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## Link—astronomy

### Astronomers define their scientific identity through their studies of Mars—makes Martians the other

Lane 11- K Maria D. Lane, Department of Geography, University of Texas, “Doctoral Dissertation Research Proposal: Geographic Representations of the Planet Mars, 1867-1907” April 18, 2011, https://webspace.utexas.edu/cherwitz/www/ie/samples/lane.pdf

The research proposed here will examine late nineteenth-century astronomy as a culture, governed both by internal rules and constraints as well as external needs to communicate with other scientific and institutional cultures. Archivally, this research will investigate the particular settings in which individual astronomers worked to produce articles, lectures and, importantly, maps that recorded their observational findings regarding Mars’ geography. Analytically, it will elucidate the intertwining of particular national, institutional, and social contexts with astronomers’ scientific activities. For instance, the proposed research will investigate the ways in which astronomers’ use of modern cartographic conventions may have functioned as an attempt to shore up astronomy’s (and astronomers’) disciplinary status in the face of increasing imperialist hype and funding for natural sciences such as geography. Analysis of the interactions among astronomers of differing nationalities, competing institutions, and varying social groups will focus on the localized contestation and negotiation of particular knowledge claims through both texts and maps. This focus will provide a critical view of the ways in which astronomers positioned themselves and defined their scientific identity through their studies of Mars.

In addition, the proposed research will investigate the cultural interactions among Mars astronomer-geographers and other intellectuals in related scientific and philosophical disciplines. Applying a science studies approach, the debated acceptance of certain astronomers’ statements regarding the existence of a canal network on Mars’ surface can be examined as a process of translation and negotiation. Examination of the publications and direct communications between individuals who interpreted the Martian canals as evidence of aliens and those who subscribed to a metaphysical belief that humans were alone in the universe will help determine whether these groups engaged in strategies of subversive appropriation and modification of each other’s claims. If so, the textual and cartographic record of how such claims were translated and negotiated will be probed for evidence of the extent to which the discourse regarding Mars’ canals produced new cultural worldviews.

Finally, this research will investigate the particular characteristics of the negotiated view of Mars as a “plural world,” inhabited by humanoid “Others.” Although the late nineteenth- century discourse regarding Mars’ inhabitants clearly employed notions of difference, familiarity and superiority – elements that Said (Said 1978) identified as central to the modern Western project of knowledge production – numerous astronomers and their allies formulated these concepts differently, postulating that Martians were actually superior to humans. In this sense, I argue, nineteenth-century Mars astronomy may have constituted an alternate modernity, one that in fact interacted significantly with the contemporaneous imperialist modernity. Using a cultural studies approach, this negotiation of modernities will be investigated as a process of cultural translation, discernible in the historical record through publications by and communications among representatives of the various modernities.

## Link—state

### [x]Acting as the state reproduces formal geopolitics that build assumptions about geography and territory

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Not surprisingly, a substantial part of critical geopolitics has focused empirically on intellectuals of statecraft – the academics, politicians, government officials and various commentators who regularly participate and comment on the activities of statecraft. This is the case especially with the early work, which indeed defined geopolitics in terms of that group of professionals – as the study of how intellectuals of statecraft represent international politics (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992:193). In order to unpack the influence of that group in more detail, that work loosely divided geopolitical reasoning into formal, practical, and popular geopolitics. In this division, formal geopolitics denotes formal highbrow analysis, practical geopolitics refers to the reasoning of politicians, pundits and specialized journals, and popular geopolitics encompasses the ways in which world politics is spatialized in popular culture. The three levels are closely intertwined (as will be elaborated below) and none should be treated as primary. This notwithstanding, practical geopolitics – the realm of intellectuals of statecraft – is particularly effective because it combines the clout and authoritative tone of formal geopolitical reasoning with commonsense metaphors from popular culture. Critical geopolitics has thus paid close attention to the production of geopolitical knowledge in these elite circles. Even today, a large share of the critical scholarship focuses on the cultural and organizational processes by which foreign policy is made in states. It investigates the geographs of elected and appointed government elites as well as popular commentators like Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, Thomas Friedman or Thomas Barnett. In one sense, this work dovetails with critical analyses of intellectuals of statecraft within IR (e.g. Campbell 1998; 1999). Yet it also differs from these other critiques by focusing explicitly on the spatial assumptions underpinning their arguments (Roberts et al. 2003; Sparke 2005; Dalby 2007).

The point of this scholarship is not to uncover what the “wise men” think. It rather dissects the assumptions that enable and constrain elite geopolitical practices. True, even a cursory investigation of geopolitical practices quickly reveals that these assumptions are not homogeneous. Disagreements and power struggles among different state institutions, think tanks, news organizations or schools of scholarship are well known (for geographical analyses, see Dalby 1990; Flint 2005; Gregory 2006). Indeed, as Gertjan Dijkink (2004) points out, a great deal of geopolitical writing is penned by elites who are frustrated with received wisdom (see also Coleman 2004). However, although intellectuals of statecraft do not work in the same end of the political spectrum, they tend to draw on and embellish a loosely coherent set of myths about nature, culture, and geography (Gusterson and Besteman 2005:2). As a result, vigorous debates are often contained in simplistic unexamined assumptions about geography and territoriality (Campbell 1999; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005).

## Link—military

### To understand our glorification of the military we must unpack the meaning of the map

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Given the large-scale violence engendered by the “war on terror,” the scholarship on subject-making includes substantial work on militarization. It seeks to analyse the current period of militarization without uncritically reifying the role of the state in this process (Flint 2003; Kuus 2009). It focuses not so much on military institutions and military conflict – although these issues are undoubtedly important – as on the structures of legitimacy on which military force depends. For as Enloe (2004:220) points out, most of the militarization of social life, a process in which social practices gain value and legitimacy by being associated with military force, occurs in peacetime. To understand the dynamics of this process, then, we need to look at the civilian rather than the military. Critical geopolitics documents the explicit glorification and implicit normalization of military force and military institutions throughout society (Hannah 2006; Cowen and Gilbert 2007; Flusty 2008; Gregory 2008; Sidaway 2008; Pain and Smith 2008). It also exposes the intellectual apparatus of militarization; for example, an integral part of academic geography is the development of the US military-industrial complex (Barnes and Farish 2006). This work is part and parcel of the growing work on security as a key concept and trope in political life today. The “war on terror” has clearly fueled (uncritical) geopolitical analysis that operates with explicitly militaristic and imperialist language (Retort 2005; Dalby 2007). This analysis maps some parts of the world in an imperial register as spaces in need of military pacification; understanding that process requires that we first unpack such maps (Gregory 2004; Dalby 2007). Geographers were latecomers to the critical study of security, but there are now a number of specifically geographic studies on the processes of securitization. They flesh out the inherent spatiality of these processes – the ways in which practices of securitization necessarily locate security and danger (e.g. Dalby 2002; Gregory 2004; Kuus 2007; Dodds and Ingram 2009).

## Link—colonization

### The atmosphere is a dividing line, colonization is connected to material gain

Redfield 2, Peter, Associate Professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, "The Half-Life of Empire in Outer Space", Social Studies of Science Vol. 32 No. 5/6, Oct-Dec 2002, p788-789

This passage is notable both for its farcical tone and for the central importance of the topic under discussion: the very goal of the voyage. Only at this advanced point in the narrative - long after the characters can claim any semblance of control over their circumstances - does Verne raise the issue of why they have embarked in the first place, or what they might hope to accomplish. The characters quickly resort to a vocabulary of colonial adventure. Theirs will be a civilizing mission, but one in which natives prove ultimately dispensable. Should their destination prove a lifeless orb, then they will simply proclaim what they otherwise would have to enforce: a recognizable social order modelled on their point of departure. I suggest that this passage neatly encapsulates the assumed political geography of most later descriptions of humanity's future beyond Earth's atmosphere (the fact that it was written before the final push of European rule through Africa and Asia should give us additional pause, since it foreshadows high imperialism as well). In stories, at least, adventure can serve as its own justification, and achieve a momentum that renders its exact goal an afterthought. Extending a network can itself be an end.'7

But what of more calculating interests, and less farcical possibilities of political economy? As a materialist counterweight, let us add another early cultural artefact of the Space Age, Fritz Lang's 1929 film, Woman on the Moon [Frau im Mond]. Lang's work is particularly significant because, as with Verne, the project sought a certain realism amid its romance (employ- ing the rocket virtuoso Hermann Oberth as a technical advisor), and inspired the young Germans who would later make up the V-2 team [McCurdy (1997): 15]. In contrast to Verne's novel, a material motivation for this flight is clear from the very start of the story, and it is Columbus' very dream - the acquisition of gold. At the heart of this modern quest lurks a traditional sin of greed. Against the mad genius of ProfessorManfeldt (who first declares the abundance of gold on the moon) and the idealism of Wolf Helius (the romantic hero who dreams of space travel), stands the villainous Herr Turner, agent of the financiers who fund the rocket and care only about returning profit to earth.18 In addition to moving elements of family drama into space, Lang's film also features the establishment of a colonial environment, featuring displaced, closed social relations and an expanded ecosystem bent on export, such that the moon can acquire calculable value. Here the pure dream of space travel becomes tied to a less genteel promise of material gain. And yet a version of that dream not only remains, but also shapes the possibility of heroism.

I want to underscore three observations about these two famous moments of space fantasy. The first is simply an affirmation of deep rhetorical connections between exploration above and below the atmos- phere. Despite the particularities of the cultural imagination displayed in them, when taken together these two works remind us of the greater narrative inertia inside the drive for adventure. While focus shifts to a wondrous horizon, and new, exacting techniques of exploration such as rockets and astronomical navigation, the field of vision retains earthly assumptions, desires and fears. As interesting as what each set of explorers seeks in the moon is what they bring with them: frock coats and a sense of civilization on the one hand, and campfire sweaters and a lust for profit on the other. The material is there for an effort to 'provincialize' these fictions by revealing the specificity of their historical debts. Such a project would remain a scholastic exercise, however, and well within the bounds of the literary end of postcolonial studies, were it not for the uncomfortable fact that these fictions provided space exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. These dreams found engi- neers, eager to materialize them.

