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Alt Solvency – Rejection

Capitalism can’t be ended all at once, but through a series of refusals to follow capitalism’s dictates can we break it down

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(John Holloway, 8/16/05, “Can We Change The World Without Taking Power?”, <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/5616> Cassettari)

But it is unlikely that world revolution can be achieved in one single blow. This means that the only way in which we can conceive of revolution is as interstitial revolution, as a revolution that takes place in the interstices of capitalism, a revolution that occupies spaces in the world while capitalism still exists. The question is how we conceive of these interstices, whether we think of them as states or in other ways. In thinking about this, we have to start from where we are, from the many rebellions and insubordinations that have brought us to Porto Alegre. The world is full of such rebellions, of people saying NO to capitalism: NO, we shall not live our lives according to the dictates of capitalism, we shall do what we consider necessary or desirable and not what capital tells us to do. Sometimes we just see capitalism as an all-encompassing system of domination and forget that such rebellions exist everywhere. At times they are so small that even those involved do not perceive them as refusals, but often they are collective projects searching for an alternative way forward and sometimes they are as big as the Lacandon Jungle or the Argentinazo of three years ago or the revolt in Bolivia just over a year ago. All of these insubordinations are characterised by a drive towards self-determination, an impulse that says, â€No, you will not tell us what to do, we shall decide for ourselves what we must do.' These refusals can be seen as fissures, as cracks in the system of capitalist domination. Capitalism is not (in the first place) an economic system, but a system of command. Capitalists, through money, command us, telling us what to do. To refuse to obey is to break the command of capital. The question for us, then, i how do we multiply and expand these refusals, these cracks in the texture of domination?

Alt Solvency - Rejection

Capitalism has reached a legitimacy crisis that makes it vulnerable to rejection

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(John Sanbonmatsu, Professor of Philosophy, May/June 09, Tikkun Vol. 24 Issue 3pg 21-72 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=106&sid=604527a1-7a4d-41a0-842a-34a6cf71d67b%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=39753533> Cassettari)

ALAS, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF VIBRANT social movements from the field of history could not come at a more tragic time: for the first time in seventy years, after decades of unquestioned supremacy over every aspect of human and natural life, capitalism is beginning to suffer its own "legitimacy crisis." The German philosopher Georg Hegel famously wrote that the Owl of Minerva would only take wing at dusk. That is, only at the end of history would Reason and divine Spirit at last come to be reconciled, in human self-consciousness, human self-knowledge. Today, however, as the Marxist James O'Connor has ironically remarked, the Owl of Minerva folds its wings at day-break — closing up shop, as it were, just when things at last start to get interesting. Antonio Gramsci, the great Italian theorist, observed that severe economic disruptions can "lead in the long run to a widespread skepticism" toward the existing order as a whole. When that happens, even the most seemingly entrenched political and social arrangements can disappear overnight. In 1997, when foreign traders suddenly pulled the plug on the "Asian miracle," devaluing currencies such as the Thai bhat and Indonesian rupiah, mass protests and riots spread through the region overnight. Within a year, the democracy movement had toppled the authoritarian government of President Suharto in Indonesia, a nation of over 200 million. A year after that, the East Timorese at last overcame decades of repression by the Suharto regime by declaring their national independence. The traumatic economic dislocations of the 1920s and 1930s, by contrast, prepared the ground for even more intensive and extensive social upheavals. When Gramsci spoke of popular "skepticism" toward an older regime, he knew of what he spoke, having himself been thrown in jail by the fascist leader, Benito Mussolini. If fascism and world war were the products of the last depression, what will the next one bring? As the world economy deteriorates, as hundreds of millions of people lose their jobs, and as the state scales back on social welfare and public services, we may see a widening crisis of confidence in the economic and social order as such. That worry seems to have been on the mind of George W. Bush last autumn, when he felt compelled to defend the capitalist system by name. ("The crisis [is] not a failure of the free-market system," he insisted, "and the answer is not to reinvent that system.") Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, offered up similarly fervent demonstrations of his faith in capitalism. But Germany's finance minister, Peer Steinbrück, struck a more ominous tone. In a revealing interview with Der Spiegel, Steinbrück warned that the corporate and banking scandals that had plagued Europe and the United States in recent years had threatened to undermine faith in the system as a whole: We have to be careful not to allow enlightened capitalism to become tainted with questions of legitimacy, acceptance, or credibility. This isn't merely an issue of excessive salary developments in some areas. I'm talking about tax evasion and corruption. I'm talking about scandals and affairs of the sort we have recently experienced, although one shouldn't generalize these occurrences. But they are the sort of thing the general public understands all too well. And when they are allowed to continue for too long, the public gets the impression that "those people at the top" no longer have to play by the rules. There have been times in Germany when these elites were closer to the general population. Some things have gotten out of control in this respect. Steinbrück, a leading light of the conservative Christian Democratic Union party, stunned his interviewer by invoking the spirit of Marxism to explain what was occurring in the international markets. "Overall," he said, "we have to conclude that certain elements of Marxist theory are not all that incorrect." The reporter from Der Spiegel objected, "And you, of all people, are saying this?" Steinbrück replied: "Every exaggeration creates, in a dialectic sense, its counter-part-an antithesis. In the end, unbridled capitalism with all of its greed, as we have seen happening here, consumes itself." If capitalism is indeed beginning to consume itself, the same way it devoured the minds, bodies, and labor of countless human and nonhuman beings over the course of centuries, then for the first time in generations, perhaps ever, we may have a brief opening, a caesura in the long, breathless tale of capitalism and its violence, in which to imagine and to set the terms for a new way of organizing human society and economy. In 1940, not long before he was driven to his death by the Gestapo, the Jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin wrote: It is well-known that the Jews were forbidden to look into the future. The Torah and the prayers instructed them, by contrast, in remembrance. This disenchanted those who fell prey to the future, who sought advice from the soothsayers. For that reason the future did not, however, turn into a homogenous and empty time for the Jews. For in it every second was the narrow gate, through which the Messiah could enter. Benjamin was reflecting on the temporality of socialist revolution — on the way that systemic crises open up unexpected Utopian fissures in the seemingly impenetrable rockface of modernity. Such a historic rupture, a "narrow gate" through which those who envision a better world might suddenly pass, may be opening up beneath our own feet today. If so, we have come to the threshold of Hope.

Alt Solvency – Discourse

Their discourse of globalization must be challenged – without challenge we doom the poor to a cycle of blame

Schram, prof @ Bryn Mawr College, 06

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The discourse of globalization creates new ways of reinscribing privilege and subordination by calling forth new forms of governance for regimenting populations into the emerging social order.1 How should people respond to the implicit understandings of self and other embedded in the globalization discourse's preoccupation with welfare dependency? They need to identify those embedded biases, call them out publicly, and propose alternative understandings about how they should practice relating each other, one-to-one and collectively. In so doing, they can make the welfare state less exclusionary and tap its latent possibilities for more compassionate policies. Failing to challenge the discourse of dependency means failing to challenge the disciplinary practices of the new forms of governance. Without the critical distance needed to question that discourse, people risk continuing to be caught in a vicious cycle that alternates from episodic charitable responses to poverty to cracking down on the poor as deviants who need to be punished for their poverty,2 The U.S. response to the Katrina hurricane disaster is but one prominent example. Thanks to a long pre-Katrina ride to the beach with my wife, the title of this chapter ended up being titled Compassionate Liberalism. President George Bush, relying on the writings of Marvin Olasky, has championed the idea that public policies should reflect a "compassionate conservatism," where social welfare provision is provided on the basis of concern for helping the less privileged develop the self-discipline to be able to adhere to moral standards.3 Compassionate conservatism practices "tough love." My point in this chapter is that the president's compassionate conservatism is by no means the only or best way to express that sort of emotional commitment to helping those who are let behind by the changes wrought by the globalizing market-centered society. In fact, I will argue that compassionate conservatism is but a convenient discursive practice for rationalizing the discipline meted out by the new forms of governance emerging with the global order. I like the idea that public policy should be compassionate. Liberalism, with its emphasis on a social contract and rational-legal logic, emphasizes rights to entitlement. Yet, it is just such a discourse that has led people away from thinking about compassion as a basis of social policy.4 Legalistic rights discourse puts in the background alternative ways in which those who have been marginalized or subordinated have claims on other members of the political community. Yet, as is often the case, those let behind socially and economically have in any actually-existing liberal order less than the full complement of legal rights to entitlements to address all their needs. Therefore, insisting that legal rights to entitlement be the sole basis for their getting to make claims on collective resources can doom many families to life of poverty. Western liberal individualistic culture, especially as experienced in the United States, has led people away from recognizing the critical roles of emotion, caring, and loving compassion in structuring people's relationships to each other. People need to recognize that they have emotional bonds to each other as members of a human, if politically constructed, community, whether they choose to act on those emotions through public or private actions, via the national welfare state or the local community.5 While it is indeed very important to think about the role of compassion in social welfare policy as a way of getting beyond the limitations of the existing social welfare state, it is important to understand the varieties of compassion. And when we do, we may find compassionate conservatism to not be the best way to introduce more compassion into the welfare state. To understand what I mean by this, we need to take a short trip through some issues of political philosophy. When done, we may come out in a very different place than did the person in the White House. It might not make everyone a practitioner of compassionate liberalism, but it might help create resources for resisting the disciplinary practices of the new forms of govenance.

Alt Solvency - Justice

Must resist globalization discourse to achieve change and natural justice

Barry K. Gills, Department of Politics, University of Newcastle “ Editorial: Globalisation and the politics of resistance”, New Political Economy, pg 11-15, Vol. 2, NO.1, 1997

Therefore, among the 'litany of sins' of globalisation discourse that we most seek to expose and react to are: its economism; its economic reductionism; its technological determinism; its political cynicism, defeatism and immobilism; its de-socialisation of the subject and re-socialisation of risk; its teleological subtext of inexorable global 'logic' driven exclusively by capital accumulation and the market; and its ritual exclusion of factors, causes or goals other than capital accumulation and the market from the priority of values to be pursued by social action. In our view, the upshot of this type of globalisation discourse is to bring about 'the death of polities', via 'the death of our ideals'. This is the inevitable outcome of a process wherein capital and the market alone determine the restructuring of economic, political and cultural life, making all other alternative values or institutions increasingly redundant. This is a vision of the future that we cannot accept and must will to resist. It is precisely the apolitical reading of globalisation that we most seek to reject. This is what we mean when we say we wish to reclaim the territory of the 'political'. We make a parallel claim, not only for the elevation of the political to centrality in our analysis, but also for the priority of social justice over the claims of the natural justice of the market, driven by the presumed inexorable 'logic' of economic globalisation.

