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\*\*\*\*\*UNIQUENESS\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*HEG HIGH\*\*

Heg High Now – General

US hegemony is high now – economic and military indicators prove.

Kagan 12 (Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a columnist for The Washington Post, The New Republic, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,1)

The answer is no. Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about China’s development predict that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the sheer size of an economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the international system. If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then the world’s largest economy, would have been the predominant power instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle again—and Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the country’s growth indefinitely—it will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP. Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

Heg High Now – General

American hegemony is not in decline, but adapting to global change

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College, Wall Street Journal. 04/09, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577305531821651026.html, “The Myth Of America’s Decline,” TJ)

The world balance of power is changing. Countries like China, India, Turkey and Brazil are heard from more frequently and on a wider range of subjects. The European Union's most ambitious global project—creating a universal treaty to reduce carbon emissions—has collapsed, and EU expansion has slowed to a crawl as Europe turns inward to deal with its debt crisis. Japan has ceded its place as the largest economy in Asia to China and appears increasingly on the defensive in the region as China's hard and soft power grow. The international chattering class has a label for these changes: American decline. The dots look so connectable: The financial crisis, say the pundits, comprehensively demonstrated the failure of "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have sapped American strength and, allegedly, destroyed America's ability to act in the Middle East. China-style "state capitalism" is all the rage. Throw in the assertive new powers and there you have it—the portrait of America in decline. Actually, what's been happening is just as fateful but much more complex. The United States isn't in decline, but it is in the midst of a major rebalancing. The alliances and coalitions America built in the Cold War no longer suffice for the tasks ahead. As a result, under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, American foreign policy has been moving toward the creation of new, sometimes difficult partnerships as it retools for the tasks ahead. From the 1970s to the start of this decade, the world was in what future historians may call the Trilateral Era. In the early '70s, Americans responded to the defeat in Vietnam and the end of the Bretton Woods era by inviting key European allies and Japan to join in the creation of a trilateral system. Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. accounted for an overwhelming proportion of the international economy in the noncommunist world. With overlapping interests on a range of issues, the trilateral powers were able to set the global agenda on some key questions. Currency policy, the promotion of free trade, integrating the developing world into the global financial system, assisting the transition of Warsaw Pact economies into the Western World—the trilateralists had a lot to show for their efforts. The system worked particularly well for America. Europe and Japan shared a basic commitment to the type of world order that Americans wanted, and so a more cooperative approach to key policy questions enlisted the support of rich and powerful allies for efforts that tallied pretty closely with key long-term American goals. It is this trilateral system—rather than American power per se—that is in decline today. Western Europe and Japan were seen as rising powers in the 1970s, and the assumption was that the trilateral partnership would become more powerful and effective as time passed. Something else happened instead. Demographically and economically, both Japan and Europe stagnated. The free-trade regime and global investment system promoted growth in the rest of Asia more than in Japan. Europe, turning inward to absorb the former Warsaw Pact nations, made the fateful blunder of embracing the euro rather than a more aggressive program of reform in labor markets, subsidies and the like. The result today is that the trilateral partnership can no longer serve as the only or perhaps even the chief set of relationships through which the U.S. can foster a liberal world system. Turkey, increasingly turning away from Europe, is on the road to becoming a more effective force in the Middle East than is the EU. China and India are competing to replace the Europeans as the most important non-U.S. economic actor in Africa. In Latin America, Europe's place as the second most important economic and political partner (after the U.S.) is also increasingly taken by China. The U.S. will still be a leading player, but in a septagonal, not a trilateral, world. In addition to Europe and Japan, China, India, Brazil and Turkey are now on Washington's speed dial. (Russia isn't sure whether it wants to join or sulk; negotiations continue.) New partnerships make for rough sledding. Over the years, the trilateral countries gradually learned how to work with each other—and how to accommodate one another's needs. These days, the Septarchs have to work out a common approach. It won't be easy, and success won't be total. But even in the emerging world order, the U.S. is likely to have much more success in advancing its global agenda than many think. Washington is hardly unique in wanting a liberal world system of open trade, freedom of the seas, enforceable rules of contract and protection for foreign investment. What began as a largely American vision for the post-World War II world will continue to attract support and move forward into the 21st century—and Washington will remain the chairman of a larger board.

Heg High Now – General

Heg will endure – economic and military power and lack of serious adversaries.

Lieber 11 (Robert J., Department of Government, Georgetown University, 8-25-2011, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34:4, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” Taylor and Francis Group, p. 527)

Because of the enormous margin of power the US possessed after the end of the Cold War, it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. China presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and in rapid expansion of its military, but has not yet sought to become a true peer competitor. In any case, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Near East, America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demographics, force size, power projection, military technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives.

Heg is high – no decline coming soon

Wolf 11 – (Charles, April 13 2011, PhD from Harvard, senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, member of the advisory board of the Center for International Business and Economic Research at UCLA's Anderson Graduate School of Business, WSJ, “The Facts About American 'Decline'”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576251292725228886.html>,) TJ

It's fashionable among academics and pundits to proclaim that the U.S. is in decline and no longer No. 1 in the world. The declinists say they are realists. In fact, their alarm is unrealistic. Early declinists like Yale historian Paul Kennedy focused in the 1980s on the allegedly debilitating effects of America's "imperial overstretch." More recently, historians Niall Ferguson and Martin Jacques focus on the weakening of the economy. Among pundits, Paul Krugman and Michael Kinsley on the left and Mark Helprin on the right sound the alarm. The debate involves issues of absolute versus relative decline and concepts like "resilience" and "passivity." Some issues are measurable, like gross domestic product (GDP), military power and demographics. Others are not measurable or less measurable. In absolute terms, the U.S. enjoyed an incline this past decade. Between 2000 and 2010, U.S. GDP increased 21% in constant dollars, despite the shattering setbacks of the Great Recession in 2008-09 and the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001. In 2010, U.S. military spending ($697 billion) was 55% higher than in 2000. And in 2010, the U.S. population was 310 million, an increase of 10% since 2000. The notion that demography is destiny may be a stretch, but demographics are important when, as in the U.S., population increase—due to higher birth and immigration rates than other developed countries—cushions the impact of an aging population. But there were also some important declines relative to the rest of the world. In 2000, U.S. GDP was 61% of the combined GDPs of the other G-20 countries. By 2010, that number dropped to 42%. In 2000, U.S. GDP was slightly more than eight times that of China, but it fell to slightly less than three times in 2010. Japan is a contrasting case: U.S. GDP was twice as large as Japan's in 2000 but 2.6 times as large in 2010, before the tsunami and nuclear disasters of 2011. Between the inclines and declines are other data to be considered. U.S. military spending inclined substantially to more than twice that spent by all non-U.S. NATO members in 2010 from 1.7 times in 2000; to 17 times Russian spending in 2010 from six times in 2000; and to nine times Chinese spending in 2010 from seven times in 2000. Demographically, the U.S. population in 2000 (282 million) was 4.6% of the global population; by 2010, the U.S. population (310 million) had risen to 4.9% of the global figure. The U.S. population was 59% as large as that of the 15-member European Union in 2000; that figure increased to 78% by 2010 (counting only 2000's 15 members) and 62% if we count the 12 new EU members added between 2004 and 2007. The U.S. population grew by 10% more than that of Japan and 13% more than that of Russia between 2000 and 2010. Relative to the huge populations of China and India (1.3 billion and 1.2 billion, respectively), the U.S. population during the past decade increased slightly (0.16%) compared to China and decreased by a similar margin compared to India. What matters more than absolute numbers is the population's composition of prime working-age people versus dependents. Compared to most developed economies and China, the U.S. demographic composition is relatively favorable. So what do all these numbers tell us about decline or incline? Despite the Great Recession, the three crude indicators—GDP, military spending and population growth—show that the U.S. inclined in absolute terms.

Heg High Now – General

Heg will endure now – economic and military power and lack of serious adversaries.

Lieber 11 (Robert J., Department of Government, Georgetown University, 8-25-2011, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34:4, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” Taylor and Francis Group, p. 527)

Because of the enormous margin of power the US possessed after the end of the Cold War, it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. China presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and in rapid expansion of its military, but has not yet sought to become a true peer competitor. In any case, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Near East, America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demographics, force size, power projection, military technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives.

Portrayals of decline are false – the US is still the hegemon.

Brooks and Wohlforth 9 [Stephen G., Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, Associate Professor of Government and Dartmouth College, and William C., Ph.D Political Science, Yale University, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, “Reshaping the World Order: How Washington Should Reform International Institutions,” p. 54, Vol. 88, No. 2, March/April 2009, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/faculty/BrooksWohlforth-FA2009.pdf]

Only a few years ago, pundits were absorbed in debates about American “empire.” Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a “unipolar moment” in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half the world’s defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output. Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that can be ﬁxed (expensive health care in the United States, for example), whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States’ potential rivals). So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States’ successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower’s performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world’s leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its policies in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today.

Heg High Now – Hard Power

US military is unmatched – multiple indicators.

Lieber 11 (Robert J. Lieber, Department of Government, Georgetown University, 8-25-2011, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34:4, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” Taylor and Francis Group, p. 526)

In addition, the American military remains unmatched and despite intense stress from nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq it has not suffered the disarray that afflicted it in Vietnam. This is evident in terms of indicators such as successful recruitment and performance of the volunteer force, the ongoing quality of the officer corps, and broad public support for the military as well as casualty tolerance. Moreover, in its capabilities, technology, capacity to project power, and command of the global commons – as dramatically evident in the recent take-down of Osama bin Laden – the US has actually increased its military margin as compared with others, though with the important exception of China.

U.S. hard power is the best in the world

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg.12-13)

The U.S. military is the best in the world and it has been so since end of World War II. No country has deployed its forces in so many countries and varied climates—from the Arctic to the Antarctic—from below the sea to outer space. No country is better able to fight wars of any type, from guerrilla conflicts to major campaigns on the scale of World War II. No country or likely alliance has the ability to defeat the U.S. military on the battlefield. Thus, measured on either an absolute or relative (that is, comparing the U.S. military to the militaries of other countries) scale, American military power is overwhelming. Indeed, it is the greatest that it has ever been.

Heg High Now – AT: China

**China can’t overtake US heg – economic factors**

**Nye 12** (Joseph S., 2012, University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, Ph.D in political science from Harvard, “The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a ‘Post-American’’ World’”, PDF pg 2) TJ

It is a mistake, however, to exaggerate Chinese power. For more than a decade, many have viewed China as the most likely contender to balance American power, or surpass it. Some draw analogies to the challenge imperial Germany posed to Britain at the beginning of the last century, though Germany surpassed Britain in 1900, and China has a long way to go to equal the power resources of the United States. Even when the overall Chinese GDP passes that of the United States, the two economies will be equivalent in size, but not equal in composition. China would still have a vast, underdeveloped countryside, and it will begin to face demographic problems from the delayed effects of its one-child-per-couple policy. As the Chinese say, they fear the country will grow old before it grows rich. Per capita income provides a measure of the sophistication of an economy. China will probably not equal the United States in per capita income until sometime near the middle of the century. In other words, China’s impressive growth rate combined with the size of its population will likely lead it to pass the American economy in total size, but that is not the same as equality. Moreover, linear projections can be misleading, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. China’s authoritarian political system has thus far shown an impressive power conversion capability, but whether China can maintain that capability over the longer term is a mystery both to outsiders and to Chinese leaders. Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution, China has not yet found a way to solve the problem of demands for political participation (if not democracy) that tend to accompany rising per capita income. Whether China can develop a formula that can manage an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality, and resentethnic minorities remains to be seen.

China won’t surpass the U.S. anytime soon

**Nye 12 (**Joseph, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective, March 5, http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1038752.files/Facilitation%20Articles/Fac\_20120305\_1.pdf, p. 4) TJ

As for the United States' power relative to China's, much will depend on the uncertainties of future political change in China. Barring any political upheaval, China's size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its relative strength vis-à-vis the United States. This will bring China closer to the United States in power resources, but it does not necessarily mean that China will surpass the United States as the most powerful country-even if China suffers no major domestic political setbacks. Projections based on gdp growth alone are one dimensional. They ignore U.S. advantages in military and soft power, as well as China's geopolitical disadvantages in the Asian balance of power. Among the range of possible futures, the more likely are those in which China gives the United States a run for its money but does not surpass it in overall power in the first half of this century. Looking back at history, the British strategist Lawrence Freedman has noted that the United States has "two features which distinguish it from the dominant great powers of the past: American power is based on alliances rather than colonies and is associated with an ideology that is flexible. . . . Together they provide a core of relationships and values to which America can return even after it has overextended itself." And looking to the future, the scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that the United States' culture of openness and innovation will keep it central in a world where networks supplement, if not fully replace, hierarchical power.

Heg High Now – AT: China

No multipolarity threat now – especially not China

Brooks and Wohlforth 9 [Stephen G., Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, Associate Professor of Government and Dartmouth College, and William C., Ph.D Political Science, Yale University, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, “Reshaping the World Order: How Washington Should Reform International Institutions,” p. 55, Vol. 88, No. 2, March/April 2009, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/faculty/BrooksWohlforth-FA2009.pdf]

Another key reason for the multipolar mania is “the rise of the rest.” Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India, many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for ﬁnal outcomes—a common strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern in the Cold War, for example, came not from the Soviet Union’s actually attaining parity with the United States but from the expectation that it would do so in the future. Veterans of that era recall how the launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading some policymakers and analysts to start acting as if the Soviet Union were already as powerful as the United States. A state that is rising should not be confused with one that has risen, just as a state that is declining should not be written off as having already declined. China is generally seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures gdp, China’s economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the United States’. More dramatic is the difference in gdp per capita, for which all measures show China’s as being less than 10 percent of the United States’. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower for a very long time. Real multipolarity — an international system of three or more evenly matched powers—is nowhere on the horizon. Relative power between states shifts slowly.

China can’t challenge the US for the foreseeable future.

Lieber 08 (Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown and author of *The America Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, summer 2008, *World Affairs* 171.1, “Falling Upwards: Declinism: The Box Set,” pp. 54, EBSCOhost)

Still, Beijing now plays an outsized role in global affairs. But, again, as China has become the dominant power in East Asia, its muscle flexing has pushed not only Japan but also Vietnam, Singapore, Australia, and others farther into the U.S. orbit. In any case, China’s priorities for the immediate future center mostly on internal development and the absorption of hundreds of millions of workers from its lagging rural and agricultural sectors. The quickening pace of China’s military buildup seems intended primarily to deter the United States from intervening in support of Taiwan and, beyond that, to establish regional rather than global power. Over the very long-term China may indeed emerge as a great power rival to the United States. But this seems very, very unlikely in the near or medium term.

Heg High Now – AT: Domestic Opposition

**Domestic support for engagement is high.**

Lieber 09 (Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown, editor of *Foreign Policy*, author of *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, March 2009, *International Politics* 46.2-3, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era,” p. 136, ProQuest)

What then about the supply side? The domestic costs and complications are evident but need to be weighed in context. The long-term reality of external threats creates a motivation for engagement abroad, as does the possibility of future attacks on the US homeland. During the 2008 presidential campaign, and despite a heated domestic political climate and sharp disagreement about Iraq and the foreign policy of the Bush administration, none of the leading candidates of either party called for dramatic retrenchment. In addition, they largely concurred on the need to increase the size of the armed forces. Indeed, and unlike the Vietnam era, popular support for the troops has been widespread, even among many critics of the Iraq war.

Heg High Now – AT: Economy

Despite economic hardships, the US is still the hegemon

Flournoy and Davidson 12 (Michele Fournoy is Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Janine Davidson is a Professor at George Mason University and former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, “Obama's New Global Posture,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137717/michele-flournoy-and-janine-davidson/obamas-new-global-posture, TJ)

TOUGH ECONOMIC times have often been met in the United States by calls for a more modest foreign policy. But despite the global economic downturn, in today's interdependent world, retrenchment would be misguided. The United States’ ability to lead the international community is still invaluable and unmatched. Its economy is still by far the largest, most developed, and most dynamic in the world. Its military remains much more capable than any other. The United States’ network of alliances and partnerships ensures that the country rarely has to act alone. And its soft power reflects the sustained appeal of American values. The United States should not reduce its overseas engagement when it is in a position to actively shape the global environment to secure its interests.

**The US maintains its economic strength – share of global output, demographics, science, education, and resources.**

Lieber 11 (Robert J. Lieber, Department of Government, Georgetown University, 8-25-2011, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34:4, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” Taylor and Francis Group, p. 525)

So, does the US today still possess the necessary resources, the ‘wallet’, and does it possess the ‘will’? Is the declinist proposition valid, that as a society, economy, and political power the country is in decline? Certainly the domestic situation is more difficult now than two decades ago. Yet while these problems should not be minimized, they should not be overstated either. Contrary to what many observers would assume, the US has managed to hold its own in globalized economic competition and its strengths remain broad and deep. For the past several decades, its share of global output has been relatively constant at between one-quarter and one-fifth of world output. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 1980 the United States accounted for 26.14 per cent of world GDP, and in 2010 23.61 per cent. These figures are based on GDP in national currency. Alternative calculations using purchasing power parities are slightly less favorable, but still show the US with 20.22 per cent in 2010, as contrasted with 24.59 per cent in 1980.44 Moreover, America benefits from a growing population and one that is aging more slowly than all its possible competitors except India. In addition, and despite a dysfunctional immigration system, it continues to be a magnet for talented and ambitious immigrants. It is a world leader in science and in its system of research universities and higher education, and it has the advantage of continental scale and resources. In short, the US remains the one country in the world that is both big and rich.45

**Financial crisis won’t kill heg – hurt the US less than other major powers.**

Lieber 09 (Robert J., professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown, editor of *Foreign Policy*, author of *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, March 2009, *International Politics* 46.2-3, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era,” ProQuest)

The extraordinary financial crisis that has impacted the United States, Europe, large parts of Asia and much of the rest of the world has provided the impetus for renewed predictions of America's demise as the preeminent global power. Of course, present problems are very serious and the financial crisis is the worst to hit the United States and Europe since the great depression began some 80 years ago. The impact on real estate, banking, insurance, credit, the stock market and overall business activity is quite severe, and a painful recession is already underway. Yet by themselves, these developments do not mean that America will somehow collapse, let alone see some other country assume the unique role it has played in world affairs. Arguably, the impact of the crisis upon the US economy is actually less than for the major European powers. For example, the $700 billion bailout for financial firms approved by Congress amounts to about 5 per cent of the country's annual gross domestic product, significantly less as a percentage than the burdens borne by many countries. In addition, while the exchange rate of the euro declined sharply in the early months of the crisis, as did the British pound, the Russian ruble and many other currencies, the dollar rose sharply in value as foreign investors sought a safe haven for their funds. (Among the other G-8 currencies, only the Japanese yen experienced a substantial rise.)

Heg High Now – AT: Economy

US remains economic leader – competitiveness, tech, education, and demographics.

Lieber 08 (Robert J., professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown and author of *The America Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, summer 2008, *World Affairs* 171.1, “Falling Upwards: Declinism: The Box Set,” pp. 55, EBSCOhost)

On the economic front, without minimizing the impact of today’s challenges, they will likely prove less daunting than those that plagued the U.S. in the 1970s and early 1980s. The overall size and dynamism of the economy remains unmatched, and America continues to lead the rest of the world in measures of competitiveness, technology, and innovation. Here, higher education and science count as an enormous asset. America’s major research universities lead the world in stature and rankings, occupying seventeen of the top twenty slots. Broad demographic trends also favor the United States, whereas countries typically mentioned as peer competitors sag under the weight of aging populations. This is not only true for Russia, Europe, and Japan, but also for China, whose long-standing one-child policy has had an anticipated effect.

Heg High Now – AT: Legitimacy

Heg is strong – claims that the US lacks legitimacy are flawed.

Brooks and Wohlforth 9 [Stephen G., Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, Associate Professor of Government and Dartmouth College, and William C., Ph.D Political Science, Yale University, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, “Reshaping the World Order: How Washington Should Reform International Institutions,” p. 56-58, Vol. 88, No. 2, March/April 2009, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/faculty/BrooksWohlforth-FA2009.pdf]

For analysts such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, the key reason for skepticism about the United States’ ability to spearhead global institutional change is not a lack of power but a lack of legitimacy Other states may simply refuse to follow a leader whose legitimacy has been squandered under the Bush administration; in this view, the legitimacy to lead is a ﬁxed resource that can be obtained only under special circumstances. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues in After Victory that states have been well positioned to reshape the institutional order only after emerging victorious from some titanic struggle, such as the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, or World War I or II. For the neoconservative Robert Kagan, the legitimacy to lead came naturally to the United States during the Cold War, when it was providing the signal service of balancing the Soviet Union. The implication is that today, in the absence of such salient sources of legitimacy, the wellsprings of support for U.S. leadership have dried up for good. But this view is **mistaken**. For one thing, it overstates how accepted U.S. leadership was during the Cold War: anyone who recalls the Euromissile crisis of the 1980s, for example, will recognize that mass opposition to U.S. policy (in that case, over stationing intermediaterange nuclear missiles in Europe) is not a recent phenomenon. For another, it understates how dynamic and malleable legitimacy is. Legitimacy is based on the belief that an action, an actor, or a political order is proper, acceptable, or natural. An action—such as the Vietnam War or the invasion of Iraq—may come to be seen as illegitimate without sparking an irreversible crisis of legitimacy for the actor or the order. When the actor concerned has disproportionately more material resources than other states, the sources of its legitimacy can be refreshed repeatedly. After all, this is hardly the ﬁrst time Americans have worried about a crisis of legitimacy. Tides of skepticism concerning U.S. leadership arguably rose as high or higher after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and during Ronald Reagan’s ﬁrst term, when he called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” Even George W. Bush, a globally unpopular U.S. president with deeply controversial policies, oversaw a marked improvement in relations with France, Germany, and India in recent years—even before the elections of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy in France. Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead the system in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent damage to U.S. legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush administration’s approach to diplomacy and international institutions. Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for sustaining and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead. The United States continues to have a far larger share of the human and material resources for shaping global perceptions than any other state, as well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce public goods that reinforce the beneﬁts of its global role. No other state has any claim to leadership commensurate with Washington’s. And largely because of the power position the United States still occupies, there is no prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system’s leader hinges on whether the system’s members see the leader as acceptable or at least preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy is not necessarily about normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its leadership is natural under the circumstances or the best that can be expected.

\*\*HEG LOW\*\*

Heg Low Now – General

Multipolar transition now—domestic and foreign factors regarding the economy prove

Layne 12 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, International Studies Quarterly 56, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. 204-206) MF

Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of his- tory. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro- Atlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. Unipolarity’s demise marks the end of era of the post-World War II Pax Americana. When World War II ended, the United States, by virtue of its over- whelming military and economic supremacy, was incontestably the most powerful actor in the international system. Indeed, 1945 was the United States’ first unipolar moment. The United States used its commanding, hegemonic position to construct the postwar international order—the Pax Americana—which endured for more than six decades. During the Cold War, the Pax Americana reflected the fact that outside the Soviet sphere, the United States was the preponderant power in the three regions of the world it cared most about: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Pax Americana rested on the foundational pillars of US military dominance and economic leadership and was buttressed by two supporting pillars: America’s ideological appeal (‘‘soft power’’) and the framework of international institutions that the United States built after 1945. Following the Cold War’s end, the United States used its second unipolar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and ideological ambitions. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, the economic foundation of the Pax Americana has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened. Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new constellation of world power. Without the ‘‘hard’’ power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the Pax Americana is doomed to wither in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, because of China’s great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it already is withering. The External Driver of American Decline: The Rise of New Great Powers American decline is part of a broader trend in inter- national politics: the shift of economic power away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers (what economists sometimes refer to as the ‘‘emerging market’’ nations). Among the former are China, India, and Russia. The latter category includes Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth between 2011 and 2025 (Politi 2011; Rich 2011). In some respects, of course, this emergence of new great powers is less about rise than restoration. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1700 China and India were the world’s two largest economies. From their perspective—especially Beijing’s—they are merely regaining what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. The ascent of new great powers is the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). The evidence that the international system is rapidly becoming multipolar—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—is now **impossible to deny**, and China is Exhibit A for the shift in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States. To spur its economic growth, for some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) China took a low profile in international politics and avoided confrontation with the United States and its regional neighbors. To spur its modernization as well, China integrated itself in the American-led world order. China’s self-described ‘‘peaceful rise’’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’’ The fact that China joined the international economic order did not mean its long-term intentions were benign. Beijing’s long-term goal was not simply to get rich. It was also to become wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities it needs to compete with the United States for regional hegemony in East Asia.2 The Great Recession caused a dramatic shift in Beijing’s perceptions of the international balance of power. China now sees the United States in decline while simultaneously viewing itself as having risen to great-power status. China’s newly gained self-confidence was evident in its 2010 foreign policy muscle-flexing. Objective indicators confirm the reality of China’s rise, and the United States’ corresponding relative decline. In 2010, China displaced the United States as the world’s leading manufacturing nation— a crown the United States had held for a century. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15%) will draw nearly even with the United States (18%) by 2014 (see Figure 2). This is especially impressive given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2% in 1980 and as recently as 1995 was only 6%. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy. While analysts disagree on the date when this will happen, the most recent projections by leading economic forecasters have advanced the date dramatically over what was being estimated just a few years ago. For example, in 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy in 2041, and in 2008, it advanced the date to 2028 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; O’Neill 2008). However, the most recent forecasts are now that China will pass the United States much sooner than 2028. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) predicts China will become the world’s largest economy in 2021; Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (2010) says 2020, and the Economist magazine says 2019 (World’s Biggest Economy 2010) (see Figure 3).3 More strikingly, according to a 2011 Inter- national Monetary Fund study, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP¢China will overhaul the United States in 2016. In fact, economist Arvin Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has calculated, also using PPP, that China is already the world’s largest economy (Subramanian 2011).4 What could be clearer proof of the United States’ relative decline than the fact that China will soon leap-frog the United States and become the world’s largest economy, if indeed it has not already done so? That China is poised to displace the United States as the world’s largest economy has more than economic significance. It is significant geopolitically. The pattern of great-power rise is well established.

