Readiness DA WNDI 2010

[Readiness DA WNDI 2010 1](#_Toc266912577)

[Readiness 1NC Shell (1/2) 3](#_Toc266912578)

[Readiness 1NC Shell (2/2) 4](#_Toc266912579)

[Uniqueness – Readiness Now 5](#_Toc266912580)

[Uniqueness – Response to Backlash 6](#_Toc266912581)

[Uniqueness – Global Leadership 7](#_Toc266912582)

[Uniqueness – Troops Fiscally Feasible 8](#_Toc266912583)

[Readiness Link – Overstretch 9](#_Toc266912584)

[Uniqueness – Heg 10](#_Toc266912585)

[Uniqueness – A2: DADT 11](#_Toc266912586)

[Uniqueness – A2: Budget 12](#_Toc266912587)

[Link – General (1/2) 14](#_Toc266912588)

[Link – General (2/2) 15](#_Toc266912589)

[Link – Middle East Withdrawal 17](#_Toc266912590)

[Link – Japan Withdrawal (1/2) 18](#_Toc266912591)

[Link – Japan Withdrawal (2/2) 19](#_Toc266912592)

[Link – Iraq Withdrawal (1/2) 20](#_Toc266912593)

[Link – Iraq Withdrawal (2/2) 21](#_Toc266912594)

[Link – Afghanistan Withdrawal 22](#_Toc266912595)

[Link – South Korea Withdrawal 23](#_Toc266912596)

[Impact – Laundy List 24](#_Toc266912597)

[Impacts – Afghanistan Withdrawal (1/2) 25](#_Toc266912598)

[Impacts – Afghanistan Withdrawal (2/2) 26](#_Toc266912599)

[Impacts – South Korea Withdrawal 27](#_Toc266912600)

[Impacts – Japan Withdrawal 28](#_Toc266912601)

[Impacts – Iraq Withdrawal 29](#_Toc266912602)

[Impacts – Terrorism (1/2) 30](#_Toc266912603)

[Impacts – Terrorism (2/2) 31](#_Toc266912604)

[Impacts – China 32](#_Toc266912605)

[Impacts – Heg 33](#_Toc266912606)

[Impact – Heg/Withdrawal Asia 34](#_Toc266912607)

[Impact – Heg/Withdrawal Asia 35](#_Toc266912608)

[Impact – Global Stability 36](#_Toc266912609)

Position Explanation

The readiness DA essentially says that withdrawing troops from their current location sends a message of weakness to adversaries abroad. Adversaries will take this sign and cause wars, proliferation, or terrorism. This is a good DA because it links to most topics on the resolution and has a strong impact story.

Readiness 1NC Shell (1/2)

Change in the military causes problem with readiness in the status quo

Michael T. Morrissey, Lieutenant Colonel. “Reset: reduce risk, improve readiness.” March 2009. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Reset:+reduce+risk,+improve+readiness.-a0213232141

The U.S. is involved in a war lasting more than eight years. The Army is engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan and is also deployed to approximately 80 countries. Simultaneously, it is defending the homeland and is ready to support domestic crises. As outlined in Field Manual 3-0 Operations, persistent conflict and instability are the projected future; a future affected by trends, such as globalization, population growth, urbanization, demand for scarce resources, climate change, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation and failed states. In this environment, the Army continues to play an indispensable role, executing national security strategy. The Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff have assessed the Army as "out of balance." The effects of high operational tempo combined with insufficient recovery time for personnel, families and equipment resulted in readiness consumption at an unsustainable rate. To restore balance by 2011, leadership has given the Army four imperatives--sustain, prepare, reset and transform. Army Force Generation. The Army purged the old system of tiered readiness and implemented the Army Force Generation model, known as ARFORGEN, to achieve its four imperatives. Simply, ARFORGEN is the development of increased unit readiness. Resources are allocated by deployment sequence; ensuring units are mission capable by deployment dates. Operational requirements drive ARFORGEN and include prioritization of resourcing, manning, equipping, sustaining and sourcing. (See the 2007 U.S. Army Posture Statement, Addendum H: Army Force Generation. Another informative article is "Reset after Multiple in-lieu-of-Missions" by LTC Geoffrey P. Buhlig in the July-September 2008 edition of Fires.) The ARFORGEN model consists of three phases--reset, train/ready and available. Of the three phases, reset contains an inordinate level of organizational risk as new unit leadership faces a multitude of challenges, such as high personnel turnover, "at risk" Soldiers, family reintegration and absent unit organizational systems. According to GEN George W. Casey, "The intent of reset is to recover personnel and equipment to a state of readiness at the end of six months so the unit can train up for the next mission." With the current strategic environment and a future of projected conflict, it is more important than ever to reset Soldiers, families and equipment properly. We must identify and mitigate organizational risk inherent in reset to build readiness successfully. The U.S. does not have the luxury of a strategic pause in the foreseeable future. Ultimately, reset success contributes to strategic depth, enabling our nation to win the Long War, and flexibility for an uncertain future. Unit environments differ by level, location and mission requirements. Some units have the added complexity of multiple subordinate units in different ARFORGEN phases. Regardless, the discussion in this article may prove useful in reducing organizational risk and improving readiness. Organizational risk in reset. Although reset makes sense at the operational and strategic levels in generating forces to meet our nation's demands, the logic isn't always evident at the tactical level. Reset requires critical thinking from tactical-level leadership to identify challenges and implement solutions. For example, reset generally includes turnover of a large portion of unit leadership during a finite window of time (battalion commander and command sergeant major through squad leaders). The reset period often has a high personnel turnover; a lack of functional fundamental administrative systems in critical areas, such as personnel, maintenance, supply and training; and a shortage of key personnel. Other reset challenges include Soldiers and families who are "at risk" due to stress incurred from deployment and separation, domestic friction, post traumatic stress disorder, alcohol/drug abuse and traumatic brain injury. In addition, reset involves leaders who excelled in a combat environment, but have limited experience in garrison, such as knowing deliberate precombat inspections are just as necessary before a long weekend as they are for a combat mission. As leaders, we fully appreciate the expeditionary nature of our Army and are eager to rebuild readiness rapidly. However, the old adage, "You've got to go slow before you can go fast" is appropriate. If not done right, your unit will come out of reset no better than it entered. Leaders must establish a balance between a sense of urgency to complete critical tasks and the need to reintegrate Soldiers and families. Reset must be planned and executed deliberately, beginning with an assessment of unit vulnerabilities and the implementation of appropriate control measures to reduce organizational risk.

Readiness 1NC Shell (2/2)

Realigning the force creates imbalances in the Armed Forces that hurt readiness

John Shimkus, NATO Parliamentary Assembly. “Changes in US Forward Deployment and its Effects on Europe.” 2006 <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=999>

The Commission also disputed the costs of the redeployment plan. They estimated that the costs could total $20 billion, but noted that the Department of Defense had only budgeted $4 billion for the redeployment process. This total is much larger than previous estimates because the Commission was including what they saw as the additional strategic mobility costs. The Global Posture Review envisions a force based primarily in the United States and relies on airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned supplies to transport and provision forces sent to a crisis area. This would require additional assets. Current plans for airlift, sealift and pre-positioned supplies, the Commission argues, do not take into account the additional burden imposed by the redeployment of more military personnel back to the United States. 20. Another more general critique is that the realignment will take years to complete, but there is no guarantee that the strategic environment will be the same and demand the same kind of basing structure. Few would have predicted, for example, the strategic need for basing rights in Central Asia in the years immediately before 2001. It is possible that the US will face other unforeseen challenges in the future, and that the realignment will not be appropriate for those contingencies. At the same time, the disruption that accompanies a realignment of this magnitude could have some effect on the readiness of the armed forces. The time and effort spent in moving equipment and establishing new facilities can impact on the amount of time available for training and education. In short, some critics of the realignment argue that the process can weaken the ability of the US military to confront current security challenges while offering no guarantee that it will be better suited to confronting tomorrow's challenges.

Readiness is critical to prevent rivals from lashing out and prevent war

Jack Spencer,, Research Fellow at Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies. “The Facts About Military Readiness.” 9-15-2000. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-Readiness>)

America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Uniqueness – Readiness Now

Readiness High

Insurance News Today “Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011” 6/1/2010 <http://www.insuranceday.org/senate-armed-services-committee-completes-markup-of-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2011/>)

WASHINGTON — Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, announced today that the committee has completed its markup of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. The bill authorizes funding for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the national security programs of the Department of Energy (DOE). “The Committee has reported out a bill that supports the men and women of the armed forces, both active and reserve, and their families, and provides them with the compensation, benefits, equipment and training that they need. The Committee continued its practice of terminating or slowing down troubled programs and activities, improving efficiencies, and applying the savings to higher-priority programs. Thus, the Committee was able to fund many of the unfunded requirements of our Service Chiefs and combatant commanders. I am pleased that the Committee provided funding, authorities, and capability to defeat al Qaeda, its affiliates and other violent organizations, with a major focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Levin said. “I am also pleased that the Committee adopted an amendment that removes a key barrier to ending the policy that prohibits military service by openly gay men and women. That action is an important step to end this discriminatory policy. But it is left to the President, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that repeal can be achieved consistent with the military’s standard of readiness, effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention, before the repeal is effective. I believe that allowing gay and lesbian service members to serve openly will open the ranks to patriotic men and women who wish to serve their country,” Levin added.

