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CPGS DA 1NC

A. CPGS will be cut now due to fiscal pressure from overseas commitments

National Defense Magazine 7/14 [Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., 7/14/10, " 'Perfect Storm' for Defense Is Here, For Real This Time ", http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/August/Pages/PerfectStormforDefenseIsHere,ForRealThisTime.aspx]

A confluence of processes and events is creating the conditions for a severe fiscal crisis that will affect all aspects of the nation’s finances, and the impact on defense will be more acute as the U.S. military continues to fight costly wars. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are now consuming in the neighborhood of $200 billion a year, which despite a defense budget just north of $700 billion, have dragged funds away from needed modernization. Recall that Congressional Budget Office projections from 2005 even then indicated that Defense Department funding was running $100 billion a year short of what it needed to fund the modernization programs planned at that time. Then came the 2007 recession, now extending past 31 months, which is the most protracted since World War II. Along with the downturn are unsustainable federal budgets and projections of more than $1 trillion in annual deficits out through 2020. The national debt is approaching $20 trillion and interest on the debt will be around $900 billion per year in 2020 — larger than the “projected” defense budget that year. The unsustainable nature of this budget projection has now been recognized as a national problem that can no longer be ignored. In response, President Obama this year appointed a National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. The so-called Deficit Commission is due to report in December. In anticipation, Congress has deferred action on the 2011 budget, which is normally scheduled to become law Oct. 1.Meanwhile, the $37 billion defense supplemental, that was requested by the Pentagon for prosecution of the ongoing wars, is stalled in Congress. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in the absence of funding by the July 4 recess, the department would have to “do something stupid.” The recess came and went, with no bill. The House passed a $58 billion bill — $37 billion for defense and $21 billion for domestic spending. The Senate has so far not acted, but leadership there opposes domestic spending in the supplemental. The Office of Management and Budget issued a “statement of administration policy” which promises a veto “if the final bill presented to the president includes cuts to education reforms.” Where this goes from here is anyone’s guess. The something “stupid” mentioned by Secretary Gates involves dipping into operations and maintenance funding from other sectors of defense, such as training, civilian pay, deferring scheduled maintenance, reprogramming and other areas. Even when requested funding becomes available, it never makes up for all the broken glass and broken programs, which creates further disruptions into the future. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont., said he sees three areas of focus: “the tax gap, the spending gap and the productivity gap.” Since it’s fairly certain that government doesn’t directly legislate productivity, it is a safe bet that specific tax and spending recommendations will come from the Deficit Commission in December. Other worrisome converging vectors are: Secretary Gates’ warnings about the need to cut unnecessary spending at Defense; a report led by Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., “Debt, Deficits & Defense,” that calls for major budget cuts; and Undersecretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s recent initiative on affordability and productivity in defense spending. Gates cautioned that the “gusher” of defense spending that opened on 9/11 is about to close. He advocates retaining the current force structure, but is looking for savings within O&M, overhead (infrastructure, multiple headquarters and staffing), while continuing to oppose “unnecessary” programs such as more C-17s and the alternate fighter engine for the F-35. The Frank report was drastic in its proposals: going to a reduced strategic triad (nuclear bombers eliminated, boomer subs and land-based missiles greatly reduced); curtailing missile defense and space; reducing the Navy to 230 ships with two fewer carriers; eliminating two Air Force fighter wings and concomitant F-35 reductions; canceling the MV-22; slip the tanker buy; and unspecified compensation and healthcare reductions for military personnel and families. Carter rolled out the acquisition companion piece with a focus on reducing funding on unneeded or low-priority overhead and conducting existing programs more efficiently. The aim is to transfer savings into these programs. Carter specifically mentioned that the Navy’s new nuclear submarine SSBN(X), the Army Ground Combat Vehicle and the Air Force long-range bomber**/prompt global strike would be particularly scrutinized.** All of these developments could begin to cause turbulence around December.  The major unstoppable weather vector is the dire financial condition of the United States. The other converging elements — tax and spending reform and defense spending and reorganization — are minor by comparison. Carter has invited the defense industry to participate in the coming decision-making and execution process. We intend to do so. Our position should be to make all decisions with a clear articulation of risk up front, and advocate for the most balanced force structure as basic criteria for future budgetary choices.

CPGS DA 1NC

B. Withdrawal Causes a Shift Towards CPGS

Diasaku, Sakaguchi, Research Fellow, 2nd Research Office, Research Department, the National Institute for Defense Studies, 09 (“The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S.” NIDS Security Reports, No.10 December 2009, pp 40-41)ZDM

Accompanying the end of the Cold War, George F. Kennan argued that the U.S. should reduce its offshore involvement.33 In addition, the U.S.’ traditional offshore balancing – whereby the balance of power within regions is left to the nations making up the region, with the U.S. intervening only when the balance cannot be maintained – also came to be revisited as a grand strategy. This strategy involves boosting nuclear weapons and the power of long-range mobility, and withdrawing U.S. forces from offshore bases, enabling the U.S. to make itself safer while not relinquishing regions of vital importance to large, rival nations.34 Possibly due to the influence of this point of view, the U.S.’ military transformation and the GPR also aim to reduce dependence on allied nations. Following the Transformation Planning Guidance,35 in which the U.S. government ordered each of the armed forces to create a roadmap for reform every year, the U.S. Air Force is exhibiting the concepts of global mobility and global strike. The former means to “launch an operation anywhere in the would in the minimum time” and the latter means to be able to strike “an important target” within a number of hours or a number of minutes, wherever that target may be in the world. As a result of progress with innovative military technologies, demonstrable improvement is occurring in information-gathering capacities, troop mobility and the might and accuracy of fire power. However, the most important point of all is that technological progress such as this will diminish the value of offshore bases and the degree of dependence on them. Among adherents to the revolution in military affairs, many believe that once it is possible to attack potential enemies around the world from the U.S. mainland or ocean, offshore bases will be unnecessary. For example, even if a change in the political climate saw an allied nation suddenly deny the U.S. the use of bases, if it were possible to immediately project military strength from the U.S. mainland to locations in which forward-deployed forces were not present the impact would not be major.36 In fact, at the time of the Iraq War, Turkey denied the U.S. military the use of bases and Austria denied the U.S. military passage through its airspace, and these experiences are a strong motivator for reviewing approaches to offshore bases.37 Regarding the issue of realigning U.S. forces, Richard Hawley, a retired U.S. Air Force general who makes proposals on approaches to the Air Force’s military strength in the Asia- Pacific region, says the reason Guam is an important operation base is that “In the Iraq War [the U.S.] was unable to get permission from Turkey to use bases and this proved a hindrance to constructing an Iraq northern front, but political problems do not arise in the U.S. territory of Guam.”38 Furthermore, the high cost of stationing troops offshore and improving the working conditions of military personnel who have to live away from their families for long periods are issues that the U.S. military needs to resolve quickly. Going forward, progress in military technology is likely to become an alternative means for compensating for the withdrawal of bases. The “sea basing” being pursued by the Navy and Marine Corps is one such example. A sea base positioned on the coast like a base on land, with an attempt to utilize it not only for support for ground offensives and troop landings, but also as a supply point and as a place for repairing equipment, massing and training troops, and other uses.39 The advantage of sea bases is that they are safer than land bases and are not restricted by political and diplomatic restraints, thus allowing the U.S. military to function independently. The goal of reducing dependence on forward-deployed bases forms a backdrop to this concept also.40

CPGS DA 1NC

C. CPGS triggers accidental war between the US and Russia – it looks like a nuclear strike.

SF Chronicle 10/6/06 (Experts warn of an accidental atomic war, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/10/06/MNGF9LJSMM1.DTL)ZDM