Their authors are overly optimistic and ignorant—the unipolar moment is over

Layne 12 Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, International Studies Quarterly 56, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. 203) MF

Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in the fall of 2007, most American security studies scholars believed that unipolarity—and perforce American hegemony—would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. Judging from some important recently published books and articles, many of them still do, the Great Recession notwithstanding (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Zakaria 2008; Special Issue on Unipolarity 2009; Norrlof 2010).1 Leading American policymakers, too, cling to the belief that US hegemony is robust. In August 2010, for example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pro- claimed a ‘‘new American moment’’ that will lay the ‘‘foundations for lasting American leadership for decades to come’’ (quoted in Kessler 2010). Even those who grudgingly concede that US hegemony will end—sometime in the distant future—contend that the post–World War II Pax Americana will endure even if American primacy does not (Ikenberry 2001, 2011; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). In the Great Recession’s aftermath, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and geopolitical transformation. The Great Recession has had a two- fold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global wealth—and power—from West to East, a trend illustrated by China’s breathtakingly rapid rise to great- power status. Second, it has raised doubts about the robustness of the economic and financial underpinnings of the United States’ primacy. In this article, I argue that the ‘‘unipolar moment’’ is **over**, and the Pax Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—is fast winding down. I challenge the conventional wisdom among International Relations ⁄ security studies scholars on three counts. First, I show that, contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar. Second, I revisit the 1980s’ debate about American decline and demonstrate that the Great Recession has vindicated the so-called declinists of that decade. Finally, I take on the ‘‘institutional lock-in’’ argument, which holds that by strengthening the Pax Americana’s legacy institutions, the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following World War II even as the material foundations of American primacy erode.

Heg Low Now – General

Rising powers are a significant threat to US hegemony – they won’t follow the US.

Kupchan 12 (Charles A., professor of international affairs at Georgetown and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3-20-2012, *The Atlantic*, “The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-decline-of-the-west-why-america-must-prepare-for-the-end-of-dominance/254779/)

But Washington simply can't expect emerging powers other than China to line up on its side. History suggests that a more equal distribution of power will produce fluid alignments, not fixed alliances. During the late 19th century, for example, the onset of a multi­polar Europe produced a continually shifting network of pacts. Large and small powers alike jockeyed for advantage in an uncertain environment. Only after imperial Germany's military buildup threatened to overturn the equilibrium did Europe's nations group into the competing alliances that ultimately faced off in World War I. As the 21st century unfolds, China is more likely than other emerging nations to threaten U.S. interests. But unless or until the rest of the world is forced to choose sides, most developing countries will keep their options open, not obediently follow America's lead. Already, rising powers are showing that they'll chart their own courses. Turkey for decades oriented its statecraft westward, focusing almost exclusively on its ties to the United States and Europe. Now, Ankara looks primarily east and south, seeking to extend its sway throughout the Middle East. Its secular bent has given way to Islamist leanings; its traditionally close connection with Israel is on the rocks; and its relations with Washington, although steadier of late, have never recovered from the rift over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. India is supposedly America's newest strategic partner. Relations have certainly improved since the 2005 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, and the two nations see eye to eye on checking China's regional intentions. But on many other fronts, Washington and New Delhi are miles apart. India frets, for instance, that the U.S. will give Pakistan too much sway in Afghanistan. On the most pressing national security issue of the day--Iran's nuclear program--India is more of a hindrance than a help, defying Washington's effort to isolate Iran through tighter economic sanctions. And the two democracies have long been at loggerheads over trade and market access. Nations such as Turkey and India, which Kagan argues will be either geopolitically irrelevant or solid American supporters, are already pushing back against Washington. And they are doing so while the United States still wields a pronounced preponderance of power. Imagine how things will look when the playing field has truly leveled out. Despite his faith that rising powers (save China) will be America's friends, Kagan at least recognizes that their ascent could come at America's expense. Will not the "increasing economic clout" of emerging powers, he asks, "cut into American power and influence?" He offers a few reasons not to worry, none of which satisfies. For starters, he claims that the growing wealth of developing nations need not diminish U.S. sway because "there is no simple correlation between economic growth and international influence." He continues, "Just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power." True enough. But one of the past's most indelible patterns is that rising nations eventually expect their influence to be commensurate with their power. The proposition that countries such as India and Brazil will sit quietly in the global shadows as they become economic titans flies in the face of history. Other than modern-day Germany and Japan--both of which have punched well below their weight due to constraints imposed on them after World War II--a country's geopolitical aspirations generally rise in step with its economic strength. During the 1890s, for instance, the United States tapped its industrial might to launch a blue-water navy, rapidly turning itself from an international lightweight into a world-class power. China is now in the midst of fashioning geopolitical aspirations that match its economic strength--as are other emerging powers. India is pouring resources into its navy; its fleet expansion includes 20 new warships and two aircraft carriers.

Heg Low Now – General

**Heg is declining – pushback to US influence is growing.**

Kupchan 12 (Charles A., professor of international affairs at Georgetown and Whitney Shepardson, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3-20-2012, *The Atlantic*, “The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-decline-of-the-west-why-america-must-prepare-for-the-end-of-dominance/254779/)

To support his thesis that emerging powers are not rising at the expense of U.S. influence, Kagan also argues that pushback against Washington is nothing new. He then cites numerous occasions, most of them during the Cold War, when adversaries and allies alike resisted U.S. pressure. The upshot is that other nations are no less compliant today than they used to be, and that the sporadic intransigence of emerging powers is par for the course. But today's global landscape is new. By presuming that current circumstances are comparable with the Cold War, Kagan underestimates the centrifugal forces thwarting American influence. Bipolarity no longer constrains how far nations--even those aligned with Washington--will stray from the fold. And the United States no longer wields the economic influence that it once did. Its transition from creditor to debtor nation and from budget surpluses to massive deficits explains why it has been watching from the sidelines as its partners in Europe flirt with financial meltdown. The G-7, a grouping of like-minded democracies, used to oversee the global economy. Now that role is played by the G-20, a much more unwieldy group in which Washington has considerably less influence. And it is hardly business as usual when foreign countries lay claim to nearly 50 percent of publicly held U.S. government debt, with an emerging rival--China--holding about one-quarter of the American treasuries owned by foreigners. Yes, U.S. leadership has always faced resistance, but the pushback grows in proportion to the diffusion of global power. China may prove to be America's most formidable competitor, but other emerging nations will also be finding their own orbits, not automatically aligning themselves with Washington. America's most reliable partners in the years ahead will remain its traditional allies, Europe and Japan. That's why it spells trouble for the United States that these allies are on the losing end of the ongoing redistribution of global power.

US influence is declining – Arab Spring and Israel/Palestine proves.

Walt 11 (Stephen M., Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, Nov/Dec 2011, *The National Interest* 116, “The End of the American Era,” ProQuest)

Nowhere is this clearer than in the greater Middle East, which has been the main focus of U.S. strategy since the ussr broke apart. Not only did the Arab Spring catch Washington by surprise, but the U.S. response further revealed its diminished capacity to shape events in its favor. After briefly trying to shore up the Mubarak regime, the Obama administration realigned itself with the forces challenging the existing regional order. The president gave a typically eloquent speech endorsing change, but nobody in the region paid much attention. Indeed, with the partial exception of Libya, U.S. influence over the entire process has been modest at best. Obama was unable to stop Saudi Arabia from sending troops to Bahrain - where Riyadh helped to quell demands for reform - or to convince Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to step down. U.S. leverage in the post-Mubarak political process in Egypt and the simmering conflict in Yemen is equally ephemeral. America's declining influence is also revealed by its repeated failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. It has been nearly twenty years since the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993, and the United States has had a monopoly on the "peace process" ever since that hopeful day. Yet its efforts have been a complete failure, proving beyond doubt that Washington is incapable of acting as an effective and evenhanded mediator. Obama's call for "two states for two peoples" in his address to the Arab world in June 2009 produced a brief moment of renewed hope, but his steady retreat in the face of Israeli intransigence and domestic political pressure drove U.S. credibility to new lows.

Heg Low Now – General

**Heg is declining now –Iraq, Afghanistan, rising powers, and declining relations.**

Maher 11 (Richard Maher, PhD candidate in the political science department at Brown, winter 2011, *Orbis*, Volume 55, Issue 1, pp. 54, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” ScienceDirect)

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcomes.

**Heg declining now – economic crisis and no diplomatic capital.**

Maher 11, Richard Maher, PhD candidate in the political science department at Brown, winter 2011, *Orbis*, Volume 55, Issue 1, pp. 58, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” ScienceDirect

Now, in addition to two costly, inconclusive wars, the United States faces the worst financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression and an unemployment rate not seen in this country since the early 1980s. Likewise, the United States faces allies who are unwilling to contribute more troops or money to the war in Afghanistan, and has exhibited a seeming inability to get its way on everything from the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, Chinese currency convertibility, and support from Russia and China to impose harsher sanctions on Iran. Never in the past several decades has America's position seemed so uncertain.

US no longer a hegemon – Iran proves

Hadar 09(Leon T Hadar, Cato Institute researcher and fellow in foreign-policy studies, 2/3/09, The US is No Longer a Global Hegemon, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-is-no-longer-global-hegemon)

Such assumptions about US omnipotence are woefully out of touch with reality. The mess the Bush administration made in the Middle East, where US military power was overstretched to the maximum, coupled with the dramatic loss of American financial resources, has produced a long-term **transformation** in the balance of power in the region and worldwide. The confluence of these negative factors has **significantly eroded** Washington's diplomatic and political clout. The increasing wariness of the American public regarding new US military interventions, as a consequence of the Iraq war, will reinforce this trend.¶ This is not the first time there has been a lag between when an international crisis, such as a military conflict or a loss of geostrategic standing, takes place and the time when officials, pundits and the public recognize its effect on the global balance of power. In the aftermath of World War II, which devastated the military and economic power of Britain and France, the two leading imperial powers, officials and journalists continued to refer to those two declining nation-states as Great Powers. It was not until the late 1950s that the diminished status of Great Britain and France was widely recognized and the adjective "great" was finally dropped when the two countries were mentioned.¶ That the US has already been losing some of its leverage has been demonstrated by Washington's failure to contain the rising power of Iran and Tehran's growing influence through surrogates in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Notwithstanding strong opposition from Washington, Israel decided to open negotiations with Syria, while Hizbullah was once again invited to join the government in Lebanon.

Heg Low Now – China

China’s better economic model, US failure to provide globally, and China’s rise all kill heg

Christopher Layne, Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, 2012, [International Studies Quarterly 56, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. 211] MF

First, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige and soft power, on the other. The ebbing of the United States’ hegemony raises the question of whether it has the authority to take the lead in reforming the post-1945 international order. The Pax Americana projected the United States’ liberal ideology abroad, and asserted its universality as the only model for political, economic, and social development. Today, however, the American model of free market, liberal democracy—which came to be known in the 1990s as the Washington consensus—is being challenged by an alternative model, the Beijing consensus (Halper 2010). More- over, the Great Recession discredited America’s liberal model. Consequently, it is questionable whether the United States retains the credibility and legitimacy to spearhead the revamping of the international order. As Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf says, ‘‘The collapse of the western financial system, while China’s flourishes, marks a **humiliating end** to the ‘unipolar moment.’ As western policy makers struggle, their credibility lies broken. Who still trusts the teachers?’’ (Wolf 2009). The second reason a US lock-in strategy is unlikely to succeed is because the United States does not have the necessary economic clout to revitalize the international order. Ikenberry defines the task of securing lock-in as ‘‘renewing and rebuilding the architecture of global governance and cooperation to allow the United States to marshal resources and tackle problems along a wide an shifting spectrum of possibilities’’ (Ikenberry 2011:353) To do this, the United States will need to take the lead in providing public goods: security, economic leadership, and a nation building program of virtually global dimension to combat the ‘‘socioeconomic backwardness and failure that generate regional and international instability and conflict’’ (Ikenberry 2011:354, 359). At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States had the material capacity to furnish the international system with public goods. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, a financially strapped United States increasingly will be unable to be a big time provider of public goods to the international order.12 The third reason the post-World War II international order cannot be locked in is the rise of China (and other emerging great and regional powers). The lock-in argument is marred by a glaring weak- ness: if they perceive that the United States is declining, the incentive for China and other emerging powers is to wait a decade or two and reshape the international system themselves in a way that reflects their own interests, norms, and values (Jacques 2009). China and the United States have fundamental differences on what the rules of international order should be on such key issues as sovereignty, non-interference in states’ internal affairs, and the ‘‘responsibility to protect.’’ While China has integrated itself in the liberal order to propel its economic growth, it is converting wealth into hard power to challenge American geopolitical dominance. And although China is working ‘‘within the system’’ to transform the post-1945 international order, it also is laying the foundations—through embryonic institutions like the BRICs and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—for constructing an alternative world order that, over the next twenty years or so, could displace the Pax Americana. As Martin Jacques has observed, China is operating ‘‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’’ (Jacques 2009:362).

Heg Low Now – Economy

US hegemony declining now – wars and Wall Street troubles prove

Hadar 11 (Leon T, Cato Institute researcher and fellow in foreign-policy studies, 1/3/11, Israel’s Post-American Future, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/israels-postamerican-future)

It's even more challenging for leaders of a dependent state to recognize that the great power they are relying on may be entering into an imperial twilight time, – that it's not so great anymore. Inertia, wishful thinking and the power of vested interests explains why elites in the empire's capital – as well as in the provinces – continue to share in the misconception about the hegemon's ability to exert global influence – even as that influence is being eroded. But after a prolonged "recognition lag" – extending from the military fiasco in Iraq to the financial meltdown in Wall Street – it's becoming clear to policymakers in Washington that the U.S. is facing the prospects of geostrategic decline. The military is overstretched in unwinnable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a decaying economic base financed by Chinese loans is making it difficult to sustain expansive global commitments. The Unipolar Moment is coming to an end and rising global powers are creating the conditions for the evolution of multipolarism.

Massive debt undermines US hegemony and kills effectiveness and sustainability

Layne 12 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, [International Studies Quarterly 56, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. 208-209] MF

The causes of the looming US fiscal crisis are complex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabilities needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and supplying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difficult ‘‘guns or butter’’ decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inflation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can finance its external ambitions (‘‘guns’’) and domes- tic social and economic programs (‘‘butter’’) by borrowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deficit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor. Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inflation.8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitlement programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to fight there, and fiscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal govern- ment expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congres- sional Budget Office forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deficits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt ⁄ GDP ratio in 50 years **and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem’’** (CBO 2009:13). In a subse- quent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current fiscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its financial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the grow- ing US national debt—and the budget deficits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining for- eign investors’ confidence in the United States’ abil- ity to repay its debts and keep inflation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inflows from abroad both to finance its deficit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is spe- cial because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and ⁄ or prints money to pay them. The United States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card’’ provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reducing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means.9 As a leading expert on interna- tional economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in**, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance’’** (Kirshner 2008).

Heg Low Now – Rising Powers

US heg is declining – rise of regional powers.

Walt 11 (Stephen M., Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, Nov/Dec 2011, *The National Interest* 116, “The End of the American Era,” ProQuest)

The security arrangements that defined the American Era are also being undermined by the rise of several key regional powers, most notably India, Turkey and Brazil. Each of these states has achieved impressive economic growth over the past decade, and each has become more willing to chart its own course independent of Washington's wishes. None of them are on the verge of becoming true global powers - Brazil's gdp is still less than one-sixth that of the United States, and India and Turkey's economies are even smaller - but each has become increasingly influential within its own region. This gradual diffusion of power is also seen in the recent expansion of the G-8 into the so-called G-20, a tacit recognition that the global institutions created after World War II are increasingly obsolete and in need of reform. Each of these new regional powers is a democracy, which means that its leaders pay close attention to public opinion. As a result, the United States can no longer rely on cozy relations with privileged elites or military juntas. When only 10-15 percent of Turkish citizens have a "favorable" view of America, it becomes easier to understand why Ankara refused to let Washington use its territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and why Turkey has curtailed its previously close ties with Israel despite repeated U.S. efforts to heal the rift. Anti-Americanism is less prevalent in Brazil and India, but their democratically elected leaders are hardly deferential to Washington either. The rise of new powers is bringing the short-lived "unipolar moment" to an **end**, and the result will be either a bipolar SinoAmerican rivalry or a multipolar system containing several unequal great powers. The United States is likely to remain the strongest, but its overall lead has shrunk - and it is shrinking further still.

Heg Low Now – AT: Kagan

The decline of Europe and Japan is *bad* news for the US – US hegemony can only sustain itself with strong partners.

Kupchan 12 (Charles A., professor of international affairs at Georgetown and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3-20-2012, *The Atlantic*, “The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-decline-of-the-west-why-america-must-prepare-for-the-end-of-dominance/254779/)

American primacy is not as resilient as Kagan thinks. His most serious error is his argument that Americans need not worry about the ascent of new powers because only Europe and Japan are losing ground to them; the United States is keeping pace. It's true that the U.S. share of global output has held at roughly 25 percent for several decades. It's also the case that "the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations ... has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy." But this is not, as Kagan implies, good news for the United States. The long run of Western hegemony has been the product of teamwork, not of America acting alone. Through the 19th century and up until World War II, Europe led the effort to spread liberal democracy and capitalism--and to guide Western nations to a position of global dominance. Not until the postwar era did the United States take over stewardship of the West. Pax Britannica set the stage for Pax Americana, and Washington inherited from its European allies a liberal international order that rested on solid commercial and strategic foundations. Moreover, America's many successes during the past 70 years would not have been possible without the power and purpose of Europe and Japan by its side. Whether defeating communism, liberalizing the global economy, combating nuclear proliferation, or delivering humanitarian assistance, Western allies formed a winning coalition that made effective action possible. The collective strength of the West is, however, on the way down. During the Cold War, the Western allies often accounted for more than two-thirds of global output. Now they represent about half of output--and soon much less. As of 2010, four of the top five economies in the world were still from the developed world (the United States, Japan, Germany, and France). From the developing world, only China made the grade, coming in at No. 2. By 2050, according to Goldman Sachs, four of the top five economies will come from the developing world (China, India, Brazil, and Russia). Only the United States will make the cut; it will rank second, and its economy will be about half the size of China's. Moreover, the turnabout will be rapid: Goldman Sachs predicts that the collective economic output of the top four developing countries--Brazil, China, India, and Russia--will match that of the G-7 countries by 2032.

\*\*\*\*\*INTERNALS\*\*\*\*\*

Credibility Key to Heg

Credibility is key to hegemony

Paal & Bader 08 (Douglas H., vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, and Jeffrey, Senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, SEPTEMBER 2, “Georgia's Lessons for Taiwan” carnegieendowment.org/2008/09/02/georgia-s-lessons-for-taiwan/2q5)

3) A constructive relationship between the United States and major powers is an essential component of security for vulnerable states. The United States has enjoyed a positive and constructive relationship with China for most of the past 36 years. Taiwan’s security has greatly benefited from this, as the PRC has understood that an attack on Taiwan would profoundly damage its relationship with the United States and its place in the world. On the other hand, the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and a disdainful attitude toward Russian security interests for the last decade led us to a situation where Russia seems to see little risk to its interests, and much to gain, in redefining its relationship with the United States. 4) Geography matters. Small nations near large powers should not forget who their neighbors are. Cuba has not prospered through its 50 years of defiance of the United States. Taiwan’s newly elected President Ma Ying-jeou seems to understand well that an improved relationship between Taiwan and China is essential to Taiwan’s future security. In the absence of unambiguous security commitments from the United States, such as those enjoyed by countries like Japan, small states might best seek a balance?the strongest possible U.S. commitment to their defense and survival, hedged by a non-hostile relationship with their big power neighbor. Taiwan’s example shows that prosperity and full-blown democracy can find their way in a tyrannical shadow. 5) It’s wise to speak softly when you don’t plan to carry a big stick. U.S. statements and actions implying that we would defend Georgia when we had neither the will nor the intention to do so, not to mention an adequate understanding of the region’s internal conflicts, sent all the wrong signals. They encouraged Saakashivili to provoke the Russians and face their response alone. The Russians saw the U.S. warnings as a bluff. And they sent a message to our allies, including those in Asia, that our real commitments might prove as empty as our casual verbal ones. 6) Credibility is global. There are no purely local crises. U.S. commitments, even in the post-Cold War era, remain critical for the stability of the international system. Potential adversaries and potential friends alike draw conclusions from our behavior. We want them to understand we will act to defend friends where we have declared security interests. We need to be careful about when and where we declare those interests to be engaged, but once we do we need to act in ways that sends a message to potential aggressors that reinforces their restraint.

Economy Key to Heg

Economic collapse causes US retrenchment.

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay, former United States Ambassador for the United Nations and counselor at the Center for Strategic and International studies, 2/8, The National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)

Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a **radical retrenchment** of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would **reshape the international order**. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world.

The economy is key to U.S. hegemony.

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg. 20)

American economic power is critical to the maintenance of the American Empire because economic power is the wellspring of military power. A good rule of thumb in international politics is that a country’s gross domestic product equals the strength of military power, or GDP = Military Power. So, a healthy American economy helps to ensure adequate military strength to preserve America’s position in the world. Fortunately for the United States, it has the world’s largest economy and its relative economic strength, like its relative military power, is astonishing.

Education Key to Heg

Education key to hegemony and competitiveness

Elzey 10 (Karen, vice president, Institute for a Competitive Workforce, May 07, Education: The Key to Global Competitiveness, http://icw.uschamber.com/newsletter-article/education-key-global-competitiveness)

As accountants say, it’s all in the numbers. Consider these figures: As of January 2010, the United States’ jobless rate stood at 9.7 percent. Yet for individuals with a bachelor’s degree or higher, the rate was substantially less — 4.9 percent. Conversely, for people who lack a high school diploma, the rate was noticeably higher — 15.2 percent. Clearly, education matters. And it matters not just for the job seeker. America’s future in the global marketplace is at stake, too. The United States faces challenges on myriad education fronts. High school graduation rates are depressingly low, college remediation rates are rising, adult literacy levels are too low, and the numbers of Americans earning advanced degrees in science and engineering are lower than they have been in years. High school dropout rates in the United States are at or near 30 percent. For African American and Hispanic students, the rate is even higher — a staggering 50 percent. Even for those who do graduate from high school and make their way to college, many require some kind of remedial instruction. America’s leaders are beginning to gauge the seriousness of the issue. In his 2009 address to a joint session of Congress, President< Obama pledged that “by 2020, America will once again have the highest proportion of college graduates in the world.” This will be a significant challenge. Of the nation’s 307 million people, 93 million adults do not possess the necessary literacy levels to enter either postsecondary education or job-training programs, according to the 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy. Demanding jobs Making matters even more challenging, the educational attainment level required for jobs continues to rise. Anthony Carnevale, Director of the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, estimates that by 2018, nearly two-thirds of all jobs in the United States will require some form of postsecondary education or training. In 1973, just 28 percent of jobs, or less than one-third, required such instruction. The demand for workers to obtain meaningful credentials has never been more important. America’s education system is critical in this effort. The United States has long prided itself on its leadership in innovation. Much of this innovation has come from expertise in science and engineering. America’s lengthy run atop the innovation scoreboard, some suggest, might be near the end. They point to the fact that the nation’s science and engineering workforce is aging. A serious skills shortage in these fields could be imminent if not enough graduates are produced to replace retiring scientists and engineers. Knowledge for the economy The implications are wide ranging, even affecting national security. For example, many jobs in U.S. defense industries require that an American citizen fill the position. According to the National Science Board’s Science and Engineering Indicators 2008 report, students from abroad attending American colleges in 2007 received 24 percent of master’s degrees in science and engineering, and 33 percent of doctoral degrees in the two disciplines. Fifty-five percent of all postdoctoral students in science and engineering in fall 2005 were temporary visa holders, according to the Board. A shortage of workers for information-sensitive positions is a possibility. The United States Patent and Trademark Office tells a similar story. In a report issued in 2009 by IFI Patent Intelligence, 51 percent of new patents went to companies outside the United States. Although IBM® received the most patents of any company (4,186 patents), overall, American firms seem to be slipping: Of the 10 companies receiving the most patents in 2008, only four were American. An economy that emphasizes knowledge requires that everyone should be able to decipher, synthesize and analyze information, and then convey it — clearly and concisely. Innovation and problem solving are built upon such thinking. Supporting innovation Not long ago, America topped the list of many key education and innovation indicators. Today, looking at the same indicators, America is a nation falling behind. And since global competitiveness is certainly a top priority for the nation’s businesses, we need to fix the problem. Simply stated, the United States cannot compete without strong national policies that support innovation. These policies include: increasing the focus on science, technology, engineering and math education implementing internationally benchmarked standards and assessments to reflect readiness for college, the workplace and the global marketplace aligning high school graduation requirements, state academic achievement standards and postsecondary entrance requirements leveraging data systems to inform instruction, improve teaching, and aid interventions ensuring that job training is relevant for jobs that exist today and for jobs in the future For the United States to stay competitive globally, the American education system — from pre-kindergarten through high school to postsecondary education and jobtraining programs — must adopt a can-do attitude regarding such policies. Human capital is the country’s greatest asset. This asset must be nurtured for the nation to reach its full potential. It’s time for the nation to take a full accounting of its education system. The numbers do not lie.

Education Key to Heg

Education is key to military readiness and hegemony

Dalton & Shelton 9 (John H, 70th Secretary of the Navy, & General Henry H., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 12, http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,182860,00.html)

Americans have always answered the call to service: to defend against powers who would threaten our security and to fight for the cause of peace in times of conflict. Our country is fighting two wars and continually faces the threat of international terrorism. A strong U.S. military is imperative to keep the American people safe and to secure freedom, economic stability and human rights for the future. We live in a dangerous world. In order to protect America, the next generation of Americans must be willing and able to serve in times of crisis. While Americans have always been willing to serve, too many of the young people we need for military service today are inadequately prepared because they lack a high school diploma or because they are in poor physical shape or have a criminal record. In fact, over 72 percent of 17- to 24-year-olds do not meet the basic educational, physical and moral standards required for service. As the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of the Navy, respectively, we find this situation troubling. The United States military has put in place rigorous standards because we need competent, healthy and educated individuals to staff the world’s most professional and technologically advanced military. A limited recruitment pool will restrict our military readiness and erode our national security in the long run. What can we do now to ensure that this trend is not the wave of the future? The most important long-term investment we can make for a strong military is in the health and education of the American people. If we want to ensure that we have a strong, capable fighting force, we need to help America’s youth succeed academically, graduate from high school and obey the law. The most reliable way to achieve these goals is by providing at-risk children with quality early childhood education. Over a period of 40 years, researchers studied children who attended a high-quality Michigan preschool as well as similar children who did not attend. What they found speaks volumes about the benefits of an early introduction to learning. Compared with those who did not attend, the at-risk children enrolled in the program were 44 percent more likely to graduate from high school and half as likely to be arrested for a violent crime by age 40. Research also shows that children who miss out on early education are more likely to drop out of school, become dependent on welfare and abuse illegal drugs. Early education is a proven solution to help more Americans achieve academic success and work toward productive citizenship and employment. Increasing support for early childhood education will also create a strong military and a stronger America. That is why we have joined with other retired military leaders in a nonprofit organization called Mission: Readiness to launch a new effort to address the needs of our armed services in the 21st century. Our recommendation to the new Congress and administration is to make the needed investment in early childhood education to ensure that more young people are ready for a role in the military -- should they choose to pursue one. There are many proposals to increase early education investments, including President-elect Barack Obama’s pledge to increase spending for early education by $10 billion to promote the success of America’s students. Congress should make this a priority as it prepares an economic recovery plan to ensure our long-term economic security and the vitality of our work force. The United States military must be ready to protect the American people and our allies from the emerging threats of the 21st century. We must commit to high-quality early childhood education at home to protect our national security and continue the tradition of American military strength.