Alt Solvency – Historical Thinking

The alternative is to reincorporate the value of political economics and historically analyze it

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UK. “Reorienting the New International Political Economy”. New political Economy 233-245, Vol. 6 NO. 2, 2001

However, rather than begin with a fairly simplistic understanding based upon crude dichotomisation of the complex social reality of the world into binary oppositions such as between ‘modernity ’ and ‘anti-modernity ’, ‘pre- modernity’ and ‘post-modernity ’, and ‘development ’ and ‘anti-development ’, we should recognise that elements of all of these exist in virtually every society or social system existing in the world today, whether supposedly ‘developed ’ or ‘un(der)developed ’. Postmodern critique and critical (I)PE can perhaps find some common ground in the need to formulate and discover new forms of emancipatory and transformatory knowledge , whether at ‘local’ or ‘global ’ scales of social action. However, we should not assume any strict separation between these, as in fact every individual person is fully capable of having multiple identities that span this supposed spatial divide . However, ‘identity ’ alone is not capable of giving us the breadth of analysis needed, nor of necessarily providing concrete political answers to some of the most pressing questions of the era before us. There has been much talk fairly recently of re-emphasising ‘politics ’ or ‘the political ’ in (I)PE (not e the special issue of this journal on the same) and this is altogether necessary . The fact, however, that we even have to make this claim (again! ) is indicative of the recent ‘poverty’ of (I)PE analysis that has led us to this unhappy situation in the first place. In all fairness, however , some (I)PE scholars never succumbed to economistic analysis , which was one of the attendant dangers of the hegemony of ‘finance ’ in (I)PE, the fascination with technology as the determinant of historical change , and the inherent conser -vatism of the ascendant neoliberal economic ideas behind the concept of ‘globalisation ’. Those working on research focusing primarily on class analysis, the role of labour or the working class(es) , non-state actors and critical social movements, and ‘civil society’, have tended all along to demonstrate how ‘politics ’ is indispensable to any (I)PE analysis . What is really necessary is not a ‘retreat’ from the ‘politics ’ of political economy, but rather an even greater emphasis and an intellectual extension of our conceptions of what is ‘political ’ today and in the future. Yes, we need to ‘bring politics back in’. Of course, we do. However, we must also ‘bring economics back in’. It is true that IR was not the best or ideal discipline to act as the intellectual fountainhead of (I)PE and particularly not for the new critical (I)PE. Yet one aspect of the still unfinished rectification of (I)PE’s intellectual moorings is precisely the rehabilitation of, reconfiguration with and reconstruction through the concerns and concepts of ‘economics ’ as a disciplinary contributor to the new (I)PE. ‘Economics ’ is in fact beginning to change itself , within its own discourse , and realise that the dichotomy with ‘Politics ’ is entirely untenable , that a theory of power is indispensable, and that the abstractions on which classical and neoclassical economics and their more recent (re)incarnations are (dogmatically ) based are themselves untenable in the real world. ‘The end of Economics’ is therefore the beginning of the larger rebirth of the much older and more ‘original ’ tradition , which is of course political economy ! We are well situated to play a strategic role in this reconstruction of ‘economics’ and retrieve its true character as ‘social theory’ that addresses the ‘big picture ’. Appreciating ancestry We must therefore re-establish (I)PE within the broad tradition of economic thought, as much or more so than any other contributory discipline . The first step to achieve this end is the necessity of teaching the fundaments of the history of economic though t to every (I)PE student in every programme in every department involved in the discipline . A great ‘ancestry’ of (I)PE exists, too often lamentably unrecognised by those too obsessed with the ‘new’ trend, the ‘new’ idea, the ‘new’ problem, etc. and who all too often therefore either re-invent the wheel (and call it ‘new’) or remain woefully ignorant of much that is useful or necessarsy to their own subject . A friend of mine once said that it is incumbent upon us, while standing on the shoulders of giants, not to relieve ourselves . This is certainly true, and good manners. It also allows us to preserve insights not lightly forgotten . (What is that old saying, about those who dolessons of their own history being condemned to repeat it?)

Alt Solvency – Hisotrical Thinking

Historically evaluating the idea of globalization helps break down the class system created by capitalism

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Moreover , it is now more than ever necessary to ensure that we effect a real synthesis of ‘development theory ’ with mainstream and critical (I)PE theory. This conjoining has always been absolutely essential but has been difficult to achieve, though there have been notable contributions lately.5 It is the virtue of the theories of imperialism that they begin from an assumption that capitalism is a world encompassing phenomenon and that the process of capital accumula - tion operates not only ‘nationally ’ but ‘globally ’. In recent years we have all witnessed the ever growing theoretical and practical tension between the paradigms, understandings and practices of ‘national development ’ (whether ‘in’ or ‘out ’ of association with the dominant capitalist world economy ) and ‘globalisation ’ or the claims of a globalised production , exchange and finance system over and above all ‘national ’ systems of political economy . Indeed, this is a central problematic of our discipline and will remain so indefinitely . Thus, there can be no separation of ‘development ’ from (I)PE. ‘Global justice ’ in response to the enduring realities of embedded structural asymmetries or ‘global inequality ’ is quickly emerging for many (I)PE practi - tioners as the pivotal moral, political and analytical concern of the discipline . By breaking out finally from the moral and intellectual confines of embedded Eurocentrism , the new ‘global ’ discipline of (I)PE can teach us something about the common intellectual , material and spiritual culture and history of humanity, and therefor e about our common future. The realisation that we are not only the inhabitants of a common planet , which gave rise to a new radical environmental consciousness , but that we are also one common species (i.e. that ‘races’ are genetically speaking undemonstrable and are in effect false constructs , particu- larly pernicious for their reliance on skin colour as the key differentiating criterion) give s rise to a new consciousness of the imperative for global justice within a growing reflexive sense of the community of all humanity. It is equally necessary that we should all endeavour to understand the full history of ‘globalisation ’, since understanding the antecedents of the contempor - ary phenomena are in effect necessary to understanding the present patterns and tensions arising. There is a growing interest in the historicisation of (I)PE and in generating a dialogue with historians who are exploring world historical processes or ‘global history ’.6 The next step forward may be to investigate ‘globalisation as global history ’ in a search for enduring patterns as well as the circumstances and possibilities of social and structural transformation . A new understanding of such ‘global history ’ can liberate us from the many parochial ‘national ’ histories which are themselves as much a fiction, or better ‘myth’, as is the current ideological construction of neoliberal ‘globalisation ’ (which was something that government s and corporation s used to frighten both adults and children with in the 1990s) . We now know that ‘globalisation ’ is not only a new mythology , but that being such it is neither historically inevitable nor technologically predetermined . It is, as our discipline is so well situated to understand, an historically open, indeterminate and, above all, thoroughly political process , and therefore subject to human action and potential transform- ation. 7 This hard fought and hard won ‘lesson ’ should be a foundation for the reconstruction of (I)PE in the coming century, in which humanity will confront a choice between catastrophic break-downs environmentally , socially and eco- nomically, and the alternative(s) : to break the iron cage of ‘realist history ’ and its Kafkaesque repetition of scenarios of war and crisis and instead find real and lasting solutions to the common threats to our planet home and to humanity itself.

Alt Solvency – Historical Thinking

Historical methods of Evaluation break down old structures and have the potential for tranformation

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Thus, historica l method (or the historica l mode of enquiry) must be reinvigo - rated, a theoretical and analytical move that goes in tandem with the necessity for the historicisation of (I)PE.8 This reinvestigation of historical method should focus on reflexivity and epistemology via a critical historicisation of the agency—structure problematic . s in (I)PE (launched in large measure by the neo-Gramscian revival of historical material - ism9) tended to concentrate on matters of ontology and epistemology. This discussion was fruitful, but a new phase is needed, central to our methodological concerns at present and for the future . I am suggesting that the next phase of the debate or discussion on historical method should concentrate on matters of ‘dialectical ’ analysis or reasoning. This should focus on two dyads, namely that between the nomothetic and the ideographic , on the one hand, and between the diachronic and the synchronic , on the other , understood as either oppositions or as necessary counterparts of analysis (where the nomothetic pertains to the study or discovery of general laws or patterns ; the ideographic to individual , single or unique facts or processes ; the diachronic to historical development of a language , culture , etc.; and the synchronic to the state of a language , culture , etc. at particular time without regard to historical development) . As dialectics is the grammar of historical materialist thinking , we can perhaps try to agree on a minimum common definition of dialectics as one which addresses ‘the existence or action of opposing forces or tendencies in society ’ (Oxford English Diction- ary, ‘dialectics ’) and on this basis understand history as ‘a series of contradic - tions and their solutions ’ (Oxford English Dictionary , ‘dialectical materialism ’), though not necessarily a unity of opposites or a Hegelian dialectic . It is my own view that (I)PE should develop into a critical historical social theory. A nomothetic and diachronic historical enquiry is appropriate to the study of (I)PE, particularly to the global logic of capital accumulation and the dialectic of political, social and ideational responses to this process, as well as to the symbiosis of state and capital in these processes. Such an approach also combats a historical and, above all, apolitical analysis (and beside these dangers, that of amoral relativism ) by reinvestigating the fluid relations between agency and structure and the conditions of emancipatory praxis . The critical historical method, when aligned to critical social theory,10 should give to the new (I)PE the analytical power and the social and political resonance it needs in the coming century, which is certain to be one of great transformation . As it is a basic insight of dialectical method to realise that every historical social system carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction , which is also a potential for transformation , so we in (I)PE should know that the times we are living in are those of potential ‘creative destruction ’ in the sense of the demise of old structures and the potential for re-creation and transformation . We must rise to the intellectual , moral and political challenges presented to us by this history and this future.

Alt Solvency – Redefine Relationship

We must redefine our relationship with the state and economy to break away from capitalism

Barry K.Gills,Department of Politics, University of Newcastle “ Editorial: Globalisation and the politics of resistance”, New Political Economy, pg 11-15, Vol. 2, NO.**1,** 1997

We believe that time has arrived. The politics of resistance to neoliberal economic globalisation will certainly be a central theme of praxis in the coming period of national and international history in the next century. There is a very real and perhaps truly urgent need, however, actively to coordinate the emerg- ence of a historic counter-movement to neoliberal economic globalisation at local, national, regional and global levels. In anticipation of and in preparation for this, there is a prior political need to reassert the right to resist in itself, and to overcome the myth that there are no alternatives. Second, there is an urgent need to reassert the values of the broad social and political left: i.e. to revalidate old values, such as worker solidarity, democracy, state intervention, welfare and redistribution; while also proposing new ones, such as gender equality, protection of the environment and the right of civil society to reconstitute itself and redefine its relationship with the state and the economy. A tentative 'manifesto' of such social rights *vis-a-vis* the forces of neoliberal economic globalisation might include the following: 1. the right of society to protect itself from the vagaries of the unregulated market; 2. the right of society to reconstitute its political life in meaningful ways; 3. the right of individuals, families and communities to employment, welfare, social stability and social justice; 4. the right to deploy the power of the state at all levels, from local, national and regional, to international or global; and whether through a mixed economy, state intervention, redistribution, or social reform against the private forces of the market, driven by greed or obsession with profits before the needs of individuals and the community; 5. the right of labour, in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy, to resist unemployment, austerity measures, reduced life chances, increased insecurity, atomisation, alienation, dislocation and immiseration; 6. the right of the poor, the dispossessed and the marginalised 'masses' of the world economy, wherever they exist, to resist poverty and the further intensification of social polarisation, and thus to assert the right to mean- ingful 'development'; and finally 7. the right to reject and resist the ideology of neoliberal economic globalisa- tion, and to choose to affirm and realise alternative modes of human development such as (global) 'civil society'; (global) democracy; (global) social justice; (global) social solidarity; (global) community; (global) welfare; (global) humane governance; and (global) 'politics' itself. The final right of this list is therefore the inalienable right to imagine and construct a politics of 'post-globalisation'. To this end, we should take heart that voices of 'dissent' exist even in unexpected places. Some commentators already make an attempt to point out that the globalisation emperor is walking about with no clothes to cover his nakedness. For instance, *The Economist* of 30 June 1994, in an article entitled 'The discreet charm of the multicultural multinational', concluded that, 'as a slogan, "globalisation" is the stalest of buns'.9 As far as slogans are concerned, we must reject the corporate mantra of 'globalisation or die' and its political economy counterpart, 'Hayek lives and Keynes is Dead'. We might prefer to chant 'Keynes (or Marx, depending on your preference) should be reincarnated and Hayek should be mummified for eternity'. We must not forget the hard-learned lessons of the past, lest, as the philosopher warned, we are doomed to relive them. One gets a distinct and distressing sense of 'Polanyian *deja* VM' concerning the 'lost lessons' of the interwar period and the Great Depression and its aftermath, i.e. the return of Hayek's ghost and of the 'dismal science' in the face of historical evidence that should have scared us off these follies permanently. Here we go again? However, there is a great tradition of political economy to draw upon for initial inspiration. Keynes, for example, should be respected and actively consulted for his fundamental attack on the follies of liberal orthodox laissez-faire economics. His undercon- sumptionist and pro-interventionist instincts and trenchant analysis of the causes and consequences of deep economic crisis is still-useful, though part of his prescription may be in need of adaptation to present conditions. Keynes, and Marx also, concentrated his effort on the problem of how to prevent repetition of the human tragedy of general economic and social crises brought about by destructive forces in modern capitalist economies. We would do well to do likewise. Above all perhaps, we should realise that the broad social left can no longer afford to be divided by doctrinaire controversies as occurred far too often over the past century. We must move to a new political economy, a new critical theory, that helps us better understand the world we live in—and to change it for the betterment of all. This is the challenge of 'globalisation' and the task to which the contributions in this special issue of *New Political Economy* are dedicated. As John Kenneth Galbraith says in the Preface, we must not sacrifice the social gains of the past century to a mindless pursuit of socially barren economic and trade policy. Otherwise, we will experience a deepening of the 'historic malaise' of capitalism and democracy that is already beginning. It is time to fight back and reclaim the future. I would like therefore to close with two epigrams from the past that give inspiration for the future direction of the new political economy: The health of nations is more important than the wealth of nations. Will Durant Salus populi suprema est lex. The welfare of the people is the highest law. Cicero

Alt Solvency – State

Breaking down the power of the state engages all classes and creates a larger sense of social progress.

