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Position Explanation

This is the middle east stability disadvantage. As you can see, there are general links, as well as case specific link arguments. Conceptually, you might want to think about this file as containing 2 separate disads.

The first disad is the general middle east stability argument. U.S. withdrawal would cause different conflicts in the region to flare up, and those would quickly get out of hand. The second disad is about containing Iran. One of the most important uses for U.S. military presence through the region is to deter and contain Iran's regional ambitions. Without a strong U.S. military presence, Iran would be emboldened in its quest for regional hegemony and would proceed to adopt a range of destabilizing policies.

You should make your decisions about which version of the disad to read based upon the quality of the case specific link arguments. In most debates, you can probably read both.

1nc Mideast Stability Shell

( ) U.S. withdrawal from the Persian Gulf leads to Iranian hegemony, economic collapse, regional proliferation and Mideast conflagration

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living.

Failure to contain Iran causes Mideast instability and war, which goes nuclear

Alon Ben-Meir, professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, UPI, February 6, 2007, Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance

That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

Yes ME Stability

Our link cards all provide uniqueness – the U.S. military presence is sufficient to deter aggression and contain any conflicts that do exist in the status quo – withdrawal is a total game changer

Despite some instability now, things could get much worse – our disad is linear

Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org, 7-14-2010, “Obama's Foreign Policy Performance,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22629/obamas\_foreign\_policy\_performance.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication\_list%3Ftype%3Dinterview

The Obama administration's recent settling of the Russian spy case, along with its dealings with Russia on Iran and the START treaty, reflect a deft handling of Washington's affairs with Moscow, says CFR President Richard Haass, who sees a comparably adroit management of relations with China. However, Haass notes that the administration has been less successful in its handling of the Middle East and Afghanistan. "One senses that as bad as the Middle East is now, as we've often seen in the past it has the potential to get even worse," says Haass, who is concerned about missiles being provided to Hamas and Hezbollah, and about what he sees as the likelihood that sanctions against Iran will be ineffective. Haass calls the war in Afghanistan the administration's biggest foreign policy issue, and argues that the White House hasn't "made the case for the scale of investment the United States is making." On Iran, he does not believe the sanctions will stop that country's nuclear program, and that if the nuclear program proceeds, the United States and Israel "will have to decide what it is they can or cannot tolerate and what it is they are prepared to do about it."

Yes Iraq Stability

Iraq is stable now

The Hill, 7-4-2010, “Biden says stability approaching in Iraq,” http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/107141-biden-says-stability-near-in-iraq

Vice President Joe Biden on Sunday said the U.S. goal for withdrawing its forces from Iraq remains on schedule and that the country is approaching stability. Speaking at a naturalization ceremony for U.S. service members in Baghdad, the vice president said by the end of August, U.S. troops will have been reduced from 140,000 troops in January 2009 to 50,000. Biden took heat last year for a similar statement that predicted stability in the country, but on Sunday he said events have proven him correct. Biden's son Beau has served in the U.S. forces in Iraq. "Last year at this ceremony, I made what I was criticized for saying a bit of a bold statement. But I was confident then as I am now about other things that are going to happen," Biden said. "I said last August of this year that we will have achieved two goals. We will have helped Iraq’s leaders set the conditions for a sovereign, stable and self-reliant nation for future generations of Iraqis within a year, and we will have ended our combat mission here after more than seven years. "And I’m proud to report that because of you, and tens of thousands of our sons and daughters, including our son, we’ve made good on that promise." Biden is in Iraq on an unannounced trip, which he called "among the biggest kicks I've gotten since I've been vice president." He addressed the military in a palace that formerly belonged to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, finding "delicious irony" in the occasion. "This nation, once embroiled in sectarian strife and violence is moving toward a lasting security and prosperity with a government that represents the interest of every member of the community in Iraq, because until they get that straight -- and they’re getting it straight -- there’s no real shot they can become what they’re capable of," he said. "And the United States is committed, we’re committed to cement that relationship through economic, political and diplomatic cooperation."

Iraq stability is in place

Marc Heller, Staff Writer at Watertown Daily Times, 6-25-2010, “Gen. Austin optimistic about Iraq,” http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/article/20100625/NEWS02/306259962

"We're on a good glide slope to get where we need to be," Gen. Austin told the Senate Armed Services Committee. His Senate confirmation as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq is expected to come quickly. He replaces Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, who awaits confirmation as commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. They shared a confirmation hearing Thursday. If confirmed, Gen. Austin will oversee the remainder of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The schedule for the drawdown depends on the progress Iraqi security forces make in taking over protection of the country, as well as having the new Iraqi government fully in place. Iraqi forces now lead security missions, generally, officials said. And Gen. Austin stuck by the timeline, even as Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., asked him the possible effect of a deep cut in U.S. funds for Iraqi security forces envisioned by Democrats on the Armed Services Committee. Mr. McCain cited the committee's decision to move $1 billion from Iraqi security forces to earmarks which, while military-related, are pork barrel spending in his view. Democrats devoted $1 billion to the security forces instead of the $2 billion requested by the Obama administration, saying the Iraqi government has excess funds that could be used for that purpose. "Earmark and pork-barrel spending seems to be the priority," Mr. McCain said. Gen. Odierno requested the $2 billion for next year's budget and said Thursday that he based the figure on a cost-sharing arrangement with the Iraqis and on giving security forces "an initial capability" to keep the peace. Mr. McCain said he cannot support the annual defense authorization bill if it includes the cut — although he is already poised to oppose the bill for other reasons as well, including the possible repeal of the military's ban on openly gay service members. Gen. Austin said he would assess the situation after he takes the position and is in Iraq. Generally, he said, officials are trying to stand up the Iraqi security forces as efficiently as possible while minimizing risk.

No civil war coming now

The Hill, 7-4-2010, “Biden says stability approaching in Iraq,” http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/107141-biden-says-stability-near-in-iraq

"Not long ago, Iraq was a country on the brink of civil war. This is my 15th, 16th, 17th trip in. And every time I come -- this is four times or five times since I’ve been Vice President -- every time I come, because of an awful lot of brave Iraqis who gave their lives and tens of thousands of Americans who risked and/or gave their lives, it gets better, every single time I’m here," he said.

Northern Iraq remains stable – Turkish influence is key

Hürriyet Daily News, 7-13-2010, “Iraqi puzzle still puzzling Turkey,” http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=iraqs-political-instability-risks-rise-in-sectarian-ethnic-violence-2010-07-13

The relative stability in northern Iraq will not change, al-Momani said. “It’s unlikely that stability in the north will be affected because stability there is a result of the Kurds’ political process and local autonomy, which are stable,” said al-Momani. “The Turkish role there is also a stabilizing factor. Add to all of that the fact that insurgents are supposedly fighting the occupiers, which tend not to be in the north.”

Iran Deterred now

Iran is deterred by the use of military force now

Kenneth Pollack, director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, Fmr. Director for Gulf Affairs at the NSC, Fmr. Persian Gulf Military Analyst at the CIA, The Persian Puzzle, 2005, p.376

The reason that the threat of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons proba­bly does not rise to the level of justifying what would be an extremely costly and risky invasion is that Iran’s behavior over the past fifteen years suggests that it can probably be deterred from taking the most harmful offensive ac­tions even after it has acquired nuclear weapons. Here as well, the comparison with Saddam’s Iraq is useful. Unlike Saddam, there is very little reporting to indicate that Tebran’s leaders want a nuclear weapon for the express purpose of embarking on a more aggressive foreign policy. In fact, all of the reporting (and the Iranians discuss this issue in public, another difference from Iraq) indicates that they want nuclear weapons to deter an American—or, to a lesser extent, Israeli or Iraqi—attack.9 Nor does the current Iranian leadership have a history of reckless behavior. What was so disconcerting about Saddam was that he was a serial aggressor who never seemed to learn from his mistakes: his humiliating confrontation with the shah in 1975 was followed by a con­frontation with Syria the next year, which was followed by the invasion of Iran in 1980, then the invasion of Kuwait two years after the end of that war, fol­lowed by the decision to fight the United States and thirty other nations for Kuwait in 1991, then the attempt to assassinate former President Bush in 1993, then the renewed threat to Kuwait in 1994, the attack on the Kurdish city of Irbil in 1996, the eviction of the U.N. inspectors (provoking the Operation Desert Fox strikes) in 1998, and his effort to move a corps of ground troops to the Golan Heights to start a war with Israel in 2000. This was a stunning record of aggressive, risk-taking behavior unrivaled in recent history. To some extent, Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini was the same—refusing to call off the invasion of Iraq despite repeated failures and refusing to back down from the confrontation with the United States in the Gulf. If the ayatollah were still in charge of Iran today, his pattern of similarly aggressive and risk-tolerant lead­ership (although inspired by very different sources than Saddam’s) would make the argument for an invasion far more persuasive in terms of the impor­tance of keeping nuclear weapons out of his hands. - Since his death, however, Iran’s leadership has been offensive and, at times, has miscalculated, but it has not been as reckless or difficult to deter as either Saddam or Iran under the ayatollah. Many of Iran’s current leaders ar­gued against the invasion of Iraq in 1982—1988, they argued for making peace in 1988, they argued against confronting the United States in the Gulf during 1987—1988, they argued for avoiding further confrontation after Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, and they demonstrated in 1996 that they could be persuaded to change their behavior in part because of the threat of an American military retaliation. None of this makes it certain that Iran could be deterred once it acquired nuclear weapons, but all of it indicates that there is a strong basis for believing it could be. And since nuclear deterrence has proven fairly robust over the years, it suggests that the risk that Iran would adopt a reck­lessly aggressive foreign policy after acquiring nuclear weapons is probably lower than the virtual certainty that the costs of an invasion would be ex­tremely high.

Deterrence solves even if Iran gets nuclear weapons – Iran makes rational foreign policy decisions

Ray Takeyh, is a senior fellow a the Council on Foreign Relations, Kenneth Pollack, director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, Fmr. Director for Gulf Affairs at the NSC, Fmr. Persian Gulf Military Analyst at the CIA, March-April 2005, “The Ticking Clock”, Foreign Affairs, nexis

It is an open question whether the United States could learn to coexist with a nuclear Iran. Since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, Tehran's behavior has conveyed some very mixed messages to Washington. The mullahs have continued to define their foreign policy in opposition to the United States and have often resorted to belligerent methods to achieve their aims. They have tried to undermine the governments of Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies in the Middle East; they have waged a relentless terrorist campaign against the U.S.-brokered Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and they have even sponsored at least one direct attack against the United States, bombing the Khobar Towers--a housing complex filled with U.S. troops--in Saudi Arabia in 1996. Although Tehran has been aggressive, anti-American, and murderous, its behavior has been neither irrational nor reckless. It has calibrated its actions carefully, showed restraint when the risks were high, and pulled back when threatened with painful consequences. Such calculations suggest that the United States could probably deter Iran even after it crossed the nuclear threshold.

Iran is rational and can be deterred

The Economist, The riddle of Iran – The riddle of Iran; Nuclear proliferation, 7/21/07, nexis

Iran is a self-proclaimed theocracy. Yet it has conducted foreign relations since the revolution of 1979 in a way that seems perfectly rational even if it is not pleasant. Its president, the Holocaust-questioning Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is widely reported to have threatened to "wipe Israel off the map". But in fact he may never have uttered those precise words, and there is both ambiguity and calculation behind the bluster. Look closer and Mr Ahmadinejad is vague about whether he means that Iran should destroy Israel or just that he hopes for Israel's disappearance. Knowing that a nuclear attack on Israel or America would result in its own prompt annihilation, Iran could probably be deterred, just as other nuclear powers have been. Didn't Nikita Khrushchev promise to "bury" the West?

