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Hey y’all-it was super hard to find specifics about some of the aff stuff but it links to everything. And here is some case stuff for funsies. If all else fails, just remember that Ayn Rand is bad. That is all. 2

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Notes

Hey y’all-it was super hard to find specifics about some of the aff stuff but it links to everything. And here is some case stuff for funsies. If all else fails, just remember that Ayn Rand is bad. That is all.Musings along the way

1. Deciding that the government should take them home turns the case. The troops in wars are there under their own will, removal links back to their own criticism by preventing people from doing what they desire.

2) the US can only win wars if they intervene-there is no other mehod that the US can develop to win wars. PTSD Turns

Returning home leaves people with PTSD, crushing their happiness

MSNBC, 6/30/2004, (1 in 8 returning soldiers suffers from PTSD, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5334479/)

The Army’s first study of the mental health of troops who fought in Iraq found that about one in eight reported symptoms of post- traumatic stress disorder.

The survey also showed that less than half of those with problems sought help, mostly out of fear of being stigmatized or hurting their careers.

The survey of Army and Marine combat units was conducted a few months after their return from Iraq or Afghanistan last year. Most studies of past wars’ effects on mental health w ere done years later, making it difficult to compare the latest results with those from the Vietnam or Persian Gulf wars, said Dr. Charles W. Hoge, one of the researchers at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.

Of particular concern, he said, is that troops with problems are not seeking care.

“The most important thing we can do for service members who have been in combat is to help them understand that the earlier that they get help when they need it, the better off they’ll be,” Hoge said.

The study is published in Thursday’s New England Journal of Medicine.

Once called shell shock or combat fatigue, post-traumatic stress disorder can develop after witnessing or experiencing a traumatic event. Symptoms include flashbacks, nightmares, feelings of detachment, irritability, trouble concentrating and sleeplessness.

IT also forces soldiers into VA hospitals and submission of the state-turns case

William M. Welch, USA TODAY, 2/28/2005 (Trauma of Iraq war haunting thousands returning home,

<http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-02-28-cover-iraq-injuries_x.htm>)

Harrison says they may even hit their partners during nightmares and never know it. Many Iraq veterans have returned home to find the aftermath of combat presents them with new challenges: • Jesus Bocanegra was an Army infantry scout for units that pursued Saddam Hussein in his hometown of Tikrit. After he returned home to McAllen, Texas, it took him six months to find a job. He was diagnosed with PTSD and is waiting for the VA to process his disability claim. He goes to the local Vet Center but is unable to relate to the Vietnam-era counselors. "I had real bad flashbacks. I couldn't control them," Bocanegra, 23, says. "I saw the murder of children, women. It was just horrible for anyone to experience." Bocanegra recalls calling in Apache helicopter strikes on a house by the Tigris River where he had seen crates of enemy ammunition carried in. When the gunfire ended, there was silence. But then children's cries and screams drifted from the destroyed home, he says. "I didn't know there were kids there," he says. "Those screams are the most horrible thing you can hear." At home in the Rio Grande Valley, on the Mexico border, he says young people have no concept of what he's experienced. His readjustment has been difficult: His friends threw a homecoming party for him, and he got arrested for drunken driving on the way home. "The Army is the gateway to get away from poverty here," Bocanegra says. "You go to the Army and expect to be better off, but the best job you can get (back home) is flipping burgers. ... What am I supposed to do now? How are you going to live?" • Lt. Julian Goodrum, an Army reservist from Knoxville, Tenn., is being treated for PTSD with therapy and anti-anxiety drugs at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington. He checked himself into a civilian psychiatric hospital after he was turned away from a military clinic, where he had sought attention for his mental problems at Fort Knox, Ky. He's facing a court-martial for being AWOL while in the civilian facility. Goodrum, 34, was a transportation platoon leader in Iraq, running convoys of supplies from Kuwait into Iraq during the invasion. He returned to the USA in the summer of 2003 and experienced isolation, depression, an inability to sleep and racing thoughts. "It just accumulated until it overwhelmed me. I was having a breakdown and trying to get assistance," he says. "The smell of diesel would trigger things for me. Loud noises, crowds, heavy traffic give me a hard time now. I have a lot of panic. ... You feel like you're choking." • Sean Huze, a Marine corporal awaiting discharge at Camp Lejeune, N.C., doesn't have PTSD but says everyone who saw combat suffers from at least some combat stress. He says the unrelenting insurgent threat in Iraq gives no opportunity to relax, and combat numbs the senses and emotions. "There is no 'front,' " Huze says. "You go back to the rear, at the Army base in Mosul, and you go in to get your chow, and the chow hall blows up." Huze, 30, says the horror often isn't felt until later. "I saw a dead child, probably 3 or 4 years old, lying on the road in Nasiriyah," he says. "It moved me less than if I saw a dead dog at the time. I didn't care. Then you come back, if you are fortunate enough, and hold your own child, and you think of the dead child you didn't care about. ... You think about how little you cared at the time, and that hurts." Smells bring back the horror. "A barbecue pit — throw a steak on the grill, and it smells a lot like searing flesh," he says. "You go to get your car worked on, and if anyone is welding, the smell of the burning metal is no different than burning caused by rounds fired at it. It takes you back there instantly." • Allen Walsh, an Army reservist, came back to Tucson 45 pounds lighter and with an injured wrist. He was unable to get his old job back teaching at a truck-driving school. He started his own business instead, a mobile barbecue service. He's been waiting nearly a year on a disability claim with the VA. Walsh, 36, spent much of the war in Kuwait, attached to a Marine unit providing force protection and chemical decontamination. He says he has experienced PTSD, which he attributes to the constant threat of attack and demand for instant life-or-death decisions. "It seemed like every day you were always pointing your weapon at somebody. It's something I have to live with," he says. At home, he found he couldn't sleep more than three or four hours a night. When the nightmares began, he started smoking cigarettes. He'd find himself shaking and quick-tempered.