Readiness High – Troop Compensation has fueled recruitment and general preparedness

WashingtonPost, 5/7/2010 (Craig Whitlock, “Pentagon urges decrease in spending on troops”, <http://www.sextonreunion.com/group/debateandcurrentevents/forum/topics/pentagon-urges-decrease-in?commentId=2101025:Comment:224040&xg_source=activity&groupId=2101025:Group:147649>)

Military officials said generous compensation were a primary reason why they were able to meet all of their annual recruiting goals last year for the first time since the all-volunteer force was established in 1973. Although the recession also played a major role, military leaders said surveys show service members are generally happy with their pay scales. Vice Adm. Mark E. Ferguson III, the chief of naval personnel, said improvements in pay and benefits have made it more likely that sailors will stick around longer. Last year, a Navy survey found that about 60 percent of spouses wanted their sailors to make a career of Navy life, meaning a stint of at least 20 years. In 2005, he said, only about 20 percent of spouses felt the same way. "I think pay was previously a concern, but it's started to change," Ferguson said. He added that Congress had been "extremely generous" but that rising personnel costs were already influencing what the Navy spends to operate, maintain and modernize its fleet.

Uniqueness – Response to Backlash

A drawdown signals weakness. Enemies will respond to his weakness

**Morris 09** - Former political adviser to Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and President Bill Clinton [Dick Morris, “Obama's Weakness Issue,” RealClearPolitics, June 24, 2009, pg. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/24/obamas\_weakness\_issue\_97145.html]

If foreign policy issues actually involve war and the commitment of troops, they can be politically potent. But otherwise, the impact of international affairs on presidential image is largely metaphoric. Since foreign policy is the only area in which the president can govern virtually alone, it provides a window on his personality and use of power that domestic policy cannot. When President Clinton, for example, dithered as Bosnia burned, he acquired a reputation for weakness that dragged down his ratings. It was only after he moved decisively to bomb and then disarm the Serbs that he shed his image of weakness. It took President H.W. Bush's invasion of Iraq to set to rest concerns that he was a "wimp." Jimmy Carter never recovered from the lasting damage to his reputation that his inability to stand up to Iran during the hostage crisis precipitated. So now, as North Korea defies international sanctions and sends arms to Myanmar and Iran slaughters its citizens in the streets, President Obama looks helpless and hapless. He comes across as not having a clue how to handle the crises. And, as North Korea prepares to launch a missile on a Hail Mary pass aimed at Hawaii, the Democrats slash 19 missile interceptors from the Defense Department budget. The transparent appeasement of Iran's government -- and its obvious lack of reciprocation -- make Obama look ridiculous. Long after the mullahs have suppressed what limited democracy they once allowed, Obama's image problems will persist. While Americans generally applaud Obama's outreach to the Muslims of the world and think highly of his Cairo speech, they are very dissatisfied with his inadequate efforts to stop Iran from developing -- and North Korea from using -- nuclear weapons. Clearly, his policies toward these two nations are a weak spot in his reputation. His failure to stand up to either aggressor is of a piece with his virtual surrender in the war on terror. Documented in our new book, "Catastrophe," we show how he has disarmed the United States and simply elected to stop battling against terrorists, freeing them from Guantanamo as he empowers them with every manner of constitutional protection. Obviously, the Iranian democracy demonstrators will not fare any better than their Chinese brethren did in Tiananmen Square. But the damage their brutal suppression will do to the Iranian government is going to be huge. The ayatollahs of Tehran have always sold themselves to the world's Islamic faithful as the ultimate theocracy, marrying traditional Muslim values with the needs of modern governance. But now, in the wake of the bloodshed, they are revealed as nothing more than military dictators. All the romance is gone, just as it faded in the wake of the tanks in Budapest and Prague. All that remains is power. China, of course, fared better after Tiananmen because of its economic miracle. But Iran has no such future on its horizon. The loss of prestige in the Arab world and the end of the pretense of government with popular support will cost Iran dearly. In the meantime, Obama's pathetic performance vis-a-vis Iran and North Korea cannot but send a message to all of America's enemies that the president of the United States does not believe in using power. That he is a wimp and they can get away with whatever they want. A dangerous reputation, indeed.

Uniqueness – Global Leadership

U.S. global leadership is secure

Thomas Henriksen, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, November 3, 2009, “America The Indispensable,” Forbes, online: http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/30/berlin-wall-09-anniversary-cold-war-nato-opinions-contributors-thomas-h-henriksen.html

For nearly a half-century, the United States stood as a rampart against the Soviet Union's subversion and expansionism as well as a beacon of hope to its subjects. In the post-Soviet epoch, it became the sole superpower and a bulwark of a different sort. Unlike past ascendant powers, the United States carved out no colonies, nor even spheres of influence in the aftermath of its nemesis' collapse, despite all the silly talk of an American empire. Indeed, American taxpayers looked inward, demanded a "peace dividend" from decades of high defense spending, and rediscovered a host of internal ills from poor education in many of the nation's schools to pervasive drug abuse demanding attention from a Washington seemingly no longer distracted by the Red Army. The impulse for non-involvement beyond our shores runs deep in our history. America's respite from international problems was brief, however. Instead of a diminished U.S. role, the post-Wall stretch has witnessed the expanded indispensability of American power and diplomacy. Without the prodigious U.S. economic capacity and military might, regional troublemakers and local conflicts would have gotten out of hand. An American-led coalition turned back Iraq's conquest of Kuwait. Washington's intervention stopped the turmoil in Haiti and the horrific atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s, while Western Europe dithered. When Bill Clinton failed to lift a finger to staunch Rwanda's genocide, hundreds of thousands died in the Central African country, testifying to the need for U.S. engagement. Desperate regimes no longer subject to the even loose leash of Moscow soon endangered regional peace. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya spread terrorism, embarked on nuclear arms and built longer-range missiles. They fiercely defied the much-ballyhooed global "flatness" of trade, information, and people flows alone to bring reconciliation among warring states, within ethnically split nations, and from extremist Islamic movements. For all its travails, the Iraq War ousted Saddam Hussein, whose invasions and terrorist promotion kept the Middle East in a state of high insecurity. The U.S.-led invasion of the Persian Gulf nation also convinced Libya to come clean on its manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction. Two rogue adversaries remain for the Barack Obama administration to deal with. It is a sure bet that if Washington fails to halt the nuclear-arming of Iran and North Korea, neither the United Nations nor any non-regional power will. The two-decade commemoration of the Berlin Wall's fall also marks another dramatic but less exhilarating world event of the same year. In June 1989, China's Communist Party crushed the student-orchestrated pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Beijing's suppression of peaceful dissent ensured the party's political dominance, its formula for a state-controlled economy, and China's rise to global power. China's astounding export engine, thinly veiled military buildup, and aggressive pursuit of its calculated interests cannot but cause unease as America journeys on a more turbulent trajectory. Thus, 20 years ago, we witnessed the eclipse of one global rival and the advent of another possible competitor. The years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks have been unkind to the United States, which stood at the pinnacle of its economic and military power when the Berlin Wall fell. Toppling the Taliban regime that hosted the terrorist-mastermind Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and subduing a belligerent Iraq proved costly in blood and treasure. U.S. military power is still matchless in spite of the media's defeatism about the U.S. losing in the "graveyard of empires." At present, America's economic health is under siege. The Obama administration's massive deficit spending poses severe risks to American power, which has acted to stabilize global affairs. Our surging government expenditures are propelling federal deficits to almost 98% of the nation's entire gross domestic product, imperiling productivity and burdening the budget for defense along with non-military expenditures with massive interest payments for our debts. Unless our government abandons its profligate spending, future Berlin Wall anniversaries will mark a far different American standing than the current one. Arnold Toynbee, the renowned British historian, warned us when he noted that more civilizations perish from suicide than murder.

Uniqueness – Troops Fiscally Feasible

Troop deployments are fiscally and politically sustainable

Kagan 7 – Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15

Readiness Link – Overstretch

Overseas basing is critical to prevent overstretch which guts military effectiveness

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Overextension is a mistake that some of the big powers have made in the past. Such a development can occur if the United States is not judicious in its use of force and gets involved in protracted conflicts in non-critical regions, thereby sapping its energies and undermining support for its global role. And when the United States uses force in critical regions, its preference should be to have its allies and friends contribute their fair share. Having the capability to protect U.S. vital interests unilaterally if necessary can facilitate getting friends and allies of the United States to participate -- especially on terms more to its liking. It is quite possible that if the United States cannot protect its interests without significant participation by allies, it might not be able to protect them at all. For example, in the run-up to the Gulf war, several allies did not favor the use of force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If the military participation of these allies had been indispensable for military success against Iraq, Saddam Hussein's forces might still be in Kuwait and Iraq might now possess nuclear weapons.

