Aff Answers Readiness DA WNDI 2010

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Position Explanation

To answer the readiness DA your main strategy will be no link and impact turns. The first impact turn is that readiness causes war. It causes aggressors and attempts at matching United States superiority and increases wars. The second impact turn is essentially that military is failing right now and continuing that force causes a loss of United States credibility. The file also include uniqueness answers.

Non-Unique – Retreat Now

US retreating now

Charles Krauthammer, “Obama's many retreats signal U.S. weakness,” Washington Post, Friday, May 21, 2010, Pg. http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2010/may/21/charles-krauthammer-obamas-many-retreats-signal/?print=1]

WASHINGTON -- It is perfectly obvious that Iran's latest uranium maneuver, brokered by Brazil and Turkey, is a ruse. Iran retains more than enough enriched uranium to make a bomb. And it continues enriching at an accelerated pace and to a greater purity (20 percent). Which is why the French foreign ministry immediately declared that the trumpeted temporary shipping of some Iranian uranium to Turkey will do nothing to halt Iran's nuclear program. It will, however, make meaningful sanctions more difficult. America's proposed Security Council resolution is already laughably weak -- no blacklisting of Iran's central bank, no sanctions against Iran's oil and gas industry, no nonconsensual inspections on the high seas. Yet Turkey and Brazil -- both current members of the Security Council -- are so opposed to sanctions that they will not even discuss the resolution. And China will now have a new excuse to weaken it further. But the deeper meaning of the uranium-export stunt is the brazenness with which Brazil and Turkey gave cover to the mullahs' nuclear ambitions and deliberately undermined U.S. efforts to curb Iran's program. The real news is that already notorious photo: the president of Brazil, our largest ally in Latin America, and the prime minister of Turkey, for more than half a century the Muslim anchor of NATO, raising hands together with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the most virulently anti-American leader in the world. That picture -- a defiant, triumphant take-that-Uncle-Sam -- is a crushing verdict on the Obama foreign policy. It demonstrates how rising powers, traditional American allies, having watched this administration in action, have decided that there's no cost in lining up with America's enemies and no profit in lining up with a U.S. president given to apologies and appeasement. They've watched President Obama's humiliating attempts to appease Iran, as every rejected overture is met with abjectly renewed U.S. negotiating offers. American acquiescence reached such a point that the president was late, hesitant and flaccid in expressing even rhetorical support for democracy demonstrators who were being brutally suppressed and whose call for regime change offered the potential for the most significant U.S. strategic advance in the region in 30 years. They've watched America acquiesce to Russia's re-exerting sway over Eastern Europe, over Ukraine (pressured by Russia last month into extending for 25 years its lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol) and over Georgia (Russia's de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is no longer an issue under the Obama "reset" policy). They've watched our appeasement of Syria, Iran's agent in the Arab Levant -- sending our ambassador back to Syria even as it tightens its grip on Lebanon, supplies Hezbollah with Scuds, and intensifies its role as the pivot of the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas alliance. The price for this ostentatious flouting of the U.S. and its interests? Ever more eager U.S. "engagement." They've observed the administration's gratuitous slap at Britain over the Falklands, its contemptuous treatment of Israel, its undercutting of the Czech Republic and Poland, and its indifference to Lebanon and Georgia. And in Latin America, they see not just U.S. passivity as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez organizes his anti-American "Bolivarian" coalition while deepening military and commercial ties with Iran and Russia. They saw active U.S. support in Honduras for a pro-Chavez would-be dictator seeking unconstitutional powers in defiance of the democratic institutions of that country. This is not just an America in decline. This is an America in retreat -- accepting, ratifying and declaring its decline, and inviting rising powers to fill the vacuum. Nor is this retreat by inadvertence. This is retreat by design and, indeed, on principle. It's the perfect fulfillment of Obama's adopted Third World narrative of American misdeeds, disrespect and domination from which he has come to redeem us and the world.