Environmental Leadership Key to Heg

Environmental leadership key to hegemony

Walter 02 (Norbet, Former chief economist of Deutsche Bank, “An American Abdication”, NYT, 8/28, nytimes.com/2002/08/28/opinion/28WALT.html)

At present there is much talk about the unparalleled strength of the United States on the world stage. Yet at this very moment the most powerful country in the world stands to forfeit much political capital, moral authority and international good will by dragging its feet on the next great global issue: the environment. Before long, the administration's apparent unwillingness to take a leadership role -- or, at the very least, to stop acting as a brake -- in fighting global environmental degradation will threaten the very basis of the American supremacy that many now seem to assume will last forever. American authority is already in some danger as a result of the Bush administration's decision to send a low-level delegation to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg -- low-level, that is, relative to America's share of both the world economy and global pollution. The absence of President Bush from Johannesburg symbolizes this decline in authority. In recent weeks, newspapers around the world have been dominated by environmental headlines: In central Europe, flooding killed dozens, displaced tens of thousands and caused billions of dollars in damages. In South Asia, the United Nations reports a brown cloud of pollution that is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths a year from respiratory disease. The pollution (80 percent man-made) also cuts sunlight penetration, thus reducing rainfall, affecting agriculture and otherwise altering the climate. Many other examples of environmental degradation, often related to the warming of the atmosphere, could be cited. What they all have in common is that they severely affect countries around the world and are fast becoming a chief concern for people everywhere. Nobody is suggesting that these disasters are directly linked to anything the United States is doing. But when a country that emits 25 percent of the world's greenhouse gases acts as an uninterested, sometimes hostile bystander in the environmental debate, it looks like unbearable arrogance to many people abroad. The administration seems to believe it is merely an observer -- that environmental issues are not its issues. But not doing anything amounts to ignoring a key source of world tension, and no superpower that wants to preserve its status can go on dismissing such a pivotal dimension of political and economic -- if not existential -- conflict.

Soft Power Key to Heg

Soft power is crucial to effective hegemony.

Nye & Armitage 07 (Joseph S., distinguished service professor, Harvard University, & Richard L, president, Armitage International, “CSIS COMMISSION ON SMART POWER A smarter, more secure America” csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106\_csissmartpowerreport.pdf)

Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes. Legitimacy can also reduce opposition to—and the costs of—using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to others’ values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction. This is evident in the changing nature of conflict today, including in Iraq and against al Qaeda. In traditional conflict, once the enemy is vanquished militarily, he is likely to sue for peace. But many of the organizations against which we are fighting control no territory, hold few assets, and sprout new leaders for each one that is killed. Victory in the traditional sense is elusive. Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas. Today, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states. Soft power is essential to winning the peace. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic.

Low Threshold for Heg

The threshold for hegemony to address their impacts is much lower than stated.

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2/17, “Grand Strategy for a Golden Age,” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/8/5/pages416851/p416851-1.php)

However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then it remains the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inherently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

\*\*\*\*\*IMPACTS\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*HEG GOOD\*\*

Heg Sustainable – General

**Heg is sustainable – flexibility and adaptability.**

Lieber 09 (Robert J., professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown, editor of *Foreign Policy*, author of *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, March 2009, *International Politics* 46.2-3, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era,” p. 136-137, ProQuest)

Finally, the United States benefits from two other unique attributes, flexibility and adaptability. Time and again, America has faced daunting challenges and made mistakes, yet it has possessed the inventiveness and societal flexibility to adjust and respond successfully. Despite obvious problems, not least the global financial crisis, there is reason to believe that America’s adaptive capacity will allow it to respond to future requirements and threats. None of this assures the maintenance of its world role, but the domestic underpinnings to support this engagement remain relatively **robust**. Thus for the foreseeable future, US primacy is **likely to be sustainable**. America’s own national interest – and the fortunes of a global liberal democratic order – depend on it.

Hegemony’s sustainable – multiple reasons

Kagan 7 (Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136) TJ

These American traditions, together with historical events beyond Americans’ control, have catapulted the United States to a position of pre-eminence in the world. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of this “unipolar” world, there has been much anticipation of the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the predominant power. Not only realist theorists but others both inside and outside the United States have long argued the theoretical and practical unsustainability, not to mention undesirability, of a world with only one superpower. Mainstream realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. Others expected the post-Cold War era to be characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and foresaw a multipolar world with the economic giants of Europe, India, Japan, and China rivaling the United States. Finally, in the wake of the Iraq War and with hostility to the United States, as measured in public opinion polls, apparently at an all-time high, there has been a widespread assumption that the American position in the world must finally be eroding. Yet American predominance in the main categories of power **persists** as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by “one superpower, many great powers,” and this configuration seems **likely to persist** into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily. 11

Hegemony’s sustainable – spending and military presence continue to improve.

Kagan 7 (Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136) TJ

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15

Heg Sustainable – General

Military, economic, and diplomatic strengths render US hegemony sustainable.

Thayer 06(Bradley A., associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, *National Interest*, “In Defense of Primacy,” 11/06, Proquest)

There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.

US hegemony is sustainable – multiple factors ensure it can be prolonged.

Paul 5 (T.V., Professor of International Relations @ James McGill, PhD, UCLA, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, Summer, Ebsco)

A variant of the realist argument is the historical/structural perspective on the rise and fall of great powers. On the basis of its logic, some scholars argue that overspending, overstretching, and internal failures will eventually cause the United States’ decline.13 Although the historical records of past great powers (e.g., Spain and Portugal) attest to the strength of this argument, one must be cautious of its application to the United States for three reasons. First, no previous empire had the benefit of capitalism in its highly developed form as the United States enjoys today. Second, several past empires and major powers managed to persevere, albeit in a weakened form, contrary to the expectations of perspectives that focus on automatic structural change. For instance, depending on the Western or Eastern manifestation, the Roman Empire lasted from 500 to 1,100 years. The Ottoman Empire survived for more than 400 years; the Mughal Empire in India more than 300; and the British Empire more than 250. Without World War II, the British Empire would probably have lasted even longer. Third, most past great powers (e.g., Spain, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, Japan, and Germany) declined following long periods of war with other imperial powers. In the case of the United States, the low probability of a global war akin to World War II may help to prolong its hegemony. Smaller challengers could wear down the hegemon’s power through asymmetric strategies; but given its technological and organizational superiority, the United States can devise countermeasures to increase its power position even if it may not fully contain such challenges. Without war as a system changing mechanism, and with no prospects of an alternative mechanism emerging for systemic change, even a weakened hegemon could endure for a long period. Further, because economic superiority does not automatically bestow military capability, as most modern weapons systems take considerable time to develop and deploy, U.S. dominance in this area is unlikely to be challenged for some time by a potential peer competitor, such as China, even after it overtakes the United States in gross economic terms.

US hegemony has survived far more threatening crises.

Lieber 11 (Robert J. Lieber, Department of Government, Georgetown University, 8-25-2011, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34:4, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” Taylor and Francis Group, p. 514)

Not only have past depictions of America warned of weakness and decline, but previous crises in American history have included perils more threatening than those of today. Consider, for example, the menace of fascism in the 1930s and then World War II against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, swiftly followed by Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the early Cold War years, the triumph of Mao’s communist forces in the Chinese Civil War, and the outbreak of the Korean War. In turn there were the upheavals of the 1970s, including a major oil shock, the loss of South Vietnam, revolution in Iran, the 444- day American embassy hostage crisis, a second oil shock, and then the 1979–82 recession with record postwar unemployment, 13 per cent inflation and interest rates of 18 per cent.

**America has vast structural advantages – outweigh all their arguments.**

Lieber 08 (Robert J., professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown and author of *The America Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, summer 2008, *World Affairs* 171.1, “Falling Upwards: Declinism: The Box Set,” pp. 56, EBSCOhost)

In the end, then, this country’s structural advantages matter much more than economic cycles, trade imbalances, or surging and receding tides of anti-Americanism. These advantages include America’s size, wealth, human and material resources, military strength, competitiveness, and liberal political and economic traditions, but also a remarkable flexibility, dynamism, and capacity for reinvention. Neither the rise of important regional powers, nor a globalized world economy, nor “imperial overstretch,” nor domestic weaknesses seem likely to negate these advantages in ways the declinists anticipate, often with a fervor that makes their diagnoses and prescriptions resemble a species of wish fulfillment.

Heg Sustainable – Bandwagoning

Other countries bandwagon behind US hegemony.

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pgs. 105-8)

Third, countries want to align themselves with the United States. Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide band-wagoning with it. The vast majority of countries in international politics have alliances with the United States. There are approximately 192 countries in the world, ranging from the size of giants like Russia to Lilliputians like Vanuatu. Of that number, you can count with one hand the countries opposed to the United States—China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. Once the leaders of Cuba and Venezuela change, there is every reason to believe that those countries will be allied with the United States, as they were before their present rulers—Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez—came to power. North Korea will collapse someday, removing that threat, although not without significant danger to the countries in the region. Of these states, only China has the potential power to confront the United States. The potential power of China should not be underestimated, but neither should the formidable power of the United States and its allies. There is an old saying that you can learn a lot about someone by looking at his friends (or enemies). It may be true about people, but it is certainly true of the United States. Of the 192 countries in existence, a great number, 84, are allied with the United States, and they include almost all of the major economic and military states. This includes twenty-five members of NATO (excluding the United States—Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom); fourteen major non-NATO allies: (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan); nineteen Rio Pact members (excluding Argentina and Venezuela—The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay); seven Caribbean Regional Security System members (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), and thirteen members of the Iraq coalition who are not captured by the other categories: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Singapore, Tonga, and Ukraine. In addition, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Tunisia are now important U.S. allies. This is a ratio of almost 17 to 1 (84 to 5) of the countries allied with the United States against those who are opposed to it. And other states may be added to the list of allies, For example, a country like Nigeria is essentially pro-United States although there is no formal security arrangement between those countries. This situation is unprecedented in international politics— never have so many countries been aligned with the dominant state in modern history. As Figure 341 demonstrates, it is a big change from the Cold War when most of the countries of the world were aligned either with the United States (approximately forty-five) or the Soviet Union (about twenty-four countries), of the Soviet Union, as captured by Figure 12. Figure 3.3 illuminates the ratio of states aligned with the United States to those opposed to it in the post—Cold War period. So, while we are entitled to our own opinions about international politics, we not entitled to our own facts. They must be acknowledged. In the post-Cold War world, the United States is much better off—it is much more powerful and more secure—than was during the Cold War. What is more, many of the allies of the United States have become more dependent on the United States for their security than during the Cold War. For many years now, most NATO countries have only spent a fraction of their budget on defense, and it is not transparent how they would defend themselves if not for the United States did not. Only six of the twenty-five members of NATO (not counting the United States) are spending 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense, while nineteen spend less than 2 percent. Such a low level of defense spending is possible only because of the security provided by the United States.

Heg secures alliances

Thayer 06(Dr. Bradley A. Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, *National Interest*, “In Defense of Primacy,” 11/06, Proquest)

A remarkable fact about international politics today-in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display-is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America-their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements-and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.

Heg Sustainable – Bandwagoning

States default to bandwagoning over balancing

Brooks and Wohlforth 2 (Stephen G., Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, Associate Professor of Government and Dartmouth College, and William C., Ph.D Political Science, Yale University, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “American Primacy in Perspective,” p. 27-28, Foreign Policy, Vol. 81, No. 4, July/August 2002 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Brooks&Wohlforth-ForeignAffairs.pdf)

The conclusion that balancing is not in the cards may strike many as questionable in light of the parade of ostensibly anti-U.S. diplomatic combinations in recent years: the “European troika” of France, Germany, and Russia; the “special relationship” between Germany and Russia; the “strategic triangle” of Russia, China, and India; the “strategic partnership” between China and Russia; and so on. Yet a close look at any of these arrangements reveals their rhetorical as opposed to substantive character. Real balancing involves real economic and political costs, which neither Russia, nor China, nor indeed any other major power has shown any willingness to bear. The most reliable way to balance power is to increase defense outlays. Since 1995, however, military spending by most major powers has been declining relative to gdp, and in the majority of cases in absolute terms as well. At most, these opposing coalitions can occasionally succeed in frustrating U.S. policy initiatives when the expected costs of doing so remain conveniently low. At the same time, Beijing, Moscow, and others have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the United States periodically on strategic matters and especially in the economic realm. This general tendency toward bandwagoning was the norm before September 11 and has only become more pronounced since then.

Heg Sustainable – Demographics

**Heg is sustainable – demographics.**

Lieber 09 (Robert J., professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown, editor of *Foreign Policy*, author of *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, March 2009, *International Politics* 46.2-3, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era,” p. 136, ProQuest)

Demography also works to the advantage of the United States. Most other powerful states, including China and Russia as well as Germany and Japan, face the significant aging of their populations. Although the United States needs to finance the costs of an aging population, this demographic shift is occurring to a lesser extent and more slowly than among its competitors. Mark Haas argues that these factors in global aging ‘will be a potent force for the continuation of US power dominance, both economic and military’ (Haas, 2007, p. 113).

Heg Sustainable – Geography

Geography makes US hegemony durable – competitors face regional balancing.

Kagan 6[Robert, January 15 2006, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, The Washington Post, “Still the Colossus,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/13/AR2006011301696.html) TJ

There are also structural reasons why American indispensability can survive even the unpopularity of recent years. The political scientist William Wohlforth argued a decade ago that the American unipolar era is durable not because of any love for the United States but because of the basic structure of the international system. The problem for any nation attempting to balance American power, even in that power's own region, is that long before it becomes strong enough to balance the United States, it may frighten its neighbors into balancing against it. Europe would be the exception to this rule were it increasing its power, but it is not. Both Russia and China face this problem as they attempt to exert greater influence even in their traditional spheres of influence.

Heg Sustainable – AT: Anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism is a minor issue – it’s transient and not widespread.

Lieber 08, Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown and author of *The America Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, summer 2008, *World Affairs* 171.1, “Falling Upwards: Declinism: The Box Set,” pp. 54, EBSCOhost

Not only is there no superpower challenge visible on the horizon, but some regions, particularly much of Africa and Asia, have been either largely untouched by post-Iraq reactions against the United States or, as with Vietnam, Singapore, and Australia, have even adopted a more pro-American stance. Anti-Americanism exists, but it always has, waxing and waning since the end of World War II and becoming especially virulent during the Vietnam, Reagan, and Bush eras. Viewing the malady as acute rather than a chronic staple of the international arena hugely overstates its impact. In fact, the truly new element in the mix is globalization, which, far from being a source of decline, tends to work in favor of the United States. As authors such as Francis Fukuyama and Walter Russell Mead have demonstrated, the more globally integrated developing countries tend to be the least anti-American, placing a premium on liberalism, the rule of law, and other traditions that have come to be seen as U.S. exports.

Heg Sustainable – AT: Counterbalancing

**No counterbalancing – countries are seeking closer relationships with the US.**

Lieber 09 (Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown, editor of *Foreign Policy*, author of *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, March 2009, *International Politics* 46.2-3, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era,” ProQuest)

Despite expectations that a period of unipolarity would trigger balancing behavior or that French-German-Russian opposition to the American-led intervention in Iraq would stimulate the formation of such a coalition, effective balancing against the United States has yet to occur. President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder could not speak for all their EU partners, and it is worth recalling that in the early months of 2003, on the eve of the American-led coalition intervention against Saddam Hussein, some two-thirds of the member governments of both the EU and NATO supported the Bush administration's decision. 3 Despite arguments about 'soft-balancing', not only has balancing not occurred, but also principal European leaders have either maintained (as in the case of Britain) or reasserted (Germany and France) pragmatic Atlanticist policies, and five of the largest EU member states (that is, all except Spain) are currently governed by avowedly Atlanticist presidents or prime ministers. 4 And for its part, the EU has not distanced itself from the United States let alone emerged as a strategic competitor.5 There are good reasons for this long-term continuity, including shared interests and values as well as the inability of the EU member countries to create a military force with sufficient funding, advanced military technology, power projection and the unity of command that would enable it to play the kind of role in the security realm that Europe's size, population and wealth would otherwise dictate. Other major powers have actually tightened their bonds with Washington, especially in Asia, where anxiety about the rise of China has shaped behavior. For example, India in June 2005 signed a 10-year defense pact ('New Framework of the US-India Defense Relationship.'). In addition, it successfully concluded an historic agreement on nuclear technology with Washington. Japan has developed closer ties with the United States than at any time in the past, especially in the realm of defense. The Philippines, after having ousted the United States from its longtime air and naval bases there, recently welcomed a return naval visit, and Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore and others also have leaned more toward than away from America. Despite a rise in expressions of anti-Americanism as indicated in opinion polls (and more reflective of disagreement with Bush administration policies than rejection of America itself), it would be a mistake to assume that the world has turned against the United States. Indeed, wide-spread positive reactions to Barack Obama's election suggest otherwise. As for the leading authoritarian capitalist powers, Russia has adopted a much more critical and assertive stance, but the financial crisis has impacted Moscow in ways that are likely to encourage restraint. Russia's currency, banking, credit sectors and commitments by foreign investors have been very significantly affected, and with world oil prices having dropped by two-thirds between the summer and autumn of 2008, the Putin regime is likely to have less latitude than when it was flush with oil revenues. For its part, China, despite its booming economy and rapidly modernizing armed forces, has yet to take an overtly antagonistic position toward the United States. Its huge domestic export sector has been seriously affected by changes in the world economy and Beijing has urged greater cooperation with the United States and other countries to address the impact of the financial crisis.

Heg Sustainable – AT: Counterbalancing

No counterbalancing – potential adversaries are siding with the US.

**Kagan 8** (Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. The September 12 Paradigm, Carnegie Endowment. September/October 2008, NP, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/21/september-12-paradigm/3dy) TJ

The next administration has a chance to learn from the Bush administration's mistakes, as well as to build on the progress the Bush administration has made in correcting them. The United States' position in the world today is not nearly as bad as some claim. Predictions that other powers would join together in an effort to balance against the rogue superpower have proved inaccurate. Other powers are emerging, but they are not aligning together against the United States. China and Russia have an interest and a desire to reduce the scale of U.S. predominance and seek more relative power for themselves. But they remain as wary of each other as they are of Washington. Other rising powers, such as Brazil and India, are not seeking to balance against the United States. Indeed, despite the negative opinion polls, most of the world's great powers are drawing closer to the United States geopolitically. A few years ago, France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schroder flirted with turning to Russia as a way of counterbalancing U.S. power. But now, France, Germany, and the rest of Europe are tending in the other direction. This is not out of a renewed affection for the United States. The more pro-U.S. foreign policies of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reflect their judgment that close but not uncritical relations with the United States enhance European power and influence. The eastern European nations, meanwhile, worry about a resurgent Russia States in Asia and the Pacific have drawn closer to the United States mostly out of concern about the rising power of China. In the mid-1990s, the U.S.-Japanese alliance was in danger of eroding. But since 1997, the strategic relationship between the two countries has grown stronger. Some of the nations of Southeast Asia have also begun hedging against a rising China. (Australia may be the one exception to this broad trend, as its new government is tilting toward China and away from the United States and other democratic powers in the region.) The most notable shift has occurred in India, a former ally of Moscow that today sees good relations with the United States as critical to achieving its broader strategic and economic goals. Even in the Middle East, where anti-Americanism runs hottest and where images of the U.S. occupation in Iraq and memories of Abu Ghraib continue to burn in the popular consciousness, the strategic balance has not shifted against the United States. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia continue to work closely with the United States, as do the nations of the Persian Gulf that worry about Iran. Iraq has shifted from implacable anti-Americanism under Saddam to dependence on the United States, and a stable Iraq in the years to come would shift the strategic balance in a decidedly pro-U.S. direction, since Iraq sits on vast oil reserves and could become a significant power in the region. This situation contrasts sharply with the major strategic setbacks the United States suffered in the Middle East during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, a pan-Arab nationalist movement swept across the region and opened the door to unprecedented Soviet involvement, including a quasi alliance between the Soviet Union and the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as a Soviet alliance with Syria. In 1979, a key pillar of the U.S. strategic position in the region toppled when the pro-American shah of Iran was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's virulently anti-American revolution. That led to a fundamental shift in the strategic balance in the region, a shift from which the United States is still suffering. Nothing similar has yet occurred as a result of the Iraq war. Those who today proclaim that the United States is in decline often imagine a past in which the world danced to an Olympian America's tune. That is an illusion. Nostalgia swells for the wondrous U.S.-dominated era after World War II. But although the United States succeeded in Europe then, it suffered disastrous setbacks elsewhere. The "loss" of China to communism, the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Soviet Union's testing of a hydrogen bomb, the stirrings of postcolonial nationalism in Indochina--each was a strategic calamity of immense scope, and was understood to be such at the time. Each critically shaped the remainder of the twentieth century, and not for the better. And each proved utterly beyond the United States' power to control or even to manage successfully. Not a single event in the last decade can match any one of those events in terms of its enormity as a setback to the United States' position in the world.

Heg Sustainable – AT: Counterbalancing

Counterbalancing fails – no countries seriously challenge the US now.

Kagan 7 (Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136) TJ

The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred.Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China ’s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach. In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort. Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States. If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia. In Asia and the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia have all engaged in “hedging” against a rising China. This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington, especially in the case of Japan and Australia. India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China.Russia ’s efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its “near abroad,” meanwhile, have produced tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe. Because these nations are now members of the European Union, this has also complicated eu-Russian relations. On balance, traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe, while their publics may be more anti-American than in the past, nevertheless pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states in their midst than about the United States. 12 This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure of Bush.

Heg Sustainable – AT: Counterbalancing

Balance-of-power theory shows counterbalancing unlikely

Brooks and Wohlforth 5 [Stephen G., Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, Associate Professor of Government and Dartmouth College, and William C., Ph.D Political Science, Yale University, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism,” p. 510-512, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3. No. 3., September 2005, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/BrooksWohlforth-Perspectives.pdf]

Many self-described realists accept the proposition that the United States can and should reduce the probability of counterbalancing by maintaining a general disposition toward multilateralism. Walt argues that “the United Nations and other international institutions help the United States exercise its power in a way that is less threatening (and therefore more acceptable) to others.”13 Michael Mastanduno explicitly derives from Walt’s balance of threat theory the proposition that “the dominant state in a unipolar setting will rely on multilateralism in its international undertakings.”14 Randall Schweller and David Priess agree, noting that “if the hegemon adopts a benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based on legitimate inﬂuence and management, lesser states will bandwagon with rather than balance against it.”15 The importance of the balancing proposition cannot be overstated, for it also ﬁgures crucially in the arguments of nonrealist scholars. When institutionalists and constructivists assess the costs of unilateralism, expected counterbalancing by other states often ﬁgures prominently.16 Moreover, the balance-of-power metaphor is a staple of punditry, both in the United States and abroad, in which each new effort at coordination among major powers that excludes Washington is routinely hailed as an epoch-making “axis.” Indeed, the leaders of other major powers—notably the presidents of France, Russia, and China—periodically seem to invoke the balancing proposition themselves, arguing that their policies are intended to foster a multipolar world. This conﬂuence of theoretical expectations, journalistic commentary, and political rhetoric lends initial plausibility to the balancing proposition and partly explains its popularity as an argument against unilateralism. The argument hinges on the proposition that the more the United States backs away from multilateralism, the greater the probability of counterbalancing. The problem is that there is no counterbalancing against the United States, nor is there likely to be any time soon. Indeed, the remarkable thing about the current international system is that three key causal factors highlighted by realist balance-of-power theory itself are conﬁgured so as to make the reemergence of traditional balancing dynamics among the major powers highly improbable.17 First is geography. The counterbalancing coalitions of the past all emerged against centrally located land powers that constituted existential threats to nearby major states. The United States, by contrast, lies far from the shores of Eurasia, where the other major powers are all clustered. Distance mutes the potential security threat U.S. power poses to others, while proximity magniﬁes the potential threat their power poses to one another and thus increases the salience of local as opposed to global counterbalancing. The geographical uniqueness of the current international system and its implications for balancing are now widely appreciated.18 This is partly true of the second key factor: the distribution of material capabilities. It is now commonplace to observe that the gap in overall power between the United States and all other states is larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern states system.19 Analysts are also sensitive to decisive U.S. advantages in the individual components of national power: military, technological, economic, and even demographic.20 Historically minded observers are aware that all preceding leading states were dominant militarily or economically, but never both simultaneously. Less widely appreciated is the gap in latent power.21 States make choices about balancing depending on their expectations of the capabilities prospective balancers could produce in extremis. The United States is in a better position than past leading states to enhance its capabilities vis-à-vis putative rivals for two reasons: it obtains its currently dominant military capabilities by devoting a historically small proportion of its economy to national defense (less than 4 percent of GDP in 2004 as compared to 5–14 percent during the cold war); and its historically large technological lead is a potential resource that could be further exploited. And these underlying advantages interact with the perennial problem would-be balancers face: they must coordinate policies in complex ways to increase capabilities against a hegemon whose response is coordinated by a single government. The third key factor is that American primacy is an accomplished fact rather than a revisionist aspiration. Many observers now recognize that other key powers derive beneﬁts from the status quo and so may be reluctant to pay costs to overthrow it.22 Less recognized is that for three centuries no balance-of-power theorist ever developed propositions about a system in which hegemony is the status quo. All the historical experience of balancing from the seventeenth century until 1991 concerns efforts to check a rising power from attaining hegemony. While both history and balance-of-power theory clearly suggest that a rising potential hegemon needs to be concerned about the counterbalancing constraint, neither yields this implication for a hegemon that is already ﬁrmly established. On the contrary, both theory and historical experience suggest that when hegemony is the status quo, all the familiar obstacles to balancing will be dramatically magniﬁed. Chief among these are the much higher coordination challenges putative counterbalancers would face today, in comparison with their predecessors. Classical balancing coalitions were always vulnerable to the collective action problem, as members would seek to ride free on the efforts of others. Those challenges would be multiplied in any attempt to counterbalance the United States today. These factors characterize an international system that is already primed against traditional power balancing due to nuclear weapons and the declining economic and military value of territory. All the major powers have or can quickly produce nuclear weapons. With a secure secondstrike capability, their territorial integrity is better secured than that of any past great power, and the security threat inherent in concentrated power is diminished.23 Moreover, the economic and military beneﬁts of owning speciﬁc bits of land have declined dramatically, reducing the incentives for conquest and diminishing the core security threat posed by concentrated power.24 Taken individually, each of these factors militates against counterbalancing. Together they make it exceedingly unlikely, for there is considerable positive interaction among them. American preponderance in the material scales of world power feeds the collective action and coordination problems, as do geography and the status quo barrier. Other schools of IR research yield additional reasons to doubt the salience of counterbalancing today.25 But the key is that all of the factors highlighted here lie within the realist system of explanation that highlights anarchy and its attendant security problems. Even discounting the importance of factors such as shared democratic norms and institutions, there is no reason to expect the reemergence of traditional balancing dynamics in the current international system. It follows that whatever the costs of unilateralism are, counterbalancing is not among them.

