense of true partnership. Two critical areas for such policy coordination should be North Korea and Taiwan. Two examples serve to underscore the sensitivity that the United States has shown recently toward Japanese national interests. Such policy accommodation has a great impact on Japanese opinion toward the alliance. On December 10, 2001, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford publicly indicated that the United States would be willing to defend the Senkaku Islands in the event of foreign aggression. [187](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038121) These disputed islands northeast of Taiwan are important national claims of Japan and the United States sent a “costly signal” [188](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038121) to China when Ford made this statement. Similarly, the United States agreed to keep bringing up the resolution of the abductee issue during North Korean dialogues in the spring of 2003. Recognition by the United States of the visceral importance of this issue in Japanese domestic opinion strongly indicates to the Japanese that the United States is willing to accommodate their interests. Furthermore, the United States, in close consultation with the government of Japan, should take proactive steps to address the primary irritants within the alliance. In this regard, a comprehensive, bilateral study of basing and training area requirements is needed. Okinawa (where 60 percent of the forces and 75 percent of the land leased by the U.S. military in Japan is situated) will continue to be a major distraction to the alliance without some proactive and sincere study and reductions.

# Consultation Key to Alliance

## Close communication between the US & Japan is crucial for the future of US-Japan relations:

**Michael Auslin 2010** (Resident scholar at AEI) “U.S.- Japan Relations”. April 15, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.aei.org/speech/100137> on June 29, 2010.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the current state of U.S.-Japan relations, and to look ahead at the role the relationship will play in future economic and security developments for both countries. **Despite current difficulties in the relationship**, I believe that **close ties with Japan are essential for the United States to retain a credible strategic position in East Asia and for future economic prosperity in both Asia and America.**  Yet **we must also recognize that relations between the United States and Japan will be more tenuous over the next several years, requiring close communication and a frank assessment of how the relationship benefits each partner. All political relationships change, and that between Japan and the United States is no exception.** Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific have continually adjusted the alliance to reflect national interests, capabilities, and perceptions of the strengths of each other. The strategic realities of maintaining a forward-based U.S. presence in the western Pacific have been intimately tied to the domestic political policies of administrations in Tokyo and Washington for the past half-century. Yet today, new governments in both countries have policies that seem, on the surface, to indicate goals different from their predecessors, thus raising anxieties in both capitals. **Any substantive change in the U.S.-Japan alliance or in the political relationship that undergirds it could have unanticipated effects that might increase uncertainty and potentially engender instability in this most dynamic region.**

## Consultation bolsters the US-Japan alliance:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

At the same time, the party, when it was out of power, when it was campaigning, took a very strong view that this was something that they were going to need to look at. And as we have worked closely with our Japanese interlocutors, the new government, they’ve been very clear that they are determined to play a role in trying to bring peace and stability to South Asia, to Afghanistan, and to Pakistan. And so that’s one of the reasons that they’ve stepped up so substantially their assistance. And we’re grateful for that. So at the same time that this mission will be missed – refueling mission – it is also the case that Japan has now stepped up in a very important, major way in terms of providing assistance on the ground. The truth is in many respects, this is the first transfer in power in about half a century. We had short-term new governments in the 1990s, and it is completely natural and indeed expected that you’re going to go through periods in which both sides ask detailed questions and have a chance to look afresh at the commitments of previous administrations. That goes on in the American – on the American scene and we should expect it on the Japanese scene as well. I would say that in many respects, in terms of our interactions, we are finding an ability to discuss issues of mutual concern, whether they be regional or global, challenges on the Korean Peninsula, or issues associated with climate change, that there is, I think, very clearly a relationship that’s developing with new players across the Pacific, and I’m quite confident about the direction ahead. And so I think it’s important not to over-blow what – these challenges that we face and put them in a larger context and to recognize that our alliance is bigger than any one or two issues, and also appreciate that in the midst of very real challenges that we’re facing on Futenma and the like, it takes place within a context of cooperation and coordination that in many respects is unprecedented.

# Consultation key to alliance

## Consultation key to improve U.S.-Japan alliance

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. www.questia.com)

With regard to the alliance, America has three real options in the years ahead. The first option is to strive to maintain the current asymmetrical power structure with Japan for as long as possible by purposely maintaining Japanese dependencies and begrudgingly compromising on peripheral issues to protect the core relationship. The second option is to rapidly cede substantive power to Japan, most likely through a dramatic reduction in forward based military capabilities, transform the alliance into a balanced partnership in the near term (5-10 years) before any Asian neighbor has the power or presence to prevent such a change, and build alternative basing options in the Western Pacific. Sharing power can be defined as a combination of greater accommodation on policy objectives and means, more frequent and substantive consultation, and achieving greater balance in military roles and missions within the alliance. The third option is the middle road and, therefore, the one most likely to be followed. Here, the United States, in consultation with Japan, would slowly change the character of the relationship to reduce asymmetries as Japanese security policy changes and diplomatic power increases, while simultaneously, but carefully, exploring alternative basing options.

## America viewed as too unilateral---consultation key to boost U.S.-Japan alliance

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, 2004. www.questia.com)

The perception of American unilateralism (heightened by the war on terrorism and rogue states which has followed September 11) serves to aggravate the lack of comfort many Japanese have in being the junior partner of the United States. [**135**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038116) The *Asahi Shimbun*, citing opinion polls showing 78 percent opposition to a war in Iraq in February 2003, declared that “voters are clearly opposed to [government actions] that merely follow the U.S. line.” [**136**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038116) “The U.S. is too focused on its own interests, ” states Katsuei Hirasawa (LDP Diet member). “It acts unilaterally and then is always asking other countries to follow its lead.” [**137**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038116) Pointedly recognizing these concerns, a March 2003 Tokyo TV-Asahi poll found that 70 percent of the respondents thought that the Bush administration's strategy of preemption of threats either was “arrogant” or “would destabilize the world.” [**138**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038116) Former Ambassador to the United States Yoshio Okawara notes that, in the eyes of the Japanese public, the continuing viability of the alliance requires a greater Japanese voice in important policy decisions made by the United States in the region. [**139**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038116)

## Consultation key to US-Japan relations

## Consultation essential to maintain strong U.S.-Japan relations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 96 (“Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security- Alliance for the 21st Century” 4/17/96 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html)

BILATERAL COOPERATION UNDER THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas. (a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements. (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States. The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan. (c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship. (d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the support fighter (F-2). (e) The two governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense. 6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the "Special Action Committee on Okinawa" (SACO), and welcomed the far reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

## Consultation key to US-Japan relations

## Consulting Japan is key-concrete commitments are key to deepen cooperation

Balbina Hwang 2005, policy analyst, Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation, July 7, accessed June 30 from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1865.cfm>

**The statement does not necessarily ensure U.S.–Japan regional security cooperation, but it does signal a new willingness by Tokyo to align itself more closely** and openly with Washington on regional issues. Nevertheless, certain **obstacles pose challenges to the continuation of the alliance in its present positive condition. Many will be encountered dur­ing the next and crucial stage of development of Japan’s new security outlook:** the implementation and operational phase. For example, a true test of Japan’s willingness to support regional military operations will come in future commitments to specific shared roles and missions, such as operations to enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative, to deal with North Korean aggression, or to handle a Taiwan contingency. **Without concrete commitments on how to carry out** the **common strategic objectives** articulated in the 2005 SCC joint declaration, the impetus **for adopting a new defense strategy** under Japan’s new NDPG **could lose momentum and meaning.** Other obstacles are political. Japan’s dramatic shift in security strategy was driven largely by the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi, his partnership with President Bush, and their coordinated response to September 11. **As the momentum for a concerted and sustained response to terrorism fades, other political pressures in both countries may dilute popular support for bold new security initiatives.** In addition, both Koizumi and Bush will be battling lame-duck status. Koizumi’s term will end in September 2006, when he will step down as chairman of the LDP, effectively resigning as prime minister. While Bush’s term will last three more years, **Iraq, the Middle East, and China will likely draw attention away from strengthening the U.S.– Japan relationship, which was a priority during the first Bush Administration**. In addition, both leaders face domestic political battles, with Koizumi’s promise to overhaul the postal system and Bush’s goals of reforming Social Security and the tax system. Their **focus on** these **domestic issues will likely divert public attention and focus away from security issues**. For Prime Minister Koizumi, expending his wealth of political capital on domestic issues makes significant movement on controversial security issues even more challenging. With Japan’s leadership unknown after Koizumi steps down, **Japan’s ability to continue evolving its security outlook** **at the current pace is uncertain**. What is certain is that the U.S.–Japan alliance will be a central political issue in the Japanese elections next September. The U.S. military presence in Okinawa has been and will continue to be a political lightning rod. Governor Shigefumi Matsuzawa has already expressed strong opposition to the U.S. Army’s plans to relocate 1st Corps headquarters from Fort Lewis in Washington State to Camp Zama in the Kanegawa Prefecture. Replacing the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will also be a flash point for public opposition. Given the uncertainty over Japan’s future political leadership, it is also unclear whether or not the momentum to address the highly sensitive issue of reinterpreting the constitution’s Article 9 will continue. To date, significant changes in Japan’s security policy, such as the SDF deployment to Iraq, have been on an ad hoc basis. **As Japan begins to ponder action that confronts collective self-defense issues, the debates will become far more political, and implementation of new actions will become more entangled in legislative and technical procedures.**

# \*\*\*\*Alliance Impacts\*\*\*\*

# Asian Economy Impacts

## A) US-Japan alliance key to economic growth in Asia:

Derek **Mitchell, 2010** (principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs). “Regional Security and Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” March 9, 2010. Accessed June 28, 2010 from: <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2010/march-9-regional-security-and-okinawa-in-the-us-japan-alliance/>

Finally, Mr. Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Affairs, reviewed the current status of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the prospects for the future. He pointed out that much of the positive change in Asia, including economic growth and the development of democracy, is due to the role of the Alliance in maintaining peace and stability in the region. He explained that the presence of American troops in Okinawa continues to serve as a deterrent and an important part of regional peace. The current questions over American bases in Okinawa have no easy answers, but he explained that the United States, Japan, and the people of Okinawa should continue to investigate a sustainable and mutually beneficial way to resolve the concerns.

## B) Asian economic decline risks world economic decline:

Perry A Trunick, 2007. “When Asia Sneezes…” March 15, 2007 (http://logisticstoday.com/global\_markets/outlog\_story\_8575/)

**All eyes were on Asia** at the end of February as stocks took a dive, setting off a ripple effect that **spread around the world.** Was it a correction or a sign of collapse? While politicos and prognosticators sought to calm market jitters, it's the fundamentals that tell the story. They only had to ask a logistics professional. While the search continues for the smoking gun—or at least the trigger— that set off the economic chain reaction, some of the evidence of slower growth was in plain sight. Wall Street analysts were ahead of the U.S. Department of Commerce (www.commerce.gov) in expecting slower growth as businesses took steps to avoid building inventory. A Commerce Department report revised the 2006 fourth quarter growth estimate for the gross domestic profit (GDP) down from 3.5% to 2.2%, an unusually large correction. In fact, Wall Street analysts had been expecting a number in line with that 2.2% figure. The big culprit in the large-scale revision appears to be inventories.

## C) Economic Decline Causes Nuke War:

Walter **Mead, 1992** NPQ's Board of Advisors, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 1992, p.30

What if the global economy stagnates-or even shrinks? In the case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor, Russia, China, India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the '30s.

# Asian Economy Impacts

## US-Japan alliance key to Asian economic growth:

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Japan, 1996**. “JAPAN-U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY

- ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the United States helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to **underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region**. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the United States are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

## East Asia is an engine of world economic growth:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (Senior Fellow, JCIE). “The US-Japan Alliance: Beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed on June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/5-1.pdf>

Over the past several years, and especially since September’s historic change of government in Japan, it has become clear that there is a need to reassess the US-Japan alliance to ensure that it is equipped to face the challenges of the 21st century. There have been changes in Japan that are now reflected in domestic politics, but we cannot ignore the fact that there have been important changes in the regional context as well. China’s rise is apparent to everyone, and there is now a consensus view that East Asia is becoming **an engine of growth whose dynamism is benefiting the world**.

## The US-Japan security relationship is critical to the East Asian economy:

Yone **Sugita, 2007** (associate professor of American history at Osaka University) July 6, 2007. “The patron-client relationship.” Accessed on July 1, 2010 on <http://sugita.us/Japan%20Today%20-%20The%20patron-client%20relationship.pdf>

The Nye report underscored the importance of security in the Asia-Pacific region and proclaimed that the

United States intended to keep a military force of 100,000 in the region. It reconfirmed the Japan-U.S.

relationship as the keystone for both U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific region and for overall U.S.

global strategy. The report stated, "Security is like oxygen: you do not tend to notice it until you begin to

lose it ... The American security presence has helped provide this 'oxygen' for East Asian development."

In short, growth in East Asia was possible because of the security supplied by the U.S.

Nye firmly believed that the region would quickly plunge into chaos if the United States were to

disengage. One of the objectives of the Nye report was to forestall demands from Congress for further

reductions in U.S. military forces in Asia.

# Asian Stability Impact Module

## A) Strong relations is the vital internal link to Asian stability---our evidence is conclusive

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. www.questia.com)

It appears clear that Japan will continue slowly and incrementally to loosen the restrictions on the use of military force and the ability to participate in collective and cooperative defense schemes. Due to the changing security environment and the resulting mismatch between the threats of that environment and Japan's capabilities to respond, the domestic resistance to change in security policy is slowly eroding. Such liberation of policy is in Japan's long-term self-interest, as it seeks to shape the world around itself in ways that enable peace and prosperity to flourish. Finding that economic and diplomatic tools alone are not sufficient for the task of achieving its national interests, the Japanese are slowly emerging from nearly 60 years of military isolation and are incrementally gaining more of a balance in their foreign policy mechanisms. It is vital to note that Japan, while increasing its capability to participate in more traditional military exercise of power, is not wholeheartedly transitioning into a *realpolitik*, balance of power nation. Rather, Japan is choosing to become more assertive as a means to bring about its own conception of “civilian power” (application of predominately nonmilitary national means) and strong desire for harmonious, community-based relations between nations. Interestingly, the Japanese support for the United States in the showdown on Iraq in early 2003 in the UNSC was motivated as much by support to an ally (in return for continued protection from DPRK) as it was by a desire to prevent a fatal rift from destroying that highly valued institution. [**179**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038120)  In the near future, the Japanese do not have a viable security alternative to the alliance with the United States. With the distinct threat of North Korea and the future uncertainties of China and a potentially unified Korean Peninsula, Japan continues to need the alliance. In general, however, the Japanese people increasingly dislike the unilateralism and penchant for the use of military force that they see in the United States. Therefore, to many, being the junior partner in an alliance with the United States (especially as currently configured) is not part of the ideal, long-term future of Japan. This point is vital―the alliance with the Americans is a *means* to security for the Japanese, not an *end* desired in and of itself. In order to maintain the strength of the alliance, it is exceedingly important that both countries recognize and act on this increased Japanese desire and capacity for bilateral and international voice. The United States eventually will have to share power with the Japanese, who will, in turn, need to embrace a more active, risktaking role or hazard a brittle failure of the increasingly artificial asymmetries of the alliance. However, these changes in capability and structure, both in Japan and within the alliance, will have a secondary impact on the Chinese and Koreans that must be mitigated through forthright, transparent, and confidence-building measures taken by the Japanese and American governments. This important, but secondary, role, multilateral diplomatic, economic, social, and military institutions have their place in both countries' foreign policies. The primary mechanism for long-term achievement of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia will be an enhanced and deepened U.S.-Japan security alliance.

## B) Asian Instability risks nuclear war

**Garden 99** (Asian Security Worries by Sir Timothy Garden, HYPERLINK "http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/1999/9910source.html" http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/1999/9910source.html, accessed 10/23/03)

 There are are however other more globally serious potential problems in Asia. The three regular Asian security issues, which bubble up from time to time, seem set to reach the boil together. Taiwan, North Korea and Kashmir are all in the news with sporadic, but perhaps increasing, confrontation between their main players. Each of the **potential conflicts has a nuclear dimension** which makes for added concern.

# Asian Stability Impacts

## Commitment to dialogue within the alliance bolsters Asian security:

Derek **Mitchell, 2010** (principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs). “Regional Security and Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” March 9, 2010. Accessed June 28, 2010 from: <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2010/march-9-regional-security-and-okinawa-in-the-us-japan-alliance/>

Ambassador Deming explained that though there are indeed many management problems for the United States and Japan to address, the Alliance continues to evolve and opportunities continue to grow. As long as the Alliance is committed to open dialogue on joint challenges, the security of Japan and the region will remain strong.

## US-Japan alliance key to peace in Asia:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

An objective assessment of the US-Japan alliance reveals that it continues to benefit both countries and play an essential role in maintaining peace and security in the region. However, saving it from narrow debates such as the one over the Futenma relocation plan requires flexibility and far-sighted thinking from both sides and, most importantly, it means that they should jointly consult with each other as allies rather than negotiate as adversaries.

## An equal US-Japan partnership is critical for a strong East Asian security environment: actions by the US are crucial to make this happen:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (Senior Fellow, JCIE). “The US-Japan Alliance: Beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed on June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/5-1.pdf>

Going a step further, Japan needs to be more proactive in creating a better security environment in East Asia. Prime Minister Hatoyama rightly talks about the need for an equal US-Japan partnership and the importance of East Asia community. But when those in Asia talk about East Asia community, they cannot separate this from discussions of the role of the United States, which has been the region’s security guarantor. To go this route, Japan has to begin seriously discussing how to create a better security architecture in the region in partnership with the United States.