Non-Unique – Heg Unsustainable (1/2)

Hegemony’s structurally unsustainable---decline’s inevitable

Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Summer 2009, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1

According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global ªnancial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justiªed.19

Heg is unsustainable in the short-term – proponents of empire underestimate the timeframe and impact of rising new powers

Christopher Layne, associate professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2007, American Empire: A Debate, p. 64-65

Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point, the primacists are correct. In terms of hard power, there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States. Nevertheless, at some point within the next decade or two, new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. To put it slightly differently, American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic, not static, which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. Thus, as Paul Kennedy has observed, no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others, because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates, technological advance, and military developments which has existed since time immemorial.”36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true, which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. Indeed, the leading primacists acknowledge, that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. There are indications, however, that American primacy could end much sooner than that. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about. But China isn’t the only factor in play, and transition from U.S. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. For example, in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020, the CIA’S National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own. In a similar vein, a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respec­tive shares of world power.38 For sure, there are always potential pitfalls in pro­jecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). But if the ongo­ing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. The real issue is not if American primacy will end, but how soon it will end.

Non-Unique – Heg Unsustainable (2/2)

Hegemonic decline is inevitable---multiple global trends

Simon Bromley, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Open University, August 2009, “Obama and the prospects for international order,” Economy and Society, Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 525-529

As well as confronting a serious financial and economic crisis and the unfinished business of two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the administration of Barack Obama also inherits all the concerns that animated the Bush turn in American foreign policy. For if we consider the four key concerns of the neo-conservatives, none of these have gone away and it is far from clear how President Obama will address them. The first such challenge relates to the ability of the most powerful states in the system to maintain more or less exclusive control over the means of mass destruction. On the one hand, proliferation threatens to undermine the nuclear oligopoly, thereby creating a more competitive environment in which less stable and potentially revisionist powers gain access to nuclear (and other) weapons and ballistic missile systems. On the other hand, a rising level of general technological competence and capacity means that technologies of mass destruction might become more widely accessible, including to non-state actors. These worries were the origins of the notion of preventive action, since both kinds of proliferation were seen as a threat not just to the United States, but to stable inter-state relations more generally. But preventive action presupposes strategic superiority more or less unilaterally exercised. The central front in this respect is now twofold: first, there is the future of Iran's nuclear programme and the prospects for stability in the Middle East if and when Iran crosses the threshold of being a nuclear military power; and, second, the current and likely future instability of the state in Pakistan, which is already a nuclear power. The options for the United States in relation to both of these challenges are further complicated by the fact that Iran and Pakistan are central to any future stabilization of Afghanistan. It is already clear that the Obama administration is seeking to open some kind of dialogue with Tehran and bringing greater political - as opposed to purely military - thinking to the Afghanistan-Pakistan question. But there are no easy solutions here since neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan is confident that the United States will do the right thing by their lights and Iran may well have concluded that America's moment of dominance in the Middle East is passing. The second concern is that the rise of new regional powers under the impetus of 'reactive modernization' is likely to be a source of instability and potential conflict in the international system. While the neo-conservatives were somewhat confident of the ability of the United States to maintain its role as the sole global military power, the fall of Russia and the rise of China (and, to a lesser extent, India) were seen as profoundly unsettling for the Eurasian theatre. In this context, while Fukuyama might in principle trump Huntington in the longer term, nationalism was the wild card in the game of democratic (or capitalist) peace. The future alignments of such powers as Turkey, Ukraine, Iran and the like were also of concern, states that were themselves not of the first rank but whose strategic choices and alignments were crucial for the system as a whole. The fear was that there were several countries that might upset the prevailing regional balances of power. The - perhaps temporary - resurgence of Russia on the back of oil and gas income has further added to concerns about rivalries.

U.S. economic power is over---full multipolarity now

Simon Bromley, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Open University, August 2009, “Obama and the prospects for international order,” Economy and Society, Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 525-529

The economic unipolar moment that the United States enjoyed vis-a-vis its capitalist allies after 1945 and which some - captured by the hubris of the 'new economy' - thought had returned in the 1990s has given way to multipolarity; and the international economy is undergoing a fundamental rebalancing in power and momentum towards emerging Asia, a region in which US power is not institutionalized to the degree that it is in the transatlantic arena. Even transatlantic integration is not what it was as a result of the launch of the euro and its potential rivalry with the dollar. No other economy is going to overtake the US economy in terms of innovation and levels of productivity for the foreseeable future - the United States is not facing the predicament of Britain in the late nineteenth century (being overtaken by Germany and America) - but economic multipolarity is now a permanent condition.