A Pentagon project to modify its deadliest nuclear missile for use as a conventional weapon against targets such as North Korea and Iran could unwittingly spark an atomic war, two weapons experts warned Thursday. Russian military officers might misconstrue a submarine-launched conventional D5 intercontinental ballistic missile and conclude that Russia is under nuclear attack, said Ted Postol, a physicist and professor of science, technology and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Pavel Podvig, a physicist and weapons specialist at Stanford. "Any launch of a long-range nonnuclear armed sea or land ballistic missile will cause an automated alert of the Russian early warning system," Postol told reporters. The triggering of an alert wouldn't necessarily precipitate a retaliatory hail of Russian nuclear missiles, Postol said. Nevertheless, he said, "there can be no doubt that such an alert will greatly increase the chances of a nuclear accident involving strategic nuclear forces." Podvig said launching conventional versions of a missile from a submarine that normally carries nuclear ICBMs "expands the possibility for a misunderstanding so widely that it is hard to contemplate." Mixing conventional and nuclear D5s on a U.S. Trident submarine "would be very dangerous," Podvig said, because the Russians have no way of discriminating between the two types of missiles once they are launched. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the project would increase the danger of accidental nuclear war. "The media and expert circles are already discussing plans to use intercontinental ballistic missiles to carry nonnuclear warheads," he said in May. "The launch of such a missile could ... provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces." Accidental nuclear war is not so far-fetched. In 1995, Russia initially interpreted the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket as the onset of a U.S. nuclear attack. Then-President Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" in the first stages of preparation to launch a retaliatory strike before the mistake was discovered. The United States and Russia have acknowledged the possibility that Russia's equipment might mistakenly conclude the United States was attacking with nuclear missiles. In 1998, the two countries agreed to set up a joint radar center in Moscow operated by U.S. and Russian forces to supplement Russia's aging equipment and reduce the threat of accidental war. But the center has yet to open. A major technical problem exacerbates the risk of using the D5 as a conventional weapon: the decaying state of Russia's nuclear forces. Russia's nuclear missiles are tethered to early warning radars that have been in decline since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. And Russia, unlike the United States, lacks sufficient satellites to supplement the radars and confirm whether missile launches are truly under way or are false alarms. The scenario that worries Postol, Podvig and other weapons experts is what might happen if the United States and North Korea come to blows and a conventional D5 is launched against a target there from a submerged Trident submarine. Depending on the sub's location, the flying time to Russia could be under 15 minutes so the Russians would have little time to confirm the trajectory -- using decaying equipment -- before deciding to launch a nuclear strike on the United States.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Uniqueness\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Uniqueness– No CPGS

Even if there is some funding for CPGS now it is woefully inadequate.

Shactman, Noah, Editor and foreign policy expert for wired, 4/26/10 (How To: Risk World War III, and Blow Billions Doing It, Wired, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/how-to-risk-world-war-iii-and-blow-billions-doing-it/#more-23973#ixzz0uc1EjZaP)ZDM

Pentagon’s plan to fire ballistic missiles at terrorists isn’t just a nuclear Armageddon risk. It’s a ludicrously expensive way to accidentally start World War III: each weapon could cost anywhere from a few hundred million to $1 billion. The Defense Department wants to spend about $240 million next year on the controversial “prompt global strike” project. Eventually, it could lead to weapons that could strike virtually anywhere in the planet within an hour or two. (Here’s an interview I did with Rachel Maddow on Friday about the plan.)  But that quarter-billion would be the tiniest of down payments. “There are no accurate cost estimates for the program, largely because the technology is unproven,” writes Joe Cirincione at ForeignPolicy.com. His back-of-the-envelope calculation: $10 billion for 10 conventionally-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, meant to strike at terrorists on the move. “Each missile with its tiny payload could easily go over $1 billion each.”

CTM will not be funded in the squo.

New York Times 4/22/10 (U.S. Faces Choice on New Weapons for Fast Strikes, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23strike.html?\_r=1?pagewanted=print)ZDM

Partly as a result, the idea “really hadn’t gone anywhere in the Bush administration,” Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who has served both presidents, said recently on ABC’s “This Week.” But he added that it was “embraced by the new administration.” Mr. Obama himself alluded to the concept in a recent interview with The New York Times, saying it was part of an effort “to move towards less emphasis on nuclear weapons” while insuring “that our conventional weapons capability is an effective deterrent in all but the most extreme circumstances.” The Obama national security team scrapped the idea of putting the new conventional weapon on submarines. Instead, the White House has asked Congress for about $250 million next year to explore a new alternative, one that uses some of the most advanced technology in the military today as well as some not yet even invented.

START limits CPGS

Brooks, Graham, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies @ Heritage Foundation, and Graham, Owen, Research Assistant @ Heritage Foundation, 7/13/10 (New START: Beyond the Rhetoric, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/New-START-Beyond-the-Rhetoric)ZDM

Critics are also bothered by the fact that New START allows the Russians to increase the number of delivery systems (e.g., missiles and bombers) while the Americans must decrease their holdings. The treaty also limits the development of the Prompt Global Strike, a strategic missile armed with a conventional warhead that could be launched in as little as 60 minutes for use against targets such as a terrorist stronghold when other U.S. forces are not immediately available. The treaty also fails to account for Russia’s enormous tactical nuclear arsenal, which might be up to 10 times larger than America’s.

Uniqueness – No Modernization Spending

Modernization currently being cut – new savings will go to modernization.

Holmes, Kim R. Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 6/14/10 (The Case for Defense Spending, the Foundry, [http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/14/the-case-for-defense-spending/)ZDM](http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/14/the-case-for-defense-spending/%29ZDM)

The country is drowning in red ink. A revolt against rising debt is unleashing a grass roots movement to curb spending. Conservatives all across America are deeply concerned that unless we can get spending under control, we will forever lose our country. This is hardly an environment conducive to making the case for more defense spending. To make matters worse the Department of Defense is in the hands of an administration that conservatives do not trust. It’s understandable that they would not want to appear to give a “blank check” to the very administration that is busting the budget with out of control domestic spending. The bottom line is that the Obama administration plans defense budget cuts that will weaken future necessary modernization and other programs. Under their plans, there is no way the U.S. can build the weapons and systems necessary to keep America safe in the coming decades. There are simply not enough “savings” in cutting “waste, fraud and abuse” in Obama’s defense budget to make up for his cuts in modernization and other programs. The right question for conservatives is not how much the Pentagon’s budget should be cut in order to contribute to overall budget reductions, but which programs, projects and personnel are needed to defend the country. After we’ve done that, we can then cost it out to include efficiencies. Any savings that can be achieved in reforming logistics or cutting personnel and benefits should be used to help fund the modernization programs and end strength needed to defend the country in the future.

Obama will cut spending- make system more efficient

**RantRave | Published Opinion.** **7/23** (7/23/10, " Solutions Pt. 2 Small Government or Efficient Government ? ", http://www.rantrave.com/Rant/Solutions-Pt-2-Small-Government-or-Efficient-Government-.aspx)

So how is Obama making these systems more efficient? Today he signed a bill to crack down on waste. He said that this bill could save $50 billion a year in waste. Last month he ordered a "Do Not Pay" database to prevent payments to dead people. In the last three years $182 million dollars were sent to dead people. Obama has proposed a three-year freeze in spendingnot tied to national security. He has instituted changes in how government contracts are awarded to save billions in such costs, and he has directed agencies to sell excess or underused real estate. In May Obama signed the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which will increase government oversight, save taxpayer dollars and spend defense funding more efficiently. Obama has also asked each arm of the military to come up with billions of dollars in savings.These are all praiseworthy efforts but the government needs to go much further in its efforts to pare down the bureaucracy, increase the efficiency, and yes make government smaller. Here are a few ideas that would make our broken government work better.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Link\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Link – Withdrawal 🡪 CPGS

Global strike capability is seen as a solution to base withdrawal.

