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Contention 1: Inherency

**Despite FEMA improvements in cost-waivers, it’s inefficient and causes a shortage in funds.**

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

Although FEMA has taken steps to improve the cost-waiver process, it continues to be lengthy and additional efforts may help expedite these reviews. In July 2009, FEMA issued an information bulletin to clarify the process that grantees should follow when submitting cost-share waiver requests.[Footnote 43] Since the issuance of this information bulletin, FEMA has received a total of 31 cost-share waiver requests-- of which, 22 were approved.[Footnote 44] In November 2009, following a Fiduciary Agent Workshop, FEMA released written responses to questions posed at the workshop. In this document, FEMA stated that a decision on a waiver request could be expected approximately 30 days after all documentation was provided to FEMA in accordance with the process outlined in the July 2009 information bulletin. However, according to FEMA records, for cost-share waivers reviewed since December 2009 DHS took--on average--126 days to approve a request once all of the required information had been received. Approval time lines ranged between 55 days and 268 days for these waiver requests. Of the 126 days, on average, it took 74 days from the date requests were considered complete to achieve approval by GPD's leadership. It took an additional 52 days, on average, to complete the remaining 11 steps of the waiver process--including approval at the Administrator of FEMA level and the Secretary of Homeland Security level. According to DHS, due diligence requires both component and department level clearances, including secretarial clearance, in order to responsibly award funding. This process ensures that PSGP projects meet program goals and objectives. However, FEMA records show that no approval recommendations from GPD leadership were overturned as a result of the additional 52 days, on average, of required review. Further, only 1 of the 31 waiver requests submitted since the July 2009 information bulletin was issued has been denied--and it was denied at the GPD level. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that "pertinent information should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame that permits people to perform their duties efficiently."[Footnote 45] FEMA officials told us that FEMA has taken internal actions to improve the review process such as meeting with other key offices involved in the waiver process in the spring of 2011 to discuss and standardize information requirements for the waiver package. FEMA officials reported that they believe that this effort has helped improve some aspects of the process, but further action may be required to streamline the process. Additionally, fiduciary agents remain wary of the cost-waiver request process. For example, one fiduciary agent told us that its field review team--including the COTP--would be unlikely to recommend a project for funding if that project relies on a cost-share waiver. Another fiduciary agent told us that there is little interest in the fiscal year 2009 funds due in part to the lengthy waiver review process. Without a more efficient review process, certain grant applicants that cannot fund the cost- match requirement may not receive grant funds to implement their projects, or may not even apply for funds. Evaluating the waiver review process could help to ensure that the process is completed in a timely manner.

1AC (2/12)

Advantage 1: Container Security

Status quo efforts are insufficient – ports are uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river ports. While no two ports in the United States are exactly alike, many share certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attacks: they are sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with complex transportation networks designed to move cargo and commerce as quickly as possible (see fig 1). They contain not only terminals where goods bound for import or export are unloaded or loaded onto vessels, but also other facilities critical to the nation's economy, such as refineries, factories, and power plants. To reduce the opportunity for terrorists to exploit port vulnerabilities, port stakeholders are taking mitigation steps. For example, port stakeholders have installed fences, hired security guards, and purchased cameras to reduce the potential for unauthorized entry and help prevent vulnerabilities from being exploited.

Only 5% of all cargo containers are screened now because the cost is too high – tighter port security is critical to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack.

**Calvan , June 12/2012** (Bobby Caina is a journalist for the Boston Globe, foreign reporting fellow with the D.C.-based International Center for Journalists and covers Congress in the Washington, D.C., bureau.“US to miss target for tighter port security”, http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/06/tighter-port-security/)

The Department of Homeland Security will miss an initial deadline of July 12 to comply with a sweeping federal law meant to thwart terrorist attacks arriving by sea, frustrating border security advocates who worry that the agency has not done enough to prevent dangerous cargo from coming through the country’s ocean gateways, including the Port of Boston. Only a small fraction of all metal cargo containers have been scanned before arriving at US ports, and advocates for tighter port security say all maritime cargo needs to be scanned or manually inspected to prevent terrorists from using ships bound for the United States to deliver a nuclear bomb. The scenario might be straight out of a Hollywood script, but the threat of terrorism is not limited to airplanes, according to Homeland Security critics, including Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts. Markey accuses the agency of not making a good-faith effort to comply with a 2007 law he coauthored requiring all US-bound maritime shipments to be scanned before departing overseas docks. “We’re not just missing the boat, we could be missing the bomb,’’ the Malden Democrat said. “The reality is that detonating a nuclear bomb in the United States is at the very top of Al Qaeda’s terrorist targets.’’ Only about 5 percent of all cargo containers headed to the United States are screened, according to the government’s own estimate, with some shipments getting only a cursory paperwork review. Homeland Security officials argue that wider screening would be cost-prohibitive, logistically and technologically difficult, and diplomatically challenging. While acknowledging the threat as real, they are exercising their right under the 2007 law to postpone for two years the full implementation of the congressionally mandated scanning program. That would set the new deadline for July 2014. Critics say the consequences of delay could be catastrophic. Terrorists have long sought to obtain uranium or plutonium to construct a nuclear bomb, global security analysts say. Government officials, including President Obama and his predecessor, George W. Bush, have worried that terrorist cells could be plotting further devastation in the United States, perhaps through radioactive explosives called “dirty bombs.’’ Homeland Security “has concluded that 100 percent scanning of incoming maritime cargo is neither the most efficient nor cost-effective approach to securing our global supply chain,’’ said Matt Chandler, an agency spokesman. Homeland Security “continues to work collaboratively with industry, federal partners, and the international community to expand these programs and our capability to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials,’’ Chandler said, adding that “we are more secure than ever before.’’ The agency has used what it calls a “risk-based approach’’ to shipments. As a result, Homeland Security has focused on cargo originating from 58 of the world’s busiest seaports, from Hong Kong to Dubai. Last year, US agents stationed at those ports inspected 45,500 shipments determined to be high risk, according to joint testimony by Homeland Security, Coast Guard, and US Customs officials in February before the House Homeland Security Committee. Republicans have been wary of forcing the agency to comply with the scanning mandate because of the presumed cost, perhaps at least $16 billion – a figure disputed by Markey and others who cite estimates that the program could cost a comparatively modest $200 million. Representative Candice Miller, a Michigan Republican who chairs the House subcommittee on border and maritime security, was more inclined to accept the estimate from Homeland Security officials. In light of the country’s budget troubles, “we have to try and prioritize,’’ she said. Scanning cargo “100 percent would be optimal,’’ she conceded, “but it’s not workable.’’ Still, she acknowledged the need to secure the country’s borders, whether by air, land, or sea. There is no dispute that a terrorist attack at a major port could be catastrophic to the global economy. Much of the world’s products – T-shirts sewn in China, designer shoes from Italy, and other foreign-made products – arrives in the United States in large, metal cargo containers. While some countries have voluntarily improved cargo screening, others have not. Large retailers have opposed measures that could increase their costs. Without full scanning compliance, it is often difficult to determine if shipments have been inspected because cargo is sometimes transferred from ship to ship offshore.

1AC (3/12)

An effective PSGP is critical to ports counterterrorism.

Committee on Homeland Security, February 17, 2012

(“Thompson: Grant Guidance Shows Rash and Shortsighted Budget Cuts” http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=714&SubSection=5&Issue=9&DocumentType=0&PublishDate=2012&issue=9)

February 17, 2012 (WASHINGTON) – Today, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS), Ranking Member of the Committee on Homeland Security, released the following statement regarding the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s release of its Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Preparedness Grant Guidance. Pursuant to the end-of-the-year spending law, a paltry $1.3 billion was appropriated for homeland security grant programs. The grant guidance sets forth how these funds have been allocated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on threat, vulnerability and consequence analysis. Under these guidelines, many targeted grant programs are eliminated entirely while the others are cut significantly. In comparison to FY2011, the following reductions are slated for FY 2012: • State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) by 44 percent • Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) by 26 percent • Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) by 59 percent • Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) by 56 percent “Today’s homeland security announcement is the predictable result of the Republican Majority’s blind approach to cutting the budget, no matter the cost to our Nation’s security. Back in December, I protested these shortsighted and rash cuts. Today, we know their real world consequences. As the threat of terrorism diversifies and grows more complex, we cannot afford to abandon the preparedness and counterterrorism partnership we made with our country’s at-risk communities over a decade ago. The Port Security Grant Program supports improving a port's ability to prevent, detect, respond, and recover from a terrorist attack through training and safety improvements. The Port Security Grant Program will receive a 59 percent cut over FY 2011 levels. The Long Beach/Los Angeles ports received $24,538,191 in Port Security Grant Program funds in FY 2011.

1AC (4/12)

The risk of a WMD terrorist attack on U.S. ports is high and would collapse the global economy, inflict mass death and destroy the environment.

Haveman & Shatz 2006 (Protecting the nations’ seaports: balancing security and cost)

<<http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf>>

The term “port security” serves as shorthand for the broad effort to secure the entire maritime supply chain, from the factory gate in a foreign country to the final destination of the product in the United States. The need to secure ports and the supply chain feeding goods into the ports stems from two concerns. The first is that transporting something from one place to another—the very activity that the ports facilitate—is an important activity for terrorists. Terrorists could use a port as a conduit through which to build an arsenal within the nation’s borders. The second concern is that ports themselves present attractive targets for terrorists. Ports are a significant potential choke point for an enormous amount of economic activity. The 361 U.S. seaports make an immense contribution to U.S. trade and the U.S. economy. They move about 80 percent of all U.S. international trade by weight, and about 95 percent of all U.S. overseas trade, excluding trade with Mexico and Canada. By value, $807 billion worth of goods flowed through the seaports in 2003, about 41 percent of all U.S. international goods trade. This value is higher than the value of trade moved by all modes in any single leading industrial country except Germany. Temporarily shutting down a major U.S. port could impose significant economic costs throughout not only the United States but also the world. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has labeled the destruction of the U.S. economy as one of his goals: “If their economy is finished, they will become too busy to enslave oppressed people. It is very important to concentrate on hitting the U.S. economy with every available means.” The potential for a port closure to disrupt economic activity has been made clear several times in recent years. In 2002, the closure of all West Coast ports was clearly responsible for some element of economic disruption, with estimates of lost activity ranging from the hundreds of millions of dollars per day to several billion. In September 2005, Hurricane Katrina further served to reinforce the fact that ports are an integral feature of our goods distribution system. The closure of the Port of New Orleans and many smaller ports along the Gulf Coast is likely to have adversely affected U.S. grain exports, although at the time of this writing, cost estimates were not available. Hurricane Katrina further illustrated the effects of disruptions to the flow of oil, gasoline, and natural gas to the nation’s economy. That a natural disaster can produce such a result implies that an attack on oil terminals at U.S. ports could be both desirable and effective for terrorists. Beyond their economic role, the largest seaports are also near major population centers, so the use of a weapon of mass destruction at a port could injure or kill thousands of people. In addition, a weapon such as a nuclear device could cause vast environmental and social disruption and destroy important non-port infrastructure in these urban areas such as airports and highway networks. How much risk is there for either of these concerns? U.S. law enforcement, academic, and business analysts believe that although the likelihood of an ocean container being used in a terrorist attack is low, the vulnerability of the maritime transportation system is extremely high, and the consequence of a security breach, such as the smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction into the country, would be disastrous. Others take issue with the notion that the likelihood of a container attack is low, believing that an increase in global maritime terrorism in 2004 and the reputed appointment late that year of a maritime specialist as head of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia portended a significant maritime attack. Before September 11, maritime experts offered this broad definition of port security: “protective measures taken to prevent crime and maintain a state of freedom from danger, harm, or risk of loss to person or property.” This definition failed to include the dangers now understood to be part of the terrorism threat. An updated definition today might read, “protective measures taken to secure the maritime related intermodal supply chain from terrorism, the unwitting transmission of terrorism-related assets, and crime; effective response should those measures fail; and freedom from danger, harm, and loss to person and property.” Port security is a challenge for many reasons. In the fall of 2000, security at America’s ports was labeled as generally poor to fair.

1AC (5/12)

Economic collapse causes global nuclear war.

Auslin and Lachman 9 [Michael Auslin is a resident scholar and Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,“ The Global Economy Unravels,” 3/6/2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/06/global-economy-unravels-opinions-contributors-g20.html]

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

Nuclear terrorism leads to global nuclear war.

Hellman 2008 (Dr. Martin E. Hellman, New York Epsilon ’66, is professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University, with research interests in cryptography and information theory, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence”, <http://nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf>)

 A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan).

1AC (6/12)

Advantage 2: Trafficking

Thousands of people are trafficked into the U.S. annually – its stealthy nature allows traffickers to slip under national radars.

Seaport 2010, Sovereign Market. Seaport Security News |. "U.S. Port Security Is A Global Issue." *Seaport Security News |*. Sovereign Market, 23 Nov. 2010. Web. 22 June 2012. <http://www.seaportsecuritynews.com/?p=212>.

Millions of people every year are the victims of human trafficking. Slavery, which is often thought to have ended with the civil war, is alive and well in the world of today. As a crime that is not beingsignificantlyimpacted by the measures taken to preventit, the governing international bodies are currently working to improve conviction of the criminals involved with this crime and also in the aid of the victims of the crime. As defined by the United Nations Protocol to Protect, Punish and Suppress Trafficking in Persons, human trafficking is “…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuses of power or of a position of vulnerability” (Article 3, par 1). This tedious definition can be shortened to two words: force and fraud. All human trafficking involves someone being forced through violence or the threat of violence or coerced through fraudulent representation. Because of the stealthy nature of the crime it often slips underneath national radars. In Eastern Europe many young woman are presented with an “Amazing modeling opportunity” in the West, only to find themselves trapped in the illicit sex trade once they arrive. Worldwide there is a high demand for women and children to work as sex slaves, sweatshop labor, and domestic servants. The inefficiency of laws and law enforcement have allowed the trafficking in human beings to be the world’s third largest market falling behind drugs and weapons. Though the largest number of victims comes from South and Southeast Asia, cases of human trafficking exist in nearly all the developed nations of the West. The State Departmentsconservative estimate calculates that 2-4 million people are trafficked annually, but some estimates range as high as 27 million. 800,000 peoplearetrafficked across international boarders each year; 80% woman and 50% children. According to Condolezza Rice, as many as 17,500 people are trafficked to the United States each year. The UN's Protocol to Protect puts the number of people the victims of human trafficking at any given time at 12.3 million. As with any crime, the causes of human trafficking are varied and complicated. But looked at simply it is a case in which an illegal market exists, and wherever money can be earned, organized crime is willing to destroy lives to earn it. While an adequate response to combating the crime has been historically slow, governments and NGO’s are beginning to rise to the call to combat the crime. Even the developing countries of the world are moving forward. Even Guatemala, considered as Tier 2 by the State Department because it does not have enforcement that is significant and has victim assistance that is considered “inadequate,” is hosting its first ever nationwide congress on the issue under the direction of the NGO Nuestros Ahijados and its sister organization ITEMP.org. In October 2008, the same organization is hosting a similar congress to combat the crime across all of Central America. The key to ending the plague of human trafficking is bringing organizations working against it together to better coordinate the convictions of the criminals and the care of the victims. With awareness finally created, steps large and small are being made to combat the crisis.

**1AC (7/**12)

**Ensuring available PSGP funds is key to stop the trafficking of people and narcotics.**

AAPA 2010. AAPA. "10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports." *-- ALEXANDRIA, Va., Sept. 1, 2011 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ --*. American Association of Port Authorities, 1 Sept. 2011. Web. 24 June 2012. <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/10-years-after-911-security-still-a-top-priority-of-us-ports-128888213.html>.

Among the materials Navy SEALS found in Osama Bin Laden's Pakistan hideout were plans showing the maritime industry is still a key Al-Qaida target. Given ongoing threats such as these, the seaport industry is asking Congress and the Administration make port security a top funding priority in current and future appropriations rather than considering it for funding cuts. AAPA is strongly in favor of reauthorizing the SAFE Port Act to ensure that U.S. port facilities and cargoes remain secure.  One such bill, S. 832, was introduced in April by Sens. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Patty Murray (D-WA), which would authorize $300 million a year for five years for the Port Security Grant Program and reauthorizes, among other aspects of the original bill, the Container Security Initiative, C-TPAT and the Automated Targeting System to identify high-risk cargo. Since 9/11, the Port Security Grant Program has received about $2.6 billion in funding for 11 rounds of grant awards.  AAPA commends Congress and the Administration for these allocations and will continue to recommend the federal government commit $400 million a year for a separate and dedicated program to help port facilities enhance their physical security.  The association supports a risk-based evaluation process that allows all facilities that are required to meet MTSA regulations to apply. "Clearly, America's ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate," remarked Mr. Nagle. "There's no question that more investments in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed. All parties—the ports, terminal operators, the various government agencies, and the Administration and Congress—must do their part in undertaking and funding these enhancements.  Only by continuing to make port security a top priority will America's seaports be able to continue serving their vital functions as trade gateways, catalysts for job creation and economic prosperity, and important partners in our national defense." The American Association of Port Authorities was founded in 1912 and today represents about 150 of the leading public port authorities in the United States, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean.  In addition, the Association represents some 250 sustaining and associate members, firms and individuals with an interest in the seaports of the Western Hemisphere.  AAPA port members are public entities mandated by law to serve public purposes.  Port authorities facilitate waterborne commerce and contribute to local, regional and national economic growth.

Sex trafficking is the ultimate form of dehumanization

DeMarco 7 – [Caitlin, intern in the Ronald Reagan Memorial Internship Program at Concerned Women for America Jul 12, http://www.cwfa.org/articles/13418/BLI/dotcommentary/index.htm]cn

We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." We join the ambassador in declaring, "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence."

**1AC (8/**12)

Dehumanization controls genocide, slavery and exploitation,

Katheryn Katz, Professor of Law, 1997**,** "The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction," Lexis-Nexis

It is undeniable that throughout human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be visited upon him. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery, racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty

1AC (9/12)

Smuggling is the biggest contributor to the Marijuana in the United States.

United States Drug Enforcement Administration, January 31, 2002.

“Drug Trafficking in the United States”, *http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/drug\_trafficking.html*

Marijuana is the most widely abused and readily available illicit drug in the United States, with an estimated 11.5 million current users. At least one-third of the U.S. population has used marijuana sometime in their lives. The drug is considered a "gateway" to the world of illicit drug abuse. Relaxed public perception of harm, popularization by the media and by groups advocating legalization, along with the trend of smoking marijuana-filled cigars known as "blunts," contribute to the nationwide resurgence in marijuana's popularity. The Internet also contributes to marijuana's popularity. Websites exist that provide information and links extolling the virtues of marijuana. These sites provide forums for user group discussions, post documents and messages for public discussions, and advocate the "legal" sale of marijuana. Several web sites advertising the sale of marijuana and providing instructions on home grows have also been identified. Marijuana smuggled into the United States, whether grown in Mexico or transshipped from other Latin American source areas, accounts for most of the marijuana available in the United States. Marijuana produced in Mexico remains the most widely available. Moreover, high-potency marijuana enters the U.S. drug market from Canada. The availability of marijuana from Southeast Asia generally is limited to the West Coast. U.S. drug law enforcement reporting also suggests increased availability of domestically grown marijuana.

Demand for illicit drugs are still rising – plagues the healthcare industry and costs billions of dollars annually.

National Drug Intelligence Center 2011

National Drug Intelligece Center. "National Drug Threat Assesment 2011." U.S. Department of Justice, 2011. Web. <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf>.