No Link – Iraq (1/2)

Iraq withdrawal doesn’t undermine credibility or get perceived as weakening resolve

Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

There are three different arguments that lead one to conclude that reputation is not worth the fight. The most salient study in recent years is the desires theory offered by Jonathan Mercer, who argues against the universality of common perceptions and the interdependence of commitments. He argues that actors typically view an adversary's backing down as the result of situational constraints, leaving judgments about the determination of the enemy unchanged. In other words, enemies get reputations for having resolve but not for lacking it.19 Mercer suggests that reputations for irresolution do not form when an act is desirable from the enemy's perspective, for they tend to take credit for the desired action of an adversary.20 Applied to Iraq, Islamists would take credit for an American exit—their preferred outcome—but not conclude anything about U.S. resolve. Because reputation matters only if behavior is undesirable to the perceiver, no reputation for irresolution can be generated for adversaries, leading Mercer to conclude that it is unnecessary to keep commitments to convince adversaries of one's resolve.21

Iraq withdrawal doesn’t undermine U.S. credibility with any ally

Hakan Tunç, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Fall 2008, “Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Orbis, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669

Unlike the Vietnam War, the reputational argument over Iraq identifies not only adversaries but also allies as intended audiences for U.S. reputational concerns. According to Frederick Kagan, a prominent advocate of the reputational argument, a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would ‘‘cement our reputation as untrustworthy [among allies]. We will lose this generation not only in Iraq, but throughout the Middle East.’’20 For Brent Scowcroft, the former National Security Advisor of President George H.W. Bush, a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would create ‘‘the perception, worldwide,. . . that the American colossus had stumbled, was losing its resolve and could no longer be considered a reliable ally or friend—or the guarantor of peace and stability in this critical region [the Middle East].’’21 Like the allegations about ally behavior during the Vietnam War, these arguments fail to provide supporting evidence. So far, no government allied with the United States in the Middle East or elsewhere has given any indication that it would indeed lose its confidence in Washington if the United States were to withdraw from Iraq.

No Link – Iraq (2/2)

Credibility is situational---no spillover from Iraq

Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

A third critic of rational deterrence is Daryl Press, whose current calculus theory asserts that “credibility does not hinge on establishing a history of resolute actions”—only interests and power matter.24 Press insists that credibility rests with situational power and interests rather than past actions.25 By this view, a withdrawal from Iraq would not affect Islamist perceptions of U.S. resolve in the future. Credibility is case-specific to unique situations, thus making reputations irrelevant. Press suggests that statesmen merely assess interests and power in each specific instance to calculate whether an adversary's threat is credible: if they are strong and have strong interests at stake, the threat is credible regardless of past actions; scant power and interests yield dubious credibility regardless of past actions taken to bolster a reputation for resolve.26

Staying in Iraq can’t create a perception of resolve---and leaving after we think we’ve “won” still links

Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

Creative attributions are one manner of escaping cognitive dissonance; creative interpretations of the events themselves is another. As John Mueller notes, Many people … argue that the U.S. must slog on because a precipitous exit from Iraq would energize Islamist militants … A quick exit would confirm [bin Laden's] basic theory that terrorists can defeat the U.S. by continuously inflicting on it casualties that are small in number but still draining.59

No Link – Single Country

Single-country withdrawals don’t link---forward-basing is increasing quickly across the globe

Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15

No Link – Afghanistan Withdrawal (1/2)

Afghanistan withdrawal doesn’t cause a perception of weakness or undermine overall hegemony

Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato, 2009, “Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, online: http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

Perhaps the most important argument against the “withdrawal is weak-kneed” meme is that America’s military roams the planet, controls the skies and space, faces no peer competitor, and wields one of the planet’s largest nuclear arsenals. America is responsible for almost half of the world’s military spending and can project its power around the globe. Thus, the contention that America would appear “weak” after withdrawing from Afghanistan is ludicrous. Unfortunately, bureaucratic inertia and a misplaced conception of Washington’s moral obligations (an argument that more often than not legitimizes America’s military occupation of a foreign people) threaten to trap the United States in Afghanistan for decades. Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is more likely to tarnish America’s reputation and undermine U.S. security than would withdrawal.