## Strong Japan-U.S. security relationship is the foundation for peace & stability in Asia:

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Japan, 1996**. “JAPAN-U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY

- ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more **peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region**. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that **the engagement of the United States in the region**, supported by the Japan-U.S. security relationship, **constitutes the foundation for such efforts.**

# Asian Stability Impacts

## U.S.-Japan relations are the cornerstone for security in Asia

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs 96** (“Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security- Alliance for the 21st Century” 4/17/96 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html)

THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE AND THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY 4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries. In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the United States. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century. (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new "National Defense Program Outline" adopted in November, 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security. (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the U.S.. The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan. (c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan's contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

## US-Japan alliance is the key pillar to US influence in Asia:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

The U.S.-Japan alliance celebrates its 50th anniversary this year.1 Since the United States and Japan signed the original Mutual Security Treaty in 1950, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been **the key pillar of U.S. strategy in Asia.**

# Asian Stability Impacts

## The relationship between the United States and Japan plays an important role in ensuring our country’s commitment to Asia

**Michael Auslin 2010** (Resident scholar at AEI) “U.S.- Japan Relations”. April 15, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.aei.org/speech/100137> on June 29, 2010.

**Japan cannot**, of course, **play this role by itself, and the United States must fully embrace its role as a Pacific nation, one inextricably tied to Asia, but most importantly, one with a vision for an Asia that is increasingly freer, more stable, and more prosperous.** That means a renewed commitment to expending the human and materiel capital required to maintain our position in the Asia-Pacific region. As we look to the kind of Asia that we hope develops in the future, there is much that continues to commend Japan to the region's planners and peoples. Much in the same way, **the U.S.-Japan relationship, plays a currently indispensable role in ensuring our country's commitment to the Asia-Pacific and in providing a necessary stabilizing force to powerful tides of nationalism, competition, and distrust in that region.** Our relationship with Japan is indeed a cornerstone of the liberal international order that has marked the six decades since the end of the Second World War as among the most prosperous and generally peaceful in world history. For that reason, among others, **we should look forward to maintaining it for years to come.**

## US force presence in Asia creates peace and manages regional disputes:

Yone **Sugita, 2007** (associate professor of American history at Osaka University) July 6, 2007. “The patron-client relationship.” Accessed on July 1, 2010 on <http://sugita.us/Japan%20Today%20-%20The%20patron-client%20relationship.pdf>

U.S. policymakers believe that maintaining the prestige of U.S. military forces in Asia.is the key to winning Asians' confidence. The U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region issued by the Defense Department in July 1997 stated, "a visible U.S. force presence in Asia demonstrates firm determination to defend U.S., allied and friendly interests in this critical region ... The U.S. military presence in Asia serves to shape the security environment to prevent challenges from developing at all. U.S. force presence mitigates the impact of historical regional tensions and allows the United States to anticipate problems, manage potential threats and encourage peaceful resolution of disputes."

## Strong US-Japan alliance key to peace in Asia:

**Hitoshi Tanaka 2010** (Senior Fellow at JCIE) (Japan Center for International Exchange) “The US-Japan Alliance: Beyond Futenma”. February 2010. Accessed from <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/5-1.pdf> on June 30, 2010.

**An objective assessment of the US-Japan alliance reveals that it continues to benefit both countries and play an essential role in maintaining peace and security in the region.** However, saving it from narrow debates such as the one over the Futenma relocation plan requires flexibility and far-sighted thinking from both sides and, most importantly, it means that they should jointly consult with each other as allies rather than negotiate as adversaries.

# Asian Stability Impacts

## US-Japan alliance critical to the commitment of the US to the East Asian region:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

Still, the alliance has also served the military interests of both countries. For the United States, a strong alliance with Japan, with a considerable U.S. military presence in the country, is critical for asserting the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. For Japan, there is no other treaty ally that is committed to defending it in case the country comes under an armed attack. Japan’s current defense posture and level of defense spending make it impossible for the JSDF to defend the country alone. For different reasons, both the United States and Japan need the alliance to continue to function and to do so effectively.

## Unipolar US management of Asia is not attainable

**Nye & Armitage 2007** (Armitage: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs & Nye: former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government) “The U.S. Japan Alliance: Getting Asia right through 2020” February 2007. Accessed from <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf> on July 2, 2010.

**As the United States considers the evolving structure of international relations in**

**Asia in 2020, there are scenarios we should seek to avoid.** In particular, **with the**

**rising power, influence, nationalism, and resource needs of Asia’s major powers,**

**it is clear that a unipolar U.S. management of Asia is not attainable, and its pursuit**

**could prove counterproductive to adjusting the U.S. role in the region to emerging**

**realities.** For some, **a condominium between the United States and China seems the**

**logical future structure for the region**. However, as long as the United States and

China have different value systems, and absent a clear understanding of our

respective interests both regionally and globally, it is our view that such an

accommodation overestimates the potential of U.S.-China relations. A

condominium with China would put at risk the quality of relations with friends

and allies across the region who are wary, if accepting, of China’s growing weight

and value to the United States, in part as key to achieving strategic balance in the

region.

# Asian Stability Impacts

## Stability in East Asia relies on US-Japan relations

**Nye & Armitage 2007** (Armitage: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs & Nye: former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government) “The U.S. Japan Alliance: Getting Asia right through 2020” February 2007. Accessed from <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf> on July 2, 2010.

At the same time, however**, a bipolar structure with only the United States and Japan facing China would be ineffective, because it would force other regional powers to choose between two competing poles. Some might side with the United States and Japan, but most regional powers would choose strict neutrality or align with China.** Ultimately, **this would weaken the powerful example of American and Japanese democracy and return the region to a Cold War or nineteenth century balance-of-power logic that does not favor stability in the region or contribute to China’s potential for positive change. Stability in East Asia will rest on the quality of U.S.-Japan-China relations, and even though the United States is closely allied with Japan, Washington should encourage good relations among all three.** The best structure for Asia rests on sustained U.S. strength, commitment, and leadership in the region, combined with proactive participation in regional affairs by Asia’s other successful powers. **An open structure in which Japan, India, Australia, Singapore, and others are leading by example, based on partnerships with the United States and shared democratic values, is the most effective way to realize an agenda for Asia that emphasizes free markets, continued prosperity based on the rule of law, and increasing political freedom.** The United States and Japan should also seek to build relationships with countries such as Vietnam, which has a growing interest in being a part of Asia’s trading life, and New Zealand, which shares our values. All these efforts should be coupled with measures to expand areas of cooperation with China, while being candid with Beijing about areas of disagreement. Working within Asia in this manner, we believe, will be key to positively influencing the growth and direction of all of Asia, including China, thereby “getting Asia right.”

# China Deterrence Impact Module (1/2)

## A) Strong US-Japan alliance needed to bolster Japan’s deterrent versus China & Russia:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

The benefits for Japan are clear. The alliance was conceived during the Cold War as a mechanism to protect Japan from a single looming threat—the Soviet Union—that has since disappeared. However, the end of the Cold War has not eliminated Japan’s need for **some sort of deterrence capacity**. Nearby countries such as **China and Russia** have nuclear capabilities and North Korea is developing its capability. Japan cannot ignore this.

## B) Russia and China are always a threat—deterrence is still necessary:

**NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, 2001**

<http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/volume%201%20complete.pdf>

As noted above, the basis on which recent proposals for nuclear disarmament or deep nuclear reductions reach their conclusions is to **set aside traditional U.S. security requirements** in favor of other priorities by **simply assuming, intuitively**, a future in which there is little or no requirement for nuclear weapons. Such an approach is **wholly inadequate for addressing the question, “how much is enough?”** The following is a concise description of a select number of the factors that must be considered prior to any recommendation concerning the appropriate size and composition of the U.S. nuclear force. Potential Adversaries and Their Strategies The **characteristics of adversaries** determine, in part, the locations, types, and numbers of targets, which, in turn, influence the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The only plausible hostile global powers in the 2000-2025 period are **Russia and China**, both of which possess large military establishments, industrial bases, and economic infrastructures spread over vast territories. Regional states of concern such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have smaller militaries and economies, but as a result of proliferation, still may present considerable threats. **Under certain circumstances**, **very severe nuclear threats may be needed** to deter any of these potential adversaries—if they are highly motivated to challenge the United States and willing to accept high risk and costs in doing so. Significant numbers of nuclear weapons, **particularly against a hostile China or Russia**—or, worse yet, a Sino-Russian alliance—could be necessary for this task. 19 The U.S. arsenal also might need to be sufficiently survivable to withstand attacks by one nuclear-armed opponent and remain capable of deterring opportunistic blackmail attempts or actual attacks by others. The Clinton Administration identified the possibility of deterring or fighting multiple adversaries simultaneously as a rationale for maintaining a significant and secure nuclear reserve force.20

# China Deterrence Impact Module (2/2)

## C) Nuclear war with Russia causes extinction

Bostrom 02 (Nick, PhD @ Oxford University, [www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html))

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

## D) China-Taiwan war causes massive worldwide nuclear conflict:

**STRAITS TIMES**, June 25, 20**00**; Lexis

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- **raise the possibility of a nuclear war**. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, **east Asia will be set on fire**. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of **a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan** might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

# Democracy Promotion Impact Module

## A) US-Japan alliance key to development of democracy in Asia:

Derek **Mitchell, 2010** (principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs). “Regional Security and Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” March 9, 2010. Accessed June 28, 2010 from: <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2010/march-9-regional-security-and-okinawa-in-the-us-japan-alliance/>

Finally, Mr. Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Affairs, reviewed the current status of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the prospects for the future. He pointed out that much of the positive change in Asia, including economic growth and the development of democracy, is due to the role of the Alliance in maintaining peace and stability in the region. He explained that the presence of American troops in Okinawa continues to serve as a deterrent and an important part of regional peace. The current questions over American bases in Okinawa have no easy answers, but he explained that the United States, Japan, and the people of Okinawa should continue to investigate a sustainable and mutually beneficial way to resolve the concerns.

## B) Democracy promotion key to preventing inevitable extinction

**Diamond**, senior research fellow at Hoover Institution, **95** (Larry, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,* A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995, p. 6)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

# Democracy Promotion Impacts

## (--) Alliance vital to democracy promotion, preventing proliferation, and maintaining U.S. hegemony in South East Asia

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. www.questia.com)

Due to the coming security policy changes in Japan and the increased desire for international voice that those changes will bring, the United States is faced with the challenge of how best to retain influence in Asia, prevent the rise of a revisionist superpower, and achieve its national interests in this vital region in the coming decades. American national interests are tied inextricably to East Asia, and this tie is likely to increase in coming decades. Figure 7 presents the national interests as outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Figure 7. American Interests. In East Asia, the U.S. Government has further refined these national interests into five primary objectives. 152 These are: (1) enhancing regional relationships, (2) promoting democracy, (3) preventing the proliferation of WMD, (4) leading a comprehensive security effort, and (5) maintaining American forward engagement in the region. Although scholars such as Robyn Lim may state that defending Japan is not a vital interest of the United States, 153 the pursuit of the interests and objectives listed above, in the current geo-strategic environment of East Asia, demands that Japan remain secure and the United States maintain its bases there. Isolationism is definitely not a method for achieving these interests; however, is the current bilateral web of alliances with the United States as the dominant partner in each the optimal way to advance American interests in the long run? Could a substantive shift to multilateralism in East Asian security affairs be a better option for the United States?

# Deterrence Impacts

## Close defense cooperation is crucial to the defense of Japan:

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Japan, 1996**. “JAPAN-U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY

- ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

(a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new "National Defense Program Outline" adopted in November, 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security **remains the guarantee for Japan's security**.

## (--) Alliance is key to deterrence

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. www.questia.com)

This monograph began by making the assertion that the alliance can and must become more than simply a narrow defense pact if both the United States and Japan want to be successful in shaping the security future of East Asia in ways that support peace, prosperity, and the growth of democratic and human values. In the next several decades, East Asia in particular will need the stability and positive character of Japan and the United States working in close concert. There is a distinct need for positive complementarities in the relationship. This power sharing could result in an alliance wellsuited to handle, in a positive manner, the most important challenge of the first half of the 21st century―the character of the rise of China to superpower status. Tight coordination of policy and increased military capability will vastly increase the deterrence credibility of the alliance. As Diet Representative Eisei Ito noted, “The best way to deal with China is for Japan and the U.S. to be partners in the truest sense and consult closely and frankly over policy toward that country.” [**207**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038123) Working together with one voice may be the best means of engaging China in the coming decades, preventing the opening of an exploitable rift, precluding the forceful reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, and creating a path that both facilitates Chinese national interests and the peace and prosperity of the entire region. [**208**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038123)

# Economy Impact Module

## A) US-Japan relations are critical to the world economy:

C. Fred **Bergsten, 1998** (Peterson Institute for International Economics). “Japan and the United States in the World Economy.” Online. Accessed June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=315>

The United States and Japan are the two largest national economies in the world. The United States is the world's largest deficit and debtor country. Japan is the world's largest surplus and creditor country. The exchange rate between the dollar and yen has fluctuated violently, strengthening from 360:1 as recently as 1971 to 80:1 in early 1995 before weakening again to about 130:1 at present. Trade frictions over the past thirty years, leading to such extreme measures as America's import surcharge in 1971 and Japan's acceptance of "voluntary export restraints" in a wide range of industries in the 1980s, have threatened the stability of the global trading system. Hence the course of **economic relations between the United States and Japan plays a critical role in the world economy** as well as a central role in overall relations between the two countries.

## B) Collapse of the economy risks end of the planet:

T. E. Bearden, LTC, U.S. Army (Retired), CEO, CTEC Inc., Director, Association of Distinguished American Scientists (ADAS), Fellow Emeritus, Alpha Foundation's Institute for Advanced Study (AIAS)

June 24, 2000 (HYPERLINK "http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm" http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm)

As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost **certain to be released**. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea {[7]} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China — whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States — attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself {[8]}. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

# Economy Impacts--Extensions

## (--) Alliance key to economic stability

**Holland 92** (Harrison M. Holland, experienced former diplomat, Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis. 1992. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=82350826#)

Attitudes of Japanese and Americans toward each other have moved in lockstep with deteriorating economic relations. As Japan's trade surplus grew, so did animosity. Reason gave way to harsh rhetoric. In the early years of the final decade of the twentieth century, we have been witnessing an extraordinary exhibition of unbridled "name calling" that is not only shameful but also dangerous. Two allies whose economies are growing increasingly interdependent and whose common interest in maintaining peace and prosperity for their peoples should be of paramount importance are increasingly talking past each other and allowing a relationship that is a barometer for economic and financial stability in the world to sour. If such conditions are allowed to continue, a financial catastrophe affecting much of humankind will ensue; such is the strength and influence of these two superpowers. Communication is at the heart of much of the difficulty in the U.S.Japanese relationship. Differences in leadership styles and patterns of communication tend to complicate the management of relations and inhibit personal friendships between Japanese and Americans. The diffusion in Japan's leadership structure and the tendency to avoid conflict and emphasize harmony has nettled many Americans at the negotiating table. Japanese are likewise confused at times over brash American behavior and the sharp, combative style of U.S. negotiators. Language differences and behavioral patterns that evolved from disparate cultures combine to erect psychological barriers between the two races, which continue to cause problems.

# Economy Impacts--Extensions

## By 2020, it is certain that the United States and Japan will still be the world’s two largest economies with shared values- the alliance is critical

**Nye & Armitage 2007** (Armitage: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs & Nye: former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government) “The U.S. Japan Alliance: Getting Asia right through 2020” February 2007. Accessed from <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf> on July 2, 2010.

**With the goal of “getting Asia right,” there is the question of where the U.S.-Japan alliance fits within this strategy.** Some argue that if we rely too much on the U.S.-Japan alliance, we and Japan will be isolated in Asia. They point to the immediate tensions between Japan and China and between Japan and Korea over

historical issues and advocate a shift in our long-term strategy to China. We believe this construct would needlessly weaken our greatest strategic asset in the region—the close U.S.-Japan alliance. The alliance can and should remain at the core of the United States’ Asia strategy. **The key to the success of this strategy is for the alliance itself to continue to evolve from an exclusive alliance based on a common threat toward a more open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values. One thing is certain about 2020: the United States and Japan will still be the world’s two largest economies with democratic systems and shared values. That is why the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to shape Asia’s future as it has its past—and be a critical factor in the global equation. The security aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance have matured significantly over the last several years.** Prime Minister Koizumi’s leadership and political will have accelerated Japan’s position onto the global stage with deployments to the Indian Ocean, Iraq, and other areas of the Middle East. In this regard, there are two

noteworthy measures of the relative strength of our alliance. The first is based on a reflection of how far the alliance has come, and the second is based on its current effectiveness and what is necessary in order to maintain its effectiveness in the future. **There is no denying the advances made in our security relationship. During most of its existence, the U.S.-Japan security relationship operated under two**

**fundamental principles: that the United States will defend Japan and areas under**

**its administration, and that Japan would provide bases and facilities for U.S. forces in country for the security of the Far East.** This, coupled with Japan’s selfimposed constraints on defense, formed a security framework that compelled an inevitable junior-senior partnership until recent years. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces deployments to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and to areas in and around Iraq to assist in the reconstruction effort demonstrated Japan’s initiative to make contributions well beyond the geographic scope of East Asia.

