# Critique Perm Solvency

**We must imagine contradictory simultaneous contradictory worlds in order to achieve utopian thought**

**Duda, 6** (John Duda, Grad Student Humanities Center @ Johns Hopkins Unviersity, “Frederic Jameson. Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions” MLN 120.5 1245-1249, Online @ Project MUSE)

For Jameson, then, **the effectiveness of Utopia is guaranteed not because it** [End Page 1247] **is empty, but because it is overfull, teeming with maximally incompatible alternatives**, perpetually in crisis due to this surfeit of content. What this calls into question is not only a tolerant pluralistic Utopia of Utopias, but also the project of a "minimal formulation of Utopian demands which might somehow retain effective universality" (172). Jameson finds precisely such an attempt at a so-called "zero-degree Utopia" in the work of T. W. Adorno. Yet even in the shadow of Adorno's critical demand ("That no one shall go hungry anymore"), and its intention to forestall any and all superfluity of Utopian construction—one might say that, after Auschwitz, any garden city or crystal palace would merely insult the dead—one can with Jameson still see the shimmer of Utopian content.Jameson's contention is that, **even in the most minimal constructions of the aesthetic project of negativity, the subjective projection of an imagined Utopia persists.** Jameson explicitly asks us to read Adorno ultimately as a science fiction author: the radical impossibility of overturning the regime of property and self-preservation still translates into a demand to imagine a future, one in which "some altogether unrecognizable 'human nature' would take the place of this one" (174). Yet this bind, in which even the most radical demands for escape from the regime of property, from the world of domination and suffering, are inflected with a particular and determinate content, is not in the final analysis, a cause for alarm: **The desire called Utopia must be concrete and ongoing, without being defeatist or incapacitating; it might therefore be better to follow an aesthetic paradigm and to assert that not only that the production of the unresolvable contradiction is the fundamental process, but that we must imagine some form of gratification inherent in this very contradiction with pessimism and the impossible.**

# AT: Feminism K

**Utopianism is a productive way of promoting feminism.**

**Johnson, 2** (Greg Johnson, Assisstant Professor of Philosophy @ Pacific Lutheran University (Tacoma, Washington), “The Situated Self and Utopian Thinking” Hypatia 17.3 (2002) 20-44, Online @ Project MUSE)