Link only goes our way---Afghanistan isn’t key to heg and staying can only cause overstretch

Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato, 2009, “Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, online: http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

Central Asia holds little intrinsic strategic value to the United States, and America’s security will not be endangered even if an oppressive regime takes over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory. America’s objective has been to neutralize the parties responsible for the atrocities committed on 9/11. The United States should not go beyond that objective by combating a regional insurgency or drifting into an open-ended occupation and nation-building mission. Most important, Afghanistan serves as the crossroads of Central Asia. From its invasion by Genghis Khan and his two-million strong Mongol hordes to the superpower proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Afghanistan’s trade routes and land-locked position in the middle of the region have for centuries rendered it vulnerable to invasion by external powers. Although Afghanistan has endured successive waves of Persian, Greek, Arab, Turk, Mongol, British, and Soviet invaders, no occupying power has ever successfully conquered it. There’s a reason why it has been described as the “graveyard of empires,” and unless America scales down its objectives, it risks meeting a similar fate.

**No Link – Afghanistan Withdrawal (2/2)**

Afghanistan withdrawal lets the U.S. maximize tangible power---key to overall heg

Andrew Bacevich, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University, December 31, 2008, “Winning in Afghanistan,” Newsweek, online: http://www.newsweek.com/id/177374

In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to vigorously pursue the wrong mission. Persisting on the present course—as both John McCain and Barack Obama have promised to do—will turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will become a sinkhole consuming resources neither the U.S. military nor the U.S. government can afford to waste. The allied campaign in Afghanistan is now entering its eighth year. The operation was launched with expectations of a quick, decisive victory but has failed to accomplish that objective. Granted, the diversion of resources to the misguided war in Iraq has forced commanders in Afghanistan to make do with less. Yet that doesn't explain the lack of progress. The real problem is that Washington has misunderstood the nature of the challengeAfghanistan poses and misread America's interests there. One of history's enduring lessons is that Afghans don't appreciate it when outsiders tell them how to govern their affairs—just ask the British or the Soviets. U.S. success in overthrowing the Taliban seemed to suggest this lesson no longer applied, at least to Americans. That quickly proved an illusion. In Iraq, toppling the old order was easy. Installing a new one to take its place has turned out to be infinitely harder. Yet the challenges of pacifying Afghanistan dwarf those posed by Iraq. Afghanistan is a much bigger country—nearly the size of Texas—and has a larger population that's just as fractious. Moreover, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan possesses almost none of the prerequisites of modernity; its literacy rate, for example, is 28 percent, barely a third of Iraq's. In terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, the government in Kabul lags well behind Baghdad—not exactly a lofty standard. Apart from opium, Afghans produce almost nothing the world wants. While liberating Iraq may have seriously reduced the reservoir of U.S. power, fixing Afghanistan would drain it altogether. Meanwhile, the chief effect of allied military operations there so far has been not to defeat the radical Islamists but to push them across the Pakistani border. As a result, efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are contributing to the destabilization of Pakistan, with potentially devastating implications. September's bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad suggests that the extremists are growing emboldened. Today and for the foreseeable future, no country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security than does Pakistan. To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghan-istan would be a terrible mistake. All this means that the proper U.S. priority for Afghanistan should be not to try harder but to change course. The war in Afghanistan (like the Iraq War) won't be won militarily. It can be settled—however imperfectly—only through politics. The new U.S. president needs to realize that America's real political objective in Afghanistan is actually quite modest: to ensure that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda can't use it as a safe haven for launching attacks against the West. Accomplishing that won't require creating a modern, cohesive nation-state. U.S. officials tend to assume that power in Afghanistan ought to be exercised from Kabul. Yet the real influence in Afghanistan has traditionally rested with tribal leaders and warlords. Rather than challenge that tradition, Washington should work with it. Offered the right incentives, warlords can accomplish U.S. objectives more effectively and more cheaply than Western combat battalions. The basis of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan should therefore become decentralization and outsourcing, offering cash and other emoluments to local leaders who will collaborate with the United States in excluding terrorists from their territory. This doesn't mean Washington should blindly trust that warlords will become America's loyal partners. U.S. intelligence agencies should continue to watch Afghanistan closely, and the Pentagon should crush any jihadist activities that local powers fail to stop themselves. As with the Israelis in Gaza, periodic airstrikes may well be required to pre-empt brewing plots before they mature. Were U.S. resources unlimited and U.S. interests in Afghanistan more important, upping the ante with additional combat forces might make sense. But U.S. power—especially military power—is quite limited these days, and U.S. priorities lie elsewhere. Rather than committing more troops, therefore, the new president should withdraw them while devising a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan.