## Link—colonization

### Space exploration and colonization are the last chance for true imperialism—genocide will result

Redfield 2, Peter, Associate Professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, "The Half-Life of Empire in Outer Space", Social Studies of Science Vol. 32 No. 5/6, Oct-Dec 2002, p797

The rhetorical link between outer space and colonial history requires little introduction. Anyone with a passing acquaintance of the Space Age is familiar with its frontier metaphors and allusions to European colonial expansion, from the frequent appearance of male explorers past in NASA presentations to the imaginary exploits of increasingly varied Star Trek crews. The above quotation thus constitutes a reflexive, though casual, reference; its intended import lies less in the actual words transcribed than the reminder of a larger pattern echoing through them.12 Just like colonial history itself, the field of representation running through outer space is complex, multiple and full of tension, encompassing the possibility of reversals and counter-themes, such as the reverse colonialism of alien abductions.13 However, at the base of rockets we can identify a consistent and optimistic reading of history through the future. In the aftermath ofthe 20th century, advocates of space exploration constitute perhaps the last unabashed enthusiasts of imperialism, cheerfully describing conquest, settlement and expansion, and hesitating not a whit before employing the term 'colony'. Theirs is a Columbus of exploration, nation building and risk taking, not of invasion, domination and genocide. History is cleansed above the planet; unlike a group of Native American scholars meeting in the immediate aftermath of the Apollo landing, it would never occur to participants of workshops such as the one cited above to 'pity the Indians and the buffalo of Outer Space' [Young (1987): 271].

Here I will take the explicit tie of human activity in outer space to the vocabulary of earlier periods of colonial expansion and imperial rule - its blatant historical resonance - as seriously as possible, in order briefly to examine the ancestry and legacy of exploration, on and over the globe. To do so I first refer to two fictions of import to space history, Jules Verne's mid-19th-century sardonic fantasy of a moon voyage, and Fritz Lang's early-20th-century film epic on the same topic, both of which employ imperial tropes prominently in their narration. Between the two we can recall variant definitions of the key term 'adventure', and its implied personal or financial risk, part way between exploration and exploitation. I want to position 'adventure' to describe a form of extending networks, an ambiguous and plural category of movement, but one that is hardly neutral.

## Link – colonization

### Colonization is rooted in a rhetoric of manifest destiny

Billings 10. Linda Billings,30 years of experience in the field of communication and 25 years of experience in aerospace Ph.D. in mass communication 2010“Colonizing Other Worlds” http://books.google.com/books?id=F62I2b4G73UC&pg=PA161&dq=%22outer+space%22+exploration+manifest+exceptionalism&hl=en&ei=j8MwTomTBPKMsAKmybjuCg&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Space colonization is often framed as a practicality, but it is as much an ideological position as a practi­cal matter. The ideas of frontier pioneering, con­tinual progress, manifest destiny, free enterprise, and rugged individualism have been especially prominent in U.S. cultural narrative. This story of what it means to be American constructs a ratio­nale for U.S. exceptionalism. It provides a U.S. belief system, an ideology. This ideology constructs Americans as independent, pioneering, resourceful, inventive, and exceptional. It establishes that lib­eral democracy and free market capitalism consti­tute rile only viable form of political economy. The belief that colonizing space is a matter of human destiny rests on the assumption that human­kind has both a genetic predisposition to explore and the power and the right to control nature. This belief is at the core of the idea that outer space is a frontier to be conquered and exploited for human benefit. Embedded in this conception of the space frontier arc the assumptions that humankind has, and presumably should have, dominion over nature iwhich encompasses the universe] and that capitalism is a model of political economy that should be replicated throughout the universe. U.S. space advocacy movements and initiatives have deployed the values and beliefs sustained by this national narrative in advocating for the colo­nization of other worlds. So-called grassroors space advocacy groups, such as the Mars Society, National Space Society, Space Studies Institute, and Space Frontier Foundation were chartered to promote the idea of expanding human society into the solar system. published in the September 1974 issue of *Physics Today.* O'Neill adopted the term *the high frontier* to describe outer space as an environment to settle and exploit. In the Reagan administration, the term was co-opted by military space advocates to describe their vision of ncar-Farth space as a terri­tory to be weaponized. O'Neill founded the Space Studies Institute in 1977 to promote his space colonization agenda. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the institute con­ducted studies and conferences on topics such as energy and materials from space, engineering with lunar and asieroidal materials, and pathways to the so-called high frontier. In 1988, other advo­cates of manifest destiny in space created the Space Frontier Foundation to promote the colonization agenda. The Mars Society, founded in 1998, also advocates colonization. Government Rhetoric U.S. government rhetoric about space exploration typically avoids the term *colonization* because of its negative connotations, preferring the term *set­tlement* or *outpost.* Nonetheless, over the past 50 years, the frontier metaphor, the ideology of prog­ress, and the belief in U.S. exceptionalism have been prevalent in government rhetoric about expanding human presence into space, as well as the rhetoric of advocacy groups. The National Commission on Space, appointed by President Ronald Reagan to develop long-term goals for space exploration, titled its final report "Pioneering the Space Frontier." Reagan's C ommission asserted that humankind is destined to settle other worlds and expand free enterprise into space. The Cieorge H. W. Rush administration cited an imperative to expand into the space fron­tier in its official rhetoric about the civilian space program, Clinton administration space policy per­petuated the idea of inevitable human expansion into space, and the Cieorge \V\ Rush administration pursued an agenda of incorporating space resources into Farth's economic sphere through Bush's "Vision for Space Exploration."

## Link – exploration

### Exploration is based on American exceptionalism

Moore 8 Mike Moore, editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a peace-and-security magazine founded by members of the Manhattan Project in 1945. Spring 2008 “Space War, the Logical Next Mistake for US Exceptionalism”

http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd87/87mm.htm

The old spirit of American exceptionalism and its progeny, the New Utopianism, helps explain the persistent passion space warriors have for developing and deploying the means to dominate space. And it helps explain America's continuing resistance to a PAROS treaty. Such a treaty simply would not square with the regenerative conviction that the United States can do as it pleases because it is a righteous and selfless nation. Who needs a new space treaty when one is already persuaded that a unilateral American military capability to dominate space serves the interests of all humankind? Everett C. Dolman, a professor at Air University's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, is among the most thoughtful and articulate of space-warrior theorists. He insists that US control of space would place "as guardian of space the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world". It would be a bold and decisive step, and "at least from the hegemon's point of view, morally just".[24] Morally just? That phrase lies at the heart of the debate. What is America's message to the world? We are a free and open society, we have a commitment to liberty and the rule of law, we have a generosity of spirit that is uncommon in the history of the world, and we are not averse to tooting our own horn about it. On balance, that sounds like a nation concerned with morality and justice as well as with good P.R. And yet, we Americans sometimes ask, Why do so many people in other nations seem to hate us? One answer comes easily: We are the world's richest and most powerful nation, a nation that lives extravagantly well, thus soaking up an inordinate share of the world's irreplaceable natural resources. But there is another and harsher answer. Some men and women hate us because they know the common belief among Americans is that the United States - alone among nations - is nearly always right. Indeed, righteous. For more than a century, dozens of US interventions, overt and covert, in the internal affairs of other states have been driven by that sense of righteousness.[25] National righteousness is not an uncommon thing. It characterizes the elites of any number of states, beginning with France, a nation whose chief exports seem to be wine, cheese, bureaucracy and moral smugness. Britain and Germany are powerfully righteous states, too, as are Norway and Sweden, Russia and India, Saudi Arabia and Israel, China and Japan... However, none of these states - and that includes China - contemplates developing and deploying a unilateral space-control capability. None of these states is attempting to design space-based weapons. None of these states seeks to achieve military dominance of space. None of these states is intent on extending a triumphalist ethic into space. And none of these states systematically vetoes the negotiation of a new space treaty. American exceptionalism can have sectarian or secular impulses, or a bit of both. Exceptionalism is a fine thing to celebrate on the Fourth of July, but when applied to foreign policy - or space policy - exceptionalism, can be a dangerous thing. Recall, for a moment, the words of Senator J. William Fulbright in The Arrogance of Power, published during the early days of the Vietnam War. "Having done so much and succeeded so well", Fulbright wrote, "America is now at a historical point at which a great nation is in danger of losing its perspective on what exactly is within the realm of its power and what is beyond it... The causes of the malady are not entirely clear but its recurrence is one of the uniformities of history: power tends to confuse itself with virtue, and a great nation is peculiarly susceptible to the idea that its power is a sign of God's favour, conferring upon it a special responsibility for other nations - to make them richer and happier and wiser, to remake them, that is, in its own shining image. Power confuses itself with virtue and tends also to take itself for omnipotence. Once imbued with the idea of mission, a great nation easily assumes it has the means as well as the duty to do God's work. The Lord, after all, surely would not choose you as His agent and then deny you the sword with which to work His will."[26]

## Link – exploration

### US space exploration is linked to geopolitics

Sage, 8 Dr. Daniel Sage, PhD in Space, Place, and Politics “Framing Space: A Popular Geopolitics of American Manifest Destiny in Outer Space” 2008, Institute of Geography and Science at the University of Wales,

In January 2004, George W. Bush rehabilitated the US space programme, reeling after the loss of Columbia on 1 February 2003, in a speech entitled ‘New Vision for Space Exploration’. Once more political rhetoric gestured towards a conflation between frontier exploration and universal destiny, or, as Bush put it**,** “Mankind is drawn to the heavens for the same reason we were once drawn into unknown lands and across the open sea. We choose to explore space because doing so improves our lives and lifts our national spirit.”86 Since this speech, US space policy has been re-structured around an ambitious, future programme of human exploration of the Moon and Mars that echoes the forecasts by Bonestell and von Braun in the pages of Collier’s magazine. While many scientists have expressed concern that this focus on human exploration will endanger NASA’s capability to pursue scientific research in outer space, it has enabled NASA to once again re-configure itself as central to popular nation-building narratives of American mission, exceptionalism and futurity. According to the current NASA administrator Michael Griffin, for example: “I believe America should look to its future – and consider what that future will look like if we choose not be a spacefaring nation.”87 Bush and Griffin’s words echo Werner von Braun’s bombastic rhetoric in Collier’s magazine in 1952: “Whoever gains that ultimate position gains control, total control over the earth, for purposes of tyranny or for the service of freedom.”88 Bush and Griffin’s comments re-iterate the image of the American national spirit being lifted to discover a higher place for America from which to survey and command universal space and eternal time; this innately evokes the Olympian gaze and the narrative of American mission and exceptionalism that is implicit in the American landscape sublime. And, perhaps not surprisingly, to envision this sense of destiny, NASA has once again turned to astronomical artists and Bonestellian visions of the Moon and Mars. See, for example, Jack Olson’s (year unknown) conception of a future Mars exploration (Figure 8) used on the NASA website to promote NASA’s ‘New Vision’.89 The Bonestellian shape of NASA’s ‘New Vision’, organised around romantic and idealised visions of frontier-spaces to stage a nationalistic sense of American global mission, testifies to the enduring historical interplay between the American landscape sublime and American geopolitics. Perhaps the most important question that remains to be asked is: in a world where Americans find themselves increasingly subjected by the media to the immanent anxiety of an increasingly unpredictable future – from scripts of the Middle East as a geopolitical quagmire, to threats to economic sovereignty from Europe and China, and the uncertainty of climate change – how is it that these mythical, heroic, visions endure as a crucial touchstone in the legitimisation of the US state’s territorial aggrandisement and destiny?