Withdrawal Bad – Iran

( ) Only U.S. military presence deters Iran – pulling out proves to Tehran that they can be more aggressive

Kenneth Pollack, director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, Fmr. Director for Gulf Affairs at the NSC, Fmr. Persian Gulf Military Analyst at the CIA, The Persian Puzzle, 2005, p.376

America’~ history with Iran also offers other warnings regarding this approrich. In practice, this policy would be identical to the failed European pol­icy of Critical Dialogue. It is a policy of all carrots at-id no sticks. Just as they did with the Critical Dialogue, Iran’s hard-liners would undoubtedly pocket all of the carrots and do nothing to change. Indeed, as the China example demonstrates, what this approach does is lock in the current regime—at least in the short and medium terms (after all, there is a case to be made that Chinese pol­itics are changing too, just very slowly). In the case of Iran it is even worse, because the hard-liners have argued for more than a decade that the United States would not be able to maintain the sanctions on Iran because the United States needed Iran more than Iran needed the United States. As Gra­ham Fuller has pointed out, this tends to say as much about the remarkably inflated view of their country held by many Iranians—who see Iran as “the center of the universe”—than it does about their objective understanding of the world.16 But by reversing course and lifting the sanctions without securing any change in Iranian behavior in return; the United States would be proving the point of the hard-liners. – Over the past fifteen years, the only things that have caused Iran to change its behavior have been the threat of military action by the United States in 1988 and 1996 and the threat of sanctions by the Europeans in 1997 and 2003. The American sanctions have inhibited Iran’s freedom of action somewhat, but because Tehran could always turn to Europe (and Russia and Japan) for trade and aid, the American sanctions never forced them to do anything. Far from coaxing Iran to become more responsible, a policy of unilateral conces­sions is much more likely to convince Tehran’s hard-liners that they can con­tinue to pursue their preferred foreign policy of aggressive opposition to the United States and the Status quo without suffering any meaningful repercus­sions.

( ) Extinction

Ephraim Sneh, Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense, 3/25/2007, “The Implications of a Nuclear Iran”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=380&PID=0&IID=1545&TTL=The\_Implications\_of\_a\_Nuclear\_Iran

Iranian President Ahmadinejad belongs to a school of thought which believes that the return of the Shiite messiah, the Vanished Imam or the Mahdi, is supposed to happen very soon. More than that, Ahmadinejad believes he has a divine role in making this arrival concrete in our lifetime, maybe even within a few years. His faith and convictions say that the messiah, the Mahdi, will come back only if there is a sort of Armageddon, a doomsday or a major global calamity, as a result of which the Shiites will govern the entire globe. When he was mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad paved a broad boulevard in the city for the Mahdi to drive on. He is making concrete preparations because he is serious. His actions and declarations are a result of his messianic beliefs, and the elimination of the Jewish state is an indispensable part of the doomsday which must precede the arrival of the Mahdi. More than that, Ahmadinajad says the Mahdi actually advised him to run for president and made his election possible.

Withdrawal Bad – Iran

Only the U.S. military can contain Iran – regional actors are too weak – withdrawal emboldens Iranian aggression and causes Israeli strikes on Tehran

Michael Rubin, Analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, November 2008, “Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained or Deterred?,” AEI Online, http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896

Even with such upgrades, and assuming Congress does not disapprove the sales--188 members of Congress have expressed concern--it is unclear whether the GCC states could contain Iranian aggression for long. No GCC state with the exception of Saudi Arabia has strategic depth. If Iraq could overwhelm Kuwait in a matter of hours, so, too, could Iran overwhelm Bahrain--the central node in regional U.S. naval strategy--or Qatar, where the U.S. army pre-positions much of its heavy equipment. A quick glance at the Iran-GCC military balance is not reassuring. Iran has 663,000 military service personnel, including regular army, IRGC, and Basij. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, has only 214,500 military personnel, and the combined total for the other five GCC states is a paltry 131,300. Iran falls short on fighter aircraft (332 versus 496 for the GCC) but is near parity on battle tanks (1,710 versus 1,912) and dominates with combat vessels (201 versus 94).[42] While Iran may fall short in certain categories, it has a superior ballistic missile capability to any immediate neighbors besides Pakistan. Iran's Shahab-3 missile has performed erratically during tests but now reportedly has a two-thousand-kilometer range. As the Gulf Security Dialogue sales indicate, the GCC states are scrambling to recover from this missile deficit. In order to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States and its allies in the region will need to enhance their military capability to counter the likelihood of successful Iranian conventional action. Iran's other neighbors cannot bring much to the containment table. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan's militaries are negligible. The Russian invasion of Georgia has eliminated the possibility of assistance from Tblisi. Uzbekistan and Armenia are, in practice, hostile to U.S. strategic concerns. Turkey, with its 514,000 troops, nearly four hundred fighter aircraft, and 4,400 tanks, is in theory a NATO ally and, as such, interoperable with the U.S. military. It could bring significant resources to the table, but it is an unreliable ally unlikely to participate in any serious containment; nor will Iraq or Afghanistan who, for years to come, will be more concerned with ensuring internal stability than participating in regional containment. Indeed, with the exception of Turkey, every other Iranian neighbor remains vulnerable to Iranian political or infrastructure sabotage, as incidents such as the Khobar Towers bombing and the 1995-96 Bahraini riots demonstrate.[43] A Kuwaiti parliamentarian has even accused the IRGC of infiltrating Kuwait.[44] Conclusion The Bush administration has treated deterrence and containment as rhetorical pillars, but, beyond the Gulf Security Dialogue, few in Washington appear willing to take the measures necessary to deter or contain a nuclear Iran. Even in the unlikely event they would achieve Iraqi acquiescence, neither Barack Obama nor Joe Biden support permanent bases in Iraq,[45] even though such facilities would be the cornerstones of a containment policy. Simply put, without permanent bases in Iraq, a nuclear capable Islamic Republic cannot be contained. While Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) laid down the necessary marker to support a deterrence strategy when she declared that the United States could "obliterate" Iran should the Islamic Republic use nuclear weapons, Obama's criticism of her statement[46] undercut the commitment to retaliation upon which any deterrence policy must rest. It may be comforting to Abizaid, Mullen, and the electorate to believe that the United States can deter or contain Tehran's worst ambitions, but absent any preparation to do so, Washington is instead signaling that the Islamic Republic has a green light to claim regional dominance and, at worst, carry out its threats to annihilate Israel. At the same time, absent any effort to lay the groundwork either for containment or deterrence, Washington is signaling to its allies in the region that they are on their own and that the U.S. commitment to protect them is empty. Arab states and Iran's other neighbors may calculate that they have no choice but to make greater accommodation to Tehran's interests. Should Israeli officials believe that the West will stand aside as Iran achieves nuclear capability and that a nuclear Islamic Republic poses an existential threat to the Jewish state, they may conclude that they have no choice but to launch a preemptive military strike--an event that could quickly lead to a regional conflagration from which the United States would have difficulty remaining aloof.

Iran will trigger all-out regional war if attacked

Joe Gelman, President of the Civil Service Commission of Los Angeles, “Iran will trigger all-out regional war if attacked, official says”, Neocon Express, 6/11/07, nexis

“Iran will trigger all-out regional war if attacked, official says” Jun. 11, 2007 (Neocon Express delivered by Newstex) -- "Ballistic missiles would be fired in mass against targets in the Persian Gulf states and Israel," one Iranian Foreign Ministry official said. "The objective would be to overwhelm US missile defense systems with dozens and maybe hundreds of missiles fired simultaneously at specific targets." The idea is to inflict maximum damage on the oil infrastructure of the Persian Gulf, and to close the straits of Hormuz, causing oil prices to rise, possibly by hundreds of dollars a barral, causing an immediate world-wide recession. Additionally, "Iran will open a freeway for terrorists from Afghanistan all the way to Lebanon, enabling the terrorists to strike in almost every country in the Middle East." Civilians will be targeted, and Israel will be blanketed with rockets, including Tel Aviv.

Withdrawal Bad – ME War

Disengagement would definitely cause a Middle East war

Joseph J. Sisco, former undersecretary of state for political affairs, Spring, 1995 Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy. - book reviews ORBIS

The main contentions of Leon T. Hadar's Quagmire: America in the Middle East are that U.S. disengagement from the region would provide strong inducement for elitist Arab leaders to put their own houses in order, would give Europe an incentive to accept more military and political responsibility for the Middle East, and would lead Israel to adopt a more moderate diplomatic posture and reform its statist system. To put it mildly, these are dubious propositions. American strategic and economic interests in the Middle East make disengagement unrealistic. For example, there is no alternative to the U.S. security role in the Gulf, as Hadar himself confirms in his concluding chapter. The notion that the Gulf states can develop an effective security arrangement of their own has, as expected, been shown to be mistaken. Left on their own, the Gulf states would be dominated by Iran or a militarily rebuilt Iraq. Either situation could mean the end of regional stability, and even the undermining of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Moreover, America cannot and should not disengage from the Arab-Israeli peace process. Washington's role has changed now that the parties are negotiating directly. But that's fine: the more direct the negotiations, the better. Such direct negotiations have brought about the peace agreements between Egypt and Israel, those between Jordan and Israel, and the Gaza-Jericho accords. Washington must remain engaged to move matters towards a more comprehensive peace, and its role in the Syrian-Israeli track is desired by both sides. Also, the parties will continue to need U.S. help in dealing with final-settlement issues.

The transition will be violent

Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT. And, Andrew Ross, Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College. International Security, Winter 1997

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation. There **would** like **be more war**. Weapons of mass destruction might be used in some of the wars, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

The impact is extinction

Joseph Nye, Former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Bound to Lead. 1990 p. 17

Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the relationship between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If, as Robert Gilpin argues, “international politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia,” the implications for the future are bleak. And if fears about shifting power precipitate a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we know it may end.

Withdrawal Bad – ME War

Status quo military presence should be maintained – it’s the best chance for regional stability

Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University August 1, 2005 Issue of The American Conservative, Middle East Paradigm Shift http://www.amconmag.com/2005\_08\_01/article2.html

Despite its manifest defects, the MEP persists in large part because, according to the conventional wisdom, no viable alternative exists. Nonsense, says Hadar, offering a policy of “constructive disengagement” as one such alternative. In a nutshell, he advocates allowing regional powers to negotiate their own equilibrium, with Europe serving as the ultimate guarantor of stability. He also wants to take a hands-off approach to the Palestinian issue, expecting that Israelis and Palestinians alike might become more serious about hammering out a settlement. Somewhat improbably, Hadar—who at one point wisely describes the Middle East as “a graveyard of great expectations”—foresees this approach paving the way for NAFTA-like trade agreements inducing “a movement toward democracy in the entire Levant” and an Israeli-Palestinian confederation akin to “a Middle Eastern Switzerland,” among other happy arrangements. Don’t count on it. In a region where, as Hadar observes, “unintended consequences are the name of the game,” disengagement is no more likely to yield utopia than is the militarized hyper-engagement of the Bush administration. Lower expectations, a lower profile, lower costs, less dependence, and patience in encouraging the peoples of the region to solve their own problems: these should be the watchwords guiding U.S. policy toward the Middle East—all the while keeping our powder dry. We can’t afford to disengage any more than we can afford to remake the region in our own image. Prudence lies in striking a course somewhere between these two extremes.

Withdrawal ensures mid-east instability

Sami G. Hajjar, Prof at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf,” https://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB185.pdf

It would be inaccurate to conclude from this discussion that U.S. military presence in the region is the reason why radical opposition groups are formed. There are several political, economic, and social reasons as to why opposition groups exist in the region. The close relations that Gulf regimes have with the United States make American military personnel and facilities an especially sought after target by radical groups. Likewise, none of the other security concerns alluded to in the Department of State report is attributable to U.S. military presence. In fact, U.S. presence is arguably justified as a deterrent to these security concerns and as a factor contributing to the long-term stability and security of the region. Still, terrorism will always be a matter of immediate concern as long as U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities are present in the region at a time when, despite all the statements of friendship and good will, U.S. policies engender strong emotional opposition. In the next section, I will examine public attitudes in the Gulf towards the United States.

Withdrawal Bad – ME Prolif

Disengagement means Saudi nuclearization

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY <http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_mcinnis.pdf>. 2005

A recent UN report recently warned that “[w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become ir- reversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” 1 One major challenge to the nonproliferation regime appearing on the strategic horizon is the likely development of an Iranian nuclear capability, which could spark a wave of pro- liferation throughout the Middle Eastern region. With this in mind, can U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities help bolster the security of U.S. allies against the threats posed by Iranian nuclear proliferation? In addition to deterring its own adversaries, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has in the past played a vital but often overlooked role of reassuring U.S. allies against their adversaries. This assurance was a key tool in preventing nuclear proliferation among allies in the European and Asian theaters during the Cold War, despite the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of their en- emies. In today’s security environment, assurance remains an important policy objective for the U.S. arsenal. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review states that “U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to secu- rity partners…. This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances.” 2 Will this strategy work in practice? In the Asian theater, extended deterrence has been effective, and the United States possesses some decent options for ensuring its effectiveness in the future. The long-standing commitment of the United States to the sur- vival of democratic states in the region, reinforced by security treaties with Japan and South Korea, has created a great deal of U.S. political credibility in the region. This political credibility, combined with U.S. military capabili ties, could be employed to deter the North Korean threat and assure U.S. allies in the region, thereby reducing the chance that they will respond to Pyongyang by building their own nuclear weapons program. The U.S. political commitment to its allies in Asia has been and remains robust, bolstered by the U.S. troop presence in Japan and South Korea for the past 50 years. This remains true de- spite the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Asian theater. Furthermore, should al- lies begin to doubt U.S. nuclear assurances, steps can be taken to reinforce the policy’s credibility. As such, despite the major challenges presented by Pyongyang’s nuclear declaration in February 2005, it is reasonably likely that East Asian allies will continue to choose to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella well into the future rather than set off a regional nuclear domino effect. U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagement than to Washington’s well-es- tablished partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous rela- tions. As then–Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, “Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and de- fense.” 3 One such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerg- ing in an already volatile Middle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities, includ- ing the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key “nuclear dominos” in the re- gion, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, decide that U.S. security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the region, creat- ing a uniquely dangerous situation.