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

The Gramscian perspective I outline here is consistent with what Bob Jessop has called a `strategic ^ theoretical' approach to the state ö an approach in which the state is seen not as an autonomous source of power but as an `institutional ensemble' in which class and class-relevant social struggles are engaged (Jessop, 1990).(4) This approach, in which states are seen as `structurally coupled' with civil society, is in accord with Gramsci's contention that states cannot merely be used by revolutionaries to reengi- neer societies but must themselves be changed in relation to broader processes of social transformation (Gramsci, 1971, pages 229 ^ 238). Such an approach does not reduce the state to an epiphenomenon or reflection of societal processes but rather sees the state as positioned in a reflexive relationship with society (Gramsci, 1971, pages 159 ^ 160). Thus, what happens within the arena of the state matters; yet struggles within states are not simply empowered by the forms and functions of states per se but rather are empowered by the way they are grounded within social processes at work in the larger society (Jessop, 1990, pages 269 ^ 270).

Link – Exceptionalism

The ideology of exceptionalism is justifications for war – we feel that our economic power should be a model for others

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

America’s unique historical development, especially the distinctive social traditions and conditions that emerged from its revolutionary origins, have underpinned the idea of ‘American exceptionalism’. While outsiders may regard the American attachment toliberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez faire - which Lipset claims embody the ‘American creed’ - with varying degrees of admiration, incredulity or bafflement, we should not underestimate how powerful a force such ideas have been in defining a sense of national identity and, by extension, American foreign policy. Indeed, unless we recognise how important the moral dimension of both America’s domestic life and its foreign policy remain, we shall not be able to understand why the characterisation of the Bush regime’s post-September 11 policy stance as a ‘war against evil’ resonated so powerfully with so many Americans. As Lipset (1996: 20) points out: To endorse a war and call on people to kill others and die for the country, Americans must define their role in a conflict as being on God’s side against Satan-for morality against evil, not, in its self-perception, to defend national interests. Gramscians, critical theorists and the temperamentally sceptical may regard the legitimating discourse that emerged around the ‘war on terror’ with a good deal of suspicion, but in a country where well over 90 per cent of the population profess a belief in God, it is difficult to overestimate the continuing importance of religion generally and Christianity in particular as a source of identity, belief and political mobilisation. Indeed, so powerful does religion remain in American life that some observers question whether the US is a secular state at all (Gray 1998). Unsurprisingly, therefore, this sense of exceptionalism, and the belief that the US is a unique country with a possibly God-given historical mission, has shaped US foreign policy and given rise to the idea that America and American values must provide a beacon for the world (McDougall 1997). Crucially, however, this is a vision that needs to be actively exported: assumptions about the presumed superiority, universality and desirability of American values, in combination with a growing economic, political and strategic power to impose such a morally-informed model on other countries, meant that America’s increasing engagement with the world would be overlaid with distinctive American norms on the one hand, and inescapable structural dominance on the other. Consequently, the key question has always been about how, rather than if, such an engagement would occur. As Lake (1999) points out, the central story of American foreign policy in the twentieth century when America became hegemonic was not about a conflict between isolationists and internationalists, but between unilateralists and multilateralists. The experience of the catastrophic, unilateralist inter- war period, and the contrast with the decisive role the US played in creating the post- war order appeared to have permanently resolved this tension in favour of the multilateralists. Recent events serve as a reminder that policy is not structurally determined or inescapably path-dependent, but a susceptible to reconstruction by those with an alternative vision, ideology or grand strategy. In other words, what Susan Strange (1994) described as America’s ‘structural power’ in the international system may inevitably make it the dominant power of the era, but this does not determine either the content of its foreign policy or the precise nature of its engagement with the world.

Link - Democracy

The US uses democracy as a disguise for furthering capitalism through expansion

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

While the specific content of American foreign policy at any given moment may reflect agency more than structure, foreign policy itself has provided an important domestic ideological coherence and underpinned a sense of national identity for an increasingly diverse population (Hunt 1987). National identity and foreign policy exist in a mutuallyconstitutive, dialectical relationship in which – in American, at least - the discursive privileging of democracy occupies a central place (Smith 1994), something which helps to account for the powerful continuities in American foreign policy from the Truman policy of containment to the Bush doctrine of pre-emption. Although the means by which American goals are achieved are contingently determined, and the ‘other’ in opposition to which an American identity is defined may be very different, key elements of America’s sense of itself and the role of its foreign policy display remarkable continuity. Making the world a better place by defending and, where possible, exporting democratic ideals and liberal capitalism have been the recurring leitmotifs of American foreign policy. However, the current generations of neocon thinkers differ from earlier Wilsonian idealists because ‘their promotion of democracy is not for the sake of democracy and human rights in and of themselves. Rather, democracy promotion is meant to bolster America’s security and to further world preeminence’ (Wolfson 2004: 46). This creates a potential contradiction and tension in American foreign policy, because there is a presumption about the superiority of America’s domestic values and political practices, and a concomitant assumption about and need for its foreign policy and its power to be legitimate (Nau 2002). It is precisely this domestically-legitimated aspect of American power that is being eroded by current policy: America’s image of itself as a champion of freedom and democracy, and the powerful tradition of anti-imperialism in American foreign policy (Smith 1994: 143), is profoundly undercut by the current conflict in Iraq, the rising tide of anti-Americanism world-wide, and the alienation of formerly stalwart democratic allies. This is arguably the most distinctive and misconceived aspect of contemporary American policy: not only is the war in Iraq, like the war in Vietnam before it, likely to prove divisive in America itself, but it will undermine America’s claims to legitimately lead the post-Cold War world and embody its putative moral order. As a number of scholars have observed (Smith 2000; Ikenberry 2001a), American values and the very structures of the US economy and polity seem uniquely in accord with long-run transformations in the international system, structural changes that ought to confirm the centrality and legitimacy of American power. And yet it is precisely these aspects of American primacy that are presently being eroded by the influence of that tight coterie of advisors and ideologues that have come to be known as the neocons. Despite their rapid and recent rise to prominence under Bush II, as with America’s overall foreign policy tradition, there are surprising continuities and contradictions hidden beneath the neocon label. Mark Beeson, University of Queensland, “The Rise of the Neocons and the Evolution o f American Foreign Policy, pg 1-18

Link State / Epistomology

The state acts to control and enforce relations created by capitalism - and destroys the sense of individualism

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

Whilst previously neglected, it is clear that Antonio Gramsci advanced a conception of the state within a broader Marxist approach to political economy that he referred to as 'Critical Economy'.[8](#en8) For Gramsci, a 'Critical Economy' approach was distinguished from the 'Classical Economy' of Adam Smith and David Ricardo in that it did not seek to construct abstract hypotheses based on generalised, historically indeterminate conditions of a generic 'homo oeconomicus' ([Gramsci 1995](#b71), 166–167). The whole conception of 'Critical Economy' was historicist in the sense that categories were always situated within historical circumstances and assessed within the particular context from which they derived, rather than assuming a universal 'homo oeconomicus' (ibid., 171–173, 176–179). Moreover, the importance of a theory of value was acknowledged to the extent that: one must take as one's starting point the labour of all working people to arrive at definitions both of their role in economic production and of the abstract, scientific concept of value and surplus value, as well as ... the role of all capitalistsconsidered as an ensemble (ibid., 168, emphasis added). This distancing from liberal ideology was then continued in Gramsci's direct reflections on the state. According to Gramsci, the conception of the state developed by dominant classes within capitalist social relations derived from a separation of politics and economics. 'The state', as represented by the intellectual class supportive of dominant social forces, 'is conceived as a thing in itself, as a rational absolute' ([Gramsci 1992](#b67), 229). Additionally, in those situations when individuals view a collective entity such as the state to be extraneous to them, then the relation is a reified or fetishistic one. It is fetishistic when individuals consider the state as a thing and expect it to act and, are led to think that in actual fact there exists above them a phantom entity, the abstraction of the collective organism, a species of autonomous divinity that thinks, not with the head of a specific being, yet nevertheless thinks, that moves, not with the real legs of a person, yet still moves ([Gramsci 1995](#b71), 15).

Link – State/Heg

The state uses its power over classes to express capitalism.

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

In contrast, a 'Critical Economy' approach understands the state not simply as an institution limited to the 'government of the functionaries' or the 'top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities'. The tendency to solely concentrate on such features—common in much mainstream debate in IR—was pejoratively referred to as 'statolatry': it entailed viewing the state as a perpetual entity limited to actions within political society ([Gramsci 1971](#b64), 178, 268). Instead, the state presents itself in a different way, beyond the political society of public figures and top leaders, so that 'the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules' (ibid., 244, emphasis added). This different aspect of the state is referred to as civil society. The realms of political and civil society within modern states were inseparable so that, taken together, they combine to produce a notion of the integral state (ibid., 12, cf. [Gramsci 1994b](#b69), 67). Within this extended or integral conception of the state there is a fusion between political and civil society within which ruling classes organise the political and cultural struggle for hegemony, to the extent that distinctions between them become 'merely methodological' ([Gramsci 1971](#b64), 160, 258, 271). The state was thus understood not just as the apparatus of government operating within the 'public' sphere (government, political parties, military) but also as part of the 'private' sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which hegemony functions (ibid., 261). Accordingly, civil society 'operates without "sanctions" or compulsory "obligations" but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality etc.' ([Gramsci 1971](#b64), 242). In these circumstances 'one cannot speak of the power of the state but only of the camouflaging of power' ([Gramsci 1995](#b71), 217). Once again, the notion of integral state was developed in opposition to the separation of powers embedded in a liberal conception of politics, hence a rejection of the notion of the state as a 'nightwatchman', only intervening in the course of safeguarding public order, because '*laissez-faire* too is a form of state "regulation", introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means' ([Gramsci 1971](#b64), 160, 245–246, 260–263). The state is not therefore agnostic and the ensemble of classes that constitute it have a formative activity in civil society to the extent that the bourgeoisie governs itself through banks and 'great capitalist consortia' reflecting the combined and unified interests of a particular class. As a result, Gramsci maintained, 'the bourgeois class no longer governs its vital interests through parliament'. Instead, government, or political society in the narrow sense, would rest on coalitions of class interests with such institutions reduced to police activity and the maintenance of social order within an attenuated form of democracy ([Gramsci 1977](#b65), 167–172, 174–175).[9](#en9) Thus it can be argued that the state in this conception is understood as a social relation. The state is not unquestioningly taken as a distinct institutional category or thing in itself, but conceived as a form of social relations through which capitalism is expressed. It is a view that reappraises different modes of cultural struggle within 'a critique of capitalist civilisation' that goes beyond a 'theory of the state-as-force' (ibid., 10–13; [Gramsci 1995](#b71), 343–346, 357). It does so by introducing the 'theoretical-practical principle of hegemony' that takes on an 'epistemological significance'. This means that the struggle over hegemony revolves around shaping intersubjective forms of consciousness in civil society—'the trench-systems of modern warfare' which have to be targeted 'even before the rise to power'—rather than focusing on gaining control of the coercive state apparatus ([Gramsci 1971](#b64), 59, 235, 365). It is through state-civil society relations, then, that particular social classes may establish hegemony over contending social forces. By constituting an 'historical bloc', that represents more than just a political alliance but indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests, hegemony may be propagated throughout society, 'bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity ... on a "universal" plane' (ibid., 181–182). The granting of concessions beyond the 'economic-corporate' level, within a 'compromise equilibrium', connotes this struggle for hegemony (ibid., 161). Hegemony is attained by a fundamental social class but it is presented as 'the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the "national" energies' to become identified with the interests of subordinate social classes (ibid., 182). An unstable equilibrium of compromises, characteristic of the struggle for hegemony within 'the life of the state', also entails relating the economic realm to that of the political and cultural spheres more broadly. This is essential as ' "civil society" has become a very complex structure and one which is resistant to the catastrophic "incursions" of the immediate economic element (crises, depressions, etc.)' (ibid., 235). As indicated earlier, the social function of the intellectual, 'whether in the field of production, or in that of culture, or in that of political administration' (ibid., 97), becomes pivotal in overcoming the impact of such crises.