Uniqueness – Heg

American military power is still strong, only a matter of a gentler hegemony

Robert D. Kaplan, Senior Fellow for Center for a New American Security. “A Gentler Hegemony” 12-17-08 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121602480.html

There is a lot of truth to this, but it goes too far. For decline itself -- as a concept -- is overrated. Britain's Royal Navy went into relative decline beginning in the 1890s, even as Great Britain remained powerful enough to help save the West in two world wars over the next half-century. The proper analogy may be the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and 1858, after the orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure, who wanted to leave traditional India as it was, lost sway to Evangelical and Utilitarian reformers who wanted to more forcefully Christianize India -- to make it in a values sense more like England. The reformers were good people: They helped abolish the slave trade and tried to do the same with the hideous practice of widow-burning. But their attempts to bring the fruits of Western civilization, virtuous as they were, to a far-off corner of the world played a role in a violent revolt against imperial authority. Yet the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire, which expanded for nearly another century. Rather, it signaled a transition away from an ad hoc imperium fired occasionally by an ill-disciplined lust to impose its values abroad -- and to a calmer, more pragmatic and soldiering empire built on trade, education and technology. That is akin to where we are now, post-Iraq: calmer, more pragmatic and with a military -- especially a Navy -- that, while in relative decline, is still far superior to any other on Earth. Near the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had almost 600 ships; it is down to 280. But in aggregate tonnage that is still more than the next 17 navies combined. Our military secures the global commons to the benefit of all nations. Without the U.S. Navy, the seas would be unsafe for merchant shipping, which, in an era of globalization, accounts for 90 percent of world trade. We may not be able to control events on land in the Middle East, but our Navy and Air Force control all entry and exit points to the region. The multinational anti-piracy patrols that have taken shape in the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden have done so under the aegis of the U.S. Navy. Sure the economic crisis will affect shipbuilding, meaning the decline in the number of our ships will continue, and there will come a point where quantity affects quality. But this will be an exceedingly gradual transition, which we will assuage by leveraging naval allies such as India and Japan. Then there are the dozens of training deployments around the world that the U.S. military, particularly Army Special Forces, conducts in any given week. We are all over Africa, Asia and Latin America with these small missions that increase America's diplomatic throw-weight without running the risk of getting us bogged down. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, our military posture around the world is generally light, lethal and highly mobile. We have been quietly reducing land forces in South Korea while compensating with a more effective air and naval presence. In Colombia, platoon-size numbers of Green Berets have been instrumental in fighting narco-terrorists; in Algeria, such training teams have helped improve our relationship with that formerly radical Arab country. Such stripped-down American military deployments garner no headlines, but they are a formula that works. The Marines, after becoming virtually desert forces since 2001, will return to their expeditionary roots aboard amphibious ships in the Greater Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. American military power is not going away. But instead of being in-your-face, it will lurk just over the horizon. And that will make all the difference.

Uniqueness – A2: DADT

DADT doesn’t hurt readiness – discharges are minimal

CNSNews**,** 2009(Cybercast News Service, “Discharging Gays from Military No Threat to National Security, Report Details”, October 27th, <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/56143>)

(CNSNews.com) – Claims that the U.S. military’s policy of discharging openly homosexual soldiers threatens national security by reducing troop numbers are not supported by data from the Defense Department, according to the Center for Military Readiness (CMR). The latest data show that the number of people discharged from the U.S. military for homosexuality represents less than 1 percent of the total number of people discharged for all other reasons. For example, 634 soldiers were discharged in 2008 for homosexuality, according to the Defense Department. That 634 number is 0.337 percent of the 187,331 total discharges in 2008. That same year, 5,627 people were discharged for drugs; 3,817 for serious offenses; 4,555 for weight standards; 2,353 for pregnancy; and 2,574 for parenthood. In 2004 there were 669 soldiers discharged for homosexuality (0.314 percent) out of 212,405 discharged for other reasons. The numbers were similar for 2005, 2006 and 2007. In total, between 2004 and 2008, there were 3,284 soldiers discharged for homosexuality. Between 1994 and 2003, the number was 9,501. There currently are 2,475,967 people serving in the U.S. military. As the Center for Military Readiness reported, “The average percentage of discharges due to homosexuality during those 10 years [1993-2004], as calculated by the Department of Defense, was 0.37.”

Uniqueness – A2: Budget

Troop Count will remain high – Budget changes won’t affect readiness levels

Gates**,** 2009 (Robert, Secretary of Defense, “DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon”, US DOD, April 6th, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396>)

The decisions have three principal objectives: First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view, represents America's greatest strategic asset. Second, we must re-balance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and finance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies. Third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy; meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting. So first, people. With regard to the troops and their families, I will recommend that we first fully protect and properly fund the growth of military and strengthen the base budget. This means completing the growth in the Army and the Marine Corps, while halting reductions in the Air Force and Navy. Accomplishing this will require a nearly $11 billion increase above the FY '09 budget level.

Link – General (1/2)

Forward deployment is key to signal US readiness to act

James S.Thomason, Senior Analyst in the Strategy, Forces and Resources Division. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD Volume I: Main Report,” July 2002. Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-3707.

Richard Haass - Also writing in the mid-1990s, Richard Haass, then of the Brookings Institution, alluded explicitly to what he viewed as the use of US forces deployed and stationed forward in a deterrent role and, implicitly at least, to their value in that role [Haass, 1999]. Force is used every day [by the US] for deterrence; examples include maintaining strategic nuclear forces on some kind of alert, stationing large numbers of forces in Europe and Korea, and the US Navy sailing the high seas to signal US interests and a readiness to act on their behalf. [p. 20] Haass, like Dismukes, alluded to the importance of appropriate signaling behavior in successful deterrence: The movement and use of military forces is obviously a critical component of a deterrent strategy. Forces can be positioned, deployed, and/or exercised to signal the existence of interests and the readiness to respond militarily if those interests are either threatened or attacked….Deterrence can be the purpose behind long-term deployments, such as the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula or in Europe since the end of World War II. Such deployments are structural, to remain until the political map or international situation fundamentally changes….Deterrence can also take the form of a response to a specific or tactical situation that emerges suddenly—say the perceived threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980’s when the United States decided to reflag Kuwaiti vessels, or the stationing of US and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia under Desert Shield to deter Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia following the invasion of Kuwait. [pp. 50–51]. Pg. II-5

Allies and adversaries measure US commitment by its forward deployment strategy

James S.Thomason, Senior Analyst in the Strategy, Forces and Resources Division. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD Volume I: Main Report,” July 2002. Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-3707.

There is a widespread habit of equating the degree of US commitment to the security of any overseas region to the number of military personnel the US maintains in that theater in peacetime. The US has worked in recent years to convince the parties concerned that a better measure is the United States’ demonstrated willingness and capabilities to conduct the type of military operations important to success in each theater, while keeping enough force and support in theater to demonstrate such willingness and to facilitate the capability. Pg. ix9

Link – General (2/2)

Force deployment is the key determinant of international perceptions of Obama

Strategic Studies Quarterly. “Obama’s “Eisenhower Moment” American Strategic Choices and the Transatlantic Defense Relationship,” 2009.

Instilling confidence among Americans in his party’s foreign policy competence and credibility requires that Obama articulate and implement diplomatic, military, and economic strategies, the ends of which attract broad-based support both at home and abroad, and the ways and means of which reflect the realities of a global economic crisis more profound than any since the 19 0s. But 20 years after the end of the Cold War, defining a framework for Euro-Atlantic cooperation and implementing tasks to accomplish common purposes will be even more difficult than for leaders of the Atlantic alliance in the 1950s. The greatest difficulties, both conceptually and practically, will arise over strategies projecting, and possibly using, military force. Despite the departure of the Bush administration, it remains unclear whether there is a consensus within Europe on the desirability of cooperating with the United States on such strategies. Pg. 3

Withdrawal undermines our military and emboldens adversaries

Ryan Mauro, Global Politician “The Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq,” 5/7/2007, pg. http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq

Military Consequences Senator John McCain, a former POW in Vietnam, said it best this week when he stated that “the only thing worse than a stressed military, is a broken and defeated military.” Withdrawal would mean the complete collapse of morale in the military and a reluctance to support a responsible military budget. Failing to support and fund our military leaves our troops without the armor they need and our political leaders without the option of force in dealing with foreign enemies.

De-emphasizing military force undermines global U.S. credibility

Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, February 1999, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay

The Clinton administration, in contrast, severed the nexus between power and diplomacy in dealing with rogue states, with a resulting decline in U.S. credibility. Its mishandling of crises in Iraq, North Korea, and the Balkans furnishes ample negative lessons for diplomatic relations with rogue governments. Rather than build public support for a respected overseas policy, the poll-driven Clinton White House pursued the lines of least resistance. It avoided shaping international policy among a disinterested electorate, devoted episodic attention to rogue transgressions, and repeatedly vacillated on the use of military force to achieve its diplomatic ends. Rogues played off American predilections for their own goals, leaving Washington appearing incoherent, hesitant, and ineffectual.

