## Desiring Transportation 1NC

#### A. Transportation infrastructure striates space by channeling mobility through government-approved conduits of desire. This excludes minorities from the planning process and allows for the segregation of entire communities in the name of efficiency.

Cresswell 2012 (Tim, Department of Geography Royal Holloway, University of London, “Constellations of Mobility,” www.dtesis.univr.it/documenti/Avviso/all/all181066.pdf.)

Mobility is channelled. It moves along routes and conduits often provided by conduits in space. It does not happen evenly over a continuous space like spilt water flowing over a table top. In Deleuze and Guatarri’s account of nomadology they point out that it is not simply a case of free, mobile nomads challenging the ‘royal science” of fixed division and classification. Mobility itself is ‘channeled’ into acceptable conduits. Smooth space (the space of the nomad) is a field without conduits or channels The State needs to subordinate hydraulic force to conduits, pipes, embankments, which prevent turbulence, which constrain movement to go from one point to another, and space itself to be striated and measured, which makes the fluid depend on the solid, and flows proceed by parallel, laminar layers. The hydraulic model of nomad science and the War Machine, on the other hand, consists in being distributed by turbulence across a smooth space, in producing a movement that holds space and simultaneously affects all of its points, instead of being held by space in a local movement from one specified point to another. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 362). Producing order and predictablility is not simply a matter of fixing in space but of channeling motion – of producing correct mobilities through the designation of routes. Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin have developed the notion of a “tunneling effect” in the contemporary urban landscape (Graham and Marvin, 2001). They show how the time-space of cities is warped by the routing of infrastructural elements ranging from roads to high-speed computer links. Valued areas of the metropolis are targeted so that they are drawn into “intense interaction with each other” while other areas are effectively disconnected from these routes (Graham and Marvin, 2001, 201). Think of highways which pass though the landscape but only let you get off at major hubs. Or think of high speed train lines that pass from airport to city centre while by-passing the inner-city in between. These ‘tunnels’ facilitate speed for some while ensuring the slowness of those who are by-passed. Routes provide connectivity which in turn transforms topographical space into topological and, indeed, dromological space: “Spacetime no longer corresponds to Euclidean space. Distance is no longer the relevant variable in assessing accessibility. Connectivity (being in relation to) is added to, or even imposed upon, contiguity (being next to)” (Offner, quoted in Graham and Marvin, 2001, 200). Think of the development of a commuter rail network in Los Angeles. Built at huge expense to facilitate speedy transit from suburb to city centre it effectively by-passed the predominantly black and Hispanic areas of the city. While train riders were disproportionately white, bus riders were overwhelmingly black, Hispanic and female. A radical social movement, the Bus Riders Union, took the Metropolitan Transit Association (MTA) to court in order to halt the use of public money to fund the train system at the expense of the bus system. In court the MTA made the claim that train lines passed through many minority areas of the city such as Watts. In response, the Bus Riders Union argued that the population of areas the train lines passed through was not the relevant fact. The arrival of the train line had been matched by the removal of bus services. While the bus services had stopped frequently along the corridor (serving a 95% minority community) the train hardly stopped at all and thus tended to serve white commuters traveling comparatively long distances. In addition, the BRU pointed out that the Blue Line was built at grade (rather than being underground or elevated), and had resulted in a high number of accidents and deaths in inner-city minority communities. So not only did the rail system produce ‘tunneling effects’ by passing through minority areas it was also logically and economically related to a decrease in convenient bus routes and an increase in rates of death and injuries among inner city residents (Cresswell, 2006).

#### B. The Aff places too much faith in the truth of their advantages. The 1AC’s façade of clarity causes the Aff to become the new Knights, acting to bring intelligibility to the chaos of the transportation landscape, but this claim to singular knowledge only replicates micro-fascisms and reinforces systems of power and violence.

Deleuze and Guattari 1987 (Gilles and Felix, French writers, philosophers and revolutionaries, Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus, pg. 227-228)

The second danger, Clarity, seems less obvious. Clarity, in effect, concerns the molecular. Once again, everything is involved, even perception, even the semiotic regime, but this time on the second line. Castaneda illustrates, for example, the existence of a molecular perception to which drugs give us access (but so many things can be drugs): we attain a visual and sonorous microperception revealing spaces and voids, like holes in the molar structure. That is precisely what clarity is: the distinctions that appear in what used to seem full, the holes in what used to be compact: and conversely, where just before we saw end points of clear cut segments, now there are indistinct fringes, encroachments, overlappings, migrations, acts of segmentation that no longer coincide with the rigid segmentarity. Everything now appears supple, with holes in fullness, nebulas in forms, and flutter in lines. Everything has the clarity of the microscope. We think we have understood everything, and draw conclusions. We are the new knights; we even have a mission. A microphysics of the migrant has replaced the macrogeometry of the sedentary. But this suppleness and clarity do not only present dangers, they are themselves a danger. First, supple segmentarity runs the risk of reproducing in miniature the affections, the affectations, of the rigid: the family is replaced by a community, conjugality by a regime of exchange and migration; worse, micro-Oedipuses crop up, microfascisms lay down the law, the mother feels obliged to titillate her child, the father becomes a mommy. A dark light that falls from no star and emanates such sadness: this shifting segmentarity derives directly from the most rigid, for which it is indirect compensation. The more molar the aggregates become, the more molecular become their elements and the relations between their elements: molecular man for molar humanity. One deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to knot and annul the mass movements and movements of deterritorialization, to invent all kinds of marginal reterritorializations even worse than the others. But above all, supple segmentarity brings dangers of its own that do not merely reproduce in small scale the dangers of molar segmentarity, which do not derive from them or compensate for them. As we have seen, microfascisms have a specificity of their own that can crystallize into a macrofascism, but may also float along the supple line on their own account and suffuse every little cell. A multitude of black holes may very well not become centralized, and acts instead as viruses adapting to the most varied situations, sinking voids in molecular perceptions and semiotics. Interactions without resonance. Instead of the great paranoid fear, we are trapped in a thousand little mono-manias, self-evident truths, and clarities that gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed judge, dispenser of justice, policeman, neighborhood SS man. We have overcome fear, we have sailed from the shores of security, only to enter a system that is no less concentricized, no less organized: the system of petty insecurities that leads everyone to their own black hole in which to turn dangerous, possessing a clarity on their situation, role, and mission even more disturbing than the certitudes of the first line.

#### C. American military doctrine has radically shifted; terror is the new condition for war and our enemies are symbolic and immaterial. Media and institutions exist to maintain the illusion of a non-existent hegemony to justify endless wars. The Affirmative’s politics enable the state apparatus to conduct Total War that annihilates entire civilizations.

Buchanan 6 (Ian, Australian cultural theorist based at Cardiff University in the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, “Deleuze and the Contemporary World: Treaties on Militarism” Deleuze Connections, Edinburgh University Press. 30-35)

For Wallerstein (2003), the Vietnam War represented a rejection by the third-world of the 'Yalta accord', the less than gentlemanly agreement between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, to divide the planet into spheres of interest (the USA grabbing two-thirds and the USSR a third). He treats America's willingness to invest all its military strength in the struggle and more or less bankrupt itself in the process as testament to the felt geopolitical significance of the conflict. And yet, as he puts it, it was still defeated. While I accept the first part of his thesis, I disagree with his conclusion because I think the very premise on which it rests lost its validity in the course of the war. A pragmatically conceived intervention designed to stop the spread of revolutionary communism became the US military's own equivalent of a 'cultural revolution' as it underwent a profound rethinking of its mode of acting in the world.18 I do not mean to claim as military revisionists have done that Vietnam was actually a victory for the USA (the right wing rhetoric on this, so resonant of the early days of the Nazi party, is that the government and the people back home betrayed the soldiers on the front line and didn't allow them to win).19 With Baudrillard, I want to argue that there occurred a paradigm shift during the course of that protracted and, bitter struggle which resulted in the concepts of victory and defeat losing their meaning. Why did this American defeat (the largest reversal in the history of the USA) have no internal repercussions in America? If it had really signified the failure of the planetary strategy of the United States, it would necessarily have completely disrupted its internal balance and the American political system. Nothing of the sort occurred. Something else, then, took place. (Baudrillard 1994: 36) Baudrillard's answer to this question is that war ceased to be real; it ceased to be determined in terms of winning and losing and became instead 'simulation', a pure spectacle no less terrifying or deadly for its lack of reality. The consequences of this metaphysical adjustment are shocking and go a long way towards explaining the rise of terrorism in recent years. As Andrew Bacevich writes, it is not only the superpowers like the US that have relinquished the concept of victory. It is as though war itself has jettisoned it as so much extra baggage. The typical armed conflict today no longer pits like against like - field army v. field army or battle fleet v. battle fleet - and there usually is no longer even the theoretical prospect of a decisive outcome. In asymmetric conflicts, combatants employ violence indirectly. The aim is not to defeat but to intimidate and terrorise, with women a favoured target and sexual assault often the weapon of choice. (Bacevich 2005: 26) The B52 pilot unloading bombs on an unseen enemy below knows just as well as the suicide bomber in Iraq that his actions will not lead directly to a decisive change, that in a sense the gesture is futile; but, he also knows, as does the suicide bomber, that his actions will help create an atmosphere of fear that, it is hoped, will one day lead to change. Deprived of teleology, war thrives in an eternal present. Terror is not merely the weapon of the weak, it is the new condition of war, and no power can claim exception status. For Clausewitz and his spiritual tutor Machiavelli the only rational reason to wage war is to win where winning means achieving a predetermined and clearly prescribed goal. Britain's colonial wars are an obvious case in point. The self- serving claim that Britain acquired its empire in a fit of absence,owes its sense to the fact that it never set out to gain its eventually quite consid- erable empire (it was at least geographically true, albeit .not historically true, that the sun never set on the British Empire, encompassing as it did territories in virtually every region of the world) all at once, as Hitler and Hirohito were later to do, but built it one territory at a time over a two-century-long period. Through a sequence of limited wars it was able to deploy its limited means to obtain colossal riches. World War I essentially started out in the same way. Germany's goal was to secure a European empire before it was too late, but barbed wire, heavy artillery and the machine-gun put paid to that ambition and instead of a quick war returning a specific prize there irrupted ;a global conflagration that was to consume the wealth and youth of Europe. As Wallerstein argues, the true victor of World War I wasn't Britain or France, but American industry, and by extension the true loser wasn't Germany and its allies but Europe itself. Eric Hobsbawm has defined the twentieth century as the age when wars of limited means and limited aims gave way to wars of limited means and *unlimited* aims (Hobsbawm 1994: 29-30). The twenty-first century appears to be the age of wars of unlimited means and no precise aim. This, according to Deleuze and Guattari 'is the point at which Clausewitz's formula is effectively reversed'. When total war - for instance, war which not only places the annihilation of the enemy's army at its centre but its entire population and economy too - becomes the object of the state-appropriated war machine, 'then at this level in the set of all-possible conditions, the object and the aim enter into new relations that can reach the point of contradiction' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 421). In the first instance, the war machine unleashed by the state in pursuit of its object, total war, remains subordinate to the state and 'merely realises the maximal conditions' of its aims. Paradoxically, though, the more successful it is in realising the state's aims, the less controllable by the state it becomes. As the state's aims grow on the back of the success of its war machine, so the restrictions on the war machine's object shrink until - scorpion-like - it effectively subsumes the state, making it just one of its many moving parts. In Vietnam, the state was blamed for the failure of the war machine precisely because it attempted to set limits on its object. Its inability adequately to impose these limits not only cost it the war, but in effect its sovereignty too. Since then the state has been a puppet of a war machine global in scope and ambition. This is the status of militarism today and no-one has described its characteristics more chillingly than Deleuze and Guattari: This worldwide war machine, which in a way 'reissues' from the States, displays two successive figures: first, that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited movement with no other aim than itself; but fascism is only a rough sketch, and the second, postfascist, figure is that of a war machine that takes peace as its object, directly, as the peace of Terror or Survival. The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth. Total war is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 421) It is undoubtedly Chalmers Johnson who has done the most to bring to our attention the specific make-up of what Deleuze and Guattari call here the worldwide war machine (Johnson 2000, 2004). His description of a global 'empire of bases' is consistent with Deleuze. and Guattari's uptake of Paul Virilio's concept of the 'fleet in being'. This is the paradoxical transformation of the striated space of organisation into a new kind of 'reimparted' smooth space 'which outflanks all gridding and invents a neonomadism in the service of a war machine still more disturbing than the States' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 480). Bases do not by themselves secure territory but, as is the case with a battle fleet, their mobility and their firepower mean they can exert an uncontestable claim over territory that amounts to control. This smooth space surrounding the earth is, to put it back into Baudrillard's terms, the space of simulation. The empire of bases is a virtual construct with, real capability. Fittingly enough, it was Jean Baudrillard who first detected that a structural change in post-World War II militarism had taken place. In *Simulacra and Simulation* he argues that the Vietnam War was a demonstration of a new kind of will to war, one that no longer thought in terms of winning or losing, but defined itself instead in terms of perseverance (Baudrillard 1994: 37). It demonstrated to the US's enemies, clients and allies alike, its willingness to continue the fight even when defeat was certain, or had in a sense already been acknowledged (the US strategy of 'Vietnamising' the war which commenced shortly after the Tet offensive in 1968, and become official policy under Nixon, was patently an admission that the war couldn't be won - in the short term it was Johnson's way of putting off admitting defeat until after the election so as to give Hubert Humphrey some chance of victory; in the longer term it was a way of buying time for a diplomatic solution) (Kolko 1994: 321). It was a demonstration of the US's reach, of its ability to inflict destruction even when its troops were withdrawing and peace talks (however futile) were under way. It also demonstrated to the American people that the fight could be continued as the troops were withdrawn, a factor that, as I've already pointed out, would become decisive in reshaping militarism as an incorporeal system. It was also a demonstration to the American domestic population that the country's leaders were willing to continue to sacrifice lives to prove this point.20 The contrary view, that Nixon wanted to end the war sooner but was unable to do so because domestic politics didn't allow it, in no way contradicts this thesis. If anything it confirms it because if true it would mean, as Deleuze and Guattari have said of fascism 'at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions' the American people wanted Vietnam, and, as they add: 'It is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 29). While there can be no doubt Vietnam was an unpopular war that was eventually brought to a halt by popular pressure, it is a sobering thought to remind oneself that it was a war that lasted some ten years. If one takes 1967 as the decisive turning point in popular opinion, the moment when protest against the war became the prevailing view and support for it dwindled into a minority murmur, then, one still has to, take stock of the fact that it took a further six years for US troops to be fully withdrawn.21 The kind of sustained popular pressure that brought the Vietnam War to a close has not yet even begun to build in the US in spite of the fact that the death toll has passed 1,700 (as of August 2005). Wars are spectacles in the traditional sense of being events staged to convey a specific message, but also in the more radical or postmodern sense that spectacle is the final form of war, the form war takes when it takes peace as its object. Hence, the military's facilitation of the media (this backfired to a large degree in Vietnam, but the lessons learned then are put to good use today). Ultimately, though, as Baudrillard rightly argues, the 'media and official news services are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality, of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of the facts' (Baudrillard. 1994: 38). Chillingly, this is no longer an incisive criticism of the state, but its explicit outlook. In a conversation with a 'senior adviser' to President Bush, New York Times Magazine reporter Ron Suskind was told: We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're [i.e., the media] studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. (cited in Danner 2005a: 73) The creation of that reality - or what Tony Blair more pointedly referred to as the 'political context' for action - was, as Mark Danner has conclusively shown, the true purpose behind the spurious charge that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Planning for the Iraq war began as early as 21 November 2001, when Rumsfeld was ordered by Bush to explore military options for removing Saddam Hussein by force. The decision to execute these plans was made in mid-July 2002 - the only issue left to be decided at that point was how to justify it to the public. Not without some hesitation, the WMD card was played - it was a risky move because if the weapons inspectors were able to demonstrate that Iraq had in fact destroyed its WMDs then it would look like the UN process had worked. If Iraq could be made to look non-compliant, secretive and cunning, as was the case, then the failure to find WMDs could be explained away as evidence of preparation for war (Danner 2005a: 70). Ironically, as Hans Blix himself realised, the worst-case scenario for Iraq was not to be found hiding weapons, but the very opposite - 'It occurred to me', Blix wrote, 'that the Iraqis would be in greater difficulty if . . . there truly were no weapons of which they could "yield possession" ' because then they'd have no way of proving compliance (Danner 2005a: 73). By not having any WMDs to give up, they couldn't prove they didn't have any to begin with, nor could they demonstrate their good faith in wanting to get rid of WMDs. From this perspective, North Korea is clearly correct in its surmise that it is better off having WMDs because not only is not, having them no deterrent to invasion, it seems not having them is a positive invitation for invasion because it denies the targeted country the diplomatic 'out' of giving them up and conspicuously demonstrating to a world audience that a political solution is being actively pursued. Far from being a last-ditch effort to save peace and prevent war, the UN weapons inspection gambit was a calculated stratagem to make war possible. The US reluctance to involve the UN had nothing to do with its claimed inefficiencies and everything to do with its likely\*success. What the US could not allow, if it wanted its war plans to proceed, was for the weapons inspection teams to-reveal - in Blix's words - that 'the UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it' (Danner 2005a: 73). Therefore, right from the start the whole process had to be cast as a failure, or more particularly as wasting precious time that might at any moment see those WMDs used against US targets. This then became the basis for the 'preventive war' rhetoric. The justification for war was stage-managed with the consummate skill of a corporate brand manager. The White House chief of staff Andrew Gard even put it that way to the *New York Times,* referring to the build- ing of a case for war as a product roll-out (cited in Danner 2005a: 72). At least since the start of World War II, when the Nazis dressed dead Polish soldiers in German uniforms and displayed their corpses to the world as justification for war, almost all modern wars have resorted to such media-friendly theatrical 'events'. A simulated event is needed to prove that no dissimulation has been involved in justifying the war. Chomsky's analyses of current trends in US imperialism lend further weight to this thesis that wars are spectacles by undercutting their reality in a different, more concrete fashion. As he argues, 'preventive' wars are only fought against the basically defenseless.22 Chomsky adds two further conditions that chime with what we have already adduced: there must be something in it for the aggressor, for instance, a fungible return not an intangible moral reward, and the opponent must be susceptible to a portrayal of them as 'evil', allowing the victory to be claimed in the name of a higher moral purpose and the actual venal purpose to be obscured (Chomsky 2003: 17). At first glance, waging war to prevent war appears to be as farcical as fucking for virginity, but that is only if we assume that the aim of the war is to prevent one potential aggressor from striking first. Or, rather, given that it is alleged that the putative enemy, Al Qaeda and its supposed supporters, took first blood (the Rambo reference is of course deliberate), we are asked to believe the current war is being fought to prevent a second, more damaging strike. The obsessive and suitably grave references to Weapons of Mass Destruction by the various mouthpieces of the Bush regime (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, but also Blair and Howard) are plainly calculated to compel us to accept that any such second strike will be of biblical, or worse, Hollywood proportions. As one joke put it, the Americans could be certain that Iraq had at least some Weapons of Mass Destruction because they had the receipts to prove it. The grain of truth in this joke reveals the true purpose of the war - it was a demonstration to all of America's clients that it wouldn't tolerate 'price-gouging'. Obviously I am speaking metaphorically here, but the fact is that Saddam's Iraq was a client of the US, it purchased arms and consumer goods and sold oil at a carefully controlled price. Why this arrangement suddenly became so unsatisfactory is subject to a great deal of speculation which centres on two basic theories: (1) when Iraq switched from the dollar to the euro it posed an intolerable threat to the stability of the US currency, (2) the US is positioning itself to monopolise oil ahead of growing Chinese demand. Either way, if one wants a metaphor to describe US imperialism it wouldn't be McDonald's, a comparatively benign operator, but the predatory retail giant Wal-Mart.23 In other words, today's wars are fought to demonstrate will. The age of gunboat diplomacy - when gunboats were used to open up markets and impose favourable market conditions for the foreign traders - has given way to the age of gunboat commerce, an era in which war does not precede commerce, but is integral to it.24 When war changed its object it was able to change its aim too, and it is this more than anything that has saved 'real' war from itself. Baudrillard's later work on the spectacle of war misses this point: through becoming spectacles the fact that real wars (for example, territorial wars) are no longer possible has not diminished their utility - the US isn't strong enough to take and hold Iraq, but it can use its force to demonstrate to other small nations that it can inflict massive damage and lasting pain on anyone who would dare defy it. Baudrillard's lament that the real Gulf War never took place can only be understood from this viewpoint - although he doesn't put it in these words, his insight is essentially that war in its idealised form is much more terrifying than peace. Again, although Baudrillard himself doesn't put it this way, the conclusion one might draw from the paradigm shift in war's rationalisatiomelucidated above - from pragmatic object (defeating North Vietnam) to symbolic object (defending the credibility of the fight forces) - is that war has become 'postmodern'. This shift-is what enables the US, ideologically, to justify war in the absence of a proper object and indeed in the absence of a known enemy. The Bush regime's 'war on terror' is the apotheosis of this change: the symbolic (terror) has been made to appear instrumental (terrorism), or more precisely the symbolic is now able to generate the instrumental according to its own needs. This is the moment when the war machine becomes militarism, the moment when doxa becomes doctrine. What is a war machine? The answer to this question must always be, it is a concept. But because of the way Deleuze and Guattari create their concepts, by abstracting from the historical, there is always a temptation to treat the war machine as primarily descriptive. More importantly, the war machine is only one element in a complex treatise which is ultimately a mordant critique of the present. Deleuze and Guattari's analysis proceeds via a threefold hypothesis: (1) the war machine is a nomad invention that does not have war as its primary object, war is rather a second-order objective, (2) the war machine is exterior to the state apparatus, but when the state appropriates the war machine its nature and function changes, its polarity is effectively reversed so that it is directed at the nomads themselves, (3) it is only when the war machine has been appropriated by the state that war becomes its primary object (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 418)Deleuze and Guattari are careful to clarify that their main purpose in assigning the invention of the war machine to the nomads is to assert its historical or 'invented' character. Their implication is that the nomadic people of the steppes and deserts do not hold the secret to understanding the war machine. We need to look past the concrete historical and geographical character of the war machine to see its eidetic core. Clearly, it is not 'the nomad who defines this constellation of characteristics'; on the contrary, 'it is this constellation that defines the nomad, and at the same time the essence of the war machine' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 422-3). In its nomad origins, the war machine does not have war as its primary objective. Deleuze and Guattari arrive at this conclusion by way of three questions. First of all they ask: is battle the object of war? Then they ask if war is the object of the war machine. And finally they ask if the war machine is the object of the state. The first question requires further and immediate clarification, they say, between when a battle is sought and when it is avoided. The difference between these two states of affairs Is not the difference between an offensive and defensive posture. And while it is true that at first glance war does seem to have battle as its object whereas the guerrilla has non-battle his object, this view is deceiving. Dropping bombs from 10,000 metres above the earth, firing missiles from a distance of hundreds of kilometres, using unpiloted drones to scout for targets, using satellite controlled and guided weapons, are the actions of a war-machine that has no interest at all in engaging in battle. The truism that the Viet Cong frustrated the US Army in Vietnam by failing to engage them in battle should not be taken to mean the US Army sought battle and the enemy did not. The Viet Cong frustrated the US Army by failing to succumb to its non-battle strategies and forced them into seeking battles with an elusive army with a better understanding of the terrain. If operation 'Rolling Thunder', or any of the many other battle-avoiding stratagems the US attempted had worked, they would not have sought battle at all.25 Ironically, too, as Gabriel Kolko points out, the more strategic the US tried to make its offensive operations, for example, the more it tried to disengage from face-to-face encounters on the battlefield, the more passive its posture became because of its escalating logistical support requirements and increasing reliance on high maintenance technology (Kolko 1994: 193). By the same token, it is clear that the guerilla armies of the Viet Cong did in fact seek battle, but did so on their own terms. As Mao said, the guerilla strikes where the other is weak and retreats whenever the stronger power attacks, the point being that the guerilla is constantly on the look-out for an opportunity to engage the enemy.26 Battle and non- battle 'are the double object of war, according to a criterion that does not coincide with the offensive and the defensive, or even with war proper and guerrilla warfare' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 417). For this reason the question has to be pushed further back to ask if war is even the object of the war machine? Too often the answer to this^question is automatically 'yes', but this reflects a precise set of historical circumstances and /fiofc arfessentialjcondition. It is true, throughout history, that nomads are regularly to be found in conflict situations, but this is because history is studded with collisions between war machines and the states and cities which would grind them into the dust. War is thrust upon the war machine, but its actual occupation is quite different. It could even be said to be peaceful were we not suspicious of that term. And as I have already argued, it is when the war machine takes peace itself as its object that it enters its most terrifying phase.

#### D. The Alternative is to adopt nomadic thinking as a form of resistance. The nomadic war machine undermines state philosophy and fascism while traditional forms of resistance feed back into statist flows. Nomadology creates new possibilities for becoming and smooths out space.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop their nomadic thought further with the concept of the ‘nomadic war machine’. This is a vehicle (or ‘assemblage’ or relation of forces) of becoming entirely immanent to itself which ‘in no way has war as its object, but rather the emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passage of mutant flows (in this sense, every new creation is brought about by a war machine). There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 253). Although Deleuze and Guattari make no mention of anarchism in their work, the nomadic war machine is clearly an anarchistic concept operating ‘against State apparatus’ which form an almost religious entity that dominates its citizens (Newman, 2007: 99). Yet as Newman makes clear - and as I note above- the state in Deleuze and Guattari refers not just to a geopolitical entity but to the ‘abstract state’- a set of principles, values and norms whose aim is to ‘conserve’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 394) and thus to halt immanent life-flows. As Newman notes: ‘according to this analysis, most political philosophy - including even anarchism based on a rational critique of the state and a Manichean division between ‘rational’ society and ‘irrational’ power, would be considered state philosophy. It leaves the place of state power intact by subjecting revolutionary action to rational injunctions that channel it into state forms’ (2007: 99). Nomadic thought and its partner in practice - the nomadic war machine - is an attempt to escape this double-bind: it maps irrational ‘lines of flight’ and flees from rationally constructed transcendent schemas, creating what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘smooth space’: a ‘nomadic’ space which is ‘occupied without being counted’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 399) and in which ‘movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 389). Smooth space is ‘heterogenous, in continuous variation…amorphous and not homogenous’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 536). It is filled with ‘multiplicity which changes in nature when it divides’ (ibid.: 534), thus creating new arrangements of forces; new possibilities for life. This stands in contrast to striated space - an arrangement in which life is organized according to hierachical, transcendent principles: a ‘Euclidean space’9 in which linkages are defined and can only be effected in one way (ibid.: 535-6).

## Links

### Transportation Infrastructure Links

#### Link - The oil politics that surround transportation infrastructure represents state territorial control of space. The state’s relationship to oil allows it to control the flow of people, goods and information.

Watson 2005 (Janell, Prof. @ Virginia Tech & Editor of Minnesota Review. “Oil Wars, or the Extrastate Conflict ‘Beyond the Line’: Schmitt’s Nomos, Deleuze’s War Machine, and the New Order of the Earth.” South Atlantic Quarterly 104:2.)

Even more fundamental to spatiality is the world’s reliance on oil for its energy, especially in transportation. Oil belongs to the spatial dimension of movement and speed, insofar as it is essential to transportation, the very technology that allowed Europe to develop the first global order of the earth, and which still drives the present world order. Indeed, control of terrestrial or maritime space depends on control of means of movement through space. Schmitt himself recognized the relevance of the dimension of airspace, added to the global order by the invention of the airplane, especially aerial bombers. With the dimension of airspace transforming the relation between land and sea, speed, in effect, became even more important, increasing the ‘‘velocity of the means of human power, transport, and information’’ (48). DavidHarvey spells out how the Iraq war fits into a strategy of establishing pro–United States governments in the Middle East, since, as he puts it, ‘‘whoever controls the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil spigot can control the global economy, at least for the near future.’’ 5 Whoever controls the fuel pump controls land, sea, and air, and, for that matter, also controls the flow of information, for even cyberspace requires power and transportation. No electricity and no transportation networks mean no computers and no Internet. No telephones, cinema, or television, either. Today’s global interstate structure depends on domination of land, sea, air, and media.

#### Link - Transportation infrastructure is filled with meaning related to life in urban city centers. Identity and differences play out within arteries of transportation.

Voithofer & Foley 2009 (Rick, Ohio State Univ., and Alan, Syracuse Univ. “(Re)territorializing Literacies in Urban Landscapes.” AERA Conference Paper, San Diego, CA.)

Urban centers are typically subdivided into areas (i.e., signifiers) defined by income, industry, activity, and ethnicity, to name a few. Most often these sub-spaces denote multiple signified meanings (e.g., poor, unsafe). How one reads and writes these spaces, moves within these spaces, performs themselves within these spaces, and represents knowledge in these spaces are literacy- related questions. For example, moving within a city is a literacy – navigating public transportation systems and other modes of transportation, getting from one place to another in the face of traffic congestion, and understanding how to perform oneself in various public and private spaces while traveling require deep knowing about the rhythm and flow of a city and the other individuals within that city. Transportation systems are only one way that one must navigate a city. Urban environments are complex grids of telecommunication, information, and telematic1 systems that require unique literacies to negotiate. A goal of this project is to think spatially about literacy in urban environments. Cities are often thought of as tightly bordered and subdivided spaces with diverse populations in proximity, densely spaced buildings, neighborhoods marked by stark economic contrasts, and quickly pulsing transportation and communication arteries moving individuals, information and goods in and out of various spaces. How literacy is seen within urban educational environments is influenced by how urban settings are represented. This paper will explore ways that Deleuze and Guattari’s theorizations of space, thought, and agency help to reinvigorate discussions about literacy in a world that is increasing urban and global (Moreno & Warah, 2006). Specifically the paper expresses the interplay between the physical, discursive, and textual notions of the city.

#### Link – Transportation - The State apparatus striates space in order to regulate and control flows of desire. Striating the sea with shipping lanes or the desert with highways is an unfortunate example of transportation as state power.

Deleuze and Guattari ‘87(Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. French philosophers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987. Print.)

The Maritime Model. Of course, there are points, lines, and surfaces in striated space as well as in smooth space (there are also volumes, but we will leave this question aside for the time being). In striated space, lines or trajectories tend to be subordinated to points: one goes from one point to another. In the smooth, it is the opposite: the points are subordinated to the trajectory. This was already the case among the nomads for the clothes-tent-space vector of the outside. The dwelling is subordinated to the journey; inside space conforms to outside space: tent, igloo, boat. There are stops and trajectories in both the smooth and the striated. But in smooth space, the stop follows from the trajectory; once again, the interval takes all, the interval is substance (forming the basis for rhythmic values). 6 In smooth space, the line is therefore a vector, a direction and not a dimension or metric determination. It is a space constructed by local operations involving changes in direction. These changes in direction may be due to the nature of the journey itself, as with the nomads of the archipela-1440: THE SMOOTH AND THE STRIATED D 479 goes (a case of "directed" smooth space); but it is more likely to be due to the variability of the goal or point to be attained, as with the nomads of the desert who head toward local, temporary vegetation (a "nondirected" smooth space). Directed or not, and especially in the latter case, smooth space is directional rather than dimensional or metric. Smooth space is filled by events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties. It is haptic rather than optical perception. Whereas in the striated forms organize a matter, in the smooth materials signal forces and serve as symptoms for them. It is an intensive rather than extensive space, one of distances, not of measures and properties. Intense Spatium instead of Extensio. A Body without Organs instead of an organism and organization. Perception in it is based on symptoms and evaluations rather than measures and properties. That is why smooth space is occupied by intensities, wind and noise, forces, and sonorous and tactile qualities, as in the desert, steppe, or ice. 7 The creaking of ice and the song of the sands. Striated space, on the contrary, is canopied by the sky as measure and by the measurable visual qualities deriving from it. This is where the very special problem of the sea enters in. For the sea is a smooth space par excellence, and yet was the first to encounter the demands of increasingly strict striation. The problem did not arise in proximity to land. On the contrary, the striation of the sea was a result of navigation on the open water. Maritime space was striated as a function of two astronomical and geographical gains: bearings, obtained by a set of calculations based on exact observation of the stars and the sun; and the map, which intertwines meridians and parallels, longitudes and latitudes, plotting regions known and unknown onto a grid (like a Mendeleyev table). Must we accept the Portuguese argument and assign 1440 as the turning point that marked the first decisive striation, and set the stage for the great discoveries? Rather, we will follow Pierre Chaunu when he speaks of an extended confrontation at sea between the smooth and the striated during the course of which the striated progressively took hold. 8 For before longitude lines had been plotted, a very late development, there existed a complex and empirical nomadic system of navigation based on the wind and noise, the colors and sounds of the seas; then came a directional, preastronomical or already astronomical, system of navigation employing only latitude, in which there was no possibility of "taking one's bearings," and which had only portolanos lacking "translatable generalization" instead of true maps; finally, improvements upon this primitive astronomical navigation were made under the very special conditions of the latitudes of the Indian Ocean, then of the elliptical circuits of the Atlantic (straight and curved spaces). 9 It is as if the sea were not only the archetype0 480 □ 1440: THE SMOOTH AND THE STRIATED of all smooth spaces but the first to undergo a gradual striation gridding it in one place, then another, on this side and that. The commercial cities participated in this striation, and were often innovators; but only the States were capable of carrying it to completion, of raising it to the global level of a "politics of science." 10 A dimensionality that subordinated directionality, or superimposed itself upon it, became increasingly entrenched. This is undoubtedly why the sea, the archetype of smooth space, was also the archetype of all striations of smooth space: the striation of the desert, the air, the stratosphere (prompting Virilio to speak of a "vertical coastline," as a change in direction). It was at sea that smooth space was first subjugated and a model found for the laying-out and imposition of striated space, a model later put to use elsewhere. This does not contradict Virilio's other hypothesis: in the aftermath of striation, the sea reimparts a kind of smooth space, occupied first by the "fleet in being," then by the perpetual motion of the strategic submarine, which outflanks all gridding and invents a neonomadism in the service of a war machine still more disturbing than the States, which reconstitute it at the limit of their striations. The sea, then the air and the stratosphere, become smooth spaces again, but, in the strangest of reversals, it is for the purpose of controlling striated space more completely. 11 The smooth always possesses a greater power of deterritorialization than the striated. When examining the new professions, or new classes even, how can one fail to mention the military technicians who stare into screens night and day and live for long stretches in strategic submarines (in the future it will be on satellites), and the apocalyptic eyes and ears they have fashioned for themselves, which can barely distinguish any more between a natural phenomenon, a swarm of locusts, and an "enemy" attack originating at any given point? All of this serves as a reminder that the smooth itself can be drawn and occupied by diabolical powers of organization; value judgments aside, this demonstrates above all that there exist two nonsymmetrical movements, one of which striates the smooth, and one of which reimparts smooth space on the basis of the striated. (Do not new smooth spaces, or holey spaces, arise as parries even in relation to the smooth space of a worldwide organization? Virilio invokes the beginnings of subterranean habitation in the "mineral layer," which can take on very diverse values.)