O’Hanlon, Micheal, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, 98 (Can High Technology Bring U. S. Troops Home?, Foreign Policy,  No. 113 (Winter, 1998-1999), pp. 73-74)ZDM

The foreign-policy implications of an RMA could be broad and pro- found. Most notably, many of its proponents argue that with the United States able to strike at any potential enemy anywhere in the world, overseas military bases and deployments will become much less important. Former RAND analyst and air force official Christopher Bowie writes that high-technology weaponry such as the B-2 bomber equipped with advanced munitions ".... would not need bases in theater ... raising the possibility for conducting paralyzing and disarming blows from the United States." The 1997 report of the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel envisions U.S.-based forces that could ". . . project significant power . .. within hours or days rather than months." The Pentagon's official line is that forward-presence levels will not change in the near future. But the various "vision" statements of the military services and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff all anticipate a much more agile, rapidly deployable, automated, precise, and long-range strike force by 2010 or 2020. This image of future warfare is understandably attractive to U.S. policymakers and military planners. Although the number of American forces based or deployed abroad has been reduced by more than 50 percent from Cold War levels, they still account for about 250,000 uniformed personnel out of a total active-duty strength of 1.4 million. The cost of equipping, training, and paying these troops rep- resents about $50 billion of the $270 billion annual defense-spending total. Since most of these forces would be retained even if they had to be based in the United States, the additional costs of forward presence amount to a few billion dollars a year. But in an era of budget cutting, such expenses are not small, and other costs are even more significant. Troops in Korea and Bosnia, most marines on Okinawa, air force pilots in Saudi Arabia, and navy sailors and marines at sea face months away from their families. Sizable deployments abroad are often a source of irritation between the United States and its allies- forces on Okinawa are much less welcome than they once were, and the tragic accident in which a marine aircraft sent 20 skiers plummet- ing to their deaths prompted outrage throughout Italy. American military facilities are often lightning rods for popular discontent and can be focal points for terrorists, as evidenced by the deadly 1996 bombing against air force units in Saudi Arabia. How much nicer it would be if U.S. troops could stay at home until called upon in a crisis or conflict. Then, according to RMA believers, they could lash out rapidly, intercontinentally, and lethally from U.S. bases with spacepower, long-range airpower, and other elements of a so-called reconnaissance-strike complex-a term describing tomor- row's military that often crops up in reports and articles.

Link – Withdrawal 🡪 CPGS

US will create CPGS to compensate for a lack of bases.

Asia Times 2/4/10 (US's strike threat catches China off guard, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LB04Ad01.html)ZDM

"In the case of China, Beijing's investments in cyberwarfare, anti-satellite warfare, anti-aircraft and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles could threaten the United States' primary means to project its power and help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them. This will put a premium on the United States' ability to strike from over the horizon and employ missile defenses and will require shifts from short-range to longer-range systems, such as the next-generation bomber."

Losing a forward presence makes the Army develop CPGS.

Carnesale, Albert, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability @Naval Studies board, 5/11/07 (Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability: Letter Report ,Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, National Research Council, p 2, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11951.html)ZDM

As discussed below, there are a variety of circumstances in which it could serve U.S. national objectives to be able to strike targets very rapidly, with high accuracy and high confidence of reaching the target, and with necessary military effect, but without using nuclear weapons. Modern technology, in particular the Global Positioning System (GPS), makes it possible, in principle, to achieve high probabilities of success with a far more limited number of conventional weapons than in the past. In many circumstances, forward-deployed assets—such as tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, long-range bombers, and unmanned aerial vehicles—make it possible to strike targets with very high accuracy and in sufficiently short times (particularly taking into account the other factors that lengthen the timeline between detection of a target and weapon impact—including evaluation of intelligence, decision to attack, confirmation of geolocation, and input into guidance systems—many of which can occur concurrent to readying or prepositioning of a weapon system). Taking the long view, however, it is clear that the United States cannot always rely on having forward-deployed forces in the right place at the right time. The question then becomes how timely conventional strikes must be in order to be effective. The time between a strike’s launch and its impact on the target is, of course, only one of the many factors in the overall time needed. These factors—not all of which can be run in parallel—include intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; discussion of options by the appropriate decisionmakers; transmission and receipt of orders; precise geolocation of targets and transfer of this information to the weapons systems; and detailed mission planning and preparation of weapons systems for launch. A comprehensive effort to make speedier response possible should be a part of any effort to achieve CPGS. However, there is no doubt that the time from launch to impact on a target is also a factor, and the DOD has concluded—and the committee concursthat situations might arise for which achieving promptness in that variable (launch to effective strike accomplished within an hour or so of an execution order) would add meaningfully to the nation’s military capabilities. Among currently available delivery systems, only long-range ballistic missiles can reach targets in very remote areas with very high speed and little or no vulnerability to defense—and to date, long-range ballistic missiles have only been equipped with nuclear warheads.

Link – Spending Shift

Funding will be shifted from bases to modernization.

Business Week, 7/6/10 (Weapons Budget Grows Amid Obama Cuts, Pentagon Comptroller Says, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-06/weapons-budget-grows-amid-obama-cuts-pentagon-comptroller-says.html)ZDM

July 6 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. spending on weapons through 2016 likely will grow faster than the overall defense budget, which will have annual increases of only about 1 percent above inflation, according to Pentagon Comptroller Robert Hale. “Our goal would be to get forces and modernization to grow by 2 or 3 percent,” Hale said in an interview, while saying that “it’s not a given.” An increase in weapons spending will include greater purchases of Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F- 35 fighter, new ground vehicles, ship construction, satellite systems and unmanned drones, according to the Pentagon’s long- range plan. Northrop Grumman Corp., of Los Angeles, and Chicago- based Boeing Co. also stand to benefit. Some money may be shifted into equipment and personnel accounts from an effort to cut $100 billion of overhead costs over five years, announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates on June 28, Hale said. “Procurement and research are in the ‘gaining’ portion of the budget,” Hale said. “The goal would be to move money from support-type activities -- operations and maintenance, military construction -- into acquisition.” Hale’s remarks are good news for defense contractors, said Todd Harrison, a defense analyst with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “It sounds like they are trying to do everything they can now to avoid major program cuts in the next few years,” Harrison said. Yet, if the Pentagon goal of cutting overhead and support costs isn’t achieved, “they will have no choice but to cut” programs, he said.

Link – McCain

McCain believes CPGS is an essential and critical program for the U.S military

Senator John McCain, 4-22-10, OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN McCAIN AT THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 2010 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (<http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.FloorStatements&ContentRecord_id=269fd071-db53-f46c-42bf-5388904c7976>)

 “Another concern stems from the assumption made in the NPR that the development of conventional capabilities, such as prompt global strike, will lead to the reduction of the role that nuclear weapons play in our deterrence posture.  To be sure, conventional weapons can augment or support our deterrence posture, but they are no substitute for nuclear weapons.  Again, I look forward to the witnesses’ explanation for why this planning assumption was made, and why it is effective. “I am also significantly concerned that no one has yet addressed the overall affordability of the course set out in this NPR. The cost alone for modernizing both the nuclear weapons complex and the triad is substantial, and as we move to reduce our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all the more important. Factoring in the cost of missile defense and prompt global strike – both essential and critical, but also costly, programs – the  overall budget outlook becomes daunting.  I look forward to discussing the notion of affordability, both in the near-term and the long-term, and further exploring how committed this administration is to resourcing these costly albeit essential modernization and development efforts. “Finally, I would just reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that the key test of our nation’s credibility on nuclear issues is not whether or how much we reduce our nuclear arsenal, but whether we meet the nuclear proliferation threats posed by regimes like Iran and North Korea.  I agree with the NPR’s conclusion that the two primary threats to international security are nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.  Unfortunately, when it comes to Iran and North Korea, this Administration has little to show for 15 months of effort.  Meeting the proliferation threats posed by rogue states like these must be our top priority as we determine our nuclear posture and work to shore up the global non-proliferation regime.  Otherwise, all of our efforts to reduce our nuclear arsenal, as well as our reliance on it, will be for naught.

Means CPGS gets compensated – McCain is the most influential republican.

Politico, 1/8/10 (Poll: McCain is leader of GOP

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31236.html)ZDM

Sen. John McCain of Arizona is the most influential player in the Republican Party, according to a new Harris Poll out Thursday. Sixty-four percent of the 2,276 adults surveyed nationwide said McCain is influential in steering the direction of the Republican Party, a 14-percentage-point edge over his closest rivals: former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and radio host Rush Limbaugh, both of whom were rated as influential by 50 percent all of those polled. Even among just the Republican polled, McCain ran away from the field, getting picked by 68 percent. Only former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney was also picked as influential by at least 60 percent of Republicans.

