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1NC – Gender K

First, the plan recreates gendered assumptions through action – policies enhancing warfare support hegemonic masculine ideologies while calls to protect the nation and increase ‘global partnerships’ re-instate feminine subordination

Penny Griffin (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies) March 25, 2006 “The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/8/3/0/pages98301/p98301-2.php

The gendered assumptions that underlie this rhetoric are tacit but striking, and depend on two distinct, heteronormative, tropes of masculinisation and feminisation. Firstly, the US’s ability to control ‘space capabilities’ depends upon assumptions of dominance and inherent superiority that revolve around the (gendered) signifier of the US’s role as ‘classic’ or ‘active warfighter’: assumptions including the need for speed and watchfulness (‘real time space surveillance’), agility and technical superiority (‘timely and responsive spacelift’), ‘enhanced protection’ (of ‘military and commercial systems’), robustness and efficient repelling capabilities (‘robust negation systems’), ‘precision force’, and ‘enhanced “sensor-to-shooter”’ capabilities. Secondly, in establishing its (heterosexually masculine) credentials, the US’s techno- strategic reconfigures all other space-able nations as subordinate, constructing a binary, heterosexual relationship of masculine hegemony/feminine subordination. Tellingly, US Space Command cites the forging of ‘global partnerships’ as essential to protecting US national interests and investments, where such partnerships are at the behest of the US, with those that partner the US ‘warfighter’ little more than passive conduits for US ‘opportunity’ and ‘commerce’ (‘Joint Vision 2020’).

1NC – Gender K

The universality of the affirmative’s claims re-enforces the masculine/feminine binaries making the power structures it wishes to eliminate inevitable

Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 6-8

The political assumption that there must be a universal basis for feminism, one which must be found in an identity assumed to exist cross-culturally, often accompanies the notion that the oppression of women has some singular form discernible in the universal or hegemonic structure of patriarchy or masculine domination. The notion of a universal patriarchy has been widely criticized in recent years for its failure to account for the workings of gender oppression in the concrete cultural contexts in which it exists. Where those various contexts have been consulted within such theories, it has been to find “examples” or “illustrations” of a universal principle that is assumed from the start. That form of feminist theorizing has come under criticism for its efforts to colonize and appropriate non-Western cultures to support highly Western notions of oppression, but because they tend as well to construct a “Third World” or even an “Orient” in which gender oppression is subtly explained as symptomatic of an essential, non-Western barbarism. The urgency of feminism to establish a universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the appearance of feminism’s own claims to be representative has occasionally motivated the shortcut to a categorial or fictive universality of the structure of domination, held to produce women’s common subjugated experience. Although the claim of universal patriarchy no longer enjoys the kind of credibility it once did, the notion of a generally shared conception of “women,” the corollary to that framework, has been much more difficult to displace. Certainly, there have been plenty of debates: Is there some commonality among “women” that preexists their oppression, or do “women” have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone? Is there a specificity to women’s cultures that is independent of their subordination by hegemonic, masculinist cultures? Are the specificity and integrity of women’s cultural or linguistic practices always specified against and, hence, within the terms of some more dominant cultural formation? If there is a region of the “specifically feminine,” one that is both differentiated from the masculine as such and recognizable in its difference by an unmarked and, hence, presumed universality of “women”? The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive framework in which that specificity can be recognized, but in every other way the “specificity” of the feminine is once again fully decontextualized and separated off analytically and politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity, and other axes of power relations that both constitute “identity” and make the singular notion of identity a misnomer.4 My suggestion is that the presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from “women” whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of identity politics. The suggestion that feminism can seek wider representation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own representational claims. This problem is not ameliorated through an appeal to the category of women for merely “strategic” purposes, for strategies always have meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are intended. In this case, exclusion itself might qualify as such an unintended yet consequential meaning. By conforming to a requirement of representational politics that feminism articulate a stable subject, feminism thus opens itself to charges of gross misrepresentation.

1NC – Gender K

The alternative is to reject the aff’s masculine view of IR—adopting a more holistic view of IR solves, but the perm fails because the aff is constructed from a masculine standpoint

Shepherd 9 [Laura, 4/3, Department of Political Science and International Studies @ University of Birmingham, “Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies”, p. EBSCO, RCB]

As well as conceiving of gender as a set of discourses, and violence as a means of reproducing and reinforcing the relevant discursive limits, it is possible to see security as a set of discourses, as I have argued more fully elsewhere (Shepherd, 2007; 2008; see also Shepherd and Weldes, 2007). Rather than pursuing the study of security as if it were something that can be achieved either in absolute, partial or relative terms, engaging with security as discourse enables the analysis of how these discourses function to reproduce, through various strategies, the domain of the international with which IR is self-consciously concerned. Just as violences that are gendering reproduce gendered subjects, on this view states, acting as authoritative entities, perform violences, but violences, in the name of security, also perform states. These processes occur simultaneously, and across the whole spectrum of social life: an instance of rape in war is at once gendering of the individuals involved and of the social collectivities – states, communities, regions – they feel they represent (see Bracewell, 2000); building a fence in the name of security that separates people from their land and extended families performs particular kinds of violence (at checkpoints, during patrols) and performs particular subject identities (of the state authority, of the individuals affected), all of which are gendered. All of the texts under discussion in this essay argue that it is imperative to explore and expose gendered power relations and, further, that doing so not only enables a rigorous critique of realism in IR but also reminds us as scholars of the need for such a critique. The critiques of IR offered by feminist scholars are grounded in a rejection of neo-realism/realism as a dominant intellectual framework for academics in the discipline and policy makers alike. As Enloe reminds us, 'the government-centred, militarized version of national security [derived from a realist framework] remains the dominant mode of policy thinking' (Enloe, 2007, p. 43). Situating gender as a central category of analysis encourages us to 'think outside the "state security box"' (p. 47) and to remember that 'the "individuals" of global politics do not work alone, live alone or politic alone – they do so in interdependent relationships with others' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 200) that are inherently gendered. One of the key analytical contributions of all three texts is the way in which they all challenge what it means to be 'doing' IR, by recognising various forms of violence, interrogating the public/private divide and demanding that attention is paid to the temporal and physical spaces in-between war and peace. Feminist security studies should not simply be seen as 'women doing security', or as 'adding women to IR/security studies', important as these contributions are. Through their theorising, the authors discussed here reconfigure what 'counts' as IR, challenging orthodox notions of who can 'do' IR and what 'doing' IR means. The practices of power needed to maintain dominant configurations of international relations are exposed, and critiquing the productive power of realism as a discourse is one way in which the authors do this. Sjoberg and Gentry pick up on a recent theoretical shift in Anglo-American IR, from system-level analysis to a recognition that individuals matter. However, as they rightly point out, the individuals who are seen to matter are not gendered relational beings, but rather reminiscent of Hobbes' construction of the autonomous rational actor. '[T]he narrowness of the group that [such an approach] includes limits its effectiveness as an interpretive framework and reproduces the gender, class and race biases in system-level international relationship scholarship' (Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, p. 200, emphasis added). Without paying adequate attention to the construction of individuals as gendered beings, or to the reproduction of widely held ideas about masculine and feminine behaviours, Sjoberg and Gentry remind us that we will ultimately fail 'to see and deconstruct the increasingly subtle, complex and disguised ways in which gender pervades international relations and global politics' (2008, p. 225). In a similar vein, Roberts notes that 'human security is marginalised or rejected as inauthentic [because] it is not a reflection of realism's (male) agendas and priorities' (2008, p. 169). The 'agendas and priorities' identified by Roberts and acknowledged by Sjoberg and Gentry as being productive of particular biases in scholarship are not simply 'academic' matters, in the pejorative sense of the term. As Roberts argues, 'Power relationships of inequality happen because they are built that way by human determinism of security and what is required to maintain security (p. 171). Realism, as academic discourse and as policy guideline, has material effects. Although his analysis employs an unconventional definition of the term 'social construction' (seemingly interchangeable with 'human agency') and rests on a novel interpretation of the three foundational assumptions of realism (Roberts, 2008, pp. 169–77), the central point that Roberts seeks to make in his conclusion is valid: 'it is a challenge to those who deny relationships between gender and security; between human agency (social construction) and lethal outcome' (p. 183). In sum, all three texts draw their readers to an inescapable, and – for the conventional study of IR – a devastating conclusion: the dominance of neo-realism/realism and the state-based study of security that derives from this is potentially pathological, in that it is in part productive of the violences it seeks to ameliorate. I suggest that critical engagement with orthodox IR theory is necessary for the intellectual growth of the discipline, and considerable insight can be gained by acknowledging the relevance of feminist understandings of gender, power and theory. The young woman buying a T-shirt from a multinational clothing corporation with her first pay cheque, the group of young men planning a stag weekend in Amsterdam, a group of students attending a demonstration against the bombing of Afghanistan – studying these significant actions currently falls outside the boundaries of doing security studies in mainstream IR and I believe these boundaries need contesting. As Marysia Zalewski argues: International politics is what we make it to be ... We need to rethink the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both that which we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world (Zalewski 1996, p. 352, emphasis in original). Conclusion: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend' (Mao Tse-Tung) In this essay, I have used the analysis of three contemporary publications in the field of feminist security studies to demonstrate three significant sets of analytical contributions that such scholarship makes to the discipline of IR. Beyond the war/peace dichotomy that is frequently assumed to be definitive of the discipline, we find many and various forms of violence, occurring in and between temporally distinct periods of conflict, which are the product/productive of socially acceptable modes of gendered behaviour, ways of being in the world as a woman or man. I have also argued that critical engagement with conventional, state-based approaches [Continues…]

[Continues…]

to (national) security must persist as the academic discourses we write are complicit in the construction of the global as we understand it. Further, 'if all experience is gendered, analysis of gendered identities is an imperative starting point in the study of political identities and practice' (Peterson, 1999, p. 37). To this end, I conclude by suggesting that we take seriously Enloe's final comment: 'Tracking militarization and fostering demilitarization will call for cooperative investigations, multiple skills and the appreciation of diverse perspectives' (2007, p. 164). While there has been intense intra-disciplinary debate within contemporary feminist security studies over the necessary 'feminist credentials' of some gendered analyses, it is important to recognise the continual renewal and analytical vigour brought to the field by such debates. Broadly speaking, there are two positions we might map. On the one side, there are those who refuse to reduce gender to a variable in their research, arguing that to do so limits the critical insight that can be gained from treating gender instead as a noun, a verb and a structural logic (see, for example, Sjoberg, 2006; Zalewski, 2007). On this view, 'gender', whether deployed as noun, verb or logic in a particular analysis, cannot be separated from the decades of feminist scholarship that worked to explore, expand on and elucidate what gender might mean. On the opposing side are scholars who, typically using phrases such as 'balanced consideration' (Jones, 1998, p. 303) and 'an inclusive perspective on gender and war' (Griffiths, 2003, pp. 327–8, emphasis in original), manipulate gender as a variable in their research to 'extend the scope of feminist IR scholarship' (Caprioli, 2004, p. 266) and to draw conclusions regarding sex-specific behaviours in conflict and post-conflict situations (see also Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Carpenter, 2006; Melander, 2005). Crucially, however, scholarship on both sides of this 'divide' coexists, and in doing so encourages 'the appreciation of diverse perspectives'. While bracketing feminist politics from the study of gender is an overtly political move, which can be presented as either strategic (Carpenter, 2006, pp. 6–10) or as common sense, in that it 'enhances [the] explanatory capabilities' of feminist security studies (Caprioli, 2004, p. 266), all interrogations of security that take gender seriously draw attention to the ways in which gender is at once personal, political and international. Although it might seem that conceiving of gender as a variable adheres both to a disciplinary narrative that rewards positivist and abstract theory (without messy reference to bodies) and to a neo-/anti-/post-feminist narrative that claims 'we' have solved the gender problem (see Zalewski, 2007, p. 303), at the very least such approaches give credence to the idea that gender matters in global politics. Mary Caprioli suggests that 'IR feminists shattered the publishing boundary for feminist IR scholarship, and tackled the difficult task of deconstructing IR theory' (2004, p. 257). I would caution that it is perhaps too soon to represent the shattering and tackling as a fait accompli, but with the vital interjections of texts such as those discussed here, security studies scholars may yet envisage a politics of violence and human subjectivity that transcends the arbitrary disciplinary boundaries which constrain rather than facilitate understanding.

Link - Colonization

The act of conquest and colonization results in structures to solidify gender binaries. This results in the most horrific atrocities

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

In such cases the metropolitan state is involved in generating categories of gender relations. The same occurs when the colonial state, engaged in setting up institutions of permanent conquest, defines permitted sexuality. It is a notable fact that colonial systems, over the long sweep of history from the sixteenth century to the twentieth, became on the whole more racist. The colonial state became more opposed to intermarriage of colonizer and colonized, came in effect to define racial categories of citizenship through its regulation of marriage. An increasing regulation of marriage developed in the metropole as well. Two centuries ago, marriage in European culture was a precipitate of kinship rules, local custom, and religion. It has increasingly become a product of contract as defined and regulated by the state. But civil, stateregulated contract is capable of civil, state-regulated abrogation; so divorce as a social institution has developed in the wake of state regulation of marriage. Again the consequence is a new category in gender relations, the divorcee, and the reorganization of other institutions around it (for example, the "blended family").48 The state thus is not just a regulatory agency, it is a creative force in the dynamic of gender. It creates new categories and new historical possibilities. But it should not be forgotten that the state also destroys. Modern states kill on a horrific scale, and gender is central to this fact. Probably the most destructive single action in modern history was not the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, but the relatively forgotten firebombing of Dresden, a town of no military significance, by the British and American air forces in February 1945. About 135,000 civilians were burned to death in a day during an attack that followed mechanically from a bureaucratic planning process. Masculine toughness had become institutionalized in an "area bombing" approach that delivered genocide; and **no process in a military bureaucracy could stop it**.49

Link - Colonization

The plan results in stronger binaries – men are used for the exploration and colonization while women will appear only in reference to procreation

Penny Griffin (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies) March 25, 2006 “The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/8/3/0/pages98301/p98301-2.php

This regulatory masculinism has undoubtedly resulted in the overwhelming dominance of male astronauts in space. Although the first American female went into space in 1983, in 2001 of an active astronaut corps of 158, only 35 were women (NASA Press Release, 2001), and of the 2004 class of astronauts, only two of eleven were female (http://spaceflight.nasa.gov). But the predominance of male astronauts also stems from the gendered nature of space discourse itself. The ‘Space Age’ that began with the Cold War ‘Space Race’ has been coded (heterosexually) masculine, dependent on a foundational ideology of masculine prowess realised through gendered assumptions of physical and technical expertise, strength, endurance and intelligence. The portrayal of the earliest astronauts as popular heroes in the US media, and beyond, sedimented an image of masculine achievement that, although highly contingent on the militarised aggressivity of Cold War discourse at that time, has proved enduring. Armstrong’s famous announcement that the Apollo 11 moon landing was ‘one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind’ thus in this instance speaks more specifically than universally, a continuation of the Western history’s overarching belief in men’s ‘natural’ ability, indeed prerogative, to conquer for the good of everyone. The operations of gender as a norm, and normalizing principle, in discourses of outer space need not be explicit nor evidently mentioned. Heteronormative ‘gender’ instead implicitly governs the ‘social intelligibility of action’, to borrow Butler’s terminology; that is, it governs the means by which the politics of outer space makes sense. Heteronormative, heterosexist gender configurations reside, for example, in those discussions of the viability of outer space exploration and human spaceflight where human involvement in space is articulated as inherently exciting, dangerous and challenging, both technically and psychologically. Outer space exploration and colonisation is heavily naturalised in US discourse as an inevitability of human activity, rather than a simple possibility. What can and cannot be done in and/or to space are defined according to those physical, hormonal, and performative forms (re)produced and normalised according to heteronormative, heterosexual, discursive parameters. If, for example, humans are to colonise space, as much scientific writing would have us believe, it is essential that they perform reproductively: human sexuality in space is thus framed and reified such that it pertains only to heterosexual intercourse, and women appear only in reference to their ‘sexual nature and procreative function’ (Casper and Moore, 1995: 319). In January 2006, NewScientist.com revealed that of its top ten most accessed ‘space’ stories of 2005, the most popular was the aptly named report, ‘Out-of-This-World Sex Could Jeopardise Missions’ (McKee, 2005). This, ahead of the apparent detection of a ‘tenth’ planet, and the discovery that lichen, unlike any other organism sent into space, can survive the space environment completely unprotected. Thirteen years after a married couple were first sent on a space shuttle mission, prompting at the time a flurry of public curiosity and controversy concerning ‘celestial intimacy’ (Casper & Moore, 1995: 312), the New Scientist’s article opens with the line, ‘[s]ex and romantic entanglements among astronauts could derail missions to Mars and should therefore be studied by NASA’. The article of course refers to penetrative sexual intercourse, not to any discovery of an alternative human ‘sex’ somewhere beyond Earth. And NASA has already long been ‘studying’ the prospect of sex, as sexual intercourse, in outer space. As the New Scientist’s article goes on to make clear, however, ‘the question of sexuality’ and ‘sexual issues’ in spaceflight and future Outer Space exploration is essentially, for NASA at least, a question of heterosexuality.