Link – Japan/Heg

US uses its power to influence the development of other institutions – we invaded Japan to recreate a strategic economic partner.

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

The third aspect of American hegemony that emerges from this highly truncated consideration of the post-war international order is that the US’s relationship with the world is a two-way street: the fact that the US took upon itself the leadership of the ‘free world’ in the aftermath of World War II, when its pre-eminent position was increasingly apparent, not only had a powerful impact on the rest of the world, it also profoundly affected and reflected the US’s domestic position. The emergence of the American ‘security state’, and the concomitant influence of what Eisenhower famously described as the ‘military-industrial complex’, remains a powerful force in US policy- making and has influenced the development and relative strength of America’s own domestic political institutions and relationships (Hogan 1998). The emergence of the ‘war on terror’ has already had a similarly transformative impact on the structure of domestic institutions in the US (Eccleston 2002). The relative importance of strategic issues and the domestic lobbies that attempt to shape public policy in this area will clearly be a function of the wider geopolitical context. It is no coincidence, for example, that the US began to behave more like a ‘normal’ state as far as foreign policy generally and trade policy in particular were concerned in the aftermath of the Cold War’s ending and the waning importance of geo-strategic issues. America’s relationship with Japan epitomises the shifting priorities of various American administrations as they ssought to reconfigure critical bilateral economic relationships through direct political leverage (Pempel 2004; Schoppa 1997). The geo-strategic context in which particular relationships are embedded is a potentially critical determinant of the nature of that relationship – bilateral, multilateral, or even unilateral – and of the nature and relative importance of the accompanying ideological or ideational discourse that accompanies it. Clearly, at the height of the Cold War such discourses were a major component of superpower rivalries and the struggle to shape the post-war international order. In the 1990s, when the spectre of inter-state war of any sort became rather more remote, and when economic competition dominated the agenda of policymakers everywhere, ideological contestation became less important (Luttwak 1998). To understand the nature of contemporary hegemony, therefore, when strategic issues are back at the top of the policy-making agenda, we need to combine both the Gramscian emphasis on the role of ideas, institutions and interests, with a recognition of the continuing importance of strategic factors. Hegemony, in other words, is a complex of, and realised within, an amalgam of institutionalised power, dominant ideas and the wider geo-strategic context within which they are embedded. Different hegemonic periods will be shaped by the interplay of these factors, none of which is determinant, but all of which are constraining. To understand American hegemony under Bush II, and the prospects for this administration’s distinctive vision, we need to look more closely at the background and development of some of the administration’s key players.

Link - Heg

Hegemony is used to exercises domination over a lower class

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

The utility of the concept of world hegemony notwithstanding, however, I wish to try to recapture some of the specificity of Gramsci's analysis of class relations, while `inter nationalizing' this analysis. I distinguish the specific version of inter- nationalized hegemony that I thus analyze from world hegemony by simply calling it `transnational hegemony'. Transnational hegemony reconceptualizes Gramsci's understanding of class relati ons outside the `territorial trap' of the national political economy. Gramsci, as all commentators note, locates the concept of hegemony in relation- ship to the dialectic between coercion and consent. A ruling class may use coercion to insure its ascendancy, in which case we would speak of it as exercising domination, but it may also rule with a certain amount of consent on the part of subordinate classes. To the extent that consent is important to maintaining existing social relations, so that coercion becomes less overt and more infrequent, the situation is one of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971, pages 12, 57 ^ 58, 80).(3) In Gramsci's account the reasons why it is possible to have some degree of worker consent to capitalist leadership are varied but revolve fundamentally around the fact that basic economic antagonisms do not automatically or inevitably manifest as trans- formative political struggles (Boggs, 1984, page 157; Gramsci, 1971, pages 161, 184 ^ 185). In short, Gramsci's account of social power is not reductionist or economistic and recognizes that, although material processes of production form a basis for such power, the political, cultural, and ideological aspects of social relations have their own dialec- tically interrelated but nonreducible aspects. The project of exercising class power inevitably involves struggle along all of these dimensions simultaneously (Gill and Law, 1993, page 94; Rupert, 1995, page 29). The ability of capitalists to rule with the consent of those they exploit ö or, as Gramsci puts it, their ability to lead ö is thus a matter of the interrelated development of their economic, political, cultural, and ideological power. That is, hegemony hinges neither solely on political ^ economic dominance nor solely on cultural and ideological persuasiveness. The power to exploit and to dominate politically hinges in part on the ability to persuade; and the ability to persuade depends in part on the ability to exploit and to dominate politically in a way that allows some prospects for real material gains on the part of those who are subordinate, even if repressive force is always available to ensure compliance. In the analysis of AFL-CIO foreign policy that follows, I rely on this basic concept of hegemony, while reconstructing it as an internationalized class process in which the leadership of capitalists is exercised ö albeit in uneven fashion ö on a transnational basis.

Link - Military

The US military uses its force with in the global order to legitimize violence

Hardt and Negri 04 (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, *Multitude*, 30, jbh)

Violence is legitimated most effectively today, it seems to us, not on any a priori framework, moral or legal, but only a posteriori, based on its results. It might seem that the violence of the strong is automatically legitimated and the violence of the weak immediately labeled terrorism, but the logic of legitimation has more to do with the effects of the violence. The reinforcement or reestablishment of the current global order is what retroactively legitimates the use of violence. In the span of just over a decade we have seen the complete shift among these forms of legitimation. The first Gulf War was legitimated on the basis of international law, since it was aimed officially at restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait. The NATO intervention in Kosovo, by contrast, sought legitimation on moral humanitarian grounds. The second Gulf War, a preemptive war, calls for legitimation primarily on the basis of its results. 46 A military and/or police power will be granted legitimacy as long and only as long as it is effective in rectifying global disorders—not necessarily bringing peace but maintaining order. By this logic a power such as the U.S. military can exercise violence that may or may not be legal or moral and as long as that violence results in the reproduction of imperial order it will be legitimated. As soon as the violence ceases to bring order, however, or as soon as it fails to preserve the security of the present global order, the legitimation will be removed. This is a most precarious and unstable form of legitimation.

Link - Class

Regardless of attempts to discuss symbolic differences, as long as material differences exist we will be trapped in a cycle of oppression

Julia Wood and Robert Cox are Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, and the Associate Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University ofof North Carolina Chapel Hill, “Rethinkin critical voice: Material and situated konoledge”, Western Journal of Communication, pg 278 -287, Spring 1993

Yet, totalizing communication as the symbolic entails certain costs. Our enchantment with claims of radical contingency and symbolicity may lead us to ignore sedimented realities of structures of power and the material weight of oppressive practices within them. By this we mean that, despite conceptual acrobatics and a penchant for abstraction that shields academics from wholly innocent encounters with the concrete world, we all nonetheless live embodied lives, constrained, informed and framed by material circumstances such as living and working environments, food, and medical care—or the lacks thereof. Consider, for instance: *Men complain about supervisors who demand too much work, while a majority of their* *female colleagues suffer some form of sexual harassment on the job.* *Middle-class homeowners bemoan a tax revaluation of their property, while black residents* *in eastern, rural North Carolina can't smell their air or drink from their wells because of* *pollutants from corporate hog farmsDual career couples worry about finding reliable day-care for an expected child, while* *minority women are twice as likely as Caucasians to deliver underweight babies whose* *chances for life and health are compromised from the start.* This special issue appears against a backdrop of turmoil, inequities, and gross perversions that mock America's claim to be the land of equal opportunity. Given obscene discrepancies in the quality of life, we are unwilling to join Condit and Rushing in diminishing emphasis on division. While, as Condit argues, even the so-called privileged may be "unhappy beasts" whose viewpoints we should try to understand, it is also true—and we think it is a more significant truth—that some people are oppressed in ways that demand greater hearing, response, and change than others. We cannot be equally receptive to all points of view, empathic with all people as long as the perspectives of some sustain and sometimes facilitate silencing, abusing, exploiting, and limiting others. To do so would be analogous to buying into the argument—usually heard from white men who patronizingly and fatuously claim to be "sympathetic" to feminism—that the real priority should be humanism in which we focus on equality and respect for all people rather than inequities disproportionately visited upon women. Some have listened too often, accommodated too much, been heard too seldom, and been misrepresented too egregiously to warrant impartial empathy and equivalent openness to all perspectives. As long as women are brutalized at a rate that would lead to a declaration of war were any other population involved, gays and lesbians are denied legal rights and public legitimacy routinely accorded to committed heterosexuals, children are molested and killed, animals are tortured to perfect perfumes and produce veal, the earth is violated to fatten humans' portfolios—as long as these practices persist and, with them, an ideology that esteems domination, so must efforts to distinguish between those who are privileged and those who are oppressed. Admittedly, there can be disagreements on how to define privilege and oppression, but the fact that some people benefit inequitably and often at the expense of others seems to us a reality that cannot be denied and should not be beclouded by definitional quibbles.

Link – Identity Politics

The US – them dichotomies of the 1AC are constructed due the use of material resoucrces

Bob Jessop, Ngai Ling Sum, “Pre-disciplinary and Post-disciplinary Prespectives”, Political Economy, pg 89-101, 2001

The ‘cultural turn’ is best interpreted broadly and pluralistically. It covers approaches in terms of discourse, ideology, identity, narrativity, argumentation, rhetoric, historicity, reflexivity, hermeneutics, interpretation, semiotics and de- construction. It is important to note here that discourse analysis and its cognates involve a generic methodology as well as the substantive fields of enquiry to which they have largely been applied . They are therefor e as relevant to the investigation of the economic and political orders as they are to work on so-called ‘ideological ’ or ‘cultural ’ phenomena . One key feature of the ‘cultural turn’ is its discursive account of power . This involves the claim that the interests at stake in relations of power are significantly shaped by the discursive constitution of identities, modes of calculation, strategies and tactics and not just by the so-called ‘objective ’ position of specific agents in a given conjuncture (as if they existed outside of discourse) ; and also that the primary institutional mechanisms in and through which power is exercised, whether directly or indirectly , themselves involve a variable mix of discursive and material resources . Another key feature, influence d both by Gramscian and Foucauldian analyses, is its emphasis on the social construction of knowledge and truth regimes. Both themes can be applied to political economy itself . Thus ‘cultural political economy’ can be said to involve a critical, self-reflexive approach to the definition and methods of political economy and to the inevitable contextuality and historicity of its claims to knowledge . It rejects any universalistic , positivist account of reality, denies the subject –object duality , allows for the co-constitution of subjects and objects and eschews reductionist approaches to the discipline . However, in taking the ‘cultural turn’, political economy should continue to emphasise the materiality of social relations and the constraints involved in processes that also operate ‘behind the backs’ of the relevant agents. It can thereby escape the sociological imperialism of pure social constructionism and the voluntarist vacuity of certain lines of discourse analysis , which seem to imply that one can will anything into existence in and through an appropriately articulated discourse . ‘Cultural political economy ’ should recognise the emergent extra-discursive features of social relations and their impact on capacities for action and transformation .

Link – ID Politics

Focus on identity politics legitimizes capital by removing superstructural contradictions while leaving the primary contradiction in place.