Link – Nukes

US compensates nuclear reduction with enhancing conventional military capabilities

**BC Online** **7/1** (Andrew Phillips, 7/1/10, " Between abolition and armageddon ", http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2943381.htm)

And therein lies the problem. As one of the global nuclear order's chief custodians, America must both reassure nervous allies that it is willing to protect them - if necessary by nuclear means - while at the same time reassuring the international community that America remains seriously committed to the task of eventual nuclear weapons abolition. This tension between the imperative of preserving the credibility of American security assurances and that of preserving the credibility of American commitments towards nuclear disarmament is by no means insurmountable. For example, America has recently narrowed the range of contingencies in which it would be prepared to use nuclear weapons, and has partially compensated for this move by further enhancing its conventional military capabilities to project power globally in defence of its vital interests and those of its allies

Internal Link – CPGS Includes CTM

Carnesale, Albert, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability @Naval Studies board, 5/11/07 (Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability: Letter Report ,Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, National Research Council, p 8, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11951.html)ZDM

If a CPGS capability is desired without forward deployment in the longer term, options (other than the more mature SLGSM) presented to the committee depend on technology advances that in its judgment are more challenging and will take at least 8 years to achieve, assuming that work on those technologies is funded beginning now. Technologies developed in the CTM program should also be applicable to some CONUS-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) delivery concepts if overflight avoidance maneuvers are not required. Funding CTM development and end-to-end testing provides the earliest and most viable opportunity to meet the initial CPGS capability. Although there are issues about how—and indeed whether—CTM should be deployed and used that have not yet been adequately addressed, the technical feasibility of CTM has been demonstrated and the design is sound and well thought out. Accordingly, a funding path that keeps the program essentially on schedule for an IOC in 3 years and also supports the SLGSM alternative is a prudent interim step. The committee does not, however, endorse funding for full-scale CTM production and deployment. There remain policy issues—including dealing with the ambiguity issue and consideration of alternative (albeit less-developed) systems that should be fully addressed before committing to CTM deployment. Moreover, the CTM program itself is not without technical issues that merit careful study. For example, the committee has concerns about the proposed mixed-load deployment configuration and the payload options relative to their ability to address the military needs for the target types of interest. The committee believes that alternative concepts of operation may be needed to more effectively use the capability of the system (e.g., providing larger numbers of deliverable weapons on station) while also minimizing ambiguity concerns.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Imapct\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Impact – CPGS Proliferates

CPGS spreads globally.

Steven Andreasen, political analyst and former Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control on the US National Security Council, July/August 2006 [Arms Control Today, “Off Target? The Bush Administration's Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles with Conventional Warheads”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2076>, BBQ]

New Deployments by States U.S. moves might also affect other states, which over the next decade or so may have the capability to develop, test, and deploy long-range ballistic missiles (e.g., India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan). They could publicly adopt our rationale for proceeding with “conventional” long-range ballistic missiles to fend off international pressure to restrict their own long-range missile programs. Yet, these missiles could and likely would, at least in the near term, serve as delivery platforms for nuclear weapons, given the challenge of developing an effective conventional capability. Thus, we could substantially undercut both our missile and nuclear nonproliferation policies by proceeding with the deployment of conventional long-range ballistic missiles. Lowering the Threshold for Use Deployment of conventional warheads on U.S. long-range ballistic missiles would be perceived by many as lowering the threshold for use of these weapons. Indeed, the public rationale for proceeding with conventional Trident missiles is to enhance the Pentagon’s ability to “pre-empt conventionally” and provide the president with an option to “respond quickly” with conventional arms.[2] Moreover, the deployment of conventional long-range ballistic missiles in Russia, China, and perhaps other states could happen soon after these states developed the necessary technology. It is difficult not to conclude that the probability of these weapons being used would increase, introducing a new and potentially destabilizing factor into the security calculations of a number of countries spread out over volatile regions of the globe.

Impact – Accidental War

CPGS triggers accidental nuclear war.

Ian Davis, Ph.D., independent human security and arms control consultant, former executive director of the British American Security Information Council, and Robin Dodd, researcher at BASIC, June 2006 [BASIC Paper No. 51, US ‘Prompt Global Strike’ Capability: A New Destabilising Sub-State Deterrent in the Making? [www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP51.pdf](http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP51.pdf), BBQ]

• The high-risk of a mistaken nuclear first-strike The launch of a conventionally armed ICBM brings an inherent risk of triggering a nuclear war. It seems likely, for example, that Russian and Chinese early warning radars would be unable to differentiate between US nuclear and conventional SLBM and/or ICBM launches, as the heat signatures of both would be the same.21 The ambiguity, by causing doubt and uncertainty, and possible delay in response, will also inevitably strengthen the capacity for a successful US nuclear first strike. Countries targeted by any ICBM strike would need to treat any attack as a nuclear one if they were to avoid being open to a successful surprise US nuclear first strike. This would contribute to instability, particularly if US commanders may at times be insensitive to the unintentional ramifications of the launch of a conventional ICBM.

CPGS trigger accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized retaliation

Steven Andreasen, political analyst and former Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control on the US National Security Council, July/August 2006 [Arms Control Today, “Off Target? The Bush Administration's Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles with Conventional Warheads”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2076>, BBQ]

Risk of Accidental, Mistaken, or Unauthorized Launch A country with an early-warning system—currently only Russia—that detected the launch of a long-range ballistic missile might fear it was the target of a missile strike, particularly if the missile appeared headed toward or over it. Moreover, it could not know if the missile was armed with a nuclear or conventional warhead. In the absence of or even with advance warning, this could increase the risk of an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized retaliatory launch.

Impact – Accidental War

CPGS => Russian Nuclear War -- CPGS launch mistaken for nuclear launch

Maj Todd C. Shull, Master of Arts in Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, M.S., University of North Dakota, B.A., Colorado State University, September 2005 [“Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Valuable Military Option or Threat to Global Stability”, <http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2005/Sep/05Sep_Shull.pdf>, BBQ]

2. Will Conventional PGS Increase the Risk of Inadvertent War? One of the most common arguments against the deployment or employment of conventional PGS capabilities that operate from or through space is potential that a PGS launch could easily be mistaken for the launch of a nuclear-armed missile. This possibility was again asserted in a recent Congressional Research Service Report on the subject of conventionally-armed ICBMs.433 This section evaluates the severity of the threat posed by conventional PGS employment for an inadvertent nuclear exchange and then examines the utility of various potential technical, procedural, and policy solutions to this problem. The scenario is simple but frightening. For example, the United States launches a conventional PGS strike against a target near the periphery of Russian territory. Because of the poor condition of Russia’s space-based early-warning system, it does not detect the initial launch at all. As the PGS weapon nears its target it is picked up by part of the Russian ballistic missile warning radar network. Since the PGS weapon has made several maneuvers during reentry. The radar is unable to accurately determine the object’s launch location or predicted impact locations. The radar operator believes the object originated from the vicinity of an ICBM field in North Dakota and is headed towards the early-warning radar site in Azerbaijan. In actuality the PGS weapon was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base on the coast of California and is headed towards a target in Woolf, Conventional Warheads, Iran. However, the erroneous report that goes forward to senior Russian leaders warns that a missile warning site is under attack from an American ICBM. Believing this to be part of the first wave of a massive attack that is underway but not yet detected (or that the radars have been “spoofed” somehow), the Russian leadership orders a retaliatory launch against counterforce and command and control targets in the United States. The belief that they were already under nuclear attack lessened the normal inhibitions against launching a nuclear strike, since the only remaining goal available was damage limitation in a nightmare scenario. How likely is this to occur? In order for this scenario to be possible at all, there are two prerequisites. First, the country in question must be able to detect an attack while it is in progress. Basically, it must possess some type of early-warning system. Second, the country must have the ability to “launch on warning.” Its nuclear forces must be generated to a level of alert that allows a retaliatory launch before the attacking warheads strike their targets. In today’s world, only the United States and Russia meet both of these requirements. As presented in the Russian case study above, the Russian nuclear force structure, force posture, and the state of its early-warning system combine to produce several risk factors for the above scenario. Heavy reliance on vulnerable, silo-based ICBMs tends to result in a “use them or lose them” mentality. Also, the relatively few “survivable” forces (deployed SLBMs and mobile ICBMs outside of garrison) available could detract from a willingness to “wait and see” what is really happening. A deteriorating early-warning system leaves the leadership uncertain as to whether what has been reported by the system is all there is. The amount of danger represented by Russia’s current status depends on which view of reality one holds. If one subscribes to Pavel Podvig’s view, they will be less concerned since Russia’s leadership is aware of the limitations of their system and they will not trust it enough to make irrevocable decisions, like launching ICBMs.434 The position taken by the 2003 RAND study is more pessimistic in tone. The message there is that Russia is blind and vulnerable and may make poor decision based on poor-quality information.435 A third view is presented by Mickhail Tsypkin. Upon initial detection there will be concern as the warning crews attempt to determine whether there is only one object or a mass attack, but within five to seven minutes the Russians will have determined the trajectory and know that it is not headed for Moscow.436 However, the entire system will have suffered “a very bad shock.”437

Impact – Accidental War

CPGS causes accidental war.