## Link – exploration

### Exploration is a means to perpetuate American civilization in space

Launius and Dick 6 Steven J.; Launius, Roger D. Dick, Editors of NASA January 1 2006“Critical issues in the history of spaceflight” pg7-8

Nearly 40 years ago. William Goetzmann. in his Pulitzer-winning Exploration and Umpire, argued that explorers were "programmed" by their sponsoring societies. They saw what they were conditioned to see and even novelty fell within a range of expected "curiosities" and "marvels." Wh.it is true for explorers has been no lest true for exploration's philosophers, historians, and enthusiasts. Pundit and public, commentator and scholar, all have become accustomed, if not programmed outright, to see exploration and space as inseparable Space has become the new frontier; exploration, if it is to thrive, must push to the stars; the solar system is where, in our lime, exploration is happening.1 Since Sputnik, no survey of exploration has not looked heavenward, and no advocate for space adventuring has failed to trace its pedigree through the lengthening genealogy of the Earth's explorers. Out in the particulars they differ; this field, too, has its "lumpers" and 'Splitters." The lumpers consider the long saga of geographic exploration by Western civilization as continuous and thematically indivisible. The Viking landers on Mars are hut an iteration ol the long ships that colonized Greenland. The Hdjilc, the Command Module orbiter. and Saturn V rocket that propelled the Apollo XI mission to the Moon are avatars of Columbus's .Wild, Pima, and Santa Xtatia. The "new ocean" of planetary space is simply extending the bounds of the old. The ur-lumpers would go further. The historic eruption of European exploration was but the most recent device to carry humanity's expansive hopes 3iul ambitions; its origins reside in the genetic code of humanity's inextinguishable curiosity. Even more, space exploration shares an evolutionary impulse. Through humanity, life will clamber out of its home planet much as pioneering species crawled out of the salty seas onto land. The impulse to explore is providential: the chain of discovery, unbroken; the drivers behind it, as full of evolutionary inevitability as the linkage between UNA and proteins. The most prominent have generally boosted space exploration as necessary, desirable, and inevitable. The argument assumes the form of a syllogism: The urge to explore is a fundamental human trait. Space travel is exploration. Therefore, sending people into space is a fundamental characteristic of our species—what more is there to say? The only impediment to the past serving as prologue to the future is imagination, as translated into political will, expressed as money. From Carl Sagan to Ray Bradbury, such advocates have sclf-admittcdly been fantasists, whether they argued that the motivating vision is embedded in our genes or our souls, lint the urge, the motivating imperative, they place within the broad pale of Homo sapiens sapiens.' Yet humanity doesn't launch rockets; nations do. So there exist also among the spaccfaring folk special themes that place interplanetary exploration within the peculiar frame of a national experience. In particular, there exist groups for whom extra-Earthly exploration is a means to perpetuate or recreate what they regard as the fundamental drivers of American civilization. Space exploration offers the chance to discover another New World and to erect a New America, a technological New Jerusalem, beyond the tug of the Earth's gravitational field and the burdens of its past. Only a New Earth can save the Old. Space colonization would remake William Bradford's vision of Plymouth Plantation into a very high-tech city and transplant it to a very distant hill." Still, a countercase exists. What expands can also collapse. Ming China launched seven dazzling voyages ot discovery and then shut down all foreign travel and prohibited multimasted boats. Medieval Islam sponsored great travelers before shrinking into the ritual pilgrimage of the hajj. The Norse spanned the Atlantic, then withered on the fjords of a new world. Moreover, plenty of peoples stayed where they were: they lacked the technological means, the fiery incentives and desperate insecurities, or the compelling circumstances to push them to explore beyond their homeland. Like Australia's Aborigines, they were content to cycle through their ancestral Dreamtime and felt little urgency to search beyond the daunting seas or looming peaks. A walkabout was world enough.\* In this perspective, what matters are the particulars—the cultural conditions that prompt and sustain discovery. What is commonly called "geographic exploration" has been, in truth, .1 highly ethnocentric enterprise. It will thrive or shrivel as particular peoples choose. There is nothing predestined about geographic discovery, any more than there is about a Renaissance, a tradition of Gothic cathedrals, or the invention of the electric lightbulb. Exploration as a cultural expression is something peculiar to times, places, and peoples. General historians might site exploration within dramas of human mobility, of empires, of Europe's astonishing millennial-long expansion, and its equally astounding almost-instantaneous implosion. They would grant exploration little intrinsic motivation; explorers would derive their inspiration, no less than their characteristics, from a sustaining society. They view contemporary arguments for space trekking as not grounded in historic reality but inspirational rhetoric.

## Link—western cooperation

### Critical astropolitics denied by EU-US cooperation in space

Wang 9, Sheng-Chih, Dept of Political and Social Sciences @ Free University of Berlin, "The Making of New 'Space': Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics", Geopolitics 14, 2009

According to critical astropolitical hypothesis, European security dependence and the latent confrontational status between Western democ- racies and Communist China should sustain strong transatlantic collective identities and community norms in terms of common security interests. If the transatlantic security community discourse has constitutive effect on transatlantic astropolitics, we should expect either Europe to continue to depend on US GPS service and the US to guarantee reliable data provision concerning European security interest, or the US to agree with the development of European Galileo system and cooperate at its initiation rather than oppose it. Besides, Europe would not conduct technology and funds exchange with China, which did not belong to the Trans-Atlantic space, had no common security interests with Europe, and shared no ideology of Atlanticism.

However, we saw obvious inconsistency between this discourse and their practices. The Galileo programme underscored Europe’s desire for a mighty and vigorous voice in outer space issue area. It would provide Europe with unprecedented leverage vis-à-vis the US. Europe regarded control over outer space–based strategic infrastructures as critical for global competitiveness and influence. The EU emphasises autonomous intelligence- gathering capability as the prerequisite to achieving independent and effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Therefore, Europe requires the capabilities to develop, launch, and operate satellites that perform global communication, positioning, and observation missions.6565

## Link—talkin’ bout planets

### Cartographers map mars as a world-like identity, which induces nationalistic motivations for exploration. And the maps aren’t even accurate—all depends on detail and geographer’s authority in the field.

Lane 6—Kristina Maria Doyle Lane, B.A.; M.S.C.R.P., Department of Geography, University of Texas, “IMAGINATIVE GEOGRAPHIES OF MARS: THE SCIENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RED PLANET, 1877 – 1910,” August 2006

At the root of the inhabited-Mars narratives lay a series of detailed maps. Beyond their role in recording the planet’s “areography” (the standard way of referring to Mars’ surface geography after 187710), these maps served a complex function in the development of Mars’ scientific and cultural meanings. Cartographic conventions lent the red planet a fundamentally geographical or world-like identity, induced nationalistic competitions among astronomers, and authorized a view of its landscape as modified and possibly inhabited. In the process, Mars maps profoundly influenced the nature of planetary investigation and produced an unprecedented scientific and popular acceptance of the possibility that life might exist on worlds beyond Earth.

In this chapter, I examine the pivotal role of maps in the early Mars debates, showing how astronomers’ claims about the geography of Mars rose to prominence or fell into disrepute in accordance with the fortunes of their maps. The triumph of specific maps over others depended on the visual authority of each, with the inscription of objectivity, certainty and detail always prevailing over representations of subtlety or simplicity. In addition, the visual authority of specific maps was closely intertwined with the personal authority of specific astronomers. On the one hand, pre-existing personal authority augmented the ability of mapmakers’ handiwork to become ingrained as scientific truth. On the other hand, the visual authority of certain maps bolstered the reputation of certain mapmakers, lending more credence to those individuals’ speculative theories and hypotheses regarding the nature of Mars. In explaining the way that maps functioned in Mars astronomers’ maneuvers for legitimacy, I also show in this chapter how the visual development of standard scientific Mars maps shaped the rise and fall of a powerful geographic icon. Changing from a naturalistic style in the 1870s to a purely geometrical scheme by the 1890s, the cartographic image of Mars became increasingly abstract. Throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, this iconic image of Mars – showing a planet covered by complex geometrical forms – stood as evidence of intelligence and civilization beyond the planet Earth. The dual strength and weakness of this popular landscape view was the fact that it had been brought into being only through the cartographic projection process. Thus, although the perceived objectivity of the scientific map gave astronomers’ theories a persuasive power they might not otherwise have enjoyed, the inhabited-Mars theory rested precariously on the power of the map. Once the legitimacy of the canal-crossed map began to falter, the associated popular mania started to wane as well.

At the time, those who were critical of the inhabited-Mars theory often blamed the long-running canal craze on the sensationalism and misunderstanding of non-scientists. The most popular explanation held that the whole episode rested on a simple mistranslation of the word “canale” from original Italian maps. Because English translators had used the artificial-sounding word “canal” instead of the more appropriate and natural-sounding word “channel,” they argued, many people had unfortunately developed a mistaken impression that Mars was inhabited. In this chapter, however, I argue that it was the image, not the term, that spurred a furor over the Martian canals. The processes and inscriptions of scientific cartography allowed partial and uncertain observations of Mars to become established as objective astronomical truths. So strong was the correlation that those truths evaporated the moment the astronomical map lost its status as a proper scientific representation.

## Link—technology

### Geographical aspects of space influence the way space policies are created – outer space tech establish sphere of influence

Wang 9 – Sheng-Chih Wang, Freie Universitat Berlin, “The Making of New ‘Space’: Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics” 'Geopolitics', 2009, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 433-461

Outer space may be physically infinite; however, for its exploitation there are still several quantitative (e.g., resource scarcity), qualitative (e.g., technological capability), and natural (e.g., gravity, electro-magnetic field, solar wind, and radiation) constraints that lead to bargaining over resources allocation.7 Everett C. Dolman points out several critical pathways and choke points of outer space shaped by technological and natural constraints that would lead to competition among states for utilisation and control of this new ‘space’.8

These geographical attributes of outer space have **substantial impacts on international politics**, in which states struggle with one another for limited outer space resources and activity room (e.g., satellite ‘parking place’ of geostationary orbit or space station) with respective cost-effective strategies. Geopolitical interests in outer space can therefore be defined as the opportunities to achieve maximum action freedom, develop full outer space capabilities, and seize pivotal positions and resources in outer space. The essence of outer space activity is to pursue these interests with the most cost-effective means from limited options. Transatlantic astropolitics also reveals such instrumental rationality.