Wexler, prof @ California State Northride, 08

Steven Wexler prof. English at Cal State Northride. 2008. “(I’m) Material Labor in the Digital Age” http://cust.educ.ubc.ca/workplace/issue15/html/wexler.html

As I argued at 2007’s MLA, to suggest that rhetoric masks class relations and surplus value is not the same thing as saying rhetoric is the cause.  I am interested in the way that knowledge economy rhetorics (e.g., “information society”) shift our attention from class to nationalism, racism, genderism, and more recently posthumanism.  Stephen Tumino has stated convincingly that to explain social inequality in these identarian terms is to “legitimate capitalism” since capitalism is cleansed of its superstructural contradictions while the primary contradiction between owners and workers endures. We then “accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies.”  Tumino is responding to new Marxisms that augment class to a matrix of floating, discursive power struggles.  These Marxisms speak of hybridity, information, difference, and multitude but rarely the labor theory of value, even though such relations are aspects and outcomes of exploitable labor.  Consider, for example, the weight given to “open articulation” in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s postmodern radicalism, a radicalism that turns its back on Marxist teleology and base/superstructure naturalism: “If the worker is no longer a proletarian but also a citizen, consumer, and participant in a plurality of positions within the country’s cultural and institutional apparatus [. . .] then the relations between them become an open articulation which offers no a priori guarantee that it will adopt a given form” (36). This ontology stands in stark contrast to Marx’s: “The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life” (*Contribution* 20).  And no one to my mind levels the former’s privilege and paradox like David Harvey.  I would like to quote him at length: The rhetoric of postmodernism is dangerous for it avoids confronting realities of political economy and the circumstances of global power.  The silliness of Lyotard’s “radical proposal” that opening up data banks to everyone as a prologue to radical reform (as if we would all have equal power to use that opportunity) is instructive, because it indicates how even the most resolute of postmodernists is faced in the end with either making some universalizing gesture (like Lyotard’s appeal to some pristine concept of justice) or lapsing, like Derrida, into total political silence.  (117)5 So while there is work beyond wage labor—and nationality, race, and gender could be kinds of work—there are only owners and workers, and this contradiction remains the principal source of value

Link – Imperialism / Media Flawed

Current studies should be treated with skepticism – they are written from the perspective that doesn’t involve the politics of identity, and perpetuate the spread of western values.

Bob Jessop, Ngai Ling Sum, “Pre-disciplinary and Post-disciplinary Prespectives”, Political Economy, pg 89-101, 2001

Nevertheless, there has been an upsurge in emphasis upon subjects sometimes only tangentially related to political economy, such as media studies, ‘cultural ’ analysis and ‘representation ’ (being the study of images, particularly media images again) , which cannot rightly substitute themselves for political economy. To do so would effectively demolish (I)PE and render it quite incapable of analysing its true subject matter—which is the political economy of the world (historical system) which some call ‘global capitalism ’. As analysis based on ‘finance’ was one move away from analysis based on ‘capital ’, so are ‘represen- tation’ and ‘identity’ possibly two steps away from ‘political economy’. In particular, the rise of ‘identity’ and the claims of ‘identity reasoning’ to the intellect of the day, though quite obviously implicated in the study of contempor - ary conflict, must not be allowed to supersede political economy as the fundament of our discipline , nor to displace its central problematic or its primary methods of analysis . ‘Identity’ and ‘representation’ in the post-Cold-War inter - regnum may perhaps usefully complement or enhance an (I)PE analysis , but must never be permitted to usurp or supplant it altogether . Dialogue is fully possible, but colonisation of (I)PE by ‘identity’, and particularly by postmod - ernist analyses of identity , is unlikely to be very fruitful, and may in fact generate unwanted internal conflict within the discipline . That being said, it should be added that certain critical insights associated with a broad postmodern literature can be useful to ‘critical ’ (I)PE analyses of ‘political economy’ questions . These do often involve attention to how so-called ‘actors’ or agents view themselves and express both material interests and (re)-construct their self identity(ies ) in the process of action . It is also both necessary and useful that critical (I)PE analyses should reject the grand or meta-narratives of ‘development ’ and ‘modernisation ’ which are so deeply Eurocentric, linear, teleological and ethnocentric . The rejection of the universal - ism associated historically with (Western) imperialism is a logical move by critical (I)PE theorists who seek to redefine ‘development ’ and invoke a plurality of worldviews and value systems , rather than perpetuate the imposition of a single (Western, capitalist ) ‘universal ’ value system upon the rest of the world. In this sense, this insight is very closely aligned with the effort to further develop and strengthen the ‘heterogeneity ’ of (I)PE.2

Link – COIN

Distributing the military as a mirror of insurgent networks, as the surge and counterinsurgency does, allows more comprehensive control

Hardt and Negri 04 (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, *Multitude*, 58-9, jbh)

It is clear at this point that counterinsurgency strategies can no longer rely only on negative techniques, such as the assassination of rebel leaders and mass arrests, but must also create 'positive" techniques. Counterinsurgency, in other words, must not destroy the environment of insurgency but rather create and control the environment. The full-spectrum dominance we spoke of earlier is one conception of such a positive strategy to control network enemies, engaging the network not only militarily but also economically, politically, socially, psychologically, and ideologically. The question at this point is, what form of power can implement such a general, dispersed, and articulated counterinsurgency strategy? In fact, traditional, centralized, hierarchical military structures seem incapable of implementing such strategies and adequately combating network war machines. It takes a network to fight a network. Becoming a network, however, would imply a radical restructuring of the traditional military apparatuses and the forms of sovereign power they represent. This focus on form helps us clarify the significance (and also the limitations) of the RMA and the counterinsurgency strategies of asymmetrical conflicts. Certainly, especially at a technological level, the RMA dictates that the traditional military apparatuses use networks more and more effectively— information networks, communications networks, and so forth. Distributing and blocking information and disinformation may well be an important field of battle. The mandate for transformation is much more radical than that: the military must not simply use networks; it must itself become a full matrix, distributed network. There have long been efforts by traditional militaries to mimic the practices of guerrilla warfare—with small commando units, for example—but these remain at a limited scale and on a tactical level. Some of the changes described in the current conception of an RMA focusing, for example, on the greater flexibility and mobility of combat units, do point in this direction. The more significant changes, however, would need also to involve the command structure and ultimately the form of social power in which the military apparatus is embedded. How can a command structure shift from a centralized model to a distributed network model? What transformations does it imply in the form of social and political power? This would be not merely a revolution in military affairs but a transformation of the form of power itself. In our terms, this process is part of the passage from imperialism, with its centralized and bounded form of power based in nation-states, to the network form of Empire, which would include not only the dominant state powers but also supranational administrations, business interests, and numerous other nongovernmental organizations. Now, finally, we can come back to the questions we posed at the beginning about the "exceptional" role of U.S. power in the current global order. Our analysis of counterinsurgency strategies tells us that the U.S. military (and also U.S. power more generally) must become a network, shed its national character, and become an imperial military machine. In this context, abandoning unilateral control and adopting a network structure is not an act of benevolence on the part of the superpower but rather is dictated by the needs of counterinsurgency strategy. This military necessity recalls the debates between unilateralism and multilateralism and the conflicts between the United States and the United Nations, but it really goes beyond both of these frameworks. The network form of power is the only one today able to create and maintain order.

Counterinsurgency is not the resolution of war but the building of empire and occupation.

Gonzalez 2004 [Roberto J., Ph. D from Berkeley, Anthropologists in the Public Sphere: Speaking out on War, Peace, and American Power. Austin: University of Texas, 2004. Print. Accessed July 1, 2010 KAP]

Today, after witnessing struggles for independence in Africa, Asia and the Americas, many anthropologists would likely be critical of *any* imperial system. Empires have historically denied the right of self-determination to colonized peoples and violently repressed them when they challenged structures of power. When anthropologists conducted ethnographic research or extended fieldwork abroad, the brutal political realities of colonialism often appeared in plain view. After the 1960s, the discipline generally became more attuned to global interconnections and inequalities. The fact that participant observation tended to place the anthropologist in personal relationships with ordinary people probably magnified the effects of imperial systems on small-scale societies. By the nature of their work, anthropologists are positioned to grasp the big picture from the perspectives of individual lives, and consequently many have been outspoken in their critiques of imperialism – including the current U.S. version, which starkly contrasts with the principles upon which our country was founded. Perhaps this is most clearly visible in U.S. military expansion. In recent months – with alarming speed and no public debate – our leaders have deployed military troops and advisers to parts of the world that were previously off-limits, including the Philippines, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Colombia, Yemen, and Georgia. The case of Iraq provides us with an alarming example of the new U.S. expansionism. When the bush administration launched an invasion of Iraq in March and April 2003, it dramatically demonstrated the lengths to which it would go to accelerate the U.S. drive for total global dominance. This was clearly foreshadowed by its National Security Strategy, a policy document advocating unilateral military action as the preferred means for projecting U.S. power.

Link – Naiton Building

Post-modern “nation building” is not a constituent process; it is a way to impose biopolitical order on an international scale

Hardt and Negri 04 (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, *Multitude*, 23, jbh)

The political program of "nation building" in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq is one central example of the productive project of biopower and war. Nothing could be more postmodernist and antiessentialist than this notion of nation building. It reveals, on the one hand, that the nation has become something purely contingent, fortuitous, or, as philosophers would say, accidental. That is why nations can be destroyed and fabricated or invented as part of a political program. On the other hand, nations are absolutely necessary as elements of global order and security. The international divisions of labor and power, the hierarchies of the global system, and the forms of global apartheid we will discuss in the next chapter all depend on national authorities to be established and enforced. Nations must be made! Nation building thus pretends to be a constituent, even ontological, process, but it is really only a pale shadow of the revolutionary processes out of which modern nations were born. The modern revolutions and national liberations that created nations were processes that arose from within the national societies, fruit of a long history of social development. The contemporary projects of nation building are by contrast imposed by force from the outside through a process that now goes by the name "regime change." Such nation building resembles less the modern revolutionary birth of nations than it does the process of colonial powers dividing up the globe and drawing the maps of their subject territories. It resembles also, in a more benign register, the battles over redrawing electoral or administrative districts in order to gain control, cast now, of course, on a global scale. Nation building, in any case, illustrates the "productive" face of biopower and security.

Link – Multilateralism

Global control is impossible without a network form, multilateralism, to counter the dispersed network form of insurgency

Hardt and Negri 04 (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, *Multitude*, 61-2, jbh)

The necessity of the network form of power thus makes moot the debates over unilateralism and multilateralism, since the network cannot be controlled from any single, unitary point of command. The United States cannot "go it alone," in other words, and Washington cannot exert monarchical control over the global order, without the collaboration of other dominant powers. This does not mean that what is decided in Washington is somehow secondary or unimportant but rather that it must always be set in relation to the entire network of global power. If the United States is conceived as a monarchical power on the world scene, then, to use old terminology, the monarch must constantly negotiate and work with the various global aristocracies (such as political, economic, and financial forces), and ultimately this entire power structure must constantly confront the productive global multitude, which is the real basis of the network. The necessity of the network form of global power (and consequently too the art of war) is not an ideological claim but a recognition of an ineluctable material condition. A single power may attempt—and the United States has done so several times—to circumvent this necessity of the network form and the compulsion to engage the plural relations of force, but what it throws out the door always sneaks back in the window. For a centralized power, trying to push back a network is like trying to beat back a rising flood with a stick. Consider just one example: who will pay for the unilateralist wars? Once again the United States seems in the position of the monarch who cannot finance his wars independently and must appeal to the aristocracy for funds. The aristocrats, however, respond, "No taxation without representation," that is, they will not finance the wars unless their voices and interests are represented in the decision-making process. In short, the monarch can usurp power and start wars unilaterally (and indeed create great tragedies), but soon the bill comes due. Such a unilateralist adventure is thus merely a transitory phase. Without the collaboration of the aristocracy, the monarch is ultimately powerless. In order to be able to combat and control network enemies, which is to say, in order for traditional sovereign structures themselves to become networks, imperial logics of political, military, and diplomatic activity on the part of the United States and the other dominant nation-states will have to win out over imperialist logics, and military strategy will have to be transferred from centralized structures to distributed network forms. Ideologically, national interest and national security have become too narrow a basis for explanation and action in the age of network struggle, but more important the traditional military power structure is no longer capable of defeating or containing its enemies. The network form is imposed on all facets of power strictly from the perspective of the effectiveness of rule. What we are heading toward, then, is a state of war in which network forces of imperial order face network enemies on all sides.

