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A. Obama- Gates Relations High- New space policy

BART JANSEN • FLORIDA TODAY journalist • June 29, 2010, “Cooperation at heart of Obama's new space policy” florida today, http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20100629/NEWS02/6290323/Cooperation-at-heart-of-Obama-s-new-space-policy

Defense Secretary Robert Gates fully supported the new policy to enhance international collaboration and reduce the country's vulnerabilities."Space-based capabilities are critical to our military's ability to navigate accurately, strike precisely, and gather battle space awareness efficiently," Gates said. "However, changes in the space environment over the last decade challenge our operations. Today, space is increasingly contested as our systems face threats of disruption and attack, increasingly competitive as more states, private firms, and others develop space-based capabilities, and increasingly congested with orbital debris."

The House Appropriations subcommittee on NASA is scheduled to vote today on the agency's spending plan for the year starting Oct. 1, which will begin to show whether Congress will adopt Obama's blueprint for space.

B. INSERT SPECIFIC LINK

C. Obama will appease Gates to prevent backlash

Francis A. Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Illinois College of Law, 1/26/2010. [War is a Crime.org, Gates Threatens Obama with US Military Coup]

Obviously, Gates is **sending a threat to Obama** and the civilian “leadership” in America: **You risk a military coup if you do not do exactly what we in the Pentagon tell you to do**. This is no idle threat. And it can happen here in America. Just remember the plutocratic sponsored military coup attempt against President Franklin Roosevelt that was thwarted by retired Marine Corps General Smedley Butler under similar economic and political conditions. If it had succeeded that anti-FDR coup would have established a fascist dictatorship in America. I am not comparing Obama to FDR by any means. But **the historical parallels should** be obvious to everyone. And remember that Bush’s General Tommy Franks publicly stated that in the event of another major terrorist attack on America, the American people would demand that the military shut the civilian government down. In other words, Gen. Franks too publicly threatened a military coup against this Republic’s democratically elected civilian leadership.

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D. RRWs are Gate’s priority –compensation he gets will be modernization

Emelie Rutherford, Staff Writer, Defense Daily, June 18, 2010, “Gates Hopeful Hill Will OK Post-RRW Warhead Mod Effort” Lexis. TP

Secretary Robert Gates said he is optimistic he will receive long-sought congressional approval to modernize the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, which a Senate panel weighed yesterday, along with the Pentagon's new Nuclear Posture Review, support a new warhead life-extension effort. President Barack Obama requested from Congress increased funding next year to improve the nuclear stockpile, and wants to transfer $4.6 billion from the Defense Department to the Energy Department in the new few years for nuclear-weapon life-extension and infrastructure-modernization efforts. Congress would never approve the former Bush administration's proposal for a Reliable Replacement Warhead, an effort intended to improve the nuclear stockpile for safety, reliability, and environmental reasons. Some lawmakers feared the program would amount to the creation of a new nuclear weapon and work against nonproliferation efforts. Gates said yesterday the New START treaty, which will not be ratified without Senate approval, would aid efforts to modernize the nuclear stockpile. "I'm confident that the new START treaty will...in no way compromise America's nuclear deterrent," **Gates told** the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). "Maintaining a credible deterrent requires an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and reliable nuclear warheads," he said. "**This calls for a reinvigoration of our nuclear-weapons complex--that is, our infrastructure and our science, technology, and engineering base.** And I might just add, I've been up here for the last four springs trying to get money for this, and this is the first time I think I've got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal." Gates noted the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, led by former defense secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger, recently reported to Congress on negative consequences of not modernizing the nuclear stockpile. The report detailed impacts on the nuclear components themselves and on the workforce. "So this is a long-term need on the part of the nation," Gates said. "We've needed it for quite some time. The Congress voted down...the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, and there has been no progress toward providing any additional funding for our nuclear weapons modernization programs since that time....Frankly, and just basically realistically, I see this (New START) treaty **as a vehicle to finally be able to get what we need** in the way of modernization that we have been unable to get otherwise." SASC member Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I/D-Conn.) linked the fate of the New START treaty, which would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads, to the administration's new warhead modernization proposal. "Ultimately, I think that whether or not the new START treaty is ratified will depend on members of the Senate of both parties having the confidence that the administration is committed to modernizing...our current nuclear stockpile," Lieberman said. The senator told Gates that, "in an interesting way and kind of a twist of fate, the ratification of this arms-control treaty may actually enable you and the administration and the last administration to receive the funding from Congress that you have been asking for to modernize our current nuclear stockpile." Energy Secretary Steven Chu, also testifying before the SASC on the New START treaty, said he has finished a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. It "provides a multi-decade investment strategy needed to extend the life of key nuclear weapon systems, rebuild and modernize our facilities, and provide for the necessary physical and intellectual infrastructure," he said. Chu, sitting next to Gates, insisted the administration is not seeking to add more military capability to the weapons and only wants to improve their safety, security, and reliability. "That means we are replacing old electronics that we can't even buy any more--tubes with integrated circuits," Chu said. "We're going to insensitive high explosives, so that they could be safer. So it's much less likely that an accident, a fire, something of that nature, could set these weapons off. We're increasing the surety, so that should any terrorists or anybody get hold of these, that it would be impossible for them to set it off." Though the administration has no plans to build a replacement warhead, Chu noted language in the New START treaty and the Nuclear Posture Review would allow scientists at the national labs to consider designs for new weapons, which potentially could be sought in the future. The New START treaty, which Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed April 8, needs the approval of 67 senators to be ratified. The agreement would set aggregate limits of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads for the United States and Russia, down from 2,200 now. It also calls for lowering the number of allowed launchers to 800 and total nuclear missiles and heavy bombers to 700.

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E. RRW triggers a modernization arms race

Thomas Scheber, National Institute for Public Policy, August 2007, “Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues” <http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/RRW%20final%20with%20foreword%207.30.07.pdf> TP

An article by Russian authors, Sergey Rogov, Viktor Yesin, and Pavel Zolotarev, discussing nuclear issues and threats to global security took a circumspect approach: … the problem of the aging of the nuclear warheads and their replacement with new warheads can be a subject of the consultations. In conditions of the rejection of nuclear tests, the problem of reliability can, in a few years, become acute due to the lack of the possibility to test new nuclear warheads. It cannot be ruled out that all five of the official nuclear states, including China, may show interest in the clarification of the technical parameters of the resolution of this problem.25 Writers in countries in which U.S. nuclear weapon programs and policies are less well understood have expressed fear and uncertainty. According to the Chinese newspaper, Renmin Ribao, the RRW program is a new nuclear weapons development program that has gone beyond the scope of fighting terrorism and will retard the international non-proliferation regime and lead to further nuclear proliferation. The author speculates that RRW will lead to an “arms race” and an “action-reaction” dynamic once the U.S. begins nuclear testing, which the author asserts it must. Also argued is that nuclear weapons are vital to the U.S. national security strategy and this strategy will lead other states to pursue nuclear weapons.26

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F. Proliferation snowballs and puts everyone on hair trigger – every small crisis will go nuclear.

Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, ‘9 (Henry, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd, Policy Review June & July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)

At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

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Uniqueness – Gates Happy Now

Shifting of power from the Navy to Counterinsurgency shows Gates is getting his way

ROBERT HADDICK, Managing editior of the Small Wars Journal, JUNE 25, 2010 “This Week at War: The Afghanistan Vortex” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/25/this_week_at_war_the_afghanistan_vortex>

The administration and its military advisers have chosen a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and a long list of officials have expressed their concerns about the implications of repeated deployments for the all-volunteer force. Afghanistan also seems to chew up generals. Gen. David McKiernan was replaced out of frustration with a lack of progress. The same frustration, expressing itself in behind-the-scenes contempt and bickering, brought down Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Now Petraeus has been recalled from a depleted bench. This move has its price. After jumping into the Afghan vortex, Petraeus will leave behind his critical duties at Central Command, which include diplomacy across the Middle East and Central Asia, the containment of Iran, and supervising the endgame in Iraq. The administration has yet to announce who, if anyone, will replace Petraeus at Centcom. The Afghan vortex has implications for defense planning elsewhere in the world. In a speech he delivered to the Navy League in May, Gates said that the costs of rehabilitating the Army and Marine Corps, combined with the ground force's long term manpower and family support costs, will mean that the Navy will see no increases in its budget. The secretary general of Japan's ruling party recently argued that U.S. naval power is in decline and that Japan needs to adjust its maritime security policy accordingly. When that view spreads throughout Asia, an arms race will be inevitable.

Gates credibility high now

IISS, International Instititute for Strategic Studies, an international IR thinktank, 2010 “The world Military Balance 2010” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/33196243/World-Military-2010>

As of November 2009 the National Defense Strategy of August 2008 remained the most recent major US document on defence doctrine. Even when the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is completed and submied (possibly in conjunc- tion with the release of the 2011 budget request to Congress in February 2010), Gates’s 2008 strategy will continue to have a powerful legacy. The National Defense Strategy emphasised the centrality of the counter-terrorist campaign, saying that ‘for the fore- seeable future, winning the Long War against violent extremist movements will be the central objective of the U.S.’. While some analysts reported that the docu- ment may have met resistance in some quarters of the military (with willingness to support large standing forces, and the purchase of systems such as mine- resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs) over longer, more-established programmes perhaps being less than wholehearted), Gates pushed back against such ideas. Nonetheless, when Gates delivered his statement on the defence budget in May 2009, after Obama’s one-year budget plan for the military suggested capping future Pentagon budget growth at roughly the rate of inlation, there was minimal criti- cism from the uniformed services. This was a reflec- tion of Gates’s credibility, the fact that these proposals had already been aired in his April budget recom- mendation statement, the rm White House support that he clearly enjoyed and perhaps also his willing- ness to deal strongly with those deemed unsuccessful in post

Uniqueness – Gates Happy Now

Gates is getting what he wants- he’s getting Indonesian counterinsurgency help despite human rights abuses.

Nasdaq 7/23/2010 “US Resumes Ties With Indonesia Special Forces – Pentagon” <http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-story.aspx?storyid=201007220320dowjonesdjonline000375&title=us-resumes-ties-with-indonesia-special-forces---pentagon#ixzz0uc4vrKrt>

JAKARTA (AFP)--The U.S. announced Thursday it was resuming military ties with Indonesian special forces after a 12-year pause, during a visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to Jakarta."We will begin a gradual, measured process of working with Kopassus," a senior U.S. defense official said, referring to the elite Indonesian military unit with which Washington suspended ties in 1998.The decision was made "in light of the progress that Indonesia and its military...has made in terms of reform and professionalization since the fall of Suharto as well as recent pledges of reform," he said.

The U.S. wants to resume training for the special forces as part of growing counterinsurgency and intelligence cooperation with Jakarta.However, the move is controversial as the Kopassus unit has been implicated in human rights abuses, including in East Timor, and some figures in the U.S. Congress have opposed embracing the force before it has accounted for its past.The U.S. broke off ties with the Kopassus under a law banning cooperation with foreign troops implicated in rights abuses.The Indonesian special forces are accused of committing abuses in East Timor and Aceh under then-dictator Suharto in the 1990s.The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama, who spent part of his childhood in Indonesia, sees the country as an increasingly important player in East Asia and key ally in the Muslim world.