Biology disproves OBJ

Altruism both scientifically makes people happier and is inevitably wired into the brain

Shankar Vedantam, Washington Post Staff Writer, 5/28/2007 (If It feel good to be Good, It might only be natural, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/27/AR2007052701056\_pf.html)

The results were showing that when the volunteers placed the interests of others before their own, the generosity activated a primitive part of the brain that usually lights up in response to food or sex. Altruism, the experiment suggested, was not a superior moral faculty that suppresses basic selfish urges but rather was basic to the brain, hard-wired and pleasurable.

Their 2006 finding that unselfishness can feel good lends scientific support to the admonitions of spiritual leaders such as Saint Francis of Assisi, who said, "For it is in giving that we receive." But it is also a dramatic example of the way neuroscience has begun to elbow its way into discussions about morality and has opened up a new window on what it means to be good. Grafman and others are using brain imaging and psychological experiments to study whether the brain has a built-in moral compass. The results -- many of them published just in recent months -- are showing, unexpectedly, that many aspects of morality appear to be hard-wired in the brain, most likely the result of evolutionary processes that began in other species. No one can say whether giraffes and lions experience moral qualms in the same way people do because no one has been inside a giraffe's head, but it is known that animals can sacrifice their own interests: One experiment found that if each time a rat is given food, its neighbor receives an electric shock, the first rat will eventually forgo eating. What the new research is showing is that morality has biological roots -- such as the reward center in the brain that lit up in Grafman's experiment -- that have been around for a very long time. The more researchers learn, the more it appears that the foundation of morality is empathy. Being able to recognize -- even experience vicariously -- what another creature is going through was an important leap in the evolution of social behavior. And it is only a short step from this awareness to many human notions of right and wrong, says Jean Decety, a neuroscientist at the University of Chicago. The research enterprise has been viewed with interest by philosophers and theologians, but already some worry that it raises troubling questions. Reducing morality and immorality to brain chemistry -- rather than free will -- might diminish the importance of personal responsibility. Even more important, some wonder whether the very idea of morality is somehow degraded if it turns out to be just another evolutionary tool that nature uses to help species survive and propagate. Moral decisions can often feel like abstract intellectual challenges, but a number of experiments such as the one by Grafman have shown that emotions are central to moral thinking. In another experiment published in March, University of Southern California neuroscientist Antonio R. Damasio and his colleagues showed that patients with damage to an area of the brain known as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex lack the ability to feel their way to moral answers.

Ayn Rand’s moral theories are impossible due to human nature

Donald DeMarco, adjunct professor at Holy Apostles College and Seminary, June 2003 (Ayn Rand: another architect of the culture of death, http://www.theinterim.com/2003/june/05aynrand.html)

No philosopher ever proposed a more simple and straightforward view of life than the one Ayn Rand urges upon us. Man=Man; Existence = Existence; only individuals are real; all forms of altruism are inherently evil. There are no nuances or paradoxes. There is no wisdom. There is no depth. Complex issues divide reality into simple dichotomies. There is individualism and altruism, and nothing in between. Despite the apparent superficiality of her philosophy, Rand considered herself history's greatest philosopher after Aristotle. Barbara Branden tells us, in her book, The Passion of Ayn Rand, of how Miss Rand managed to make the lives of everyone around her miserable, and when her life was over, she had barely a friend in the world. She was contemptuous even of her followers. When Rand was laid to rest in 1982 at the age of 77, her coffin bore a six-foot replica of the dollar sign. Her philosophy, which she adopted from an early age, helped to assure her solitude: "Nothing existential gave me any great pleasure. And progressively, as my idea developed, I had more and more a sense of loneliness." It was inevitable, however, that a philosophy that centred on the self to the exclusion of all others would leave its practitioner in isolation and intensely lonely. Ayn Rand's philosophy is unlivable, either by her or anyone else. A philosophy that is unlivable can hardly be instrumental in building a Culture of Life. It is unlivable because it is based on a false anthropology. The human being is not a mere individual, but a person. As such, he is a synthesis of individual uniqueness and communal participation. Man is a transcendent being. He is more than his individuality. The Greeks had two words for "life": bios and zoe. Bios represents the biological and individual sense of life, the life that pulsates within any one organism. This is the only notion of life that is to be found in the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Zoe, on the other hand, is shared life, life that transcends the individual and allows participation in a broader, higher, and richer life. In Mere Christianity, C. S. Lewis remarks that mere bios is always tending to run down and decay. It needs incessant subsidies from nature in the form of air, water, and food, in order to continue. As bios and nothing more, man can never achieve his destiny. Zoe, he goes on to explain, is an enriching spiritual life which is in God from all eternity. Man needs Zoe in order to become truly himself. Man is not simply man; he is a composite of bios and zoe. Bios has, to be sure, a certain shadowy or symbolic resemblance to Zoe: but only the sort of resemblance there is between a photo and a place, or a statue and a man. A man who changed from having Bios to having Zoe would have gone through as big a change as a statue which changed from being a carved stone to being a real man. The transition, then, from bios to zoe (individual life to personal, spiritualized life; selfishness to love of neighbor) is also the transition from a Culture of Death to a Culture of Life.

Beliefs in both Determinism and Free will are impossible and doom us to paralysis

Franz Kiekeben, Prof. Philosophy at the Ohio State University, Marion, 2003( Rand on Causation and Free Will, http://www.kiekeben.com/rand.html)