Carnesale, Albert, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability @Naval Studies board, 5/11/07 (Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability: Letter Report ,Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, National Research Council, p 4, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11951.html)ZDM

The possibility that a very limited strike in a time of crisis or opportunity could be mistaken as a nuclear attack, especially with use of a ballistic missile for strike delivery, must be soberly assessed as decisions are made with respect to both fielding a weapon and using it. While ambiguity issues may be mitigated by cooperative measures, any CPGS option, including CTM, should be designed in both hardware and operational terms to minimize the possibility of misinterpreting intent, specifically taking into consideration detection and tracking capabilities anticipated in the world over the next 10 to 15 years. Although the ambiguity problem may not be as significant as some believe, the committee thinks that it merits serious consideration. Indeed, the ambiguity between nuclear and conventional payloads can never be totally resolved, in that any of the means for delivery of a conventional warhead could be used to deliver a nuclear warhead. It remains to be seen whether nuclear-related security or cooperative measures might ease the problem.

CPGS leads to nuclear counter-strike

Sue Michaels, Feature Writer for Chattahbox.com, 4/23/10, http://chattahbox.com/world/2010/04/23/prompt-global-strike-missile-could-replace-nukes-in-the-future/

It looks like a nuke, acts like a nuke, but it isn’t. The new advanced missile system, called Prompt Global Strike deploys a conventional warhead at speeds faster than several times the speed of sound. Having pin-point accuracy with the capability of reaching a target anywhere around the globe in less than an hour, the Prompt Global Strike missile would become an important part of [President Obama’s](http://chattahbox.com/world/2010/04/23/prompt-global-strike-missile-could-replace-nukes-in-the-future/) plan, called “Global Zero,” to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons. But there still are some kinks to iron out with the technology. An early test version of the missile would not be ready, until 2014 or 2015. And there is the very real danger that other countries may mistake the Prompt Global Strike missile for a nuclear warhead and respond accordingly.

CPGS triggers accidental war.

Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 16 No. 12, 6/16/10, “Air Force Weighing PGS Options As Part Of ICBM Follow-On Strategy Inside Missile Defense”, Lexis

The PGS concept, as envisioned by DOD, is to have a non-nuclear weapon capable of hitting any target around the world within one hour. The only weapon within the U.S. arsenal currently capable of meeting those time lines are nuclear.

However, should a land-based PGS weapon be launched from a location too close to the nuclear missile fields in the CONUS, the fear is that conventional launch would be mistaken for a nuclear attack, and incite a nuclear counterstrike.

Impact – Accidental War

Conventional and nuclear warheads are indistinguishable under CPGS – triggers accidental nuclear holocaust

Maj Gen G D Bakshi, Deputy Director of Research at Vivekanda International Foundation, 7/1/2010 [Vivekanda International Foundation, “The US Nuclear Posture Review: Prompt Global Strike System”, <http://www.vifindia.org/article/118>, BBQ]

The Trident Solution The respected science magazine,Popular Mechanics gave details of this system. In 1988, Lockheed Martin’s Trident II D S Nuclear Ballistic Missiles entered service on Ohio Class submarines. In the PGS system, each submarine would be armed with 22 Tridents along with two retrofitted Trident missiles, each with four independently targetable conventional warheads. Gas pressure would eject the Trident from the submarine. Once the missile clears the water, the first stage ignites and burns in about 65 seconds. When the missile is locked on to targets at maximum range (roughly 6,000 nautical miles), this falls away. The second stage ignites for another 65 second burn that carries the missile 500-800 miles down range. The third stage now ignites for 40 seconds concluding the boost phase that lifts the Trident some 600 miles above the earth (the altitude of weather satellites). The post boost vehicle (or bus) now receives navigational updates and deploys four independently targetable warheads (that travel at 13,000 mph and have an accuracy of 30 ft). The warheads are GPS guided on decent by means of tiny flaps. Two types of warheads are planned: 1. The Fragmentation version which shatters tungsten rods (each upto 12 times more destructive than a 50 caliber bullet). Anything within a 3,000 sq ft area is obliterated by this metallic storm. 2. The Bunker Busting version This has a bunker-busting metal “shock-impactor”, which relies on kinetic energy for its destructive power. This can tackle targets in deep cover/underground bunkers or caves. The problem with this solution began with the strident response of the Russians and the Chinese. They warned that they would not be able to distinguish between the launch of such Trident missiles that were armed with nuclear/conventional warheads. **This could trigger off accidental nuclear responses and result in a nuclear holocaust. Apparently the US Congress was thus alarmed enough to cancel funding for this program**.

Impact – Accidental War

**CPGS triggers nuclear retaliation and is mistake-prone**

**The Independent**, 4/9/**10**, “US moves from nuclear arms to conventional missiles with global reach”, Lexis

WHILE PRESIDENT Barack Obama speaks overseas of his vision of a world without nuclear weapons, his military commanders at home are quietly accelerating a programme to develop and deploy a new class of conventional intercontinental ballistic missiles which will have the capacity to strike targets anywhere in the world within an hour.
While the effort to develop the new missile capability, called Prompt Global Strike, began in the late 1990s and through the Bush years, President Obama has expanded its budget with hopes that it can be added to US military's array of options by the middle of this decade. First prototype tests will be carried out by the Air Force next month.
American commanders envisage a missile that will travel at hypersonic speeds, in part outside of the Earth's atmosphere, with the ability to strike a target anywhere around the globe within one hour from launch with a conventional but still potentially devastating explosive payload.
Even as Moscow has agreed to the arms control treaty signed yesterday, it has become increasingly loud in warning of the dangers of the new global missiles under development by the Pentagon. "World states will hardly accept a situation in which nuclear weapons disappear, but weapons that are no less destabilising emerge in the hands of certain members of the international community," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said earlier this week.
Nuclear deterrence has been the key plank of US defence policy for six decades but while Washington views the new conventional weaponry as key to protecting America in a post-Cold War world where the threats may come not just from nations but also from terror networks, critics argue that they present new and important risks. Most commonly cited is the danger that other countries, including China and Russia, could mistake one of them for a nuclear missile unless they are fired at sufficiently low altitude. Once they are launched, there could be difficulty in distinguishing their conventional payloads from nuclear ones. That in turn could accidentally trigger a nuclear retaliation by Russia or another similarly-armed power.
Another danger is that if nuclear weapons are no longer at issue, there would be a bigger temptation for American military commanders to become more cavalier about ordering strikes. And unless intelligence can be fully relied upon, the chances of striking mistaken targets are high.

**CPGS Triggers aNuclear Exchange**

Vince **Manzo**, Center for Defense Information Research Assistant, **08**, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/PGSfactsheet.pdf

Weapon systems developed in pursuit of a PGS capability could raise the probability of an inadvertent nuclear exchange and complicate future arms control negotiations. Accordingly, the ramifications of a PGS capability must be considered within the context of US arms control, nonproliferation and nuclear safety objectives. Only then will policy-makers and Congress be able make informed assessments of the potential advantages, risks and tradeoffs of PGS. As members of Congress consider future DoD budget requests for PGS programs, they should take care to remember that achieving a PGS capability is not an end in and of itself; it only has value in as much as it helps US achieve its broader goals of thwarting attacks on the US homeland, promoting a stable international environment and preventing further proliferation and use of WMDs

Impact – Accidental War - AT: Joint Warning Center

Joint Warning Center can’t distinguish between all nuclear and conventional missiles – submarines prove

Steven Andreasen, political analyst and former Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control on the US National Security Council, July/August 2006 [Arms Control Today, “Off Target? The Bush Administration's Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles with Conventional Warheads”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2076>, BBQ]

The challenge of assuring another state that a conventional long-range ballistic missile detected by their early-warning systems or notified through a joint warning center was not a nuclear missile aimed at them differs depending on whether the conventional missile is launched from land or sea. A U.S. conventional land-based missile could be deployed at a new base used exclusively for conventional missiles and separated geographically from existing nuclear missile bases. In this scenario, Russian early-warning systems, assuming they had reliable coverage of the United States or they believed U.S. data provided via a joint warning center, could distinguish between a nuclear and conventional ballistic missile launch. In the case of a ballistic missile launched at sea, however, there does not appear to be any easy or easily believable way to distinguish between a nuclear or conventional missile launch because any missile originating from a U.S. submarine could be armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead.