#### Link - Investment in transportation infrastructure invests identities, territories and desires doubly into the state. Infrastructure mechanically organizes land and citizens while capitalism spreads. This double articulation and centralization of power creates docile, dehumanized subjects blind to their territorial and social enslavement.

Kuswa 4 (Kevin, PhD Communications, California State University, Fresno Department of Communication “Machinic Rhetoric, Highways and Interpellating Motions” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[1] This brief argument moves through a framework of the nation, the state, and capitalism in order to better understand the highway machine and its effects. In many ways, it is a theoretical discourse stemming from the highway machine in the United States. As a backdrop, it is important to note that the highway machine does a number of things from the middle of the 20th Century to the present, including the transformation and generation of new subjects (road tourists, global suburbanites, and gentrified pedestrians), new places (the edge city, gated communities, blue highways), and new motions (energy security, cross-country touring, globalization, and border formation). We have come a long way from the driver, the rural access road, and troop movement as national security. Or have we? Are these effects simply different shades of the same thing? Is the historical progression of these changes artificially linear, gradual, and evolutionary? Does this project not create its own infallible map-isolating the rhetoric and subjectivities of the highway as neat and clean events? [2] But, then again, is the highway distinct from the things circulating through and alongside it? How are the motions and movements of regimes of signs distinct from and similar to the motions and movements of the highway? These questions must be bracketed both by history and by the organizing theme of a transportation revolution in America during the last century. Highway identities, territories, and energies have occupied molecular lines in America, retaining a sense of haunting, a phantasm of the past that holds presence through its absence. What makes this historical narrative distinct in terms of its practice? How can we deploy the map of machinic rhetoric to talk about certain clusters of subjects, places, and motions? The primary answer to these methodological inquiries is that machinic rhetoric is a way to account for the materiality of the highway without globalizing rhetoric's domain or falling prey to the politics of representation. Rhetoric is both the manifestation of competing realities and one of the generators of these realities. The key to this practice, however, is specificity-in this case the specificity of the highway. [3] To link rhetoric to the highway machine requires a journey through three sections, hitchhiking primarily with Deleuze and Guattari to augment our vocabularies of circulation. Section one starts with a re-thinking of capitalism and the nation-state in order to position the highway and highway rhetoric in an interconnected context. From that abstract discussion, Section two offers the specifics of interpellation to mark how the highway constitutes identities and their circulation. Interpellation attaches rhetoric to the process of identity-production associated with Fordism, globalization, and late-capitalism. Section three returns to the abstract as a means to add elements of "time" to subjectivity-a unique way in which the highway constitutes specific effects. The primary angles on time produced by the highway are both circulation and its absence; namely, the accident. Fatal bodies are produced through accidents as an effect of the highway machine operating in tandem with the circulation of goods and services. As speed, rate, exposure, duration, and circulation operate, to borrow from Paul Virilio, so too do changes (stops and starts) in our fragmented subjectivities. I. Capture, Subjection, and Enslavement [4] Beginning with the highway machine's movement, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) intervene with a diagram that is indispensable to any discussion of circulation and modernity. They plot the state's shift from "machinic enslavement" to "social subjection" as the components of the nation are captured by an organizing apparatus working through capitalism. As Fordism and the energy crisis demonstrated, machines are tied to nations and states-in this case the highway machine intertwines with America and the United States government. Capitalism, likewise, is effectuated by a law of states that offers the possibility of a "free" flow of labor and capital for a group of producers. More generally, we must take into account a 'materialist' determination of the modern State or nation-state; a group of producers in which labor and capital circulate freely, in other words, in which the homogeneity and competition of capital is effectuated, in principle without external obstacles. In order to be effectuated, capitalism has always required there to be a new force and a new law of States, on the level of the flow of labor as on the level of the flow of independent capital. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p455) A state, then, is a nation that has been realized through the flow of capital (land) and the flow of labor (people). When the land and the people are deterritorialized or overcoded through flows of labor and capital, the nation becomes "the very operation of a collective subjectification, to which the modern State corresponds as a process of subjection" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p456). This does not mean that nations are simply appearances or the consequences of a dominant ideology. Instead, nations "are the passional and living forms in which the qualitative homogeneity and the quantitative competition of abstract capital are first realized" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p456). [5] In the United States, the nation was partially incorporated into the state apparatus (and its subjection of labor and capital) by organizing the land and its citizens through the highway machine. The land and the people, beginning with horses and then through the railroad, also pushed for their own notions of "space"-a desire for specific places to live that necessitated new means of circulation and transportation. The Secretary of the Treasury in 1955, George Humphrey, stated: "America lives on wheels, and we have to keep America living on wheels and keep the kind and form of life that we want" (Rose, 1990, p33). What would the American nation be without the possibility of realizing the dream of space? How does the nation realize its aspirations for space in appropriating and organizing ways? Lewis Mumford (1938, p168) expresses the potency of the American drive for space: The necessity for increasing the amount of housing, for expanding the space, for multiplying the equipment, for providing communal facilities, was far more revolutionary in its demands than any trifling expropriation of the quarters of the rich would be. The former notion was merely an impotent gesture of revenge: the latter demanded a revolutionary reconstruction of the entire social environment-such a reconstruction as we are on the brink of today. As Mumford aptly notes, the reconstruction that swept through America was both enabling for middle-class expansion outside the city and constraining for those groups stuck in the run-down and vacated inner-city. These shifts accelerated much faster after World War II and the ubiquitous status of highways. In the meantime, as the highway machine approached during the beginning of the 20th Century, a national solidification of America became the assumed legacy of coast-to-coast highway circulation. [6] Returning to the abstract plane, we can trace how the highway links into a statist conception of people and territory. Likewise, two types of machines are implicated and consolidated by the state's process of subjection. The human machine conceives of subjects as constituent parts of larger machines composed of humans and perhaps other components such as animals or tools. In short, the human machine brings inhumanity along for the ride in the form of machinic enslavement. On one hand, the human machine is the body and its full array of experiences-a combination of circulating and resistant parts, "each specialized in function, operating under human control to transmit motion and perform work" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p457). On the other hand, machinic enslavement tortures and erases the human body as a means of dehumanizing the person. The person becomes a small (and replaceable) part within a larger exterior. In the extreme, a human (machine) may be enslaved to the highway or even the television such that the driver/viewer "is no longer a consumer or user, nor even a subject, but intrinsic component pieces, 'input' and 'output,' feedback or recurrences that are no longer connected to the machine in such a way as to produce or use it" (Deleuze & Guattari, p458). [7] Alongside the machinic enslavement and embodied circulation of the human machine, the technical machine acts as a coexisting pole. This is not to speak exclusively about metaphor because machines are concrete and physical arrangements. Being machinic, the highway is about macadam, medians, asphalt, ramps, bridges, tar, rubber, and paint just as much as it is abstract or idealized. The important factor is the temporary condensing of the machine into a single line or "a certain simplicity in the non-uniform material" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p344) for the purpose of further analysis. If the line or object is multiplied too many times, a scramble results full of static. Sound effects may offer depth and atmosphere once the machine is territorialized, but the first step requires "a pure and simple line accompanied by the idea of an object, and nothing more" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.344). Harmonious and even ruptured lines constitute the effects of the machine, but the "richness of the Machine's effects" (p344) depends on the sobriety of assemblages, a simple figure in motion, and a "plane that is itself mobile" (p344). [8] Recognizing that machines are not merely metaphors, but also concrete and physical assemblages, the technical machine works to transform machinic enslavement into social subjection. The technical machine distributes humans as subservient to, and determined by, the machines around them. In other words, "one is not enslaved by the technical machine but rather subjected to it" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p457). In many ways, the state has substituted technical machines for machinic enslavement through technological development. Within the state's coding of the nation, capitalism arises as an axiom or "as a worldwide enterprise of subjectification" (p457). These technical machines function as a governing apparatus by subjecting people to a scheme of wage labor, thereby holding human capital hostage to the goals of production and capital accumulation. [9] Through these machines, "the human being is no longer a component of the machine, but a worker, a user" (Deleuze & Guattari, p457). Instead of just being enslaved by the machine, people are also subjected to it. The highway follows both trajectories, enslaving drivers and workers as constituted parts of the machine, but also subjecting the nation to the ever-expanding needs of infrastructure and circulation. Because these two processes (machinic enslavement and social subjection) constitute two coexistent poles, the aggregate includes subjection and enslavement "as two simultaneous parts that constantly reinforce and nourish each other" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p458). The effects of capitalism and the highway machine are bumper-to-bumper throughout America, often becoming "central to the history of the advanced capitalist countries in the twentieth century, and explaining an especially large part of the history of the American people" (Flink, 1988, pvii). [10] So, how do we traverse from this diagram of the machine to the production of subjectivities by and through the machine? The starting point, and the topic of the next section, is rhetoric. Ironically, we arrive at rhetoric by rethinking the auto-mobile as a form of interpellation. Flink (1988, p1) provides the transition when he defines the automotive idea: "The combination of a light, sprung, wheeled vehicle; a compact, efficient power unit; and hard-surfaced roads." The three central parts are the vehicle, the source of energy, and the surface to cover. These three parts are the same basic elements in machinic rhetoric, whether the "vehicle" is a car or language, whether the "power" is energy or discourse, and whether the "surface" is the road or a rhetorical effect. In one sense, it is hard to discover many stakes that are not tied up with the intersection between the circulation of highways in America and the production of subjectivity.

#### Link - America uses transportation infrastructure to interpellate the ideal modern subject. The spectre of the accident is a perverse moment of interruption where control over our flows of desire can be interrogated and challenged.

Kuswa 4 (Kevin, PhD Communications, California State University, Fresno Department of Communication “Machinic Rhetoric, Highways and Interpellating Motions” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[16] We return to the notion of driver-subjectivity here in the last section of this paper, for now it is sufficient to see this figure as an embodied vehicle in motion, an extension and transportation of the self, and a body enslaved to the machine and its potentially catastrophic (mal)function. Widening the intersection of the highway machine to incorporate the movement of communication and the generation of subjectivity, the specifics of a Deleuzian reconceptualization cannot be exhausted. Before equating lines with subjectivity, territory with movement, minority with discourse, and becomings with minor; however, we should idle briefly on the unifying intersection of communication. What is communication? How does it relate to other descriptors such as language, discourse, or rhetoric? Fortunately, Chen occupies himself with the same types of questions. Chen goes back to Deleuze & Guattari to assert the idea that communication can be reconceived as a flow of forces or the circulation of desire. More directly, Chen contends that the notions of "lines of subjectivity," "territorialization," "minor discourse," and "becoming-minor" demonstrate the valuable and untapped potential of Deleuze and Guattari's work in communication and critical rhetoric. Chen preserves an abstract and a concrete role for rhetoric because he does not stop at the discovery of circulation as desire as does Vivian (2000). Completing the circle, it is here where subjectivity and circulation come back into focus. Chen (1989, p56) brings it together in a concise way: From Deleuze and Guattari's point of view, communication cannot be conceptualized as transmission of information, encoding/decoding, intersubjective sharing, or dialogue between the subjects or between subject and object. Instead, communication has to be reconceptualized as a flow of forces, the circulation of desire, power as well as the representable. It is within the social network and its established trajectories that communication takes place; it is in the moment of communication and discommunication that partial subjects are formed and transformed. Subjects are constantly forming and reforming themselves in partial (or schizophrenic) lines generated by communication. This means communication plays a role in the constitution of subjectivity materiality and their change, even when communication is theorized as a process other than transmission, intersubjectivity, message encryption, or dialogue. [17] Thus, an additional series of questions arises: What concrete traits make up our identities as we participate in the highway machine? What are the effects of America's addiction to cars and speed? What do cars and speed mean for American individualism? What does the emerging notion of the driver do to our communities, our families, or our bodies? How does the motor vehicle take over our lives so quickly and so pervasively? What types of people fall into (and out of) place through the discourse of the driver's seat? And, interlocking all of these questions: What makes a machine distinct from a horse or even from the human body? Is the driver distinct from the machine being driven? Driving no longer necessarily involves building or assembling. Marking this transition and helping to offer an approach to these questions, Dunbar (1915) positioned the human race on the cusp of a technological revolution in transportation-the edge of an era where a majority of Americans would ride in cars every day, yet not have a solid idea what made the vehicle move (nor want such knowledge). Human "auto" agency became possible, but always contained by the mechanism of circulation and the availability of roads. The average mind already shrinks from efforts to assimilate what eyes behold and hands use, and so, hereafter, we must accept much of what is done for us without understanding, content to let a few work in regions not for us, while we casually employ what they bestow. Those who hereafter become benefactors of the race through invention and discovery in the fields of physical and mechanical science are destined to find their large reward within their own thoughts....Thus it has always been, and much more often will it be so in the future. It is not because we are thoughtless, or ungrateful. It is because we have so many other things to think about, and to do. (Dunbar, 1915, p1366) [18] When have now arrived at the point, following Dunbar, where the highway machine is partly machinic because of its continual series of explosions. Harnessing energy also promises its leakage [2]. Road accidents and the enormity of tragedy and destruction associated with the highway machine are the flip side of the practices of circulation. Humans move along the highway, but when that movement is suddenly and terminally halted, the need has been demonstrated for more security or a higher level of safety. Time also implies its interruption. The life of circulation is also the lethality of excess speed. The unexpected shock of the accident and the danger of fatality mark a line of flight in an otherwise consistent subject. The line of flight is also called a "quantum dimension of power" by Thomas Dumm (1994), a moment in the constitution of subjectivity that transforms fear into disgust. The struggle between fear and disgust establishes the impact of the fatal driver: driving means death. Thomas Dumm (1994, p139) elaborates on the impact of the dissolution of the subject: The politics of danger is ubiquitous in modern life. Danger may be conceived as a line that serves to create and delimit others. It is a technique at work in the processes by which the modern subject is constituted. Yet it also intrudes into what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the quantum dimension of power, the area of flows and powers that cannot be contained by segmentations and lines. In discussing the dangers of the line, they argue, 'The more rigid the segmentarity, the more reassuring it is for us. That is what fear is, and how it makes us retreat into the first line' (Thousand Plateaus, p227). The trajectory that overcoming fear takes is first clarity, then power, then disgust. And disgust concerns the lines of flight that might be anxiously pursued once one overcomes fear. A danger such as the car accident that is simultaneously an elimination of thousands of people puts another angle on Dumm's deployment of the "modern subject." If danger is a technique in the constitution of the modern subject, than the highway machine has embedded itself in the subjectivity of American culture since the early decades of the 20th Century as a "subject-erasing" form of subjectivity. Dumm's comments make immense strides. His articulation of danger as a process in the constitution of subjectivity connects to Baudrillard's triad of inertia, silence, and the fatal. The modern body begins to merge with the fatal body. [19] The modern is fraught with dangers and their politics, but it is also a backdrop for the resolution of those dangers. Resolution of danger in the context of the highway accident is on going. The end point of motion, a body catapulting through the air, new nodes of gravity, and a fleeting transcendence are some of this figure's lines of flight. The snapshot of the accident, a body frozen in place immediately prior to contact, gives us an image of the accident(al) subject. Unlike almost any other subject, this body is a line of flight, yet also a material entity with organs capable of experiencing injury or death. The "body-in-accidental-motion" is both the extreme and the limit of the human driver as subject. In Jean Baudrillard's terms (1987, p101), the fatal is the void produced by inertia and a response to acceleration:

#### Link - Transportation infrastructure perpetuates the most violent form of human destruction. The highway has claimed 2 million lives in the past century taking three-times more lives than the battle deaths of the American military. Accidents and destruction outweigh their advantages.

Kuswa 4 (Kevin, PhD Communications, California State University, Fresno Department of Communication “Machinic Rhetoric, Highways and Interpellating Motions” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

To counter the acceleration of networks and circuits the world will seek slowness, inertia. In the same movement, however, it will seek something more rapid than communication: the challenge, the duel. On the one side, inertia and silence. On the other, challenge and the duel. The fatal, the obscene, the reversible, the symbolic, are not concepts, since nothing distinguishes the hypotheses from the assertion. The enunciation of the fatal is also fatal, or it is not at all. In this sense it is indeed a discourse where truth has withdrawn (just as one pulls a chair out from under a person about to sit down). Baudrillard's depiction of a battle between acceleration and inertia speaks directly to the highway machine and the accident, offering a final impact to this section. [20] One ramification of the highway is the perpetual event of the accident-the highway machine is always pulling the chair out from under its users. Jolts in the machine are violent and sudden. Society has always found ways to negotiate accidents and large-scale warfare, but nothing has had the monumental impact that the automobile and the road have had in terms of the destruction of human lives. The destruction is also pronounced because it is a result of technology and modes of transport that humans have built themselves. These are not earthquakes or diseases, but colliding vehicles that were intended to "speed up" the process of circulation. Even guns and other weapons are distinct from cars and highways because guns have the express purpose of either injuring another human or scaring that human into submission. How has the subject of the fatal body of the accident victim assumed significant but acceptable status in the United States? [21] To answer, we must return to speed and the accident. Paul Virilio aligns the event of the accident with inertia, forming a link between society and the specificity of automotive motion. The accident-which is the halting of movement in a sudden way-is capable of producing the fatal subject as an effect of highway inertia. Virilio's (1989, p111) contention is that motion and the absence of motion are tied together through the mutation of the automobile and the shrinking of distance: Spatial distance suddenly makes way for mere temporal distance. The longest journeys are scarcely more than mere intermissions. But if, as already shown, the nineteenth century and a large part of the twentieth really experienced the rise of the automotive vehicle in all of its forms, this mutation of it is by no means completed. As before, except now more rapidly, it will make the transition from the itinerancy of nomadic life to inertia, to the ultimate sedentariness of society. In this frame, the accident is the malaria of the Panama Canal: the inertia of highway fatalities. The subject of the driver is now always tied up with the risks and realities of the highway fatality. Again, driving means death. [22] The subject of the driver and the fatal body takes countless directions through the course of the highway machine. Even within one generalization-the subject propelled to death by a vehicle in a collision-multiple figures emerge such as the fatal bodies of the alcoholic, the soldier, and the consumer of safety. Whether or not we attach the figure of the mobile alcoholic to the death parade of the highway machine, the omnipresence of the fatal driver, and society's acceptance of these drivers as an allowable form of collateral damage, gestures toward circulating subjectivities. The driver-soldier, for example, marks the driver as a type of human cannon fodder, putting life on the line in the name of circulation and the highway machine. Defense and security take on new angles: "More than 2 million persons have died in auto accidents in the U.S. in this century or more than three times the 652,000 battle deaths the U.S. sustained in all the wars it ever fought" (McCombs, Aug. 7, 1977). [23] By merging perspectives on traffic and accidents, we find ourselves approaching modernity from an odd direction: within. Traffic and commerce (the movement of people and goods) are typically signs of "health" for a community, yet too much traffic is often cited as an illness that has afflicted society. Too much traffic also risks accidents, spiraling into even greater traffic. The subject-position of the driver is potentially threatened by the accident, while the subject-position of the traffic manager is perpetually warding off the accident. Before and after the accident, the movement of bodies takes place in an attempt to govern the "event" itself. The accident may be an immutable rupture or interruption: a moment when the body can no longer deterritorialize itself through the micropolitics of highway identities. The human body and institutional bodies are thrust together through the everyday trauma surrounding road accidents and highway fatalities. Preceding a given accident, which is inevitable but randomly occurring, an entire assemblage exists to govern safety and security on the road-everything from license requirements (often a critical passage into maturity or adulthood) to vehicle innovations such as shoulder-belts or non-reflective windshields. Through the expansion of highways and the proliferation of the automobile, death and life in America have moved precariously close to the side of the road. [24] The body is already ground-breaking in both everyday and revolutionary ways. The body is organic and machinic as it moves from one mode to another: by operating the speed and acceleration of a motorized vehicle, by strapping to a chair via a seat belt, and by obeying or breaking speed limit laws. In sum, we should take the body's relation to the road, the vehicle, and the accident as crucial sites of modernity's concentrations and movements. A few concepts related to speeds, rates, and modes of production and transportation will help to link together the highway machine in many ways. Appropriate for the study of speed, Virilio begins his 1993 article on the accident with an Einstein reference: "Events do not come, they are here" (Virilio, 1993). [25] From Einstein, Virilio sprints through a chain reaction of the last 50 years of history, gesturing to Hiroshima, radioactivity, Three Mile Island, fusion, and fission to contend: "power is no longer a function of matter, element, but of immateriality, energetic performance." Virilio plots a cluster of issues in "The Primal Accident" that magnify the plane of consistency set up by our previous maps of subjectivity drawn by Deleuze & Guattari. Initially, Virilio reverses the opposition between the accident and substance. The accident-typically conceived as fleeting, temporary, relative, or contingent-has generally been contrasted with the absolute and universal connotations of substance. Looking at the Latin root accidens, Virilio notes how the unanticipated (the surprise) became part of the accident's mythology. In other words, the surprise failure that befalls a mechanism or product is an accidental destruction. The displacement of responsibility intrinsic in the use of accident allows the blame and the surprise to focus on the "mechanism that failed" and not the operation of the mechanism itself. Virilio's point is that the association of an accident with an unexpected misfortune should be questioned. [26] Assuming that failure is not built-in or programmed into the mechanism may be a mistake. We cannot separate life and death and we cannot separate the machine from the accident. For Virilio (1993, p212), the accident itself can be attached to "the product from the moment of its production or implementation." Production interpellates destruction. The mode of production cannot stand without the mode of destruction. The highway machine may generate traffic and the possibility of managing that traffic, but such production brings destruction: the decimation of the earth's ecology through rapid fossil fuel consumption as well as the demolition of vehicles and desolation of human bodies that arrive in an endless stream of road fatalities. Moving the modern away from structure and more toward vectors and trajectories, Virilio (1993, p212) inverts the substance of accidents: Since the production of any 'substance' is simultaneously the production of a typical accident, breakdown or failure is less the deregulation of production than the production of a specific failure, or even a partial or total destruction....One could imagine a fundamental modification in the direction of research toward a prospective of the accident. Since the accident is invented at the moment the object is scientifically discovered or technically developed, perhaps we could reverse things and directly invent the accident in order to determine the nature of the renowned 'substance' of the implicitly discovered product or mechanism, thereby avoiding the development of certain supposedly accidental catastrophes. From the idea that the accident precedes the invention, Virilio focuses on the rate of technological development. Through continual transformations, the changes in circulation borrow from each other just as they negate each other. In this sense, "the revolution of transport will coincide with a characteristic change of arrival, with the progressive negation of the time interval" (Virilio, 1989, p111). [27] So, the time interval, or the space between moments, has been minimized as the immediacy of the arrival has intensified. How does this revolution of transport spread or circulate? In many ways, the subjectivity of the fatal body marks a motion-a motion of halting or sudden interruption. The accident draws a line between the subjects and the motions that the highway machine generates. Having noted Virilio's link between technologies and speed, an expansion of the motion-effects of the highway machine requires moving from the accident to movements of subjectivity through rhetoric.

#### Link - Transportation is a method for the State to construct strata on the social field. The state apparatus uses channels of transportation to direct flows of desire towards fascism.

Bonta and Protevi 4 [Mark, Assoc. Prof. of Geography, Delta State University; and John, Professor of Philosophy, Louisiana State University; “Deleuze and Geophilosophy” p. 148-9 //JG

DG call striation one of the ‘fundamental tasks’ of States (385), given that the State apparatus must operate to transform the earth [terre] of primitive society (or even the ground [sol] of nomads) into land [terre] (441). They show that the State, though it did not originate in one place, is a universal and unavoidable feature of human existence, and indeed has formed everywhere in relationship to nomads as well as ‘primitives’ (360; 429-30). What a State apparatus cannot striate, it retains as a smooth space for communication and transportation of the war machines of capitalistic conquest. It may still be that everything in existence exists on the terms of the State, particularly, of State or Royal science (and State philosophy, whether Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel); we might presume that the current era of globalization is a precursor to a stronger one, two, or three mega-States, rather than a break-down of the nation-state world in favor of decentered corporate/tribal networks. One way or the other, the State apparatus’s fundamental operations remain constants. The war machine, the cutting edge or expansive wave of smooth space as it smoothes striated space, was long ago appropriated by the State apparatus, though civilian control of the military and the hesitancy of the most powerful contemporary States to deploy the military internally (next to or in place of the police) indicates the still uneasy and incomplete nature of the capture of the nomads’ war machine. The role of the military nomads, today, is to wage war using the smooth global spaces, but still at the whims of the State apparatus.

The State apparatus can act directly on any stratum of human society, any regime of signs, and any ecosystem. It has and is the force and power to overcode anything, to put anything to work, to turn anything into stock. However, all the diverse, molecular spaces must be made to resonate, to come into some sort of harmony, to obey some type of universal refrain (usually having to do with the absolute beneficence of the leader-Signifier or Principle); the State is an ‘intraconsistency’ (433). Once resonating, the overcoded territories can be stratified and organized in numerous ways, segmented and striated to the limits of human tolerance. State apparatuses operate in a supplemental or higher dimension than their subjects, and thus are able, parasitically, to oversee, to control, and to siphon the surplus that is necessary for their survival. DG describe several forms of States that have come about, and in many cases there has been little or no pretension to universality among these States; just the opposite has often been the case. However, the worldwide machines of capitalism, ‘American democracy\*, and Protestant-work-ethic Christianity have returned us to the pretenses of the archaic, universalizing State: ‘Capitalism has awakened the Urstaat, and given it new strength’ (460). This was written before the fall of the Soviet Union, so is even more pertinent to today’s conditions.

#### Link - Allowing the state the ability to organize transportation becomes a way to control migration and divide up cities – which is hostile to nomadic forms of existence

Koppensteiner 2009 [Norbert, “ON MOVING: NOMADISM AND (IN)SECURITY”; Norbert Koppensteiner is a peace researcher, currently based in Vienna and Innsbruck/Austria. He is the program coordinator of the MA Program in Peace, Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation and the research and publications coordinator of the UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies at the University of Innsbruck. 2009. <http://www.kurator.org/media/uploads/publications/DB04/Koppensteiner.pdf>]

The two key features for transpositions are movement and difference. Transpositions carry out a perpetual form of movement in which, as Braidotti (2006: 5) puts it, the “positivity of difference” becomes a speciﬁc theme of its own. Deployed as a method in academic writing, trans-positions imply a perpetual, nomadic movement through concepts. In a series of differentiations and approximations, local points of reference (trans-positions) can be established while the guiding question is kept open as impetus. The movement so continues without ever ﬁnally settling on any one of those reference points (trans-positions). Transpositions carry on in a non-linear manner in order to achieve, through variations and shifts of scale, a pattern that is discontinuous yet not without harmony. Moves of transposition trace a path which appears to ‘proceed by leaps and bounds’ but is not ‘deprived of logic and coherence’ (Braidotti 2006: 5ff.). Transpositions in short, proceed in a rhizomatic fashion (Deleuze & Guattari 1987) and imply a movement of approximations, partial fusions with – yet also differentiations between – several related concepts. They are a ‘becoming nomadic of ideas’ and carry out a Deleuzian ‘deterritorialization’ (Braidotti 1994: 37) ‘The desert is a gigantic map of signs for those who know how to read them, for those who can sing their way through the wilderness.’ (Rosi Braidotti) The modern, dualistic philosophy of the subject dates back to René Descartes. The term is derived from the Latin subiectum for the ground, the fundamental. The subject’s coherence is guaranteed no longer by God, as had been the case previously, but by the - for Descartes indubitable - fact that I think. Everything else derives from this ﬁrst fact of thinking. Being is a consequence of thinking and the subject therefore is deﬁned as the thinking, self-reﬂecting, perceiving being. With the theory of the subject, Descartes inaugurates a division between this reﬂecting subject (res cogitans) on the one hand and the outside world, the tobe-observed object (res extensa) on the other (Dietrich 2008; Capra 1988). The subject (observer) and object (the observed) so form two separate entities. From the point of view of the subject, everything else - including other humans - is an ‘outside’, an object. The world is so divided dualistically in I and not-I. Between subject and object, between every ‘I’ and ‘not-I’ a chasm opens up which in principle can no longer be bridged. Mediated through the works of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, the discourse of modernity echoes these foundations (Dietrich 2008: 350ff.). The modern legal order proceeds from the foundations of the stable, autonomous and individually responsible subject just as well as modern positivist science or the political frame of democracy within the nation state, which is built on the individual right to vote. The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and his co-author Félix Guattari (1983, 1987) challenge these modern foundations in a postmodern vein. Deleuze and Guattari use different models to exemplify a difference between nomadic and sedentary living and thinking. In light of the above discussion on spaces and movement, one of those models – which might be called the topological model – seems especially pertinent for approaching this differentiation. Deleuze and Guattari therein differentiate the nomadic and the sedentary by two different types of space that correspond to the two forms of existence. The sedentary form of existence, they contend, is inherently linked to a certain form of space which relies on the state as instituting principle. The task of the state is essentially one of control over its territory and everything therein, including its people. This control is achieved by dividing and organising space, by parceling it out: ‘One of the fundamental tasks of the state is to striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth spaces as a means of communication in the service of striated space. It is a vital concern of every state not only to vanquish nomadism but to control migration and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire “exterior”, over all the ﬂows traversing the ecumenon.’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 385) Once more, some deﬁnitions are in order: smooth space stands for the plains and deserts as horizon for nomadic trajectories. As concept, smooth space is open-ended and without center. There is no longer any division between the earth and the sky as in the vast open spaces one directly melts into the other. The horizon then is a line of ﬂight but no conﬁning limit. Smooth space subsequently is unbounded. It is deﬁned by the trajectories that traverse its surface. It thus knows points of reference, yet no overall ﬁxed structure: ‘The sand desert has not only oases which are like ﬁxed points, but also rhizomatic vegetation that is temporary and shifts location according to local rains, bringing changes in the direction of the crossings. [...] Their variability, the polyvocality of directions, is an essential feature of smooth spaces of the rhizome type, and it alters their cartography.’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 382) In smooth space the cartography remains variable and is deﬁned in terms of the trajectories that are possible at a given moment. Routes and movements ﬂuctuate. Smooth spaces are deﬁned by the relations and movements that traverse them. Relations and movements are not just something added to an already pre-existing space but are its characteristic. It is the apparatus of the state that turns smooth into striated space, installing the grids and divisions of cities, ﬁxed roads, provinces and countries. Striated space is structured, patterned and hierarchical. It enables ﬁxity, certainty and stability. Smooth space is not undifferentiated, yet its cartography is not organised according to pre-given categories but made up by the multiple movements that cross it. Smooth space is shifting and mobile – it transforms together with the patterns and relations of movement that deﬁne it. Striated space is organised in ﬁxed patterns according to a pre-given unitary logic, that of the state. Deleuze and Guattari use the concepts of striated and smooth not only as denominations for physical spaces. The process of striation is not only a matter of a territorialising geography but also of producing corresponding subjectivities. Striation introduces sedentariness and stability in both living and thinking. The statal apparatus produces disciplines and tools for a certain form of subjectivation just as it just produces borders and territorial divisions. A sedentary subjectivity is produced via schools, barracks, and prisons until psychoanalysis as method of mental normalisation. Striation implies a molding of concrete subjects according to the pre-established, supposedly universal, cast of the Cartesian subject.

### Roadways and Highways Links

#### Link - Roadways facilitate the flow of labor and the flow of capital. They enable the state to survive as a capitalist machine.

Kevin Kuswa 04 director of debate of University of Richmond

Machinic Rhetoric, Highways and Interpellating Motions

 Beginning with the highway machine's movement, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) intervene with a diagram that is indispensable to any discussion of circulation and modernity. They plot the state's shift from "machinic enslavement" to "social subjection" as the components of the nation are captured by an organizing apparatus working through capitalism. As Fordism and the energy crisis demonstrated, machines are tied to nations and states-in this case the highway machine intertwines with America and the United States government. Capitalism, likewise, is effectuated by a law of states that offers the possibility of a "free" flow of labor and capital for a group of producers.

More generally, we must take into account a 'materialist' determination of the modern State or nation-state; a group of producers in which labor and capital circulate freely, in other words, in which the homogeneity and competition of capital is effectuated, in principle without external obstacles. In order to be effectuated, capitalism has always required there to be a new force and a new law of States, on the level of the flow of labor as on the level of the flow of independent capital. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p455)

A state, then, is a nation that has been realized through the flow of capital (land) and the flow of labor (people). When the land and the people are deterritorialized or overcoded through flows of labor and capital, the nation becomes "the very operation of a collective subjectification, to which the modern State corresponds as a process of subjection" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p456). This does not mean that nations are simply appearances or the consequences of a dominant ideology. Instead, nations "are the passional and living forms in which the qualitative homogeneity and the quantitative competition of abstract capital are first realized" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p456).

#### Link – Highway - Narratives of progress and utopian futures surrounding contruction of highways are constructed to occupy our cultural imagination. The control over this imagination allows States to justify war and violence.