Link – Environmental Security

The affs attempt to solve environmental problems through IR fails—it uses an inherently gendered understanding of state interaction to problem solving—only the alternative solves warming

**Tickner 92** [Ann, Professor @ the School of International Relations USC, B.A. in History, U London, M.A. in IR, Yale, PhD in pol science, “GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY”]

Social ecologists such as William Leiss explicitly link man's domination of nature with certain men's domination over other human beings. Defending the original goals of the scientific revolution as an attempt to liberate human beings from the constraints of their natural environment and increase their material well-being, Leiss claims that the rationalism of modern science became caught in a web of social contradictions. The instruments through which human beings have transformed the resources of nature into means for the satisfaction of material desires have increasingly come to be regarded as objects of political conflict both domestically and internationally.[61](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note61#note61) According to Leiss's class analysis, the real object of domination has not been nature but human beings: through enhanced technological capabilities certain people have appropriated nature's resources and thereby dominated others. A more rational science would understand the world in a way that would produce harmony with the environment. But this can be realized only when the struggle for domination ends, along with disparities in power among groups and nations.[62](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note62#note62) Social ecologist Murray Bookchin, one of the few ecologists who raises the issue of gender relations, also points to the hierarchical structuring of the contemporary world embodied in man's domination over man, woman, and nature. Bookchin believes that these modes of domination are historically constructed and can therefore be transcended. He stresses the emancipatory potential of ecology, a science that recognizes no hierarchy and is therefore in a position to combat domination at all levels.[63](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note63#note63) Bookchin claims that this Western hierarchical thinking, which valorizes male power, devalues women by associating them with its devalued image of nature. It is this essentialist connection between women and nature, made both by some ecologists and certain feminists, that contributes to many other feminists' reluctance to espouse an ecological perspective.[64](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note64#note64) The immanent connection between women and nature, linked to women's biological functions, has been criticized by many feminists as demeaning, deterministically excluding women from the male domain of culture and transcendence. Yet recent work in feminist cultural anthropology disputes claims that this connection is innate and suggests instead that it is historically contingent: rooted in Western cultural traditions, it has been imposed on other cultures as part of the Western project of domination.[65](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note65#note65) If, as these anthropologists and social constructionist ecofeminists believe, Western civilization has reinforced the subjugation of women through its assertion that they are closer to nature than men, then the nature/culture dualism must be challenged rather than ignored. If, as these authors claim, the woman/nature connection is historically contingent, then there are possibilities for transcending this hierarchical dualism in ways that offer the promise of liberation for both women and nature. Since the liberation of nature is also the goal of ecology, ecofeminist Ynestra King suggests that feminism and ecology can usefully form an alliance. According to King, ecology is not necessarily feminist, but its beliefs are quite compatible with those of these social constructionist ecofeminists since both make their chief goal the radical undermining of hierarchical dualisms. King argues that, since ecofeminists believe that misogyny is at the root of the dualism between nature and culture that ecologists deplore, ecology is incomplete without feminism.[66](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note66#note66) While ecologists such as Leiss have connected the exploitation of nature to class domination, social constructionist ecofeminists make more explicit an interlocking pattern of dominance relationships that include sexism and racism as well as classism and that, they claim, are historically tied to the domination of nature. Joan Griscom believes that only when conceptual connections between all these forms of repressions are made can the emancipatory potential of ecology be fully realized.[67](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note67#note67) According to ecofeminist Ynestra King, feminism challenges the male-based values of our culture: when coupled with an ecological perspective, it insists that all human beings, both women and men, remember and accept their origins in nature. King claims that ecofeminism is in a position to heal the splits in a world divided against itself and built on a fundamental lie: the defining of culture in opposition to nature. Only by seeking to overcome such hierarchical dualisms can we move toward a more harmonious relationship with our natural environment.[68](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note68#note68) Since women have been associated with a devalued nature through these hierarchical dualisms, women have a particular are often the worst victims of environmental degradation. But just as I have argued against perceiving women as victims in the protector/protected discourse of national security, so women must not be seen solely as victims of environmental degradation but also as agents who must participate equally in the solution of these problems. Since women have not been well represented in national and international institutions dealing with the environment, their contribution to working for ecological security has been largely at the grassroots level. For example, the Chipko movement, which began with women hugging trees as a protest against cutting them down in the Chamoli district of Uttar Pradesh in 1973, met with some success when Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi issued a fifteen-year ban on the commercial felling of the forests of Uttar Pradesh. Women are also taking part in projects of reforestation; Kenya's Green [Continues…]

[Continued…]

Belt Movement, started in 1977 by the National Council of Women, involves women in the establishment of "Green Belt communities" and small tree nurseries.[69](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner15.html#note69#note69) The kind of knowledge that women bring to these various environmental movements is gained from experience as producers and providers for daily household needs. However, the belief that this type of knowledge cannot be "scientific" has kept it from being recognized by development and environmental "experts" as well as foreign policymakers. As long as metaphors such as "global housekeeping" associate ecological security with the devalued realm of women, it will not become an issue of priority on the foreign policy agendas of states or in the mainstream discipline of international relations. While it has paid little direct attention to environmental issues, the conventional discipline of international relations has relied to a great extent on modernity's mechanistic view of nature in framing its assumptions about the behavior of states in the international system. Feminist perspectives on ecology reveal not only the hierarchical relationship between humans and nature that has grown out of this worldview but also the extent to which this unequal relationship interacts with other forms of domination and subordination, including gender relations. The hierarchical dualisms discussed in this chapter, such as culture/nature, civilized/wild, North/South, rich/poor, public/private, and international/local, have been characteristic of the way in which we describe world politics and the interaction of states with their natural environment. A feminist perspective would argue that not until the boundaries of inequality and domination these dualisms represent are transcended can true ecological security be achieved. Only through the emergence of a system of values that simultaneously respects nature, women, and adversity of cultures-- norms that have been missing from the historical practices of international statecraft-- can models that promise an ecologically secure future be devised.

Link – “Feminist Policies”

Affirmation of gender binaries and the categorization of ‘women’ or ‘feminist policies’ in the political sphere locks identities of the individual into a “pregendered person” This connection makes political or cultural change impossible and reproduces the masculine/feminine binary making conflict inevitable

Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 5-6

The question of “the subject” is crucial for politics, and for feminist politics in particular, because juridical subjects are invariably produced through certain exclusionary practices that do not “show” once the juridical structure of politics has been established .In other words, the political construction of the subject proceeds with certain legitimating and exclusionary aims, and these political operations are effectively concealed and naturalized by a political analysis that takes juridical structures as their foundation. Juridical power inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent; hence, politics must be concerned with this dual function of power: the juridical and the productive. In effect, the law produces and then conceals the notion of “a subject before the law”2 in order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise that subsequently legitimates that law’s own regulatory hegemony. It is not enough to inquire into how women might become more fully represented in language and politics. Feminist critique ought also to understand how the category of “women,”the subject of feminism,is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought. Indeed, the question of women as the subject of feminism raises the possibility that there may not be a subject who stands “before” the law, awaiting representation in or by the law. Perhaps the subject, as well as the invocation of a temporal “before,”is constituted by the law as the fictive foundation of its own claim to legitimacy. The prevailing assumption of the ontological integrity of the subject before the law might be understood as the contemporary trace of the state of nature hypothesis,that foundationalist fable constitutive of the juridical structures of classical liberalism. The performative invocation of a nonhistorical “before” becomes the foundational premise that guarantees a presocial ontology of persons who freely consent to be governed and, thereby, constitute the legitimacy of the social contract. Apart from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion of the subject, however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common identity. Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, *women,*e ven in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety. As Denise Riley’s title suggests, *Am I That Name?* is a question produced by the very possibility of the name’s multiple significations.3 If one “is” a woman,that is surely not all one is;the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pregendered “person” transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained.

Link – Final Frontier

The characterization of space as the ‘final frontier’ or ‘threshold’ of human flourishing instills normative thought that humanity has no obstacle. In order to achieve this space discourse produces the “ideal individual” which becomes the “norm” resulting in exclusionary practices of “the feminine”

Penny Griffin (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies) March 25, 2006 “The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/8/3/0/pages98301/p98301-2.php

Humans, argues Crawford, ‘bring speed, agility, versatility and intelligence to exploration in a way that robots cannot’, justifying to many the employment of astronauts as ‘field scientists’ on other planets (Crawford, 2005: 252). The consistent discursive articulation of outer space as a frontier, a ‘threshold’ for human intervention requiring the utmost in human performance, depends on a regulatory framework wherein ‘humanity’ is able to consistently and without obstacle (material, psychological or otherwise) seize the challenge of exploiting and controlling its natural environment and resources. Rarely conceived of purely in technological, aphysical terms, space is a politics (in US discourse) entirely constituted in reference to the physical attributes of the (neoliberally) human. Within the heteronormative, heterosexual, regulatory frameworks of space discourse, the ideal, space-able, individual is constructed and reproduced within an unspoken but unequivocal heteronormative framework of reproductive sexuality, as a model that others should approximate: a person, evolved of heterosexual binaries; who is reactive but calm, reproductive but sexually restrained, agile but not hyperactive, versatile but not sexually ambiguous, rational but not mechanical. Located within a ‘masculine context’, such a framework has only solidified the sense of male bodies existing as the norm against which female bodies are evaluated, and male physiology the standard by which female bodies are judged (Casper and Moore, 1995: 316-319).

Link – Global Warming

The desire to ‘protect mother earth’ and ‘stop’ global warming reveals and re-enforces heteronormative thought. This internalizes the impacts that the aff attempts to solve.

Ariel Salleh (sociologist who writes on social ecology and ecofeminism) 2010 “How the Ecological Footprint Is Sex-Gendered” http://www.springerlink.com/content/k4884u82194210xj/

When governments and think tanks deliberate on strategies for combatting climate change, you can be sure they’ll bypass one highly salient variable. Yes, you’ve got it! – Global warming causes, effects, and solutions are ‘gendered’, or strictly speaking sex-gendered. Why for example, is women’s ecological footprint negligible in com- parison with men’s? Why are women and children the main victims of global warming? Why are women under-represented in negotiations at local, national, and international levels? And guess who carries the social cost of Kyoto policies … The gender differential (how boys and girls are trained into different adult behaviour models) is critical to understanding questions like resource consumption and energy security (Salleh 1997, 2009). But it will also affect how eco-socialism is theorised, as I will argue further into this Chapter. **Social norms for ‘masculinity and feminin- ity’ lead to different attitudes in energy use, and to preferred policy approaches at competitive neo-liberal forums like the** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (**IPCC**). This claim is based on research from the German government funded women’s NGO – GENANET, led by Ulrike Roehr (2007), and on surveys compiled by the Women’s Environment Network – WEN, in London (2007). One way to illustrate this systematic gender difference is through the ecological footprint measure (Wackernagel and Rees 1996).1 In Africa, for instance, there was a time when women farmers provided 80% of the continents’ food with minimal resource inputs and pollution outputs. Today, in parts of the global South where communal land holdings are untouched by war, free trade deals, and technology transfers, many women continue this ecologically sound and self reliant subsistence economics. High tech economies also reveal a distinction between men’s and women’s pat- terns of resource use. A Swedish Government report shows that men’s ecological footprint in that nation is remarkably larger than women’s is (Johnsson-Latham 2006). There are always individual variations, but on average, Swedish men as a social category, are found to be big consumers of energy expensive manufactures and durable assets like houses, cars, and computers, while Swedish women are mainly purchasing weekly domestic consumption items – nature’s perishables. But women’s ecological footprint is actually smaller again, if adjusted for the fact that most are shopping for two or more other household members. Australia, as a medium size developed nation will show a similar pattern to Sweden. I am not qualified to speak about the sociology of resource consumption in China. Energy use in the transport sector also reflects the way in which modern societies are structured by gender as much as by class or ethnicity. Focussing on the former, a 2006 report commissioned by the European Parliament from a transnational consor- tium of researchers, including the University of East London and the prestigious Wuppertal Institute, points out that men in EU states tend to make trips by car for a single purpose; and over longer distances than women do (European Parliament 2006). A high sense of individualism and low awareness or concern for the environmental costs of private transport is inferred. Conversely, the EU statistics show that it is mainly women who travel by public transport or on foot. When women do use private cars, it is for multiple short journeys meeting several purposes on the one outing. The reason for this complex activity pattern of women, is that even among those in the waged workforce, most undertake reproductive or domestic labour for husbands, children, or elderly parents. The double shift, as feminists call it. Meike Spitzner, an author of the European Parliament report observes, that women’s days are characterised by multi-tasking and their transport needs are characterised by ‘spatio-temporal scatter’. Moreover, the time spent by women moving between one labour activity and another – say from office to kindergarten to supermarket – adds to their existing economic exploitation as unpaid household care providers. Of course, it is important not to overgeneralise. All around the world, the number of childfree career women is increasing, but this in turn, means that environmentally speaking, their transport footprint will be more like that of men in the waged productive sector. Even so, these emancipated women remain a statistical minority. Generally the pattern in industrial economies is that men have determinate job hours and simpler schedules than working women. For this reason, men could more easily make good use of public transport options; but they don’t – or at least in Europe they don’t. Again, this choice is a gendered one, having to do with structural differences in earning capacity. Internationally, workplace gender bias is so entrenched that women are concen- trated in lower salaried jobs and even when they perform the same tasks as men, their wages are lower by one fifth. Thus, it is mainly men as a social category who have money available for purchasing big status cars, as well as time available for leisure pursuits. Here they favour high energy consumption recreation involving speed- boats, golf courses, motorbikes, and computerised entertainments. Under capitalism, speed and technology are associated with the psychology of masculine prowess. By contrast, due to the time consuming double shift of work and home, women’s leisure footprint is all but non-existent. Today, globalised economic scarcity and environmental stress extracts more time from women’s lives. But under pressure, women are found to meet their reproductive labour tasks with fewer resources, by using good organisation and time management. This internalised response to envi- ronmental pressures contrasts with the accepted public practice of externalising or displacing problems on to less powerful sections of

(Continued…)

the community.2 To amplify this from the EU evidence: men interviewed about solutions to social and environmen- tal problems, prefer technological solutions and end-of-pipe remedies. Ethically (and thermodynamically), this is essentially a form of ‘deferred or displaced responsibility’.

Link – “Helping” women

Calls to ‘help’ women or advance feminist notions are self-defeating. By eliminating the fluidity of identity and sex the affirmative locks the individual into a power structure produced by juridical formation of language and politics. This makes the identity a part of gender as a stable structure re-enforcing heternormative thought and disempowering movements it seeks to help

Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 3-5

i. “Women” as the Subject of Feminism For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only initiates feminist interests and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom political representation is pursued. But politics and representation are controversial terms. On the one hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects; on the other hand, representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women. For feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed necessary to foster the political visibility of women. This has seemed obviously important considering the pervasive cultural condition in which women’s lives were either misrepresented or not represented at all. Recently, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist theory and politics has come under challenge from within feminist discourse. The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms. There is a great deal of material that not only questions the viability of “the subject” as the ultimate candidate for representation or, indeed, liberation, but there is very little agreement after all on what it is that constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women. The domains of political and linguistic “representation” set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before representation can be extended. Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent.1 Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms—that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, control, and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, then the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as “the subject” of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation. This becomes politically problematic if that system can be shown to produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce subjects who are presumed to be masculine. In such cases, an uncritical appeal to such a system for the emancipation of “women” will be clearly self-defeating.

Link – Industry

The state has a vested interest in industry, mobilization of it is merely to re-enstate gender politics

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

5. Because of its power to regulate and its power to create, the state is a major stake in gender politics; and the exercise of that power is a constant incitement to claim the stake. Thus the state becomes the focus of interest-group formation and mobilization in sexual politics. It is worth recalling just how wide the liberal state's activity in relation to gender is. This activity includes family policy, population policy, labor force and labor market management, housing policy, regulation of sexual behavior and expression, provision of child care, mass education, taxation and income redistribution, the creation and use of military forces - and that is not the whole of it. This is not a sideline; it is a major realm of state policy. Control of the machinery that conducts these activities is a massive asset in gender politics. In many situations it will be tactically decisive. The state is therefore a focus for the mobilization of interests that is central to gender politics on the large scale. Feminism's historical concern with the state, and attempts to capture a share of state power, appear in this light as a necessary response to a historical reality. They are not an error brought on by an overdose of liberalism or a capitulation to patriarchy. As Franzway puts it, the state is unavoidable for feminism. The question is not whether feminism will deal with the state, but how: on what terms, with what tactics, toward what goals.5"

Link - Language

We must focus on the discourse of the 1AC – language ties gender to sex. This shapes policies that re-enforce patriarchal hierarchies. That’s the root cause of their impacts

Joyce P. Kaufman and Kristen P. Williams (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Whittier Scholars Program at Whittier College and Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations and Co-Director of the Women’s and Gender Studies Program at Clark University) 2007 )"Women, the State, and war: A comprehensive perspective on citizenship and Nationalism" p. 11-29

Critical feminism looks at gender identities and power to improve on "liberal feminism's use of gender as a variable." Tickner and Sjoberg cite Sandra Whitworth's work as an example of a critical feminist approach to IR investigating the interaction of "material conditions, ideas, and institutions"—historical structures at a point in time, with the assertion that ideas can change given that these "are the product of human agents." Whitworth "suggests that gender is also constituted by the meaning given to that reality—ideas that men and women have about their relationships to one another." Importantly, in attempting to understand the world, critical theory seeks to change it, and thus there is a normative element to the analysis.21 As mentioned previously, constructivism has recently entered the discourse of the discipline of international relations'as a challenge to the two dominant paradigms, realism and liberalism. Constructivists examine ideas and identities, and feminist constructivism builds on this approach in looking at "the way that ideas about gender shape and are shaped by global politics."22 Power, also viewed as a social construct, is closely linked to gender, as it is the essence of power that reinforces the patriarchal hierarchy of men over women.23 (We will discuss in a later section the impact of the construction of gender in understanding nationalism and citizenship and women's relation to the state.) According to Jill Steans, "[p]erhaps the most radical challenges to mainstream IR have come from poststructuralist feminist interventions in the field, since these have ultimately called into question the very possibility of IR.'"24 Poststructural feminists assert that because language has meaning, terms such as "woman" and "man" are constructed. The implication is that "there is no essence to 'woman'." Nor, is there a "simple relationship between being a woman and perceiving oneself to have specific interests that arise from one's gender. This calls into question the idea that women necessarily share similar interests or a common perspective on the world."25 Thus, for poststructural-ists, the meaning of language matters—in other words, the connection between knowledge and power cannot be dismissed. As Tickner and Sjoberg note, "those who construct meaning and create knowledge thereby gain a great deal of power. Feminists point out that men have generally been seen as the knowers—what has counted as legitimate knowledge in the social sciences has generally been based on knowledge about men's lives in the public sphere; women have been marginalized both as knowers and as subjects of knowledge."26 Moreover, it is the dichotomies of weak/strong, private/public, and so forth that perpetuate the divisions between men and women, and in essence the hierarchy of power of men over women in global politics. For feminist poststructuralists, it is the deconstruction of language and thus the hierarchy necessary to promote a more equal and just world.27 j Postcolonial feminism is linked to poststructuralist feminism given that both approaches examine differences among women. Not only do differences between men and women exist, but so too do those among women from different parts of the world.28 In their critique of western feminists, postcolonial feminists argue that women's experiences in the developing world are significantly dissimilar to those of privileged, white women in the western/developed world. Culture, class, race and ethnicity, as well as geographical location play a role in understanding women's oppression in the colonized world.29 The implication is that to overcome the oppression and subordination facing women in the developing world is to recognize cultural differences, and that there may not be a "universal understanding of women's needs."30 f. While the various feminist theories discussed above approach the analysis Of gender and women in different ways, feminist IR theorists, in general, all argue that existing power structures reinforce constructed gender hierarchies, which then prevent women from participating in the political process in general, and in foreign policy decision making in particular. Further, states are not neutral entities, rather states are gendered such "that [they] promote and support policy practices primarily in the interests of men."31 Moreover, as the modern state developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, participation within the polity was limited—only men could participate. Thus, as Tickner contends, "We must conclude, therefore, that the historical construction of the state, upon which the unitary-actor model in international theory is based, represents a gendered, masculine model. In the West, the image of a foreign-policy maker has been strongly associated with elite, white males and representations of hegemonic masculinity."32

Link – Military

Military operations not only re-enstate masculine policies they leave no room for feminine strategies and lock in gendered notions of politics

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

4. The state's power to regulate reacts on the categories that make up the structure being regulated. Thus the state becomes involved in the historical process generating and transforming the basic components of the gender order. The masculinization of the military apparatus was mentioned earlier as an example of the gender division of labor. It is more than a statistical trend. In armies a dominance-oriented masculinity is deliberately cultivated, in the rigors of basic training and in the manners of the officer corps. The space for femininity of any kind is narrow, a point re-discovered by women recruited to the American military in the recent phase of "equal opportunity." But this masculinity is not all of a piece. The violent masculinity of the frontline soldier would be worse than useless in the commanding general. The most successful general of the twentieth century, Georgi Zhukov, was domineering and brutal but never fired a shot at the Japanese or the Germans; he was a manager, not a fighter, as is clear in his memoirs. A modern army is built around the relations among frontline fighters, managers, supply staff, and technical experts; none can function without the others. In military affairs the state apparatus is visibly constructing particular forms of masculinity and regulating the relations between them, not as an incidental effect of its operations but as a vital precondition of them. This part of the state operates through the gender relation thus constructed.4" The attempts at regulating sexuality made in the core industrial states in the nineteenth century led to equally dramatic effects. As Walkowitz's research indicates, the state's intervention on the terrain of venereal disease, morality, and military efficiency produced the modern socio-legal category of the "prostitute" - creating a category out of what had been much more fluid and relational before. At much the same time, the same state apparatuses restructured the legal proscription of men's homosexuality. In combination with the medicalization of sexual "deviance" by a state-backed medical profession, this marked off "the homosexual man" as a distinct type of person, transforming what had been a much more fluid play of sexuality, at most a sub-cultural tendency among urban men, into a clearly-flagged social barrier.47

Link – Space Discourse

The discourse surrounding and developing “outer space” is inherently gendered. The affirmative’s desire to dominate space via exploration of the renewable technology field and development of SPS that attempts to be the solution of all earthly problems re-enforces masculine ideologies of domination.

Griffin, 2009 (Penny Griffin, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies, “The Spaces Between Us”, found in “Securing Outer Space” by Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan, p.)