The link threshold is low---blinking undermines U.S. credibility and security

Victor Davis Hanson, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, March 11, 2005, The National Review, online: http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson200503110746.asp

Every time the United States the last quarter century had acted boldly — its removal of Noriega and aid for the Contras, instantaneous support for a reunified Germany, extension of NATO, preference for Yeltsin instead of Gorbachev, Gulf War I, bombing of Milosevic, support for Sharon's fence, withdrawal from Gaza and decapitation of the Hamas killer elite, taking out the Taliban and Saddam-good things have ensued. In contrast, on every occasion that we have temporized — abject withdrawal from Lebanon, appeasement of Arafat at Oslo, a decade of inaction in the Balkans, paralysis in Rwanda, sloth in the face of terrorist attacks, not going to Baghdad in 1991 — corpses pile up and the United States became either less secure or less respected or both. So it is also in this present war, in which our unheralded successes far outweigh our notorious mistakes. A number of books right now in galleys are going to look very, very silly, as they forecast American defeat, a failed Middle East, and the wages of not listening to their far smarter recommendations of using the U.N. more, listening to Europe, or bringing back the Clinton A-Team. America's daring, not its support for the familiar — but ultimately unstable and corrupt — status quo, explains why less than three years after September 11, the Middle East is a world away from where it was on the first day of the war. And that is a very good thing indeed.

Link – Middle East Withdrawal

American hegemony can only be maintained through cooperative policies with the Middle East – otherwise, the rising regional powers will join together to topple the United States\*\*\*

Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor, counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) “Second Chance” 2007. LexisNexis.

The power shift is most evident in the increased economic power of the Asian states. Whatever the exact prospects for China, Japan, India, and South Korea—as well as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran--most of them will soon rank with the European states as the world's most dynamic and expanding economies. Add in Brazil, Mexico, and perhaps some other non-Asian states, and it is no wonder that Western-dominated global financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMPand the WTO are coming under increased pressure to redistribute existing decision-making arrangements. East Asia will likely be the next region to define its economic and political interests on a transnational basis, either with China at the helm of an East Asian community and Japan somewhat marginalized, or (less likely) with China and Japan managing to contrive some form of partnership.(The Japanese, seeking to dilute China's preeminence, have been pressing to open membership in the emerging Asian community to the United States and Australia.) But even the narrower version of such a grouping would represent a major change in world affairs and a significant reduction of the Euro-Atlantic world's traditional dominance. In effect, a tri-partite division of the United States, the European Union, and East Asia is emerging, with India, Russia, Brazil, and perhaps Japan preferring to act as swing states according to their national interests. Russia's residual resentment of America's special status may tempt Moscow to associate itself with America's rising rivals. At some point we could see the emergence of a more pointedly anti-U.S. coalition led by China in East Asia and by India and Russia in EurAsia. It could then draw in Iran. Although that may seem far-fetched now, it is noteworthy that after the first ever Chinese–Indian--Russian summit in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2006, some Chinese foreign affairs specialists wrote nostalgically that Lenin had once advocated an anti-Western alliance among these three countries. They pointedly noted that such an alliance would embrace 40 percent of the world's people, 44 percent of its surface, and 22 percent of its GNP. In this increasingly complicated global context, much will depend on whether America succeeds in restoring some degree of comity in its relations with the world of Islam. A protracted traded failure to do so will create opportunities for China to enhance its role, not only with Indonesia or Pakistan but also with Iran and the Persian Gulf states. If America's position in the region continues to deteriorate, a Chinese political presence might be very welcome. That would greatly increase China's global influence and could even tempt some European states to conclude that it is in the long-term interest of the European Union to forge a special relationship with the energetically emerging East Asian community.

Link – Japan Withdrawal (1/2)

Japanese bases are key lillypads to sustain military readiness

Yoshio Shimoji, Asia-Pacific Journal.“The Futenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawan perspective.” 05-03-2010. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoshio-SHIMOJI/3354)

Obviously, the U.S. Marines or the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, to be more specific, are stationed in Okinawa not to defend Japan as ballyhooed but simply to hone their assault skills in preparation for combat elsewhere. It's a cozy and easy place to train, with Tokyo providing prodigious financial aid, which Washington demands in the name of “host nation support.” I liken it to turf dues exacted by an organized crime syndicate, which offers protection from rival gangs. In 2003, for example, Japan's direct "host nation support" amounted to $3,228.43 million or $4,411.34 million if indirect support is added. Compare these figures with Germany's and Korea's support. Germany's direct host nation support in the same year was $28.7 million (1/112th that of Japan) and indirect support $1.535.22 million. Korea's direct host nation support in that same year was $486.31 million (about 1/7th that of Japan) and indirect support $356.5 million [4]. For ten years from 2001 through 2010, Japan shouldered an average annual sum of $2,274 million for host nation support [5], which incidentally is known as "sympathy budget" as if Japan were voluntarily doling out money out of compassion for those U.S. service members who are deployed in this far-away country. The amount Japan has financed to support USF Japan operations since the system started in 1978 totals an astounding $30 billion. That the Marines are based in Okinawa not to defend Japan but mainly to strengthen U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and beyond is widely recognized, as the following quotation from GlobalSecurity.org suggests: “The Regiment (3rd Battalion 6th Marines) continues to support the defense of the Nation by maintaining forces in readiness in support of contingency operations and unit deployments to the Mediterranean, Pacific rim and around the globe.”(Italics mine) Pundit Kevin Rafferty is more direct saying, "some of the bases (in Japan) are staging-posts for deployment in Afghanistan and elsewhere [6]." When Marine contingents were compelled to move out of Gifu and Yamanashi Prefectures in mainland Japan in the face of mounting anti-U.S. base demonstrations and moved to Okinawa in the 1950's, a number of Pentagon strategists are reported to have cast doubt on the wisdom of such a shift. The U.S. Army was the major element in the U.S. Forces in Okinawa during the occupation period which ended in 1972 with reversion. Apparently, the Army recognized the limited value of being stationed in Okinawa and so withdrew, leaving behind only a few hundred troops. The Marines grabbed this chance to expand their role and function, taking over everything from the departing Army. They are not, however, deterrents against outside "threats" as they boast.

Basing troops in Japan is key to signal U.S. resolve to defend allies---withdrawal crushes Asian stability

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, August 26, 2009, “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” online: http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2308.cfm

Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia, including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States and one of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces there. Japan is America's principal missile defense partner in the world. Washington and Tokyo have made significant progress in recent years in evolving the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Alliance managers and military personnel should be commended for achieving considerable accomplishments despite often seemingly insurmountable political obstacles. The two militaries now have enhanced and integrated their joint training, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.

Link – Japan Withdrawal (2/2)

It’s impossible to have a credible alliance without U.S. bases in Japan

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, January 7, 2010, “CHARTING JAPAN'S COURSE / Japan, U.S. must reaffirm alliance's importance,” Interview in The Daily Yomiuri

Q: Hatoyama once advocated a concept he dubbed a "security treaty without a military presence in Japan." The concept calls for an alliance with the United States without American military bases in Japan. How does the United States view this concept? A: If Japan wants no American troops, we will withdraw the troops. I think that would be a big mistake for Japan. What the troops provide you is a security guarantee which is credible. Japan is faced with both China and North Korea as nuclear powers and of course Russia. Japan needs an American guarantee if it doesn't wish to develop its own nuclear weapons. How do you make that guarantee credible? You make that credible by having American troops in Japan. Anyone who attacks Japan--North Korea for example--is going to kill Americans as well as Japanese. But if Japan asks for the removal of troops, Americans of course would remove them.

Link – Iraq Withdrawal (1/2)

2. Iraq’s the central conflict for U.S. credibility and resolve---withdrawal would be a massive propaganda coup for militant Islamists

Hakan Tunç, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University. “Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq.” Fall 2008, Orbis, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669