Burgess 4 (Helen J, Assistant Professor of English in the Communication and Technology track at University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “Futurama, Autogeddon: Imagining the Superhighway from Bel Geddes to Ballard” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[1] In 1939, the General Motors Pavilion at the New York World's Fair unveiled "Futurama," Norman Bel Geddes' future vision of American transportation. Futurama consisted of a scale-model America, including a "City of Tomorrow" and a network of interconnecting fourteen-lane superhighways. These highways carried upon them ten thousand model cars, which traveled ceaselessly around the system. Bel Geddes imagined a future in which cars were equipped with radio transceivers to prevent collision -- the perfect technological fix to provide a safe environment for the burgeoning traffic on American roads. Visitors to the pavilion left wearing a lapel pin (above), stating "I Have Seen the Future." [2] In this web-essay I argue that Bel Geddes' narrative of the golden future of the Interstate was haunted from the start by a ghost -- the specter of its own death. By the time the Interstate was begun, it was already clear that such a project would have massive material effects on both the natural and the socioeconomic environment. Whole neighborhoods were razed, mountains leveled, wetlands drained, even while the Interstate continued to project forward into a glowing technological future. The Interstate, from the moment of its conception, attempted to use this future-perfect to cover over the ghosts it would leave behind, both human and animal -- the destruction of delicate environments, the ever-present road-kill, the high-speed car smashes. [3] The first section of this essay will investigate optimistic narratives of the highway, using archival materials from the 1939 World's Fair and the beginning of the Interstate building era in the 1950s. These materials represent a vision of the future driven by narratives of progress, civic duty and manifest destiny, often commissioned for the purpose of fulfilling and inciting a demand for consumer goods. The imagined future represented in such ephemera suggests a longing for a perfect, utopian future characterized by technological intervention and social engineering. [4] But the ghosts always come back. In the second section, I argue that a messy, always-under-construction, polluted highway system, beaming cheerfully forward into the future, is reflected back to us in the second half of the century as a degraded landscape in J G Ballard's Crash and The Atrocity Exhibition. In these tales, Bel Geddes' optimistic narrative of the Interstate has collapsed, perhaps under the force of urban decay, but perhaps also because the Interstate system is unsustainable -- both narratively and ecologically. The ghosts of the highway call back to us from these future narratives, reminding us that death is just around the next bend. [5] Jacques Derrida has suggested that ghosts come to talk with us both from the past and the future. Learning to understand these ghosts of the future-past or the past-future is necessary, he claims, if we wish to take responsibility for future generations: [we must] learn to live by learning not how to make conversation with the ghost but how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, even if it is in oneself, in the other, in the other in oneself: they are always there, specters, even if they do not exist, even if they are no longer, even if they are not yet. (176) In the case of highways, thus, it is important to understand the role that ghosts play in our constructions of the past and the future, if we are to learn to take responsibility for their role in the future. The way we imagine the roads of tomorrow suggests something about the way we value our selves, our environment, and our technologies -- and suggests something about the way we must act, if we are to have responsibility for our future selves. [6] The 1939 World's Fair, held on the cleaned-up site of a former ash-dump in Flushing Meadows, New York, set the stage for a powerful vision of the future. Industrial designer Norman Bel Geddes' model America of 1960 was an immense diorama stretching over 35,000 square feet; it was housed in the impressively modern General Motors Pavilion. The "Futurama ride" was the highlight of the Fair, attracting up to 28,000 people a day over the two-year duration of the fair (Corn, 49). According to the accompanying tour guide, the model consisted of "a half-million buildings and houses -- thousands of miles of multi-lane highways -- more than a million trees -- rivers, lakes and streams -- snow-capped mountains -- rich-flowering countryside -- industrial centers -- college and resort towns -- great, towering cities" ("Futurama," 24). Visitors were seated in a "carry-go-round" consisting of 552 plush chairs, which moved slowly around the sides of the diorama as simulated night fell and the sun rose again. The tour was narrated by a voice issuing from a sound-box in each chair. [7] Futurama was a part of a larger exhibition offered by General Motors called "Highways and Horizons." Its purpose was twofold: to offer a model of improved highways of the future (thereby clinching the sale of more cars), and to spike consumer confidence more broadly in goods, cars and appliances of the future. The issue of America's reluctance to be involved in the rapidly escalating war in Europe was temporarily quashed by visions of a grand, utopian future of spectacular superhighways, ironically borrowed from Hitler's Reichsautobahnen (begun in 1933). [8] To help sell its dream of a mechano-utopian future, General Motors enlisted the popular modern narrative of progress, arguing that "history shows that the progress of civilization has run parallel to advancement in transportation" ("Futurama," 2). Even the General Motors Pavilion itself, a white deco-curved giant of a building, featured superhighway-inspired ramps to allow public entrance. Superhighways, thus, were seen as a symbol of progress, in this case imagined as a road leading into a bright, utopian future. [9] The movie "To New Horizons," (The Jam, Handy Organization, 1940) commissioned by General Motors to document its grand exhibition, added visual impetus to the imagined world of tomorrow. In a montage of stock images, the film announced the coming of the world of tomorrow by tapping into narratives of progress and manifest destiny. The film then went on to showcase the Futurama model exhibit, showing close-ups of the Futurama diorama in action, and ended with shots of the popular exhibition building itself, replacing the familiar "the end" with "Without End" to signifying that the future was something to strive for indefinitely.

#### Link – The Highways connect humans into a larger state apparatus. Humans literally become cogs in a striated flow of state production.

Kevin Kuswa 04 director of debate of University of Richmond

Machinic Rhetoric, Highways and Interpellating Motions

Returning to the abstract plane, we can trace how the highway links into a statist conception of people and territory. Likewise, two types of machines are implicated and consolidated by the state's process of subjection. The human machine conceives of subjects as constituent parts of larger machines composed of humans and perhaps other components such as animals or tools. In short, the human machine brings inhumanity along for the ride in the form of machinic enslavement. On one hand, the human machine is the body and its full array of experiences-a combination of circulating and resistant parts, "each specialized in function, operating under human control to transmit motion and perform work" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p457). On the other hand, machinic enslavement tortures and erases the human body as a means of dehumanizing the person. The person becomes a small (and replaceable) part within a larger exterior. In the extreme, a human (machine) may be enslaved to the highway or even the television such that the driver/viewer "is no longer a consumer or user, nor even a subject, but intrinsic component pieces, 'input' and 'output,' feedback or recurrences that are no longer connected to the machine in such a way as to produce or use it"

#### Link – Autopia - The idealized aesthetics of an “autopia” is an uncanny ghost in our history of transportation infrastructure. The affirmative is part of a larger historical narative that centralizes control and creates enviromental and social destruction. We have a responsibility to challenge this narrative in order to prevent future lives from being sacrificed in its name.

Burgess 4 (Helen J, Assistant Professor of English in the Communication and Technology track at University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “Futurama, Autogeddon: Imagining the Superhighway from Bel Geddes to Ballard” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[26] Bel Geddes could not imagine the explosion of private car ownership in his future "autopia"; similarly, estimates that the Interstate highway system would be completed by 1970 were, at best, optimistic: not only is it still not complete in the form it was originally planned, but it must be constantly upgraded to deal with weather damage, earthquake damage, and general wear-and-tear. The Interstate, then, is not a perfect network overlaid on America, but a constantly renegotiated layering of dynamic variables -- traffic patterns, construction, weather. The magic date at which "the future" would be realized -- 1960 -- in effect never happened. construction, weather. [27] But at the same time, the American highways systems are haunted by Bel Geddes' idealized aesthetics. The grand, curving sweep of the highways and overpasses, the perfect symmetry of cloverleaf interchanges, and the deco-inspired architecture of arterial city highways bear the stamp of Walter Teague and Bel Geddes, fellow designers for Ford and General Motors in the World's Fair pavilions of the thirties and forties. Bel Geddes' book Magic Motorways (1940) would be influential in the process of Interstate highway design in the 1940s and 1950s, when the complex engineering project was planned and designed. Bel Geddes' voice, thus, speaks to us every time we head out, onto the open road. [28] David Gelertner, in comparing the 1990s with the 1930s, has suggested that the difference between the optimistic futurism of the World's Fair and the pessimism of the 1990s is a lack of belief in "the future." In fact, he suggests, the utopia imagined in the 1930s was in many ways achieved, although perhaps not in the way its dreamers hoped: The fair predicted that Americans would move out of the cities into the suburbs, and we did. It claimed that the automobile would remake the landscape, and it did. It foresaw working and middle classes that were rich enough to live 'the good life,' and in the fair's terms that is exactly what we have done. (367) He goes on to suggest that ...should we ever wish to change things and return to a world view like the high thirties,' ... our biggest task will be to see something where today we see nothing; to imagine the future, period (369). What Gelertner forgets, though, is that the ghosts of that future are with us, every time we engage in the act of imagining potential futures for ourselves. The future is not a lack of imagination but an overflowing of it, so much so that voices come from it and speak to us in ways we don't expect. The ghosts of Bel Geddes' Futurama -- the ghosts of the people for whom the future never came, at least not in the way they imagined -- continue to speak to us from Ballard's stylized depictions of automobile-created death. [29] Jacques Derrida, meditating on what it means to live in a world populated with the ghosts of the dead, suggests that we owe our ghosts, both present and future, some consideration. In doing so, his implication is that responsibility lasts beyond our immediate present, and therefore we must learn to think about the future effects of our contemporary decisions: No justice ... seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead... (xix). These ghosts live on in every fictional imagination of the future we engage in. Science fictional landscapes, whether Ballard's texts or Bel Geddes' dioramas, give us an unique chance to imagine what our next steps might be like. The social, environmental and economic change that we enact now will change lives in the future; so, too, will the narratives we tell ourselves about the future, just as the narratives told about the coming of the Interstate system in the thirties and fifties changed the way countless lives unfolded from the sixties to the nineties and beyond. Despite Gelertner's characterization of the present as somehow future-less, the stories we continue to weave do, in fact, contain a future. Whether these narratives are golden, as they were in the age of technological utopianism, or pessimistic, as they are in Ballard's networks of death, the ghosts of the future will come back to speak to us.

#### Link - Driver safety training is a guise for the state to tighten its hold over populations.

Packer 7 [Jeremy, Associate Prof of Communication, “Automobility and the driving force of warfare: From public safety to national security” - Conference at the Symposium "Architectures of fear. Terrorism and the Future of Urbanism in the West" CCCB 17-18 May 2007] //JG

A photo of a mushroom cloud rising above the waves of what can only be imagined by an American audience as a far-off tropical land, featured this caption, “Today’s great problem is modern man’s control of power”. This second metaphor was both timely, seeing as the atomic bomb was newly configuring global relations of power, and prescient, given the political changes in the U.S. that have followed the attacks of 9/11/2001. As Whitney explained over 50 years ago, “inteligent control” (italics in the original) was the means for dealing with “power” whether it be “obtained from atomic fission, or from the combustion of a gasoline-air mixture” (WHITNEY, 1949, p. 4). This shift in emphasis from “self-discipline” to “inteligent control” mirrors the broad shift described as that from a disciplinary society to a control society (DELEUZE, 1995). Automobility provides not only a useful example for understanding how such a shift has been occurring, but it will be argued that recently formulated means for controlling automobility are experiments for the more general control of mobile populations. Strange as it may seem, the automobile’s power is no longer simply metaphorically related to war. For the War on Terror and U.S. Homeland Security, the automobile needs to be controlled precisely because it has come to be problematized as a bomb.

Altering driving behavior over the past 100-plus years through scare tactics, traffic rules, education programs, and surveillance has been a massive undertaking by a cluster of invested governing agencies. I have previously shown (PACKER, 2008) how a series of safety crises have created different problematic mobile populations which have been the target for disciplining. Women, youth, motorcyclists, transportation laborers, and racial minorities have all been represented as automotive threats to themselves and others. As groups who historically have been lacking in political, economic, and cultural capital gained access to automobility or created different forms of automobility, their mobile behavior was popularly represented as dangerous. These “threats” were almost exclusively responded to in terms of traffic safety and police surveillance. If the danger they posed is instead understood in terms of how increased mobility disrupts social order, then safety, at least partially, needs to be understood in political terms. One question that follows is: “How has safety been used as a means for altering or maintaining asymmetric relations of power?” This is not just a question though of who gets to drive and with how much latitude as if the equation is simply automobility=freedom=equality. Automobility and the freedom it promises need also to be understood as an obligation. The systems of automobility in the United States and other highly industrialized countries very often nearly demand that one must drive a car. Thus, the disciplining of mobility organized through traffic safety is a means for keeping other interconnected economic and social systems running smoothly, including systems of social inequality.

### Buses Links

#### **Link – Buses - Itineraries and buses that travel from one point to another make striated space.**

D'haen et al 05 (Theo,  Paul Giles, Djelal Kadir, and Lois Parkinson Zamora. Prof of Modernism at leuven university in Belgium. “How far is America from here?” PG 622 – 623)

This Tourist map with its suggestion of perspective is reminiscent of the panoramic view on which Michel de Certeau elaborates in his influential essay “Walking in the City,” where he describes the “voluptuous pleasure” of the god like observer who seems to possess the city and be possessed by it in his gaze from above. In comparison with non-tourist maps this map demonstrates the citys transformation but by the suggestion of concretion. The inserted representations of concrete attractions recall images that are already present in the viewers imagine and localize them in the topography. The attractions rise up from the ground to the viewer as an enticing, clear, manageable ensemble. This ensemble negates the chaos of skyscrapers that block each other from view, in favor of a bright plane from which single buildings emerge in all visibility. The selected attractions are connected with red lines— these represent the itineraries of the sight-seeing buses. The buses themselves are visible, too, in oversize representations. The vehicles and their marked itineraries introduce the idea of story into the map, and thus of narrative. The map does not limit itself to a representation of urban space as an object of the viewers gaze, but it also produces a space of agency and experience. This space, however, is subjected to the same rules as the observed space: even as participants in the urban web, the tourists remain in possession of the general view that is guaranteed by the map. The city’s meaning results from the sum of its attractions. It is not even necessary to “read” the city, since the maps icons suggest the city imprints itself in its reproduction. Taking up MacCannell’s metaphor cited above, the buses “weave” the city’s attractions together into a seemingly closed text. The space herby represented is a striated space, in which the lines and trajectories of the new York apple tour are subordinated to the points, the attractions: “one moves from one point to the next” as Deleuze and Guattari describe striated space.

### High Speed Rail Links

#### Large scale infrastructure projects like High Speed Rail massively change the metric and order of power relations. While icons of progress and economic growth justify these mega-projects, States deligitimize labor and institute polymorphic geographies to exert political control.

Zanon 11(Bruno, Associate professor of urban planning urban sustainability, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Trento, “Infrastructure Network Development, Re-territorialization Processes and Multilevel Territorial Governance: A Case Study in Northern Italy”, Planning Practice & Research, 26:3, 325-347)

Infrastructure networks play a crucial role in the construction of the territory because they create connections among places, thus defining spatial systems in physical and economic as well as political terms. This means that a change in the configuration of the infrastructure modifies territorial connections and systems, challenging the politico-administrative organization. Infrastructure projects—and in particular mobility networks—therefore constitute a key issue in the debate and in initiatives aimed at organizing and re-organizing territories. Decisions concern strategic perspectives as well as engineering problems, imply the interaction among different administrative levels and a variety of sectoral actions, and involve an array of actors in socio-economic programming and physical planning procedures. The change in the nature of connections due to technological innovations, new management responsibilities (the end of public monopolies, in particular) and the need to connect different places in a diverse (faster, more immaterial) way, represents one of the faces of globalization. It has been claimed that we now live in a ‘space of flows’ rather than in ‘spaces of places’ (Castells, 1996), and new infrastructure projects undoubtedly perform an important role in such a shift by activating de-territorialization and re-territorialization processes, which are changes in the nature and scale of the constituting relations of territories (Brenner, 1999; Governa & Salone, 2004). This is not only a matter of physical spatial organization, however; for there are multiple spaces of flows, which have many dimensions. Blatter (2004, p. 544) stresses the material flows (‘socio- economic exchanges and ecological interdependencies’) together with the flows of ideas (‘shared visions, beliefs and ideologies’), implying that the infrastructure innovates the territory as well as the society. Material components and immaterial links are equally important. Currently, states, regions and cities are proposing numerous projects for the reorganization of infrastructure networks. The reasons can be summarized in slogans such as ‘be on the map’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003) and ‘more networks for better accessibility for more GDP’ (Espon, 2004a, p. 466). A first point to be stressed concerns the role of the infrastructure in constructing (and transforming) the territory. Territory is a concept that relies, on the one hand, on the correspondence between space and government, and, on the other, on the relationships among activities, functions and places. If the infrastructure constructs the territory, and if political power traditionally refers to a territory, a change in networks produces a shock on the polities involved. Moreover, territorial changes connected with new political conditions (European integration, in particular) give rise to new connections. Another point regards the change in the nature of relationships among places, because a ‘space of flows’ may supersede the traditional ‘space of places’ ‘as the dominant logic for social organizations and institutions’ (Blatter, 2004, p. 530). It must be stressed, anyway, that networks cover the entire territory but they do not connect all places together, so that they differentiate conditions and opportunities. A final point is related to governance, because the re-scaling process (Brenner, 1999, 2004; Amin, 2002; Gualini, 2006) and the ‘hollowing-out’ of state powers (Jessop, 1997) ongoing in many countries are related to the new role of the European Union (EU) and to the emergence of regional politico-administrative levels (MacLeod, 1999) as well as to a new role of market actors. This regards also the re-organization of infrastructure networks and the shift from supply-side infrastructure provision models to demand-sensitive ones. The activation of a multiplicity of institutional and non-institutional actors (agencies, enterprises, etc.) responsible for the construction of the infrastructure and the management of services implies the displacement of competencies and responsibilities that used to be the raison d’etre of local authorities, traditionally related to a specific territory and to the provision—within a monopolistic regime—of services of public interest. Places are therefore taking part in ‘multiple spatialities’ (Amin, 2002) (a regional administration, a river basin, a motorway influence area, an international cooperation network, etc.) and are involved in diverse decisional processes. This paper focuses on the relationships between the change in the physical territorial organization connected to infrastructure policies and actions and the evolution of the politico-administrative system from exclusive competencies typical of nested political administrations to shared responsibilities within a multilevel governance system. The key questions addressed regard whether consolidated decisional and planning processes are responding to new infrastructure proposals and how innovative concepts, like that of ‘infrastructure platforms’ elaborated in Italy in order to integrate networks within ‘territorial projects’, are operating. The challenge concerns technical issues (better: infrastructure planning) as well as political ones, because top-down procedures have been replaced by concerted ones, and the federal perspective (devolution of powers from the state to regions) seems not to be appropriate to address proposals impacting on different jurisdictions. Multilevel governance procedures have therefore to be activated, taking into consideration that territorial competition must be balanced with territorial cohesion and that new actors have appeared on the scene. The key research questions are the following: . What is the role of new infrastructure networks in building the territory within the European framework? . What kind of multilevel governance should be activated? . How can the sustainability (economic, first of all) of new proposals be addressed? . How can infrastructure proposals be connected with territorial planning and local development? The article develops a case study regarding a proposal, within the European financial programmes, for a new infrastructure corridor called ‘Ti-Bre’. This stands for ‘Tirreno–Brennero’, the two areas to be connected, which are contiguous but not efficiently linked. This is therefore a re-territorialization process that enables a number of considerations to be added to the recent literature on such projects (Fabbro & Mesolella, 2010; Janin Rivolin, 2010). After a methodological part addressing the role of the infrastructure in constructing the territory, the article develops the case study on the basis of analysis of governmental documents concerning the ‘infrastructure platforms’ taking into consideration regional plans and programming documents, as well as the diverse initiatives and projects of the actors involved (cities, agencies and companies). Part of the work was developed within a wider research project that involved interviews with key informants and whose results have been recently published (Fabbro & Mesolella, 2011). Infrastructure, Networks, Territory: Contrasting Visions of Local Development The infrastructure builds the territory by enabling communication, transport and relationships to take place. It has been defined a ‘sociotechnical’ construction (Graham & Marvin, 2001), which means that it cannot be ‘treated as an undifferentiated ‘‘black box’’ marked technology’ (Graham, 2001, p. 340), with the attendant risk of giving rise to a technological determinism, while there is broad space for political decisions and social interaction. From roads to canals, railroads, motorways and information and communications technologies, networks support human relations of both a material and immaterial nature. For these reasons, urban technologies have become ‘fetishes’ of the industrial city (Kaika & Swyngedow, 2000), symbols and icons of progress, although most networks have disappeared underground, losing part of their rhetorical power. This role has been recently assumed by other public works: in particular, high-speed train stations, airports, bridges, and so forth, all of which tend to have strong images, albeit with different values connected to them. For instance, a much-debated infrastructure like the major high-speed train line in Italy has given rise to a new identity symbol for the city of Reggio Emilia thanks to a bridge designed by Santiago Calatrava; whereas in Piedmont the line between Turin and Lyon, in France, has become a battlefield on which environmentalists and local communities confront the supporters of a European-level project (Bobbio & Dansero, 2008; Janin Rivolin, 2010). There is no doubt that in many cases the construction of new infrastructure lines implies environmental degradation, because they affect delicate habitats and natural areas. Moreover, ‘large-scale infrastructure works are seen by many as a form of what could be called ‘‘unreflexive modernization’’, exclusively aimed at enhancing economic growth’ (van der Heijden, 2006, p. 24). This view is shared by people in different countries, who do not necessarily suffer directly from the drawbacks of a specific project but who take action in the name ‘of what has been called a ‘‘global civil society’’’ increasingly active in a ‘multi-level environmentalism’ (van der Heijden, 2006). On the other hand, to be noted is a positive view of territorial equipments. These works structure the urban space, support mobility, provide a healthy living environment or activate cyber-connections. In other words, networks create interdependencies among places, and ‘these places may then be considered belonging to one territory’ (Offner, 2000, p. 170). Hence, ‘it is through the networks that territories form a system’ (Offner & Pumain, quoted in Offner, 2000, p. 170). This happens because connectivity, which is different from proximity (Graham & Marvin, 2001), entails that places, regardless of their reciprocal distance, form a territory on the basis of a number of different networks, material and immaterial, physical or electronic. The effects are not evenly distributed, because transport and communication infrastructures can only operate when they are organized into networks composed of nodes and lines, which mean places and flows. Distance has become relative because connections depend on the nature of the medium and the organization of the network. The result is that places outside such systems and intermediate spaces can suffer not from distance but from disconnections (Bobbio & Dansero, 2008). This condition has been called the ‘tunnel effect’ (Andreu, 1998, quoted in Graham, 2000): territories crossed by high-level infrastructure lines cannot take advantage of their physical presence because the service is provided at specific points, where a ‘pump effect’ (Fabbro & Mesolella, 2010, p. 31) is activated. In this regard, networks can be seen from two contrasting positions: as constituting ‘territorial ‘‘selectors’’, which create a dual space: territories with a service or not, connected or not to the networks . . .’, or as ‘an instrument of Infrastructure Networks, Re-territorialization and Territorial Governance de-territorialization’, in that they ‘provide the same service at every point in the territory’ (Offner, 2000, p. 167). The infrastructure projects currently being debated are promoted under pressures of different kinds: territorial re-organization at the European level, innovation in management and technology, economic development programmes. In fact, EU integration processes stimulate new and more efficient connections among places previously separated by physical and political barriers. Traditional networks tend to be made obsolete by the introduction of new technologies as well as by the activation of different management systems. Both can dramatically change the efficiency, costs, and the accessibility of the services required. More generally, the new urban forms arising throughout Europe are all dependent on extended transportation and communication systems: the networked city, the archipelago, the me ́tapolis (Offner, 2000) as well as the Netzstadt (Oswald & Baccini, 2003) and the extended urban sprawl characterizing some regions (as the so-called ‘citta` diffusa’ of Veneto), are all urban forms where mobility channels tend to prevail over places. Such issues are not only of an engineering kind; they also regard the governance of processes producing ‘polymorphic geographies’ (Brenner, 2004). From an economic point of view, networks are investments that define ‘spatial fixes’ (to use a neo-marxian term: see Harvey, 2001) traditionally provided by the public on a ‘supply-side’ logic. This concept means that the infrastructure is a fixed factor embedded in the land that allows other factors (and people and goods as well) to move from one place to another. The stress is to be placed on both the physical issues and the socio-economic system related to the structured space as described by the more recent concept of ‘territorial capital’ (Camagni, 2007; Espon, 2007). The economic effects of infrastructure networks are in any case difficult to forecast, owing to the complexity of the cause–effects relationships. New connecting lines may increase the accessibility of peripheral regions but, at the same time, they can improve connections among stronger areas, enlarging their markets. The lowering of barriers may place weak areas at risk, but it can also integrate them in a new market for local products (Wegener et al., 2004).

### Water Project Links

#### Link – Water Projects - The state trains highly specialized engineers to make water space striated for the state’s ability to direct the flow of desire and establish individual connections to state power.

Trotter 03 ( Jullie. PHD at Australian national university. “The need for multiscalar analysis in the management of shared water resources” <http://www.feem-web.it/nostrum/db_doc/UNESCO.pdf>)

A state territorialization process occurs when a state tries to invest a new space for its own legitimization, whether it is physical, rhetorical, or symbolic, argues P. Faggi (1990). Water projects have often provided occasions for states to develop their territorialization process over a previously uncontrolled area. Faggi distinguished between the productive and the strategic logic of water projects. The productive logic that is put forward, generally aims at increasing agricultural production or domestic water supply. The strategic logic aims at introducing some state control over matters that were previously decided by other social actors. Massive water infrastructure projects systematically alter the former relations to water, whether customary law regulated them or not. They bring new technology that requires experts, thereby removing control of water use, access, and allocation from local communities that previously used lower level technology every inhabitant could master. Such massive infrastructure projects are generally accompanied by new rules and regulations, spelled out by the state, that are supposed to replace the former rules. This process whereby the state appropriates the right to spell out rules governing social control is what Faggi refers to as state territorialization. Such a process accompanies all massive water infrastructure projects, including those relating to centralization. A state always strives to preserve its right to spell out the rules governing social control. It may delegate the execution of tasks to other social actors and call this decentralization. It may also delegate to other social actors the power to lay down some rules, but it will always strive to retain (or acquire) the right to decide which social actors are empowered to do this. With his model of weak states and strong societies, Joel Migdal has observed how most of the states born out of decolonization entered into competition with a multitude of other social actors over the right of spelling out the rules governing social control. In most cases, the state lost that competition and had to settle for a compromise with various formal and informal institutions already spelling out these rules (Migdal, 1988). Migdal later refined this initial model to produce his state-insociety model (Migdal, 2001). Whenever the state attempts to extend its power over a given sphere, various state institutions interact with the social actors they are attempting to control or influence. This dynamic process changes the groupings ¶ themselves, their goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are promoting (Migdal, 2001, ¶ p. 23). ¶ State leaders view the state as a mechanism to create a single jurisdiction – ¶ a rule of law in which the rules are the same from border to border. This is ¶ a desideratum of the modern state. These strongmen, whether they are ¶ village chiefs, urban caciques, or rich peasants, work for precisely the ¶ opposite effect. They seek to maintain their own rules, their own criteria for ¶ who gets what, within much more limited bounds. . . . Struggles for ¶ domination take place in multiple arenas in which the parts of the state are ¶ related not only to one another but each is a single social force in a field of ¶ interacting, at times conflicting, social forces. ¶ (Migdal, 2001, p. 91 and p. 100) ¶ Such interactions are especially salient in the case of water. As state institutions attempt to extend control over the use, access, and allocation of water they are engaged in a multiplicity of interactions with a great variety of social actors who are already exercising an aspect of this control. These social actors invest the state ¶ institutions and the resulting situation is often one where “the idea of the state” does not correspond to “the practices of the state.” ¶ Researchers investigating international water conflicts have virtually never tried ¶ to understand how these strongmen, urban caciques, or rich peasants actually affect ¶ the water policy of a state as it spills over into its foreign policy. Often, the ¶ compromises reached within this complex array of interactions induce second-order ¶ water scarcity. The weaker a state feels towards its domestic array of social actors involved in water competition, the stronger is the temptation to denounce a need for more water resulting from an unfair international water agreement. ¶ States do not design the social control of water in the manner an engineer ¶ designs a network. States are immersed in a complex dynamic process whereby their institutions interact with non-state institutions both within and outside the national territory. Understanding such a process sufficiently to determine whether an international water agreement is sustainable is only possible through a multiscalar analysis.

### Statism Links

#### Link - The state gains power by striating space, closing off territories and allocating them according to the needs of fascism.

Watson 2005 (Janell, Prof. @ Virginia Tech & Editor of Minnesota Review. “Oil Wars, or the Extrastate Conflict ‘Beyond the Line’: Schmitt’s Nomos, Deleuze’s War Machine, and the New Order of the Earth.” South Atlantic Quarterly 104:2.)

Because movement is the essential spatial aspect of oil, the Schmittian framework may be inadequate to fully understand the oil war. Like Schmitt, Gilles Deleuze and FeÅLlix Guattari also establish a spatial divide between state space and not–state space, which they define as sedentary and nomadic, respectively. They write that ‘‘the State itself has always been in a relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship.’’ 6However, whereas Schmitt dwelt on the legal differences among the terrestrial, maritime, and aerial, Deleuze and Guattari focus on the modes of organization of different spaces, and the different kinds of movement possible within each. In the striated space of the state, they explain, ‘‘one closes off a surface and ‘allocates’ it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks.’’ In the smooth space of the nomads, in contrast, ‘‘one ‘distributes’ oneself in an open space.’’7 The state allocates striated space, while nomads populate smooth space. Making a similar distinction, Schmitt emphasized that order and orientation divide land, in contrast to the indifferentiation of the free space of the sea—at least until the technology of the submarine transformed the sea by muddling the distinction between land war and sea war, which had previously been subjected to different legal regulations. 8 While Deleuze and Guattari agree that the sea and the desert have historically tended to be smooth spaces, any space may be striated, whether that space consists of land, sea, air, or digitized signals.

### Economic Growth Links

#### Link – Economic Growth - Efforts to sustain the post-“recovery” economy put an ominous new spin on biopolitics, transforming the lives of the populace into liabilities.

Nadesan 11 [Majia Holmer, Professor of Comm at ASU; “THE BIOPOLITICS OF TRANSACTIONAL C APITALISM,” MediaTropes Vol III, No 1 (2011) accessed online at <http://www.mediatropes.com/index.php/Mediatropes/article/view/15747/12840> - p. 23-24 //JG

By the spring of 2010, major newspapers, periodicals, and investment websites in the U.S. were calling the end of the recession. Stock and bond markets “flirted with milestones,” unemployment stabilized, the service sector expanded, and manufacturing increased. “Recovery,” it seemed, was imminent. This essay examines the biopolitics of recovery in the wake of the disaster capitalism of the financial meltdown. The financial disaster, it is argued, enabled the types of structural adjustments previously reserved for developing economies. The implications for western populations have yet to be fully examined; however, it is clear that twentieth century social -welfare biopolitics 1 that derived wealth from laboring populace s have been replaced by new forms of power whose global circulations and convergences in electronic exchanges exploit wealth informatically, through devices such as derivatives and mediated technologies such as high-frequency trading. Labor’s displacement as an important source of capital accumulation within western economies problematizes the telos of twentieth century Keynesian social-welfare biopolitics, which sought to enhance and regulate the biovitalities of national populations. This essay argues that the convergence of power in financial services and entities, coupled with the informatic codification and circulation of wealth, have ominous implications for western biopolitical relations. Stripped of surplus value within economic calculi, the lives of the populace are transformed into liabilities as their resource consumption and effluents threaten the biosphere. Thus, aggregate consumption is now linked to depleted water tables, dwindling arable lands, and proliferating green house gasses. Yet, efforts were made to transform even these threats into digitalized representations enabling wealth accumulation. In concluding, this essay examines how carbon derivatives trading was used to expropriate wealth from a thanatopolitics of destruction. 2

#### Link – Economy - The flow of wealth is infused with speed and becomes a centrifuge that colonizes sociality.

Nadesan 11 [Majia Holmer, Professor of Comm at ASU; “THE BIOPOLITICS OF TRANSACTIONAL C APITALISM,” MediaTropes Vol III, No 1 (2011) accessed online at <http://www.mediatropes.com/index.php/Mediatropes/article/view/15747/12840> - p. 23-24 //JG

Global wealth has moved centripetally toward elite centers within and across nations as a result of de-regulation, corporate and government predation, and securitization (Vrabel, 2010). The potential for wealth to be digitalized and to circulate instantaneously has facilitated this centripetal action. The evolving computer -communication networks that enable this unprecedented accumulation of intangible wealth operate at unimaginable speeds. Wealth accumulation strategies that exploit virtual markets have a tendency to colonize all forms of sociality by attaching quantitative values to social phenomena, thereby enabling them to be traded in market transactions. So pervasive is this type of commoditization that it has captured public policy efforts to forestall climate change.

#### Link – Progress - Images of progess and expansion via transportation are a smoke screen for military mobilization and control.