A cogent example occurred during the Cold War, when the US enjoyed outer space supremacy and European dependence. Before the success of European Ariane launcher, France turned to the Soviet Union for launching the Franco-German Symphonie communication satellites in 1971, just because the US proviso for launch was that these satellites can only be used for experimental but no commercial purposes,9 which seriously undermined European freedom of action and outer space capability development. The demands of independent access to pivotal positions in outer space and autonomous use of satellites prompted Europe to develop its own Ariane launcher. Besides, cooperation in outer space application programme even occurred between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which again denounced the discursive constitution of collective identities, shared norms, and common culture on European and US outer space strategy. The first international human spaceflight cooperation – Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in 1975 – not only represented US and Soviet convergent symbolic policy preferences to reduce the Cold War tensions, but also satis- fied their functional policy preferences that the US obtained a firsthand glance of Soviet capability and the Soviet Union obtained access to US outer space technology and know-how.10 Outer space cooperation between the US and Russia reached a pinnacle by the inclusion of Russia in the ISS programme in 1993. The US departed from its strict policy guidelines of outer space cooperation to transfer funds from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to Russia because the US needed critical technology and hardware of the Russian Mir space station, while Russia needed US funds to operate its outer space programmes. However, the US adamantly restricted sensitive technology and funds transfer to Europe in the same programme. These examples are not exhaustive. European and US practices indicate that the differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘others’ in transatlantic astropolitics is determined by the most cost-effective way to satisfy respective geopolitical interests rather than the constitutive effect of transatlantic security community discourse. Policy and Technology in the Geopolitical Setting of Outer Space

Geopolitics is a dynamic struggle among strong states who seek to seize new ‘space’ and organise it to fit their own interests. Therefore, ascending European outer space capability makes the struggle between Europe and the US for mastery of outer space the major dynamics of transatlantic astropolitics. As key instruments to pursue such mastery, **outer space policy formation and outer space technology development** in Europe and the US **are quite sensitive to the demands of different types of geopolitical interests.**

Outer space policy and technology are indispensable tools to seize pivotal positions and resources in outer space, and thereby fulfil states’ political goals. The launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in 1957 manifested the geopolitical prospect of outer space. Geopolitical exploitation of this new ‘space’ then entered security concerns of the US and the Soviet Union. Outer space–related issues burgeoned in their policy agenda, large numbers of funds for outer space technology development were invested, and several outer space–based military systems, such as espionage and reconnaissance satellites, were under construction. Advanced outer space capability not only implied state’s relative security status and **sphere of influence**, but also served as the **key instrument to master this new ‘space’.**

With the end of the Cold War, civilian outer space technology was popularised rapidly. The goal of outer space policy and technology transformed gradually to pursue economic benefits and social welfare from outer space utilisation. However, these changes do not totally obliterate the very importance of security use of outer space. New types of threats, for example, international terrorism and global environmental problems, make it a difficult task for states to guard their territorial security. Advanced outer space technology like **systems of navigation and Earth observation** can help states **monitor these protean threats and develop capability of security management** as well.

Since outer space serves as a new ‘space’ for human exploitation, geopolitical variables largely dictate the formation of outer space policy and the development of outer space technology. To explain transatlantic astropolitics, it is important to study these geopolitical variables, including sovereignty, pivotal position in outer space, and the transatlantic security community discourse.

Sovereignty can be defined as the exclusive authority and autonomy of a political entity on its own affairs. The impact of globalisation decreases the extent of European and US autonomy in outer space activities, but not their authority for outer space policy making. Outer space remains acstate-dominated and geopolitically demarcated realm, although non-state actors are active in international politics. Europe and the US, self-perceived as unitary sovereign actors, pursue geopolitical interests with respective cost-effective strategy. Transatlantic astropolitics is principally conducted by the institutions and governments of Europe and the US. Outer space facilities and resources are also under governmental disposition. Sovereignty remains a crucial component of transatlantic astropolitics.

Seizing pivotal position in outer space facilitates states to define outer space agenda, gain a greater share of outer space resources, and control this new ‘space’. Advanced outer space technology is the key instrument facilitating state’s policy goal of seizing pivotal position in outer space. Governments can focus resources to develop desired technology. And advanced technology may offer greater flexibility and broader range of policy options than in the past.11

## Impact—otherization

### Geographical divisions are the root cause of differentiation between the self and the other

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As a part of this interest in political subjectivity and subject-formation, there has been tremendous interest in identity politics, that is, in the geographical demarcation of Self and Other, “our” space and “theirs.” This strand of work has been so voluminous that critical geopolitics is sometimes accused of overvalorizing culture and identity at the expense of economic issues (e.g. Thrift 2000). Much of this “cultural” work has focused on the construction of national spaces and the geopolitical cultures of particular states (e.g. Campbell 1998; Sharp 2000; Toal 2003; Jeffrey 2008). It shows that geographical claims about cultural borders and homelands are central to narratives of national identity. There is also an extensive literature on bordering practices (Paasi 1998; 2005a; Newman 2006; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007; Agnew 2007b; Kaiser and Nikiforova 2008). It argues that international borders are best viewed not as lines representing already existing political entities called states or nations. Rather, these entities themselves are constituted through bordering practices. In John Agnew’s (2007b:399) succinct formulation, “borders [. . .] make the nation rather than vice versa.” It is indeed at borders first and foremost where these entities are defined: where the inside is demarcated from the outside and Self is differentiated from the Other. This process is not only about exclusion. It is also about borrowing and adaptation – for example, of the concepts of statehood and nationhood. Borders thus have multiple functions: they serve as barriers, but they must also necessarily allow movement across in order to reproduce the entities they supposedly contain. Statecraft is being activated and transformed at multiple scales at and far away from borders (Coleman 2007). Borders do not simply differentiate space. They are spaces where both different as well as similar conceptions of citizenship and belonging are operationalized. State borders are becoming markedly more porous in some spheres and for some groups, while being securitized for other flows of goods, people, and ideas (Sparke 2006).

These processes of geopolitical subject-making are not limited to nation-states. On the supranational level, region-building processes, such as the processes of European integration, are deeply geopolitical exercises in the same way (Moisio 2002; Kuus 2007). European integration, for example, may well overcome nationalist narratives of territory and identity, but it entails powerful claims about Europe as a territorial and cultural unit (Bialasiewicz 2008; Heffernan 2007). This process is a particularly fascinating geopolitical project because it explicitly moves beyond the state-centered understandings of space. The power of the EU is the governmentalized power of technical and political standards. There is an emerging literature that explores the intricate reworking of political, economic, and juridical borders inside and around the EU. This reworking is richly illustrative of processes of regionalization and the respatialization of borders today (Agnew 2005b).

## Impact—otherization

### Space colonization creates otherization because powerful/privileged nations begin to move beyond their history of colonialism

Redfield 2, Peter, Associate Professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, "The Half-Life of Empire in Outer Space", Social Studies of Science Vol. 32 No. 5/6, Oct-Dec 2002, p795-796

In this paper, I take a related but slightly different tack, emphasizing degrees of distance within locality, and examining intersections of place, power and time implicit in the location and operation of a vast technical network. For if we incorporate colonial history into our considerations of science and technology, do we not always, continually, need to ask what it might mean for something to be somewhere relative to somewhere else? My focus will rest directly on the spatial edge between metaphor and materiality used to distinguish global and local: the planet, united and bounded by its atmospheric limit, revealed and transcended by techno- science. The general argument I will advance here is that outer space reflects a practical shadow of empire.10 I mean by this two things. The first is that space represents a kind of stabilization of 'elsewhere', and its removal from the globe. From the very inception of influential modern dreams of space exploration, the masculine adventure of earthly colo- nialism was a constant referent, and the temporal pairing of rocket launches and the greatest anti-colonial movements only accentuated the parallel."1 Indeed, the realization of outer space - its initial domestication if you will - represents the effective provincialization of terrestrial empire from above. Once a few white men moved beyond the atmosphere they became newly, artificially human by virtue of the nonhuman space around them, cast as universal representatives by virtue of their transcendent, hazardous location. Once extended beyond the planet, modernity acquired the possibility of another geographic frame, intermingled with a new temporal order. Whatever the past may have been, the future was clearly out there, and everything else a local concern. Aliens became extraterrestrials.

## Impact—otherization

### Space strategies otherize, Classical geopolitics apply in outer space.

Wang 9, Sheng-Chih, Dept of Political and Social Sciences @ Free University of Berlin, "The Making of New 'Space': Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics", Geopolitics 14, 2009

This article aims to establish two interconnected arguments. First, European and US cost-effective calculations cause their strategic variation in transatlantic astropolitics. Transatlantic astropolitics reveals an instrumental rationality that both sides pursue geopolitical interests from exploiting outer space with respective cost-effective calculation rather than collective identity, common culture, or shared discourse. To wit, transatlantic astropolitics represents an extension of classical geopolitics, in which sovereignty and geopolitical interests satisfaction play the determinant role in US and European outer space strategy. Robert A. Dahl defines interest as the oppor- tunities to achieve maximum feasible freedom, develop full capabilities, and attain satisfaction of all other things that actors judge important.3 This defini- tion is properly applicable to transatlantic astropolitics.

Second, the transatlantic security community discourse has no constitutive effect on transatlantic astropolitics. The main content of this discourse is that the interaction between Europe and the US is guided by the ‘logic of appropriateness’ embedded in a highly institutionalised democratic community. Member states possess mutual trust, sympathy, and loyalty, which make this community a remedy for material power competition.4 Robert O. Keohane also argues that in this community, states would not worry about partner’s rel- ative economic gains, and would feel comfortable with partner’s economic success because it means a stronger ally.5 The moral and geopolitical codes of this discourse make transatlantic security cooperation necessary in terms of their own interests. In the context of transatlantic security community, col- lective identities between Europe and the US are materialised through discursive construction, and therefore their outer space strategies can be understood as a process of making differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘others’.

## Impact—otherization

### Reps of space colonization are parallel to European colonialism, unifies the powerful at the expense of the other/subaltern

Redfield 2, Peter, Associate Professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, "The Half-Life of Empire in Outer Space", Social Studies of Science Vol. 32 No. 5/6, Oct-Dec 2002, p799-800

My second observation is about the form of colonization being im- agined: like the occupants of Verne's projectile for whom the 'Selenites' are ultimately superfluous, or Lang's heroic protagonist who stays behind on the moon, the history of space representation is full of visions of settler colonization. This point is not surprising, given the narrative topology of any act of leaving the earth or extending human life through the galaxy, but it has effects when placed next to the fissures of terrestrial history. Even the planners of the German V-2 dreamed beyond their engines of destruction, imagining an era of peaceful exploration, while American and Soviet cold warriors alternated geopolitical fears of final conflict with calls to embrace a new dawn for humanity.'9 Amid explicitly imperial tropes of representa- tion, space offered the prospect of a renewed form of settlement, this time into a zone safely free from human difference. Returning to etymological roots, humans could find new domains to culture, together, as a species.20 By considering the earth as a planetary entity, then, fantasies of space exploration have presented a 'limit case' of one measure of scale. Within them - and their potential realization - the atmosphere serves as the threshold of human unity.