This chapter is about sex, but not the sex that people already have clarity about “Outer space” as a human, political domain is organized around sex, but a ‘sex’ that is tacitly located, and rarely spoken, in official discourse. The politics of outer space exploration, militarization and commercialization as they are conceived of and practiced in the US, embody a distinction between public and private (and appropriate behaviors, meanings and identities therein) highly dependent upon heteronormative hierarchies of property and propriety/ The central aim of this chapter is to show how US outer space discourse, an imperial discourse of technological, military and commercial superiority, configures and prescribes success and successful behavior in the politics ol outer space in particularly gendered forms. US space discourse is, I argue, predicated on a heteronormative discourse of conquest that reproduces the dominance of heterosexual masculinity<ics), and which hierarchically orders the construction of order (subordinate) gender identities. Reading the politics of outer space as heteronormative suggests that the discourses through which space exists consist of institutions, structures of understanding, practical orientations and regulatory practices organized and privileged around heterosexuality. As a particularly dominant discursive arrangement of outer space politics, US space discourse (reproduces meaning through gendered assumptions of exploration, colonization, economic endeavor and military conquest that are deeply gendered whilst presented as universal and neutral. US space discourse, which dominates the contemporary global politics of outer space, is thus formed from and upon institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that privilege and normalize hererosexuality as universal. As such, the hegemonic discursive rationalizations of space exploration and conquest (re)produce both hcterosexuality as 'unmarked\* (that is, thoroughly normalized) and the heterosexual imperatives that constitute suitable space-able people, practices and behaviors. As the introduction to this volume highlights, the exploration and utilization of outer space can thus tar lx- held up -is a mirror of, rather than a challenge to, existent, terrestrially-bound, political patterns, behaviors and impulses The new possibilities tor human progress that the application and development of space technologies dates us to make are grounded only in the strategy-obsessed (be it commercially, militarily or otherwise) realities of contemporary global policies. Outer spare is a conceptual, political and material space, a place of collisions and collusions (literally and metaphorically) between objects, ideas, identities and discourses. Outer space, like international relations, is a global space always socially and locally embedded. There is nothing "our there” about outer space. It exists becauseof us, nor in spire of us, and it is this that means that it only makes sense in social norms, that is, in relation to our own constructions of identity and social location. In this chapter, outer space is rlie problematic to which I apply a gender analysis; an arena wherein past, current and future policy-making is embedded in relation to certain performances of power and reconfigurations of identity that are always, and not incidentally, gendered. Effective and appropriate behavior in the politics of outer spare is configured and prescribed in particularly gendered forms, with heteronorma-rive gender regulations endowing outer spaces hierarchies of technologically superior, confusing performance with their everyday power. **It is through gender that US techno-strategic and astro-political discourse has been able to (re)produce outer space as a heterosexualizcd. masculinized realm.** To talk of US outer space politics and discourse as “sexed” and therefore gendered (through the pre/proscription and reproduction of those human identifies considered most effective and appropriate to space) is not purely to limit discussion to sex acts, or sexual identities in the usual sense; it is to talk about 'sex as it is mediated by publics; some of whose obvious relation to sex may be obscure (Berlant and Warner 1998: 547). As Bedford argues, using sexuality as an analytical concept extends beyond discussion of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender issues to consider the ways in which heterosexuality as 'unmarked' (that is, thoroughly normalized) is (re)produced in changing forms by political actors (2005: 296)- **The institutions, structures of understanding and practical orientations through which US space discourse privileges and normalizes heterosexuality as universal are tacitly, not explicitly, gendered.** The dominant discursive rationalizations of outer space exploration and conquest that constitute space as heterosexual, and (re)produce the heterosexual imperatives that constitute suitable space-able people, practices and behaviors, do so in ways that are not necessarily obvious nor are they always coherent. As Butler argues, gender' operates in discourse as a “norm”, a 'standard of normalization' that serves to discursively regulate the bodies over which it presides. When gender operates as a normalizing principle in social practice, it is more likely ro be 'implicit, difficult to read', amid 'discernible most clearly and dramatically\* in the effects that it produces, thus the prescription and reproduction of hetero-normarive gender in Outer Space discourse, like all other norms, 'may or may nor be explicit' (Butler 2004: 41).

Link – Space Discourse

The justifications of space exploration or development based on \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ justifies sexualized and gendered assumptions. This results in the drive for imperial expansion

Griffin, 2009 (Penny Griffin, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies, “The Spaces Between Us”, found in “Securing Outer Space” by Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan, p.)

This section begins an exploration of US outer space discourse as, from the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1937, dominated by an aggressive, colonialist project perpetuated through the reproduction of types of what Dean refers to as "imperial masculinity(ies) Dean 2001). US outer space, as a discursive realm, articulates identities, behaviors and meanings in particular, sexed, ways. I use 'discourse’ to imply, as Derrida suggests, an, intrinsically (re)productive (of itself, but also the identities, behaviors and meanings considered necessary, suitable, or most selective), historically dependent system of signification (Derrida 2001: 3)- A discourse thus forms the identities of sub jeers and objects^ and is composed of a multitude ot practices, institutions, identities, norms, rules and disciplinary procedures. Both material and heterogeneous in nature (Best and Kellner 1991\* 26), a discourse carries its meanings and modes of representation in discursive practices. This chapter otters an analysis of US outer space discourse as a constructed, and thus potentially unstable, arrangement of identity. US space discourse constitutes an exceptionally powerful, bur not unchallenged, arrangement of identities, practices, norms and processes, embodying tacit, but crucial, gendered and sexualized assumptions. Historically contingent and therefore subject to significant change, contemporary US space discourse does nor articulate meaning or reproduce identities in exactly the same way as it might have done fifty years ago. at the height of Cold War posturing. This is not to argue, however, that a certain continuity does not exist in US space discourse, **which has been and continues to be grounded on claims to colonization, expansionism, competition, weaponization, privatization, securitization and commercialization**. One difference is, however, that, as Rees argues, the US is \*not as overwhelmingly economically superior\* as it was when it launched the Marshall Plan, it cannot stabilize the world economically in the way that it might have done fifty years ago, and that it is vulnerable in a way that it was not in the post-war years (Rees, interviewing Tony Benn, in Reza 2003: 13). It is, therefore, worth considering how, and according to what politics, US discourse has constituted and continues to constitute outer space. So, before I go on to examine the gendered constitution of US outer space discourse, I want first to provide some, political and historical, background to the contemporary constitution of US space policy. II the Marshall Plan her-aided \i sort of colonial reconstruction of Europe' (Benn, in Reza 2003: 13—14), the Bush administrations "new vision for space exploration” represents an equally imperial design, a design predicated on ideas of imperial expansion in which the reproduction and promulgation of heterosexual gender identities) are not just incidental to the success of the project, but absolutely central to it. As analysts have noted, particularly of the Kennedy and Johnson Cold War administrations, IS electoral politics has long embodied. \in obsession with "roughness" and the use of a sexualized language of competition and dominance among men who contended for power within the American electoral system and within the foreign policy bureaucracy’(Dean 2001: 3—4).

Link – Space Dominance

The discourse of US dominance over space that the aff engages in reproduces space as an arena of the ultimate conquest of the heterosexual male. This forms locks in the identities of subjects and objects re-enforcing heteronormative values and solidifying gender.

Penny Griffin (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies) March 25, 2006 “The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/8/3/0/pages98301/p98301-2.php

The central aim of this paper is to show how a dominant US discourse of technological, military and commercial superiority configures and prescribes success and successful behaviour in the politics of outer space in particularly gendered forms. US space discourse is predicated on a heteronormative discourse that (re)produces the dominance of heterosexual masculinity(ies), and which hierarchically orders the construction of other (subordinate) gender identities. As a particularly dominant discursive arrangement of outer space politics, US space discourse (re)produces meaning through the gendered assumptions of exploration, colonisation, economic endeavour and military conquest that are deeply gendered whilst presented as universal and neutral. It is worth considering how, and according to what political ideology, US political discourse constitutes space. Thus, while it is true that a particularly insidious neoliberal globalisation thesis does indeed drive much of US space discourse (dependent on the expansion of the free market into all areas of social life), space is rarely only conceived of in commercial terms in the US. As such, neoliberal, commercial imperatives, together with various narratives of scientific ‘progress’ and ‘discovery’, also interact in US political culture with a highly militaristic and imperial discourse of weaponization, territorial conquest and securitization. Herein, important performances of gendered identity construct specific, tacitly gendered, rationalisations of outer space exploration and colonisation in particular ways. Specifically, this involves highly masculinized performances of so-called techno-wizardry, speed, proliferation and investment that construct space as a frontier to be conquered, controlled and colonized through scientific, commercial and/or military prowess. Through gendered, discursive constructions of technologically superior, conquesting performance, the dominant (US) discourse of outer space thus (re)produces space as the arena of the ultimate conquest of heterosexual man over nature, an arena dependent on. Conceptualising Outer Space This paper examines outer space as a discursive realm, articulating identities, behaviours and meanings in particular, gendered, ways. Discourses are, as Derrida suggests, historically dependent systems of signification and are intrinsically (re)productive (Derrida 2001, 3). Discourses, as (re)productive systems of meaningful practices, form the identities of subjects and objects, and are composed of a multitude of practices, institutions, identities, norms, rules and disciplinary procedures. These systems are material and heterogeneous in nature (Best and Kellner 1991, 26), and carry their meanings and modes of representation through discursive practices. This paper offers an analysis of US outer space discourse as a constructed, and thus potentially unstable, arrangements of identity. US space discourse constitutes an exceptionally powerful, but not unchallenged, arrangement of identities, practices, norms and processes, embodying tacit, but crucial, gendered and sexualized assumptions. Space, as a discursive realm, cannot be considered ‘extraterrestrial’ in any traditional sense. Outer space may, physically, exist somewhere beyond the Earth’s terrestrial atmosphere, but the politics of outer space are invariably Earth-bound. Global outer space politics, although involving a multitude of actors, organisations, state and non-state-based articulations, is currently dominated by a US-led ‘liberal’ discourse of military, commercial and scientific conquest that draws heavily from essentialist and foundational ideologies of nature, civilization, science, progress and consumption. Crawford, in proposing a case for the ‘scientific and social’ importance of human space exploration, suggests that, [T]here are reasons for believing that as a species Homo sapiens is genetically predisposed towards exploration and the colonisation of an open frontier. Access to such a frontier, at least vicariously, may be in some sense psychologically necessary for the long-term wellbeing of human societies. (Crawford, 2005: 260) Similarly, NASA’s website claims that ‘[f]rom the time of our birth, humans have felt a primordial urge to explore,’ to ‘blaze new trails, map new lands, and answer profound questions about ourselves and our universe’ (www.nasa.gov). This remark, along with others such as Crawford’s, presents a vision of the human colonisation of Outer Space as both natural and essential to humanity, a ‘psychological and cultural requirement’ that is not merely a ‘Western predisposition’, but ‘a human one’ (Crawford, 2005: 260). By their very nature, such statements are founded on a definition of ‘universal’ human society entirely Western in origin, dependent on the kind of ‘modern, knowledge-based economy’ that the US has sought to establish through technological, military and commercial expansion. Although the ‘we’ in much US space discourse is meant as universal, in reality it is a highly singular and culturally specific construction of identity, one deeply embedded in the liberal belief that humanity needs ‘a sense of freedom’ and ‘choice’ (Seguin, 2005: 981); that it was ‘our’ grandparents who thought exploring Africa was an adventure (Mendell, 2005: 10), and not Africans themselves; that the ‘scientific revolution’ sprang from the ‘unusual pragmatic and classless entrepreneurship of US society’ that ‘promoted commercialisation and innovative marketing of new technology’ (ibid.).

Link – Space Exploration

The highly sexualized nature of space drives exploration and the heteronormative values that come with it. The threat of emasculation by rival countries, like Russia, and the success of being “able to perform” after accomplishing missions, like the first man on the moon, re-enforce hegemonic and heteronormative binaries.

Penny Griffin (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies) March 25, 2006 “The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/8/3/0/pages98301/p98301-2.php

Dominating Outer Space: The Discursive Constitution of (US) Space Politics [S]omething about space travel excites the human imagination in ways that transcend mundane political objectives. (Mendell, 2005: 7) Contrary to this somewhat ‘Star Trek’, politically liberal, vision of a humanity united by the dream of space exploration, and however apparently exciting outer space is envisioned (as an essentially little known and unexplored frontier of human endeavour), there is actually very little about the politics of outer space that would suggest that humanity has transcended the monotony of planet Earth. In order to consider the constitution of space as a discursive realm dominated by US space discourse, this section begins with a brief genealogy, of sorts, of the development of US space politics, with a view to understanding the ways in which a regulatory, heteronormative framework of heterosexually masculinity is constructed and (re)produced. The Cold War between the US and USSR dominated the writings of intellectuals and the agendas of political leaders during the 1950s and 1960s. US politics was the preserve of security, military policy and alliance politics, with issues beyond these receiving little sustained attention (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 2). Within a discourse predicated on the attainment and maintenance of military and strategic superiority, the conquest of outer space achieved particular prominence as a ‘Space Race’ to develop the most effective long-range rocket-based weaponry. At this point, the US approach to space was to consider it entirely an extension of Earth-bound warfare, probably most clearly evidenced by the public ‘clamour’ surrounding the Soviet launch of Sputnik I in 1957. Although this mass public panic belied Sputnik’s ‘inability to do more than orbit the Earth and transmit meaningless radio blips’ (Dickson, 2004: 1), the agenda was thus configured as a crisis in US identity, and read as a warning to the administration that the US’s mantle of ‘greatest nation on Earth’ was slipping (cf. http://.history.nasa.gov/sputnik). Any discussion of space ‘exploration’ for its own sake, as distinguishable from the development of ‘rocket technology’, remained at this point of marginal concern. Although the mass ‘hysteria’ generated in Washington at the launch of Sputnik may have been somewhat overstated, the US certainly appeared to many something less of world hegemon, and Eisenhower’s “paternalistically vague” (Democratic Senator Stuart Symington, quoted in Dickson, 2004: 2) response to Soviet space ‘dominance’ was heavily criticised. Dickson characterises the period immediately proceeding Sputnik’s launch as one of ‘national insecurity, ‘wounded national pride’, ‘in-fighting’, ‘political grandstanding’, ‘clandestine plots’ and ‘ruthless media frenzy’ (2004: 4). Less a battle of scientific and technological achievement, the origins of the ‘Space Race’ more accurately lie in US and Soviet attempts at psychological one-upmanship. The Space Race became a mirror for the ways in which Americans perceived themselves and their, thus far unchallenged, hegemony, less a reflection of the exact nature of the US state during the Cold War than the refraction of its political, cultural and administrative insecurities. Accordingly, a highly sexualised discourse emerged in the US. Insistent on the militarisation of all aspects of US life, this discourse was fuelled by a national paranoia that the US might be perceived, by others and itself, as in any sense weak, complacent, or showing any kind of ‘missile gap’, or aspect of ‘lack’, that is, as emasculated by Soviet achievement. Kennedy’s election came at a moment when Eisenhower’s ‘passive’ and apparently ‘unconcerned’ leadership appeared at its most effeminately inferior. Kennedy’s immediate focus on the ‘space gap’ signalled the announcement of a more militaristically virile engagement. Space exploration increasingly became a central policy tenet of the Kennedy government, with the ‘first’ of getting a US astronaut on the Moon a means of reasserting US authority and avenging any doubts as to the administration’s ability to perform. While the USSR, however, had always shrouded the actual processes of its development of space technology in secrecy, the US elected a different approach, one that intentionally and actively separated the public and private of space colonisation through the creation of so-called ‘civilian’ (that is, more open to the public) programmes, such as the Apollo 11 mission to the Moon, and ‘military’ (closed to the public) space agencies.

Link – Space Law

US manipulates “space law” to lock in gender – it passes policies that protect the home base but not that limit weaponization

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This ‘warfighting’ discourse is not, of course, the US’s only discursive construction of outer space. It is also at odds with much so-called ‘space law’, in particular the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which defines space as the ‘province of all mankind’ and asks that states act ‘with due regard to the corresponding interests of States Parties to the Treaty’ (Brearly, 2005: 16- 17). Within the US itself, congressionally-led efforts to discuss and minimise the threats posed by human-made debris caught in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), of which there is somewhere in the region of 2,300 metric tonnes (ibid.: 9), appear ill-matched to US Space Command’s clear efforts to increase the US weaponization of space. The US’s inconsistent position stems from the individualism of politically liberal rhetoric. The US cooperates, to a limited extent, in perpetuating a sustainable space environment for its satellite- based systems, to which space debris undoubtedly poses a threat, because this is of direct individual benefit to US commercial interests. The US refuses, however, to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), prohibiting all use of nuclear explosions in space, since this constitutes a restriction of its ability to develop and test ‘new’ weapons. US critics of the CTBT contend that ratifying the treaty would ‘undercut confidence in the US deterrent’, and thus increase ‘the incentive for rogue states to obtain nuclear weapons’ (Medalia, 2006: 13).

Link – State

State action is gendered – locks in power hierarchies of masculine domination

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

The second component of a gender regime is a structure of power. More feminist analysis has focused on the external power relations of the state than on its internal arrangement, but there has been some discussion of the most conspicuous feature of authority in the modern state, its bureaucratization. Bureaucracy, as argued by Ferguson and by Grant and Tancred-Sheriff, is a "gendered hierarchy." Its connection with the rise of new models of masculinity in the nineteenth century has already been mentioned. The classical theory of bureaucracy developed by Weber and his followers emphasized the connection of bureaucracy with the secularization and rationalization of human relationships. Feminist research on cultural history, especially the history of science, is now showing the fundamental connections of this model of rationality with gender politics and the legitimation of men's domination over women.38 Yet seeing bureaucracy in direct opposition to feminism, as Ferguson does, misses key points about it. As Deacon points out, the growth of a "white-collar" workforce as the state's administrative apparatus expanded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a crucial means of access for women, who entered the resulting clerical and semi-professional occupations in very large numbers. Women in the bureaucracy fought, and eventually won, battles to eliminate the many organizational barriers (such as "marriage bars") set up to restrict their access. The very "rationalization" of practice on which bureaucracy is built is potentially subversive of patriarchy. Like the concepts of citizenship and representation, rationality implicitly contains universalizable claims; once made, these corrode the legitimacy of traditional gender inequalities. Equal employment opportunity programs are now using this leverage to some effect.39 Bureaucracy is not the only feature of the organization of power within the state. The "other side of bureaucracy" involves personal networks, factions, the informal organization of resources and contacts. Organized as networks among men, these may survive the advent of formal sex equality. The various units of the state require coordination; and the means of coordination change historically. In the 1980s a pattern of administrative coordination within state structures was increasingly displaced by fiscal coordination, and this shift is not gender-neutral. The language of finance and "economic rationalism" has been the vehicle for an attack on welfare ideology, and a downgrading of women's interests on a very broad front, from the abolition of women's access programs in further education to the gutting of child-care programs.4" Finally the system of representation has also been socially organized on gender lines, with the enormous majority of elected officials being men though at least half of most electorates are women. Electoral patriarchy, as we might call this situation, has been surprisingly resilient. The only part of the world where it is seriously frayed, where women are elected in substantial numbers to positions of real power, is Scandinavia.