Burgess 4 (Helen J, Assistant Professor of English in the Communication and Technology track at University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “Futurama, Autogeddon: Imagining the Superhighway from Bel Geddes to Ballard” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[10] "To New Horizons" begins with stirring music and black-and-white footage of the ocean, panning slowly onto the shore. The purpose of the first section of the film is to set up "progress" as a desirable historical development over time, showing gradual changes in living, transportation and availability of commercial goods. "New Horizons," the narrator proclaims. "In a restless search for new opportunities, the mystery and promise of distant horizons have always called men forward ... old horizons open the way to new horizons." Key in this montage scene are images of roads and highways, segueing from small paths to bridges to roadways, and thence to highways. Technological improvements are paralleled with the metaphorical movement "forward" into the future; the narrator suggests that travel is indicated in time as well as space: The accelerating rate of man's progress in all fields of endeavor has paralleled closely our progress in the field of movement from place to place. New things to do, new ways to do them; telephone, electric lights, automobiles, aircraft are all symbols of better living. This mixture of road metaphor and progress narrative ("New horizons: roads for men to go places!") is compounded with the implicit narrative of manifest destiny. As roadways are shown in montage, we see images of covered wagons moving across the landscape, followed by pictures of a woman first pumping water from a well, then calling children in to play on a farm, then baking bread in an old stove. Pioneer images shift into "progress" images as the woman gets a better stove, running hot water, a new lamp, and a phonograph. This montage suggests that just as Americans crossed the landscape and conquered space, so scientists are helping to show "new horizons" -- in the shape of consumer products. The narration stretches the highway metaphor further and further to encompass scientific and capitalist expansion: The highways of social and commercial development are widening without end or limit except for the imagination, vision of men who do new things. Today, engineers are always leading us higher, widening the trails, while the men of science are broadening our mental avenues with new activities. These mental avenues are signified by point-of-view shots from a car as it moves up the side of a mountain, taking in a viewscape of controlled wilderness on the outside and a groomed highway ahead. [11] As the black and white montage sequences end, however, the narrator suggests that space is not the final frontier: Our greatest drives in providing more things for more people have been made at a time when the influence of new geographical frontiers was about over. Mentally and physically, we are progressing toward new horizons. As these words are spoken, the film moves away from its stock city-and-highway footage and comes to rest on the latest "new horizon": the GM Pavilion at the World's Fair and the Fair's concrete symbol, the massive white "Trylon and Perisphere" statue. This abstract sculpture of a sphere and elongated pyramid suggests that it is time to abstract our thoughts as well, looking with our imaginations into the "new horizons" of the future. At the same time, the film changes from black and white into Technicolor, signifying the move from the past and present into a more glorious and colorful future. Queues of people are shown milling around outside the pavilion, waiting to "see the future" as they have been promised. [12] The second part of the film documents closely Bel Geddes' diorama, sweeping over the scale models and coming in for close-ups as the narrator continues to speak. Chief among these scenes are the "highways of tomorrow" with their lovingly detailed tiny cars (bulbous, streamlined and brightly colored, unlike the bland black cars in the parking lots outside the fair!). The magnificent overpasses and sweeping curves ("highway engineering at its most spectacular") both act as a monument to the conquering of space and stand in for more general scientific and social change: "This 1960 drama of transportation progress is but a symbol of future progress in every activity, made possible by constant striving toward new and better horizons." The final cuts, featuring animations of highways and the streamlined abstract curves so prevalent in graphic design of the time, suggest a continued movement forward into the future, motivated by the metaphor of the highway. [13] The underbelly of this bright look into the future is, to our eyes and ears, quite obvious. Megan Shaw and Rick Prelinger, in discussing the narratives of manifest destiny so freely used in the imagination of future highways, note that borrowing from a pre-twentieth-century paradigm for an understanding of the uniquely twentieth-century road-building technology that freeways represent has left us open to the dissonances that arise from the conflict between the lived experience of freeways in the late twentieth century and the remembered experience of free horizons that we were drawing on when we built them (19). The triumphant presentation of "an American city replanned around the highly developed modern traffic system" ("To New Horizons") carries rather more scary connotations to a people who have endured fifty years of the gutting of the inner city to make way for arterial bypasses, as well as the noise and air pollution that came with them. Urban renewal, though, seemed to the people of the post-depression a welcome relief; David Gelertner reports that "[T]he depression made the utopian future an urgent and compelling belief" (51). Social welfare being virtually nonexistent in the United States (as it continues to be, by the standards of many countries), the onus was on urban planners and engineers such as Le Corbusier and Robert Moses to find ways to create more pleasant urban environments. Unfortunately, urban planners responded by sweeping the social problem under the carpet, with the approbation of the middle-class public. One of the scariest parts of the narration of the film enacts this version of social Darwinism with the following statement: On all express city thoroughfares, the rights of way have been so routed as to displace outmoded business section and undesirable slum areas whenever possible. Man continually strives to replace the old with the new. The power of the highway to enact social renewal is thus symbolic of a more insidious possibility: the engineering of the world of tomorrow by urban planners. Bel Geddes' dream of Futurama is haunted by the dark ghost of social engineering. [14] Interrupted by World War II and then the project of European reconstruction, Futurama's "Interregional Highways" did not come into being until 1954, when what is now known as the Eisenhower Interstate System was passed by Congress. Despite the delay, however, Bel Geddes' vision of a safer, streamlined future had already become deeply entrenched in American culture. A publication by the National Highways Users Conference advertising the proposed system personified the Interstate as a bounteous and beautiful Lady Liberty (right), who held a cornucopia from which issued consumer goods, while an American family (white, of course) gazed in wonder at this spectacle of the future. The Interstate occupied the American cultural imagination as the safer, cleaner, faster mode of transportation which would save drivers time and allow for fast mobilization of military transports across the country. Bel Geddes' radio transceivers were nowhere to be seen, but the split-highway system promised to lessen collisions caused by oncoming traffic. Streamlined cars owed their design to a retro-deco sensibility which promised a return to the technologically-optimistic days before the war; in the cities, stylized overpasses were built, reminiscent of Fritz Lang's Metropolis.

### Environment Links

#### Link – Environment - Narratives of environmental crisis are infused with biopolitical relationships that use kinship to promote state power.

Mikulak 7 [Michael, Fellow in Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic, Ph.D. “The Rhizomatics of Domination: From Darwin to Biotechnology” accessed online at <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue15/mikulak.html> //JG

In a time where global warming, pantoxicity, pesticide pollution, resource scarcity, and a whole host of environmental problems regularly appear in news headlines, the perennial question about what the relationship between humans and nature is and should be, is more pressing than ever. While it may seem trite to focus on questions of narrative, representation, agency, and subjectivity in the face of more "pressing" material concerns, the environmental crisis is more than a problem for scientists; it is a problem of narrative, ontology, and epistemology. It is as much a failure of imagination as it is a technological problem, arising from maladapted social and political ecologies that fail to establish healthy and sustainable network of kinship imaginaries 2 that are capable of addressing the competing needs and desires of multiple actors within the biocultural networks humanity is always with in. Kinship imaginaries are the foundation of how we relate to others, and thus are the ground upon which (bio)politics are based. They are the basis of how we imagine ourselves to be connected to the world around us, and the myriad organisms that populate this increasingly shrinking and sullied world. How we imagine ourselves in relation to nature determines, to a large extent, the power dynamics of that relationship, whether it is colonial, ownership based, or convivial and respectful. Whether the Christian narrative of Genesis that encourages Man to "increase, multiply and subdue the earth" (cf Lynn White Jr, Merchant), or Gary Snyder's blend of Eastern mysticism and Aboriginal myth which sees the world in terms of an etiquette of freedom, kinship imaginaries are the foundation of our relationship with each other and the world around us, and thus must be interrogated carefully if we are to address the source of the environmental crisis. They are the discourses, emotional ties, art and beliefs we have about our place in the world and provide the substrata and intellectual justification for our actions in the world. Although not an exhaustive sampling, this paper is about two competing kinship systems, the arboreal and the rhizomatic, and the ways in which they structure and are structured by political economy, scientific knowledge, and power. The environmental crisis is a complicated interaction of all these things, and my choice to focus on kinship imaginaries derives from the belief that any solutions to the environmental crisis must also occur on the level of narrative if they are to be more than a passing fad. Neil Evernden suggests that "we are not in an environmental crisis, but are the environmental crisis," in the sense that our way of knowing and being in the world is the problem (134). As such, to address kinship imaginaries, is to approach the problem from the understanding that we must first change the way we think about nature and culture if we are to solve the problem. There are many different kinship imaginaries circulating, but I choose to focus on rhizomatics and arboreal systems for the sake of brevity, but also because of the potency of certain discourse emerging out of the biotechnological debate, and their implications for transforming the way we understand nature and culture to be related.

### Information Exchange Links

#### Link – Information – Economies of information are the newest form of insidious control. Increasing flows of information within communication networks enable state surveillance and fascism. Discipline requires training and repetition, but the numerical language of control can be deployed instantaneously.

Bogard 2009 [William, Professor of Sociology, PhD from Colorado State University, (“Deleuze and New Technology”) p. 18-19]

Like Foucault, Deleuze asks how the integration of a form of content and a form of expression is effectuated by an abstract machine. In a well-known essay, Deleuze writes that control is replacing discipline as an abstract machine that invests the entire social field today (Deleuze 1 992 ) . Although it is also a function of disciplinary assemblages, control as an abstract machine differs from discipline in many ways. In control societies, the form of content, the machinic form, is the distributed network, whose model supplants the Panoptic on as a diagram of control.6 Distributed networks deterritorialise the disciplinary assemblage. There is a shift from mastery over visible space to the integrated management of information, and control operates less through confinement than through the use of tracking systems that follow you, so to speak, out the door and into the open. What matters most in these assemblages is not that your body is visible - that is an already accomplished fact for the most part - but that your information is available and matches a certain pattern or profile. Matching information, in fact, becomes a precondition for visibility in control societies, for example, when your racial profile makes you a target of observation by the police (Bogard 1996). The abstract machine of control no longer 'normalises' its object, as discipline does. Normative information rather is integrated into numerical codes. 'The numerical language of control', Deleuze writes, 'is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it', for example, your passwords or DNA (Deleuze 1992: 5 ) . Codes are the form of expression or enunciation in control societies; unlike norms, which demand prolonged training to instill, codes only require programming and activation.7 The socius, Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus, is basically an 'encoding machine' : 'this is the social machine's supreme task . . . [to code] women and children, flows of herds and of seed, sperm flows, flows of shit, menstrual flows: nothing must escape coding' (Deleuze and Guattari 1 9 8 3 : 141-2 ) . Immanent within the socius, however, are 'decoding' machines that carry it away and open it to the outside. Capital is such a machine. In an interesting analysis, Deleuze and Guattari note that the general business of the pre-capitalist social machine is to overcode flows of desire. Capital, however, decodes these codes and places them in flux (Marx understood this as Capital's destruction of the prior mode of production) (Deleuze and Guattari 1 9 8 3 ) . Decoded desire and the desire for decoding exist in all societies, even pre-capitalist ones, but capital turns them into axioms and ends of production. This does not mean codes do not exist in capitalist societies. In fact they proliferate even more - in the way, for example, fashion codes proliferate through their continuous decoding, or decoded DNA can be recoded. Capital does not aim to make codes extinct but to produce fluid codes that adapt to its changing technical means of control. It does not decode the socius to eliminate social codes, but to re-engineer them. The following extended passage from Anti-Oedipus is relevant here:

#### Link – Information – Global networks of communication have replaced borders as the mechanism for establishing state relationships. Globalization uses virtual space to reconfigure and strengthen our connection to the state.

Monnier 10 (Christine, “What is Globalization” <https://globalsociology.pbworks.com/w/page/14711303/What%20is%20Globalization>)

This convoluted concept simply conveys the idea that, under conditions of globalization, territory becomes less relevant to human relations. For instance, thanks to information technology, anyone in the United States equipped with a computer and an internet connection can play the stock market in Tokyo, chat online with friends in Canada, upload or download all sorts of information and data from any place in the world from other individuals similarly equipped, as well as watch Al Jazeera (a television network from Qatar, in the Arabic peninsula) via satellite. Territories and borders have become irrelevant to such interactions that are therefore global in nature. The process of deterritorialization is what makes globalization different from any other processes of social change in human history. David Harvey (1990) described this process as time-space compression. When one America individual exchanges instant messages with someone in another country, this instantaneous s interaction erases distance and occurs as if these two individuals were in the same place, a virtual space. Time and space have therefore been compressed through the technological creation of a virtual space of interaction unaffected by distance. The real physical distance between these two individuals is covered, literally, in no time. Practically every phenomenon that we can think of has acquired such supraterritorial (above space) qualities: electronic communications, environmental degradation, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, financial flows, health threats, etc. All these areas of human life are being globalized insofar as they are no longer attached to specific territories but develop and affect us at a transnational level. The process of globalization, as deterritorialization, turns the world into a single space.

#### Link - Texts are striated - Striated space is hierarchical and authoritarian while smooth space is dynamic and situated. Striated space exists within literal and metaphorical spaces, including infrastructure and education.

Voithofer & Foley 2009 (Rick, Ohio State Univ., and Alan, Syracuse Univ. “(Re)territorializing Literacies in Urban Landscapes.” AERA Conference Paper, San Diego, CA.)

This dynamic between the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of literacy is framed as a move between striated and smooth spaces. Striated spaces are routine, hierarchical, rulebound, disembodied, authoritarian, and static while smooth spaces are dynamic, transforming, becoming, embodied, and situated. Urban environments contain both striated and smooth spaces. Smooth space is haptic, not merely optical – it is perceived and interacted with by multiple senses. There is continuous variation in smooth space, which is the space of the war machine – inhabited by nomads. Striation is motivated by anxiety (i.e., the anxiety of performance on a test) that disciplines these spaces. The imposition of clocks in education is an example of the stratification of smooth space. Striation makes things measurable. As Deleuze and Guattari summarize, "all progress is made by and in striated space, but all becoming occurs in smooth space" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 486). A city might be seen as the striation of the rural. Deleuze & Guattari do not offer these concepts as binaries, but as processes in perpetual motion and interchange. The image of the bookshelf wave machine comes to mind. As the machine slowly moves from side to side, waves of liquid flow back and forth between the two ends never stopping. Those hierarchies and boundaries in a socially striated space can also be seen in other spaces, namely textual spaces. Moulthrop discusses how smooth and striated space applies to technology and pedagogy and asserts that striated space is the domain of routine, specification, sequence, and causality (Moulthrop, 1994).

### Urbanism Links

#### Link – Urbanism - Urban spaces striate space as a method for organizing capitalist labor. The ocean is one example of how transportation systems striate space to direct flows of desire.

Sverrisdottir 2011 (Hildigunnur, Architect and part time lecturer at Iceland Academy of Arts. “The Destination Within”. Landabrefid (Journal of the Association of Icelandic Geographers) 25).

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari (1987 [1980]) described and defined space according to two conceptual opposites; the smooth and the striated. In their analysis, striated space is the organized space of, e.g., the city, with systematic planning and a clear orientational quality, originally grounded on the city-state and further developed through modern capitalism. The space very much like any given modern city, the space of a sedentary urbanite, grounded on the wish of the metropolis to organize and later optimize production, consumption and service for its own citizens; optimal, visual, completely definable and measurable. At the opposing end, we have the realm of pure nature, unaccountable, haptic, vast, and useless as a base of systemization. This is the space of the ocean or the sand dune in the desert that has its horizons rearranged every instant by the blow of the winds. Obviously, this is also the realm of the lava field in the fog and the vast glacier, in the Icelandic context. This is the realm of intensities, a multi-sensory experience, not easily rationalized – of feeling the cold, tasting the snow and hearing the silence; a space of the haptic, bound through the body, multitudes of possibilities with no clear direction, a space of the event (figure 2). The condition of space being smooth or striated is, however, based on the subject’s context with the environment. The ocean was striated with the help of the stars (and later GPS) to control commerce and transport. But it also refers to logical comprehension, the capabilities of navigation through whatever field of life. Conversely, the over-striated urban tissue of metropolitan cities can transform itself into smooth space from the point of view of a visiting outsider. The two opposing concepts of space – the smooth and the striated – are, however, interdependent and one will always coexist with the other, thus giving meaning to the dynamics of shifting realms, based on the transcendence of perception of the observer.

### Utopianism Links

#### Link – Utopianism – Totalitarian control is required to produce “utopian” societies. State based discipline is justified by a drive to perfect obligations in transportation and all other areas of life.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

Authoritarian utopianism is driven by a desire for perfection (Davis, 1981: 14; Berneri, 1950: 2). Utopia is conceived of as a static state of perfected being, whilst utopianism constitutes attempts to realise this state - a movement from blueprint to perfection. These blueprints are drawn up according to rationally constructed plans that appeal to abstract principles (Davis, 1981: 102, Popper, 2003: 154, Berneri, 1950: 5) - the application of which, it is hoped, will end result in perfection. Achieving and maintaining these states of perfection requires strong - even totalitarian - authority, something Davis makes abundantly clear: ‘the perfection of utopias must be total and ordered; the totality, ordered and perfect. In order to achieve this, without denying the nature of man or society, there must be discipline of a totalitarian kind’ (1981: 39) - an argument supported (from a critical stance) by Popper (2003) and Berneri (1950: 7). This totalitarianism must extend to the psychological sphere too, for the ability of the individual to think alternatives, let alone attempt to realise them, represents a challenge to perfection (Davis, 1981: 54, 374) - utopia is ‘static and does not allow its citizens to fight or even to dream of a better utopia’ (Berneri, 1950: 7). Hence we find Davis arguing that ‘utopia’s greatest enemy is pluralism’ (1981: 382). Such a philosophy is necessarily statist: a large state apparatus being necessary in order to achieve the levels of control required. Davis calls this the ‘Leviathan state’ – a: centralised, bureaucratic, sovereign state with its impersonal, institutional apparatus… [a] comprehensive, collective state with its assumption of obligations in every area of human life, from health to employment, education to transport, defence to entertainment and leisure… a total and rational social order, of uniformity instead of diversity, of impersonal, neutrally functioning bureaucracy and of the comprehensive, the total state (1981: 8-9). He even goes so far as to suggest that utopianism is worth studying primarily because it was influential in the development of the modern state (1981: 9).

#### Link – Utopianism - Utopianism is an integral part of state based philosophy. It promotes transcendentalism and sends the signal that desire is based on lack. This mode of thinking is incapable of producing freedom or accepting difference.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

From the perspective of nomadic thought, authoritarian utopianism is a philosophy hostile to life. It is grounded in rationalism and transcendence: an example of state philosophy par excellence. It is thus unable to think the genuinely new, incapable of conceiving of difference-in-itself and hostile to immanent flows of life: a state philosophy - State Utopianism18. State utopias show themselves to be unable to think freedom and difference, expressing only ‘repetition’ - the values of their time projected forwards in time (Jameson, 1994: 62) They submit immanence to the laws of the transcendent, with Utopia taking the form of this ‘something’ or ‘lack’ - a point of being to which all flows of becoming are directed. Utopia thus becomes what Rosset refers to (in the quote from Anti-Oedipus above) as the world’s double – ‘some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)’.

### Freedom Links

#### Link – Freedom - The freedom and liberty that the aff fetishizes becomes an ornamental object in a mass consumer culture.

Burgess 4 (Helen J, Assistant Professor of English in the Communication and Technology track at University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “Futurama, Autogeddon: Imagining the Superhighway from Bel Geddes to Ballard” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[15] Bel Geddes' vision continued to gain credence, but with a distinctly 1950s flavor. Comfort and consumption were on the minds of Americans; women were encouraged to imagine a life of leisure without the drudgery of the kitchen. Another General Motors film, this one set at the 1956 Motorama in New York City, "Design for Dreaming" (1956) gave the audience a surreal vision of life in the automobile age. Staged as a dream sequence experienced by a woman of the fifties, "Design for Dreaming" showcased an automated kitchen, a range of futuristic-looking cars, and a model superhighway. In this movie, romance and luxury were key. During a dance sequence, the dreaming woman is turned around the floor of the showroom by a man in a silver mask (presumably the "man of her dreams"), exclaiming over the cars as she goes: I'm a girl who happens to think that a brand new car is better than mink.  Excited?  Delighted! So glad I got invited.  Since it's just a dream and involves no money, which one would you like me to buy you, honey?  They're all so beautiful, I really don't know, so let me go down, get the lowdown, and look at each one much closer ... I want a Corvette.  I thought you would.  Ooh! I want a Pontiac too.  Okay, we'll have the usual two-car garage. How do you feel about this fine Oldsmobile?  It's easy to see myself taking the wheel.  This Buick's a beaut.  I'll try it. Ooh, what a dreamy ride! I think that we ought to buy it.  Let's go all out and buy a Cadillac too.  I can hardly wait for this dream to come true! [16] The mysterious man and the dreaming woman end the film by driving onto the highway of tomorrow. Sitting in their futuristic car ("designed for the electronic highway of the future, the fabulous, turbine-powered, Firebird II!"), they prepare to head out, the man reporting to the "control tower" reminiscent of Bel Geddes' 1939 radio towers: "Firebird II to control tower, we are about to take off on the highway of tomorrow, stand by." As they speed onto the highway we see a starlit Jetsons-style scene showing model cars driving on a series of curved highways, and music swells as the woman sings: The film suggests a fissure already forming in the 1950s with the saturation of mass consumerism: how to get women, an untapped market, to buy expensive products? The answer was to suggest that technology and automation would free them from drudgery -- but ironically this "freedom" meant freedom to continue being viewed as beautiful but useless ornamental objects. The car, in this case, was merely another consumer item, while the highways of the future suggested not the freedom of the road but the fulfillment of the sugary romance women were taught to desire.

### Root Cause Links

#### Link - Rhizome - The Affirmative’s use of social relations to criticize debate as currently practiced suffers from its own dangerous ideology because its implementation requires one to put on an epistemological straightjacket. The 1AC’s singular focus and subsequent assertions of root causes deepens preestablished modes of thinking that rely on unity and hierarchy.

Deleuze and Guattari 1987 (Gilles and Felix, French writers, philosophers and revolutionaries, Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus, pg. 14-17)

Thought is not arborescent, and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter. What are wrongly called “dendrites” do not assure the connection of neurons in a continuous fabric. The discontinuity between cells, the role of the axons, the functioning of the synapses, the existence of synaptic microfissures, the leap each message makes across these fissures, make the brain a multiplicity immersed in its plane of consistency or neuroglia, a whole uncertain, probabilistic system (“the uncertain nervous system”). Many people have a tree growing in their heads, but the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree. “The axon and the dendrite twist around each other like bindweed around brambles, with synapses at each of the thorns.” The same goes for memory. Neurologists and psychophysiologists distinguish between long-term memory and short-term memory (on the order of a minute). The difference between them is not simply quantitative: short-term memory is of the rhizome or diagram type, and long-term memory is arborescent and centralized (imprint, engram, tracing, or photograph). Short-term memory is in no way subject to a law or contiguity or immediacy to its object; it can act at a distance, come or return a long time after, but always under conditions of discontinuity, rupture, and multiplicity. Furthermore, the difference between the two kinds of memory is not that of two temporal modes of apprehending the same thing; they do not grasp the same thing, memory or idea. The splendor of the short-term Idea: one writes using short-term memory of long-term concepts. Short-term memory includes forgetting as a process; it merges not with the instant but instead with the nervous, temporal, and collective rhizome. Long-term memory (family, race, society, or civilization) traces and translates, but what it translates continues to act in it, from a distance, off beat, in an “untimely” way, not instantaneously.

The tree and root inspire a sad image of thought that is forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a centered or segmented higher unity. If we consider the set, branches-roots, the trunk plays the role of opposed segment for one of the subsets running from bottom to top: this kind of segment is a “link dipole,” in contrast to the “unit dipoles” formed by spokes radiating from a single center. Even if the links themselves proliferate, as in the radicle system, one can never get beyond the One-Two, and fake multiplicities. Regenerations, reproductions, returns, hydras, and medusas do not get us any further. Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centers of significance and subjectification, central automata like organized memories. In the corresponding models, an element only receives information from a higher unit, and only receives a subjective affection along preestablished paths. This is evident in current problems in information science and computer science, which still cling to the oldest modes of thought in that they grant all power to a memory or central organ. Pierre Rosenstiehl and Jean Petitot, in a fine article denouncing “the imagery of command trees” (centered systems or hierarchical structures), note that “accepting the primacy of hierarchical structures amounts to giving arborescent structures privileged status…. The arborescent form admits of topological explanation…. In a hierarchical system, an individual has only one active neighbor, his or her hierarchical superior…. The channels of transmission are preestablished: the arborescent system preexists the individual, who is integrated into it at an allotted place” (Significance and Subjectification). The authors point out that even when one thinks one has reached a multiplicity, it may be a false one – of what we call the radicle type – because its ostensibly nonhierarchical presentation or statement in fact only admits of a totally hierarchical solution. An example is the famous friendship theorem: “If any two given individuals in a society have precisely one mutual friend, then there exists an individual who is the friend of all the others.” (Rosenstiehl and Petitot ask who that mutual friend is. Who is “the universal friend in this society of couples: the master, the confessor, the doctor? These ideas are curiously far removed from the initial axioms.” Who is this friend of humankind? Is it the philo-sopher as he appears in classical thought, even if he is an aborted unity that makes itself felt only through its absence or subjectivity, saying all the while, I know nothing, I am nothing?) Thus the authors speak of dictatorship theorems. Such is indeed the principle of roots-trees, or their outcome: the radicle solution, the structure of Power.

### Impact Calculus Links

#### Link – Impact Calculus - Weighing impacts presumes an act of judgment by the ego. Analyzing decisions based on quotients of freedom ignores the importance of the present moment and assumes a transcendent character.

Smith 07 (PhD in philosophy at college of Chicago, Head assistant of Department of Philosophy at Purdue Universty. “DELEUZE AND THE QUESTION OF DESIRE: TOWARD AN IMMANENT THEORY OF ETHIC”

Pg 71 – 73)

Now with these Nietzschean reﬂections in hand, I want to turn to my second text of an immanent ethics, which comes from Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Although the names of Nietzsche and Leibniz are not usually linked together by philosophers, the relation between the two thinkers is not an accidental one. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche praised Leibniz’s critique of consciousness and his differential conception of the unconscious, the profundity of which he says, “has not been exhausted to this day” (GS 357). In the New Essays, Leibniz asks: What would it mean to act “freely,” as we like to say, given this theory of the drives? Leibniz asks us to consider a simple example: suppose I am hesitating between staying at home and writing this paper, or going out to a tavern to have a drink with some friends. (The same analysis would apply to the hesitation someone might feel, say, for choosing between two candidates in an election.) How do I go about making a decision between these two? The error would be to objectify these two options, as if “staying in” or “going out” were objects that could be weighed in a balance, and as if deliberation were an act of judgment in which “I”—my self, my ego, my intellect—attempt to assess the direction toward which the balance is leaning, “all thing being equal.” But in fact these two options are not isolatable “objects” but rather two drives, or as Leibniz calls them, “motives” or “inclinations” of the soul. The strength of Leibniz’s analysis in the New Essays is to show that drives or motives are not simple things, but rather complex “orientations” or “tendencies,” each of which integrates within themselves a host of what he liked to call “minute perceptions.” My inclination to go to the tavern, for instance, includes not only the minute perception of the effect of the alcohol, or the taste and temperature of the drink, but also the clinking of glasses in the bar, the smoke in the air, the conversation with friends, the temporary lifting of one’s solitude, and so on. The same is true of the inclination to stay at home and work, which includes the minute perceptions of the rustling of paper, the noise of my ﬁngers tapping at the computer, the quality of the silence of the room when I stop tapping, the comfort (or frustration) that I ﬁnd in my work. Both inclinations are formed within an unconscious complex of auditive, gustative, olfactory, and visual perceptions, an entire perceptio-inclinatory ensemble. For just as we have unconscious perceptions, we likewise are constituted by what Leibniz called “insensible inclinations” or “disquietudes” of which we are not aware, that pull us simultaneously in a multitude of directions. Not only are all of us constituted by a multitude of unconscious drives, each drive is itself multiple, an inﬁnite complex of minute perceptions and inclinations. It is these drives and motives that constitute the very tissue of the soul, constantly folding it in all directions. This is what Locke termed the “uneasiness” of the soul, its state of constant disquiet and disequilibrium, and Leibniz, its dark background, the fuscum subnigrum. What then is the act of deliberation? At the moment when I am torn between staying home and going out for a drink, the tissue of my soul is in a state of disequilibrium—oscillating between two complex perceptive poles (the perceptive pole of the tavern and the perceptive pole of the study), each of which is itself swarming with an inﬁnity of minute perceptions and inclinations.. Here, the movement of the soul, as Leibniz says, more properly resembles a pendulum rather than a balance—and often a rather wildly swinging balance at that. 13 The question of decision is: On which side will I “fold” my soul? With which minute inclinations and perceptions will I make a “decisive” fold? Arriving at a decision is a matter of “integrating” (to use a mathematical term) the minute perceptions and inclinations in a “distinguished” perception or a “remarkable” inclination. The error of the usual schema of judgment is that, in objectifying my two options—staying home or going out—as if they were weights in a balance, it presumes that they remain the same in front of me, and that the deliberating self likewise remains the same, simply assessing the two options in terms of some sort of decision procedure (whether in terms of my interest, or a calculus of probabilities, or an assessment of potential consequences). But this falsiﬁes the nature of deliberation: if neither the options nor the self ever change, how could I ever arrive at a decision? The truth of the matter is that, during the entire time the deliberation is going on, the self is constantly changing, and consequently is modifying the two feelings that are agitating it. What Leibniz (and Bergson, for that matter) calls a “free” act will be an act that effectuates the amplitude of my soul at a certain moment, the moment the act is undertaken. It is an act that integrates the small perceptions and small inclinations into a remarkable inclination, which then becomes an inclination of the soul. But this integration requires time: there is a psychic integration and a psychic time of integration. Thus, at 10:15 p.m. I have a vague urge to go to the tavern. Why do I not go? Because at that moment, it remains in the state of a minute inclination, a small perception, a swarm. The motivation is there, but if I still remain at home, working, I do not know the amplitude of my soul. Indeed, most of the time my actions do not correspond to the amplitude of my soul. “There is no reason,” says Deleuze, “to subject all the actions we undertake to the criterion: Is it free or not? Freedom is only for certain acts. There are all sorts of acts that do not have to be confronted with the problems of freedom. They are done solely, one could say, to calm our disquietude: all our habitual and machinal acts. We will speak of freedom only when we pose the question of an act capable or not of ﬁlling the amplitude of the soul at a given moment.” At 10:30 p.m., I ﬁnally say to myself, to hell with this paper, I’m going out drinking. Is that because the drive to go out has won out over the drive to stay home working? Even that simpliﬁes the operation, since what came into play may have been other motives that remain largely unknown to us, such as (these are all examples given by Nietzsche in Daybreak): “the way we habitually expend our energy”; “or our indolence, which prefers to do what is easiest”; “or an excitation of our imagination brought about at the decisive moment by some immediate, very trivial event; or “quite incalculable physical inﬂuences”; or “some emotion or other [that] happens quite by chance to leap forth.” As Bergson puts it, in terms very similar to Leibniz’s, “all the time that the deliberation is going on, the self is changing and is consequently modifying the [often unknown] feelings that agitate it. A dynamic series of states is thus formed which permeate and strengthen one another, and which will lead by a natural evolution to a free act....In reality there are not two tendencies, or even two directions, but a self which lives and develops by means of its very hesitations, until the free action drops from it like an over-ripe fruit. As Leibniz puts it, to say that we are “free” means that we are “inclined without being necessitated.” A free act is simply an act that expresses the whole of the soul at a given moment of duration—that is, an act that ﬁlls the amplitude of the soul at a given moment. Parenthetically, one might contrast this theory of decision with the one proposed by Derrida in his well-known essay “Force of Law.” Both Derrida and Deleuze insist that decision presupposes an Idea, almost in the Kantian sense. For Derrida, however, these Ideas—for instance, the Idea of justice, which would guide our juridical decisions—are, as he says, “inﬁnitely transcendent,” and hence the very condition of possibility of their effectuation is their impossibility. For Deleuze, such Ideas are purely immanent: the Idea is nothing other than the problematic multiplicity of these drives and minute inclinations, which constitutes the condition of any decision. In this sense, one might say that Deleuze “replaces the power of judgment with the force of decision.”

#### Link - Traditional forms of thinking arise from an apparatus of capture that promotes state power. Nomadic thinking is an escape route.

Patton 2006 (Paul, Humanities Prof. @ Univ. of New South Wales. “Order, Exteriority and Flat Multiplicities in the Social,” Deleuze and the Social, Edinburgh University Press.)

This problem arises because the traditional understanding of concepts as the constitution of a form of interiority in thought is modelled on the state form understood as an apparatus of capture. Deleuze and Guattari point to the manner in which the traditional representational image of thought expresses the essence of the state form in general (ibid.: 374ff.).2 The problem of how to give conceptual expression to a pure form of exteriority therefore calls for another, non-state style of thought which Deleuze and Guattari call ‘nomad’ thought. This is a mode of thinking which delineates its object not by conceptual capture but by retracing a line of continuous conceptual variation through the various kinds of content addressed in this plateau: the two poles of sovereignty identified in Dumézil’s studies of Indo-European mythology, the games of chess and go, the different styles of epic drama found in Shakespeare and Kleist, and so on. In this manner, the war machine concept is indeterminate or inexact in a way that parallels the differential and dispersed nature of the object. It is a mobile concept that reproduces in its form the exteriority of the war machine. The difference between the concepts of state and war machine thus provides a striking illustration of Deleuze and Guattari’s preferred form of conceptualisation. Two conclusions may be drawn from this example. The first is that the contrast between state and nomad thought, or arborescent and rhizomatic thought, implies an altogether different kind of world in each case. The second is that the sense in which A Thousand Plateaus provides an original conception of social being and social order is inseparable from the mode of thought developed in the course of the book. That is why, paradoxically, although the social, social relations and social formations are everywhere in A Thousand Plateaus, there is no concept of the social as such.

### Fear of Death Links

#### The affirmative values life from a point of negation and guilt, every attempt to save life is an attempt to control it. Prefer our politics of desire because it starts from a point where death is not an end and life is never extinguished.

Williams 11(James, Professor of European Philosophy at the University of Dundee “Never Too Late? On the Implications of Deleuze’s Work on Death for a Deleuzian Moral Philosophy” Edinburgh University Press Ltd, p. 172)

What could have been done differently? What should be learned? How can we salvage a general moral consolation from the particular disaster, when perhaps even the shared label of “particular” is already a betrayal of the singular events? Is there any consolation to be drawn from the end, from the choking, terrified, doomed struggle of the beast, perhaps some other rebirth, a memorial, a celebration of survival and a remembrance of sacrifice? More wisely, and against the corrosion of guilt and what ifs, of necessary communal self-deception, how can we work together against any repetition? They let it happen again . . . The moral problem under consideration here is not in any given prescription. “Keep away from the sands.” It is not even in any more abstract law. “Always act to preserve a fellow beast’s life; right up to the very limit of yours.” It knows almost nothing of calculations and recipes. “The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few . . .” It shies away from the lofty versions of such work on scales, either (and rightly) calibrated according to lower thresholds, or set within hybrid systems of measurement and assessment. “We must eradicate poverty first.” “What we need is a non-monetary, non-capital based account of value.” “Calculation is on the rules, not on any specific circumstance.” The problem is in a prior valuation about life, about who and what is worth saving and why. This valuation and its many obscure links to desires, thoughts and emotions explains the despair when it is too late, the guilt at having failed and the resolution to be ready next time, better next time. A valued life has been lost. We have to know and feel for something worth saving, before debating about how to save and when. We also have to be aware of the need for preservation, of the finiteness and singularity of what is to be saved. What then to make of a philosophy of life and death, of life in and through death? What happens when late is never too late, because part of life is never extinguished, because death is not an end. What happens when life is affirmed in death, despite its consumption of living creatures? Do we then find reasons not to act, or to temper our acts, because absolute lateness never comes, because any resolution of “never again” resonates as nonsense in a world where nothing is ever the same again, where it is always too late and still too early in every passing instant and atom, and hence never too late for this life here? So the cruel demagogue stares at the fading rings and bubbles on the surface of the pool and tells us that in some sense the beast is not dead. In our grief and remorse we cling to those words and commit the double violence of trading away the living for some illusion of an afterlife for those who have passed, while betraying the dead in divining a living image in a terminal event. We project the phantasm of a life after death into the future and turn away from new living beings, erasing the truth of “too late” in favor of the consolation of “still here, still time.”1

#### The death that the 1AC fetishizes is a negation of life. Their problematic notion of death precludes understanding it.