Public has favorable opinion of gates, showing his influence within the administration

Jeffrey Jones, Gallup Journalist, November 6, 2009“Americans Mostly Favorable on Defense Secretary Gates” http://www.gallup.com/poll/124175/americans-mostly-favorable-defense-secretary-gates.aspx

PRINCETON, NJ -- As President Obama nears an important decision on U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, Americans rate one of his key military advisers, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, much more positively than negatively. Forty-nine percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of Gates while 19% view him unfavorably. One in three Americans are not familiar enough with Gates to rate him.These results are based on the Oct. 16-19 USA Today/Gallup poll. This is the first Gallup reading on public opinion of Gates, who served as George W. Bush's defense secretary in the latter part of his administration and whom Obama asked to remain in that role in his new administration.Compared with other members of Obama's cabinet for whom Gallup has data, Gates is rated more positively than Vice President Joe Biden but less positively than Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton's unfavorable ratings are much higher than Gates', while Gates is the least well known of the three.Gallup does not have much data on prior defense secretaries, though it did take several measurements of Gates' immediate predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld averaged 49% favorable and 37% unfavorable ratings while he was secretary of defense, but had just a 27% favorable rating (and a 57% unfavorable rating) immediately after Bush replaced him with Gates in late 2006. Gates himself is a Republican who not only served under George W. Bush but was deputy national security adviser and then CIA director under George H.W. Bush.Despite his long service to Republican presidents, Gates receives a more positive review from Democrats than from Republicans.This suggests that Gates' status as an Obama administration official is more influential than his political affiliation or prior service in how people view him. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has also served under both Bush and Obama, and Gallup observed an abrupt shift in how confident Republicans and Democrats were in his economic leadership after the change in administrations. Republicans expressed more confidence in Bernanke to recommend the right thing for the economy from 2006 to 2008 while Bush was in office, but after the change in administrations, that pattern reversed and now Democrats are much more confident in Bernanke. Whether this indicates that Americans are unaware of the political background of these officials, or merely put greater emphasis on their current service to one party or the other is unclear.

Uniqueness – Gates Happy Now

Gates is going to receive the patriot award. Nuff said.

PR Newswire, national news source, May 27, 2010, “Secretary Gates to Receive the 2010 American Patriot Award” http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/secretary-gates-to-receive-the-2010-american-patriot-award-95019044.html

WASHINGTON, May 27 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- Dr. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, was named today as recipient of the 2010 American Patriot Award given by The National Defense University Foundation. Washington's most powerful and influential leaders will gather to celebrate his lifetime of patriotism and to witness his receiving this prestigious award at the American Patriot Award Gala on Friday, November 5, 2010, at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington, D.C. Secretary Gates will be recognized for his outstanding contributions to the intelligence, national security and defense communities throughout his impressive career in government. Past recipients of the American Patriot Award include former President George H.W. Bush; General Colin Powell; Dr. Henry Kissinger; General David H. Petraeus, USA, and the Extraordinary Men and Women of CENTCOM; Senator Bob Dole; Senator John W. Warner and Representative Ike Skelton; Senators Daniel Inouye and Ted Stevens; Astronaut and Senator John Glenn; former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger; and The Men and Women of our Nation's Defense Team. The American Patriot Award Gala is one of Washington, D.C.'s most illustrious events, attended by nearly 600 guests, including senior Administration officials, Members of Congress, senior military officials, Ambassadors, dignitaries, and corporate and community leaders. Past attendees include former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan; White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel; ABC News' Chief White House Correspondent Martha Raddatz; NBC News' Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Andrea Mitchell; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen; former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft; Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps General James Conway; and, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Materiel Command General Ann Dunwoody, USA. Beyond honoring the recipients, the Gala showcases and supports the National Defense University and its crucial mission of preparing military and civilian leaders from the U.S. and other countries to examine national and international security challenges through multidisciplinary educational and research programs, professional exchanges, and outreach. It is the only university providing a common educational experience for all the various professional communities engaged in national security. The main campus is located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C."As a true patriot, Secretary Gates is most deserving of the National Defense University Foundation's American Patriot Award because of his inspirational leadership and selfless dedication in serving our nation's ideals, values and democratic principles," said Brigadier General William J. Leszczynski, Jr., USA (Ret), President and CEO, National Defense University Foundation. The National Defense University Foundation is a non-profit organization that has provided private sector support for the National Defense University in mission-oriented areas for more than 28 years. Additionally, in collaboration with the University, the Foundation develops and manages outreach programs that help educate and engage the public for a better understanding of critical national security issues and the vital role NDU plays in addressing them.

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Links – Iraq

Gates wants the US to win in Iraq

Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, September 2008, “Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations,” online: http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdf

In both Afghanistan and Iraq there are questions about the quality of the planning to govern either country. Part of the problem may have stemmed from defining the objective as regime change, with humanitarian assistance and reconstruction as potential missions, without asking the basic questions about who would govern the country, how they would do so, and who had the mission to govern at both the central and local level.

Yet all might agree that, in the absence of clear objectives, it is easy to confuse military activity with progress and difficult to judge how military operations fit into the overall civil-military effort or how well they are contributing to resolving a problem consistent with national interests. Acknowledging both the difficulty and importance of defining goals and objectives, George Marshall once quipped that, if one gets the objectives right, “a lieutenant can write the strategy.” Not surprisingly, the development of goals and objectives is often the first point of tension in civil-military relations at the highest levels of government.

Despite the positive developments in Iraq, questions remain over how labor should be divided and civilian and military activities coordinated to support counterinsurgency operations in foreign theaters. Today, the need for overall political leadership and coherence appears greater but achieving it more difficult. At the same time, a distant, top-down style of strategic management or micromanagement of the complex tasks in remote contested zones seems quixotic.

So we ask ourselves, how does irregular warfare alter our thinking about civilmilitary relations? Is the putative decline in civil-military relations permanent, serious, and crippling? Or conversely, is it sui generis to a conflict such as Iraq or Afghanistan— and overblown in terms of the problems it presents—depending mainly on individual actors and therefore manageable, given the right set of personalities? To what degree does command and control structure contribute to, or detract from, the ability to integrate civil-military efforts? And at what levels and in what venues should civil-military efforts be integrated in an irregular war?

The war that “we are in and must win” (to paraphrase Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) pits us against nonstate groups that seek to advance extremist agendas through violence. Accordingly, irregular warfare will be the dominant form of conflict among adversaries in the early years of the 21st century. To succeed in these messy and profoundly political wars, the United States needs a framework that appropriately and effectively balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the best use of their unique and complementary portfolios.

Gates does not support withdrawal from Iraq.

Gareth Porter, staff writer at the Asian Times, 3/27/2009, “When a withdrawal is not a withdrawal”, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KC27Ak02.html>

Despite United States President Barack Obama's statement at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, on February 27 that he had "chosen a timeline that will remove our combat brigades over the next 18 months", a number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which have been the basic US Army combat unit in Iraq for six years, will remain in Iraq after that date under a new non-combat label. A spokesman for Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick S Ryder, told Inter Press Service on Tuesday that "several advisory and assistance brigades" would be part of a US command in Iraq that would be "re-designated" as a "transition force headquarters" after August 2010. But the "advisory and assistance brigades" to remain in Iraq after that date will in fact be the same as BCTs, except for the addition of a few dozen officers who would carry out the advice and assistance missions, according to military officials involved in the planning process. Gates has hinted that the withdrawal of combat brigades would be accomplished through an administrative sleight of hand rather than by actually withdrawing all the combat brigade teams. Appearing on *Meet the Press* on March 1, Gates said the "transition force" would have "a very different kind of mission", and that the units remaining in Iraq "will be characterized differently". "They will be called advisory and assistance brigades," said Gates. "They won't be called combat brigades." Obama's decision to go along with the military proposal for a "transition force" of 35,000 to 50,000 troops thus represents a complete abandonment of his own original policy of combat troop withdrawal and an acceptance of what the military wanted all along - the continued presence of several combat brigades in Iraq well beyond mid-2010

Gates supports staying in Iraq

Aluf Benn and Shmuel Rosner, staff writers at Haamatz, 6/6/2010, “Israel fears US Iraq exit could topple Jordanian regime”, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-fears-u-s-iraq-exit-could-topple-jordanian-regime-1.215746>

One day earlier, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told AIPAC that "in a region where impressions are important, countries must be careful not to demonstrate weakness and surrender to extremists ... It is [also] true for Iraq." Defense Minister Amir Peretz, who met in Washington this week with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and several senior senators, expressed a similar view. Olmert, explaining his position to a visiting delegation from the American Jewish Committee the day after his AIPAC speech, said the question of why America began the war in Iraq is currently secondary. What matters, he argued, is that given the present state of affairs in Iraq, if America were to leave now, it would lose its authority throughout the Middle East.

Links – Afghanistan

SQ plans don’t link, they aren’t abrupt. Abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan angers Gates.

Roxana Trion, writer for The Hill, December 2, 2009, “Gates opposes troop withdrawal deadline for Afghanistan,” The Hill, online: http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/70165-gates-clinton-and-mullen-defend-afghan-plan

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he opposed setting deadlines for U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan as he defended President Barack Obama’s new war strategy.

Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen on Wednesday made their first rounds on Capitol Hill to publicly sell Obama’s Afghanistan war plan to conflicted lawmakers still trying to digest the president’s announcement.

Obama announced on Tuesday he will send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, some as early as the next few weeks. The president also announced his goal of beginning a U.S. troop withdrawal by the summer of 2011.

Gates said he agrees with the president’s July 2011 timeline but he would not agree with any efforts to set a deadline for complete troop withdrawal.

“I have adamantly opposed deadlines. I opposed them in Iraq, and I oppose deadlines in Afghanistan. But what the president has announced is the beginning of a process, not the end of a process. And it is clear that this will be a gradual process and, as he said last night, based on conditions on the ground. So there is no deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan,” Gates told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday afternoon. “July 2011 is not a cliff.”

Gates is confident in and happy with the current strategy in Afghanistan.

Adam Entous, Reuters Staff Writer. 06-09-10. Reuters. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N2923922.htm

LONDON, June 9 (Reuters) - U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates voiced confidence on Wednesday that sufficient progress would be made in the war in Afghanistan to allow Afghan forces to take more authority in parts of the country this winter. Gates predicted "a very tough summer" of growing violence as U.S. forces push deeper into the southern provinces where the Taliban are strongest, but he said success in Afghanistan depended on far more than securing Kandahar and Helmand alone. "I think it's important to remember that Kandahar is not Afghanistan," Gates said in comments that appeared to play down a U.S.-led operation for control of the area, known as the birthplace of the Taliban. Gates said the United States had confidence in Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who some U.S. officials had described as the weak link in the U.S. strategy, citing his reluctance to tackle rampant corruption. U.S. President Barack Obama last year embraced a strategy to push the Taliban from key population centres and is sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. He has also set a goal of starting a gradual drawdown of those forces in July 2011, security conditions permitting. "All of us, for our publics, are going to have to show by the end of the year that our strategy is on the right track and making some headway," Gates told reporters after talks with British leaders in London. "I don't think anyone has any illusions that we'll be done or that there'll be big victories or something like that." SUFFICIENT PROGRESS But Gates said General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, was "pretty confident that by the end of the year he will be able to point to sufficient progress that validates the strategy and also justifies continuing to work at this." "I think there will be measures of effectiveness that he (McChrystal) will be able to show by the end of the year". McChrystal envisions a gradual campaign in Kandahar to deliver security and governance, as opposed to one big military assault. In March, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the U.S. military's Joint Chiefs of Staff, described Kandahar as Afghanistan's "center of gravity" and the key to reversing the Taliban's momentum this year, Obama's goal when he ordered the troop surge in December. Gates made clear he believed Kandahar was an important piece of a successful strategy, but not the only piece. "Kandahar and Helmand are important but they are not the only provinces in Afghanistan that matter in terms of the outcome of this struggle," he said. Gates said the transition to greater Afghan control would begin in areas where not only security has improved but where gains have been made in "civil governance, the ability to deliver some measure of a rule of law and government services to people". "The ground has to be ready on both the civilian and the military sides to begin the transition process," Gates said. "I am pretty confident that we will, in fact, be able to begin that process sometime this coming winter in various parts of Afghanistan."

**Gates is confident in the 2011 withdrawal date and doesn’t want to shift strategy.**

Jim Tankersley. Staff Writer for the LA Times. 06-20-10. LA Times. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/20/world/la-fg-us-afghan-20100621

Reporting from Washington — Top Obama administration officials Sunday continued their campaign to paint a more positive picture of progress in the Afghanistan conflict, even as they declined to predict how many American troops might begin to leave Afghanistan next year.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told "Fox News Sunday" that "we are making progress" in Afghanistan after President Obama ordered 30,000 more troops to the region over the winter, albeit at a rate "somewhat slower than anticipated."