Impact – Accidental War - A2: Safe Guards stop Nuclear War

Even if safeguards solve for the US use they can’t address spill over to other countries.

Shactman, Noah, Editor and foreign policy expert for wired, 4/26/10 (How To: Risk World War III, and Blow Billions Doing It, Wired, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/how-to-risk-world-war-iii-and-blow-billions-doing-it/#more-23973#ixzz0uc1EjZaP)ZDM

Critics like Cirincione (and me) are worried such conventional ICBMs would look to Russia and China like nuclear launches — risking an atomic response every time one of the weapons was sent into the sky.  Defenders of the prompt global strike effort note that the missiles would be based far from America’s nuclear arsenal, and would follow different flight paths. So the risk of one of these missiles touching off an atomic showdown are very small. “Nuclear in one place. Conventional in another.  This isn’t a Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup,” notes the National Space Studies Center’s blog. Maybe the U.S. can put enough safeguards in place to persuade Moscow and Beijing that America’s conventional ICBMs aren’t nukes. (And maybe, as commenter “Almanac” notes, the Russian and Chinese radars are functioning well enough to tell the difference.) Maybe. But what happens other countries follow our lead, and start assembling their own conventional ballistic missile stockpiles? Will Pakistan and India be able to assure eachother that their intentions are pure? How and Israel and Iran? Perhaps a unipolar planet can survive an American global strike arsenal. A multipolar planet — that’s less likely.

Impact – US China War

CPGS causes US China war.

Christopher Bolkcom, analayst on nuclear issues at Congressional Research Service, former researcher at the Federation of American Scientists, Shirley A. Kan, analyst of foreign affairs and national defense at the CRS, and Amy F. Woolf, nuclear specialist at the CRS, 8/11/2006 [CRS Report for Congress, “U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence A China Case Study”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33607.pdf>, BBQ]

While these new conventional weapons might enhance deterrence, they might also detract from crisis stability if a conflict were to occur. For example, in Scenario C (combined arms attack), neither U.S. nor Chinese nuclear forces appear postured in a way that would exacerbate a crisis over Taiwan. Neither is vulnerable to a first strike from the other. However, the same may not be true of conventional forces. China may believe that its forces are vulnerable to an attack by either Taiwan or the United States., and that such an attack is about to occur. It may then believe that, in spite of the risk of escalation and possible attacks (conventional or nuclear) on its own territory, that it would be better off initiating the conflict during the crisis. In essence, then, the U.S. ability to defend Taiwan by attacking targets, especially “centers of gravity,” in China could actually make a crisis worse, and could spur China to begin or expand its attack on Taiwan. It can also be argued that potent conventional forces, those that truly overmatch China’s defenses, may weaken deterrence. As described in the background section of this report, during the Cold War, relatively weak U.S. conventional forces were viewed by many as consistent with strong deterrence because the United States would have to quickly fall back on nuclear weapons if attacked by more potent Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.

Impact – China/ North Korea War

CPGS causes war with China and North Korea

Steven Andreasen, political analyst and former Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control on the US National Security Council, July/August 2006 [Arms Control Today, “Off Target? The Bush Administration's Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles with Conventional Warheads”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2076>, BBQ]

Second, although the use of lethal force against a terrorist threat involving weapons of mass destruction is a capability that the United States must have and use if necessary to prevent an attack, the notion that conventional long-range ballistic missiles are an indispensable silver bullet for our military deserves close scrutiny. In short, we know where rogue regimes are located, we know where “ungoverned” areas provide terrorist havens, and we are improving our existing and planned conventional capabilities to deal with these threats. Moreover, it is far from clear that using a conventional long-range ballistic missile would in practice be “quicker” than using other conventional assets, given challenges associated with identifying and locating targets, receiving authority to fire, and having submarines in position to shoot. There may be other scenarios, for example, using U.S. long-range conventional ballistic missiles to pre-emptively strike North Korean ballistic missiles or China’s nuclear forces during a conflict over Taiwan. If North Korea were about to launch a nuclear missile at the United States, however, there would be more—much more—than conventional Trident missiles heading toward North Korea. A U.S. conventional ballistic missile attack against China’s nuclear forces would run a big risk of nuclear retaliation by Beijing. We also need to look closely at the opportunity cost of the development, deployment, and potential use of long-range conventional ballistic missiles. The achievement of our core security interests, including preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and protecting against terrorists, requires the judicious expenditure of U.S. resources. This is particularly true in the context of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which the Congressional Budget Office now estimates will cost $811 billion. Simply put, is it a wise investment to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on conventional long-range ballistic missiles compared with other urgent defense priorities such as global port security, military personnel, and threat reduction programs? What of the risks? Is the niche capability that conventional Trident missiles might provide worth it if it leads to more countries with more ballistic missiles more willing to use them in their own pursuit of their security interests? Moreover, would any president take the risk of launching a conventional long-range ballistic missile against a terrorist target if there was even the smallest chance of a mistaken retaliatory launch directed at the United States, perhaps with a nuclear-tipped missile? Up to this point, the answers and assurances that have been provided by U.S. officials with respect to a mistaken retaliatory launch have not been reassuring. For example, transparency relating to missile test launches or exercises would provide no reassurance regarding an operational launch of a Trident missile. Moreover, it is difficult to conclude that transparency and Joint Data Exchange are “starting to work,” as Cartwright claims, when there is no system of shared early warning of operational missile launches in place among the United States, Russia, and other states. Even if there was, it may not work or be credible. Moreover, the argument that we have years of experience with nuclear and conventional “dual-capable” systems as a palliative ignores the uniquely destabilizing and destructive characteristics of long-range ballistic missiles, in particular their ability to deliver nuclear payloads globally in near real time. Finally, the issue of conventional Trident missiles embedded in the concept of Prompt Global Strike provides another opportunity to examine whether we are pursuing the right balance in defending the United States, in particular whether we are effectively utilizing all elements of U.S. power or relying too heavily on our military to win the global war on terrorism. Our strategy against terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction must be more than just reducing the time to target our enemies. Indeed, the use of long-range conventional ballistic missiles in volatile regions of the globe might easily lead to greater instability rather than fewer terrorists, especially when factoring in the political fallout overseas from employing long-range ballistic missiles for the first time in combat. In this context, our continuing search for another first-use weapon to deal with the security challenges of the 21st century may in fact be a symptom of a much larger problem: the failure to better use other aspects of U.S. power—economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural—in our national security policy.

Impact--Deterrence

While CPGS may decrease nuclear weapons use – will heighten security problems.

Matthew Martin, program officer in Policy Analysis and Dialogue at the Stanley Foundation, January 2009 [The Stanley Foundation,
“New Understanding of Security Threats Must Drive Rethink of US Nuclear Weapons Policy”, <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=371>, BBQ]

At the same time, simply replacing nuclear with conventional offensive capabilities will not by itself lead to greater stability or strategic reassurance, and could if not properly implemented paradoxically lead to the reverse, for several reasons: · Moving from nuclear to conventional strategic capabilities while maintaining identical strategic objectives may lower the threshold for offensive military action. Without the inseparable and significant downsides to strategic nuclear use, choosing a conventional offensive option to dealing with an identified strategic threat may become more attractive and skew the decisionmaking process against other potential options for action. 2 · The external perception of this lowered threshold may alter potential adversaries' judgment of US actions and reactions in directions not favorable to US security and global strategic stability. · Allied perceptions of US commitments to extended deterrence may skew negatively if the judgment is that the United States has not sufficiently accounted for allied security and stability when reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons and moving to emphasize conventional capabilities. In short, while attempts to devalue nuclear weapons in US strategic planning may open the door to significant downgrading of the offensive US nuclear enterprise, persistent challenges to strategic security and stability will remain and perhaps be exacerbated without a parallel reconsideration of the overall national security strategy.