Potential competitors have abandoned the strategy of counter-balancing.

Paul 5 (T.V., Professor of International Relations @ James McGill, PhD, UCLA, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, Summer, Ebsco)

A growing body of international relations literature contends that balance of power theory has become a relic of the Cold War.1 According to this literature, second-ranking major powers such as Russia and China are abandoning balance of power strategies despite increased U.S. capabilities in almost all parameters of traditional sources of national power.2 In every category of new weapons development and acquisition, the United States is widening its lead vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Not only does it possess global power status, but it has also been pursuing unilateralist strategies to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Since the terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, preventive and preemptive military actions against regional challengers seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have become a key part of the United States’ global strategy.3 Certain U.S. policies, especially with respect to the Middle East and Central Asia, have made some foreign governments uneasy—among them the United States’ traditional allies in Europe. Yet evidence of a balancing coalition forming against the United States to countervail its power or threatening behavior has been conspicuously absent. In this article I argue that since the end of the Cold War, second-tier major powers such as China, France, Germany, India, and Russia have mostly abandoned traditional “hard balancing”—based on countervailing alliances and arms buildups—at the systemic level. This does not mean, however, that they are helplessly watching the resurgence of U.S. power. These states have forgone military balancing primarily because they do not fear losing their sovereignty and existential security to the reigning hegemon, a necessary condition for such balancing to occur. In the past, weaker states aligned themselves against the increasing power of a hegemonic state out of concern that the rising power would inevitably challenge their sovereign territorial existence. Examples include great power behavior in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe as well as during the Cold War. Absent this fear, the motivations and strategies of second-tier major powers vis-à-vis the dominant state can change. The U.S. imperial strategy by indirect methods sufficiently assures these powers that they are safe from predatory attacks by the United States. Indeed, they view the United States as a constrained hegemon whose power is checked by a multitude of factors, including: internal democratic institutions, domestic politics, and above all, the possession of nuclear weapons by some second-ranking powers.

Heg Sustainable – AT: Defense Spending

Defense spending can continue despite deficits.

Lieber 11 (Robert J. Lieber, Department of Government, Georgetown University, 8-25-2011, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34:4, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” Taylor and Francis Group, p. 516-517)

Mandelbaum’s argument cannot by any means be discounted, not least because of the increasing proportion of entitlement programs in the federal budget. Here, however, my own approach draws upon three broader considerations. First, it is well to keep in mind the unreliability of long-term economic forecasts. Even slight changes in relevant parameters produce widely varying results the farther into the future that projections are made. Illustratively, medium and long-term estimates of federal budget balances during recent decades have often been wide of the mark because even modest annual variances in productivity gross domestic product (GDP) growth, employment, inflation, and tax revenues can quickly cause forecasts to become outdated. In this light, forecasts that extend to the years 2040–50, as in the Global Trends 2025 report become deeply problematic.23 Second, major economic, social or political crises can make it possible to shatter political taboos and enable political leaders to implement policy changes once thought impossible. Moreover, while current defense spending is enormous in dollar terms, and despite the burdens of Afghanistan and Iraq, it amounted to just 4.9 per cent of GDP in the 2011 fiscal year. In historic terms, the per centage is modest in comparison with double digit shares during the early Cold War decades and 6.6 per cent at the height of the Reagan buildup in the mid- 1980s. A third reason to question whether deficit and entitlement costs may compel severe cutbacks in defense and foreign policy concerns the likelihood of external threats which can lead policymakers to maintain foreign commitments even when their preferences might have led them in the opposite direction. As a telling example, consider President Obama’s ownership of two wars: Iraq, where he had to follow a pace of withdrawal notably slower than that he had advocated as a senator and presidential candidate, and Afghanistan, which he had previously identified as the necessary war, but where he had to commit 30,000 additional troops, funding to support the effort, and substantial economic and military assistance to neighboring Pakistan. Moreover, as the March 2011 Libyan intervention suggests, no matter how reluctant a president may be, circumstances can compel action and involvement.

U.S. hard power is financially sustainable.

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg. 14)

No other country, or group of countries, comes close to matching the defense spending of the United States. Table 1.3 provides a context for this defense spending through a comparison of the defense spending of major countries in 2004, according the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The United States is far ahead of the defense spending of all other countries, including its nearest competitor, China, This is by design. As former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich has argued, "You do not need today’s defense budget to defend the United States. You need today’s defense budget to lead the world. If you are prepared to give up leading the world, you can have a much smaller defense budget." To maintain the robust American lead in military capabilities, it must continue to spend large, but absolutely affordable, sums. And it is affordable. While the amount of U.S. defense spending certainly is a large sum, it is only about 4 percent of its gross domestic product, as Table 1.3 illustrates. An examination of the data in the table is remarkable for four reasons. First, U.S. defense spending is about half of the world’s total defense spending. Second, the United States spends more than almost all the other major military powers in the world combined. Of course, most of those major military powers are also allies of the United States. Third, U.S. defense spending is very low when measured as a percentage of its economy, about 3.7 percent of its total economy. Fourth, defense spending at that level is easily affordable for the United States into the future.

Heg Sustainable – AT: Iraq

Declinism based on Iraq is cherry-picked and exaggerated.

Lieber 08, Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown and author of *The America Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, summer 2008, *World Affairs* 171.1, “Falling Upwards: Declinism: The Box Set,” pp. 55, EBSCOhost

Much of the case, however, wilts under close analysis, relying as it does overwhelmingly on transient or reversible indicators. (Comparing America’s share of the global economy in the late 1940s with its share today, for example, gives a skewed result for the simple reason that much of the rest of the world was in ruins sixty years ago). Declinism gains much of its power from cherry-picking among daily reports of bad news and from the assumption that those who defend this country’s basic strength have blinkered themselves to the Hegelian logic behind America’s weakening. As with the pessimistic intellectual troughs that followed the Depression, Vietnam, and the stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, there is a tendency among declinists to over-extrapolate from a momentous but singular event—in this case, the Iraq War, whose wake propels many of their gloomy forecasts.

Heg Key to Solve War – General

American retrenchment causes transition wars across the globe.

Felzenberg & Gray 11 (Alvin S., Adviser to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard, & Alexander B., 1/3, nationalreview.com/articles/256150/new-isolationism-alvin-s-felzenberg)

Should China conclude, on the other hand, that the United States intends to turn inward, it may grow even more ambitious and assertive in its region and beyond, potentially menacing world peace. Its smaller neighbors nervously wait to see how the United States will respond to China’s growing assertiveness. Should they come to believe that the U.S. is in retreat, they will make their own accommodations with Beijing. That result would wreak irreparable damage both to America’s economy and to its security. Messrs. Frank and Paul and their supporters have taken it into their minds that a reduced American presence in world affairs, particularly where the military is involved, would be a good thing. They had better think again: World politics, like nature, is hardly prone to respect vacuums. Iran and Venezuela remain as bellicose and destabilizing as ever, in spite of two years of Obama “engagement.” Iran squats beside the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s energy supply travels. Iran has also, the original Monroe Doctrine be damned, extended its military cooperation with Hugo Chávez’s authoritarian regime. Evidence is strong that Venezuela is providing sanctuary for Hezbollah terrorists in South America. The alliance of these two anti-American and increasingly menacing states could pose a threat to the United States of a kind that would make us nostalgic for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Faced with such challenges, the United States can ill afford military retrenchment as advocated by the new isolationists. While waste in the Pentagon’s budget can and should be cut, the new isolationists want to do it with a chainsaw when a scalpel is needed. In the last decade, the U.S. Navy’s fleet has shrunk to its smallest size since the 19th century, just as potential rivals such as China have not only expanded theirs but have begun to target perceived American maritime vulnerabilities. The U.S. Air Force is fielding an aging and shrinking force, while China is developing an advanced fighter for sale to adversaries of America, including Iran. A world in which the United States willingly ceded power and influence would both be more dangerous and prove less receptive to values that most Americans share, such as respect for human rights, the need to restrain governments through the rule of law, and the sanctity of contracts. By reducing its military strength to alarmingly low levels, the United States would create **dangerous power vacuums** around the world that other nations, with entirely different values, would be only too happy to fill. That, as history shows, would make war more, rather than less, likely. Congress and the president would do well to reflect on those lessons and remember their duty to provide a dominant American military presence on land, at sea, and in the air.

Multipolarity leads to nuclear war.

Nye 8 (Joseph, PhD, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “War, peace and hegemony in a globalized world”, page 37, edited by Chandra Chari – founder/editor of The Book Review) TJ

Many realists extol the virtues of the classic nineteenth-century European balance of power in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a multipolar balance of power at the global level today. French President Jacques Chirac has often appealed for a return to multipolarity. But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad for the world is debatable. War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where **war could turn nuclear**, or where the major new threats come from transnational terrorism. Many regions of the world and periods in history have seen stability when one power has been pre-eminent. As the historian Niall Ferguson has warned, in a disorderly world people may find that the problem in the future is too little American power rather than too much.4

Heg Key to Solve War – General

Declining US hegemony provokes great power wars.

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzad, counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 2/8/11, The National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)

If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in **frequent crises and major wars** among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.

U.S. hegemony’s key to prevent international power vacuums and war.

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pgs. 108-9)

The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and **arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would result**. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that the post—Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability. The United States does not provide security to other countries because it is altruistic. Security for other states is a positive result (what economists call a positive externality) of the United States pursuing its interests. Therefore, it would be a mistake to seek “benevolence” in great power politics. In international politics, states advance their self-interest and, most often, what might appear to be “benevolent” actions are undertaken for other reasons. To assist Pakistani earthquake refugees, for example, is benevolent but also greatly aids the image of the United States in the Muslim world—so self-interest is usually intertwined with a humanitarian impulse .The lesson here is straightforward: Countries align themselves with the United States because to do so coincides with their interests, and they will continue to do so only as long as their interests are advanced by working with Uncle Sam. In 1848, the great British statesman Lord Palmerston captured this point best when he said: “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

Heg Key to Solve War – General

Heg decline causes power vacuums and nuclear war.

Ferguson 4 (Niall, professor of history at New York University's Stern School of Business, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, “A World Without Power”, Foreign Policy)

The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few Page 5 strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony— its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder

Heg Key to Solve War – General

U.S. dominance deters conflict between major powers, creating peace and stability

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg. 42)

Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent. Throughout history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin means the Roman peace, or the stability brought about by the Roman Empire. Rome’s power was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too. So it is with the United States today, Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of **major war**, Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually **reduces the likelihood of war** because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its "normal" condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.

Retrenchment ensures aggression and war

Thayer 06(Bradley A., associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, *National Interest*, “In Defense of Primacy,” 11/06, Proquest)

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.

Heg Key to Solve War – Kagan 7

Hegemonic decline causes nuclear great power wars

Kagan 7 **(**Robert, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world ’s powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a **major war between great powers**. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China’s foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is pass é; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. The Chinese do not share the view that power is passé; hence their now twodecades- long military buildup. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power — with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending — now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea ’s nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan’s own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or “little brother” to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other ’s rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a “greater China” and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe ’s past than its present. But it also looks like Asia’s past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the eu and nato, would not insist on predominant influence over its “near abroad,” and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia ’s international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from nato and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia’s complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia ’s relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India ’s regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its “century of humiliation.” Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on. Israel has become its living symbol. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through **confrontation and wars** of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would **possess nuclear weapons**. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them **more catastrophic**. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of **world war**. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Heg Key to Solve War – Kagan 12

Hegemonic decline leads to war – other countries can’t fill in the gap

Kagan 12 (Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, “Why the World Needs America,” 2/11, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html) TJ

With the outbreak of World War I, the age of settled peace and advancing liberalism—of European civilization approaching its pinnacle—collapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism and economic calamity. The once-promising spread of democracy and liberalism halted and then reversed course, leaving a handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The collapse of the British and European orders in the 20th century did not produce a new dark age—though if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had prevailed, it might have—but the horrific conflict that it produced was, in its own way, just as devastating. Would the end of the present American-dominated order have less dire consequences? A surprising number of American intellectuals, politicians and policy makers greet the prospect with equanimity. There is a general sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not mean the end of the present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the current economic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers. American power may diminish, the political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive." The commentator Fareed Zakaria believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers like China "will continue to live within the framework of the current international system." And there are elements across the political spectrum—Republicans who call for retrenchment, Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutions—who don't imagine that a "post-American world" would look very different from the American world. If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great-power autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in a new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democracies—Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa—picked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it. What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Unfortunately, they might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global commons—or rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order. And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, but in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over $40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly where Slovenia and Greece are today. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful. Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to **miscalculation**. **Conflicts erupt** as a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded. The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker has observed, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for maintaining the balance of power." There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. President Bill Clinton left office believing that the key task for America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world's only superpower," to prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can it be done? For particularly in matters of security, the rules and institutions of international order **rarely survive** the decline of the nations that erected them. They are like scaffolding around a building: They don't hold the building up; the building holds them up. Many foreign-policy experts see the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government—forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. Americans certainly like to believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and just—not only for us but for everyone. We assume that the triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may **collapse altogether** as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to **disorder**. We may discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but **chaos and catastrophe**—which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

Heg Key to Solve War – Khalilzad 95

Heg prevents global nuclear war.

Khalilzad 95 (Zalmay, Defense Analyst at RAND, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War” The Washington Quarterly, RETHINKING GRAND STRATEGY; Vol. 18, No. 2; Pg. 84)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a **global nuclear exchange**. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Heg Key to Solve War – AT: International Order Resilient

International institutions fail – lack of shared norms, influence of authoritarian powers, and delay.

Lieber 09 (Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown, editor of *Foreign Policy*, author of *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, March 2009, *International Politics* 46.2-3, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era,” ProQuest)

Of course, international law does operate in multiple realms, and traditional national sovereignty has eroded under pressure from the forces of modernity and globalization. This is especially true for smaller and medium-sized countries and for rules and practices involving trade, finance, investment, intellectual property, air travel, shipping and sports, as well as for international tribunals to punish a selected number of gross human rights violators from conflicts in places such as Bosnia, Rwanda and Liberia. Shared understandings and rules of the road are important, but by no means do all societies accept the norms of liberal democracy, transparency and the rule of law. Moreover, even shared norms and beliefs can sometimes be flawed. Why, for example, is a decision to act against threats to the peace more legitimate when it is validated by the representatives of authoritarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing than when merely agreed to by the elected leaders of liberal democracies? In crisis situations the invocation of global governance, international norms or treaty obligations is as much or more likely to be a pretext for inaction than a spur to compliance. And the more urgent, dangerous or deadly the peril, the less likely there is to be effective agreement by the international community.

International institutions empirically fail.

Lieber 09 (Robert J. Lieber, professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown, editor of *Foreign Policy*, author of *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, March 2009, *International Politics* 46.2-3, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era,” ProQuest)

Consider a number of cases in point: Bosnia, from 1992 to 1995, where UN resolutions and peacekeepers proved unable to halt the carnage or to rein in Serbia, and where UN peacekeepers stood by impotently during the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre. The Rwanda genocide of 1994, where the UN Security Council permanent members consciously averted their gaze and deliberately reduced the small UN troop presence. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which from 1991 to 2002 failed to comply with its obligations in sixteen successive UNSC resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and which from 1996 to 2002 used bribery and corruption to undermine the UN oil-for-food program and divert revenues for Saddam's use. Syria and Hezbollah, which have repeatedly defied Security Council resolutions concerning Lebanese sovereignty and the disarming of militias. North Korea, which has - at least until very recently - systematically, secretly and sometimes openly, flouted both IAEA and UN resolutions as well as its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran, whose concealed nuclear program has violated NPT and IAEA requirements for nearly 20 years, as well as recent Security Council resolutions, and whose Revolutionary Guard Corps have repeatedly intervened covertly in Lebanon and Iraq, and carried out terrorist bombings as far afield as Argentina. Sudan, whose depredations in the Darfur region have caused as many as 400 000 deaths and the flight of some 2 million refugees, and which has managed (with Chinese help) to minimize effective international intervention by the UN Security Council. Russia, which has used both overt and covert means to intimidate or coerce independent states of the former Soviet Union by such means as arming separatist groups, refusing to withdraw its troops and bases, and manipulating energy supplies, and which launched a manifestly disproportionate attack against Georgia after that small republic reacted rashly to a series of provocations orchestrated by Moscow in the separatist enclave of South Ossetia.

Heg Key to Solve War – AT: Layne

Layne’s theory of defensive realism is wrong – the U.S. should maximize its power

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pgs. 104-5)

Countries want more power to protect their people and their other interests, such as economic growth and allies. Layne is right about a fundamental cause—the anarchy of the international system. But there is a debate among theorists of international relations concerning whether states should adopt a “Goldilocks” strategy—having just enough power, not too little nor too much—or if they should maximize their power to the extent that they are able to do so.’ Defensive realists like Layne favor a “Goldilocks” strategy for security. Offensive realists, like me, favor maximizing power for security. For the United States, defensive realists are more passive, support a smaller military, and favor reducing its commitments abroad. Offensive realists are: more active, support a larger military, and favor using the power of the United. States to protect its interests overseas, e.g., by taking the fight to the terrorists in the Middle East rather than waiting for them to come to the United States to attack Americans. Each country knows it will never be perfectly secure, but that does not detract from the necessity of seeking security. International politics is a dangerous environment in which countries have no choice but to participate. Any involvement—from the extensive involvement of the United States to the narrow activity of Switzerland—in this dangerous realm runs the risk of a backlash. That is simply a fact of life in international politics. The issue is how much participation is right. Thankfully, thus far the United States recognizes it is much better to be involved so that it may shape events, rather than to remain passive, having events shaped by other countries, and then adjusting to what they desire. In contrast to Layne’s argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible. Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possible—just as knowing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible. The value of U.S power for the country itself as well as for most of the world is demonstrated easily by considering four critical facts about international politics. First, if you doubt that more power is better, just ask the citizens of a country that has been conquered, like the Czech Republic, Poland, Kuwait, or Lebanon; or the citizens of a country facing great peril due to external threats or terrorists, like Colombia, Georgia, Israel, Nepal, or Turkey. These countries would prefer to possess greater power to improve their security. Or query the citizens of a fallen empire. For the British, French, or Russians, having the power to influence the direction of international politics, having the respect and recognition that flows from power, and, most importantly, having the ability to advance and defend their country’s interests are elements of power that are missed greatly. In sum, the world looks very different from the perspective of these countries than it does from a powerful and secure United States.

Heg Key to Solve War – AT: Offshore Balancing

**Offshore balancing fails – causes massive conflicts and global instability.**

Kagan 11 (Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, 1/24, “The Price of Power,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3) TJ

Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of **major war**, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

Offshore balancing is the worst option – it incurs all the DA’s to heg but gains none of the benefits.

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg. 116-7)

There is no viable alternative grand strategy for the United States than primacy. Primacy is the best and most effective means to maintain the security and safety of the United States for the reasons I argued in chapter 1. However, it is also the best because every other grand strategic “alternative” is a chimera and can only weaken the United States, threaten the security and safety of the American people, and introduce great peril for the United States and for other countries. A large part of what makes primacy such a success is that other countries know where the United States stands, what it will defend, and that it will be involved in disputes, both great and small. Accordingly, other countries have to respect the interests of the United States or face the consequences. Offshore balancing incurs the risks of primacy without its benefits. It pledges that the United States will defend its interests with air power and sea power, but not land power. That is curious because we could defend our interests with land power but choose not to, suggesting our threat to defend is not serious, which weakens our credibility and invites challenges to the interests of the United States. Offshore balancing increases the probability of conflict for the United States. It raises the danger that the interests of the United States will be challenged not only from foes like China and Iran but, perversely, also from countries now allied with the United States like Japan and Turkey.

Heg Key to Solve War – AT: Offshore Balancing

Offshore balancing would kill important alliances and cause conflicts

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg. 109)

If the United States adopted offshore balancing, many of those allies would terminate their relationship with the United States. They would be forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps ally against the United States, even aiming their nuclear weapons at the United States. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much worse off than it is now. That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy. To be sure, at present the United States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It wields enormous influence in international institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it. When you reflect on all the countries who have been hegemons, the United States is the most accommodating and helpful the world has seen. That is a weighty point and must be emphasized too frequently, it is not. The United States is so for many reasons, including its democratic ideology, the good-natured qualities of the American people, and geography; and the United States is far away from the Eurasian and African landmasses, which makes it a more attractive ally for a typical country in Eurasia—say, Poland or Turkey—since the United States must be invited in comparison to a great power like Russia. If Warsaw or Ankara were to invite the Russians in, they may never leave) and they might incorporate Poland or Turkey into Russia. There is no danger of that with the United States. And this simple fact alone helps us enormously in our relations with the rest of the world.

Offshore balancing would be dangerous for the U.S. and its allies

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg. 104)

Layne does not illuminate the risks associated with his preferred grand strategy of offshore balancing principally because those risks far outweigh any gain. Abandoning primacy in favor of offshore balancing would entail enormous dangers for the United States and its allies. Most importantly, it would cause the United States to abandon its dominant position in favor of inferiority for the first time in a century. Offshore balancing is a radical break with American tradition, statecraft, and policies which have allowed the United States first, to defeat four peer competitors—Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union in World War II and the Cold War; second, by peaceful means, to replace the previously dominant state—Great Britain; and third, to win greater security for the American people and their allies.

Heg Key to Solve China – Module

Heg is key to preventing Chinese aggression and Asian war.

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzad, former United States Ambassador for the United Nations and counselor at the Center for Strategic and International studies, 2/8/11, The National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)

American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of **arms races, miscalculation**, or other crises spiraling into **all-out conflict**. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the **most significant barrier** facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

Asian conflict causes global nuclear war.

Ogura & Oh 97 (Toshimaru, Professor of Political Economy at Toyama University, & Ingyu, Professor of Organizational Behaviour and Innovation at the Graduate School of Management at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan, “Nuclear Clouds over the Korean Peninsula and Japan” Monthly Review, April)

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - **nuclear annihilation**. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.

Heg Key to Solve China – Ext – Heg Key to Solve China

Heg is key to prevent Chinese aggression and Asian war.

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay, former United States Ambassador for the United Nations and counselor at the Center for Strategic and International studies, 2/8/11, The National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)

Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance economic growth and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a **flare-up in Asia**. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.

Heg Key to Solve China – Ext – Heg Key to Solve China

Heg key to solve Chinese aggression.

Blumenthal 12(Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “A strong military keeps the threat of war small”, 5/2/12, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/a-strong-military-keeps-the-threat-of-war-small/)

There are good reasons for mutual apprehension; they cannot be papered over with better communications or "confidence building measures." China's dictators are neither wrong in their belief that the ultimate U.S. aim is democracy in China, nor misguided in their belief that Washington will do whatever it takes to make sure China does not dominate Asia. Washington is right to believe that China has greater ambitions now that it is more powerful. China wants more control, if not hegemony, over the Asia Pacific. There should be no surprise that China is a strategic rival: great power competition is the natural state of international politics. Why anyone thought China would be different is a mystery. Though the two sides have clashing interests, neither side wants strategic competition to descend into conflict. Managing the competition calls for sophisticated statecraft. The two sides should acknowledge their divergent objectives, while continuing to focus on their mutual interests — deep economic reform in both countries. But, in the end, it will be old-fashioned deterrence by the U.S. that will keep the peace between these great powers. This is easier said than done. A war-weary United States is reluctant to provide resources for its stated strategy of checking Chinese power. Historically, Washington's habit is to cut its military after long wars. It is incumbent upon America to go against this penny-wise, pound-foolish practice. America's leaders must make the case that paying now for a greater military presence in Asia will deter a far more costly possible conflict with China. By paying for the ships and aircraft our military needs, Americans may buy themselves peace.

Declining US influence emboldens Chinese aggression.

Felzenberg & Gray 11 (Alvin S., Adviser to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard & Alexander B., July 20, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/272148/don-t-slash-defense-spending-alvin-s-felzenberg?pg=1)

China’s leaders talk of an “active defense” that sees various strategic locations on China’s periphery as essential to Beijing’s economic and political survival. To this end, they have developed a navy capable of denying American forces access to crucial waterways such as the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Deeply shaken by President Clinton’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet down the Taiwan Strait in response to Beijing’s threats against Taiwan in 1996, the Chinese set out to develop weapons systems capable of deterring a similar American response in the future. Through several initiatives — which include deploying anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, some of which are thought to be aimed at American aircraft carriers, and developing a submarine program capable of intimidating many of our Asian allies — China is coming dangerously close to achieving one of its major strategic goals: reducing, if not eliminating, an American presence in East Asia. The nations of the region — allies such as Japan, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as former enemies such as Vietnam — look anxiously for signals that the United States will retain both the will and the capacity to remain active in their region. Should the current balance of powers and interests in the region be replaced by Chinese hegemony, these nations will have little choice other than to negotiate their own arrangements with China. Rest assured, these will come at great expense to American economic and security interests. The Obama administration’s intimations of drastic defense cuts serve only to embolden China and other competitors. A U.S. Navy with its smallest fleet strength since the 19th century and serious shipbuilding problems cannot afford a $10 billion cut. All reasonable people can agree that there is waste and redundancy at the Pentagon; the challenge is targeting actual waste, such as the Defense Department’s bloated civilian workforce and dysfunctional contracting process, rather than the weapons systems and personnel required to deter aggressors and, if necessary, win America’s wars.

Heg Key to Democracy – Module

US hegemony’s key to democracy – that’s key to prevent great power wars.

Thayer 06 (Dr. Bradley A. Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, National Interest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/218445899, 11/06)

Everything we think of when we consider the current international order-free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization-is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that **they are dead wrong** and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Dormer sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned-between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: **great power wars**. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy.

Democracy solves international peace and environmental protection.