"I think that it is a tough pull, and we are suffering significant casualties," Gates said. "We expected that; we warned everybody that would be the case last winter, that as we went into areas that the Taliban had controlled for two or three years that our casualties would grow, especially this summer."

Both Gates and White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel emphasized that the administration would begin drawing down American troops in July 2011, as Obama has said. They noted the Afghan army was exceeding recruiting goals and that Al Qaeda's presence in the country had diminished.

"The July '11 date, as stated by the president, that's not moving," Emanuel said on ABC's "This Week." "That's not changing. Everybody agreed on that date.... And the goal is to take this opportunity, focus on what needs to get done, and then on July 2011, … begin the reduction."

Gates said it "absolutely has not been decided" how many troops would be withdrawn next year.

A holdover from the Bush administration, Gates acknowledged a "sense of frustration" among Americans about Afghanistan but compared it to the national mood over Iraq three years ago, when a troop buildup was ordered to combat a growing civil war. He noted that a third of the fresh troops ordered into Afghanistan had yet to arrive there.

"So I think there's a rush to judgment, frankly," he said, "that loses sight of the fact we are still in the middle of getting all of the right components into place and giving us a little time to have this work."

Senate leaders expressed greater caution about the war's progress and the likelihood of troop withdrawals.

Gates believes in current NATO strategy in Afghanistan.

Thom Shanker. Staff Writer for the New York Times. 02-09-08 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/world/asia/09gates.html

Over recent weeks, Mr. Gates has made public and private efforts to persuade NATO governments to offer more combat troops and military and police trainers for the Afghan mission. At the conclusion of a two-day meeting of NATO defense ministers in Lithuania on Friday morning, Mr. Gates expressed confidence that “a number of the allies are considering what more they might be able to do.”

Mr. Gates said his recent public comments, as well his keynote speech scheduled here for Sunday, were meant to “focus on why [Al Qaeda](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?inline=nyt-org) in Afghanistan and failure in Afghanistan would be a security problem for Europe.”

He said Qaeda leaders hiding in and near Afghanistan and terrorist foot soldiers linked to the organization had already been responsible for violent attacks in Europe.

In a public diplomacy strategy somewhat unusual for an American defense secretary, Mr. Gates said he would speak directly to the people of Europe, and not to their governments, “in an effort to try and explain why their security is tied to the success in Afghanistan and how success in Afghanistan impacts the future of the alliance.”

Mr. Gates acknowledged that there was a risk in making a personal appeal to Europeans for support in stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan when their own governments had not yet been able to make the case with complete success.

Mr. Gates said there was no need to rethink the NATO strategy in Afghanistan or to reshape the mission. But, he said, while he was pressing immediately for increased commitments from NATO nations and other allies for combat troops, trainers and transport aircraft, he also stressed that rebuilding Afghanistan was “a long-term project.”

“Afghanistan is going to need significant international help and support for a long time,” he said, adding that the goal should be to move toward civil reconstruction as insurgents are defeated.

Yet 2007 was a violent year for the mission, and a series of recent studies by policy institutes have said the international mission in Afghanistan is at risk of failure.

Gates thinks progress is being made in Afghanistan.

AFP 06-24-10. Space War. http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US\_not\_bogged\_down\_in\_Afghanistan\_Gates\_999.html

Gates insisted there was forward movement in the Afghan war, in the latest attempt by the US administration to defend the mission in the face of troubling signs from Afghanistan and a spike in allied and US troop casualties.

"I do not believe we are bogged down. I believe we are making some progress," Gates told a news conference.

"I think we are moving forward," he said.

Gates doesn’t want withdrawal from Afghanistan. He wants to stay the course.

Jim Miklazewski, NBC staff writer. 09-03-09 MSNBC. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32677418/

WASHINGTON — Facing eroding public support for the war in Afghanistan, the Pentagon chief said Thursday that the Obama administration's effort in the eight-year-old conflict is "only now beginning."

Defense Secretary Robert Gates also said he disagrees with people who say it's time to get out of Afghanistan.

But Gates indicated he might drop his reluctance for a larger military presence in Afghanistan. Gates indicated that the new strategy from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new U.S. and NATO commander, puts a larger emphasis on "protecting the Afghan people" and may be a game changer.

"It's not the size of the footprint, but the nature of the footprint" that matters, said Gates.

Gates also said after eight years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan he understands why public support for the war in Afghanistan is slipping — but tried to remind Americans that the war there stemmed from the 9/11 attacks and is aimed at preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

Several recent public opinion polls have shown Americans expressing declining support for the idea of sending more troops to the conflict and falling confidence in how the campaign is going. But at a Pentagon news conference, Gates challenged the public perception that the effort is getting away from the administration.

"I don't believe that the war is slipping through the administration's fingers," Gates said. "The nation has been at war for eight years. The fact that Americans would be tired of having their sons and daughters at risk and in battle is not surprising."

Gates argued that President Barack Obama's new strategy in Afghanistan hasn't even been given a chance to work.

"I think what is important to remember is the president's decisions on this strategy were only made at the very end of March; our new commander appeared on the scene in June," Gates said, adding that the extra troops Obama ordered are not even all there yet, nor is the "civilian surge" he wants on hand to help.

"So we are only now beginning to be in a position to have the assets in place and the strategy or the military approach in place to begin to implement the strategy," he said.

McChrystal on Monday delivered a classified assessment of how the war is going and is expected in the coming weeks to ask for more troops and money to turn the war around.

Obama is reading the report during his vacation at Camp David, his aides said.

Neither Gates nor Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen responded to a question about what the still-classified report concludes. But they repeatedly dropped references to some of McChrystal's recommendations, with Mullen calling it a "frank and candid" look at how military forces can accomplish the Afghanistan mission.

Much of the debate around Afghanistan has centered on how many troops are needed there, and for how long. By the end of the year, an estimated 68,000 troops will be in Afghanistan — 21,000 of which were ordered there by Obama last spring. Military commanders and State Department officials on the ground, however, say many more are needed to get the job done.

Mullen said questions of how many more troops might be sent was just a piece of the needs that the Pentagon soon will ask Congress to fulfill. "It's a piece — critical, but it's not total," Mullen said.

Links – Japan

The military, especially Gates, thinks involvement in Japan is important.

McCormack 9 - Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor at Australian National University, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, November 16, 2009, “The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama,” online: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250

As the year wore on and as the new agenda in Tokyo became apparent before and after the August election, the confrontation deepened. Warnings became more forceful. Kurt Campbell told the Asahi there could be no change in the Futenma replacement agreement. [23] Michael Green, formerly George W. Bush’s top adviser on East Asia, though moved under Obama to the private sector at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, warned that “it would indeed provoke a crisis with the US” if the Democratic Party were to push ahead to try to re-negotiate the military agreements around the Okinawa issue.” [24] Gregson, for the Pentagon, added that the US had “no plans to revise the existing agreements. [25] Ian Kelly, for the State Department, stated that there was no intention on its part to allow revision. [26] Kevin Maher (also at State) added a day later that there could be no reopening of negotiations on something already agreed between states. [27] A “senior Department of Defense spokesperson” in Washington said it would be a “blow to trust” between the two countries if existing plans could not be implemented. [28] Summing up the rising irritation in Washington, an unnamed State Department official commented that “The hardest thing right now is not China. It’s Japan.” [29]

The drumbeats of “concern,” “warning,” “friendly advice” from Washington that Hatoyama and the DPJ had better not implement the party’s electoral pledges and commitments rose steadily leading up to the election and its aftermath, culminating in the October Tokyo visit by Defense Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Michael Mullen. Gates is reported to have insulted his Japanese hosts, refusing to attend a welcoming ceremony at the Defense Ministry or to dine with senior Japanese Defense officials. [30]

Gates’ message was no-nonsense:

“The Futenma relocation facility is the lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realignment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa.” [31]

Gates does not support withdrawal from Okinawa.

Malcolm Foster, staff writer at the Associated Press, 5/28/2010, “US, Japan agree to keep Marine air base on Okinawa”, <http://www.salon.com/wires/allwires/2010/05/28/D9FVSHG00_as_japan_us_military>

The U.S. and Japan "recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in japan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability," said the joint statement, which was issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa.

Gates supports continued US military presence in Okinawa

BBC News, 10/21/2009, “Gates presses Japanese on Okinawa”, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8317656.stm>

A broad plan to reorganise US forces in Japan was agreed in 2006 with the previous Japanese administration, but has yet to be implemented. The agreement would see Japan fund a replacement base in Okinawa and the transfer of 8,000 US marines to Guam by 2014. Mr Gates is eager for the agreement to be acted upon as soon as possible. "Our view is this may not be the perfect alternative for anyone but it is the best alternative for everyone," he said at a joint press briefing with Mr Kitazawa.

Gates is implacable on the issue of keeping US military in Okinawa

Akahata, 11/4/09, Japan: Call for New Government to Block New Air Base in Okinawa”, <http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/9144/>

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Japan to urge the new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan to implement the Japan-U.S. agreement on a new U.S. base in Okinawa.  He held talks separately with Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya, and Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi on October 20 and 21.  Suggesting the possibility of moving the U.S. Marine Corps Camp Schwab runway site a little farther from the coastline of Nago City than the original plan, Gates pressed the Japanese government to stick to the agreement to construct the new USMC air base.  The new air base plan faces opposition from many Okinawans, and Hatoyama has stated that the USMC Futenma air station should be moved out of Okinawa and even out of Japan if possible.  The government intends to delay its decision on the new air base issue, but Okinawans want the government to meet the demand of Okinawans without delay.  In 1996, Japan and the United States at their joint Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreed to relocate the Futenma base to another location in Okinawa. Thirteen years later, Okinawans continue to block construction work from starting for the new base. The SACO agreement has obviously failed.  In an Okinawa Times-Asahi Shimbun survey last May, 68 percent of respondents said “No” to relocation of the USMC base within Okinawa, while only 18 percent said “Yes.”  The Liberal Democratic Party and the Komei Party lost their absolute majority in the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly in the 2008 election. In the House of Representatives general election last August, they lost all their seats in the Okinawa constituencies.  Contrary to the former LDP-Komei coalition government’s explanation that the new air base would help reduce Okinawans’ burden associated with the base, the new base, if constructed, will force nearby residents to endure even more noise pollution from sonic booms caused by U.S. military aircraft. The danger of plane crashes will also increase as the U.S. forces will deploy tilt-rotor Ospray aircraft, which has so far been shown to be many accident-prone. Dugongs, a rare sea mammal, will be endangered, and rich marine resources will be destroyed.  Okinawans know that U.S. bases in Okinawa have been used, under the SACO agreement, as a stepping-stone for U.S. military intervention in Iraq and elsewhere. Okinawans, who experienced the tragedy of the Battle of Okinawa, will not continue to allow U.S. forces to strengthen their strongholds for wars abroad.  Gates stated in Tokyo, “Our view is [that] this may not be the perfect alternative for anyone, but it is the best alternative for everyone, and it is time to move on.” However, if he respects the majority voice of Okinawans, the United States should agree to scrap the relocation plan.  He also threatened Okinawans by stating, “Without the Futenma [replacement] facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and return of land in Okinawa.” However, they will never yield to such lawless pressure.

Gates resists changing SQ US military presence in Okinawa

G. JOHN IKENBERRY and CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, staff writers at the NY Times, January 21, 2010, “A New Japan, a New Asia”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22iht-edikenberry.html>

On the one hand, U.S. officials have reacted with considerable discomfort to the more independent and assertive policies of the new Japanese government. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called Tokyo’s desire to reopen debate about the location of U.S. bases in Okinawa “counterproductive” and the alternatives to current plans “politically untenable and operationally unworkable.” On the other hand, President Obama observed during his visit to Tokyo in November that the U.S.-Japan relationship must be one of “equals” and “not a senior-vs-junior partnership.” And Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg last week welcomed the “expression of Japan’s vibrant democracy” and the opportunity to “conduct an open dialogue on shaping the future of the alliance.”