Link – State

We must break out of the construction of the state. Its empiric focus on sexuality coopts any solvency of the alternative by re-enforcing gender binaries

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A note about terms and scope is necessary. Sexuality is part of the domain of human practice organized (in part) by gender relations, and "sexual politics" is the contestation of issues of sexuality by the social interests constituted within gender relations. "Gender politics" is a broader term embracing the whole field of social struggle between such interests. "The state" is empirically as well as theoretically complex. Actual states include local government, and regional (for example, provincial or state) and national levels, and there is even an international level of the state, found in international law and inter-governmental organizations such as the European Economic Community and the United Nations. Drawing boundaries around "the state" is not easy; taxation departments and courts are obviously state institutions, but are medical associations? welfare agencies? universities? unions? The problem is compounded by the fact that the realm of the state as well as the form of the state changes historically. The approach taken in this article, as in much modern state theory, is to emphasize the state as process rather than the state as thing. In this respect the approach parallels the work on the state and sexuality by Foucault and those influenced by him, and I have drawn on this tradition in discussing processe of regulation. But the history of gender politics requires also an analysis of the institutional apparatus of the state that makes regulation possible, and of the process of internal coordination that gives state apparatuses a degree of coherence in practice. Here I have found more helpful models in socialist state theory and in the sociology of bureaucracy. Coordination (which can be linked on the one hand to the concept of "sovereignty," on the other hand to the institutional transformations that compose the structural history of the state) is the main point of reference in this article for marking out the sphere of the state. When I speak, to save circumlocution, of the state as an object or as an actor, I mean the set of institutions currently subject to coordination (by administrative or budgetary means) by a state directorate. The focus of the discussion, as in most of the English-language literature, is the liberal state associated with industrial-capitalist economies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Living in a semi-colonial country makes one acutely aware of the importance of imperialism in the history of modern states, and at various points I discuss divergences in gender politics between metropole and colony. I do not discuss communist states, though in principle the framework should be of use in discussing them. If it is true, as I suspect, that most communist states have little to do with socialism and in most respects are a quite familiar form of the state, a kind of military dictatorship, then their sexual politics will differ from liberal states in the way interests in sexual politics are articulated, but in other ways will be similar.

The state is gendered and uses it for political manipulation

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Liberal feminism has brought to the surface the suppressed truth that the state is gendered, and has used this truth to inspire a formidable and sustained politics of access. But it has not been able to grasp the character of gender as an institutional and motivational system, nor to develop a coherent analysis of the state apparatus or its links to a social context. The underlying individualism of classic liberalism, as Z. Eisenstein argues, is at odds with the social analysis required for the development of feminism. Only through a break with liberal presuppositions can these antinomies be overcome. It is, indeed, in the more radical feminisms of the 1970s and 1980s that a new concept of the state has emerged.'3

Link - State

Power relations produced in private life are inherently tied to relations of the public. Attempts to use the state to create political change are futile and deceptive in favor of true political change.

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A strategic question The classic feminist slogan "the personal is political" states a basic feature of feminist and gay politics, a link between personal experience and power relations. In many cases the power relations are immediately present in personal life, in matters conventionally thought "private": housework, homophobic jokes, office sexuality, child rearing. Yet there is also a highly "public" dimension of these politics. During the 1970s, Western feminisms made open and substantial demands on the state in every country where a significant mobilization of women occurred. So did gay liberation movements, where they developed. The list of reforms sought includes the decriminalization of abortion in France, a constitutional guarantee of equal rights for women in the USA, rape law reform in Australia, decriminalization of homosexuality in many countries; not to mention expanded state provision of child care, nonsexist education, protection against sexual violence, equal employment opportunity, and anti-discrimination measures. By the early 1980s a women's peace movement had added disarmament and feminist environmentalists had added environmental protection - neither conventionally thought of as gender politics but both now argued in gender terms.' Across this spectrum of demands, the results at the end of the 1980s seem discouraging. The ERA was defeated in the United States. Abortion was decriminalized in some countries, but a powerful American movement to re-criminalize it is under way. Men's homosexuality was decriminalized in some countries and some jurisdictions, but usually in a grudging and partial way, and official homophobia is on the rise again, in Britain most conspicuously. Public provision of child care remains massively below demonstrable need. Non-sexist education policies with teeth (and funding) remain rare. Governments led by Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl, riding the neo-conservative tide, have been openly reactionary in matters of sexual politics. Those led by figures such as Mitterand and Hawke, who came to power with support from feminists, have been glacially slow to introduce the reforms feminists want, beyond the easy symbolic gestures. Does this experience show the strategy was mistaken? If the modern state is itself "the general patriarch," in Mies's evocative phrase,2 then demanding that the state redress injustices worked by the "individual patriarch" in the family (or any other setting) is merely appealing from Caesar unto Caesar. Seeking reform through the state is an exercise in futility, perhaps even in deception. What is at issue here is not just a practical appraisal of the results of a particular period of political activism. At issue is the way we think about gender and about the state. Complex theoretical questions are involved. There is no established theoretical framework to which the appraisal can be related. In a widely read article, MacKinnon ruefully remarked that "feminism has no theory of the state."3 This is not completely correct, but it is certain that feminism has no developed or widely agreed theory of the state. The same applies to gay liberation, and to socialscientific conceptualizations of gender. Yet the slate is not blank. Many beginnings with the problem have been made.

Link – Terrorism

The fight against terrorism is a fight against the uncivilized, irrational danger—this justifies endless war and intervention to protect the masculine order

Wilcox 3 [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”, RCB]

These statements give several clues as to the implications of ”barbaric‘ behavior. Terrorists are barbaric and uncivilized, and opposed to democracy. Those who commit evil acts commit attacks against civilization, therefore, being uncivilized is equivalent to being evil. Finally, terrorists fight without rules, they kill innocents and women, and they are cowards, therefore they are barbaric and uncivilized. Overall, the message is clearly that of a dichotomous world, in which there are only two choices; civilization or barbarism, us or them. In order to understand the significance of the use of the discourse of civilization versus barbarism in the war on terror, a brief history of this discourse is helpful. Applying the label ”barbaric‘ to people from the Middle East, or any non-white peoples is hardly a new historical development. In his book Orientalism˙ Edward Said critiques the discipline of Oriental Studies in the European and American academies for reproducing stereotypes and using their privileged status to create knowledge about people in the Middle East that served to justify and increase their control and domination over these people. 63 Said describes the relationship between West and the Middle East, as seen from the West, —to be one between a strong and a weak partner,“ and adds that, —many terms were used to express the relations…The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ”different‘; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ”normal.‘ “64 This relationship is gendered in that ”Orientals‘ are assigned traits associated with femininity and inferiority. This dichotomous relationship is replicated in political discourses as well as in academic and literary circles. The discourse of civilization/barbarism was used in order to justify colonialism of non-white peoples throughout the world, and has a long history in US foreign history. A people labeled ”uncivilized‘ is considered to be unable to rule themselves, and is need of guidance from more civilized people. The use of force against ”barbarians‘ is also justified.65 Furthermore, the rules of humane and civilized warfare do not apply to wars against ”barbaric‘ peoples. Against this background, the use of the discourse of barbarism can be seen as an attempt to foretell the coming war and to persuade people of the necessity of using force against al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan. The additional measures of control, surveillance, and detention of Middle Eastern and North African men in the process of securitizing immigration served to harass, demean and subordinate this ”inferior‘ masculinity, contributing to the constructing of the hegemonic masculinity of American men. The ”special‘ registration requirements for the National Security Entry-Exit System is evidence of the gendered inside/outside, us/them distinction in regards to national identity. This program, instituted as part of the securitization of immigration, serves to support the construction and maintenance of the current articulation of hegemonic masculinity, which differentiates American men as superior to men in the Middle East. The special registration requires that men and boys over the age of fifteen with non-immigrant visas from countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and an outlier, North Korea, be interviewed and have their whereabouts tracked by the INS.66 These persons will be finger printed and photographed, with their fingerprints matched against fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists and used by law enforcement. They are also required to submit personal contact information, and are required to notify the Attorney General when the change addresses. These measures are in addition to the detention and questioning of thousands of men of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11 that tacks, some allegedly detained without access to attorneys or proper food.67 The INS has also recently changed its policy on asylum, as people seeking asylum from thirty-three countries, mostly in the Middle East, are now being detained pending the processing of their applications, where previously they have been released.68 By concentrating on men as the ”outsiders‘ Middle Eastern men specifically service not only as the ”other‘ that American identity is contrasted again, but a feminized ”other‘ that American masculinity is defined against.

Impact - Exclusion

Space policy only identifies ‘sex’ and the categorization of women based off of “gender related” differences to men and how they are inadequate. This locks in heterosexist framings of gender and forces a standard of “normal” allowing for extreme policies of exclusion

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Sex in Public/Private In arguing that the politics of outer space can be read as heteronormative, this paper suggests that outer space embodies institutions, structures of understanding, practical orientations and regulatory practices organised and privileged around heterosexuality. As Butler would argue, politics is derived of ‘fields of power’, sometimes differently articulated, and which therefore suggest that categories of ‘sex’ can be read in different ways (Butler, 1990: 25). An anglo-american, neoliberalised, politics of outer space exists as a particular embodiment of a regulatory economy of sexuality. ‘Sex’ is only explicitly spoken of in US space discourse to signal the category of ‘woman’, and the physical and psychological constraints that woman’s ‘body’ brings to spaceflight and exploration. NASA, for example, in identifying ‘gender-related’ differences affecting the efficacy and effects of spaceflight and travel, focus exclusively on the physiological differences between men and women (bone density, blood flow, hormonal and metabolic differences, etc.). As Casper and Moore argue, NASA’s heterosexist framings of these issues highlight sex in space as a social and scientific problem (1995: 313). Female bodies are thus ‘constructed against a backdrop in which male bodies are accepted as the norm, an inscription process shaped by the masculine context of space travel’ (ibid.: 316). By identifying only ‘woman’ with ‘sex’, and the ‘ostensibly sexualised features’ of women’s ‘bodies’ (Butler, 1990: 26), a certain, heterosexist, order and identity is effectively instituted in US outer space discourse. Persons (for example, those astronauts selected for spaceflight) cannot be signified, as Butler argues, ‘without the mark of gender’ (ibid.: 28). Inextricably bound to the ‘popular heroes’ of the Cold War (American) cultural imaginary, the construction of the astronaut as space pioneer is embedded within a broader political framework of space travel, wherein ‘women’ are seen as essentially different to men both physiologically and in terms of being taken seriously with a masculine environment, one in which the true ‘visionary’ and ‘entrepreneur’ leading the quest into outer space has, in the US, always been coded male. Thus NASA not only physically and empirically regulates which bodies can and cannot succeed in outer space (from its refusal to consider women candidates in the 1950s and 1960s, to ongoing controversies surrounding the possibility of menstruation, sexual intercourse and pregnancy in mixed-crew space travel); it also constitutes the discursive regulations through which persons are made ‘regular’. Gender, as Butler argues, thus becomes the ‘norm’ that operates within social practices as ‘the implicit standard of normalization’ (2004: 41).

Impact – Extinction

Patriarchy guarantees extinction—try or die

Nhanenge 7 [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust. Such actions are denial of wisdom. It is working against natural harmony and destroying the basis of existence. But as long as ordinary people leave questions of technology to the "experts" we will continue the forward stampede. As long as economics focus on technology and both are the focus of politics, we can leave none of them to experts. Ordinary people are often more capable of taking a wider and more humanistic view than these experts. (Kelly 1990: 112-114; Eisler 1990: 3233; Schumacher 1993: 20, 126, 128, 130).

Impact – Imperial Conquest

US discourse of space provides justification for unchecked imperial conquest

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The US is, of course, heavily reliant on its satellite-based systems, and to this end works (to a certain extent) within a regime framework of international space ‘law’ (Brearly, 2005: 14). This is not to suggest that US discourse is not constructed around the embedded belief that the US itself represents the global hegemon, and the only viable, indeed legitimate, keeper of global ‘order’. Although, as US Space Command states, the US may be challenged ‘regionally’, it remains ‘unlikely to be challenged by a global peer competitor (US Space Command, ‘Joint Vision 2020’). From a position of discursive hegemony, US Space Command and the Pentagon have formulated a politics of Outer Space that is in all but name a justification for unabashedly imperial conquest. According to the ‘Joint Vision 2020’ control of space assures ‘access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required’. The discursive deployment of space as a ‘medium’ suggests that, in US discourse, space exists essentially as a void, an extractable and expendable resource to be used at will (much like the oceans of ‘historical sea commerce’), with the US cast in ‘a classic warfighter role’.

Impact – fascism/authoritarianism

The impact is authoritarianism and fascism – Growing masculinity of the state results in emotional distancing and the desire to dominate

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

The third component of a gender regime is the structure of cathexis, the gender patterning of emotional attachments. This is the side of the state we know least about, by far. There is a long tradition of psychological research on attachment to political authority, going back to early psychoanalytic speculation about political leadership, and culminating in the research on fascism that produced theories of the "authoritarian personality." There was almost no recognition of gender in this literature, though it can now be re-read as a discourse about masculinity and the ways men can be attached to political leaders. Macciocchi has explored the parallel problem for women in Italian fascism. A gender patterning of emotion may also be significant within the state apparatus. Pringle has explored the complexities of boss/secretary relationships and suggests the importance of pleasure for understanding these workplace connections. What Hochschild calls "emotional labor" is an important part of the labor process in some fields of state employment, such as welfare and nursing. Such work is often allocated to women, and emotion thus becomes linked into the state's sexual division of labor. One might speculate that the growth and impersonality of the state structure has created increasing problems in the management of cathexis, and that modern official nationalism is partly a response to this. There is certainly an active gender politics around nationalism. Mies has pointed to a dramatic shift in nationalist imagery in postrevolutionary states: In this phase, the female image of the nation, found on the revolutionary posters mentioned above, is replaced by the images of the founding-fathers: Marx. Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao. Ho Chi Minh, Castro. Mugabe, to name only a few. Typically, among this gallery of socialist patriarchs, there are no women. A patriarchal structure of cathexis, it appears, cannot be presumed; strenuous work goes into trying to guarantee it.41

Impact – Patriarchy

Patriarchy is not inevitable—failure to solve guarantees extinction

Clark 4[Mary E., PhD and professor of biological studies @ Berkeley, "RHETORIC, PATRIARCHY & WAR: EXPLAINING THE DANGERS OF "LEADERSHIP" IN MASS CULTURE", http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4005307/Rhetoric-patriarchy-war-explaining-the.html]

I begin by questioning the notion that patriarchy is a "natural" or "inevitable" form of human society. By "patriarchy" I do not mean a community or society where males hold political positions as spokespersons for the whole and often are adjudicators of local disputes. This "male function" is common in tribal and indigenous societies. But men's power over others is severely limited and generally held only at the pleasure of the entire group, especially the elder women. (4) Patriarchies, rather, are those much larger societies where not only is there gender dominance; they also are highly class-structured, with a small, powerful elite controlling the rest of society, A short history of these entities is necessary to understand today's dilemma. Rigidly controlled patriarchies have evolved and disintegrated at many times and in many places in the past few millennia of human existence-which, being the era of written history, is the condition of humankind most familiar to us. But, as I have argued elsewhere (5) this was an unknown political condition throughout earlier human existence, when small, egalitarian, highly dialogic communities prevailed. Even today, small remnants of such societies still exist in comers of the planet that escaped the socially destructive impact of Western colonization. Modern Western "democracies" are, in fact, patriarchal in structure, evolving out of the old, male-dominated aristocracies of late-Medieval Europe. Those historic class/caste hierarchies were legitimized by embedded religious dogma and inherited royal authority. Together, church and monarch held a monopoly of physical and economic power, creating politically stable, albeit unjust, societies. During the gradual development of the religious Reformation, coupled with the Enlightenment's concept of the "individual citizen," emerging egalitarian ideas threatened to destabilize the social coherence of patriarchal regimes. At the same time, principalities and dukedoms were fusing into kingdoms; kingdoms, in turn, were joining together as giant nation states. The United Kingdom was formed of England, Wales and Scotland-each a fusion of local earlier dukedoms. City States of Italy fused rather later. Bismarck created the "Second Reich" out of diverse German-speaking princedoms in the 1870s. And, adding to this growth in the sheer size of patriarchies there was a doubling of populations every couple of generations. Nation-states emerged as "mass cultures," with literally millions of persons under the control of a single, powerful government. The centralized physical power possessed by most of these several industrializing European nations matched or exceeded that of ancient Rome. To achieve coherence of such societies demanded a new legitimating force to create a broad base of support among giant, diverse populations. The erosion of the belief that classes were a god-given, "natural" state of affairs was hastened by the introduction of low-cost printing and rapidly growing levels of literacy (both necessary to underpin the new Industrial Age). These politically equalizing forces unleashed a host of social discontents that had to be controlled. The old religious threats of damnation or excommunication were fast losing their force, and new legal systems circumscribed the absolute powers of monarchs to control social behavior. This very cacaphony of voices threatened the stability of the new giant states. The "solution," of course, was to take control of the public dialogue, to define the legitimate "topics of conversation." This is the primary role of political "leadership" in today's mass societies, and that leadership uses two major tools to wield its influence: rhetoric and the mass media. I suggest, then, that the high potential for internal instability in giant patriarchal states is a primary factor in setting the stage for today's global insecurity and the extreme militaristic rhetoric that exists both within and between nations. Before continuing this discussion of patriarchy's dangers, I would note that, although in modern Western patriarchies the domination of women by men is less evident as women have gained increasing political and economic status, women with such status tend to assume the "shoulder pads" and "language" of men when it comes to political and economic institutions. Women like Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Golda Melt, Israeli Prime Minister; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador to the United Nations; Madeleine Albright, Clinton's Secretary of State; Margaret Thatcher, Britain's Prime Minister; and Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush's Security Advisor, come readily to mind. (Thatcher cites the following terms the media applied to her: Iron Lady, Battling Maggie, and Attila the Hen. (6)) The glass ceiling in the corporate world has proved harder to crack, however, so fewer well-known examples exist there of powerful females. (Katherine Graham, who became publisher of the Washington Post after the death of her husband, was one of the few powerful women who to her credit, did not adopt the patriarchal mode.) Hence, I regard the Western nations' politico-economic world view as very much in accordance with that of historical patriarchies, with perhaps one or two Scandinavian exceptions. I thus conclude that the language of international politics today is "gendered" by the political insecurity experienced by leaders of earlier patriarchies, and that the presence of women in such governments has little effect on the framework of public dialogue. (I recall hearing Geraldine Ferraro, when running for Vice-President in 1984, assure an interviewer that she would not hesitate to push the "nuclear button" if necessary.) Hence, it is not our X and Y chromosomes that are at issue here; it is the gendered world view that underpins our institutions and frames our behaviors. As long as those in power "think" in this patriarchal box, we will live in a globally-armed camp, where war-leading even to the annihilation of our species-is a constant, real possibility.

Impact – War

The state is a wider structure of gender relations that allows violenc, viewing policies through a gendered lens eliminates the logic of power and control

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The state is constituted within gender relations as the central institutionalization of gendered power. Conversely, gender dynamics are a majorforce constructing the state, both in the historical creation of state structures and in contemporary politics. Many of the policy-oriented discussions of topics such as "women and welfare" take the already written history of the modern state for granted, and inquire about its consequences for women. This traps the analysis of gender politics in an external logic, most commonly in a logic of class. Rather, we need to appraise the state from the start as having a specific location within gender relations, and as having a his- tory shaped by a gender dynamic. This is not the only basis of state history, but it is an essential and irreducible aspect of the state. The state is a structure of power, persisting over time; an institutionalization of power relations. It is not the only institutionalization of power, nor even the monopolist of legitimate force, as some classic theory has it. Feminism points to the family as a domain of power, and to husbands' violence against wives - which survey research shows very widespread - as a socially legitimated use of force. Violence against gay men is also widely regarded as legitimate, and in bashings of gays, as in husbands' bashing of wives, the laws against assault are generally inactive.29 The state, then, is only part of a wider structure of gender relations that embody violence or other means of control. It is a node within that network of power relations that is one of the principal sub-structures of the gender order. The state is indeed the main organizer of the power relations of gender. Its scale and coherence contrast, for instance, with the dispersed, cellular character of power relations institutionalized in families. Through laws and administrative arrangements the state sets limits to the use of personal violence, protects property (and thus unequal economic resources), criminalizes stigmatized sexuality, embodies masculinized hierarchy, and organizes collective violence in policing, prisons, and war. In certain circumstances the state also allows or even invites the counter-mobilization of power.

