# \*\*\*1AC’s

## 1AC (Right)

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase investment in transportation infrastructure to make it more accessible

### Advantage one

#### Contention one is the medical gaze

#### Status quo transportation infrastructure is discriminatory – it structurally excludes persons with disabilities

National Council on Disability 2005 - Lex Frieden, Chairperson, Texas¶ Patricia Pound, First Vice Chairperson, Texas¶ Glenn Anderson, Ph.D., Second Vice Chairperson, Arkansas¶ Milton Aponte, J.D., Florida¶ Robert R. Davila, Ph.D., New York¶ Barbara Gillcrist, New Mexico¶ Graham Hill, Virginia¶ Joel I. Kahn, Ph.D., Ohio¶ Young Woo Kang, Ph.D., Indiana¶ Kathleen Martinez, California¶ Carol Novak, Florida¶ Anne M. Rader, New York¶ Marco Rodriguez, California¶ David Wenzel, Pennsylvania¶ Linda Wetters, Ohio¶ Staff¶ Ethel D. Briggs, Executive Director¶ Jeffrey T. Rosen, General Counsel and Director of Policy¶ Mark S. Quigley, Director of Communications¶ Allan W. Holland, Chief Financial Officer¶ Julie Carroll, Senior Attorney Advisor¶ Joan M. Durocher, Attorney Advisor¶ Martin Gould, Ed.D., Senior Research Specialist¶ Geraldine Drake Hawkins, Ph.D., Program Analyst¶ Mark Seifarth, Congressional Liaison¶ Pamela O'Leary, Interpreter¶ Brenda Bratton, Executive Assistant¶ Stacey S. Brown, Staff Assistant¶ Carla Nelson, Office Automation Clerk ( National Council on Disability Members and Staff June 13, 2005 http://disabledinaction.org/ncd\_print.html#railtransit1)bs

A glance at government data on accessible rail stations quickly reveals a pattern that has stymied many travelers with disabilities, although this pattern could be perfectly legal under disability rights laws. In relatively new train systems, such as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in Washington, D.C., and the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in California, all stations are relatively accessible to people with mobility impairments. But some of the older subway systems, such as New York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, and the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, have only a minority of their stations accessible and, thus, very limited locations to which many people with disabilities may go, in comparison with the general public. This situation renders the system unusable for wheelchair riders and other individuals who need structural access at stations. At best, it can mean an individual must travel three or four stations out of his or her way, then board a bus to go back in the right direction, rendering any trip so lengthy as to be impractical.

Jim Weisman, general counsel with the United Spinal Association (formerly Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association), has a long history at the forefront of disability transportation rights. His work in New York and Philadelphia on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, an important disability rights law preceding the ADA, became the models for the ADA's key station requirements. Weisman was also deeply involved in the development of the ADA's transportation provisions. His comment on the paucity of accessible stations in some of the older rail systems because of the key station approach is that, in the ADA,

Key stations is all we could get. ... [Regarding the New York MTA], with only about 51 stations currently accessible [out of more than 400 stations in all], rail usage is terrible because travel is difficult. The commuter rail system (Long Island Rail Road and Metro North) is much better, about one in every three stations with elevators and ramps. Commuter stations renovated in the ordinary course of business get made accessible far more often than non-key subway stations renovated in the ordinary course of business, because the 20% disproportionality rule for ADA alterations eliminates elevator installation in subway renovations because costs are so high. ... The key station concept is outdated and should be eliminated; i.e., all stations should ultimately be made accessible, since to do otherwise is to permit discrimination. In short, all passenger rail stations should be made accessible, ending the fragmented access provided under the ADA's limited key station requirements.

#### This discrimination creates participation barriers for persons with disabilities – transportation is key

Schwartz 5/9/12, VP of External Affairs, American Association of People with Disabilities, (“People with Disabilities still left behind in transportation debates” http://www.aapd.com/resources/press-room/press-releases/people-with-disabilities.html)