According to Rand, then, the law of identity implies that everything has a cause, and this in turn implies that, at any given moment, there is only one way that anything can act — only one outcome that is possible. This is causal determinism. A rather bizarre type of causal determinism, since it is based on nothing more than the law of identity, but causal determinism nonetheless. But Rand also believes in freedom of the will, and believes that it is incompatible with determinism. In other words, she is a libertarian. Again, in Peikoff's Rand-approved words: "Because man has free will, no human choice — and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice — is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man has chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so: he could have done otherwise." (The Ayn Rand Lexicon, 180.) So when it comes to any man-made fact, it might not have been. Something else might have been instead. But this obviously contradicts what Peikoff said above regarding there being "in any given set of circumstances... only one action possible to an entity". Now, as already pointed out, in "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy", Peikoff explicitly leaves human action out of this determinist picture. It might therefore seem that there is no contradiction: the deterministic view applies only to non-human reality. But this will not do — unless Peikoff means that the law of identity does not apply to human beings. Remember that the whole point is that determinism (that is, that only one outcome is possible at any given time) is supposed to be entailed by that law of logic. On Rand's view, then, if a human being is free to either do A or not do A in a given situation, then the human being must not have a specific nature. Of course, we all know that Rand did not really believe such a thing. She obviously believed that the law of identity applied to human beings as much as to anything else. But that's not my point. My point is that, if we accept what she says about the relationship between identity and causality, and also what she says about human volition, then we should conclude that human beings are exempt from the law of identity. And that is obviously ridiculous. Objectivism attempts to avoid this contradiction by claiming that, in the case of human beings, acting in accordance with one's nature does not imply that there is only one action possible at each moment. It is part of human nature, according to Rand, to have the ability to choose from among more than one course of action. "The attribute of volition", she says, "does not contradict the fact of identity... [Man] is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness." (Ibid.) Or in Peikoff's words: "The law of identity... tells us only that whatever entities there are, they act in accordance with their nature... The law of causality by itself, therefore, does not affirm or deny the reality of an irreducible choice. It says only this much: if such a choice does exist, then it, too, as a form of action, is performed and necessitated by an entity of a specific nature." (Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, 68-69.) But this changes things. Now it no longer is the case that "acting in accordance with a specific nature" implies that there is only one possible way of acting. According to Rand, human beings act in accordance with their nature, and thus in accordance with the law of identity, and yet they are able to choose from among more than one possible course of action. So the law of identity does not, in fact, mean that only one outcome is possible for an entity at any given time. And in fact, that is exactly right: the original claim was simply wrong. Determinism (whether of human or non-human entities) simply does not follow from the law of identity. To suppose that it does, whether for human beings or for any other entity, is an obvious confusion. But now Rand's view of causation can be seen for what it really is: it means absolutely nothing. All Rand's "law of causation" tells us is that entities act in accordance with their nature. But that tells us nothing about how any given entity must act. It merely says that they act the way that they act. John Hospers apparently pointed this out to Rand, saying that her claim that an entity must act in accordance with its nature "is guaranteed by the meaning attached to the word 'nature'." (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528.) Judging from her reply, she seems to not have understood the complaint. His point, I take it, was that because her statement is true by definition, it is no more than an empty truism. That every entity always acts in accordance with its nature tells us nothing about how it will in fact act, including whether or not there is more than one possible way for it to act. It does not, for instance, rule out the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics: all one needs to say is that it is in an electron's nature (for example) to behave unpredictably. Nor would it be contradicted by a helium-filled balloon that fell. If a balloon ever acted this way, then that would merely show that such behavior is part of its nature. Or, in other words, no matter how anything acts, it is by definition acting in accordance with its nature. To sum up: Rand's view that the law of identity implies determinism contradicts her view that human beings have free will. Furthermore, it is simply false that determinism follows from the law of identity.

No value to life in objectivism

Turn: Objectivist attitudes create greater internal suffering, not joy

Michael Prescott, graduate of Wesleyan University and NYT best selling author, 2004 (Ayn Rand and Martyrdom, http://michaelprescott.net/moreonrand.htm)

Eventually (and improbably) Roark does achieve success, but instead of enjoying his hard-won accomplishments, he risks everything on a final uncompromising gesture - destroying a housing project built from altered versions of his original designs, then submitting to arrest without a struggle. At the peak of his success he is willing to martyr himself. One wonders if he wasn't disappointed by his rather surprising acquittal. The heroes of [Atlas Shrugged](http://http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0451191145/ref=pd_bxgy_text_1/104-5171915-5213523?v=glance&s=books&st=*), endure even greater extremes of suffering. These multimillionaire industrialists walk away from their life's work, abandoning their factories, their homes, even their friends and families (if any). They take menial jobs, laboring in poverty and obscurity in the hope that, by going "on strike," they can bring down the parasitic government that oppresses them. One of them, Francisco D'Anconia, abandons the love of his life, Dagny Taggart, for the sake of this crusade. The leader of the movement, John Galt, allows his revolutionary invention - a new type of motor - to languish in a scrap heap, forgoing the riches he could have earned, instead working as a day laborer on a railroad. The essential motif of these characters is denial - the fiercely stoic, masochistic asceticism that drives a person to cut himself off from the things he loves. The reader is expected to admire, even emulate, these heroes - and many Objectivists have. The Objectivist movement has never had any shortage of underachievers, smart people stuck in dead-end jobs, who explain their lack of progress by reference to our "irrational society." Now perhaps we can see why A Man for All Seasons holds such strong appeal for Objectivists. Sir Thomas More was no exemplar of Rand's philosophy, but he did choose suffering over compromise. He chose imprisonment and death in order to remain true to his principles. We can be sure that Howard Roark, Francisco D'Anconia, or John Galt would do the same. Indeed, Roark does risk imprisonment for his crime, and Galt, who says he will die rather than compromise, ends up on a torture rack at the climax of Atlas Shrugged. If there is any merit to this analysis, then it is surely one of the ironies of modern popular philosophy that Objectivism, marketed as a wholesale assault on the virtue of self-sacrifice, actually romanticizes martyrdom. How could this happen? I think there are two explanations - one philosophical, the other psychological. The philosophical explanation is that Rand's vision of "the ideal man," as she phrased it, is simply not realistic. In [Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0595196330/qid=1075163423/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-5171915-5213523?v=glance&s=books), Greg S. Nyquist goes to great lengths to show that Rand's concept of the hero - entirely in control of his emotions, having no inner conflicts or doubts, guided exclusively by reason in every aspect of his life, including his romantic choices and artistic tastes - is untenable in reality. (Whether or not it would be desirable even if it were tenable is another question.) Human nature is far more ambiguous and multilayered, and human psychology is far more complex, than Rand acknowledged. At some level Rand may have realized that her ideas were impractical. At the very least, she couldn't visualize her kind of hero thriving in the world she saw around her every day. And so she naturally pictured her heroes cut off from this world, at odds with it, tormented by it. She liked to imagine a future utopia in which her "ideal men" could flourish, but this utopia bore little relation to life on earth here and now. The psychological explanation, closely allied to the foregoing, is that by most accounts Rand was moody and pessimistic, frequently unhappy, prone to angry outbursts and judgmental accusations. Because the people around her failed to live up to her impossible standards, she ostracized most of her friends and ended up nearly alone. Because the world had little use for her philosophy, she became increasingly bitter and depressed. These tendencies, more pronounced in her later years, appear to have been with her from the start. Authors cannot help projecting their own personalities into their books. Rand's gloomy cast of mind found expression in the chronic suffering of Howard Roark and the grim dystopia of Atlas Shrugged. Look again that those lines from Margaret George. Is her startling image of Thomas More so very different from that of Howard Roark relentlessly attacking the granite quarry, his body shaking with waves of physical exertion, or John Galt being tortured by electric shocks and steadfastly refusing to scream? Ayn Rand viewed Objectivism as a philosophy of self-fulfillment and personal happiness. I would argue that instead of self-fulfillment, it glorifies martyrdom; instead of happiness, suffering. Like More, Rand's heroes are most true to themselves when they are enduring privation or even torture, and like More, they would be at peace only on the scaffold, submitting to the execution that would elevate them, once and for all, above this world of imperfect compromise. "A philosophy for living on earth," Ayn Rand called Objectivism. In this, as in so many other things, she got it wrong.