My final observation involves a potential dynamic of representation created by the interaction of the first two points. Like Verne's protagonists, committed to their trajectory and inventing a goal on the fly, the language of space exploration returns to history post hoc, within a planetary frame implying common humanity. Thus it should come as no surprise that the sense of history commonly invoked in space narratives is a species narra- tive, full of giant leaps. Here we have a variation of Chakrabarty's dilemma, only posed in scalar, rather than chronological terms. Just as European history naturally defines the categories of modernity by virtue of prece- dence, outer space naturally defines the globe by virtue of bounding it. Those people claiming this new realm seem to leave old ones - at least their more unpleasant details - behind. Such a space fantasy involves 'scale', both in the sense of a motion of expansion and the sense of establishing a boundary. It is consequently impatient with concerns that remain local (the actual lives of any Selenites), or ultimately earthly (the calculations of Lang's financiers). Space is a higher calling. In order to interrogate the continued resonance of this higher calling on the ground, moving from general discourse more deeply into specific practice, I will shift closer to the material present and briefly sketch a tropical outpost of high technology.

## Impact—otherization

### Space policies are determined by self interest

Wang 9 – Sheng-Chih Wang, Freie Universitat Berlin, “The Making of New ‘Space’: Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics” 'Geopolitics', 2009, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 433-461

This article aims to establish two interconnected arguments. First, European and US cost-effective calculations cause their strategic variation in transatlantic astropolitics. Transatlantic astropolitics reveals an instrumental rationality that both sides pursue geopolitical interests from **exploiting outer space** with respective cost-effective calculation rather than collective identity, common culture, or shared discourse. To wit, transatlantic astropolitics represents an extension of classical geopolitics, in which **sovereignty and geopolitical interests satisfaction** play the determinant role in US and European outer space strategy. Robert A. Dahl defines interest as the oppor- tunities to achieve maximum feasible freedom, develop full capabilities, and attain satisfaction of all other things that actors judge important.3 This defini- tion is properly applicable to transatlantic astropolitics.

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However, this shared discourse can not overwhelm European and US concerns with individual geopolitical interests in transatlantic astropolitics. Obvious inconsistency between this shared discourse and individual practices explicates the nullified constitutive effect of transatlantic security community discourse on transatlantic astropolitics. For example, transatlantic launch capability competition was exactly caused by concerns of relative commercial and industrial gains derived from advanced transportation technology and concomitant prestige, control of outer space, and market profits. Other details will be elaborated in the case studies.

## Impact—imperialism

### Their god’s eye view of the universe is through a lens that inevitably reproduces imperialism

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In geography, this relational and anti-essentialist work produced a marked interest in the discursive construction of political space and the role of geographic knowledge in this process. Approaching geographical knowledge as a technology of power – both the result and a constitutive element of power relations – it pushed geography out of the illusion of political neutrality and fueled a critical examination of the discipline itself. Whereas traditional geopolitics treats geography as a nondiscursive terrain that preexists geopolitical claims, critical geopolitics approaches geographical knowledge as an essential part of the modern discourses of power. Thus, the 1990s produced numerous analyses of the complicity of geography and geographers in colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, and Cold War superpower enmity (Livingstone 1993; Gregory 1994; Ó Tuathail 1996b).

Many of these early analyses were historical. They traced geopolitical theorizing to the emergence of European geopolitical imagination during the Age of Exploration (Gregory 1994; Agnew 2003; Heffernan 2007). They showed how geopolitical thought – the god's eye view of world as a structured whole that can be captured and managed from one (European) viewpoint – emerged as a part and parcel of European exploration and colonialism. Highlighting that many of the key territorial assumptions of international politics have European origins – often more specifically northern European origins – this work showed that the history of geopolitics is also the history of imposing these concepts inside and outside Europe. It also reexamined the key writers of classical geopolitics, illuminating the role of geographical knowledge in legitimizing the balance-of-power politics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Holdar 1992; Crampton and Ó Tuathail 1996; Ó Tuathail 1996b).

The critical work on geopolitics was further fueled by the increased popularity of explicitly geopolitical claims in mainstream political analysis. The term critical geopolitics was first coined by Simon Dalby (1990) in his analysis of the representational strategies of the Committee on Present Danger (a conservative foreign policy interest group) in the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1990s, after numerous articles and several further books (e.g. Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Ó Tuathail 1996b; Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998), critical geopolitics was a clearly discernible and rapidly growing strand within political geography.

Much of this early self-consciously critical work tackled the legacies of the Cold War. It highlighted the ways in which the Cold War and international politics in general were informed by entrenched geographical and territorial assumptions about East and West, freedom and unfreedom, development and underdevelopment. It showed that these supposedly universal concepts were highly parochial, coming out of a particular corner of Western intellectual and political circles. This early work also situated critical geopolitics in other strands of the social sciences, including International Relations (IR) theory, as well as feminist and postcolonial theory (Dalby 1991; Ó Tuathail 1996b). At the same time, critical geopolitics also differentiated itself from political theory by its more sustained engagement with political economy and the materiality of power more generally.

## Impact—imperialism

### Place-making is imperialist

Cannavó 5- Peter F. Cannavò, Visiting Assistant Professor of Government, Department of Government, Hamilton College, “The Familiar Chair and Table: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Place,” August 9, 2005

Since the beginning of Modern colonialism, the nature of place-making has largely been an imperial venture. When voices of authority assign a name to a space, this activity transforms it into a meaningful place.1 In this way, Mars has become a real place for us now, in the same way that America and Africa became meaningful places at the beginning of their colonial period—with maps of Latin place-names, the language of apparent scientific austerity. Philosopher V. Y. Mudimbe describes “the opposition of Greek or Roman civility” to that of the ancient “barbarians” “concretized by being located on a map…[where] the map is a scientific project” meant to identify the other; map-making thus becomes “the technical vision of subjective perceptions.”2 The power of the scientist as creator of place is palpable. Henri Lefebvre identifies map-making with creating a conceptualized, conceived space—calling this space “the space of scientists.”3 For example, outside the purview of the naked eye, scientists have used their unique powers of analysis to identify the source of the Mississippi River. When scientists identified the source as one particular lake among many, the area around the lake was designated a park—now flocked to by eager tourists. Yi-Fu Tuan, a scholar of place studies, explains, “Scientists thus appear to have a certain power: they can create a place by pointing their official fingers at one body of water rather than another.”4 In this way, place is given official meaning and status.

## Impact—imperialism

### Imaginative geography of mars familiarizes the unfamiliar though uncompromising domination

Lane 11- K Maria D. Lane, Department of Geography, University of Texas, “Doctoral Dissertation Research Proposal: Geographic Representations of the Planet Mars, 1867-1907” April 18, 2011, https://webspace.utexas.edu/cherwitz/www/ie/samples/lane.pdf

The proposed research will contribute to colonial studies not only by analyzing the extent to which selected astronomical imagery and writing served to construct a previously unstudied “imaginative geography” of Mars, but also by assessing the possibility that such representation constituted a challenge to the dominant Orientalism Said identified. Preliminary analysis suggests that nineteenth-century astronomers and popular science writers used common tropes and metaphors to make the planet’s unfamiliar geography conceptually accessible and familiar to scientific colleagues and popular audiences. Through repetition and uncritical citation of each other’s work, it appears that European and American astronomers created a powerful discourse that represented the red planet as an Earthlike, inhabited, engineered, and irrigated landscape.

This discourse employed a number of familiar metaphors that were also present in orientalist and colonial texts, including association with the eternal and immutable classical world (Godlewska 1995), the supposed crippling aridity (Saberwal 1997; Grove 1997) and ruined landscape (Grove and Rackham 2001) of the distant realm, and environmental determinism of inhabitants’ physique/intelligence (Hudson 1977). The nineteenth-century imaginative geography of Mars, like those produced by Orientalists to represent the Islamic world, was certainly more reflective of astronomers’ own geographical notions than of the reality of Mars’ surface characteristics. Nonetheless, it seems to have constrained subsequent investigations and compelled certain perspectives of Mars’ geography until at least the 1960s, when photographic imagery taken by remote probes contradicted the view of Mars as an inhabited planet.

Interestingly, however, the standard imaginative representations of Mars appear to have departed from or challenged several well-known imperial tropes, including the presentation of the unknown realm as an empty wilderness (Blaut 1993), the effacement of human presence (Pratt 1992) or “creative destruction” of an existing culture to make way for European customs (Godlewska 1995), the presentation of any inhabitants as backward and depraved (Said 1978), and the assumed superiority of European civilization through technology (Godlewska 1995). The imagined Martians of the late nineteenth century were not the animal-like inhabitants that Europeans described after visiting the Orient; they were skilled, noble engineers who managed to irrigate their arid planet with a massive global system of interlinked canals. These cosmic neighbors were hardly inferior to the modern European technologists who had just completed their first major canal (Suez) in 1869.

This preliminary analysis raises exciting challenges to Said’s widely-accepted concept of Orientalism, suggesting that the discourse astronomers engaged in to represent the geography of Mars constructed a familiar imaginative Other that was actually superior to modern Europeans. The ways in which conceptual engagement with this Other – through scientific, philosophical, and popular discourses – may have deflected, challenged or transformed modernity’s truth claims in the West will serve as the primary inquiry of the proposed research.

## Impact—environment

### This causes an essentialist view of the self that justifies environmental destruction

Cannavó 5- Peter F. Cannavò, Visiting Assistant Professor of Government, Department of Government, Hamilton College, “The Familiar Chair and Table: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Place,” August 9, 2005

To postmodernists, the affirmation of stable, coherent places and geographically rooted identities also seems nostalgic, reactionary, and dangerous. The yearning for place is a misguided quest for clear, policed boundaries to community, for depoliticized social unity, for ‘authentic’ locales and communities with uncontested, static meanings, and for the exclusion of outside influences and internal and external difference. Moreover, notions of place as fundamental to human experience conflict with an anti-essentialist, postmodern view of the self as a fragmented, unstable collection of traits and attachments, none having foundational priority.

 Yet many academics, including even some like Manuel Castells and David Harvey who recognize the dangers of place-attachment, express concern about the danger to place. Castells sees the ‘space of places’ as threatened by the ‘space of flows’: the global realm of information and capital flows is disrupting place-based and historically situated social relationships even as physical location remains a central determinant for most human lives. There is thus a disturbing dissonance between individuals’ lived experience in physical place and the increasing degree to which they are subject to intangible, globalized, placeless interactions beyond their understanding and control. Similarly, Harvey speaks of “a quest for visible and tangible marks of identity ... in the midst of fierce space-time compression.” He notes, “[T]here is still an insistent urge to look for roots in a world where image streams accelerate and become more and more placeless.” Geraldine Pratt, warning against academics’ rejection of place-based boundaries and stability, argues that coherent, bounded places are a key basis for personhood and identity. Mark Sagoff says, “Much of what we deplore about the human subversion of nature – and fear about the destruction of the environment – has to do with the loss of places we keep in shared memory and cherish with instinctive and collective loyalty.” Peter Calthorpe, in discussing the destructive effects of sprawl, warns of a contemporary “crisis of place.”