Washington, D.C. – As conferees begin debating how to move forward with the federal transportation reauthorization, two civil rights organizations are highlighting massive disparities in transportation access for people with disabilities. “Equity in Transportation for People with Disabilities,” a report by The American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) and The Leadership Conference Education Fund, documents the lack of funding, enforcement, and oversight of transportation programs that allow people with disabilities the opportunity to participate fully in community life. The collected findings demonstrate that federal and local policymakers have failed to fulfill the promise of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and provide equal access to affordable transportation for all communities through federal surface transportation legislation. Among the findings: • Many public transit systems– particularly older rail and bus systems, as well as Amtrak--are still inaccessible to people with disabilities. • Paratransit services required by the ADA are plagued by poor oversight, high costs to transit agencies and, and woefully inadequate service. • Taxi services continue to be out of reach for people who use wheelchairs, both due to discrimination by drivers and because of physically-inaccessible cabs. • Enforcement of ADA compliance remains spotty. • Significant access problems remain for people living in rural communities. The report includes recommendations for ensuring that the next surface transportation reauthorization bill can begin to meet the needs of all individuals living in the United States. “This report underscores how much the civil rights community has at stake in the transportation debate,” said Wade Henderson, president and CEO of The Leadership Conference Education Fund. “Because of inadequate funding and enforcement, countless people with disabilities can’t reliably vote, work, attend medical appointments, or enjoy full independence.” Mark Perriello, president of AAPD, commented that “access to transportation is a prerequisite to full civil rights for people with disabilities. The goals of the Americans with Disabilities Act—economic power, independent living, political participation, and equal opportunity—can only be realized with affordable, accessible transportation systems.”

#### Exclusion of disabled from the community is founded on a flawed nationalism which demands an archetypal normative citizen defined by a medical gaze

Campbell, '9 -Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka,( Fiona Kumari "States of Exceptionality: Provisional Disability, its Mitigation, and Citizenship", http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/109813/20\_Marshall\_Vol3\_Ch19\_p273-p284.pdf

I argue that law reflects a broader desire to drive down disability —thus ensuring that this class of enumerated persons remains problematically in a state of exceptionality, defi ned by law, rather than being a signifi cant part of a country’s population. The state of exceptionality refuses to conceive of disability as a form of difference within the population. The role of biomedicalism coupled with regulative aspects of the law can be found in many legal defi nitions of disability. For instance, in the Indian Person with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act (1995), disability is reduced to diagnostic types: s. 2 (i) and a “person with a disability” to “a person suffering from not less than 40% of any disability as certifi ed by a medical authority” (s. 2 (t)). In this example, the legal enactment of purifi cation zones attempts to settle the matter of disability by way of enumerative exactness and reduction of disability to a medical model. The motif of disability is much more than a state of being. Nationalism demands that the archetypal normative citizen be free from fl aws and matters of possible degeneracy. In these times of economic rationalism and panics over risk and terror, the sentiments of famous U.S. eugenist case Buck v. Bell (274 U.S. 200) fi nd new credence:

We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifi ces, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfi t from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough. (p. 208)

#### Transportation is the root cause of social exclusion / plan solves

Imrie 2000 - Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London( Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf)bs

The inequities of mobility and movement are connected to sociocultural values and practices which prioritise mobile bodies or those characterised by societally defined norms of health, fitness, and independence of bodily movements. Such bodies are, as Ellis (2000, page 5) notes, ``naturalised as a biological given'' and projected as ``the legitimate basis of order in a humanist world''. Illustrative of this are the plethora of metaphors of mobility and movement which are infused with conceptions of bodily completeness and independence, of the (normal) body far removed from those with physical and mental impairments. Such representations counterpoise the mobile body to reinforce what Oliver (1990) refers to as a ``legacy of negativism'', or values which mark out disabled people as ``problems because they are seen to deviate from the dominant culture's view of what is desirable, normal, socially acceptable, and safe'' (Corker, 1999, page 20; in addition, see Abberley, 1987; Paterson and Hughes, 1999).

In this paper, I argue that assumptions of unrestricted movement and mobility in contemporary Western societies are hegemonic in prioritising specific bodies and modes of mobility and movement. (2) In particular, mobility and movement are defined through discourses which serve to alienate impaired bodies and to prioritise the movement of what one might term `the mobile body'. In exploring such ideas, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part is a discussion of the hegemonic discourses of the body in relation to mobility and movement. This is followed by an empirical exploration, through self-testimonies, of disabled people's experiences of movement and mobility. I conclude by exploring some of the practical and political possibilities for challenging the hegemonic discourses of the body, mobility, and movement.