# Hard Power Impacts

## US-Japan alliance allows for US power projection into Asia:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

The alliance continues to yield crucial benefits for the United States as well. One thing that has not changed is the fact that the alliance makes it less costly for the United States to maintain defense capabilities closer to potential trouble spots in the region. This better enables it to quickly deploy substantial forces in the case of regional contingencies, and it enhances the US capacity to promote stability in Asia.

# Human rights Impacts

## U.S-Japan alliance key to hold China to human rights standards

**Osius 02** [Ted, U.S Foreign Service officer, The U.S- Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It, 2002, p. 40]

After failing to produce results by explicitly linking trade with China to human rights improvements, the Unites States moved in the mid 1990s to internationalize its human rights differences with China by pursuing them in multilateral fora. Although Japan no longer cosponsors America’s annual human rights resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, it continues to advocate a multilateral approach tot induce gradual change in China. By insisting that Beijing live up to international human rights standards, the United States, Japan and others can help those seeking to expand individual rights in China and shrink the role of the state. Plans to host the 20008 Olympics will serve as a constraint on Beijing in the realm of human rights, and even in the PRC relations with Taiwan.

# Japan Economy Impact Module

## A) Alliance bolsters Japan’s economy:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

But even putting aside the critical issue of the US nuclear umbrella, it is **clear that the alliance helps Japan immensely**, given the uncertainties in the region. For example, **Japan benefits on purely economic grounds.** It has maintained its defense budget at less than one percent of GDP for historical reasons, but it is difficult to imagine how Japan’s low levels of defense spending could be sustained without US protection.

## B) Japan’s economy key to the world economy:

C. Fred **Bergsten, 1998** (Peterson Institute for International Economics). “Japan and the United States in the World Economy.” Online. Accessed June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=315>

The United States has two main motives for pushing Japan so hard on these fronts. First, it is virtually impossible to resolve the Asian economic (and increasingly political) crisis satisfactorily without a substantial pickup in Japanese growth. Japan accounts for two thirds of the entire economy of Asia. Hence the problem countries in the region, ranging from Korea to Indonesia, simply cannot achieve the export increases required for them to recover - even if they do everything right themselves - as long as Japan is in recession. There are enormous risks to the world economy as long as Asia festers and the United States correctly sees Japanese recovery as a necessary component of resolving that key problem.1

## C) Economic Decline Causes Nuke War:

Walter Mead, NPQ's Board of Advisors, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 1992, p.30

What if the global economy stagnates-or even shrinks? In the case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor, Russia, China, India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the '30s.

# Japan Economy Impact Extensions

## The US-Japanese relationship benefits Japan’s economy.

NAKANO **RYOKO 2005** (Ikenberry, American Empire and the U.S.-Japan Relationship Nanzan Review of American Studies, volume 27, 65-74)

Ikenberry dismisses the dissonance between Okinawa, Japan, and the United States primarily because his focus is limited to inter-state relationships. His suggestion has been built upon a logic shared by the Japanese central government that the alliance has benefited Japan’s national security and economy. Based on this “Japanese” support of the U.S.-Japan alliance, he asserts that an American empire is not a correct expression. However, it is hard to see clear evidence that the United States is the exception in taking a consensual approach in comparison with the empires in the past. Chatterjee argues that colonies have been disciplined either by force or by culture.27 Both an empire and a liberal hegemony share not only a strong military force to coerce its decisions but also an influential normative power to decide what is right. Thus, unlike Ikenberry’s proposition, the concepts of empire and liberal hegemony are not exclusive but form an amalgamation. The history of normalizing the U.S.-Japan alliance is inseparable from the history of  empire. Ikenberry’s liberal strategy and beyond This article has examined Ikenberry’s influential view of the United States as a liberal hegemony that helps stabilize the international and regional order. I particularly focus on what he regards as the partnership between Japan and the United States. According to Ikenberry, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an assurance that the United States has enhanced security and order by rule-based negotiations and mutual consent. By rejecting the label of empire, he seems to overthrow a skeptical view that perceives the U.S. alliance as a destabilizing force in the region. His arguments rest on two assumptions: first, that the US military presence and leading role undoubtedly remains important for the peace and stability of the world, and second, that the Japanese government’s approval of the alliance is the result of a mutual agreement.

# Japanese Prolif Impacts

## Alliance prevents Japanese pursuit of nuclear weapons

Rapp 2004 (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. [www.questia.com](http://www.questia.com))

Next, an enhanced relationship within the alliance may allay some of the Japanese fears of insecurity that may lead to a decision to “go nuclear.” Although the vast majority of Japanese citizens oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan, the topic is increasingly broached in the press and academic circles due to nuclear uncertainties in North Korea. The past 4 years have seen considerable change in the ability to discuss nuclear weapons. In October 1999, then Vice Minister of State for Defense Shingo Nishimura was forced to resign after suggesting in an interview that Japan should scrap its ban on nuclear weapons. Contrast this with the relatively benign February 2003 publishing by *Asahi Shimbun* of a previously classified 1995 Defense Agency study on nuclear feasibility. [167](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038119) This highlights the increasing demise of the taboo on debates on nuclear weapons and the dependence on the American nuclear umbrella. The best way for the United States to maintain Japan as a non-nuclear power is to remain firmly engaged with Japan in the region and jointly enforce nonproliferation regimes so that Japan is not faced with a security dilemma seemingly solved only by a resort to nuclear weapons. Finally, an enhanced partnership with Japan provides the United States with the most effective means to simultaneously balance and engage China. Although great care and transparency during the transformation of the alliance would be required to prevent an overtly hostile posture toward China, such a partnership would provide the deterrent and incentives necessary to shape Chinese entrance into the superpower ranks in the most favorable and responsible manner.

# Japanese Prolif Impacts

## (--) Strong U.S.-Japan relations key to preventing Japanese re-arm, which causes Asian arms race

**Holland 92** (Harrison M. Holland, experienced former diplomat, Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis. 1992. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=82350826#)

Although these factors suggest that Japan is not destined to threaten peace in the region, they do not eliminate completely the possibility that Japan may once again play a destructive role in the Asian-Pacific area. Some worrisome trends can be detected. Japan, unlike Germany, has not been particularly successful in integrating itself into the international community. It is continuing to search for an international role. While becoming a major economic force in the world, it still shuts itself off from the mainstream of international life. Nakane Chie wrote in her important book, *Japan in the Context of Asia*, that the exclusive tendency of the Japanese, nurtured since the premodern period, has become a deeply ingrained social habit: psychological resistance to outsiders who seek entrance into the system. Japan's proclivity to protect itself from economic predators has caused it acute problems with the United States, some of its Asian neighbors, and the European Economic Community. China and Japan have long been contestants for power and influence in Asia. The deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, People's Liberation Army, PRC, Pan Zhenqiang, who was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University during 1988-1989, made a persuasive case for caution in predicting future Japanese security policy. Although Japan's imposing economic power has been felt throughout much of the Western world, it remains culturally isolated. This power has evoked a sense of pride and nationalism, especially in the younger generation, which is becoming increasingly impatient with its elders for not being assertive enough with the United States and Europe. Colonel Pan worried that the mystique surrounding Japan's "divine" origin would once again spur the Japanese to adventures that could destabilize Asia. A Japan with military ambitions could produce a counterreaction in the countries of Asia, creating an arms race with unforeseen consequences. New political and economic uncertainties in Asia or even seek the nuclear option if they feel threatened." [**22**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/82351054) Colonel Pan stressed the importance of avoiding political, economic, and military situations in which Japan might feel cornered. Since the end of World War II, China has raised the specter of a resurgent, militant Japan, exploiting the real fears of countries that experienced the brutality of Japan's army in the Pacific War. Although there are strong constraints on Japans' becoming an active military power, U.S. policy must not discount that possibility should Japan feel vulnerable and isolated. To ward off and/or contain potential political and military explosions will require statesmenship, a dedication to tolerance, an unremitting quest for better understanding, a recognition of the fallacy of military conflict as a solution to economic and political disputes, the maintenance of a finely tuned balance of power among the major nations of the area, enhanced regional economic cooperation, and a strong and reliable security relationship between Japan and the United States.

# Japanese Prolif Impacts

## (--) Strong alliance essential to maintaining economic interdependence in order to prevent Japanese re-arm

**Holland 92** (Harrison M. Holland, experienced former diplomat, Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis. 1992. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=82350826#)

The general tenor of these remarks reflects a keen sensitivity to defense issues, a reluctance to pay more for Japan's security, nervousness over how Japan's neighbors might react to its rearmament, concern about U.S. intentions, and an unmistakable pride in Japanese accomplishments. In concluding this chapter on managing the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship, I think it important to steer our thoughts to the future; to consider the role the geostrategic position of Japan may play in the next several decades; to reflect on how the main powers in the western Pacific, the PRC, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan might shift their priorities to meet the demands of a region destined for more military flux; and finally, to imagine the unimaginable -- a Japan once again a formidable military power. A number of factors are said to inhibit Japan from becoming a military power, including close economic interdependence between the United States and Japan, effective international economic cooperation among advanced industrial states, which provides incentives for Japan to remain a peaceful nation, a prevailing sentiment among the Japanese people opposing a return to the path of militarism, the U.S.-Japanese security relationship, and Japan's geostrategic military vulnerabilities.

## (--) U.S. – Japan alliance prevents Japanese re-arm & Sino-Japanese arms race

G. John Ikenberry, 2003 Prof. of Geoptx and Global Justice @ Georgetown, Michael Mastanduno, Prof and Chair of Dep. Of Gov’t @ Dartmouth, eds.; *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 14]

The bilateral security alliances between the United States and Japan and Korea may be playing a similar, if more limited, role in the Asia-Pacific. **The U**nited **S**tates**-Japan security treaty eliminates the need for Japan to develop a more capable and autonomous military force, and this in turn reduces the likelihood of a security dilemma-driven arms race between Japan and China. The bilateral alliances also make the American presence in the region more predictable and durable, which has a stabilizing impact on the wider set of regional relations.**

# Japan Relations

## US-Japan alliance is the cornerstone to the US-Japan relationship in world affairs:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

As P.J. indicated, this is – today, we’re marking the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, security partnership. It’s no exaggeration to say that it has been the cornerstone and the foundation of everything that we’ve managed to accomplish over the course of the last few generations in Asia. And we hear this not just from Japanese friends, interlocutors, but throughout the region. Over the course of the last couple of months, as the United States and Japan work together on a series of challenging matters, one of the things that’s been most interesting, and indeed gratifying, is how much we hear from other countries in the region, from South Korea, from Singapore, from Australia, from New Zealand, all countries in Southeast Asia of how much the U.S.-Japan relationship matters to them, not just to us. Indeed, many people think of **it as sort of the irreducible component of American and Japanese approaches to global policy.**

## US-Japan alliance is the foundation for US-Japanese cooperation on other global issues:

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Japan, 1996**. “JAPAN-U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY

- ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security **is the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,** and underlies the **mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues**. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the United Nations and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Both governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders agreed that cooperation in the United Nations and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values.

# Japanese Prolif Impacts

## (--) U.S.-Japan alliance prevents Japanese re-arm

Thomas J. Christensen, 2003 Prof. PoliSci @ MIT, contributor to *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 31]

The vast majority of these optimists and pessimists believe that, **along with the domestic political and economic stability of Japan, the most important factor that might delay or prevent Japanese' military buildups is the status of the U.S.-Japan relationship**, particularly the security alliance. **The common belief in Beijing security circles is that, by reassuring Japan and providing for Japanese security on the cheap, the United States fosters a political climate in which the Japanese public remains opposed to military build ups and the more hawkish elements of the Japanese elite are kept at bay. If, however, the U.S.-Japan security alliance either becomes strained or undergoes a trans formation that gives Japan a much more prominent military role , Chinese experts believe that those ever present hawks might find a more fertile field in which to plant the seeds of militarization.**

# Japan Soft Power Impacts

## A broad consensus confirms that a close US-Japan alliance bolsters Japan’s influence in Asia:

Michael **AUSLIN and** Michael **GREEN, 2007** (American Enterprise Institute and the CSIS). Asian Economic Policy Review, “Japan's Security Policy in East Asia.” Accessed via EBSCO host, July 2, 2010.

Yet while many analysts and pundits focus on the history problem in Japan’s international role, most have missed the fact that Japan has developed a much more comprehensive toolkit for security policy. Where Japan was long paralyzed by the fear of entrapment and thereby frequently put itself at risk of abandonment, the new Koizumi–Abe doctrine is much more strategic about leveraging the alliance to Japan’s national interests by utilizing not only Japanese money, but now Japanese troops and ideas as well. What is also striking in this new era is the degree to which Japan’s conservative elite has stopped swaying between Asia and the West and settled on a broad consensus that closer US–Japan alliance

ties reinforce Japan’s position in Asia, while a more proactive Japanese foreign policy in Asia enhances Japan’s own influence and value in the alliance. This consensus has been accompanied by a growing identification by Japan’s conservative elite with universal values of democracy, governance and rule of law, and recognition that Japan has a national interest not only in identifying with, but also preserving the neoliberal international order and hegemonic stability. Despite Abe’s sudden resignation in September 2007, these trends seem likely to remain the core consensus.

## Japan can slide into a middle power role that undermines its soft power:

Michael **AUSLIN and** Michael **GREEN, 2007** (American Enterprise Institute and the CSIS). Asian Economic Policy Review, “Japan's Security Policy in East Asia.” Accessed via EBSCO host, July 2, 2010.

Ultimately, the greatest threat to Japan’s position in the world is not a return to the

dangerous militarism of the 1930s or even the longer-term demographic challenges Japan

faces. The greatest threat to Japan’s position in the world is a pernicious fascination among

many academics and politicians with the idea of a less ambitious Japan – a “middle power”

– that takes on less risk and less leadership in upholding and shaping the international

system. For all of the faults with the Koizumi and Abe era foreign policy, its greatest

strength is the call for Japan to be ambitious in the world. And since Japan is the pillar of

US forward military engagement in an entire hemisphere, the second largest contributor

to international institutions such as the UN and the International Monetary Fund, and the

first and best example of non-Western civilization embracing universal values – the world

clearly needs an ambitious Japan.

# Japan Soft Power Impacts

## The Japanese alliance with the US will remain the linchpin of Tokyo’s foreign policy

**Yuka Hayashi 2010**(The Wall Street Journal) “Japan Leader Affirms Ties With U.S.” June 6, 2010. Accessed from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704002104575290903096729916.html> on July 1, 2010.

TOKYO—Japan's new prime minister, **Naoto Kan, told President Barack Obama that the alliance with the U.S. will remain the linchpin of Tokyo's foreign policy** in a call Sunday that took place while the premier was shaping his cabinet. Two days after Yukio Hatoyama stepped down as leader following his botched effort to relocate a controversial U.S. base in Okinawa, **Mr. Kan pledged to solve the issue in accordance with a recent bilateral agreement that led to his predecessor's departure. In a call the U.S. requested, Messrs. Kan and Obama reaffirmed the importance of the security alliance between their nations and agreed to work in lockstep to solve issues facing both, such as the tensions in Iran and North Korea, the Japanese foreign ministry said.** The White House said the leaders discussed bilateral, regional and global issues. The two also hit it off on a personal level given their backgrounds—with Mr. Kan having worked as an activist, and Mr. Obama as a community organizer, according to a senior U.S. official in Washington.

# Korea Deterrence Impact Module

## A) Strong US-Japan alliance needed to bolster Japanese deterrent versus North Korea:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

The benefits for Japan are clear. The alliance was conceived during the Cold War as a mechanism to protect Japan from a single looming threat—the Soviet Union—that has since disappeared. However, the end of the Cold War has not eliminated Japan’s need for some sort of deterrence capacity. Nearby countries such as China and Russia have nuclear capabilities **and North Korea is developing its capability**. Japan cannot ignore this.

## B) A strong deterrence posture is essential to stop a North Korean war—we need the visible ability to crush North Korea at a moment’s notice:

Robert **Dujarric, 5/29/2009** (runs the Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University, http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000130)

The best reaction to the DPRK's WMD program is to maintain a high level of deterrence by making sure that the United States has the **visible ability to crush North Korea** should **Pyongyang choose the path of war**. **Deterrence worked** against far more dangerous enemies—first and foremost the Soviet Union—and it has worked with North Korea for decades. Nukes and missiles do not radically alter the equation. The second task for Japan, the United States, and South Korea, along with China, is to think about how to manage unification if the regime in Pyongyang collapses, which could be tomorrow or many decades from now.

## C) A Korean war risks extinction: it turns the earth into a smoldering cinder

**Africa News,** 10/25/19**99;** Lexis

Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably **reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder** it is the **Korean Peninsula** in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war.