Middle East arms race leads to nuclear conflict.

Stephen Blank, Spring 2004, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.1, Strategic Studies Institute,US Army War College

Even if we were not living in an age of military-technological revolution, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) such regional security tendencies would have the following impacts. • All forms of conventional war in the Middle East now become possible simultaneously as nuclear power possession diffuses. Iran can employ terrorism against Israel or another state, relatively secure in the knowledge that it controls the escalation ladder and can turn this weapon on or off given its nuclear deterrence of even conventional warfare on the other side in response to the threat. These threats are not directed only at Israel but also can be directed at U.S. forces, installations, or allies, e.g. Saudi Arabia or the Gulf Emirates. They can be used in a time of “peace” to undermine the credibility of U.S. guarantees to its regional allies which ultimately take the form of guaranteed extended deterrence. Certainly possession by regional aspirants to hegemony would threaten the U.S.’ conventional ability to project power by targeting American or allied targets to deny U.S. forces access to bases, propositioned stocks, ports, or any kind of lodgment in the Middle East as a whole. • In that case, no six-month buildup in Saudi Arabia as in 1990 would now be possible. Nor would the kinds of strikes that the United States carried out against Iraq be feasible because ports, air bases, staging areas, and the like would be unavailable to it. Either U.S allies, fearing the prospect of becoming targets would deny it the access or it would just be too risky to employ those “platforms” given enemy capabilities. • States having even a minimum nuclear deterrent or WMD capability could then pursue conventional superiority over their neighbors or rivals regenerating the arms race at both ends throughout the region and further stressing already under developed local economies.83 • Not only would nuclear or chemical and biological weapons in the hands of rivals deter American and allied forces in the Middle East, the significance of nuclear weapons would change from being a primarily defensive weapons that ensured the status quo to being an offensive weapon with distinct uses in wartime beyond merely brandishing threats. That transformation would undermine one of the foundation stones of American global strategy since 1945 but it would also herald the return of limited (and possibly even unlimited) nuclear war as a viable operational mission.

Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism

**Disengagement encourages terrorist aggression**

**The Union Leader, 2/14/2002**

Leftist critics of American involvement **in** the Middle East are urging the United States to raise federal fuel efficiency standards to reduce dependence on foreign oil. They claim that our purchasing of oil from that region is angering radical terrorists who would leave us alone if only we removed our presence and never again set foot on their sand-swept shores. Conservative critics of foreign oil dependency say the United States must discover and use additional domestic sources of oil because buying oil from Arabs indirectly funds Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Once we have these new sources of oil, we can stop writing checks to Mohammed and let that region alone. Either way, the result is the same: Scared by the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States will have pulled out of the Middle East and turned inward. If this happens, the unavoidable conclusion that all Islamist jihad warriors will come to is that terrorism against the United States works. There is another answer, however. The United States does not have to turn tail and run. Instead, we could solve the problem. And dependence on oil from the Middle East is not the problem. The problem is the theocratic Middle Eastern regimes that control the oil and use Western dollars to fund terrorist organizations. This includes “friendly” countries like Saudi Arabia.

A2: Withdrawal Inevitable

**The US isn’t turning isolationist anytime soon.**

David Brooks, Writer for The Times Union (Albany, New York). February 1, 2007. “U.S. needs to stay on world stage.” Pg. A13.

There hasn't even been a broad political shift in favor of the doves. The most important war critics are military types like Jack Murtha, Chuck Hagel and Jim Webb, who hate this particular war but were superhawks in other circumstances. Finally, there has been no change in America's essential nature. As Robert Kagan writes in his masterful book "Dangerous Nation," America has never really been an isolationist or aloof nation. The United States has always exercised as much power as it could. It has always coupled that power with efforts to spread freedom. And Americans have always fought over how best to fulfill their mission as the vanguard of progress. What's happening today is just another chapter in that long expansionist story. Today's debate in the Senate flows seamlessly from the history Kagan describes. Most senators agree that the tactical question of sending 20,000 more troops is not the central issue. Their core concern, they say, is finding a new grand strategy to stabilize the region. Most senators want a much more aggressive diplomatic effort to go along with the military one. (If President Bush said his surge was part of an effort to establish a regional diplomatic conference, he'd have majority support tomorrow.) But they don't question the need for America to play a leading role. They take it for granted that the U.S. is going to be in the Middle East for a long time to come. When you look further into the future, you see that the next president's big efforts will not be about retrenchment, but about expansion. They'll be about expanding the U.S. military, expanding the diplomatic corps, asking for more shared sacrifice, creating new interagency bureaus that will give America more nation-building capacity. In short, the U.S. has taken its share of blows over the past few years, but the isolationist dog is not barking. The hegemon will change. The hegemon will do more negotiating. But the hegemon will live.

**Withdrawal isn’t inevitable – American politics prove.**

David Brooks, Writer for The Times Union (Albany, New York). February 1, 2007. “U.S. needs to stay on world stage.” Pg. A13.

Today, Americans are disillusioned with the war in Iraq, and many around the world predict that an exhausted America will turn inward again. Some see a nation in permanent decline and an end to American hegemony. At Davos, some Europeans apparently envisioned a post-American world. Forget about it. Americans are having a debate about how to proceed in Iraq, but we are not having a strategic debate about retracting American power and influence. What's most important about this debate is what doesn't need to be said. No major American leader doubts that America must remain, as Dean Acheson put it, the locomotive of the world. Look at the leaders emerging amid this crisis. The two major Republican presidential contenders are John McCain and Rudy Giuliani, the most aggressive internationalists in a party that used to have an isolationist wing. The Democrats, meanwhile, campaigned for Congress in 2006 by promising to increase the size of the military. The presidential front-runner, Hillary Rodham Clinton, is the leader of the party's hawkish wing and recently called for a surge of U.S. troops into Afghanistan. John Edwards, the most "leftward" major presidential contender, just delivered a bare-knuckled speech in which he castigated the Bush administration for not being tough enough with Iran.

A2: Withdrawal Solves Entanglement

Draw-in means you can’t solve entanglement – only sustained Heg prevents it from escalating

Michael Hirsch, Senior Editor of the Washington Bureau. 2003. At War With Ourselves. Pg. 10-11.

Yes, it is possible. But first we must cross a psychological threshold ourselves. We need to grasp what many other nations already understand: the meaning of America in today’s world. Despite a century of intense global engagement, America is still something of a colossus with an infant’s brain, unaware of the havoc its tentative, giant-sized baby steps can cause. We still have some growing up to do as a nation. One of my favorite movies has always been *It’s a Wonderful Life.* Like everyone, I’m a sucker for the sentiment. But I also though the conceit was ingenious: What if we could all be granted, like Jimmy Stewart’s George Bailey, a look at the world without us? I think it’s useful to apply the same conceit to the one uberpower world. Suppose, with the end of the Soviet Union, America had mysteriously disappeared as well or, more realistically, had retreated to within its borders, as it had wanted to do ever since the end of World War II. What would a Jeffersonian America, withdrawn behind its oceans, likely see unfolding overseas? Probably a restoration of the old power jostle that has sent mankind back to war for many millennia. One possible scenario: Japan would have reacquired a full-scale military and nuclear weapons, and would have bid for regional hegemony with China. Europe would have had no counterbalance to yet another descent into intraregional competition and, lacking the annealing structure of the postwar Atlantic alliance, may never have achieved monetary union. Russia would have bid for Eurasian dominance as it has throughout its modern history. Most important of all, the global trading system, which the United States virtually reinvented after World War II (with some help from John Maynard Keynes and others), would almost certainly have broken down amid all these renewed rivalries, killing globalization before it even got started. That in turn would have accelerated many of the above developments. A war of some kind would have been extremely likely. And given the evidence of the last century, which shows that America has been increasingly drawn into global conflicts, the U.S. president would be pulled in again – but this time in a high-tech, nuclearized, and very lethal age of warfare.

Deterrence solves

Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls.” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002.

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

Heg minimizes entanglements – disengagement is worse

William Wohlforth, Summer 1999Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security,. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.”

Second, doing too little is a greater danger than doing too much. Critics note that the United States is far more interventionist than any previous system leader. But given the distribution of power, the U.S. impulse toward interventionism is understandable. In many cases, U.S. involvement has been demand driven, as one would expect in a system with one clear leader. Rhetoric aside, U.S. engagement seems to most other elites to be necessary for the proper functioning of the system. In each region, cobbled-together security arrangements that require an American role seem preferable to the available alternatives. The more efficiently the United States performs this role, the more durable the system. If, on the other hand, the United States fails to translate its potential into the capabilities necessary to provide order, then great power struggles for power and security **will reappear sooner**. Local powers will then face incentives to provide security, sparking local counterbalancing and security competition. As the world becomes more dangerous, more second-tier states will enhance their military capabilities. In time, the result could be an earlier structural shift to bi- or multipolarity and a quicker reemergence of conflict over the leadership of the international system.

A2: Layne

Layne is wrong – his arguments are based on gross misunderstandings of history.

Jack Snyder, Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. July/August 2006. “The Crusade of Illusions.” Foreign Affairs. New York: Jul/Aug 2006. Vol. 85, Iss. 4; pg. 183. Proquest.

His account, however, is far too one-sided to convince, and Layne is wrong on many key issues. In his historical overview, he ignores the fact that the U.S. decision to withdraw from active participation in balancing power in Eurasia in the 1930s was a disaster, and that the U.S. victory in the Cold War came cheap compared to other historic contests for hegemony. Moreover, Stalin would never have accepted a deal to set up a truly independent Germany, because he rightly feared a rerun of World War II. And NATO was created because the Europeans pushed for it; if anyone was ambivalent about it, it was the U.S. Congress, which was reluctant to fund ongoing troop deployments abroad. More generally, Layne is right to worry that U.S. dominance may provoke resistance. But he overlooks the critical fact that during the Cold War, most states balanced against the weaker but more threatening Soviet Union, rather than against the stronger but more attractive United States. The result of such skewed historical judgments is that Layne unfairly dismisses the possibility that a consensual international order based on prudent, liberal American leadership could emerge.

Layne’s version of counter-balancing is under-theorized. Any way it would work would fail.

Gary J. Schmitt, Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies. March 12, 2007. American Enterprise Institute Online: “Pax Americana.” <http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp>

An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the vast majority of his time criticizing the argument for primacy, without giving the reader much of a handle on his own preferred strategy's particulars. As a result, we don't know whether his model of "off-shore balancing" is more British in style--that is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other competing states--or more passive in content--a la the United States in the 1920s and '30s. If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever engaged in before. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to carry it out, would the American public really be willing to let its government play this version of international politics--shifting partners based on power relations--rather than the character of the states themselves? Surely, the disappearance of the United States as security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, and found itself in numerous conflicts in any case. If the latter, the passive "off-shore balancing" approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in the United States addressing a security problem at a time when it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet their challenge. Possibly. But doing so might create an even more destabilizing competition among neighbors, or lead those same neighbors to accept China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises are the result of not addressing more minor ones initially. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to deal with these issues when one is in a better position to do so than to wait for them to become full-blown security problems.

Layne mistheorizes hegemony - there’s no risk of overstretch and counterbalancing wouldn’t solve it anyway.