Turn

Turn: The types of rampant individualist ethics promoted by the affirmative are what got us into the war in the first place; the aff justifies rampant killings and murders of millions of innocent civilians

[Justin Raimondo](mailto:justin@antiwar.com), editorial director of Antiwar.com and author, October 12, 2004 (The Objectivist Death Cult, http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig5/raimondo1.html)

In some ways, it really isn’t fair to raise the most extreme example of the pro-war faction of the libertarian movement, the orthodox Objectivists centered around Dr. Leonard Peikoff and the Ayn Rand Institute, because – judging from his pronouncements on the subject of the Iraq war – the man is clearly crazed, as his Ford Hall Forum speech, "America Versus Americans," given last year, makes all too abundantly clear. But it is really such a clear distillation of pure evil that I can’t resist citing it: it is far too inviting a target. Peikoff is sorely disappointed by this war, for a number of reasons, first and foremost being that his preferred target, Iran, is not yet in America’s crosshairs. The war in Afghanistan was a letdown for him because we took care not to inflict civilian casualties. This, says Peikoff, is immoral: in Iraq, too, we are far too squeamish about innocent civilians. And I note that Peikoff emphasizes the word "innocent," even as he proclaims that it would be immoral not to condemn these innocents to death. When someone in the audience cried out in horror at this brazen display of naked evil, Peikoff interrupted his talk and imperiously demanded "please throw that man out." A far cry from Ayn Rand herself, who, during the 1930s, took to the stump for Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie, and, when confronted by hecklers – of which there were plenty – gave as good or better than she got. But the thuggish, hectoring Peikoff, whose high-pitched voice is in stark contrast to his stern admonitions, will have none of that. Unlike the neocons, whose foreign policy he faithfully echoes, up to and including their iconization of Israel, Peikoff doesn’t hide behind any beneficent-sounding slogans, like "exporting democracy" and implanting free markets and the rule of law. This, he claims, would be "altruism," the worst sin in the Objectivist theology – although why freedom, in the abstract, and not just one’s own freedom, cannot be a value in and of itself is not at all clear to me. And the clear implication is that the Iraqis, like the Palestinians, are considered "savages" by Peikoff, who wouldn’t appreciate such a gift in any case. No, what we must do, says Peikoff, is kill them – enemy soldiers and innocent civilians alike. This same maniacal bloodthirstiness is expressed by Yaron Brook, the executive director of the Ayn Rand Institute, in a recent lecture on "The Morality of War," in which he outdoes Peikoff – and also Cuffy Meigs – in the complete thuggishness of his stance, advocating the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians in a total war of annihilation against the entire Middle East – except Israel, of course. When one timorous questioner raises the issue of how Mr. Brook reconciles such a view with the central doctrine of individualism, which is that all people are endowed with inalienable rights, Brook brushes this aside with an impatient wave of his hand and declares that all enemy civilians are legitimate targets. The reason is because your government represents you, whether you like it or not. So much for the idea of individualism. Yes, but what about a six-year-old child, asks the persistent – and clearly perplexed – questioner, who complains that he has trouble "internalizing" (his word) this monstrous doctrine of collective responsibility for the crimes of a ruling elite. What, he wants to know, has the child done to deserve such a fate? Brook hems, and haws, apparently reluctant to come right out and advocate child murder on a mass scale – and in the name of "individualism," yet! – but, in the end, he gathers up his courage, and, in a wavering voice that sounds eerily like Elmer Fudd, declares that six-year-old kids suffer all the time because of their parents’ behavior. This instance – in his view – is no different, he says, except in degree, reiterating his crazed view that when a government violates rights, all the citizens of that state are guilty, and can therefore be put to death. How can people who claim to hold "rationality" as their highest value sink to such depths of depravity? The problem is that these people are living in a fantasy world of pure abstractions, in which everything is viewed through the lens of a Manichean struggle between Reason and Unreason, Modernity and Primitivism, the West and the Rest. The humanity and reality of anyone deemed "irrational" is defined out of existence, so that it’s okay to torture and kill six-year-olds. Because, you see, they aren’t really people. Not like us.