No Impact – Withdraw Solves Terrorism

No impact on deterrence. Drawdown prevents terrorism

Christopher **Layne**– Professorship of international affairs @ Texas A & M University “Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters: The Case for Offshore Balancing,” WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • FALL 2007]

This policy of containment, and deterrence worked in 1990—and still was working in March 2003. To ensure no Gulf oil hegemon emerges in the future, Washington should make it clear that it would respond militarily to prevent a single power from gaining control over a majority of the region’s oil capacity. However, a deterrence strategy does not require an on-the-ground American military presence in the region, because the U.S. today (in contrast to 1990), can back-up its deterrent threat with long-range airpower, and sea-based cruise missiles. Because the deployment of U.S. air and naval power would provide sufficient deterrent power to ensue that no oil hegemon emerges in the Persian Gulf, the United States could pull back its military forces from the Gulf, including Iraq, except for a naval presence in the Strait of Hormuz. This retraction of American forces from the Gulf would help greatly to reduce the terrorist threat to the United States. Contrary to the administration, the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases American vulnerability to terrorism by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that Washington is pursuing a neo-colonial policy to further its own imperial ambitions. The huge U.S. politico-military footprint in the region, including Iraq, is the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism, and has garnered thousands of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. Contrary to the administration, Islamic radicals do not hate the United States because of its freedom; they hate the United States because of its policies. As University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape argues, offshore balancing “is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf ” because the “mere presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future.”39 Similarly, Harvard’s Stephen Walt who also favors a U.S. offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East, observes, “The U.S. does have important interests in the Middle East—including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism— but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces.”40 Indeed, maintaining American military dominance in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty regimes in the Middle East are not effective policies to reduce the terrorist threat to the United States. Tactically speaking, terrorism is best combated through good intelligence (including collaboration with U.S. allies), covert operations, and strengthening America’s homeland defenses. Pg. 46

Extinction

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed – Graduate of Cairo University's School of Law (54) & Cairo University's School of Engineering (55) [Mohamed Sid-Ahmed (political analyst for the ‘Al-Ahram’ newspaper), “Extinction!,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 705, 26 August - 1 September 2004, pg. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living Societies would close. in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and **ethnic conflicts would proliferate**. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive**.** But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

No Impact – PGS Solves

PGS will preserve US dominance and deterrence

[[Jack A. Smith](http://original.antiwar.com/author/jack-a-smith/), “Obama’s War Machine: The Pentagon's Game Plan,” Antiwar.com, May 07, 2010, pg. http://tiny.cc/z4rlg]

• The NPR’s second objective is "reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons." This does not mean reducing the number, deployed or in storage, just the role. And there is a very good reason to reduce the role: The U.S. is developing a major non-nuclear alternative. It’s called Prompt Global Strike (PGS) and sometimes Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS). The U.S. government realizes that there are serious problems about using nuclear weapons. Such weapons may be justified as a deterrent to avoid a nuclear exchange because strike and counter-strike would result in mutually assured destruction (MAD). But the entire world would object to a preemptive unilateral strike against a non-nuclear state. For instance, had the Bush Administration’s "shock and awe" terror bombing of Baghdad included nuclear weapons, the global outcry — substantial to begin with — would have been magnified a hundred fold, and the act would never be forgiven by much of the world. Indeed, it would spark proliferation as countries scrambled to build nuclear deterrents of their own, as did the DPRK, to forestall a possible nuclear attack. The document barely mentions Prompt Global Strike, revealing only that the Pentagon "is studying the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-nuclear prompt global strike." Global Strike usually means nuclear bombs and missile warheads. PGS or CPGS means conventional, i.e., non-nuclear. Prompt Global Strike relies on high speed missiles, satellite mapping and other cutting edge military technology to launch a devastating non-nuclear payload from a military base in the U.S to destroy a target anywhere in the world in less than one hour. The purpose is to resolve the conundrum posed by the global inhibition toward the use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, thus greatly strengthening the Obama Administration’s full spectrum military dominance.