Let me begin this section by saying that I embrace the spirit of conventional utopian thought as that which imaginatively questions what is given and produces alternative possibilities. I agree here with Drucilla Cornell, who embraces the "representational device" of traditional utopian thought and its "pride of place given to the imagination, including its function as fundamental to reason" (Cornell 1998, 185). However important this function of utopian thinking is, as Cornell also suggests, it is not enough. More is needed. First, situated utopian thinking is the mode by which we reflect on society at the level of both politics and morality. This is not, however, in the sense of the establishing a blueprint of an ideal society. Rather, and again following Cornell, the utopian is that which "demands the continual exploration and re-exploration of the possible and yet also unrepresentable" (Cornell 1991b, 169). Second, situated utopian thinking is the fundamental way we avoid the pitfalls of parochialism (often an extreme implication of situatedness), and ahistorical disinterestedness (a risk in retaining a notion of universalism). That is, utopian thinking provides the point of convergence between our need to speak from our location and our ability to argue for the universally intended dimension of our claims. Third, utopian thinking argues for more than that which is different. Difference is not necessarily utopian. Situated utopian thinking, insofar as it is political thought, demands something of those who argue for alternative pictures of reality. For example, broadly construed, feminism as a political movement is not utopian simply because it seeks *to think differently* about the sex-gender system, which is to say offers alternatives to our understanding of this system. Instead, as Benhabib indicates, feminism as a political movement [End Page 30] is utopian because on the one hand it argues for, among other things, the universally intended claim that the sex-gender system as a system that reinscribes a hierarchy of knowledge that excludes the experience of women is oppressive and wrong. On the other hand, as a utopian movement, feminism requires those committed to its visions to place themselves at risk, which, for example, might mean jeopardizing job security or personal safety, or risking other forms of persecution. Feminism as a transformative political movement of the utopian demands that those who are committed to the betterment of the lives of women (including men) place themselves at risk in offering an alternative to the sex-gender system that seeks to degrade and dehumanize so many women. What Benhabib offers is a way to conceptualize how the utopian is both universal and interactive. It is universal insofar as it posits a vision of the future and attempts, in her words, to "woo the consent" of everyone (Benhabib 1992, 136). When, for example, we undergo a transformation, an interruptive moment, a utopian moment, we will more than likely argue for that position in a robust and confident way (especially if this transformation fundamentally reorients us). Perhaps, then, to "woo" is not as strong because based on the universalistic and rationalistic dimensions of the utopian (understood the way Benhabib explains it) we will woo, argue, testify, critique, and even exclude positions that we do not like because on an interactive model not every ethical and political claim is equally valuable. [5](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/hypatia/v017/17.3johnson.html" \l "FOOT5) In this regard, the utopian moment that interrupts us and reorients our thought and practice and potentially opens us to newness is a normative moment, which can be understood in the following way. First, the normative weight of the utopian occurrence arises from our lived bodily experience as we attempt to make sense of the situation in which we find ourselves. This attempt is one where we describe or venture an interpretation of the situation that, as in the case of the sex-gender system, shapes our identities in particularly degrading ways. Second, we also attempt to interpret the situation so as to enable us to reconfigure or transform the situation for the better. What is offered here is a description and depiction of what is other to, which is to say better than the current narrative that is harmful. Third, and important for my purposes, our embodiment supplies us with and offers a standard against which we are able to challenge and interrupt the system in which we find ourselves. This standard, therefore, is an embodied norm that judges and prescriptively offers something else in the place of that which often devastates our lived existence. The sex-gender system again can illustrate this point. Once we find ourselves in the sex-gender system that constructs our identities in particular ways, we undergo a moment that causes us to challenge a particular understanding of the system. The interruption we undergo, which is grounded in and by our embodiment, is an interruption that moves us then to disrupt and transform the sex-gender system in ways that offer new alternatives. What may follow, and I would contend does follow, is that the normative claims [End Page 31] against the sex-gender system and the claims *for* something other are claims that interactively emerge in a situation but are *intended* universally. This is something that Benhabib helps us to see, namely, that even though our normative claims are put forth with confidence (for example, the sex-gender system as that which reinscribes an inferior/superior way of understanding knowledge to the exclusion of women's experiences is wrong everywhere), our new understanding does not entail that in order for us to have agreement on the best utopian alternative we must all concur on a certain set of a priori principles. The normative weight, while boldly engaging others, proceeds with humility and the recognition that the newness that has come from a utopian moment is still a particular and located vision. Thus, the normative weight that emerges in and through our bodies is understood*interactively*, where we are intertwined with those whose consent we seek to "woo" (to use Benhabib's language). [6](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/hypatia/v017/17.3johnson.html" \l "FOOT6) The important point here is that in offering a modified view of the utopian that utilizes the framework of interactive universalism, with its reliance on our embodied interaction with our environment, we can begin to transform the utopian by reconsidering the body as the ground for its situatedness. The place of embodiment as that which structures or illuminates the movement of the utopian must be examined more closely so that the connections between embodiment and the utopian can be seen more clearly. In doing so, however, we must turn or return to the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose work on embodiment provides the framework to make this connection clearer. Accordingly, with the help of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body, I now want to do for the utopian what Benhabib does for universalism, namely, to show how it is possible to reconceive it as thoroughly situated yet equally critical.

**Transformative utopianism infused with politics is consistent with feminist goals.**

**Johnson, 2** (Greg Johnson, Assisstant Professor of Philosophy @ Pacific Lutheran University (Tacoma, Washington), “The Situated Self and Utopian Thinking” Hypatia 17.3 (2002) 20-44, Online @ Project MUSE)

The above examples, in the end, indicate something that feminist thinkers such as Benhabib and Cornell adamantly claim: we do not have to fear the utopian. Instead, as they do, we can and should reject crude forms of utopian thought and affirm a more interactive and embodied understanding. Without thinking through these embodied and situated dimensions, utopian thinking runs the risk of repeating the past problems of presenting alternative visions as naive, disinterested and pathological. In this essay, I have shown one way we might begin to think through these connections. I have, more precisely, argued that such thinking relies on the following: First, it depends on a reconfigured understanding of universalism that initially provides the framework in which the call emerges for a non-conventional view of the utopian. Second, as that which is central to understanding what it means to speak of the interactive, it depends on rethinking the relationship between our embodiment and the utopian movement that inspires transformative ethics and politics. Finally, whether one chooses the view of Benhabib, or of Cornell, or of Merleau-Ponty (and these are by no means the only theorists who can aid us in this task), it calls for a retrieval of *philosophical* resources that enable us to adopt utopian thinking without succumbing to naive, futuristic projections that ignore the present. I have tried to tell one narrative—from interactive universalism to embodiment to utopian thought—as to how we might begin this task. If our utopian thinking is to be different than the past and avoid pathological moves [End Page 40] to disinterestedness, then it has to begin to take situatedness in its embodied and embedded forms seriously. If, however, our situatedness is not to paralyze us ethically and politically, then we must finds ways to rise above our particularities so that transformative links can be made where differences are not violently erased. Only then will utopian thinking be a credible mode of thought and action "after metaphysics."