 In a time of dislocating change it may be especially important to emphasize the virtues of geographic stability and coherence, though with the caveat that geography is not static and places are not pure and uncontested in meaning and character. Among the most powerful yet balanced affirmations of place as a key aspect of human experience came from Hannah Arendt, particularly in The Human Condition. This may seem surprising: Arendt did not specifically address the term ‘place,’ and she is not generally recognized as a theorist of place. Arendt scholarship has focused on other themes, such as her concepts of the public and private spheres and of the social, her theory of political action, her agonistic politics, her analysis of totalitarianism, and her views on the relation between politics and morality.

## Impact—violent conquest

### The process of cartography mandates conquest—it acknowledges the power of dominant imaginative geographies while disclosing others.

Sparke 11- Matthew Sparke, Department of Geography and the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, “Everywhere but Always Somewhere,” January 24, 2011, http://faculty.washington.edu/sparke/Everywhere.pdf

To use the terms of Du Bois (1903), a critical capsizal of colonial cartographic convention involves articulating a double consciousness about the over-mapping of the Global South: acknowledging the power of the dominant imaginative geographies while also disclosing the critical possibilities of the other geographies that are covered-up. Toni Morrison provides a powerful example at the start of her book about whiteness. She explains that she wants “to draw a map of a critical geography and use that map to open as much space for discovery, intellectual adventure and close exploration as did the original charting of the New World – without the mandate for conquest” (Morrison, 1992: 3). Even in the original moments of mapping the ‘New World’ as New it is possible in this way to locate critical ab-original geographies of the Global South. Thus in ‘Newfoundland’, to pick an early example from what eventually became the ‘The True North, Strong and Free’ – according to Canada’s national anthem – the maps of Shawnadithit can be read as a critical commentary from the last of the native inhabitants on the new found colonizers at their territorial-cum-terrorizing work (Sparke, 1995).

Tracking forward to the present, the same possibility of mapping the Global South without a mandate for conquest discloses many other critical geographies, geographies that map other-wise and which by doing so locate the Global South in places such as the tent cities of rich country homeless protests as well as in the reimagination of the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and Latin America as heterogeneous but shared grounds for anti-imperial uprising and critique. Just like Shawnadithit’s counter-mappings, the double- consciousness in these diverse geographies means that they are imagined and developed in critical relationship to cartographies of colonial control. For example, the World Social Forum, which has been held now four times in Porto Alegre Brazil, once in Mumbai India, and which is currently proliferating globally in the form of more accessible and diverse regional social forums, was initially imagined as a venue where the ‘globalization is inevitable’ world view articulated at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, might be capsized and critiqued. Retaining some of the global imagery, but transforming it through appeals to the grassroots globalization of the Global South, World Social Forum participants have repeatedly argued that ‘Another World is Possible’ (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003). Instead of the ‘level playing field’ view of globalization that is routinely rehearsed by the player-managers in Davos (Lapham, 1998), the World Social Forum has therefore also allowed for diverse counter-mappings that highlight how increasing economic interdependency has also come with increasing inequalities and increasing awareness about how to resist too (see Sparke et al, 2005).

Learning from the World Social Forum counter-mappings, one way of demonstrating how critical geographies of the Global South actually enable criticism is to outline in the few paragraphs that remain how they can thereby provide for a critique of one of the most successful über-mappers of the ‘level playing field’ writing in English today, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman. Friedman’s new book-length declaration that The World is Flat is narrated as a form of ‘road to Bangalore’ conversion experience in which a visit to the campus of Infosys Technologies in India leads the columnist to return to America and whisper to his wife: “Honey, I think the world is flat” (Friedman, 2005: 5). The fact that Nandan Nilekani, the CEO of Infosys, had said nothing about flatness but rather “Tom, the playing field is being leveled,” is not allowed to interrupt Friedman’s new world narrative. Neither is the would be Columbus of the 21st century put off from his discovery discourse by the fact that the actual road to the Infosys headquarters is pockmarked and bumpy. “As I left the Infosys campus that evening and bounced along the road back to Bangalore, I kept chewing on that phrase: ‘The playing field is being leveled’. What Nandan is saying, I thought, is that the playing field is being flattened… Flattened? Flattened? My God, he’s telling me the world is flat!” (2005, 7).

Here, in one of its most populist, pompous and reality-repudiating rehearsals, is how the Global South gets over-mapped most frequently today. The unevenness on the road to Bangalore is invoked only to be ignored, while an Indian CEO is ventriloquized to tell the American columnist what he wanted to hear in the first place.

## Impact—wars

### Constructing outer space as a “place” reduces it in scale and justifies conflict against difference

Redfield 2, Peter, Associate Professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, "The Half-Life of Empire in Outer Space", Social Studies of Science Vol. 32 No. 5/6, Oct-Dec 2002, p813

In our story, we can extend the principle of the time-knot to space, and consider 'outer space' as a dense tangle of space and time. Such an outer space contains both astronauts and aliens, and flows around both rockets and roads. It is full of the future, but also infused with the past; it is as vast and infinite as we can imagine, but also replete with small and specific struggles. Most crucially, it frames the globe, simultaneously marking the extent of human difference and the limit possibility of its geometric transcendence. Like history, it is inherently contested, but unequally so. To provincialize outer space, then - to the extent that such an endeavour is possible - would not be simply to reduce it in scale, or suggest that it represents but one of many possible framings of the earth. Rather, it would entail recognizing the tensions of human difference running through differ- ences of scale, and even through a limiting frame.

So at last we come to a moral. Every place is local, but not equally so; in considering points of context we must also factor in their historical mass and inertia, as well as potential isotopes of colonial rule. French Guiana is a setting where a routine form of rocketry directly crosses the remains of less final frontiers. There the very length and direction of networks affect the significance of their presence, the extent to which they can 'be' local. Dreams of spaceflight and more earthly independence both linger along a singularly modest stretch of road. But where one embraces outward motion, the other struggles against the inertia of earlier expansions. In such a setting, stabilization can never quite appear complete, since difference extends into the very combination of time and space framing each narra- tive position.

## Impact—wars

### Geography influences war

Murphy et. Al 5 - Alexander B. Murphy, H. J. de Blij, B. L. Turner II, Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Derek Gregory, “The role of geography in public debate” Progress in Humran Geography 29, 2 (2005) pp. 165-193 http://phg.sagepub.com/content/29/2/165 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1191/0309132505ph538oa

So, to return to the original question: what kind of geography for what kind of public debate? In The colonial present (Gregory, 2004a) I identified three imaginative geographies that continue to be central to the 'war on terror'. War is not the only possible response to terrorism, and neither is it the most effective, and many geopolitical and geoeconomic calculations enter into the decision to resort to spectacular and sustained military violence. But war also requires a cultural mobilization - the inculcation ofa sense of common purpose and public conviction that identifies an Enemy and legitimizes the loss of life (on both sides). Imaginative geographies are powerful rhetorical weapons precisely because they fold difference into distance. Yet they do not only produce a series of performative spacings between 'us and 'them', 'white on 'black: their topologies also produce a vast grey zone in which indifference is folded into indistinction. I want to sketch the imaginative geographies that were mobilized to convert the 'war on terror into a mission civilisatrice, in each case describing them in active terms as spatial strategies, in order to identify in minimalist form three countergeographies that might produce counterpublics informed by other, less destructive maps of meaning (Gregory, 2004a; 2004b).

## Impact—no personal agency

### Drive to conquer space abstracts from an individuals self

Arendt 63, Hannah, political philosopher, 'The conquest of space and the stature of man', republished in the Fall 2007 issue of the new atlantis http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man

It is, I think, safe to say that nothing was more alien to the minds of the scientists, who brought about the most radical and most rapid revolutionary process the world has ever seen, than any will to power. Nothing was more remote than any wish to “conquer space” and to go to the moon. Nor were they prompted by an unseemly curiosity in the sense of a *temptatio oculorum*. It was indeed their search for “true reality” that led them to lose confidence in appearances, in the phenomena as they reveal themselves of their own accord to human sense and reason. They were inspired by an extraordinary love of harmony and lawfulness which taught them that they would have to step outside any merely given sequence or series of occurrences if they wanted to discover the overall beauty and order of the whole, that is, the universe. This may explain why they seem to have been less distressed by the fact their discoveries served the invention of the most murderous gadgets than disturbed by the shattering of all their most cherished ideals of necessity and lawfulness. These ideals were lost when the scientists discovered that there is nothing indivisible in matter, no a*-tomos*, that we live in an expanding, non-limited universe, and that chance seems to rule supreme wherever this “true reality,” the physical world, has receded entirely from the range of human senses and from the range of all instruments by which their coarseness was refined. From this, it seems to follow that causality, necessity, and lawfulness are categories inherent in the human brain and applicable only to the common-sense experiences of earthbound creatures. Everything that such creatures “reasonably” demand seems to fail them as soon as they step outside the range of their terrestrial habitat.

The modern scientific enterprise began with thoughts never thought before (Copernicus imagined he was “standing in the sun...overlooking the planets”)[[17]](http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man#_ftn17) and with things never seen before (Galileo’s telescope pierced the distance between earth and sky and delivered the secrets of the stars to human cognition “with all the certainty of sense evidence”).[[18]](http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man#_ftn18) It reached its classic expression with Newton’s law of gravitation, in which the same equation covers the movements of the heavenly bodies and the motion of terrestrial things on earth.[[19]](http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man#_ftn19) Einstein indeed only generalized this science of the modern age when he introduced an “observer who is poised freely in space” and not just at one definite point like the sun, and he proved that not only Copernicus but also Newton still required “that the universe should have a kind of center,” although this center, of course, was no longer the earth. It is, in fact, quite obvious that the scientists’ strongest intellectual motivation was Einstein’s “striving after generalization,” and that if they appealed to power at all, it was the interconnected formidable power of abstraction and imagination. Even today, when billions of dollars are spent year in and year out for highly “useful” projects that are the immediate results of the development of pure, theoretical science, and when the actual power of countries and governments depends upon the performance of many thousands of researchers, the physicist is still likely to look down upon all these space scientists as mere “plumbers.”[[20]](http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man#_ftn20)

The sad truth of the matter, however, is that the lost contact between the world of the senses and appearances and the physical world view had been re-established not by the pure scientist but by the “plumber.” The technicians, who account today for the overwhelming majority of all “researchers,” have brought the results of the scientists down to earth. And even though the scientist is still beset by paradoxes and the most bewildering perplexities, the very fact that a whole technology could develop out of his results demonstrates the “soundness” of his theories and hypotheses more convincingly than any merely scientific observation or experiment ever could. It is perfectly true that the scientist himself does not want to go to the moon; he knows that for his purposes unmanned spaceships carrying the best instruments human ingenuity can invent will do the job of exploring the moon’s surface much better than dozens of astronauts. And yet, an actual change of the human world, the conquest of space or whatever we may wish to call it, is achieved only when manned space carriers are shot into the universe, so that man himself can go where up to now only human imagination and its power of abstraction, or human ingenuity and its power of fabrication, could reach. To be sure, all we plan to do now is to explore our own immediate surroundings in the universe, the infinitely small place that the human race could reach even if it were to travel with the velocity of light. In view of man’s life span—the only absolute limitation left at the present moment—it is quite unlikely that he will ever go much farther. But even for this limited job, we have to leave the world of our senses and of our bodies not only in imagination but in reality.