Diamond 95 (Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Heg Key to Democracy – Ext – Heg Key to Democracy

U.S. heg allows for the spread of democracy

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pg. 42-3)

The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as for the United States This is because democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance—small as it may be—that once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will be reduced further, Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel. 58 This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush He has said that Sharansky’s worldview “is part of my presidential DNA." Whether democracy in the Middle East would have this impact is debatable. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in October 2004, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. Elections were held in Iraq in January 2005, the first free elections that country’s history. The military power of the United States put Iraq on the path to democracy. Democracy has spread to Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Caucasus and now even the Middle East is becoming increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. The march of democracy has been impressive. Although democracies have their flaws, simply put, democracy is the best form of government. Winston Churchill recognized this over half a century ago: democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time". The United States should do what it can to foster the spread of democracy throughout the world.

Heg key to democracy

Kagan 12 **(**Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, “The world America Made,” pgs 26-28) TJ

The United States, in fact, played a critical role in making the explosion of democracy possible. This was not because Americans pursued a consistent policy of promoting democracy around the world. They didn’t. At various times throughout the Cold War, American policy often supported dictatorships as part of the battle against communism or simply out of indifference. It even permitted and at times encouraged the overthrow of democratic regimes deemed unreliable—Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954, and Allende in Chile in 1973. At times American foreign policy was almost hostile to democracy. Richard Nixon regarded it as “not necessarily the best form of government for people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”2’ Nor, when the United States did support democracy, was it purely out of fealty to principle. Often it was for strategic reasons. Reagan officials came to believe that democratic governments might actually be better than autocracies at fending off communist insurgencies, for instance. And often it was a reaction to popular local demands that compelled the United States to make a choice it would otherwise have preferred not to make, between supporting an unpopular and possibly faltering dictatorship and “getting on the side of the people.” Ronald Reagan would likely have preferred to support the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s had he not been confronted by Filipino “people power.” In only a few cases—such as George H. W. Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama and Bill Clinton’s 1994 intervention in Haiti—did the United States seek a change of regime primarily out of devotion to democratic principles. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the general inclination of the United States did begin to shift toward a more critical view of dictatorship. The U.S. Congress, led by human rights advocates, began to condition or cut off American aid to authoritarian allies, which had the effect of weakening their hold on power. In the Helsinki Accords of 1975, a reference to human rights issues raised greater attention to the cause of dissidents and other opponents of dictatorship in the Eastern bloc. President Jimmy Carter focused attention on the human rights practices of the Soviet Union as well as on right-wing governments in Latin America and elsewhere. American international information services such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty put greater emphasis on democracy and human rights in their programming. The Reagan administration, after first trying to roll back Carter’s human rights agenda, eventually embraced it and made the promotion of democracy part of its stated policy. Even during this period, American policy was far from consistent. Many allied dictatorships, especially in the Middle East, were not only tolerated but actively supported with American economic and military aid. But the net effect of the shift in American policy, joined with the efforts of Europe, was significant.

Heg Key to Democracy – Ext – Heg Key to Democracy

US hegemony supports democracy

Owen 11(John Owen, associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, PhD in Politics, 2/11/11, Don’t Discount Hegemony, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

Heg Key to the Economy – Module

U.S. heg promotes the global economy

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pgs. 43-4)

Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce respect for intellectual property rights mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that “economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability”; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and “we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity...business follows the flag.” Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat, researcher at the World Bank, prolific author, and now a professor who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India that strongly condemned empire. He has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American Empire. Lal has traveled the world and, in the course of his journeys, has witnessed great poverty and misery due to a lack of economic development. He realized that free markets were necessary for the development of poor countries, and this led him to recognize that his faith in socialism was wrong. Just as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard “evidence and experience” that stemmed from “working and traveling in most parts of the Third World during my professional career” caused this profound change. Lal submits that the only way to bring relief to the desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the American Empire. Empires provide order, and this order “has been essential for the working of the benign processes of globalization, which promote prosperity.”62 Globalization is the process of creating a common economic space, which leads to a growing integration of the world economy through the increasingly free movement of goods, capital, and labor. It is the responsibility of the United States, Lal argues, to use the LIEO to promote the well-being of all economies, but particularly those in the Third World, so that they too may enjoy economic prosperity.

**An economic crisis would cause aggression and nuclear war.**

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 08, Aaron Friedberg, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, and Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of *Commentary*, visiting scholar the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, NJ, 10-21-2008, *Wall Street Journal*, “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html

In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more **reckless with their nuclear toys**, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

Heg Key to the Economy – Ext – Heg Key to the Economy

US hegemony key to economic growth

Owen 11 (John, associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, PhD in Politics, 2/11/11, Don’t Discount Hegemony, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/ )

The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

U.S. primacy increases the global economy

Thayer 06 (Dr. Bradley A. Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, *National Interest*, “In Defense of Primacy,” 11/06, Proquest)

Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.

Heg Key to Free Trade – Module

Heg decline overseas will cripple the international free trade system

Kagan 12(Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, “The world America Made,” pgs 77-78) TJ

The move from American-dominated ocean ways to a collective policing by multiple great powers—even if it occurred—might turn out to be a formula for competition and conﬂict rather than a bolstering of the liberal economic order. In the nineteenth century, British naval dominance undergirded peace and global free trade, except in times of war, when Britain itself closed the avenues of trade to its enemies and their trading partners. When the world’s navies became more equal—with the rise of not only the German navy but also those of Japan and the United States—both peace and the international free-trade system became imperiled. Historically, a liberal economic order has ﬂourished under only one set of conditions—a great power with a globally dominant navy and a profound interest in a free-trade, free-market international system, the situation that existed in the latter half of the nineteenth century under British naval supremacy, and again after World War II, under American naval supremacy. The multipolar eras that preceded British supremacy and that existed between the two world wars, prior to American naval supremacy, did not give rise to liberal economic orders. Even if one sets aside the problem of who will police the commons, it is not clear that the great powers in a new, multipolar era would be able to sustain a free-market, free-trade international system, even if they wanted to. They might kill the goose inadvertently, despite their dependence on it, simply because of the nature of their own political and economic systems.

Extinction

Panzner 8 (Michael J., Faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

Heg Key to Free Trade – Ext – Heg Key to Free Trade

US naval heg is key to free trade – decline causes maritime tensions.

Kagan 12(Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, “The world America Made,” pgs 76-77) TJ

One key element of the liberal economic order over the past two centuries has been control of the seas. Today, although we live in a digital age, goods are not beamed through the ether. Much of the world’s oil and gas, raw materials, ores and minerals, and food and grain still travel by ship, which means that free trade still requires open trade routes on the high seas. Yet throughout history, shipping lanes have often become victims of international crises and conﬂicts, as nations have sought to control waterways and deny access to adversaries. The United States went to war twice—in 1812 and in 1917— partly in response to efforts by other great powers to blockade American trade in wartime. Since World War II, the United States has used its dominance of the oceans to keep trade routes open for everyone, even during periods of conﬂict. But it is not enough to have an interest in free trade. Today, Portugal and Singapore have an interest in free trade and open oceans. but they lack the capacity to keep trade routes open. **Only** the United States has had both the will and the ability to preserve freedom of the seas. Indeed, it has done so largely by itself, policing the world’s oceans with its dominant navy with only minor assistance from other powers, while other trading nations, from Germany to Iapan, from Brazil to India, from Russia to China, have been content to be “free riders.” This has been one of America’s most important contributions to the present liberal world order. But what would happen if the United States ceased to carry this burden? If American decline means anything, it would have to mean an end to this hegemony on the high seas. Would today’s free riders decide to take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies that could take over some of the tasks now handled by the Americans? And even if they did, would this actually produce an open global commons, or would it produce competition and tension? For as it happens, both China and India are increasing their naval capabilities. This has produced not greater security but a growing strategic competition between them in both the Indian Ocean and, increasingly, the South China Sea. The fact that China is trying to use its growing naval power not to open but to close international waters offers a glimpse into a future where the U.S. Navy is no longer dominant.

Heg Key to Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. dominance is key to global humanitarian assistance – numerous examples

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pgs. 44-6)

If someone were to ask “How many humanitarian missions has the United States undertaken since the end of the Cold War?”, most Americans probably have to think for a moment and then answer "three or four". In fact, the number is much larger. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War, and while wars like the invasion of Panama or Iraq received considerable attention from the world’s media, most of the fifty actions were humanitarian in nature and received almost no media attention in the United States. The U.S. military is the earth’s “911 force”—it serves as the world’s police; it is the global paramedic, and the planet’s fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, typhoon, or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. In 1991, when flooding caused by cyclone Marian killed almost 140,000 people and left 5 million homeless in Bangladesh, the United States launched Operation Sea Angel to save stranded and starving people by supplying food, potable water, and medical assistance. U.S. forces are credited with saving over 200,000 lives in that operation. In 1999, torrential rains and flash flooding in Venezuela killed 30,000 people and left 140,000 homeless. The United States responded with Operation Fundamental Response, which brought water purification and hygiene equipment saving thousands. Also in 1999, Operation Strong Support aided Central Americans affected by Hurricane Mitch. That hurricane was the fourth-strongest ever recorded in the Atlantic and the worst natural disaster to strike Central America in the twentieth century. The magnitude of the devastation was tremendous, with about 10,000 people killed, 13,000 missing, and 2 million left homeless. It is estimated that 60 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala was destroyed. Again, the U.S. military came to the aid of the people affected. It is believed to have rescued about 700 people who otherwise would have died, while saving more from disease due to the timely arrival of medical supplies food, water, blankets, and mobile shelters. In the next phase of Strong Support, military engineers rebuilt much of the infrastructure of those countries, including bridges, hospitals, roads, and schools. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra and killed 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. More importantly, Washington not only contributed a large amount of aid, $350 million, plus another $350 million provided by American citizens and corporations, but also—only days after the tsunami struck—used its military to help those in need. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention, as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort, and it is important to keep in mind that its costs were separate from the $350 million provided by the U.S. government and other money given by American citizens and corporations to relief organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent. The generosity of the United States has done more to help the country fight the war on terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving 3 million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the war on terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States provided about $156 million in aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the generosity of the United States, it left a lasting impression about the United States. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the war on terror. There is no other state or international organization that can provide these benefits. The United Nations certainly cannot because it lacks the military and economic power of the United States. It is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on small matters as well as great ones. Thus, it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on important issues and to act as a unified force once a decision has been reached. Moreover, it does not possess the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. Simply put, there is no alternative to the leadership of the United States. When the United States does not intervene, as it has not in the Darfur region of Sudan and eastern Chad, **people die**. In this conflict, Arab Muslims belonging to government forces, or a militia called the Jingaweit, are struggling against Christian and animist black Africans who are fighting for independence. According to the State Department, 98,000 to 181,000 people died between March 2003 and March 2005 as a result of this struggle. The vast majority of these deaths were caused by violence, disease, and malnutrition associated with the conflict.

Heg Key to Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. primacy is key to humanitarian assistance.

Thayer 06 (Dr. Bradley A. Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, National Interest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/218445899, 11/06)

Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote die welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War-and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"-it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces.

Heg Key to Solve Proliferation – Module

U.S. primacy stops prolif

Thayer 06(Bradley A., associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, *National Interest*, “In Defense of Primacy,” 11/06, Proquest)

U.S. primacy – and the bandwagoning effect – has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.

Proliferation causes global nuclear war.

Utgoff 2 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Heg Key to Solve Proliferation – Ext – Heg Key to Solve Proliferation

Collapse of hegemony causes rapid proliferation globally

Rosen 3 (Stephen Peter, Professor of National Security at Harvard, National Interest, Spring)

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

Heg Key to Solve Terrorism – Module

Heg prevents terrorism

Kagan 11 (Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, January 24, “The Price of Power,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3) TJ

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it.

Blame for terrorism escalates to catastrophic nuclear confrontations between the great powers

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and directs the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at Victoria University, June 21, “After a terrorist nuclear attack: Envisaging catalytic effects” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 33(7), Jul 2010, 571-593)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the ﬁrst place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in signiﬁcant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-ﬁrst century might bring would fade into insigniﬁcance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a **massive exchange of nuclear weapons** between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be ﬁngered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the ﬁssile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science ﬁction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identiﬁable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efﬁciency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” 41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American ofﬁcials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be deﬁnitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would ofﬁcials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conﬂict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conﬂict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a signiﬁcant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of inﬂuence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ . . . long-standing interest in all things nuclear.” 42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

Heg Key to Solve Terrorism – Ext – Heg Key to Solve Terrorism

Declining hegemony makes terrorism more likely and more dangerous.

Brooks and Wohlforth 2 (Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs, July/August)

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.

\*\*HEG BAD\*\*

Heg Unsustainable – General

The declining US economy and China’s rise assure that US retrenchment and multipolarity are inevitable – the US will benefit from a shift to offshore balancing now.

Layne 12 (Christopher Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, 1/27, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405) MF

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be **replaced** by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency. Two terms not found in the DSG are “decline” and “imperial overstretch” (the latter coined by the historian Paul Kennedy to describe the consequences when a great power’s economic resources can’t support its external ambitions). But, although President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta may not admit it, the DSG is the first move in what figures to be a dramatic strategic retrenchment by the United States over the next two decades. This retrenchment will push to the fore a new U.S. grand strategy—offshore balancing. In a 1997 article in International Security, I argued that offshore balancing would displace America’s primacy strategy because it would prove difficult to sustain U.S. primacy in the face of emerging new powers and the erosion of U.S. economic dominance. Even in 1997, it was foreseeable that as U.S. advantages eroded, there would be strong pressures for the United States to bring its commitments into line with its shrinking economic base. This would require scaling back the U.S. military presence abroad; setting clear strategic priorities; devolving the primary responsibility for maintaining security in Europe and East Asia to regional actors; and significantly reducing the size of the U.S. military. Subsequent to that article, offshore balancing has been embraced by other leading American thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble and Robert Pape. To be sure, the proponents of offshore balancing have differing ideas about its specifics. But they all agree that offshore balancing is based on a common set of core strategic principles. ● Fiscal and economic constraints require that the United States set strategic priorities. Accordingly, the country should withdraw or downsize its forces in Europe and the Middle East and concentrate is military power in East Asia. ● America’s comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air power, not on sending land armies to fight ground wars in Eurasia. Thus the United States should opt for the strategic precepts of Alfred Thayer Mahan (the primacy of air and sea power) over those of Sir Halford Mackinder (the primacy of land power). Offshore balancing is a strategy of burden shifting, not burden sharing. It is based on getting other states to do more for their security so the United States can do less. ● By reducing its geopolitical and military footprint on the ground in the Middle East, the United States can reduce the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism directed against it. Islamic terrorism is a push back against U.S. dominance and policies in the region and against on-the-ground forces in the region. The one vital U.S. interest there—safeguarding the free flow of Persian Gult oil—can be ensured largely by naval and air power. ● The United States must avoid future large-scale nation-building exercises like those in Iraq and Afghanistan and refrain from fighting wars for the purpose of attaining regime change. Several of these points are incorporated in the new DSG. For example, the new strategy document declares that the United States “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” The document also states the United States will “rebalance [its] military investment in Europe” and that the American military posture on the Continent must “evolve.” (The Pentagon’s recent decision to cut U.S. ground forces in Europe from four brigades to two is an example of this “evolution.”) Finally, implicitly rejecting the post-9/11 American focus on counterinsurgency, the strategy document says that with the end of the Iraq war and the winding down of the conflict in Afghanistan, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” The DSG reflects the reality that offshore balancing has jumped from the cloistered walls of academe to the real world of Washington policy making. In recent years the U.S. Navy, the Joint Staff and the National Intelligence Council all have shown interest in offshore balancing as an alternative to primacy. Indeed, in his February 2011 West Point speech, then defense secretary Robert Gates made two key points that expressed a clear strategic preference for Mahan over Mackinder. First, he said that “the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere.” Second—with an eye on the brewing debate about intervention in Libya—he declared that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” In plain English, no more Eurasian land wars. The subsequent Libyan intervention bore the hallmarks of offshore balancing: The United States refused to commit ground forces and shifted the burden of military heavy lifting to the Europeans. Still, within the DSG document there is an uneasy tension between the recognition that economic constraints increasingly will impinge on the U.S. strategic posture and the assertion that America’s global interests and military role must remain undiminished. This reflects a deeper intellectual dissonance within the foreign-policy establishment, which is reluctant to accept the reality of American decline. In August 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a “New American Moment;” reaffirmed the U.S. responsibility to lead the world; and laid out an ambitious U.S. global agenda. More recently, Mitt Romney, a leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination, declared that the twenty-first century “must be an American century” and that “America is not destined to be one of several equally balanced global powers.” These views are echoed by foreign-policy scholars who refuse to acknowledge the reality of decline or embrace a theory of “painless decline” whereby Pax Americana’s norms and institutions will survive any American retrenchment. But, American “exceptionalism” notwithstanding, the United States is not exempt from the historical pattern of great-power decline. The country needs to adjust to the world of 2025 when China will be the number-one economy and spending more on defense than any other nation. Effective strategic retrenchment is about more than just cutting the defense budget; it also means redefining America’s interests and external ambitions. Hegemonic decline is never painless. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are **staging a comeback**. The central strategic preoccupation of the United States during the next two decades will be its own decline and China’s rise.

Heg Unsustainable – General

US hegemony will inevitably decline – trying to preserve it is suicidal.

Kupchan 12 (Charles A., Professor International Affairs at Georgetown, Former Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council, B.A. from Harvard and M.Phil. and D.Phil from Oxford, National Journal; 3/17, p4-4, 1p, 1 Graph, “Is American Primacy Really Diminishing?”)

Finally, Kagan's timing is off. He is right that power shifts over decades, not years. But he underestimates the speed at which substantial changes can occur. He notes, for example, "The United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire's relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power." After two draining wars, an economic crisis, and deepening defense cuts, this assertion seems doubtful. But let's assume that the United States is indeed "at the height of its power," comparable with Britain circa 1870. In 1870, British hegemony rested on a combination of economic and naval supremacy that looked indefinitely durable. Two short decades later, however, that picture had **completely changed**. The simultaneous rise of the United States, Germany, and Japan altered the distribution of power, forcing Britain to revamp its grand strategy. Pax Britannica may have technically lasted until World War I, but London saw the writing on the wall much earlier--which is precisely why it was able to adjust its strategy by downsizing imperial commitments and countering Germany's rise. In 1896, Britain began courting the United States and soon backed down on a number of disputes in order to advance Anglo-American amity. The British adopted a similar approach in the Pacific, fashioning a naval alliance with Japan in 1902. In both cases, London used diplomacy to clear the way for retrenchment--and it worked. Rapprochement with Washington and Tokyo freed up the fleet, enabling the Royal Navy to concentrate its battleships closer to home as the Anglo-German rivalry heated up. It was precisely because Britain, while still enjoying preponderant strength, looked over the horizon that it was able to successfully adapt its grand strategy to a changing distribution of power. Just like Britain in 1870, the United States probably has another two decades before it finds itself in a truly multipolar world. But due to globalization and the spread of new manufacturing and information technologies, global power is shifting **far more rapidly** today than it did in the 19th century. Now is the time for Washington to focus on managing the transition to a new geopolitical landscape. As the British experience makes clear, effective strategic adjustment means getting ahead of the curve. The alternative is to wait until it is too late--precisely what London did during the 1930s, with disastrous consequences for Britain and Europe. Despite the mounting threat posed by Nazi Germany, Britain clung to its overseas empire and postponed rearmament. After living in denial for the better part of a decade, it finally began to prepare for war in 1939, but by then it was way too late to stop the Nazi war machine. Even Kagan seems to recognize that comparing the United States to Britain in 1870 may do his argument more harm than good. "Whether the United States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries," he writes, "will matter a great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in." The suggestion here is that the United States, as long as it marshals the willpower and makes the right choices, could still have a good 200 years of hegemony ahead of it. But two decades--more in line with the British analogy--is probably the better guess. It strains credibility to propose that, even as globalization speeds growth among developing nations, a country with less than 5 percent of the world's population will run the show for two more centuries. Whether American primacy lasts another 20 years or another 200, Kagan's paramount worry is that Americans will commit "preemptive superpower suicide out of a misplaced fear of their own declining power." In fact, the greater danger is that the United States could head into an era of global change with its eyes tightly shut--in denial of the tectonic redistribution of power that is remaking the globe. The United States will remain one of the world's leading powers for the balance of the 21st century, but it must recognize the waning of the West's primacy and work to shepherd the transition to a world it **no longer dominates**. Pretending otherwise is the real "preemptive superpower suicide."

Heg Unsustainable – General

Status quo is heading towards inevitable decline

Layne 11 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, 3/28, “Bye Bye Miss American Pie”, The European, http://theeuropean-magazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) MF

International politics is in a period of transition, no longer unipolar, not yet multipolar and evidence of America’s relative decline is **omnipresent**. The current era of globalization will end and the Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order, reflecting the interests of emerging powers like China and India. The epoch of American hegemony is **drawing to a close**. Evidence of America’s relative decline is omnipresent. According to the Economist, China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in 2019. The U.S. relative power decline will affect international politics in coming decades: the likelihood of great power security competitions – and even war – will increase; the current era of “globalization” will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order that reflects the interests of China and the other emerging great powers. American primacy’s end is result of history’s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are **gone forever**. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be **unaffordable**. In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. If so, the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U.S. created after World War II. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. The decline of American power means **the end of U.S. dominance** in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. Indeed, the Pax Americana is **already is crumbling** in slow motion.

Heg Unsustainable – General

**Power predominance does not lead to legitimacy or preferred outcomes – decline of US heg is inevitable.**

Maher 11 (Richard Maher, PhD candidate in the political science department at Brown, winter 2011, *Orbis*, Volume 55, Issue 1, pp. 54-55, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” ScienceDirect)

As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily *American* predominance that produces unease but rather American *predominance.* Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is **inevitable** that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will **necessarily** see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.

**Decline of heg is inevitable – trying to hold onto preeminence is the worst option.**

Maher 11 (Richard Maher, PhD candidate in the political science department at Brown, winter 2011, *Orbis*, Volume 55, Issue 1, pp. 68, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” ScienceDirect)

The United States will continue to be the “default power” (to use Josef Joffe's term) in the near future.20 No other country will be able to duplicate the overall reach and influence of the United States—in terms of economic, political, and military power—for at least several decades. It is not clear, moreover, how many people would want to live in a world dominated by China, India, Russia, or even Europe. The United States retains a number of tremendous advantages compared to possible strategic competitors: its demographics; advanced technology; raw materials; research universities and laboratories; continued dominance in global mass culture, and labor market flexibility. It still remains **inevitable** that America's outsized role in world politics will decline in the years and decades ahead. Rather than seeking to desperately prolong this position at undue expense, which would serve only to hasten America's decline and weaken its long-term position, the United States should start thinking now about how it will exercise its power and influence once its preeminent position is over. The United States is still in a position to shape this new world order, by defining the rules, institutions, and patterns of legitimacy that will prevail in this new era of global politics. Periods of change in the global distribution of power are often chaotic, unstable, and violent. The United States will be responsible for maintaining some kind of global equilibrium so the end of one era of world politics and the emergence of a new, different era avoids the overt power competition and instability of previous transitions. While the United States will face more constraints and pushback from the rest of the world, it may actually be able to preserve and in some cases even expand its influence in this new era.

Heg Unsustainable – Economy

Economic weakness spells the end of hegemony now – retrenchment’s inevitable.

Layne 12 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, International Studies Quarterly 56, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. 210) MF

US decline has profound implications for the future of international politics. Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system requires a single hegemonic power to perform critical military and economic tasks. Militarily, the hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and for guarding the global commons (Posen 2003). Economically, the hegemon provides public goods by opening its domestic market to other states, supplying liquidity for the global economy, and providing a reserve currency (Kindelberger 1973; Gilpin 1975). As US power continues to decline over the next ten to fifteen years, the United States will be progressively unable to discharge these hegemonic tasks. The United States still wields preponderant military power. However, as discussed above, in the next ten to fifteen years the looming fiscal crisis **will compel Washington to retrench strategically**. As the United States’ military power diminishes, its ability to command the commons and act as a hegemonic stabilizer will be compromised. The end of the United States’ role as a military hegemon is still over horizon. How- ever, the Great Recession has made it evident that the United States no longer is an economic hegemon. **An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them.** However, it was the freezing-up of the US financial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis. The hegemon is supposed to be the lender of last resort in the international economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of first resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibility for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global economic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the firewall against global economic downturns. This is not what happened during the Great Recession, however. The US economy proved too infirm to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States’ inability to galvanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an economic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Other recent exam- ples of how relative decline and loss of economic hegemony have eroded Washington’s ‘‘agenda set- ting’’ capacity in international economic manage- ment include the US failure to achieve global economic re-balancing by compelling China to reva- lue the renminbi, and its defeat in the 2009–2010 ‘‘austerity versus stimulus’’ debate with Europe.

Heg Unsustainable – Economy

US primacy is no longer sustainable or credible – economic crisis.

Walt 11 (Stephen M., Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, Nov/Dec 2011, *The National Interest* 116, “The End of the American Era,” ProQuest)

Taken together, these events herald a sharp decline in America's ability to shape the global order. And the recent series of economic setbacks will place even more significant limits on America's ability to maintain an ambitious international role. The Bush administration inherited a rare budget surplus in 2001 but proceeded to cut federal taxes significantly and fight two cosdy wars. The predictable result was a soaring budget deficit and a rapid increase in federal debt, problems compounded by the financial crisis of 2007-09. The latter disaster required a massive federal bailout of the financial industry and a major stimulus package, leading to a short-term budget shortfall in 2009 of some $1.6 trillion (roughly 13 percent of gdp). The United States has been in the economic doldrums ever since, and there is scant hope of a rapid return to vigorous growth. These factors help explain Standard & Poor's U.S. government creditrating downgrade in August amid new fears of a "double-dip" recession. The Congressional Budget Office projects persistent U.S. budget deficits for the next twenty-five years - even under its optimistic "baseline" scenario - and it warns of plausible alternatives in which total federal debt would exceed 100 percent of gdp by 2023 and 190 percent of gdp by 2035. State and local governments are hurting too, which means less money for roads, bridges, schools, law enforcement and the other collective goods that help maintain a healthy society. The financial meltdown also undermined an important element of America's "soft power," namely, its reputation for competence and probity in economic policy. In the 1990s, a seemingly robust economy gave U.S. officials bragging rights and made the "Washington Consensus" on economic policy seem like the only game in town. Thomas Friedman (and other popular writers) argued that the rest of the world needed to adopt U.S.-style "DOScapital 6.0" or fall by the wayside. Yet it is now clear that the U.S. financial system was itself deeply corrupt and that much of its economic growth was an illusory bubble. Other states have reason to disregard Washington's advice and to pursue economic strategies of their own making. The days when America could drive the international economic agenda are **over**, which helps explain why it has been seventeen years since the Uruguay Round, the last successful multilateral trade negotiation. The bottom line is clear and unavoidable: the United States simply **won't have the resources** to devote to international affairs that it had in the past. When the president of the staunchly internationalist Council on Foreign Relations is penning articles decrying "American Profligacy" and calling for retrenchment, you know that America's global role is in flux. Nor can the United States expect its traditional allies to pick up the slack voluntarily, given that economic conditions are even worse in Europe and Japan. The era when the United States could create and lead a political, economic and security order in virtually every part of the world is **coming to an end**. Which raises the obvious question: What should we do about it?