Impact – Warfare/Policy Failure

Masculine views of IR exclude other possible solutions, that makes warfare and policy failure inevitable—Iraq proves

Lieberfeld 5 [Daniel, Associate Professor of Social and Political Policy @ Duquesne University, PhD in IR from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, “THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND THE IRAQ WAR”, International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2005, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10\_2/wLieberfeld10n2IJPS.pdf, RCB]

Some observers have also located motives for the invasion decision in Bush’s relationship with his father: Given the continual comparisons with his father within the Bush family, and how far he was from being a self-made man, Bush junior may have felt compelled to prove himself by surpassing his father and overthrowing Hussein, which his father had rejected doing after the 1991 Gulf war. Moreover, going to war with Iraq may have enhanced the younger Bush’s sense of his own virility, given his sensitivity to the fact that his father had been publicly labeled a “wimp” (Schweizer and Schweizer, 2004, 388; see also Woodward, 2004, 421). Feminist theories of international relations highlight the causal role of gender in war. These theories generally assume that increasing women’s roles in governance and public decisionmaking would lessen war and violence. Such theories might account for the invasion decision with reference to key administration members’ sense of masculinity and to gendered images of the adversary (see Cohn, 1993), or to the relative absence of women (pace Condoleezza Rice) from the highest levels of decision-making authority. Interpretations stressing motivated biases posit that Bush and his inner circle were genuinely convinced that Iraq was a major threat and that, due to their emotional and cognitive predispositions, they seized on ambiguous intelligence information as confirmation of their biases. Such interpretations stand in contrast to the possibility that the administration deliberately deceive d Congress and the public regarding an Iraqi threat that they knew to be minor or non-existent. The administration’s miscalculations—underestimating the al-Qaeda threat before 9/11, overestimating Iraq’s weapons capabilities and intentions, underestimating the costs of an invasion and the potential for an anti-U.S. insurgency, as well as overestimating the degree to which other countries would bandwagon with the U.S. in the wake of the invasion—were probably facilitated by conformity of opinion among the inner circle of decisionmakers and the exclusion of outside expert advice. This facilitated a groupthink process (Janis, 1972) in which the members of the tight decisionmaking circle around Bush minimized the risks of an invasion. The absence of genuine debate and the presence of “mindguards” like Cheney who protect leaders from dissenting opinions (see, e.g., Suskind, 2004a, 76) create the conditions for groupthink, in which group members’ independent and rational judgment is overridden by pressures to defer to the perceived preferences of a higher-ranking leader. Groupthink typically involves overestimating the group’s chances of success and the righteousness of its cause, while neglecting to test assumptions about policy options and, consequently, underestimating their drawbacks and vulnerabilities. Bush’s personality predisposes him toward certainty, rather than nuanced reflection, introspection, or self-criticism (Suskind, 2004b). This trait may have led him to expect an easy victory in Iraq. Bush’s faith may have also constituted a motivated bias that led Bush to minimize risks and to favor a policy of confrontation. Bush’s lack of cognitive complexity—the capacity to view groups, policies, and ideas in differentiated terms and the disinclination to monolithic views and interpretations (Hermann, 1977, 167)—and his personal history as a former alcoholic turned evangelical, may also have predisposed him to think and behave in ways that enhanced the attractiveness of war as a policy option (Schweizer and Schweizer, 2004, 517). While the groupthink hypothesis may explain why group members fail to challenge a preferred policy’s flawed assumptions, it does not account for the origins of the particular policy whose flaws go unrecognized: In this case groupthink does not explain why administration leaders were considering an invasion option in the first place. Implications of Ideological and Non-rational Influences Theories address causality on a fundamental level only if they address why the invasion policy was under consideration in the first place. While President Bush had personal motives for overthrowing Saddam Hussein, personality traits should not necessarily be considered causal. For example, although Bush’s religious beliefs and his lack of cognitive complexity may be relevant factors, the connection with Iraq is imprecise. Such traits may have facilitated approval of the invasion policy but were not responsible for its emergence and its prominence. One may with more confidence view Bush’s personal animosity toward Iraq’s ruler as another tipping factor that made the invasion policy more attractive. If U.S. society exhibits a perennial need for an external enemy, in part due to widespread nationalist attitudes, then the convergence of Christian evangelical and Zionist ideologies in the U.S. perhaps helps explain the choice of Iraq, rather than a different target. At the societal level, and among political elites, a sense of national chosenness and superiority, as well as racism, may make the U.S. more war-prone in the Middle East, due to evangelicals’ beliefs about the Holy Land, and due to domestic political incentives for championing Israel. Ideological beliefs may have rendered U.S. leaders more susceptible to manipulation by those like Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, or the government of Ariel Sharon in Israel, which may have fed the U.S. false intelligence reports about Iraqi weapons in order to promote a U.S. invasion that served their own political agendas.

Alt Solvency – PIK specific

Only by re-conceptualizing gender politics and the private/public influence can we create effective policies

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If such a politics can be generalized - and no one should doubt the dif ficulty of the task - what would be its ultimate goal? Is the state as a whole capable of being transformed; or should it, as anarchist tradition prescribes, be smashed? To put the question another way, we can con ceive a patriarchal state, because we have one; is a feminist state con ceivable? One way of answering this is to look at the "utopias" conceived by feminist novelists. On the whole they seem to answer no. They tend to present, as an image of a society free of patriarchy, a society without the state - such as the communities in Piercy's Woman on the Edge of Time or Le Guin's Always Coming Home. Or they locate a feminist state in a world fundamentally different from our own, such as the hidden world without men in Gilman's Herland.6" The problem with such a position is that it fails to deal with the sheer scale of issues in a global society requiring a decision-making and co ordination capacity. We live in a world of five-thousand million people, not a world of villages, however high-tech they may become. Rather than moving to a smaller-scale political structure, it may be that a move to a larger scale is needed to achieve the goals of eco-feminism and the women's peace movement. An argument can be made that the nation state as the unit of sovereignty is an institution of patriarchy, requiring in a context of competition between sovereign states - militarization and internal hierarchy. Another way of approaching the question is to start from existing state structures and ask how they would have to be re-shaped. Considering the gender regime of the liberal state outlined above, it is clear that the masculinized "core" of decision-making and enforcement would have to go, replaced by demilitarization and participatory democracy. The idea of a "representative bureaucracy" canvassed in some 1970s reform movements seems consistent with this. However, these moves would be nugatory unless the cultural distinc tion that reproduces women's exclusion from state power, the distinc tion between public (masculinized) and private (feminized), were abol ished. In one sense that seems to imply an end to the state as such, which is founded on such a distinction. In another sense it suggests an expansion of the realm to which a program of democratization would apply. The state would become, so to speak, broader and thinner.

Alt Solvency

Gendered politics in not fixed – a break down of power structures can solve

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

6. The state is constantly changing; gender relations are historically dynamic; the state's position in gender politics is not fixed. Crisis tendencies develop in the gender order, which allow new political possibilities. Much social analysis seems to imply that the state directorate has it easy, that the functional thing to do is obvious and straightforward. In reality, state elites typically face shifting situations and contradictory pressures that their strategies can only partly resolve. Their power may be destabilized by crisis tendencies arising from sources outside their control.53 One such is a tendency toward crisis in the legitimation of patriarchy, a breakdown of established bases of authority. The long-term decline of religion has stripped patriarchy of its main cultural defense. The rise of the liberal state gave weight to generalizable claims of equality. The use of state power must be balanced with a search for legitimation if the power is to continue, and legitimation involves the ballot-box credibility of governing parties, the willingness of citizens to pay taxes and obey officials, the discipline or compliance of state employees. Feminism lays demands on the state that may be difficult to dodge without putting legitimacy at risk. The liberal feminist platform of equal citizenship, employment rights, and anti-discrimination measures is formulated in a way that maximizes this leverage on the state. That is one reason why liberal feminism on certain issues has been very effective. Even the Reagan government found it expedient to appoint women to senior levels of the judiciary.

Alt Solvency

Evaluation of the plan through a critical mindset of gender prevents hierarchies and policy failure

Joyce P. Kaufman and Kristen P. Williams (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Whittier Scholars Program at Whittier College and Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations and Co-Director of the Women’s and Gender Studies Program at Clark University) 2007 )"Women, the State, and war: A comprehensive perspective on citizenship and Nationalism" p. 11-29

Further, in describing the origin of the modern state, Charles Tilly asserts that it was born from war, and that the military was integral to the continued success of and even existence of the state.33 It is that militaristic essence of the state that builds into the concept a gendered perspective, as argued by feminist IR scholars, who are particularly interested in the connection between masculinity and war.34 Again, Tickner notes that, "Throughout the period of state building in the West, nationalist movements have used gendered imagery that exhorts masculine heroes to fight for the establishment and defense of the mother country."35 And in this statement there is an interesting juxtaposition of two concepts that reinforce the gendered perspective. On the one hand, central to the evolution of the state, and often nation, is the notion of "masculine heroes" which, by definition, excludes women (men as citizen-soldier). Yet, what makes those heroes is defense of the "mother country," the entity from which all citizens are bom and to whom their loyalty rests. But "she" must also be defended by her men. In essence, as Peterson states, "women are linked to the state through their fathers/husbands; women are expected to bond only through and with 'their men.'"36 Cynthia Cockburn makes the linkage between gender, nationalism and conflict even more explicit when she says "Seeing with eyes that are gender-aware, women tend to make connections between the oppression that is the ostensible cause of a conflict (ethnic or national oppression) in the light of another cross-cutting one: that of the gender regime."37 It is this perspective that sets the stage for the politicization and activism that we see emerging in some cases.

Alt Solvency

The alternative does not preclude the action of the 1AC but to instead engages in a gendered view of policy making. Only this allows us to truly understand the current power structure that exists

Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 8-9

Obviously, the political task is not to refuse representational politics—as if we could. The juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field of power; hence, there is no position outside this field, but only a critical genealogy of its own legitimating practices. As such, the critical point of departure is the historical present, as Marx put it .And the task is to formulate within this constituted frame a critique of the categories of identity that contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and immobilize. Perhaps there is an opportunity at this juncture of cultural politics, a period that some would call “postfeminist,” to reflect from within a feminist perspective on the injunction to construct a subject of feminism. Within feminist political practice, a radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of identity appears to be necessary in order to formulate a representational politics that might revive feminism on other grounds. On the other hand, it may be time to entertain a radical critique that seeks to free feminist theory from the necessity of having to construct a single or abiding ground which is invariably contested by those identity positions or anti-identity positions that it invariably excludes. Do the exclusionary practices that ground feminist theory in a notion of “women” as subject paradoxically undercut feminist goals to extend its claims to “representation”?5 Perhaps the problem is even more serious. Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject an unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations? And is not such a reification precisely contrary to feminist aims? To what extent does the category of women achieve stability and coherence only in the context of the heterosexual matrix?6 If a stable notion of gender no longer proves to be the foundational premise of feminist politics, perhaps a new sort of feminist politics is now desirable to contest the very reifications of gender and identity, one that will take the variable construction of identity as both a methodological and normative prerequisite, if not a political goal. To trace the political operations that produce and conceal what qualifies as the juridical subject of feminism is precisely the task of a feminist genealogy of the category of women. In the course of this effort to question “women” as the subject of feminism, the unproblematic invocation of that category may prove to preclude the possibility of feminism as a representational politics. What sense does it make to extend representation to subjects who are constructed through the exclusion of those who fail to conform to unspoken normative requirements of the subject? What relations of domination and exclusion are inadvertently sustained when representation becomes the sole focus of politics? The identity of the feminist subject ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics, if the formation of the subject takes place within a field of power regularly buried through the assertion of that foundation. Perhaps, paradoxically, “representation” will be shown to make sense for feminism only when the subject of “women”is nowhere presumed.

Discourse Shapes Gender

Use of gendered language sets inherent limits on identities and the fluidity of gender. It produces hegemonic truths from language and constitutes constraining the domain of gender

Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 11-13

iii. Gender: The Circular Ruins of Contemporary Debate Is there “a” gender which persons are said to have, or is it an essential attribute that a person is said to be, as implied in the question “What gender are you?” When feminist theorists claim that gender is the cultural interpretation of sex or that gender is culturally constructed, what is the manner or mechanism of this construction? If gender is constructed, could it be constructed differently, or does its constructedness imply some form of social determinism, foreclosing the possibility of agency and transformation? Does “construction” suggest that certain laws generate gender differences along universal axes of sexual difference? How and where does the construction of gender take place? What sense can we make of a construction that cannot assume a human constructor prior to that construction? On some accounts, the notion that gender is constructed suggests a certain determinism of gender meanings inscribed on anatomically differentiated bodies, where those bodies are understood as passive recipients of an inexorable cultural law. When the relevant “culture” that “constructs” gender is understood in terms of such a law or set of laws, then it seems that gender is as determined and fixed as it was under the biology-is-destiny formulation. In such a case, not biology, but culture, becomes destiny. On the other hand, Simone de Beauvoir suggests in The Second Sex that “one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes one.”12 For Beauvoir, gender is “constructed,” but implied in her formulation is an agent, a cogito, who somehow takes on or appropriates that gender and could, in principle, take on some other gender. Is gender as variable and volitional as Beauvoir’s account seems to suggest? Can “construction” in such a case be reduced to a form of choice? Beauvoir is clear that one “becomes” a woman, but always under a cultural compulsion to become one. And clearly, the compulsion does not come from “sex.” There is nothing in her account that guarantees that the “one” who becomes a woman is necessarily female. If “the body is a situation,”13as she claims, there is no recourse to a body that has not always already been interpreted by cultural meanings; hence, sex could not qualify as a prediscursive anatomical facticity. Indeed, sex, by definition, will be shown to have been gender all along.14 The controversy over the meaning of construction appears to founder on the conventional philosophical polarity between free will and determinism. As a consequence, one might reasonably suspect that some common linguistic restriction on thought both forms and limits the terms of the debate. Within those terms, “the body” appears as a passive medium on which cultural meanings are inscribed or as the instrument through which an appropriative and interpretive will determines a cultural meaning for itself. In either case, the body is figured as a mere instrument or mediumfor which a set of cultural meanings are only externally related. But “the body” is itself a construction, as are the myriad “bodies” that constitute the domain of gendered subjects. Bodies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the mark of their gender; the question then emerges: To what extent does the body come into beingin and through the mark(s) of gender? How do we reconceive the body no longer as a passive medium or instrument awaiting the enlivening capacity of a distinctly immaterial will?15 Whether gender or sex is fixed or free is a function of a discourse which, it will be suggested, seeks to set certain limits to analysis or to safeguard certain tenets of humanism as presuppositional to any analysis of gender. The locus of intractability, whether in “sex” or “gender” or in the very meaning of “construction,” provides a clue to what cultural possibilities can and cannot become mobilized through any further analysis. The limits of the discursive analysis of gender presuppose and preempt the possibilities of imaginable and realizable gender configurations within culture. This is not to say that any and all gendered possibilities are open, but that the boundaries of analysis suggest the limits of a discursively conditioned experience. These limits are always set within the terms of a hegemonic cultural discourse predicated on binary structures that appear as the language of universal rationality. Constraint is thus built into what that language constitutes as the imaginable domain of gender.

Discourse Shapes Gender

Gender is not shaped by ones sex. The discursive elements of the state create and lock individuals into heteronormative binaries

 Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 9-11

The Compulsory Order of Sex/Gender/Desire Although the unproblematic unity of “women” is often invoked to construct a solidarity of identity, a split is introduced in the feminist subject by the distinction between sex and gender. Originally intended to dispute the biology-is-destiny formulation, the distinction between sex and gender serves the argument that whatever biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally constructed: hence, gender is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex. The unity of the subject is thus already potentially contested by the distinction that permits of gender as a multiple interpretation of sex.7 If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of “men” will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that “women” will interpret only female bodies. Further, even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their morphology and constitution (which will become a question),there is no reason to assume that genders ought also to remain as two.8 The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female one. This radical splitting of the gendered subject poses yet another set of problems. Can we refer to a “given” sex or a “given” gender without first inquiring into how sex and/or gender is given, through what means? And what is “sex” anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to assess the scientific discourses which purport to establish such “facts” for us?9 Does sex have a history?10 Does each sex have a different history, or histories? Is there a history of how the duality of sex was established, a genealogy that might expose the binary options as a variable construction? Are the ostensibly natural facts of sex discursively produced by various scientific discourses in the service of other political and social interests? If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.11 It would make no sense, then, to define gender as the cultural interpretation of sex, if sex itself is a gendered category. Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical conception);gender must also designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established. As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; **gender is** also **the discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and established** as “prediscursive,”prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts. This construction of “sex”as the radically unconstructed will concern us again in the discussion of Lévi-Strauss and structuralism in chapter 2.At this juncture it is already clear that one way the internal stability and binary frame for sex is effectively secured is by casting the duality of sex in a prediscursive domain. This production of sex as the prediscursive ought to be understood as the effect of the apparatus of cultural construction designated by gender. How, then, does gender need to be reformulated to encompass the power relations that produce the effect of a prediscursive sex and so conceal that very operation of discursive production?

Discourse Shapes Space Policy

Discourse shapes policy – private/public division, specifically proves when US policies are made discussion of this division is in the policy to ensure a desired international perception

Penny Griffin (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at UNSW, PhD at University of Bristol, researches IR, global governance, feminism and gender studies) March 25, 2006 “The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/8/3/0/pages98301/p98301-2.php

It would certainly be careless to ignore the strength of the ties that bind US discourse on outer space to military endeavour. The importance of economic, scientific and technological gain should not, however, be underestimated. There remains a close proximity, in official and unofficial US rhetoric, between the militarisation of outer space and its exploitation for economic, technological and scientific gain, embedded within a wider, neoliberal discourse concerning the assumed essentiality of the (rational) individual’s need for freedom, choice and access to markets. The separation of a ‘public’ and ‘private’ face to the US approach to outer space is thus an important one, resulting in no small part from the political liberalism of US institutional and administrative culture. The secrecy of the development of military space technologies (**including ‘missile defence’ systems, military ‘spy’ satellites and anti-satellite weapons**) and the relative openness of ‘civilian’ projects (**plans for ‘manned’ Moon and outer space stations**, for example) also, however, reflect the discursive construction of a US discourse of neoliberal globalisation that, economically, politically and psychologically, has depended on the establishment and continuance of military hegemony to secure regional, economic interests. The functionally rational, neoliberal market actor and the essentially expansionist neoliberal free market in US discourse enjoy a peculiarly close relationship with the US’s seemingly unquestionable ‘right’ to bear arms across, and beyond, the globe. Thus while the US is a ‘neoliberal’ power to the extent that it is committed to the ideology of the market, to private capital, to flexible labour and to deregulated economies, the US ‘state’ is so heavily constituted by a historical discourse of militarisation that, in effect, global economic competition and military ambition are rarely distinct categories. Explicitly clear in the case of China’s growing economic pre-eminence, official US discourse firmly allies economic ‘competition’ with future ‘military conflict’. With the US ‘looking at Asia as the most likely arena for future conflict, or at least competition’ (Ricks, 2000), the US appears to be summoning a physical arsenal with which to ‘contain’ the more ethereal threat of China’s expanding economic potential. Extending its military presence in the region, the US is currently engaged in lengthening and widening runways for its bombers in Guam, where it is also adding new fighter squadrons, installing small, ‘lily pad’ bases throughout the Asia-Pacific (for ‘rapid interventionary capability’), and even transferring the US First Corps to Japan to more tightly integrate that nation ‘in US global military planning’ (Gagnon, 2005: 1). In public, the US administration is hesitant to refer explicitly to a Chinese ‘threat’, or situate China as an adversary. Although, according to Ricks, when Pentagon officials sat down in 2000 to plan their Joint Chiefs of Staff document, China was notably listed as a future adversary, the final, publicised version of the document (the ‘Joint Vision 2020’) warns only of the possible rise of an unidentified ‘peer competitor’ (Ricks, 2000). But the wording of the document would seem to be directed at growing Chinese ‘space power’, as US Space Command term the deployment of space policy to support land, sea and air operations. As the document reads, ‘space forces will emerge to protect military and commercial national interests and investment in the space medium due to their increasing importance’ (US Space Command, ‘Joint Vision 2020’). In suggesting a need for US ‘full spectrum dominance’, the document refers to ‘denying an adversary’s [emphasis added] ability to fully leverage’ space capabilities to ‘collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information’. Launching its first space vehicle in 1964, and its first satellite in 1970, China, according to Filho, ‘became the fifth space power in the world’ (Filho, 1997: 153), alongside the US, former Soviet Union, the European Space Agency (ESA) and, more recently, Japan (Iran, South Korea and India have also begun to focus on increasing their space capabilities, although their efforts are considered to be, thus far, relatively limited). China remains, however, the only one of these ‘space powers’ to pose, in US discourse, a significant and sustained threat to US hegemony.