Williams 11(James, Professor of European Philosophy at the University of Dundee “Never Too Late? On the Implications of Deleuze’s Work on Death for a Deleuzian Moral Philosophy” Edinburgh University Press Ltd, p. 177)

The struggle to wage war against war, and to bring death to death, therefore rests on the ideas of the double death and “one dies.” Particular deaths are transformed through their participation in the multiple minor deaths and attendant creative novelties accompanying their duration. In place of a final passing away of personal identity, we have myriad impersonal continuities. Yet this is only under a difficult condition, since this continuity cannot simply be a representation of the death of given identities multiplied at smaller scales. There would then be a vicious regress in Deleuze’s position, where on closer inspection we would find the difficulty we hoped to solve but at greater magnification: the multiple ongoing lives are subject to the same obliterating endpoints. This regression is not Deleuze’s point at all. Instead, what matters is the relation between deaths and not the deaths themselves. Any continuity is in those relations and in none of the actual deaths. Each death changes those ongoing and continuous relations, but also, each death is shaped by its relations to all others. These relations must be of a different order than final deaths and destructions of identified things. There is an afterlife in new and different lives but not through physical remnants, in a genetic code passed on to descendants, in the exchange of blood through a tiny wound, or in fertile ashes and bursting seeds scattered among burned-out stumps. Instead, it must pass through something expressed in physical lives and wounds, in sensations, affects and acts, but not reducible to them. Deleuze explains this in Difference and Repetition in a paragraph that sets up a connection between death as negativity in the Freudian death drive and death as productive and life creating in Eros or love.14 Actual death is death as “negation” and “opposition” (Deleuze 1968a: 148). That is not all it is, though, since death is something that comes from the outside and introduces something new into the dying thing, in the dying duration. That’s why death takes the form of a problem, as something unknown and unknowable, rendered through the questions “Where?” and “How?” whose source is “that (non) being that every affirmation is fed from” (Deleuze 1968a: 148). This non-being isn’t nothingness or a void. It is a positive reality, but one taking a different form than being or than identified existents.

#### The affirmative’s concept of death holds no relation to actual death; it only knows about a death in the future. This is problematic because their reflection on death induces paralysis and despair about what to do in the present.

Williams 11(James, Professor of European Philosophy at the University of Dundee “Never Too Late? On the Implications of Deleuze’s Work on Death for a Deleuzian Moral Philosophy” Edinburgh University Press Ltd, p. 177-9)

Deleuze explains this formal difference in relation to time in the second chapter of Difference and Repetition. Actual death takes place in relation to the present, in a struggle in the present against a limit that “makes everything pass” (Deleuze 1968a: 148). Impersonal death, or virtual death, the “one dies,” eludes the present and the past.15 Instead, it is always “to come” and as such has no relation to the dying self, but is rather “the source of a ceaseless multiple adventure in a persisting question” (Deleuze 1968a: 148). This split in times is reproduced in The Logic of Sense in the descriptions of the times of Chronos and Aion, where the former corresponds to the present that concentrates past and future and makes them pass, and the latter is a time where everything either has been or is to come, but is never present (Deleuze 1969: 190–4). A good way of understanding Deleuze’s points here is to focus on the important terms of problem and question, both of which play central roles in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. A problem is a network of questions that express a situation incapable of solutions but operative as a driver for action to change that situation in creative and novel ways. Thus, as much as reflection on the when and where of an actual death can induce paralysis and despair when considered in relation to the identity that must pass away with its past and future, there is also a desire to affirm life by eluding this death since it is never finally given in terms of when and where it will happen. Death is our destiny, but it can be counter-actualized, not in the sense of negated or fled, but changed in its “When?,” “Where?” and “How?”16 The questions describe a productive problem in relation to death and the death drive because until actual death arrives, the questions have no fixed answer and therefore open up the possibility of novel acts in relation to death, underwritten by “non-being” as a condition for the openness of the problem.17 This allows us to understand the difficult phrase cited earlier. The time of the problem is always “to come” because it is characterized by a lack of definite answers and an open field of potential connections and relations between past and future – independent of the certainty of the present.18 This leads to an “adventure” because the way to express this potential is to alter present situations in relation to this open potential: it is a creative venture into what is necessarily unknown as actual identity. This adventure is “ceaseless” because the potential is not extinguished when a particular actual death arrives. It remains for others as expressed by earlier lives and deaths. It is “multiple” not only due to the multiplicity of questions making up the problem of death, but also because of the multiplicity of relations reserved as a potential for different actual lives. Mirroring this ceaselessness and multiplicity, questions persist because each time they are answered in a particular death as “here” “like this” and “now,” they remain as the same questions but calling for different answers in relation to different adventures for future lives. The present passes, but the future is always to come.

### Whiteness K Links

#### Focus on the epistemological and discursive aspects of race glosses over the ontological realities that create it. This prevents effective criticism and reifies racism – turns case

Saldnha 6 (Aran, Dep of Geography @ U of Minnesota, “Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype” pg. 9-10 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2006, volume 24, pages 1-24)

In contemporary theory, **race tends to be conceived as a problem of language**. **We read that race is an ideology, a narrative, a discourse. Race then refers** **to** the **cultural representation** of people, **not to people** themselves. It could be said that **race tends to be approached as an epistemological problem**: how is race known? Why was it invented? Some argue that we should simply stop thinking in terms of race. In this paper I would like to argue this might not be a good idea. Race will be approached ontologically, as a real process demanding particular concepts and commitments. Not so much representations, but bodies and physical events will be foregrounded. For instance, **the phenotype of humans can be shown to play an active part in the event called race.** When understood as immanent process, it becomes clear that, though contingent, **race cannot be transcended, only understood and rearranged**. Whether there is any physical basis for the concept of race has of course been hotly contested for many decades. In cultural studies, postcolonial theory, cultural anthropology, and most human geography, **it is common to treat race as a discursive construct.** **Many** in American critical race theory, such as Howard Winant and Naomi Zack, **opt** instead **for a** more **realist approach, granting that there are phenotypical differences but that their social force depends on culture,** **economics, and the law**. In this paper I chiefly follow poststructuralist philosophy not American left-wing prag­matism, but **I** do so in order to **take issue with the epistemological bias in much of the humanities inspired by poststructuralism**. Despite coming from a different intellectual trajectory, therefore, I would locate this intervention closer to the realist approach. The paper presents a number of entries into the argument. This theoretical eclecti­cism demonstrates that **the materiality of race can be conceptualised from a number of perspectives, making the reconceptualisation very much due**. First, Frantz Fanon's phenomenology of race is revisited, and I argue against Judith Butler's linguistic take on embodiment. Then the deontologisation of race in authors such as Paul Gilroy is scrutinised. Not asking properly what race is, Gilroy believes too easily in the possibility of its transcendence. In the fourth section, the refusal to engage with phenotype is with Bruno Latour shown to follow from a wider anxiety in the social sciences about matter. Nevertheless, in many places, as in the feminism of Elizabeth Grosz, **materiality is again treated positively**. As discussed in the fifth section, the openness of the human organism is also affirmed in anthropology—as well as in biology, from Darwin onwards. In particular, biology influenced by complexity theory and its philosophical under­pinning by Gilles Deleuze and Michel Serres can help in imagining the biocultural emergence and evolution of race relations. The last two sections follow Deleuze and Guattari and use their term machine assemblage to capture race's reality of unmediated connections. **Far from being an arbitrary classification system imposed upon bodies, race is a nonnecessary and irre­ducible effect of the ways those bodies themselves interact with each other and their physical environment. The spatiality of race is not one of grids or self/other dialectics, but one of viscosity, bodies gradually becoming sticky and clustering into aggregates**. **Battling against racism is then not a question of denying race, but of cultivating its energies against the stickiness of racial segregation.** **Crucial in this process is that social scientists critically engage with race's biological aspect.** **For if they insist that race is but a 'social construction', they might leave the discursive arena open for** (closet) **racists to reinstate biological justifications for white privilege.**

#### Racism is material and representational practices prevent the creation of an open cosmopolitan society. We have an ethical obligation to convince people of the materiality of race.

Saldnha 6 (Aran, Dep of Geography @ U of Minnesota, “Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype” pg. 19-20Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2006, volume 24, pages 3-24)

E**very time phenotype makes another machinic connection, there is a stutter**. Every time bodies are further entrenched in segregation, however brutal, there needs to be an affective investment of some sort. This is the ruptural moment in which to intervene.

**Race should not be eliminated, but proliferated**, **its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic.** Many in American critical race theory also argue against a utopian transcendence of race, taking from W E B Du Bois and pragmatism a reflexive, sometimes strategically nationalist attitude towards racial embodiment (compare Outlaw, 1996; Shuford, 2001; Winant, 2004). **What is needed is an affirmation of race's creativity and virtuality: what race can be**. **Race need not be about order and oppression, it can be wild, far-from-equilibrium, liberatory. It is not that everyone becomes completely Brownian** (or brown**!), com­pletely similar, or completely unique. It is just that white supremacism becomes strenuous as many populations start harbouring a similar economic, technological, cultural productivity as whites do now, linking all sorts of bodies with all sorts of wealth and all sorts of ways of life. That is, race exists in its true mode when it is no longer stifled by racism.**

"The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers; there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no domi­nant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race'' (Deleuze and Guattari, [1980] 1987, page 379) In ''A thousand tiny sexes'', Grosz (1994b) follows a well-known passage of Deleuze and Guattari to argue for non-Hegelian, indeed protohuman feminism that utilises lines of flight of the gender assemblage to combat heterosexist patriarchy. **"If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident that they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double reciprocal dependency between them**. For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes'' (Deleuze and Guattari, [1980] 1987, page 213). Similarly**, the molecularisation of race would consist in its breaking up into a thousand tiny races. It is from here that cosmopolitanism should start: the pleasure, curiosity, and concern in encountering a multiplicity of corporeal fragments outside of common-sense taxonomies.** "We walk the streets among hundreds of people whose patterns of lips, breasts, and genital organs we divine; they seem to us equivalent and interchangeable. Then something snares our attention: a dimple speckled with freckles on the cheek of a woman; a steel choker around the throat of a man in a business suit; a gold ring in the punctured nipple on the hard chest of a deliveryman; a big raw fist in the delicate hand of a schoolgirl; a live python coiled about the neck of a lean, lanky adolescent with coal-black skin. Signs of clandestine disorder in the uniformed and coded crowds'' (Lingis, 2000, page 142). **Machinism against racism builds upon a gradual, fragmented, and shifting sense of corporeal difference**, that of course extends far further than the street. **Responsibility, activism, and antiracist policy will follow only from feeling and understanding the geographical differentials that exist between many different kinds of bodies:** between a Jew and a black soldier, between a woman in the Sahel and a woman in Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist. **A machinic politics of race takes into account the real barriers to mobility and imagination that exist in different places; cosmopolitanism has to be invented, not imposed. It may seem that machinism is** as **utopian and open ended** as Gilroy's transcendent antiracism. **It is not, because it is empirical, immanent, and pragmatic. The machinic geography of phenotype shows that racism differs from place to place, and cannot be overcome in any simple way**. **It shows that white supremacy can subside only by changing the rules of education, or the financial sector, or the arms trade, or the pharmaceutical industry, or whatever.** **For machinic politics, the cultural studies pre­occupations with apology, recognition, politically correct language and reconsiliation, or else cultural hybridity, pastiche, and ambivalence, threaten to stand in the way of really doing something about the global structures of racism**. **A thousand tiny races can be made only if it is acknowledged that racism is a material, inclusive series of events, a viscous geography which cannot be 'signified away'**. Miscegenation, openness to strangers, exoticism in art, and experimentations with whiteness can certainly help. **But ultimately cosmpolitanism without critique and intervention remains complacent with its own comfortably mobile position**. In a word, **ethics encompasses politics, and politics starts with convincing people of race's materiality**.

#### Overdetermining whiteness and blackness as a linguistic problem paralyzes us from acting in response to how language shapes static biological phenotypes, they address the symptom not the cause

Saldnha 6 (Aran, Dep of Geography @ U of Minnesota, “Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype” pg. 11-12 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2006, volume 24, pages 2-24)

**The relationality between blackness and whiteness** in Fanon **will** to many readers **be reminiscent of the relationalities of language**. Signifiers, in the legacy of Ferdinand de Saussure, can only mean by way of a formal system or arbitrary differences. After the 'linguistic turn' associated with the poststructuralists Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, and the 'archaeological' Foucault, society has been widely considered to operate in the same way that Saussurian signs do. **In a social system of differences, dominance is achieved through the fearful discursive exclusion of 'the Other'. But since identity is never given, the future of the system is inherently political. Politics is then about the formation of heterogeneous coalitions amongst the disenfranchised to wrestle signifiers from the dominant**. **This conception of the social as structured through negativity and floating signifiers is very influential**, more or less informing important theorists of the left such as Butler, Gilroy, Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Slavoj ZiZek.

**These theorists might retort to the phenomenologist of race that it isn't phenotype at all**, but the white boy's reiterated interjection ''Look!'' that determines the differ­entiation of bodies. Fanon is 'interpellated' as black subject by the use of racist language, while the boy reproduces himself as white. **They** both **have little choice but to be produced by discourse. But what does 'produced' mean?** Surely not that there was no Frantz Fanon prior to this boy's interjection. **It means**, for these theorists, **that the interjection makes phenotype matter, that without language there would not be any difference**. **Language** (or culture at large) **is a screen which mediates between consciousness and the obscure matter of the body.** **Whenever language** (the language of science, for example) **claims to grasp materiality 'itself', it in fact hits against the wall of its own mediations.** In this mediation model of language, **materiality is forever unknown and there is no intermingling possible between the two realms**. In Bodies That Matter, Butler writes: "The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified as prior. This signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes its own action'' (1993, page 30). **Butler's well-known argument is that there is no anatomy or phenotype unless invoked by signification, by discourses of gender and race**. **It is beyond dispute that no body is untouched by signification.** **The question is,** rather, **how signification comes to have any effect at all, if not through the materiality of signs, bodies, and spaces**. The statement ''Tiens, un negre'' requires a larynx, the proximity of a Negro, a comprehen­sion of French, and being within earshot to hear it. For sure, Butler repeatedly states that there is a 'materiality' to signs, but she refuses to extend this statement to bodies or things. **The physical body of skin, blood, and bones remains other, a 'constitutive outside' that is expelled by discourse** (''signified as prior''), **but has no rhythms and volume of its own**. Thus, a Butlerian critique can rightly question the 'naturalness' of a bedrock of phenotype posited by, and justifying, racial discourse (Butler, 1997). But such critique halts abruptly at the deep gorge between racist discourse (which it attacks) and phenotypical matter (about which it will not say anything). Is not pheno- type itself shaped by cultural practice? Does phenotype ever resist its 'performance'? By not allowing anything from across the gorge to enter her critique, **Butler ultimately remains complicit with what she attacks: the metaphysical positing of an inert exter­iority to language. Can it not be possible to think and write about physical bodies without positing them as primary, pure, fixed, bounded, and self-transparent?**

**Bodies need to be appreciated as productive in their own right**, just like words or money or architecture. Fanon's **phenotype is not at all 'performed' or 'constituted'** by the boy's exclamation. **Phenotype is constituted instead by genetic endowments, envi­ronmental conditions, exercise, hormones, diet, disease, ageing**, etc. **What language does to phenotype**—phenotype itself— **is charge it, circumscribe what it is capable of doing in particular spaces.** There was certainly real phenotypical difference before the exclamation, but it had no effect on the situation (yet). The exclamation brings out a latency, a latency Fanon knew was there, but had perhaps forgotten, looking absent- mindedly for a seat. After the exclamation, Fanon's options are limited. Now, his **phenotype demands active management**. Now, his phenotype is alive, chaining him to the histories and geographies of race and colonialism.

#### We need an attention to anthropology and biology to prevent essentialism. Our opponents gloss over how racism emerges from within a complex matrix of other oppressive structures.

Saldnha 6 (Aran, Dep of Geography @ U of Minnesota, “Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype” pg. 11-12 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2006, volume 24, pages 3-24)

**In these epistemological days, anthropology is criticised for mediating nonwhite bodies and places through a Euro-American lens.** **I would like to treat the discipline** more positively, **as a third entry point into the ontology of race**, after phenomenology and feminism. Anthropology is in a sense a privileged domain for theorising the heteroge­neous materiality of the social, having always studied phenotypes, habitats, customs, beliefs, nutrition, and artefacts together, and across the planet (compare Mukhopadhyay and Moses, 1997). **Though undeniably anthropologists** willy-nilly **extended** European **imperialism**, **it is their way of getting to know phenotype and culture on a continuum that interests me. But it was modern epistemology that again divided cultural and physical anthropologists.** Peter **Wade** (2002) **argues that this division is precisely what prevents a critical,** neither biologically nor culturally deterministic, **conception of race**. He states simply: **''In understanding race, social science might do well to be open-minded about biology'**' (2002, page 121). Tim Ingold provides a transdisciplinary framework for such an ontological approach to race. "**Indeed so long as it is assumed that the biological constitution of human organisms is given as a genetic endowment, there can be no escape from racism save by disconnecting cultural from biological variation**. Clearly there is no foundation in fact for the raciological belief that cultural differences have a genetic basis. My point, however, is that in turning its back on racist dogma, subsequent theorising about human evolution has constituted the eighteenth-century view in all its essen­tials. Once again human beings figure in a dual capacity, on the one hand as species of nature, on the other as creatures who—uniquely among animals—have achieved such emancipation from the world of nature as to make it the object of their consciousness'' (2000, page 389). Drawing primarily on Merleau-Ponty and ecological perspectives, **Ingold's debunking of the nature - culture binary could encourage anthropologists to contribute to a critical biogeography of human phenotype**. **Phenotypical variations of humans is necessarily embedded in contingent networks of resources**, symbiosis, competition, **communication**, migration, environmental constraints, **and individual life trajectories**—just as ecology shows it is for other animals. Alfred W Crosby's biological history of European colonialism in Ecological Imperialism (1986) is worth mentioning here. In fact, **biology itself could be a fourth place to start thinking about the complex materiality of the social.** After all, **quite far from what most social scientists have made of it, biology** (as I understand it) **is the science of life:** **of movement and unpredictability at every level**. Grosz has suggested Charles Darwin himself could be useful to pro­gressive politics: ''He is perhaps the most original thinker of the link between difference and becoming, between matter and its elaboration in life, between matter and futurity'' (1999, page 34). The Origin of Species (1859/1998) is indeed full of references to ''difference'', ''tendency'', ''circumstance''—and, of course, ''geographical variation''. Evidently Darwin and race are a volatile couple. But yielding to the pull of social Darwinism or Nazism is conceivable only if Darwin is equated with essentialism and teleology (racial hierarchy is 'natural', that is, unavoidable). As Grosz and many biologists have shown, a reactionary reading of Darwin does not respect his persistent emphasis on historical and geographical contingency. **Nature is never given, it has to be continually remade.** It is well known that, in spite of his Victorian belief that the ''white race'' was intellectually superior, Darwin also and paradoxically insisted that ''It may be doubted whether any character can be named which is distinctive of a race and is constant'' ([1871] 2003, page 174). With Darwin, **human phenotypes can be understood as continuous and multifaceted, not discrete or linear**; as much products of isolation as of migration and miscegenation. The population biology of Ernst Mayr has long argued against the essentialism inherent to taxonomical biology (Mayr, 1963). And especially for humans, intraspecies physical differences are accumulated over many generations by active sexual selection (that is, culture), not simply natural selection (that is, 'blind' survival of the fittest). Such a materialist biology cannot be reconciled with the molecular Macchiavelism of neo-Darwinians like Richard Dawkins (1982).

As Lewontin's Human Diversity (1995) shows, **scientists and poststructuralists can teach each other a thing or two about how to avoid reductionism and essentialism in conceptualisating difference**. In the first comprehensive effort at a Deleuzian philosophy of science, Manual DeLanda (2002) relies heavily on the innovative encounters between the life sciences and nonlinear mathematics. The basic question Stuart Kauffman (2000) addresses, for example, is how it is physically possible that a system starts behaving on its own behalf. What Kauffman is talking about can perhaps best be captured by the term emergence: the nonnecessary, gradual, spontaneous, and constrained accumulation of organisation and a larger 'agency' through the synergy of smaller forces. The concept of emergence is spreading rapidly through the popular science writing on so-called complexity theory. Steven Johnson begins his Emergence with the slime mold: "The slime mold spends much of its life as thousands of distinct single-celled units, each moving separately from its other comrades. Under the right conditions, those myriad cells will coalesce again into a single, larger organism, which then begins its leisurely crawl across the garden floor, consuming rotten leaves and wood as it moves about. When the environment is less hospitable, the slime mold acts as a single organism; when the weather turns cooler and the mold enjoys a large food supply, 'it' becomes a 'they'. The slime mold oscillates between being a single creature and a swarm'' (2001, page 13). DeLanda is helpful in reading Deleuze's Difference and Repetition ([1968] 1994) as our best philosophical treatise on emergence. Anglophone Deleuze studies unfortu­nately exhibit an aversion to thinking about how the emergence of social entities and power relations happens. **It is not difficult to affirm the rhizomatic, the nomadic, and the creative potential of the world. The trick is to explain how**, even then, **we are faced with** the slime molds of **racism, sexism, capitalism, and what have you**. **The concept of emergence is Deleuze's true contribution to philosophy**, not his tendency to cosmo-anarchy (which admittedly tends to obscure the rigour of his thinking). **A racial organisation could emerge** in that French train **from the synergy of a host of bodies and things. For an ontology of the materiality of race, a conception of emer­gence is indispensable**. Apart from Darwin, ecological anthropology, and the embodied politics of feminism and Fanon, **it is Deleuze's project of grappling with emergent materiality that philosophically subtends a critical materialism.**

#### No solvency. The singular focus on one form of identity politics prevents consideration of other social positions and their intersection and Becomings within identity.

van Eijk 8 (T.J.K., Masters candidate @ Utrech University Gender Studies dep, “Diversity Management and Otherness-Politics: Organising (with) Difference How a theoretical thinking about diversity can make a difference in addressing policies and actions” pg. 37 June 12)

Identity politics, as the label suggests, centres on the idea of authentic, fixed identities. This is its strength because by narrowing the purview of emancipation it can set realistic goals. Therein, however,also lies the problem. Identity politics is in a position of impossibility to consider multiple subject positions as it centralises certain forms of being the standard of something. For example, first wave feminism has been accused of heterosexism and indifference to ethnicity. Both lesbian and black women blame early feminism that their idea of ‘a woman’ was the white middle class woman with no attention toward the differences among women. In addressing this critique, Butler points out that the list of adjectives referring to different social groups, colour, sexuality, ethnicity, class and ablebodiedness invariably closes with an embarrassed ‘etc.’ at the end of the list. It is through this horizontal trajectory of adjectives that one strives to encompass a situated subject, but invariably fails to be complete. It is this inability to treat multiple subject positions, the inability to attend to more than one specific subject at a time, which has come to be an important critique of identity politics. Identity politics fails to recognise the interactions among different characterisations and the possibilities of different identities within the same social category.

Another formulated critique is that identity politics is an attempt to thematise ‘the Other’ in terms of its similarities with ‘the Self’. Because any state of sameness actually requires difference in order to structure itself, identity requires difference in order to be. It is this necessary dependence on difference for its own identity that has kept open a space for ‘the Other’. This realisation comprises what Nealon calls the theoretical success of multiculturalism. There is an increasing appreciation of differences and everybody seems to love ‘the Other’. At the same time, however, the realisation of difference necessity has not led to a significant increase in social respect and tolerance.

#### Racism or whiteness do not operate by exclusion—they operate by identifying degrees of deviation from the fake universal standard of white, male, heterosexual, European, and capitalist. This assimilation process is based on a fundamental binarity that they redeploy, turns case

Deleuze and Guattari 80 (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Paris VIII, and Felix, radical psychoanalyst and policitical activist, “A Thousand Plateaus” pg. 172-173)

The reason is simple. **The face is not a universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself,** with his broad white cheeks and the black hole of his eyes. The face is Christ. The face is the typical European, what Ezra Pound called the average sensual man, in short, the ordinary everyday Erotomaniac (nineteenth-century psychiatrists were right to say that erotomania, unlike nymphomania, often remains pure and chaste; this is because it operates through the face and facialization). Not a univer­sal, but fades totius universi. Jesus Christ superstar: he invented the facialization of the entire body and spread it everywhere (the Passion of Joan of Arc, in close-up). Thus **the face is by nature an entirely specific idea**, which did not preclude its acquiring and exercising the most general of functions: **the function of biuni vocalization, or binarization**. It has two aspects: the abstract machine of faciality, insofar as it is composed by a black hole/white wall system, functions in two ways, one of which concerns the units or elements, the other the choices. Under the first aspect, the black hole acts as a central computer, Christ, the third eye that moves across the wall or the white screen serving as general surface of reference. **Regardless of the content one gives it, the machine constitutes a facial unit, an elementary face in biunivocal relation with another:** it is a man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, "an x or a y." **The movement of the black hole** across the screen, the trajec­tory of the third eye over the surface of reference, **constitutes so many dichotomies or arborescences**, like four-eye machines made of elementary faces linked together two by two. The face of a teacher and a student, father and son, worker and boss, cop and citizen, accused and judge ("the judge had a stern expression, his eyes were horizonless..."): **concrete individu­alized faces are produced and transformed on the basis of these units, these combinations of units**—like the face of a rich child in which a military call­ing is already discernible, that West Point chin. **You don't so much have a face as slide into one.** Under the second aspect, the abstract machine of **faciality assumes a role of selective response, or choice: given a concrete face, the machine judges whether it passes or not**, whether it goes or not, on the basis of the elementary facial units. This time, **the binary relation is of the "yes-no" type.** **The** empty eye or **black hole absorbs or rejects**, like a half-doddering despot who can still give a signal of acquiescence or refusal. The face of a given teacher is contorted by tics and bathed in an anxiety that makes it "no go." A defendant**, a subject, displays an overaffected submission that turns into insolence.** Or someone is too polite to be honest. A given face is neither a man's nor a woman's. Or it is neither a poor person's nor a rich person's. Is it someone who lost his fortune? At every moment, **the machine rejects faces that do not conform, or seem suspicious.** **But only at a given level of choice. For it is necessary to produce successive divergence-types of devi­ance for everything that eludes biunivocal relationships, and to establish binary relations** between what is accepted on first choice and what is only tolerated on second, third choice, etc. **The white wall is always expanding, and the black hole functions repeatedly.** The teacher has gone mad, but madness is a face conforming to the «th choice (not the last, however, since there are mad faces that do not conform to what one assumes madness should be). A ha! It's not a man and it's not a woman, so it must be a trans- vestite: T**he binary relation is between** the "**no**" of the first category **and** the "**yes**" of the following category, **which under certain conditions may just as easily mark a tolerance as indicate an enemy to be mowed down at all costs.** At any rate, **you've been recognized, the abstract machine has you inscribed in its overall grid**. It is clear that in its new role as deviance detector, **the faciality machine does not restrict itself to individual cases but operates in just as general a fashion as it did in its first role, the compu­tation of normalities**. If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your aver­age ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence- types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the wall, distributed by the hole. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European **racism as the white man's claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other**: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an "other."12 **Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to inte­grate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves**, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it's a Jew, it's an Arab, it's a Negro, it's a lunatic . . .). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the out­side. **There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. The dividing line is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective choices. Racism never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out** (or those who only allow themselves to be identified at a given degree of divergence). Its cruelty is equaled only by its incompetence and naivete.

## Impacts

### Violence Impacts

#### MPX – Accidents - The high speed crash culture that the affirmative participates in fetishizes death while defusing fears of the inherent danger in speed.

Burgess 4 (Helen J, Assistant Professor of English in the Communication and Technology track at University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “Futurama, Autogeddon: Imagining the Superhighway from Bel Geddes to Ballard” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[17] The darker side of highway construction was well hidden. The Interstate was backed by the powerful members of the highway lobby, including not only car manufacturers and oil companies but also a vast number of smaller business organizations, such as "the Association of General Contractors ƒ the National Asphalt Pavement Association; the National Ready Mixed Concrete Association; the American Concrete Paving Association; and the American Road Builders Association" (Lewis 110). The 1952 movie "Key to Our Horizons" suggested that "any picture of America without automobiles is hopelessly out of date," and went on to show how two out of seven Americans owed their employment to the burgeoning automobile and road surfacing industries. [18] As the lobby gained power, it began releasing pro-highway films which seemed to address public concerns about the impact of the proposed Interstate system. "Highway Hearing," commissioned in 1956 by the Dow Chemical Company, featured a dramatized version of a town meeting between concerned citizens and highway officials. The film began with the opening of a new stretch of highway and flashed back to the meeting, which included irate citizens (mollified by officials' answers) and a "movie-within-a-movie", shown to the town citizens and featuring classic pro-automobile rhetoric. The citizens in the end agreed to vote for the highway and it was duly built; the last scenes returned to the grand opening with now-satisfied townspeople come along to celebrate. [19] By the 1960s, however, cultural responses to the Interstate were beginning to change. Thirty years after the Futurama exhibition, J G Ballard penned The Atrocity Exhibition (1970), a dreamlike and fractured series of narratives which imagined near-future highways in a darker light. These generic highways, imagined by a British writer but realized in the nightmarish quality of the LA freeway system, Ballard called "Autogeddon": Waking: the concrete embankment of a motorway extension. Roadworks, cars drumming two hundred yards below. In the sunlight the seams between the sections are illuminated like the sutures of an exposed skull. (31) In The Atrocity Exhibition, highways are refigured as a network of fetishized sex and death -- their appeal no longer stemming from the glorious vision of a streamlined future but rather from the inevitability of crash culture. The book iterates road accidents, dismemberments and cut-up women's bodies to create a crash future: "Sequence in slow motion: a landscape of highways and embankments, evening light of fading concrete, intercut with images of a young woman's body" (72). Aside from the gender implications, in themselves troubling, Ballard's Autogeddon is a disturbing vision of a near-future in which sex and death are rendered equivalent by the vertiginous speed of the automobile; the highway, in other words, is haunted by death. [20] In his notes on The Atrocity Exhibition twenty years later, Ballard would observe that ... the car crash differs from other disasters in that it involves the most powerfully advertised commercial product of this century, an iconic entity that combines the elements of speed, power, dream and freedom within a highly stylized format that defuses any fears we may have of the inherent dangers of these violent and unstable machines. (97) Despite the preeminence of the automobile in this statement, though, something else is also going on in Ballard's text. The car is really secondary to the space in which it exists: the highway system itself. In fact, he suggests, "[t]he ultimate concept car will move so fast, even at rest, as to be invisible" (98). The Atrocity Exhibition imagines a world in which the highway has exhausted its own future, so that the world is re-presented as an extended moment; a car-crash which never ends but endlessly repeats, so that the space of the highway replaces the functioning of narrative time. [21] Ballard's collapsing of space and time comes to the forefront in Crash (1973). In the surreal landscape of the highways surrounting Shepperton (an airport suburb surrounded by London's answer to the Beltway system), he taps into the ultimate fear of every commuter: the "end of the world by automobile" (50). Space and time, in Crash, are determined by the intimate interior of the smashed-up automobile, "fossilized for ever in this web of chromium knives and frosted glass" (12). On the highways, time stops: Looking around, I had the impression that all the cars on the highway were stationary, the spinning earth racing beneath them to create an illusion of movement (196). In a world where electronic mediation creates an endless spectacle of images for us, whether Ballard's images of sex and death or General Motors' fond imaginings of a technological wonderland, the future collapses in on us, so that we can no longer tell what is happening and when it is happening. Jacques Derrida, writing about this kind of collapse of space and time, suggests that it is in this moment that ghosts are born: It obliges us more than ever to think the virtualization of space and time, the possibility of virtual events whose movement and speed prohibit us more than ever from opposing presence to its representation, "real time" to "deferred time," effectivity to its simulacrum, the living to the non-living, in short, the living to the living-dead of its ghosts. (169) In turning the highway into a flattened moment in time, Ballard creates a stylized tableau owing much to the deco-perfect diorama of Bel Geddes' Futurama. In Crash he ironically characterizes the architecture of the superhighway as a kind of perfect mesh of nature and machine: "Along the elegant motion sculpture of the concrete highway the coloured carapaces of the thousands of cars moved like the welcoming centaurs of some Arcadian land ' (166). [22] This scene, calling to mind the tiny colored cars racing through Futurama's idyllic country landscape, is populated with cars reveling in pure speed with an animal-like innocence: "The marker-lines diving and turning formed a maze of white snakes, writhing as they carried the wheels of the cars crossing their backs, as delighted as dolphins" (196). [23] These scenes, however, are far from the clean and gentle spaces in Bel Geddes' futurism-inspired diorama. Crash, far from reflecting Futurama's perfect future, is populated by the ghosts of the highway. For Ballard's protagonist, the highway is a place populated by the dead and the future-dead: "In our wounds we celebrated the re-birth of the traffic-slain dead, the deaths and injuries of those we had seen dying by the roadside and the imaginary wounds and postures of the millions yet to die" (203). The dreamy perfect landscapes of Futurama and Motorama have become populated by ghosts of the the dead and the future-dead; protagonist James describes the crushed post-accident interior of his car as "the perfect module for all the quickening futures of my life" (69). [24] In a more optimistic era in which technology seemed poised to solve all the problems an industrial society posed, Bel Geddes' imagination of the perfect highway seemed to suggest a switching network built for endless speed and minimal delay. Thus the Interstate Highway System, in our imagination, became not a network of routes which enable drivers to get places, but rather a system which, except for fueling (of the car and its driver), the driver could circulate endlessly. The Interstate, in effect, became its own "place," reminiscent of William Gibson's "distanceless home." [25] And yet, like all idealized networks, the Interstate does not correspond to itself. This system contains both attempts to homogenize the driving experience -- gas stations, fast food joints, green signage -- and unexpected differences -- different colored stone used in construction, orange cones, inconsistent numbering schemes for exits. Blown-out tires litter the shoulder of main-line trucking routes; carcasses of deer and other smaller animals are a grim reminder of another kind of "road toll" from the one we are accustomed to hearing. Sections of the Interstate decay; the clicking, changing sound of the Interstate rolling under wheel tells us of the cycles of construction and repair that are required to maintain it in working order. The typical long-distance road trip today is tempered with three key considerations: the weather, traffic congestion, and the presence or absence of construction.