Heg Unsustainable – Rising Powers

**Rising powers make heg decline inevitable – trying to prolong heg makes it worse.**

Brooks 12 (Rosa, professor of law at Georgetown Law Center and fellow at the New America Foundation, 2-1-2012, LA Times, “America’s waning influence,” http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/01/opinion/la-oe-brooks-decline-20120201

That's dangerous pabulum. Any honest diplomat will tell you that American power and global influence is waning, and if we shy away from acknowledging that fact, we'll only speed up the process. American influence is waning for two reasons, the first of which should potentially be a source of comfort, not despair. While we continue to have the world's most formidable military, America's power in the world is declining simply because once-weak states are growing stronger. Europe, despite its current woes, is an economic and diplomatic force to be reckoned with. China, India and Brazil are emerging as regional powerhouses with increasingly global reach. As a result of "the rise of the rest," U.S. power is declining in a relative sense. In the last decade, for instance, our share of global output dropped from 23.5% to 19.1%. And this is a trend that began decades ago. In his 1987 National Security Strategy, President Reagan noted, "The United States no longer ha[s] an overwhelming economic position vis-a-vis Western Europe and the East Asia rimland." In 1990, President George H.W. Bush echoed this theme in his National Security Strategy: "It was inevitable that our overwhelming economic predominance after the war would be reduced."

Heg Unsustainable – AT: Brooks & Wohlforth

Brooks and Wolforth’s defense of heg is weak – heg decline is inevitable.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service., International Studies Review (2009) 784-787 MF)

Unipolarity has preoccupied American international relations (IR) scholars, policymakers, and foreign policy analysts since the Cold War ended and the ‘‘unipolar moment’’ was proclaimed (Krauthammer 1990⁄1991). Since the Cold War’s end IR scholars of various stripes—especially balance-of-power realists—have warned that unipolarity would boomerang against the United States (Layne 1993, 2006a,b; Waltz 1993). The United States’ post-9⁄11 policies—especially the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003—fanned these worries as scholars and policy analysts argued that ‘‘unilateralist’’ US policies were fueling a backlash against American hegemony (Ikenberry 2002; Nye 2002; Walt 2002, 2005; Pape 2005; Paul 2005). More recently, the financial and economic crisis that hit the US economy beginning in Fall 2007—coupled with the rise of new great powers like China and India, and the resurgence of Russia—have raised questions about the decline of America’s relative power. These doubts found official expression in the National Intelligence Council’s (2008) Global Trends 2025 report. World Out of Balance is a forcefully argued rebuttal to arguments that American hegemony is waning and that unipolarity provokes other states to check US power. This is an important—must read—book for scholars of IR theory, security studies, and US foreign policy. Displaying a firm mastery of the various IR theory literatures, Dartmouth professors Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth seek to refute the arguments of Waltzian realists, liberal IR theorists, neoliberal institutionalists, and constructivists that ‘‘the current unipolarity is not an unalloyed benefit for the Untied States because it comes with the prospect of counterbalancing, increased dependence on the international economy, a greater need to maintain a favorable reputation to sustain cooperation within international institutions, and greater challenges to American legitimacy’’ (p. 4). Brooks and Wohlforth conclude the ‘‘unprecedented concentration of power resources in the United States generally renders inoperative the constraining effects of the systemic properties long central to research in international relations’’ (p. 3). Building on their theoretical findings, Brooks and Wohlforth prescribe policy: the United States should use its ‘‘leverage to reshape international institutions, standards of legitimacy, and economic globalization’’ (p. 21). World Out of Balance demolishes the respective liberal IR theory, institutionalist, and constructivist contentions about systemic constraints on US hegemony. How- ever, Brooks and Wohlforth’s central claim—that unipolarity and concomitant US hegemony will last for a long time—fails to persuade. Indeed, there is a lot less to their argument for unipolar stability than meets the eye.1 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system that does not engage the argument that, like all hegemonic systems, the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise both because, over time, a hegemon’s economic leadership is undermined by the diffusion of know-how, technology, and managerial skills throughout the international system (which propels the rise of new poles of power), and leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power pushing it into decline (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Goldstein 1988; Modelski and Thompson 1996). Contrary to the argument in World Out of Balance, a strong case can be made that the early twenty-first century will witness the decline of US hegemony. Indeed, notwithstanding their claim that unipolarity is robust and US hegemony will endure well into the future, Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another 20 years, which really is not very long at all (pp. 17, 218). This is a weak case for unipolarity, and also is an implicit admission that other states in fact are engaged in counterbalancing the United States and that this is spurring an on-going process of multipolarization.2 The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization, and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). Here, there is evidence that global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia (Emmott 2008; Mahbubani 2008; National Intelligence Council 2008; Zakaria 2008). The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it is propelling China’s rise (Goldstein 2005; Gill 2007; Lampton 2008; Ross and Feng 2008)—thus hastening the relative decline of US power. Unsurprisingly, Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise, and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame (pp. 40–45) Theirs is a static analysis, however, and does not reflect that although the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure, the trend lines appear to favor China, which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States held for more than a century (Marsh 2008; Dyer 2009).3 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to 15 years. Empirically, then, there are indications that the unipolar era is in the process of drawing to a close, and that the coming decades could witness a power transition (Kugler and Lemke 1996; : Organski and Kugler 1980; Organski 1968). Brooks and Wohlforth also maintain that unipolarity affords the United States a 20-year window of opportunity to recast the international system in ways that will bolster the legitimacy of its power and advance its security interests (pp. 216–218). Ironically, however, institutional reform is the arena where multipolarization’s effects already are being felt because—as was apparent during the run- up to the April 2009 London meeting of the Group of 20—the impetus for change is coming from China and the other emerging powers. Here, there is a big flaw in Brooks and Wohlforth’s argument: if they perceive that the United States is in decline, rising powers such as China need to wait only a decade or two to reshape the international system themselves. Moreover, because of the perception that its hard power is declining, and the hit its soft power has taken as a result of the financial and economic meltdown, there is a real question about whether the United States retains the credibility and legitimacy to take the lead in institutional reform. World Out of Balance is a major contribution to both the scholarly and policy debates. But its main argument about the durability of American hegemony has a dated feel, and Brooks and Wohlforth are outliers on the question of US relative decline.4 During the next 20 years, we will find out if they are right or, as others (Layne 2006c; Pape 2009) have argued, the United States has passed the apogee of its power. From a grand strategic standpoint, a lot rides on whether—as Brooks and Wohlforth claim—the United States can successfully prolong its hegemony or international politics is reverting to multipolarity.

Heg Causes War – General

**Unipolarity is the most conflict-prone international system – statistics prove.**

Monteiro 11 (Nuno P., assistant professor of political science at Yale, winter 2011/12, *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 17-19, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the **most conflict prone** of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is **by far** the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

Unipolarity leads to preventive wars.

Monteiro 11 (Nuno P. Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale, winter 2011/12, *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. p. 26-27, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security.74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue.

Heg Causes War – General

**Unipolarity is not peaceful – empirically proven.**

Monteiro 11 (Nuno P., assistant professor of political science at Yale, winter 2011/12, *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 11-12, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received virtually no attention. Although the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism, preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010.22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War.23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at war.24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace. Why? To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate.25 The debate on whether, when, and how unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention. In this article, I provide a theory of unipolarity that focuses on the issue of unipolar peacefulness rather than durability. I argue that unipolarity creates significant conflict-producing mechanisms that are likely to involve the unipole itself. Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature. To be sure, I do not question the impossibility of great power war in a unipolar world. Instead, I show how unipolar systems provide incentives for two other types of war: those pitting the sole great power against another state and those involving exclusively other states. In addition, I show that the type of conflict that occurs in a unipolar world depends on the strategy of the sole great power, of which there are three. The first two—defensive and offensive dominance—will lead to conflicts pitting the sole great power against other states. The third—disengagement—will lead to conflicts among other states. Furthermore, whereas the unipole is likely to enter unipolarity implementing a dominance strategy, over time it is possible that it will shift to disengagement.

Unipolarity causes war – no hegemonic strategy yields peace.

Monteiro 09 (Nuno P., Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago, dissertation submitted to the faculty of the social sciences in candidacy for the degree of doctor of philosophy, “Three Essays on Unipolarity,” ProQuest, pp. 2-3)

Chapter One addresses the question of whether unipolarity is peaceful. The conventional wisdom unequivocally answers yes. But, as my argument shows, there is no good reason to expect unipolarity to foster peace. The chapter lays out a theory of conflict in unipolarity, showing how a world with a sole great power produces incentives for conflict. Contrary to what is assumed, neither the structure of a unipolar world nor U.S. strategic choices have a clear beneficial impact on the overall prospects for peace. A unipole can implement one of three types of grand strategy. First, a strategy of dominance will focus on minor powers, which do not possess the capability to deter the unipole. Threatened by the latter, recalcitrant minor powers will try to increase their relative power (e.g., by developing nuclear weapons). But, before they do, the unipole is likely to attack them. Second, a strategy of defense of the status quo will produce not dampen uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions, similarly prompting minor powers to bolster their deterrent capability. Such revision of the status quo is, however, likely to be opposed by the unipole; and war is, once again, likely to ensue. Finally, a strategy of disengagement, though eliminating tensions vis‐à‐vis the unipole, leaves other regions of the globe on their own, making room for wars among other states. In the case of unipolar regions, conflict will result from the dynamics described above. In case of bipolar and PREVIEW 3 multipolar regions, conflict is likely to result from the several mechanisms described by theories about such structures. In sum, for the world as a whole, unipolarity makes conflict likely. For the unipole itself, it presents a difficult choice between disengagement and frequent conflict. In any case, unipolarity hardly allows for the peaceful conversion of the unipole’s power into favorable outcomes.

Heg Causes China War – Module

Heg leads to US-China War and relations collapse — whether heg is slipping or not.

Layne 7 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, American Empire: A Debate, Chapter 2 “The Case Against the American Empire”, p. 71-72] MF

In essence, then, American grand strategy requires China to accept U.S. primacy and the ideology that underpins it—which means trouble ahead in Sino-American relations. Although “the United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China that appreicates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world,” the United States is not willing to countenance a China that emerges as a great power rival and challenges American primacy. Unsurprisingly, U.S. grand strategy under both the Bush II and Clinton administrations has aimed at holding down China. While acknowledging that China is a regional power, both the Clinton and Bush II administrations have been unwilling to concede that China either is, or legitimately can aspire to be, a world-class great power. Enjoining China against challenging the United States militarily, the Bush II administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy warns Beijing that “In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of greatness.” Washington rejects the notion that China has any justifiable basis for regarding the American military presence in East Asia as threatening to its interests. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently reiterated this point when he suggested that any moves by china to enhance its military capabilities are, ipso facto, a signal of aggressive Chinese intent. According to Rumsfeld, china’s military modernization cannot possibly be defensive because “no nation threatens China”—a view restated in the Bush II administration’s report, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. In the Pentagon’s view, “China’s military modernization remains ambitious” and in coming years “China’s leaders may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests, or resolve disputes. The Bush II administration has not entirely abandoned engagement with Beijing, but—more openly than the Bush I and Clinton administrations—it has embraced containment of China as an alternative to engagement. Given the influence of neoconservative foreign policy intellectuals on the administration’s grand strategy, this is unsurprising. After all, during the 1990s, leading neoconservatives were part of the so-called Blue Team of anti-China hardliners in the foreign policy community. Containment is a strategy that emphasizes using the traditional hard power tools of statecraft to prevent China’s great power emergence and maintain American primacy. The heart of containment, however, lies in military power and alliance diplomacy. What, specifically, do primacists mean when they call for China’s containment? First, they want the United States to pledge explicitly to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack and also to help Taiwan build us its own military capabilities. Primacists believe that the United States should not back away from confronting China over Taiwan and, indeed, they would like the United States to provoke such **a showdown**. They also want the United States to emulate its share a common interest in curbing rising Chinese power. As part of such a strategy, the United States should tighten its security relationship with Japan and invest it with an overtly anti-Chinese mission. Needless to say, primacists are determined that the United States maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority over China. Indeed, with respect to nuclear weapons, as Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have pointed out in an important Foreign Affairs article, the United States currently has an overwhelming nuclear first strike capability against china, which will be the national ballistic missile defense system that the United States currently is deploying. Even if Beijing switches its military modernization prioritizes from its current conventional defense buildup to the enhancement of tis strategic nuclear deterrent, it will take some time before China could offset the first-strike capability that the United States possesses. Advocates of containment hope that the various measures encompassed by this strategy will halt China’s rise and preserve American primacy. However, as one leading proponent of containment argues, if these steps fail to stop China’s great power emergence, “the United States should consider harsher measures,” That is, before its current military advantage over China is narrowed the United States should launch a **preventative war** to forestall China’s emergence as a peer competitor. Of course, in the abstract, preventative wars are always has been an option in great powers’ strategic playbooks—typically as a strategy that declining great powers employ against rising challengers. However, it also is a strategy that also can appeal to a dominant power that is still on top of its game and is determined to squelch potential challengers before they become actual threats.

**US-China war goes nuclear, causing global wars and extinction.**

**Straits Times 2k** “No one gains in war over Taiwan” Pg. 40 June 25, 2000. L/n

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Heg Causes China War – AT: Heg Key to Solve China – Retrenchment Peaceful

Declining US power does not lead to US-China conflict

Parent and MacDonald 11 (Joseph Parent, Assistant professor at the University of Miami, Paul Macdonald, Assistant professor at Williams college, “Graceful decline? The surprising success of Great Power Retrenchment” pages 40-43, 2011, MIT press journal, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034)

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.”92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades **without inviting Chinese expansionism**.

Heg Causes China War – AT: Heg Key to Solve China – Retrenchment Peaceful

US retrenchment leads to Asian stability

Parent and MacDonald 11 (Joseph Parent, Assistant professor at the University of Miami, Paul Macdonald, Assistant professor at Williams college, “Graceful decline? The surprising success of Great Power Retrenchment” pages 43-44, 2011, MIT press journal, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034)

Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes

Heg Causes China War – AT: Heg Key to Solve China – China Rise Peaceful

China’s rise will be peaceful – it’s seeking a strategy of accommodation.

Schweller and Pu 11 (Randall L. Schweller, professor of political science and director of Mershon Center’s Series on National Security Studies at Ohio State University, and Xiaoyu Pu, doctoral candidate in the department of political science at Ohio State University, summer 2011, *International Security* 36.1, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” p. 52-53, EBSCOhost)

Chinese resistance operates along two dimensions: the ways by which China exploits the current order and its thinking beyond that order. To cope with the existing order, China pragmatically accommodates U.S. hegemony, on the one hand, while it contests the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony, on the other. This type of resistance is similar to rightful resistance in a domestic context, in which weak actors partially accept the legitimacy of the hegemon but seize opportunities to grow and contest perceived injustice. Thus, China has worked within the current international system to expand its economy and increase its visibility and status as a global political player, while avoiding actions that directly challenge U.S. hegemony. Relying on existing institutionalized channels to contest U.S. hegemony, China seeks to increase its political influence and prestige through active participation in, not confrontation with, the existing order. Specific tactics include (1) denouncing U.S. unilateralism and promoting the concept (if not always the practice) of multilateralism; (2) participating in and creating new international organizations; (3) pursuing a proactive “soft power” diplomacy in the developing world;43 (4) voting against the United States in international institutions; and (5) setting the agenda within international and regional organizations. In the short term, China seeks a gradual modification of Pax Americana, not a direct challenge to it. There are several reasons why China’s grand strategy incorporates accommodation with the United States. First, China’s ability to grow requires a stable relationship with the United States. Contemporary Chinese leaders view the ªrst two decades of the twenty-ªrst century as “a period of important strategic opportunities.”44 Second, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has generally pursued engagement with China, not containment of it.45 Third, Chinese strategists have a realistic estimate of their country’s relative strength. It “would be foolhardy,” Wang Jisi, dean of Peking University’s School of International Studies, proclaims, “for Beijing to challenge directly the international order and the institutions favored by the Western world—and, indeed, such a challenge is unlikely.”46 Predicting continued U.S. domination during this era, Chinese leaders believe that they must accommodate the United States while relentlessly building China’s own strength. At the end of this period, China will be in a better position to defend and advance its interests.47

China will act within multilateral institutions – sees international legitimacy as the best way to expand influence.

Schweller and Pu 11 (Randall L. Schweller, professor of political science and director of Mershon Center’s Series on National Security Studies at Ohio State University, and Xiaoyu Pu, doctoral candidate in the department of political science at Ohio State University, summer 2011, *International Security* 36.1, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” p. 55-56, EBSCOhost)

Fourth, China continues to expand its influence in defining legitimate norms in international affairs.58 According to some Chinese scholars, a rising power such as China must not only increase its material capabilities but grow “socially” within the existing international society. This expansion requires international recognition of China’s status and normative preferences as legitimate. 59 In the security domain, for example, China zealously defends its definition of legitimate war through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. As Guo Shuyong, an international relations expert at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, points out, “Legitimacy plays an indispensably important role in the structuring and socializing of international political behavior, and the ability to wage legitimate wars constitutes an important part of a nation’s soft national power.”60 In recent years, China has become more active in UN peacekeeping operations, partly because the nature of these operations has changed in such a way that China’s normative concerns have been addressed.61 With respect to human rights, the influence of the European Union and the United States has been declining in recent years, while Chinese and Russian positions on human rights have garnered increasingly more votes in the UN General Assembly. The success of China and Russia in this regard reflects not only their commitment to a strict definition of state sovereignty but also their enhanced diplomatic skill and influence within the United Nations.62

Heg Causes China War – AT: Heg Key to Solve China – China Rise Peaceful

International stability is durable -- the rise of China will not overturn the Western order

Ikenberry 08 (G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 1/2008, Foreign Affairs Vol. 87 No.2, http://www.princeton.edu/~gji3/TheRiseOfChina.pdf)

That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely—eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today’s Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a uniﬁed international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order—if managed properly—will live on.

Economic incentives mean China won’t seek to overturn the existing international order.

Ikenberry 08 (G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 1/2008, Foreign Affairs Vol. 87 No.2, http://www.princeton.edu/~gji3/TheRiseOfChina.pdf)

First, unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. Across history, international orders have varied widely in terms of whether the material beneﬁts that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or are widely shared. In the Western system the barriers to economic participation are low, and the potential beneﬁts are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system.

Heg Causes Intervention – General

Unipolarity ensures global interventions and authoritarianism

Calleo 2009 (David P., Prof @ John Hopkins, “Follies of Power America’s Unipolar Fantasy”, pg 50)

By comparison with Europe’s project, the Pax Americana, conceived of as global hegemony, with the right, indeed the obligation, to intervene anywhere, is a program that seems a good deal less attractive or attainable. The costs are bound to be high. Installing and maintaining global hegemony will almost certainly require a more authoritarian government than Americans are used to. It seems unlikely to bring out those traits that embody the best of American civilization. It seems an improbable way to enrich our national life. It points toward a disappointing outcome for two centuries of American democracy. For the U.S. to pursue unipolar power also means accepting the duty to preserve it and to thwart any regional power or grouping that might threaten America’s predominance. This is a task that automatically makes the U.S. hostile toward rising new powers, including a rising European Union. In a world increasingly diverse and dynamic, this seems an unpromising course.

Heg Causes Intervention – Insecurity Pathology

Hegemony causes pathological obsession with insecurity.

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival (00396338); Apr/May, Vol. 52 Issue 2, p59-82, 24p)

Since great powers have broader interests than do smaller powers, one might expect that the lone hyperpower in a unipolar system would have the broadest interests of all.40 With great power comes both great flexibility to pursue a wide variety of goals and great responsibility to affect the progression of events. ‘Most countries are primarily concerned with what happens in their neighborhoods’, says Robert Jervis, ‘but the world is the unipole’s neighborhood’.41 As interests expand, new threats appear which, if states are not careful, can soon take on an inflated importance and inspire unnecessary action. Threats to secondary interests can rapidly be misinterpreted as significant dangers if not kept in perspective by a constant, conscious process of evaluation. The expansion of interests as power grows is natural, but the interpretation of those new interests as vital is not. Vital national interests do not change from decade to decade, much less from administration to administration, but interest inflation is a central aspect of foreign-policy pathology in unipolar systems. Great powers of the past have often proved unable to disconnect vital interests from peripheral ones as expansion occurred. Newly perceived dangers have seemed to require action, which has often taken the form of further expansion, leading to the identification of new threats. There will never be a time when no threats can be generated by the human imagination. States can never be fully safe if all interests are vital and all threats dire. Insecurity has no natural limits, and if not kept in check can easily lead to overexpansion, overspending and decline. 42 Historical examples are not difficult to find. Two millennia after its collapse, it is easy to forget that insecurity contributed to the growth of the Roman Empire. Many of its most prominent conquests, from Gaul to Dacia to Iberia, were driven not only by the desire for glory or plunder but also by the sincere belief that the populations along Rome’s widening periphery could represent a threat. Cicero observed that many Romans felt that expansion was thrust upon them, as part of a project to rid themselves of ‘frightening neighbours’.43 The fact that most of these neighbours were manifestly weaker did not matter. As its power grew, so too did Rome’s insecurity. Even Rome’s most ardent defenders stop short of claiming that Roman expansion can be fully explained with reference to virtuous, defensive motives. But prestige and financial gain were not the only motivations of Roman strategists. As both Cicero and Virgil argued, Rome never felt safe as long as it had enemies, both real and imagined.44 The most powerful – and in many ways safest – society in the ancient world was unconvinced that its security was assured as long as it had neighbours. Their mere existence constituted a potential threat. Great Britain exhibited a similar level of insecurity as its power grew throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As the boundaries of its empire expanded, new dangers constantly appeared just over the horizon. British politicians and strategists felt that turbulence on colonial borders ‘pulled them toward expansion’, in the words of historian John Galbraith. 45 The notion that empire could never be safe until all potential threats were addressed encouraged unnecessary and strength-sapping forays into such places as Afghanistan, Zululand and the Crimea. There is little doubt that the empires of the past did have real enemies that could have been the cause of genuine security concerns. Insecurity is only pathological when elevated to disproportionate, irrational levels. Today the United States faces far fewer existential dangers than did either the Roman or British empires. American dominance is far greater, as is the strength of its pathology.

That sparks interventionism.

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival (00396338); Apr/May, Vol. 52 Issue 2, p59-82, 24p)

For individuals as well as states, pathologies – mistaken or incorrect beliefs that inspire irrational action – create their own reality and drive behaviour accordingly. In individuals, pathologies reside in the mind, while state-level pathologies exist as shared irrational beliefs among leaders and the public. Strategic pathologies, then, are incorrect beliefs that drive destructive, or at least counterproductive, state behaviour. The United States suffers from several. The credibility imperative is a clear example, one that continues to have a particularly strong influence upon the United States. 7 Credibility, when used in policy debates, is a code word for the prestige and reputation of a state; it is, in Henry Kissinger’s words, ‘the coin with which we conduct our foreign policy’, an intangible asset that helps states influence the actions of others. 8 In periods of high credibility, policymakers believe, a state can deter and compel behaviour and accomplish goals short of war. When credibility is low, sceptical adversaries and allies may be tempted to ignore threats and promises. To national leaders, therefore, healthy credibility seems to be the equivalent of many armed divisions, and is worth protecting at almost any cost. This belief rests on a shaky foundation, to put it mildly. Decades of scholarship have been unable to produce much evidence that high credibility helps a state achieve its goals, or that low credibility makes rivals or allies act any differently. 9 Although study after study has refuted the basic assumptions of the credibility imperative, the pathology continues to affect policymaking in the new century, inspiring new instances of irrational, unnecessary action. The imperative, like many foreign-policy pathologies, typically inspires belligerence in those under its spell. 10 Credibility is always maintained through action, usually military action, no matter how small the issue or large the odds. Insecurity, likewise, whether real or imagined, leads to **expansive, internationalist, interventionist** grand strategies. The more danger a state perceives, the greater its willingness to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. The ‘preventive’ war in Iraq is the most obvious consequence of the inflated US perception of threat, but is hardly the only one. America’s insecurity pathology is in need of diagnosis and cure, lest Iraq be not a singular debacle but a harbinger of other disasters to come.

Hegemony causes a pathological obsession with insecurity in the US.

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival (00396338); Apr/May, Vol. 52 Issue 2, p59-82, 24p)

The US reaction to the invasion of Georgia is just one of many post-Cold War examples of Parkinson’s Law, adapted for international relations. British civil servant Cyril Northcote Parkinson began an essay in The Economist in 1955 by observing that ‘work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion’. 5 International relations has its own version: insecurity expands along with power. 6 As states get stronger, they identify more interests, and the number of threats they perceive tends to grow. Consequently, and perhaps paradoxically, the stronger countries are, the more insecure they often feel. Today, for instance, the United States is simultaneously the world’s most powerful country and its most insecure. Parkinson’s Law helps explain why so many in Washington interpreted the Russian invasion not as a minor flare-up of a long-standing regional grievance but as a threat to the existence of freedom and security everywhere. Logic might suggest that power and security ought to be directly, not inversely, related. As state power grows, so too should security; after all, the stronger the state, the less likely is successful conquest from abroad. Presumably, potential challengers should be emboldened by weakness and deterred by strength. Why, then, do strong states often seem to worry more, often about seemingly trivial matters? The tendency for insecurity to expand with power is not merely paradoxical, it is pathological, an irrational aspect of international politics that, like individual psychopathologies, might be corrected if identified and brought into the open.

Heg Causes Intervention – Intervention Fails

Interventionism fails – Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo prove

Logan 06 (Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 1/2006, Flawed States and Failed Logic, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa560.pdf?q=failed)

“Enlargement,” as it turned out, was rather messy in practice and lacked broad domestic support within the United States. President Clinton’s first major foreign policy action turned into a tactical and strategic catastrophe in Somalia, when his administration attempted nation-building measures in that country, resulting in the deaths of 22 American service personnel. The Somalia operation led to a hasty retreat and a suspicion around the world that the United States was a paper tiger, a country that would run home with its tail tucked between its legs at the first sign of casualties. More accurately, the Somalia experience showed that few Americans are willing to risk American lives when vital national interests are not at stake. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration thought it could recover from the Somalia debacle. It tinkered with the formula for intervention and tried out its new theories in places as diverse (and far removed from U.S. interests) as Haiti and Kosovo. Those interventions cost billions of dollars and resulted in neither the spread of liberal democracy nor the enhancement of U.S. national security. At the time of this writing, Haiti remains a failed state, and the crisis in Kosovo is only forestalled by the presence of international peacekeepers. Its political status is entirely unresolved.