# Utopianism transformative

**Utopian desires through affective connections create transformative politics**

**McManus, 7** (Susan McManus, Lecturer in Political Theory @ Queen’s University, “Theorizing Utopian Agency: Two Steps Toward Utopian Techniques of the Self” Theory and Events, Volume 10 Issue 3, 2007, Online @ Project MUSE)

The utopian potential of political agency and ethical engagement stands at the intersection of a series of important and varied debates within contemporary political theory. Contemporary political theory has become increasingly concerned to cultivate the affective (and even the somatic) registers as those registers inflect the epistemological and the ethical so as to cultivate ways of knowing and modes of agency that are active, creative, and potentially transformative. Drawing theoretical sustenance from the modern altercanon, in which Spinoza, Marx, Nietzsche, Benjamin, Foucault and Deleuze, among others, are vital, contemporary engagements with the politics of agency have been increasingly concerned to theorize a subject both within the world (and so resisting the abstract rational subject that has been dominant in the liberal tradition), and capable of reshaping an engagement with, and effects upon, that world (thus speaking to a potentially transformative *and* poststructuralist mode of agency).[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn6" \o ")While at some level still committed to a polity shaped by forms of procedural justice, radical liberal theory engages the affective agency of the subject in various ways. In its predominantly post-Foucauldian forms, a (late-)modern subjectivity capable of challenging subtle, menacing, and enveloping forms of modern power is theorized by means of a critique of the political dynamics of *ressentiment*, a life-denying, ascetic, reactive mode of being in the world.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn7" \o ") In its post-Spinozist forms, "affective attachment" to and within the world is theorized as "a mood with ethical potential" that can "lend energy to political struggles".[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn8" \o ") And key post-Nietzschean engagements with the political subject speak to an "ethos" of the political that carefully theorizes the subject's affective and "visceral" registers in order to lend sustenance to a polity shaped by liberal pluralism where relations between self and other might no longer be seen as oppositional and thus exclusionary.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn9" \o ") The affective is thus deployed as a means of reflexively engaging with political orientations of the subject. Such attention to the dynamics of political agency, underpinned by an emphasis on an ethics grounded in affective connections with the world, has an implicit but marked utopian dimension. Despite Marx's protestations to the contrary, utopia, as a way of doing politics, has been centrally concerned with agency and with political transformation grounded in "yearning" for better and more just worlds.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn10" \o ") The utopian challenge to knowledge is precisely the imperative to "think differently": to feel and know the world in ways that "venture beyond" the given, that are not captured and contained by the exigencies of the present order of things.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn11" \o ") Utopians seek a wisdom that is disjunctive, at once within yet against its times. In so doing, utopians gesture toward a knowledge, or wisdom, in which "lucidity" has become "combative".[12](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn12" \o ") Such a knowledge seeks to open spaces of alterity and critique; its alterity seeks to alter, to intervene within the configuration of the present by revealing new and different possibilities, not to legitimate the world as it is already given, already known, already ordered. As such, Fredric Jameson has recently suggested that within the contemporary struggles of the "post-globalization left," "Utopia seems to have recovered its vitality as a political slogan and a politically energizing perspective."[13](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn13" \o ")

**Dreaming and wonder infused with politics create change**

**McManus, 7** (Susan McManus, Lecturer in Political Theory @ Queen’s University, “Theorizing Utopian Agency: Two Steps Toward Utopian Techniques of the Self” Theory and Events, Volume 10 Issue 3, 2007, Online @ Project MUSE)