# Korea Deterrence Impact Extensions

## (--) Alliance allows US to respond to North Korean attack and strengthens Korea-US alliance

Byung-joon & Sarkisov 98 (Ahn & Konstantin, **Chair-Dept. of Political Science**  **Yonsei @ U., Seoul & Dir., Center for Japanese Stud. Institute of Oriental Stud. Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, “**Korean Peninsula Security and the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines: An IGCC Study Commissioned for the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue VII Tokyo, Japan: 3-4 December, 1997”, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October, igcc.ucsd.edu/pdf/policypapers/pp45. Pdf)

If war does break out in Korea, the Guidelines require Japan to make her ports, airports, and other facilities available for American use. Given that the initial two weeks after any North Korean attack would be most crucial, use of Japanese facilities as a rear base is essential for an effective U.S. military response.6 If, because of the prevailing domestic interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution, that support were not forthcoming, the U.S.–Japan alliance would be jeopardized. Seoul understands that for the United States to rapidly deploy forces during a Korean emergency it would be necessary for Tokyo to provide rear area support, including transportation, medical service, humanitarian relief, and even surveillance. Thus, as long as the North Korean threat remains, Seoul will not be receptive to the idea of removing the United States Marine force from Okinawa—as some Asian security experts are suggesting—to defuse local protests. Such removal would undermine the credibility of U.S. forces in Japan and Korea as effective deterrents. 7 Thus, Seoul tends to view the U.S.–Japan alliance as reinforcing the Korea–U.S. alliance, by jointly anchoring the deployment of 47,000 American troops in Japan and 37,000 troops in Korea, and by preparing for various peninsular contingencies. Where the Guidelines cement this mutually reinforcing relationship, South Korea welcomes them

## (--) A strong alliance allows Japan to make the US look credible and control Korea

Osius 02 [Ted, U.S Foreign Service officer, The U.S- Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It, 2002, p. 18]

A North Korean defector said it would be a mistake to conclude that the DPRK will buckle if America takes a hard line approach. Instead, he maintained, the United States has sufficient power and leverage to adopt a flexible approach and change North Korean society. “The lion can control the fox,” he concluded. Through its alliance with the United States, Japan can help guide the lion and perhaps persuade it to be appropriately flexible. Too slow a pace will strengthen the South Korean opponents of reconciliation and provide ammunition to those who claim that the United States, through its military presence, seeks to keep the peninsula divided.

# Korean Prolif Impacts

## (--) No solution to North Korean prolif is possible without a strong US-Japan alliance

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. www.questia.com)

North Korea and its quest for nuclear weapons represent a salient opportunity for the alliance to act in concert for the stability of Northeast Asia. **No resolution** of the current crisis on the Peninsula **will be possible** without both Japan and the United States working together within an agreed strategic framework. In addition, the powerful American and Japanese navies can help to guarantee the maintenance of the vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) running through Southeast and East Asia. [**209**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038123) About 52 percent of all commercial sea cargo (59 percent of supertankers) transit this region amid thorny and unresolved issues of territorial boundaries, intrastate governance problems, and piracy. [**210**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038123) For Japan, the routes are even more important―over 85 percent of the oil Japan imports sails through these sea lanes. [**211**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038124) Piracy in South and Southeast Asian shipping lanes remains a major hazard, especially in Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca. [**212**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038124) At present, Japan is committed to protect only SLOCs out to 1,000 miles from Osaka and Tokyo. [**213**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038124) This arc of committed sea lane protection does not even extend all the way through the vital Bashi Channel to the southern end of Taiwan and the northern entrance to the South China Sea. Increasing this Japanese maritime reach through port calls, freedom of navigation cruises into the Indian Ocean, and combined exercises should be encouraged. [**214**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038124) Aiding in the provision of unfettered SLOCs, which benefit most of Southeast and East Asia, also may reassure Asia about the future role of the Japanese military, thus increasing Japan's ability to comprehensively engage ASEAN. Working in concert, the two alliance partners could expand their tight cooperation into associated security realms within the region. WMD and ballistic missile nonproliferation, cyber-terrorism, and counternarcotics are just three examples of potentially fruitful venues for increased cooperation. Ideally, the alliance would continue to deepen into a multidimensional force for peace and prosperity in East Asia.

## Development of militarily operational nuclear weapons in North Korea would cause Japanese & South Korean prolif:

**Harrison,** Director of the Asia Program, 6/10/20**05** (Selig,

HYPERLINK "http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/06/09/DI2005060901034.html" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/06/09/DI2005060901034.html)

Selig Harrison: I do not believe that the development of nuclear weapons is in the best long-term interest of North Korea but as you say, it is understandable for North Korea to perceive a nuclear deterrent as necessary in the context of the present U.S. pre-emptive war policy. I do not believe that North Korea would be irrevocably committed to a nuclear weapons capability if the U.S. reversed course and moved toward the normalization of relations that Bill Clinton had envisaged. The development of militarily operational nuclear weapons by North Korea would stimulate nuclear weapons development in Japan and South Korea and is thus, highly undesirable for the U.S. and the countries of the region.

## Proliferation causes extinction

**Taylor '02** (Stuart Jr., Senior Writer with the National Journal and contributing editor at Newsweek, Legal Times, September 16, L/N)
< The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation another five or ten potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off on our soil by terrorists or terrorist governments. Even an airtight missile defense will be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat. Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "**the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day**," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations," So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

# Leadership Impacts

## Abandonment of the US-Japan security treaty would destroy US hegemony:

**Kazuhisa Ogawa 1996** (military analyst) “Japan: The Strategic Pawn”. 1996. Accessed from <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96winter/ogawa.html> on July 2, 2010.

**The alleged rape of a twelve-year-old girl by American soldiers in Okinawa has had the unforeseen consequence of shaking the US-Japan security alliance to its core.** The reaction to this incident, which initially focused on calls for review of the Status of Forces Agreement--**the bilateral arrangement that covers, among other things, judicial proceedings against American military personnel accused of crimes--eventually resulted in a nationwide debate over the US-Japan security regime itself**. The most vocal of these cries for downsizing and/or eliminating US bases in Okinawa come from the Okinawans themselves, led by their elected representative, Governor Masahide Ota. **This extraordinary chain of events led to an equally extraordinary reaction by high-level US officials.** Immediately following the incident, apologies from what could be termed an "all-star cast" were forthcoming, led by former Vice President and current Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale, who called the three accused American soldiers "animals." President Clinton also expressed his apologies and expressed his desire to cooperate with several Japanese proposals that were quickly written up to deal with the situation, including a comprehensive review of the Status of Forces Agreement. Key national security officials such as Secretary of Defense William Perry, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili came to Japan in quick succession. That **the United States would abandon the bilateral security treaty if Japan ever demanded any real change is a commonly held perception in Japan.** Many Japanese feel that Americans, to the extent they are aware of it at all, are all-too willing to pull their troops out of Japan the moment they feel these personnel are not wanted. In this context it is difficult to grasp the significance of the immediate and high-ranking apologies from the United States. However, an underlying rationale lies behind the apologies, and it is based on US national strategy. **A palpable fear exists in the United States that the Okinawan incident will spark anti-American nationalism in Japan and subsequently lead to a Japanese decision to abandon the bilateral security treaty.** **The dissolution of the US-Japan military alliance would mean many things for both the United States and Japan, but one clear consequence of such a break is that the US would reliquish its position as the world's sole superpower.**

# Leadership Impacts

## US bases in Japan help maintain US global leadership:

**Kazuhisa Ogawa 1996** (military analyst) “Japan: The Strategic Pawn”. 1996. Accessed from <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96winter/ogawa.html> on July 2, 2010.

Article 5 of the Security Treaty stipulates that both Japan and the United States must jointly respond to military attacks when either country is attacked in territories within Japanese jurisdiction. However, **Japan has no obligation to defend attacks on the US military in US territory or in bases outside of Japan.** Thus, this system calls for the unilateral defense of Japan by the United States.1 This belief is an illusion. Throughout the fifty-year period following World War II, the United States had no real military competitors. The former Soviet Union, even at its peak, never presented much of a challenge to the United States. How, therefore, could any country that signed a military alliance with the United States be its military equal? In other words, any military alliance with the United States was bound to be one-sided Needless to say, the United States signed these treaties not because it engages in charitable work, but because it was beneficial to do so. This point must not be misunderstood. This is not to say that the treaty should remain one-sided; economically powerful countries should seek to make the treaty relationship truly reciprocal. In most instances this can be (and is) achieved by offering strategically valuable military bases; often it is done through direct financial assistance to the US military. In this sense, **Japan has made extraordinary efforts. Japan arguably has the most reciprocal relationship in the world with the United States.** **Unfortunately, ignorance about the strategic philosophy of the United States is a source of illusion in both the United States and Japan**. Most Japanese and American citizens believe that US military bases in Japan maintain the same essential character as--and are substantially inferior to--those on the NATO front as well as those in South Korea and the Philippines (the Philippine bases were withdrawn in 1992). This belief is demonstrably false. US bases on the NATO front and in South Korea (and formerly in the Philippines) are bases to counter threats. **The importance of American bases on the Japanese archipelago contain a different dimension: the bases are there to help maintain American global leadership.**

# Prolif Impact Module

## The US must work closely with the Japanese government to solve prolif

Sheila A. **Smith 2010** (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies) “U.S.-Japan Relations” (testimony). March 17, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/21666/usjapan_relations.html> on July 2, 2010.

Finally, and perhaps **the most critical task of 2010, we should work closely with the Japanese government to articulate a common understanding of our respective strategies for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This year will be a seminal year for clarifying our own thinking on extending nuclear deterrence to regional allies, and on examining how to continue to ensure our cooperation on the UN Security Council Resolution 1874 on curtailing North Korean proliferation.** Likewise, **this year will be crucial to international cooperation on persuading Iran to end its proliferation activities, and Japan can be a *considerable partner* in this effort**. Finally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review this year offers yet another instance of critical behavior for both of our countries as we grapple with the increasing proliferation pressures and our global capacities for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. **Both Washington and Tokyo would benefit from the development of a U.S.-Japan action plan for supporting global nuclear nonproliferation efforts.** As President Obama has noted, **the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons may not be attained easily or soon, but the path to that goal requires the shared energies and technological superiority of our two societies.** As the only country to have used nuclear weapons and the only country to have experienced their use, **the United States and Japan together could offer a powerful partnership in the global effort to ensure security against those who would proliferate and in mapping out a secure path to reducing our dependence on these weapons.** **In our relationship with Japan, the time has come for clarity in our thinking about the need to proffer extended deterrence to Tokyo—the world’s most prosperous and influential non-nuclear power. We should begin to focus our planning attention on the lessons learned from our cooperation bilaterally and via the UN Security Council on responding to proliferation on the Korean peninsula. We must also continue to work closely to integrate our policy goals for coping with Iran.** In other words, **the United States and Japan must integrate our nonproliferation goals with our force posture consultations so that the next decades of security cooperation between the United States and Japan reflect our shared vision for working towards a nuclear-free world.**

## Proliferation causes extinction

**Taylor '02** (Stuart Jr., Senior Writer with the National Journal and contributing editor at Newsweek, Legal Times, September 16, L/N)
< The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation another five or ten potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off on our soil by terrorists or terrorist governments. Even an airtight missile defense will be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat.
Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "**the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day**," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations," So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

# Taiwan Impacts

## (--) U.S-Japan alliance key to Taiwanese Stability

**Osius 02** [Ted, U.S Foreign Service officer, The U.S- Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It, 2002, p. 23]

To deter conflict, the United States discourages Taipei form declaring independence and Beijing form forcibly attempting to unite Taiwan with the mainland. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States supplies Taiwan with weapons necessary for defense against the Maitland. Given China’s size and resources, however, Taiwan cannot achieve security based solely on independent military capabilities. Taipei relies on Beijing’s fear that the Unite States would defend it in the event of a cross-straight conflict. Because the U. S forward deployed forces are in Japan, Taiwan also depends on a strong and stable U.S Japan alliance.

## (--) US-Japan Relations key to protecting Taiwan Strait

Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang 20**05** “The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait," Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2 (October 2005): 1-50, P. 32-33)

The revised U**.S.-Japanese security cooperation guidelines provide one additional operational option for the U.S. to maintain peace, deter aggression, and** to, when deterrence fails, **defeat aggression**. Hitherto **the options for Taiwan’s security** under TRA **are** either **U.S. sales of defensive weapons** and training to enable Taiwan defend itself **or direct U.S. unilateral intervention** (as the 1996 aircraft carrier mission demonstrated). **The new Guidelines** and Joint Statement not only **enlist an important ally** (**Japan**) when needs arise, but also fill in the gaps on how the U.S. would intervene in a Taiwan Strait crisis once it decides to intervene, as the next section shows.

# Terrorism Impacts

## A) The Alliance increases multilateralism

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. www.questia.com)

Finally, as the United States undertakes these alliance measures, it also must look to widening and deepening the multilateral institutions necessary to mitigate the resultant fears of China and Korea. Current forums such as ARF and APEC may be insufficient to secure the peace but provide a baseline to advance cooperative security. Although the U.S.-Japan Alliance will be the true shield and sword of deterrence to maintain the peace in the region, these other international forums will be necessary to build confidence, appeal to the popular affinity for multilateral endeavors, continue the process of deepening interdependencies, and prevent an escalation of tensions and security fears. They also will help to show China a way forward into superpower status in the next several decades that encourages peaceful integration and accommodation rather than paranoia and revisionism. A superb recent example is the Proliferation Security Initiative recently exercised in the Coral Sea by the Australians, Japanese, and American naval and special forces. Paradoxically, perhaps, the U.S.-Japan alliance is served well by encouraging multinational regimes and institutions in the region.

## B) Multilateralism key to solve the war on terror

Osius 02 [Ted, U.S Foreign Service officer, The U.S- Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It, 2002, p. 74]

Separated from Asia and Europe by vast oceans, the United States through much of its history tended toward unilateralism. In the war against terrorism, however, collective action is essential. Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as well as the powerful forces of globalization, have shown that America’s fate is also bound up in happenings across the oceans. Fortunately, the United States have vast experience over the past half-century in establishing collective security arrangements. This experience contributed to the Bush administration’s successes in building a coalition to combat terrorism.

## C) Terrorists will use nuclear weapons triggering global nuclear war and extinction

Mohamed **Sid-Ahmed, 2004** ([**http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm**](http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm), 26 August - 1 September 2004)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario **is if the attack succeeds**. This could **lead to a third world war**, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When **nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.**

# Terrorism Impacts

## (--) Japan-U.S. alliance needed for War on Terrorism:

**Nye and Armitage.** February **2007**. CSIS. The U.S.- Japan Alliance Getting Asia Right Through 2020. Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International.Joseph S. Nye, Professor of International Relations at Harvard. Online accessed at: http://www.armitageinternational.com/news/file-2007-02-16-122048US-Japan%20Alliance-Getting%20Asia%20Right%20Through%202020.pdf

That judgment still stands. Indeed, the challenges of the new century—radical Islamic fundamentalism’s attack on Western values, **international extremism including terrorism**, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the rise of crossroads states—will require even greater efforts on the part of the United States and Japan, individually and as alliance partners. Our interest is in stability, to which the United States, Japan, China, and all countries in East Asia can play a supportive role. In particular, stability in East Asia will rest on a triangle of U.S.- Japan-China relations, which should be fostered in addition to our strong alliance with Japan. The cooperative efforts that marked Japan’s support for the United States in Afghanistan, its contribution to postwar reconstruction in Iraq, and its early participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative have set a firm foundation for closer future cooperation. We would conclude this report with the observation that to those to whom much has been given, much will be expected.

## (--) The Japan-US alliance is vital for global security and the war on terror.

Arpita **Mathur 2004** (“Japan’s Changing Role in the US-Japan Security Alliance”Dr. Arpita Mathur is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)

An assessment of the US-Japan Security Alliance exhibits an incremental transformation in its role, purpose and scope. It is more importantly a saga of the noticeable growth in the Japanese profile within the overarching paradigm of the partnership. The alliance, which was initially meant to perform the function of being the proverbial ‘cork in the bottle’ in the rise of Japanese militarism as well as containment of communism, has grown both in purpose and scope, even as it has proved to be a boon for Japan in the long run. It is now not limited to being a mechanism instituted for the defence of Japan and the Far East, but has become a partnership that looks beyond borders into the region, and has even been termed a ‘global alliance’ –the keyword at the Koizumi-Bush Summit of 2003. The two leaders declared that their countries are intertwined in a ‘global alliance’ and are “addressing threats to our common security and meeting our common responsibilities” around the globe.55 The US war on terror and the Japanese assistance to its ally is a significant case in point. The dispatch of SDF to Iraq was of symbolic importance, being the first troop dispatch of its kind by Japan. There are new expectations from Japan both as an ally of the US as well as a member of the international community – both of which has spurred Tokyo to recast its defined role. However, what is essentially intrinsic to all these developments relating to the changing Japanese security role is the fact that they have dovetailed well with the development of the partnership and have been in consonance with needs of the alliance. Prominent changes in its security policy, including the augmented role and overseas dispatch of the SDFs, passage of new domestic laws to **support the US war on terror** have all added value to the substance of the bilateral partnership.

# US-Sino Relations Impacts

## Strong US-Japan relations undermine US-Sino relations:

Aurelia George **Mulgan, 2008** (University of New South Wales). “Breaking the mould: Japan's subtle shift from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2008. Online. Accessed on July 1, 2010 at: <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6479/is_1_30/ai_n29432526/>

Third, the security declaration reflected Japan's sensitivity to the subtle shift in America's China policy in which the Bush administration moved to calling China a "strategic stakeholder" instead of a "strategic competitor", (26)and looked for ways in which to enhance reciprocal relations. Such a shift heightened Japan's sense of vulnerability to over-reliance on the US alliance in relation to China and concern about its position in the US-Japan-China strategic triangle, where **a closer relationship between any two powers undermined the position of the third.** Based on the realization that Japan was too vulnerable if the United States were the only bedrock on which its security rested, the Abe administration sought out new defence partners, hedging against a decline in its importance to the United States relative to China. This hedging strategy provided specific insurance against a reoccurrence of "Japan passing" phenomenon that characterized the administration of President Bill Clinton and any weakening of the American security commitment to Japan in potential Sino-Japanese disputes.