Links – South Korea

Gates supports the exercises in South Korea.

BBC News. 07-20-10 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10687924

Speaking during a visit to Camp Casey, a US base 20 miles south of the demilitarised zone, Mr Gates said he and Mrs Clinton planned to meet US and South Korean troops deployed along the frontier.

"Secretary Clinton and I, along with our Korean counterparts, will visit the DMZ to highlight how important operations are there to the security of the peninsula as well as the region and demonstrate our steadfast commitment to the [Republic of Korea]," he told reporters.

Jung Sung-Ki, staff writer for Defense News. 07-20-10. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4716208&c=ASI&s=AIR

"These defensive, combined exercises are designed to send a clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must stop, and that we are committed to together enhancing our combined defense capabilities," said the statement issued after talks here between South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Gates supports the exercises in South Korea as an act of deterrence

Li Xiaokun and Ai Yang, staff writers for China Daily. 07-21-10. China Daily. http://www.chinadailyusa.com/news/NewsInfo.asp?range=0&lv2=3&id=20638

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and his Republic of Korea (ROK) counterpart Kim Tae-young made the announcement after meeting in Seoul on Tuesday.

The two sides said their drill, which will be held from July 25 to 28, is designed to send a “clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must stop’’ in the wake of the deadly sinking of ROK warship Cheonan in March that has been blamed on Pyongyang.

Gates is taking an active role in deterrence against North Korea and supports South Korea.

Kevin Baron, Stars and Stripes Staff Writer. 07-14-10. Stars and Stripes http://www.stripes.com/news/in-south-korea-gates-and-clinton-will-seek-new-exercises-1.111089

In what the Pentagon says is a direct response to North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, the U.S. and South Korea likely will agree to a series of new naval and air exercises next week, when Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton make a joint visit to Seoul.

Those war games would be “defensive in nature, but send a clear message of deterrence to North Korea,” Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Wednesday.

Gates believes in stationing troops in the ROK.

Doug Bandow. Senior fellow at the CATO Institute. 06-09-08 National Interest Online http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17812

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has returned from the Republic of Korea (ROK), where he reaffirmed “the solid U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea.” Troop levels will fall no lower than twenty-five thousand, to be reached after modest reductions this year. The goal, he adds, is to turn the relationship into a “twenty-first century strategic alliance.”

Links - Turkey

Gates maintains that US needs the Incirlik base

Tulan Daloglu, writing for the Washington Times, 10/23/2007, “Ankara’s Eyes”, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/oct/23/ankaras-eyes/?page=1>

But what most worried the U.S. was Turkey's possible reaction to restricting use of Incirlik Air Base. Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted that 70 percent of U.S. air cargo, one-third of its fuel and 95 percent of mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles bound for Iraq move through Incirlik. President Bush echoed the "very real risk" to those operations: "Congress has more important work to do than antagonizing a democratic ally in the Muslim world, especially one that's providing vital support for our military every day."

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Internal Link\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Internal Links – Obama Compensates Gates

Obama will find ways to please Gates if his ambitions are threatened- nuclear program proves

POLITICO, “Obama and Gates Not Always Eye-to-Eye with Nukes,” 3/6/10 (http://www.seattlepi.com/politico/416304\_politico34010.html)

So it was no accident that when Biden delivered a policy address last month about nuclear disarmament and the need to boost funding for America's atomic labs, Gates introduced the vice president—who quickly downplayed any divisions. "This speech was a collaborative document," Biden told the audience at the National Defense University, in an apparent ad lib. "Bob Gates could have delivered this speech." Unsurprisingly, Obama's categorical opposition to any new nuclear weapons appears to have carried the day—at least on the surface. When the administration's 2011 budget plan emerged last month, there was no mention of any new atomic weapons programs. But the question of whether Gates is still pushing for new designs isn't as clear-cut, despite Biden's 22-minute speech and the public budget proposal. Analysts say squaring the previously stated positions of the president and the Pentagon chief depends on what the definition of the word 'new' is. And, as is so often the case with the federal government, **the Obama budget's proposal for a huge injection of cash should help smooth over any hard feelings at the Pentagon and the nuclear labs**. "It comes down to what constitutes 'new,' '' Kristensen added. "Even very new concepts can be proposed that are not necessarily considered 'new,' but as modifications of existing types of warheads. It's not a black and white thing."

Internal Links – Obama Compensates Gates

Gates demanding budget reflects special treatment given by the White House

Greg Jaffe and Shailagh Murray, Washington Post staff writers, 4/7/09 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/06/AR2009040601784\_pf.html)

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates outlined sweeping changes to the defense budget Monday that would shift billions of dollars in Pentagon spending away from elaborate weapons toward programs more likely to benefit troops in today's wars. The proposal by Gates amounts to a radical change in the way the Pentagon buys weapons. For decades, the United States has spent trillions of dollars on weapons programs that strove for revolutionary leaps but often were delivered years late and billions of dollars over budget. In proposing his 2010 budget, which is likely to face stiff resistance from Congress, Gates emphasized that he wanted to change the "priorities of America's defense establishment." The effort to pare back weapons programs that Gates derided as "truly in the exquisite category" reflects a growing recognition in the Pentagon that the days of soaring defense budgets are over. And it highlights Gates's long-stated desire to increase spending on surveillance systems and other relatively low-tech weapons that are best suited for guerrilla or irregular war, which has traditionally been an industry backwater. "I'm just trying to get the irregular guys to have a seat at the table and to institutionalize some of the needs they have," he said. To bolster the Afghan war effort, he would spend $2 billion more on intelligence and surveillance programs to track insurgents and $500 million to field more helicopters and an additional 2,800 Special Operations personnel focused on counterterrorism. The $534 billion plan represents a $20 billion increase over 2009. Among the weapons taking the biggest hits are the Navy's DDG 1000 destroyer, a stealthy ship whose cost has ballooned over the past decade. The Navy will purchase only three of the advanced ships and then revert to building the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that have been a mainstay of the fleet for years. Gates recommended halting production of the Air Force's F-22 fighter jet at 187 planes -- four more than the current number -- and killing the new presidential helicopter program. The Pentagon proposal also would dramatically cut back the Army's ambitious Future Combat Systems program, which consists of a network of advanced vehicles, unmanned surveillance aircraft and battlefield sensors. Specifically, Gates said that he is canceling the $87 billion in the program set aside to develop a new generation of light armored vehicles that were meant to replace Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 72-ton tanks. These advanced vehicles, which have been in development for almost a decade, were supposed to rely on better surveillance technology to compensate for their lack of armor. The huge toll that low-tech roadside bombs have taken on Army and Marine Corps troops in Iraq and Afghanistan led Gates to conclude that such an approach was not feasible. Instead of pouring more money into the futuristic vehicles, Gates indicated that he was more comfortable spending money on the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, or MRAP, which is based on a South African design that dates to the early 1990s.He also set aside $2 billion for surveillance technology, such as Predator unmanned surveillance planes and sensors that have proved their worth tracking down insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another $11 billion is being reallocated within the budget to pay for a planned increase of 65,000 troops to the Army's ranks and an additional 27,000 Marines. In unveiling his new priorities for the Pentagon, Gates acknowledged that he would probably face opposition from lawmakers eager to protect jobs in their districts. "My hope is that members of Congress will rise above parochial interests and consider what is in the best interest of the nation as a whole," he said.

Internal Links – Obama Compensates Gates

Obama uses budget to improve the Obama-Gates alliance

Fred Kaplan, Reporter on Obama’s defense budget plans, 2/26/09 (http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2212323)

This last program is still in the early stages of development—just $20 billion has been spent to date—and so it might be particularly vulnerable. The White House budget released today states in its introduction that weapons programs will not be allowed "to proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the risk of cost growth and schedule slippage." That sounds like a reference to the Future Combat System. And if Obama and Gates want to take away big items from the Air Force and Navy, they would be wise—politically as well as on the merits—to take a big slice out of the Army's baroque mess, too. The president and his defense secretary, after all, are still asking for a lot of money: nearly as much as the military budgets of all the rest of the world's countries combined; more (adjusting for inflation) than the United States has spent on the military in any single year since World War II.

Obama appeases Gates’ budget desires- even if seen as unpopular

Greg Jaffe and Shailagh Murray, Washington Post staff writers, 4/7/09 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/06/AR2009040601784\_pf.html)

Gates demanded unprecedented secrecy when developing the budget over the past six weeks. Senior generals throughout the department were required to sign non-disclosure agreements. In order to prevent leaks, Gates won special permission from the president to withhold his decisions from the White House's Office of Management and Budget until after the budget proposal was formally announced. "We wanted to ensure that the changes were presented in full context," a senior Pentagon official said. The initial response on Capitol Hill was restrained, reflecting Gates's credibility among Republicans, the president's popularity and the fact that the midterm congressional elections are still 18 months away. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) called the Gates plan "a good-faith effort." But he also asserted Congress's authority over how defense money is spent. "The buck stops with Congress," Skelton said in a statement. The cuts will undoubtedly be painful for communities such as Marietta, Ga., where about 2,000 Lockheed Martin workers assemble the F-22. The program employs about 25,000 people around the country, said Rep. Tom Price (R), whose Georgia district includes the Lockheed Martin plant. "This decision will not only cost thousands of jobs at a critical time, it is detrimental to the country's national defense capabilities," Price said. "The president's priorities are deeply flawed." Similarly, Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.) bemoaned the decision to stop building F-22s. "This would result in the loss of thousands of jobs in Connecticut," he said. Gates said he was concerned about the impact his changes would have on companies and workers, but he noted that many of the job cuts would be offset by increases in other areas. For example, even as the number of employees working on the F-22 declined, tens of thousands more workers would be hired to build the F-35, a more affordable and slightly less advanced stealth fighter. Gates said he planned to accelerate production of the plane to buy 30 in 2010, up from a planned purchase of 14 this year.

Internal Links – Obama Compensates Gates

Obama’s lack of experience with defense means more vulnerable to appeasement of Gates for important decisions

David Bogoslaw, staff writer for business week, 8/23/08 (http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/aug2008/pi20080822\_702066.htm)

More specifically, as industry lobbyists and consultants see it, Russia's invasion of Georgia will probably spur a rethinking of the Defense Dept.'s current emphasis on counterinsurgency and lead to a shift back to traditional superpower tools, such as aircraft carriers. "The realization that the future is in traditional superpower conflicts—the pre-Afghanistan environment—and that hunting the Taliban might just be a passing fad—that's an even bigger potential sea change than the topline [revenue] issue," says Aboulafia. Multiyear Contracts The defense industry is also more consolidated now, which means any cuts in weapons spending might well put a contractor out of business. "If you want to maintain an industrial infrastructure, you have to have people doing something," says Cowen's von Rumohr. More coordinated, effective lobbying efforts by the industry, he says, could persuade U.S. policymakers to continue generous funding of weapons systems. Weapons procurement is a major source of concern among defense contractors. There's a dichotomy between McCain's ideological stance on defense spending and his reputation for populist policy choices aimed at reining in government spending, says Aboulafia. Case in point: McCain's intention to press for eliminating multiyear procurement contracts, without which contractors find it hard to plan beyond one year. Locking in a project for four or five years allows them to buy materials in bulk, to negotiate better prices with suppliers, and to plan their workforce, cutting overall costs more than 10%, he adds. Obama's lack of experience with the Armed Forces and shorter trail of public policy statements make it harder to predict what his Defense Dept. would look like if he's elected. "We don't know what Obama will do, but he's likely to stick with the experts' recommendations, whereas McCain has a record of promoting his popular image with bad policy," says Aboulafia. Boeing's Strategy

Internal Links – Obama Compensates Gates

Support from Obama and both parties means Gates decisions will be recognized

NSN (National Security Network) “A New Defense Budget Reality,” 6/17/10 (http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1635)

An intense discussion is underway between the administration and Congress about how Pentagon spending fits within the context of a recovering economy, tightening government spending due to budget deficits, and the development of a 21st century defense strategy. The need for defense spending reform is deep**, and extends beyond even what the Obama administration**, despite significant effort, has so far delivered. Secretary Gates has acknowledged this point, reminding audiences both inside and outside the Pentagon that aligning resources with current security challenges and overall budgetary demands will require "hard choices" in the future. Congress should take advantage of this opening and take the first step in this process by eliminating funding for wasteful, unwanted defense programs. With the Defense Authorization bill out of the House and being considered by the Senate, this conversation will intensify in the weeks and months ahead. In particular, there is likely to be a vigorous debate over the costly alternative engine for the F-35, which the Pentagon has insisted it does not want, but has crept back into the House's defense bill. Congress is also considering inserting funding for more C-17 cargo planes, which again, the Pentagon does not want. As the debate unfolds, Congress would do well to remember that strong, bipartisan support for reforming military spending exists among both defense experts and its own Members, as evidenced by the bipartisan Sustainable Defense Task Force, led by House Financial Services Committee Chair Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), which has called for such reforms. The reform process is part of a larger push toward establishing a 21st century defense strategy, which balances the threats of today with those of tomorrow, meets our military, diplomatic, and development goals, and recognizes that for America to effectively project power, it must have its economic house in order.