I have proposed that the contemporary theoretical engagement with the transformative power of affective agency might be well situated to respond to the exhaustion of agency, just as the utopian inflection of the capacities of agency may then further radicalize the politics of that agenda. The re-visioning and re-orienting of subjectivity and thus agency is detailed, delicate work. I respond, then, to aspects of this problematic through mapping subjectivity via a "cartography of affective forms" that seeks to lend itself to the speculative articulation of utopian "techniques of the self" as a means of encouraging hopeful agency from the malaise of blocked consciousness and exhaustion.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn24" \o ") Modes of the affective can serve to enhance ethical commitment and political agency; and utopian techniques of the self can, I wager, provide small steps in tracing possible ways of moving from desire to hope; that is, can play a part in the "education of desire," as Ruth Levitas, drawing on Morris, has argued is the vital political dynamic of the utopian impulse.[25](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn25" \o ") To be sure, affective agency is always already shaped, disciplined, invested. However, to "engage with the limits that are imposed upon us" is also to "experiment with the possibility of going beyond them."[26](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn26" \o ") The dynamic and creative potential of poststructuralist formulations of "subjectivity as subjection" can be elicited to reflexively enhance the imaginative and productive aspects of subjectivity.[27](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn27" \o ") In the following sections, as a speculative attempt to render the knowing self in the world differently, I turn to a cartography of the affective forms of *dreaming* and *wonder*. Why these forms? Both have an immediate utopian affiliation; but both, as I demonstrate, harbor hegemonic or disciplinary as well as affirmative modes. Both are thus undervalued and erased, as well as contested and vexed, modes of orienting the self in the world. I propose, through an "untimely" genealogy, that affirmative forms of both can be cultivated via utopian techniques of the self.[28](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn28" \o ") I name this task genealogical because I am concerned to problematize and unwork the disciplinary production of modern, western, rational subjects (the subject of blocked consciousness who inhabits political theory texts from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls and beyond). The boundaries of this genealogy are thus (ambitiously) modernity itself, and the status and effects of its dominant affective-subjective formations. In unpacking some key moments in the disciplining of each affective form, its potential in informing a hopeful utopian political agency can be gleaned. So, I seek to invoke an agency and impulse at once fully within, yet resolutely against, the hegemonic, instrumental logic of the times, deploying the limitations and disciplinary moments of those cartographies as a way to move beyond them. Such cartographies figure agency in Walter Benjamin's terms: through the "peaks and crags, which offer a footing to someone who would cross over them"; the utopian impulse for the "beyond" is manifest in the other-within.[29](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn29" \o ") What, then, are the (potentially) utopian techniques of the self that I offer? First,dreaming. That certain ways of experiencing and knowing the world have been rendered epistemologically and politically subordinate is a matter of a distinsctive historical production and disciplining. Dreaming, and dreaming otherwise, is politically vital. Through a genealogical excavation of the ways in which dreaming has functioned in philosophical work, I expose a lateral fissure through which the edges of the construction of the current regime of subjectivity can be glimpsed. Dreaming, therefore, can be opened to a productive self-alterity. And second, wonder. As affective form, wonder is no less troubled or complicit in the production of a certain disciplinary and hegemonic form of self-consciousness within western modernity. Nevertheless, attention to re-figuring wonder has the potential to critically interrupt and overturn its hegemonic maneuvers. For, as an "ethical passion," or an "affective energetic," wonder makes vivid an "alter-vision" that traverses subject and object (knowing self and her world) and infuses knowledge with possibility.[30](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.3mcmanus.html" \l "_edn30" \o ") Cultivating this sense of wonder (traversing subject and object) could, I suggest, be a vital utopian technique of the self, one that enables an alertness to the irreducible plurality and potential of the present (those other strata of possibility in the present orderings of things).

# AT: Capitalism

**Utopianism offers an envisioned alternative to capitalism and challenges its inevitability**

**Wiggins, 7** (Kyle A. Wiggins, doctoral candidate in the English and American Literature Department at Brandeis University, Futures of Negation: Jameson's Archaeologies of the Future and Utopian Science Fiction, PMC 17.3, 2007, Online @ Project MUSE)