NDIC estimates yearly drug-related healthcare costs to be more than $11 billion, including both direct and indirect costs related to medical intervention, such as emergency services, in-patient drug treatment, and drug use prevention and treatment research. In addition, the nation’s health is plagued by numerous other ills arising from drug abuse, including driving under the influence of drugs, parental neglect, and exposure to toxic methamphetamine laboratories. Drug abusers are often hospitalized as a result of drug use. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) estimates that ap- proximately 2 million emergency department (ED) visits to U.S. hospitals in 2009 were the result of drug misuse or abuse. Of these, approximately 50 percent involved illicit drug abuse (see Table B1 in Appendix B). NDIC estimates healthcare costs for nonhomicide ED visits related to drug use to be approximately $161 million annually. Hospital admissions are estimated to be an additional $5.5 billion. Drugged driving is a growing problem in the United States, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. While the overall number of drivers, passengers, or occupants killed in vehicle and motorcycle accidents decreased from 37,646 in 2005 to 28,936 in 2009, the number of driver fatalities involving licit or illicit drugs increased during that time from 3,710 to 3,952. Law enforcement personnel and first responders who handle clandestine meth- amphetamine laboratory seizures are often exposed to toxic chemicals, fires, and explosions. According to National Seizure System (NSS) data, the number of law en- forcement officials injured at methamphetamine production sites increased from 32 in 2005 to 62 in 2009. In the first 9 months of 2010, 41 law enforcement officials were injured. Children living in homes where methamphetamine is produced are also at great risk for negative health consequences. According to NSS, the number of children injured at methamphetamine production sites increased from 4 in 2005 to 11 in 2009, while 14 children were injured from January through September 2010. Such children are also at risk from fires and explosions. NSS data show that there were 171 explosions or fires at methamphetamine production sites in 2009, compared with 101 in 2008; in the first 9 months of 2010, there were 160 explosions or fires. The demand for most illicit drugs in the United States is rising, particularly among young people.The trend is evident in national- level studies including NSDUH. According to NSDUH, an increasing number of individuals, particularly young adults, are abusing illicit drugs. In 2009, an estimated 8.7 percent of Americans aged 12 or older (21.8 million individuals) were current illicit drug users, a statistically significant increase from 8.0 percent in 2008. Rates of abuse—particularly for marijuana—are increasing, especially among young adults aged 18 to 25, who constitute the largest age group of current abusers. Rates of marijuana abuse among this cohort rose from 16.5 percent in 2008 to 18.1 percent in 2009. In 2009, 21.2 percent of respondents aged 18 to 25 reported that they had abused drugs in the past month. Adolescents appear to be abusing illicit drugs at a greater rate than most other segments of society. NSDUH shows that, among youths aged 12 to 17, the current illicit drug use rate increased between 2008 (9.3%) and 2009 (10.0%). The majority of these abusers used marijuana; NSDUH shows an increase from 6.7 percent in 2008 to 7.3 percent in 2009 among youth aged 12 to 17 reporting current marijuana abuse. Moreover, findings from the 2010 Monitoring the Future (MTF) study reveal that after a decade of gradual decline, marijuana use among adolescents has begun to increase. The rate of daily abuse among adolescents in 2010 increased among eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders. This increase was both preceded and accompanied by a decline in adolescents’ perception of the risks associated with marijuana abuse.

1AC (10/12)

## Stable healthcare industry is key to bioterrorist readiness and checks a smallpox outbreak

**Sklar, 2002** (Holly, Coauthor of “Raise the Floor”, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Rolling the Dice on Our Nations’ Health”, December 19, <http://www.commondreams.org/views02/1219-07.htm>)

Imagine if the first people infected in a smallpox attack had no health insurance and delayed seeking care for their flu-like symptoms. The odds are high. Pick a number from one to six. Would you bet your life on a roll of the dice? Would you play Russian Roulette with one bullet in a six-chamber gun? One in six Americans **under age 65** has no health insurance. The uninsured are more likely to delay seeking medical care, go to work sick for fear of losing their jobs, seek care at overcrowded emergency rooms and clinics, and be poorly diagnosed and treated. The longer smallpox--or another contagious disease--goes undiagnosed, the more it will spread, with the insured and uninsured infecting each other. Healthcare is literally a matter of life and death. Yet, more than 41 million Americans have no health insurance of any kind, public or private. The uninsured rate was 14.6 percent in 2001--up 13 percent since 1987. The rate is on the rise with increased healthcare costs, unemployment and cutbacks in Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). One in four people with household incomes less than $25,000 is uninsured. One in six full-time workers is uninsured, including half the full-time workers with incomes below the official poverty line. The share of workers covered by employment health plans drops from 81 percent in the top fifth of wage earners to 68 percent in the middle fifth to 33 percent in the lowest fifth, according to the Economic Policy Institute. As reports by the American College of Physicians, Kaiser Family Foundation and many others have shown, lack of health insurance is associated with lack of preventive care and substandard treatment inside and outside the hospital. The uninsured are at much higher risk for chronic disease and disability, and have a 25 percent greater chance of dying (adjusting for physical, economic and behavioral factors). To make matters worse, a health crisis is often an economic crisis. "Medical bills are a factor in nearly half of all personal bankruptcy filings," reports the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine. The U.S. is No. 1 in healthcare spending per capita, but No. 34--tied with Malaysia--when it comes to child mortality rates under age five. The U.S. is No. 1 in healthcare spending, but the only major industrialized nation not to provide some form of universal coverage. We squander billions of dollars in the red tape of myriad healthcare eligibility regulations, forms and procedures, and second-guessing of doctors by insurance gatekeepers trained in cost cutting, not medicine. Americans go to Canada for cheaper prices on prescription drugs made by U.S. pharmaceutical companies with U.S. taxpayer subsidies. While millions go without healthcare, top health company executives rake in the dough. A report by Families USA found that the highest-paid health plan executives in ten companies received average compensation of $11.7 million in 2000, not counting unexercised stock options worth tens of millions more. The saying, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," couldn't be truer when it comes to healthcare. Yet, we provide universal coverage for seniors through Medicare, but not for children. We have economic disincentives for timely diagnosis and treatment of diseases. Universal healthcare is a humane and cost-effective solution to the growing healthcare crisis. Universal coverage won't come easy, but neither did Social Security or Medicare, which now serves one in seven Americans. Many proposals for universal healthcare build on the foundation of "Medicare for All," albeit an improved Medicare adequately serving seniors and younger people alike. Healthcare is as essential to equal opportunity as public education and as essential to public safety as police and fire protection. If your neighbor's house were burning, would you want 911 operators to ask for their fire insurance card number before sending--or not sending--fire trucks? Healthcare ranked second behind terrorism and national security as the most critical issue for the nation in the 2002 Health Confidence Survey released by the Employee Benefit Research Institute. The government thinks the smallpox threat is serious enough to start inoculating military and medical personnel with a highly risky vaccine.It's time to stop delaying universal healthcare, which will save lives everyday while boosting our readiness for any bioterror attack.

Smallpox causes extinction.

**Singer 1** professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Clifford E.,Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?, p. http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_XIII/Singer.htm

There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

1AC (11/12)

Plan: The United States federal government should grant all allocated funds in the Port Security Grant Program.

1AC (12/12)

Contention 4: Solvency

Cost share waivers prevent ports from getting grant funds – removing them solves

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

Fiduciary agents in 8 of 11 port areas in our review reported a lessened demand for grant funds in grant years where there was a cost- share requirement, particularly for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Fiduciary agents cited a variety of challenges with the cost-share requirement, including: (1) applicants were aware of long delays in the distribution of grant funds and faced difficulty preserving the cost-share obligation in their entity's budget while pending receipt of awarded grant funds, (2) facility owners who were compliant with security requirements under MTSA were hesitant to invest their own money for additional security projects beyond the requirements, and (3) applicants were unable to afford the cost-share requirement due to the economic downturn. For example, one fiduciary agent reported that while she generally supports a cost-share requirement because it ensures stakeholder buy-in, the cost-share requirement has been challenging due to the poor economic environment. As a result of the cost-share, this fiduciary agent reported conducting three distinct rounds of project solicitations in the fiscal year 2008 grant round in order to generate enough demand to spend the port area's entire allocation. We reported in October 2010 that a cost-share requirement is a key factor for effective federal grants because it ensures that federal grants supplement--rather than substitute for--stakeholder spending. We further reported that a cost-share requirement is reasonable given that grant benefits can be highly localized.[Footnote 39] As a result of the inconsistent cost-share requirement, several fiduciary agents told us that applicants were more likely to request funding under the grant rounds with the most lenient cost-share requirement or delay project submission while waiting to learn whether or not the next round of grants would include the cost-share requirement. This uncertainty about the cost-share requirement created a disincentive for grant applicants to request funding during cost- share years. For example, the fiduciary agent in one port area told us that the port area received project proposals totaling twice the port area's total allocation for fiscal year 2011. Thus, projects had to be denied for fiscal year 2011 funding during the field-level review, even though more than $9 million in fiscal year 2008 and 2009 grant money remained unused. As shown in table 8 below, a greater portion of money from cost-share years remains unused as compared to money from non-cost-share years, even though cost-share grant years preceded the non-cost-share grant year. For example, about 22 percent of grant funding awarded to Group 1 port areas during cost-share years remains unused, as compared to less than 4 percent during fiscal year 2010, when the cost-share requirement was waived

PSGP is critical to upgrading and sustaining our port security

AAPA, March 7/2012 (American Association of Port Authorities is a trade association that represents over 150 port authority organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere, “Testimony of Captain John M. Holmes”, http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf)

In the decade since 9/11, a key component of our nation’s effort to harden the security of seaports has been the Port Security Grant Program, currently managed by FEMA. The Port of Los Angeles alone has spent more than $250 million to upgrade its security, over $100 million of which was provided through grant funding. These upgrades would not have been possible if it were not for the Port Security Grant Program. As is the case in Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funds have helped port facilities and port areas to strengthen facility security and work in partnership with other agencies to enhance the security of the region. In the Port of Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funding has been used to procure equipment such as vessels and vehicles, install detection systems such as cameras and sensors, and provide equipment maintenance for the systems recently installed. Port Security Grant funds have also been used to harden port IT infrastructure, and most recently this funding has been used to fill a serious training gap -- Maritime Security Training for State and Local police officers. Under the SAFE Port Act, the Port Security Grant program is authorized at $400 million. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the funding for this program has decreased, currently standing at a dangerously low level. The current level of $97.5 million is 75 percent less than the authorized level, and it is currently at one of the lowest funding levels ever for this program. As costs of systems, maintenance and equipment continue to rise, this level of funding will bring into question the sustainability of the protection levels we have worked so hard to build over the last decade.

\*\*\*2AC\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*Inherency\*\*\*\*

**Port Security is underfunded- economic downturn**

The Maritime Executive January 18, 2011, (highly prestigious naval newspaper & magazine) “US Ports Remain Underfunded to Provide Maritime Security” <<http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2006-04-13us-ports-remain-underfunded-to-provide>>

The political firestorm, which erupted over whether a United Arab Emirates company, Dubai Port World, should be permitted to manage six U.S. ports, has garnered huge headlines in the recent past. **Slipping beneath the radar** of the national press, however, **is the** relatively **paltry sum**, according to representatives of the nation's seaports, **being given to provide port security and infrastructure maintenance.** Although the Administration's 2007 federal budget includes $65.6 billion for transportation, with $258 million designated for the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) says that amount is nowhere near enough. With **virtually 99% of U.S. overseas cargo passing through U.S. ports annually, security and deep-draft channel maintenance shortfalls could seriously hamper port operations. The ripple effect through the U.S. economy, in the event of a catastrophic terrorism event or operational casualty, would be significant.** The AAPA notes that, "The federal share of the seaport facility security funding partnership needs to be increased, not reprogrammed and diluted." This refers to a proposal to eliminate the Port Security Grant program and to lump maritime security infrastructure needs together with trains, trucks, bus, and public transit under the Targeted Infrastructure Protection program. **In the five rounds of funding since 2002, the Port Security Grant program has meted out to U.S. ports $708 million of much-needed funding, but this amounts to less than 25 percent of what the ports themselves said they needed for security.** The U.S. Coast Guard has estimated that port facilities needed $5.4 billion over a 10-year period to comply with new regulations in accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Since September 11, 2001, **the grant program has made only $708 million available out of almost $3.8 billion requested for port security expenses.** The AAPA recommends annual funding at a $400 million level. Beyond this, the Army Corps of Engineers' Civil Works program, which is responsible for maintaining federal navigation channels, remains under-funded and would require $750 million from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, according to the AAPA. The budget calls for $707 million and, though that is up $33 million over last year, it is less than the $750 million needed for navigation channel maintenance. The budget does call for some draw down of the estimated $3 billion surplus in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. Still, port executive complain that this will not be enough. These are funds paid into the Trust Fund through the harbor maintenance tax paid by users. This surplus is expected to grow to $5 billion by 2010, but, during that time, port volumes are expected to grow dramatically, including container traffic. Already, according to port managers, **the trade-off between port infrastructure projects and required port security projects is underway. Additionally, some ports complain that only a portion of their security expenditures has been reimbursed under the security grant program. Some ports are already experiencing a loss of depth in their harbors and channels and, consequently, must limit ship access.**

**Future cuts ensure port security erosion**

American Association of Port Authorities **(AAPA)** March 7, 2012 [The AAPA was founded in 1912 and represents 160 of the leading seaport authorities in the United States as well as other countries.] <http://www.aapa ports.org/Press/PRdetail.cfm?itemnumber=18434>

At two separate Congressional hearings today, AAPA representatives emphasized the need for federal support for seaport security and maintenance and improvements to federal navigation channels.  Port industry leaders illustrated the challenges that underfunding security and dredging pose for national security and US international competitiveness.  As the House Appropriations Committee begins work on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, AAPA executives reminded Congressional leaders of the critical role that ports play for the nation – serving as a front line of defense on international borders and facilitating overseas trade, 99 percent of which moves by water.  Captain John Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Operations at the Port of Los Angeles, testified before the Homeland Security Subcommittee regarding Port Security Grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency.   “The FY 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level,” Holmes stated.  “This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans and fund federal mandates such as installation of TWIC readers.” AAPA President and CEO Kurt Nagle submitted testimony to the Energy and Water Subcommittee on the budget for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Civil Works program.  The testimony focused on the need for full use of the Harbor Maintenance Tax annual revenue for maintenance dredging and the need to adequately fund needed channel deepening projects. Nagle wrote, “The federal government has a unique Constitutional responsibility to maintain and improve the infrastructure that enables the flow of commerce, and much of that infrastructure in and around seaports have been neglected for too long, particularly the capacity of the federal channels which affects the ports’ ability to move cargo efficiently into and out of the U.S. This hurts U.S. business, hurts U.S. workers and hurts our national economy.”

Ports underfunded

Key ports and harborways are not getting enough funding

Sandy Levin, May 7th 2012, <http://levin.house.gov/letter-urging-harbor-maintenance-trust-funds-actually-be-spent-operating-and-maintaining-our-nation>

As you proceed to a House-Senate conference committee on the transportation reauthorization bill to resolve differences between S. 1813 and H.R. 4348, we want to call your attention to important provisions included in both of the bills that involve our federal ports and harbors.  The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) and Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) were established in 1986 to strictly and efficiently fund U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) operations and maintenance purposes and ensure that our navigation system operates effectively.   The HMT is a user fee charged against the value of imports and domestic cargo arriving at the nearly 1,000 U.S. ports and harbors and deposited into the HMTF, where they are then subject to appropriations.  Yet only about half of the funds collected through a user fee charged on shippers are actually appropriated for harbor maintenance, threatening width and depth of American waterways.  The USACE has estimated that even the so-called top-priority harbors, those that handle about 90 percent of the commercial traffic, are dredged to their authorized depths and widths only 35 percent of the time.  This lack of maintenance is simply unacceptable.  Ports and harbors support about 13 million jobs and account for $4 trillion in economic impacts.  Additionally, because waterborne transportation is often the least expensive means of transporting vital commodities used for manufacturing, construction, and energy generation, shipping bolsters our international competitiveness, economic recovery and job creation, while also keeping costs in check for American consumers. The harbor maintenance provisions, contained in Sections 1533 and 401 of the Senate and House bills, respectively, would ensure all funds deposited into the HMTF in a given fiscal year be fully expended to operate and maintain the navigation channels of the United States, and not for other purposes.  We ask that this language be retained and strengthened further through an “enforcement of guarantees”; that language should mirror that provided in Section 2(c) of the Realize America’s Maritime Promise (RAMP) Act (H.R. 104).  Similar action was taken for aviation programs in the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) to more closely tie aviation trust fund revenues with expenditures in the Airports and Airways Trust Fund.  Given this precedent, we believe taking similar action for the HMTF is appropriate, and will provide a greater degree of certainty for waterborne commerce. As the economy struggles to recover, we cannot afford to threaten commerce and trade by failing to maintain our harbor infrastructure.  We look forward to working with you to ensure our nation has a strong transportation infrastructure supporting jobs, growing our economy, and competing successfully in this global economy.  Thank you for your consideration of our request.

Ports still not being provided adequate money for security

Dredging News Jun 8th, 2012 <<http://www.dredgingtoday.com/2012/06/08/congressman-stands-up-for-american-waterways/>>

This bill continues to ignore South Louisiana’s coastline and wetlands and severely underfunds the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Operations & Maintenance account at the expense of the nation’s waterways. Boustany, an outspoken critic of this legislation, voted against the bill: “This bill continues to steal money from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) at the expense of our nation’s ports and harbors. The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) will generate $1.6 billion next year, but only a little over half will be used toward dredging and maintenance. The rest will be funneled off into other accounts. This vote allows for approximately $658 million of a dedicated user fee to continue to be diverted from the HMTF for unrelated appropriations and budget gimmicks.“As Chairman of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, with jurisdiction over taxes and revenues, I held a February hearing looking into this issue. At a time when Americans are concerned about our nation’s competitiveness, the federal government seems to be content with allowing our ports and waterways to fall into disrepair. This is a blatant abuse of the dedicated federal tax meant to maintain and care for our nation’s main avenue for trade exports. Louisiana is the nation’s 4th largest trading state and our farmers, shippers, mariners, and port workers deserve and are demanding full use of the HMT. *“*This bill goes a step further in negatively impacting South Louisiana. Since Hurricane Rita, dollars invested in the Southwest Coastal Louisiana Feasibility Study have advanced this comprehensive protection and restoration plan. This legislation contains zero funding for the Southwest Study. South Louisianans need comprehensive hurricane and storm protection to protect vital energy infrastructure and their livelihoods. The Study will provide key information needed to protect and restore Calcasieu, Cameron, and Vermilion Parishes from devastating hurricanes. Much needed funding to accelerate completion of the Study is critical not just to Louisiana, but to our entire country.“Through my efforts, the funding level is historic, but we are at a critical juncture. I will not support a bill that steals from our nation’s waterways. Doing so will directly harm small businesses, industries, and families in South Louisiana. The issue will not be solved until the amount of HMT receipts equal the amount of expenditures*.* With 195 cosponsors, the RAMP Act, H.R. 104, gained wide bipartisan support because it seeks to fix the current raiding of the HMTF.”