Link – International Law

International law reproduces global hierarchies and is totally useless in the face of the empire, which will never implicate itself

Hardt and Negri 04 (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, *Multitude*, 28-9, jbh)

Legal structures have traditionally provided a more stable framework for legitimation than morality, and many scholars insist today that national and international law remain the only valid bases for legitimate violence. 43 We should keep in mind, however, that international criminal law consists of a very meager set of treaties and conventions with only minimal mechanisms of enforcement. Most efforts to apply international criminal law have been fruitless. The legal proceedings against Chile's former dictator Augusto Pinochet in British and Spanish courts, for instance, were attempts to establish the precedent that war crimes and crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction and can potentially be prosecuted under national law anywhere in the world. There are similar calls to prosecute former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger for war crimes in Laos and Cambodia, but these calls have, predictably, received no legal action. New institutions are emerging to punish illegitimate violence. These institutions extend well beyond the old schema of national and international law and include such bodies as the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, established by the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994, and (more important), founded at the Hague in 2002, the permanent International Criminal Court (which the United States has refused to join, substantially undermining its powers). Whereas the old international law was based on the recognition of national sovereignty and the rights of peoples, the new imperial justice, for which the conception of crimes against humanity and the activities of the international courts are elements, is aimed at the destruction of the rights and sovereignty of peoples and nations through supranational jurisdictional practices. Consider, for example, the charges brought against Slobodan Milosevic and the other Serbian leaders in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The fact of whether the violence the Serbian leaders exercised violated the law of the Yugoslavian state is not at issue—in fact, it is completely irrelevant. Their violence is judged illegitimate in a framework outside of the national and even international legal context. These were crimes not against their own national laws or international laws, in other words, but against humanity. This shift signals the possible decline of international law and the rise in its stead of a global or imperial form of law. 44 Undermining international law in this way is not, in our view, in itself a negative development. We are perfectly aware of how often international law served in the twentieth century merely to legitimate and support the violence of the strong over the weak. And yet the new imperial justice, although the axes and lines have shifted somewhat, seems similarly to create and maintain global hierarchies. One has to recognize how selective this application of justice is, how often the crimes of the least powerful are prosecuted and how seldom those of the most powerful are. Arguing that the most powerful must also abide by imperial law and sanctions seems to us a noble but increasingly utopian strategy. The institutions of imperial justice and the international courts that punish crimes against humanity, as long as they are dependent on the ruling global powers, such as the UN Security Council and the most powerful nation-states, will necessarily interpret and reproduce the political hierarchy of Empire. The refusal of the United States to allow its citizens and soldiers to be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court illustrates the unequal application of legal norms and structures. 45 The United States will impose legal sanctions on others, either through normal domestic systems or ad hoc arrangements, such as the extraordinary imprisonment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay, but it will not allow its own to be subject to other national or supranational legal bodies. The inequality of power seems to make it impossible to establish equality before the law. In any case, the fact is that today accordance of violence with either established international law or the emerging global law does not guarantee legitimation, and violation does not mean it is considered illegitimate—far from it. We need to look beyond these legal structures for other mechanisms or frameworks that are effective today as the basis for legitimate violence.

Impact – Value to Life

The methodology of the capitalist system creates prisons of oppression that deny value to life and make the actions like “final solutions” possible – only through the complete rejection of this mode of thought is liberation possible

Deleuze and Guattari, prof philosophy @ University of Paris & psychoanalyst, 72

(Gilles Deleuze AND Felix Guattari, professor of philosophy at the University of Paris and psychoanalyst, worked at La Borde. Anti-Oedipus 1972 pg 373)

"There is not one of these aspects---not the least operation, the least industrial or financial mechanism--that does not reveal the insanity of the capitalist machine and the pathological character of its rationality: not at all a false rationality, but a true rationality of this pathological state, this insanity, "the machine works too, believe me". The capitalist machine does not run the risk of becoming mad, it is mad from one end to the other and from the beginning, and this is the source of its rationality, Marx's black humor, the source of Capital, is his fascination with such a machine: how it came to be assembled, on what foundation of decoding and deterritorialization; how it works, always more decoded, always more deterritorialized; how its operation grows more relentless with the development of the axiomatic, the combination of the flows; how it produces the terrible single class of gray gentlemen who keep up the machine; how it does not run the risk of dying all alone, but rather of making us die, by provoking to the very end investements of desire that do not even go by way of a deceptive and subjective ideology, and that lead us to cry out to the very end, Long live capital in all its reality, in all its objective dissimulation! Except in ideology, there has never been a humane, liberal, paternal, etc., capitalism. Capitalism is defined by a cruelty having no parallel in the despotic regime of terror. Wage increases and improvements in the standard of living are realities, but realities that derive from a given supplementary axiom that capitalism is always capable of adding to its axiomatic in terms of an enlargement of its limits: let's create the New Deal; let's cultivate and recognize strong unions; let's promote participation, the single class; let's take a step toward Russia, which is taking so many toward us; etc. But within the enlarged reality that conditions these islands, exploitation grows constantly harsher, lack is arranged in the most scientific of ways, final solutions of the "Jewish problem" variety are prepared down to the last detail, and the Thrid World is orgainized as an integral part of capitalism. the reproduction of the interior limits of capitalism on an always wider scale has several consequences: it permits increases and improvements of standards at the center, it displaces the harshest forms of exploitation from the center to the peripher, but also multiplies enclaves of overpopulation in the center itself, and easilty tolerates the so-called socialist formations. (It is not kibbutz-style socialism that troubles the Zionist state, just as it is not Russian socialism that troubles world capitalism.) There is no metaphor here: the factories are prisons, they do not resemble prisons, they are prisons.

Impact – Democracy

Capitalism is naturally undemocratic, but makes people identify with their rulers

Sanbonmatsu, prof philosophy, 09

(John Sanbonmatsu, Professor of Philosophy at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, May/June 09, Tikkun Vol. 24 Issue 3pg 21-72 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=106&sid=604527a1-7a4d-41a0-842a-34a6cf71d67b%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=39753533> Cassettari)

CAPITALISM'S ANTAGONISM TOWARD POPULAR RULE IS STRUCTURAL — IT IS BUILT INTO THE political DNA of capitalism itself By nature, if not by design, capitalism is a system in which a small minority of individuals controls the wealth, labor, production, political power, and cultural expression of the whole of society. Under capitalism, the demos is permitted to exert only the mildest, most indirect of influences on the direction of state and society. All of the truly important decisions — the ones that concern what kinds of technologies and commodities get produced, what kinds of laws will be passed, and which wars should be fought (or whether any should be fought at all) — are effectively left in the hands of a small clique whose members are drawn from the ranks of what C. Wright Mills famously called "the power elite." No matter how many finance reform laws are passed in Congress, the enactment of new laws alone will never be sufficient to neutralize the tremendous discrepancy in power between the wealthy few and the ordinary many. Secretly, we all know this. None among us is so naive as to believe that an ordinary plumber, teacher, or transit worker commands the same respect or influence on Capitol Hill, or in the Bundestag or the Knesset, as the chief executive officer of Siemens or Bechtel. And while we may profess to be "shocked" upon learning that this or that politician (or presidential appointee) engaged in corrupt activities at the publics expense, in truth we are seldom surprised at all. Plato warned 2,500 years ago that "in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored," an observation that holds as true today as it did then. The rich will always be with us .… That phrase, rather than the more familiar one from Matthew 26, is the one that haunts us deep inside, the one we truly heed. The rich may not be like you and me, as F. Scott Fitzgerald put it, but that doesn't keep us from identifying with them, or from feeling strangely grateful for remaining forever at their mercy. The steel worker is grateful "to have any job at all." The waitress smiles at having received a tip. The university president is so relieved that her fawning attentions to a wealthy patron have paid off that she doesn't mind naming the new science building after him. Like hostages taken prisoner by anonymous masked figures, we thus come to identify with our own kidnappers. Capitalism is the Stockholm Syndrome made into a universal condition of humanity.

Impacts - Commodification

The era of pancapitalism consumes us in it’s commodification of all aspects of life.

Hakim Bey 1997 (Hakim Bey, an American political writer, essayist, and poet, Studied at Columbia University. The Obelisk, <http://www.t0.or.at/hakimbey/obelisk.htm>, May 1st 1997, MT)

Analogously, since 1989-91 we have entered a new "dark age" in which one worldview (and its imaginaire) claims hegemony over all difference. Not only is "pancapitalism" a global system, it has also become its own medium, so to speak, in that it proposes a universal stasis of imagery. The free circulation of the image is blocked when one image of the world structures the world's self-image. True difference is leached away toward disappearance and replaced by an obsessive re-cycling and sifting-through of "permitted" imagery within the single system of discourse (like the medieval theologians who supposedly quarreled over the gender of angels as the Turks besieged Byzantium). Pancapitalism "permits" any imagery that enhances profit—hence in theory it might permit any imagery—but in practice, it cannot. This is the crisis of "postmodernism"—crisis as a form of stasis, of infinite re-circulation of the same—the impossibility of difference. Within the crisis of stasis all manner of imagery can be allowed or even encouraged when it tends toward the depiction of relation as exchange—even the imagery of terror, murder, crime—even the extinction of Nature and the Human—all this can be turned (as imagery at least!) into profit. What cannot be allowed (except perhaps as nostalgia) is the imagery of relations other than exchange. Nostalgia can be contained and marketed—but actual difference would threaten the hegemony of the one worldview. The "Gift Economy" of some nearly-extinguished "primitive tribe" makes excellent TV; our mourning for its disappearance can only boost the sales of whatever commodity might soothe our sense of loss. Mourning itself can become fetishized, as in the victorian era of onyx and jet and black-plumed graveyard horses. Death is good for Capital, because money is the sexuality of the dead. Corpses have already appeared in advertising—"real" corpses. Assuming that our hypothesis holds so far, we might well ask from "whence" there could appear any image of true difference in such a situation. The obvious answer is that it would have to come from "outside" the stasis. This means war, obviously. At the very least, it means "Image War". But how can we even begin to define what might lie "outside" the stasis? Are we not precisely engaged in a situation where all circulating images become part of the crisis of circulation? This is the "malign hermeticism" of the totality of mediation—its spectral metastasis, so to speak—ontology as oncology. Everything that enters the discourse, all that which is "seen", is subverted by the very fact that there is only one discourse, one exchange. "Image War" might be just as productive for exchange as other forms of "pure war", since it would at least offer an "illusion of choice". This, then, is the hermetic crisis of the tactical media.

Impacts - Commodification

By destroying the separation commodification creates we enable true contact with the other.