Intervention Good

US interventions spread democracies which allow for greater individual rights and turns the case

[Sean M. Lynn-Jones](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/146/sean_m_lynnjones.html?back_url=%2Fpublication%2F2830%2Fwhy_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html&back_text=Back%20to%20publication), Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security @ Harvard, March 1998 ("Why the United States Should Spread Democracy", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why\_the\_united\_states\_should\_spread\_democracy.html)

First, as human beings, American should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings. The bonds of common humanity do not stop at the borders of the United States.[**19**](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn19) To be sure, these bonds and obligations are limited by the competitive nature of the international system. In a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism. The human race is not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. But there are many possibilities for action motivated by concern for individuals in other countries. In the United States, continued public concern over human rights in other countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that Americans accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners. The emergence of the so-called "CNN Effect"-the tendency for Americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical sentiments exist. If Americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end.

Second, Americans have a particular interest in promoting the spread of liberty. The United States was founded on the principle of securing liberty for its citizens. Its founding documents and institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. Among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is Samuel Huntington, who argues that America''s "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values."[**20**](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn20) As I argue below, one of the most important benefits of the spread of democracy-and especially of liberal democracy-is an expansion of human liberty. Given its founding principles and very identity, the United States has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has argued: "The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in Britain''s 13 American colonies-and that to secure the `unalienable rights'' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive `their just powers from the consent of the governed.''"[21](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn21)

Impacts

Objectivist world views allow for the annhilation of entire civilizations and mass genocide

Milton Batiste, writer in New york, 9/19 /2001 (Randians for Mass Murder, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig2/batiste1.html>)

Leonard Peikoff – the "intellectual heir" of Ayn Rand – is the founder of The Ayn Rand Institute, the fountainhead of orthodox Objectivism. [His reaction](http://www.aynrand.org/medialink/blacktuesday.shtml) is – unsurprisingly – similiar to Kelley’s, but even more indiscriminate. Americas enemies, it seems, are Arabs in general: "The Arabs embodied in extreme form every idea-selfless duty, anti-materialism, faith or feeling above science, the supremacy of the group-which our universities and churches, and our own political Establishment, had long been preaching as the essence of virtue." And what are Americans to do about the blatantly religious Arab altruists? Simple. Kill’em all – inflict "mass death" upon the citizens of Towelhead Nations: "To those who oppose war, I ask: If not now, when? How many more corpses are necessary before this country should take action? The choice today is mass death in the United States or mass death in the terrorist nations." Many libertarians are attracted to the remnants of Aristotelian philosophy within Objectivism. Those elements are conspicuously absent in the Objectivist proposals provoked by terrorism. The enemy is a faceless, barely human, collective entity. No references are made to the Just War doctrine. They say that war brings out the best and the worst in people. That goes for Objectivists too, and it is not a pleasant revelation for libertarians.

Impacts

The aff’s world of individuals justifies genocidal actions like the responses to Hurricane Katrina, rampant crime, and violence

Julian Edney, Ph.D. from Yale University, Instructor at Santa Monica College, a Lecturer on Research Methods in Psychology at California State University, Dominguez Hills, 3/27/2006 (Who Stole The Common Good? The Shadow of Ayn Rand, http://www.swans.com/library/art12/jedney01.html)

This is not a nation taking care of its own. It's not a group with a common good. Something is missing. Instead of a national "with," we have indifference. And where did this come from? I'm arguing the common good didn't just expire one day from lethargy. Humans are naturally sociable. They like to make new friends and get into things. So we're looking for a force, an idea, that's powerful enough to destroy what we do naturally. Ayn Rand's ideology was that force. Ayn Rand was a public flamboyant who wrote, lectured, and harangued from the 1940s to the 1970s. She mounted vaulting attacks on the common good. Her point: that "mutual obligation" stuff robs you of your personal freedom. To get ahead, she argued, you have to break the bonds of obligation. Selfishness is actually virtue. Altruism toward the less able, she said, is a vice. If you have real talent you should avoid groups, teams, and organizations. You should work on solo flight, not stopping to help average people who are hopelessly mired in conformity. Her two novels, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, have heroes who are pioneering, productive loners. And a free market, she argues, needs such heroes; because it is a dog-eat-dog world in which people with excellence propel themselves to the top and do more good for their nation in their selfishness than all the welfare and social programs can. Welfare programs just perpetuate mediocrity. Ayn Rand declared repeatedly in The Virtue of Selfishness that there is no common good; that it is a fallacy trumped up to enslave the productive geniuses of the world into providing for the poor and the lazy. What Rand promotes beyond anything else is personal freedom. Above justice. Above caring for your fellow man. Above trust. Above equality. She also calls this rational. But taken to its logical extreme, Rand's is a society in which freedom trumps morality, greed trumps trust. If, on the way up, the strong crush the weak, that is survival of the fittest (the essence of Social Darwinism, a discredited philosophy from the Robber Baron era saying that animal natural selection also applies to humans.) But was Ayn Rand influential? Hugely. Her books have sold over three million copies -- more than any philosopher. Her biographers estimate that her books and those of her followers still sell over 400,000 a year. (4) Alan Greenspan, recent Chief of the Federal Reserve was one of her students and wrote three of the essays in her Capitalism. President Reagan's inner staff was largely Randians. Rand's brass-knuckle selfishness on the one hand, the common good on the other. These two ideas are mutually exclusive. You can't fit the big pot in the little one. One had to go. So the virtue of the common good was submerged. Instead, we have indifference, which now masquerades as freedom. So much, it appears, leaders exploit their own followers who depend on them. So much, Equality hides her face. Let alone Kitty Genovese: we cannot even pull together in a concerted effort when a major crisis like Katrina hits. This monstrous indifference has become another part of the national frame of mind. Man overboard? Oh, well. Will the common good ever rise again? It will be difficult. Television, which catches the audience for its advertisers, reveals today's imperatives. They are pleasure, possession, prestige, and power. It seems very few people can stop watching television. It's not just that these Randian qualities promote success as individualism. It's that this has risen almost to the status of a spiritual legacy. A toxic one, and a powerful one. Could a new idea, a healing concept, break through this silence? Actually, something is already stirring. There is a new concept: "social capital" -- originally coined by J. S. Coleman, now expanded by Professor Kawachi of Harvard and his colleagues, and recently spotlighted in a Scientific American article. (5) When researchers get into the streets and survey people's opinions, they can rate communities and neighborhoods on the results. A community has high social capital if people say they trust one another and help each other out, and if they belong to local groups (service groups, tenant associations, unions, etc.) which have an impact; the community has an atmosphere of cohesiveness. A community has low social capital if residents don't belong to organizations, don't trust each other and say others try to take advantage of them. Researchers like Kawachi also check out health statistics and crime rates. He and his colleagues have found that communities with low social capital also have worse health, higher mortality rates, and higher rates of violent crime. (6) Also, cohesive communities turn out to be more egalitarian. Ayn Rand's advice destroys social capital. You can't be dog-eat-dog selfish, competitive, helping nobody, and at the same time expect to grow a cohesive community. By deduction, Ayn Rand's prescription would have a devastating effect on health and lead to crime and indifference. Ideas run a society. If we are to help ourselves, the common good is an idea that must rise again.