Space Policy Key

We must look to space to answer questions of gender. Even if it already exists in space questioning is key to stop the expansion of the hierarchies

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Conclusion: Performances of Power and Identity in the Politics of Outer Space This paper has argued that ‘sex’, ‘gender’ and ‘sexual practice’ are discursively constituted to render the apparently ‘ungendered’ discourse(s) of outer space exploration and colonisation coherent. ‘Gender’ is made intelligible in US outer space discourse in order to preserve an essentially heteronormative, regulatory public/private distinction that allows for both increased the militarisation of space, while serving neoliberal, anglo- american ideals of marketization, privatization, deregulation and flexibilization. This public/private binary creates a troubled relationship between sex, gender and the politics of (re)production in outer space. ‘Sex’ invariably appears (if indeed it does appear) in outer space politics as a category pertaining only to the lives and bodies of women, as fixed, binary, and biologically and physically constant. As Elias argues, ‘the global sphere cannot be regarded as a gender-neutral arena, but rather, becomes a site for the production of gender identity’ (2004: 30). But ‘male dominance within what we define as “the international” is not the only reason for thinking about a gendered global arena’, we also need to examine ‘the impact of these masculinist assumptions’ (ibid.: 31). Space, constructed through a heteronormative, heterosexual, regulatory framework, as a particular frontier to be conquered and colonised, involves particular constructions of gender identity. The result is the creation and perpetuation in anglo-american discourse of outer space as an emptiness and void; the conquest of heterosexual man over nature. Discursive hierarchies of technologically superior, conquesting performance are imbued with their everyday power through an implicitly gendered framework for understanding both the Earthly and extraterrestrial environments, and it is through gender that US political discourses of outer space have been able to (re)produce outer space as a masculinized, heterosexualized realm.

Policy Framing Key

Framing of policy shape policies and implementation – gendered notions key to chang the political strategy

Dorothy E. McBride and Amy G. Mauzer (Emeritus Professor of Political Science in the Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and 2010 "The Politics of State Feminism: Innovation in Comparative Research" p.

Analysts agree that there is an important connection between the definition or framing of a policy problem and, eventually, policy outcomes (Schatt-schneider 1960; Kingdon 1995; Cobb and Elder 1983; Schneider and Ingram 1993; Muller 1990). Frames shape agenda-setting processes as well as decision making, and might also influence policy implementation. The opportunity to shape the overall idea of a policy gives power to collective actors from outside state institutions. They can, thus, insert their ideas into the policy process and realize their interests by changing the policy discourse and the underlying ideas in a specific policy environment in which the policy decisions are prepared. Such a change in framing constitutes one form of process change because it brings ideas and interests of new groups into the policy discourse and changes substantive representation. Moreover, outside actors are at the same rime "constructed" as participants by the specific framing of an issue. In other words, a specific framing of an issue might mobilize collective action and allow these actors, and not others, to participate in a policy debate. Thus, since framing might open the door to power for women's movements, it becomes a political strategy to gain substantive and descriptive representation. Frames produce political action (Benford and Snow 2000: 631) and compose part of the cultural or discursive opportunity structure (Burstein 1999; Ferree et al. 2002). The cross-issue, cross-time, and cross-country analyses of this chapter seek to contribute to the fast-growing political science literature on framing by giving detailed empirical evidence on how women's movements and policies, as well as civil society and state, are connected through framing.

Policy Framing Key

Framing of the policy is key to solvency and better future policies

Dorothy E. McBride and Amy G. Mauzer (Emeritus Professor of Political Science in the Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and 2010 "The Politics of State Feminism: Innovation in Comparative Research" p.

The concept of state feminism used in this book places certain aspects of framing as indicators as well as drivers of women's movement success and agency effectiveness. For example, movement success is defined as the compatibility of policy content with movement micro frames expressed in the debate. The compatibility of ideas of women's movement actors who take a position a debate with the frames that characterize the given policy environment is explored as a central explanatory factor in the success of women's movement Moreover, it is shown, in Part II of the book, that the role of women's pc icy agencies in mediating between women's movements and the policy environments may also be crucial—namely, the gendering or de-gendering of i issue by the agencies in a way that the perceptions of the issue by policy acto coincide with the movement frames in the debate (also see Ferree and Gar son 2003). Women's policy agencies that effectively insert women's movement frames into policy debates are influential in enhancing Movement State Feminism in two respects: They facilitate the entry of women's movement actors the policy arena, and they shape the policy outcome according to the women movements ideas and goals. Alliances between women's movements and women's policy agencies are likely to occur through an agreement on frames—this, on the definition of the policy issue at stake, and on the vision of the poll solution. The state feminism framework also assumes that gendered issue frames he to put the aims of women's movement actors on the political agenda and that the gendering of an issue is important for the substantive and descriptive success of the women's movement. The major assumption is that frames aren’t "glue" to policy change, for the participation of women's movement actors, a: for state feminism. The framing of a policy issue is a way to enhance the likelihood that women's movement actors will be able to change the content of policy and to bring forward the quantitative representation of women in a policy arena.

AT: Plan Changes View of Space

Our understanding of space facilitates and supports ‘man’ not woman. The justification of colonization, exploration, or desire for knowledge is only a vague distinction. Even if the aff claims to not engage in this power hierarchy the plan would result in heteronormative expansion locking in binaries of power, identity, and sexual assumptions

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All this is not to argue that dominant ‘scientific’ and ‘commercial’ justifications for space exploration do not also embody a gendered sense of ‘man’s’ natural right to colonise so-called unknown territory in their basic assumptions (cf. Morabito, 2005). The ‘quest for knowledge’ remains deeply embedded in Western accounts of the need for space colonisation, rationalised from humanity’s so-called ‘natural’ desire to explore and conquer. Much commercial gain already depends on the exploitation of outer space, but there is undoubtedly more to be made of space’s ‘resources’: ‘asteroidal’ mining, for example; the extraction of ‘lunar soil oxygen’; the mining of very rare ‘Helium-3’ from lunar soil as fuel for nuclear fusion reactors; or space, and particularly the Moon, as a ‘tourist venue’, offering all kinds of new ‘sporting opportunities’ (Morabito, 2005: 5-7). Outer space represents in every possible sense the discursive collisions of culturally configured ideas concerning what is ‘essentially’ and definitively human. As Goh states, outer space ‘is an arena of growing economic and technological importance. It is also a developing theatre of military defence and warfare’ (2004: 259). The line distinguishing the various components of the outer space ‘whole’ is vague, and is particularly obscured, in anglo- american, neoliberal discourse, by the tacit but pervasive heteronormativity that drives US outer space politics. Above all, US outer space discourse is driven by the belief that outer space can be conquered, that those at the cutting edge of its exploitation are the ‘visionaries’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ that will pave the way to tourists, explorers, TV crews and to, as Morabito claims, ‘dubious characters’ such as, perhaps, ‘bounty hunters’ (2004: 10). Underlying such discourse exists the basic assumption that space is a ‘masculine’ environment, a territory for colonial conquest, and an arena for warfare and the display of military and technological prowess. Herein, ‘man’, not woman, is the human model by which to gauge those adventurous enough to engage in the ‘space medium’. Fundamentally then, the hierarchies of power, identity and cultural and sexual assumption that infuse outer space politics are no different to those that structure terrestrial politics. As Morabito, rather worryingly claims, ‘why expect men on the Moon to behave much better than on Earth? [emphasis added]’ (2004: 10).

AT: Perm

Stats prove that if we don’t initially evaluate policies from a gendered notion they have a 70% chance of failure. AIK solves 100% of case with full solvency of gendered politics

Dorothy E. McBride and Amy G. Mauzer (Emeritus Professor of Political Science in the Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and 2010 "The Politics of State Feminism: Innovation in Comparative Research" p.

The focus now turns to issue frames—the explicit way the majority of actors a policy subsystem defines the meaning of issues. Issue frames influence the pi cess and outcome of policy debates, and they give voice to specific actors di ing the policy process. The analysis of issue frames over time—when and if gender equality becomes part of the mainstream perception of a policy problem—shows the development of gender knowledge, gender consciousness, and gender awareness in policy environments. More generally, it may indicate mechanisms of cultural change in political systems toward gender equality, especially more openness to women's movement ideas and aims, and more gendering of dominant issue frames. This section examines the patterns of change in how abortion, prostitution, job training, political representation, and hot issues are framed by major actors in policy subsystems. Measures of frames at the beginning and end of each debate found in the RNGS dataset are analyzed over time, across issues, and across countries.6 To what extent do debate frames become gendered, stay gendered, or become de-gendered from the beginning to the end of a policy cycle? In 41 percent of all debates, the issue frame was gendered at the beginning. This means that in more than half of the debates the problem at stake was not seen as a problem of men and women. By the end of the debates, 68 percent of the policy issue frames were about gender; this means that women's movements and women's policy agencies were able to raise gender awareness in the policy arena. Looking at the pattern of change during the debates, nearly half of the issue frames changed to become gendered or more gendered, as shown in Table 9.3. In 29 percent of all 130 cases, the issue frame evolved from non-gendered to gendered, and in 18 percent it moved from gendered to more gendered. Fifteen percent remained gendered similarly throughout the course of the debate. In only 8 percent of the cases were there reversals in gendering, with 5 percent going from gendered to less gendered and 3 percent from gendered to nongendered. In 30 percent of all debates, the issue frame remained unchanged and nongendered throughout the debate. So **we can conclude that once the debate has become gendered at the beginning, it remains gendered until the end, and that the framing of an issue in terms of gender relations is becoming "mainstreamed."** Returning to the question of gendering issue frames at the beginning and at the end of a policy debate, there are variations by issue area. The abortion and political representation debates are more likely to be gendered at the beginning and at the end than the other issues. Job training has especially low rates of gendered issue frames, both at the beginning (13 percent of debates) and at the end (39 percent of debates). Debates about state restructuring (hot-issue debates) in the 1990s are also relatively low at the beginning (25 percent) but show a higher success rate at the end than job training (58 percent). While abortion and political representation were seen as women's issues with a good chance of becoming more politicized by women's movement actors, the issues of job training and state restructuring presented difficulties in this regard. Nevertheless, the change in gendering from beginning to end in job training debates was dramatic. If change in issue frames is an indication of cultural change in policy processes in political systems, then both job training and prostitution debates saw the most dramatic shifts (threefold increases). **The smallest change is found in the political representation debates, which entered the political agenda as gendered issues.**

AT: Perm

The alternative must take action that is not intrinsically tied to the state. Only a fluid discussion and genealogy of social constructed gender will enable discussion that is the critical from of departure

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia) “The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562 Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544

Recent theoretical writing contains a remarkable series of sketches of a theory of the patriarchal state; at least nine have appeared in English, as essays or book chapters, since 1978.4 Materials for developing them are available in immense volume, in practical experience and academic writing. Yet the sketches have remained sketches; there has not been a sustained development of theory. This suggests that we need to look carefully at the conceptual foundations of the discussion and perhaps configure it in another way. The first section of this article is an exploration of the main ways of thinking about gender, sexuality, and the state to be found in English-language writing in recent decades. I argue that there are indeed some problems in the theoretical bases of this literature that have severely limited it. The second section of the article is an attempt to move beyond these limits by proposing, not an alternative sketch of the patriarchal state, but at a somewhat more generalized level a framework for theorizing the interplay of gender relations and state dynamics. This is meant to be systematic, though brief. It is based on the view that gender is a collective phenomenon, an aspect of social institutions as well as an aspect of personal life, and is therefore internal as well as external to the state. Put another way, the state as an institution is part of a wider social structure of gender relations. A recognition of the historicity of gender relations is the essential point of departure. Accordingly the exposition of the framework begins with the question of the historical constitution of the state. The analysis moves from this starting-point toward issues of political practice. My assumption throughout is that the point of a theory of the state is a better capacity to make appraisals of political strategy.

AT: Co-option

The alternative won’t get co-opted

**Tickner 92** [Ann, Professor @ the School of International Relations USC, B.A. in History, U London, M.A. in IR, Yale, PhD in pol science, “GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY”, pg. 33]

Jane Addams's vision of national security, which deemphasizes its military dimension and was dismissed at the time as impractical, is quite compatible with the new thinking on common security I have just described. Like women at the Halifax and Nairobi conferences, contemporary new thinkers also include the elimination of structural violence in their definition of security. Feminist peace researcher Elise Boulding tells us that women peace researchers were among the pioneers in this contemporary redefinition of security, although, like Jane Addams at the beginning of the century, their work did not receive the attention it deserved. It is often the case that new ideas in any discipline do not receive widespread attention unless they are adopted by significant numbers of men, in which case women's work tends to become invisible through co-optation. Boulding claims that the one area in which women are not in danger of co-optation is their analysis of patriarchy and the linkage of war to violence against women**.** Like most other feminists, Boulding believes that these issues must also be included in any comprehensive definition of security. Given these various definitions of security offered by women, it is evident that feminist perspectives on security would grow out of quite different assumptions about the individual, the state, and the international system. Using feminist literature from various disciplines and approaches I shall now suggest what some of these perspectives might look like.

AT: We aren’t patriarchal

The state is patriarchal, history proves

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

Is the state patriarchal? Yes, beyond any argument, on the evidence discussed above. It is not "essentially patriarchal" or "male"; even if one could speak of the "essence" of a social institution, this would exaggerate the internal coherence of the state. Rather the state is historically patriarchal, patriarchal as a matter of concrete social practices. State structures in recent history institutionalize the European equation between authority and a dominating masculinity; they are effectively controlled by men; and they operate with a massive bias towards heterosexual men's interests. At the same time the pattern of state patriarchy changes. In terms of the depth of oppression and the historical possibilities of resistance and transformation, a fascist regime is crucially different from a liberal one, and a liberal one from a revolutionary one. The most favorable historical circumstance for progressive sexual politics seems to be the early days of social-revolutionary regimes; but the later bureaucratization of these regimes is devastating. Next best is a liberal state with a reformist government; though reforms introduced under its aegis are vulnerable in periods of reaction. Though the state is patriarchal, progressive gender politics cannot avoid it. The character of the state as the central institutionalization of power, and its historical trajectory in the regulation and constitution of gender relations, make it unavoidably a major arena for challenges to patriarchy. Here liberal feminism is on strong ground.

AT: Patriarchy Inevitable (Social Construct)

Gendered binaries are social constructs not objective truth—criticizing assumptions of the world is a necessary starting point of resistance

Tickner 92 [Ann, Professor @ the School of International Relations USC, B.A. in History, U London, M.A. in IR, Yale, PhD in pol science, “GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY”]

This celebration of male power, particularly the glorification of the male warrior, produces more of a gender dichotomy than exists in reality for, as R. W. Connell points out, this stereotypical image of masculinity does not fit most men. Connell suggests that what he calls "hegemonic masculinity," a type of culturally dominant masculinity that he distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities, is a socially constructed cultural ideal that, while it does not correspond to the actual personality of the majority of men, sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order. Hegemonic masculinity is sustained through its opposition to various subordinated and devalued masculinities, such as homosexuality, and, more important, through its relation to various devalued femininities. Socially constructed gender differences are based on socially sanctioned, unequal relationships between men and women that reinforce compliance with men's stated superiority. Nowhere in the public realm are these stereotypical gender images more apparent than in the realm of international politics, where the characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are projected onto the behavior of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy. Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity depends on its opposition to and unequal relationship with various subordinated femininities. Many contemporary feminists draw on similarly socially constructed, or engendered, relationships in their definition of gender difference. Historically, differences between men and women have usually been ascribed to biology. But when feminists use the term gender today, they are not generally referring to biological differences between males and females, but to a set of culturally shaped and defined characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity. These characteristics can and do vary across time and place. In this view, biology may constrain behavior, but it should not be used "deterministically" or "naturally" to justify practices, institutions, or choices that could be other than they are. While what it means to be a man or a woman varies across cultures and history, in most cultures gender differences signify relationships of inequality and the domination of women by men. Joan Scott similarly characterizes gender as "a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and... a primary way of signifying relationships of power." Indeed one could characterize most contemporary feminist scholarship in terms of the dual beliefs that gender difference has played an important and essential role in the structuring of social inequalities in much of human history and that the resulting differences in self-identifications, human understandings, social status, and power relationships are unjustified. Scott claims that the way in which our understanding of gender signifies relationships of power is through a set of normative concepts that set forth interpretations of the meanings of symbols. In Western culture, these concepts take the form of fixed binary oppositions that categorically assert the meaning of masculine and feminine and hence legitimize a set of unequal social relationships. Scott and many other contemporary feminists assert that, through our use of language, we come to perceive the world through these binary oppositions. Our Western understanding of gender is based on a set of culturally determined binary distinctions, such as public versus private, objective versus subjective, self versus other, reason versus emotion, autonomy versus relatedness, and culture versus nature; the first of each pair of characteristics is typically associated with masculinity, the second with femininity. Scott claims that the hierarchical construction of these distinctions can take on a fixed and permanent quality that perpetuates women's oppression: therefore they must be challenged. To do so we must analyze the way these binary oppositions operate in different contexts and, rather than accepting them as fixed, seek to displace their hierarchical construction. When many of these differences between women and men are no longer assumed to be natural or fixed, we can examine how relations of gender inequality are constructed and sustained in various arenas of public and private life. In committing itself to gender as a category of analysis, contemporary feminism also commits itself to gender equality as a social goal. Extending Scott's challenge to the field of international relations, we can immediately detect a similar set of hierarchical binary oppositions. But in spite of the seemingly obvious association of international politics with the masculine characteristics described above, the field of international relations is one of the last of the social sciences to be touched by gender analysis and feminist perspectives. The reason for this, I believe, is not that the field is gender neutral, meaning that the introduction of gender is irrelevant to its subject matter as many scholars believe, but that it is so thoroughly masculinized that the workings of these hierarchical gender relations are hidden. Framed in its own set of binary distinctions, the discipline of international relations assumes similarly hierarchical relationships when it posits an anarchic world "outside" to be defended against through the accumulation and rational use of power. In political discourse, this becomes translated into stereotypical notions about those who inhabit the outside. Like women, foreigners are frequently portrayed as "the other": nonwhites and tropical countries are often depicted as irrational, emotional, and unstable, characteristics that are also attributed to women. The construction of this discourse and the way in which we are taught to think about international politics closely parallel the way in which we are socialized into understanding gender differences. To ignore these hierarchical constructions and their relevance to power is therefore to risk perpetuating these relationships of domination and subordination. But before beginning to describe what the field of international relations might look like if gender were included as a central category of analysis, I shall give a brief historical overview of the field as it has traditionally been constructed.