Ports underfunded

Ports severely underfunded

Dredging News December 22, 2011<http://www.sandandgravel.com/news/article.asp?v1=15459>

Port Strategy reports that ports in the US are pressing Congress to hand over a bigger portion of the money collected through the Harbour Maintenance Tax (HMT), to enable them to maintain infrastructure and facilities. The tax is collected from container importers, based on the value of the container contents but despite its name an overwhelming amount of the sums collected stays in the general fund of central government rather than going to ports and harbours, says Jacksonville Port Authority’s chief operating officer, Chris Kauffmann. It is, he agrees, a bit like levying a road tax and spending nearly all of it on something else. At present only US$1.3-1.6 billion of the US$5.7 billion HMT surplus is going back to the sector. “What we would like to see is a larger sum on an annual basis from that fund to help maintain our port facilities,” says Mr Kauffmann. “Right now, if we are going to get out of this economic situation, we have to see our harbour facilities and infrastructure maintained and developed. “We don’t believe there are sufficient dollars for the Corps of Engineers; in Jaxport, for example, we received about $5m last year for harbour maintenance. That only allowed them to do certain reaches on the river, what we call the hot spots; it didn’t allow them to do the entire length of the river, only where they have seen the challenges and silting.” Because of lack of funds, the port is not able to maintain the entire stretch to the complete 40ft authorised channel depth it would like to, says Mr Kauffmann – although, so far, the port has not had a problem using the whole length. “There is a broader issue here,” he adds. “Maintenance is by definition maintenance of the existing channel depth and width. But as the expanded Panama Canal comes onstream, many ports need deepening. "The argument is, why can’t all the money being collected for Harbour Maintenance Tax be fully utilised for deepening. This has been raised and the government is evaluating it.” In a letter to the Committee on Appropriations earlier this year, American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) president and chief executive Kurt Nagle wrote: “AAPA strongly believes that the HMTF should be fully utilised for its intended purpose of maintaining federal navigation channels and not for any additional uses. ”He said that lack of adequate maintenance dredging had become an acute problem on the Great Lakes and the East and Gulf coasts and called for legislation to ‘firewall

Ports underfunded

Port security in the backseat

THOMAS BARLAS, November 24, 2010 <<http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/breaking/article_0cb0627e-f81a-11df-8966-001cc4c002e0.html>>

The federal government may be planning ways to more carefully scrutinize airline cargo, but the issue of dealing with goods brought to this country by ship is still a major issue. In fact, it’s one that U.S. Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-2nd, says is being neglected. LoBiondo said ports such as Atlantic City, Cape May and Salem, which are located in his sprawling southern New Jersey district, aren’t likely targets of maritime terrorism. The security issue involves larger ports around the country, such as Philadelphia, which is near his district, and the effects a major incident could have on the nation’s economy, he said. LoBiondo, the ranking Republican on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, contends efforts to upgrade security for port workers and development of new technology to more accurately screen port cargo is taking something of a back seat to security measures for the aviation industry. “Overall, all the focus has been on aviation security, and efforts on port security and maritime terrorism have been lacking,” LoBiondo said. “Any incident or attack on one port would have a dramatic impact,” LoBiondo said. “In my view, if an attack takes place on one of our major ports that was terrorist related, it would have the effect of shutting down all of our ports until we can figure out what happened. We have to be very concerned.” One of the major port security measures yet to be fully implemented is the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, of TWIC, program, which provides biometric identification cards to port workers. The federal government estimates that about 1.2 million port workers need the cards. While TWIC was mandated in 2002 as part of the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act, which was authored by LoBiondo, the federal government has missed several deadlines for TWIC’s full implementation. The subsequent federal Safe Port Act set an April 2009 deadline for the establishment of final TWIC rules and the issuance of devices to read the cards. However, according to LoBiondo’s office, the federal Transportation Security Administration under the Obama Administration told Congress the final rules regarding operation of the readers won’t be issued until late 2012. Port workers are now paying $132.50 for biometric identification cards that are useless because there are no electronic devices to read them, his office said. “It’s like showing your library card,” LoBiondo said. LoBiondo isn’t alone in wanting the TWIC program to advance more rapidly. Aaron Ellis, spokesman for the American Association of Port Authorities, said TWIC cards are “far superior” to what was used in the past and are issued after significant background checks and are “very difficult” to duplicate and forge. However, TWIC cards are little more than “flash cards” without the electronic readers, he said. Some port authorities are taking the financial risk of developing their own electronic card-reading system to improve security, he said. “But there’s no guarantee the U.S. Coast Guard will say that’s one of the approved systems,” Ellis said. Additionally, Ellis said there are hundreds of millions of dollars worth of port security grants yet to be dispersed by the federal government. Ports and port authorities have to pick up much of the cost of implementing security measures, he said. “It’s been kind of a tough road to get some of the most important projects underway when those projects are expensive and the cost share is an onerous burden,” he said. The federal government estimates that about $700 billion worth of goods passes through American ports annually, and keeping them safe has been a topic of discussion since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In July, a report issued by the federal General Accounting Office states that while considerable progress has been made in port security, some problems remain. For instance, Coast Guard vessel-tracking systems generally can’t track small vessels, and resource constraints limit its ability to meet security activity goals. The Coast Guard is also limited in its ability to help foreign countries enhance their established security requirements, the report said. Then there’s the problem of how to adequately screen all the cargo that passes through ports in the United States. The sheer volume of goods makes widespread screening difficult. “You can’t choke-hold the operation for too long,” Ellis said. “While we want to screen all cargo, we know that is physically impossible,” LoBiondo said. What cargo gets screened is based on intelligence on manifests and point of origin, he said. LoBiondo wants to speed up work on technology that will allow for more cargo to be screened quickly and more thoroughly. “We’ve got to be able to see more than an anomaly,” he said. The screening devices could be based in part on what’s been developed for the airline industry, he said. “Airports can tell much more about what coming in,” LoBiondo said.

Ports underfunded

**Port Security is underfunded- economic downturn**

The Maritime Executive January 18, 2011, (highly prestigious naval newspaper & magazine) “US Ports Remain Underfunded to Provide Maritime Security” <<http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2006-04-13us-ports-remain-underfunded-to-provide>>

The political firestorm, which erupted over whether a United Arab Emirates company, Dubai Port World, should be permitted to manage six U.S. ports, has garnered huge headlines in the recent past. **Slipping beneath the radar** of the national press, however, **is the** relatively **paltry sum**, according to representatives of the nation's seaports, **being given to provide port security and infrastructure maintenance.** Although the Administration's 2007 federal budget includes $65.6 billion for transportation, with $258 million designated for the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) says that amount is nowhere near enough. With **virtually 99% of U.S. overseas cargo passing through U.S. ports annually, security and deep-draft channel maintenance shortfalls could seriously hamper port operations. The ripple effect through the U.S. economy, in the event of a catastrophic terrorism event or operational casualty, would be significant.** The AAPA notes that, "The federal share of the seaport facility security funding partnership needs to be increased, not reprogrammed and diluted." This refers to a proposal to eliminate the Port Security Grant program and to lump maritime security infrastructure needs together with trains, trucks, bus, and public transit under the Targeted Infrastructure Protection program. **In the five rounds of funding since 2002, the Port Security Grant program has meted out to U.S. ports $708 million of much-needed funding, but this amounts to less than 25 percent of what the ports themselves said they needed for security.** The U.S. Coast Guard has estimated that port facilities needed $5.4 billion over a 10-year period to comply with new regulations in accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Since September 11, 2001, **the grant program has made only $708 million available out of almost $3.8 billion requested for port security expenses.** The AAPA recommends annual funding at a $400 million level. Beyond this, the Army Corps of Engineers' Civil Works program, which is responsible for maintaining federal navigation channels, remains under-funded and would require $750 million from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, according to the AAPA. The budget calls for $707 million and, though that is up $33 million over last year, it is less than the $750 million needed for navigation channel maintenance. The budget does call for some draw down of the estimated $3 billion surplus in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. Still, port executive complain that this will not be enough. These are funds paid into the Trust Fund through the harbor maintenance tax paid by users. This surplus is expected to grow to $5 billion by 2010, but, during that time, port volumes are expected to grow dramatically, including container traffic. Already, according to port managers, **the trade-off between port infrastructure projects and required port security projects is underway. Additionally, some ports complain that only a portion of their security expenditures has been reimbursed under the security grant program. Some ports are already experiencing a loss of depth in their harbors and channels and, consequently, must limit ship access.**

**Future cuts ensure port security erosion**

American Association of Port Authorities **(AAPA)** March 7, 2012 [The AAPA was founded in 1912 and represents 160 of the leading seaport authorities in the United States as well as other countries.] <http://www.aapa ports.org/Press/PRdetail.cfm?itemnumber=18434>

At two separate Congressional hearings today, AAPA representatives emphasized the need for federal support for seaport security and maintenance and improvements to federal navigation channels.  Port industry leaders illustrated the challenges that underfunding security and dredging pose for national security and US international competitiveness.  As the House Appropriations Committee begins work on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, AAPA executives reminded Congressional leaders of the critical role that ports play for the nation – serving as a front line of defense on international borders and facilitating overseas trade, 99 percent of which moves by water.  Captain John Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Operations at the Port of Los Angeles, testified before the Homeland Security Subcommittee regarding Port Security Grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency.   “The FY 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level,” Holmes stated.  “This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans and fund federal mandates such as installation of TWIC readers.” AAPA President and CEO Kurt Nagle submitted testimony to the Energy and Water Subcommittee on the budget for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Civil Works program.  The testimony focused on the need for full use of the Harbor Maintenance Tax annual revenue for maintenance dredging and the need to adequately fund needed channel deepening projects. Nagle wrote, “The federal government has a unique Constitutional responsibility to maintain and improve the infrastructure that enables the flow of commerce, and much of that infrastructure in and around seaports have been neglected for too long, particularly the capacity of the federal channels which affects the ports’ ability to move cargo efficiently into and out of the U.S. This hurts U.S. business, hurts U.S. workers and hurts our national economy.”

Cost-Share prevents funding

There is still over 800 million dollars of the 1.6 billion awarded to PSGP funding left from 2006-2010

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

Table: Financial Status of PSGP Awarded Funds, Fiscal Year 2006 through 2010: Total funds awarded: $1,676,068,946; Funds drawn down by grantees: $394,880,416 (23.6%); Funds available to grantees to implement projects: $873,430,493 (52.1%); Funds unavailable to grantees to implement projects: $407,758,036 (24.3%).

Grant money is left un-touched because of cost-share

Kimery, homeland security expert at HSToday, 2012 (Anthony, “Counternarcotics, Terrorism & Intelligence

Security, Port Authorities Associations Urge DHS to Reconsider Port Allocations”, <http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/counternarcotics-terrorism-intelligence/single-article-page/security-port-authorities-associations-urge-dhs-to-reconsider-port-allocations.html>, HSToday)

“Even though Congress reduced the budget for preparedness grants by 40 percent, we are concerned with the allocation decisions made by the department,” SIA and AAPA said in their letter to Napolitano. “The recently announced cuts result in a 59 percent reduction in funding for the Port Security Grant Program and are 75 percent less than authorized by Congress in the SAFE Port Act.” Continuing, the two organizations stated that “this allocation will not come close to meeting local needs. It will result in continued struggles to bring port security into the 21st century and hamper meeting government mandates, such as the Transportation Worker Identity Card.” The two groups said that, “while we understand that Congress initiated this cut because of what it saw as a backlog of unspent funds, we believe such a drastic reduction of funds will have negative consequences on port security. In addition, we believe that one of the best ways to utilize existing funding is to categorically waive all cost-share requirements for grants that have already been awarded. Requiring short, individual waivers diverts the efforts of those involved from the goal of getting these projects done quickly. Grantees often put projects on hold until they receive a waiver.” “We are certain there are other options available, and we would encourage your office to think through those options to help us as we help secure our ports,” the groups’ joint letter to Napolitano concluded. “Every agency has to do more with less; we understand that,” said Marcus Dunn, Director of Government Relations at SIA. “However, what is difficult to understand is the allocation made by DHS.” Many ports have applied for - and have been granted - funding for critical security components. Unfortunately, those grants have been tied to matching grants, the two organizations noted in a statement. They added that “given the state of the economy, some ports are unable to meet the matching amount, leaving those dollars unclaimed and leaving critical security projects unfinished.” “If the matching amounts were waived, we would really be looking at a budget-neutral situation,” Dunn said in a statement. “Many of these projects are scalable and ready to be implemented now.

Removing cost-share waiver requirements key to port security – prevents money from being used by the ports

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

FEMA has faced several challenges in distributing PSGP grant funds, and FEMA has implemented specific steps to overcome these challenges. Only about one-quarter of awarded grant funding has been drawn down by grantees, and an additional one-quarter remains unavailable (see table below). Funding is unavailable-—meaning that grantees cannot begin using the funds to work on projects—-for two main reasons: federal requirements have not been met (such as environmental reviews), or the port area has not yet identified projects to fund with the grant monies. Several challenges contributed to funds being unavailable. For example, DHS was slow to review cost-share waiver requests—requests from grantees to forego the cost-share requirement. Without a more expedited waiver review process, grant applicants that cannot afford the cost-share may not apply for important security projects. Other challenges included managing multiple open grant rounds, complying with program requirements, and using an antiquated grants management system. FEMA has taken steps to address these challenges. For example FEMA and DHS have, among other things, increased staffing levels, introduced project submission time frames, implemented new procedures for environmental reviews, and implemented phase one of a new grants management system. However, it is too soon to determine how successful these efforts will be in improving the distribution of grant funds.

Cost-Share prevents funding

Cost-Share prevents Port-Security funding

Whit Richardson December 29, 2011(managing editor of Security Director News) “Report cites flaws in DHS Port Security Grant program” <<http://www.securitydirectornews.com/public-sector/report-cites-flaws-dhs-port-security-grant-program>>

The Federal Emergency Management Agency considers a port's vulnerability when deciding how to allocate funds from the Department of Homeland Security's Port Security Grant Program. However, that vulnerability assessment does not take into consideration recent security enhancements at the ports, including those funded through past PSGP allocations. That was among a handful of deficiencies in the program that were detailed in [a recent report from the Government Accountability Office](http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-47%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank). The GAO recommended FEMA develop a new vulnerability index that takes recent security enhancements into account. In the interim, FEMA should coordinate with the Coast Guard to determine and use the most precise data available until a revised vulnerability index is developed. "Without accounting for the reductions in vulnerability achieved through new security measures implemented in a port, including those funded through the PSGP, the robustness of the risk model may be limited and not accurately reflect the relative risk of port areas throughout the nation," the report states. FEMA officials promised to continue to refine the agency’s vulnerability assessments, but said "capturing data on all security improvements would be challenging due to the need to collect and validate data for all ports included in the PSGP risk model," the report states. The existing model separates ports based on their risk and allocates funds accordingly. In fiscal year 2011, there were seven ports in Group I (highest risk group), which received 60 percent of available funding. The 48 ports in Group II received 30 percent of the funding, and the 35 ports in Group III received 5 percent of the funding, according to the report. Ports outside the three groups received the remainder of the funding. Overall, the GAO report did not provide any big surprises, Arif Ghouse, director of security and emergency preparedness at the Port of Seattle, told Security Director News. "I don't think it said anything new," he said. "It was a good report with sound recommendations that I would support." Concerning the vulnerability assessments, he said they may not work the same everywhere, but in the Seattle port area, the Coast Guard does the assessment and takes into consideration all recent security enhancements. "It's probably not taking place in every sector, but locally I don’t see that as a huge problem," he said. The report also notes FEMA's problems distributing the funds. Of the roughly $1.7 billion awarded by FEMA between 2006 and 2010, only 23.6 percent has been drawn down by grantees, while 24.3 percent (or about $400 million) remains "unavailable" to grantees, according to the report. The remaining 52.1 percent is funding that has been allocated, but has yet to be drawn down by the grantees. Of the $400 million that is "unavailable,” the funds are either "unused" or "on hold." Unused funds have yet to be allocated to specific projects, while on-hold funds are unavailable because grantees have yet to meet post-award requirements, such as environmental reviews. One thing to remember is that the PSGP is a draw-down program, meaning ports have to put up the money first before they can actually go out and get paid back for their expenses, Aaron Ellis, spokesman for the American Association of Port Authorities, told SDN. "A lot of times the permitting process can take a couple years," he said. One of the issues contributing to the amount of unused funds, according to the report, has been the inconsistent cost-share requirement of grantees. While cost-share requirements were waved for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, previous years required a match. In the economic downturn, many grantees chose not to pursue the funds, especially once they knew that future monies would not carry the requirement, according to the report. The AAPA has consistently lobbied for the elimination of the cost-share requirements, which Ellis points out do not exist for the transit security and state homeland security grant programs. "Particularly in these tight economic times, the cost share is a challenge for ports that are cutting back in all areas to address economic shortfalls," Ellis said. Grantees can submit waivers to avoid the cost-share requirement, but the "lengthy" process has 22 steps, according to the report. FEMA in November 2009 said a response to cost-share waivers could be expected approximately 30 days after submission. However, the GAO determined that on average FEMA's response time was 126 days and noted that one decision took seven months. Ghouse said a waiver the Port of Seattle submitted to FEMA took "in the magnitude of months" to be decided. As a result, ports have avoided the process, the report concluded. It recommends that FEMA review its cost-share waiver process in order to speed up the allocation of grant funds. The report also recommends that FEMA, in collaboration with the Coast Guard, develop "time frames and related milestones for implementing performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of the PSGP." The PSGP has already gone through several changes. Initially, it was one lump sum that ports across the country could apply for. Then funds began to be allocated regionally, but some regions have not spent all their money. Ghouse said there is some debate whether the program should return to the one-lump-sum model. "So it will be interesting how all this shakes out," he said. "With the budget woes, everything is on the table right now."

Ports vulnerable now

Port Security possesses huge gaps

Laura Craven, Tuesday, May 27, 2008

<http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/05/report_finds_gaps_in_security.html>

A Department of Homeland Security program to strengthen port security has gaps that could be exploited to smuggle weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers, congressional investigators have found. The report by the Government Accountability Office, being released Tuesday, assesses the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a federal program that was established after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to deter a potential terrorist strike via cargo that passes through 326 of the nation's airports, seaports and designated land borders. Under the C-TPAT program, roughly 8,000 importers, port authorities and air, sea and land carriers are granted benefits such as reduced scrutiny of their cargo. In exchange, the companies submit a security plan that must meet the minimum standards of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and allow federal officials to verify that their measures are being followed. A 2005 GAO report found many of the companies were undergoing the reduced cargo scrutiny without the required full vetting by U.S. Customs, a division of the DHS. The agency has since made some improvements, but the new report found that Customs officials still couldn't provide guarantees that companies are in compliance. Among the problems: --Companies can become certified for reduced Customs inspections before they fully implement any additional security improvements requested by the U.S. government. Furthermore, under the program, Customs employees are not required to systematically follow up to make sure the requested improvements were made and that security practices remained consistent with the minimum criteria. --A company becomes certified based generally on self-reported security information that Customs employees use to determine if minimum government criteria are met. But due partly to limited resources, Customs does not typically test the member company's supply-chain security practices and thus is "challenged to know that members' security measures are reliable, accurate and effective." --Customs employees are not required to utilize third-party or other audits of a company's security measures as an alternative to the agency's direct testing, even if such audits exist. "Until Customs overcomes these collective challenges, Customs will be unable to assure Congress and others that C-TPAT member companies that have been granted reduced scrutiny of their U.S.-bound containerized shipments actually employ adequate security practices," investigators wrote. "It is vital that Customs maintain adequate internal controls to ensure that member companies deserve these benefits." Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), a leading advocate for scanning all cargo containers in foreign ports before they arrive on U.S. soil, said the GAO assessment shows that self-reporting by private industry is an inadequate form of protection. "This is yet another reminder that we cannot rely on a patchwork system when it comes to the security of our nation's ports," Menendez said. "We continue to depend upon voluntary and self-reported information, and that keeps us at risk. Until we have achieved 100 percent scanning -- something the administration has tried repeatedly to hold back -- we cannot be assured that we know what or who is entering our ports." Rep. Bill Pascrell, who serves on the House Committee on Homeland Security, said the report also illustrates the need to give Customs and other agencies the resources they need to safeguard the nation. "This report is a troubling reminder of the potential homeland security loopholes present at New Jersey's ports," Pascrell (D-8th Dist.) said in a statement. "Congress has made significant strides in enacting the 9/11 commission's recommendations to tighten port security, but the Bush administration has failed over the years to provide adequate resources and personnel for U.S. Customs and other agencies to fulfill their mission." While government and private companies must work together to tighten security, Pascrell added, "it is the duty of the federal government to ensure each side upholds its end of the bargain." The GAO urged Customs and Border Protection to require consideration of third-party and other outside audits and take steps to make certain companies comply with any additional security improvements requested. The report also calls for some technological improvements to help improve consistency and better information-gathering in Customs' security checks. Responding in part, Customs officials in the report agreed they could do more to follow up on suggested security improvements but noted that employees often use their expert discretion in assessing the potential danger before certifying a company. The agency has also said the program overall has made the nation safer. Congress has been working to improve port security after the independent Sept. 11 commission cited the potential dangers in its 2004 final report. The commission stated that, compared with commercial aviation, "smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United States in cargo containers is low, the nation's vulnerability and consequences of such an attack are potentially high. The GAO study examined a sample of 25 company reviews by Customs and Border Protection opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation." The DHS has said that while the likelihood of terrorists from March 1 through Sept. 30 in 2006. Investigators interviewed officials, reviewed documents and studied the agency's minimum security criteria to see if standards were being met.