Status quo nuclear reductions will force Obama to shift to conventional PGS. That sures-up deterrence

[Nathan Gardels (editor-in-chief of NPQ, the journal of social and political thought), “[The Zero Nukes Conundrum](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/the-zero-nukes-conundrum_b_587699.html),” The Huffington Post, Posted: May 24, 2010 04:06 PM, pg. http://tiny.cc/xhdm0]

Certainly, there is plenty of room to radically reduce arsenals, as the [new START treaty](http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol) begins to do, starting with the destabilizing weapons and putting in place controls that prevent unauthorized or accidental launch of a nuclear-armed missile. As long as a minimal balance remains that ensures the capacity for mutual destruction, deterrence will hold. The other focus should be on non-nuclear means of deterrence, though that too may generate instability if it creates a gap, real or perceived, with the capabilities of rival powers. The favored child of the Obama Pentagon is the ["Prompt Global Strike" (PGS) weapon](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7107179.ece) -- a highly accurate inter-continental ballistic missile armed with a conventional warhead that can hit any target globally within an hour. The advantages of such a weapon are self-evident -- it can strike at the heart of any enemy without annihilating its population or prompting a return nuclear attack. As such, its large-scale deployment could radically reduce dependence on nuclear weapons. At the same time, since its use will not be incommensurate with rational goals, it is far more likely to be used than a nuclear weapon.

No Impact – Terrorism

There’s virtually no threat from terrorism

John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, September/October 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat.html?mode=print

THREAT PERCEPTIONS The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to. Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength. Those attacks demonstrated, of course, that al Qaeda -- or at least 19 of its members -- still possessed some fight. And none of this is to deny that more terrorist attacks on the United States are still possible. Nor is it to suggest that al Qaeda is anything other than a murderous movement. Moreover, after the ill-considered U.S. venture in Iraq is over, freelance jihadists trained there may seek to continue their operations elsewhere -- although they are more likely to focus on places such as Chechnya than on the United States. A unilateral American military attack against Iran could cause that country to retaliate, probably with very wide support within the Muslim world, by aiding anti-American insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and inflicting damage on Israel and on American interests worldwide. But while keeping such potential dangers in mind, it is worth remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaeda­like operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 -- about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000). Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -- reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

Resolve doesn’t solve terrorism---militants never interpret it positively

Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

Next, looking at cases of firmness as well, we find that there is no reward for resolve in the perceptions of militant Islamists. Acts of firmness are discounted, reinterpreted, or situationally attributed to preserve the paper tiger image of the superpowers in the minds of the militants. Thus there is little value in fighting for reputation if the goal is to deter militants by the firmness of their adversary. The implications for a war on terror are significant if a war for reputation is pointless, or if exiting wars has reputational consequences for how the United States and others are perceived.

No Impact – Iran

Iranian prolif doesn’t cause aggression, arms races, terrorism, or lashout at Israel – experts agree a laundry list of checks prevent their impacts, even if Iran is extremist

Jahangir Amuzegar, former pre-revolutionary Iranian Finance Minister and Economic Ambassador, Summer 2006, “Nuclear Iran: Perils and Prospects,” Middle East Policy, v. 13, iss. 2, pq