Obama will continue to square up differences with Gates through many of Gates’ wishes

POLITICO, “Obama and Gates Not Always Eye-to-Eye with Nukes,” 3/6/10 (http://www.seattlepi.com/politico/416304\_politico34010.html)

The Obama administration is acutely aware of perceptions that the Nuclear Posture Review has divided senior officials—with Vice President Joe Biden viewed as heading up an arms-control focused camp, and Gates perceived as speaking for a military and nuclear establishment that favors more funding and new weapons programs. "This is the big challenge of the Obama administration, **that it has to find some common ground for those two relatively,** I wouldn't say contradictory, but what can be distant positions," Kristensen said. When Obama asked Gates to stay on, the move was widely hailed for bringing continuity to the Pentagon at a time of two wars, and **for avoiding the temptation any president faces to purge all of his predecessor's appointees**. But holding over a member of the Cabinet, especially one who served a president of the opposing party, **inevitably means some awkward policy cla**shes. It's not merely that a president and one of his senior advisers might diverge on an important policy question. It's that Obama's call to move toward a world without nuclear weapons is one of the signature tenets of his foreign policy.

Internal Link – Compensates With RRW

Obama-Gates disagreements mean Obama needs to concede RRWs to Gates

Josh **Gerstein**, Staff Writer, Politico.com, March 6, 20**10**, “Obama, Gates not always eye-to-eye on new nukes,” Lexis. TP

President Barack Obama has been clear. He wants no new nukes. Pentagon chief Robert Gates has been equally direct, advocating in recent years for a new generation of warheads. And nearly 14 months into their bipartisan-tinged partnership, Obama and Gates haven't publicly reconciled their views. Some anti-nuclear activists suspect the pair still don't see completely eye-to-eye and that Gates has never fully abandoned his goal of refurbishing the American nuclear arsenal with new weapons. Now, the administration is on the verge of releasing a major nuclear policy review that could call attention to this disagreement between the Democratic president and his holdover Defense Secretary - just in time for a nuclear safety summit Obama is hosting for heads of state next month in Washington. "Quite clearly," said Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, "the secretary has been stating he sees a need for replacement warheads and new designs, and I'm not sure those are the words the president would want to use at this stage in the process." The Obama administration is acutely aware of perceptions that the Nuclear Posture Review has divided senior officials-with Vice President Joe Biden viewed as heading up an arms-control focused camp, and Gates perceived as speaking for a military and nuclear establishment that favors more funding and new weapons programs. "This is the big challenge of the Obama administration, that it has to find some common ground for those two relatively, I wouldn't say contradictory, but what can be distant positions," Kristensen said. When Obama asked Gates to stay on, the move was widely hailed for bringing continuity to the Pentagon at a time of two wars, and for avoiding the temptation any president faces to purge all of his predecessor's appointees. But holding over a member of the Cabinet, especially one who served a president of the opposing party, inevitably means some awkward policy clashes. It's not merely that a president and one of his senior advisers might diverge on an important policy question. It's that Obama's call to move toward a world without nuclear weapons is one of the signature tenets of his foreign policy. And liberal arms control activists worry that Obama's 2011 budget - which would spend more on nuclear weapons labs and related activities than the United States did at the height of the Cold War, even adjusted for inflation-goes too far to assuage the concerns of the defense secretary and leaders of the nuclear weapons complex. "Increasing funds for nuclear weapons appears to conflict with a vision of a world without them," former Office of Management and Budget analyst Robert Civiak said. Asked directly about whether Obama and Gates had squared up their past differences, White House officials dismissed the question as premature ahead of the release of the policy review. "The NPR is still being worked," National Security Council Chief of Staff Denis McDonough said in response to questions from POLITICO. Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said the Obama administration's overall approach is in line with Gates' views. Gates "still believes in the fundamental goals of ensuring warhead safety, security, and reliability, and believes we need a modern infrastructure to support that. Those investments are in the budget," the spokesman said. "The RRW [Reliable Replacement Warhead] program was killed by Congress, and isn't coming back. Sec. Gates recognizes that fact." However, Morrell said it was too soon to say how modernization of nuclear warhead stocks would be carried out. The Pentagon is "not going to say now what the policy will be on this issue," the spokesman said. During the presidential campaign, Obama was unequivocal in his opposition to new designs. "I will not authorize the development of new nuclear weapons," he told Arms Control Today in September 2008. About a month later, while still working for Bush, Gates delivered a speech calling for "urgent attention" to the Bush administration's call for a new Reliable Replacement Warhead and warning of a "bleak" outlook for the U.S. nuclear arsenal if the new devices weren't pursued. "Sensitive parts do not last forever. We can and do re-engineer our current stockpile to extend its lifespan," Gates said. "With every adjustment we move farther away from the original design that was successfully tested when the weapon was first fielded...At a certain point it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal-especially in light of our testing moratorium." Gates might have been expected to keep mum on the point after Obama was elected, at least in public. He didn't. "It is clear, at least to me, that it is important for us to continue to make investments, and I think larger investments in modernizing our nuclear infrastructure, the labs and so on, the expertise in those places, to have the resources for life extension programs and in one or two cases probably new designs that will be safer or more reliable," Gates said last September, fielding a question at an Air Force Association conference.

Internal Link –Compensates With RRW

Gates’ safety concerns means RRWs are a compensation priority

Josh **Gerstein**, Staff Writer, Politico.com, March 6, 20**10**, “Obama, Gates not always eye-to-eye on new nukes,” Lexis. TP

No matter how the Obama administration irons out its differences, Bolton contends that the U.S needs new nuclear weapons, like bunker-busters and low-yield nuclear weapons. "It would be better, cleaner, safer and more reliable simply to design what are clean, new designs intended for that purpose, which is very necessary given countries like Iran and North Korea are doing to bury hardened targets," he said. If Gates were to publicly renounce his call for new warheads, he would be able to cite a new study released last fall in which scientists concluded the current arsenal could last for decades without all-new warheads. In his public comments, Gates has consistently said his sole concern was reliability and safety, not trying to seek a military advantage. "We have no desire for new capabilities. That's a red herring," Gates said last September. "This is about modernizing and keeping safe a capability that everyone acknowledges we will have to have for some considerable period into the future." While the arms control community has generally been ecstatic about the repeated public calls from Obama and his administration to move towards a nuclear-free world, they are nervous that the large budget hike the White House proposed for nuclear programs pulls in the opposite direction, all but ensuring that the U.S. will have a large and growing nuclear weapons complex for the indefinite future.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Impacts – RRW 🡪 Modernization

RRWs spur US modernization program

Walter **Pincus**; Washington Post Staff Writer, December 5, 20**08**, “Strategic Command Chief Urges Quick Nuclear Weapons Modernization” Lexis. TP

The leader of the U.S. Strategic Command said yesterday that "time is not on our side" to modernize the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, particularly as China and Russia upgrade their nuclear warheads and delivery systems. "The path of inaction is a path leading toward nuclear disarmament. . . . The time to act is now," Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton told an audience of government, military and civilian arms experts attending the Nuclear Deterrence Summit in Washington. But Rep. Ellen O. Tauscher (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic weapons, told the same audience that the nation's nuclear modernization program was in a "holding pattern" until the [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9805953818&returnToId=20_T9805953881&csi=8075&A=0.9629937534573472&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P)  could review studies that are to be completed next year. Chilton said he was concerned that Congress had effectively killed the Bush administration's Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which is designed to provide a modern, safer warhead with **no new** **capabilities** before the end of this decade. Expressing concern that the nation's Cold War stockpile is aging, Chilton said that "a reliable [nuclear] inventory supports nonproliferation goals." Tauscher, whose California district is the site of one of the nation's leading nuclear weapons labs, became a leader in Congress's effort to eliminate the RRW program. She said the [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9805953818&returnToId=20_T9805953881&csi=8075&A=0.9629937534573472&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P)  should "take the high ground" internationally by developing a comprehensive nuclear weapons policy that includes ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, extending the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia and modernizing a sharply reduced warhead stockpile. She called on the United States to boost funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency and prepare a multilateral program to be presented at the 2010 U.N. review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. She proposed one potentially controversial step, saying, "India, Pakistan and Israel must be brought into the nuclear club and asked to make serious nonproliferation commitments." U.S. officials have regularly refrained from talking about Israel's nuclear weapons since that government has never acknowledged them, although Iran regularly cites them in defending its own nuclear program. The RRW program, Tauscher said, was "sound" because it was designed "to extend the life of the stockpile while adding security and safety features." It failed before Congress, she said, because it was "poorly presented." In its place, Tauscher proposed upgrading a tested warhead design while making clear it would have a lower yield than older weapons and would use less-toxic components and contain safety elements to prevent its use by terrorists. Tauscher said the Obama Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review should answer key questions regarding the number of warheads needed to deter Russia or any other state from attacking the United States, while at the same time assuring U.S. allies that they will be protected. "Limited purposes require limited numbers of weapons," she said. In a Foreign Affairs article released yesterday, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stressed the need for a strong nuclear deterrent and expressed support for the RRW. "As long as other nations possess the bomb and the means to deliver it," Gates wrote, "the United States must maintain a credible strategic deterrent. . . . Congress needs to do its part by funding the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program -- for safety, for security, and for a more reliable deterrent."

RRW 🡪 Prolif

Proliferation costs of RRW outweigh the benefits.

Perry 7

William Perry, Ph.D., Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project, Center for International Security Cooperation at Stanford, 7-18-2007. [Federal News Service, HEARING OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: U.S. **NUCLEAR** WEAPONS POLICY, p. ln]

One specific question faced by this committee is whether to authorize the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program. There are two valid arguments for proceeding with that program: first, that it will maintain the capability of our nuclear weapon designers, and that it allows the design of a warhead that cannot be detonated by a terror group even if they were able to get one. A countervailing argument is that if the United States proceeds to develop new nuclear warheads, it will undermine our ability to lead the international community in the fight against proliferation.

My best subjective judgment at this time is that the proliferation argument outweighs the other two. But I under-stand that we live in a dangerous and uncertain world, and I firmly believe that we have to maintain an unequivocal de-terrent capability for the foreseeable future. So my judgment would be different if I thought that our present nuclear force could not be maintained to provide that capability for many decades in the future.

In sum, I believe that we could defer for a number of years the development of a Reliable Replacement Warhead, and I have no doubt that this will put us in a stronger position to lead the international community in the continuing bat-tle against nuclear proliferation, which is an imminent danger to all of us. And most importantly, I believe that our best protection against nuclear terrorism are the robust programs to keep nuclear weapons and fissile material out of the hands of the terrorists.