A2: NPGP

NPGP makes port security an even lower priority

AAPA, March 7/2012 (American Association of Port Authorities is a trade association that represents over 150 port authority organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere, “Testimony of Captain John M. Holmes”, http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf)

In regards to the future of this program, in February, the FEMA Grants Directorate released a vision document that outlined its plan to consolidate 16 separate grant programs into one National Preparedness Grant program starting in FY 2013 that would send the money to the states for distribution. AAPA believes this would make port security programs an even lower priority and urges your Committee to keep the program separate as you do for Firefighter Assistance grants. Port Security Grants are managed quite differently than other homeland security grants. Priorities are set locally, based on the risks and vulnerability of the local port area. Other homeland security grants have a list of core capabilities, which all grantees try to attain. This capabilities list is based more on movable and shared assets rather than set facilities. There is no such list of core capabilities for port security grants and the ones developed for other grant programs were not developed with ports in mind. Additionally, ports have certain federal mandates, such as TWIC readers, that they must comply with, and the cost of those requirements will not be fully felt until Coast Guard issues its final regulations.

\*\*\*\*Terrorism Advantage\*\*\*\*

Uniqueness

Ports are vulnerable to terrorist attack – threatens biological, chemical, and nuclear warfare

Allam , May 9, 2012 (Zaheer Allam is senior vice president of Telecom Products and Operations for Polaris Wireless, Government Technology, “3 Ways Machine-to-Machine Tech Can Assist Governments”, http://www.govtech.com/technology/3-Ways-Machine-to-Machine-Tech-Can-Assist-Governments-.html)

According to the RAND Corporation, the U.S. maritime port infrastructure consists of more than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. U.S. ports handle approximately 20 percent of the maritime trade worldwide, and are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack and sabotage. As a result, the security cost to protect ports has skyrocketed, with state and local port authorities sharing a significant portion of this burden. A major fear is that terrorists will infiltrate cargo somewhere along the transit route and smuggle in a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon.

Risk of terrorist attacks on sea ports are increasing – 5 reasons

Chalk ’8 (Peter, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States, RAND, 2008)

Over the past six years, there has been a modest yet highly discernible spike in high-proﬁle terrorist attacks and plots at sea. These various incidents have galvanized fears in the West that terrorists, especially militants connected with the international jihadist network, are moving to decisively extend operational mandates beyond purely territorially bounded theaters. Five main factors explain the presumed shift in extremist focus to water-based environments. First, many of the vulnerabilities that have encouraged a higher rate of pirate attacks also apply to terrorism. Second, the growth of commercial enterprises specializing in maritime sports and equipment has arguably provided terrorists with a readily accessible conduit through which to gain the necessary training and resources for operating at sea. Third, maritime attacks oﬀer terrorists an alternate means of causing mass economic destabilization. Disrupting the mechanics of the contemporary “just enough, just in time” cargo freight trading system could potentially trigger vast and cascading ﬁscal eﬀects, especially if the operations of a major commercial port were curtailed. Fourth, sea-based terrorism constitutes a further means of inﬂicting mass coercive punishment on enemy audiences. Cruise ships and passenger ferries are especially relevant in this regard because they cater to large numbers of people who are conﬁned in a single physical space. Finally, the expansive global container-shipping complex oﬀers terrorists a viable logistical conduit for facilitating the covert movement of weapons and personnel in two critical respects. First, because much of the maritime trading system is designed to be as accessible and ﬂexible as possible (to keep costs low and turnover high), there is no strong incentive to enact a stringent (and disruptive) regime of security measures. Second, the highly complex nature of the containerized supply chain, combined with the ineﬀectiveness of point-of-origin inspections, creates a plethora of openings for terrorist inﬁltration by providing extremists with numerous opportunities to “stuﬀ” or otherwise tamper with boxed crates.

Anonymity of containers means every container is a potential threat

Keefer, Campbell Law Review, 2012 (Wendy, March 3rd, “Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain”, Campbell Law Review)

As will become apparent, not only are foreign entities already heavily invested in United States port operations, but the cooperation of private and governmental interests in other countries is crucial to securing, among other things, container shipments into United States ports. Rather than foreign investment, the real security issue surrounding shipping containers is the anonymity of those involved with the shipment and of the cargo actually contained inside. Regardless of any opposition to marine terminal or other port facility operations, "ports are vulnerable to the entry of terrorists or illicit weapons because of the large number of containers that enter U.S. territory, regardless of who manages them. '5

Uniqueness

Port terrorism threat increasing

**CBS Business Library 2k5** (Maxwell Cole, and Blanda, Tony, 9/2005, from the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Terror by the Sea: The Unique Challenges of Port Security, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2194/is\_9\_74/ai\_n15966347/).

The United States always has defended its borders and natural resources from harm. Unlike threats of the past, however, maritime terrorism constitutes a multifront conflict both at home and abroad. It recognizes no borders and can originate from organized groups and individuals operating inside or outside the United States. The fight against maritime terrorism, unlike conventional threats, is a complicated struggle with neither an easy nor a rapid conclusion. The U.S. maritime jurisdiction represents a daunting challenge: more than 1,000 harbor channels with 25,000 miles of inland intracoastal and coastal waterways that serve 361 ports containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals. Annually, the U.S. Maritime Transportation System manages over 2 billion tons of freight, 3 billion tons of oil, more than 134 million ferry passengers, and an estimated 7 million cruise ship travelers. The dimensions of the extraordinarily difficult task confronting the United States center on an estimated 7,500 foreign ships, manned by 200,000 sailors, entering U.S. ports every year. The more than 6 million intermodal cargo containers that enter annually represent two-thirds of the total value (as opposed to tonnage) of all U.S. maritime trade.

**Terrorists increasing attacks now**

**CBS Business Library 2k5** (Maxwell Cole, and Blanda, Tony, 9/2005, from the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Terror by the Sea: The Unique Challenges of Port Security, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2194/is\_9\_74/ai\_n15966347/).

"Today's pirate is tomorrow's terrorist and one can foresee that a nexus will ultimately develop between terrorist organizations and pirates. Both are acts of violence against innocent people, one done for monetary gains and the other perhaps for a political purpose. Since piracy is largely undertaken for a commercial gain, pirates will not hesitate to carry out a terrorist act if someone pays them enough and they have a reasonable chance of getting away." (2) This nexus cannot be ruled out. After all, if terrorist groups are to sustain their operations, they likely will tend toward mounting suicide attacks on commercial and military vessels for such purposes as-- \* procuring alternative revenue for their main initiatives (i.e., simple piracy); \* carrying out suicide attacks on unsuspecting ships or ports in the spirit of September 11; \* smuggling weapons and explosives to their affiliates in other parts of the world, probably by hijacking a ship before renaming and otherwise disguising its identity and providing a new crew and manifest; \* seeking ransoms and trading hostages for members of their groups detained by authorities; and \* placing mines aboard innocent-looking tugs and barges, commonly found in the coastal and intracoastal waters and ports of the United States. As an example, the Strait of Malacca, the world's busiest waterway, provides passage to more than one-third of the global trade. The number of vessels that ply the waters ranges from 50,000 to 330,000 each year. Geographically, the Strait of Malacca is 500 nautical miles in length and extremely narrow, especially along its southern half where it ranges from a mere 20 nautical miles wide to as little as 9 nautical miles at the southern end. A terrorist attack on a steamer could endanger the lives of its crew, threaten the safe passage of other vessels and the lives of their crews, and disrupt maritime traffic along the straits, crippling regional and international trade. Post-September 11 World Before the tragic events of September 11, marine enforcement officers received specialized training to combat drug smuggling and illegal immigration and to protect America's natural resources and environment. Today, however, because of the threat of maritime terrorism, the need for advanced, specialized, and tactical training of these officers has become far more critical.

Uniqueness

Increased port security is necessary to combat rising threats

United Marine Security

(United Marine Security, “Port Security”, http://www.unitedmarinesecurity.com/port.html , no date)

In recent years port security has become a major factor in the ever growing war on terror. Terrorists can take advantage of the vulnerabilities and exploit the shipping industries deficiencies in cargo security. Potential threats include the smuggling of weapons, drugs and even human trafficking. All which could result in significant loss of both life and property. Our Highly skilled and trained security teams can help provide 24/7 security to ensure that ports of entry are safeguarded from all threats. Our teams use the latest technology and surveillance systems. We can also offer security training and consulting to our clients that already have a security detail in place.

**Dirty bomb risk is high**

Konkel, Todd, 2011

Konkel, Todd. "Services." *Cargo Container Security and Tracking*. Cargo Container Security and Tracking, Oct 27, 2011 <http://www.abiresearch.com/research/1003062-Cargo Container Security and Tracking>.

An act of nuclear terrorism involving a cargo container could take one of two forms: a nuclear weapon or a radiological dispersal device (commonly referred to as a “dirty bomb”). A nuclear weapon requires the presence of a critical mass of fissile nuclear material – specifically, plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) – in order to achieve a nuclear chain reaction. A nuclear detonation generates extreme levels of heat and radiation, which, in a densely populated area, would result in immediate, large-scale destruction, as occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In contrast, a dirty bomb involves conventional explosives designed to spread radioactive material over a wide area. For example, a terrorist might use a fertilizer bomb, such as the one used to destroy the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, in order to disperse radioactive material in a commercial center. Although a dirty bomb could result in long- lasting contamination of the affected area, its potential impact pales in comparison to that of a nuclear detonation. Thus, logistical considerations aside, a terrorist seeking to maximize damage in a nuclear attack would choose a nuclear device over a dirty bomb.

Funding key to combat terrorist threats

Mark Lowe, June 13, 2012.

Lowe, Mark. "Tighter Port Security." *Maritime Security Review*. Maritime Security Review, 13 June 2012. Web. 24 June 2012. <http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/06/tighter-port-security/>.

Critics say the consequences of delay could be catastrophic. Terrorists have long sought to obtain uranium or plutonium to construct a nuclear bomb, global security analysts say. Government officials, including President Obama and his predecessor, George W. Bush, have worried that terrorist cells could be plotting further devastation in the United States, perhaps through radioactive explosives called “dirty bombs.’’ The agency has used what it calls a “risk-based approach’’ to shipments. As a result, Homeland Security has focused on cargo originating from 58 of the world’s busiest seaports, from Hong Kong to Dubai. Last year, US agents stationed at those ports inspected 45,500 shipments determined to be high risk, according to joint testimony by Homeland Security, Coast Guard, and US Customs officials in February before the House Homeland Security Committee. Republicans have been wary of forcing the agency to comply with the scanning mandate because of the presumed cost, perhaps at least $16 billion – a figure disputed by Markey and others who cite estimates that the program could cost a comparatively modest $200 million. Representative Candice Miller, a Michigan Republican who chairs the House subcommittee on border and maritime security, was more inclined to accept the estimate from Homeland Security officials. In light of the country’s budget troubles, “we have to try and prioritize,’’ she said. Scanning cargo “100 percent would be optimal,’’ she conceded, “but it’s not workable.’’ Still, she acknowledged the need to secure the country’s borders, whether by air, land, or sea.

Uniqueness

Ports are increasing in terrorist threat

GOSLIN ‘8 (Charles, Vice President of International Operations for Duos Technologies, Inc., international expert in security threat and risk assessment for the CIA, 11/12/2008, “MARITIME AND PORT SECURITY WHITE PAPER” <http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf>)

Global trade is dependent mainly on maritime transport. It is estimated that more than 46,000 vessels and 4,000 ports make up the world’s maritime transportation system. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated in 2001 that 5.8 billion tons of goods were traded by sea in 2001; more than 80 percent of the world’s trade4. This fact alone makes maritime networks an attractive target of terrorists. Although it has been some time since Usama bin Laden has been seen, it is ominous that in one of his last video appearances in October 2004 he confirmed that his agenda remained primarily economic5. While terrorists have in the past targeted land or aviation assets, experts believe that this could soon change to include shipping, port, coastal facilities, and container/container yards are increasingly vulnerable because secondary emphasis has been placed on hardening these assets due to the urgent need to address threats to aviation facilities and transportation6. The following trends in terrorist threat reporting underscore increased concern for the maritime industry: When captured in November 2002, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Al Qaida’s operations chief in the Persian Gulf had developed a four-pronged strategy to attack Western shipping targets: - Ramming vulnerable vessels at sea - Blowing up medium-sized vessels at ports - Attacking vulnerable, large cargo ships such as super tankers from the air by using explosive-laden small aircraft - Underwater attacks by divers or suicide demolition teams, using limpet mines Al-Nashiri was an explosives expert, specializing in naval demolition sabotage7. Al Qaida operative Saud Hamid al-Utaibi who replaced al-Nashiri, took an active role in the operation that targeted the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and the French tanker Limburg in 2002. Following al-Utaibi’s appointment, the threat to maritime targets involving chemical agents was elevated8. Operatives belonging to the Islamic Extremist group Jemaah Islamiah (JI), which is affiliated with Al Qaida, have been trained in sea-borne guerrilla tactics. A key element to their strategy is to gain unauthorized access to ships and port facilities in order to place explosives9. At least one Al Qaida operative is known to have been in the process of obtaining an international seaman’s license that would allow him into any port in the world without a visa10. In 2003, 35 heavily armed terrorists boarded a chemical tanker off the coast of Sumatra. However, unlike pirates who operate in the region and routinely rob the crew and loot the vessel, these boarders simply demanded that the ship’s captain teach them how to “drive” the large ship. Like the 9/11 hijackers, who only wanted to learn to fly an airliner, these boarders were not interested in learning how to dock the vessel. 11 Intelligence officials have identified cargo freighters they believe are controlled by Al Qaida, which could be used by the terrorist network or its affiliates to ferry operatives, explosive components, cash or commodities on the high seas.12 One example is a well-dressed middle-eastern man discovered by Italian police who had hidden himself in a cargo container destined for the U.S. He was equipped with a bed, toilet, water supply, satellite phone, laptop computer, cameras and maps. He also had security passes to various airports in the U.S.13

**Terrorist attacks are the biggest threat to cruise ships**

GOSLIN ‘8 (Charles, Vice President of International Operations for Duos Technologies, Inc., international expert in security threat and risk assessment for the CIA, 11/12/2008, “MARITIME AND PORT SECURITY WHITE PAPER” <http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf>)

As illustrated previously, the threat of an attack by heavily armed pirates or terrorists from unsecured waters represents the single greatest vulnerability to cruise ships today. Existing warning systems, such as that used by the “Seabourn Spirit” off the coast of Somalia, only provide a single layer of protection from a determined, inbound threat.

Economy

An attack on ports collapses the global economy

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the nation's ports have been viewed as potential targets of attack for many reasons. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ports, waterways, and vessels are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on global shipping, international trade, and the global economy.[Footnote 1] Additionally, ports often are not only gateways for the movement of goods, but also industrial hubs and close to population centers, presenting additional opportunities for terrorists intending to harm U.S. interests. They are also potential conduits for weapons prepared elsewhere and concealed in cargo designed to move quickly to many locations beyond the ports themselves. Further, cruise ships, tankers, and cargo ships present potentially desirable terrorist targets given the potential for loss of life, environmental damage, or disruption of commerce. Balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of people and commerce remains an ongoing challenge for the public and private sectors alike.

Ports impact the global economy

GAO 2011 (Government accountability office, November, “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened”)

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the nation’s ports have been viewed as potential targets of attack for many reasons. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ports, waterways, and vessels are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on global shipping, international trade, and the global economy.1 Additionally, ports often are not only gateways for the movement of goods, but also industrial hubs and close to population centers, presenting additional opportunities for terrorists intending to harm U.S. interests. They are also potential conduits for weapons prepared elsewhere and concealed in cargo designed to move quickly to many locations beyond the ports themselves. Further, cruise ships, tankers, and cargo ships present potentially desirable terrorist targets given the potential for loss of life, environmental damage, or disruption of commerce. Balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of people and commerce remains an ongoing challenge for the public and private sectors alike.

Even a small attack could collapse the economy

Altiok ‘11 (Tayfur, Ph. D, professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Director of the Laboratory for Port Security at Rutgers, Feb 9, 2011, “Port security/safety, risk analysis, and modeling” http://www.springerlink.com/content/mn653022144671u0/fulltext.pdf)

Freely ﬂowing international trade, carried predominantly by ocean-going vessels, has been a major contributor to the global prosperity experienced in the second-half of the 20th century. In the U.S. and many countries worldwide, maritime trafﬁc in ports and waterways is a critical component of national supply chains and the backbone of many economies. However, the proximity of major seaports to urban centers and the volume and diversity of seaport activities render them vulnerable targets, where even small incidents could have crippling economic effects. Increasing important is that security operations must strike a balance between providing security and impeding the movement of cargo with the attendant economic costs, as any stoppage or appreciable slow-down in port operations impacts numerous supply chains, and extended stoppages necessitate diverting vessels to other ports, as was the case in the 2003 strike of longshoremen in the port complex of LA/LB.

Economy

A terrorist attack on US oil infrastructure is coming, collapsing the economy

Meserve and Cratty ’11 (May 20, 2011, Jeanne Meserve and Carol Cratty, CNN “U.S.: Al Qaeda has interest in strikes on energy infrastructure” http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-20/us/terror.alert\_1\_tankers-imminent-terrorist-attack-attack-planning?\_s=PM:US)

The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI have warned police across the United States that al Qaeda has a "continuing interest" in attacking oil and natural gas targets, a department spokesman said Friday. The warning issued Thursday came as a result of information seized during the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, a U.S. official said. "We are not aware of indications of any specific or imminent terrorist attack plotting against the oil and natural gas sector overseas or in the United States," Homeland Security spokesman Matthew Chandler said. "However, in 2010 there was continuing interest by members of al Qaeda in targeting oil tankers and commercial oil infrastructure at sea." It is "unclear if any further planning has been conducted" since the middle of last year, Chandler said. CNN obtained a copy of a DHS/FBI intelligence bulletin that says al Qaeda has been interested in "targeting unspecified oil tankers abroad" as a means to "draw the West into an extreme economic crisis" by disrupting a significant portion of the oil supply for several years. The advisory says al Qaeda wanted to target oil tankers in the Indian and Atlantic oceans, as well as the Arabian Sea, but the terrorist group "was opposed to targeting tankers in coastal areas with large Muslim populations." The warning says al Qaeda "believed an effective method for sinking oil tankers was to hijack them and then detonate explosives from the inside." The group thought it would be more difficult to stage an attack from outside a ship, as it could "require several explosive charges since tankers are divided internally into multiple watertight sections." The bulletin says in 2010 al Qaeda tried to get information about the size, layout and construction of oil tankers to help with attack planning. The document says al Qaeda also recognized the importance of pre-attack surveillance of a possible target and recommended conducting trial runs. The U.S. official said there's "not a lot of detail" concerning the information, and strikes against the oil infrastructure have "long been part of the al Qaeda playbook." "No specific attack method was identified in 2010 and there was no reference to a specific date or time of the threatened attack. The global marine industry operates under an international convention intended to prevent terrorist incidents from occurring on commercial ships and in port facilities," the official said.