Heg Causes Proliferation – Module

**Unipolarity sparks nuclear proliferation and great power wars.**

Monteiro 11 (Nuno P., assistant professor of political science at Yale, winter 2011/12, *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 9-40, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.”75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility.76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conflict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including **major power wars**. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the first war, its ability to manage confrontations between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility.

Proliferation causes global nuclear war.

Utgoff 2 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Heg Causes Proliferation – Ext – Heg Causes Proliferation

Unipolarity leads to prolif – Iran and North Korea prove.

Monteiro 11 (Nuno P. Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale, winter 2011/12, *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 30, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole.85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s.86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a confluence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war.87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.”88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

Heg Causes Proliferation – AT: Heg Solves Proliferation

**Deterrence fails – countries believe the US will attack even compliant states.**

Monteiro 10 (Nuno P. Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale, spring/summer 2010, *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, pp. 159-160, “Why US Power Does Not Deter Challengers,” http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105216monteiro.pdf)

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while Yale Journal of International Affairs 160 NUNO P. MONTEIRO suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

Heg Causes Terrorism – Module

Heg causes WMD terrorism.

Calleo 09 (David P., Prof @ John Hopkins, “Follies of Power America’s Unipolar Fantasy”, pg 73)

Not surprisingly, U.S. administrations have, in recent years, grown increasingly concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in particular, to unstable states or terrorist groups. Here a perverse military logic works against the United States. The more America’s overweening military power threatens smaller countries with forcible regime change, the more they will seek asymmetric solutions. Their options are terrorism, on the one hand, and rogue strategic weapons, on the other. Combining the two into **terrorism using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons** offers still more striking prospects. These prospects, intrinsic to the post-Soviet strategic dispensation, bode ill for a unipolar America pressing regime change around the world. More interventions give incentive to more proliferation.

Blame for terrorism escalates to catastrophic nuclear confrontations between the great powers

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and directs the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at Victoria University, June 21, “After a terrorist nuclear attack: Envisaging catalytic effects” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 33(7), Jul 2010, 571-593)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the ﬁrst place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in signiﬁcant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-ﬁrst century might bring would fade into insigniﬁcance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a **massive exchange of nuclear weapons** between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be ﬁngered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the ﬁssile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science ﬁction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identiﬁable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efﬁciency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” 41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American ofﬁcials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be deﬁnitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would ofﬁcials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conﬂict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conﬂict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a signiﬁcant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of inﬂuence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ . . . long-standing interest in all things nuclear.” 42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

Heg Causes Terrorism – Ext – Heg Causes Terror

Hegemony causes terrorism – terrorist rally against the hegemon

Innocent and Carpenter 09(Malou, foreign policy analyst at Cato who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, 6/2009, Escaping ‘The Graveyard of Empires’, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)

Contrary to the claims that we should use the U.S. military to stabilize the region and reduce the threat of terrorism, a 2008 study by the RAND Corporation found that U.S. policies emphasizing the use of force tend to create new terrorists. In “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qai’da,” Seth Jones and Martin Libicki argue that the U.S. military “should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim societies, since [a U.S. military] presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment.” Some policymakers claim the war is worth waging because terrorists flourish in failed states. But that argument cannot account for terrorists who thrive in centralized states that have the sovereignty to reject external interference. That is one reason why militants find sanctuary in neighboring, nuclear armed Pakistan. In this respect, and perhaps most important, is the belief that our presence in the region helps Pakistan, when in fact the seemingly open-ended U.S. presence in Afghanistan risks creating worse problems for Pakistan. Amassing troops in Afghanistan feeds the perception of a foreign occupation, spawning more terrorist recruits for Pakistani militias and thus placing undue stress on an already weakened nation. Christian Science Monitor correspondent Anand Gopal finds, “In late 2007, as many as groups merged to form an umbrella Taliban movement, the Tehreek-e-Taliban, under guerrilla leader Baitullah Mehsud.” He continues, “Three of the most powerful, once-feuding commanders—Mr. Mehsud and Maulavi Nazeer of South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Behadur of North Waziristan—formed an alliance in response to US airstrikes.” America’s presence has already caused major problems for the government in Islamabad, which is deeply unpopular for many reasons, including its alignment with U.S. policies. There are also indications that it has raised tensions in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. For Islamic militants throughout the region, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan — like the occupation of Iraq — is an increasingly potent recruiting tool. Only by prolonging our military presence do we allow the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami, the Haqqani network, and even Pakistani Taliban militants to reframe the conflict and their position within it as a legitimate defense against a foreign occupation. In this respect, policymakers should recognize that not everyone willing to resist U.S. intervention is necessarily an enemy of the United States. Most importantly, we must understand that not every Islamic fundamentalist is a radical Islamist, let alone one who is hell-bent on launching a terrorist attack against the American homeland.

Hegemony gives support to terrorist groups

Calleo 2009 (David P., Prof @ John Hopkins, “Follies of Power America’s Unipolar Fantasy”, pg 24)

Anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East has, however, broader causes than Israel. Islam, not unlike Christianity, has had great trouble coming to terms with the modern world. But the Arab world, unlike the Christian one, has been far less able to use nationstates as frameworks and instruments for social, cultural, and economic advancement and reconciliation. This is not least because the existing Arab states lack the legitimacy of Western nation states. For this fatal deficiency, many Arabs find it both plausible and convenient to blame the West. Most Middle Eastern states, unlike European states, are not the natural outgrowth of several centuries of indigenous conflict and reconciliation. Rather, they are artificial structures imposed on the Arab world, principally by Britain and France after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in World War I.7 Such imposed states, lacking a natural consensus and legitimacy, are necessarily fragile and tyrannical. Typically, they are controlled by minorities ruling more by coercion and inertia than by active consent. Many Arab reformers detest their own governments and regional state systems and hold the West responsible for installing and sustaining them. By now, “West” has come to mean, above all, the United States. After supporting Israel’s implantation, the U.S. replaced Britain and France as the principal sustainer of the region’s imposed state system. Accordingly, the U.S. is widely resented. Ironically, America’s own clients are sometimes themselves major contributors to anti- American feeling. Unpopular traditionalist regimes curry popular favor by supporting fundamentalist Muslim foundations, often disseminators of rancorous anti-American propaganda. Al Qaeda itself springs and derives much of its nourishment from unofficial Saudi Arabian sources.8 Modernist tyrannies, like Syria, use similar populist tactics at America’s expense. Anti-Americanism helps them to gain the popular support they otherwise lack. Successive administrations have searched for some new formula to stem the growing anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. An obvious course would be to achieve a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. One administration after another has tried and failed.9 Terrorist organizations, feeding on popular hatred for Israel and the U.S., are the principal beneficiaries. They grow increasingly difficult for the Arab states themselves to manage. In short, the U.S., ostensibly the dominant force in the region, has been trapped in an inexorably declining position. It has been tied both to an Israel that so far cannot reconcile itself with its neighbors and to authoritarian Arab allies, driven to seek popular legitimacy through covert accommodations with terrorists and anti-American forces generally.

Heg Causes Terrorism – Ext – Heg Causes Terror

Hegemony leads to global backlash and turns our allies against us—causes terrorism

Layne 07 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service., American Empire: A Debate, Chapter 2 “The Case Against the American Empire”, p. 51-53) MF

The events of the last five years suggest the answer. In the aftermath of 9/11, Americans—citizens and policy-makers alike—asked repeatedly, “Why do they hate us?” President George W. Bush answered by claiming that the United States was the target of al Qaeda’s terrorist strikes because radical Islamacists hate America’s freedom. More thoughtful analysts have pointed out that it is the U. S. policies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf that caused the terrorists to attack the United States. In March 2004, The United States invaded Iraq. In this endeavor it was opposed not only by Russia and China but also by long-time allies like Germany and France. Around the world, public opinion—which largely had been sympathetic to the United States in 9/11’s wake—turned sharply against the United States. Increasingly, the United States has come to be perceived globally as an 900-pound gorilla on steroids—out of control, and dangerous to others. Far from being regarded as a “benevolent hegemon,” America has come to be seen as a kind of global Lone Ranger, indifferent to its allies, ignoring international institutions like the United Nations and acting in defiance of international law and norms. In the last five years there have been many indications that, far from welcoming American primacy, others worry about it—and sometimes find it downright threatening to their own interests and security. In other words, **a too powerful America risks a global geopolitical backlash against its preeminent position in international politics.** The issue of whether a strategy of primacy is good for the United States has been a subject of debate in the forging policy community for the last fifteen years. After 9/11, however, the debate about primacy merged with another debate. Cognizant of America’s overwhelming “hard” (military and economic) power, and believing in the attractiveness of its democratic values and neoconservatives—urged that the United States should use its primacy to construct a new American Empire, The United States, it was urged, should use its states like Iraq and engage in a policy of “nation-building” to ensure that such states no longer serve as either terrorist havens or sources of instability and aggression. Writing in The Weekly Standard shortly after 9/11, the neo-conservative’s pundit Max Boot argued that the United States should follow in Britain’s imperial footsteps and administers Afghanistan—ruled by the Islamic until “a responsible, humane, preferably democratic government takes over.” Once the United States dealt with Afghanistan, the United States, Boot said, should invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. As Boot freely admitted, the United States should do this even if Saddam Hussein was not implicated in the 9/11 Attacks: “Who cares if Saddam was involved in this particular barbarity?” By overthrowing Saddam Hussein the United States could “establish he first Arab democracy.. [and] turn Iraq into a beacon of hope for the oppressed peoples of the Middle East.” The Bush II administration—the neocon fellow-travellers—took up Boot’s challenge. The March 2003 invasion of Iraq was the first step in the administration’s “generational commitment” to bring about a “democratic transformation” in the Middle East. The heart of the current debate about the direction of American foreign policy—about the costs and benefits of primacy and empire—is about security. Do primacy and empire make the United States more secure, or—as I argue—less secure? This debate is important and not just for policy-makers, but also for *citizens*. The events of 9/11 underscored that the debate over America’s grand strategy is not an abstract one. The policies the United States follows in international arena have real-life consequences for Americans. To understand the debate about American primacy and empire, one must engage with the key theories of international politics that underlie both current US strategy and its alternative, offshore balancing: and with competing narratives—that is, contrasting ideas about, and interpretations of—concerning America’s proper role in world affairs. These narratives are rooted deeply in this nation’s history and its political culture. This may seem like a daunting challenge. After all, most Americans do not make their living studying international politics and U.S. foreign policy. But the challenge is not insuperable. The major debates about American foreign policy during the last six decades have reflected parallel debates in academe about “how the world works.” These scholarly debates invariably seep into the real world of policymaking and influence decision-makers’ actions. After all, as leading scholars of strategic studies like Stephen Walt and Barry Posen have pointed out, far from being esoteric, grand strategy actually is policy-makers’ theory of how to “cause” security for the United States. Put another way, decision-makers have a set of a cause and effect—or less—secure. For example, American primacy and empire are based on—among others—two key propositions derived from international relations theory: that attaining, and keeping, overwhelming hard power—that is, primacy—is the strategy best calculated to ensure U.S. security; and that the United States should promote regime change abroad, because a world composed of democracies will be more stable and peaceful than a world in which “rogue states” are allowed to exist (a preposition derived from so-called democratic peace theory.”

Heg Causes Terrorism – Ext – Heg Causes Terror

Hegemony causes anti-Americanism and terrorism

Hadar 06 (Leon T Hadar, former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post and is currently the Washington correspondent for the Singapore Business Times, September 18, 2006, CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/responding-antiamericanism-arab-world-has-united-states-been-effective-911)

From Gulf War I to Gulf War II there has been an effort to maintain that U.S. hegemony. Under Presidents Bush the First and Clinton that was done through a "Cost-Free Pax Americana" that included the "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran and creating the impression that Washington was "doing something" to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But that only ignited more anti-Americanism and led to the Second Intifadah and 9/11, demonstrating that if you want hegemony – you'll have to pay for it. Since 9/11 the U.S. hegemonic undertaking in the Middle East is looking more and more like a rerun of the British imperial project in the region. And one can say about the imperial designs of great powers in the Middle East what Oscar Wilde once said about a second marriage: That it was the triumph of hope over experience. In the old movie: The British created Iraq. They put the Hashemittes and the Saudis in power. Maintained influence in Egypt. They tried to end this or that cycle of violence between Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land. We know how that movie ended: The costs of the British Empire in the Middle East were higher than the expected benefits. This time the name of the movie is the American Unilateral Moment in the Middle East. But we have a feeling that we've seen that movie before. Different actors. But a similar script: Recreating Iraq. Navigating between the Saudis and the Hashemittes. Preserving influence in Egypt. Bringing an end to another cycle of Arab-Jewish violence. This hegemonic project –like its predecessor --- was bound to ignite counter-pressures in the form of nationalism -- including tribal, ethnic and religious identities. Now the neoconservatives added a Wilsonian soundtrack to the old script. America was going to achieve a strategic hegemony in the Middle East – while making the region "safe for democracy." It's a vision of a Democratic Empire, a creature that could have been conceived only through an unnatural union between President Woodrow Wilson and Queen Victoria. What America ended up doing in Iraq and the Middle East is making it safe not for democracy – but for the revival of tribal, religious and ethnic identities --- for nationalism -- -- a force that is more powerful than democracy. This force is challenging the current hegemon – taking a clear anti-American form. So we here we are trying to impose an armed hegemony: Directly in Iraq, indirectly in Lebanon, or through proxies in Palestine. And at the same time we provide power through elections, to the religious Shiite parties in Iraq, to the Hamas/Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine, and to the Hizbollah in Lebanon.

AT: Heg Key to Solve War – International Order Resilient

Hegemony is not key to stability – empirically proven.

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival (00396338); Apr/May, Vol. 52 Issue 2, p59-82, 24p)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

No data to support hegemonic stability

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2/17, “Grand Strategy for a Golden Age,” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/8/5/pages416851/p416851-1.php)

Believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a compelling logic, but rarely cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a twenty-five percent reduction. 53 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 54 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

AT: Heg Key to Solve War – International Order Resilient

Hegemony doesn’t affect global stability

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2/17, “Grand Strategy for a Golden Age,” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/8/5/pages416851/p416851-1.php)

The verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: The empirical studies cited above should be more than adequate to demonstrate that the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could presumably argue that spending is not the only or the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

Alternatives solve for global stability – heg not key

Preble 10(Christopher Preble, Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, Ph.D. in history from Temple University, 8/3/10, US Military Power: Preeminence for what purpose?, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/)

Dan Goure says that U.S. military preeminence is not unaffordable. That is probably correct. Even though we spend in excess of $800 billion annually on national security (including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs) we could choose to spend as much, or more, for a while longer. We could choose to shift money out of other government programs; we could raise taxes; or we could continue to finance the whole thing on debt, and stick our children and grandchildren with the bill. But what is the point? Why do Americans spend so much more on our military than does any other country, or any other combination of countries? Goure and the Hadley-Perry commissioners who produced the alternate QDR argue that the purpose of American military power is to provide global public goods, to defend other countries so that they don’t have to defend themselves, and otherwise shape the international order to suit our ends. In other words, the same justifications offered for American military dominance since the end of the Cold War. Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short, we shouldn’t have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the military is designed to implement, must come from other quarters.

AT: Heg Key to Solve War – International Order Resilient

Heg isn’t responsible for global stability – primacists ignore the contributions of other countries.

Walt 11 (Stephen M., contributing *Foreign Policy* editor and Robert and Renee Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard, November 2011, *Foreign Policy*, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism?page=0,4)

Once again, there is something to this line of argument, just not enough to make it entirely accurate. The United States has made undeniable contributions to peace and stability in the world over the past century, including the Marshall Plan, the creation and management of the Bretton Woods system, its rhetorical support for the core principles of democracy and human rights, and its mostly stabilizing military presence in Europe and the Far East. But the belief that all good things flow from Washington's wisdom overstates the U.S. contribution by a wide margin. For starters, though Americans watching Saving Private Ryan or Patton may conclude that the United States played the central role in vanquishing Nazi Germany, most of the fighting was in Eastern Europe and the main burden of defeating Hitler's war machine was borne by the Soviet Union. Similarly, though the Marshall Plan and NATO played important roles in Europe's post-World War II success, Europeans deserve at least as much credit for rebuilding their economies, constructing a novel economic and political union, and moving beyond four centuries of sometimes bitter rivalry. Americans also tend to think they won the Cold War all by themselves, a view that ignores the contributions of other anti-Soviet adversaries and the courageous dissidents whose resistance to communist rule produced the "velvet revolutions" of 1989. Moreover, as Godfrey Hodgson recently noted in his sympathetic but clear-eyed book, The Myth of American Exceptionalism, the spread of liberal ideals is a global phenomenon with roots in the Enlightenment, and European philosophers and political leaders did much to advance the democratic ideal. Similarly, the abolition of slavery and the long effort to improve the status of women owe more to Britain and other democracies than to the United States, where progress in both areas trailed many other countries. Nor can the United States claim a global leadership role today on gay rights, criminal justice, or economic equality -- Europe's got those areas covered.

AT: Heg Key to Solve War – Offshore Balancing Solves

Offshore balancing preserves US strategic interests – trying to dominate everywhere will fail and is too expensive.

Walt 11 (Stephen M., Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, Nov/Dec 2011, *The National Interest* 116, “The End of the American Era,” ProQuest)

Above all, Washington needs to set clear priorities and to adopt a hardheaded and unsentimental approach to preserving our most important interests. When U.S. primacy was at its peak, American leaders could indulge altruistic whims. They didn't have to think clearly about strategy because there was an enormous margin for error; things were likely to work out even if Washington made lots of mistakes. But when budgets are tight, problems have multiplied and other powers are less deferential, it's important to invest U.S. power wisely. As former secretary of defense Robert Gates put it: "We need to be honest with the president, with the Congress, with the American people ... a smaller military, no matter how superb, will be able to go fewer places and be able to do fewer things." The chief lesson, he emphasized, was the need for "conscious choices" about our missions and means. Instead of trying to be the "indispensable nation" nearly everywhere, the United States will need to figure out how to be the decisive power in the places that matter. For starters, we should remember what the U.S. military is good for and what it is good at doing. American forces are very good at preventing major conventional aggression, or reversing it when it happens. We successfully deterred Soviet ambitions throughout the long Cold War, and we easily reversed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The U.S. naval and air presence in Asia still has similar stabilizing effects, and the value of this pacifying role should not be underestimated. By contrast, the U.S. military is not good at running other countries, particularly in cultures that are radically different from our own, where history has left them acutely hostile to foreign interference, and when there are deep ethnic divisions and few democratic traditions. The United States can still topple minor-league dictators, but it has no great aptitude for creating stable and effective political orders afterward. It follows that the United States should eschew its present fascination with nation building and counterinsurgency and return to a grand strategy that some (myself included) have labeled offshore balancing.2 Offshore balancing seeks to maintain benevolent hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and to maintain a balance of power among the strong states of Eurasia and of the oil-rich Persian Gulf. At present, these are the only areas that are worth sending U.S. soldiers to fight and die in. Instead of seeking to dominate these regions directly, however, our first recourse should be to have local allies uphold the balance of power, out of their own selfinterest. Rather than letting them free ride on us, we should free ride on them as much as we can, intervening with ground and air forces only when a single power threatens to dominate some critical region. For an offshore balancer, the greatest success lies in getting somebody else to handle some pesky problem, not in eagerly shouldering that burden oneself. To be more specific: offshore balancing would call for removing virtually all U.S. troops from Europe, while remaining formally committed to nato. Europe is wealthy, secure, democratic and peaceful, and it faces no security problems that it cannot handle on its own. (The combined defense spending of nato's European members is roughly five times greater than Russia's, which is the only conceivable conventional military threat the Continent might face.) Forcing nato's European members to take the lead in the recent Libyan war was a good first step, because the United States will never get its continental allies to bear more of the burden if it insists on doing most of the work itself. Indeed, by playing hard to get on occasion, Washington would encourage others to do more to win our support, instead of resenting or rebelling against the self-appointed "indispensable nation." In the decades ahead, the United States should shift its main strategic attention to Asia, both because its economic importance is rising rapidly and because China is the only potential peer competitor that we face. The bad news is that China could become a more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was: its economy is likely to be larger than ours (a situation the United States has not faced since the nineteenth century); and, unlike the old, largely autarkic Soviet Union, modern China depends on overseas trade and resources and will be more inclined to project power abroad. The good news is that China's rising status is already ringing alarm bells in Asia. The more Beijing throws its weight around, the more other Asian states will be looking to us for help. Given the distances involved and the familiar dilemmas of collective action, however, leading a balancing coalition in Asia will be far more difficult than it was in Cold War Europe. U.S. officiais will have to walk a fine line between doing too much (which would allow allies to free ride) and doing too little (which might lead some states to hedge toward China). To succeed, Washington will have to keep air and naval forces deployed in the region, pay close attention to the evolving military and political environment there, and devote more time and effort to managing a large and potentially fractious coalition of Asian partners. Perhaps most importantly, offshore balancing prescribes a very different approach to the greater Middle East. And prior to 1991, in fact, that's exactly what we did. The United States had a strategic interest in the oil there and a moral commitment to defending Israel, but until 1968 it mostly passed the buck to London. After Britain withdrew, Washington relied on regional allies such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel to counter Soviet clients like Egypt and Syria. When the shah fell, the United States created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) but did not deploy it to the region; instead, it kept the rdjtf over the horizon until it was needed. Washington backed Iraq against Iran during the 1980s, and the U.S. Navy escorted oil tankers during the IranIraq War, but it deployed U.S. ground and air forces only when the balance of power broke down completely, as it did when Iraq seized Kuwait. This strategy was not perfect, perhaps, but it preserved key U.S. interests at minimal cost for over four decades. Unfortunately, the United States abandoned offshore balancing after 1991. It first tried "dual containment," in effect confronting two states - Iran and Iraq - that also hated each other, instead of using each to check the other as it had in the past. This strategy - undertaken, as the National Iranian American Council's Trita Parsi and Brookings' Kenneth Pollack suggest, in good part to reassure Israel - forced the United States to keep thousands of troops in Saudi Arabia, sparking Osama bin Laden's ire and helping fuel the rise of al-Qaeda. The Bush administration compounded this error after 9/11 by adopting the even more foolish strategy of "regional transformation." Together with the "special relationship" with Israel, these ill-conceived approaches deepened anti-Americanism in the Middle East and gave states like Iran more reason to consider acquiring a nuclear deterrent. It is no great mystery why Obama's eloquent speeches did nothing to restore America's image in the region; people there want new U.S. policies, not just more empty rhetoric. One can only imagine how much policy makers in Beijing have enjoyed watching the United States bog itself down in these costly quagmires. Fortunately, there is an obvious solution: return to offshore balancing. The United States should get out of Iraq and Afghanistan as quickly as possible, treat Israel like a normal country instead of backing it unconditionally, and rely on local Middle Eastern, European and Asian allies to maintain the peace - with our help when necessary.

Offshore balancing preserves US security best – trying to control the world will fail.

Walt 07 (Stephen Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard University, in a debate at the Watson Institute for International Studies with G. John Ikenberry, fall 2007, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 14.1, p. 13-14, “Offshore Balancing or International Institutions? The Way Forward for U.S. Foreign Policy,” ProQuest)

Stephen Walt: The overriding goal of U.S. foreign policy is, of course, to protect U.S. citizens and promote U.S. prosperity. Our primary strategic objective has long been to prevent challenges to our dominant position. No presidential candidates ever run for office saying they want to make the United States number two. Realism in foreign policy begins by dealing with the world as it really is, without unrealistic or idealistic follies. The neoconservatives in the Bush administration have been a foreign policy disaster because their basic views on foreign policy, though appealing to U.S. values and U.S. pride, were deeply unrealistic. They thought wrongly that liberty was easy to export and U.S. power could dominate the world. Liberal internationalists like John Ikenberry are not in complete agreement with this vision but are, in a sense, fellowtravelers: kinder, gentler neocons who want to remake the world in the United States' image. Unfortunately, using U.S. power to spread democracy-to forge a world of liberty under law-puts us on the slippery slope of intervening all over the world. A better, more realistic strategy would be one of offshore balancing. It recognizes the United States doesn't need to control other parts of the world or tell other societies how to govern their own internal processes. It just needs to maintain local balances of power to ensure that key areas of the world aren't dominated by hostile powers. For example, we have to make sure that Persian Gulf oil doesn't fall under the control of a single hostile power. Intervening with our own forces should only be a last resort, partly because other countries see U.S. power as potentially dangerous. Offshore balancing recognizes that U.S. power can do many good things, but the United States is not good at running other societies and we should stay out ofthat business. It calls for limiting our global military presence because that presence generates resentment, fuels more terrorism, and threatens our liberty at home. Finally, offshore balancing recognizes that there are limits to U.S. power. Liberal internationalists still want to use U.S. power to remake the world, while realists think that this is neither beneficial nor necessary. Ironically, we will do a better job of spreading U.S. values-values that both liberals and realists share-if we stop trying to save the world and concentrate more of our attention on making things better here in the United States.

AT: Heg Key to Solve War – Offshore Balancing Solves

Offshore balancing solves terrorism, relations, and security.

Walt 05 (Stephen M. Walt, Academic Dean and Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, Sept/Oct 2005, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84, No. 5, “Taming American Power,” EBSCO)

Instead, the United States should resume its traditional role as an "offshore balancer." This strategy assumes that only a few parts of the world are of strategic importance to the United States, such as Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Instead of controlling these areas directly, the United States would rely on local actors to maintain the regional balance of power. The United States would still stand ready to deploy its power against specific threats to its interests, but it would intervene only when absolutely necessary – when the local balance broke down and vital U.S. interests were clearly threatened by hostile forces. In short, while remaining engaged with its allies, the United States should keep its military presence as small as possible. Reducing the size of the U.S. footprint would diminish the likelihood that foreign terrorists -- especially suicide bombers -- would target the United States, because such responses are most often triggered by perceived foreign occupation. Being less directly involved on the ground would also bolster the United States' freedom of action. Washington would be able to play hard to get, making its support for others conditional on broad compliance with U.S. goals. Other states would be less likely to take U.S. protection for granted. By diminishing global concerns about U.S. dominance, this approach would also make it easier for Washington to gain global backing on those rare occasions when it needed to use force. Playing hard to get would not win over a recalcitrant regime such as that in Pyongyang, but it would make it easier for the United States to attract broad assistance for its policies in even those hard cases.