Value to Life

The judge should not endorse a position that places an amount of value to someone’s life

Lisa Schwartz 2004 Medical Ethics http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/viewchapter.cfm?ID=399

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine’s choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient’s interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the type of life and the fact of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions: 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. Relative value The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving, based on the relative social value of the individual concerned. So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high. Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option. According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one person’s life and is measured against that person’s needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her life before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to her. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against permitting people in Katherine’s position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this; they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, a case-based, context-sensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve, the decision to seek other ways of valuing this major life change led to him perceiving his life as highly valuable, even if different in value from before the accident that made him a paraplegic. This invokes the second assertion, that Katherine could change her view over time. Although we recognize this is possible in some cases, it is not clear how it applies to Katherine. Here we have a case in which a rational and competent person has had time to consider her options and has chosen to end her life of suffering beyond what she believes she can endure. Ten months is a long time and it will have given her plenty of opportunity to consult with family and professionals about the possibilities open to her in the future. Given all this, it is reasonable to assume that Katherine has made a well-reasoned decision. It might not be a decision that everyone can agree with but if her reasoning process can be called into question then at what point can we say that a decision is sound? She meets all the criteria for competence and she is aware of the consequences of her decision. It would be very difficult to determine what arguments could truly justify interfering with her choice. Subjective determination The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

Ayn Rand=not pinata

Ayn Rand is a sociopathic murder lover; her ideas justify serial murderers

Mark Ames, B.A. University of California Berekely, has contributed to [*New York Press*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Press), [*The Nation*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Nation), [*The San Jose Mercury News*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_San_Jose_Mercury_News), [*Alternet*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternet), [*Птюч Connection*](http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.ptuch.ru), 2/26/2010 (“Ayn Rand: Sociopath as Mentor to Far Right, <http://www.progressivesforobama.net/?p=39>)

So what, and who, was Ayn Rand for and against? The best way to get to the bottom of it is to take a look at how she developed the superhero of her novel, Atlas Shrugged, John Galt. Back in the late 1920s, as Ayn Rand was working out her philosophy, she became enthralled by a real-life American serial killer, William Edward Hickman, whose gruesome, sadistic dismemberment of 12-year-old girl named Marion Parker in 1927 shocked the nation. Rand filled her early notebooks with worshipful praise of Hickman. According to biographer Jennifer Burns, author of Goddess of the Market, Rand was so smitten by Hickman that she modeled her first literary creation -- Danny Renahan, the protagonist of her unfinished first novel, The Little Street -- on him. What did Rand admire so much about Hickman? His sociopathic qualities: "Other people do not exist for him, and he does not see why they should," she wrote, gushing that Hickman had "no regard whatsoever for all that society holds sacred, and with a consciousness all his own. He has the true, innate psychology of a Superman. He can never realize and feel 'other people.'" This echoes almost word for word Rand's later description of her character Howard Roark, the hero of her novel The Fountainhead: "He was born without the ability to consider others."The Fountainhead is Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas's favorite book -- he even requires his clerks to read it.

I'll get to where Rand picked up her silly Superman blather from later -- but first, let's meet William Hickman, the "genuinely beautiful soul" and inspiration to Ayn Rand. What you will read below -- the real story, details included, of what made Hickman a "Superman" in Ayn Rand's eyes -- is extremely gory and upsetting, even if you're well acquainted with true crime stories -- so prepare yourself. But it's necessary to read this to understand Rand, and to repeat this over and over until all of America understands what made her mind tick, because Rand's influence over the very people leading the fight to kill social programs, and her ideological influence on so many powerful bankers, regulators and businessmen who brought the financial markets crashing down, means her ideas are affecting all of our lives in the worst way imaginable. Rand fell for William Edward Hickman in the late 1920s, as the shocking story of Hickman's crime started to grip the nation. His crime, trial and case was a non-stop headline grabber for months; the OJ Simpson of his day:

Hickman, who was only 19 when he was arrested for murder, was the son of a paranoid-schizophrenic mother and grandmother. His schoolmates said that as a kid Hickman liked to strangle cats and snap the necks of chickens for fun -- most of the kids thought he was a budding manic, though the adults gave him good marks for behavior, a typical sign of sociopathic cunning. He enrolled in college but quickly dropped out, and quickly turned to violent crime largely driven by the thrill and arrogance typical of sociopaths: in a brief and wild crime spree that grew increasingly violent, Hickman knocked over dozens of gas stations and drug stores across the Midwest and west to California. Along the way it's believed he strangled a girl in Milwaukee, and killed his crime partner's grandfather in Pasadena, tossing his body over a bridge after taking his money. Hickman's partner later told police that Hickman told him how much he'd like to kill and dismember a victim someday -- and that day did come for Hickman. One afternoon, Hickman drove up to Mount Vernon Junior High school in Los Angeles, and told administrators that he'd come to pick up "the Parker girl" -- her father, Perry Parker, was a prominent banker. Hickman didn't know the girl's first name, so when he was asked which of the two Parker twins -- Hickman answered, "the younger daughter." And then he corrected himself: "The smaller one." The school administrator fetched young Marion, and brought her out to Hickman. No one suspected his motive; Marion obediently followed Hickman to his car as she was told, where he promptly kidnapped her. He wrote a ransom note to Marian's father, demanding $1,500 for her return, promising that the girl would be left unharmed. Marian was terrified into passivity -- she even waited in the car for Hickman when he went to mail his letter to her father. Hickman's extreme narcissism comes through in his ransom letters, as he refers to himself as a "master mind [sic]" and "not a common crook." Hickman signed his letters "The Fox" because he admired his own cunning: "Fox is my name, very sly you know." And then he threatened: "Get this straight. Your daughter's life hangs by a thread." Hickman and the girl's father exchanged letters over the next few days as they arranged the terms of the ransom, while Marion obediently followed her captor's demands. She never tried to escape the hotel where he kept her; Hickman even took her to a movie, and she never screamed for help. She remained quiet and still as told when Hickman tied her to the chair -- he didn't even bother gagging her because there was no need to, right up to the gruesome end. Hickman's last ransom note to Marion's father is where this story reaches its disturbing: Hickman fills the letter with hurt anger over her father's suggestion that Hickman might deceive him, and "ask you for your $1500 for a lifeless mass of flesh I am base and low but won't stoop to that depth " What Hickman didn't say was that as he wrote the letter, Marion was already several chopped-up lifeless masses of flesh. Why taunt the father? Why feign outrage? This sort of bizarre taunting was all part of the serial killer's thrill, maximizing the sadistic pleasure he got from knowing that he was deceiving the father before the father even knew what happened to his daughter. But this was nothing compared to the thrill Hickman got from murdering the helpless 12-year-old Marion Parker. Here is an old newspaper description of the murder, taken from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette on December 27, 1927: "It was while I was fixing the blindfold that the urge to murder came upon me," he continued, "and I just couldn't help myself. I got a towel and stepped up behind Marian. Then before she could move, I put it around her neck and twisted it tightly. I held on and she made no outcry except to gurgle. I held on for about two minutes, I guess, and then I let go. "When I cut loose the fastenings, she fell to the floor. "I knew she was dead. "Well, after she was dead I carried her body into the bathroom and undressed her, all but the underwear, and cut a hole in her throat with a pocket knife to let the blood out." Another newspaper account dryly explained what Hickman did next: He put the limbs in a cabinet. He cut up the body in his room at the Bellevue Arms Apartments. Then he removed the clothing and cut the body through at the waist. He put it on a shelf in the dressing room. He placed a towel in the body to drain the blood. He wrapped up the exposed ends of the arms and waist with paper. He combed back her hair, powdered her face and then with a needle fixed her eyelids. He did this because he realized that he would lose the reward if he did not have the body to produce to her father. Hickman packed her body, limbs and entrails into a car, and drove to the drop-off point to pick up his ransom; along his way he tossed out wrapped-up limbs and innards scattering them around Los Angeles. When he arrived at the meeting point, Hickman pulled Miriam's head and torso out of a suitcase and propped her up, her torso wrapped tightly, to look like she was alive--he sewed wires into her eyelids to keep them open, so that she'd appear to be awake and alive. When Miriam's father arrived, Hickman pointed a sawed-off shotgun at him, showed Miriam's head with the eyes sewn open (it would have been hard to see for certain that she was dead), and then took the ransom money and sped away. As he sped away, he threw Miriam's head and torso out of the car, and that's when the father ran up and saw his daughter--and screamed. This is the "amazing picture" Ayn Rand -- guru to the Republican/Tea Party right-wing -- admired when she wrote in her notebook that Hickman represented "the amazing picture of a man with no regard whatsoever for all that a society holds sacred, and with a consciousness all his own. A man who really stands alone, in action and in soul. Other people do not exist for him, and he does not see why they should." Other people don't exist for Ayn, either. Part of her ideas are nothing more than a ditzy dilettante's bastardized Nietzsche -- but even this was plagiarized from the same pulp newspaper accounts of the time. According to an LA Times article in late December 1927, headlined "Behavioralism Gets The Blame," a pastor and others close to the Hickman case denounce the cheap trendy Nietzschean ideas that Hickman and others latch onto as a defense:

"Behavioristic philosophic teachings of eminent philosophers such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer have built the foundation for William Edward Hickman's original rebellion against society," the article begins. The fear that some felt at the time was that these philosophers' dangerous, yet nuanced ideas would fall into the hands of lesser minds, who would bastardize Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and poison the rest of us. Which aptly fits the description of Ayn Rand, whose philosophy developed out of her admiration for "Supermen" like Hickman. Rand's philosophy can be summed up by the title of one of her best-known books: The Virtue of Selfishness. She argues that all selfishness is a moral good, and all altruism is a moral evil, even "moral cannibalism" to use her words. To her, those who aren't like-minded sociopaths are "parasites" and "lice" and "looters." But with Rand, there's something more pathological at work. She's out to make the world more sociopath-friendly so that people like Ayn and her hero William Hickman can reach their full potential, not held back by the morality of the "weak," whom Rand despised. That's what makes it so creepy how Rand and her followers clearly get off on hating and bashing those they perceived as weak--Rand and her followers have a kind of fetish for classifying weaker, poorer people as "parasites" and "lice" who need to swept away. This is exactly the sort of sadism, bashing the helpless for kicks, that Rand's hero Hickman would have appreciated. What's really unsettling is that even former Central Bank chief Alan Greenspan, whose relationship with Rand dated back to the 1950s, did some parasite-bashing of his own. In response to a 1958 New York Times book review slamming Atlas Shrugged, Greenspan, defending his mentor, published a letter to the editor that ends: "Parasites who persistently avoid either purpose or reason perish as they should. Alan Greenspan." As much as Ayn Rand detested human "parasites," there is one thing she strongly believed in: creating conditions that increase the productivity of her Supermen - the William Hickmans who rule her idealized America: "If [people] place such things as friendship and family ties above their own productive work, yes, then they are immoral. Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man's life. A man who places others first, above his own creative work, is an emotional parasite." And yet Republican faithful like GOP Congressman Paul Ryan read Ayn Rand and make declare, with pride, "Rand makes the best case for the morality of democratic capitalism." Indeed. Except that Ayn Rand also despised democracy, as she declared: "Democracy, in short, is a form of collectivism, which denies individual rights: the majority can do whatever it wants with no restrictions. "Collectivism" is another one of those Randian epithets popular among her followers. Here for example is another Republican member of Congress, the one with the freaky thousand-yard-stare, Michelle Bachman, parroting the Ayn Rand ideological line, rto explain her reasoning for wanting to kill social programs: "As much as the collectivist says to each according to his ability to each according to his need, that's not how mankind is wired. They want to make the best possible deal for themselves." Whenever you hear politicians or Tea Baggers dividing up the world between "producers" and "collectivism," just know that those ideas and words more likely than not are derived from the deranged mind of a serial-killer groupie. When you hear them threaten to "Go John Galt," hide your daughters and tell them not to talk to any strangers -- or Tea Party Republicans. And when you see them taking their razor blades to the last remaining programs protecting the middle class from total abject destitution -- Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid -- and brag about their plans to slash them for "moral" reasons, just remember Ayn's morality and who inspired her.