# World Conflicts

## Strong-US Japan relationship key to conflict resolution around the globe:

Kenji **Takita, 2009** (Chuo University, Tokyo). “Obama and Japan.” Online. Accessed June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/01/21/obama-and-japan/>

Perhaps the current Japanese mood about the Obama administration is overly optimistic. Firstly, it goes without saying that a nation will desperately pursue its own national interests in this anarchical international society, and the United States under Obama will definitely do that, despite unfurling the banner of multilateralism. And the Obama administration will have to direct all its energies inward in its focus on salvaging the US economy. As it faces large challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Palestine, India-Pakistan and North Korea, **it will also need to mobilize its allies, including Japan**, to resolve conflicts in these areas under the banner of multilateralism. Though Clinton showed her willingness to negotiate directly with North Korea, the top priority will be denuclearization of North Korea, and not the abduction issue.

## US-Japan relations key to preserving alliances in Asia and key to deterrence against North Korea and China/Taiwan war

Eric **Talmadge 2010**, staff writer, (AP), Okinawa basing stresses US-Japan relation, June 22, accessed June 30 from <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/ap_us_japan_062210/>

Prime Minister **Naoto Kan said he sees the arrangement as a crucial means of maintaining the balance of power in Asia, where the economic and military rise of China is looming large, and vowed to stand behind it despite recent disputes with Washington. "Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region,**" Kan said in a televised question-and-answer session with other party leaders. **"Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn, China and the United States." The U.S.-Japan alliance,** formalized over violent protests in 1960, **provides for the defense of Japan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan.**

## US-Japan alliance is crucial to achieve common security objectives:

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Japan, 1996**. “JAPAN-U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY

- ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the United States. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.

# \*\*\*\*\*Answers to Affirmative Arguments\*\*\*\*\*

# Consult is Theoretically Legitimate

## Critical to real world debate- consultations with Japan and other countries prior to the Iraq War prove debate over prior consultation is a critical policy question

## Key to competitive equity because consultation is key to check new affirmatives- it’s a negative right to have a strategy to defeat new affs

## We have an obligation to assess the quality of the counterplan versus the plan as policy-makers- the counterplan is a reason to reject the affirmative through opportunity cost

## Consulting Japan is critical education because Japan has the largest economy in East Asia- assessing the effect of the plan on their opinion is relevant to policy-making

## The counterplan is a negative right because we need to be able to test immediacy and the resolution of the affirmative

## The aff is guaranteed offense in every consult debate because they can win that Japan will say no to leverage case as a disad to the counterplan

## Ere negative on theory because the affirmative gets an inherent side bias by speaking first and last and having infinite prep

## Theory isn’t a voter- there is no reason to ignore other legitimate negative arguments as a result of one illegitimate argument

# \*\*\*Answers to Permutations\*\*\*

# AT: Permutation

## We’ll provide a framework for evaluating any permutation

## First, Theory – Any permutation that does not defend immediate and durable adoption of the plan and therefore departs from the 1AC is a voting issue—Extend our resolved and substantially definitions that the plan must be immediate and unconditional.

## A. Severance – jettisoning any element of the affirmative advocacy literally erases negative ground and skews time allocation-they get infinite prep time to write the most strategic plan, allowing them to change it after we’ve read our strategy tips the scales too far in their favor. The plan must be a stable focus for debate- affirmative conditionality is distinctly different from negative conditionality- they get the last speech we could never respond to their last clarification

## B. Topicality – all topical elements of the plan must survive – no longer defending a “fixed purpose” violates the word resolved – extend the 1NC.

## C. Intrinsicness – delaying the plan’s adoption or adding elements that don’t exist in either original text is intrinsic and makes all counterplans irrelevant. Intrinsicness is illegitimate- infinite regress- they could fiat out of any disad link, moving target- if we read a disad to the intrinsicness argument they can make a new one to get out of it

## Second, No Permutation Can Solve

## A. Extend our 1NC Osius evidence – only prior and binding consultation is even really consultation – “[it] has nothing to do with whether you are willing to talk to people”

**B. Consultations must be different than the status quo variety to solve: That’s the Green in ’10 evidence specific to the transition to Kan.**

## AT: Permutation

## B. Only prior and binding consultation can provide sustainable support for the alliance needed to weather crises and public sentiment

Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, Director of the Asian Studies Program, George Washington University, Former Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Former Co-Director, Center for Asia-Pacific Policy, RAND Corporation, Spring 1997 (“ Relations with the Great Powers: Japan; The US-Japan Security Alliance” – Brookings Review) p. lexis

RESTRUCTURING THE ALLIANCE The time has come to strike a new strategic bargain between Japan and the United States. Under current arrangements, the alliance may not weather the test of a severe security crisis. The Persian Gulf crisis and war of 1990-91 provoked international criticism of Japan's limited role, wounded Japanese pride, and proved the inadequacy of checkbook diplomacy. Hesitation from Japan in another crisis could severely strain the alliance. When shared vital interests are at stake, Japanese financial contributions will be inadequate to convince Americans about the alliance's importance. **Preventing a rupture of the alliance** during a crisis, therefore, requires altering the terms of the security relationship before such **a crisis occurs**. While the Pentagon has temporarily defused tensions on Okinawa, there is now widespread support in Japan for a gradual but significant reduction of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and elsewhere. Rather than inflexibly sticking to the need for 47,000 U.S. troops in Japan, the United States should adopt a roles-and-mission approach and determine what forward deployments are absolutely critical for deterrence and crisis response in light of changes in the strategic environment and technological capabilities. America's most important military assets in Japan are its air and naval power. Washington should make the adjustments necessary to sustain Japan's willingness to host these assets. In return, Japan should take steps to support U.S. military operations in regional contingencies and to facilitate rapid deployments into and out of Japan during an emergency. If such a bargain can be struck, the Marine combat forces in Okinawa could be removed without impairing U.S. military missions as long as Marine combat equipment is prepositioned on the island for ready use in a crisis. Such a move would go far in consolidating Japanese political support for the alliance well into the next century. As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to say "yes" to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say "no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve toward something akin to America's strategic relationships with the major West European allies.

## C. Modifications are essential to solvency- the permutation can’t allow them

J.G. Merrils, Professor of Public Law, University of Sheffield, 1998 (International Dispute Settlement) p. 4

Consultation When a government anticipates that a decision or a proposed course of action may harm another state, discussions with the affected party can provide a way of heading off a dispute by creating an opportunity for adjustment and accommodation. Quite minor modifications to its plans of no importance to the state taking the decision, may be all that is required to avoid trouble, yet may only be apparent if the other side is given a chance to point them out. The particular value of consultation is that it supplies this useful information at the most appropriate time – before anything has been done. For it is far easier to make the necessary modifications at the decision-making stage, rather than later, when exactly the same action may seem like capitulation to foreign pressure or be seized on by critics as a sacrifice of domestic interests. A good example of the value of consultation is provided by the practice of the United States and Canada in antitrust proceedings.

# AT: Permutation (General Cards)

## (--) Prior coordination of policy is critical to sustained cooperation – simultaneous and after-the-fact action fails

Richard L. Armitage, Former Deputy Secretary of State and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, October 2000 (“The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership” – Institute for National Strategic Studies, Other Study Group Authors include Dan E. Bob, Kurt M. Campbell, Michael J. Green, Kent M. Harrington, Frank Jannuzi, Robert A. Manning, Kevin G. Nealer, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Torkel L. Patterson, James J. Przystup, Robin H. Sakoda, Barbara P. Wanner, and Paul Wolfowitz) http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR\_01/SR\_Japan.htm

It is imperative to nurture popular support in the United States and Japan to sustain current cooperation and to open the door to new bilateral endeavors. There should be no surprises in diplomatic cooperation. Japan often has promoted ideas, such as the Asian Monetary Fund, without coordinating with Washington. The United States too often has brought Japan belatedly into its own diplomacy. Both countries suffer when policymaking-by-afterthought characterizes our relationship. It is past time for the United States to drop the image of Japanese cooperation in foreign policy as checkbook diplomacy. Japan must recognize that international leadership involves risk-taking beyond its traditional donor's role. U.S. policy must consider Japan's goals, even as it strives to ensure that our agenda is well understood and actively supported by Tokyo. Washington must recognize that multilateral efforts are important to Tokyo. The Japanese Government regards such initiatives as expressions of national identity, not as attempts to undermine U.S. leadership. Quiet, behind-the-scenes coordination of strategies often is more effective than theatrical pronouncements of partnership thrown together at the last moment as an outcome of bilateral summits.

## (--) Prior consultation must respect Japanese independence in order to support a healthy alliance and close coordination of views

The Japan Times 7/7/1999 (“Toward a Debate on National Security”) p. lexis

The DPJ regards the Japan-U.S. security treaty as the linchpin of Japan's security policy. On that basis, it stresses the need for this nation to take a more independent stance and to develop a working system of prior consultations on U.S. military operations here.   The Japan-U.S. alliance does not necessarily mean that the two nations' interests must always agree. For the security arrangements to work smoothly, it is essential to maintain close coordination of views. Prior consultation is an important means of achieving this. In practice, however, this arrangement has not worked as it should.   Many Japanese are also concerned about cooperation with U.S. forces under the guidelines. The reason is that the U.S. might dictate to Japan in the event of a military crisis occurring in an area around this country. To prevent that, the government needs to make greater efforts to develop a better framework of cooperation so that the nation can maintain a more independent position.

## AT: Permutation (General Cards)

## (--) Continued perception of junior partner status and inequality threatens the viability of the alliance

Kamiya ’03 (Matake, a graduate of Tokyo and Columbia Universities, is associate professor-of international -relations- at -the National Defense Academy of Japan, Reinventing the Alliance Ed. G. John Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi Pg 111)

Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese are frustrated with the fact that their country tends not to be viewed by the rest of the world as being its own independent political entity. They want their country to become a major political power. A considerable number of Japanese doubt if that goal is achievable as long as Japan remains dependent upon the U.S. alliance for its security. For its own national interest as well as for the sake of stability in the region and the world, Japan should not become a major military power. However, if Japan continues to be treated as a second-class political power ranking below the United States, China, and Russia because of its self-restrained military posture, the Japanese might be forced to consider ending its military dependence on the United States. The Americans should recognize that the Japanese particularly want to be treated as an equal partner by the United States. Despite the rhetoric used by Washington, many Japanese feel that their country is still treated as a junior partner by the United States. On the condition that enough efforts are taken by Japan to become a more responsible security partner of the United States, Washington should stop treating Japan this way. The partnership between the two allies must be transformed into a more "equal" one.

# A2: Lie Perm

## **(--) The perm is severance – consultation is an ongoing process and the plan is not adopted until after the consultation. This severs out of the immediacy of the plan. Severance is illegitimate and a voting issue because the aff can get out of any disad links if they can discard the plan.**

## **(--) The perm is intrinsic – it adds an entirely new form of non-binding consultation. Our counterplan only advocates binding consultation. Intrinsicness is illegitimate and a voting issue because the aff can add on anything to their plan to dodge disad links.**

## (--) Binding consultation is key to the alliance – non-genuine consultation only causes distrust and resentment

Ota in 2006 (Fumia, Director of the Center for Security and Crisis Management Education, Japanese National Defense Attorney; “The US-Japan Alliance in the 21st century: A View of History and a Rationale for its Survival”, p 137)

In 1972, President Nixon visited China. At that time, the Japanese government was informed of the decision only on very short notice. That kind of ‘bypass diplomacy’ created distrust in Japan and the distrust has remained in the Japanese psyche for a long time. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond argued in their book When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics that in the spirit of distrust, the security dilemma facing the international community is created, not resolved. Alliance partners always have security dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment. After the Cold War, Japan is no longer afraid of being trapped into conflict with the Soviet Union. Her concern today is abandonment by the US.

## (--) Japan will discover the lie- government representation will leak the secret

James Q. Wilson, Professor of Political Science at UCLA, and John J. DiIulio, Professor of Political Science at Princeton, 1998 [American Government: Institutions and Policies, p. 291]

American government is the leakiest in the world. The bureaucracy, members of Congress, and the White House staff regularly leak stories favorable to their interests. Of late **the leaks have become geysers**, gushing forth torrents of insider stories. Many people in and out of government find it depressing that our government seems unable to keep anything secret for long. Others think that the public has a right to know even more and that there are still too many secrets. However you view leaks, you should understand why we have so many. The answer is found in the Constitution. Because we have separate institutions that must share power, each branch of government competes with the others to get power. One way to compete is to try to use the press to advance your pet projects and to make the other side look bad. There are far fewer leaks in other democratic nations in party because power is centralized in the hands of a prime minister, who does not need to leak in order to get the upper hand over the legislature, and because the legislature has too little information to be a good source of leaks. In addition, we have no Official Secrets Act of the kind that exists in England; except for a few matters, it is not against the law for the press to receive and print government secrets.

## A2: Lie Perm

## (--) This crushes relations- genuine consultation is the only means of sustaining the alliance

C. Fred Bergsten, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Noland, October 2001 (352 pp, http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters\_preview/105/7iie2865.pdf, accessed 8/05)

Programmatically, making the alliance work is less a matter of bold new initiatives that of achieving improved consultation between Tokyo and Washington on the whole panoply of international issues that they face. This includes both economic and security issues, as well as each country’s positions in the international institutions. The Armitage Report (IISS 2000) contains numerous specific recommendations along these lines. For example, Washington must accept a greater political role for Japan and understand that there is a difference between genuine consultation and mere forewarning. At the same time, Tokyo should be reminded that global and regional policy initiatives undertaken without prior consultation with Washington—such as the AMF proposal in 1997, and the FTAs that it has launched unilaterally in recent years—are unlikely to succeed.The alternative to making the alliance work would be for Japan to become an autonomous great power. Under current circumstances, without significant regional organizations to mediate festering historical animosities, this would run the risk of destabilizing Asia. Its huge costs, to Japan itself and to the United States as well as to regional and global stability, add strongly to the case for making every effort to restore the Japan-United States relationship—including in the economics sphere—in a modern and normal direction.

## (--) The Bush administration fails to protect classified information- Japan will discover the lie

Jack Shafer, Slate’s editor at large, 6-23-2004 [http://www.slate.msn.com/id/2102855]

Don't mistake Leonard for an ACLU firebrand: As Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists (whose excellent [listserv](http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html) alerted me to the speech) puts it, Leonard "is not an 'openness' advocate or a free-lance critic of government secrecy." He's a career security professional who deplores the leaks of classified material to the press. Leonard attributes what he calls an "epidemic" of leaks to the press to the dysfunctional classification system, which has recently taken to using the war as an "excuse to disregard the basics of the security classification system." Leaks are coming out of the "highest levels of our government" (the Valerie Plame affair); a former Cabinet secretary is alleged to have handed off classified material to a book author for publication, and the classification machine is operating so poorly down at Guantanamo Bay that a chaplain was publicly charged with pilfering secrets on his computer and then released. "The problem [Leonard] has identified is that the currency of classification is being devalued by questionable, sometimes suspiciously self-serving secrecy actions," writes Aftergood in e-mail. "This produces an erosion of security discipline, which in turn fosters an environment in which leaks are more likely to come about. The net result is bad security policy and bad public policy." Because leaks of classified information make for such great headlines, journalists rarely give much thought to why something was leaked or why it was classified in the first place. Leonard's speech encourages us to look for the important story behind every leaked classified-info story and ask these questions: Why was the information classified in the first place? Who or what was served by its classification—some self-interested bureaucracy or our national interest? (Think Abu Ghraib.) Who was served by the leak? Who was damaged? (Think Valerie Plame.) Who is served by declassification delays? The secrecy czar has spoken. But who's listening? According to Nexis, nobody. I couldn't find a single story about the speech. Maybe he should have leaked it to the press instead of posting it on the [Web](http://www.archives.gov/isoo/speeches_and_articles/print_friendly.html?page=bill_leonard_ncms_speech_june_15_2004_content.html&title=NARA%20%7C%20ISOO%20%7C%20NCMS%20Remarks%2015%20June%202004).

# A2: Nonbinding Permutation

## (--) The perm doesn’t solve relations- the Rapp evidence indicates binding consultation is key to establish symmetry in the alliance. The perm doesn’t capture US-Japan realignment because they will never perceive a more independent position via the US

## (--) Binding consultation is a precondition to US hegemony

Osius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002 p. 75-76

(Ted, The US Japan Security Alliance)

The Armitage report challenges the U.S.-Japan relationship to evolve from one of "burdensharing" into "power-sharing. Armitage's actions since joining the government suggest his sincerity in pursuing this goal. In Senate testimony, he reiterated themes from the autumn presidential campaign: "Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership.... To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of pretentions.-The United States can, in fact, gain from power sharing, as long as it learns to tolerate it. America and the United Kingdom fought shoulder-to-shoulder in wars, share a language and cultural roots, and pursue democratic and free market values in many shared endeavors around the globe. The United States regularly takes British views into account when dealing with European matters. Although decades may pass before the U.S.-Japan relationship reaches that level of trust, Japan is the world's second-largest economy and a nation that shares America's commitment to democracy and a free market. Japan needs to make its views known, especially regarding Asia, and America must in return listen respectfully and with an open mind. Although it is difficult to imagine as effective a foreign policy partner as Prime Minister Tony Blair, in Asia the United States needs an Asian partner empowered, at times, to play a parallel role**.** Consultation, according to the Brookings Institution's lvo Daalder**,** implies "give-and-take, putting one view on the table, hearing the other view and seeing if what emerges from the disagreement is a way forward that satisfies both sides.... Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you're willing to talk to people. It's whether you're willing to take their views into account." Japan can help the United States deal with its challenge, as the world's only superpower, in taking other views into account. Japan can also help the United States take advantage of the opportunities in Asia to engage in real consultation and to build coalitions to address today's complex global issues**.** Watching America's contradictory impulses, and its oscillations between support for multilateral solutions and unilateral approaches, gives Tokyo an excuse to hesitate about tightening the alliance. However, America's historical pattern as part of collective security and collective economic arrangements should provide significant reassurance. The United States led the way in building the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, APEC, and other regional and global institutions.