A terrorist attack on ports collapses the economy

Kapperman Feb 20, 2012 (Robyn , Port and Maritime Security Online “Overview of Port Security Regulations” http://www.pmso.net/OverviewPortSecurityRegulatinsKappermann.html)

The historic terrorist incident of September 11, 2001 prompted Congress to introduce new policy and regulatory guidance addressing the safety and security of U.S. shipping ports (Frittelli, Congress (RL31733) 2). The consequences of an act of terrorism within a port community could produce both devastating economic and psychological effects to the United States (Silke 231). The U.S. port industry in 2005 accounted for 27% of the country’s gross national product; therefore, the economic damage a month closure of a port from a terrorist attack might exceed $60 billion (Henderson and Pate 2).

Terrorist attack on US ports collapses the world economy (also a SK econ internal link)

Allison, March 27, 2012(Graham , director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, SOUTH KOREA AND THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT keynote address)

2. Economic Impact: what would the impact on South Korea be of a nuclear bomb exploding in one of the other great cities of the world? A study by the RAND Corporation estimated that direct economic costs of a nuclear terrorist attack on a US port would exceed $1 trillion, about ten times the cost of 9/11. There would be immediate pressure to close all US ports to prevent another attack. Given that US ports carry out 7.5% of all global trade activity, the consequences for the world economy would be catastrophic. Countries with strong export sectors, especially those highly dependent on maritime trade, such as South Korea, would be particularly affected. South Korea is the 13th biggest economy in the world, but its 8th biggest exporter and 9th biggest importer. As well as the immediate impact from greatly restricted international trade, South Korea’s economy would suffer from the global financial crisis and recession that would almost certainly follow in the wake of the nuclear attack.

Economy

Port containers are the backbone of the globalized economy

Keefer, Campbell Law Review, 2012 (Wendy, March 3rd, “Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain”, Campbell Law Review)

The invention of shipping containers is relatively young, dating to the mid-1950s.' Despite their youth, however, these containers have globalized the world economy9 and their use is continuously growing. l° Indeed, "[tlhe container market is growing nearly three times as fast as the world economy."" But without the shipping container, globalization may not have been as easily achieved. Globalization drives containerized cargo, and containers fuel globalization. Steel boxes have become the building blocks of the new global economy. Without this ingeniously simple, stackable and standardized receptacle, we would still be waiting for China's economic miracle, and the American urge to spend, spend, spend would have been stifled in its infancy.1 2 The rise of shipping containers, though beneficial to world trade and globalization, also creates security concerns. These concerns stem from the limited scrutiny at ports of arriving cargo, the large volume of containerized cargo arriving at ports around the world, and the very fact that closed containers do not lend themselves to easy or economically efficient inspection. In 2005, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan referred to ports as a modern day "Trojan horse. ' 13 Other government officials voiced similar concerns for the perceived holes in overall port security. 4 Maritime experts had been warning of the "Trojan Horse" style threat of shipping containers as well. 15 Indeed, many quickly concentrated on the unique risks posed by container shipments, shipping containers having also been characterized as a potential "poor man's missile."' 6 The use of containers in the global supply chain involves a complex network of manufacturers, exporters, importers, brokers, carriers and foreign customs and port officials. What ultimately arrives in a shipping container shipped to a United States port depends on the actions and information provided by these numerous entities and individuals. Everyone from manufacturers to land carriers to middlemen freight forwarders to customs brokers, terminal operators and port employees (including management, stevedores, and longshoremen) at every port entered by the carrying vessel play a role in securing the cargo and the locations to which it is sent.17 The many hands that access a single container create a number of significant container security issues. Opportunities for security breaches occur primarily in the following stages of the shipping process: (1) the packing process at the foreign warehouse or factory; (2) the transport of the packed goods from that location to the foreign port at which the goods will be loaded; and (3) the preparation of the cargo manifest setting forth the contents and other information about the goods being shipped. 18 Given these opportunities to tamper with the shipment process, container security efforts focus in large part on container inspection and documentation, container seals, and the secure storage of containers.

Ports key to the US economy

Carl Southwell et al. ‘9(September 4, 2009, Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California, “PortSec: Port Security Risk Management and Resource Allocation System” http://research.create.usc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=nonpublished\_reports)

Ports are major contributors to the national economy through the large value of maritime import and export trade. In addition, ports are a major provider of both direct and indirect jobs locally and nationally, and any impact on the daily operations of these ports ripples through the various layers of the economy. This is particularly true with the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Approximately 40% of the US container trade flows through the two-port complex. In addition, the POLA/LB complex supports large bulk cargo, tanker, and cruise ship operations.

Ports key to the US economy

Carl Southwell et al. ‘9(September 4, 2009, Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California, “PortSec: Port Security Risk Management and Resource Allocation System” http://research.create.usc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=nonpublished\_reports)

Ports are important to the US economy. This is particularly true with the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Over 40% of all containers shipped in and out of the US flow through the two-port complex. It is vital that these ports be protected from terrorist attack and other disasters. The DHS funded Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California is developing a port security risk management and resource allocation system (PortSec). PortSec supports both tactical day-today decision-making and long-term strategic security planning.

Economy

Port attacks collapse the economy

GOSLIN ‘8 (Charles, Vice President of International Operations for Duos Technologies, Inc., international expert in security threat and risk assessment for the CIA, 11/12/2008, “MARITIME AND PORT SECURITY WHITE PAPER” <http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf>)

Ports and shipping remain attractive targets for criminals and organized crime because of the centralized aggregation of both containerized and warehoused goods that often have not yet been subjected to end-user accounting and valuation. This has always, sadly, been known. More ominously, the maritime industry as a whole is an increasingly important target for both transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qai’da and its affiliates, and state-sponsored terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah. Terrorists are increasingly aware of the fact that the maritime industry represents an exploitable soft target in terms of smuggling in arms, personnel, or lethal WMD components and as a point of attack. They understand the fact that a strike on a large port facility could cripple a nation’s economy, significantly impact world stock markets and cause significant casualties and potential long-term environmental damage. Following are key vulnerable assets in the maritime system: Ports: Drawbridges and their operation, locks, dams, navigational aids, dock infrastructure (cranes, mooring facilities), pilot boats, multimodal connections (oil and gas pipelines, rail access, roads), power and water distribution systems, utilities, communications systems, fuel and HAZMAT depots, and terminal facilities (containers and container yards). Bridges: Approximately 1.7 million rail cars carrying Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) move annually through the United States and Canada, alone. Shipments of HAZMAT, which includes ordinance, are a very attractive target to terrorists. The consequences of an attack in a port facility where many drawbridges are located and often in densely populated urban centers would be catastrophic. Bridges are particularly vulnerable to attack by explosives, or explosives tied to chemical/biological agents. Al Qaida has been known to have targeted the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City and the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, among others. Ships: Cruise liners (vulnerable both from a media perspective if attacked, and as an easy infiltration/exfiltration method), supertankers (vulnerable due to slow speed, particularly when navigating straits or canals), and warships (demonstrated vulnerability to lowtech sea borne attack, a la USS Cole).

Terrorism

Port security is a critical aspect to the war on terror

United Marine Security 2012. "United Marine Security." *United Marine Security*. Dondesignstudio.com, n.d. Web. 22 June 2012. <http://www.unitedmarinesecurity.com/port.html>.

In recent years port security has become a major factor in the ever growing war on terror. Terrorists can take advantage of the vulnerabilities and exploit the shipping industries deficiencies in cargo security. Potential threats include the smuggling of weapons, drugs and even human trafficking. All which could result in significant loss of both life and property. Our Highly skilled and trained security teams can help provide 24/7 security to ensure that ports of entry are safeguarded from all threats. Our teams use the latest technology and surveillance systems. We can also offer security training and consulting to our clients that already have a security detail in place. **Our Training services include:** 1. Entry and Exit Control point procedures 2. Canine officer training 3. Electronic Security and Surveillance Training 4. Weapons proficiency training 5. Detection and detention training.

**Container security initiative scans containers effectively**

CBP (Custom Border Protection), N/A

"CSI In Brief - CBP.gov." *CSI In Brief - CBP.gov*. CSI, 7 Oct. 2011. Web. 22 June 2012. <http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo\_security/csi/csi\_in\_brief.xml>. The three core elements of CSI are: Identify high-risk containers. CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance information and strategic intelligence. Prescreen and evaluate containers before they are shipped. Containers are screened as early in the supply chain as possible, generally at the port of departure. Use technology to prescreen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade. This technology includes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices. Through CSI, CBP officers work with host customs administrations to establish security criteria for identifying high-risk containers. Those administrations use non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection technology to screen high-risk containers before they are shipped to U.S. ports. Announced in January 2002, CSI has made great strides since its inception. A significant number of customs administrations have committed to joining CSI and operate at various stages of implementation. CSI is now operational at ports in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin and Central America. **CBP’s 58 operational CSI ports now prescreen over 80 percent of all maritime containerized cargo imported into the United States.**

Port Security helps control the importation and exportation of goods

**George McClure, 2007**

*McClure, George. "IEEE-USA Today's Engineer." IEEE-USA Today's Engineer. SafePorts, n.d. Web. 22 June 2012. <http://www.todaysengineer.org/2007/Sep/port-security.asp>.*

Last year, the American Association of Port Authorities reaffirmed its full commitment to the security of America’s seaports. Its Security Committee has developed a comprehensive port security manual and conducts an annual Port Security Seminar. It is working with government agencies to address timely security issues such as the pending Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Coast Guard are implementing to ensure those seeking access. to secure port areas can be positively identified, have authorization to enter the facility and do not pose a terrorist risk. The GAO recently completed another report dealing with port security in the Caribbean Basin. Duty-free access to U.S. markets from 24 beneficiary countries resulted from the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative. In addition to freight shipments and Panama Canal ship transits, the Caribbean is the world’s most popular cruise ship destination, serving some 7 million North American passengers per year. The State Department expressed considerable concern over the possibility of an explosive-laden vehicle directed at a cruise ship port facility, or directly to a cruise ship that could put U.S. citizens in peril. Security concerns include suicide attacks, standoff attacks, armed assaults, corruption and organized gang activities, geography abetting illegal activity, difficult to safeguard break-bulk and soft-top vessel cargo, stowaways, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and the presence of Islamic radical groups and foreign terrorist organizations. “In its report on risk assessment at ports and other critical infrastructure, the GAO gave high marks to the Coast Guard and Office for Domestic Preparedness, but noted that the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, with responsible for assessing risk across all types of critical infrastructure, is still developing its methodology and has not demonstrated that it can accomplish this task. The report states that there is “a critical longer-term need: more guidance, direction, and coordination from DHS. The challenges and difficulties associated with creating a coordinated, coherent risk management approach to the nation’s homeland security has been widely acknowledged since the events of September 11 and the creation of DHS. One of the presidential directives calls on DHS to provide such guidance, but the agency has yet to do so.”

Impact

Terrorism will escalate into extinction

Dennis Morgan 2009 South Korea Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10

Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. Andas long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used,it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

AT- Terrorist doesn’t have means to attack

Al Qaeda has the means to execute port attacks

Keefer, Campbell Law Review, 2012 (Wendy, March 3rd, “Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain”, Campbell Law Review)

 Moreover, entire vessels are actually controlled by Al Qaeda. This terrorist organization may use those vessels for legitimate trade to raise funds or to carry out further terrorist activities. 48 The ease with which Farid clearly used a container for his own transport-only discovered when he attempted to widen ventilation holes with port employees nearby-is disturbing.4 9 This successful concealment of container contents, along with potential Al Qaeda control of entire vessels able to carry thousands of shipping containers, is particularly troubling when the total volume of maritime container shipments in need of security screening is considered.

\*\*\*\*Drug Trafficking\*\*\*\*

Uniqueness

**The U.S. military’s ability to stop drug trafficking is declining.**

Bennett, reporter for Los Angeles Times, March 12 2012

(Brian Bennett, “U.S. military's ability to stop drug smuggling declines”, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/08/world/la-fg-us-drugs-20120308, March 12, 2012)

Despite intensified counter-narcotics efforts over the last five years, the military's ability to stop drug smuggling into the U.S. from Latin America has declined as planes and ships have been diverted to combat operations around the globe, according to a senior military officer. As a result, the Navy and Coast Guard are stopping one of three suspected seaborne drug shipments headed to American shores, Gen. Douglas Fraser, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, told reporters Wednesday. The Navy has four frigates on patrol in the Caribbean and along the Pacific coast of Central America — one more than usual — as the U.S. works with regional allies in an anti-drug operation aimed at pushing smugglers further offshore. But other military craft used to track or interdict drug shipments have been diverted to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the NATO-led air campaign last year in Libya, the coast of Somalia to hunt pirates and the Persian Gulf to beef up the Navy's presence as tensions build with Iran. "It's really the capacity to intercept that we are really lacking," Fraser said. The military has spent $6.1 billion since 2005 to help detect drug payloads heading to the U.S., as well as on surveillance and other intelligence operations, according to a report last year by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

**Poor federal security allows drug smuggling to occur in the status quo**

Kestin, writer at South Florida Sun, 2011 (Sally, June 12, “SECURITY AT SEAPORTS COULD BE IN JEOPARDY”, Proquest)

Potentially more worrisome, say Janes and others, are shortcomings with the federal ID, known as the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). Only the most serious security-related crimes such as espionage or treason bar someone from being approved for a TWIC. Other crimes are not disqualifying and even applicants with records for murder, drug smuggling and possession of an explosive device can be cleared through a waiver. As of last September, the Transportation Security Administration had issued credentials to more than 460,000 port workers with criminal records, according to a May report by the Government Accountability Office. Undercover government investigators were able to obtain credentials by presenting fraudulent information and entered ports with counterfeit TWICs. "The federal system, like any system, there are holes," Wiltshire, of Port Everglades, acknowledged. The main argument for repealing Florida's law came down to money and the hardship on ports. The cost for a state security clearance was about $50 a year for each worker at Port Everglades, and slightly more at some other ports. That added up to about $3 million annually for all of the state's port workers and put Florida at a competitive disadvantage, according to the Ports Council. The Office of Drug Control commissioned a study that last year concluded the dual regulations were unnecessary. Scott agreed and signed the bill last month, saying repeal of the law will reduce "burdensome and expensive regulation" and allow Florida ports to "now be able to compete." McDonough, a retired Army colonel and the state's first Drug Control chief, has another prediction. "I think what we'll see is a return to the bad old days of more drugs coming into the state of Florida," he said. Even with both state and federal security requirements, federal agents in December busted a ring of longshoremen that imported millions of dollars worth of cocaine, heroin and marijuana on cargo ships arriving at Port Everglades and the Port of Miami. "Drugs, like water, find the weakest points to flow to," McDonough said. "The Florida law just gave [smugglers] a gift: Come on back in."

Uniqueness

Very few of the cargo containers on ships are checked.

United States Department of Justice 2010

United States Department of Justice, “Drug Movement Into and Within the United States”, Feb 2010

Traffickers use commercial maritime vessels to smuggle sizable quantities of drugs into the United States, but data suggest that other conveyance methods are preferred by smugglers. Traffickers often hide drugs among legitimate cargo in maritime containers, a fraction of which are inspected. Analysis of commercial maritime seizure data for 2004 through 2009 indicates that cocaine and marijuana are most often smuggled in commercial maritime vessels from Caribbean locations, such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica, into East Coast ports in Florida and New Jersey. Traffickers also use commercial vessels to smuggle cocaine from the Dominican Republic into Puerto Rico. Smaller amounts of heroin, typically 2 kilograms or less, are occasionally smuggled by cruise ship passengers working for Caribbean trafficking organizations into East Coast ports; however, this smuggling technique appears to have declined since 2006. Seizure data indicate that methamphetamine is rarely smuggled into the United States on commercial maritime vessels. Despite the fact that sizable quantities of drugs are seized annually from commercial maritime vessels arriving in the United States, the dominance of Mexican trafficking organizations as the primary transporters of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine to the United States results in commercial maritime seizure totals that are far less than Southwest Border seizure totals. Seizure data for 2009 show that the amount seized from commercial maritime vessels remains less than 1 percent (6,015 kg of 828,223 kg) of the amount seized at the Southwest Border. Law enforcement reporting confirms that Caribbean and South American traffickers are more likely than Mexican traffickers to take advantage of commercial maritime vessels as a smuggling conveyance to supply their much smaller U.S. distribution networks. Moreover, large quantities of drugs seized at U.S. ports are often destined for distribution in countries other than the United States. Many drug shipments concealed in commercial maritime containers by Caribbean and South American traffickers are intercepted by U.S. authorities as they transit the United States en route to markets in Europe and Asia.

Drug trafficking is a severe problem plaguing the nations seaports.

Harper 2009

Tom Haper, “The Juarez Tijuana Port Angeles Connection”, Mach 27 2009

Port Angeles, along with twenty-three other Washington cities, has a Mexican drug trafficking presence. This is according to the annual report of the National Drug Intelligence Center. A total of 230 cities have had Mexican drug trafficking activity between 2006 and 2008. Port Angeles Police Chief Terry Gallagher said: “We have known for several years that some of the cocaine and methamphetamine that is distributed in the region comes from Mexican gangs.” He said Port Angeles was the only Olympic Peninsula city mentioned in the report, but that’s probably because the Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enforcement Team (OPNET) is based in Port Angeles. Ron Cameron, Clallam County chief criminal deputy and OPNET commander, said the designation reflects the entire region and not just Port Angeles. He said: “Historically, we've been dealing with it [Mexican drug trafficking] in this county since 1993. In '07, we took out a significant group that was operating in Western Washington. These things have a tendency to go in waves and cycles.” According to the federal report: “Mexican DTOs [Drug Trafficking Organizations] are the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States. They control most of the U.S. drug market and have established varied transportation routes, advanced communications capabilities and strong affiliations with gangs in the United States.”

Uniqueness

A lack of port security is leading to drug trafficking.

Committee on Military Affairs and Domestic Security 2008

Committee on Military Affairs and Domestic Security, “The Florida Senate Interim Report 2009-122” PDF, October 2008

Customs considers poor seaport security a major reason for drug smuggling. Unlike airports, there is

no viable system of federal regulations mandating specific security standards for seaports and marine

terminals. Fairly new regulations govern security for large passenger vessels and cruise ship terminals.

There are however, no corresponding federal regulations for sea cargo vessels and seaport and marine

terminals.

Illegal drug trafficking is very popular because it is a highly profitable business.

Zill and Bergman no date

(Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, “Do The Math: Why The Illegal Drug Business is Thriving”, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/math.html, no date)

Imagine a typical weekend in New York City. Experts estimate that at least one percent of the population - 80,000 plus - spends $200 on illicit drugs. That alone would amount to $16 million dollars a week or $832 million a year. And that's just New York. All those drug sales mean that large amounts of cash accumulate in stash houses and collection points around the country. For the multi-billion dollar narcotics business - like any commodities business -- it is essential that the suppliers and transporters be paid. That means the money must make its way south, and the traffickers, aided by specialists in money laundering, have devised myriad methods to insure the efficient and safe delivery of their profits. Estimates on how much money is sent south each year range from $10 to 30 billion. For Mexican traffickers along the Southwest border, the money is literally driven across the border in bulk amounts and then deposited into Mexican banks. "Steve," who was involved with the Mexican cartels in money laundering, explains this process. For Colombians, the process is more complicated because dollars are not negotiable in the Colombian economy due to currency controls. That, combined with the fact that Colombia can only be reached by sea or air, has led to all kinds of ingenious methods for repatriating their proceeds. When the drug money ultimately makes its way into the foreign economy, it is used to pay the salaries of shippers and processors, as well as the bribes that supplement the incomes of government officials on both sides of the border. Whole regions of Mexico, Colombia and points in between have become dependent on the demand for drugs in the United States. Large scale drug organizations such as the once powerful Cali cartel in Colombia or the Mexican Arellano Felix brothers are said to resemble corporate organizations with division of labor and huge cash reserves designed to keep their operations moving smoothly. What keeps the drug industry going is its huge profit margins. Producing drugs is a very cheap process. Like any commodities business the closer you are to the source the cheaper the product. Processed cocaine is available in Colombia for $1500 dollars per kilo and sold on the streets of America for as much as $66,000 a kilo (retail). Heroin costs $2,600/kilo in Pakistan, but can be sold on the streets of America for $130,000/kilo (retail). And synthetics like methamphetamine are often even cheaper to manufacture costing approximately $300 to $500 per kilo to produce in clandestine labs in the US and abroad and sold on US streets for up to $60,000/kilo (retail).