Gary J. Schmitt, Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies. March 12, 2007. American Enterprise Institute Online: “Pax Americana.” <http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp>

And speaking of money: Layne's argument about looming imperial overstretch is itself a stretch. Even with all the problems in Iraq, a war in Afghanistan, and an emerging hedging strategy vis-a-vis China, the defense burden is still barely over 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product. The United States has certainly had far higher defense burdens in the past, while still retaining its status as the world's economic juggernaut. There may be plenty of reasons to worry about the country's economy, but "guns over butter" is hardly one of them. Moreover, while pulling back from a forward-leaning defense strategy would undoubtedly save money, offshore balancing would still require the United States to have a major military establishment in reserve if it wanted to be capable of being a decisive player in a game of great power balancing. Is the $100 billion or so saved--or, rather, spent by Congress on "bridges to nowhere"--really worth the loss in global influence that comes from adopting Layne's strategy?

A2: China Fills In

China won’t fill-in

Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer of The Henry L. Stimson Center, April 22, 2006, China and the Middle East: No threat to US interests, for now

China wants the US to be more flexible vis a vis Iran and is concerned about the consequences of US failure in Iraq. It does not harbor, for now, any great ambition to inherit leadership for the region's protracted problems, and is satisfied with its current limited role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Overall, China would see its interests served if US leadership could manage to bring greater stability to the region, as it develops strategically important energy ties to the oil and gas exporters. It sees, however, poor prospects for America's ability to achieve that goal. During recent exchanges in Beijing, Chinese foreign policy experts expressed respect for American power and influence in the Middle East, but were honest and direct about the shortcomings in US policies and performance. They shook their heads in dismay about the "mess" that is Iraq, and wondered why the US is not more creative and flexible in finding some accommodation with Iran. In the view of some Chinese Middle East experts, the asymmetry of power between Washington and Tehran obliges the US to take the lead in breaking the long impasse in bilateral relations. On each topic, the Chinese averred that they could not substitute for American influence and power, and had no plans to do so. Despite China's protestations of modest capabilities and intentions, its own policies are evolving quickly in the strategically vital Middle East. Energy demand drives the policy, but fairly quickly leads to other forms of economic interdependence, including two-way foreign investments and trade on a wide array of commercial and industrial products. The industrialization fever underway in the Arab Gulf, according to an academic expert, is oriented almost entirely to the Chinese market. Neither China nor the Arabs talk of strategic partnership or a security dimension to their relations, but some Arabs talk of the Chinese experience of rapid economic growth without radical political change as an attractive reference point. (The Chinese also object to the very notion that there is a Chinese "model", and prefer to look at processes for change in each country on its own terms.) Some of China's foreign policy experts express considerable understanding and empathy for the Arab world. A military officer spoke eloquently of the region's sensitivities about its loss of status, compared to earlier historic periods, and its loss of international respectability, despite its great natural resources and contributions to world civilization. This gap seemed to resonate with the Chinese, who remember the "century of humiliation" at the hands of outside powers, and may suggest another aspect of growing political and cultural ties that would not be transparent to western observers. This could be one dimension of China's emerging "soft power" that will accrue political benefits to China over time. In the short and medium term, Washington and Beijing should be able to avoid letting the Middle East become a source of tension. At the official level, there are now exchanges between regional experts as part of a global forum between the two countries that could facilitate cooperation on discrete problems. Leaders also need to associate themselves with the notion that strategic competition over this vital region, reminiscent of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War, is not in either party's interest. Energy issues need to be managed at the level of institutions of global governance and in the marketplace; some more transparency on the part of the Chinese would be desirable. Beyond that, the two powers could work together more actively to prevent nuclearization of the region, and China can be a constructive, albeit secondary, player in bringing greater stability to Iraq and reducing tensions with Iran, which are global, not regional, concerns. Chinese interlocutors hope for an agenda that is not too daunting, as they move from observers to more "responsible stakeholders" in the critical Middle East.

China won’t fill-in or pursue plan

Chietigj Bajpaee, Power of Interest News Report, March 10, 2006, ''China Becomes Increasingly Involved in the Middle East'' http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\_report&report\_id=455&language\_id=1

While China and the United States are not engaged in an overt competition in the Middle East, it is not difficult to envision that the region could emerge as the stage for future Sino-U.S. rivalry. Not only are the United States and China dependent on energy resources from the Middle East, but both states offer competing models for international conduct, with the Chinese model becoming increasingly popular in the region. While the United States has become more willing to engage in humanitarian intervention, preemptive action and regime change, with the Middle East emerging as the most likely candidate for the U.S. to practice these policies, China retains a preference for a traditional Westphalian-style of conducting international relations with emphasis on non-intervention, state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since 9/11 and the launch of the U.S.-led war on terrorism and the Greater Middle East Initiative to spread democratic principles across the Middle East, regimes in the region, including those that have traditionally maintained close relations with Washington such as Saudi Arabia, have deepened relations with Beijing in order to hedge their bets against a downturn in relations with the U.S. China's relations with pariah, terrorism-sponsoring governments in the region including Iran, Libya, and Syria, as well as the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and other weapons platforms to these countries, has already created a source of tension between the United States and China.

A2: EU Fills In

Europe won’t fill in – they are afraid of being hardline against Hezbollah

Soeren Kern, Staff Writer for Human Events Online, September 12, 2007, Fear Factor: Lebanon and the European Way of Peacekeeping http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=22289

Meanwhile, Europeans remain indifferent, indeed, duplicitous, vis-à-vis Hezbollah. On the one hand, Hezbollah has killed scores of Europeans in assassinations and bombings around the world. On the other hand, European officials refuse to join the United States, Canada and Australia in adding Hezbollah to its official list of terrorist organizations, a move that would deprive the group funding from Islamic “charities” in Europe. Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, in June 2006 said there was no plan to add Hezbollah to the terrorism list because the EU did not have enough information to determine whether the group should be deemed as such. Solana tries to justify himself by saying the issue is legal, not moral, in nature. But in March 2005 the European Parliament passed a resolution by 473 votes to eight stating there is abundant evidence that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization and calling for “all needed measures to put an end to the terrorist activities of this group.” Just why are Europeans so ambivalent about doing the right thing? Fear, fear and more fear, according to experts at a June 20 hearing titled Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List sponsored by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives. Europeans are reluctant to call Hezbollah what it is because they fear reprisals against European interests at home and abroad. Europeans are afraid that if they take a hard line against Hezbollah, their troops in Lebanon may be attacked. They are also afraid that Hezbollah (which is said to have operatives in every EU country) may activate sleeper cells to carry out attacks inside Europe. And Europeans are afraid of inciting the thousands of shiftless young Muslim immigrants in towns and cities throughout Eurabia. Indeed, the fear of angry Muslims is so pervasive that in practical terms Islam has already established a de facto veto on European foreign policymaking.

Europe fill-in causes terrorist attacks

Rajan Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. 2007. *The End of Alliances*. Pg. 79-80

But it’s not just fear of a terrorist tide from without that could make European members of NATO unwilling to join the United States in using military power to combat terrorism. There is also the risk of a ter­rorist tide from within. Islamic radicalism and terrorism appeal to cer­tain constituencies within Europe’s own Muslim communities. Euro­pean Muslims are, it must be stressed at the outset, varied in ethnicity and national origin, hailing as they do from the Maghreb, Turkey, South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans. They do not constitute a monolithic bloc. Some are immigrants; others were born in Europe and have assimilated to local culture and feel more bound to their birthplace than that of their parents. Some consider Islam central to their identity and are be­lievers; others do not and are agnostics. Interpretations of Islam vary. There are divisions rooted in class and the degree of education and pro­fessional advancement. Nevertheless, there is no denying that militant return-to-roots variants of Islam that condone attacks on civilians have gained adherents in Europe’s Muslim communities. That the extremists do not represent mainstream attitudes is irrelevant. The oxygen of ter­rorist cells is secrecy: infiltration and surveillance are constant dangers, trust and allegiance all important. Terrorism, for these reasons, has never been a mass movement. Fewer is better. Three facts are germane to assaying the nature and magnitude of Islamic extremism in Europe.43 The first is that Europe’s Muslim popu­lation is large in absolute terms. There are barriers and uncertainties that make compiling accurate data difficult. For instance, France does not permit the compilation of official statistics of citizens’ religious af­filiation; some Muslims live in Europe illegally; many are citizens, others are not. But estimates are that between fifteen and twenty million Mus­lims live in Europe. They constitute a significant proportion of the population in some NATO countries, but not in others. At the high end are France (between 5 and 10 percent), the Netherlands (4.4 percent), Belgium (4 percent), and Germany ~ percent); at the low end are Britain (2.5 percent) and Denmark (2 percent).

Changing demographics in Europe make support for terrorists inevitable.

Rajan Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. 2007. *The End of Alliances*. Pg. 81.

Muslims in Europe tend to be concentrated in some of the largest cities—and this is my third point—that are by virtue of sheer size the political and economic nerve centers. Most, moreover, are also poorly integrated into local culture and society, and economically are markedly worse off than the Europeans in whose midst they live. Far from having embraced secularism, many European Muslims (even those who are well-educated and economically successful) remain attached to Islamic religious and cultural values. They are also critical of Western policies in the Muslim world. Moreover, radical Islamist ideologies appeal to the young, whether or not they are citizens of the countries they inhabit.45 Militant, millenarian renditions of Islam offer them an escape from anomie and underdog status by inculcating pride and identity. Such doctrines also provide an explanation for the barriers that block their own advancement and that account for the unenviable position of a once-glorious Islamic civilization. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, 9/11, the 2003 Madrid bombings, and the 2005 ter­rorist strike against the London Underground reveal a particularly dis­turbing fact: Muslims who have lived in Europe for many years, or who are citizens of their countries of residence by virtue of naturalization and even birth, were participants in the atrocities, whether as planners or perpetrators.

Afghan Withdrawal Bad – Iran

Afghan military presence is key to contain Iran

Michael Rubin, Analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, November 2008, “Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained or Deterred?,” AEI Online, http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896

What Is Required to Contain Iran? Any containment operation against a nuclear Iran would require more than the single battle group that participated in Operation Earnest Will. Should the Islamic Republic acquire nuclear weapons, it may become dangerously overconfident as it convinces itself that its conventional, irregular, or proxy forces can operate without fear of serious reprisal from the United States, Israel, or any other regional power. In order, therefore, to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States and its allies in the region will need to enhance their military capability to counter the likelihood of successful Iranian conventional action. There are two strategies that U.S. policymakers may pursue separately or in tandem. First, U.S. defense planners might examine what U.S. force posture would be necessary for the United States unilaterally to contain a nuclear Iran. Second, U.S. officials must gauge what investment would be necessary to enable neighboring states to do likewise. Put more crudely, this requires calculating under what conditions and with what equipment regional states could successfully wage war against Iran until U.S. forces could provide relief. If the Pentagon has pre-positioned enough equipment and munitions in the region, this might take three or four days; if not, it could take longer. If U.S. forces are to contain the Islamic Republic, they will require basing not only in GCC countries, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Without a sizeable regional presence, the Pentagon will not be able to maintain the predeployed resources and equipment necessary to contain Iran, and Washington will signal its lack of commitment to every ally in the region. Because containment is as much psychological as physical, basing will be its backbone. Having lost its facilities in Uzbekistan, at present, the U.S. Air Force relies upon air bases in Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Oman, and the isolated Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia.

Failure to contain Iran results in global nuclear war

Alon Ben-Meir, professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, UPI, February 6, 2007, Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance

That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

Afghan Withdrawal Bad – Iran

Afghan bases are key to contain Iran

Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg News, 5-21-2010, “Pentagon Plan to Beef Up Afghan Base Near Iran May Rile Regime,” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-21/pentagon-plan-to-beef-up-afghan-base-near-iran-may-rile-regime.html

A U.S. plan to upgrade its airbase in southwestern Afghanistan just 20 miles from Iran’s border will likely rile the Islamic regime, bolstering suspicions the West is trying to pressure it with military might, analysts say. The Defense Department is requesting $131 million in its fiscal year 2011 budget to upgrade Shindand Air Base so it can accommodate more commando helicopters, drone surveillance aircraft, fuel and munitions. Plans to expand the base come as the U.S. works to strengthen the militaries and missile defenses of allies in the region and presses at the United Nations for a new round of sanctions aimed at forcing Iran to curb its nuclear program. U.S. military officials say the base is only to support U.S. and Afghan military operations in Afghanistan. Iran will likely view the Shindand buildup as another step to squeeze it, said Kenneth Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Whatever U.S. intentions, the Iranian regime will see it as a threat -- as another American effort to surround Iran with U.S. military forces,” Pollack said in an interview. “The Iranians are almost certainly going to assume that a beefed-up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance presence is really about spying on them,” he said. Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, shares that view. “The positioning of the base gives us the opportunity to monitor any efforts by Iran to serve as a sanctuary for anti- government Taliban and allied forces, and to support operations in Iran itself if that were to become necessary,” he said.