## (--) The perm is theoretically illegitimate:

## Nonbinding consultation is not intrinsic to the plan or the counterplan because the only consultation is nonbinding

## Intrinsic permutations are a voter because they skew negative strategy- it justifies reading additions to their plan text in order to solve for any disadvantage or counterplan

# A2: Nonbinding Permutation

## **(--) Genuine consultation is the only means of sustaining the alliance**

C. Fred Bergsten, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Noland, October 2001 (352 pp, http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters\_preview/105/7iie2865.pdf, accessed 8/05)

Programmatically, making the alliance work is less a matter of bold new initiatives that of achieving improved consultation between Tokyo and Washington on the whole panoply of international issues that they face. This includes both economic and security issues, as well as each country’s positions in the international institutions. The Armitage Report (IISS 2000) contains numerous specific recommendations along these lines. For example, Washington must accept a greater political role for Japan and understand that there is a difference between genuine consultation and mere forewarning. At the same time, Tokyo should be reminded that global and regional policy initiatives undertaken without prior consultation with Washington—such as the AMF proposal in 1997, and the FTAs that it has launched unilaterally in recent years—are unlikely to succeed.The alternative to making the alliance work would be for Japan to become an autonomous great power. Under current circumstances, without significant regional organizations to mediate festering historical animosities, this would run the risk of destabilizing Asia. Its huge costs, to Japan itself and to the United States as well as to regional and global stability, add strongly to the case for making every effort to restore the Japan-United States relationship—including in the economics sphere—in a modern and normal direction.

# A2: Do Counterplan Permutation

## The perm is theoretically illegit:

A. Resolved means having a fixed purpose: the permutation severs out of that by not guaranteeing the action of the plan.

B. Substantially means without material qualification—extend our 1nc evidence: the permutation severs out of that by placing a qualification on the action.

## C. Severence is a voter because it skews strategy- it makes the plan text conditional which undermines the only stable advocacy on the affirmative- severance allows the aff to spike out of all negative arguments

## Textual competition is bad:

## Infinite Regression – textual competition allows an infinite number of CP clarifications that compete based on grammar, word meaning, language, etc. We can’t predict all possible CPs hurting our ability to clash, killing education.

## Quality debate – textual competition forces debate over trivial distinctions rather than substantive issues, making debate boring and un-educational.

## Allows Aff conditionality – they can add the words “not” or “except” in permutations to sever parts of the plan meaning the neg would always lose to unpredictable advocacy shifts.

## Causes vague plan-writing – to get out of semantic or grammar PICs, skews negative ground.

## Functional competition best – only way to compare real world policies with differences on substantive, educational issues.

## Cross-ex checks abuse – Negs can establish CP links and competition in cross-ex, which is binding.

# A2: Consult on Other Issues

## The perm is intrinsic because it consults over an issue not intrinsic to the plan or the counterplan. Intrinsicness is a voter because it skews negative strategy- it justifies reading additions to their plan text in order to solve for any disadvantage or counterplan

## This doesn’t solve the net benefit- our Harris evidence is specific to consultation over China policy because Japan wants input in policy over regional issues

# A2: Have Japan Consult the US Permutation

## They don’t solve the alliance- ALL of our evidence assumes that the US makes the first move to Japan- we are the dominant member of the alliance which means the only way to bring about realignment is via relinquishing our power in the alliance from time to time

## This is theoretically illegit:

## It’s intrinsic because it involves Japan consulting the US which isn’t in the plan or counterplan. Intrinsicness is a voter because it skews negative strategy- it justifies reading additions to their plan text in order to solve for any disadvantage or counterplan

## This is international fiat which is outside of the US federal government- this crushes predictability because it justifies the affirmative reading arbitrary add ons to international actors acting or fiatting Chinese cooperation over the plan

# No Delay From Consultation

## (--) Empirically consultation takes 7 hours max

Japan Economic Newswire ’91 <May 8, lexis>

KIMMITT, THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S THIRD-RANKING OFFICIAL, ALSO MET WITH PRIME MINISTER TOSHIKI KAIFU AND FOREIGN MINISTER TARO NAKAYAMA TO CALL FOR A STRENGTHENING OF BILATERAL TIES, NOTING THAT THE RELATIONSHIP HAS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS. THE OFFICIALS, WHO DECLINED TO GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SEVEN-HOUR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN KIMMITT AND OWADA, SAID THE MOST FRUITFUL OUTCOME OF THE MEETING IN JAPAN'S VIEW WAS WASHINGTON'S COMMITMENT TO HELPING JAPAN ATTAIN "A GREATER VOICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA."

## (--) We solve and outweigh any risk of delay—the net benefit captures any of their offense, and they can’t prove an incremental disadvantage to the tiny amount of delay.

## (--) CONSULTATION KEY TO ALLIANCE AND DOESN’T GO THROUGH LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

**Koji**, Assoc Prof @ University in Kyoto, **2000** <Murata, *The Japan-U.S. Alliance*, ed. Nishihara Masashi, p.35 >

The U.S. and Japanese governments should **reinstate both prior and regular consultation provisions.** As mentioned earlier, the prior consulta­tion clause has never been exercised. Furthermore, the Japanese govern­ment has taken the position that it will not propose prior consultation to the U.S. government and that the content of such consultation need not be reported to the Diet. As Japan is willing to take more active roles in the Japan-U.S. alliance, however, this position should be revised. Also, although the two governments meet regularly for consultation, especially at the senior officials' level, given the importance of daily communication between the allies, a standing consultative body at the working level would be more ef­fective. The establishment of such a body would be helpful in cultivating and educating security specialists on both sides as well.

# No China DA

## (--) WE SOLVE THE IMPACT: OUR KHALILZAD EV SAYS THAT THE ALLIANCE IS CRITICAL TO PREVENTING CHINESE AGRESSION AND WAR VIA ARMS RACES.

## (--) CHINA WANTS A STRONG ALLIANCE BECAUSE IT PREVENTS JAPANESE MILITARISM.

**Zagoria and Rivlin 97** <Donald Zagoria, Prof of Poli Sci @ Hunter College, Benjamin Rivlin, Director of the raplh Bunche Institute, May, “revitalizing the US-Japan Alliance, HYPERLINK "http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:8470StgVon0J:www.ciaonet.org/conf/bun03/bun03d.html+%22china+accepts+the+alliance+if+it+checks%22+AND+%22peace+and+stability%22&hl=en" http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:8470StgVon0J:www.ciaonet.org/conf/bun03/bun03d.html+%22china+accepts+the+alliance+if+it+checks%22+AND+%22peace+and+stability%22&hl=en >

Officially, the Chinese scholar said, the Chinese government has adopted a wait-and-see attitude and the future of the debate will depend on US policies and actions. He added that his own conclusion from recent developments was that there had been no basic change in the Chinese position on the alliance. China accepts the alliance if it checks Japan from going it alone and from becoming militaristic, and if the alliance contributes to peace and stability, and if it is not directed against China. Chinese leaders face a dilemma. If the United States were to end the alliance and withdraw from East Asia, then China would lose the buffer between itself and Japan. Without this buffer, Japan might well decide to increase the size and capabilities of its military. Sooner or later, the two East Asian powers could confront one another. Given the technological superiority of Japanese industry and the massive revenues on which it can draw, the Chinese would be hard put to compete with Japan in a regional arms race and it would divert resources away from economic modernization. Such a scenario is clearly not in China’s interest.

## (--) NOT UNIQUE: ALLIANCE HAS EXISTED FOR OVER 40 YEARS AND THERE’S NO IMPACT

## (--) The US- Japan alliance is key to keep China at bay

(Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang 2005 The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait," Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2 (October 2005): 1-50, P. 16)

The importance of Asia-Pacific for U.S. military planning purposes is clearly underscored in the Pentagon’s 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) -- the Defense Department’s major high-level strategic planning document. The report says that **with Europe largely at peace, “Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition.”** It noted the possibility that **“a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in** the region (the **East Asia**n littoral).”28 **Many suspect this implies China.** The report echoed the conclusion of a February 2001 study by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and its director Andrew Marshall, which “cast the Pacific as the most important region for military planners.” 29 A subsequent study by the ONA reiterated that **“long-term trends – political, economic, and military – indicate that the primary security challenges the United States will face in the first decades of the 21st century will come from Asia**.”30 In this context, **the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance only increases.**

# No China DA

## (--) China likes rejuvenation of US- Japan alliance

(Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang 2005 The U.S.-Japanese Alliance Redefined: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait," Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2 (October 2005): 1-50, P. 39)

China’s oppositions are likely to be measured for a number of reasons: (1) **Both Japan and the U.S. have reassured that the pact is not targeted at any third country**. (2) The guidelines are revised within the context of the Peace Constitution. (3) **The peaceful resolution of the “Taiwan issue” is a stated Chinese goal.** (4) **The alternatives – U.S. withdrawal – would not be attractive**, as they most likely involve Japanese remilitarization. (5) **China itself benefits from the public good – peace and stability – provided as a result of U.S.-Japanese cooperation. This stable external environment is conducive to China’s economic modernization and political transformation.**

## (--) U.S-Japan alliance key to Taiwanese Stability

**Osius 02** [Ted, U.S Foreign Service officer, The U.S- Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It, 2002, p. 23]

To deter conflict, the United States discourages Taipei form declaring independence and Beijing form forcibly attempting to unite Taiwan with the mainland. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States supplies Taiwan with weapons necessary for defense against the Maitland. Given China’s size and resources, however, Taiwan cannot achieve security based solely on independent military capabilities. Taipei relies on Beijing’s fear that the Unite States would defend it in the event of a cross-straight conflict. Because the U. S forward deployed forces are in Japan, Taiwan also depends on a strong and stable U.S Japan alliance.

# No Free Riding Disad

## (--) Clarification of Japan’s role in the alliance during the Clinton administration insulated it from economic conflicts

Thomas J. Christensen, 2003 Prof. PoliSci @ MIT, contributor to *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 31-32]

Before 1995 some U.S. elites argued that the alliance was overrated and that it had prevented the United States from pursuing its economic interests in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Some even argued that the United States should use the security relationship as leverage against Japan in an attempt to open Japanese trade and financial markets to American firms. In this view Japan had been able to ride free for too long all the U.S. economy because of Washington's concern over preserving an apparently unfair alliance relationship. Since the publication of the critically important February 199, East Asia Strategy Report (also known as the Nye report), U.S. leaders have been expressing very different concerns about the U.S.-Japan relationship. The Nye report, and the broader Nye initiative of which it is a part, placed new emphasis on maintaining and strengthening the security alliance and on keeping economic disputes from poisoning it. The report reaffirms the centrality of U.S. security alliances in Asia, places a floor on U.S. troop strength in East Asia at 100,000, and calls for increased security cooperation between Japan and the United States, including greater Japanese logistics support for U.S. forces operating in the region and consideration of joint research on TMD. Despite the Clinton administration's decision to insulate the U.S.-Japan security relationship from economic disputes, there has been a widely held concern that, purely on security grounds, the alliance could be dangerously weakened if Japanese roles are not clarified and expanded and if the two militaries are not better integrated in preparation for joint operations. Japan's checkbook diplomacy in the Gulf War was considered insufficient support for U.S.-led efforts to protect a region that supplies Japan, not the United States, with the bulk of its oil. It also became clear during the 1994 crisis with Pyongyang over North Korea's nuclear weapons development that, under the existing defense guidelines, in a Korean conflict scenario Japan was not even obliged to allow the U.S. military use of its civilian airstrips or ports. In fact, if the crisis had escalated, Japan might not have provided overt, tangible support of any kind. Even U.S. access to its bases in Japan for combat operations not directly tied to the defense of the Japanese home islands was questionable. Aside from the obvious military dangers inherent in such Japanese passivity, Japanese obstructionism and foot-dragging could undermine elite and popular support in the United States for the most important security relationship in East Asia. It appeared to many American elites that the cold war version of the U.S.-Japan alliance could be one regional crisis away from its demise. Such concerns drove the Nye initiative, which was designed to clarify and strengthen Japan's commitment to support U.S.-led military operations. Fearing instability in Japanese elite and popular attitudes on defense issues, Washington also wanted to increase the number of functional links between the two militaries to tie Japan more firmly into the U.S. defense network for the long run.

# No Japan Politics DA to the Counterplan

## Military consultation unlikely to be politicized in Japan:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

With Tokyo’s alliance management structure in flux, what will become of the alliance? Given the tension over Futenma and the U.S. sense of frustration toward the Hatoyama government in the process, it is unlikely that the two countries will be able to carry out a meaningful discussion on how to enhance the alliance in the way appropriate for the challenges of the 21st century. Moreover, confusion in the Japanese domestic political situation will probably continue for the next several years. This will likely make political discourse inward-looking, leaving little time to discuss some of the strategic questions for Japan, such as Japan’s role in the world, its role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, or its relations with China. In the meantime, alliance managers in both countries can only consult on a limited number of issues, such as technical cooperation in ballistic missile defense or military to- military cooperation in non-combatant operations—issues that are apolitical or technical in nature and therefore are unlikely to be politicized.

# No US Politics Link to the Counterplan

## US-Japan alliance has bipartisan support in Congress:

Michael **AUSLIN and** Michael **GREEN, 2007** (American Enterprise Institute and the CSIS). Asian Economic Policy Review, “Japan's Security Policy in East Asia.” Accessed via EBSCO host, July 2, 2010.

Of course, and the 2008 presidential election cycle has already generated a serious

debate about how to balance the need for respect of American ideals with respect for

American power. The good news for Tokyo is that there is a robust bipartisanship behind

the US–Japan alliance in Washington. Japan can take advantage of that opportunity by

energizing its own foreign policy strategy to be a strong presence and partner in the

world.

# A2: Collapse Inevitable

## Even if its collapse is inevitable, the alliance will still be largely beneficial in the next 15 years

Thomas J. Christensen, 2003 Prof. PoliSci @ MIT, contributor to *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 44]

**Even if sustainable only for the next ten to fifteen years, the U.S. strategy of carefully calibrating increased Japanese activities in the alliance should have high payoffs.** If the United States can avoid an escalation of Sino-Japanese security tensions in this time frame, **several objectives could be achieved. First, the very nascent efforts to create regional confidence-building measures and regimes that encourage transparency will have time to bear fruit,** as will Tokyo's and Beijing's recent efforts to improve bilateral ties and high-level contacts. **Second, more cosmopolitan government officials and advisers should rise through the ranks in China as a generation of Chinese experts with extensive experience abroad comes of age. Third, China more generally will have time to undergo the next political transition as the "fourth generation" leadership replaces** Jiang Zemin's generation, **perhaps carrying with it significant political reform**. Given the strong popular sentiments in China about Japan and Taiwan and the dangers of hypernationalism in the democratization process, **it would be best for the region and the world if China transited** political **reform without the distractions** and jingoism that would likely flow **from a Sino-Japanese security competition. Fourth, the process of Korean unification would be significantly simplified if it were not accompanied by a Sino-japanese military rivalry. Fifth, the region, including both Japan and China, will have time to recover from the current economic crisis without simultaneously worrying about intensifying** security **competition.**

# A2: Alliance is Resilient

Current challenges to the alliance put its long-term health at risk:
Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

This essay argues that although the United States and Japan both have interests in keeping the alliance effective, **the challenges that the alliance presently faces** indeed have the potential to **put its long-term health at risk.** The essay largely attributes the current challenge to the change of government in Tokyo and the policy decisions made by the new government. While maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan alliance is in the interest of both countries, the policy decisions made by the current government in Tokyo **may put this prospect at risk**, in which case some adjustment may have to be made in order to accommodate the more distant alliance relationship.

## Relations between the United States and Japan may be in store for a bumpy road in the future- the entire alliance is at risk

**Hitoshi Tanaka 2010** (Senior Fellow at JCIE) (Japan Center for International Exchange) “The US-Japan Alliance: Beyond Futenma”. February 2010. Accessed from <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/5-1.pdf> on June 30, 2010.

On the other hand, **it is important to recognize that the burden of maintaining the US-Japan security alliance** has been disproportionately shouldered by local citizens in a few areas in Japan, **especially in Okinawa.** In today’s world, it is natural for people in a place like **Okinawa,** which **hosts 75 percent of the US military facilities for the entire country of Japan**, to be bothered by the presence of foreign bases and another country’s soldiers, with all the disruption they inevitably bring. **If local relations cannot be managed skillfully, the entire US-Japan security alliance can be put at risk.**

## (--) US-Japan alliance needs to be tilted more toward Japan to maintain relevance and political support:

Hitoshi **Tanaka, 2010** (senior fellow at Japan Centre for International Exchange). Feb. 16, 2010. “The US-Japan alliance: beyond Futenma.” Online. Accessed from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/16/the-us-japan-alliance-beyond-futenma/> on June 29, 2010.