It is not surprising, then, that depicting the United States as weak and irresolute has become crucial evidence for those opposing Iraq withdrawal on reputational grounds. The argument’s proponents repeatedly point out that a quick withdrawal from Iraq would confirm bin Laden’s claim about U.S. irresolution. For President Bush, if the United States abandons Iraq, ‘‘the terrorists would be emboldened, and use their victory to gain new recruits.’’25 Vice President Cheney asserted that ‘‘absolutely the worst possible thing we could do at this point would be to validate and encourage the terrorists by doing exactly what they want us to do, which is to leave [Iraq].’’26 According to a former aide in the Bush White House, the claim that America is a ‘‘‘weak horse’ that runs when bloodied ‘will be right’ if the United States does not bring a decent outcome in Iraq.’’27 A widely-read conservative observer notes that ‘‘To drive the United States out of Iraq would be a huge victory for the terrorists, attracting both recruits and support from around the world.’’28The forcefulness of the reputational argument also depends on how important a particular battlefield or theater of war is in the eyes of America’s adversaries. If adversaries believe a particular battlefield constitutes the major front in a larger conflict, then the reputational argument is strengthened. Conversely, if a military conflict is understood to be peripheral to a larger strategic conflict, then the reputation stakes are relatively low. In this regard, the contrast between the Vietnam War and Iraq is again striking. Neither the United States, the Soviet Union nor China saw Vietnam, or Indochina for that matter, as the central front in the Cold War. For all three powers, Vietnam was considered peripheral to the larger conflict whose main front was in Europe. Neither the Soviet nor Chinese leadership suggested that Vietnam was pivotal in the Cold War. In fact, Moscow and Beijing from the late 1960s onward did not perceive any great advantage to themselves as a result of a humiliating U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Moreover, Washington wished to see a quick end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement.29 Even though Nixon and Kissinger believed that an honorable exit from Vietnam was important, they ‘‘shared the conviction that Vietnam was an irritant that needed to be removed by any means necessary.’’30At present, proponents of the reputational argument, in particular, Bush administration officials, argue that Iraq is the central front for the United States in the larger conflict with radical Islamists. This greatly raises the stakes for U.S. reputation.31 Given the centrality of Iraq, advocates of the reputational argument contend an American withdrawal would embolden jihadists to an extent even greater than previous U.S. departures, such as Beirut and Somalia. Jihadists will certainly liken an American withdrawal from Iraq under fire to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. Consequently, their determination to defeat the United States will harden.Once again, the jihadists’ rhetoric and actions provide sufficient evidence for the reputational argument proponents to claim that ‘‘Al Qaeda does not think Iraq is a distraction from their war against us. Al Qaeda believes Iraq is the central front – and it is.’’32 Indeed, both bin Laden and Zawahiri regard Iraq now as being the front line of the Islamic militant battle against the West. For instance, Osama bin Laden noted in 2006: ‘‘the war [in Iraq] is for you or for us to win. If we win it, it means your defeat and disgrace forever as the wind blows in this direction with God’s help.’’33 In another statement, bin Laden announced: ‘‘The whole world is watching this war and the two adversaries. It’s either victory and glory, or misery and humiliation.’’34 In his letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in late 2005, bin Laden’s deputy Zawahiri also emphasized that Iraq had become ‘‘the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era.’’35 The fact that Iraq had attracted thousands of jihadists from other Muslim countries attests to the importance of Iraq as the central front in the global war on terror.36

Link – Iraq Withdrawal (2/2)

Early withdrawal from Iraq would devastate U.S. credibility and leadership

Hakan Tunç, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Fall 2008, “Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Orbis, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669

Last year, the editors of The Economist magazine asserted that ‘‘the most important question that now confronts American foreign-policymakers: beyond the question of whether it was right to invade Iraq, what are the likely consequences of getting out now?’’1 So far, attention has focused on the strategic and security consequences of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, including the possibilities of a decline of American influence in the Middle East, a wider regional war, and an increased terrorist threat as Al Qaeda fills the vacuum left by the Americans.2 For those who oppose a rapid U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, including members of the Bush administration, however, among the most feared consequences is damage to America’s reputation. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility. The forces of radical Islam would tout a U.S. pullout as a victory, declaring that the United States did not have the resolve to endure the battle. A U.S. withdrawal would thus encourage jihadists to foment unrest against other governments they oppose and against other U.S. interventions, such as in Afghanistan. President Bush has repeatedly noted that ‘‘Extremists of all strains would be emboldened by the knowledge that they forced America to retreat.’’3 A number of observers have driven the same point home.4 This article argues that the proponents of the reputational argument make a strong case against a premature and hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. The argument is forceful in the sense that it can invoke pronouncements by the radical Islamists themselves, which unmistakably call into question the United States’s resoluteness. These pronouncements point to America’s past withdrawals from theaters of war and declare Iraq to be the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument regarding Iraq is also clear when compared to the formulations of similar arguments about U.S. reputation in the past, especially the Vietnam War. In contrast to the current struggle in Iraq, advocates of the reputational argument (‘‘credibility’’) as applied to Vietnam were unable to employ their adversaries’ rhetoric to substantiate their claim that a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam would change the latter’s perception about America’s resolve. The importance of the reputational argument regarding U.S. policy towards Iraq should not be underestimated. Any discussion of a U.S. withdrawal which focuses solely on the strategic, humanitarian, and/or financial consequences of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq would be incomplete. What does ‘‘U.S. withdrawal’’ mean in the context of the Iraq War? I would argue that the term means abandoning America’s major combat role in Iraq and such a quick departure of U.S. troops from Iraq that the United States will not have achieved its core military objectives of pacification and stability in the country.

Link – Afghanistan Withdrawal

Presence in Afghanistan is critical to ensure US interests and military readiness

Lawrence Korb “Building a Military for the 21st Century.” 12-10 2008 http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/military\_priorities.html)

Embrace a new vision for the U.S. military. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the changing threat environment for the United States. It is increasingly likely that, in this post-9/11 world, U.S. troops will more frequently be assigned to non-traditional warfare tasks, including both kinetic and non-kinetic counterinsurgency operations, rather than full-scale conventional wars with near-peer competitors. While proficiency in conventional warfare cannot be allowed to lapse, the next administration should consider the type of conflicts most likely to be encountered when allocating limited funding to procurement, training, force expansion, and other budgetary requests. For the next four years, allow the defense budget to keep pace with inflation. As previously noted, today’s defense baseline budget is higher than it has been in real dollars since the end of the World War II. This sum, if used wisely, is more than enough to ensure American military predominance while recapitalizing equipment lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing and modernizing the force. The next administration should therefore keep the defense budget flat over the next four years, adjusting for inflation and fluctuations in the U.S. dollar. The substantial increase in defense spending during the Reagan administration, which saw DOD’s base budget increase by some 53 percent over five years, was followed by a sustained period of budget cuts of about 35 percent between 1985 and 1998. In contrast, the dramatic rise in base defense spending during the Korean War—DOD’s budget nearly quadrupled between 1950 and 1954—was followed by a long period of sustained but modest growth in DOD’s budget at an annual real increase of about 1.5 percent between 1954 and 1980. The latter precedent represents the better model to emulate. However, economic constraints and the almost unprecedented size of the current budget suggest that even small increases in the baseline budget can and should be avoided in the next administration’s first term. Include supplemental war funding in a consolidated budget. Long-term U.S. interests in Iraq and Afghanistan require that an American military presence will be maintained in those countries for the foreseeable future, most of the cost of which should be paid for through supplemental appropriations. However, the services have taken advantage of these ostensibly “emergency” war-funding bills to request money for significant non-war-related projects. DOD should in the future submit appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the baseline request in one consolidated budget. This procedure will allow lawmakers to scrutinize the items from the supplemental and force Congress and DOD leaders to make trade-offs and hard choices when considering the FY 2010-13 defense budget priorities.

Military presence in Afghanistan’s key to tangible U.S. hegemony globally

Campaign for Peace & Democracy, co-directors Joanne Landy & Thomas Harrison, October 2009, “We Call for the United States to End Its Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan!,” online: http://www.cpdweb.org/stmts/1014/stmt.shtml

U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Pakistan take place in the context of a global military system much more massive and far-flung than most Americans realize. Officially, over 190,000 troops and 115,000 civilian employees are stationed in approximately 900 military facilities in 46 countries and territories -- and the actual numbers are far greater. U.S. military spending of more than $600 billion a year, in the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “adds up to about what the entire rest of the world combined spends on defense.” The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan have been part of a comprehensive effort to assert U.S. strategic power and credibility, in the Central and South Asian region and globally -- the power to control energy supplies, to overawe rivals, to intervene wherever Washington deems necessary, and to engage other countries in U.S. power projection. Since 2001, the United States has established 19 new bases in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, inserting a military presence into an area that Russia and China also seek to influence.

Link – South Korea Withdrawal

US support in South Korea is key to resolve – Only way to beat North Korea is through isolating them and making no compromises

Glenn Kessler, Washington Post “Pyongyang tests U.S. 'patience.” 05-2010. LexisNexis

When Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Enhanced Coverage Linking Hillary Rodham Clinton stopped in Seoul on Wednesday to meet with President Lee Myung-bak and other officials, Lee's spokesman said, she reaffirmed the policy of strategic patience. Officials traveling with Clinton said efforts to restart long-dormant nuclear disarmament talks had been put on hold. "What we're focused on is changing North Korean behavior," one senior U.S. official said. "We are not focused on getting back to the table." "We recognize that diplomacy, some form of diplomacy with North Korea, is inevitable at some point," another official said. "We're really not there." Analysts worry, though, that the administration's policy allows North Korea to set the agenda. The United States and its allies are constantly reacting to Pyongyang's actions and, partly as a result, have little opportunity to reduce tensions or bolster diplomatic efforts. The administration is "all about resolve. We want North Korea to know they can't jerk us around again," said Susan Shirk, a former Clinton administration official who is director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and a professor at the University of California at San Diego. "The problem with it is, how do you credibly convince them that if they did something positive, we would be prepared to engage?" The Obama Enhanced Coverage Linking Obama policy is in many ways a reaction to the jarring dissonance of the George W. Bush administration's handling of North Korea. That administration veered from tough talk and actions -- which included the termination of a deal that had provided North Korea with fuel oil in exchange for freezing its nuclear program -- to a desperate gamble to strike any deal at almost any cost. In the end, Bush returned illicit funds and removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, only to see his efforts collapse with few lasting achievements. Because the Bush approach also frayed relations with Japan and South Korea, the Obama administration has worked hard to coordinate closely with Tokyo and Seoul. U.S.-Japanese relations were rocky in the early months of the new government but seem to have stabilized in the wake of the North Korean actions. That coordination, U.S. officials say, has sharpened the attention of Chinese officials. "It complicates their security environment. And over time, it affects their thinking," one of the U.S. officials said, predicting that China soon will signal support for South Korea despite Beijing's longtime alliance with the North. People involved in the Obama transition say the North Korea portfolio was thought to have so little chance of success that there was no desire to invest much diplomatic capital in the effort. Still, L. Gordon Flake, a Korea expert who is executive director of the Mansfield Foundation in Washington, said the administration and the current South Korean government "have displayed remarkable adherence to their core principles in dealing with North Korea. There is a consistency you have not seen before." But "looking forward, I'm a bit concerned," he said. "It leads down a road where the diplomatic options are increasingly constrained. Strategic patience is a solid policy, but what if North Korea is not patient?" In the coming weeks, North Korea is likely to respond negatively to U.S.-South Korea anti-submarine exercises and to possible Security Council action. Either could heighten tensions and lead to possible miscalculations. North Korea's recent belligerence may be tied to internal domestic considerations, specifically leader Kim Jong Il's efforts to ensure that one of his sons succeeds him. U.S. intelligence analysts attribute the North's action to both an effort to build up popular support for a successor and a desire to avenge a naval skirmish with South Korea last year that North Korea lost. Such internal political calculations in North Korea could make diplomacy more difficult. They may already have been a factor in the Obama administration's fitful efforts to restart six-nation disarmament talks. In the past year, North Korea at times has appeared to signal that it was willing to engage, only to pull back. Stephen W. Bosworth, the administration's envoy for North Korea, visited Pyongyang in December. But a return visit to the United States by a North Korean official fell through this spring; North Korea would not agree to a U.S. demand that it return to the negotiating table in exchange for the visa. The lesson may be that the United States ignores North Korea at its peril. "The problem is that North Korea won't let you put them on a back burner," Shirk said.

Impact – Laundy List

Foreign policy resolve’s key to prevent a host of impacts---now’s key

Bernard Chapin- interviewer, and Victor Davis Hanson, the Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 7, 2009, “Change, weakness, disaster,” online: http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

Impacts – Afghanistan Withdrawal (1/2)

Troop withdrawal from Afghanistan devastates similar U.S. counterinsurgency strategies globally

Thomas Henriksen, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, November 3, 2009, “As goes Afghanistan ...,” The National Post, online: http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/11/03/thomas-henriksen-as-goes-afghanistan.aspx

The outcome of the Afghanistan strategy debate within Barack Obama’s administration will carry deep consequences for the fight against terrorist-based insurgencies around the world. The current U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in the Central Asian country is similar to anti-insurgent campaigns elsewhere. What impacts one, therefore, is likely to affect others. If President Obama abandons counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, it will be difficult for it to be applied elsewhere despite many successes. Army General Stanley McChrystal, the overall U.S. and NATO commander, requested 40,000 additional American troops to conduct a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign. Although the McChrystal counterinsurgency strategy is rooted in specific cases in U.S. military history, its most recent success came late in the Iraq War. After the 2003 invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, the Persian Gulf country exploded in a paroxysm of violence against the U.S. and its coalition partners. America’s initial “train and transition” response failed to train enough effective Iraq soldiers and police to countenance an orderly departure as the insurgency raged. Instead, Marine and Army units in the field turned to “hearts and minds” tactics to win over local towns and tribes to reduce the number of their foes. Befriending the Sunni tribal leaders combined with a surge of 28,500 combat troops in early 2007 defeated the local al-Qaeda affiliate and turned the tide toward a decidedly less bloody Iraq, paving the way for the current U.S. military withdrawal from that country. Lifting a page from the Iraq counterinsurgency campaign, Gen. McChrystal is implementing what has come to be regarded as a classical counterinsurgency. His plans entail protecting the local Afghans from Taliban terrorism, expanding Afghanistan’s army and police, and providing modest economic development and jobs to villagers so they will provide intelligence and recruits for the security forces, and take up a better life without the Taliban. The global stakes could not be higher in the forthcoming decision by the administration about the future course of action in Afghanistan. If Washington ditches its counterinsurgency course here, it will deliver a blow to similar U.S. and Western counterinsurgency doctrines worldwide. Counterinsurgency tactics have been successful in keeping the lid on budding low-intensity conflicts around the world. Compared to conventional wars they are low-budget and low- or no-U.S. casualty affairs. The U.S. supplies training, equipment, arms, guidance and financial support. But indigenous forces take the lead in combating terrorists and insurgents and in creating better societies with less neglect of marginalized groups who often provide recruits for terrorism. Allowing the domestic security forces to take the credit, U.S. special operations forces help in refurbishing mosques, building schools, digging wells and staffing medical and veterinary clinics.

It’s key to counter-terrorism in Pakistan and Yemen

Thomas Henriksen, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, November 3, 2009, “As goes Afghanistan ...,” The National Post, online: http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/11/03/thomas-henriksen-as-goes-afghanistan.aspx

Across the Gulf of Aden, U.S. special forces are training Yemen’s troops in counterinsurgency tactics to arrest a spreading insurgency in the country’s northern belt along the border with Saudi Arabia. In Pakistan, American forces are engaged in training missions to help the Pakistani military confront a series of Taliban insurgent movements in the nation’s northern zones. In these countries, as well as others, the Pentagon has deployed small U.S. units to train local armies in counterinsurgency techniques similar to those being instituted in Afghanistan.

Impacts – Afghanistan Withdrawal (2/2)

Unchecked terrorism will result in extinction

Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States. “Terrorism myths and realities,” The Washington Times, August 28, 2003

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."

Impacts – South Korea Withdrawal

Withdrawal from South Korea spills over to U.S. military withdrawal from Japan---destroys the U.S.-Japan alliance

Alon Levkowitz, Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Haifa, 2008, “The seventh withdrawal: has the US forces' journey back home from Korea begun?,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 131-148

Are there any signs of a pending seventh withdrawal? Is it possible to detect a potential change in one side's point of view? Will Seoul and Washington react differently when the next withdrawal plan is proposed, and what kind of withdrawal will it be? The continued wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and possibly the eruption of a new conflict might stretch the capabilities of the US army and lead to an additional withdrawal plan for at least some, if not all, of the remaining US forces in Korea. The geostrategic situation in North-East Asia and in the Korean Peninsula also reinforces the possibility that another withdrawal plan is imminent. The normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between South Korea and Russia and China, veteran allies of North Korea, significantly reduced the tension in the region and actually nullifies the possibility of a surprise North Korean attack, backed by its major allies. The deep and important changes in the inter-Korean relations stemming from the Sunshine Policy will probably continue during President Lee Myung-bak's term, although in a much more conservative manner, i.e. more critical of North Korean behavior and based more on demand for DPRK reciprocity. These local considerations will affect U.S global plans – regardless of who will be occupying the White House after the next presidential elections. A complete withdrawal, however, must take into account its impact on the North-East Asian arena and the US forces in Japan. If the US forces withdraw from Korea, it might lead to increased internal pressure on the government in Tokyo to evacuate the American forces from Japan, backed by political groups in Washington DC who will link the withdrawal from Korea to the need to withdraw from Japan as well. This will have serious implications on the USA–Japan alliance, which USA will have to thoroughly consider before deciding on a complete withdrawal from Korea.

Impacts – Japan Withdrawal

Basing troops in Japan is key to signal U.S. resolve to defend allies---withdrawal crushes Asian stability

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, August 26, 2009, “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” online: http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2308.cfm

Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia, including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States and one of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces there. Japan is America's principal missile defense partner in the world. Washington and Tokyo have made significant progress in recent years in evolving the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Alliance managers and military personnel should be commended for achieving considerable accomplishments despite often seemingly insurmountable political obstacles. The two militaries now have enhanced and integrated their joint training, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.

That causes nuclear war---but maintaining troops in Japan solves

Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor – The Australian, Hatoyama poised for global struggle, The Australian, 9-5-09, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26027029-7583,00.html

Kurt Campbell, now the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, co-authored a study on the US's Asia policy last year. He wrote: "Asia is not a theatre at peace. It is a cauldron of religious and ethnic tension; a source of terror and extremism; an accelerating driver of the insatiable global appetite for energy; the place where the most people will suffer the adverse effects of global climate change; the primary source of nuclear proliferation and the most likely theatre on earth for a major conventional confrontation and even a nuclear conflict." This is not just rhetoric. For the first time, there are more warships in the US Pacific fleet than in its Atlantic fleet. And a rarely acknowledged truth is that Japan is Washington's most important ally anywhere on the globe. Who else would be a candidate? Britain sends more troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are not decisive and the US has a full suite of European allies. Australia is important, but we are a nation of only 22 million people. Japan and the US military bases it hosts are central to the US position in Asia. Japan, a nation of 125 million people, is still the world's second-largest economy, far bigger than any of the Europeans. The Obama administration seems to get this.