RRW development destroys the NPT

Thomas **Scheber**, National Institute for Public Policy, August 20**07**, “Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues” <http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/RRW%20final%20with%20foreword%207.30.07.pdf> TP

The most common criticism of RRW found in the international press deals with those struggling to accept the grand agreement codified in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. The NPT accorded continuing nuclear weapon status to the five nuclear weapons states at that time while also implementing measures to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to articles from the UK newspaper, The Guardian, the decision by the British government (Prime Minister Blair) to replace the Trident missile and upgrade the nuclear facilities at Aldermaston will lead to the destruction of the NPT. Also criticized in The Guardian is the U.S. decision to build new weapons under the RRW program which, they claim, will invariably lead to underground testing. These actions, according to the articles, will lead to further proliferation and a possible lowering of the nuclear threshold with low-yield nuclear weapons and proliferation.27 Issues raised within the U.S. and in the international press provide a basis for examining the case for RRW in the current geopolitical context. In a recent report the Congressional Research Service provides a concise summary of concerns. As the RRW program has developed, opponents have emerged. They raise a number of concerns. In their view, RRW could lead to nuclear testing; it would run counter to a U.S. commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; it would be costly, as it would require building perhaps thousands of warheads and could require reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex; it would demonstrate the continuing value that the United States places on nuclear weapons, undermining U.S. efforts to tell other nations that they should not develop such weapons; and it could lead to new weapons capable of performing new military missions.28

RRW – Russia Modernization

RRW causes Russian modernization and risks nuclear war.

Pikayev 7

Alexander A. Pikayev, Director, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Institute of World Economy and International

Relations, Moscow, July/Aug 2007. [BOAS 63.4, “Unfair Advantage,”

http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/n71j0p1665001882/fulltext.pdf]

More seriously, Russia increasingly perceives RRW not as a means of deterrence, but as a war-fighting tool. RRW could increase a warhead’s accuracy, and thus, reduce its yield. As a result, the warheads could more capably destroy hardened Russian strategic targets, while inflicting less collateral damage on civilian populations. The latter could increase the temptation to use nuclear weapons first, as the consequences of a first strike would be less disastrous than during the Cold War. This could also enhance intra-war deterrence: A disarming attack with a relatively small number of civilian casualties might deter the aggrieved nation from responding because doing so could trigger an allout, devastating retaliation.

U.S. plans for an extensive missile defense system, including components that Washington intends to deploy near Russia’s borders, further embitter Moscow. At present, technical limitations prevent the U.S. missile defense from threatening Russia’s nuclear forces, and the deployment itself is relatively modest. But Moscow is concerned that the early deployment will allow the system to become more modern and sophisticated over time, eventually allowing it to intercept Russian strategic missiles.

At a time when Russian nuclear forces are at their lowest levels in 30 years, many Russians believe that such U.S. actions represent an attempt to capitalize on Moscow’s weaknesses. Unfortunately, this increases determination in Russia not to repeat past disarmament “mistakes” and inspires discussions of countermeasures to strengthen the credibility of its strategic nuclear forces.

Extinction

Wickersham 8

Bill Wickersham, adjunct professor of Peace Studies at Missouri U., 4-30-2008. [Colombia Missourian, U.S., Russia need to reverse arms race, http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2008/04/30/us-russia-need-reverse-arms-race/]

The timeline reflects the continuing level of nuclear threat that exists between the U.S. and Russia. Many, if not most, Americans seem to have forgotten that we are still faced with a possibility of either purposeful or accidental nuclear war with the Russians. If that war occurs, it will result in **instant extinction** without representation. There will be no parliamentary or congressional deliberations and no declarations of war.

Unfortunately, when George W. Bush assumed the presidency, he adopted the neoconservative strategy of indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons instead of measures to reverse the arms race as agreed to by the United States at the 2000 Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Russia’s response to Bush’s policies, especially to his deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, has been the development and deployment of even more dangerous intercontinental missiles, some of which are based in silos, others that are mobile, and that constantly roam the forests of Russia. Additionally, the Russians are apparently reactivating some of their nuclear-weapons-capable submarines that had been effectively “mothballed,” so that the launch to landing time of their missiles may now also fall within the 10 minute time frame. Clearly this situation represents a mutual death wish of insane proportions.

Impact – China/India/Pakistan

RRW would encourage Chinese nuclear modernization, spurring an arms race with India and Pakistan.

Shen 7

Dingli Shen, Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University, July/Aug 2007. [Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Upsetting a

delicate balance, p. 37]

Worse yet, RRW sends the wrong message to the other nuclear weapon states. If the United States is questioning the reliability of its arsenal, Russia, France, Britain, and China might also begin to ask similar questions about their warheads, providing the justification and impetus to “improve” their nuclear weapons. In particular, RRW could alter the way Beijing views its nuclear arsenal.

Thanks in part to careful diplomacy by the leadership in both Beijing and Washington, U.S.- Chinese relations have remained stable in recent years—especially given the Taiwan situation, long a point of disagreement between the two countries. But some of the credit for this balanced relationship also belongs to the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Although much smaller than the U.S. arsenal according to public reports, China retains around 200 warheads, while the United States possesses about 10,000—Beijing’s nuclear capability has served as an effective deterrent to any potential U.S. military aggression. RRW, along with other U.S. initiatives such as a renewed interest in the militarization of space, could force Beijing to reevaluate its security policies and nuclear posture, increasing pressure on China to either improve and/or enlarge its nuclear capability. And in Asia’s strategic landscape, an enhanced and/or expanded Chinese nuclear deterrent could have a ripple effect on India and Pakistan, China’s nuclear neighbors—an outcome the United States certainly doesn’t want.

India Pakistan Arms Race Cause Nuclear War

NYT 98 (5/29, ln)

Diplomats and arms control experts see this arms race as particularly dangerous because Pakistan and India, unlike the United States and Russia during the Cold War, have not held serious negotiations over outstanding problems for decades or concluded agreements that reduced the number of weapons aimed at each other. These experts now fear that **Pakistan and India could be drawn into a nuclear war over Kashmir**, a territory that has been in dispute since the two countries gained independence in 1947. They also worry that nuclear testing by India and Pakistan could encourage other nations that have long sought nuclear arms to acquire these weapons.

Impact – China/India Paksitan

So Does a China Arms Race

Henry Kissinger, Thug, ‘5 [June 13, Washington Post, ln]

China's emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and that the United States had best prepare for it. **That assumption is as dangerous as it is wrong.** The European system of the 19th century assumed that its major powers would, in the end, vindicate their interests by force. Each nation thought that a war would be short and that, at its end, its strategic position would have improved. Only the reckless could make such calculations in a globalized **world of nuclear weapons. War between major powers would be a catastrophe for all participants; there would be no winners**; the task of reconstruction would dwarf the causes of the conflict. Which leader who entered World War I so insouciantly in 1914 would not have recoiled had he been able to imagine the world at its end in 1918? Another special factor that a century ago drove the international system to confrontation was the provocative style of German diplomacy. In 1900 a combination of Russia, France and Britain would have seemed inconceivable given the conflicts among them. Fourteen years later, a bullying German diplomacy had brought it about, challenging Britain with a naval buildup and seeking to humiliate Russia over Bosnia in 1908 and France in two crises over Morocco in 1905 and 1911. Military imperialism is not the Chinese style. Clausewitz, the leading Western strategic theoretician, addresses the preparation and conduct of a central battle. Sun Tzu, his Chinese counterpart, focuses on the psychological weakening of the adversary. China seeks its objectives by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances -- only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown. It is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was heir to an imperialist tradition, which, between Peter the Great and the end of World War II, projected Russia from the region around Moscow to the center of Europe. The Chinese state in its present dimensions has existed substantially for 2,000 years. The Russian empire was governed by force; the Chinese empire by cultural conformity with substantial force in the background. At the end of World War II, Russia found itself face to face with weak countries along all its borders and unwisely relied on a policy of occupation and intimidation beyond the long-term capacity of the Russian state. The strategic equation in Asia is altogether different. U.S. policy in Asia must not mesmerize itself with the Chinese military buildup. There is no doubt that China is increasing its military forces, which were neglected during the first phase of its economic reform. But even at its highest estimate, the Chinese military budget is less than 20 percent of America's; it is barely, if at all, ahead of that of Japan and, of course, much less than the combined military budgets of Japan, India and Russia, all bordering China -- not to speak of Taiwan's military modernization supported by American decisions made in 2001. Russia and India possess nuclear weapons. In a crisis threatening its survival, Japan could quickly acquire them and might do so formally if the North Korean nuclear problem is not solved. When China affirms its cooperative intentions and denies a military challenge, it expresses less a preference than the strategic realities. The challenge China poses for the medium-term future will, in all likelihood, be **political and economic, not military.**

Impact – AT: RRW K2 Deterrence

Deterrent value of RRW warheads will be less than current warheads.

Butt 8

Yousaf Butt, Ph.D., (experimental nuclear astrophysics), staff scientist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, currently on leave at the National Academy of Sciences, 12-2-2008. [Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Redefining deterrence, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/reports/redefining-deterrence/redefining-deterrence-is-rrw-detrimental-to-us-security-ca]

The new Energy/Defense nuclear strategy paper states, "[T]o maintain a credible deterrent at these lower levels, the United States requires nuclear forces that can adapt to changing needs, and a responsive industrial infrastructure that can maintain existing capabilities and manufacture new or replacement components as needed." But since the proposed new weapons will be untested, they will be a marginally less credible deterrent in the eyes of an adversary. Even if the actual numerical reliability of RRWs is higher, the perceived deterrent value of these untested weapons cannot be more than that of empirically tested weapons. Remember, in matters of deterrence, what adversaries believe is more important than what some weapons experts may assert.

Reliability irrelevant for deterrence.

Butt 8

Yousaf Butt, Ph.D., (experimental nuclear astrophysics), staff scientist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, currently on leave at the National Academy of Sciences, 12-2-2008. [Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Redefining deterrence, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/reports/redefining-deterrence/redefining-deterrence-is-rrw-detrimental-to-us-security-ca]

Arguably, though, the most egregious conceptual mistake in Energy and Defense thinking is conflating technical warhead reliability with its deterrent value. Because of the **massive destruction potential** of a nuclear weapon, an adversary's deterrence calculus could hardly be different for, say, a 96-percent reliable nuclear weapon versus a 99-percent reliable weapon. In fact, it's questionable whether it would even be different for a 25-percent reliable weapon versus a 99-percent reliable weapon.6 Switching perspective to the receiving end of a possible massive nuclear retaliatory attack makes the argument more acute: If a country is facing the prospect of several 300-kiloton U.S. warheads destroying its 25 most populous cities, it hardly matters that perhaps one of the weapons will have a suboptimal yield and doesn't completely annihilate the twenty-fifth city.

This deterrent logic is especially pertinent to the RRW debate considering that nuclear targeting practice places more than one weapon on any high-value target, making the probability of annihilation essentially 100 percent whether a single warhead has a 96-percent or 99-percent reliability.7 Ultimately, deterrence is an exercise in psychology, and small differences in the numerical reliability of overwhelmingly destructive nuclear weapons don't have a measurable influence on any adversary's deterrence calculus.

Unlike almost any other type of modern tool, machine, or weapon system, nuclear weapons are purposefully designed not to be used. Therefore, their reliability isn't relevant in the same sense as for a car or computer. As clearly stated in the December 2006 "Deterrence Operations--Joint Operating Concept" document DOC, "The end state for all deterrence operations is decisive influence over the adversary's decision calculus in order to deter aggression and coercion against U.S. vital interests." So even the Pentagon considers the reliability of its nuclear warheads in the context of the perceived deterrent value in an adversary's eyes. Another way to think about it: Consider Chinese or Russian nuclear weapons. Do we know their technical reliability numbers? No. Yet, we still take them very seriously.

Impact - AT: RRW K2 Deterrence

RRW unnecessary—current stockpile is reliable for foreseeable future.