Archaeologies of the Future is divided into two sections: the first section comprises previously unpublished material that theorizes the utopian genre and codifies Jameson's earlier schematics on the subject, and the second collects essays on utopias that Jameson has written throughout his career, ranging from 1973 ("Generic Discontinuities in SF") to recent efforts ("Fear and Loathing in Globalization"), including some of his most provocative essays, pieces that are landmarks in utopian criticism and theory ("Progress versus Utopia, or, Can We Imagine the Future?"). The book's holistic project traces the historical development of utopia as a literary form, moving from Thomas More's generative 1516 text, Utopia, to contemporary novels. However, Jameson devotes most of his analysis to utopian mechanisms in science fiction. He follows Darko Suvin's postulation that utopia is a socioeconomic sub-genre of SF and that, like the larger genre to which it belongs, utopia produces an effect of "cognitive estrangement"--that is, the fictions in which utopian desire appear make strange the familiar power structures of our lives. As readers, we recognize our own world burning within the alien place. Malls, prisons, governments, customs, speech, and even geographies are recognizable yet different by one remove (or more). By disturbing the familiarity and fixity of recognizable power structures, SF texts tease us with radical social models. Science fiction satiates our desire for a transformed tomorrow while reminding us of that future's uncertainty and contingency. However, Jameson dismisses the "vacuous evocation" of utopia "as the image of a perfect society or even the blueprint of a better one" (72). Such a conception of utopia is too simplistic. Instead, **he sees utopian desire as global capitalism's imagined neutralization. J**ameson believes that "one cannot imagine any fundamental change in our social existence which has not first thrown off Utopian visions like so many sparks from a comet" (xii). Utopia's political relevance, though, comes not from banal pining but from its combative opposition to the "universal belief that the historic alternatives to capitalism have been proven unviable and impossible, and that no other socioeconomic system is conceivable, let alone practically available" (xii). **Utopian science fictions threaten the ideological dominance of capitalism by theorizing a world change towards egalitarianism.** Or, as Jameson puts it, the **utopians "not only offer to conceive of such alternate systems; Utopian form is itself a representational meditation on radical difference, radical otherness**, and on the systemic nature of social totality" (xii). Utopia offers **the imaginative counterpunch to the Thatcherite decree that free-market capitalism is our inevitable future.**

**Our advocacy is key to open up public critiques of capitalism.**

**Fitting, 98** (Peter Fitting, Director of the Cinema Studies Programme at the University of Toronto, associate professor of French, and former chair of the Society of Utopian Studies, “The Concept of Utopia in the Work of Frederic Jameson” Utopian Studies Vol 9 No2 1998, Penn State University Press, Online @ JSTOR)

Jameson's first contribution to the development of Utopian studies fol lows from his presentation of "dialectical thinking" in Marxism and Form (1971) with its influential discussion of Bloch and Marcuse, and his defence of the timeliness of the Utopian impulse: For where in the older society (as in Marx's classic analysis) **Utopian thought represented a diversion of revolutionary energy into idle wish-fulfilments and imaginary satisfactions, in our own time the very nature of the Utopian concept has undergone a dialectical reversal.** Now it is practical thinking which every where represents a capitulation to the system itself, and stands as a testimony to the power of that system to transform even its adversaries into its own mirror image. The Utopian idea, on the contrary, **keeps alive the possibility of a world qualitatively distinct from this one and takes the form of a stubborn negation of all that is.** (1971: 110-111) In the 1960s, Utopian writing in North America found a home in science fiction, a genre better suited to the task of imagining "a world qualitatively distinct from this one" than was the realism of mainstream fiction. The enlargement of science fiction, from hardware and adventure to social con cerns began with the critique of the status quo and soon turned to more The Concept of Utopia 9 explicit "thought experiments." While there was science fiction which pre sented a critique of capitalism or of the US intervention in Vietnam, the most important new thematic area followed the fault line of gender. Ursula K. Le Guin's celebrated science fiction novel dealing with sex and gender, The Left Hand of Darkness (1969)?was followed by a series of science fic tion Utopias in the 1970s: beginning with her own The Dispossessed (1974), Joanna Russ's The Female Man (1975), Samuel Delany's Triton (1976) and Marge Piercy's Woman on the Edge of Time (1976)?to name only a few of the best known of these works.3

# AT: Utopianism Bad Offense

**Utopianism should not be read literally – it’s meant to open us up to new modes of thinking-feeling-acting**

**Fitting, 98** (Peter Fitting, Director of the Cinema Studies Programme at the University of Toronto, associate professor of French, and former chair of the Society of Utopian Studies, “The Concept of Utopia in the Work of Frederic Jameson” Utopian Studies Vol 9 No2 1998, Penn State University Press, Online @ JSTOR)