Heg key to freedom

Hegemony is key to global democracy and freedom globally

Samuel Huntington, Professor of Political Science at Harvard 1993 (International Security, Spring 1993)

Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union leaves the United States as the only major power whose national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values. For the United States these are liberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets. In varying degrees other major countries may from time to time support these values. Their identity, however, is not defined by these values, and hence they have far less commitment to them and less interest in promoting them than does the United States. This is not, obviously, to argue that these values are always at the forefront of American foreign policy; other concerns and needs have to be taken into consideration. It is, rather, to argue that the promotion of democracy, human rights, and markets are far more central to American policy than to the policy of any other country. Following in the footsteps of both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton has committed himself to a foreign policy of “democratic realism” in which the central goal of the United States will be the promotion of democracy in the world. The maintenance of American primacy and the strengthening of American influence in the world are indispensable to achieving that goal. To argue that primacy does not matter is to argue that political and economic values do not matter and that democracy does not or should not matter. A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.

Ethics Evaluations

Catastrophic consequences must be evaluated first in order to stop a complete violation of rights.

Tim **Stelzig,** masters in philosophy from UIC, 19**98**, “Deontology, Governmental Action, and Distributive Exemption: How the Trolley Problem Shapes the Relationship Between Rights and Policy”

Yet, as Blackstone also realizes, the “local or occasional necessities of the state” sometimes demand that rights be “modified, narrowed, or enlarged.” Bluntly put, sometimes the public good wins out, Rights clearly must give way in catastrophic cases, where harms of colossal proportions will be suffered unless some right is violated. For example, if stopping a terrorist from launching a salvo of nuclear missiles against China required killing several innocent hostages, it would be undeniably morally permissible— though nevertheless unfortunate — to sacrifice the hostages for the greater good. Even a healthy respect for the hostages’ rights cannot suffer consequences of such magnitude. Catastrophic cases do not fundamentally challenge the notion that tights protect us from being sacrificed for the public good. Such cases merely reveal that rights have thresholds.

We have an ethical obligation and global responsibility to discuss consequences of nuclear war.

David **Krieger,** President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, May 17, 2007, “Responsibility in an Era of Consequences,” <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/05/17_krieger_Responsibility_In_An_Era.htm>

The inaugural meeting of the World Future Council was recently held in Hamburg, Germany. It brought together 50 Councilors from all continents, chosen for their diversity and pioneering commitment to building a better world. At the conclusion of the four-day meeting, the Council released the Hamburg Call to Action, a document calling for action to protect the future of all life. It began, “Today we stand at the crossroads of human history. Our actions – and our failures to act – will decide the future of life on earth for thousands of years, if not forever.”

The Call to Action is a challenge to each of us to take responsibility for assuring a positive future for humanity and for preserving life on our planet. The document states: “Today there is no alternative to an ethics of global responsibility for we are entering an era of consequences. We must share, co-operate and innovate together in building a world worthy of our highest aspirations. The decision lies with each one of us!”

We are challenged to consider what we are individually and collectively doing not only to radically undermine our present world through war and its preparation, resource depletion, pollution and global warming, but also the effects of what we are doing upon future generations. Those of us alive now have the responsibility to pass the world on intact to the next generation, and to assure that our actions do not foreclose the future.

The Hamburg Call to Action is a great document and I urge you to read and reflect upon it. But I draw your attention specifically to the section on nuclear weapons: “Nuclear weapons remain humanity’s most immediate catastrophic threat. These weapons would destroy cities, countries, civilization and possibly humanity itself. The danger posed by nuclear weapons in any hands must be confronted directly and urgently through a new initiative for the elimination of these instruments of annihilation.”

Impacts of nuclear war are the ultimate immoral consequence under an ethical or rights framework.

Daniel **Callahan**, Ph.D., senior fellow at the Harvard Medical School, 19**73**, The Tyranny of Survival, pg. 33.

While the cosmopolitan approach has the virtue of accepting transnational realities and avoids the sanctification of the nation-state, an unsophisticated cosmopolitanism also has serious drawbacks. First, if morality is about choice, then to underestimate the significance of states and boundaries is to fail to take into account the main features of the real setting in which choices must be made. To pursue individual justice at the cost of survival or to launch human rights crusades that cannot hope to be fulfilled, yet interfere with prudential concerns about order, may lead to immoral consequences. And if such actions, for example the promotion of human rights in Eastern Europe, were to lead to crises and an unintended nuclear war, the consequences might be the ultimate immorality. Applying ethics to foreign policy is more than merely constructing philosophical arguments; it must be relevant to the international domain in which moral choice is to be exercised.