U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan causes Iran to compete for regional hegemony in Afghanistan – this risks instability across the region

Flynt Leverett, Mideast Expert, 7-8-2010, “IRAN’S STRATEGIC STAKE IN AFGHANISTAN: HILLARY MANN LEVERETT IN FOREIGN POLICY,” http://www.raceforiran.com/

On Iran’s reaction to a drawdown in U.S. military forces in Afghanistan: “In contrast to the United States, which seems at least to be looking for a viable exit strategy from Afghanistan, there is no exit strategy for Iran. Iran publicly calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, partly because U.S. forces there could be used against Iran. But Tehran also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan because Iranian policymakers believe that the extended U.S. presence there is seen by much of the population as an occupation and that it is this occupation which is fueling an increasingly fierce cycle of violence and instability. From Tehran’s perspective, this cycle of violence and instability empowers Iran’s Afghan adversaries, principally the Taliban, and their external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both of which are regional rivals to the Islamic Republic. From an Iranian standpoint, the most constructive American strategy would have been for the United States to begin a gradual but steady withdrawal of troops a few years ago when that could have helped shape a political settlement based on power sharing among all of Afghanistan’s major constituencies. From an Iranian perspective, such a settlement could have included the Pashtun, though, at least at the time, not necessarily the Taliban, and would have given Iran’s Afghan allies—who, at the time, were also America’s allies—the upper hand. Today, Iran is concerned that, as America belatedly positions itself to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan next year, the Obama administration still has no coherent strategy regarding President Karzai’s drive for a political deal—a deal which, because of mistakes made by Washington, must now include the Taliban and its chief external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia… Iran is concerned that the United States’ interest in fostering sufficient stability in Afghanistan for long enough to allow U.S. troops to begin leaving next year will lead Washington to drop the “red lines” it has imposed on Taliban participation in a political process. Iran is concerned that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will be able to use the Taliban’s unchecked involvement in a power-sharing arrangement as a proxy to expand their influence in Afghanistan at Tehran’s expense and to threaten the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, Iran will intensify its support for key players among the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups, just as it did during the civil war that broke out after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and after the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996. These dynamics raise the risks of renewed civil war in Afghanistan—a civil war that would simultaneously be a proxy war among Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the country’s most powerful external players. These were precisely the conditions under which al-Qaeda found sanctuary and thrived in Afghanistan during the 1990s.”

Iraq Withdrawal => ME War

Withdrawal sparks an expanding sectarian conflict that pulls in Iraq’s neighbors

Kimberly Kagan, affiliate John Olin Institute of Strategic Studies executive director Institute for the Study of War Awareness “Symposium: If We Fail” Jamie Glazov

Front Page Magazine 10/12/2007

http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=A0DB2FFE-E3E8-4AD3-8C48-84773E6FF95D

Should the Iraqi Security Forces collapse or sectarian violence escalate again, Iraq’s neighbors are likely to become involved in the struggle to stabilize Iraq: for security reasons as well as sectarian reasons. Iraq’s neighbors – Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait - do not share a common vision of what Iraq should be, and they have military capabilities that they can use to settle the issue in the absence of American troops. Broad sectarian conflict in Iraq is likely to have second-order effects in neighboring countries, where Sunni and Shia live tensely, and where many Iraqi refugees have settled. These are not worst-case scenarios; these are likely consequences of an American withdrawal based on the involvement of these states in the present conflict. The consequences of Iraq’s collapse after a premature withdrawal of U.S. troops will ripple throughout the region for years to come.

Withdrawal leads to a massive regional war that would suck the U.S. back into Iraq

Max **Boot,** Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Center for Foreign Relations, 3-22-2006, Los Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-boot22mar22,1,6869809.column?coll=la-news-columns&ctrack=1&cset=true

Is Iraq already in the middle of a civil war? That depends on the meaning of "civil war." Clearly there is increasing internecine violence, and if Iraq isn't already in a civil war, it is heading that way. But bad as the situation is, it could get far, far worse if the U.S. were to withdraw prematurely. At the moment, the presence of about 136,000 U.S. troops is, believe it or not, keeping a lid on the violence and limiting the options of the most extreme elements in both the Sunni and Shiite communities. At least 30,000 Iraqis have died over the last three years, largely at the hands of ruthless terrorists. But the current period would seem paradisiacal if a full-blown civil war were to erupt. An all-out sectarian conflict could resemble the bloodbaths in the Balkans, Rwanda and Sudan, with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, dying and neighboring states being drawn into the fray. If that were to happen, there would be a call for international intervention led by — who else? — the United States. We would be back exactly where we are today: in the middle of Iraq, trying to preserve a modicum of security and urging the various factions to cut a deal to end the fighting.

A U.S. withdrawal would cause regional war and global terrorism

Kenneth **Pollack**, Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and a Brookings Senior Fellow, February 20**06**, A Switch in Time: A new Strategy for America in Iraq, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iraq\_Brookings\_Feb\_14.pdf, p. 3

Nevertheless, the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces sug- gested by Bush Administration critics is also not the correct answer to the challenges that the United States faces in Iraq. Iraq’s political and military institutions are not yet strong enough to allow the country to survive without comprehensive U.S. support, and are unlikely to be able to do so for several years. A precipitate withdrawal of U.S. forces before Iraq has developed capable institutions would almost certainly plunge the country into civil war. Existing armed groups would immediately seize as much wealth and territory as they could and some would mount pre-emptive attacks on other groups whose intentions they suspected. Meanwhile, the zealots in each major community, the Sunnis, Shi’ah, and Kurds alike, would indulge in the full-scale ethnic cleansing they have been pressing for since the fall of Baghdad. A civil war in Iraq would likely destabilize Iraq’s neighbors. Civil wars often have spillover effects on neigh- boring states—such as refugee flight and armed groups moving in to seek sanctuary there. Neighboring states often intervene to prevent such spillover or to grab territory, which would be especially tempting in oil-rich Iraq .For instance, the Lebanese civil war of the 1970s and 1980s imposed damaging spillover effects on both Syria and Israel, while civil strife in Afghanistan in the 1990s exacerbated the problems of Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan. The collapse of the Democratic Republic of Congo from the late-1990s onwards has embroiled six neighboring countries in southern and eastern Africa and caused millions of deaths. A civil war in Iraq might well spread instability into already fragile states such as the major oil producers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran; our NATO-ally Turkey; our friend, Jordan; and even our sometimes foe, Syria—an enormous risk to vital U.S. national interests. Experts already fret over the long-term stability of each of these countries. Allowing Iraq to fall into civil war and further threat- en the well-being of these other states would be running an enormous risk to vital U.S. national interests. For the United States, to leave Iraq in a state of civil war would be as reckless as having invaded Iraq without being adequately prepared to prevent civil war. Moreover, President George W. Bush is no doubt correct that if Iraq were to fall into chaos and civil war, it would probably become a haven and breeding ground for terrorist groups to an even greater extent than it already is. Lebanon in the 1970s and Afghanistan in the 1990s are examples of this phenomenon. Iraq was not the central front of the war on terrorism before the U.S.-led invasion. By invading and failing to stabilize the country, however, it has become the central front. Today, many Salafi Jihadist4 recruits are traveling to Iraq to learn the trade of terrorism and to test their mettle in direct combat with the Americans. If the United States leaves Iraq in chaos, terrorists will establish training camps and bases from which to attack the United States and its allies throughout the world, just as al-Qa‘ida used Afghanistan to mount the East Africa bombings, the attack on the USS Cole,and September 11.Moreover,if we left Iraq prematurely, this would be seen across the Muslim world as a great victory for the Salafi Jihadist cause—greater even than their part in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan. This would be a major spur to terrorist recruitment.

Iraq Withdrawal => ME War

Withdrawal bad, laundry list

Junior Scholastic, 10-29-07, “The World in focus: 2007-2008 skills manual,” Lexis.

Some reasons given for keeping U.S. troops in Iraq: (a) If U.S. troops withdraw, the violence and destruction are likely to get worse. Although the U.S. military has been training Iraqi forces to take over policing and security in Iraq, trained Iraqis are too few to quell the violence. (b) The U.S.-led invasion contributed to destruction ofIraq's infrastructure. The U.S. has an obligation to help rebuild that infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity, etc.), and that work cannot be accomplished without the security U.S. troops would provide. (c) Without U.S. military presence, the hostilities between Iraq's Sunni and Shia Muslims is likely to grow worse, turning into all-out civil war.

Withdrawal is most likely to accelerate ethnic competition and provoke war—our evidence is comparative

Conrad **Crane**, Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, **and** W. Andrew **Terrill**, Middle East specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College, October 20**05**, PRECEDENTS, VARIABLES, AND OPTIONS IN PLANNING A U.S. MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

STRATEGY FROM IRAQ, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB627.pdf, p. 37

It is also technically possible that convincing evidence of an upcoming U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will prod Iraqi ethnic and sectarian groups into redoubling their efforts to find common ground and avoid civil war. According to this line of thought, the imminent departure of U.S. forces that are currently helping to deter intercommunal conflict will remove a crutch that may help foster intransigence among groups. These groups know they can engage in brinkmanship with each other without consequence so long as U.S. military forces deter communal warfare. Nevertheless, Iraq’s factional dynamics are so complex that such linear reasoning seldom leads to the desired result. Rather than seek compromise, Iraqi factions may instead accelerate the development of their militias, seek foreign regional support, and position themselves for a civil war.

Withdrawing from Iraq would cause the Islamists to embolden and attack American troops in the Middle East

Dallas Morning News, 2005, Iraq withdrawal now would be bad idea, LN

P.J. Crowley, a senior spokesman for the Pentagon and the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton, said that while he and others thought before the invasion that Iraq was not a legitimate target in the war on terrorism, its role as a magnet for Islamic extremists has made it one. Reed [{Jack} D-R.I., a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee] ventured that a U.S. pullout under current circumstances would "embolden the Islamists, just as they were emboldened by the Russians' departure from Afghanistan." Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden's claim to fame in the Islamic movement stems in part from his aid to the mujahedeen fighters who ended the Soviets' decade-long occupation of Afghanistan. “That still is part of their core beliefs, that because of their fighting qualities and their faith, they drove the Russians out and can do the same thing to the Americans," Reed said. "If they do that, that's not going to make them satisfied; that's going to embolden them." Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute, author of "Making War on the Terror Masters," said that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal "would obviously encourage the terrorists and the countries that support them." "It would probably encourage them to expand their activities because they, too, are fairly narrowly focused against us in Iraq right now," Ledeen said. "They'd probably be more inclined to attack us elsewhere." A withdrawal that left an Iraqi government unable to defend itself also would shatter U.S. standing in the Middle East, making it hard for moderate Arabs to stand up to Islamic extremists who hope to overthrow their governments, Cordesman said. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and other U.S. allies would find it "very, very hard ... to hold together and deal with this problem without distancing themselves from the United States," he said. "And we need to remember that we are talking about a region in the gulf with 60 percent of the world's proven oil reserves."