From the perspective of those of us who work on and write about Utopian fiction, Jameson's most fruitful and troubling intervention lies else where, in his proposal that the literary Utopia should not be seen as the rep resentation of an ideal society, but as a reflection on "our own incapacity to conceive [utopia] in the first place" (1975: 230). This argument, first advanced in the conclusion of his article on Le Guin's The Left Hand of Darkness (1975), was fully elaborated in his 1977 analysis of Marin's Uto piques, and again in the 1982 article "Progress Versus Utopia; or, Can We Imagine the Future," in which he discussed the Strugatsky brothers' Road side Picnic. There he **wrote that our "constitutional inability to imagine Utopia itself, [is not due] to any individual failure of imagination but is the result of the systemic, cultural, and ideological closure of which we are all in one way or another prisoners."** (1982: 153) Instead of a mode of repre sentation, then, the literary Utopia is "a determinate type of praxis" (1977: 6), whose first operation is the "neutralization" of the real: "In the case of the Utopian narrative, the place of the Real?of that which must first be constituted within the work before it can be dissolved or 'neutralized' by the work as process?may be identified by the obsessive references to actuality which seem part of the conventions of such texts ..." (1977: 10). Thus, in his discussion of Le Guin's The Dispossessed, for instance (and I am taking my examples from other critics writing about the novel), instead of writing about Le Guin's use of Bakunin or the feasibility of the Anneresti system for assigning work, instead of critiquing the sexual poli tics demonstrated in Shevek's monogamous, heterosexual relationship with Takver, Jameson argues that it is only in terms of a more conventionally novelistic and more properly repre sentational standard of literature that [The Dispossessed] can be reproached for the poverty of its political concepts and the naivete of its view of present-day world history; if on the contrary we adopt Marin's view of the Utopian as proc ess and production, we will see that it is precisely such stereotypicality, and the conventionality of Le Guin's own liberalism, which constitute the raw material upon which her Utopian praxis must do its work of transformation. (1977: 8) In this way, if we refer to the familiar definitions of the literary Utopia as containing both the critique of the author's existing society as well as a model for a better one (e.g. Suvin: 54), "neutralization," in Jameson's dynamic terms, may be seen as an analogue to the idea of critique or nega tion. This dynamic critique has less to do with the construction and perfection of someone's "idea" of a "perfect society" than it does with a concrete set of mental operations to be per formed on a determinate type of raw material given in advance, which is con temporary society itself?or what amounts to the same thing, on those collective representations of contemporary society that inform our ideologies just as they order our experience of daily life. (1977: 6)

**None of your offense is responsive – our invitation of imagination is distinct from enforcing utopianism – our advocacy opens up better spaces for change.**

**Fitting, 98** (Peter Fitting, Director of the Cinema Studies Programme at the University of Toronto, associate professor of French, and former chair of the Society of Utopian Studies, “The Concept of Utopia in the Work of Frederic Jameson” Utopian Studies Vol 9 No2 1998, Penn State University Press, Online @ JSTOR)

If the Utopia is to be considered as a form of praxis, it must be one which like the often cited bust of Apollo in Rilke's sonnet, will force us to acknowledge that "you must change your life."9 Yet this is the crux of the dilemma, for the specificity of the literary Utopia lies not in some ideal of beauty which reminds us of the insufficiency of our own lives, not in its ability to express the Utopian impulse, to "figure" in some metaphorical way "the ultimate concrete collective life of an achieved Utopia or classless soci ety" (1981: 291), nor even to negate or neutralize ideological contradictions, although the literary Utopia may also do all of these things. Many of us still think that the special task of the Utopia?and I am thinking precisely of the revival of the 1970s?was to reach a different audience with images of, with The Concept of Utopia 15 the look and feel and shape and experiences of what an alternative might and could actually be, a thought experiment or form of "social dreaming" (Sargent: 3) which gave us a sense of how our lives could be different and better, not only in our immediate material conditions, but in the sense of an entire world or social system. Yet those Utopias are no longer being written, and few would dispute the link between Utopian writing?or its absence?and the larger social and political context in which we now live. I have perhaps mistakenly given the impression that in Jameson's analysis of works like Robinson's Mars trilogy there is no place for the actual discussion of the work's Utopian features. Rather, in his typical dialectical manner, Jameson moves between generic considerations (e.g. the consideration of the relationship of science fiction and Utopia, or of the possibility of Utopias today), and a description of the properly Utopian (and dystopian) elements in Robinson's work: **[The Utopian text] is not supposed to produce this synthesis all by itself, or to represent it: that is a matter for human history and for collective praxis. It is supposed only to produce the requirement of the synthesis, to open the space into which it is to be imagined.** And this is the spirit in which the various politi cal "solutions" of the Mars trilogy are also to be evaluated: that they are numer ous, and contradictory or even irreconcilable, is I believe an advantage and an achievement in a contemporary Utopia, which must also, as Darko Suvin has pointed out, stage an implicit debate with the objections and ideological and political prejudic