As the world around us changes, we should not be shy about analyzing the costs and benefits of the US-Japan alliance and acknowledging that it **needs to continue to benefit both parties** in order to retain its meaning and political support. The central agreement of the alliance is encapsulated in two of its articles: Article V in essence commits the United States to defend Japan from attack, while Article VI basically pledges Japan to provide basing facilities for the United States to use in the protection of Japan and the maintenance of regional security. A hardnosed analysis of this trade-off does indeed show that it continues to yield important strategic benefits for both Japan and the United States.

# A2: Alliance is Resilient

## (--) The political shift in Japan threatens the alliance

Sheila A. **Smith 2010** (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies) “U.S.-Japan Relations” (testimony). March 17, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/21666/usjapan_relations.html> on July 2, 2010.

**Japan’s historic Lower House election last August is part of the on-going structural shift in Japan towards alternating party responsibility for governance.** **This shift** in Japanese politics **creates new questions for the alliance, as well as new demands on policymakers responsible for alliance management.** The arrival of a viable second party on the electoral scene suggests that **Japan’s foreign policy—as well as its domestic policy choices—will be subject to new types of scrutiny and perhaps to significant challenge in the legislature.** In short, **we should expect that Japanese choices for the alliance will need to demonstrate greater salience domestically.** The **questions being raised in Japan today call for an even greater understanding between Americans and Japanese on such complex topics as the rise of China and India, the incentives for nuclear proliferation, and the economic consequences to all of us from the current economic crisis. The United States and Japan seek to work alongside each other not simply in ensuring that we meet the obligations of our bilateral security treaty, but also in trying to devise strategies for national security that meet the changing demands of the day.**

## (--) Past resilience is weakening now—the Evolution and adaptation of the US-Japan alliance is slowing now:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

The alliance has remained relevant by successfully adapting to the changing security environment that surrounds it. Since 2005, however, the optimistic forecast that the alliance’s evolution will steadily continue has been gradually replaced by frustration over the lack of progress in addressing challenges to the alliance management, as well as by confusion and anxiety over the political transition in Tokyo in 2009.

## Tension over Futenma has poisoned the political atmosphere surrounding the alliance:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

The current tension over the relocation of the Marines Corps Air Station (MCAS) in Futenma, Okinawa, has further worsened the political atmosphere that surrounds the alliance. In May 2006, after an almost four year-long negotiation, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to relocate MCAS Futenma to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), which was to be built off of Hennoko. It was also agreed that as MCAS Futenma relocates to the FRF, 8,000 marines and their families will be relocated to Guam.4 Both governments even signed a bilateral agreement on how to proceed with the relocation of marines to Guam in February 2009.5 After coming to power in September 2009, however, the Hatoyama government decided that it wanted to pursue the relocation of MCAS Futenma to an alternative relocation site outside Okinawa, effectively throwing out the bilateral agreement that took four years to shape.

# A2: Alliance is Resilient

## Recent disputes over Okinawa are straining US-Japan relations now

Eric **Talmadge 2010**, staff writer, (AP), Okinawa basing stresses US-Japan relation, June 22, accessed June 30 from <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/ap_us_japan_062210/>

**The U.S. forces include** a key naval base south of Tokyo where the only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier has its home port; Kadena Air Base, which is one of the largest in Asia; and more than **10,000 U.S. Marines on the southern island of Okinawa. The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defense spending low, to about 1 percent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere — a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the world's second-largest economy.** "Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remains strong," said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. "Very few people think that it is actually necessary to make major changes in the alliance." **But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there — more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa**, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade. **A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month.**

# A2: No Japanese Re-Arm

## Developments in China risk a Japanese military build-up:

**Kazuhisa Ogawa 1996** (military analyst) “Japan: The Strategic Pawn”. 1996. Accessed from <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96winter/ogawa.html> on July 2, 2010.

The current military buildup in Asia is a matter of concern to all. Continued suspicions in Asia about Japan are certain to intensify the Asian arms race, and developments in China are bound to have a grave influence on the future of Japan. **It is hard to believe that China will heed the warnings of the United States once it loses its strategic base of Japan or once the security treaty is abandoned. If developments in China induce a military buildup in Japan, there is no guarantee that Japan will not follow the path it followed just fifty years ago. This is especially true if democracy in Japan remains underdeveloped. All in all, this is a worst-case scenario for Japan.**

# \*\*\*\*\*AFF Answers\*\*\*\*\*

# Consult Japan 2AC

## Consult counterplans are illegitimate:

**A) Infinitely regressive:** you can consult any country on the planet—making it impossible for the AFF to keep up.

**B) Steals 100% of AFF ground:** If the counterplan results in the plan makes it impossible for the AFF to generate offense versus the counterplan.

## C) Disads solve all their offense: they can read it as a disad without stealing all the AFF plan—solves all their education warrants without skewing AFF ground.

**D) Voting Issue:** Time & strategy skew have already occurred, we can’t go back and re-give the 2ac.

## No alliance collapse: US-Japan alliance is resilient—the alliance is very strong and stable:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

This is nothing in comparison to what we faced in 1995 and 1996. Let’s keep in mind a few basic things. In the last several weeks, we have seen opinion polling in Japan about the United States and the U.S.-Japan alliance **which are the best polls in history ever taken**, with support in Japan of the United States in the 80 percentile, 85-86 percent – just enormous – and 70s for other aspects of our alliance. And so if you compare and contrast that with 1995 and 1996, after the tragic rape of the young schoolgirl in Okinawa, when most of Japan had deep, serious, and sustained questions about the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance, I would argue with you that we are in **a much stronger, very stable, and ultimately strong position for the continuation of the U.S.-Japan security relationship**. And it is also the case that as an alliance, it has **demonstrated enormous adaptability**. It has gone from a situation where it was originally aimed at fears of Soviet expansionism and adventurism in Asia, now it is basically aimed at no specific or particular nation. It serves as the foundation to bring a degree of confidence to the Asia-Pacific region. It’s been enormously successful in this regard. And no, the challenges we face today aren’t – I mean, there were times where we were in offices in the 1990s where people were worried that the entire fabric of the alliance was coming apart. **We do not face challenges like that today.** This is a process that many have called for, for years, that democratization of Japanese foreign and security policies, a need to explain more clearly to the Japanese public about the choices and challenges that Japan faces, not only in the region but working with the United States. And I think we’re very confident we’re going to get through this and, at the end of it, be stronger because of the process.

# Consult Japan 2AC

## Permute: do the counterplan—our interpretation is that counterplans must textually and functionally compete.

## A) Their justifications allow an infinite variety of “do the AFF” counterplans like consult and condition with random country of the week on random issue of the week

## B) Focus on function alone destroys education about specific plan mandates : encourages the neg to compete with implicit implementation questions so the NEG always come up with a counterplan that results in the entirety of the AFF plan

## C) Focus on text alone allows for an infinite variety of word PIC’s—destroys AFF ability to generate offense and creates a focus on trivial wording questions.

## D) Counterplans that align themselves 100% with the AFF plan aren’t a reason to negate the plan: counterplans have to be a reason to negate the AFF: not a reason to align yourself with the AFF.

##  (--) Should means process counterplans don’t compete—it merely means the plan ought to be done—without respect for implementation questions:

**Sudison,** 7/18/20**06** (<http://sudison.blogspot.com/2006_07_01_archive.html>)

Shall **'shall' describes something that is mandatory**. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement \_will\_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. Should **'should' is weaker.** It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.

## (--) Resolved is merely the precursor to a policy statement: it doesn’t mean to stand firm:

**Robert’s Rules of Order** Revised 20**04**

<http://www.constitution.org/rror/rror-01.htm#4> Accessed 7/15/04

Motions and Resolutions. A motion is a proposal that the assembly take certain action, or that it express itself as holding certain views. It is made by a member's obtaining the floor as already described and saying, "I move that" (which is equivalent to saying, "I propose that"), and then stating the action he proposes to have taken. Thus a member "moves" (proposes) that a resolution be adopted, or amended, or referred to a committee, or that a vote of thanks be extended, etc.; or "That it is the sense of this meeting (or assembly) that industrial training," etc. Every resolution should be in writing, and the presiding officer has a right to require any main motion, amendment, or instructions to a committee to be in writing. When a main motion is of such importance or length as to be in writing it is usually written in the form of a resolution, that is, beginning with the words, "**Resolved, That,"** the word "Resolved" being underscored (printed in italics) and followed by a comma, and the word "That" beginning with a capital "T." If the word "Resolved" were replaced by the words "I move," the resolution would become a motion. A resolution is always a main motion. In some sections of the country the word "resolve" is frequently used instead of "resolution."

# Consult Japan 2AC

## Consultation on military issues fails to solve US-Japan relations:

Yuki **Tatsumi, 2010**. “A Short-Term Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk.” Accessed July 1, 2010 at <http://www.stimson.org/eastasia/pdf/Tatsumi_Challenge_to_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

For instance, while the two countries agreed on the dialogue about how to deepen the U.S.-Japan alliance with a goal of reaching an agreement in time to commemorate the alliance’s 50th anniversary, this process has not shown noticeable progress due to differences over the Futenma relocation. Consultation on the roles, missions, and capabilities between U.S. forces and the JSDF—an important relationship in which to discuss ways to deepen defense cooperation between the two uniformed organizations—**continues to show very little progress.**

(--) Permute: Consult and do the plan regardless of the outcome

## (--) Binding Consultation causes delays and devastates leadership

**Steinberg**, professor of political studies at Bar Ilan University, **2001** (Gerald, The Jerusalem Post, 9/21, lexis)

Instead of **time-consuming negotiations** and diplomatic coalition building, President Bush, as the leader of the world's only superpower needs to demonstrate his determination and power through clear action. This does not mean that long-standing allies such as NATO (including Turkey) and partners such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and even Russia and China should be ignored. Consultation and cooperation are important, but the US must also provide an **unambiguous lead.** Those states that are serious about anti-terrorist policies will follow, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and many other Arab and Islamic countries which are themselves threatened by fundamentalist Islamic terror.

## (--) Terminal impact is nuclear war:

**Khalilzad**, RAND Corporation, **1995** [Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly, Spring, l/n]

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# Consult Japan: 1ar Extensions: Alliance Resilient

## The US-Japan alliance is resilient: one or two issues won’t undermine it:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

At the same time, the party, when it was out of power, when it was campaigning, took a very strong view that this was something that they were going to need to look at. And as we have worked closely with our Japanese interlocutors, the new government, they’ve been very clear that they are determined to play a role in trying to bring peace and stability to South Asia, to Afghanistan, and to Pakistan. And so that’s one of the reasons that they’ve stepped up so substantially their assistance. And we’re grateful for that. So at the same time that this mission will be missed – refueling mission – it is also the case that Japan has now stepped up in a very important, major way in terms of providing assistance on the ground. The truth is in many respects, this is the first transfer in power in about half a century. We had short-term new governments in the 1990s, and it is completely natural and indeed expected that you’re going to go through periods in which both sides ask detailed questions and have a chance to look afresh at the commitments of previous administrations. That goes on in the American – on the American scene and we should expect it on the Japanese scene as well. I would say that in many respects, in terms of our interactions, we are finding an ability to discuss issues of mutual concern, whether they be regional or global, challenges on the Korean Peninsula, or issues associated with climate change, that there is, I think, very clearly a relationship that’s developing with new players across the Pacific, and I’m quite confident about the direction ahead. And so I think it’s important not to over-blow what – these challenges that we face and put them in a larger context and to recognize that **our alliance is bigger than any one or two issues,** and also appreciate that in the midst of very real challenges that we’re facing on Futenma and the like, it takes place within a context of cooperation and coordination that in many respects is unprecedented.

## Support to the alliance remains strong in Japan

Sheila A. **Smith 2010** (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies) “U.S.-Japan Relations” (testimony). March 17, 2010. Accessed from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/21666/usjapan_relations.html> on July 2, 2010.

**We must not allow ourselves to become consumed with this one issue. Our alliance relationship with Japan demands a broader lens—and a more thoughtful overhaul—if it is to demonstrate its salience for the next generation of Japanese and Americans. We must organize our policy cooperation with Japan for a more complex regional environment—and we must do it in a way that allows our policy coordination and cooperation to reflect changing responses to this environment.** Let me offer some suggestions on the opportunities ahead that if embraced could strengthen and focus our security cooperation with Japan in the years ahead. **The demand for greater transparency and accountability is part of any democratic nation’s politics, and in virtually every area of public policy, our governments are expected to respect the public’s rights to ask questions about priorities, procedures and policy choices. Support for the U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong in Japan. But it is the policy management practices of maintaining 50,000 troops on the ground that needs some adjustment.** Like many other societies that host U.S. military forces, there is a sense that the needs of local communities are not getting the attention they deserve. Japan’s governors, for example, articulate the need for a better set of guidelines for managing the environment on and around U.S. military bases. Obligated by local law to monitor and manage natural resources, governors in prefectures hosting U.S. military bases run into unique obstacles to the implementation of their obligations. Domestic law and the Status of Forces Agreement do not mesh well on the task of environmental management, and this needs greater attention. Thus, a bilateral discussion of the past practices of cooperation in hosting U.S. military forces in Japan could provide the opportunity to strengthen the relationship between U.S. commanders and local communities, and satisfy the growing desire for greater government accountability that is part and parcel of Japanese democracy. Incorporating local governors in the conversation would be a crucial first step to ensuring that the local impacts of the U.S. military are fully accommodated in national policy decisions. The growth in multilateral conversations within the region over regional security and economic cooperation is of great benefit to the construction of a greater sense of community among the diverse countries of the Asia Pacific. But in the past decade, we can also see new challenges for governments, and for the collective capacity of the countries of the region to cope with the significant challenges to their populations. **The United States, South Korea and Japan have intensified their cooperation on how to cope with the belligerence of North Korea, and this ought to be continued, including our collaboration on ballistic missile defense. Policy cooperation among the countries of Northeast Asia has produced a greater sense of common interest than in any previous time.**

# Consult Japan: 1ar Extensions: Alliance Resilient

## War on terror prevents alliance collapse and constitution blocks rearm.

**Kamiya**, associate professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan, **2002** <Matake, Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?, The Washington Quarterly 26.1 (2002-03) 63-75>

Today, no one should assume that the U.S.-Japanese alliance serves as the "cap in the bottle," without which Japan would easily go nuclear. Japan's nonnuclear policy is much stronger than that characterization would imply. It is more legitimate, however, to claim that Japan will be even less likely to reconsider its nonnuclear policy as long as it maintains a strong partnership with the United States. In his February 2002 speech to the Diet, President George W. Bush declared that the alliance between the two countries "has never been stronger" as a result of Japan's active cooperation in the U.S. war on terrorism. For a variety of reasons, particularly under such favorable circumstances today, international observers should be even less concerned about Japanese nuclear intentions.

# Consult Japan: 1ar Extensions: Economics, not military key

## Economic, not military issues are key to US-Japan relations:

C. Fred **Bergsten, 1998** (Peterson Institute for International Economics). “Japan and the United States in the World Economy.” Online. Accessed June 29, 2010 from: <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=315>

Relations between the United States and Japan also represent a paradox at the present moment. On the one hand, overall ties between the two countries are extremely strong. Recent agreements to update and improve security arrangements have indeed strengthened a crucial, and frequently contentious, element of the nexus. On the other hand, the frequency and intensity of disagreement over economic issues - especially the appropriateness, and degree of urgency, of Japanese policy in this area - have reached record levels. Their continuation could jeopardize the entire relationship despite all the progress on other topics.

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# Consult Japan Answers: Japan Won’t Re-arm

## (--) NO REARM: THEY KNOW IT’S NOT IN THEIR INTEREST

**Kamiya**, associate professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan, **2002** <Matake, Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?, The Washington Quarterly 26.1 (2002-03) 63-75>

Japan's Defense Agency soberly recognizes this reality. An unofficial study conducted in 1994 by Defense Agency officials and Self-Defense Forces officers at the behest of Administrative Vice-Minister Shigeru Hatakeyama concluded that Japan's possession of its own nuclear arsenal had little if any strategic merit. 19 In a 1996 presentation, Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces—reportedly a participant in the 1994 study group—asserted that, even without the protection of a U.S. nuclear umbrella, Japan would be worse off with its own nuclear arsenal. 20 He emphasized that, because Japan is an island country with a large part of its population of more than 120 million living in a small number of densely populated cities, nuclear armament would not suit Japan because of its inherent vulnerability to nuclear attack. As a result, Japan is better off in a world where just a few states possess nuclear weapons capability. Consequently, going nuclear would only endanger Japan because, while bringing only minimal military benefits to the country, such a move would motivate numerous other currently nonnuclear states to pursue proliferation. [End Page 68]

## (--) NO REARM: FOOD/SURVIVAL

**Kamiya**, associate professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan, **2002** <Matake, Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?, The Washington Quarterly 26.1 (2002-03) 63-75>

As alive and fundamental as antinuclear sentiment is, it does not represent the sole factor behind Japan's nonnuclear stance. Comparing the costs and benefits of going nuclear yields at least four basic reasons why Japan's decision to remain nonnuclear is also largely based on its national interests.