Questioning the validity of objections to a nuclear-powered Iran, however, are a large number of experts who find the threats somewhat exaggerated, if not largely based on hysteria. First, the Islamic Republic's challenge to Washington's interests and power in the region needs no bomb for leverage, as U.S. interests and influence have already been effectively threatened since 1979 through conventional means and via financial support to groups in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Second, the chances of the Islamic Republic's engaging in adventurism or naked aggression against its neighbors are far-fetched. The last time Iran started a war was back in 1850 to liberate Herat; its last invasion of another country was in 1738. In the immediate past, even when Afghan Taliban challenged the Tehran government both militarily and ideologically, the clerical leadership showed an astonishing restraint. Third, the possibility of the Iranian nuclear program spawning a Middle East arms race is indeed ominous, but that race started decades ago, and Iran was not the one to launch it. Furthermore, Israel, Pakistan and India are already nuclear powers. Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf emirates all enjoy U.S. or NATO presence, alliance or protection and, thus, have no need of a nuclear defensive shield. No Iranian government, no matter how belligerent or stupid, would dare provoke or challenge American or NATO forces. Still further, potential candidates for the race - Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - present technical, financial, political and security problems of their own, and their foray into the nuclear bazaar is highly circumstantial.46 Finally, Iran might hesitate to start a regional nuclear arms race because it would lose its current superiority in conventional weapons. Fourth, there is the straw-man issue of a "bold Iran" engaging in nuclear coercion through the so-called "suitcase bomb."47 But chemical and biological weapons would be much cheaper to produce, less cumbersome to pack and carry, easier to handle and more devastating in effect. Fifth, Iran's influence in OPEC, whatever it might be, will be neither augmented nor diminished by possession of the bomb, but rather by its own oil-capacity limitations. Last, and most crucial, Washington's concern about the Islamic Republic's posture toward the Jewish state seems to be a bogus argument to neutral observers. The esteemed Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld believes that, "given the balance of forces," it cannot be argued that a nuclear Iran will threaten the United States or even Israel.48 Since the chances of mutual annihilation loom large in any nuclear first strike, a nuclear Iran would not dare initiate such an attack. Visiting the Natanz centrifuge facility, President Ahmadinejad told the staff, "What enemies fear is not production of an atomic bomb because in today's world atomic weapons are not efficient."49 The new president may be a political amateur, occasionally making dimwitted statements, but he is neither a fool nor a suicide bomber. Some pundits argue that a Shiite belief in martyrdom, coupled with the Iranian regime's extremist ideology, could render deterrence meaningless.50 Such people know neither Shiite martyrdom nor the regime leaders' instinct for self-preservation, nor even the mullahs' bazaari habit of always looking for the best deal.

Iranian proliferation doesn’t cause an arms race

Barry R. **Posen**, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2-27-**06**, The New York Times

<A Middle Eastern arms race is a frightening thought, but it is improbable. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, among its neighbors, only Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could conceivably muster the resources to follow suit. Israel is already a nuclear power. Iranian weapons might coax the Israelis to go public with their arsenal and to draw up plans for the use of such weapons in the event of an Iranian military threat. And if Israel disclosed its nuclear status, Egypt might find it diplomatically difficult to forswear acquiring nuclear weapons, too. But Cairo depends on foreign assistance, which would make Egypt vulnerable to the enormous international pressure it would most likely face to refrain from joining an arms race. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has the money to acquire nuclear weapons and technology on the black market, but possible suppliers are few and very closely watched. To develop the domestic scientific, engineering and industrial base necessary to build a self-sustaining nuclear program would take Saudi Arabia years. In the interim, the Saudis would need nuclear security guarantees from the United States or Europe, which would in turn apply intense pressure on Riyadh not to develop its own arms. Finally, Turkey may have the resources to build a nuclear weapon, but as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it relied on American nuclear guarantees against the mighty Soviet Union throughout the cold war. There's no obvious reason to presume that American guarantees would seem insufficient relative to Iran. So it seems that while Iranian nuclear weapons might cause considerable disquiet among Iran's neighbors, the United States and other interested parties have many cards to play to limit regional proliferation. But what about the notion that such weapons will facilitate Iranian aggression? >

Impact Turn: Readiness Causes War

Prioritizing resolve in foreign policy causes war

Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62

Decisionmakers' persistent concern for losing reputation has brought unnecessary bloodiness to international politics: too many wars have been waged for the sake of defending honor, prestige, reputation, and credibility. During the cold war alone, the two superpowers fought at least three large-scale wars (Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan) and were involved in countless proxy conflicts for the sake of reputation (or prestige, honor, and credibility).42 On many occasions, politicians' only justification for plunging into conflicts was defending reputation and credibility. Consider Ronald Reagan's justification for U.S. involvement in Central America: "If we cannot defend ourselves (in Central America)... our credibility will collapse and our alliance will crumble----If Central America were to fall,... which ally, which friend would trust us then?" (Type I-a).43