Drug trafficking causes more addiction

Increased drug trafficking leads to more addiction - studies show a 237% increase

Griffen 2008. Griffen, Kathleen. "Canadian Medical Association Journal." The York Region Methamphetamine Strategy. Canadian Medical Association, 17 June 2008. Web. 26 June 2012. <http://www.cmaj.ca/content/178/13/1655.short>.

The key criminal incentive to becoming involved in the production and distribution of methamphetamine is profit. The money-making potential of trafficking this drug is attractive to organized-crime groups. By studying trends of methamphetamine and other illicit drugs in communities in Canada and the United States, law enforcement professionals anticipate the use and production of the drug will increase in Ontario in coming years.

The experience of the police in the York Region, a jurisdiction of about 1 000 000 people in the Greater Toronto Area, puts the emerging societal impact of methamphetamine laboratories into perspective. In 2001, York Regional Police made 3 seizures of small amounts of methamphetamine that were intended for personal use. In 2007, the York Regional Police made 25 seizures of methamphetamine totalling 3445 g. This includes methamphetamine seized from drug dealers associated with criminal organizations. In contrast, in 2007 the York Regional Police executed search warrants at 83 indoor marijuana grow operations and seized 36 844 marijuana plants and 200 kg of marijuana. One large-scale ecstasy seizure, coupled with several laboratory and street-level seizures, led to the removal of 958 318 ecstasy pills from the streets.

In 2006, as part of the York Regional Police's overall war against illicit drugs, the Drugs and Vice Enforcement Unit executed 246 search warrants, arrested 338 people, laid 960 charges and seized $1 091 133 related to drug trafficking and production. This represents a substantial increase in drug enforcement activities by this unit compared with 2005. Specifically, there was a 41% increase in the number of search warrants, 36% increase in arrests, 25% increase in charges and a 237% increase in cash and securities seized from drug manufacturers and traffickers.

Increased drug trafficking leads to more addiction

Caulkins 2012, Carnegie MellonUniversity. Caulkins, Jonathan P. "Long-Run Trends in Incarceration of Drug Offenders in the United States." *Long-Run Trends in In carceration of Drug Offenders in the United States*. Sage Journals, 2012. Web. 26 June 2012. <http://cad.sagepub.com/content/52/4/619.short>.

Estimates are developed for the number of people incarcerated in the United States for drug law violations between 1972 and 2002, broken down by type of institution (federal prison, state prison, or jail) and, to the extent possible, by nature of drug offense (possession or use, trafficking, or other). These time series are compared to trends in drug use indicators, revealing at best weak correlations, and the absolute levels are compared to different market indicators to draw various inferences. For example, even though about 480,000 people are incarcerated for drug law violations, on average retail sellers spend less than 2 hours behind bars per sale. Still, full-time sellers might expect to spend 3 months incarcerated per year of selling, suggesting that there are roughly four active drug sellers for every one who is incarcerated.

More drug trafficking leads to more crimes and addiction

While no exact figures are available on the extent of drug addiction in the country, continuing media reports of student drug addiction, drug smuggling rings, and crime associated with drug trafficking have brought into focus the interrelated aspects of the narcotics problem. India is strategically situated in two of the most important drug trafficking routes. More than half the illegal heroin used throughout the world comes from the Golden Triangle where the borders of Burma, Laos, and Thailand meet. The other important international narcotics smuggling route, the Golden Crescent, covers Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Heroin is also brought to India through the land route from the Golden Crescent and then smuggled to other countries. Narcotics transit via air routes through such major cities as Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras. To deal with the drug problem, India's Parliament passed the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act in 1985. Essential elements of a counternarcotics strategy for India are an efficient law enforcement system to deal nationally and international with crimes related to narcotics and other dangerous drugs, stringent penalties for narcotics traffickers, protection of the public against drug addiction, and compulsory treatment for drug addicts. Appendixes contain India's Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. 30 references, 2 illustrations.

Amazon Impact Mod

Drug trafficking destroys the Amazon rainforest – U.S. consumption is a direct cause.

**Mongabay, 5-26-08,** (Environmental News Source, “Cocaine use is destroying the Amazon”, http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0526-cocaine.html, ACC: 9.23.11, p. online

The campaign estimates that 2.2 million hectares of forest have been cleared for cocaine production in Colombia. Pollution from production — kerosene, sulfuric acid, acetone, and carbide are used to process the leaves — has fouled waterways while armed groups operating in forests areas have decimated wildlife. "The real price of cocaine is not just among communities and on the streets here, but in communities and on the streets of Colombia," British Home Office Minister Vernon Coaker was quoted as saying by Reuters. A new campaign has linked cocaine consumption in Europe and the United States to destruction of the Amazon rainforest in Colombia. The "Shared Responsibility" drive, a joint initiative by the British and Colombian governments, features a collection of photographs showing the destruction of rainforest for coca plantations, the raw ingredient used for cocaine production.

Cocaine production destroys rainforest

In a speech in London marketing the launch of the initiative, Francisco Santos, Colombia's Vice President, said that every gram of cocaine consumed "destroys four square meters of rainforest."

Amazon destruction leads to widespread famine and triggers a thermonuclear war – causes extinction.

David **Takacs,** Professor of Environmental Humanities @ the Institute for Earth Systems Science and Policy @ California State University-Monterey Bay, **1996**, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise, p. 200-1, http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm, ACC: 2.15.08, p. online

"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.""

\*\*\*\*Human Trafficking\*\*\*\*

Uniqueness

Human trafficking slips under national radars due to its stealthy nature

Seaport 2010, Sovereign Market. Seaport Security News |. "U.S. Port Security Is A Global Issue." *Seaport Security News |*. Sovereign Market, 23 Nov. 2010. Web. 22 June 2012. <http://www.seaportsecuritynews.com/?p=212>.

Millions of people every year are the victims of human trafficking. Slavery, which is often thought to have ended with the civil war, is alive and well in the world of today. As a crime that is not beingsignificantlyimpacted by the measures taken to preventit, the governing international bodies are currently working to improve conviction of the criminals involved with this crime and also in the aid of the victims of the crime. As defined by the United Nations Protocol to Protect, Punish and Suppress Trafficking in Persons, human trafficking is “…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuses of power or of a position of vulnerability” (Article 3, par 1). This tedious definition can be shortened to two words: force and fraud. All human trafficking involves someone being forced through violence or the threat of violence or coerced through fraudulent representation. Because of the stealthy nature of the crime it often slips underneath national radars. In Eastern Europe many young woman are presented with an “Amazing modeling opportunity” in the West, only to find themselves trapped in the illicit sex trade once they arrive. Worldwide there is a high demand for women and children to work as sex slaves, sweatshop labor, and domestic servants. The inefficiency of laws and law enforcement have allowed the trafficking in human beings to be the world’s third largest market falling behind drugs and weapons. Though the largest number of victims comes from South and Southeast Asia, cases of human trafficking exist in nearly all the developed nations of the West. The State Departmentsconservative estimate calculates that 2-4 million people are trafficked annually, but some estimates range as high as 27 million. 800,000 peoplearetrafficked across international boarders each year; 80% woman and 50% children. According to Condolezza Rice, as many as 17,500 people are trafficked to the United States each year. The UN's Protocol to Protect puts the number of people the victims of human trafficking at any given time at 12.3 million. As with any crime, the causes of human trafficking are varied and complicated. But looked at simply it is a case in which an illegal market exists, and wherever money can be earned, organized crime is willing to destroy lives to earn it. While an adequate response to combating the crime has been historically slow, governments and NGO’s are beginning to rise to the call to combat the crime. Even the developing countries of the world are moving forward. Even Guatemala, considered as Tier 2 by the State Department because it does not have enforcement that is significant and has victim assistance that is considered “inadequate,” is hosting its first ever nationwide congress on the issue under the direction of the NGO Nuestros Ahijados and its sister organization ITEMP.org. In October 2008, the same organization is hosting a similar congress to combat the crime across all of Central America. The key to ending the plague of human trafficking is bringing organizations working against it together to better coordinate the convictions of the criminals and the care of the victims. With awareness finally created, steps large and small are being made to combat the crisis.

Human Trafficking causes HIV

**Human trafficking cause HIV is one of the most significant issues of our time**

Stein 2010 , professor at Princeton. Stein, Richard A. (2010) "HIV: The Hidden Face of Human Trafficking," World Medical & Health Policy: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 7.

\Human trafficking emerges as one of the most significant social, legal, medical, and public health crises of our time. A relatively under-explored facet of human trafficking is the victim' risk to become infected with HIV and other sexually transmitted pathogens. Several studies reported that significant percentages of trafficking victims are HIV-positive. In addition, some of the HIV-positive victims are co-infected with hepatitis B, tuberculosis, or syphilis. The large numbers of clients, together with the unprotected sexual relationships that many trafficking victims are forced to have, greatly heighten their risk to become infected. Furthermore, just like trafficking, HIV represents a taboo topic in many societies worldwide, and the marginalization of rescued trafficking victims by families and society significantly compounds their suffering and increases their susceptibility for further abuse. The interface between human trafficking and HIV represents an important area that needs to be explored in future studies, and should receive increased attention from public health officials.

Human trafficking contributes to the spread and vulnerability of HIV and threatens human development and security

Sirilal 2007, journalist. Sirilal, Ranga. "Human Trafficking Helps Spread HIV/AIDS in Asia: UN." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 22 Aug. 2007. Web. 22 June 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/22/us-srilanka-aids-idUSL22325220070822>.

(Reuters) - About 300,000 women and children are trafficked across Asia each year, accelerating the spread of HIV/AIDS, the United Nations said on Wednesday."**Trafficking** ... **contributes to the spread of HIV by** significantly increasing the vulnerability of trafficked persons to infection," said Caitlin Wiesen-Antin, HIV/AIDS regional coordinator, Asia and Pacific, for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)."Both human trafficking and HIV greatly threaten human development and security."Major human trafficking routes run between Nepal and India and between Thailand and neighbors like Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. Many of the victims are young teenage girls who end up in prostitution."The link between human trafficking and HIV/AIDS has only been identified fairly recently," Wiesen-Antin told the International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific."Neither HIV/AIDS nor human trafficking have been integrated or mainstreamed adequately, either at policy or programmatic level." UNAIDS estimates 5.4 million people were living with HIV in the Asia Pacific region in 2006, with anywhere between 140,000 and 610,000 people dying from AIDS-related illnesses. That makes it the world's second largest number of people living with HIV after sub-Saharan Africa, where 25.8 million people are infected with the virus. Conference host Sri Lanka has one of the lowest rates of HIV in Asia, with an estimated 5,000 infected people out of a population of around 20 million. Neighboring India, by comparison, has the world's third highest HIV caseload after South Africa and Nigeria, with around 2.5 million people living with the virus.

Sex Trafficking I/L

Human smuggling results in sex trafficking

US DOS 06. US Dept. of State, “Fact Sheet: Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking 2006” U.S Dept of State Diplomacy in Action, January 1, 2006<http://www.state.gov/m/ds/hstcenter/90434.htm>

Human smuggling is the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation or illegal entry ofa person(s) across an international border,in violation of one or more countries laws**,** either clandestinely or through deception, such as the use of fraudulent documents. Often, human smuggling is conducted in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit for the smuggler, although financial gain or material benefit are not necessarily elements of the crime. For instance, sometimes people engage in smuggling to reunite their families. Human smuggling is generally with the consent of the person(s) being smuggled, who often pay large sums of money. The vast majority of people who are assisted in illegally entering the United States are smuggled, rather than trafficked**.** Smuggled persons may become victims of other crimes. In addition to being subjected to unsafe conditions on the smuggling journeys, smuggled aliens may be subjected to physical and sexual violence. Frequently, at the end of the journey, smuggled aliens are held hostage until their debt is paid off by family members or others. It is also possible that a person being smuggled mayat any pointbecome a trafficking victim**.**

Sex trafficking is the strongest promoter of prostitution

Enriquez, 1999 (Jean, Director of the Coalition Against the Trafficking of Women in the Asia Pacific, November,

“Filipinas in Prostitution around U.S. Military Bases in Korea: A Recurring Nightmare”, http://www.catw-ap.org/resources/speeches-papers/filipinas-in-prostitution-around-us-military-bases-in-korea-a-recurring-nightmare/)

CATW asserts that trafficking in women is inseparable with the issue of prostitution. The gender-based nature of trafficking exposes itself as serving the purpose of ensuring the steady supply of women to areas where men demand sexual services. We deplore trafficking and prostitution as violations of women’s human rights. We cannot consider it work, because among others, it compels women to perform acts that denigrates their person — their integrity as human beings. The impact to women of sexual exploitation is hardly healed by time. Amerasian children, estimated at 30,000, were born to Filipinas prostituted around the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. They receive no assistance from either the U.S. or Philippine government. Economically, ‘working in the clubs’ meant irregular earnings and slavery, as many of them would be withheld of their salaries or are fined for any ‘misconduct’. The women were abused physically, psychologically and emotionally. Some were murdered. With the Visiting Forces Agreement recently signed between the Philippine and U.S. governments, 22 ports will be opened to foreign troops and more women will be abused in the remote rural areas of the country. In Korea, our women are once again subjected to the same brutality. The same experiences continue to haunt our women. In Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere, the women are viewed as commodities to be bought, and being Asians, they are certainly perceived as less than human.

Sex Trafficking I/L

Prostitution results in rape and stigmatization.

Kirk and Francis in 2000 (Gwyn and Carolyn Bowen, Founding members of the East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism. “Redefining Security: Women Challenge US Military Policy and Practice in East Asia” Berkeley Women’s Law Journal, 2000, v15, pg. 229)

The women work from early evening until dawn, encouraging the men to buy drinks, and making arrangements for sex. The sexual arrangements may last for what is referred to in the bars as a "short time," meaning an hour or two, or they may last overnight. Some women work on contract to one man for his tour of duty and live that entire time in a room that he rents. A woman involved in prostitution may take on a soldier's homesickness, frustration, alienation, boredom, or fear, and, at the same time, deal with his sexism and racism. She may drink or do drugs as a way of coping with the job.(n101) Militarized prostitution has had very serious effects on women's health, including HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, drug and alcohol dependency, and mental illness.(n102) Women who work in the bars, massage parlors, and brothels near U.S. bases are also particularly vulnerable to physical and sexual violence.(n103)

These women who, forced by poverty and lack of meaningful alternatives, work in the sex trade near the bases are unprotected by the military system and their own cultures. Speaking about military prostitution in South Korea, Yu Bok Nim, co-founder and former director of Du Rae Bang (a center for bar women and their children), cites "a deeply-rooted patriarchal family system that encourages families to reject these women," and notes that many of those involved with Du Rae Bang are survivors of rape, incest, or domestic violence.(n104) From the sexist perspectives of the host governments, women in military prostitution are to be disparaged and stigmatized. From the perspective of the U.S. military, Asian women may be caricatured and disparaged, as they are in the Philippines, for example, as "little brown fucking machines."(n105)

We have a moral obligation to reject rape – it’s a type of sexual violence that’s in the spirit of murder and destroys value to life.

Wing 97.(PROF LAW U IOWA, CONCEPTUALIZING VIOLENCE, 60 ALB. L. REV. 943)

The multiple effect of violence on these women, simultaneously coming from outside and inside their culture, constitutes a "spirit injury" to women, and thus on the entire culture. Spirit injury is a critical race feminist term which contemplates the psychological, spiritual, and cultural effects of the multiple assaults on these women. 38 Spirit injury "leads to the slow death of the psyche, of the [\*953] soul, and of the identity of the individual." 39 Women come to believe in their own inferiority, and that there is justification for the violence against them, because "[a] fundamental part of ourselves and of our dignity is dependent upon the uncontrollable, powerful external observers who constitute society." 40 If society places a low value on certain members, they in turn will perceive themselves as having a lesser worth in that society. Because they are devalued by both the outside society of the oppressor and the inside society of their own culture, as well as by the intimate inside of their own family, women cannot help but be profoundly silenced and experience a loss of her self-actualization. The spirit injury becomes "as devastating, as costly, and as psychically obliterating...as robbery or assault." 41 On the group level, the accumulation of multiple individual spirit injuries can "lead[] to the devaluation and destruction of a way of life or of an entire culture." 42 and misery of others.

Solvency

Increased funding for port security will diminish human trafficking –including Haiti

Martin 2010. Martin, Tim. "Haiti: Redefining Port Security | SLDInfo." *Haiti: Redefining Port Security | SLDInfo*. Second Line of Defense, 24 Feb. 2010. Web. 24 June 2012. <http://www.sldinfo.com/in-the-wake-of-disaster-how-the-haiti-earthquake-is-likely-to-redefine-the-notion-of-port-security/>.

The Haiti earthquake is an important reminder that the security of maritime ports is vital in order to maintain the logistics of aid and fast response in the wake of such a disaster. This is particularly the case for developing nations with minimal infrastructure and/or marginal port facilities to begin with. Although the French and American foothold in the Caribbean island-nation prior to the earthquake has made a difference to help speed up the logistical effort, security initiatives that had been adopted prior to the earthquake did not prepare the port for such an emergency.This is intriguing since Haiti seems to experience a high level of natural catastrophes. Therefore it is likely that this crisis, more than any other natural disaster, might inadvertently affect how port security management occurs in the future, especially in relation to ports in developing countries that are subject to natural disasters, or for port facilities that may be used as gateways for disasters in landlocked countries. However, the security threats envisioned and level of disaster management planning has not taken into consideration the logistical challenges created by such large-scale destruction of Port au-Prince’s port infrastructure, the key link in the foreign aid logistics chain in an emergency. Therefore the aforementioned bureaucratic alphabet soup did little to provide a contingency plan for a human security-related catastrophe in an otherwise disaster prone region. Taking soundings, marking submerged rubble and containers and inspecting the damaged port were key tasks for the joint operation but the security of the port, as in Port-au-Prince itself, is a priority because the city’s surviving law enforcement capabilities are seriously overwhelmed. US troops are flooding into the city and are expected to provide security for the aid and rescue effort but they are not a law enforcement solution, as soldiers are generally not trained in constabulary services. The earthquake damaged the main prison in Port-au-Prince allowing approximately 4,000 prisoners, including gang leaders connected to high-level organized crime syndicates to escape into the shattered city. In The virtual absence of a fully functioning police force, these criminals have begun to return to old ways of gang rivalries, controlling turf in the Cité Soleil slum areas of Port-au-Prince, located in the port area. Furthermore, the major road networks leading to and from the port cross through these suburbs. These areas have long been no-go zones where drug trafficking and human trafficking syndicates have flourished. Brazil had a peacekeeping force of 145 soldiers in Cité Soleil but lost 18 of them, including three of its commanders in the earthquake during a building collapse. All of their weapons were looted. Since the initial quake, armed criminal gangs have been accused of attacking rescue workers trying to pull bodies from the rubble, and contributing to the insecurity felt by aid workers and locals. At night, gunshots are often heard, and there are reports of women being raped due to the lack of adequate street lighting. Vigilante groups for the protection of citizens are active with the encouragement from the incapacitated police services but this is not an ideal security solution. The UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon has requested that the Security Council send reinforcements to support the UN peacekeeping mission to Haiti, which will add to the existing 7,000 peacekeepers and 2,000 police already in Haiti. Reinforcements will include 2,000 peacekeeping troops and 1,500 police units. Current maritime security upgrades in recent years have only facilitated the day-to-day security of port operations, whereas the security of ports must be part of a wider response mechanism, perhaps in collaboration with regional states through CARICOM, OAS, and of course, the US. The lessons learned in this instance are that indigenous security forces may be non-existent due to corruption, a lack or resources, or a damaged chain of command after a catastrophe, but it is vital that ports and vessels still have a secure operating environment. Haiti has been hit by hurricanes and a major earthquake and was already struggling with its own security and stability before the aforementioned disasters occurred. Developing countries like Haiti (or Indonesia) that clearly do not have the capacity to cope with the added security demands that arise in the wake of large-scale emergencies need to assess all aspects of port logistics security. The Haitian port facilities and roads will be repaired in due time in order to accommodate the necessary docking of larger ships and the delivery of equipment and supplies. During this time the capacity of the city to provide its own maritime security for the ongoing logistical challenges faced by trying keep Port-au-Prince alive will depend on the goodwill of countries such as the US, French and other donor countries. As more aid supplies and heavy equipment is chartered to Haiti for the relief effort, shippers will need to know there is safe access to permanent or temporary wharfs, and that adequate provisions have been made to unload cargoes onto barges alongside when no other options are available. To those within the shipping industry that are contracted to play a role in the aid delivery to Haiti, the safety and security of their crew and vessel as well as logistical variables to avoid time delays are key priorities. Despite the considerable efforts of the US reconstruction and security teams, the ongoing nature of aid supply, the fragility of Port-au-Prince infrastructure, the dysfunctional state of the police force, and the potential for select Haitian gang involvement in the port area will threaten shippers who risk their vessels to deliver the much needed cargo. In the short to medium term, port security will rely on external military forces, however, in the long term, port security in the developing world will depend on the lessons that can be learned from Haiti and translated into future port security planning.