#### MPX - Our current global climate is defined by fascism and destruction of civil society. Even worse, current modes of social analysis replicate societies of control. We must resist biopolitical production within the social field by incorporating the rhizome into our theories.

Fuglsang & Sorensen 2006 (Martin and Bent, ecturers in management, politics, and philosophy at the Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Deleuze and the Social, Edinburgh University Press.)

The twentieth century will not likely be called the Deleuzian century. The deadly limbo of the twenty-first century is a more plausible candidate, faced with the withering of civil society, fascism in the streets and in our daily practices, mutant flows of migrations on account of exploitation, and a rampant, world-integrated capitalism deterritorialising the socius, the need for an at once critical and affirmative social science should be apparent. This need has hardly been satisfied, and, even more disturbing, the analysis of the social has in recent years lost a great deal of its enunciative force. This is why we at the same time have witnessed a search for new approaches that are able to convey a higher degree of concreteness and precision in the social scientific approach to the emergence, production and organisation of the social. A number of the chapters deal with organisation theory, and the tendency of a sadly diminishing return is especially visible when the concern is research within management and organisation. Here, German phenomenology and especially French post-war philosophy have been dominant in the attempt to revitalise the discourse. It seems nevertheless as if these new approaches remain caught in the resentment typical of the academic showdown: negation rather than affirmation, destruction rather than creation. Hence, the quest of thinking anew is lost at the outset: Oedipus got us again. Perhaps this is because contemporary social analysis is still concerned with what Foucault characterised as ‘disciplinary societies’ (Deleuze 1992b). They focus on binary segmentations of the social field (as for instance in dualisms of dominant and dominated) even though the flow of capital and the fluidity of its organisational principles is guided by quite different kinds of segmentations and different kinds of power relations: those of biopolitical production and of the re-production of life itself (Hardt and Negri 2000: 24). It is a power that does not just produce segmentations, organising only the movements of the body, but also functions as a virtual and immanent self-circulation of thoughts and actions within the body under the auspices of humanistic ‘freedom’. In this sense, external disciplinary authority has become an internal principle of regulation and control in the social bios as such, not so much in its actualised institutions and organisations, but directly in relation to the transformation of their flows of matter and function, where their expressions and contents emerge. It is as Maurizio Lazzarato points out in his discussion of the difference between disciplinary societies and control societies, ‘the nonrelation as the informal “outside”, a virtual, an event’ which is confined by the biopolitical sphere Deleuze calls the societies of control.

## Alternatives

### Nomadism Alternatives

#### ALT – Nomadic thinking unites opposition against state philosophy and gives rise to new ways of thinking and living. Nomadic thought opens spaces for life and solves fascism.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

For Deleuze and Guattari, the history of western philosophy is constructed on the transcendence of the idea and the self-unification of the subject via the theory of the Cogito. They present this philosophy as a philosophy hostile to life4, which creates societies who see themselves as the telos of mankind: a final state of being in which no further becoming is necessary (Deleuze, 1983: 141). In A Thousand Plateaus, they refer to such thought as ‘state philosophy’- going beyond the idea of a state as a solely geopolitical entity to a body of thought that - as Saul Newman notes encompasses ‘most political philosophy’ (2007: 99). Against this, they develop their nomadic thought, inspired by an ‘orphan-line of thinkers…united in their opposition to the State philosophy’ who provide a ‘secret link constituted by the critique of negativity, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the exteriority of forces and relations, the denunciation of power’ (Deleuze, quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: x). Such thought resists the orientation to finality found in state philosophy, instead harnessing ‘forces’5 to open new spaces for life. This thought, I wish to suggest - is both materialist and vitalist. This appears counterintuitive for classical philosophy, yet for Deleuze and Guattari, life is a material force that may be ‘diverted’ into organic beings, but maintains a singularity quite apart from its appropriation in animal or human form. Indeed, they state that organisms often seek to ‘confine’ life, as the following passage from A Thousand Plateaus makes clear: [Life is a] streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation [that] liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had confined, and which matter now expresses as the trait, flow or impulse traversing it. If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized, but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a body that is all the more alive for having no organs (501emphasis added). Life, then, is a force that creates the new by ‘variation’. It produces a sensation that Deleuze refers to as ‘complete power, complete bliss [and is]…no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act - it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life’ (Deleuze, 2001: 27). The task of nomadic thought is to work in unity with this life force, although this is necessarily ‘a complex unity: one step for life, one step for thought. Modes of life [inspire] ways of thinking; modes of thinking create ways of living. Life activates thought, and thought in turn affirms life’ (Deleuze, 2001: 66)6. This is a unity unobtainable for idealist philosophy which argues that change comes from a transcendent ideal posited in a place beyond the present.

#### ALT - The nomadic war machine opposes state power because it operates according to a different mode of organization. Nomadic politics prevent state warfare.

Watson 2005 (Janell, Prof. @ Virginia Tech & Editor of Minnesota Review. “Oil Wars, or the Extrastate Conflict ‘Beyond the Line’: Schmitt’s Nomos, Deleuze’s War Machine, and the New Order of the Earth.” South Atlantic Quarterly 104:2.)

War can also be understood along the sedentary/nomad divide, claim Deleuze and Guattari, since sedentary peoples invented the state (Greeks, Romans), while nomads invented the war machine (Genghis Khan). Even when the state seeks to appropriate it, ‘‘the war machine is exterior to the State apparatus’’ and should be distinguished from the state military.9 To summarize in the terms set forth in A Thousand Plateaus, Schmitt sought to establish the conditions for a state form of war, in his description of the successful ‘‘bracketing’’ of war among the strongest states in Europe. Such a project may well have been doomed from the start, for, as Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly claim, the war machine must always remain exterior to the state, because it operates according to a very different logic and mode of organization. If the nomadic war machine is truly antithetical to the sedentary state, then perhaps war cannot possibly be rationalized or bracketed without some provision for waging war outside of the confines of the state, as in the New World. Does the war in Iraq support the notion that the war machine is antithetical to the state (Deleuze and Guattari), or is there a state form of war (Schmitt)?

#### ALT – Nomadic Utopianism – A utopian model based on freedom and a suspicion of “perfection” constitutes an act of social dreaming that creates the partial flows necessary to combat fascism.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

Here, I consider the tradition of utopianism orientated around freedom, arguing that its resonances with the thought of Deleuze and Zamyatin can lead to a creative encounter and the creation of a ‘nomadic utopianism’. Utopianism orientated around freedom rejects the idea of utopia as a once-and-for-all political act bringing about a perfect state of being (Sargent, 1994: 9). Rather, utopianism is an act of ‘social dreaming’ (Sargent, 1994; Levitas, 1990: 12) which permanently looks to go beyond the present- a view perhaps most famously expressed by Oscar Wilde: ‘A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias’ (1891: online at flag.blackened.net)26. Darko Suvin, meanwhile, invokes Umberto Eco’s definition of a semiotic encyclopedia in order to explain the tradition: ‘It appears not as a finished object but rather as an open project: not a utopia as terminus ad quem, i.e. a state of perfection to be reached, but a utopia as a regulating idea, as a project ante quem, whose force stems precisely from the fact that it cannot and should not be realized in any definitive form’. (1997: 134) At its most radical, this tradition of utopianism argues that the authoritarian tradition is hostile for life, for perfection ‘symbolizes death: the death of movement, the death of progress and process, development and change; the death, in other words, of politics. To strive for perfection is to strive for death’ (Sargisson, 1994: 37). Rationally constructed perfection can no longer be the guide for utopia, which must instead ground itself in what Ben Anderson calls ‘an explicit ethos of hope’ (2006: 691); drawing on ‘irrational’ impulses to ‘go beyond the present’ (ibid.: 693). Yet this is a pessimistic hope - bound by the knowledge that every utopia will be a failure and - as soon as it declares itself a utopia - will slip into an anti-utopian state of being, denying further flows of life - a ‘metonymy of utopianism’. Hence Jameson’s assertion that utopian thought succeeds by failure (1982: 153); Tom Moylan’s concepts of the ‘critical utopia’ and the ‘critical dystopia’ which stand ‘against those who invoke the “end of history”… and find new directions for critical comparisons between what is and what is coming to be, where we are and what we might be doing’ (Moylan, 2000: 27) and Ursula K. Le Guin’s claim that ‘utopia is uninhabitable. As soon as we reach it, it ceases to be utopia. As evidence of this sad but inelecutable fact, may I point out that we in this room, here and now, are inhabiting a utopia’ (1989: 81)27. This is a useful quote, for it highlights the problematic nature of the site of utopia for those who see utopianism as a movement rejecting perfection. For Le Guin, utopia is - as Deleuze and Guattari tell us - now here and nowhere. Today’s world is yesterday’s utopia; but it contains within it immanent forces which will come to constitute tomorrow’s utopia. This leads some utopian scholars to reimagine utopia as a process, rather than a place (Jameson, 1982; Buchanan, 1998). Given this turn away from perfection, I would argue that when Tormey and Townshend state Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy demands a ‘flight from…utopian schemas’, they are talking of what I have called State Utopianism. Indeed, I would argue that this nomadic flight - if enacted in practice- would itself constitute a utopianism- an immanent, nomadic movement opening up spaces for active life and allowing the creation of the new without reference to a transcendent ideal or lack: a nomadic utopianism.

#### ALT – Nomadic thinking creates new horizons of sense that manipulate the incorporeal elements of our bodies to promote new types of being.

Fuglsang & Sorensen 2006 (Martin and Bent, ecturers in management, politics, and philosophy at the Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Deleuze and the Social, Edinburgh University Press.)

It also changes the status of the body. The diagrammatic relationship between desiring machines and the body without organs sets the conceptualisation of the body against a remarkably new horizon of sense. The body is of course corporeal, tattooed and scarified by common sense and embedded in the informational and communicative arrangement we call our everyday life. But at the same time the body is incorporeal, that is, transformed by the incorporeality of sense itself, announcing the orderword (mot d’ordre) as a unique kind of ‘action’ constituted by the incision of the event. ‘Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualised elsewhere, at a different moment’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158). This logic of sense coincides with the biopolitical production of affective effects and sets new standards for social analysis. It has to transgress the idea of action as a marriage between causality and human intention and establish another awareness, adding to the notion of action which effects the body as an actualised entity in the social organisation. This affords us a notion of action that transforms the body’s incorporeal attributes through statements, that is, pure sense-events that change the sensible arrangement and compositional architecture of the body and thereby actualising it in a new affective state organised by a new sociomachinic production, new abstract machines.

#### ALT - Our alternative is a critical consciousness in support of a nomadic way of becoming. Nomadism implies becoming over final goals and destinations

Koppensteiner 2009 [Norbert, “ON MOVING: NOMADISM AND (IN)SECURITY”; Norbert Koppensteiner is a peace researcher, currently based in Vienna and Innsbruck/Austria. He is the program coordinator of the MA Program in Peace, Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation and the research and publications coordinator of the UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies at the University of Innsbruck. 2009. <http://www.kurator.org/media/uploads/publications/DB04/Koppensteiner.pdf>]

Smooth space, on the other hand, corresponds to nomadic subjectivities (Deleuze & Guattari 1987; Braidotti 1994 2002, 2006). The nomad is the permanently itinerant and voyaging form of existence. The nomad of Deleuze and Guattari is also an answer to Kant, who lamented certain kind of barbarism that had allowed ‘for a kind of nomads who abhor all permanent cultivation of the soil’ (Kant, quoted after Colebrook 2005: 180). Nomadism is deﬁned by movement and difference, leading to a subjectivity that is an ongoing, open and ﬂuctuating becoming. Nomadic subjectivity is not conceived as a coherent substance but as a shifting assemblage of diverse parts. Nomadic living and thinking still can be located in concrete surroundings at a given moment in time, yet those surroundings successively change as nomadic mobility implies a trajectory that no longer knows any ﬁnal goal or ultimate resting point: ‘The nomad’s identity is a map of where s/he has already been; s/he can always reconstruct it a posteriori, as a set of steps in an itinerary. But there is no triumphant cogito supervising the contingency of the self; the nomad stands for diversity, the nomad’s identity is an inventory of traces.’ (Braidotti 1994: 14) Nomadic consciousness re-introduces smooth, open, space into the striation. It disperses the subjectivity that the Cartesian cogito tries to make stable and coherent. Nomadic consciousness resists this Cartesian subjectivity point by point: instead of stability and sedentariness, the nomad is based on a movement leading to becoming and transformation. Instead of the subject-object duality, nomadic subjectivity is an ever shifting multiplicity in which the borders between self and other are constantly displaced. Nomadic subjectivity is never singular, never individual, but always a multiplicity in relation to itself and with other co-subjects, and the nomadic strategy is one of a temporary and ﬂuctuating becoming-in-togetherness, a co-emergence (Ettinger 2006). Even when by her/ himself, the nomad is never single but always a multiplicity – a tribe, clan or pack. The nomad so forms a mobile subjectivity that fragments and dissolves the unity of the Cartesian subject. Nomadic movements challenge the striated distribution of spaces. The nomad is not an essential category – one is not born a nomad. Becoming nomad arises out of a ‘critical consciousness’ (Braidotti 1994: 5) which seeks temporary linkages of (political) afﬁnity to standpoints that share a common concern without, however, conﬂating this afﬁnity into a sameness.

### Machinic Rhetoric Alternative

#### ALT - The affirmative’s framework is too abstract to solve their impacts. Their representations project an artificial condition of stasis on top of a transitory reality. Constructing a machinic rhetoric gives way to lines of flight from transportation fascism.

Kuswa 4 (Kevin, PhD Communications, California State University, Fresno Department of Communication “Machinic Rhetoric, Highways and Interpellating Motions” Rhizomes Issue 8 (Spring 2004) JTB)

[11] Interpellation is a critical outline of the material and constitutive properties of rhetoric and becomes the key term linking the highway machine to various subjects, places, and motions. Greene (1998a) and Butler (1997), most significantly, read Althusser's notion of interpellation as a way to re-position rhetoric's precarious balancing act between institutions and individuals. The point is to rescue rhetoric from its superficial or descriptive status, for rhetorical events are not predetermined by the people or institutions that enact those events. We cannot really talk about the subject or the individual without locating specific instances of rhetorical expression and legitimation/rejection. Expanding the scope of interpellation opens up the stakes of the rhetorical project. [12] The movement is bi-directional, meaning that interpellation constitutes certain effects and that certain elements constitute interpellation [1]. So, we are always pretending that the bystander in Althusser's model is actually the matrix of effects (places, people, motions, etc.) generated by the officer. Likewise, specific subjects, places, and motions are always being imagined and constituted by the highway machine. Adding concreteness to the model is not about adding complexity to interpellation, but about mapping the genealogy of the machine in as many contexts as possible. Entities other than subjects engage in interpellation and effects are generated by interpellation that include more than just subjects. [13] A different way for rhetoric emerges through machinic rhetoric as a methodology outside the dichotomizing realm of representation or globalization. Arguing that the term comes to mean more than this, Tsing (2000, p331) argues: "globalization came to mean an endorsement of international free trade and the outlawing of protected or public domestic economies." As a metaphor for globalization, then, the highway machine expanded through the promise of unrestricted mobility and free access, paving over local "highway markets" and toll-ways in favor of a national (global) machine. Anna Tsing talks about globalization in terms of planetary interconnections, linkages that can further exploitation and inequality as well as linkages that can open up possibilities of globalist wishes and fantasies. For Tsing (2000, p331), the process of invoking the global turn "is to call attention to the speed and density of interconnections among people and places." Exactly, for to isolate the driver, the traffic manager, the suburb, or the American imaginary without diagramming the movements and rates of those people and places is to project an artificial condition of stasis on top of very transitory events. [14] Circulation itself must share the stage with temporality and spatiality. McKenzie Wark helps to tie together the motions of the highway machine by defining our terrain as the "place where we sleep, work, or hang-out" (1994, p1). Similar to Morse's (1990) idea of distraction and "distractedness" as ontology for everyday life, Wark traces events such as the highway machine to various forms of circulation, but also to the directed movement of people, places, ideas, institutions, and forces. The drive-ins, quickie marts, truck-stops, and other roadside hang-outs are only one plane of the terrain. Those places are now being forced to share terrain with the flow and timing of images: We live every day in another terrain, equally familiar: the terrain created by the television, the telephone, the telecommunications networks crisscrossing the globe...This virtual geography is no more or less 'real." It is a different kind of perception, of things not bounded by rules of proximity, of "being there." (Wark, 1994, p1) The highway machine and machinic rhetoric contribute two angles to Wark's distinction between the real and the virtual. First, the separation is only partial, for any light of flight (site of virtual experience) must be grounded or located. Second, the virtual is limited by access and the restriction of particular flows (energy, transport, etc.). As with the highway machine, the motion of freely circulating people or products is always mediating by competing motions of state security and economic exchange. [15] Providing a transition back to machinic rhetoric, the motion of circulation creates interconnections and "interconnection is everything in the new globalisms" (Tsing, 2000, p336). Rhetoric assists in the meeting points on either end of circulation, in both coercive and liberating ways. Thus, we can map the ways that globalization itself enters modes of circulation. The motions of globalization, for Tsing (2000, p336), are rhetorical because "global rhetoric" relies on circulation in the same way capitalism relies on penetration: "the way powerful institutions and ideas spread geographically and come to have an influence in distant places." This means that machinic rhetoric can uniquely point to the boundaries of rhetoric's circulation by diagramming the object of a flow as well as the social conditions "that allow or encourage that flow" (Tsing, 2000, p337). Certainly by linking globalization and circulation, machinic rhetoric can add the angle of penetration, not to mention the critique of "the use of the rhetoric of circulation as a ruling image for global interconnections" (Tsing, 2000, p337). If we do want to trace the highway machine to the globalization of rhetoric and the globalization of capital, the arresting and releasing sides of circulation fashion a middle-ground that must be negotiated in any effort to talk about how rhetoric works. At the very least, the three assemblages (subject, place, motion) prepare machinic rhetoric for its role as a living entity, a collection of particle-signs occupying a place and preventing an occupation of that same place by other entities, and a circulating process of (ex)change.

### Immanence Alternative

#### ALT – Immanence – Accepting immanence as a life stops transcendent ideologies of violence and allows life to flow as a state of pure becoming. This gives rise to new types of being that resist state power.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, the only way philosophy can stay true to life is to proceed immanently - the potential to go beyond the present is to be found within the present itself (the material, inorganic forces of life). This is perhaps most clearly expressed in Deleuze’s essay Immanence: A Life: ‘We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is nothing is itself a life…. It is complete power, complete bliss…no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act - it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life’ (2001: 27). If immanence is life, then the transcendent, as a higher power to which life must orientate itself, must be seen as hostile to life. Yet to understand what Deleuze and Guattari mean by immanence and transcendence one must turn to What Is Philosophy? where they state: ‘Immanence is immanent only to itself and consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent. In any case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent’ (45). Life, as immanence, is a state of pure becoming - opposed to static being, for ‘all that is necessary [for a philosophy of the transcendent to establish itself] is for movement to be stopped. Transcendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 47)7. Life - as a state of becoming - is an eternal force that cannot be organized according to supposed ‘higher’ principles but must be allowed to flow freely and as its own end. It is a mistake to think that ‘a line [of becoming] goes from one point to another’ and posit the ‘submission of the line to the point’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 323), for ‘a line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points…a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination’(ibid.). It is only by ‘becoming’ that we can bring the new into being, something Jameson is aware of when he states that ‘if you know already what your longed-for exercise in a not-yet existent freedom looks like, then the suspicion arises that it may not really express freedom after all but only repetition’ (1994: 56). Any ideal posited beyond the present serves as a transcendent point which removes immanent life of its power to produce the new.

#### ALT - Social analysis that is informed by immanence causes a revolutionary becoming that gives rise to new political philosophies.

Fuglsang & Sorensen 2006 (Martin and Bent, ecturers in management, politics, and philosophy at the Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Deleuze and the Social, Edinburgh University Press.)

Everything is political. No, we are not too proud to resort to slogans. If social analysis aims at being non-transcendent and hostile to any image of thought, it should effect a diagonal movement between an actualised history and the event of the problem produced by the analysis, an event that is ‘immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure reserve’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 156). It is the concept itself that is able to bring the problem through its critical thresholds towards the problematic, where it will revolt. That is why the intuitive, critical method of creating concepts is so vital to Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.: Chapter 1). The problematic is realised in a milieu as a revolutionary becoming, a conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu, designating the birth of a political philosophy (ibid.: 100). Social analysis seen from this point of view is the analysis of the event as a multiplicity, or the analysis of the sayable and the visible and their interrelation as fundamentally ontological modalities of signs.

### War Machine Alternative

#### ALT - The war machine promotes revolutionary and disorganizing modes of desire while acting as a weapon against the state apparatus.

Voithofer & Foley 2009 (Rick, Ohio State Univ., and Alan, Syracuse Univ. “(Re)territorializing Literacies in Urban Landscapes.” AERA Conference Paper, San Diego, CA.)

War, according to Deleuze, is comparable to thought. The war machine prevents the centralization of nomadic groups, based, for example, on race, class, ability, or gender into a homogenized set of values – what Deleuze calls “the state”. War is exterior to the state which is unaware of the potential violence of reason and leads to “the drawing of a creative line of flight” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 466) that reveal the power of becoming. Becoming involves a deterritorialization that disrupts the familiar, along new directions in new and experimental ways. Deterritorialization is inseparable from reterritorialization - they both serve to reinscribe order. The war machine must, in turn, distinguish between desire that is created, organized and maintained by prohibitionary mechanisms through regulation and codification by the state and a form of desire that is revolutionary and disorganizing and exists outsides state regulations and codes. "The war machine does not in itself have war as its object, but necessarily adopts it as its object when it allows itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 513)

#### ALT – The city is a striated space that holds the potential to be smooth. Embracing the concept of becoming can lead to urban nomadism.

Deleuze and Guattari ‘87(Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. French philosophers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987. Print.)

Let us return to the simple opposition between the smooth and the striated since we are not yet at the point where we can consider the dissymmetrical and concrete mixes. The smooth and the striated are distinguished first of all by an inverse relation between the point and the line (in the case of the striated, the line is between two points, while in the smooth, the point is between two lines); and second, by the nature of the line (smooth-directional, open intervals; dimensional-striated, closed1440: THE SMOOTH AND THE STRIATED □ 481 intervals). Finally, there is a third difference, concerning the surface or space. In striated space, one closes off a surface and "allocates" it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one "distributes" oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one's crossings (logos and nomos). I2 As simple as this opposition is, it is not easy to place it. We cannot content ourselves with establishing an immediate opposition between the smooth ground of the nomadic animal raiser and the striated land of the sedentary cultivator. It is evident that the peasant, even the sedentary peasant, participates fully in the space of the wind, the space of tactile and sonorous qualities. When the ancient Greeks speak of the open space of the nomos—nondelimited, unpartitioned; the pre-urban countryside; mountainside, plateau, steppe—they oppose it not to cultivation, which may actually be part of it, but to the polis, the city, the town. When Ibn Khaldun speaks oibadiya, bedouinism, the term covers cultivators as well as nomadic animal raisers: he contrasts it to hadara, or "city life." This clarification is certainly important, but it does not change much. For from the most ancient of times, from Neolithic and even Paleolithic times, it is the town that invents agriculture: it is through the actions of the town that the farmers and their striated space are superposed upon the cultivators operating in a still smooth space (the transhumant cultivator, half-sedentary or already completely sedentary). So on this level we reencounter the simple opposition we began by challenging, between farmers and nomads, striated land and smooth ground: but only after a detour through the town as a force of striation. Now not only the sea, desert, steppe, and air are the sites of a contest between the smooth and the striated, but the earth itself, depending on whether there is cultivation in nomos-space or agriculture in city-space. Must we not say the same of the city itself? In contrast to the sea, the city is the striated space par excellence; the sea is a smooth space fundamentally open to striation, and the city is the force of striation that reimparts smooth space, puts it back into operation everywhere, on earth and in the other elements, outside but also inside itself. The smooth spaces arising from the city are not only those of worldwide organization, but also of a counterattack combining the smooth and the holey and turning back against the town: sprawling, temporary, shifting shantytowns of nomads and cave dwellers, scrap metal and fabric, patchwork, to which the striations of money, work, or housing are no longer even relevant. An explosive misery secreted by the city, and corresponding to Thorn's mathematical formula: "retroactive smoothing." 13 Condensed force, the potential for counterattack? In each instance, then, the simple opposition "smooth-striated" gives rise to far more difficult complications, alternations, and superpositions. But these complications basically confirm the distinction, precisely482 □ 1440: THE SMOOTH AND THE STRIATED because they bring dissymmetrical movements into play. For now, it suffices to say that there are two kinds of voyage, distinguished by the respective role of the point, line, and space. Goethe travel and Kleist travel? French travel and English (or American) travel? Tree travel and rhizome travel? But nothing completely coincides, and everything intermingles, or crosses over. This is because the differences are not objective: it is possible to live striated on the deserts, steppes, or seas; it is possible to live smooth even in the cities, to be an urban nomad (for example, a stroll taken by Henry Miller in Clichy or Brooklyn is a nomadic transit in smooth space; he makes the city disgorge a patchwork, differentials of speed, delays and accelerations, changes in orientation, continuous variations ... The beatniks owe much to Miller, but they changed direction again, they put the space outside the cities to new use). Fitzgerald said it long ago: it is not a question of taking off for the South Seas, that is not what determines a voyage. There are not only strange voyages in the city but voyages in place: we are not thinking of drug users, whose experience is too ambiguous, but of true nomads. We can say of the nomads, following Toynbee's suggestion: they do not move. They are nomads by dint of not moving, not migrating, of holding a smooth space that they refuse to leave, that they leave only in order to conquer and die. Voyage in place: that is the name of all intensities, even if they also develop in extension. To think is to voyage; earlier we tried to establish a theo-noological model of smooth and striated spaces. In short, what distinguishes the two kinds of voyages is neither a measurable quantity of movement, nor something that would be only in the mind, but the mode of spatialization, the manner of being in space, of being for space. Voyage smoothly or in striation, and think the same way... But there are always passages from one to the other, transformations of one within the other, reversals. In his film, Kings of the Road, Wenders intersects and superposes the paths of two characters; one of them takes a still educational, memorial, cultural, Goethean journey that is thoroughly striated, whereas the other has already conquered smooth space, and only experiments, induces amnesia in the German "desert." But oddly enough, it is the former who opens space for himself and performs a kind of retroactive smoothing, whereas striae reform around the latter, closing his space again. Voyaging smoothly is a becoming, and a difficult, uncertain becoming at that. It is not a question of returning to preastronomical navigation, nor to the ancient nomads. The confrontation between the smooth and the striated, the passages, alternations and superpositions, are under way today, running in the most varied directions.

### Rhizome Alternatives

#### ALT – Rhizomatic thinking collapses the distinction between the human world and the natural world. This deterritorializes anthropocentric tendencies and enables a multiplicity of relationships with other beings.

Mikulak 7 [Michael, Fellow in Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic, Ph.D. “The Rhizomatics of Domination: From Darwin to Biotechnology” accessed online at <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue15/mikulak.html> //JG

For example, Elizabeth Behnke argues that we must resist a frontal knowledge of Nature that knows it from above and confronts "Nature as a totality of sheer things… in such a way that being known (or being-object) becomes the measure of being" (95). As an alternative to the Cartesian ontology she resists frontal knowing in favor of speaking within nature, and thus being a part of it: "We must learn to speak from within this Nature that surrounds and includes us" (95). She takes this framework and tries to apply it in order to create a practical, "embodied ethics" for interspecies peace (96). She shifts language into the body, learning to decode and recode somatic semantics, or somantics , in a way that enables and fosters interspecies peace and a kinship of life by learning to harmonize "kinetic melodies" (109) and becoming a co-participant in fluid situations. This does not mean that all encounters will be peaceful or possible; however, openness is an essential first step. She embraces the notion of an "improvisational" or "wild body" that enables us to push at the boundaries of our semiotic, cultural, and historical contexts and engage in communication with significant others (108). By taking the posture of "primordial motility" (107), we can hope to adapt and listen by abandoning the "pervasive style of seperative seeing that makes Being, Nature, Others, etc., into objects over-against a subject" (108). But how do you resist this frontal knowing and enable modes of interbeing that embrace what Haraway calls the "counter-intuitive geometries and incongruent translations necessary to getting on together" ( Companion Species 25)? The implication of rhizomatic thought, with its emphasis on becoming and flow is one such way. Behnke echoes Deleuze and Guattari in many ways, speaking of a subjectivity that is unfixed and in constant flux and thus resistant to overcoding. The notion of an improvisational body seems to, on some fundamental level, abandon a desire to be one with nature in favor of a mixing or, like the wasp and the orchid, a kind of semiotic translation through a process of de and reterritorialization. In this context, we can see echoes of Delueze and Guattari rejecting unity: "The notion of unity (unité) appears only when there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the signifier or a corresponding subjectification proceeding" (8). This artificial unity is similar to viewing the world from a strictly anthropocentric standpoint: a semiotic overcoding of the human that renders the multiplicity of nature unintelligible by naturalizing the human and humanizing nature. The way in which Darwinism has been deployed politically, emphasizing the arborescent logic of purity, origins, and struggle, is a perfect example of this kind of overcoding. From a critical standpoint, rhizomatics can help us resist this overcoding by providing a language for becoming-nature that does not separate or blindly ameliorate, but rather, celebrates the messiness of becoming. The kinship imaginary that emerges is one that, on a fundamental level, is profoundly multiple and resonates with the ecological precept that everything is connected to everything else, without seeking a knee-jerk and un critical union or unity.

#### ALT - A rhizomatic model of disability avoids the problems with the social and medical model – allowing immanent transformation of individuals opposed to predetermined form of disability activism

Kuppers 05 [Petra. Department of English, University of Michigan. University  Focusing on poststructuralist theory, especially Deleuze and Guattari. http://www.nonsitecollective.org/system/files/rhizomatic%20model%20of%20disability%20article%203.3.kuppers.pdf]

Disability is the realm I traverse with a strong sense of the haptic, the touching of concepts and bodies. Disability is a slippery word that holds nightshade and sunlight, a concept that grows above ground, in our disability culture politics, and below, in the privacy of the disarticulation of pain, of isolation, of the lived reality of social and physical oppression: Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order. … [N]ot every trait in a rhizome is necessarily linked to a linguistic feature: semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.) that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status. (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, 7) One of the central struggles in Disability Studies concerns models of disability, a somewhat fixed generic form by now, and much discussed in the Social Science and Humanities literature on disability. In these models, disability activism and, later, Disability Studies, plumb the meaning of the word disability, and put it into play with the way that disability is culturally and socially grasped. In the social model, disability is a category that is extrinsic to specific bodily being: a wheelchair user becomes disabled when she encounters a stairwell. And she can embrace the label as a sign of shared oppression, identification across a social position. 6 In the medical model, disability is intrinsic: this body is disabled, faulty, in need of being (and potentially able to be) cured, managed, rehabilitated. I propose a rhizomatic model of disability, already a model, slanted, quotationed, rather than a mode of experience. This is a model in which the extrinsic and intrinsic mix and merge, as they do in my own physical and psychical being when I am in pain, and cannot walk up the stairs, and wish for a painkiller, and 6. The critiques of the social model are varied and provide an exciting impetus to much theoretical labor in Disability Studies. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick, for instance, critique the social model and its lack of attention to the lived experience of disability, and see the problems with taking the social model too far: “[i]n disability politics, and to a large extent in theory, that putative split between mind and body has been perpetuated to the extent that the body is seen simply as the focus of discriminatory practices on the part of wider society which limit the possibilities open to its owner” (67). Susan Wendell calls for a more nuanced approach in contemporary Disability Studies: “[k]nowing more about how people experience, live with, and think about their own impairments[,] could contribute to an appreciation of disability as a valuable difference from the medical norms of body and mind” (22).26 Petra Kuppers take pride in my difference (what other choice do I have?), and feel unable to speak of the nature of my discomfort, cannot find the words, but find comfort in the company of others whose pain might be different, but who somehow feel sympatico. The rhizomes in A Thousand Plateaus connect at any point of their surface, assemble into new life forms, run along the surface of the earth, and just beneath it, mixing below and above, refusing fixed differentiation (and of course, the schizoanalytic rhizome is not the biological rhizome, but neither is it ‘not it’: the two, concrete and abstract, are in productive tension). To me, in my life reality, thinking about my disability as a rhizomatic formation is useful and productive. And of course Deleuzoguattarian politics are specific, momentary, individual, and not-reproduceable. And yet I feel that there is currency in this rhizomatic model for more than just me and my personal imaginary. Without knowing what specific assemblages will emerge for any one reader-operator, a rhizomatic model allows the co-existence of “not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, 7)— and that last part of the quote, things of differing status, resonates with my lived experience of disability as one that lives in a simultaneity of codes, devalued and valued at the same time. The rhizomatic model of disability produces an abundance of meanings that do not juxtapose pain and pleasure or pride and shame, but allow for an immanent transformation, a coming into being of a state of life in this world, one that is constantly shifting and productive of new subject/individual positions. But, like all Deleuzoguattarian concepts, this rhizomatic model of disability is only useful when used. It cannot have truth status, for it is empty of specific meaning. It is a movement rather than a definition.