#### These barriers establish the able body as the social and political norm – this creates societal ableism

**Livingston 2k,** Professor of Sociology BS, Mercy College NY; MS, Queens College; PhD, Graduate School & University Center, (Kathy “When architecture disables: Teaching undergraduates to perceive ableism in the built environment” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1318988.pdf>, jstor)

The definition of disability used by the World Health Organization (WHO) is "any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being" (Weitz 1996:155). Although the WHO model focuses on the individual and suggests that disability resides within the person, a sociological model suggests that disability is defined or determined by how others re- spond "to bodies that fail to meet social expectations...[as] reflected in the social or built environment" (Weitz 1996:155). The built environment demands certain physical abilities and "rewards" able-bodied people as "normal" but "punishes" those who can- not meet those demands and thus deviate from the norm. For example, stairways make parks, buildings, buses and trains inaccessible to people who use wheelchairs, whereas wheelchair ramps allow anyone to access those places independently. A link can then be made between access to the built environment and access to the social envi- ronment; public spaces that favor able- bodied people create ableism by making people with disabilities less visible, mini- mizing their chances for social interaction, and making isolation and stigma likely. Re- moving barriers in public places for people with disabilities increases their visibility and provides opportunities for social interaction among all people, regardless of their abili- ties. If the built environment were modified to accommodate people with various abili- ties, almost anyone could live independently and travel to jobs or school without having to rely on the "mercy" of others for assis- tance. But students need help perceiving and understanding these examples as illustrations of structural discrimination or ableism

#### Society defines disability as a problem with the person – repoliticizing transportation infrastructure breaks down the system and relegates authority to the environment

Koch, 2008 (Tom, Adjunct Professor of Medical Ethics at the University of British Columbia, “Spaced Out in the City: the Wrinkled World of Transit for Those With Limited Mobility”, Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28 No. 2, Spring, <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/94/94>)