Impact – Arms Race

CPGS leads to nuclear arms race

Andrew Lichterman, Program Director and Research Analyst for Western States Legal Foundation, 4/7/2007 [“Disarmament Activist, Next generation strategic weapons and the possibility of arms races to come”, <http://disarmamentactivist.org/2007/04/07/next-generation-strategic-weapons-and-the-possibility-of-arms-races-to-come/>, BBQ]

In its current budget request, the military is pushing ahead with its proposals for “prompt global strike,” a broad effort aimed at giving the United States the ability to hit targets anywhere on earth in an hour or two. In the near term, the military wants to deploy conventional warheads on Trident submarine launched ballistic missiles, taking advantage of accuracy improvements resulting from programs conducted in recent years that have received little public attention. In the current proposal, two missiles on each ballistic missile submarine would be conventionally armed. At the same time, the U.S. is exploring other technologies and weapons concepts, ranging from land-based missiles with accurate, maneuverable re-entry vehicles to hypersonic glide vehicles that could deliver a variety of weapons. Although the technologies that would be developed in the Global Strike program currently are slated to be used to deliver only conventional weapons, there is nothing, aside from current policy, to prevent them from being adapted for nuclear weapons delivery in the future, potentially resulting in significant increases in the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Together with initiatives to rebuild the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex and to design new warheads with the flexibility to be fitted to a variety of delivery systems, the pieces are being put in place for a renewed arms race in the 21st century, with the U.S. leading the way.

CPGS triggers global arms race.

Harald Müller, researcher at the UN Institute of Disarmament Research and professor of International Relations at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Summer 2007 [“A New Arms Race? We’re in the Middle of it: The US missiles planned for Poland reflect a new cycle of armament”, <http://www.ip-global.org/archiv/volumes/2007/summer2007/download/65086152078611dcbc86331f1fe270737073/original_ipge_2_mueller.pdf>, BBQ]

The symbolic abandonment of target lists no longer functions as a trust building measure, especially in light of the “prompt global strike” strategy designed to rapidly feed coordinates into the target computers in the event of a crisis. Within the framework of prompt global strike, the maximum number of US warheads stipulated in the Moscow agreement (2,500) is sufficient to cover the decisive military targets in Russia, especially considering that long-range conventional weapons are also reserved for this purpose. Russia and China are arming themselves in order to counter this potential threat. The growth in the Chinese nuclear arsenal has provided an armament impulse for India, which has subsequently provoked similar measures in Pakistan. In the wake of the arms race between the “three major powers,” Great Britain and France are also modernizing their nuclear strike forces. Since the nuclear powers, in the opinion of the majority of non-nuclear states, have not met their obligations according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the treaty’s effectiveness as a normative obstacle to the nuclear ambitions of third parties has suffered. The idea that these ambitions have nothing to do with the behavior of the nuclear-weapons states, but is rather based purely on regional or national particularities, is a fairy tale. First, every security region in the world is influenced by at least one of the nuclear-weapons states. Second, the example set by the strong and successful states has always had an effect on the ambitions of the emerging powers. The tragic consequence: we are not at the beginning of a new arms race, we are in the midst of it

Impact – Arms Race

CPGS increases likelihood of arms race and weapon usage

Ian Davis, Ph.D., independent human security and arms control consultant, former executive director of the British American Security Information Council, and Robin Dodd, researcher at BASIC, June 2006 [BASIC Paper No. 51, US ‘Prompt Global Strike’ Capability: A New Destabilising Sub-State Deterrent in the Making? [www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP51.pdf](http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP51.pdf), BBQ]

• International legal implications The bombing of targets thousands of miles away with a PGS capability raises serious legal implications and questions pertaining to territorial sovereignty. These concerns extend to long-standing treaties covering international and sovereign airspaces that ICBM flyovers would be likely to violate. • Undermining the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: A new arms race in ballistic missiles? The PGS capability also raises serious non-proliferation issues. First, it is likely to lead to a new arms race in ballistic missiles and countermeasures as other countries seek to match the US system and/or seek to protect their sovereignty by building weapon systems to counter US capabilities. It seems likely, for example, that other nuclear powers, such as China and Russia, would embark on similar SLBM and ICBM conversion projects. This could in turn ratchet up the potential for major armed conflict in areas, such as the Taiwan Straits, where tensions already run high. Second, PGS clearly undermines ballistic missile non-proliferation efforts, such as the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which calls for greater restraint in developing, testing, using, and spreading ballistic missiles.22 At the signing of the Code, John Bolton, then US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, affirmed US support for it, but also highlighted a number of qualifying factors and reservations. One such reservation concerning pre-launch notifications was that the United States ‘reserves the right in circumstances of war to launch ballistic missile and space-launch vehicles without prior notification’.23 If the US administration is also asserting its ‘right’ to pre-emptive launch of a PGS capability the Code is as good as dead and buried. Third, it will lower the threshold of use for such weapons. And as Steve Andreason, a former US Nation Security Council staffer has pointed out: “Long-range ballistic missiles have never been used in combat in 50 years”. But once the United States starts indicating that it views these missiles as no different than any other weapon, “other nations will adopt the

CPGS prompts a new arms race with Russia and China

Jack A. Smith, Antiwar.com, 5/7/10, “Obama's War Machine”, Lexis

Prompt Global Strike relies on high speed missiles, satellite mapping and other cutting edge military technology to launch a devastating non-nuclear payload from a military base in the U.S to destroy a target anywhere in the world in less than one hour. The purpose is to resolve the conundrum posed by the global inhibition toward the use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, thus greatly strengthening the Obama Administration's full spectrum military dominance.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, a once leading Cold War hawk, had PGS in mind in an article he placed in the January-February 2009 Foreign Affairs titled A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age. Writing of the need to balance nuclear capabilities with non-nuclear weapons, he declared: ??The United States cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, platforms and personnel that will ensure that dominance's persistence,? he said.
PGS is a non-nuclear weapon on steroids. Along with existing nuclear missiles and anti-missile systems, this new addition, still in its experimental stage, will provide the United States with a decisive advantage over China and Russia, unnecessarily provoking an arms race, defensive or offensive, in a totally new weapon category.

Impact – Russia/China/US Relations

CPGS => perception of U.S. vulnerability to China and Russia

Maj Todd C. Shull, Master of Arts in Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, M.S., University of North Dakota, B.A., Colorado State University, September 2005 [“Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Valuable Military Option or Threat to Global Stability”, <http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2005/Sep/05Sep_Shull.pdf>, BBQ]

1. Will Conventional PGS Create a “Security Dilemma?” According to the 2001 NPR, the United States desires expanded non-nuclear strike capabilities as a way to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons and enhance the credibility of its deterrent posture. Conventional PGS capabilities could fill this need by providing a rapid response, precision strike capability that can defeat a variety of target types. Will the deployment of conventional PGS capabilities by the United States cause Russia and China to develop increased perceptions of vulnerability? In short, the answer is yes. The inherent characteristics that allow conventional PGS capabilities to deny a rogue state or terrorist organization the benefit of its hard and deeply buried facilities, WMD storage areas, and missiles through a preemptive strike, could also be turned against strategic targets, such as missile silos, in Russia and China. Both nations have exhibited concerns over the dominance of existing U.S. conventional forces as demonstrated in DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. Technically, conventional PGS capabilities do not expand the threat already posed by existing U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities. However, the greater speed of PGS verses other conventional capabilities and the greater usability verses nuclear capabilities will likely combine to produce a greater overall sense of vulnerability. Even assuming Russia and China do not feel threatened directly, conventional PGS capabilities could be destabilizing if for no other reason than they may make the United States more likely to resort to force instead of diplomacy. Assuming Russia and China perceive greater vulnerability, what, if anything, will they do to reestablish balance with the United States? As discussed in the case study above, Russia already feels threatened by the conventional warfighting capabilities of the United States. This perceived vulnerability contributed to Russia’s decision to renounce the former Soviet Union’s “no first use” pledge and adopt a nuclear doctrine that allows for nuclear retaliation in response to attacks with conventional weapons. Other procedural remedies to reduce the vulnerability of Russian strategic forces have also been implemented previously. For example, to reduce their vulnerability to preemptive strike, Russian ICBMs are on alert and are reportedly able to be launched within twelve minutes.426 The relatively low percentage of “survivable” forces (deployed ballistic missiles submarines and mobile ICBMs outside of garrison) amounts to only 2 to 4 percent of Russia’s entire force. While fiscally impractical, increasing the percentage of warheads deployed on ballistic missile submarines or increasing the number of mobile ICBMs deployed outside of garrison could reduce Russia’s perceived level of vulnerability. Any reduction in Russia’s perception of vulnerability will likely need to come in the form of measures taken by the United States to reduce the threat it projects. As with Russia, it is fairly certain that U.S. conventional PGS capabilities would contribute to an enhanced sense of Chinese vulnerability vis-à-vis the United States. While having been vulnerable to American conventional and nuclear capabilities for quite some time, China’s commitment to “no first use” and minimum deterrence have significantly limited the scope of China’s response by preventing increasing the size and readiness of its strategic forces. China’s on-going programs to field mobile ICBMs and improved SLBMs should work to reduce the level of potential crisis instability by increasing the survivability of Chinese strategic forces.