First, Japan's decision to go nuclear would surely undermine the stability of the international environment in which the country lives. As a resource-poor island country, friendly international relations are Japan's only hope to maintain its security and prosperity. The country imports nearly 80 percent of its total energy requirements and almost 100 percent of its petroleum requirements. 15 In fiscal 2000, Japan was self-sufficient for only 40 percent of its calories and 28 percent of its cereal grains. 16 As an island nation, Japan depends on sea-lanes for imports and exports. Thus, the Japanese are not merely speaking rhetorically when they say that world and regional peace is inseparable from the country's security and prosperity, as the government's Diplomatic Bluebook recently emphasized. 17

# Consult Japan Answers: Japan Won’t Re-arm

## U.S. withdrawal doesn’t mean Japanese re-arm – hierarchal model proves – prefer it, it’s predictive

David Kang, 20**03** Associate Prof of Gov’t @ Dartmouth, contributor to *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 183]

At the same time, **the importance of the U.S. as the lid on the boiling mess of Asian arms-racing and competition may be overstated.** **If the U.S. pulls out, a hierarchic view would predict that China would take a greater role in organizing the system, and Vietnam, Japan, and Korea adjust, with order preserved. U.S. withdrawal is not nearly so destabilizing for Japan in a hierarchic system** as in a realist world. Under this scenario **the US might withdraw and Japan will not rearm, because it feels no threat from China. In this case China and Japan know each other's place in the system and respect it.** Japanese restraint does not imply that Japan does not fear China. **Although there is plenty of concern about China in Japan, hierarchy does not imply warm friendly relations between the powers.**68 **Japan can be wary of China and still conduct its foreign policy in a manner that implicitly recognizes China's central position in Asia.** Historically, Chinese weakness has led to chaos in Asia. When China is strong and stable, order has been preserved. **The picture of Asia that emerges is one in which China, by virtue of geography and power, is the central player in Asia.** And as China's economy continues to develop, it is increasingly a major economic and financial power, as well. **In response, Asian nations will adjust to China.**

## Japan will not re-arm – current conditions are in its favor

David Kang, 2003 Associate Prof of Gov’t @ Dartmouth, contributor to *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 177]

The alternative to the umbrella hypothesis is fairly simple: **Japan has not rearmed to the level it could because it has no need to, and it has nointention of challenging China** for the central position in Asian politics. **Japan can survive right now- it has no need to arm any more**. **It also has a view that accepts China as big and central. The historic animosities** and the lingering mistrust **over Japan** for its transgressions in the first half of the twentieth century **are reasons sometimes cited for a fear of Japanese rearmament. However, the situation has changed dramatically after** nearly **sixty years. In the late nineteenth century Japan faced** decaying and despotic **Chinese and Korean monarchies**, a significant power vacuum, and extra-regional pressures from the western nations. **Today Japan faces the opposite: well-equipped Korean and Chinese militaries with significant economic growth and robust economies, and no significant European** or Russian **intrusions to its region. It is unlikely that Japan need or will seek to expand its diplomatic and military influence on the Asian landmass.**

# Consult Japan Answers: Japan Won’t Re-arm

## Weakening of the U.S. – Japan alliance would not cause Japanese re-arm – empirically denied and realist hypotheses false

David Kang, 2003 Associate Prof of Gov’t @ Dartmouth, contributor to *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 176]

The second hypothesis, regarding the U.S. as keeping the genie in the bottle, is also suspect. First, why would the second-largest power in the system trust the hugest power? Threats arise by the mere presence of capabilities – intentions can always change for the worse. As Robert Jervis writes, "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise." Even if a nation was peaceful when it was weak, changes in power can bring changes in goals. Second, why has Japan not doubted the U.S. commitment many times before? Arguments about the umbrella implicitly assume that Japan is realist and would rearm if the U.S. leaves. If this is true, and if there is no other factor that keeps Japanese foreign policy from being more assertive, then we should have seen Japan rearm at least a decade ago. **From a Japanese perspective, there are only two pieces of information necessary to doubt the trustworthiness of the U.S. commitment:** l. **How we treat our allies in Asia** 2. **How we treat Japan** From a realist perspective, the only information Japan should need to rearm is evidence regarding those two conditions. **Yet those two conditions were met in the mid-1950s**. **From the vantage point of 1985, a Japanese policy maker would have to conclude that it was unlikely that the U.S. would still be defending Japan in 2000. Why? Because Japan had just had 15 years of negative signals.** As the Jervis quote above shows, "things change," and if anything, **Japanese had every reason to doubt the U.S. commitment.** **In** 19**69** President **Nixon** had called for "Asia for Asians" and **began a major drawdown of U.S. troops and commitments to the region. By** 19**85**, Japan had seen **the U.S. abandon both South Vietnam and Taiwan. By the mid-1980s, U.S. anger at Japanese trading and economic policies was reaching a crescendo**, culminating in the 1985 Plaza Accords and the 1988 Structural Impediments Initiative. In addition, the U.S. had begun to pressure Japan over "burden sharing" and attempted to make the Japanese pay more for the U.S. troops already deployed. All the indicators pointed to the conclusion that the U.S. would not be a reliable ally of Japan in the future. In addition, Japanese economic growth was at its height, Japanese national sentiment about its future was increasingly optimistic, and in 1985 Japan was potentially a better technological and manufacturing country than the U.S. From a realist perspective, only the most naive and myopic of leaders would focus only on the present. Indeed, precisely because of the vagaries of international politics, realists see leaders of nations as constantly looking over the horizon and trying to anticipate future trends. **Thus, Japan has already had ample reason to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense.**

# Consult Japan Answer Extensions: Consult Damages Leadership

(--) Consultation devastates leadership

Charles Krauthammer, The National Interest, Winter, 2003

America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest. Especially on matters of national security, war-making and the deployment of power, America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions such as those imposed by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, yes. No need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a need to do so on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the u.s.s. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be hostage to others. No unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question that separates unilateralism from multilateralism-and that tests the "pragmatic realists"-is this: What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national-and international-security? The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America's unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up-either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.

# Consult Japan Answer Extensions: Consult Damages Leadership

(--) BINDING CONSULTATION UNDERMINES LEADERSHIP AND EMBOLDENS ADVERSARIES

Bob **Dole**, former Senator from Kansas, Spring 19**95** [Foreign Policy]

The United States, as the only global power, must lead. Europe--as individual states or as a collective cannot. China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Japan are important regional powers, and some may be potential regional threats. But only the United States can lead on the full range of political, diplomatic, economic, and military issues confronting the world. Leadership does not consist of posing questions for international debate; leadership consists of proposing and achieving solutions. The American attempt in May 1993 to discuss lifting the Bosnian arms embargo with NATO allies, for example, was simply wrong: It was a discussion, not a U.S. initiative, and was readily perceived by the Europeans as a half-hearted attempt lacking President Clinton's commitment. By comparison, if President Bush had followed a similar course after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein would still be in Kuwait today--if not in Saudi Arabia--and he would very possibly be armed with nuclear weapons. Leadership is also saying what you mean, meaning what you say, and sticking to it. That includes a willingness to use American force when required. To state that North Korea "cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb" and then one year later to sign an agreement that ignores the issue of the existing arsenal is confusing to the American people and to our allies. To threaten to withdraw most-favored-nation trading status from China because of human rights violations and then to extend such status months later--despite no change in Chinese human rights practices--makes the world wonder why the linkage was made in the first place. To introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, while top administration officials claim the war is over and the Serbs have won, severs any link between the words of U.S. policymakers and their deeds. U.S. Sovereignty Must Be Defended, Not Delegated International organizations--whether the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or any others--will not protect American interests. Only America can do that. International organizations will, at best, practice policymaking at the lowest common denominator--finding a course that is the least objectionable to the most members. Too often, they reflect a consensus that opposes American interests or does not reflect American principles and ideals. Even gaining support for an American position can involve deals or tradeoffs that are not in America's long-term interests. Acquiescence in Russian activities in Georgia and other border states, for example, may be too high a price for Russian acceptance of U.S. positions. The choices facing America are not, as some in the administration would like to portray, doing something multilaterally, doing it alone, or doing nothing. These are false choices. The real choice is whether to allow international organizations to call the shots--as in Somalia or Bosnia--or to make multilateral groupings work for American interests--as in Operation Desert Storm. Subcontracting American foreign policy and subordinating American sovereignty encourage and strengthen isolationist forces at home--**and embolden our adversaries abroad.**

# Consult Japan Answers: Delay Extensions

CONSULTATION TAKES MONTHS

**BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2002**  (From London-based paper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 6/26, lexis)

The US president also spoke about reaching a final peace between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. This is also in agreement with the Arab position, which believes that the comprehensive and final peace will not be achieved if the negotiations do not include the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. Within the context of pondering the positive points, Bush's statement - which came after a long wait, delay and extensive consultations between Washington and the Arab parties, Israel, the EU and Russia - can be seen as the outcome of the Arab diplomatic efforts that lasted **many months** to make President Bush's administration undertake its responsibilities in the Middle East in its capacity as the superpower and the main sponsor of the peace negotiations

# Consult Japan Answers: Multilateralism Won’t Solve

## Multilateral approach can’t solve for stability in East Asia---multiple warrants

**Rapp 2004** (William E. Rapp, career soldier who has served in Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 2004. www.questia.com)

There are four primary reasons why the United States should not be enthusiastic about multilateral, collective security as the primary policy option in Northeast Asia. First, the region has no history of such practices. On the contrary, its history, for most of the past two millennia, has been one of subordination to cultural, economic, and political (though rarely military) influence of the Middle Kingdom in China. [**157**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038118) In more modern times, Amitav Acharya notes that the extreme diversity of the region, combined with the geopolitical situation following World War II, has prevented the establishment of effective multilateral regimes in Asia as compared to Europe. [**158**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038118) Second, a collective security arrangement requires a baseline of consensus and the shelving of standing disputes among its members as entry into the forum. Michael Armacost notes that “the prerequisites for collective security―a common perception of threats, general agreement about the territorial status quo, and a sense of community underpinned by widely accepted political and philosophical principles―have not taken root in Asia.” [**159**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038118) For both domestic and future energy policy reasons, it is not likely for territorial disputes such as those in the Senkakus, Northern Islands (Southern Kuriles), Takeshima, the Paracels, and the Spratlys to be put aside so readily. [**160**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038118) Third, a cooperative security regime requires a sanction capability that is widely perceived as legitimate to punish transgressions. Since a multilateral regime that did not include China would likely create a security dilemma for Beijing and thus lead to an arms spiral that would be highly counterproductive, the inclusion of China would exacerbate the problems of sanctioning behavior seen by the United States and Japan as illegal. This same tendency is seen on a lesser scale in the current security forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF is hamstrung by the “ASEAN way, ” which involves pervasive norms of nonconfrontation, consensus, and respect for each other's sovereignty. [**161**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038119) Finally, the United States, especially under the George W. Bush administration, is wary of multilateral security arrangements that could become institutionalized in coming years and reduce American policy options in Asia. [**162**](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/110038119) In summary, reducing the salience of the U.S.-Japan alliance in favor of a multilateral cooperative security arrangement is not a viable near term option for the United States.

# Consult Japan Answers: Japan Won’t Seek Soft Power

## (--) Japan’s emergence as a hegemon is impossible due to its nature

G. John Ikenberry, 2003 Prof. of Geoptx and Global Justice @ Georgetown, Michael Mastanduno, Prof and Chair of Dep. Of Gov’t @ Dartmouth, eds.; *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York : Columbia University Press, c 2003 [pgs. 9-10]

This observation is even more relevant in thinking about Japanese hegemony. The chapter by Masaru Tamamoto (ch. 5) makes a strong argument that Japanese hegemony is not even possible- even if the objective material capabilities and conditions existed. According to Tamamoto, Japan has fundamentally redefined its political identity and ambitions so as to make any type of hegemony unthinkable. Japan has moved so decisively beyond the territorial and military-dominated great-power orientation that defined Japan's foreign policy until its defeat in World War ll that it will remain satisfied playing a junior role in America's regional and global system. Indeed, from a contemporary 'Japanese perspective , Japan has devised a brilliant solution to its regional dilemmas: the United Stales solves Japan's security problems-keeping estranged Korea and China at bay, and leaving Japan to perfect and protect its internal political culture and society. Tamamoto argues that Japan really doesn't have a foreign policy, or if it does, it is channeled through Washington, D.C. Japanese hegemony is essentially unthinkable because Japan's external orientation is deeply embedded in its transformed postwar political identity

## Consult Japan Answers—Asian Conflict Answers

## (--) Japan would be able to handle an Asian security crisis if independent from the US alliance

Carpenter 97 (Ted, **vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Cato Handbook For Congress: Toward a New Relationship With Japan,** [**http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-47.html**](http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-47.html) **)**

The U.S. military alliance with Japan no longer serves the best interests of either country. Washington subsidizes Japan's defense at the expense of American taxpayers. That subsidy, which has amounted to more than $900 billion (in 1996 dollars) since the early 1950s, is a powerful incentive for the Japanese government to continue free riding on the U.S. security guarantee. And Japan's much-touted host-nation support of $5 billion a year actually pays only a small fraction of the total cost of the U.S. security commitment. Even worse, Washington's policy encourages a dependent mentality on the part of the Japanese and enables Tokyo to evade political and military responsibilities in East Asia even when Japan has important interests at stake. Japanese officials state repeatedly that, in the event of war, Japanese military units would not join U.S. forces in combat operations unless Japan itself were attacked. U.S. leaders foolishly perpetuate Japan's security dependence. Washington's East Asian policy is held hostage to the exaggerated fears of Japan's neighbors, who oppose a more active military role for Tokyo. A lingering undercurrent of distrust toward Japan in U.S. policy circles has also been a major motive for Washington's "smothering'' strategy. A new policy is needed. It would seek a mature relationship between equals and recognize that Japan, as the principal great power in East Asia, must play a more significant role in the region's security affairs. The United States should withdraw its forces from Japan over the next five years and keep smaller forces based in Guam and other U.S. territories. The U.S.-Japanese alliance ought to be replaced by a more limited, informal security relationship.

# Consult Japan Answers—Japan troops say no evidence

## Japan wouldn’t support the removal of all troops from Japan:

Mari **Yamaguchi, 2010 (**staff writer). Japan Today. “Japan balks at $2 billion bill to host U.S. troops.” Online. Accessed on July 1, 2010 from: <http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/japan-balks-at-2-billion-bill-to-host-us-troops>

 “When people who live in crowded areas in small houses drive by and see the situation on the bases, some feel angry,” said Hideki Toma, an official dealing with the bases on Okinawa. “This is a bigger issue than the golf courses and free highway passes,” Toma said. “It goes back to the fact that Okinawa was occupied after World War II and why the bases have to be here in the first place.” That sentiment is widely shared, and underscores a feeling that the bases should be spread out more evenly among Japan’s main islands and Okinawa. Okinawa was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II, and Okinawans feel that the continued U.S. presence places an uneven burden on them, though the argument that all U.S. forces should leave Japan is not popular. American officials say the deployment in Japan of troops, fighter jets and the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier based outside the U.S. has enabled Japan to hold down its own defense costs in line with its pacifist constitution.

# Consult Japan Answers: Okinawa Base

## No net benefit: US & Japan have already consulted extensively about Futemna base:

Kurt M**. Campbell, 2010** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). “Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance.” January 19, 2010 <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>

Indira Lakshmanan. I’m from Bloomberg. I want to ask you two unrelated questions. The first is about Japan. What sort of indications do you have that we don’t already know about that this Futemna issue is actually going to be worked out? Because what we’ve seen until now is each side intransigent in their position or seemingly, at least publicly. So what signs do you have that this is actually going to work out the way the U.S. wants it to? And secondly, on China, I’d like to know whether that demarche has been formally issued over the Google case, and I’d also like to hear from you a little bit more about what the U.S. is doing with China in terms of internet freedom and internet security. ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Thank you, good questions. Look, it is clearly – and I’ll take the first one first – we have had extraordinarily deep and detailed conversations between the United States and Japan on this matter. And obviously, there’s a balance here. The United States is trying to be very clear and firm about why we think this position that’s been worked out over decades, really, is the right approach. But at the same time, we do not wish to appear intransigent, and indeed, we’ve tried to be very clear that our door is open for dialogue and discussions on a whole host of matters, and we’re also trying to maintain within this general context a flexibility.

# Consult Japan: Japan Soft Power Impact Turns

## A) Increased Japanese soft power causes trade friction with the United States:

Michael **AUSLIN and** Michael **GREEN, 2007** (American Enterprise Institute and the CSIS). Asian Economic Policy Review, “Japan's Security Policy in East Asia.” Accessed via EBSCO host, July 2, 2010.

The Soviets’ military build-up in the Far East, invasion of Afghanistan, and then support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 all contributed to greater Japanese fears of abandonment and added new glue to the US–Japan alliance. After formulating clearer guidelines for US–Japan defense cooperation in 1978 in response to the initial Soviet threat, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and US President Ronald Reagan joined together to create a new alliance based on upgraded interoperability, Japanese capabilities for air and sea defense of the Northern Territories, and unequivocal Japanese alignment with the West. Yet Tokyo also pursued its own interests based on rapid economic growth and the sudden appreciation of the yen after the 1985 Plaza Accord. Massive official development assistance investment and exports yielded enormous softpower benefits for Tokyo in the region, **but caused increased trade friction with Washington.**

## B) Free trade solves nuclear war:

**Copley News Service**, 12/1/**99** (Lexis)

For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to **forestall conflict with other nations**. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of **a worldwide nuclear war** for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have **a major disincentive to wage war**. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.