Butt 8

Yousaf Butt, Ph.D., (experimental nuclear astrophysics), staff scientist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, currently on leave at the National Academy of Sciences, 12-2-2008. [Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Redefining deterrence, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/reports/redefining-deterrence/redefining-deterrence-is-rrw-detrimental-to-us-security-ca]

This raises another interesting point: What would be the required reliability level of the proposed new warheads? It could only be different from the current weapons by no more than 2 percent, as the current weapons are 98 percent reliable--assuming, of course, that the new warheads are really more reliable than the current warheads. Can a 2-percent difference in reliability really alter an adversary's thinking? And, more importantly, in the absence of testing, how are we to determine the baseline reliability of RRWs? As for the military utility of reliability, does a supposed few percentage point increase in reliability matter when considering the overall destructive power of nuclear weapons? No, especially since the overall reliability of the weapon system is dominated by the intercontinental ballistic missile delivery system--of 2,160 test launches, approximately 15 percent resulted in some type of delivery system failure that would have prevented the warhead from reaching its target.9

Since experts have agreed that the current U.S. stockpile is likely to remain reliable for at least the next 50 years, there's no reason for Energy and Defense to further discuss any potential problems in unclassified documents that may semaphore any alleged weaknesses in the country's nuclear weapons systems to potential adversaries. The current stockpile is a highly credible and effective deterrent in the eyes of any potential adversary for the foreseeable future. To keep it that way, future discussions of warhead reliability should be classified with strict oversight from truly independent experts with appropriate security clearances--i.e., the JASON group.

Stockpile Stewardship guarantees current arsenal reliability for foreseeable future.

Drell and Goodby 7

Sidney Drell, Ph.D., professor of physics at Stanford’s Linear Accelerator Center, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, James E. Goodby, Ambassador, research fellow at the Hoover Institution, nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, October 2007. [Arms Control Association Report, “What are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendation for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces”, p. http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20071104\_Drell\_Goodby\_07\_new.pdf]

The United States has built and currently maintains a nuclear arsenal that is robust and reliable and should **remain so for the foreseeable future**. Congressional pressure during George H. W. Bush’s presidency led the U.S. government to recognize that there was no need to develop and test new nuclear warhead designs. This helped lead to the U.S. moratorium on underground nuclear tests that is still in effect. As a consequence, existing warheads are remaining in the arsenal for more years than originally anticipated and longer than had been the case during the first five decades of the nuclear era, during which the arsenal was being regularly modernized with new designs based on technological advances. An enhanced, multifaceted, science-based program of stockpile stewardship was established in 1994 to provide confidence to the U.S. weapons community and, through it, to the government that the health of the stockpile and the way in which special bomb materials age is well understood. This strong technical and scientific program at the national weapons laboratories is providing a deeper understanding of the performance of these weapons. Maintaining and refurbishing the warheads, as well as sustaining the competence of the weapons scientists, is proceeding, relying on comprehensive surveillance, forensics, diagnostics, extensive simulations with new computers, and experiments with advanced facilities. In fact, it has served to enhance confidence in the arsenal and in the U.S. ability to hear and heed any warning bells of unanticipated problems that may develop in the future

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Aff\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Aff – Gates Supports South Korea Withdrawal

AFF: Gates supports withdrawal from South Korea

Eric **Schmitt**, New York Times staff writer, 6/4/**08**, NYTimes, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/washington/04gates.html?_r=1&em&ex=1212724800&en=616e073aa51f13ea&ei=5087%0A>

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Tuesday that he supported extending the tours of thousands of troops stationed here to three years and allowing their spouses and children to live with them during their assignments.

His endorsement adds momentum to a policy shift favored by commanders to improve the quality of life for most of the 28,500 troops assigned to South Korea on unaccompanied 12-month tours because South Korea is considered a combat zone.

Such a change would also reverse decades of Pentagon policy for South Korea, acknowledging that the threat of an attack from the North has declined in the face of an unwavering American deterrent force and the growth of an increasingly capable South Korean military.

“I don’t think anybody considers the Republic of Korea today a combat zone,” Mr. Gates told reporters here on the final day of a weeklong Asian trip, which also had stops in Guam, Singapore and Thailand.

But Mr. Gates, elaborating on comments he made on Monday, noted that extending tours and allowing families to join soldiers here would require building more housing and consideration of other financial and logistical details, suggesting that such a step was still years away.

Aides to Mr. Gates said that with broad agreement to align the policy in South Korea with that in Germany and other overseas bases, the next step will be for each of the armed services to determine how to incorporate three-year tours in South Korea with other personnel duty rotations worldwide.

“Our goal is to rapidly reach the point when all U.S. service members can bring their families to Korea and stay here for a normal three-year tour,” Gen. Walter L. Sharp of the Army said Tuesday. He spoke at a ceremony at Yongsan Garrison in which he assumed command of American forces on the Korean Peninsula from Gen. B. B. Bell, who is retiring.

Only about 10 percent of the forces in South Korea, mostly senior officers, are authorized to have their families with them.

Extending the length of tours would be another major change to the American military presence here. Over the past few years, United States troops have been moving from bases near the demilitarized zone to new posts farther south, leaving South Korean troops to take over the major responsibility along the front.

Moving the American troops away from the border with North Korea — where they are within easy range of 12,000 artillery pieces and rocket launchers — would make them better able to absorb and respond to a North Korean offensive.

The shift of American forces has the added benefit of defusing tensions with South Koreans. Many American bases built decades ago in rural areas have since been swallowed up by the sprawl of Seoul, the capital.

Mr. Gates said that in a meeting on Tuesday with South Korea’s defense minister, Lee Sang-hee, he reaffirmed the realignment plan and a transition of wartime control of allied forces to a South Korean joint military command by 2012.

Mr. Gates said they discussed broadening security relations beyond the Korean Peninsula to regional and global issues. The American military presence in South Korea has declined by about 9,000 troops in five years, with some of those soldiers now used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To offset the drop in American troops, United States commanders plan to rely on a new generation of sensors, precision-guided bombs and high-speed transport ships, Pentagon officials said.

Aff – Gates Supports Iraq Withdrawal

Gates supports withdrawing from Iraq

Robert Burns, staff writer at the Associated Press, 2009, “US hopeful about exit after a quiet July in Iraq”, <http://www.kndo.com/Global/story.asp?S=10821532&nav=menu484_2>

A spike in bombings and other attacks that killed about 300 people in the 10 days leading up to the June 30 city withdrawal deadline sparked concern that the move would jeopardize security gains. But that level of violence did not continue into July. Jim Dobbins, director of national security research at RAND Corp., said the relatively smooth transition was one reason for Wednesday's remarks by Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the U.S. may speed up its withdrawal plans if the trend toward reduced violence continues. "I think the fact that they were able to (take over the cities) so relatively successfully and the fact that they've continued to try to expand their own autonomy and limit the U.S. role, particularly the visible U.S. role, was a factor," he said. "It demonstrates a sense of self-confidence that the U.S. wants to encourage."

Gates supports withdrawal from Iraq.

Elisabeth Bumiller and Peter Baker, staff writers at the NY Times, 7/9/2009, “Gates Sees Faster Iraq Troop Pullout“, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/world/middleeast/30military.html>

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Wednesday that the United States might accelerate the withdrawal of its forces from Iraq even as fresh tension there underscored worries about instability after the American troops are gone. Speaking with reporters after his latest visit to Baghdad, Mr. Gates said another brigade of about 5,000 troops could leave by the end of December on top of the two brigades, or 10,000 troops, now scheduled to pull out this year. That would still leave the bulk of American forces in Iraq until after January’s elections. The upbeat assessment came as flash points around Iraq offered cautionary notes about the country’s progress toward self-sustained security. While Mr. Gates met with his commanders, Iraqi forces made a surprise raid on a camp of Iranian exiles previously under American protection. A dispute between Baghdad and Kurdish leaders is intensifying, and the Shiite-led government has been arresting several Sunni militia leaders allied with the United States. Mr. Gates and other administration officials said such issues need to be addressed but did not cause them to rethink their current timetable for drawing down American forces. Instead, they expressed confidence that the month-old pullback from Iraqi cities had gone “better than expected,” as Mr. Gates put it, and indicated that, if anything, the American disengagement could proceed somewhat faster. The Obama administration has made it clear that Iraq is not its war and that it is committed to withdrawal, but some analysts cautioned that officials have to pay attention to events in Iraq rather than focusing on an artificial calendar. “I don’t think there’s anything in the cards for a slowdown,” Mr. Gates said during a stop in Turkey on Wednesday, a day after he had dinner in Baghdad with Gen. Ray Odierno, the top American commander in Iraq. “I think there’s at least some chance of a modest acceleration because of the way General Odierno sees things going. But that remains to be seen.”

Aff – Gates Supports Iraq Withdrawal

Gates supports withdrawing from Iraq

David R. Francis, staff writer at the Christian Science Monitor, 3/29/2010, “Defense budget: After Afghanistan and Iraq withdrawal, a peace dividend?”,<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend>

Nevertheless, the election in Iraq has raised hopes that the US can shrink its military presence there to 50,000 noncombat troops by September. On March 10, Defense Secretary Robert Gates reportedly also raised the possibility that some of the 33,000 troops involved in the recent buildup in Afghanistan could leave before July 2011, the date set by President Obama for beginning withdrawal. If and when these wars wind down, the US may receive an even bigger peace dividend in the form of overall defense cuts. Huge federal budget deficits will force them.

Gates supports withdrawing from Iraq

Khaled Farhan, staff writer at the National Post, 6/23/2010, “Iraqi cleric Sadr extends militia ceasefire”, <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/story.html?id=db327af6-7e18-4bb9-90a8-43365e12842c&k=31747>

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Friday he hoped to pull more troops out of Iraq after a brief pause in withdrawals in July or August to give the military time to assess the likely impact of lower force levels. "My hope is that we will be able to further draw down our troops in Iraq over the course of the next 10 to 12 months," he said, speaking in a plane on the way to a meeting in Australia.

Gates supports withdrawing from Iraq- in spite of instability in the region

Phil Stewart and Adam Entous, staff writers at Reuters, 3/26/2010, “U.S. might boost Iraq force structure during drawdown”,<http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-46968520100316>

U.S. General David Petraeus, testifying before a Senate panel, confirmed plans to meet President Barack Obama's target of 50,000 U.S. troops by end-August, from about 97,000 today. All U.S. forces will withdraw by the end of 2011. But he also noted that the situation in Iraq remained fragile, despite declining violence and high turnout in national elections, and said the U.S. military was still tinkering with plans on how best to administer the drawdown. "There's a possibility we may want to keep an additional brigade headquarters, as an example, but then slim out some of its organic forces and some of the other organic forces elsewhere," Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, told lawmakers, adding such headquarters are key to facilitating engagement with Iraqis. "And if indeed we think there's a particularly fragile situation, say in a certain area in the north, we might do that. And that's something we are looking at." The comments follow U.S. media speculation, denied by Pentagon officials, that the military might try to slow the drawdown. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said there would have to be a "pretty considerable deterioration" in Iraq before recommending slowing the timetable for withdrawal.

Aff – Gates Supports Japan Withdrawal

Gates supports withdrawing some troops from the Futenma base in Okinawa

Viola Gienger, staff writer at Bloomberg,  October 21, 2009, “Gates Says Japan Troop Cuts Hinge on Okinawa Base (Update1)”, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axXSTPC9ibuo>

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the U.S. won’t withdraw some of its troops from Japan unless the new government honors previous commitments, raising tension with an ally that wants a more equal relationship. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration wants to review an agreement signed in 2006 to move an American airbase within the island of Okinawa. The current relocation plan for the Futenma base is the “best alternative for everyone,” Gates told reporters in a joint appearance today with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa in Tokyo. Gates’ comments drew a clear line in establishing ties with a new government that seeks to exert more influence in its military alliance and shift the base off the island. The Obama administration says the base plan is integral to a broader military agreement and shouldn’t be altered. Japan also plans to stop providing refueling assistance for the war in Afghanistan, a task that Gates says largely helps nations other than the U.S.