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CPGS Good – Deterrence

CPGS enhances deterrence – more credible that nuclear weapons

Christopher Bolkcom, analayst on nuclear issues at Congressional Research Service, former researcher at the Federation of American Scientists, Shirley A. Kan, analyst of foreign affairs and national defense at the CRS, and Amy F. Woolf, nuclear specialist at the CRS, 8/11/2006 [CRS Report for Congress, “U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence A China Case Study”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33607.pdf>, BBQ]

DOD argues that PGS systems would be able to hold at risk targets that, at present, can only be destroyed with high confidence by nuclear weapons. Examples could include mobile, buried or hardened targets or command and control (C2) facilities. They could also attack promptly at the start of a conflict, destroying an enemy’s air-defenses or other “anti-access” forces. Therefore, prompt global strike capabilities might enhance deterrence because these conventionally armed weapons would be more useable, and therefore more credible, than nuclear weapons. China could still retaliate against the United States or its allies, but, with its no-first use policy in place and forces consistent with a minimum nuclear deterrent, it may not be able to respond with nuclear weapons. Thus, supporters argue that the United States might have greater credibility when extending deterrence to its friends and allies. If, through accident or miscalculation, a war were to break out, conventional weapons could offer improved warfighting capabilities that would allow the United States to prevail conventionally, and raise the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons. For example, China’s ballistic missiles, long-range air defenses, long- range surveillance radar, and anti-ship cruise missiles are widely considered problematic for DOD. These weapons are expected to strongly impinge on DOD’s freedom to maneuver in this theater, and overcoming these capabilities are likely to engender significant U.S. casualties. Advocates argue that in a warfighting context, PGS and the F-22 Raptor (by virtue of its stealth, speed, advanced sensors, and avionics) will be able to destroy or defeat these targets more effectively and with much less attrition than current weapon systems.

CPGS deter and in the instance of WMD launch – will take out weapons in 30 minutes

Ian Davis, Ph.D., independent human security and arms control consultant, former executive director of the British American Security Information Council, and Robin Dodd, researcher at BASIC, June 2006 [BASIC Paper No. 51, US ‘Prompt Global Strike’ Capability: A New Destabilising Sub-State Deterrent in the Making? [www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP51.pdf](http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP51.pdf), BBQ]

The PGS concept is an entirely predictable extension of current US ‘pre-emptive’ strategic thinking. Indeed, its conceptual development from a purely strategic to a viable tactical weapon mirrors the subtle way (since 2002) the Bush doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ has increasingly become one of ‘prevention’. The evolving rationale behind the PGS concept reflects a shift in emphasis away from a ‘one size fits all’ nuclear deterrent to a more ‘tailored deterrence’ designed to counter each individual threat or adversary as or when it should arise.11 A fully operational PGS system would provide military commanders with an ‘on-demand’ force projection capability designed to ‘hold at risk’ a variety of perceived threats, both strategic and tactical. On a strategic level these threats would range from ‘rogue’ regimes and terrorist networks to near-peer competitors and potential major adversaries such as China. ‘‘This weapon would give the US global conventional pre-emption – a strike first capability – in 30 minutes, to attack North Korean or Iranian WMD or leadership facilities”, said William Arkin, a former Army intelligence analyst and independent defence consultant.12 On a tactical level, the range and immediacy of the weapon would also permit the US military to take out ‘time-urgent’ or ‘fleeting targets’ – such as enemy WMD being deployed for launch or use – in restricted or ‘anti-access’ environments or environments where the US military has a limited forward-deployed presence. The missile’s payload would also enable the US military to target what are commonly referred to as ‘hard and deeply buried targets’.

AT: CPGS Bad – China War

**CPGS =/= China Nuclear War**

Maj Todd C. Shull, Master of Arts in Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, M.S., University of North Dakota, B.A., Colorado State University, September 2005 [“Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Valuable Military Option or Threat to Global Stability”, <http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2005/Sep/05Sep_Shull.pdf>, BBQ]

Recently, there have been rumblings from inside China that the time may have come to renounce it policy of “no first use” and minimum deterrence. Major General Zhu Chenghu, Dean of China’s National Defense University, presented this case recently in remarks he characterized as his own personal view rather than that of the government.427 Even though he claimed to be speaking on his own behalf, his remarks generated great controversy in the United States and China. Bruce Blair, the President of the World Security Institute, recently wrote an article refuting the logic of Zhu’s proposal. He argues that China’s nuclear program has “remained virtually etched in stone for many decades” in spite of the fact that the superpowers built up huge nuclear arsenals and placed them on “hair-trigger” alert.428 China’s current policy has also endured the more recent provocations of being officially added back to U.S. nuclear war plans as a target in January 1998 and being identified as an “immediate threat” by the 2001 NPR.429 Blair reasons that if China’s nuclear policy has lasted this long in the face of significant nuclear threats, why would it be renounced now in the face of U.S. conventional superiority?430 Blair also points out that Zhu’s proposal to shift to a “first use” policy is suicidal unless China can achieve “a meaningful level of escalation dominance” over the adversary, which given the wide disparity in nuclear capabilities between the United States and China is extremely unlikely to occur without a significant Chinese nuclear buildup.431 In order to accomplish this buildup, China would need to restart its fissile materials production facility (closed since 1990), design new nuclear warheads, and resume underground nuclear testing, but all of this would involve an “implausibly radical departure from China’s current course.”432

Aff - CPGS =/= Nuclear Counter-strike

Use of a hypersonic plane ensures no miscalculation

Agence France Presse, 4/27/10, “US hypersonic glider flunks first test flight”, Lexis

The hypersonic program appears to fit in with US plans to develop a way of hitting distant targets with conventional weapons within an hour, dubbed "prompt global strike."

According to a Pentagon fact sheet for the vehicle, "the US military seeks the capability to respond, with little or no advanced warning, to threats to our national security anywhere around the globe."

A hypersonic plane could substitute for a ballistic missile armed with a conventional warhead, as other countries might suspect the missile represented a nuclear attack.

"Aside from its speed, another advantage is that it would not be mistaken by Russia or China for a nuclear launch," said Loren Thompson, an analyst with the Lexington Institute who has done consultant work for Lockheed Martin.

The US Air Force has also looked at hypersonic vehicles for intelligence-gathering if spy satellites in low orbit were attacked, he said.

Aff - CPGS Key to Heg

CPGS key to heg.

Rick **Rozoff** Quoting Russian General Leonid Ivashov, 4/7/**10**, http://www.sott.net/articles/show/212206-America-s-Prompt-Global-Strike-World-Military-Superiority-Without-Nuclear-Weapons

The Prompt Global Strike concept envisages a concentrated strike using several thousand precision conventional weapons in 2-4 hours that would completely destroy the critical infrastructures of the target country and thus force it to capitulate.

"The Prompt Global Strike concept is meant to sustain the US monopoly in the military sphere and to widen the gap between it and the rest of the world. Combined with the deployment of missile defense supposed to keep the US immune to retaliatory strikes from Russia and China, the Prompt Global Strike initiative is going to turn Washington into a modern era global dictator.

"In essence, the new US nuclear doctrine is an element of the novel US security strategy that would be more adequately described as the strategy of total impunity. The US is boosting its military budget, unleashing NATO as a global gendarme, and planning real-life exercises in Iran to test the efficiency of the Prompt Global Strike initiative in practice. At the same time, Washington is talking about a completely nuclear-free world.