Attempting to signal resolve leads to crisis breakdowns and war

Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62

The third cult-derived peril is that the cult increases the probability of misperception during crisis bargaining. States in crisis bargaining often try to communicate their resolve by claiming that, although they may not be ready to defend a place for its intrinsic interest, they nonetheless are ready to defend it for the sake of their reputation.56 The rationale behind such posturing is that staking one's reputation is an effective means of making one's commitment credible.57 At the same time, however, states almost never judge an adversary's resolve based on their calculation of how much the adversary values its reputation or credibility. Instead, states judge an adversary's resolve based on their calculation of the adversary's interest and capability.58 These dynamics lead to a scenario in which both sides in a conflict seek to convey resolve by staking their reputations, while both sides also heavily discount signals based on such rhetoric. Thus, cult-based signals tend to make the two sides in crisis bargaining talk past each other. For instance, the United Kingdom's cult-based signal that it had to stand firm because its reputation (and prestige) was at stake was largely ignored in Argentina during the crisis bargaining preceding the Falklands/Malvinas war,59 just as us. leaders' repeated warnings to the North Vietnamese that the United States would fight to the end to defend its reputation and prevent the domino effect fell on deaf ears. As a result, the cult makes it more difficult for the two sides in a conflict to read how much the other side values the issue in dispute; signals intended to deter war cannot deter, and preventable war cannot be prevented.6"

Concern with U.S. credibility and resolve chain-gangs the U.S. into fighting wars just to demonstrate strength

Christopher Layne, associate professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Summer 1997, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, p.102-103

The diplomatic historian Robert J. McMahon has observed that since 1945 U.S. policymakers consistently have asserted that American credibility is "among the most critical of all foreign policy objectives.” As Khalilzad makes clear, they still are obsessed with the need to preserve America's reputation for honoring its security commitments: "The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies, such as Germany and Japan, believe that the current arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived as lacking the will or capability to lead in protecting their interest^."^^ Credibility is believed to be crucial if the extended deterrence guarantees on which the strategy of preponderance rests are to remain robust.

Preponderance's concern with credibility leads to the belief that US, commitments are interdependent. As Thomas C. Schelling has put it: "Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves . . . but defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one's commitments to action in other parts of the world at later times."45 If others perceive that the United States has acted irresolutely in a specific crisis, they will conclude that it will not honor its commitments in future crises. Hence, as happened repeatedly in the Cold War, the United States has taken military action in peripheral areas to demonstrate-both to allies and potential adversaries- that it will uphold its security obligations in core areas.

Impact Turn: Continued Presence Kills Credibility

Continuing a failed military engagement is worse for credibility

Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato, 2009, “Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, online: http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

Former national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations scholar Stephen Biddle, and many others, concede that the war in Central Asia will be long, expensive, and risky, yet they claim it is ultimately worth waging because a withdrawal would boost jihadism globally and make America look weak.26 But what we’ve invested in the Afghanistan mission could all fall apart whether we withdraw tomorrow or 20 years from now. In fact, if leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. If the issue is preventing U.S. soldiers from having died in vain, pursuing a losing strategy would not vindicate their sacrifice. And trying to pacify all of Afghanistan, much less hoping to do so on a permanent basis, is a losing strategy. Regardless, some people invoke memories of America’s ignominious withdrawals from Vietnam, Somalia, and Lebanon to muster support for an open-ended commitment. President Bush in 2007 claimed that withdrawing from Vietnam emboldened today’s terrorists by compromising U.S. credibility. “Here at home,” he said, “some can argue our withdrawal from Vietnam carried no price to American credibility, but the terrorists see things differently.”27 Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute agrees with that reasoning, writing that “the 1983 withdrawal from Lebanon and the retreat from Somalia a decade later emboldened Islamists who saw the United States as a paper tiger.”28 When opinion leaders in Washington talk about “lessons learned” from Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else’s domestic dispute, but that America should never give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost.29 But the longer we stay and the more money we spend, the more we’ll feel compelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predicament plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam: After 1968 it became increasingly clear that the survival of the [government of 7 If leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. South Vietnam] was not worth the cost of securing it, but by then the United States had another rationale for staying— prestige and precedent setting. The United States said the [South Vietnamese government] would stand, and even those in the administration now long convinced of the hollowness of the domino argument could agree that a U.S. failure in South Vietnam might endanger vital US national interests elsewhere or in the future.30 For decades, the fear of America losing the world’s respect after withdrawing from a conflict has been instrumental in selling the American public bad foreign policy.