**Solvency**

**Effective border security prevents human trafficking**

Bam 2012. Creative, Bam. "Border Security and Anti-Human Trafficking." *-Â Global Justice SolutionsÂ - Specialists in International Justice and Security Consultancy Based in Perth, Sydney and London.* N.p., 2012. Web. 24 June 2012. <http://www.global-justice.com/services/border-security-anti-human-trafficking/>.

Effective border security that can control the movement of people and goods, to counter threats of terrorism, transnational crime and biosecurity, depends on operational and technical efficiency of the responsible organisations and their interaction with other government agencies on an international, national, and sub-national basis, both alone and in bilateral and multilateral relationship.   GJS works with host governments to identify country specific needs; systems and training to maximize the contribution that border control and other agencies make to national security.In the field of Anti Human Trafficking, GJS works with governmental and nongovernmental organisations to design specific strategies and action plans in the fields of investigation, prevention, communication and risk reduction. GJS experts are able to provide direct technical expertise, advice and strategic support to prepare a comprehensive overarching strategy that addresses causes and the push and pull factors that drive this criminal activity.

**Making human trafficking security a federal priority is key**

AAPA 2010. AAPA. "10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports." *-- ALEXANDRIA, Va., Sept. 1, 2011 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ --*. American Association of Port Authorities, 1 Sept. 2011. Web. 24 June 2012. <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/10-years-after-911-security-still-a-top-priority-of-us-ports-128888213.html>.

Among the materials Navy SEALS found in Osama Bin Laden's Pakistan hideout were plans showing the maritime industry is still a key Al-Qaida target. Given ongoing threats such as these, the seaport industry is asking Congress and the Administration make port security a top funding priority in current and future appropriations rather than considering it for funding cuts. AAPA is strongly in favor of reauthorizing the SAFE Port Act to ensure that U.S. port facilities and cargoes remain secure.  One such bill, S. 832, was introduced in April by Sens. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Patty Murray (D-WA), which would authorize $300 million a year for five years for the Port Security Grant Program and reauthorizes, among other aspects of the original bill, the Container Security Initiative, C-TPAT and the Automated Targeting System to identify high-risk cargo. Since 9/11, the Port Security Grant Program has received about $2.6 billion in funding for 11 rounds of grant awards.  AAPA commends Congress and the Administration for these allocations and will continue to recommend the federal government commit $400 million a year for a separate and dedicated program to help port facilities enhance their physical security.  The association supports a risk-based evaluation process that allows all facilities that are required to meet MTSA regulations to apply. "Clearly, America's ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate," remarked Mr. Nagle. "There's no question that more investments in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed. All parties—the ports, terminal operators, the various government agencies, and the Administration and Congress—must do their part in undertaking and funding these enhancements.  Only by continuing to make port security a top priority will America's seaports be able to continue serving their vital functions as trade gateways, catalysts for job creation and economic prosperity, and important partners in our national defense." The American Association of Port Authorities was founded in 1912 and today represents about 150 of the leading public port authorities in the United States, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean.  In addition, the Association represents some 250 sustaining and associate members, firms and individuals with an interest in the seaports of the Western Hemisphere.  AAPA port members are public entities mandated by law to serve public purposes.  Port authorities facilitate waterborne commerce and contribute to local, regional and national economic growth.

\*\*\*\*Solvency\*\*\*\*

PSGP key to security

PSGP is critical to upgrading and sustaining our port security

AAPA, March 7/2012 (American Association of Port Authorities is a trade association that represents over 150 port authority organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere, “Testimony of Captain John M. Holmes”, http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf)

In the decade since 9/11, a key component of our nation’s effort to harden the security of seaports has been the Port Security Grant Program, currently managed by FEMA. The Port of Los Angeles alone has spent more than $250 million to upgrade its security, over $100 million of which was provided through grant funding. These upgrades would not have been possible if it were not for the Port Security Grant Program. As is the case in Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funds have helped port facilities and port areas to strengthen facility security and work in partnership with other agencies to enhance the security of the region. In the Port of Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funding has been used to procure equipment such as vessels and vehicles, install detection systems such as cameras and sensors, and provide equipment maintenance for the systems recently installed. Port Security Grant funds have also been used to harden port IT infrastructure, and most recently this funding has been used to fill a serious training gap -- Maritime Security Training for State and Local police officers. Under the SAFE Port Act, the Port Security Grant program is authorized at $400 million. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the funding for this program has decreased, currently standing at a dangerously low level. The current level of $97.5 million is 75 percent less than the authorized level, and it is currently at one of the lowest funding levels ever for this program. As costs of systems, maintenance and equipment continue to rise, this level of funding will bring into question the sustainability of the protection levels we have worked so hard to build over the last decade.

PSGP key to maintain port security

AAPA, March 7/2012 (American Association of Port Authorities is a trade association that represents over 150 port authority organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere, “Testimony of Captain John M. Holmes”, http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf)

As you know, for FY 2012, this Committee decided to bundle all FEMA State and Local grant programs, cut the combined programs by 40 percent, and give DHS the authority to determine funding levels for individual programs. AAPA has long been wary of efforts to bundle programs, fearing that traditional homeland security grants would be given a higher priority. DHS was given the authority to make the funding decisions, and last month, our fears became reality. The FY 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level. This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans and fund federal mandates such as installation of TWIC readers. In a constantly changing threat environment, this level of funding will make it difficult to maintain our current capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles, much less meet new and emerging concerns in such areas as infrastructure protection, continuity of services such as power and water, protection of our information technology capabilities and response to the ever-growing cyber threat. At the Port of Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funding has been a critical component in our efforts to build a resilient port, and we would hate to see a degradation of these efforts as a result of grant funding reductions.

PSGP key to security

**PGSP is key to port protection**

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

Port areas have unique characteristics--they are centers of commerce, hubs of transportation, and often close to major population centers. These characteristics result in specific vulnerabilities that must be addressed to avoid the human or economic losses that would result from a terrorist attack. The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)-- administered by FEMA and supported with subject matter expertise from the Coast Guard--is one tool DHS uses to protect critical maritime infrastructure from these risks. Risk management has been endorsed by the federal government to help direct finite resources to areas of greatest risk and grant programs have provided substantial resources toward this effort. We found that PSGP allocations were highly correlated to risk for the grant years we examined and DHS has taken steps to strengthen the PSGP risk allocation model by improving the quality and precision of the data inputs. However, additional efforts- -such as accounting for how new security measures affect port vulnerability and using the most precise data available in the risk model--could further strengthen the model and build upon the progress made. While the allocation process has been risk-based, FEMA has faced significant challenges administering the grant program. For example, FEMA awarded nearly $1.7 billion in port security grants for fiscal years 2006 through 2010; however, draw down levels for the PSGP are low--with about one-quarter of fiscal year 2006 through 2010 grant monies drawn down as of September 2011. While FEMA may not consider draw down levels to be an accurate measure of progress made in improving port security, this measure has become the de facto yardstick for assessing progress in securing our ports because no other measures exist. Additionally, about a quarter of the awarded funding remains unavailable due to delays in using grant funds, challenges with the cost-match and associated waiver process, and challenges that grantees have had complying with postaward requirements. As a result, about $400 million in awarded grant funding remains unavailable to grantees for port security projects.

Grants ensure port security

Waino, Port Director and CEO-Tampa, 2012 (Richard, April 26, “House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications Hearing “Ensuring the Efficiency, Effectiveness and Transparency of Homeland Security Grants (Part II): Stakeholder Perspectives”, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/TPADOCS-.pdf)

Port Security grants are an essential component in assisting ports to meet important mandates under Federal law. These mandates assure a safe/secure environment required of the modern, and ever-changing, intermodal transportation system. These grants also support terminal operators and local first responders in their mission to work in partnership with ports to assure safe and secure port operations. Many systems employed to support efficiently operated secure port operations are expensive to procure and maintain. With this in mind, the trend of reducing port grant allocations is troubling and counterproductive. It should be noted that much of this money also goes to projects that directly, or indirectly, support parallel Federal enforcement issues, such as cruise terminal security and monitoring of high value cargo. Shortening the grant procurement process by requiring ports to spend money at a more rapid pace will only contribute to waste of precious dollars. Many delays in the procurement process are the result of mandates imposed by the program, such as environmental assessments that are time-consuming. While certain restrictions are important, they add to the time it takes to vet and procure important equipment for projects. Each port authority is also subject to purchasing guidelines that are necessary to prevent waste and corruption, but are also time-consuming. There is great debate about cost shares, with many pros and cons. The reality is that many port authorities already spend a significant portion of operating budgets on security-related expenses. In the case of the Tampa Port Authority, security expenses often exceed 30 percent of our annual operating budget. In tight budget times, these cost shares may make the difference in a decision to procure necessary equipment

Removing Cost-share requirements solves

Implementation of the “cost-share waiver” and appropriation of funds solves port security

Burson, executive editor at logistics management, 2010 (Patrick, “U.S. Port Security: A work in progress”, Logistics management, July)

 The AAPA endorses the current federal strategies and supports even stronger protection measures, but not without some caveats and suggestions. "The Port Security Grant program (PSGP) continues to be very valuable and serves as a partner with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to harden security at U.S. ports and to protect our homeland," says AAPA president and CEO Curt Nagle. "But the cost must be shared." The PSGP funds are primarily intended to assist ports in enhancing maritime domain awareness, enhancing risk management capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive devices as well as training and Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) implementation. According to the AAPA, this can best be achieved with what it calls "Cost-share Waiver," as ports do not have the money to contribute more than they are spending right now. Presently, says the AAPA, a 25 percent cost-share for public agencies is "a significant economic disincentive" to make security enhancements and implement regional maritime security plans. In these tight economic times, the cost-share is an even greater problem as ports are cutting back in all areas to address economic shortfalls, authorities note. The Port Security Grant program is one of the few DHS grant programs that requires a cost-share. Transit grants and state homeland security grants, for example, are exempt from cost-share requirements. At the same time, say port authorities, funding is key. They advocate a plan that will continue to appropriate $400 million for the program as authorized in the SAFE Port Act. "All ports should be eligible for these funds to avoid a soft underbelly that leaves this country vulnerable to terrorist threats," says Nagle. "Grant funding should be better tied to port area strategic plans and funding should be made available for resiliency and business continuity projects." Part of this, of course, involves a quicker distribution of funds, too. Currently, there is a significant time delay between when DHS announces the awards and when FEMA finally completes all reviews and gives grantees authority to begin these security improvements. According to the ports, DHS should work to streamline their processes and get funding out more quickly.

Removing the cost-share is critical to implementing security infrastructure

Traister, March 6, 2012,(Rob, manager of communications for the Security Industry Association, “SIA and AAPA Urge DHS to Reconsider Port Allocations”, http://www.siaonline.org/content.aspx?id=9644)

ALEXANDRIA, VA — Today the Security Industry Association (SIA), along with the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), sent a letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano. In the letter, the organizations urge the secretary to reconsider grant allocations assigned to the Fiscal Year 2012 Port Security Grant Program, or to offer waivers on cost share agreements of previously awarded grants. The letter was sent in response to the DHS grant guidance issued on February 17, 2012, wherein DHS slashed the Port Security Grant Program by 59 percent. “Every agency has to do more with less; we understand that,” said Marcus Dunn, Director of Government Relations at (SIA). “However, what is difficult to understand is the allocation made by DHS.” SIA, along with AAPA called on DHS to waive cost sharing requirements of previously-issued grants, which would free up dollars currently being held hostage by antiquated matching grant stipulations. Many ports have applied for -- and have been granted -- funding for critical security components. Unfortunately, those grants have been tied to matching grants. Given the state of the economy, some ports are unable to meet the matching amount, leaving those dollars unclaimed and leaving critical security projects unfinished. “If the matching amounts were waived, we would really be looking at a budget-neutral situation,” said Dunn. “Many of these projects are scalable and ready to be implemented now.” In the letter, SIA and the AAPA call on the DHS to collaborate in finding a solution.

Removing Cost-share requirements solves

Removing Cost-share waiver requirements solve – ports can access over 800 million dollars of funding

Rausnitz 11(Zach, associate editor for the Government and Enterprise IT groups at FierceMarkets, Dec 21, 2011,“GAO highlights flaws in the Port Security Grant Program” http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/gao-highlights-flaws-port-security-grant-program/2011-12-21)

Additionally, the report criticizes FEMA because grantees have only drawn down 23.6 percent of the $1.7 billion awarded between 2006 and 2010. On top of that, 24.3 percent of funds awarded in that time remain unavailable. That's either because federal agencies must comply with postaward budgetary and environmental requirements or because money has been awarded to a port but not yet used for specific projects. GAO attributes the unused funds largely to cost-share requirements. Because applicants knew about delays in fund distribution, it wa s difficult to preserve their cost-share obligation in their budgets while they waited to receive grant funds. Some hesitated to invest their own money in new security projects that were not mandatory. Others could not afford the cost-share requirement because of the recession. As a result, a greater portion of money awarded in cost-share years remains unused compared to non-cost-share years--even though cost-share years preceded non-cost-share years. The requirement was waived for fiscal 2010 and 2011 under the Recovery Act. Applicants can still request a waiver for the cost-share requirement if money from previous grant cycles remains unused. But getting one requires undergoing a process of 22 separate steps, and the report says that's exacerbated the problem because it is time-consuming and confusing. FEMA records show that cost-share waivers reviewed since December 2009 took DHS on average 126 days to approve.

It’s empirically proven cost share waivers prevent ports from getting grant funds – removing them solves

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

Fiduciary agents in 8 of 11 port areas in our review reported a lessened demand for grant funds in grant years where there was a cost- share requirement, particularly for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Fiduciary agents cited a variety of challenges with the cost-share requirement, including: (1) applicants were aware of long delays in the distribution of grant funds and faced difficulty preserving the cost-share obligation in their entity's budget while pending receipt of awarded grant funds, (2) facility owners who were compliant with security requirements under MTSA were hesitant to invest their own money for additional security projects beyond the requirements, and (3) applicants were unable to afford the cost-share requirement due to the economic downturn. For example, one fiduciary agent reported that while she generally supports a cost-share requirement because it ensures stakeholder buy-in, the cost-share requirement has been challenging due to the poor economic environment. As a result of the cost-share, this fiduciary agent reported conducting three distinct rounds of project solicitations in the fiscal year 2008 grant round in order to generate enough demand to spend the port area's entire allocation. We reported in October 2010 that a cost-share requirement is a key factor for effective federal grants because it ensures that federal grants supplement--rather than substitute for--stakeholder spending. We further reported that a cost-share requirement is reasonable given that grant benefits can be highly localized.[Footnote 39] As a result of the inconsistent cost-share requirement, several fiduciary agents told us that applicants were more likely to request funding under the grant rounds with the most lenient cost-share requirement or delay project submission while waiting to learn whether or not the next round of grants would include the cost-share requirement. This uncertainty about the cost-share requirement created a disincentive for grant applicants to request funding during cost- share years. For example, the fiduciary agent in one port area told us that the port area received project proposals totaling twice the port area's total allocation for fiscal year 2011. Thus, projects had to be denied for fiscal year 2011 funding during the field-level review, even though more than $9 million in fiscal year 2008 and 2009 grant money remained unused. As shown in table 8 below, a greater portion of money from cost-share years remains unused as compared to money from non-cost-share years, even though cost-share grant years preceded the non-cost-share grant year. For example, about 22 percent of grant funding awarded to Group 1 port areas during cost-share years remains unused, as compared to less than 4 percent during fiscal year 2010, when the cost-share requirement was waived.[Footnote 40]

Removing Cost-share requirements solves

**Cost-share waiver applications take a long time – undercuts solvency**

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

Fiduciary agents reported that the lengthy cost-share waiver process-- used by applicants seeking an exemption from the required cost-share-- further exacerbated the impact of the cost-share requirement under the PSGP. Grant applicants unable to meet the cost-share requirement are eligible to apply for a waiver. The waiver approval process requires 22 steps--which include approval by leadership within FEMA's GPD, approval by FEMA's Administrator, and finally, approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.[Footnote 41] According to statute, the Secretary can grant a waiver of the cost-share requirement if she determines that a proposed project is meritorious but cannot be undertaken without additional federal support.[Footnote 42] However, 5 of the 11 fiduciary agents we interviewed told us that they had concerns with the cost-waiver request process--including with the length of time required for a decision. For example, one fiduciary agent--who oversaw a cost-waiver application that took about 7 months to be approved--told us that the cost-waiver request process was time- consuming and confusing. According to FEMA officials, an unknown portion of this 7-month approval process was spent ensuring that the fiduciary agent had submitted all of the required documentation and thus, the actual approval time once the request was finalized was less than 7 months.

**Squo Cost-share requirements fail**

Squo changes to PSGP don’t solve – slow implementation of grants undercuts solvency

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

FEMA is developing performance measures to assess its administration of the PSGP but it has not implemented measures to assess PSGP grant effectiveness. Although FEMA has taken initial steps to develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its grant programs, it does not have a plan and related milestones for implementing measures specifically for the PSGP. Without such a plan, it may be difficult for FEMA to effectively manage the process of implementing measures to assess whether the PSGP is achieving its stated purpose of strengthening critical maritime infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks.

**Current grants leave ports unable to update security measures**

AAPA, March 6/2012 (American Association of Port Authorities is a trade association that represents over 150 port authority organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere, Letter to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, <http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/Ports%20Letter%20Final.pdf>)

Even though Congress reduced the budget for preparedness grants by 40 percent, we are concerned with the allocation decisions made by the department. The recently-announced cuts result in a 59 percent reduction in funding for the Port Security Grant Program and are 75 percent less than authorized by Congress in the SAFE Port Act. This allocation will not come close to meeting local needs. It will result in continued struggles to bring port security into the 21 st century and hamper meeting government mandates, such as the Transportation Worker Identity Card. While we understand that Congress initiated this cut because of what it saw as a backlog of unspent funds, we believe such a drastic reduction of funds will have negative consequences on port security. In addition, we believe that one of the best ways to utilize existing funding is to categorically waive all cost-share requirements for grants that have already been awarded. Requiring short, individual waivers diverts the efforts of those involved from the goal of getting these projects done quickly. Grantees often put projects on hold until they receive a waiver.