Aff – Gates Supports General Withdrawal

Gates does not see the need for aggressive US military presence abroad

Anna Murline, staff writer at US News and World Report, 11/19/2008, “America's Best Leaders: Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense”, <http://politics.usnews.com/news/best-leaders/articles/2008/11/19/americas-best-leaders-robert-gates-us-secretary-of-defense.html>

Gates has discussed this notion of moving beyond simple brute force before, and it's echoed in the Army's new stability operations field manual. "Four years ago, we never could have actually talked about generating 'soft power,'" says Lt. Col. Steve Leonard, one of the manual's authors. "People were hesitant to use such a term." A constructive capability, Gates noted, is essential for the Pentagon to attain its political objectives: "The U.S. military's ability to kick down the door must be matched by our ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward." He echoed Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen, who said, "In the broader battle for hearts and minds abroad, we have to be as good at listening to others as we are at telling them our story." An emphasis on cleaning up and listening does not always sit well with traditionalists, who argue that the military is, at heart, an instrument of blunt force. It shouldn't, they add, forsake its fighting roots for what some dismissively call the "blue beret" work of the United Nations. But while Gates admitted that "the United States would be hard-pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice," he added, "where on Earth would we do that"

Gates advocates reducing military presence – especially in Iraq

Rodger Baker, staff writer for the Georgian Daily, 2/18/2009, “The Emerging Obama Foreign Policy**”,** <http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9997&Itemid=132>

Anticipation of a weaker administration created a challenge for Obama from the start. While many of his supporters saw him as the anti-Bush, the new president had no intention of shifting America to a second-tier position or making the United States isolationist. Obama’s focus on reducing U.S. forces in Iraq and the discussions during Clinton’s confirmation hearing of reducing the military’s role in reconstruction operations did not reflect an anti-military bias or even new ideas, but something Defense Secretary Robert Gates had advocated for under former U.S. President George W. Bush. A reshaping of the U.S. military will in fact take place over the course of Obama’s term in office. But the decision to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq is not unique to this administration; it is merely a recognition of the reality of the limitations of military resources.

Aff – Gates Supports General Withdrawal

Gates supports reducing the US military’s role in solving international problems

Thom Shanker, staff writer at the NY Times, 1/3/2009, “Top officer urges limit on mission of U.S. military”,<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/world/americas/13iht-military.1.19310206.html>

Because of those traits, Mullen said, the military receives vast resources - and then is asked to do even more. "I believe we should be more willing to break this cycle, and say when armed forces may not always be the best choice to take the lead," he said. "We must be just as bold in providing options when they don't involve our participation or our leadership, or even when those options aren't popular." U.S. national security and foreign policy requires "a whole-of-government approach to solving modern problems," Mullen said. "And we need to reallocate roles and resources in a way that places our military as an equal among many in government - as an enabler, a true partner." Mullen's tour as chairman will continue into the new administration, and President-elect Barack Obama has asked the current defense secretary, Robert Gates, to stay on. Mullen's speech was wholly in sync with remarks made by Gates, who has delivered a series of talks, remarkable for a Pentagon chief, calling for more resources for civilian agencies responsible for American "soft power," including the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and Agriculture.

Aff – RRW Good – Deterrent

Aff Card – RRW will be a credible deterrent

Thomas **Scheber**, National Institute for Public Policy, August 20**07**, “Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues” <http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/RRW%20final%20with%20foreword%207.30.07.pdf> TP

Former Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre has gone even further. In May 2005, he endorsed the RRW program and advocated one or a few nuclear tests of RRW designs to confirm the accuracy of nuclear simulation codes on supercomputers at the national laboratories. He implied that it may be worth conducting a few nuclear tests to demonstrate that the RRW designs work, that supercomputer calculations are accurate, and that the United States retains a credible nuclear deterrent. Then, Hamre asserted, we can proceed into an era of no nuclear testing with confidence. Dr. Hamre wrote: … the current inventory of nuclear weapons is grossly oversized and ill-suited for whatever the future might bring. These weapons were designed for an earlier age. While the force is quite capable today and provides a reliable deterrence, its credibility will erode as it ages. … we do better to hedge an uncertain future by maintaining competent design teams and building new weapons at low production rates than by holding on to a massive inventory of aging weapons. Almost all technical experts believe we probably do not need to test new-design [RRW] weapons to have high confidence in their effectiveness. But if we completely retire all existing systems, I think we should test the new weapons to demonstrate to the world that they are credible. Such testing need not be extensive. And while I acknowledge that testing is widely seen as a provocative act, it can be made acceptable internationally so long as it is preceded by a commitment to retire our entire existing inventory.29

Aff – RRW Good – Deterrent

Aff Card – RRW modernization is the only way to deter rising powers

Thomas **Scheber**, National Institute for Public Policy, August 20**07**, “Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues” <http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/RRW%20final%20with%20foreword%207.30.07.pdf> TP

Extended Deterrence: How might RRW affect extended deterrence guarantees provided to allies by the United States? For decades the United States has provided extended deterrence guarantees to NATO and to Asian-Pacific allies such as Japan and South Korea. As noted, this has been an important element of the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. The reasoning has been that as long as the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains effective and credible and U.S. security commitments remain valid, these allies would have little incentive to seek indigenous nuclear weapon programs for security. To date, this extended deterrence commitment by the United States has been an effective measure in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons; allies who have been the Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues 23 beneficiaries of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees have not developed nuclear arsenals. However, in the contemporary environment some allies are reportedly reconsidering their need for nuclear weapons. Reasons for this change include the following: 􀂃 Some U.S. allies are increasingly concerned about the growth of threats in their region. For example, recent North Korean tests of ballistic missiles and of a nuclear warhead create serious concerns for Japan, a key U.S. ally. 􀂃 With nuclear threats on the rise, Japan and other allies have openly questioned whether long-standing U.S. extended deterrence guarantees will remain valid. At the same time, Japan and other allies have witnessed dramatic reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and debates in the U.S. over nuclear modernization and the ability of America to sustain confidence in the nuclear stockpile without testing.36 If Iran and North Korea successfully continue nuclear weapon development efforts, a new round of nuclear proliferation may result. Iran and North Korea have undermined the NPT regime, subverted its civil technologies for military applications, and continue to ignore UN Security Council resolutions. In addition the leaders of both Iran and North Korea have demonstrated willingness to transfer dangerous weapons to others—both state and non-state actors. It is not surprising that several U.S. allies are threatened by the prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of such leaders. This concern is explored by authors Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss in their book, The Nuclear Tipping Point. In this book, they explore case studies of countries that may reconsider the need for nuclear weapons. They conclude: The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of U.S. security assurances will be a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudia Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options.37 A successful effort by the United States to develop, produce, and deploy RRWs and make continued progress on a responsive nuclear infrastructure would help to shore up allies’ concerns over perceptions that the U.S. may be neglecting its nuclear force and that the U.S. may not be able to sustain confidence in the Cold War legacy stockpile over the long-term.

Aff – RRW Good – Theft

Aff Card – RRWs make nuke theft impossible

Thomas **Scheber**, National Institute for Public Policy, August 20**07**, “Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues” <http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/RRW%20final%20with%20foreword%207.30.07.pdf> TP

Current warhead designs 20 Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues were not developed from requirements that included the kinds of threats from terrorists that we face in the contemporary environment.30 The current terrorist threat is more demanding. Suicide bombers could seek to gain access to weapons, either deployed or in storage, with the goal of exploding the weapons in place. Modern security features in U.S. weapons would help prevent an unauthorized nuclear detonation; however, an explosion near a nuclear warhead could scatter radioactive materials from inside the warhead. Such an act of terrorism could close down operations at the site for an extended timeframe while the tedious and expensive process of cleanup was conducted. Dr. Bruce Goodwin, Associate Director for Nuclear Weapon Technology at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, was quoted in a Los Angeles Times news article on the subject of RRW designs and terrorism: "It is essential that we make sure our weapons are impossible for terrorists to use," said Bruce Goodwin, chief of nuclear weapons design at Livermore. The weapons produced during the Cold War, he said, were not designed for an Age of Terrorism. … weapons scientists inside the labs say their goal of "absolute surety" is not only the right policy but is clearly achievable. "We know how to do it," Goodwin said. 31

Aff – RRW Doesn’t Cause Arms Race

Aff Card – No arms race – countries don’t model US nuke capabilities

Thomas **Scheber**, National Institute for Public Policy, August 20**07**, “Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues” <http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/RRW%20final%20with%20foreword%207.30.07.pdf> TP

Arms Competition: Would the RRW program send the wrong signal to other countries that the United States is modernizing and improving its nuclear arsenal at a time when we are seeking to convince countries such as North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear weapon ambitions? Some argue against any development and production of nuclear warheads by the United States because it would signal the continued value of nuclear weapons, compel others with nuclear weapons to expand and modernize arsenals, and encourage those without nuclear weapons to seek them. This argument is a holdover from the Cold War in which it was assumed that a new development by either the U.S. or the Soviet Union would spur development by the other in order to keep pace. This is one of the myths from the past addressed by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Keith Payne: …this arms race theory was inadequate to explain U.S. or Soviet motives during the Cold War, and today it mistakenly attributes the same motivation and dynamic to rogue states. Rogue states seek nuclear capabilities for their own unique purposes, such as the ability to intimidate or attack their regional neighbors and to deter with nuclear threats an overwhelmingly strong U.S. conventional response to such actions. These nuclear aspirations do not require rogues to mimic U.S. nuclear Reliable Replacement Warheads: Perspectives and Issues 21 programs quantitatively or qualitatively, nor do they need U.S. signals to appreciate the value of nuclear weapons for their own purposes. North Korea and Iran, for example, see considerable value in nuclear weapons.32 Another who explicitly rejects the action-reaction “arms race” dynamic as the explanation for contemporary proliferation is Professor Jacques Hymans. In his recent book, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Hymans concludes that some leaders possess unique traits that lead them to seek nuclear arsenals.33 In his analysis of why some countries, when faced with the same external circumstances, seek nuclear weapons while others do not, Hymans concludes that an analysis of the psychology of individual leaders is simply unavoidable. He notes that the source of the differences in motives to acquire nuclear weapons lies primarily in the character and disposition of individual leaders, and not in the “external structure.”34 Thus historical research of both Payne and Hymans teaches that the Cold War theory of action-reaction dynamics driven by U.S. nuclear weapon development is not supported by the empirical evidence. Consequently, a priori assertions that RRW will ignite a new nuclear arms race are similarly ill-founded. Development and production of RRW warhead components are no more likely to affect nuclear activities in other countries than other possible drivers; the action-reaction dynamic is an inadequate basis for expecting otherwise. If the U.S. cancelled the RRW program, it would be unlikely to change the motivations of other countries to modernize or acquire nuclear arsenals.

Aff – Gates Wants Irregular Warfare

Gates prioritizes irregular warfare – budget requests prove

Spencer **Ackerman**, Staff Writer, The Washington Independent, 4/6/**09**, “Gates $663 Billion Budget Changes Defense Priorities” <http://washingtonindependent.com/37503/gates-663-billion-budget-changes-defense-priorities> TP

Accordingly, Gates shifted the budget request to allow for institutionalized support for irregular warfare — a key goal of the generation of counterinsurgency theorist-practitioners who have emerged from Iraq and Afghanistan. Support for programs desired by counterinsurgents, such as training and mentoring partner militaries in counterinsurgency, have been funded through ad-hoc budgeting during the two wars, but Gates heralded an end to that practice. “Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs,” he said. Training partner militaries, for instance, will be part of a $500 million effort to “boost global partnership capacity efforts.” John Nagl, the president of the Center for a New American Security and a longtime advocate of an institutional capability within the Army for training foreign militiaries, praised Gates’ move. “The most important military component of the Long War against radical extremism may not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our friends to fight against our common enemies,” Nagl said. This budget takes significant steps in the direction of helping our friends defeat the internal threats to their stability that also threaten us.” Gates cautioned against reading the budget submission as a triumph of irregular warfare over conventional capabilities, arguing that it “crudely” provides “about 10 percent for irregular warfare, about 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent dual-purpose capabilities.” His goal was not to see irregular warfare replace conventional warfare in defense budgeting, but rather to give the “irregular-war constituency” a “seat at the table for the first time when it comes to the base budget.”