AT: It’s inevitable

It’s not inevitable – sexual politics is not the only form and the counter movement to masculine dominated politics is growing

R. W. Connell (Professor of Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.)“The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/657562

In a longer historical perspective, all these forms of politics are fairly new. Fantasies like Aristophanes's Lysistrata aside, the open mobilization of groups around demands or programs in sexual politics dates only from the mid-nineteenth century. The politics that characterized other patriarchal gender orders in history were constructed along other lines, for instance as a politics of kinship, or faction formation in agricultural villages. It can plausibly be argued that modern patterns resulted from a reconfiguration of gender politics around the growth of the liberal state. In particular its structure of legitimation through plebiscite or electoral democracy invited the response of popular mobilization. This response was, however, asymmetrical. In class politics the mobilization of a subordinate group, via socialist parties, was followed by a counter-mobilization of conservative parties, with remarkable success. But feminist mobilization has not been followed by a counter-mobilization of anti-feminist men. There have been some small "men's rights" groups but they have had no mass appeal. The right-wing mobilizations that have opposed feminism, for instance on the abortion issue, are based in churches and include a large number of women. The absence of mobilization "from above" in gender politics raises questions about the way men's power is institutionalized, and about the connection between different sites of power. A banal but perhaps largely correct explanation is that patriarchy is so firmly entrenched in existing political institutions, such as the bureaucracy, the press, and the major parties, that in the normal run of things no more is needed; state and media substitute for a mobilization of men. In some situations of crisis, however, this can break down. In European fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, and Iran in the 1980s, a political mobilization in favor of patriarchy has occurred, feminism and sexual degeneracy were denounced, and violent repression followed the seizure of state power by the movement.52

AT: Realism

1. Realism makes violence inevitable – the Kritik is key to averting destruction.

J. Ann Tickner, Prof of IR at USC, M.A. Yale and Ph.D Brandeis, ’92, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,” 50-1

In this section, I have shown how realists paint a consistent three-tiered picture of a world in which survival in a violence-prone international system "requires" war-capable states peopled by heroic masculine citizen-warriors. This picture legitimates certain "realistic" portrayals of situations and conduct at each level, which serve to reinforce the need for power balancing, strong states, and citizen-warriors. It achieves relative consistency by downplaying the feasibility and attractiveness of alternative possibilities at each level of analysis by claiming that peaceful international systems are idealist utopias, that non-power-seeking states are soon conquered or dismembered, and that citizens who are not warriors are inessential to the reproduction of the state. Feminist perspectives should question the analytical separability of these three levels of analysis, which realists have treated as supposedly independent levels or aspects of reality. If systems-oriented realists criticize reductionist causal accounts focused only on human nature, feminists might equally well object that scientific causal analyses of state and system-level phenomena distract our attention from the role of responsible individuals and groups in the construction and maintenance of state-level and systemic relationships. Power-oriented statesmen have a vested interest vis-a-vis their domestic supporters in painting a picture of the world around them as threateningly anarchic; anarchic international systems are reproduced by individuals who believe no alternatives exist. Recognizing the gendered construction of this three-tiered world picture, feminist perspectives on national security must offer alternative conceptions. Assuming that these categories are mutually constitutive and mutually reinforcing of each other, we should heed Paul Fussell's claim, in the epigraph to this chapter, that our conception of the possibilities of individual manhood must be redefined in theory and practice before war at the international systemic level can be regarded as avoidable. These gendered depictions of political man, the state, and the international system generate a national security discourse that privileges conflict and war and silences other ways of thinking about security; moving away from valorizing human characteristics that are associated with the risking of life, toward an affirmation of life-giving qualities, allows us to envisage alternative conceptions of national security.

2. Realist conceptions of the state as unitary and rational are masculine and ignore social problems within states

J. Ann Tickner, Prof of IR at USC, M.A. Yale and Ph.D Brandeis, ’92, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,” 42

More recently, however, neorealism has depicted states rather differently, as abstract unitary actors whose actions are explained through laws that can be universalized across time and place and whose internal characteristics are irrelevant to the operation of these laws. States appear to act according to some higher rationality that is presented as independent of human agency. Nowhere in the rational power-balancing behavior of states can we find the patriot willing to go to war to defend his women and children in the name of national security. As poststructuralist international relations theorist Richard Ashley suggests, the "rationalization of global politics" has led to an antihumanism whereby states, posited unproblematically as unitary actors, act independently of human interests.36 It is a world in which, as Jean Elshtain observes, "No children are ever born, and nobody ever dies. ... There are states, and they are what is."37 Behind this reification of state practices hide social institutions that are made and remade by individual actions. In reality, the neorealist depiction of the state as a unitary actor is grounded in the historical practices of the Western state system: neorealist characterizations of state behavior, in terms of self-help, autonomy, and power seeking, privilege characteristics associated with the Western construction of masculinity. Since the beginning of the state system, the national security functions of states have been deeded to us through gendered images that privilege masculinity.

3. The affirmative advocacy of realism does nothing to avoid the impacts to the Kritik – it neither attempts nor succeeds in including the feminist voice in IR, which is key to avoid the impacts.

AT: Realism

4. Their claims of objectivity are inherently gendered and ignore the clear possibility for a form of politics outside of realism

J. Ann Tickner, Prof of IR at USC, M.A. Yale and Ph.D Brandeis, ’92, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,” 64

Given the interdependent nature of contemporary security threats, new thinking on security has already assumed that autonomy and self-help, as models for state behavior in the international system, must be rethought and redefined. 4Many feminists would agree with this, but given their assumption that interdependence is as much a human characteristic as autonomy, they would question whether autonomy is even desirable.95 Autonomy is associated with masculinity just as femininity is associated with interdependence: in her discussion of the birth of modern science in the seventeenth century, Evelyn Keller links the rise of what she terms a masculine science with a striving for objectivity, autonomy, and control.96 Perhaps not coincidentally, the seventeenth century also witnessed the rise of the modern state system. Since this period, autonomy and separation, importantly associated with the meaning of sovereignty, have determined our conception of the national interest. Betty Reardon argues that this association of autonomy with the national interest tends to blind us to the realities of interdependence in the present world situation.97 Feminist perspectives would thus assume that striving for attachment is also part of human nature, which, while it has been suppressed by both modern scientific thinking and the practices of the Western state system, can be reclaimed and revalued in the future.

5. Realism cannot be objective – objectivity can only be achieved once all perspectives have been acknowledged. With an ignorance of the feminist voice, there can be no objectivity.

6. Feminism represents a better understanding of IR than anarchy or power because of its role in shaping identity

Jarvis 2000 D. S. L. Jarvis, 2000. [University of South Carolina Press, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, p 147].

While such renditions are, to be fair, extreme and few, there is a tendency among feminist theorists of international relations to meld a pseudopsychoanalytics with a textual interpretivism and arrive at discourses that posit sexual difference as a definitive explanation of the character of international polities by virtue of theft domination by males. This also circumscribes the need for a feminist perspective/critique of the discipline and its theoretical approaches. Patriarchy, gender, and masculinism, for feminists, become as pertinent to understanding international relations as do strategic studies, nation-states, and military force. "A gender-sensitive lens," notes V. Spike Peterson, "illuminates mounting tensions and even contradictions between the 'deeper historical structures' of masculinism (bequeathed to us by the success of western civilization) and multiple transformations in 'events-time' (the dimensions of today's structural crisis)." For feminists, gender is a "central facet of human identity," and identities are "constructed by others who have a stake in making up certain social categories and in trying to make people conform to them." In fact, for Jill Krause, gender is the ontological essence of self, being, and identity: "Our view of ourselves, how we relate to others and how we understand our world and our place in it are all coloured by our perception of ourselves and others as gendered individuals." Gender, in other words, is an indispensable ingredient in the study of international politics, a means of understanding not just the systemic basis of the international system, but of the power structures imbedded in these relations. Without feminist perspectives, International Relations is adduced as being illegitimate, "dominated mostly by white, English-speaking background intellectuals, located mainly within the Anglo-North America academic establishment," and this dominated by men, asking questions and pursuing interests that affect them.27 Gender, in other words, is both the problem in international relations (and International Relations) because of its untheorized, unconscious, unrecognized importance to the play of global politics and theft analysis, and also the solution to these problems that, once out of the closet, will yet elucidate the systemic basis of aggression, war, identity, discrimination, power, and territoriality. The need for gendered perspectives and gender sensitive lenses is thus self-evident for feminists, representing "a more powerful vehicle than anarchy or power for understanding international relations."" "Gender," it seems, "makes the world go round.""

AT: Essentialism

The alt isn’t essentialist—gender is a socially construct way of approaching difference, not a biological set of traits

Wilcox 3 [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”, RCB]

13When writing of ”gender,‘ I want to make clear I do not equate this term to ”men and women‘ (or just women for that matter) but, as a system of asymmetrical social constructs of masculinity and femininity.14 While employing a gender analysis of issues such as militarization, war, and terrorism, I will not be addressing such issues as whether or not men or women are inherently violent or peaceful, or, in response to Francis Fukuyama, what would happen if women were our political leaders.15 Rather, I use to concept of gender as a symbolic system organizes many cultural discourses, and is mapped on to certain dichotomies, such as hard/soft, inside/outside, sovereignty/anarchy, active/passive, as I briefly explained above. As gender is a normative system in which the concept associated with masculinity in the dichotomy is considered more desirable, gender in International Relations also serves as a prescriptive formulation. This is not say that actual men and women are irrelevant to gender, but that gender as a discursive system represents men and women differently, and constructs different social spaces and functions for them. Race, class, and other variables are also part of a gender discourse that represents a feminine ”other‘ that deviates from the masculine ”norm‘. The concept of ”hegemonic masculinity‘ is also related to the concept of gender. This term, which is discussed at length in chapter three, indicates the prevailing definition of masculinity, driven by social and political trends and defined against subordinate masculinities, such as racial minorities and non-heterosexual orientations.

AT: Essentialism

The alt isn’t essentialist—the kritik isn’t based on biological difference, but gendered power relations

Cohn et al 5 [Carol Cohn (Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights), Felicity Hill (Peace and Security Adviser to the United Nations Development Fund for Women), and Sara Ruddick (Professor of philosophy and women's studies at Eugene Lang College, The New School for Social Research), “The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction”, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No38.pdf,]

Before proceeding with the argument, we need to look at the oft misused and misunderstood term “gender” and clarify its multiple meanings and our use of it. “Gender” has increasingly been employed to make a distinction between biology and culture – that is, the biological differences between male and female bodies on the one hand, and the meaning given to those differences on the other. People in every culture have biologically male or female bodies, but what it means to be “masculine” or “feminine” is different for different cultures and changes over time. What kinds of capabilities or personality traits we expect women or men to have, the kinds of activities, jobs, and family roles we think it appropriate for them to take on, what it means to be a “real man” or a “good woman” – all of these are part of the cultural meaning given to biological difference. Gender is not only about individual identity or what a society teaches us a man or woman, boy or girl should be like. Gender is also a way of structuring relations of power – whether that is within families, where the man is often considered the head of the household, or in societies writ large, where men tend to be the ones in whose hands political, economic, religious and other forms of cultural power are concentrated. These two phenomena – individual identity and structures of power – are significantly related to each other. Hence it is the meanings and characteristics culturally associated with masculinity that make it appear “natural” and just for men to have the power to govern their families and their societies. That is, if as a society we come to believe that people with biologically male bodies are the ones most likely to be strong, rational, prudent, responsible, objective, and willing to fight if necessary (also known as “masculine”), we will think it right that they are the ones to rule. Conversely, if as a society we come to believe that people with female bodies are weak, emotional, irrational, passive, nurturing, and in need of protection (also known as “feminine”), we will think it natural and right that most women’s lives should be limited to the private sphere of home and family. A next crucial step in thinking about gender is to realise that its effects go beyond the meanings ascribed to male and female bodies, and the concomitant ways that power is (unequally) distributed amongst men and women. Gender also functions as a symbolic system: our ideas about gender permeate and shape our ideas about many other aspects of society beyond male-female relations – including politics, weapons, and warfare. The easiest way to see this is to look at some of the adjectives associated with masculinity (e.g., strong, rational, prudent, active, objective) and femininity (e.g., weak, irrational, impulsive, passive, subjective). What is immediately apparent is: - first, they constitute dichotomous pairs of characteristics which are seen as mutually exclusive (e.g., strong/weak, active/passive, etc.); - second, in each case, the “masculine” side of the pair is valued more highly than the “feminine” one. - third, the very meaning of masculinity and femininity is defined through its relation to its “opposite”. That is, they are dependent upon each other for their meaning: masculinities do not exist except in contrast to femininities and vice versa. This means that a man could not be seen as insufficiently masculine or “wimpy” unless we have an idea of the “feminine” characteristics “real” men must avoid. Critically, this creation of gender-dichotomised pairings extends far beyond a list of human characteristics: think, for example, of culture/nature; analysis/intuition; order/disorder; assert/compromise; military/civilian. Here, too, although these pairs have no necessary relation to male or female bodies, in US (the dominant Western) culture, one side of each pair is culturally coded “masculine”, the other “feminine”, and the “masculine is the more highly valued. The effect of this symbolic gender-coding is that any human action or endeavour, no matter how unrelated to biological maleness or femaleness, is perceived as more or less masculine or feminine – even if only at a subconscious level – and valued or devalued accordingly. In other words, ideas about gender not only shape how we perceive men and women; they shape how we see the world. And they have political effects.

AT: Essentialism

Our alternative isn’t essentialist—it’s not based on biological notions of women but recognizes the value of marginalized understandings of IR

**Tickner 92** [Ann, Professor @ the School of International Relations USC, B.A. in History, U London, M.A. in IR, Yale, PhD in pol science, “GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY”, pg. 33]

Characteristics that have typically been associated with femininity must therefore be seen not in essentialist terms but as characteristics that women have developed in response to their socialization and their historical roles in society. The association of women with moral virtues such as caring comes not from women's innate moral superiority but from women's activities in the private sphere where these values are accepted in theory, if not always in practice. Since they are linked to women and the private sphere, however, these feminine characteristics have been devalued in the public realm, particularly in the world of international politics. The question then becomes how to revalue them in public life in ways that can contribute to the creation of a more just and secure world. Taking care not to elevate these feminine characteristics to a position of superiority, we can regard them as an inspiration that can contribute to our thinking about ways to build better futures. Even if the better future is not female, a human future that rejects the rigid separation of public and private sphere values and the social distinctions between women and men requires that the good qualities of both are equally honored and made available to all.

\*\*\*AFF Answers\*\*\*

AFF: No Link

We don’t frame policies in terms of gender, but as citizens. This creates more political and democratic principles

Joni Lovenduski et al (Professor of Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London and a Fellow of the British Academy ) Claudie Baudino and Marila Guadagnini and Petra Meier and Diane Sainsbury p. 8

At the same time women framed their claims in ungendered terms. They made their claims as voters and citizens – not as women. As citizens they demanded that the principle of equal rights to political office be translated into reality. Framing the issue of women’s representation as citizens’ rights had several strategic advantages. First, it enhanced unity among women. Politically organised women constituted a minority within each of the parties, and they were divided along partisan lines. As citizens they had equal rights and were joined together in redressing the denial of their rights. Second, as half the citizenry, women were entitled to a corres- ponding share of the seats. Third, framed as a contradiction of democratic principles, the demand for increased representation for women was hard to argue against. In fact, everyone concurred in principle, and all the party leaders expressed their support of more women in office.

AFF: Link Turn – Warming

Causes and consequences of warming are gendered – taking steps to eliminate it help to break down the binary

Erika Cudworth  Stephen Hobden(Paper presented to European Consortium for Political Research  5th Pan European Conference on the EU, University of Oporto,  Porto, Portugal,) 24th‐26th June 2010 “Securing what for whom? Multiple complex  Inequalities and the politics of environmental  security in Europe”

International Relations with its tradition of state‐based analysis, has difficulties in dealing with the global character of many environmental issues. Both the globalised character of some environmental problems needs to be fully appreciated, whilst also being cognisant of the differential impact of problem effects in the context of profound and persistent inequities. Global warming is the clearest and most pressing example of a global environmental problem. Other environmental issues may not be so ‘global’ in impact. Land pollution is often localized; humans pollute land where they bury industrial and consumer waste, or locate industrial processing. However, the international trade in commercial and industrial waste, and the practices of dumping waste in international waters and on other countries, adds a global dimension. The pollution of seas is global, as almost all seawater is connected; as is air pollution, carried over considerable distances by prevailing winds (Yearley 1996: 33‐34). The loss of species biodiversity has also come to be defined as an environmental problem for the maintenance of healthy ecosystems, and the widespread character of this collapse of species diversity has been labelled the ‘sixth extinction’ (Leakey and Lewin 1996). This said, most authors argue that the impacts of global climate change will have greater impact on the South. Devereux and Edwards argue that the effects of global warming will be ‘globally stratifying’. Those countries where drought is already a problem are likely to become drier. These same countries are more dependent on agriculture where the possibilities for diversification are more limited. It is likely, they argue, that ‘the prevalence and depth of hunger will deteriorate in those countries and population groups where food security is already significant’ Devereux and Edwards 2004: 28). Furthermore, as Rogers (2004: 99‐100) points out, extreme weather events tend to have a much more drastic impact on countries of the South compared to the North. Goldblatt (1996) argues that the exploitation of the South’s environment commenced during the colonial period and has continued since the end of the European empires. In this sense the ‘North’ has exported much of its environmentally damaging industrialisation, making the notion of environmental security on a national basis nonsensical. In addition, the extent to which gender inequalities differentiates human causes of environmental changes and their effects, is absent from most accounts in the environmental security literature. Salleh argues that the impact of gender inequalities is absent from the notion of ecological footprint that has been used in an essentialist way, as it differentiates humanity only in terms of Northern or Southern location (Salleh, 2009: 11). This ignores the gendered qualities of paid and unpaid work and of transport and energy use and the feminisation of poverty. Collectively, as Spitzner notes, these inequalities mean that both the causes and consequences of global warming are gendered (2009: 218‐222).

AFF: Perm Solvency

State key – empirically working within the system results in better political action and democracy

Joni Lovenduski et al (Professor of Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London and a Fellow of the British Academy ) Claudie Baudino and Marila Guadagnini and Petra Meier and Diane Sainsbury p. 8

The representation of women in a political system is a good test of its claims to democracy. The claims that women make for representation are claims for their citizenship and at the heart of their engagement with politics. Political representation is therefore a fundamental feminist concern, although its importance has not always been acknowledged. The women’s liberation movements that began in the 1970s were, in many countries, ambivalent about formal political representation. However, by the end of the twentieth century women’s movements were active to secure equality of representation throughout the world. From the moment that women’s movements were making demands on the state the issue of their political representation was in play. Whilst suffrage campaigns were explicit movements for political participation and representation, campaigns over rights to education, to paid work, to equal pay, to personal dignity and security, to sexual autonomy were also in part about the inclusion of women’s interests in policy-making. Later movements for representation in legislatures and assemblies were movements for presence that challenged political arrangements and sought to insert women’s interests into policy-making by ensuring they were amongst the policy-makers. The connection between agenda status for women’s interests and the claim for equal political representation continues. Since the nineteenth century women’s movement activists have demanded state action on a range of issues that includes anti-discrimination policies, anti-violence policies, reproductive rights, childcare and political equality. In the late twentieth century governments responded, some more slowly than others, by developing a set of agencies to take responsibility for such demands. These women’s policy agencies (WPAs) vary in scope, size, resources, stability and location. They appeared at different times in different countries but are now part of the political landscape. Their existence is, at least in symbolic terms, an acknowledgement of women’s demands for representation.

AFF: Perm Solvency

ONLY Endorsing political action can prevent gender inequality- the permutation affirms a universal notion of women to prevent current power structures

**Baldwin, 97** (Margaret A., Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p ln)

However salutary the postmodern goal of de-essentializing women, postmodern theory ultimately effaces the specific situation of public women, and forfeits altogether any account of gender along the way. This difficulty, and its implications for political strategy, is often spoken of but rarely addressed seriously within postmodern feminism. Denise Riley offers the diktat that at such junctures women can know amongst themselves "that 'women' don't exist -- while maintaining a politics of [\*160] 'as if they existed' -- since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did." 434 Judith Butler makes the same tactical concession when she affirms the continued necessity of asserting "a generally shared conception of 'women'" 435 as a political strategy: Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity to speak as and for women, and I would not contest that necessity. Surely, that is the way in which representational politics operates, and . . . lobbying efforts are virtually impossible without recourse to identity politics. So we agree that demonstrations and legislative efforts and radical movements need to make claims in the name of women. 436

AFF: Realism

Working within realism necessary- failure to use gender binaries ingrains sexist politics.