Squo port security fails

Current grants can’t meet security needs

Bioterrorism Week 2012 (September 12, “Terrorism; 10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports”, proquest)

The comprehensive Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, and the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 changed the way ports handle cargo and passenger movements. To implement the security measures in this legislation, America's ports and their terminal operators have invested billions of dollars into security personnel and training, enhancements to perimeter security, access control and credentialing systems, interoperable communications technology, and waterside security such as patrol boats, vessel tracking and underwater threat detection systems. While federal Port Security Grant Program funds have helped pay for the sweeping security overhaul at U.S. ports, the grants oftentimes require ports to pay a 25 percent "cost-share," pay 100 percent of their security program operations, management and policing personnel expenses (representing the highest ongoing cost for security at most ports), and limit infrastructure construction costs to 10 percent of the grant total. Furthermore, in addition to the huge funding cuts proposed for fiscal 2012 and beyond, the lumping of port grant funds with other State and Local Program grants--such those for first responders, urban areas and transit systems--will likely result in even less funding for port security. Although insufficient security grant funding is a chief concern among ports, there is also a significant concern about the time delay between when DHS announces grant awards and when it completes all reviews and gives grantees authority to begin their security improvements. Consequently, AAPA has urged DHS to streamline their processes and get funding out more quickly.

Budget cuts prevent ports from upgrading and maintaining port technology

Port Strategy 2011 (September 01, “Can US port security stand up to the cuts?”, http://www.portstrategy.com/news101/americas/can-us-port-security-stand-up-to-the-cuts)

Ten years on from 9/11, US ports are being asked to enhance their security further, but it’s a troubling issue in the recent environment of budgetary cuts. The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) points out that in the decade since the World Trade Centre attack there have been substantial security gains. However, among the materials Navy SEALS found in Osama Bin Laden's Pakistan hideout were plans showing the maritime industry is still a key Al-Qaida target. Kurt Nagle, AAPA president and CEO said, “Clearly, America’s ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate.” Mr Nagle added, “There’s no question that more investment in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed.” Given ongoing threats such as these, the seaport industry is asking US congress and administration make port security a top funding priority in current and future appropriations rather than considering it for funding cuts. Mr Nagle said, “Regrettably, the more than 50% funding level cut recommended for FEMA’s State and Local Program grants, which includes the Port Security Grant Program, could impact the current security capabilities of many US ports as well as hamper their ability to carry out their five-year port protection plans.

Current port security is incompetent.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Opium/Heroin Market” PDF, 2011

On the basis of production, seizure and consumption data, an estimated 460-480 mt of heroin were trafficked

(including seizures) worldwide in 2009. Of this, 375 mt reached the consumers. Opiate trafficking from production countries to consumer markets requires a global network of routes as well as facilitation by domestic and international criminal groups. In particular, traffickers’ use of maritime transportation and seaports has been identified as a key emerging threat – one which is largely overlooked by international law enforcement. In 2009, more than 420 million containers were shipped worldwide, yet only 2% of these were inspected. Although the trafficking routes are constantly changing, the global movement of heroin from producers to international consumers follows well-established paths. Heroin from Myanmar is mainly trafficked to China and Mexican heroin is mainly trafficked to the United States of America, while Afghan heroin is trafficked to every region of the world, except South and Central America. Opiates flow from Afghanistan through Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Central Asia before moving to the main consumer markets in West and Central Europe, East Europe, and East and South-East Asia.

Squo port security fails

Present-day port security fails

Jeffrey, Terence P. September 2009 Human Events;9/7/2009, Vol. 65 Issue 31, p9

In fiscal 2008, U.S. Border Patrol officers working at checkpoints that are typically set up along roads and highways 25 to 100 miles North of the U.S.-Mexico border stopped three people “who were identified as persons linked to terrorism,” according to information provided by the Border Patrol to the Government Accountability Office. “In addition,” says a new GAO report, “the Border Patrol reported that in fiscal year 2008, checkpoints encountered 530 aliens from special-interest countries, which are countries the Department of State has determined to represent a potential terrorist threat to the United States. “According to the Department of Homeland Security, which oversees the Border Patrol, the vast majority of illegal aliens and contraband attempting to move across our border through official ports of entry will succeed. In other words, our border security fails most of the time – not out in remote desert areas, but at official ports of entry where people and vehicles can be stopped and screened.”At the ports of entry,” reports GAO, “CBP (Customs and Border Patrol) has both increased training for agents and enhanced technology. However, the DHS Annual Performance Report for fiscal years 2008-2010 sets a goal for detecting and apprehending about 30% of major illegal activity at ports of entry in 2009, indicating that 70% of criminals and contraband may pass through the ports and continue on interstates and major roads into the interior of the United States.”Homeland Security’s in-house performance review paints a devastating picture of an agency failing dismally in carrying out a vital national security function of the federal government. On January 15, the outgoing Bush Administration published the “Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Years 2008-2010.” The report, which quantifies the departments recent past performance and sets future goals, was updated by the Obama Administration on May 7. The report says Homeland Security’s No. 1 goal is: “Protect our nation from dangerous people.” One objective for achieving this goal is: “Strengthen screening of travelers and workers.” It defines this as “reducing the risk that potential terrorists or others who pose a threat will exploit travel and employment opportunities to harm our nation.”On page 36, the report lists inspections at ports of entry as one of the programs designed to achieve this objective and says DHS’s goal for this program is improve “the targeting, screening, and apprehension of high-risk international cargo and travelers to prevent terrorist attacks, while providing processes to facilitate the flow of safe and legitimate trade and travel. “One “measure” of whether DHS is achieving this goal, the DHS report says, is “land border apprehension rates for major violations. “In fiscal year 2008, says the DHS report, the department set a goal of apprehending 35% of the major violations at border ports of entry. The report estimates that DHS actually apprehended only 28.9%. Approximately 71.1 % of “major violations” got through. Had DHS met its goal, 65% of major violations would have gotten through. In fiscal 2009, DHS’s goal is to apprehend only 28% of the major violations at border ports entry. For fiscal 2010, which begins next month, DHS has set a goal of apprehending 29% of the major violations. That means that next year – if DHS actually achieves its goal – 71% of major violators presenting themselves at U.S. border ports will be allowed to enter the United States undetected. Before President Obama closes the Guantanamo Bay prison where we keep the terrorists we do capture, perhaps he should secure the ports of entry at our border where a terrorist has about a 70% chance of escaping capture.

Drug-traffickers are more advanced and our current system is incompetent.

Anonymous, author for The Economist, 2008

Anonymous, “The Americas: Waving, not drowning; Drug trafficking” , http://www.economist.com/node/11294435 , May 1st 2008

THE history of the cocaine trade between Andean countries and the United States over the past 30 years shows that no sooner have police and customs officials become adept at spotting one smuggling method than the drug-traffickers come up with a new one. Light planes and commercial flights gave way to shipping containers. Where once cocaine was hidden in shipments of fresh vegetables and flowers, more recently it has been found in specially moulded furniture and concrete fencing posts. But the latest method is especially cunning: home-made submarines. These first appeared a decade ago, but were considered by officials to be an oddity. Now it seems the traffickers have perfected the design and manufacture of semi-submersible craft (although they look like submarines, they don't fully submerge). In 2006, American officials say they detected only three; now they are spotting an average of ten a month. Of those, only one in ten is intercepted. Many sail up the Pacific coast, often far out to sea. With enough cargo space to carry two to five tonnes of cocaine, they also carry large fuel tanks, giving them a range of 2,000 miles (3,200km). They are typically made of fibreglass, powered by a 300/350hp diesel engine and manned by a crew of four. They normally unload their cargo onto fast power boats for the final leg to shore. None has been sighted unloading at ports or beaches.

Squo port security fails

Current port security funding is gutting security measures

Maritime Reporter February 09, 2006 **(Naval website that reports and posts news) “Some Argue for Port Security Enhancements”** <<http://www.marinelink.com/news/article/some-argue-for-port-security-enhancements/309142.aspx>>

According to the Washington Times, the U.S. port industry is facing unprecedented challenges that should concern American consumers, as well as the president and Congress. If unaddressed, these challenges could weaken the nation's supply chain and economic vitality. With international trade growing, ports are struggling to keep up with demands on their facilities. With today's cargo volume level expected to at least double by 2020, adequate port infrastructure is a growing concern. Federal law mandating port security enhancements set up a program in 2002 to help protect port facilities from terrorist attack. This program has been dramatically under-funded, leaving ports no choice but to pay the lopsided balance themselves to ensure that their facilities are safe and secure -- not only for the nearly 5 million Americans who earn their livelihoods in the maritime industry, but also for the urban communities near commercial seaports and for the well-being of the nation's economy, in which ports and goods movement play a critical role. The problem is, this has required ports to divert limited funds away from expanding port infrastructure in order to pay for hardening their facilities against terrorism. While ports must remain safe and secure in the face of terrorist threats, they also must remain accessible. The federal government collects a fee on imports and domestic cargo to maintain these navigation channels, but the government spends far less on maintaining those channels than it collects each year. As a result, federal navigation channels at ports are not being adequately maintained, while the trust fund has an approximately $3 billion surplus that continues to grow annually. The U.S. public port industry has urged the federal government to spend at least $400 million per year on port facility security.

Government funding isn’t enough to sustain port security

United States Accounting Office, 2002.

Hecker, JayEtta Z. "Container Security." *Container Security*. United States General Accounting Office, 18 Nov. 2002. Web. 24 June 2012. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03297t.pdf>.

Many of the planned security improvements at seaports will require costly outlays for infrastructure, technology, and personnel. Even before September 11th, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports estimated that the costs for upgrading security infrastructure at U.S. ports will range from $10 million to $50 million per port. Officials at the Port of New York and New Jersey estimate their capital costs for bringing the port’s security into compliance with the port’s vulnerability assessment at $73 million. The federal government has already stepped in with additional funding for port security, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available.

Port Security increases port efficiency

Security bolsters port efficiency

Bichou, port consultant and is a co-founder of PORTeC, 2011 (Khalid, march, “Assessingthe impact of procedural security on container port efficiency”, Maritime Economics & Logistics, proquest)

On the other hand, proponents of the new security regime argue that its implementation is not only necessary but can also be commercially rewarding. The main argument put forward is that measures such as the CSI and the 24-hour rule fundamentally shift the focus from inspection to prevention, the benefit of which offsets and ultimately outweighs the costs of implementation. Detailed data recording, electronic reporting and other procedural requirements brought about by the new port security regulations would allow for pre-screening and deliberate targeting of suspect containers, which would be more cost-effective and less time-consuming than conventional random physical inspections. Furthermore, compliant participants would benefit from access certification and fast-lane treatment as well as reduced insurance costs and risk exposure. Other advantages that go beyond the intended security benefits include the support of legitimate commerce, reduced risk of cargo theft and pilferage, stronger protection against illegal drugs and human trafficking, and improved lead-time predictability and supply chain visibility.

Security increases port efficency

Bichou, port consultant and is a co-founder of PORTeC, 2011 (Khalid, march, “Assessingthe impact of procedural security on container port efficiency”, Maritime Economics & Logistics, proquest)

The results of the multi-year TFP analysis show that on a year-by-year basis, container terminals in the sample have on average experienced a flat efficiency trend in their pure technical efficiency (PEC) against a steady improvement in scale efficiency (SEC) from year to year until the period 2007-2008. The analysis of the relationship between the multi-year MPI and its sub-categories also shows that productivity gains achieved from the scale efficiency component have a stronger impact on the improvement of the overall efficiency of container terminals, which suggests that the focus from the part of terminal operators during the study period was on achieving operational efficiency through terminal expansion rather than through the rationalisation of input use. The analysis of TFP change before (2002-2004) and after (2005-2008) the introduction of procedural security confirms that the TFP change has been driven mainly by adjustments in scale production but also indicates that container terminals seem to have benefited positively from technological investment in security following the introduction of the new security regulations. The analysis of regulatory-specific MPI has shown that productivity change varies greatly by type of security regulation and across terminal groups, but there is evidence of generalised productivity gains from targeted inspection prompted by cargo pre-screening and reporting and from the technological progress prompted by the investments in new security technology. On the one hand, the introduction of targeted inspection through regulations such as the CSI has proven to be more procedurally effective than random physical inspections. On the other hand, technology-driven regulations like the 24-hour rules seem to have had a positive impact on terminal efficiency. In addition to the benefits of compliance and fast-lane treatment, the use of new technologies, in order to comply with security regulations, has proven to be less time-consuming for data recording, cargo and manifest reporting, and related processing procedures. The results also show that productivity change related to the ISPS Code is difficult to assess given the differences in interpretation and execution of the Code across world ports and terminals. This reopens the debate as to whether the focus of port security should diverge from the ISPS Code to more specific and targeted security measures. This article provides a first empirical account of the ex-post impact of procedural security on container port efficiency. The results of this study may serve both operational and policy decision making on improving and implementing current security regulations but can also be used to investigate the mechanisms and implications of future security requirements such as the 100 per cent container scanning under the US SAFE port act and Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). In a similar vein, the framework and methods developed in this article could also serve as a roadmap to assess and manage the impacts of procedural security on other port types (for example, oil and gas terminals, bulk and break bulk ports) and transport infrastructure systems (airports, border-crossings, and so on).

\*\*\*\*Answers to Off case\*\*\*\*

AT: States CP

States can’t solve - 3 reasons

AAPA, March 7/2012 (American Association of Port Authorities is a trade association that represents over 150 port authority organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere, “Testimony of Captain John M. Holmes”, http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf)

Moving the funding to the states is also a big concern for AAPA. Port security is focused on protecting international borders. This is a federal responsibility, not a state responsibility. Many States don’t have the personnel or expertise to evaluate maritime risks or determine how ports should be prioritized against other homeland security priorities in the state. The risk evaluations for ports are made at the federal level by the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies. We are also concerned that this would increase the complexity in grant management and slow a process that is already recognized as cumbersome. Not only does a second or potentially third pass-through layer (the State or municipal government, respectively) mandate its own sets of compliance requirements on top of Code of Federal Regulations and Office of Management and Budget Circulars, it also creates unnecessary cogs in the administration that slows down our ability to spend, execute, and deliver. Moving funds to the states would compromise program efficiency and effectiveness. If, however, a decision is made to consolidate the program and move it to the states, AAPA strongly urges your Committee to allocate a set amount of funding for the program to ensure that funding for port security is not diluted further.

**Coast-Guard oversight is necessary to ensure funding for ports- states fail**

Waino, Port Director and CEO-Tampa, 2012 (Richard, April 26, “House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications Hearing “Ensuring the Efficiency, Effectiveness and Transparency of Homeland Security Grants (Part II): Stakeholder Perspectives”, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/TPADOCS-.pdf)

The plan to consolidate the Port Security Grant Program into one National Preparedness Grant Program ultimately administered by each individual state is extremely counterproductive. History has proven that interaction and oversight by the local U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port assured that funds were being distributed in a manner that best benefitted each geographic area. The U.S. Coast Guard has the training, expertise and systems in place to assess risk, threat and vulnerability; and apply this information to grant submissions. Through no fault of their own, most states do not possess this capability. Further, as state homeland grant funding diminishes, states might be tempted to stretch the intent of the port security grants to meet needs that may not be the most productive use of funds targeting the safety and security of the maritime transportation system.

**States fail to allocate funds properly**

AAPA, Feb 12, 2012 (American Association of Port Authorities is a trade association that represents over 150 port authority organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere, “iscal 2013 Administration Budget Proposal Supports Aspects Of Seaports Agenda”, <http://www.aapa-ports.org/Press/PRdetail.cfm?mnitemnumber=&tnitemnumber=&itemnumber=18400&unitemnumber=&pf=1&snitemnumber>=)

With regard to seaport security, Mr. Nagle said that the AAPA is both supportive and appreciative of the portion of the administration’s proposed budget that calls for $2.9 billion—more than double last year’s funding level—for FEMA State and Local Programs, which houses the Port Security Grant Program. The budget request, however, also bundles all funds into one pot and gives the Homeland Security secretary the authority to determine funding levels. The association has opposed similar proposals in the past because first responder programs are substantially different than port security programs and because states may not adequately allocate funds for port security if the programs are combined at the state level. AAPA continues to advocate for a separate port security funding program at a $400 million annual level to aid ports in beefing up their security infrastructure, technology and personnel programs, and to ensure that terrorist threats don’t become terrorist realities.

AT: Topicality

**The PSGP is transportation infrastructure**

DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency, February 27, 2012,

(“FY2012 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)” http://www.patriot3.com/2012/02/27/port-security-grant-program-psgp/)

The PSGP is one of the DHS’s FY 2012 grant programs which directly support transportation infrastructure security activities.

The Port Security Grant Program is transportation infrastructure

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Feb 23/2012

 (“Grant Guidance Outreach” <http://www.vamaritime.com/resource/resmgr/Files/FY12_PSGP_Outreach_Briefing.pdf>)

The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) is one of three funded grant programs within the Transportation Infrastructure Security Branch (TISB) for FY 2012

Port security is transportation infrastructure

Bioterrorism Week 2012 (September 12, “Terrorism; 10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports”, proquest)

"For centuries, seaports have been a vital part of this nation's transportation infrastructure, and safe, secure seaport facilities are critical to protecting our borders and moving goods," said Kurt Nagle, American Association of Port Authorities' president and CEO. "Regrettably, the more than 50 percent funding level cut recommended for FEMA's State and Local Program grants, which includes the Port Security Grant Program, could impact the current security capabilities of many U.S. ports as well as hamper their ability to carry out their five-year port protection plans."

Obama likes the plan

Obama is for the plan -millions of people’s lives are endangered and we need to improve our port security with the right programs

Obama 2012. Obama, Barack. "Presidential Proclamation -- National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month, 2012." The White House. USA.gov, 30 Dec. 2011. Web. 22 June 2012. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/30/presidential-proclamation-national-slavery-and-human-trafficking-prevent>.

Nearly a century and a half ago, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation -- a document that reaffirmed the noble goals of equality and freedom for all that lie at the heart of what it means to live in America.  In the years since, we have tirelessly pursued the realization and protection of these essential principles.  Yet, despite our successes, thousands of individuals living in the United States and still more abroad suffer in silence under the intolerable yoke of modern slavery.  During National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month, we stand with all those who are held in compelled service; we recognize the people, organizations, and government entities that are working to combat human trafficking; and we recommit to bringing an end to this inexcusable human rights abuse. Humantrafficking endangers the lives of millions of people around the world, and it is a crime that knows no borders.  Trafficking networks operate both domestically and transnationally, and although abuses disproportionally affect women and girls, the victims of this ongoing global tragedy are men, women, and children of all ages.  Around the world, we are monitoring the progress of governments in combating trafficking while supporting programs aimed at its eradication.  From forced labor and debt bondage to forced commercial sexual exploitation and involuntary domestic servitude, human trafficking leaves no country untouched.  With this knowledge, we rededicate ourselves to forging robust international partnerships that strengthen global anti-trafficking efforts, and to confronting traffickers here at home.My Administration continues to implement our comprehensive strategy to combat human trafficking in America.  By coordinating our response across Federal agencies, we are working to protect victims of human trafficking with effective services and support, prosecute traffickers through consistent enforcement, and prevent human rights abuses by furthering public awareness and addressing the root causes of modern slavery.  The steadfast defense of human rights is an essential part of our national identity, and as long as individuals suffer the violence of slavery and human trafficking, we must continue the fight.With the start of each year, we commemorate the anniversaries of the Emancipation Proclamation, which became effective on January 1, 1863, and the 13th Amendment to abolish slavery, which was signed by President Abraham Lincoln and submitted to the States for ratification on February 1, 1865. These documents stand as testaments to the gains we have made in pursuit of freedom and justice for all, and they remind us of the work that remains to be done.  This month, I urge all Americans to educate themselves about all forms of modern slavery and the signs and consequences of human trafficking.  Together, and in cooperation with our partners around the world, we can work to end this terrible injustice and protect the rights to life and liberty entrusted to us by our forebears and owed to our children.NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim January 2012 as National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month, culminating in the annual celebration of National Freedom Day on February 1.  I call upon the people of the United States to recognize the vital role we can play in ending modern slavery and to observe this month with appropriate programs and activities.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirtieth day of December, in the year of our Lord two thousand eleven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-sixth.