Iraq Withdrawal => ME War

Iraqi disintegration causes regional war and global economic collapse

Kenneth **Pollack**, Director of Research for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July-August, 20**03**, http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/pollack/20040107.htm

After the experience of the last thirty years we now know quite a bit about failed states—enough to know that allowing Iraq to become one would be disastrous. The chaos bred by a failed state can never be successfully contained. Iraqi refugees would flow out of the country and into neighboring states. Chaos in Iraq would breed extremists and terrorists who would not limit their targets only to those within Iraq’s nominal borders. Groups within Iraq would call on co-religionists, co-ethnicists, tribesmen, and fellow political travelers across the borders for aid. Petty warlords would seek help from neighboring powers, and the neighbors themselves would inevitably begin to intervene in Iraq’s civil strife if only in the vain hope of preventing it from spilling over into their territory. The same would likely hold true for Iraq and its impact on the countries of the Persian Gulf. They would be inundated by refugees and armed groups seeking sanctuary and assistance. They would be sucked in by tribal rivalries, ethnic and religious ties, and fear that a failure to act would cause the chaos to spread across their borders. They would likely become battlegrounds for rival Iraqi militias and breeding grounds for Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists. And these are countries that the United States cares about deeply. Saudi Arabia is frail enough as it is. Many analysts fear that even on its own, the Saudi state might not last another ten years. Add to that the tremendously destabilizing influence of civil war in Iraq next door, and no one should be sanguine about Saudi prospects. Kuwait is another major oil producer, and if chaos consumed Iraq and Saudi Arabia, it would be hard for tiny Kuwait to remain inviolate. The loss of oil production as a result of chaos or revolution in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait would cripple the international oil market with unimaginable consequences for the global economy. Beyond them, much as two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, and its oil is absurdly economical to produce. Saudi Arabia has a majority of the world's excess production capacity, and it increases or decreases production to stabilize and control prices. The sudden loss of the Saudi oil network would send the price of oil through the ceiling, probably causing a global downturn at least as devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930s. Most Middle East experts think that a revolution or civil war in any of the GCC states within the next few years is unlikely, but few say so now as confidently as they once did. Indeed, fears of mounting internal turmoil have prompted each of the GCC regimes to announce democratic Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Syria are all also economically and politically fragile and all would suffer from the political, military, and economic spillover of a failed state in Iraq. Nor are these simply abstract warnings. They are being played out on the ground even today. Already the Iranians, Syrians, Turks, and Saudis have begun to stake out their turf and potential proxies in the event that Iraq falls apart.

That leads to economic collapse

Richard **Douthwaite**, advisor for the Green Economics Institute and author of The Growth Illusion, 2003, Construct Ireland, http://www.constructireland.ie/articles/0210douthwaite.php

In April, the merchant bank Goldman Sachs warned that a ‘super-spike’ in oil prices might drive the cost of a barrel of crude up to $105, twice what they are at the time I’m writing this in early June. $105 would also be six times the average price between 1987 and 2000. The bank referred to a ‘spike’ because prices could not stay at the $100 level for more than a few months without causing the collapse of the world economy. This would happen because we would all be spending so much more to buy our oil that we would be unable to carry on buying other things at the rate we do at present, particularly as the prices of other fuels would rise in step with that of oil. As a result of the diversion of our spending, factories around the world would find they had spare capacity. They would lay off staff and cancel expansion projects and, as construction work is so energy intensive, its cessation would cause oil demand to fall rapidly. This is exactly what happened the last time its price went significantly above the $20 level in 1972 money. Millions of people would become unemployed and cut their spending to the bare minimum, causing other people to lose their jobs too. A global depression could develop in which the lack of activity in the world economy could cause the price of oil in today’s money to plummet from $100 back to around $15 a barrel again.

Global economic decline causes extinction

Lt. Col, Tom Bearden, PhD Nuclear Engineering, April 25, 2000, <http://www.cheniere.org/correspondence/042500%20-%20modified.htm>

Just prior to the terrible collapse of the World economy, with the crumbling well underway and rising, it is inevitable that some of the [wmd] weapons of mass destruction will be used by one or more nations on others. An interesting result then---as all the old strategic studies used to show---is that everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies. The reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are unleashed at all, the only chance a nation has to survive is to desperately try to destroy its perceived enemies before they destroy it. So there will erupt a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles, nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the nations as they feel the economic collapse, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier. The ensuing holocaust is certain to immediately draw in the major nations also, and literally a hell on earth will result. In short, we will get the great Armageddon we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is that we have about a 99% chance of that scenario or some modified version of it, resulting.

Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Terrorism

Withdrawal destroys new cooperation, resparks sectarian violence, and kills cooperation with counter-terror agencies

Kimberly Kagan, affiliate John Olin Institute of Strategic Studies executive director Institute for the Study of War Awareness “Symposium: If We Fail” Jamie Glazov

Front Page Magazine 10/12/2007

http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=A0DB2FFE-E3E8-4AD3-8C48-84773E6FF95D

As a result of the new counterinsurgency doctrine, which has U.S. forces spread through Iraq, working with Iraqi security forces and protecting the people, U.S. forces are now seen by most Iraqis as impartial actors preventing a grave sectarian struggle and helping them get what they need from their government. Because the population is now more secure, and because U.S. troops are present in areas where they had not been for three years, thousands of Iraqis are volunteering to join local police forces and protect their homes – not as militias, nor as terrorists, but rather as supporters of the state. This is a change in Iraqi attitudes toward Iraq’s security forces – and toward American troops.

Independent of stability, withdrawal sends a key signal emboldening terrorists globally

Max **Boot,** Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Center for Foreign Relations, Spring2006, American Interest, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10062/guess\_what\_were\_winning.html

The good news is that the wanton depravities of the violent Islamists, most of whose victims are fellow Muslims, are causing a backlash in the Muslim world. According to a July 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project report, the percentage of those saying that “violence against civilian targets is sometimes or often justified” has dropped by big margins in Lebanon (-34 points) and Indonesia (-12) since 2002, and in Pakistan (-16) and Morocco (-27) since 2004. And approval ratings for Osama bin Laden have slid since 2003 in Indonesia (-23 points), Morocco (-23), Turkey (-8) and Lebanon (-12). The Arab street is rising in outrage, all right—but it is outrage as much or more directed against Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as it is against George W. Bush. After Zarqawi’s henchmen murdered 59 people in three Jordanian hotels this past November, more than 200,000 people turned out in the streets of Amman in protest. Even Zarqawi’s own clan disowned him. The anti-American “blowback” widely predicted by opponents of the invasion of Iraq may yet materialize, but so far we’ve seen as much or more anti-terrorist blowback. The anti-terrorist trend among Muslims will get stronger if the United States stays resolute in Iraq. Conversely, if we exit prematurely, the terrorists will be emboldened to commit ever greater depravities, leading to the loss of more American lives. If the past two decades teach anything, it is that terrorist groups feed off U.S. defeats ( Beirut and Somalia), not off our victories (Afghanistan). Critics are right that Iraq was not the top breeding ground of terrorism before 2003, but it has become the central front in the war on terror today—a war that we cannot afford to lose.

Terrorism leads to nuclear war

**Easterbrook**, visiting fellow - Brookings Institute, 20**01** [Gregg, CNN,November 2, 2001, p. lexis]

Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.

Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Iran Prolif

Only staying in Iraq solves Iranian proliferation.

Robert **Zelnick**, Chairman of the Department of Journalism at Boston University and a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 20**05**, The Hoover Digest, No. 1, http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3001066.html

We are now informed authoritatively that Saddam Hussein sought weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as part of his ongoing struggle with Iran for primacy in the Persian Gulf. He had used chemical weapons with tactical effectiveness during the brutal 1980s conflict and was convinced that they had prevented his defeat. Iran’s WMD programs are part of a grander design: domination of the region, with the ability to deter the United States from intervening to prevent it. The Iranians have fantasized aloud about a single nuclear bombing run to terminate the State of Israel. They are the principal supporters of the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and of the Islamic Jihad, which is active in the suicide bomb campaign against Israel. Iranian aid will likely put steel in the spines of rejectionists once peace talks resume in the wake of Yasser Arafat’s death. Iran has also sought to influence the large Shiite population in southern Iraq by infiltrating substantial numbers of clerics and others into the Basra area, operating through the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution, hoping to bring about the establishment of a Shiite-dominated theocracy modeled on Iran. The Shiites see the American presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf as a direct threat and have, according to the CIA, pushed ahead with their WMD program in order to neutralize the threat of an even more active American role. In November Britain, France, and Germany obtained a commitment from Iran to freeze work on its uranium enrichment activities short of the material needed to make a bomb. But the accord is not considered airtight, and, even if it were, it would still permit the production of plutonium at an undiscovered location. President Bush has described the current deal as insufficient. If the United States stays committed to Iraq until that difficult task is completed, it will have the credibility it needs to stare down Iran’s neighboring mullahs. If not, we can soon prepare to welcome another nuclear power into the world, this one among the most radical Islamic states on the planet.

Iranian proliferation leads to nuclear war

Amir **Taheri**, former executive editor of Kayhan, Iran's largest daily newspaper, 4-18-**06,** http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/67114.htm

The Middle East is passing through the most decisive moment in is history since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The options are clear. One is to let the Khomeinist regime dominate the region and use it as the nucleus of an Islamic superpower which would then seek global domination. The other is to go for regime change in Tehran as a strategic goal. (A third option - creating an Irano-American co-dominium in the region - might not be acceptable to the Arabs and Turkey, let alone Israel.) All three options are hard to contemplate, especially for the United States and its European allies - powers that wish to set the global agenda but are reluctant to fight for it. The problem is that by refusing to stand up against the Khomeinist regime now, the Americans and Europeans (and their allies in the Arab world) may later have to fight an even bigger and costlier war against a nuclear-armed foe.

Iraq Withdrawal Bad – Heg

Iraq withdrawal collapses U.S. credibility

Nikolas K. **Gvosdev**, Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies at The Nixon Center **and** Paul J. **Saunders**, Executive Director of The Nixon Center, Fall 20**05**, The National Interest 2005 FALL "Defining Victory" The National Interest.

Both strategies are problematic. Withdrawal after a self-proclaimed "victory" that leaves the insurgency largely intact and operational would fool no one; Americans and others around the world know a real victory when they see one--and they know a defeat when they smell it. Setting aside the fact that it would allow a cancerous terrorism problem to metastasize, withdrawal would lead to inevitable (if inaccurate) comparisons to the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, intensified speculation about "imperial overstretch" and declining American power, and a costly loss of credibility and influence.  The reality is that to be effective in the international system, the United States must be respected by the good and feared by the evil. Recklessness in foreign policy decision-making can lead the good to fear rather than respect us--and encourage efforts to limit U.S. power--while fecklessness produces neither respect nor fear but contempt. Many outside the United States might interpret withdrawal from Iraq without a clear victory as a feckless end to what they saw as a reckless war and would draw appropriate conclusions. As Alexis Debat outlined in the Summer 2005 issue of The National Interest, it would also allow international jihadists to consolidate a "new base in Iraq around which the technical, financial and human resources of Jihad, Inc., can again coalesce."

It destroys U.S. leadership

Conrad **Crane**, Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, **and** W. Andrew **Terrill**, Middle East specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College, October 20**05**, PRECEDENTS, VARIABLES, AND OPTIONS IN PLANNING A U.S. MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

STRATEGY FROM IRAQ, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB627.pdf, p. 4

The long-term dilemma of the U.S. position in Iraq can perhaps best be summarized as “We can’t stay, we can’t leave, and we can’t fail.” The longer that significant numbers of U.S. forces remain in Iraq, the more nationalist resentment builds and the more the United States appears to be an occupier. Additionally, the Army is strained more and the American public may become more uncertain about the wisdom of continuing to wage counterinsurgency war in Iraq. On the other hand, the United States cannot withdraw prematurely and risk a civil war or a return to unrestrained repression. Such a failed result would reinforce perceptions of American foreign policy ineptitude and lack of national will, and compromise the ability of the world’s remaining superpower to wield corresponding international influence.

US leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange.

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Iraq Withdrawal => Drawn Back In

Withdrawal spurs global terrorism and Iraq civil war and eventually draws the U.S. back into Iraq

Daniel **Byman**, Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, Spring 20**05**, Survival, p. 20-21

Pulling out of Iraq, however, could be even more disastrous than staying put. Foreign jihadists would justly tout a pullout as a victory, arguing that the United States left under fire. Iraq would become a place where radicals come to meet, train, fight and forge bonds that last when they leave Iraq for the West or for other countries in the region. The jihadist presence in Iraq may be limited to a few thousand fighters, but they would exert disproportionate influence in the absence of any counterweight. Entire regions of Iraq, particularly Sunni areas like al- Anbar province, might be under their sway. From this base, jihadists could organise and train to strike at US or allied facilities around the world, including in the US homeland. They would be particularly likely to reach out and strike Saudi Arabia given the long, lightly patrolled border between the two countries and the jihadists’ high interest in destabilising the Al Saud regime. Such a development might lead the United States to again have to invade Iraq as it did Afghanistan to extirpate the jihadist base. Here is where the Vietnam parallel breaks down. From Iraq, jihadists would continue their worldwide struggle against the United States and US allies in the region: the equivalent of the Viet Cong deciding to strike California and Australia after they had won Saigon. Saudi Arabia in particular would be vulnerable, given the jihadist-linked unrest in that country and its long and open border with Iraq. Moreover, in contrast to Vietnam, Iraq is a resource-rich country in a critical region. Because there are, for now, few competent Iraqi forces to fill the security vacuum that would be left by departing US forces, strife would grow tremendously and Iraq could easily collapse into civil war. Iraqi forces trained by the United States would find themselves outgunned. Security service members would be even less capable than they are today of protecting their families from retaliation, making them reluctant to confront insurgents or criminals. Cooperation with government opponents or wholesale defection would be likely. Iraq’s Shi’a population, which so far has not attacked other communities, might resort to communal war if left without any government to protect it.46 Violence in ethnically mixed areas such as Kirkuk would be particularly likely. The Kurds, who have the most organised indigenous military force in Iraq, would probably push for even greater autonomy or even independence. In response, Turkey might intervene. Drawdown they openly used dozens of camps and enjoyed free access in the countryside under Taliban control.