## Alt—examine

### Our alternative to examine the interconnectedness between geopolitical offenses and their agents—it’s the only way to challenge structures of authority.

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A problem with this emphasis on intellectuals of statecraft is that it focuses on a very narrow range of geopolitical actors. In response, recent work has paid greater attention to geopolitical practices outside state structures (and these strands of work will be discussed below). In addition, there have also been attempts to analyze state bureaucracies in more detail. Especially in the context of increased state power in the realms of security, state institutions require renewed scrutiny as sites of geopolitical practice (Agnew 2005b; Coleman 2005; Retort 2005). This attention to the fragmented and articulated institutional structures of geopolitics links up with analyses of policy. For policy impinges on all aspects of self and society. It shapes not just societal outcomes but, more importantly, the processes that produce these outcomes. To study policy is to investigate not a ready-made blueprint but a dynamic and unpredictable process. In geography as well as other social sciences, there is today a growing recognition of the need for utilizing ethnographic methods to understand policy (Megoran 2006; see also Mitchell 2005; Agnew 2007a; Neumann 2007). Ethnographic work is especially helpful for dislodging studies from the stereotype that policy professionals merely execute pregiven political and juridical blueprints without any significant agency of their own.

Ultimately, this closer focus on policy procedures is about sensitivity to specific geographical contexts. Such contexts include the personal backgrounds, interests, and identities of the individuals who actually articulate geopolitical claims.

Intellectuals of statecraft are not synonymous with the state and we cannot assume that they merely voice some pregiven state interest. Rather, their geopolitical practices need to be carefully contextualized in their specific societal settings. For example, we cannot understand American geopolitics of the Cold War era without considering the personal anticommunism of some of the leading writers – in some cases because of their personal contacts among Russian émigré circles (Crampton and Ó Tuathail 1996; Ó Tuathail 2000). We likewise cannot comprehend the culturalist flavor of Central European geopolitics without considering the arts and humanities backgrounds of many of the region’s leading politicians (Kuus 2007:ch. 5). In that example, humanities backgrounds give these individuals special legitimacy to speak in the name of culture and identity. The culturalist narratives of foreign policy in Central Europe – for example, the “return to Europe” narrative – points to the need to carefully unpack such cultural resources.

In addition to adding nuance and color to analyses, there are at least two further reasons why a close examination of agency in geopolitics must include in- depth studies of intellectuals of statecraft. The first reason has to do with their influence. Other actors undoubtedly contest the dominant geopolitical discourses, but their arguments are still positioned in relation to intellectuals of statecraft. Over the long run, the institutional and cultural resources available to them serve to systematically push the game in their direction. As James Scott (2005:401) puts it, even though the dominant arguments do not reach the ground uncompromised, “can there be much doubt about which players in this [. . .] encounter hold most of the high cards?” The “war on terror” has further highlighted the crucial importance of a few state agencies, particularly those connected to the national security apparatus, in mainstream conceptions of world affairs (Gregory and Pred 2006; Coleman 2007; Dalby 2007). It is easy to say that we need to look beyond elites and beyond the state. Yet this process of producing hegemonic norms outside the sphere of the state is still heavily influenced by state elites.

The second reason why we need more studies of these professionals has to do with their diversity. Simply speaking of power discourses can overlook the conscious manipulation of (geo)political claims by specific well-placed individuals. If we broaden our definition of geopolitics from the narrowest circles of officials in the highest echelons of the state apparatus, we need to analyze more diverse settings of policy. These settings include immigration, trade and aid policies, as well as international and supranational institutions – and all of these in addition to locations like foreign ministries. The study of geopolitics must not be limited to the handful of men at the key nodes of state power, but neither should it exclude these men. Given the relatively closed nature of foreign policy, challenges to dominant geopolitical narratives come as much from the inside as from the outside of policy structures (see Ó Tuathail 1999; Dijkink 2004). The challenge, then, is not to bypass intellectuals of statecraft, but, to the contrary, to offer more nuanced accounts of them. There is no easy way around the methodological difficulties (e.g. access) in attempting such accounts, but they should be pursued nonetheless. Critical geopolitics is indeed increasingly engaged with fieldwork in diverse empirical settings (Megoran 2006; see also Pain and Smith 2008).

 To argue for a closer engagement with intellectuals of statecraft is not to imply that we should try to uncover their “identities” in some abstract sense disconnected from their social context. It is likewise not an attempt to uncover some “real story” in the corridors of power. It is rather to argue for a closer examination of the interconnections between geopolitical practices and the agents of these practices (Agnew 2007a). It is to more closely consider the daily production of geopolitical knowledge – the mundane repetition of claims not just in official speeches, but also around the coffee machine (e.g. Neumann 2007). This would help us to bring into focus the multiple structures of authority and legitimacy through which geopolitical arguments work.

## Alt—connectedness

### Our identities are shapes by the borders that we arbitrarily construct—We need to remember that we are not just earthly beings but also part of one universe

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Globalisation, as has been extensively documented, poses severe challenges for the traditional idea of borders.[5] While it may not be a new phenomenon, it may be that the Westphalian state system represented the most embedded and rigid conception of territory and borders thus far, and the development of technology poses a strong challenge to the spatial delineation of borders and sovereign territory. The debate has been particularly interesting in the field of International Political Economy, where globalised production has made it increasingly difficult to tie down a ‘national’ manufacturing industry or financial system in modern capitalist economies.

While globalisation and the dissolution of borders may occur in political or economic terms, it is not certain that this has led to a homogenising identity. In crude terms, borders are a representation of the ability to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’, whether the referent is the state or otherwise. It is now common practice to define identity as primarily constructed through a negative process of separation between what an entity is, and what it is not.[6] As identity operates outside of the conception of the state system, and continues to operate beyond the systems perceived reduction in influence, so must borders. This has been analysed by Huntington in the Clash of Civilizations, where he argues that civilisational divides, imposed ex ante, are a more significant border than those of individual nation states, and that this will play a, if not the defining, role in the political map of the future. While the divides imposed by geographical and spatial limitations are constantly changing, and are even subject to natural processes that contain little human agency, the identities that we inherit and shape through our own actions are far more difficult (if not impossible, according to Huntington), to overcome in any permanent sense.[7]

This essay therefore considers borders as the construction that divides identities in agreement with Huntington, and sees some form of border as a necessary constituent of a unit’s identity. However, the idea that such identities are primordial or fixed is rejected.[8] As such, the act of bordering is considered the discursive practise that upon repetition reifies this divide. This conception is intended to take account of the way in which borders do not operate purely in spatial terms, but are also a necessary constituent in areas of life outside of politics between states. This holds true for the metaphorical ‘wrong side of the tracks’, a border that may operate within a single state, but is no less pervasive in the mindsets of people within that area. The possibility that a unit may hold more than one identity, as asserted by Amartya Sen in Identity and Violence, precludes the use of a single unitary identity for each, as well as the idea that borders operate only at a state level – people’s identities are not held purely in common with the state of which they are a part. Sen is often quoted in this context, and is worth repeating:

There are a great variety of categories to which we simultaneously belong. I can be, at the same time, an Asian, and Indian citizen, a Bengali with Bangladeshi ancestry, an American or British resident, an economist, a dabbler in philosophy, an author, a Sanskritist, a strong believer in secularism and democracy, a man, a feminist, a heterosexual, a defender of gay and lesbian rights, with a nonreligious lifestyle, from a Hindu background, a non-Brahmin, and a nonbeliever in an afterlife.[9]

## Alt—re-conceptualize borders

### Our alternative challenges the currently unquestioned ethnocentrism that defines difference

MacDonald 7 – Fraser, Professor of Human Geography at the University of Melbourne “Anti-Astropolitik: Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography”, Online, Progress in Human Geography, Oct2007, pg. 609

Astrography and astropolitics, like geo- graphy and geopolitics, constitute ‘a political domination and cultural imagining of space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). While com- mentators like Colin Gray have posited an ‘inescapable geography’ (eg, ‘of course, physical geography is politically neutral’), a critical agenda conceives of geography not as a fixed substratum but as a highly social form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173; Ó Tuathail, 1999: 109). For geography, read ‘astrography’. We must be alert to the ‘declarative’ (‘this is how the Outer Earth is’) and ‘imperative’ (‘this is what we must do’) modes of narration that astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 107). The models of Mackinder and Mahan that are so often applied to the space environment are not unchanging laws; on the con- trary they are themselves highly political attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes in specific historical circumstances.

(2) Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of power, a critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always already in question. Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinize the power politics of the expert/ think-tank/tactician as part of a wider project of deepening public debate and strengthening democratic accountability (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 108).

(3) Mackinder’s ‘end of geography’ thesis held that the era of terrestrial exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the task of consolidating the world order to fit British interests (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolman’s vision of space strategy bears striking similarities. Like Ó Tuathail’s critique of Mackinder’s imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably described as ‘triumphalism blind to its own precarious- ness’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). Dolman, for instance, makes little effort to conceal his tumescent patriotism, observing that ‘the United States is awash with power after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovo campaign, and stands at the forefront of history cap- able of presiding over the birth of a bold New World Order’. One might argue, however, that Mackinder – as the theorist of imperial decline – may in this respect be an appropriate mentor (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 112). It is important, I think, to demystify Astropolitik: there is nothing ‘inevitable’ about US dominance in space, even if the USA were to pursue this imperial logic.

(4) Again like Mackinder, Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism. Implicit in this ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space because ‘they’ are not like ‘us’. ‘The most ruthlessly suitable’ candidates for space dominance, we are told – ‘the most capably endowed’ – are like those who populated America and Australia (Dolman, 2002: 27).

(5) A critical astropolitics must challenge the ‘mythic’ properties of Astropolitik and disrupt its reverie for the ‘timeless insights’ of the so-called geopolitical masters. For Ó Tuathail, ‘geopolitics is mythic because it promises uncanny clarity ... in a complex world’ and is ‘fetishistically concerned with .... prophecy’ (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 113). Ó Tuathail’s critical project, by con- trast, seeks to recover the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of Mackinder and Mahan has become formalized.