AT: Heg Key to Solve War – AT: Transition Wars

Retrenchment is peaceful – even when it’s quick.

Parent and MacDonald 11 (Joseph Parent, Assistant professor at the University of Miami, Paul Macdonald, Assistant professor at Williams college, “Graceful decline? The surprising success of Great Power Retrenchment” pages 1-10, 2011, MIT press journal, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034)

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. The central issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable or probable. Some pessimists counsel that retrenchment is a dangerous policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert Kagan, for example, warns, “A reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun.”1 Robert Kaplan likewise argues, “Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America’s decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on being more of an offshore balancer. . . . While this may be in America’s interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country ºinch from its international responsibilities.” 2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3 Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, “Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations’ identity and place in world politics. More than most, America’s foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States’ hegemonic role.”5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, “The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress.”6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7 These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing ºux in the coming decades.8 Yet, if the pessimists about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, “Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations’ identity and place in world politics. More than most, America’s foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States’ hegemonic role.”5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, “The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure.9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deªcits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11 In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, **peaceful retrenchment is the most common response**, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are **less likely** to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment **neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through **compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

AT: Heg Key to Democracy

Hegemony isn’t key to democracy.

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2/17, “Grand Strategy for a Golden Age,” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/8/5/pages416851/p416851-1.php)

The vigor with which post-Cold War American administrations have pursued the promotion of democracy might make one believe that without a strong ally, liberty and freedom are powerless and doomed. In fact, waves of democracy have at times swept over the world with very little direct aid from the United States. 69 This is not to say that the promotion of democracy should cease to be a goal of U.S. foreign policy, merely that the means to pursue that goal would not be those of the internationalist. As the Iraq experience ought to make perfectly clear, America aids democracy more by inspiration than imposition, by providing its example rather than its army. “The best way for a larger country to help smaller ones,” argued George Kennan, echoing the belief held by the Founding Fathers, “is surely by the power of example.” 70 While it is perhaps not impossible for an idea to impose itself on others, surely it is easier when those others choose to accept it. At the very least, it is cheaper.

Heg doesn’t promote democracy

Calleo 09 (David P., Prof @ John Hopkins, “Follies of Power America’s Unipolar Fantasy”, pg 68-69)

Nevertheless, the image of America as the land of opportunity remains strong and, for millions of immigrants, is still very real. As Chapter 2 observes, neoconservatives of the Bush administration have tried to parlay this American image into a vigorous form of soft power, exported as a revolutionary ideology to undermine economically illiberal and politically repressive regimes, particularly in the Middle East.5 The ideological appeal of American globalism, democracy, and upward mobility, on occasion accompanied by hard military power, is supposed to pave the way for “democratization.” Afghanistan and Iraqare admittedly rather special tests for this American soft power. So far they are not very successful. To be sure, the time frame is still short. But what has happened so far belies hopes for quick success. In general, the American national model, with its enabling liberal culture, moral habits, entrepreneurial energy, and physical abundance, is not easy to transfer elsewhere. In effect, the Bush administration’s promoters of these ideas are, at best, conservatives `a la carte. Suspicious of social engineering at home, abroad they reason like old-fashioned liberal revolutionaries, determined to believe that economic and political free markets will work their magic once the evil obstructions of dictatorship and monopoly have been removed. To reassure themselves, these “neoconservative” liberals point to the democratic transformations of postwar Germany, Italy, and Japan.6 With enough will and time, they argue, the early postwar success achieved in those countries can be replicated in today’s Middle East. The differences, however, are notable. Germany, Italy, and Japan were highly “modernized” cultures, societies, and economies. Before falling into totalitarian dictatorships, all three had enjoyed several decades of constitutional government and active parliaments. Arguably, their postwar incarnation was less Americanization than a return to their own frustrated constitutionalism. But certainly the return was strongly assisted by American power. It came after the total defeat of their dictatorial regimes and terrible devastation of their home territories. American occupation followed, together with an enormous and prolonged American effort to assist reconstruction, something hard to imagine without the threat of the Cold War to keep the U.S. engaged and its transforming allies faithful.7 And although the American role in remaking postwar Germany and Italy was critical, the European Union, built around a special relationship between Germany and France, was certainly no less significant. In short, these postwar success stories involved far more promising countries and were helped in innumerable ways by the Cold War and by the enlightened regional initiatives of democratic neighbors.

AT: Heg Key to Democracy

Hegemony can’t promote democracy- culture isn’t modeled

Calleo 09 (David P., Prof @ John Hopkins, “Follies of Power America’s Unipolar Fantasy”, pg 70)

The implications for America’s adventure in Iraq are obvious: Imposing a liberal democracy will, at best, take a long time and great patience. It means maintaining a significant army of occupation, skilled in policing, as well as a substantial investment in creating the political, cultural, and linguistic expertise needed to govern so large and diverse a population. The odds for success are not impressive. Today’s Western democracies are not notable for their ability to conduct steady long-term policies of this sort. Nor are they likely to tolerate for long the rough police practices needed to rule a country with a widespread and steadfast resistance. Even if sufficient order can be imposed long enough for democratic institutions to sprout, military force will have to remain on hand to protect the new regime and prevent its abrupt eradication. In other words, in Iraq and the Middle East generally, America’s revolutionary unipolar agenda will depend heavily on the effectiveness and durability of America’s own hard power – militaryand economic. Continuing to exercise raw hard power on a resisting population does not fit with those modern ideas of legitimacy common in the West. We can expect diffidence to persist and opposition to grow at home and among our allies. Nor are we in an era when non-Western societies are passive receptacles for Western tutelage. Is America’s power adequate for such a test? Can the U.S. be shielded from the disdain its policies will arouse in the rest of the world? What will be left of America’s soft power?

AT: Heg Key to the Economy

Hegemony isn’t key to the economy or competitiveness

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2/17, “Grand Strategy for a Golden Age,” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/8/5/pages416851/p416851-1.php)

Finally, strategic restraint does not imply economic isolation, or some sort of complete withdrawal from the rapidly-globalizing world. Strict isolationists in the Pat Buchanan vein may be suspicious of trade, and may argue that U.S. national interests are best served when its corporations and/or its labor force are protected from foreign competition. 71 Strategic restraint begins with a different assumption: The United States as a whole benefits from trade and open markets, so both should be pursued with vigor. Rather than economic isolation, restraint recommends “free commerce with all,” to borrow Jefferson’s phrase, and economic engagement around the world. That engagement is not in need of a robust political or military presence to be successful, since all modern states recognize that free commerce is in everyone’s interest. Rarely do states seek to restrict trade to their own advantage. Prosperity no longer needs to be protected by the armed men from the public sector. Microsoft does not need the Marine Corps.

AT: Heg Key to Humanitarian Assistance

Hegemony not key to solve humanitarian issues

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2/17, “Grand Strategy for a Golden Age,” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/8/5/pages416851/p416851-1.php)

Second, a restrained United States would play its part – but only a part – in international humanitarian affairs. Restraint does not necessarily imply indifference to the world’s problems any more than internationalism automatically implies concern; it merely rejects the notion that the United States has the sole responsibility to police the world, a national noblesse oblige that it alone can address. It is logical and reasonable that the United States, as the world’s richest country, should be called upon to make the largest contributions to multilateral institutions. Restraint merely provides two counsels about humanitarian and developmental assistance: First, that their (usually fairly modest) burdens should be shared and performed in conjunction with the rest of the industrialized world; and second, that they should not be conflated with security or political aid. Much of the assistance that the United States sends abroad is has little utility if war is becoming obsolete. Foreign humanitarian assistance is cheap, relatively speaking, and often carries benefits for both the donor and recipient alike. The entire operation in Somalia, during which as many as a quarter million lives were saved, cost U.S. taxpayers less than two billion dollars. 68 More is spent every week in Iraq. Because international institutions facilitate cooperation and burden sharing, they would be very useful to a restrained United States, who would cease playing the role of unilateral global problem-solver. International social work should not be Washington’s exclusive purview.

AT: Kagan

Kagan uses post hoc fallacy to explain the world – hegemony and peace are not causal

Preble 12 (Christopher A., vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Professor at St. Cloud State and Temple University, PhD, 6/28, Critique of Pure Kagan, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/book-review-critique-pure-kagan)

How other nations respond to U.S. power also follows a familiar pattern. In Kagan’s telling, allies will bandwagon with us if we are committed to defending them but bolt like frightened racehorses at the first sign of trouble. Would—be challengers will back down in the face of U.S. power but rush to exploit opportunities for conquest if Uncle Sam exhibits any hesitation or self—doubt. And Kagan simply dismisses any suggestion that other countries might chafe at American dominance or fear American power. His ideas represent something close to the reigning orthodoxy in Washington today and for the past two decades. Inside the Beltway, there is broad, bipartisan agreement on the basic parameters of U.S. foreign policy that Kagan spells out. This consensus contends that the burden of proof is on those who argue against the status quo. The United States and the world have enjoyed an unprecedented stretch of security and prosperity; it would be the height of folly, the foreign—policy establishment asserts, to upend the current structure on the assumption that an alternative approach would represent any improvement. But such arguments combine the most elementary of post hoc fallacies with unwarranted assumptions and idle speculation. Correlation does not prove causation. There are many factors that could explain the relative peace of the past half century. Kagan surveys them all—including economic interdependence, evolving norms governing the use of force and the existence of nuclear weapons—and concludes that U.S. power is the only decisive one. But, once again, he concedes that he cannot prove it.

Kagan’s arguments are false and yield counterproductive policies.

Kupchan 12 (Charles A., Professor International Affairs at Georgetown, Former Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council, B.A. from Harvard and M.Phil. and D.Phil from Oxford, National Journal, 3/17, p4-4, 1p, 1 Graph, “Is American Primacy Really Diminishing?”)

Although it sounds reassuring, Kagan's argument is, broadly, wrong. It's true that economic strength and military superiority will preserve U.S. influence over global affairs for decades to come, but power is undeniably flowing away from the West to developing nations. If history is any guide, the arrival of a world in which power is more widely distributed will mean a new round of jockeying for position and primacy. While it still enjoys the top rank, the United States should do its best to ensure that this transition occurs peacefully and productively. The worst thing to do is to pretend it's not happening. By overselling the durability of U.S. primacy, Kagan's analysis breeds an illusory strategic complacency: There is no need to debate the management of change when one denies it is taking place. Even worse, the neoconservative brain trust to which Kagan belongs chronically overestimates U.S. power and its ability to shape the world. The last time that like-minded thinkers ran the show--George W. Bush's first term as president--they did much more to undermine American strength than to bolster it. Neoconservative thinking produced an assertive unilateralism that set the rest of the world on edge; led to an unnecessary and debilitating war in Iraq, the main results of which have been sectarian violence and regional instability; and encouraged fiscal profligacy that continues to threaten American solvency. Kagan would have us fritter away the nation's resources in pursuit of a hollow hegemony.

AT: Kagan

Kagan oversimplifies the current international political climate

Preble 12 (Christopher A., vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Professor at St. Cloud State and Temple University, PhD, 6/28/12, Critique of Pure Kagan, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/book-review-critique-pure-kagan)

The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States does not need to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy. Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human rights hinge on U.S. power, contrary to Kagan’s assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and values. Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure, it is difficult to sustain public support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongering and threat inflation. Indeed, when Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nation’s power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign policy has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national security—the very state of affairs that Kagan celebrates—they grow even less supportive. KAGAN’S FLAWED analysis begins with a fundamental misconception about the international system and the relations of states within it. His worldview perceives two types of countries: those that are congenitally incapable of dealing with urgent security challenges on their borders or in their respective regions; and a crafty, rapacious few who are forever scheming to intimidate, disrupt or simply devour the hapless and the helpless. Within this dichotomy, however, is a third sort of country, the only one of its kind. The United States enjoys a privileged place in the world order, explains Kagan. Its power is unthreatening because it is relatively distant from others. And, according to Kagan, the costs of this power are easily borne by the wealthiest country in the world. Kagan’s world order “is as fragile as it is unique,” and “preserving [it] requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.” The message today is consistent with that from sixteen years ago when he and William Kristol first made the case for what they called “benevolent global hegemony.” The object of these relatively optimistic assessments is to convince Americans that they can manage to hold on to their position of global dominance for many years without bankrupting themselves financially or exhausting themselves emotionally. This line of argument cuts against Kagan’s other claims, however, both in this volume and elsewhere, that the United States should spend even more on its military and that Washington should use this military more often, and in more places, than it has in the recent past.

Kagan exaggerates claims based on mid-19th century politics

Preble 11 (Christopher A., vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Professor at St. Cloud State and Temple University, PhD, 1/21, The Real Price of Power, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-real-price-power-4758)

Actually, it is a question of fairness, but not the one that he proposed. Because security is a core function of government (I think one of the only core functions of government), it would be a mistake to treat military spending as synonymous with spending on, say, farm subsidies. But Kagan’s writings presume that other countries’ governments do not — and should not — see their responsibilities in the same way. Kagan contends that American taxpayers should be responsible for the security of people living in Europe or East Asia or the Middle East. Or anywhere in the world, really. This argument might have been plausible in 1945, or 1955, or even 1965, when our allies were weak, and when we were confronting a common enemy in the Soviet Union. But one of the practical effects of continuing to pay for the security of others more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet empire is that we have created dependency, a problem with all forms of foreign aid. It simply isn’t fair to ask Americans to pay for something that other people should pay for themselves. For reference, the average American—every man, woman and child—spends two and a half times more on national security than the French or the British, five times more than citizens living in other NATO countries, and seven and a half times as much as the average Japanese. A second key theme in Kagan’s work of the past two decades is that the world will collapse in a fiery inferno if the U.S. military was slightly smaller, and if Washington was slightly less inclined toward intervention than in, say, 1998. I think that Kagan exaggerates our insecurities, and he bases his predictions for how others will react to U.S. restraint on a notion of the world of the mid-19th century, not the world of today. I don’t have room to go into that here, but I spent a good part of a chapter of my book discussing the point, and Justin Logan is preparing a longer response to Kagan’s article for publication elsewhere.

\*\*GENERAL\*\*

China – War Goes Nuclear

US/China war causes global nuclear war.

Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, 2009, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict

Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

China – AT: China War Impact

The US will be able to successful disarm Chinese nukes—no counter strikes.

Lieber and Press 2009 (Keir, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and Daryl, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, November/December, “The Nukes We Need,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88 No 6)

To illustrate the growth in U.S. counterforce capabilities, we applied a set of simple formulas that analysts have used for decades to estimate the eªectiveness of counterforce attacks.We modeled a U.S. strike on a small target set: 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms) in hardened silos, the approximate size of China’s current longrange, silo-based missile force.The analysis compared the capabilities of a 1985 Minuteman icbm to those of a modern Trident II submarinelaunched ballistic missile.1 In 1985, a single U.S. icbm warhead had less than a 60 percent chance of destroying a typical silo. Even if four or five additional warheads were used, the cumulative odds of destroying the silo would never exceed 90 percent because of the problem of “fratricide,” whereby incoming warheads destroy each other.Beyond five warheads, adding more does no good. A probability of 90 percent might sound high, but it falls far short if the goal is to completely disarm an enemy: with a 90 percent chance of destroying each target, the odds of destroying all 20 are roughly 12 percent. In 1985, then, a U.S. icbm attack had little chance of destroying even a small enemy nuclear arsenal. Today, a multiple-warhead attack on a single silo using a Trident II missile would have a roughly 99 percent chance of destroying it, and the probability that a barrage would destroy all 20 targets is well above 95 percent. Given the accuracy of the U.S. military’s current delivery systems, the only question is target identification: silos that can be found can be destroyed. During the Cold War, the United States worked hard to pinpoint Soviet nuclear forces, with great success. Locating potential adversaries’ small nuclear arsenals is undoubtedly a top priority for U.S. intelligence today. The revolution in accuracy is producing an even more momentous change: it is becoming possible for the United States to conduct lowyield nuclear counterforce strikes that inflict relatively few casualties. A U.S. Department of Defense computer model, called the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (hpac), estimates the dispersion of deadly radioactive fallout in a given region after a nuclear detonation. The software uses the warhead’s explosive power, the height of the burst, and data about local weather and demographics to estimate how much fallout would be generated, where it would blow, and how many people it would injure or kill. Hpac results can be chilling. In 2006, a team of nuclear weapons analysts from the Federation of American Scientists (fas) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (nrdc) used hpac to estimate the consequences of a U.S. nuclear attack using high-yield warheads against China’s icbm field. Even though China’s silos are located in the countryside, the model predicted that the fallout would blow over a large area, killing 3–4 million people. U.S. counterforce capabilities were useless, the study implied, because even a limited strike would kill an unconscionable number of civilians. But the United States can already conduct nuclear counterforce strikes at a tiny fraction of the human devastation that the fas/nrdc study predicted, and small additional improvements to the U.S. force could dramatically reduce the potential collateral damage even further. The United States’ nuclear weapons are now so accurate that it can conduct successful counterforce attacks using the smallest-yield warheads in the arsenal, rather than the huge warheads that the fas/nrdc simulation modeled. And to further reduce the fallout, the weapons can be set to detonate as airbursts, which would allow most of the radiation to dissipate in the upper atmosphere.We ran multiple hpac scenarios against the identical target set used in the fas/nrdc study but modeled low-yield airbursts rather than high-yield groundbursts. The fatality estimates plunged from 3–4 million to less than 700—a figure comparable to the number of civilians reportedly killed since 2006 in Pakistan by U.S. drone strikes. One should be skeptical about the results of any model that depends on unpredictable factors, such as wind speed and direction. But in the scenarios we modeled, the area of lethal fallout was so small that very few civilians would have become ill or died, regardless of which way the wind blew. Critics may cringe at this analysis. Many of them, understandably, say that nuclear weapons are—and should remain—unusable. But if the United States is to retain these weapons for the purpose of deterring nuclear attacks, it needs a force that gives U.S. leaders retaliatory options they might actually employ. If the only retaliatory option entails killing millions of civilians, then the U.S. deterrent will lack credibility. Giving U.S. leaders alternatives that do not target civilians is both wise and just. A counterforce attack—whether using conventional munitions or low- or high-yield nuclear weapons—would be fraught with peril. Even a small possibility of a single enemy warhead’s surviving such a strike would undoubtedly give any U.S. leader great pause. But in the midst of a conventional war, if an enemy were using nuclear threats or limited nuclear attacks to try to coerce the United States or its allies, these would be the capabilities that would give a U.S. president real options.

Economy – Decline Causes War

Economic decline causes global war

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Proliferation – AT: Prolif Good

Prolif bad – lack of safety measures and accidents

Sagan 94(Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute, Spring 1994, The Perils of Proliferation, Page 98-99)

Third, accident-prone nuclear operations will be more prevalent in states with volatile civil-military relations because military officers, who have or- ganizational biases in favor of maintaining high readiness for war, will be less constrained by safety-conscious civilian authorities.101 Pakistan is the most worrisome case in point. The Pakistani Air Force plans to use U.S. F-16 aircraft in nuclear weapons delivery roles if necessary, and yet in 1992 former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates suggested that Pakistan had not perfected the electrical mechanisms necessary for safe maintenance, transportation, and delivery of weapons by F-16s.102 The existence of such safety problems makes the reports that the Pakistani Air Force, without informing Prime Minister Bhutto, loaded nuclear weapons on its F-16 aircraft during the 1990 Kashmir crisis even more alarming than previously recognized.

Prolif bad – crude nuclear weapons risk accidental detonation

Sagan 94(Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute, Spring 1994, The Perils of Proliferation, Page 98-99)

First, some emergent nuclear powers lack the organizational and financial resources to produce even minimal mechanical safety devices and safe weapons design features. Although all countries may start with "crude nuclear arsenals," in Waltz's terms, the weapons of poorer states will likely be more crude, and will remain so for a longer period of time. Evidence for this prediction can be found in the case of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, as UN inspectors discovered soon after the 1991 Persian Gulf War: The inspectors found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb [design]-it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapon-grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off-even while sitting on the workbench. "It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it," one inspector says, adding: "I wouldn't want to be around if it fell off the edge of this desk."99

Prolif bad – increases the odds of accidental and unauthorized detonation

Sagan 94(Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute, Spring 1994, The Perils of Proliferation, Page 98-99)

Sixth, serious political and social unrest is likely in the future in a number of the nuclear proliferants, which will significantly increase the risks of accidental and unauthorized weapons detonations. Waltz, in contrast, insists that domestic instability in new nuclear powers will not be a problem: What is hard to comprehend is why, in an internal struggle for power, any of the contenders should start using nuclear weapons. Who would they aim them at? . . . One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown with any plausibility how those expected events may lead to the use of nuclear weapons. This exclusive focus on deliberate uses of nuclear weapons is misleading, however, since severe domestic instability can produce accidental detonations under many plausible scenarios. If a civil war in a new nuclear state leads to a fire fight between rival military factions at a nuclear weapons base, the danger of an accidental detonation or spreading of plutonium would be severe.107 If domestic unrest leads to severe economic hardships at military bases, disgruntled operators are more likely to engage in acts of sabotage which could inadvertently or deliberately produce accidents. An example of the type of dangerous incident one should anticipate in future proliferators occurred in early 1992 at the Ignalina nuclear plant in Lithuania, where a programmer reported that he had found a virus in the computer that ran the safety systems for the plant. Investigators later believed, however, that he had placed the virus there himself in order to receive a pay bonus for improving safety. 108 Finally, domestic political unrest can increase the risk of nuclear weapons accidents by encouraging unsafe transportation, exercise, or testing operations. If warheads are moved out of unstable regions in haste (as occurred in the USSR in 1991) or if weapons tests are rushed to prevent rebellious military units from gaining access to the weapons (as occurred in Algeria in 1961),109 safety is likely to be compromised. The most dramatic example of risky actions induced by domestic crises is Marshal Nie Rong- zhen's decision to launch a test missile 800 kilometers across China with a live nuclear warhead onboard in October 1966 in the middle of the Cultural Revolution. Nie was apparently fully aware of the risks involved in such an unprecedented test, but believed that the nuclear weapons program needed a dramatic and public sign of success as part of his "strategy of siding with the radicals to fend off radical penetration of the program

Proliferation – AT: Prolif Good

Prolif bad – Accidental war and catastrophe inevitable

Sagan 94(Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute, Spring 1994, The Perils of Proliferation, Page 98-99)

In short, while there have been no major nuclear weapons accidents in the new proliferators yet, there are good reasons to anticipate that the probabilities will be high over time. Any serious nuclear weapons accident will have tragic consequences for the local community, and if an accidental detonation, false warning, or unauthorized use of a weapon leads to "mistaken retaliation" and accidental war, the consequences would be even more catastrophic. As long as would-be proliferators choose not to cross the final threshold of "weaponization" by actually deploying fully assembled nuclear weapons and launchers, these safety problems will largely remain dormant. Once these states begin to deploy arsenals, however, such organizational safety problems are likely to emerge with a vengeance. The current safety record is likely to be the lull before the storm

Prolif bad – States aren’t rational actors and the consequences are huge

Sagan 94(Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute, Spring 1994, The Perils of Proliferation, Page 98-99)

By assuming that all nuclear states will behave quite rationally and will therefore take all the necessary steps to fulfill the requirements of deterrence, Waltz and other nuclear proliferation optimists have confused prescriptions of what rational states should do with predictions of what real states will do. This is an error which the classical American realists rarely committed: Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan believed that states should follow the logic of balance of power politics, but their whole enterprise was animated by a fear that the United States would fail to do so.1"' This is also an error which Waltz avoided in Theory of International Politics, where he noted that "the theory requires no assumptions of rationality . .. the theory says simply that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside."'112 Adding this element of natural selection to his theory of international relations put less of a burden on extreme rationality assumptions. My approach is consistent with this vision. Many proliferators may well behave sensibly, but some will not and will then "fall by the wayside." Falling by the wayside, however, means in this case using nuclear weapons and thus has very serious implications for the whole international system.

Terrorism – AT: No Nuclear Terrorism

A terrorist nuclear attack could occur easily

(Valerie Plame Wilson, Former CIA Officer, April 08, 2010, articles.cnn.com/2010-04-08/opinion/plame.wilson.nuclear.danger\_1\_nuclear-weapons-nuclear-terrorism-nuclear-materials?\_s=PM:OPINION)

But I did not lose my belief that the danger of nuclear terrorism was the most urgent threat we face. Nor did I lose my passion for working, albeit in a new way, to address that threat. I am working on this issue now as part of the international Global Zero movement, in which political, military and faith leaders, experts and activists strive for the worldwide elimination of all nuclear weapons. We know that terrorist groups have been trying to buy, build or steal a bomb. In the past two decades, there have been at least 25 instances of nuclear explosive materials being lost or stolen. There is enough highly enriched uranium, or HEU, in the world today to build more than 100,000 bombs. Terrorists looking to buy or steal HEU could look to the approximately 40 countries with nuclear weapons materials. And then there are rogue individuals out there who are running black markets selling nuclear materials and technology. Pakistan's Dr. A. Q. Khan did it for years before my group at the CIA brought him down in December 2003 after catching him red-handed selling a full-scale nuclear bomb to Moammar Gadhafi's regime in Libya. If terrorists manage to get their hands on enough HEU, they could smuggle it into a target city, build a bomb and explode it. A hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium could fit in a shoebox, and 100,000 shipping containers come into the United States every day.

Terrorism – AT: Terrorism Impact

No impact to terrorism

(Christopher Fettweis, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2/17/10, “Grand Strategy for a Golden Age,” http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/4/1/6/8/5/pages416851/p416851-1.php)

Conventional attack, much less outright conquest, is obviously not the leading security challenge facing the United States in the minds of most analysts. President Bush has not been alone in his belief that terrorism represents an “existential threat” to the United States, especially if weapons of mass destruction were ever employed. It should not take long to demonstrate that such claims are unsustainable. While terrorists can certainly kill people and scare many more, the damage they cause is always localized and temporary. No terrorist attack of any severity can by itself threaten the long-term independence, prosperity or basic nature of any modern industrialized society. 41 The dangers that terrorists pose are more psychological than physical, and they can neither threaten the survival of any modern state nor change the character of Western civilization. Only the people of the West, largely through their own overreaction, can accomplish that. Far from being an existential threat to the existence of the United States, terrorists are at best nuisances, albeit dangerous and occasionally deadly nuisances, to the powerful countries of the world. Even the oft-expressed “ultimate nightmare” of nuclear terrorism, which is exceptionally unlikely to begin with, could not cause damage which would prove fatal to any state.