### Rejection Alternative

#### ALT - Reject the plan as a movement to free political action from all totalizing states such as the USFG, and to develop our own positive thoughts to channel our desire.

Foucault 83 (Michel, French philosopher and studied humanities at École Normale Supérieure “anti-oedipus” Preface xiil)

Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism (whereas Anti-Oedipus' opposition to the others is more of a tactical engagement). And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini—which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively—but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. I would say that Anti-Oedipus (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time (perhaps that explains why its success was not limited to a particular "readership": being anti-oedipal has become a life style, a way of thinking and living). How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior? The Christian moralists sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the body. Paying a modest tribute to Saint Francis de Sales,\* one might say ¶ that Anti-Oedipus is an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life. This art of living counter to all forms of fascism, whether already present or impending, carries with it a certain number of essential principles which I would summarize as follows if I were to make this great book into a manual or guide to everyday life: • Free political action from all unitary and totalizing paranoia. ¶ • Develop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchiza-tion. • Withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as a form of power and an access to reality. Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic. • Do not think that one has to be sad in order to be militant, even though the thing one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force. • Do not use thought to ground a political practice in Truth; nor political action to discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought. Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action. • Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization. • Do not become enamored of power. It could even be said that Deleuze and Guattari care so little for power that they have tried to neutralize the effects of power linked to their own discourse. Hence the games and snares scattered throughout the book, rendering its translation a feat of real prowess. But these are not the familiar traps of rhetoric; the latter work to sway the reader without his being aware of the manipulation, and ultimately win him over against his will. The traps of Anti-Oedipus ate those of humor: so many invitations to let oneself be put out, to take one's leave of the text ¶ and slam the door shut. The book often leads one to believe it is all fun and games, when something essential is taking place, something of ¶ extreme seriousness: the tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from ¶ the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives.

### Insecurity Alternative

#### ALT - Our alternative is to embrace insecurity as a political statement – this is the only way to produce a fearlessness necessary to avoid the biopolitics of security.

Koppensteiner 9 [Norbert, “ON MOVING: NOMADISM AND (IN)SECURITY”; Norbert Koppensteiner is a peace researcher, currently based in Vienna and Innsbruck/Austria. He is the program coordinator of the MA Program in Peace, Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation and the research and publications coordinator of the UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies at the University of Innsbruck. 2009. <http://www.kurator.org/media/uploads/publications/DB04/Koppensteiner.pdf>]

Nomadicism today seems to be more important than ever, in a time when contemporary geo- and biopolitics of security aim at intensifying striation, at producing sedentary, stable - and thus predictable – subjects (Dillon 2007). While in the past, nomads of all stripes were forced to become settled under the master-signiﬁers of progress, enlightenment, civilisation or development, striation these days largely builds on the emotion of fear. Activating the memories of past traumas, security discourses narrate threats into existence, which it afterwards pretends to ﬁght. 9/11, terrorism, Muslim fundamentalism are the chiffres around which this fear can be crystallised and what it turns into are much broader categories - fear of the Other, fear of difference and of the uncertainties of becoming. Those strategies aim to incite subjects to invest in the identity positions so fabricated – the one of fearful citizens clamoring for security. The biopolitical move of striation is thus to make a certain form of life that corresponds to the needs of the security apparatus for fearful citizens, which then democratically provides it with the necessary legitimacy. Yet whenever power takes life as its object, as Gilles Deleuze succinctly remarked, it is inevitable that life becomes resistance to power (1988: 92). A nomadic politics would therefore aim at re-introducing smooth space into the striation. At stake are concrete forms of living, possibilities of expression, of living and thinking differently. If fear is the primary incentive to accept striation, then refusing to let one’s actions be guided by it turns into a political statement. Yet this fearlessness can not be born out of certainty, out of a superior position which knows better, but on the contrary out of embracing the very insecurity of existence which striation tries to banish. Openness, ﬂuidity, risk, connection and circulation are acknowledged as parts of daily existence and welcomed as such, instead of feared. Not giving in to the striation also implies an openness towards transformation, a willingness to let the new emerge out of the concrete situation. This way the possibility for smooth space arises. In a nomadic politics the stake is always also the own becoming. Nomadic living and thinking lead to a form of resistance that tries to safeguard the possibilities inherent to movement and the becoming-differently that it might engender. As such, it is a risky strategy, for what is at stake is always the own becoming, the continued possibilities for the own living and thinking. From the above rendering, it ﬁnally also follows that no prescriptive recipes for action can be forthcoming. Nomadic becomings are notoriously hard to predict and enact rhizomatic ﬂuctuations instead of following the pre-given paths of the sedentary. This will be a disappointment for everybody looking for universal ‘how-to’s’ and global strategies of resistance. Instead, responses will have to be elicited (Lederach 1995) from the concrete situation. What is necessary is situational awareness instead of pre-given strategies, nomadic movements of displacement, which change together with the conditions. Just as smooth space is formed with the paths that traverse it and thus remains constantly emergent, nomadic movements cannot be charted once and for all. They afﬁrm and create insecurity, instead of opting for the sedentariness and stability of the secured. Therein lies their exhilarating freedom, their potential for becoming and therein also lies, for whomever so inclined, their potential for resistance.

#### ALT – Creating new rhizomatic formations of discourse re-maps the social field and resists biopolitical power.

Fuglsang & Sorensen 2006 (Martin and Bent, ecturers in management, politics, and philosophy at the Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Deleuze and the Social, Edinburgh University Press.)

The attempt to map the social field has, in recent decades, moved towards expressionism, if you like. This movement seems obvious, once we take into account the fact that aesthetic expressivity has always been about life as it is actualised in affects that move beyond the self-conscious subject. This enables aesthetic expressivity to conjoin but also to confront the biopolitical power of contemporary social production, not only confining the body in circuits of regulation, but also controlling the incorporeal constitution of sense (cf. Deleuze 1990). This is why one cannot say that art has wholesale become a willing servant to world-integrated capitalism, even though the idealistic and romantic idea of the artist as a critical voice is long gone, or, what would be still more horrifying, has reappeared in the technologies of modern management. Rather, we want to emphasise the more subtle point that when aesthetic expression is actualised as an affective ambience it carries a unique resistance in the midst of the biopolitical field. It is this understanding of resistance and counteractualisation in the centre of order and things that becomes crucial in the constitution of a new social analytical practice, not in the sense that investigation and diagnostics should become artistic expression, but more in the sense that the modalities of art should become a form of biopolitical combat understood as an active ethics of being, far removed from any moral propositions and judgements. This combat implies a passage to the critical. Deleuze has become increasingly fashionable as one of the few remaining critical voices, too often riding the same bandwagon as Foucault in this regard. Everywhere there is the reduction of the real work of the apparatus to the chatter of discoursive formations, a D-formation if you will, a tidy corner in the ongoing academic discourse. Indeed, in his interview with Claire Parnet, Deleuze said that becoming a university professor did not make him especially happy: ‘it was simply a normal career’. Like Kafka’s famous mouse, however, Deleuze had a talent for ‘making a ceremonial performance out of doing the usual thing’ (Kafka 1996). There is always a need to sharpen the cutting edges of the machines, to reinvent the critical voice, even if it is as small as Josephine’s piping among the greater ‘clamour of being’. It was Deleuze’s conceptual activism which originally created the fashion for this ‘ordinary’ song, though his contemporaries perhaps found the military metaphor of the Foucauldian dispositif more exciting. As we see it, however, the fashion for military metaphors was always in somewhat poor taste. ‘There is a war,’ as Leonard Cohen pointed out; it is quite real; and the D-function is a war machine, no metaphor.

#### ALT – How to make yourself a body without organs (beautiful card)

Fuglsang & Sorensen 2006 (Martin and Bent, ecturers in management, politics, and philosophy at the Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Deleuze and the Social, Edinburgh University Press.)

Our advice is to start with a small thing. First realise that we are in a social formation; then see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are. Next, descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage (cf. Sørensen 2005, if in doubt as to how to proceed). From here, you will have to make the assemblage pass over to the side of the plane of immanence. That’s the hard part. Tip it gently; don’t use a sledgehammer but a very fine file. Count the connections in the assemblage (there will be several), find the rhythm of its trembling (for it will tremble), slip into its mean time (for there is always time). Finally, create immanent revolutions (small ones) and lines towards the outside (fast ones) in order to deterritorialise and connect again with an outside. It is here, when you see the plane at its horizon, that the body without organs reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 161). It is here that you enter your becoming along with the problem that you are problematising. It is a pure process or a movement with infinite speed, a molecular transmutation that runs from the subject towards a line of flight. Any productive encounter between Deleuze and the social must travel this way. You may, of course, have to repeat the operation.

### Suicide Bomber Alternative

#### ALT – Suicide Bomber - The alternative is to adopt the perspective of the suicide bomber, exposing and transcending the limits of the state’s hold over life

Packer 7 [Jeremy, Assoc. Prof. @ North Carolina State University; “Automobility and the driving force of warfare: From public safety to national security” - Conference lectured at the Symposium "Architectures of fear. Terrorism and the Future of Urbanism in the West" CCCB 17-18 May 2007]

One of the problematic elements of such attacks for a military operating under the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and biopolitical formations of Empire, is that the suicide bomber makes apparent “the ontological limit of biopower in its most tragic and revolting form” (HARDT and NEGRI, 2004, p. 54). Where RMA military strategy minimizes its own military casualties in acknowledgement of the productive capacity of life, the suicide bomber inverts this notion to acknowledge and exploit the destructive (resistant) capacity of life. As a problematic of governance, the suicide bomber exposes the limits of disciplinarity as a means for governing at a distance; that is, organizing, regulating, and making productive the mobility of individuals and the population alike without direct or excessive governmental control.9 If all automobiles are potential bombs, then in a time when the U.S. government is operating under a state of perpetual warfare, governing at a distance can not merely depend upon panopticism and disciplinarity as a means for creating docile citizens. In a biopolitical order, the pastoral relation of state and subject makes life the end-goal of and motor for creating a productive population and, thereby, nation (FOUCAULT, 1978). When life is not equally invested as a desired ends by both state and citizen, life is not only that which must be groomed and cared for, but rather treated as a constant and immanent threat which needs diffusing or extinguishing.10 The governance of automobility then needs to be understood in terms of this new problematic, mobility as immanent threat. In the “new normal” of perpetual war, the subject is no longer treated as a becoming accident, but a becoming bomb. For the regime of Homeland Security in the United States, it is not the safety of citizens that is at stake, but rather the stability of Empire’s social order most generally, and more specifically the security of the U.S. state form.11It is a war in which the state form fears all that may become problematic, become bomb. So the new mode of problematization treats all mobilities as potential bombs and thus technologies of control are being developed and applied to the automobile as a means for addressing such perceived threats.

## 2NC

### AT: PERM

#### AT: Perm - Our kritik is a theory attached to the praxis of rethinking subjectivity. All theory is local and fragmented, and must be attached to praxis. Adding pieces to local fragmented theories such as the alternative fails because it totalizes our approach and converts it to disciplinary power. The permutation simply cannot explain its praxis, which means it will always fail.

Deleuze and Foucault 2004 (Gilles and Michel, French philosophers, “Desert Islands and Other Texts.” Intellectuals and Power. Semiotext.)

Gilles Deleuze: Maybe it's because for us the relationships between theory and praxis are being lived in a new way. On the one hand, praxis used to be conceived as an application of theory, as a consequence; on the other hand, and inversely, praxis was supposed to inspire theory, it was supposed to create a new form of theory. In any case, their relationship took the form of a process of totalization, in one shape or another. Maybe we're asking the question in a new way. For us the relationships between theory and praxis are much more fragmentary and partial. In the first place, a theory is always local, related to a limited domain, though it can be applied in another domain that is more or less distant. The rule of application is never one of resemblance. In the second place, as soon as a theory takes hold in its own domain, it encounters obstacles, walls, collisions, and these impediments create a need for the theory to be relayed by another kind of discourse (it is this other discourse which eventually causes the theory to migrate from one domain to another). Praxis is a network of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory relays one praxis to another. A theory cannot be developed without encountering a wall, and a praxis is needed to break through. Take yourself, for example, you begin by theoretically analyzing a milieu of imprisonment like the psychiatric asylum of nineteenth-century capitalist society. Then you discover how necessary it is precisely for those who are imprisoned to speak on their own behalf, for them to become a relay (or perhaps you were already a relay for them), but these people are prisoners, they're in prison. This was the logic behind your creating the GIP (Group for Information on Prisons):

to promote the conditions in which the prisoners themselves could speak.2 It would be totally misguided to say, as the Maoist seemed to be saying, that you were making a move toward praxis by applying your theories. In your case we find neither an application, nor a reform program, nor an investigation in the traditional sense. It is something else entirely: a system of relays in an assemblage, in a multiplicity of bits and pieces both theoretical and practical. For us, the intellectual and theorist have ceased to be a subject, a consciousness, that represents or is representative. And those involved in political struggle have ceased to be represented, whether by a party or a union that would in turn claim for itself the right to be their conscience. Who speaks and who acts? It's always a multiplicity, even in the person that speaks or acts. We are all groupuscles. There is no more representation. There is only action, the action of theory, the action of praxis, in the relations of relays and networks.

Michel Foucault: It seems to me that traditionally, an intellectual's political status resulted from two things: 1) the position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production, in the ideology which that system produces or imposes (being exploited, reduced to poverty, being rejected or "cursed," being accused of subversion or immorality, etc.), and 2) intellectual discourse itself, in as much as it revealed a particular truth, uncovering political relationships where none were before perceived. These two forms of becoming politicized were not strangers to one another, but they didn't necessarily coincide either. You had the "cursed" intellectual, and you had the "socialist" intellectual. In certain moments of violent reaction, the powers that be willingly confused these two politicizations with one another—after 1848, after the Commune, after 1940: the intellectual was rejected, persecuted at the very moment when "things" began to appear in their naked "truth," when you were not supposed to discuss the king's new clothes.

Since the latest resurgence, however, intellectuals realize that the masses can do without them and still be knowledgeable: the masses know perfectly well what's going on, it is perfectly clear to them, they even know better than the intellectuals do, and they say so convincingly enough. But a system of power exists to bar, prohibit, invalidate their discourse and their knowledge—a power located not only in the upper echelons of censorship, but which deeply and subtly permeates the whole network of society. The intellectuals are themselves part of this system of power, as is the idea that intellectuals are the agents of "consciousness" and discourse. The role of the intellectual is no longer to situate himself "slightly ahead" or "slightly to one side" so he may speak the silent truth of each and all; it is rather to struggle against those forms of power where he is both instrument and object: in the order of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse."

So it is that theory does not express, translate, or apply a praxis; it is a praxis— but local and regional, as you say: non-totalizing. A struggle against power, a struggle to bring power to light and open it up wherever it is most invisible and

insidious. Not a struggle for some "insight" or "realization" (for a long time now consciousness as knowledge has been acquired by the masses, and consciousness as subjectivity has been taken, occupied by the bourgeoisie)—but a struggle to undermine and take power side by side with those who are fighting, and not off to the side trying to enlighten them. A "theory" is the regional system of this struggle.

#### AT: Perm - Arborescent discourses can transform rhizomatics into more insidious modes of domination – only a pure alternative can solve

Mikulak 7 [Michael, Fellow in Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic, Ph.D. “The Rhizomatics of Domination: From Darwin to Biotechnology” accessed online at <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue15/mikulak.html> //JG

And so this is a paper about bioscientific origin stories and the vectors of biopower that align themselves along these convoluted narrative transversals. More specifically, this is a paper about trees, roots and rhizomes, and how origins, subjectivity, kinship, unity and diversity, and the relationship between humans and nature are configured, refigured, shaped, and shattered by the competing, although not antithetical discourses of rhizomatics and arborescence. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, Darwin, Haraway, Heimlreich, and a range of ecocriticism, I will interrogate how the radically open concept of subjectivity in flux characteristic of ecological models of rhizomatic kinship, transforms the political vectors of the various kinship imaginaries that tie us together. Because the biopolitical nexus of life and politics always draws on discourses of naturecultures in order to find more efficient modes of domination, we must carefully attend to kinship imaginaries that on the surface may seem to promise connection, but which op en the door to perhaps more insidious modes of domination. This is especially the case with environmentalist discourses of ecology, which often valorize an open concept of complete rhizomatic interpenetration and connectivity, without considering how vectors of category transformation may infect the body politic with yet undreamt of viruses of biopower. What I call the rhizomatics of domination are the shifting configurations of (bio)power that capitalize on ecological understandings of relationality and kinship. This is not to say that Deleuze and Guattari, and other rhizomatic theorists blindly celebrate the rhizome, but rather, that rhizomatics is being shaped by other rather arborescent discourses, namely the bioscientific narratives of biotechnology, capitalism, and solving world hunger and curing disease through genetic engineering. It is thus important to understand how the rhizome is being deployed, much in the same way that Darwin's notions of evolution were transformed into racist justifications for eugenics. In terms of ecology, Donald Worster declares Darwin as the "single most important figure in the history of ecology over the past two or three centuries" (114), and as such, it is important to interrogate Darwin's contributions to rhizomatics, and the way he has been taken up. Darwin(ism) has profoundly shaped contemporary kinship imaginaries, both positively and negatively, and by examining the profound struggles and tensions Darwin faced in articulating a non-anthropocentr ic web of life, I hope to cast some light on current problems we face today as biotechnology, and the intensely capitalist discourses around it, rewrite both life itself, and the way we imagine our connections to the world.

### AT: Reterritorialization Inevitable

#### AT: Deterr/Reterr Inevitable – Deterritorializations are not doomed to capture by the state apparatus. The whole point of our argument is that the war machine breaks the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization to enable new flows of desire to emerge.

Voithofer & Foley 2009 (Rick, Ohio State Univ., and Alan, Syracuse Univ. “(Re)territorializing Literacies in Urban Landscapes.” AERA Conference Paper, San Diego, CA.)

Deleuze and Guattari refer to the body without organs (BwO) "not as a notion or concept but a practice or set of practices" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 149-150) that represent the potential for someone to act outside the constraints of individualized rehearsals of state2 produced priorities (about in this instance education and literacy). In this case we use “state” to mean any official discourse, or more broadly discourses that carry social authority, as opposed to individual authority. According to Deleuze and Guattari this can only be achieved with others through “becomings” that dismantle (in the case of this paper) static notions of literacy. The process of becoming is achieved through the deterritorialization of dominant, Eurocentric, middle class constructions of literacy that rigidly impose hierarchical rules that package literacy practices into discrete categorized units with singular coded meanings and identities (i.e., literate vs. illiterate). The deterritorialization of literacy can move towards a reterritorialization of literary within a rhizomatic zone of multiplicity, where meanings and operations flow freely between texts, individuals, and groups, resulting in a dynamic, constantly changing set of interconnected entities with fluid individual boundaries. The ultimate goal is a reterritorialization (remapping of beliefs, models, literacies, understandings) that is not necessarily identical to the prior territory, but does not disavow it. Deleuze and Guattari call this collective grass routes process a “war machine”, which emerges from common concerns for freedom. The war machine de/reterritorializes so that it may fracture sanctioned flows of power.

#### AT: D&G use binaries – Our kritik does not devolve into biunivocal thinking or become an exercise in binaries. Rather, our concepts fold into one another to produce multiplicities of meaning.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

So far I have identified and explained a small number of Deleuze and Guattari’s neologistic concepts. The attentive reader will have noted that these usually come in pairs - smooth and striated space; the immanent and the transcendent and, of course, the state and the nomad. I have tried to show how one of these concepts is linked to the life and the opening of new spaces for life whilst the other seeks to close off possibilities for new ways of being. It would be easy, therefore, to argue that Deleuze and Guattari have created a binary system of the kind they purport to despise: yet that would miss a crucial aspect of their theory. For these conceptual pairs concepts do not function as binary opposites. Rather - and here I will introduce a further Deleuzeo-Guattarian neologistic pair- they ‘deterritorialize’ and ‘reterritorialize’ into one another. These terms vary in meaning across Deleuze and Guattari’s works, but I will be following Adrian Parr in stating that ‘to deterritorialize is to free up the fixed relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations’ (in Parr, 2005: 67). Nomadic thought is a deterritorializing force smoothing over the striated spaces created by state thought, but state thought is able to immediately reterritorialize and striate the newly created smooth space. Simon Tormey and Jules Townshend liken this to Sartre’s concept of the ‘practicoinert’: the moment when revolutionary ideals become victorious and ossify into established norms, closing off opportunities for future change (2006: 45).

### AT: Psychoanalysis

#### AT: Psychoanalysis – Lack is wack. Lack is not a defining characteristic of desire and the rhetorical turn of psychoanalysis implies that the key to desire is transcendent beyond experience.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

In the psychoanalytic language of Anti-Oedpius and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari take influence from Lacan and posit ‘desire’ as the essence of becoming. Yet where desire is traditionally considered as a subordinate product of lack (the subject desires what it lacks), Deleuze and Guattari are adamant that ‘desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 28). Rather, it is an immanent essence, a ‘process of production without reference to any exterior agency’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 170-171) - without reference to a transcendent ideal: ‘Clement Rosset puts it very well: every time the emphasis is put on a lack that desire supposedly suffers from as a way of defining its object, “the world acquires as its double some other sort of world…there exists some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)”’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 28). Desire is therefore an eternal force of becoming: it does not cease with the realization of a ‘lack’. Rather, it creates its own lack and - once this lack is fulfilled starts the whole process again: ‘everything stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in place - and then the whole process will begin over again’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 8). Eugene W.Holland likens this to Lacan’s metonymy of desire, in which a desired object loses its desirable qualities as soon as it is realized (in Stivale, 2005: 61).

### AT: Case Comes First

#### AT: Case Comes First - The alternative is a pre-requisite. Deleuze’s theory can be applied in practice to redefine our perspectives and create a better system.

Weizman 2k6 (Eyal, Israeli journalist, “The Art of War,” Fireze Magazine Issue 99, May 2006, Online)

**Although you do not need Deleuze to attack Nablus, theory helped the military reorganize by providing a new language in which to speak to itself and others**. A ‘smart weapon’ theory has both a practical and a discursive function in redefining urban warfare. **The practical or tactical function, the extent to which Deleuzian theory influences military tactics and manoeuvres, raises questions about the relation between theory and practice**. **Theory obviously has the power to stimulate new sensibilities, but it may also help to explain, develop or even justify ideas that emerged independently within disparate fields of knowledge and with quite different ethical bases. In discursive terms, war – if it is not a total war of annihilation – constitutes a form of discourse between enemies.** Every military action is meant to communicate

something to the enemy. Talk of ‘swarming’, ‘targeted killings’ and ‘smart destruction’ **help the military communicate to its enemies that it has the capacity to effect far greater destruction**. **Raids can thus be projected as the more moderate alternative to the devastating capacity that the military actually possesses and will unleash if the enemy exceeds the ‘acceptable’ level of violence or breaches some unspoken agreement**. In terms of military operational theory it is essential never to use one’s full destructive capacity but rather to maintain the potential to escalate the level of atrocity. Otherwise threats become meaningless.

### AT: Alt links to the K

#### The alt does not link to the K.

Albertsen & Diken 2001 (Niels, professor of political science, Aarhus School of Architecture, and Diken, professor of sociology, Lancaster University, “Mobility, Justification,

and the City,” Nordic Journal Architectural Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/14140/.)

In our framework, there is a fourth form of mobility, which has nothing to do with physical movement. In this context Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “nomadism” is particularly interesting. Nomadism is associated with a particular sort of mobility, which is not linear, that is, directed from a fixed point to another, but which “deviates to a minimum extent”. Hence, the opposition between the Nomad and the non-Nomad is not that of the mobile and the immobile. The opposition is between speed and movement. Speed means, above all, a deviation, however slowly from fixation and linear movement.7 It is thus by speed, and not necessarily by physical movement, Deleuze and Guattari’s “nomadic space” is constructed. Likewise, Bauman’s “exile” creates, by staying “non-socialized”, or “non-integrated”, “a plac”e of one’s own”.8 It is no surprise, then, some philosophers, who are often criticised for “romanticising” mobility, are in fact not so keen on travelling. Hence, “you shouldn’t move around too much, or you’ll stifle becomings”, says Deleuze. He adds, by referring to Toynbee: “the nomads are those who don’t move on, they become nomads because they refuse to disappear”

## AFF Answers

### Nomadology is Bad

#### AFF – The state military apparatus utilizes nomadic tactics to annihilate indigenous populations. Sedentary institutions and international laws actually constrain state power and prevent brutality.

Watson 2005 (Janell, Prof. @ Virginia Tech & Editor of Minnesota Review. “Oil Wars, or the Extrastate Conflict ‘Beyond the Line’: Schmitt’s Nomos, Deleuze’s War Machine, and the New Order of the Earth.” South Atlantic Quarterly 104:2.)

As Manuel Delanda points out, certain historical moments favor the state military over the nomadic war machine, especially when technological changes also affect the ability of weak states to resist their more powerful rivals. There are great military machines that only states can afford, such as the stealth bombers and tanks currently in use in the Middle East. Furthermore, the divide between the state military and the nomadic war machine is not always cut and dried. Modern armies have adopted many nomadic tactics, such as the use of small independent commando units conducting raids, even though it is only with difficulty that state armies consistently relinquish enough control that soldiers may use the decentralized tactics of the nomads.11 Also nomadic is the U.S. Pentagon’s marked preference for the desert as a theater of war, as opposed to forested mountains. It is easy to imagine Donald Rumsfeld as he dreams of waging a nomadic war in the smooth space of the Iraqi desert. Damn that state that will not allow his soldiers to act as warriors. Damn the international community that will not grant Iraq the full status of nonstate soil—the space in which international law does not hold. The humanizing, rationalizing, and legalizing side of the state, whose positive accomplishments Deleuze and Guattari fail to acknowledge, does in fact constrain my imaginary Rumsfeld with international laws and policies such as the Geneva Convention, in effect bracketing war, even when a powerful state is fighting ‘‘beyond the line’’ on nonstate soil, such as that of the overthrown Iraq. The international community and its institutions for maintaining rules of military engagement pose the greatest impediment to today’s most powerful state armies, which might wish to employ the brutal tactics of the nomads or to annihilate indigenous peoples—modern-day nomads.

#### The concept of the nomad produces sterile politics and cedes the political. Because it’s too purist it leaves too many questions, like feasibility, unanswered.

Newman 10 [Saul, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2]

At the same time, however, we should be cautious here of too easy an identification of Badiou’s thought with anarchism; to do so would be to elide the important ways in which it makes problematic certain aspects of the revolutionary narrative of classical anarchism.9 What would be opposed in Badiou’s account is the idea of the pure social revolution that destroys state power in one giant upheaval. The spontaneous movement of social forces against the state is premised on the Manichean division – central to classical anarchism – between the natural social principle, and the artificial political principle, between, in other words, society and the state. What this opposition neglects, according to Badiou, is the deeper dialectical relationship between these two forces. In a critique of what he saw as the libertarianism of Deleuze and Guattari’s work Anti-Oedipus, with its polar opposites of Flux and the System, the Nomad and the Despot, the Schizo and the Paranoiac – in other words of the spontaneous, revolutionary movement of desire against fixed, authoritarian structures and identities – Badiou argues that this simply leads to a sterile politics of resistance and opposition which leaves existing power structures intact.10 The critique referred to here was written in the 1970s, during Badiou’s more explicitly Maoist and also Marxist-Leninist phase; and, indeed, it is interesting to note the major contrast between his earlier insistence on the iron discipline of the vanguard party and its project of seizing state power - in opposition to ‘anarcho-desirers’ like Deleuze and Guattari - and his more recent attempts to conceive of a politics beyond the state and the party. For all his criticism of the anarchist tradition, Badiou, it would seem, has moved further in this direction in recent years and I can only add that, when compared to his earlier fetishization of the vanguard party, this is a good thing. However, is there anything in this critique of left libertarianism - what he denounced at the time, using the sectarian jargon of the day, as ultra-leftism11 – that is worthy of more serious consideration? What I think can be taken from this is a certain problematization of the absolute moral division between society and power that was central to classical anarchism. What Badiou’s critique forces us to consider is the extent to which this sort of Manicheanism obscures a more complex relationship between the two forces; the way that – in a Foucauldian sense – there might be a more intimate interaction between the society and power, a realisation which would unsettle to some extent the revolutionary narrative of the great, spontaneous upheaval against state power. More specifically, anarchists would be forced to grapple with the realities of power: what does it mean to destroy state power?; how can this be concretely achieved?; can the overthrow of the state be realised without an engagement with other power relations?; to what extent is the idea of a totalising revolution against state power a comfortable illusion which condemns anarchism to a kind of purist position, which in reality is a position of impotence?In other words, such considerations would make it difficult for anarchism to sustain a position of pure anti-politics. It is questions such as these which necessitate a rethinking of certain aspects of classical anarchism, and it is here that we could speak of a ‘postanarchism’.12 However, we must not concede too much to Badiou here.

#### Nomadic politics cause genocide.

Barbrook 98 [Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at U of Westminster, The Holy Fools]

While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari’s dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the ‘grand narrative’ of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The ‘line of flight’ from Stalin had led to Pol Pot. [22]

#### Nomadism is only possible for those in a position of privilege. Nomadology is a bourgeoise masculine subjectivity masquerading as cosmopolitanism.

Hannam et al. 2006 (Kevin, School of Arts, Design, Media and Culture, University of Sunderland, Mimi Sheller, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Swarthmore College, John Urry, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, “Editorial: Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings,” Mobilities Vol. 1, No. 1, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17450100500489189.)

Mobilities also are caught up in power geometries of everyday life (Massey, 1994). There are new places and technologies that enhance the mobility of some peoples and places even as they also heighten the immobility of others, especially as people try to cross borders (Timothy, 2001; Verstraete, 2004; Wood & Graham, 2006). ‘Differential mobility empowerments reflect structures and hierarchies of power and position by race, gender, age and class, ranging from the local to the global’ (Tesfahuney, 1998, p.501). Rights to travel, for example, are highly uneven and skewed even between a pair of countries (Timothy, 2001; Gogia, 2006). Many feminist theorists have argued that nomadic theory rests on a ‘romantic reading of mobility’, and that ‘certain ways of seeing [arise] as a result of this privileging of cosmopolitan mobility’ (Kaplan, 2006; see also Pritchard, 2000; Tsing, 2002). Ahmed, for example, critiques mobile forms of subjectivity and argues that the ‘idealisation of movement, or transformation of movement into a fetish, depends upon the exclusion of others who are already positioned as not free in the same way’ (Ahmed, 2004, p.152). Skeggs further argues that the mobility paradigm can be linked to a ‘bourgeois masculine subjectivity’ that describes itself as ‘cosmopolitan’; she points out that ‘[m]obility and control over mobility both reflect and reinforce power. Mobility is a resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship’ (Skeggs, 2004, p.49; see also Morley, 2002; Sheller & Urry, 2006b). It is not a question of privileging a ‘mobile subjectivity’, therefore, but rather of tracking the power and politics of discourses and practices of mobility in creating both movement and stasis (Cresswell, 1999; Maurer, 2002; Franklin et al., 2000).

### Alt can’t solve Striated Space

#### AFF – Territorialization is a two step process. Smooth space is always striated and striated space is always smoothed out. State based thinking is inevitable because it is locked in an eternal dance with the nomad. Thinking the new is simply a consequence of this inevitable relationship. Voting Neg does nothing to stop the pendulum.

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.” Political Perspectives, 4:1)

Hence, although Deleuze and Guattari argue that life is an immanent process, they acknowledge that the genuinely new is only created in the fluctuation between the immanent and the transcendent (in the sense of interruption of the infinite). Nomadic ‘escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to molar organizations’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 239- emphasis added), whilst ‘smooth space is constantly being translated, transformed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space’ (ibid.: 524). A purely smooth space traversed solely by desire, warn Deleuze and Guattari, would be a site of total nonproduction, and although smooth space is a crucial aspect of nomadic thought it does not constitute a perfect utopia. Indeed, Steven Shaviro reads Angela Carter’s The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman as a novel providing a dystopian example of such a state, in which the narrator becomes so overwhelmed with the constant movement of the infinite that his only desire is that everything stop (Shaviro, 2009: 123). Thus, what interests Deleuze and Guattari is how immanence reverts to transcendence; smoothness reverts to striation; how what is deterritorialized becomes reterritorialized and how these changes create the new, how this newness becomes ossified, organized, calcified and stops the ‘movement of the infinite’ before deterritorializing again. Their inorganic vitalism aims to open up new spaces for the play of life, but they explicitly acknowledge that this can only be done when death is inserted into the process (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 9). ‘Everything stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in place - and then the whole process will begin all over again’: a politics of radical pessimism, perhaps best summed up by a mantra from Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho!: ‘Fail again. Fail better’ (1984: 7)10.

#### Aff – Smooth space and Striated space are intimately connected with each other. It is impossible to smooth space without causing striation.

Deleuze and Guattari ‘87(Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. French philosophers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987. Print.)

Smooth space and striated space—nomad space and sedentary space—the space in which the war machine develops and the space instituted by the State apparatus—are not of the same nature. No sooner do we note a simple opposition between the two kinds of space than we must indicate a much more complex difference by virtue of which the successive terms of the oppositions fail to coincide entirely. And no sooner have we done that than we must remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space. In the first case, one organizes even the desert; in the second, 4740 1440: THE SMOOTH AND THE STRIATED □ 475 the desert gains and grows; and the two can happen simultaneously. But the de facto mixes do not preclude a de jure, or abstract, distinction between the two spaces. That there is such a distinction is what accounts for the fact that the two spaces do not communicate with each other in the same way: it is the de jure distinction that determines the forms assumed by a given de facto mix and the direction or meaning of the mix (is a smooth space captured, enveloped by a striated space, or does a striated space dissolve into a smooth space, allow a smooth space to develop?). This raises a number of simultaneous questions: the simple oppositions between the two spaces; the complex differences; the de facto mixes, and the passages from one to another; the principles of the mixture, which are not at all symmetrical, sometimes causing a passage from the smooth to the striated, sometimes from the striated to the smooth, according to entirely different movements. We must therefore envision a certain number of models, which would be like various aspects of the two spaces and the relations between them.