Bey 1993 (Hakim; Ontological Anarchist of the Information Age; <http://www.hermetic.com/bey/boundary.html>, MT)

The APA offers an interesting paraphrase of the abuse-concept when it mentions "conditions that are associated with boundary violations in [the patient's] past." New professional jargon always provides the semanticist/sociologist a golden opportunity to unpack hidden political and psychological content from tell-tale words and phrases -- and boundary violation is a veritable trick suitcase -- a richness of embarrassments. We'd need a whole monograph to dump all the items jammed into this little portmant eau. The metaphor of nationalism springs to mind first of all -- boundaries are borders, violations are invasions. The individual is hypostatized not as a sovereign monarch (who might after all mingle and mate with other monarchs) but as a closed-off area surrounded by an abstract grid of map-lines, political separations, exclusions. A border-crossing here is a violation, not an act of trade, or love, or harmonial association. The border is not a skin which can be caressed, it is a barrier. In relation to the inviolate body, all "others" are simply potential wetbacks, illegal immigrants, terrorists traveling on forged documents. The next obvious metaphor is the immune system. In fact, we can mix metaphors already here, like the Iranian scholar M. Rahnema (quoted by P. Feyerabend in Farewell to Reason, p. 298) who "has compared the effects of developmental aid with the effect of the illness Aids." The meddling of Capital in the "third" world has a viral effect -- it breaks down immune systems made up of traditionally-scaled economics and values, and replaces them only with diseased "growth". This is true -- but the use of the metaphor is interesting, giving an air of hysteria and hopelessness to the argument. After all, there's a cure for Capitalism, but it doesn't involve non-contact among peoples; on the contrary. In a sense, Capitalism creates separation -- a vicious parody, if you like, or grotesque exaggeration of the "natural" immune systems of peoples and cultures. It imposes uniformity but denies contact. The other, the "different", is perceived as viral and threatening. The cure for this "condition" might well be to deny uniformity but to make contact. Ultimately it's not the "immune system" which is at stake, but life itself. The metaphor of AIDS has been a godsend to crypto-ideologues like the APA, who can make use of its semantic effluvia in terms like "boundary violation" to hint obliquely at the underlying agenda of their therapeutic control paradigm -- i.e., to erase the concept "childhood desire" and replace it with the concept "abuse". If all sex is dirty and causes death, then everyone must be "protected". Children here serve as metaphors for "everyone". To "protect children" is to protect the spiritual values of civilization itself against the threat of desire, the otherness of the body. No doubt the APA remains unconscious of these meanings; but then the APA has jettisoned the unconscious, so it's only appropriate that they should be among the first to fall victim to its surreptitious return. The unconscious -- banished safely to the realms of advertising and disinformation, or so we fondly imagined -- has come back to haunt us with Godzilla-like vengeance -- raped by aliens and satanists! Our boundaries are being invaded, and we are urged to "believe the victim." The APA warns us that "abusers come from all walks of life. There is no uniform 'profile' . . . ," etc. Anyone may be an abuser, just as anyone may have been abused. Abuse is universal. There is only abuse. Of course the APA doesn't believe in UFO's -- but it does believe, quite clearly, that pleasure is evil. Some extremists in the "Deep" Ecology movements joined certain Xtian bigots in hailing AIDS as God's plan (for overpopulation, not immorality), and went on to suggest building a wall between the US and Mexico to keep out the teeming billions of the angry South. Cut down to a few million healthy hetero's America could restore its "wilderness" -- which the Deep Ecolo's seem to envision as something like the Ayatollah Khomeini's idea of heaven: -- clean, pure, aryan . . . well, maybe more like the SS's idea of heaven. Ethnic cleansing is yet another panic reaction to the sensation of "boundary violation". Abusers are, above all, aliens -- even though (as the APA palpitatingly insinuates) they might look like . . . . you and me! The other is the locus of all forbidden desire which we ourselves must deny and hence project onto the unknown. But of course, that's Freudianism -- or even Reichianism! We have no desires. We are the victims of  abuse. Q.E.D. The new catchphrase "multiculturalism" simply hides a form of ethnic cultural cleansing under a semantic mask of liberal pluralism. Multiculturalism is a means of separating one culture from another, for avoiding all possibility of cross-cultural synergy or mutuality or communicativeness. At best multiculturalism provides the Consensus with an excuse to commit a bit of cultural pillaging -- "appropriation" -- to add some sanitized version of otherness to its own dreary uniform boredom -- through tourism , or vapid academic curricula based on "respect and dignity". But the underlying deep structure of multiculturalism is fear of penetration, of infection, of mutation, of inextricable involvement with otherness -- of becoming the other. Again, there's a cure for tourism -- but it doesn't involve everyone staying home and watching TV. It necessitates a simultaneous attack on uniformity, and a breaking down of borders -- it demands both a genuine pluralism and a genuine comradery or solidarity -- it demands  conviviality. Protectionism becomes the one true philosophy of any culture based on mass anxiety about border violation; "safely" and "survival" become its shibboleths and highest values. The "security state" emerges like an abstract constellation figured against a random patterning of stars -- each star representing a threatened job, "dysfunctional" family, "crime-ridden" neighborhood, black hole of boredom . . . . Power in the security state emerges out of fear, and depends on fear for its rule. In the society of safety, all jobs are threatened, all families are dysfunctional, crime is universal, and boredom is god. You may read the signs of this power not only in the texts of the media which define it, but even more clearly in the very landscape which "embodies" it. The PoMo architecture of paranoid urbanism complements the already-picturesque decay of the Modern, the haunted emptiness of industrial ruins and abandoned farms. The aesthetic history of Capitalism maps out a process of retreat, a withdrawal into the psychic fortress, the "drug-free-zone", the Mall, the planned community, the electronic highway. We design for a life without immunity, believing that only Capital can save us from infection. As we watch "History" unfold for us in the media, including the media of cultural and political representation, we become voluntary trance-victims of "terrorism" (the secret inner structure of "protectionism"); -- in consequence, our political acts (such as architecture) can express no higher vision than fear. The design of private space is based on the easiest antidote to fear, which is boredom.

Impact - Commodification

Commodification militates against otherness by creating separation between potential ‘threat’ forging a unity between security state and capital.

Bey 1993 (Hakim; Ontological Anarchist of the Information Age; <http://www.hermetic.com/bey/boundary.html>, MT)

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To "protect children" is to protect the spiritual values of civilization itself against the threat of desire, the otherness of the body. No doubt the APA remains unconscious of these meanings; but then the APA has jettisoned the unconscious, so it's only appropriate that they should be among the first to fall victim to its surreptitious return. The unconscious -- banished safely to the realms of advertising and disinformation, or so we fondly imagined -- has come back to haunt us with Godzilla-like vengeance -- raped by aliens and satanists! Our boundaries are being invaded, and we are urged to "believe the victim." The APA warns us that "abusers come from all walks of life. There is no uniform 'profile' . . . ," etc. Anyone may be an abuser, just as anyone may have been abused. Abuse is universal. There is only abuse. Of course the APA doesn't believe in UFO's -- but it does believe, quite clearly, that pleasure is evil. Some extremists in the "Deep" Ecology movements joined certain Xtian bigots in hailing AIDS as God's plan (for overpopulation, not immorality), and went on to suggest building a wall between the US and Mexico to keep out the teeming billions of the angry South. Cut down to a few million healthy hetero's America could restore its "wilderness" -- which the Deep Ecolo's seem to envision as something like the Ayatollah Khomeini's idea of heaven: -- clean, pure, aryan . . . well, maybe more like the SS's idea of heaven. Ethnic cleansing is yet another panic reaction to the sensation of "boundary violation". Abusers are, above all, aliens -- even though (as the APA palpitatingly insinuates) they might look like . . . . you and me! The other is the locus of all forbidden desire which we ourselves must deny and hence project onto the unknown. But of course, that's Freudianism -- or even Reichianism! We have no desires. We are the victims of  abuse. Q.E.D. The new catchphrase "multiculturalism" simply hides a form of ethnic cultural cleansing under a semantic mask of liberal pluralism. Multiculturalism is a means of separating one culture from another, for avoiding all possibility of cross-cultural synergy or mutuality or communicativeness. At best multiculturalism provides the Consensus with an excuse to commit a bit of cultural pillaging -- "appropriation" -- to add some sanitized version of otherness to its own dreary uniform boredom -- through tourism , or vapid academic curricula based on "respect and dignity". But the underlying deep structure of multiculturalism is fear of penetration, of infection, of mutation, of inextricable involvement with otherness -- of becoming the other. Again, there's a cure for tourism -- but it doesn't involve everyone staying home and watching TV. It necessitates a simultaneous attack on uniformity, and a breaking down of borders -- it demands both a genuine pluralism and a genuine comradery or solidarity -- it demands  conviviality. Protectionism becomes the one true philosophy of any culture based on mass anxiety about border violation; "safely" and "survival" become its shibboleths and highest values. The "security state" emerges like an abstract constellation figured against a random patterning of stars -- each star representing a threatened job, "dysfunctional" family, "crime-ridden" neighborhood, black hole of boredom . . . . Power in the security state emerges out of fear, and depends on fear for its rule. In the society of safety, all jobs are threatened, all families are dysfunctional, crime is universal, and boredom is god. You may read the signs of this power not only in the texts of the media which define it, but even more clearly in the very landscape which "embodies" it. The PoMo architecture of paranoid urbanism complements the already-picturesque decay of the Modern, the haunted emptiness of industrial ruins and abandoned farms. The aesthetic history of Capitalism maps out a process of retreat, a withdrawal into the psychic fortress, the "drug-free-zone", the Mall, the planned community, the electronic highway. We design for a life without immunity, believing that only Capital can save us from infection. As we watch "History" unfold for us in the media, including the media of cultural and political representation, we become voluntary trance-victims of "terrorism" (the secret inner structure of "protectionism"); -- in consequence, our political acts (such as architecture) can express no higher vision than fear. The design of private space is based on the easiest antidote to fear, which is boredom.

Epistomology

In modern research scholars lose touch with the subject of the research – the best alternative is to voice the issues honestly and on a level formed by local research

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Trained to think conceptually, academics may perhaps be forgiven for their preoccupation with abstractions. Nonetheless, we are not excused from scrutinizing the implications of privileging the abstract, concep- tual, and theoretical over the concrete, material, and embodied. If, as Condit suggests, criticism has become too enamored of conceptual structures and too inattentive to actual subjects in specific historical settings, then we must ask what this implies. West suggests, as did Smith earlier (1987), that when conceptual thought dominates research what gets lost is the subject—the embodied person engaged in activities, including ones designed to make sense of her or his world as she or he experiences it. This is to say "lower class" is not isomorphic with Carlos or Mabel's identity; woman is a falsely homogenizing description of Tipper, Hillary, Marilyn, and Barbara; and economic discrimination fails to capture what it means to Harvey and Michael to subsist on life's fringes. As West correctly points out, research that begins with concepts and ends with our own authorial, authoritative voices produces nothing more than self-enhancing, circular reiterations of our own world views; more to the point, these are promulgated at the expense of representing faithfully the lived world of those we claim to study. More appropriate for scholars seeking to understand and improve the lives of others is to start from the standpoint of those who are studied, including especially the material conditions of their lives. Yet, we resist an opposition between theory and lived experience, between symbolicity and materiality, which is as false as a polarity often drawn between teaching and scholarship. While it may be true that structures of hierarchy, institutions, poverty, racism, and misogyny originate in and are sustained by discursive practices, these practices often become sedimented, or reined, in their daily iterations. Once *sedimented*, they constitute scenic or material constraints not affected in the short-term by speech acts, that is, by communication as agency. We are not pleading for a return to earlier discourses of vulgar determinism. Rather, we are voicing a hope that scholars will confront more honestly the material dimensions of scene and the "situated knowledges" (Haraway, 1988) that affect our own and others' voices. The issue is not whether theory or lived experience should be the focus of research, but rather how these two may join in a productive conversation that, like any good conversation, produces something richer than either party alone could. The relationship is, of course, dialectical. To appreciate the circum- stances and activities of particular individuals, scholars initially may need to suspend theoretical and conceptual lenses. Having made local lives the starting point of research, scholars may then usefully employ theories and concepts to explicate how social relations at large infuse and direct situated behaviors. As Scholes (1989, p. 88) reminds us, "theory is not the superego of practice but its self-consciousness. The role of theory is not to lay down laws but to force us to be aware of what we are doing and why we are doing it. Practice without theory is blind." Once we eschew a false dichotomy between theory and embodied life, we are free to be appropriately attentive to both. We can listen and observe carefully to grasp the intrinsic integrity of what and whom we study. If that is the extent of our work, however, we add nothing beyond what a perceptive actor can make of her or his own experience. By the same reasoning, teaching that is passionate but uninformed by scholarship becomes entertainment masquerading as education; social activism unguided by knowledge about rhetorical strategies and discursive constructions of power relations degenerates into dramatic but generally ineffective grandstanding; and observation innocent of conceptual knowl- edge risks being uninsightful. A pivotal value of theory and concepts is to account for culturally sedimented values that are seldom self-evident in everyday activities. So, a passion to engage social problems need not disregard scholarship's capacity to illuminate real experience.

Methodology

Scholars views can not be accepted as true - must take into account the individuals behind the actions.