## Alt solvency—academia

### Academia is the necessary place to begin discussions about geopolitics

Dalby 8 – Simon Dalby, Carleton University, “GEOPOLITICS, GRAND STRATEGY AND CRITIQUE: TWENTY YEARS AND COUNTING …” Paper for presentation to the "Critical Geopolitics 2008" conference, Durham University, September 2008.

All these matters need much more attention from critical geopolitics; they will be all the more efficacious in so far as these investigations explicitly link geopolitics to grand strategy.

This is in many ways closer to Phil Kelly's (2006) rearticulation of what he calls the classical understanding of geopolitics in terms of the viewpoints of foreign policy makers concerning other states than some of the critical literature acknowledges. In Colin Dueck’s (2004:512) terms ‘“grand strategy’ involves a self-conscious identification and prioritization of foreign policy goals; an identification of existing and potential resources; and a selection of a plan which uses these resources to meet those goals.” All of this is done in terms of the context for particular states and its here that geopolitics provides the discursive context for grand strategy. In so far as the geographic designations of the context for policy remain at the heart of the intellectual exercise of geopolitics, it remains necessary to link this to the strategic arguments if the critique of contemporary foreign policies is to be effective. But it will, it seems, do so in the context of a changing cartography of danger that cannot rely on blocs, fronts and regions to specify dangers. 11

As Fraser McDonald (2007) shows clearly it will have to think about the macro context of military affairs and the militarization of orbital space just as much as it thinks about the local topographies of Southern slums and urban battlefields (Graham 2008). But none of this will be effective if it doesn't directly tackle the assumptions of war as "the permanent social relation” of our times to use Hardt and Negri’s (2004:12) phrasing.

THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS?

Predictions are not very useful in terms of scholarly trends nor for that matter in politics itself; but some speculative comments can be made drawing on the themes in this paper. One possibility for the future is that Matt Sparke's (2007) suggestions of geographical categories as the key to a post-foundational critique will become the disciplinary norm. If geography per se becomes a mode of critique the specificity of critical geopolitics might then be rendered redundant, absorbed in a larger disciplinary enterprise. Always assuming that geography itself remains a clearly defined discipline in the academies of the twenty first century of course. Of course a very uncritical geography may undergo a revival if American political managers in particular finally decide that local specific knowledge is useful as at least a supplement to the reductionism and claims to universality that have shaped military strategy as an explicitly technical practice since the revolution in military affairs and the professionalization of the military took over a generation ago (Dalby forthcoming b). But at least so far the cultural turn in

American military thinking seems to be drawing on anthropologists for its “human terrain teams” rather than geographers (Featherstone 2008)!!

The wider geographical literature on violence, warfare, militarization, military landscapes and related matters in the last few years (Gregory and Pred 2007; Graham 2004; Woodward 2004; Cowen and Gilbert 2008) also suggests that concerns with warfare are once again much more widespread in the discipline and as such the links between these matters and geopolitics are only one theme in this much larger disciplinary discussion. Hence too when viewed from this angle the specificity of geopolitics in this larger discussion raises the question as to whether critical geopolitics becomes simply part of the disciplinary concern. But insofar as there is a specific part of this larger enterprise that deals with the strategic representations of the globe in terms of battlefields, dangers, and insecurities tied into a cartographic specification of the necessities for violence and supposedly inevitable rivalries that require military responses, it seems that the designation critical geopolitics may still have utility in coming years.

## Alt solvency—discussions/learning

### Learning about geography necessary to social change – this discussion is key

Wellens et al 6 - Jane Wellens, University of Leicester, UK Andrea Bernardi, Open University, UK Brian Chalkley, University of Plymouth, UK1 Bill Chambers, Liverpool Hope University College, UK Ruth Healey, University of Sheffield, UK Janice Monk, University of Arizona, US Jodie Vender, Pennsylvania State University, US “TEACHING GEOGRAPHY FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION,” 2006

Teaching about social transformation develops the relationship between activism and the academy (Hay 2001a). Previously the argument has been that solutions to societal problems lie in hands outside the classroom such as government bodies. However, classrooms can be “a microcosm of the emancipatory societies we seek to encourage” (Hay 2001a, l70). bell hooks (1994, p.12) argues that “the classroom remains the most radical space of possibility in the academy”. Hay (2001, b), while recognising the danger of naïve idealism, believes that through changing classrooms we may change the world. Geography offers an opportunity “to include the voices of marginalised people in academic representations of their lives” (Cook 2000, p.13). It can provide a critical approach to addressing inequalities in power relations (Curran and Roberts 2001). Bondi (2004) and Heyman (2000) argue that the geography classroom should be a site of political engagement and highlight the importance of students’ examining the meaning of social justice and equity in their own lives. In addition, Merritt (2004, p.xxx), writing in this journal, argues that “geographers are particularly well suited to study and teach concepts related to social justice because social injustice is caused by and expressed in such intrinsically geographical ways as ghettos, borders, margins, peripheries and regions at different scales.”

The importance of re-focussing geography teaching in the directions outlined above is further reinforced by a number of trends and pressures affecting the health and status of our discipline and by its ability to recruit students. Arguably, we need to change not only to keep abreast of major global developments and problems but also to protect and enhance the welfare of our subject. Many recent surveys in a variety of different countries point to a decline in the subject’s popularity at both school and university levels. The international evidence is generally not encouraging. Gerher (2001) surveyed the situation in 31 countries and found the position of geography a cause for concern. A recent European survey by Donert (2004) indicated that the subject is under serious threat in 38% of school and 45% of higher education systems. Similarly, in a survey of 14 countries, Rawling (2004, 168) identified the “uncertain place” of geography in both the primary and secondary school curriculum. In the United Kingdom, Gardner and Craig (2001) highlighted the declining popularity of school geography and the threat this poses to the discipline at higher education level. In the United States, Bednarz and Bednarz (2004, 210) have expressed the view that, faced with increasing competition from other disciplines, geography runs the risk of being left behind.

In the schools’ sector the position and role of disciplines within the curriculum is normally centrally controlled by governments. It seems that geographers have not been sufficiently active or successful in persuading politicians and education bureaucrats of the value of our subject (Rawlinson, 2004). Moreover, the difficulties facing geography in schools inevitably impact on the discipline’s status and success at higher education level, although here the curriculum is generally less centrally controlled and more responsive to factors such as student demand. However, if fewer students take geography in schools this of itself is likely to reduce recruitment for degree courses. As a result in the UK, for example, some smaller and less well known geography departments have been forced to close (Gardner and Craig, 2001).

Although geography’s position is by no means entirely negative, the current problems do provide a prompt for the discipline to review its relationship with government, with education policy makers, with the public and with our students. There are, of course, many different ways of improving the discipline’s position but certainly one of these is to strengthen our engagement with the agenda for social change. Put simply, geography needs to be seen as a discipline which can help to make the world a better place. We need to be perceived as a subject which has something significant to say about issues such poverty, inequality, globalisation and sustainable development. Geography must be a discipline which enables its students to play a part in engaging with these major questions and of contributing intelligently and knowledgeably to debates about social transformation and how to achieve it.

### Space education is important!

Pass 7 – Jim, Chief Executive Officer / Senior Research Scientist at the Astrosociology Research Institute, “Educating Astrosociologists: The Need to Bring Outer Space into Social Science Classroom”, 2007, <http://astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/PSA2007_Educating%20Astrosociologists.pdf>

When officials in the space community speak about utilizing space as a teaching tool to encourage students to become the new scientists and engineers of the future, they inevitably narrow their scope of attention to the natural sciences. They rarely, if ever, think about the growing importance of training social scientists to fulfill their important responsibilities that will undoubtedly arise in the future. While the training of natural scientists does indeed represent a high priority, it remains vital to recognize that a new priority now exists. We can no longer afford to continue neglecting the other branch of science in our preparations for exploring space in the next fifty years. Astrosociologists study the relationship between outer space and society – between the cosmos and humanity – and therefore it becomes more relevant to humans and their societies the farther we venture into outer space as well as the more that space influences us here on the Earth. Future missions will require the input of social scientists to cover subjects that fall outside the normal bounds of the space and engineering sciences. If we take the long-term view, it becomes clear that we must begin to train astrosociologists to participate alongside traditional members of the space community. To accomplish this, we must bring outer space into the classrooms of prospective social scientists (and, in fact, expose all students to astrosociology). The potential contributions of social scientists to the space program should be emphasized to offer an alternative for students unwilling to pursue careers as natural scientists and engineers. If the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) results in the involvement of both fundamental branches of science, then astrosociology can help to make this a social reality for the benefit of all through the creation of a well-rounded understanding of issues related to outer space and society.

## \*\*\*AFF ANSWERS\*\*\*

## Perm solvency

### Their critique disengages from relevant geographical complexities. Only the permutation conceptualizes geopolitics in its natural basis

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Although one can tentatively trace critical geopolitics back to the early 1990s, as has been done here, it has never connoted a clearly delimited or internally coherent research program. It is rather a set of approaches that borrow particularly, but not exclusively, from poststructuralist strands of social theory. It is distinct from other themes in political geography not by its empirical focus but by its theoretical and methodological underpinnings. In broad terms, critical geopolitics does tend to differ from other strands of critical scholarship, such as Marxism, by its explicitly Foucauldian underpinnings. Like much of poststructuralist analysis, it pays greater attention to micro-level capillaries of power than to macro-level or global economic developments. However, there is no neat distinction between poststructuralist and other critical approaches. Thus, the subfield includes a range of works that explicitly address economic structures and/or utilize Marxist perspectives, among others (e.g. Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Herod et al. 1997; Agnew 2005b). The key trait of critical geopolitics is that it is not a theory-based approach – there is no “critical geopolitical” theory. The concerns of critical geopolitics are problem-based and present-oriented; they have to do not so much with sources and structures of power as with the everyday technologies of power relations. The field’s key claim is that although (classical) geopolitics proclaims to understand “geographical facts,” it in fact disengages from geographical complexities in favor of simplistic territorial demarcations of inside and outside, Us and Them. Critical geopolitics seeks to destabilize such binaries so that new space for debate and action can be established.

Conceptualizing geopolitics as an interpretative cultural practice and a discursive construction of ontological claims, it foregrounds the necessarily contextual, conflictual, and messy spatiality of international politics (Herod et al. 1997; Toal and Agnew 2005; see also Campbell 1993). In so doing, it offers richer accounts of space and power than those allowed within mainstream geopolitical analysis. Geography in that conceptualization does not precede geopolitics as its natural basis. Rather, claims about geographical bases of politics are themselves geopolitical practices.