Mary Caprioli, 2004, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee., “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis” International Studies Review.

The derision with which many conventional feminists view feminist quantitative studies persists to the detriment of both feminist and other types of IR scholarship. As Jan Jindy Pettman (2002) has argued, however, no single feminist position exists in international relations. One of the most common feminist critiques of feminist quantitative research is that scholars cannot simply "add gender and stir" (Peterson 2002;Steans2003), for gender is not just one of many variables. Yet, gender is one of many variables when we are discussing international issues, from human rights to war. As Fred Halliday (1988) has observed, gender is not the core of international relations or the key to understanding it. Such a position would grossly overstate the feminist case. Gender may be an important explanatory and predictive component but it certainly is not the only one.260 Such a critique only serves to undermine the feminist argument against a scientific methodology for the social sciences by questioning the scholarship of those who employ quantitative methodologies. One does not pull variables "out of the air" to put into a model, thereby "adding and stirring." Variables are added to models if a theoretical justification for doing so exists. Peterson (2002:158) postulates that "as long as IR understands gender only as an empirical category (for example, how do women in the military affect the conduct of war?), feminisms appear largely irrelevant to the discipline's primary questions and inquiry." Yet, little evidence actually supports this contention—unless one is arguing that gender is the only important category of analysis. If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female- centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gender-centric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world. Sylvester (2002a) has wondered aloud whether feminist research should be focused primarily on critique, warning that feminists should avoid an exclusive focus on highlighting anomalies, for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.

AFF: Essentialism Counter K

Feminism relies on an essential an universal women that reinforces the same stereotypes produced under patriarchy

Witworth, prof of political science and female studies @ York U, 94 (Feminism and International Relations, pg 20, 1994)

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a ‘re-thinking’ from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women. Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism’s reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of ‘women’. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal ‘man’, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal ‘woman’. And indeed, that notion of ‘woman’ not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy. Those women who do not fit the mould – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – are quickly dismissed as expressing ‘negative’ or ‘inauthentic’ feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men). In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism. It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.

The negative is colonial – they universalize the experiences of Western women

Goetz, research fellow in Development studies at U of Sussex, 91 (Anne Goetz, “Gender and International Relations,” Harper and Row, 1991)

Third world women have accused first word and western-trained feminists of exercising a certain cultural colonialism, of misrepresenting different women by homogenizing the experiences and conditions of western women across time and culture. Chakravorty Spivak has shown that western women are “complicitous” in contributing to the continued ‘degredation’ of third world women whose micrology they interpret without having access to it. Monica Lazreg, exploring the ‘perils of writing as a woman on women in Algeria’ suggests that third world women have been produced as a field of knowledge, essentializing their difference in a process that represents a ‘caricature of the feminist project’. Black feminists have accused white feminists of adding on difference at the margin ‘without leaving the comforts of home’ so as to support ‘the seeming homogeneity, stability, and self-evidence of its experience based epistemology’. Trinh T. Minh-ha identifies this neutralized difference as ‘the very kind of colonized anthropologised difference the master has always granted his subordinates’. Audre Lorde’s response to the universalized picture of oppression in Mary Dali’s Gym/Ecology reproaches her for failing: “to recognize that, as women… differences expose all women to various forms and degrees of patriarchal oppression, some of which we share, some of which we do not… The oppression of women knows no ethnic nor racial boundaries, true, but that does not mean that it is identical within those boundaries… to imply… that all women suffer the same oppression simply because we are women is to lose sight of the many varied tools of patriarchy. It is to ignore how these tools are used by women without awareness against each other.” These statements amount to descriptions of an epistemologically totalizing and culturally disruptive feminist. And to the extend that feminist theory’s claim to relevance is based upon its claim to represent the meaning of women’s social experience in all its heterogeneity, these critiques point to some fundamental problems. The original consciousness raising approach of traditional feminist – what Catherine MacKinnon has called its critical method – involved a project of theorizing the collective expression of the social constitution of sexed identities. This was informed by a political understanding that gender was not an inalienable description of human reality; an understanding derived from the insights of a traditional feminist ideology whose analysis of the political meaning of experience was concerned with deconstructing the legitimating surface of women’s oppression. Theorizing the social construction of subjectivity produced an understanding of the mechanisms of sexist oppression. In practice, and as seen above, particularly in the context of WID practice, that collective critical reconstitution of women’s experiences in traditional feminist movements has tended to reproduce the situational consciousness of the white, bourgeois, heterosexual feminist, developing a set of certainties structured around that specific subjectivity. Such certainties in liberal or Marxist feminist ideologies tended to inform the cross-cultural investigations of sexual subordination, producing a certain myopia with respect to the details of sexual subordination in different societies. The failure to guide practice with reference to the processes that shape human perceptions and norms promoted the disintegration of feminist pronouncements on women in development into a norm setting activity by a counter-elite.

AFF: Essentialism Counter K

Double bind- either the alt defines a genderless subject or its essentialist- both being counterproductive and nonsensical for their political action

Linda Alcoff, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College/CUNY Graduate Center, 1988, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory,” PK

Lauretis's main thesis is that subjectivity, that is, what one "per- ceives and comprehends as subjective," is constructed through a continuous process, an ongoing constant renewal based on an interaction with the world, which she defines as experience: "And thus [subjectivity] is produced not by external ideas, values, or material causes, but by one's personal, subjective engagement in the practices, discourses, and institutions that lend significance (value, meaning, and affect) to the events of the world."42 This is the process through which one's subjectivity becomes en-gendered. But describing the subjectivity that emerges is still beset with dif- ficulties, principally the following: "The feminist efforts have been more often than not caught in the logical trap set up by [a] paradox. Either they have assumed that 'the subject,' like 'man,' is a generic term, and as such can designate equally and at once the female and male subjects, with the result of erasing sexuality and sexual dif- ference from subjectivity. Or else they have been obliged to resort to an oppositional notion of 'feminine' subject defined by silence, negativity, a natural sexuality, or a closeness to nature not compro- mised by patriarchal culture."43 Here again is spelled out the di- lemma between a post-structuralist genderless subject and a cultural feminist essentialized subject. As Lauretis points out, the latter alternative is constrained in its conceptualization of the female sub- ject by the very act of distinguishing female from male subjectivity. This appears to produce a dilemma, for if we de-gender subjectivity, we are committed to a generic subject and thus undercut feminism, while on the other hand if we define the subject in terms of gender, articulating female subjectivity in a space clearly distinct from male subjectivity, then we become caught up in an oppositional dichot- omy controlled by a misogynist discourse. A gender-bound subjec- tivity seems to force us to revert "women to the body and to sexuality as an immediacy of the biological, as nature."44 For all her insistence on a subjectivity constructed through practices, Lauretis is clear that that conception of subjectivity is not what she wishes to pro- pose. A subjectivity that is fundamentally shaped by gender appears to lead irrevocably to essentialism, the posing of a male/female opposition as universal and ahistorical. A subjectivity that is not fundamentally shaped by gender appears to lead to the conception of a generic human subject, as if we could peel away our "cultural" layers and get to the real root of human nature, which turns out to be genderless. Are these really our only choices?

Essentialism bad – shouldn’t associate women with peace

J. Ann Tickner (professor of international relations at USC) 2001, Gendering World Politics. Pp. 6.

Feminists have claimed that the likelihood of conflict will not diminish until unequal gender hierarchies are reduced or eliminated; the privileging of characteristics associated with a stereotypical masculinity in states' foreign policies contributes to the legitimization not only of war but of militarization more generally. Wary of what they see as gendered dichotomies that have pitted realists against idealists and led to overly simplistic assumptions about warlike men and peaceful women, certain feminists are cautioning against the association of women with peace, a position that, they believe, disempowers both women and peace. The growing numbers of women in the military also challenges and complicates these essentialist stereotypes. To this end, and as part of their effort to rethink concepts central to the field, feminists define peace and security, not in idealized ways often associated with women, but in broad, multidimensional terms that include the elimination of social hierarchies such as gender that lead to political and economic injustice.

AFF: Identity Politics Bad

The K is self defeating – their discourse regulates essentializes women, foreclosing other methods of representation

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 1)

For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only initiates feminist interest and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom political representation is pursued. But politics and representation are controversial terms. On the one hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects: on the other hand, representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women. For feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed necessary to foster the political visibility of women. This has seemed obviously important considering the pervasive cultural condition in which all women’s lives were either misrepresented of not represented at all. Recently, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist theory and politics has come under challenge from within feminist discourse. The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms. There is a great deal of material that not only questions the viability of “the subject” as the ultimate candidate for representation or, indeed, liberation, but there is very little agreement after all on what it is that constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women. The domains of political and linguistic “representation” set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before representation can be extended. Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent. Juridical notions of power appeal to regulate political life in purely negative terms - that is, through the imitation, prohibition, regulation, control and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. - that is, through the imitation, prohibition, regulation, control and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, then the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as “the subject” of feminism is itself a distinctive formation and effect of a given version of representational politics. And **the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation**. This becomes politically problematic if that system can be shown to produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce subjects who are presumed to be masculine. **In such cases an** uncritical **appeal to such a system for the emancipation of “women” will be clearly self-defeating.**

This re-entrenches gender binaries

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 5)

For gender to “belong to philosophy” is for Wittig to belong to “that body of self-evident concepts without which philosophers believe they cannot develop a line of reasoning and which for them go without saying, for they exist prior to any thought, any social order, in nature. Wittig’s view is corroborated by that popular discourse on gender identity that uncritically employs the inflectional attribution of “being” to genders and to “sexualities.” The unproblematic claim to “be” a woman and “be” heterosexual would be symptomatic of that metaphysics of gender substances. In the case of both “men” and “women,” this claim tends to subordinate the notion of gender under that of identity and to lead to the conclusion that a person is a gender and is one in virtue of his or her sex, psychic sense of self, and various expressions of that psychic self, the most salient being that of sexual desire. In such a pre-feminist context, gender, naively (rather than critically confused with sex, serves as a unifying principle of the embodied self and maintains that unity over and against an “opposite sex” whose structure is presumed to maintain a parallel but oppositional internal coherence among sex, gender, and desire. The articulation “I feel like a woman” by a female or “I feel like a man: by a male presupposes that in neither case is the claim meaninglessly redundant, although it might appear unproblematic to be a given anatomy. Although we shall later consider the way in which that project is also fraught with difficulty) the experience of a gendered psychic disposition or cultural identity is considered an achievement. Thus, “I feel like a woman” is true to the extent that Aretha Franklin’s invocation of the defining other is assumed: “You make me feel like a natural woman” This achievement requires a differentiation from the opposite gender. Hence, one is one’s gender to the extent that one is not the other gender, a formulation that presupposes and enforces the restriction of gender within that binary pair.

AFF: Identity Politics Bad

Relying on “gender” as a category for mobilization forces us to ignore the complexities of identity.

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 3)

A part from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion the subject, however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common identity Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, women, even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety. As Denise Riley’s title suggests, Am I That Name? is a question produced by the very possibility of the name’s multiple significations. If one “is” a woman that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pre-gendered “person” transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced.

Gender must be rejected as a category for mobilization. Emancipatory gender models can only reify existing power relations.

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 94)

In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the univocal construct of “sex (one is one’s sex and, therefore, not the other) is (a) produced in the service of the social regulation and control of sexuality and (b) conceals and artificially unifies a variety of disparate and unrelated sexual functions and then (c) postures within discourse as a cause, an inferior essence which both produces and renders intelligible all manner of sensation, pleasure and desire as sex-specific. In other words, bodily pleasures are not merely casually reducible to this ostensibly sex-specific essence, but they become readily interpretable as manifestations or signs of this “sex.” In opposition to this false construction of sex as both univocal and casual, Foucault engages a reverse-discourse which treats sex as an effect rather than an origin. In the place of “sex” as the original and continuous case and signification of bodily pleasures, he proposes “sexuality” as an open and complex historical system of discourse and power that produces the misnomer of “sex” as part of a strategy to conceal and, hence, to perpetuate power-relations. One way in which power is both perpetuated and concealed is through the establishment of an external or arbitrary relation between power, conceived as repression or domination, and sex, conceived as a brave but thwarted energy waiting for release or authentic self-expression. The use of this juridical model presumes that the relation between power and sexuality is not only ontologically distinct, but that power always and only works to subdue or liberate a sex which is fundamentally intact, self-sufficient, and other than power itself. When “sex” is essentially in this way, it becomes ontologically immunized from power relations and from its own historicity. As a result, the analysis of sexuality is collapsed into the analysis of “sex,” and any inquiry into the historical production of the category of “sex” itself is precluded by this inverted ad falsifying causality. According to Foucault, “sex” must not only be contextualized within the terms of sexuality, but juridical power must be reconceived as a construction produced by a generative power which, in turn, conceals the mechanism of is own productivity. The notion of sex brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it possible to invert the representation of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as being rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to dominate. Foucault explicitly takes a stand against emancipatory or liberationist models of sexuality in The History of Sexuality because they subscribe to a juridical model that does not acknowledge the historical production of “sex” as a category, that is, as a mystifying “effect” of power relations. His ostensible problem with feminism seems also to emerge here: Where feminist analysis takes the category of sex and, thus, according to him, the binary restriction of gender as its point of departure. Foucault understands his own project to be an inquiry into how the category of “sex” and sexual difference are constructed within discourse as necessary features of bodily identity. The juridical model of law which structures the feminist emancipatory model presumes, in his view, that the subject of emancipation, “the sexed boy” in some sense is not itself in need of a critical deconstruction. As Foucault remarks about some humanist efforts at prison reform, the criminal subject who gets emancipated may be even more deeply shackled than the humanist originally thought. To be sexed, for Foucault, is to be subjected to a set of social regulations, to have the law that directs those regulations reside both as the formative principle of one’s sex, gender, pleasures and desires and as the hermeneutic principle of self-interpretation. The category of sex is thus inevitably regulative, and any analysis which makes that category pre-suppositional uncritically extends and further legitimates that regulative strategy as a power knowledge regime.

AFF: Identity Politics Bad

Feminism creates a divide in international relations that makes the problem worse, rather than helping it because the current system is based off our similarities, not our differences

Jarvis 2000 D. S. L. Jarvis, 2000. [University of South Carolina Press, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, p 167].

Lurking behind such positions, of course, is the highly problematic assumption that a fundamental shift in the political, social, and economic worlds has occurred; that "people, machinery and money, images and ideas now follow increasingly nonisomorphic paths, and that because of this there is a "deterritorializing mobility of peoples, ideas, and images," one overcoming the "laborious moves of statism to project an image of the world divided along territorially discontinuous (separated) sovereign spaces, each supposedly with homogeneous cultures and impervious essences." In this new world where global space-as-territory has been obliterated, where discrete national cultures no longer exist but are dissolved by cosmopolitanism and ubiquitous images peddled by hypermodern communications, all that remains as tangible referents for knowledge and understanding, we are told, are our own fractured identities."' While, for feminists, this is profoundly liberating, allowing them to recognize a "multiplicity of identities," each engaged in a "differing politics," it also betrays how narrow is the intent of feminist postmodernism, which stands for no other end except the eradication of essentialism."3 Much as Ashley saw in positivism tyrannical structures of oppression, so in essentialism postmodern feminists see the subjugation of diversity amid universal narratives. Yet the reification of difference as the penultimate ontological beginning and end point seems disingenuous in the extreme. The question is not whether there are differences-of course there are-but whether these are significant for International Relations, and if so in what capacity? Historically, the brief of International Relations has been to go out in search of those things that unite us, not divide us. Division, disunity, and difference have been the unmistakable problems endemic to global politics, and overcoming them the objective that has provided scholars with both their motivating purpose and moral compass. In venerating difference, identity politics unwittingly reproduces this problematique: exacerbating differences beyond their significance, fabricating disunity, and contributing to social and political cleavage. Yes, we are not all the same. But the things that unite us are surely more important, more numerous, and more fundamental to the human condition than those that divide us. We all share a conviction that war is bad, for example, that vio- lence is objectionable, global poverty unconscionable, and that peaceful interstate relations are desirable. Likewise, we all inhabit one earth and have similar environmental concerns, have the same basic needs in terms of developmental requirements, nutrition, personal security, education, and shelter. To suppose that these modernist concerns are divisible on the basis of gender, color, sexuality, or religious inclination seems specious, promoting contrariety where none really exists from the perspective of International Relations. How, for example, amid the reification of ever-divisible difference, do we foster political community-and-solidarity, hope to foster greater global collectivity, or unite antithetically inclined religious, segregationist, or racial groups on the basis of theft professed difference? How this is meant to secure new visions of international polities, solve the divisions of previous disputations, or avert violent fictionalisms in the future remains curiously absent from the discourse of identity politics."4 Methodologically, the implications of reifying false difference are also far from benign for International Relations, but betray a devolution of disciplinary knowledge and theory amid sundry narratives captive to personal "travelogues," attempts to recreate histories or enumerate a catalogue of previous "silences" simply on the basis that such has not been done before. The result is a type of agenda inflation, sprawling research topics that, from a more traditionalist perspective, would seem unrelated to International Relations. Consider, for example, Birigit Weiss, who attempted to extol the virtues of an identity-based research agenda for International Relations, suggesting that we think of "symbols such as phone boxes, mail boxes, or the little green man flashing electronically above pedestrian crossings. [These] are national (identity) symbols which we seldom notice as such," she writes. "Only: (sic) once we are away from home do we perceive them as different. First deduction. Being abroad we learn to know what home means." Travel, and the distance associated with it, for Weiss "helps us to define who we are (and where we come from)-which is a necessary condition for developing an international perspective." The old adage that "travel does round the individual" is now reiterated in postmodem form, and International Relations exalted to become "interNETional" or "inter- cultural" studies where, for example, Weiss notes that with the internet "one can travel from ocean to ocean, from continent to continent, from country to country and around the globe in one night-through cyber- space." One can only suppose that play on the internet assists in the formation of our personal identities, makes us better scholars, and that reflections on this can constitute discourse in "InterNETional" studies. As a final reflection on what "intercultural" as opposed to International Relations might look like, Weiss recalls the Container 96-An across Oceans exhibition held in Copenhagen, where "artists coming from 96 seaport cities…created art works inside the containers. The visitors were able to 'circumnavigate the globe in just a few hours' and could 'take a walk from continent to continent, from elimazone to dliniazone and from seaport to seaport and enter into visions and realities, as perceived by artists from near and far.'"" "In my view," Weiss writes, "this exhibition is an example for an alternative vision of international relations, and might help us look beyond the scope of the discipline."

AFF: Identity Politics Bad

Identity politics in the context of preventing violence against women ignore intragroup differences and cause tension between groups.

Kimberle Crenshaw, prof law @ UCLA, 1993, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, p. 1242

The embrace of identity politics, however, has been in tension with dominant conceptions of social justice. Race, gender, and other identity categories are most often treated in mainstream liberal discourse as vestiges of bias or domination—that is, as intrinsically negative frameworks in which social power works to exclude or marginalize those who are different. According to this understanding, our liberatory objective should be to empty such categories of any social significance. Yet implicit in certain strands of feminist and racial liberation movements, for example is the view that the social power in delineating difference need not be the power of domination; it can instead be the source of social empowerment and reconstruction.

The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite—that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences. In the context of violence against women, this elision of difference in identity politics is problematic, fundamentally because the violence that many women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and class. Moreover, ignoring difference within groups contributes to tension among groups, another problem of identity politics that bears on efforts to politicize violence against women. Feminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains. Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the practices expound identity as woman or person of color as an either/or proposition, they relegate the identity of women of color to a location that resists telling.