Impacts – Iraq Withdrawal

US military presence in Iraq key to deter Iranian nuclearization

Michael Einstadt, . Director of Military and Security Studies Program; “Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran” July 2007 Washington Institute for Near East Studies, Policy Focus #72, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus72FinalWeb.pdf, CB)

Experience shows that some proliferators (e.g., the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Pakistan) have been emboldened by their new capabilities to take what appear in retrospect to be imprudent risks. Efforts to create a stable nuclear deterrent relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and India and Pakistan, were much more risky and difficult than is generally recognized. This experience raises all kinds of questions with regard to Iran, particularly since the political environment in the Middle East is evolving in ways that could greatly complicate efforts to establish a stable nuclear deterrent relationship with the Islamic Republic. In particular, a nuclear Iran is prone to be more assertive and aggressive, and to miscalculate; U.S. and Israeli deterrent threats are likely to be of uncertain efficacy; and other regional states are increasingly likely to explore their nuclear options, creating a more complex, and perhaps unstable, regional threat environment. For these reasons, the emergence of a nuclear Iran is likely to be one of the most serious foreign policy challenges facing the United States in the coming years. This underscores the importance of doing everything possible to ensure that the ongoing nuclear diplomacy with Iran succeeds, and that preventive military action remains an option

Leaving Iran unchecked leads to Middle East nuclear Holocaust

Jeffrey T. Kuhner, 2009 (columnist at The Washington Times and president of the Edmund Burke Institute, a Washington-based think tank, “The coming war with Iran,” October 4, 2009, The Washington Times; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/04/the-coming-war-with-iran/?page=2, CB)

Yet, allowing a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to lead to an even worse regional war. Once the ruling clerics get their hands on nukes, a military showdown with Israel is inevitable. They will seek to destroy the Jewish state once and for all. Jerusalem will not stand by and commit existential suicide. It will retaliate. The result would be a nuclear holocaust in the Middle East. The winds of war are blowing across the Persian Gulf. Following this summer's crackdown on pro-democracy protesters, the Iranian regime is weak, desperate and fracturing. Washington should vigorously pursue a policy of internal regime change; otherwise, Tehran will drag the Middle East into a certain conflagration that could lead to the slaughter of millions. Instead, Mr. Obama has ruled out "meddling in Iran's internal affairs." His peace-at-any-cost diplomacy guarantees military conflict. It is no longer a question of if this will happen, but when and on whose terms. Mr. Obama is sleepwalking into disaster. America and the Middle East will pay the price.

 Impacts – Terrorism (1/2)

Military withdrawals create a perception that the U.S. is irresolute---that gets exploited by terrorists

Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

At the heart of the debate on reputation and terrorism are the “merits of retaliating in order to maintain a credible deterrent to future attacks.”5 Current thinking about reputation and the power of credibility and resolve tend to fall into two camps: those who believe actions affect reputation universally and thus should be fought for, and those who argue that actions do not matter and reputation should never be fought for. The conventional wisdom of rationalist deterrence theory takes a strong form of the former; actions taken during crises today can affect (and perhaps prevent) the crises of tomorrow. These reputational effects are deemed clear and universal in terms of signaling resolve. Studies applying this logic to terrorism argue that “U.S. responses to crises in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Kosovo have signaled that the United States can be both risk and casualty adverse when U.S. forces are sent into battle for purposes not clearly aligned with common understanding in the United States of what constitutes a threat.”6 The conventional wisdom suggests that actions speak to one's type and that lessons from one action carry inferences about future actions.7 The core theoretical view is that the perception of the likelihood that one will carry out threats or promises is based on “past actions” of keeping or breaking commitments.8 Thomas Schelling referred to this as the “interdependence of commitments.”9 This logic presumes universal lessons across space and time by all observers: irresolution anywhere will lead to a reputation for irresolution everywhere in the minds of everyone.

Their defense only applies to states---it’s wrong in the context of terrorists’ perception

Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

These critics make important points but have yet to extend or test their theories of reputation in the context of terrorism and militant Islam. Given the salience of the war on terror in current international relations, it is important to explore the theoretical and empirical basis of reputation and war. Robert Jervis notes that states can get reputations but “it is not clear how these reputations are established and maintained.”27 While he and others are rightly skeptical of presuming behavior will influence reputation formation in a uniform or predictable way,28 we lack a clear understanding of the contextual complexities of reputation applied to militant Islam. We argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong, but that arguments dismissing reputation altogether have shortcomings as well. We agree with Mercer that, “without an explicit theory to tell us how people will interpret behavior, we have no basis on which to determine whether or not a state's retreat furnishes information about its resolve.”29 Contrary to rationalists, who presume actions speak for themselves and are commonly understood by all, Mercer rightly points to variation in perceptions of the same act by different observers. The problem is in Mercer's own rigidity in predefining all adversary firmness as undesirable, claiming desirable behavior will not invoke dispositional judgments, and denying that situational attributions can enter into reputation formation. We contest all of these theoretically and empirically below. Qualified or contingent views of the interdependence of commitments suggest a middle way, which reputations can form within subsets of audiences or action types. We therefore second Elie Lieberman's conclusion that reputation matters if the structure of the situation remains the same.30 This is the essence of analogical reasoning central to our argument: drawing parallel conclusions about an actor given parallel situations in the mind of the observer. Parting with rationalists, who are optimistic about the clear-eyed analyses of leaders in crisis, we are firmly in the camp that presumes people perceive the world through lenses of context and preconceptions.31 Using a psychological perspective, we offer a theory of biased attribution that explains reputation formation more consistently than either rationalists or their critics.32

Impacts – Terrorism (2/2)

Empirically proven---military withdrawal confirms terrorists’ belief in adversary irresolution

Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

As the United States engages in a lengthy counter-insurgency in Iraq, the issue of reputation has resurfaced in the policy debate. In the face of insurgents and al Qaeda elements, administration officials argue for staying the course at least in part due to concerns about American credibility in the global war on terrorism. President George W. Bush expressed the concern that “with every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends.”1 Bush added that premature withdrawal from Iraq “would vindicate the terrorists' tactics … and invite new attacks on America.”2 The battle with militant Islamists in Iraq raises the issue of whether and how to gain a reputation for resolve or avoid a reputation for irresolution in the face of terror. The Bush administration's perspective reflects the conventional wisdom about reputation for resolve, namely that actions beget dispositional attributions and affect how countries are viewed in future interactions. Critics of this view suggest the United States need not worry about such reputational concerns. We disagree with both the conventional wisdom and its critics. In opposition to the latter, we argue that reputations for irresolution are formed by actions interpreted by adversaries. But unlike the conventional wisdom, we suggest reputation for resolve cannot be obtained through firmness and caution against blanket presumptions on the universality of perceptions and reputation across all actors and situations. We argue that reputation for irresolution is explained by a combination of preexisting observer biases that filter the actions of states to discount or reread firmness and confirm the irresolution expected of a “paper tiger” adversary, one who is both aggressive (tiger), yet irresolute (paper). Though the study of reputation and deterrence has a long and fruitful history, few have engaged the full debate in the context of terrorism. So one of our goals is to explore how the reputation debate applied to the militant Islamists at the heart of much of today's terrorism. A common definition of reputation is “a judgment of someone's character (or disposition) that is then used to predict or explain future behavior.”3 In line with this definition and the deterrence literature, we focus on reputation for resolve based on these two core elements of 1) dispositional attributions and beliefs regarding U.S. resolve and 2) the interdependence of attribution across cases. With these two criteria we can place our expectations head to head with existing studies of reputation for resolve. We adopt Paul Huth's criterion of identifying cases when the defender backed down and look to see if the adversary infers reputation for irresolution.4 We show that the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon and Somalia, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan led to reputational conclusions that both the USSR and the United States were paper tigers who could be pushed out with sufficient force. Each episode emboldened the plotting of future events, indicating an interdependence of events that critics tend not to expect. We argue that the blanket suggestion that reputation never matters is as overly simplified and wrong as the conventional wisdom's contention that it always matters.

Impacts – China

Great-power adversaries like China perceive regional withdrawals as a signal of low resolve

Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, February 1999, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay

Low points in American determination and leadership, such as the North Korean negotiations, did not go unnoticed. U.S. reactions encouraged Iraq's recalcitrance in its dealings with U.N. arms inspectors, accounted for North Korea's later face-off with Washington over demands to open its underground facilities to inspection (while demanding $500 million to discontinue missile exports), and bolstered Serbia's reluctance, in the face of U.S.-led NATO efforts, to halt the bloodshed first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. A high-ranking Chinese military officer, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of China's general staff, reportedly declared in 1995, in response to an American's unofficial warnings that Washington might react militarily to a Beijing attack on Taiwan, "No, you won't. We've watched you in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and you don't have the will."15

Chinese perception of weakened U.S. resolve destroys deterrence---causes war

Thomas Christensen – professor of politics at Princeton, Spring 2001, “Posing problems without catching up”, International Security, p. ebscohost)

On the active defense side, it appears that China is attempting to import and to build indigenously a fairly impressive layered air defense system to counter cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. In addition to reported clandestine acquisition of Patriot technology, China has purchased and is seeking to purchase from Russia an undisclosed number of SA-10 (S-300) and SA-15 (TOR-1) SAM systems. Some of this Russian technology might be successfully integrated into China's own domestically produced SAM systems, such as the HQ-9. [66] China is also working to develop antistealth and antisatellite capabilities. Even if the Chinese programs have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they may still pose a future security challenge to Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war of wills over an issue that they care about much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might still be emboldened by the perceived capability--however limited--to increase costs to American and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets in such a struggle. This problem is only exacerbated by any perceptions that Chinese elites might have about America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer casualties. Implications and Prescriptions for U.S. Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing war across the Taiwan Strait and between the United States and China is much more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relative military power in the region might suggest. To deter China from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in the region, the United States must do more than demonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict; it must also demonstrate American resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from defeat but also from significant harm.