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SCHOLARLY ATTITUDE Discussions of research for the most part focus on matters of design and methodology, what Harding (1991) calls the context of justification. Occasionally scholars such as Lee, Farrell, West, and Rigsby add to the dialogue consideration of how we define the subjects of our work, thus enlarging the discussion to encompass the context of discovery. Almost never, however, does attitude enter into discussions. Yet, attitudes toward research, like those toward anything else, guide all aspects of the process. By attitude we mean how scholars position themselves in relation to their work and, relatedly, how they understand their work within larger contexts. Burke (1968, p. 446) thought attitude so important he amended the pentad to include it, thereby creating a hexad. Burke viewed "attitude" as incipient action which helps identify human motives. Focusing on attitude allows us to extend several themes raised in this issue. *Self Positioning* For starters, attitude refers to how scholars see themselves. As Allen points out, research deriving from Baconian tradition assumes the researcher is separate from what she or he studies and is an impartial observer. The bulk of more recent work on philosophy of science in diverse fields (Geertz, 1973; Harding, 1986, 1991; Haraway, 1985; Hartsock, 1983; Keller, 1985; Wander, 1983), however, maintains knower and known are inextricably intertwined. If, as Gergen (1991) argues, all persons are selves-in-relation, not autonomous individuals, then research is inevitably a conversation between parties. *Respecting Others* Conversations, of course, may be more or less equitable, more or less enabling of participation by different parties. An attitude that esteems equality—which is not to say sameness—between interlocutors invites knowledge that exceeds that of either party alone and even the sum of their independent understandings. Predicated on respect for others' voices, such conversation invests presumptive validity in actors' ac- counts of their experiences, which may function as entry points into abstract theories. Condit's advice to be empathic and listen openly to how others define their worlds seems constructive since others are likely to have key insights into what they do, as well as some of the motives that guide their conduct. This view has not typically informed academic research. We routinely use others (the "objects of research") to prove our theories, texts to support our critical perspectives, and social activities to test our models. In so doing we suppress the totality of lived experience—of subjects as active knowers, texts, or utterances, as complex, layered processes, and ourselves as situated, contradictory beings. When subjects are defined by our concepts and their activities distorted to fit our purposes, we inevitably misrepresent the meaning of concrete, embodied practices. Kohlberg did it when he imposed on women a model drawn from studies exclusively of males, then proclaimed women "morally stunted." The consultants in Lee's study did it when they used Euro-American views of There is an irony—though one without humor—in subordinating others' experience to our models and interpretations when it is done by those who claim to resist oppression and who aim to demystify hege- mony for those on whom its most insidious consequences are inflicted. In positioning ourselves as experts, entitled to speak for others and able to represent their experiences better than they can, we engage in what Haraway (1988) calls the "god trick," in which we cast ourselves as omniscient beings able to speak from an Archimedian position of disinterest and complete vision. Clearly, this serves self-interest by elevating scholars; it also, however, reveals arrogance in presuming to speak for others (Alcoff, 1991; Borland, 1991). But what is research if we do not privilege the voice of the scholar? Do we become only stenographers who record what others tell us? Not if we take the metaphor of research as conversation seriously. After hearing others' accounts of their lives, it is constructive to draw upon theories to disclose how culturally denned and sustained values suffuse particular experiences in local settings. West and, earlier, Smith (1987) make it abundantly clear that individual actions—like texts—cannot be studied as autonomous, independent, or strictly personal since they are impli- cated in and implicatory of larger social relations. Because local practices partake of general conditions, Morris argues text and context cannot be separated without producing distortions. Understanding interconnec- tions suggests the scholar's unique contribution to the conversation is showing how social relations and prevailing ideologies prefigure every- day activities. Through this effort scholars are able to situate embodied practices within broader horizons of cultural life.

K is a preq

Breaking down class related structures formed by capitalism is a perquisite to discussing non – class issues

Jim Glassman, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “Transnation hegemony and US labor foreign policy: towards a Gramscian international labor geography”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2004, volume 22, pages 573-593

These patterns are referred to as modes of social relations of production, which encapsulate configurations of social forces engaged in the process of production. By discerning different modes of social relations of production it is possible to consider how changing production relations gives rise to particular social forces that become bases of power within and across states and thus within a specific world order ([Cox 1987](#b50), 4). To examine the reciprocal relationship between production and power there is, then, a focus on how social relations of production may give rise to certain social forces, how these social forces may become the bases of power in forms of stateand how this might shape world order. Social forces, as the main collective actors engendered by the social relations of production, operate within and across these spheres of activity by bringing together a coherent conjunction between ideas, understood as intersubjective meanings as well as collective images of world order, material capabilities, referring to accumulated resources, andinstitutions, which are amalgams of the previous two ([Cox 1981](#b48), 139). It is with this framework that three successive stages of world order have been traced within which the hegemonic relationship between ideas, institutions and material capabilities varied and during which different forms of state and patterns of production relations prevailed. These are: 1) the liberal international economy (1789–1873); 2) the era of rival imperialisms (1873–1945); and 3) the post-Second World War era of *pax Americana* ([Cox 1987](#b50), 109). Therefore, not too dissimilar to Open Marxism, it is worth stressing that the focus on social forces and periods of structural change within these world order configurations prompts an open-ended inquiry into modes of class struggle. There is a focus on 'class struggle [be it intra-class or inter-class] as the heuristic model for the understanding of structural change' ([Cox 1996a [1985]](#b53), 57–58; see also[Cox 1987](#b50), 355–357). Class identity is therefore inscribed within the broader notion of social forces to emerge within and through historical processes of economic exploitation. 'Bring back exploitation as the hallmark of class, and at once class struggle is in the forefront, as it should be' (Ste. Croix 1981, 57). As such, class-consciousness emerges out of particular historical contexts of struggle rather than mechanically deriving from objective determinations that have an automatic place in production relations (see [Thompson 1968](#b136), 8–9 and 1978). Yet the focus on exploitation and resistance to it ensures that other forms of identity are included within the rubric of social forces—ethnic, nationalist, religious, gender, sexual—with the aim of addressing how, like class, these derive from a common material basis linked to relations of exploitation ([Cox 1992](#b52), 35). In short, '"non-class" issues—peace, ecology, and feminism—are not to be set aside but given a firm and conscious basis in the social realities shaped through the production process' ([Cox 1987](#b50), 353).

A2 – Inevitable

Globalisation is not inevitable – challenging the ideologies behind it solves

Barry K. Gills, Department of Politics, University of Newcastle “ Editorial: Globalisation and the politics of resistance”, New Political Economy, pg 11-15, Vol. 2, NO.1, 1997

Globalisation discourse involves a serious political risk, i.e. the danger that the insidiously apolitical 'logic of inevitabilism' will prevail, and thus obscure the many political alternatives to neoliberal globalisation that do actually exist and may yet be politically attainable. This logic of inevitabilism rests on deeply flawed arguments that mistake technological determinism for social explanation, and present recent politically and ideologically generated trends as deep inexor- able structural changes. However, it can, and must, be challenged and defeated, empirically, theoretically and—most of all—politically. The contributors to this volume are committed to revalidating progressive alternatives to neoliberal economic globalisation. We believe now is the right time to do this, especially through reasserting the socially contested and thus historically 'open' nature of all political economy, so-called 'globalisation' included. We must begin by firmly putting people back into the analysis as actors and agents in the processes of social and historical change. Globalisation is not just an abstraction, but a felt experience by millions of individual people. It is for this reason that we believe that the logic of inevitabilism will not in the end prevail over the spirit of collective political resistance. In the words of Manfred Bienefeld: The alleged irreversibility of globalisation will be increasingly challenged as more people experience its costs and recognise that these are not due to minor or temporary disturbances affecting a small minority, but are part of an open ended and long term challenge to the majority's quality of life. Once that majority also understands that the obstacles standing in the way of a reversal of these trends are not immutable historical laws or technological inevitabilities, but political choices imposed on them by a venal and short-sighted minority, the time will be ripe for change.8

A2- Perm

Capitalism is tied with commodification – fixing an unchanged system only perpetuates the issue.

Bob Jessop, Ngai Ling Sum, “Pre-disciplinary and Post-disciplinary Prespectives”, Political Economy, pg 89-101, 2001

Re-invigorating Marxism Marxism has experienced recurrent crises closely related to capitalism’s surprising capacity for self-regeneration and socialism ’s equally surprising capacity for self-defeat. Yet Marx’s pioneering analysis still defines the insurpassable horizon for critical reflection on the political economy of capitalism . This does not mean that it is incontrovertibly true and cannot be improved —far from it. Instead, it means that Marx’s critique of political economy is an obligatory reference point for any serious attempt to improve our understanding of the nature and dynamic of capitalism as an historically specific mode of production .7 This is nowhere clearer today than in Marxist analyses of the growth dynamic and crisis-tendencies of Atlantic Fordism, the re-scaling of economic and political relations , the logic —and illogic —of neoliberal globalisation , the structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas of the so-called knowledge-driven economy (or, as Castells ’s influential work defines it, ‘informational capitalism’),8 the restructuring of the Keynesian welfare national state and the tendential emergence of the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime,9 and the new forms of socialisation of the relation s of production corresponding to the new forces of production . Key concepts for this work of reinvigoration include the contradictions inherent in the commodity as the ‘cell form’ of capitalism ; the specificities of labour-power , money, land (or, better , the natural environment ) and knowledge as fictitious commodities ; the constitutive incompleteness of the capital relation, that is, the inherent incapacity of capital to reproduce itself solely in and through exchange relations ; the significance of spatio-temporal fixes as socially-constructed institutiona l frameworks for displacing and deferring the contradiction s and dilemmas of capital accumulation beyond their prevailing spatial boundaris and temporal fixes; 10 and the overall importance of focusing on social relations , social practices and emergent processes , rather than on fixed, unchanging structures and their equally fixed, unchanging contradictions that function teleologically as the hidden hand of history

Capitalism cannot be ended with compromise. A total rejection of the system is necessary to maintain agency and avoid backlash. Anything short of the revolutionary demands of the alternative will make capitalism stronger

Bookchin, Environmental theorist and founder of the Social Ecology Institute, ’07

(Murry Bookchin is an Environmental theorist and founder of Social Ecology, “Social Ecology and Communalism,” 2007 p. 74-76.)

Except where its profits and “growth opportunities” are concerned, capitalism now delights in avowals of the need to “compromise,” to seek a “common ground” – the language of its professoriat no less than its political establishment – which invariably turns out to be its own terrain in a mystified form. Hence the popularity of “market socialism” in self-styled “leftist” periodicals; or possibly “social deep ecology” in deep ecology periodicals like The Trumpeter; or more brazenly, accolades to Gramsci by the Nouvelle Droite in France, or the “Green Adolf” in Germany. A Robin Eckersley has no difficulty juggling the ideas of the Frankfurt School with deep ecology while comparing in truly biocentric fashion the “navigation skills” of birds with the workings of the human mind. The wisdom of making friends with everyone that underpins this academic “discourse” can only lead to a blurring of latent and serious differences – and ultimately to the compromise of all principles and the loss of political direction. The social and cultural decomposition produced by capitalism can be resisted only by taking the most principled stand against the corrosion of nearly all self-professed oppositional ideas. More than at any time in the past, social ecologists should abandon the illusion that a shared use of the word “social” renders all of us into socialists, or that “ecology,” into radical ecologists. The measure of social ecology’s relevance and theoretical integrity consists of its ability to be rational, ethical, coherent, and true to the ideal of the Enlightenment and the revolutionary tradition – not of any ability to earn plaudits from the Price of Wales, Al Gore or Gary Snyder, still less from academics, spiritualists and mystics. In this darkening age when capitalism – the mystified social order par excellence – threatens to globalize the world with capital, commodities, and a facile spirit of “negotiation” and “compromise,” it is necessary to keep alive the very idea of uncompromising critique. It is not dogmatic to insist on consistency, to infer and contest the logic of a given body of premises, to demand clarity in a time of cultural twilight. Indeed, quite to the contrary, eclecticism and theoretical chaos, not to speak of practices that are more theoretical than threatening and that consistent more of posturing than convincing, will only dim the light of truth and critique. Until social forces emerge that can provide a voice for basic social change rather than spiritual redemption, social ecology must take upon itself the task pf preserving and extending the great tradition from which it has emerged. Should the darkness of capitalist barbarism thicken to the point where this enterprise is no longer possible, history – as the rational development of humanity’s potentialities for freedom and consciousness – will indeed reach its definitive end.