U.S. will stop withdrawal efforts amid Iraqi conflict

Baqi Barzani, Kurdish Aspect, July 2010, “Farewell Iraq!,” http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc071210BB.html

The 2011 withdrawal of all US combat forces in Iraq is contingent on the level of peace and political stability. Should the level of violence heighten at any moment, America forces will require reassessing their position and deferring their drawdown plan in order to contain the status quo from exacerbating.

A2: Iraq Withdrawal Solves the Insurgency

U.S. withdrawal doesn’t solve the incentive for insurgent warfare—it would set the stage for a rapid escalation

Kenneth **Pollack**, Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and a Brookings Senior Fellow, February 20**06**, A Switch in Time: A new Strategy for America in Iraq, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iraq\_Brookings\_Feb\_14.pdf, p. 27

It is incorrect to suggest that more U.S. troops will simply stimulate more terrorist attacks either because they will provide more targets or because they will generate more animosity. The insurgents have repeatedly demonstrated that they oppose not just the U.S. presence, but the entire project of reconstruction and, for the Sunnis who comprise the vast bulk of the insurgency, the ascendance of the Shi’i majority. The insurgents have committed far more acts of violence against other Iraqis than they have against U.S. forces. Similarly, many of the leading insurgents have made it clear that they believe they are already waging a civil war against the Shi’ah, whom the Salafi Jihadists regard as apostates and for whom they reserve far greater venom than for “infidel”Americans. All of the evidence available indicates that were U.S. forces to leave Iraq without first securing it, the insurgents would be even less restrained and would greatly increase their attacks on the new Iraqi government, on the Shi’ah, on the Kurds, and on their other enemies. They would be joined (“opposed” might be more accurate) in this escalation of violence by the various Shi’i militias, and possibly by Kurdish and Turkoman groups as well, who would retaliate for insurgent attacks, attempt to seize as much territory as possible, and/or pre-empt feared attacks by other groups. Again,this is exactly how many civil wars have started.

Withdrawal would only encourage insurgent warfare

Anthony **Cordesman**, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Security and International Studies, 11-22-20**04**, “Playing the Course:” A Strategy for Reshaping US Policy in Iraq and the Middle East, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraq\_playingcourse.pdf, p. 27

It cannot be emphasize too strongly that the US should not set deadlines for a US troop presence, or ceilings on US aid. These are a dangerous signal to the insurgents, who will see such deadlines as a reason to keep fighting and as a key sign of American weakness and lack of resolve. They will make it even more difficult to attract and keep coalition and international support. They also are far more likely to make Iraqis think about protecting themselves, and make them avoid the risks of supporting the interim government and nation building process. Morality and ethic also play a role, not just expediency. This is a war the US started, and a peace process that it initially bungled. Quite aside from power politics and strategy, it has a moral and ethical responsibility to the Iraqi people.

Kuwait Withdrawal Bad – Iran

Withdrawal from Kuwait emboldens Iranian aggression

W. Andrew Terrill, General, Douglas MacArthur Professor of National Security Affairs @ the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, , “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

Kuwait and the other Gulf Arab states are known to be deeply apprehensive about the Iranian interest in acquiring nuclear technology, although they are also worried about appearing too confrontational with Tehran.208 The concern about an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is not surprising given that such a system could increase Iranian self-confidence and strongly embolden Tehran in its desire to play a more assertive regional role with conventional and unconventional forces. While Kuwaitis probably do not fear being attacked with nuclear weapons, they are aware that the large and powerful Iranian army is a serious threat that may be employed more readily if Tehran has a nuclear option to protect itself from “regime change” by the United States.209 Moreover, the Iranian danger could be amplified if the United States is seen to be faltering in its commitment to Kuwaiti security due to isolationism that could result from Iraq war setbacks and traumas. The Kuwaitis and other Gulf Arabs have sought techniques to express their concern about an Iranian nuclear capability without implying a threat of Iranian aggression. One of the central ways in which they have done this is to treat the Iranian program as an environmental issue rather than a security issue in their overt diplomacy. In particular, they suggest that a nuclear accident in Iran would have dramatic implications for their own countries if massive amounts of radiation were released into the atmosphere as a result of such an occurrence.210 The Kuwaitis also stress dangers to their desalination plants which are their primary source of fresh water. This approach to the problem also allows Kuwaiti diplomacy and that of the other Gulf states to sidestep the issue of whether or not the Iranian nuclear energy program is also a nuclear weapons program.

That leads to nuclear war

Alon Ben-Meir, professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, UPI, February 6, 2007, Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance

That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

Kuwait Withdrawal Bad – Iran

U.S. presence in Kuwait checks Iranian adventurism

Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

Dr. Terrill also considers how an assertive Iran is interacting with Kuwait at the present time and how the two nations have a historic pattern of widely fluctuating relations. While Kuwait and Iran are currently superficially friendly to each other, they nevertheless have strong conflicting interests. In particular, Iran is not pleased with the close U.S.-Kuwait military relationship and would like to replace U.S. influence in the Gulf with its own. Kuwait, conversely, feels the need to maintain open and friendly relations with its much larger neighbor to limit Iranian intrigue and to assuage Kuwaiti Shi’ites who view the Islamic Republic with some warmth. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership knows not to trust Iranian intentions and is sometimes appalled by Tehran’s assertive rhetoric. Kuwaitis, like the other Gulf Arabs, are deeply disturbed about theIranian move to acquire nuclear capabilities, which they view as an environmental and security threat. Nor would Kuwaitis like to see the United States depart from the Gulf and thereby remove the most serious countervailing influence to Iranian dominance.

U.S. presence is key to deter Iran

Sami G. Hajjar, Prof at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf,” https://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB185.pdf

Many U.S. military personnel serving in the Arabian/ Persian Gulf region, it is safe to assume, consider this tour of duty a direct consequence of the 1991 Gulf War that ejected Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, which he had occupied in August 1990 and declared a province of Iraq. The objectives of U.S. military presence involve the enforcement of United Nations (U.N.) imposed sanctions on Iraq, and deterrence to maintain regional security and stability against the potential of renewed threats from possible regional aggressors such as Iraq and Iran.

Kuwait Withdrawal Bad – Iraq

U.S.-Kuwait military cooperation is key to Iraq stability

Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

The United States has found no shortage of difficulties in recent years as it has moved forward in implementing its security policies toward the Middle East and especially the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Security threats resulting from an Iraq in turmoil and an assertive Iran are near the top of U.S. concerns about its future security. Efforts to deal with terrorism and to encourage and support the efforts of regional states to stem the rise of violent terrorist groups are also important. Kuwait, while a small country with a limited population, nevertheless has many of the same concerns as the United States in that part of the world. While Kuwait cannot act as a major regional power, it can nevertheless still serve as a valuable ally, whose contributions to regional security and democratization should not be overlooked. These contributions center on strategic geography, economic strength, and a willingness to host U.S. forces that is long-standing in a region where such actions can sometimes be seen as controversial. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill provides a comprehensive and nuanced examination of Kuwait defense and security issues including a consideration of the importance of the current security relationship with the United States. He approaches this task by carefully documenting historical and ongoing security threats to Kuwait. Of special importance, Dr. Terrill considers the history of difficulties seen in Iraqi- Kuwaiti history and illustrates in detail how Kuwait’s problems with Iraq which culminated with Saddam Hussein are much larger and more complex than the ruthlessness of one individual. Dr. Terrill outlines the ongoing territorial tension between Iraq and Kuwait since before the later country was independent, as well as the various Kuwaiti attempts to control Iraqi demands through diplomacy, regional consensus, and foreign aid. Dr. Terrill also examines the historical basis for Iraq’s claims against Kuwait noting that they have no serious legal basis, but also noting that many Iraqis appear to be open to the idea that all or part of Kuwait should belong to Iraq. Kuwait’s current relations with post-Saddam Iraq are not without notable problems, and the Kuwaitis look at their northern neighbor with great uncertainty. Iraq will continue to be of concern to both Kuwait and the United States in forthcoming years, and cooperation between the United States and Kuwait will be valuable in addressing Iraq-related problems. Kuwait, moreover, has the double difficulty of facing expected critical problems from either a strong, nationalistic Iraq or an Iraq that has collapsed into anarchy.

Strong relations with Kuwait are key to contain Iraqi violence after the U.S. completes it current withdrawal plans – the plan causes a backlash

W. Andrew Terrill, General, Douglas MacArthur Professor of National Security Affairs @ the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, , “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

This monograph notes that the United States can, if insufficiently careful, neglect the Kuwaiti relationship and fail to adequately consult the leadership and take Kuwaiti interests into account. Kuwaitis have the potential to become more jaded and less cooperative in their relations with the United States if they view themselves as taken for granted or dealt with as subordinates. The United States has a long history of resentful allies carefully measuring the degree of cooperation they will give in return for security guarantees. There is no need for this to occur with Kuwait. Moves to strengthen U.S.-Kuwait relations thus become important and may become especially vital if setbacks in Iraq eventually prompt a U.S. withdrawal under less than optimal conditions. Strong efforts should be made to prevent sectarian warfare in Iraq from spreading to Kuwait under such scenarios. Such efforts may require a great deal of new and creative thinking by both Kuwaitis and Americans as the threat of a conventional Iraq attack has now been overshadowed by the dangers of spillover from an Iraqi civil war, new and deadlier terrorism, and largescale subversion.

Withdrawal ensures instability

W. Andrew Terrill, General, Douglas MacArthur Professor of National Security Affairs @ the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, , “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

In Kuwait fear is increasing that the United States will leave Iraq in anarchy due to domestic political pressure, and Iraq will subsequently devolve into a large and uncontrollable civil war.163 According to a November 30, 2006, statement by the emir, “Under the current circumstances, an American withdrawal would not help at all in bringing back stability [to Iraq]. On the contrary, the situation would get worse, and we would be looking at a very intense civil war.”164 This concern has been reiterated at various other meetings of Kuwaitis and U.S. officials.165 The Kuwaitis have also publicly supported President Bush’s “surge” option into Baghdad, although they have also indicated that they would like to see the United States open a dialogue on Iraq with all regional powers including Iran and Syria.166

Turkey Withdrawal Bad – Iran

Turkey is key to U.S. power projection in the middle east

Henri J. Barkey, Lehigh University, 5-12-2003, “Turkey's Strategic Future: A US Perspective,” http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm

U.S. interests and objectives in Turkey have steadily expanded since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War's straightjacket has given way to many new considerations. The primary U.S. foreign policy vision after the Cold War was one based on preventing regional disputes from threatening its own and its allies' interests and on expanding market reforms and democratic principles and practices. With no serious Russian threat to European security, U.S. attention shifted to mid-level powers with ambitions to acquire non-conventional weaponry and the means to deliver them, such as Iran and Iraq. This policy vision lacked the simplicity of containment, but it would impact Turkey significantly. Turkey's proximity to many regions in flux or conflict together with Ankara's long standing adherence to NATO alliance helped Washington reinterpret this country's geo-strategic importance. The Iraq War, however, is likely to alter these calculations further. Simply put, on the eve of the Iraq War Turkey's importance for the United States could be summarized along four dimensions. \* First, it served as a potential platform for the projection of U.S. power. Saddam Hussein's resilience in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War had made Ankara essential to sustain the UN sanctions regime and more importantly Washington's containment policy. From the Incirlik base in Turkey, U.S. and British airplanes as part of Operation Northern Watch, routinely patrolled the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in an effort to keep Saddam Hussein's forces away from Kurdish controlled parts of Iraq. It is difficult to see how the United States could have sustained its policy of sanctions, regime isolation, and the protection of the Kurdish population without Turkey's cooperation. \* Second, Turkey was a bulwark standing in the way of revisionist regimes such as Iran's, intent on changing the regional landscape. Turkey's strong links to the United States, NATO and the West were in direct opposition to some of the Iranian regime's regional preferences if not designs. Hence even in the event of cordial relations with Ankara, no Iranian government can ignore Turkey's reaction in its regional calculations. The improving relations between Turkey and Israel throughout the 1990s has changed the strategic setting in the Middle East-although much exaggerated by Arab countries-which served to change the perception of Ankara in Washington as a more balanced regional player. \* Third, what also made Turkey different and valuable is that it is a NATO ally that takes security seriously; its need for military modernization notwithstanding, Ankara has large numbers of troops under arms which are deployable and is committed to maintaining its spending on defense. Even if the economic crisis has put a dent on its modernization plans, Ankara intends to continue along this path as the April 2003 decision on purchasing AWACS aircraft demonstrates. \* Finally, in Washington's perception Turkey represented an alternative and successful path for many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is a model to be emulated as NATO's only Muslim member and candidate EU member. In addition to its historical ties to the West, Turkey had a vibrant albeit flawed democratic political system and in the 1980s embraced economic liberalization-well ahead of Latin America and save for Israel, the only one in the Middle East. Ankara's actual contribution to Washington's challenges went well beyond the Middle East. Turks collaborated with the allies in both Bosnia and Kosovo. It steadfastly improved relations with Bulgaria and Romania, took the lead in organizing Black Sea region institutions, and thus proved to be a source of stability in the Balkans. Successive US administrations in the early 1990s encouraged Turkey's efforts to reach out to the Turkic Central Asian countries and the Caucasus to provide them with technical and economic know how not to mention political leadership, all designed to counter growing Iranian and Russian influence in the region. Turkish forces at Washington's request also took part in the ill-fated Somalia operation. Similarly, in April 2002, Washington prevailed upon Ankara to take over the leadership of the Afghan peacekeeping force in Kabul, ISAF. It was Prime Minister and later President Turgut O¨zal, after a decade of turbulence, who solidified Turkey's image in Washington. He made himself a valued interlocutor during the Iran-Iraq war and decisively maneuvered his country in support of U.S. and allied action against Iraq in 1990. While often drawing attention to his Muslim identity and Turkey's unique role in NATO, O¨zal nevertheless succeeded in convincing Washington of his deep commitment to the West and its values. Despite his traditional upbringing and religious roots, O¨zal was by far the most pro-American leader Turkey has ever had. He shared none of the suspicions of the United States of his left and right wing contemporaries. Having engineered the most far-reaching restructuring of the Turkish economy, he strongly believed in Turkey's ability to become an economic powerhouse of its own and also allied with the United States. With O¨zal Washington could envision in Turkey a more democratic, stable and prosperous ally and, as a result, also a better commercial partner Turkey's growing strategic value made its internal stability an even more important concern for U.S. policymakers. Instability in Turkey can potentially lead to the ascendancy of anti-Western forces, be they Islamic or nationalist in orientation, which could lead to the denial of access to critical military facilities and change the whole environment in the Middle East. The emergence of the twin challenges to the regime in the last two decades of the 20th Century in the form Kurdish and Islamic political activism has deeply undermined Turkey's confidence in itself. Not only has the state gone out of its way to prosecute citizens for the most minor of infractions, but the civil war against the PKK-led insurgency and the rise of the Islamic movement have resulted in greater military interference in Turkish domestic political matters. The combination of domestic instability and the military's resurgence has worried Washington decision makers in part because the tactics used by the state could end up making matters worse. In addition, the mismanagement of the Turkish economy by successive governments had resulted in the worst economic crisis of the post World War II period leading to a US-initiated $31.5 billion IMF rescue package.

Loss of power projection in the middle east causes Iranian hegemony, economic collapse, regional proliferation and Mideast conflagration

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living.

Turkey Withdrawal Bad – ME Stability

U.S.-Turkey security cooperation is key to Mideast stability

Sharmine Narwani, Senior Associate, St. Antony's College, Oxford University, 6-11-2010, “Israel vs Turkey: Which Serves US Interests Better?,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/israel-vs-turkey-which-se\_b\_595583.html

Turkey: Actions Not Words And then there is Turkey: a NATO member since 1952; the world's 16th largest economy; second largest standing armed force in NATO with over one million soldiers; a founding member of the United Nations, OECD and the G-20 major economies; a major trading partner of the European Union -- more than 50% of its imports and exports; abundant in natural resources, minerals, oil and gas. The list goes on. A Rand Corporation study published in February 2010 concludes the following: "A strong security partnership with Turkey has been an important element of U.S. policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East since the early 1950s. It is even more important today. Turkey stands at the nexus of four areas that have become increasingly critical to U.S. security since the end of the Cold War: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus/Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf region. In all four areas, Turkey's cooperation is vital for achieving U.S. policy goals." Diplomacy rules in today's Turkey. In the past decade, Turkey has solved most of its outstanding regional conflicts by pursuing a policy of "zero problems" with its neighbors, in the process signing record breaking trade agreements that have boosted its economy and increased its influence exponentially in the international arena. The US, on the other hand is neck deep in three wars, has lost the global influence it enjoyed a decade ago, confuses diplomacy with brinkmanship, and is mired in one of the worst economic crises in its history. There are few countries that have served global security and stability better than Turkey in recent years. We have a lot to learn from them. Changing our failed policies and living up to our public declarations will make us more honest and useful. In the "strategic interest" contest between Israel and Turkey, I suspect we will ultimately find more shared values with Turkey -- but only if we can break the dangerous hold Israel has over us.

Turkey is key to Mideast moderation

Melik Kaylan, a writer based in New York, writes a weekly column for Forbes.com, 3-17-2009, “Why Turkey Matters To The U.S.,” http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/16/obama-turkey-summit-opinions-columnists-erdogan.html

What are the practical benefits to the U.S.? Let us list them: Turkish troops in Afghanistan. Freer NATO naval access to the Black Sea to bolster Ukrainian and Georgian morale. Turkish help for Georgia. A pro-U.S. Turkish flanking threat to distract Iran. Ditto Syria. The continued flow of non-Arab, non-Russian oil from Azerbaijan to the world. Increased U.S.-friendly Turkish influence in Central Asia's Turkic states to counteract Russian and Iranian influence (remember those U.S. bases?). A secular Muslim buffer in the region against Islamization. If the U.S. and Turkey act in unison, as they did in the Cold War, Turkey can tip the balance as a pro-Western force in the region's new politics. But it will take all of President Obama's diplomatic and symbolic skills, sustained over time, to turn things around.

Incirlik is key to get troops to northern Iraq

Xinhua, 3-21-2003, “US military bases in Turkey,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-03/21/content\_792693.htm

Although the Turkish parliament Thursday approved the motion on sending troops to northern Iraq and opening Turkish airspace to US planes, Ankara and Washington have yet to reach a final agreement over the issue. However, the US troops in Turkey are using the Incirlik air base and a depot atAnkara as military bases. Located in the southern province of Adana and about 56 km from the Mediterranean Sea, the Incirlik air base is the operational equipment and material reserve center for US troops in the event of an attack on the north of Iraq.

ME Wars Go Nuclear

Mideast war escalates and goes nuclear

John Steinbach, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44).

Specifically, the U.S. and Russia will intervene

Pavel Felgenhauer, Defense Analyst and columnist in Novaya Gazeta, NO URANIUM FOR IRAN;

The Kremlin can't keep on maneuvering between radical Islam and the West, Defense and Security (Russia), 11/27/06, ln

Iran will soon acquire a nuclear arsenal. Not only Israeli sources are saying so now; former nuclear energy minister Viktor Mikhailov maintains that it will happen within five to seven years, perhaps even earlier. Hence, a nuclear war in the Middle East, involving Iran and Israel, will be entirely possible. Many other countries would certainly be drawn into such a conflict - perhaps including the United States and Russia. In Tehran last week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Iran will shortly launch a 60,000-centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment. Mikhailov says that "Iran is capable of producing those centrifuges," and that it does have the science and technology "required to create nuclear weapons." Mikhailov knows what he's talking about; in the 1990s he took part in organizing the Bushehr nuclear power plant contract, and personally signed a protocol of intent for Russia to supply a uranium centrifuge system to Iran.

Mid-East war goes nuclear

Seymour Hersh, one of America's premier investigative reporters (he broke My Lai), 1991, The Samson Option, p. 319

None of this has ever been discussed in the open in Israel, or in the Knesset. Meanwhile, Israeli field commanders have accepted nuclear artillery shells and land mines as battlefield necessities: another means to an end. The basic target of Israel’s nuclear arsenal has been and will continue to be its Arab neighbors. Should war break out in the Middle East again and should the Syrians and the Egyptians break through again as they did in 1973, or should any Arab nation fire missiles again at Israel, as Iraq did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability. Never again. The Samson Option is no longer the only nuclear option available to Israel.

Conflict in the middle east escalates to WMD use

Stephen Blank, Prof @ Strategic Studies Institute @ US Army War College, 2-1-2001, World and I

After seven or more years of America's best efforts, we now should see with whom we are dealing and the multiple fronts of the real Middle East war. In today's Middle East, every form of conflict along the spectrum from rock throwing to nuclear war can take place. Governments there have long since used weapons of mass destruction in other states' civil wars. Further opportunities to start these civil wars or use such weapons must be firmly deterred and discouraged. Rather than choose peace and democracy, Arafat and his allies have chosen war and hatred. Israel and the United States should act together to make sure that they never get to make another similar choice.

ME Wars Go Nuclear

Middle east instability causes accidental conflict and nuclear escalation

Yair Evron, Professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University, ISRAEL’S NUCLEAR DILLEMA, 1994, p. 123-4

The potential risks involved in the functioning of the superpowers’ C3 may recur in the Middle East and, in some cases, with apparently greater intensity. The probability of erroneous decisions is therefore higher. These factors center on technical failures of warning systems, or the combination of technical failure and human error, deriving from misperception of the enemy’s behavior. There also exist processes of escalation that are totally distinct from technical failure, and which derive exclusively from human error. The latter case is most often the function of the erroneous interpretation of various enemy actions. These factors are liable to yield disastrous outcomes. The outcomes can be divided into two major categories of events: misperception of an enemy action that is mistakenly understood as a conventional or nuclear attack on the state’s nuclear bases or on the state in its entirety. Such a misperception could cause a rapid escalation. The second category comprises the escalation from a conventional war to the use of nuclear weapons. The persistence of intense conflicts in the Middle East will of course contribute to the potential danger of misperceptions. Hence, for example, if the Arab-Israeli peace process fails to advance and in particular were the situation to return to the level of conflict that preceded the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the intensity of the conflict could reinforce the potential for errors of perception among decision-makers. A high level of conflict tends to promote the tendency of decision-makers to view the other side’s actions with great concern.

Israeli nuclear posture ensures escalation

Ed Blanche, Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1, 1999 Pg. 24

Israel has hinted that it might deploy its nuclear weapons in a "launch-on-warning" mode; if missiles are fired in its direction it would immediately unleash its nuclear forces before the missiles landed. Such a strategy seriously increases the risk of accidental nuclear war and has caused deep uncertainties in a region where the proliferation of missiles and non-conventional weapons is accelerating. US analysts see this as a bluff - for the time being at least - designed to unnerve Tehran. While many question Israeli and US concerns about Iran's non-conventional weapons ambitions, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu rarely misses an opportunity to remind audiences that Israel's decision to knock out Saddam's reactor in 1981 - which stirred almost universal condemnation at the time - was vindicated by the discovery after the 1991 Gulf War of the advanced extent of Iraq's clandestine weapon development.

And, Middle East war leads to extinction

Bahig Nassar, co-ordinating center of non governmental organizations, and Afro-Asian People's Solidary Organization, keynote paper for Cordoba Dialogue on Peace and Human Rights in Europe and the Middle East,

11/15/2002, www.inesglobal.org/bahignassar.html (accessed 2/28/06)

Wars in the Middle East are of a new type. Formerly, the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union had prevented them, under the balance of the nuclear terror from launching war against each other. In the Middle East, the possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction leads to military clashes and wars - Instead of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Israel are using military force to prevent others from acquiring them, while they insist on maintaining their own weapons to pose deadly threats to their nations. But the production, proliferation and threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear chemical and biological) are among the major global problems which could lead, if left unchecked, to the extinction of life on earth. Different from the limited character of former wars. The current wars in the Middle East manipulate global problems and escalate their dangers instead of solving them.