#### Radical opposition to the state doesn’t work – when we attempt to radically break with the system, it will only throw the strata into suicidal collapse and bring it back down on us harder than before. The only solution is to mimic the strata, work within the system so that we know how it is stratified and are able to free lines of flight without risking failure.

Deleuze & Guattari 87 [Gilles & Felix, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Paris & psychoanalyst @ La Borde, “How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?”, A Thousand Plateaus, pg. 160-1]

You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of signifiance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality. Mimic the strata. You don’t reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. That is why we encountered the paradox of those emptied and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they had emptied themselves of their organs instead of looking for the point at which they could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the BwO: either one fails to produce it, or one produces it more or less, but because the BwO is always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratified – organized, signified, subjected – is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flwos to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate, continue: a while “diagram”, as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs. We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines. Castaneda describes a long process of experimentation (it makes little difference whether it is with peyote or other things): let us recall for the moment how the Indian forces him first to find a “place,” already a difficult operation, then to find “allies,” and then gradually to give up interpretation, to construct flow by flow and segment by segment lines of experimentation, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, etc. For the BwO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, powers and fragments of all of these; for it is not “my” body without organs, instead the “me” (moi) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing thresholds.

### Aff solves the K

#### AFF – The Affirmative alters the context of transportation such that travelers are experiencing the new. These new associations undermine the everyday and promote nomadic thinking.

Sverrisdottir 2011 (Hildigunnur, Architect and part time lecturer at Iceland Academy of Arts. “The Destination Within”. Landabrefid (Journal of the Association of Icelandic Geographers) 25).

To prepare for travel in space, astronauts are trained to adjust for the state of weightlessness by flying in specially equipped aircrafts (NASA 2006). During a parabolic dive of the aircraft, the astronauts in training get a moment of mere 25 seconds in simulated weightlessness. In a similar fashion, in the interval between departure from the familiar to the point in time when one’s instincts of orientation kick in again in a new setting – before one gets to know the ways around to the local bar, cathedral or mountain peak – there is a rare moment of gliding in a state similar to zero-gravity, the moment of the non-savant, evoking the innocence and obligatory humility towards the surroundings: Where am I – and who am I? Who am I without my code of reference, code of language, status, cultural relevance? The traveller has to use her whole body in these new surroundings. One has to open one’s ears, one’s taste buds, start hearing with the toes and talking with the hands and eyes. This multi-sensory and smooth spatial experience is just as relevant anywhere. However, the farther the new situation is from the everyday, the more substantial is the re-orientation that has to take place, prolonging the stage of gliding in the temporal and spatial state of the question mark. The Icelandic artist Sigur<eth>ur Gu<eth>mundsson recently published an account of a year spent in introspection and of his efforts of social striation in the vastly populated Ho Chi Minh City (Gu<eth>mundsson 2010). Finding himself in the setting of an enormous living city where he was unable to properly orient himself, unable to verbally communicate with other people, and where his social status was partially undefined, he discovered (what he considered to be) true interpersonal communication and a direct route to the self.

#### AFF – Technological innovation produces rhizomatic networks where information flows in multiple directions at the expense of state power.

Deleuze and Guattari ’99 (Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. French philosophers. ©1998 MAHESH SENAGALA. Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture International Conference Rome, 1999.)

As technology gets more sophisticated, it becomes more rhizomatic in its design and functioning. The way nature works is rhizomatic. The way our brains function is rhizomatic. As technology becomes more sophisticated, its functioning becomes more akin to the biological structures as Kevin Kelly so brilliantly explains in his masterly work ìOut of control.î 16 Pure geometries, tree-like networks, polarized dualisms, strictly delimited territories, are all things of past. As Kevin Kelly points out, ìThe realm of the born-all that is nature-and the realm of the made-all that is humanly constructed-are becoming one. Machines are becoming biological and the biological is becoming engineered. î 17 The first hallmark of technology is its ability to enable complex interconnections between any number of points. Historically, each progressive transportation technology allowed us to make connections between any two points without necessarily going through strictly hierarchical tree-networks. Each progressive communication technology allowed us to establish point to point data and voice connections. In ancient times, a message had to be sent through human means ñ a messenger. A message was synonymous with the messenger traveling in physical space. I will call this the ìbody space.î Technology of printed text liberated the message from its bondage to the messenger. Technology of text gave birth to the ìtextual space.î The message could travel in its own space independent of the messenger or the sender. Later on, radio and wireless technologies made it possible to get rid of the physical messenger altogether. The message could travel at the speed of light on its own in the space of electromagnetic waves. I will call this the ìradio space.î The world of pure geometry and linear thinking is giving way to a world of complex structures and non-linear thinking. I once had a conversation with a professor of urban design who said that cyberspace does nothing to determine or affect the urban form and patterns. He was right and wrong at once. Such a perspective ignores the fact that cyberspace eats architecture from inside out as long as we ignore it. The fact is it simply doesnít matter anymore if you are in a metal shed or a Stonehenge if you want to communicate with your friend across the globe and understand the world. The urban form will probably not be affected simply because it does not matter anymore. Cyberspace subverts the very foundation and centrality of physical space. The fact that we are oblivious to other spaces does not spare us the spate of immateriality and marginality. What applies to the profession applies to education equally well.8 The second feature of technology is to liberate us from the eternal bondage to the physical space and time. With your cellular phone, you could be virtually anywhere, anytime and yet be in touch with anyone anywhere anytime. Technology decreases the distance between desire and gratification. Another hallmark of technology is fidelity. An oral message through a messenger is the least reliable mode of communication compared to a digital email message in terms of fidelity. There is something ironic at play when Jacques Ellul writes that ì[technology] dissociates the sociological forms, destroys the moral framework, desacralizes men and things, explodes social and religious taboos, and reduces the body social to a collection of individuals.î 18 If you recall our earlier discussion about the multiplicitous nature of rhizome, Ellul is correct in his observations and incorrect in his inferences. All that is united must fall apart. Technology fosters rhizomatic structures. Therefore a single rupture could bring down an entire tree-like society. No wonder societies fall apart because they do not realize the necessity of rhizomatization. The same applied to, of course, architecture and architectural education. The next hallmark of technology is that it integrates. As Jacques Ellul rightly points out, ìTechnique integrates everything. It avoids shock and sensational events.î 19 Technology, as it reaches the state of the art, empowers the human beings with simpler interface. Now we could talk to our computers that fit in our palms. Technology integrates economic systems, political systems, and eliminates boundaries that were previously thought as fortifications. Our usual approach to integration of computers into architectural curriculum is to ìintegrate computers into the curriculum.î However such an approach does not reflect a proper understanding of the computer as a new environment. Rather than integrating computers, we should let the computers integrate disparate elements within the curriculum and beyond the curriculum that have so far remained isolated and forge new connections with the larger world.

#### AFF TURN - Transportation technology can deterritorialize. New forms of transportation allow breaking away from spatial limitations

Delanda 2010 [Manuel, Gilles Deleuze Chair of Contemporary Philosophy and Science at the European Graduate School, as well as an overall great guy, (“Deleuze: History and Science”) page 19-20]

As with interpersonal networks, territoriality in the case of organizations has a strong spatial aspect. Most organizations possess physical premises within which they carry on their activities and which, in some cases, define the extent of their jurisdiction. This territory is defined both formally, by the legitimate jurisdictional area, as well as materially, by the area in which authority can actually be enforced. But just as in interpersonal networks, processes of territorialization go beyond the strictly spatial. The routinization of everyday activities, in the form of the repetition of rituals or the systematic performance of regulated activities, stabilizes the identity of organizations and gives them a way to reproduce themselves, as when a commercial organization opens up a new branch and sends part of its staff to bring with them the institutional memory (the day to day routines) of the parent company. Technological innovation, on the other hand, can destabilize this identity, deterritorializing an organization, and opening the assemblage to change. Transportation and communication technologies, for example, can have deterritorializing effects on organizations similar to those on face to face interaction, allowing organizations to break away from the limitations of spatial location. The modern bureaucratic form of authority may have emerged in part thanks to the precision with which the dispersed activities of many branches of an organization could be coordinated via the railroads and the telegraph. 21 And a similar point can be made about the transformation that large commercial or industrial corporations underwent in the nineteenth century, as they became nationwide corporations, as well as in the twentieth century when they became international.

#### AFF - Transportation deterritorializes life by reducing population density

Delanda 2010 [Manuel, Gilles Deleuze Chair of Contemporary Philosophy and Science at the European Graduate School, as well as an overall great guy, (“Deleuze: History and Science”) page 45]

Communities increase in territorialization with the degree of density of their inter-personal networks. Hence, anything that decreases density will deterritorialize them. One of these density-reducing factors is social mobility, a factor that became more and more important as middle classes increased in numbers, and as forms of movable wealth (money, debt in paper, stocks) increased relative to those that were immovable (land). Affordable long distance transportation and communication technologies also acted as deterritorializing forces. I could add many more examples that both confirm Deleuze and Guattari’s hypothesis while at the same time showing how inadequate it is to ascribe those deterritorializations and decodings to the “system as a whole”, that is, to society as an axiomatic.

#### AFF - Urban infrastructure allows for the transgression of societal hierarchies and the formation of smooth spaces

Wall 1999 (Alex, Professor of Urban Design in the Institute for Local, and City Planning in the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Karlsruhe in Germany, “Programming the Urban Surface,” Princeton Architectural Press, www2.fiu.edu/~readg/Courses/GradTheory/.../WallUrbanSurface.pdf.)

The design and integration of new transportation infrastructure is central to the functioning of the urban surface. The importance of mobility and access in the contemporary metropolis brings to infrastructure the character of collective space. Transportation infrastructure is less a self-sufficient service element than an extremely visible and effective instrument in creating new networks and relationships. Whereas the railroad station and the airport offer a centralized infrastructural condition-a density that almost resembles the city, in terms of services and programs-the more amorphous connective web of roads has rarely been recognized as a collective space unto itsel£ As the Italian architect Vittorio Gregotti argues: We are trying to return a positive morphological value to the road ... in an attempt to revive it as a component of the settlement event and by restoring the road to the architectural realm [while] forcing one's discipline to consider the problems it implies as its own specific ones.15 One very clear example, in answer to Gregotti, is the second beltway of Barcelona, completed for the 1992 Olympics. The northern arc, the Ronda de Dalt, extends between the interchanges at the Diagonal Avenue (northwest) and the Trinitat Park (northeast) and was designed by a team of architects and engineers led by Bernardo de Sola (Fig. 6).16 The Ronda de Dalt was conceived to achieve not the highest through-capacity of vehicles but the highest capacity of collection and distribution among local and regional transportation networks. The design also created opportunities to reconfigure the local conditions · for new programs and open space. This is especially the case at the interchanges, where new typologies between landscape and building have begun to emerge. Thus, the significance of the design of this highway is less its scenic and efficiency value than the road's actual capacity to stimulate and support new forms of urban space. This is achieved partially by the segregation of the sectional character of the road, with faster (regional) lanes in the center, flanked by slower (local) lanes that connect with new frontage and neighborhood streets. In some places, the space above the highway is occupied by new public buildings, especially high-volume structures such as sports venues. New parks and recreational areas are also designed into the system, linking once isolated housing estates to larger public spaces. The Ronda de Dalt thus demonstrates, in contemporary terms, the forgotten idea of the 1920s parkway as an instrument of connection, convenience, and mobility. A second example of new infrastructural design demonstrates how the space of mobility may also be a collective space. Among the northern suburbs of Paris, between St. Denis and Bobigny, is a mix of industrial zones, large social housing estates, cemeteries, hospitals, ·and areas of waste ground. Existing transportation infrastructure reflects the nineteenth-century pattern of radial extension and effectively divides communities into separate sectors~ Between 1990 and 1995, the landscape architect Alexandre Chemetoff and the Bureau des Paysages implemented the design of a new trolley line running between St. Denis and Bobigny (Fig. 7).17 This is a nine-kilometer line with twenty-one stations, and it is the first tangential boulevard in this area of Paris, initiating new relationships among once isolated sectors. Because of this new transportation line superimposed across the urban fabric, the project forms the basis for a host of other urban interventions. The tramline is, literally, a link that provides a coherent system across an otherwise fragmented field. It comprises three series: the material of the surface; the vegetation structure ofhedges, trees, and plantings; and furnishings, such as bollards, fences, lamps, trellises, and seating. Organized in different configurations, the families of surface, vegetation, and furnishings produce a contrapuntal effect in relation to the untidy irregularity of the surrounding fabric. The integrity and continuity of these elements produces not only an image of public space but also the necessary environmental conditions to support public activities. On a Sunday morning, for example, the line is crowded with French families of African, Arabic, and Asian background making their way to and from the street markets along the length of the line. Chemetoff's design is a prime example ofhow infrastructure engages social and imaginative dimensions as much as it does engineering concerns. It effectively integrates parts of the city, reduces the marginalization and segregation of certain social groups, and stimulates new forms of interaction.

### Rhizome Thinking Bad

#### Valorization of pure rhizomatics replicates the binary thinking it tries to escape on a more insidious level – only incorporating rhizomatics into current action can solve

Mikulak 7 [Michael, Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic University, Ph.D. in English and Cultural Studies from McMaster University (Thesis: “The Nature of Capitalism: How Green Can You Grow?”) “The Rhizomatics of Domination: From Darwin to Biotechnology” accessed online at <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue15/mikulak.html> //JG

While I agree that the rhizome as a model is potentially very libratory and politically flexible, the ludic tone of valorization that often surrounds the rhizome tends to replicate the very binaries and dualistic thinking it attempts to escape by privileging an equally abstracted notion of multiplicity, lines of flight, rupture, and schizoanalysis that are potentially even more amenable to shifting configurations of biopower within the age of biotechnology. Rhizomatics seems to be the theoretical soup de jour, and in the same way that arborescence has been rigorously overcoded and dominated by certain bioscientific discourses of purity, miscegenation, and progress, the rhizome is equally vulnerable to such manipulations. As such, my paper argues that the celebration of rhizomes must be amended with careful attention to what I call the rhizomatics of domination. Echoing Haraway's notion of the "informatics of domination" (Manifesto 161), [go to footnote: I am specifically thinking about the way that systems of networks and information, while liberating us from certain older forms of oppression and domination, open up whole new systems of power that may be more difficult to locate and resist.] the point of this paper will be to reach back into Darwin in order to show how even what we consider pure models of arborescent descent, are in fact much more rhizomatic and complicated in their configuration of origins. By looking at the ways in which Darwinism was transformed by the arboreal logic of the time (social Darwinism, eugenics, degeneracy, anti-immigration), and tracing the lines of flight from his theories to the bioscientific origin stories assembled by political opportunists, we can extrapolate and begin to see how the rhizomatics of domination is effecting the landscape of late capital. With discourse of climate change, eco-apocalypse, and the recent celebration of global warming as a boon for capitalism, the struggle over kinship imaginaries will shape the terrain of the future by fundamentally setting the tone for how we deal with the environmental crisis. The way we perceive environmental damage dictates how we will react to it, who we blame, and the actions we take. Discourse shapes the way we understand our relationship to global pollution and the actions we can take to address it, and kinship imaginaries are the most basic ideas we have about how we relate to the world. It is thus my contention that the reception and use of Darwinism must stand as an example for us when we are theorizing the political potential of rhizomatic or ecological thinking, especially in the context of powerful new technologies of genetic engineering that are rewriting the social and biological fabric of the tree of life along increasingly privatized lines of rhizomatic flight. In the same way that Darwinism was (mis)construed as a bioscientific discourse of legitimation for political philosophies that fly in the face of its author's intentions, rhizomatics must attend to the fascistic potential of re-coding bios within the current biopolitical terrain.

#### AFF – The rhizome concept deployed by the negative is a ruse that is itself overcoded with biunivocal thinking. The rhizome is equally capable of being used to sediment biopower.

Mikulak 7 [Michael, Fellow in Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic, Ph.D. “The Rhizomatics of Domination: From Darwin to Biotechnology” accessed online at <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue15/mikulak.html> //JG

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### D+G Philosophy Justifies Fascism

#### AFF - The alternative fails-- Deleuze’s theory is used for violence and military destruction.

Weizman 2k6 (Eyal, Israeli journalist, “The Art of War,” Fireze Magazine Issue 99, May 2006, Online)

**The attack conducted by units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the city of Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier-General Aviv Kokhavi, as ‘inverse geometry’, which he explained as ‘the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of micro-tactical actions’**.1 **During the battle soldiers moved within the city across hundreds of metres of ‘overground tunnels’ carved out through a dense and contiguous urban structure**. Although several thousand soldiers and Palestinian guerrillas were manoeuvring simultaneously in the city, they were so ‘saturated’ into the urban fabric that very few would have been visible from the air. Furthermore, they used none of the city’s streets, roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved horizontally through walls and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as ‘infestation’, seeks to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares. **The IDF’s strategy of ‘walking through walls’ involves a conception of the city as not just the site but also the very medium of warfare – a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux. Contemporary military theorists are now busy re-conceptualizing the urban domain**. At stake are the underlying concepts, assumptions and principles that determine military strategies and tactics. The vast intellectual field that geographer Stephen Graham has called an international ‘shadow world’ of military urban research institutes and training centres that have been established to rethink military operations in cities could be understood as somewhat similar to the international matrix of élite architectural academies. However, according to urban theorist Simon Marvin, the military-architectural ‘shadow world’ is currently generating more intense and well-funded urban research programmes than all these university programmes put together, and is certainly aware of the avant-garde urban research conducted in architectural institutions, especially as regards Third World and African cities. **There is a considerable overlap among the theoretical texts considered essential by military academies and architectural schools. Indeed, the reading lists of contemporary military institutions include works from around 1968 (with a special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari** and Guy Debord), as well as more contemporary writings on urbanism, psychology, cybernetics, post-colonial and post-Structuralist theory. If, as some writers claim, **the space for criticality has withered away in late 20th-century capitalist culture, it seems now to have found a place to flourish in the military**. I conducted an interview with **Kokhavi, commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, who at 42 is considered one of the most promising young officers of the IDF** (and was the commander of the operation for the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip).2 Like many career officers, he **had taken time out from the military to earn a university degree; although he originally intended to study architecture, he ended up with a degree in philosophy from the Hebrew University**. When he explained to me the principle that guided the battle in Nablus, what was **interesting for me was not so much the description of the action itself as the way he conceived its articulation. He said: ‘this space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. […] The question is how do you interpret the alley? […] We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. […] I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win […] This is why that we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing. […] I said to my troops, “Friends! […] If until now you were used to move along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls!**”**’2 Kokhavi’s intention in the battle was to enter the city in order to kill members of the Palestinian resistance and then get ou**t. The horrific frankness of these objectives, as recounted to me by Shimon Naveh, Kokhavi’s instructor, is **part of a general Israeli policy that seeks to disrupt Palestinian resistance on political as well as military levels through targeted assassinations from both air and ground**. **If you still believe, as the IDF would like you to, that moving through walls is a relatively gentle form of warfare, the following description of the sequence of events might change your mind. To begin with, soldiers assemble behind the wall and then, using explosives, drills or hammers, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Stun grenades are then sometimes thrown, or a few random shots fired into what is usually a private living-room occupied by unsuspecting civilians. When the soldiers have passed through the wall, the occupants are locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the operation is concluded, often without water, toilet, food or medicine. Civilians in Palestine**, as in Iraq, **have experienced the unexpected penetration of war into the private domain of the home as the most profound form of trauma and humiliation. A Palestinian woman i**dentified only as Aisha, interviewed by a journalist for the Palestine Monitor**, described the experience: ‘Imagine it – you’re sitting in your living-room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal, and suddenly that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders. You have no idea if they’re after you, if they’ve come to take over your home, or if your house just lies on their route to somewhere else. The children are screaming, panicking. Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, 12 soldiers, their faces painted black, sub-machine-guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall?**’3 Naveh, a retired Brigadier-General, directs the Operational Theory Research Institute, which trains staff officers from the IDF and other militaries in ‘operational theory’ – defined in military jargon as somewhere between strategy and tactics. He summed up the mission of his institute, which was founded in 1996: ‘We are like the Jesuit Order. We attempt to teach and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John Forester, and other architects. We are reading Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz. Not myself, but our soldiers, our generals are reflecting on these kinds of materials. **We have established a school and developed a curriculum that trains “operational architects”**.’4 In **a lecture Naveh showed a diagram resembling a ‘square of opposition’ that plots a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labelled with phrases such as ‘Difference and Repetition – The Dialectics of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Manoeuvre’, ‘Velocity vs. Rhythms’, ‘The Wahabi War Machine’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists’ and ‘Nomadic Terrorists’, they often reference the work of Deleuze and Guattari. War machines, according to the philosophers, are polymorphous; diffuse organizations characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of small groups that split up or merge with one another, depending on contingency and circumstance**s. (Deleuze and Guattari were aware that the state can willingly transform itself into a war machine. Similarly, in their discussion of ‘smooth space’ it is implied that this conception may lead to domination.) **I asked Naveh why Deleuze and Guattari were so popular with the Israeli military. He replied that ‘several of the concepts in A Thousand Plateaus became instrumental for us** **[…] allowing us to explain contemporary situations in a way that we could not have otherwise. It problematized our own paradigms. Most important was the distinction they have pointed out between the concepts of “smooth” and “striated” space [which accordingly reflect] the organizational concepts of the “war machine” and the “state apparatus”. In the IDF we now often use the term “to smooth out space” when we want to refer to operation in a space as if it had no borders. […] Palestinian areas could indeed be thought of as “striated” in the sense that they are enclosed by fences, walls, ditches, roads blocks and so on.**’5 When I asked him if moving through walls was part of it, he explained that, ‘In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem. [...] Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and practice.’6

#### Turn – Your authors USE FASCISM AS A REPRESENTATION FOR ALL BAD POLITICS; THEY HARBOR THEIR OWN FASCIST TENDENCIES AND; THEIR ALTERNATIVE - LIBIDINAL MICROPOLITICS - WOULDN’T HAVE PREVENTED ANY CRISES FOR THE LEFT.

Zizek 04 (Slavoj, Senr Reschr @ Dept of Philosophy, U of Ljubjana, Critical Inquiry, Winter)

However, productive as this Deleuzian approach is, it is time to problematize it and, with it, the general tendency, popular among (especially Western) Marxists and post-Marxists, of relying upon a set of simplistic clues for the triumph of fascism (or, nowadays, for the crisis of the Left)--as if the result would have been entirely different if only the Left were to fight fascism at the level of libidinal micropolitics, or, today, if only the Left were to abandon "class essentialism" and accept the multitude of "post-political" struggles as the proper terrain of its activity. If ever there was the case of leftist arrogant intellectual stupidity, this is the one. Back to Deleuze and Guattari: there are two problems with this theory. The notion that fascism could have been defeated earlier if only the Left would have countered it with its own politics of passions, an old idea defended already by Ernst Bloch and Wilhelm Reich, seems naive enough. Furthermore, what Deleuze proposed as his big insight was already claimed--albeit in a different mode--by the most traditional Marxism, which often repeated that fascists disdain rational argumentation and play upon people's base irrational instincts. More generally, this Deleuzian approach is all too abstract--all bad politics is declared fascist, so that fascism is elevated into a global container, a catch-all, an all-encompassing term for everything that opposes the free flow of Becoming; it is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran's fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office. (7) One is almost tempted to add: and the fascism of the irrationalist vitalism of Deleuze himself (in an early polemic, Alain Badiou effectively accused Deleuze of harboring fascist tendencies!). Deleuze and Guattari (especially Guattari) often indulge here in a true interpretive delirium of hasty generalizations; in one great arc, they draw a continuous line from the early Christian procedure of confessions through the self-probing of romantic subjectivity and the psychoanalytic treatment (confessing one's secret, perverse desires) up to the forced confessions of the Stalinist show trials (Guattari once directly characterized these trials as an exercise in collective psychoanalysis). To such analyses, one is tempted to respond by pointing out how the Stalinist trials were evidently productive; their actual goal was not to discover the truth, but to create new truth, to construct or generate it. It is here, against such generalizations, that one should evoke the lesson of Laclau's notion of hegemonic articulation: fascism emerges only when disparate elements start to resonate together. In fact, it is only a specific mode of this resonance of elements (elements that can also be inserted into totally different hegemonic chains of articulation).

#### War machines against the state turn lines of flight into lines of death.

Diken and Laustsen 1 [Bülent, lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University, and Carsten Bagge, Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Sciences, September, online: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Diken-Laustsen-Enjoy-Your-Fight.pdf]

The second danger of the line of flight, which is less obvious but more interesting is “clarity”. Clarity arises when one attains a perception of the molecular texture of the “social”, when the holes in it are revealed. What used to be compact and whole seems now to be leaking, a texture that enables de-differentiations, overlappings, migrations, hybridizations. Clarity emerges with the transformation of Fight Club into Project Mayhem. “Everything is nothing, and it’s cool to be enlightened” (Palahniuk 1997: 64). Clarity is also the reason why Fight Club fascinates its members. In this sense, Fight Club does not only reproduce the dangers of the rigid in a miniature scale; it is microfascism. “Instead of the great paranoid fear, we are trapped in a thousand little monomanias, self-evident truths, and clarities that gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed judge, dispenser of the justice, policeman, neighbourhood SS man” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 228). Interestingly, whereas the movie clearly makes a self-reflexive mockery of Project Mayhem in the context of the first danger (macrofascism), the aspects of Fight Club that do not resonate in Project Mayhem (that is, its microfascist aspects) escape its ironic perspective. It seems as if the movie assumes that power predominantly pertains to molar lines. But lines of flight are not exempted from power relations, and there is a microfascism in Fight Club that cannot be confined to Project Mayhem. It is in this context remarkable that Fight Club operates as a deterritorialized line of flight, as a war machine that is violently opposed to the state; its members are not merely the Oedipalized paranoiacs of the capitalist state order. Its micro-fascism can be understood best as a transgressive delirium. “What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement”, a proliferation of molecular interactions, “skipping from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 214-5). If Project Mayhem is the ridiculous Nazi-type organization with unreflexive skinheads who just repeat Tyler’s orders, Fight Club is the molecular face of fascism. The third danger: a line of flight can lose its creative potentials and become a line of death. This is precisely what happens in Fight Club: “the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion for abolition” (1987: 229). In fact, fascism is the result of an intense line of flight that becomes a line of death, wanting self-destruction and “death through the death of others” (Ibid. 230). A line of flight that desires its own repression. The point at which escape becomes a line of death is the point at which war (destruction) becomes the main object of the war machine rather than its supplement. Fight Club, transforming into Project Mayhem, becomes an instrument of pure destruction and violence, of complete destratification, a war machine that has war as its object. In other words, the regression to the undifferentiated or complete disorganization is as dangereous as transcendence and organization. Tyler, the alluring and charismatic, the free-wheeling pervert of Fight Club, is as dangerous as society. If there are two dangers, the strata and complete destratification, suicide, Fight Club fights only the first. Therefore a relevant question, never asked by microfascists, is whether it is not “necessary to retain a minimum of strata, a minimum of forms and functions, a minimal subject from which to extract materials, affects, and assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 270). The test of desire is not denouncing false desires but distinguishing between that which pertains to the strata, complete destratification, and that which pertains to line of flight, a test, which Fight Club does not pass (Ibid. 165). Let’s qualify this point by investigating the way the logic of the cut works in the film.

### Fight Club Turn

#### Project Mayhem Turn - A politics of lines of flight inevitably restratifies and turns into what it opposes – their transcendence of boundaries can’t happen without tons of violence. They start out as Fight Club but turn into Project Mayhem.

Diken and Laustsen 1 [Bülent, lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University, and Carsten Bagge, Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Sciences, September, online: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Diken-Laustsen-Enjoy-Your-Fight.pdf]

In his Programme from 1936 and his analysis of fascism, Bataille concludes that there is much the Left can learn from the organizational forms of fascism (Bataille 1997, 1997b; Sørensen 2001). “Assume the function of destruction and decomposition…. Take part in the destruction of the existing world… Fight for the decomposition … of all communities…” (Bataille 1997: 121). Fight Club, too, seeks “a prematurely induced dark age¼. The complete and right-away destruction of civilization.” (Palahniuk 1997: 125). Bataille had argued that it is necessary to affirm the “value of violence” and “to take upon oneself perversion and crime” (1997: 121); and Fight Club, again, violently lifts the curse: “yes, you’re going to have to kill someone¼. No excuses and no lies¼. You are the same decaying organic matter as everyone else” (Palahniuk 1997: 125, 134). Fight Club wants the whole world to “hit the bottom” (Ibid. 123). Echoing the French nouveaux philosophes, especially the Situationist manifesto, it especially attacks the society of spectacle. “Fight club isn’t about words … Fight club is not football on television. You aren’t watching a bunch of men you don’t know halfway around the world beating on each other live by satellite with a two-minute delay” (Ibid. 50, 51). Fight Club is about street fights, urban anarchism, and strategies of subversion. “Realize … the irony of the animal world”, continues Bataille’s Programme (1997: 121). In his imagination, Jack walks up the entrance of a cave and out comes a penguin. “Slide”, it says, smiling. “Without any effort, we slid through tunnels and galleries” (Palahniuk 1997: 20). It is no coincidence that the social space, in which Jack/penguin “slides”, is a smooth social space. Losing the social bond is freedom, and in this sense Fight Club is a Deleuzian “war machine”, a free assemblage oriented along a line of flight out of the repressive social machinery. It is that which cannot be contained in the striated, rigidly segmented social space; it consists of flows (speed), operates in a smooth space, and unties the social bond (codes) in multiplicity (mass-phenomena). In this respect “war”, or “fight”, is the surest mechanism against social organization: “just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State was against war, so war is against the State, and makes it impossible” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 357). It is crucial in this context that Deleuze and Guattari recognize a war machine as an assemblage that has as its object not war—war is only “the supplement” of the war machine—but the constitution of a creative line of flight, a smooth space. War is simply “a social state that wards off the State” (Ibid. 417). In this sense, violence is Fight Club’s supplement, not necessarily its object; Fight Club is above all a social state that wards off “society”. Fight Club proliferates in, or even better, constructs a nomadic social space without zones, centres, segments: a flattened space, in which one can “slide” through connections: “and” … “and” … “and”. Lines rather than points; connection rather than conjugation. Fight Club does not have a fixed spatiality, a permanent address; it grows like a rhizome, thorough discontinuous jumps. And temporally, it “exists only in the hours between when fight club starts and when fight club ends” (Palahniuk 1997: 48)

### PERM

#### PERM - The 1AC is a slow experiment; even if it fails to liberate us, it is better than the negative’s fast rejection and overdose, which leads to collapse and death

Gilles Deleuze, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris; and Felix Guattari, psychoanalyst, 1987, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 160-161

You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of signifiance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality. Mimic the strata. You don’t reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. That is why we encountered the paradox of those emptied and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they had emptied themselves of their organs instead of looking for the point at which they could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the organs we call the organism. There are, in fact, several ways of botching the BwO: either one fails to produce it, or one produces it more or less, but nothing is produced on it, intensities do not pass or are blocked. This is because the BwO is always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratified—organized, signified, subjected—is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate, continue: a whole “diagram,” as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs. We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines. Castaneda describes a long process of experimentation (it makes little difference whether it is with peyote or other things): let us recall for the moment how the Indian forces him first to find a “place,” already a difficult operation, then to find “allies,” and then gradually to give up interpretation, to construct flow by flow and segment by segment lines of experimentation, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, etc. For the BwO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, powers, and fragments of all of these; for it is not “my” body without organs, instead the “me” (moi) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing thresholds).

### Fear of Death Good

#### AFF – Fear of Death Good - EVEN IF DEATH DOESN’T KILL BEING, IT DOES ANNIHILATE CONSCIOUSNESSES THAT ARE COMPOSED OF PRECISE COMBINATIONS OF ENERGY AND MATTER, MEANING THAT DEATH EXTINGUISHES THOUGHT PROCESSES THAT PEOPLE ARE ATTACHED TO, MEANING THAT FORCED DEATH IS VIOLENT AND UNDESIRABLE. WE’RE MORE THAN THE MATTER OF OUR PARTS, BUT CREATE MEANING THROUGH COMMUNICATIVE PROCESSES. CARBON ATOMS AREN’T THE KEY COMPONENT OF LIFE, COMPLEX INFORMATION PROCESSING IS, MEANING THAT DEATH CAUSES ANNIHILATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Tipler ‘94

[Frank J., Professor of Mathematical Physics at Tulane University, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead, New York: Doubleday, 1994, 124-5//uwyo-ajl]

IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER LIFE can continue to exist forever, I shall need to define "life" in physics language. I claim that a "living being" is any entity which codes information (in the physics sense of this word) with the information coded being preserved by natural selection. Thus "life" is a form of information processing, and the human mind-and the human soul-is a very complex computer program. Specifically, a "person" is defined to be a computer program which can pass the Turing test, which was discussed in Chapter II.

This definition of "life" is quite different from what the average person-and the average biologist-would think of as "life." In the traditional definition, life is a complex process based on the chemistry of the carbon atom. However, even supporters of the traditional definition admit that the key words **are "complex process" and not "carbon atom**." Although the entities everyone agrees are "alive" happen to be based on carbon chemistry, there is no reason to believe that analogous processes cannot be based on other systems. In fact, the British biochemist A. G. Cairns-Smith! has suggested that the first living beings--':our ultim:ate ancestors-were based on metallic crystals, not carbon. If this is true, then if we insist that living beings must be based on carbon chemistry, we would be forced to conclude that our ultimate ancestors were not alive. In Cairns-Smith's theory, our ultimate ancestors were self-replicating patterns of defects in the metallic crystals. Over time, the pattern persisted, but was transferred to another substrate: carbon molecules. What is important is not the substrate but the pattern, and the pattern is another name for information.

But life of course is not a static pattern. Rather, it is a dynamic pattern that persists overtime. It is thus a process. But not all processes are alive. The key feature of the "living" patterns is that their persistence is due to a feedback with their environment: the information coded in the pattern continually varies, but the variation is constrained to a narrow range by this feedback. Thus life is, as I stated, information preserved by natural selection.