Impacts – Heg

U.S. leadership prevents global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

There’s no viable replacement for U.S. power---collapse leads to apolarity and nuclear war

Niall Ferguson, Herzog professor of history at New York University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, July-August 2004, Foreign Policy, Issue 143, p. 32.

The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

Declining U.S. hegemony causes WMD war across the globe

Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 53

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted, elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan world have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons — which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involv­ing Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competi­tion among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, even­tually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable.

Impact – Heg/Withdrawal Asia

There’s no alternative to U.S. power in Asia---military withdrawal destroys regional stability

Charles A. Kupchan, Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Spring 2003, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 2

Nonetheless, it is still important for East Asian countries to work toward a regional security structure that is less dependent upon American power. If the United States does practice a more discriminating internationalism in the coming years, East Asia is likely to feel at least some of the consequences. The ongoing crisis on the Korean peninsula could affect the scope and tenor of America's strategic commitment in the region, with both Washington and Seoul in the midst of reevaluating the U.S. presence in Korea. Defending South Korea, at least in terms of public diplomacy, remains one of the main missions justifying America's forward presence in East Asia. If that mission disappears, it may be hard to make the case — in the United States as well as in America's regional allies such as Japan-that America's forward strategic posture should continue in its current form. At a minimum, the United States and East Asia's regional powers should begin a dialogue on how to move toward a more self-sustaining and stable regional order.

Preparing East Asia for less reliance on American power is far more complicated and dangerous than the parallel task in Europe. The key difference is that states in Europe took advantage of America's protective umbrella to deal with the past and pursue an ambitious agenda of regional cooperation and integration. Europeans have accordingly succeeded in fashioning a regional order that is likely to withstand the retraction of American power. In contrast, states in East Asia have hidden behind America's presence, pursuing neither reconciliation nor regional integration. East Asia's major powers remain estranged.

The United States, therefore, faces a severe trade-off in East Asia between the dependence upon American power arising from its predominant role in the region and the intraregional balancing that would ensue in the wake of an American retrenchment. America's sizable military presence keeps the peace and checks regional rivalries. But it also alienates China and holds in place a polarized political landscape. As China's economy and military capability grow, its efforts to balance against the United States could grow more pronounced. Were the United States to reduce its role as regional arbiter and protector, relations with China would likely improve, but at the expense of regional stability. Japan and Korea would no doubt increase their own military capabilities, risking a region-wide arms race and spiraling tensions.

Strong troop presence in Asia is key to stability

Stephen Walt, the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Spring 2002, Naval War College Review, Vol. LV, No. 2, p. 13

The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the “American pacifier” is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America’s allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want “Uncle Sam” to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but amore exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than “interesting” decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

Impact – Heg/Withdrawal Asia

Troop withdrawal from Asia sparks prolif and arms races---leads to war

Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 174-175

Taken together, these Asian involvements are not without risk, espe­cially vis-a-vis North Korea, China-Taiwan, and the uncertain future of a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Nonetheless, the American engagement provides both reassurance and deterrence and thus eases the secu­rity dilemmas of the key states there, including countries that are America’s allies but remain suspicious of each other. Given the history of the region, an American withdrawal would be likely to trigger arms races and the accelerated proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is thus no exaggeration to describe the American presence as providing the “oxygen” crucial for the region’s stability and economic prosperity37

Impact – Global Stability

Withdrawal causes a host of problems to global stability

Fareed Zakaria editor of Newsweek International, November 29, 2008, “Wanted: A New Grand Strategy”, Newsweek, p. lexis

The "Global Trends" report identifies several worrying aspects of the new international order—competition for resources like oil, food, commodities and water; climate change; continued terrorist threats; and demographic shifts. But the most significant point it makes is that these changes are taking place at every level and at great speed in the global system. Nations with differing political and economic systems are flourishing. Subnational groups, with varied and contradictory agendas, are on the rise. Technology is increasing the pace of change. Such ferment is usually a recipe for instability. Sudden shifts can trigger sudden actions—terrorist attacks, secessionist outbreaks, nuclear brinksmanship. The likelihood of instability might increase because of the economic crisis. Despite some booms and busts—as well as 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—the world has been living through an economic golden age. Global growth has been stronger for the past five years than in any comparable period for almost five decades. Average per capita income has risen faster than in any such period in recorded history. But that era is over. The next five years are likely to be marked by slow growth, perhaps even stagnation and retreat, in certain important areas. What will be the political effects of this slowdown? Historically, economic turmoil has been accompanied by social unrest, nationalism and protectionism. We might avoid these dangers, but it is worth being acutely aware of them. At the broadest level, the objective of the United States should be to stabilize the current global order and to create mechanisms through which change—the rise of new powers, economic turmoil, the challenge of subnational groups like Al Qaeda—can be accommodated without overturning the international order. Why? The world as it is organized today powerfully serves America's interests and ideals. The greater the openness of the global system, the better the prospects for trade, commerce, contact, pluralism and liberty. Any strategy that is likely to succeed in today's world will be one that has the active support and participation of many countries. Consider the financial crisis, which several Western governments initially tried to handle on their own. They seemed to forget about globalization—and nothing is more globalized than capital. Belatedly recognizing this, leaders held the G20 meeting in Washington. This was a good first step (though just a first step). Without a coordinated approach, efforts to patch up the system will fail. The same applies not just to "soft" problems of the future—pandemics, climate change—but to current security challenges as well. The problem of multilateralism in Afghanistan—a place where everyone claims to be united in the struggle—is a sad test case for the future. Thirty-seven nations, operating with the blessing of the United Nations and attacking an organization that has brutally killed civilians in dozens of countries, are still unable to succeed. Why? There are many reasons, but it does not help that few countries involved—from our European allies to Pakistan—are genuinely willing to put aside their narrow parochial interests for a broader common one. Terrorism in South Asia generally requires effective multinational cooperation. Business as usual will produce terrorism that will become usual. National rivalries, some will say, are in the nature of international politics. But that's no longer good enough. Without better and more sustained cooperation, it is difficult to see how we will solve most of the major problems of the 21st century. The real crisis we face is not one of capitalism or American decline, but of globalization itself. As the problems spill over borders, the demand for common action has gone up. But the institutions and mechanisms to make it happen are in decline. The United Nations, NATO and the European Union are all functioning less effectively than they should be. I hold no brief for any specific institution. The United Nations, especially the Security Council, is flawed and dysfunctional. But we need some institutions for global problem-solving, some mechanisms to coordinate policy. Unless we can find ways to achieve this, we should expect more crises and less success at solving them. In a world characterized by change, more and more countries—especially great powers like Russia and China and India—will begin to chart their own course. That in turn will produce greater instability. America cannot forever protect every sea lane, broker every deal and fight every terrorist group. Without some mechanisms to solve common problems, the world as we have come to know it, with an open economy and all the social and political benefits of this openness, will flounder and perhaps reverse. Now, these gloomy forecasts are not inevitable. Worst-case scenarios are developed so that they can be prevented. And there are many good signs in the world today. The most significant rising power—China—does not seem to seek to overturn the established order (as have many newly rising powers in the past) but rather to succeed within it. Considerable cooperation takes place every day at the ground level, among a large number of countries, on issues from nuclear nonproliferation to trade policy. Sometimes a crisis provides an opportunity. The Washington G20 meeting, for instance, was an interesting portent of a future "post-American" world. Every previous financial crisis had been handled by the IMF, the World Bank or the G7 (or G8). This time, the emerging nations were fully represented. At the same time, the meeting was held in Washington, and George W. Bush presided. The United States retains a unique role in the emerging world order. It remains the single global power. It has enormous convening, agenda-setting and leadership powers, although they must be properly managed and shared with all the world's major players, old and new, in order to be effective. President-elect Obama has powers of his own, too. I will not exaggerate the importance of a single personality, but Obama has become a global symbol like none I can recall in my lifetime. Were he to go to Tehran, for example, he would probably draw a crowd of millions, far larger than any mullah could dream of. Were his administration to demonstrate in its day-to-day conduct a genuine understanding of other countries' perspectives and an empathy for the aspirations of people around the world, it could change America's reputation in lasting ways. This is a rare moment in history. A more responsive America, better attuned to the rest of the world, could help create a new set of ideas and institutions—an architecture of peace for the 21st century that would bring stability, prosperity and dignity to the lives of billions of people. Ten years from now, the world will have moved on; the rising powers will have become unwilling to accept an agenda conceived in Washington or London or Brussels. But at this time and for this man, there is a unique opportunity to use American power to reshape the world. This is his moment. He should seize it.