Making my way slowly toward the geography building I wondered about the nature of impairments and the limits they impose, the world they create. **What did it mean to be a 20-something**, wheelchair-**mobile car driver in a city; how was that different from being** a middle-aged, sight-impaired fellow with a cane? Was my world in fact restricted because I cannot drive? Is it in some way limited by my reliance on transit? Having written about disability ethics I was familiar with the broad arguments of both physical limits and their social construction (Koch 2001; 2006a; 2006b). Here, however, the broad issues were focused in the built environment and there the data seems … sparse. The problem is clear: "people adjust their preferences to what they think they can achieve" (Nussbaum 2006, 73). But to what extent might my impairments limit what I saw as achievable. How is being **unable to drive**, and perhaps to use a bus, a limit that forces us to adjust our goals and does that limit our lives? The more I looked the more I came to understood that **the real problem** in thinking about this problem **is the method in which we think about transit, the methodology constructed to frame questions and seek answers about accessibility.** Understanding, and perhaps reconstructing, our view of the environment as a traversable surface became the goal of a project whose origins were personal and broadly conceptual but whose end is concrete and pragmatic. Literature: Geography There are two pertinent literatures here, one is geographic and the other a "disability literature." Many have described in a general way the affect of physical limits on urban access and mobility, the broad differences between "enabling" (Gleeson 2002, 201) and conversely inhibiting environments. Eric Britton described the changing circumstances of his mother's life as her Parkinson's disease progressed (Britton 2002); **I describe**d the limits — **social and physical** — my father experienced in a "geriatric decline" (Koch 1990). Reginald Golledge has written extensively, alone and with others, on "disability, barriers, and discrimination," from the perspective of the blind (Golledge 1994, Marston, Golledge and Costanzo 1997). Within this broad literature is a subset concerning **limits on** urban **accessibility based not on the physical characteristics of the person alone but on the structure of transport systems that connect the built environments in which we live.** The consensus seems to be that what Porter called "the simplistic equation of impairment with disability" is unsustainable when, as she discovered, a quadriplegic with a motorized wheelchair and adapted motor van was more mobile and "independent" than many with less extreme physical limits (Porter 2002, 12). My observation, clearly, was not unique. **What Porter calls "transit disability" defines in a general way limits to** urban **access based on one's mode of transportation and the inability of** some **bus travel, for example, to match the access of others**, especially automobile use. But what is meant by this, and how it is to be understood, is unclear in Porter's work or that of other researchers. The problem was framed in a general way in 1993 by Golledge who suggested, as Church and Marston have noted, that **"even when considering the exact same geographic space, people with differing abilities must use, access, and travel through that environment using different routes, such that the conception and use of that space is 'transformed' for different users**" (Church and Marston 2003, 12). **The problem**, therefore, **is not simply in the location of this or that barrier but in the space created by different routes and different modes of travel for users with different capabilities**. **While this makes intuitive sense, it flies in the face of decades of transportation studies**. **There space is assumed to be democratically uniform and constant irrespective of the mode of transportation or the abilities of users**. Its topology is typically expressed as a collection of lines (streets, bus routes, airline routes) and points (street intersections, bus stops, airline terminals) that permit regular access to and egress from across the regular and unchanging space of the city or state (Taffe and Gauthier 1973). **The systems we use** **to design** urban **systems and measure their accessibility all rely on this idea of a space that can be measured in simple and regular units of time and distance** such that ten miles will take twice as long to travel as five miles. By the late 1960s, a series of algorithms had been developed in which graph theoretic modeling was employed to design interactive systems at a range of scales (the city, the nation, and the world) **based on this idea of a single and regular space accessible by all** (Haggett 1967). **Those equations remain the very essence of our thinking today** (for a review see Church and Marston 2003). **But** what if **persons with mobility disorders, and persons who cannot drive, in fact are relegated by the transit system to a very different space**? How might this different space be understood, its origins described? Geographies of disability, while rich in "the everyday geographies of people with disability, chronic illness, and psychiatric problems" ( Dyck and O'Brien 2003) hold no answers to the broader problem. This paper details an attempt to come to grips with this idea of non-regular spaces as a function of mobility limits and transit systems. It offers no answers and is less a report of "work-in-progress" than a pre-study whose outcome is a proposed means of defining a methodology that might better express the variable spaces in which we live. This paper describes the first stage of a research initiative, one that grounded in individual experience will lead, hopefully, to a more complete and complex spatial metric capable of describing **transit modalities** and the method they **construct different spaces** affecting users differently. **Through** a careful **consideration** of a single case, **questions are raised and methodologies proposed for future application**. Disability and Impairment While concrete and geographic in its subject and analysis, **the result will certainly bear upon the greater issues of social exclusion and inclusion of persons of difference.** For more than a generation debate has continued over the degree to which physical limits and the social context in which they are enacted influence daily life activities and life quality. A "social disability model" argues, to paraphrase Tremain, **"disablement is nothing to do with the [physical] body, impairment is nothing less than a description of the body"** (Tremain 2005, 9). My **impairments** — low vision and mobility restrictions — **are physical realities but any limits they present in daily life**, in this trope, **result form a failure in social** infrastructure **support, the real "disablement." In considering the space created by transit modalities, the nature of that** infrastructure itself becomes the subject**.** Once a principal proponent of the social disability model, British sociologist Tom Shakespeare recently has argued the **dichotomies of disablement/impairment, of physical realities and social barriers, are too simple. "Disability studies would be better off without the social model, which has become fatally undermined by its own contractions and inadequacies"** (Shakespeare 2006, 28). **It is not that social realities are unimportant**, Shakespeare insists, **but that they exist within a context in which the physical difference is real and not necessarily society's responsibility to address**. A vast literature has grown around the poles of disability and impairment, of clinical reality and social responsibility, one rich in theory if not in pragmatic answers (for a review see, for example, Koch 2006a, 2006b). The technical literature in this area typically takes an "activity-based approach" (Marston, Golledge, and Costanzo 1997). Grounded in the regular space of classical transportation modeling in which space is constant and regular, Kwan, among others, has experimented with network-based approaches that develop space-time accessibility measures, a point-based approach in which travel networks are divided into origins and destinations, points on a map or graph, between which distance is calculated in one or another metric (time travel, cost of travel, etc.) (Kwan 1988). Two problems were immediately apparent. First, **the assumption has been that while travel across existing** urban **networks may be** more **expensive or** more **time consuming** for some **the system is accessible to all.** Whether that is true is unclear, **however**. One may as easily argue that **physical limits create absolute barriers, spaces that cannot be traveled.** Methodologically, an activities-based approach — trips to the doctors, to shop, to the record store — is necessarily individualistic and therefore eccentric. While useful as a starting point, the goal must be a broader analytic whose subject is general and not specific. How might that broader analytic be expressed? Thus, the study of an individual case or cases should serve not as a description of "transportation disability" but as a springboard to a general problem of "transportation space" as eccentric and fluid. How might that transposition from individual to general be achieved? Urban Barriers One stream of work seeks to identify barriers to access in the local environment, those elements — high curbs, busy traffic intersections, steep slopes — that impede access for those with mobility limits. An example of this focused, large-scale approach is a study by Kitchen in association with members of an Irish "pan-disability organization" (Kitchen 2002). Working with the Newbridge (Ireland) Access Group, Kitchen developed a map of largely preventable environmental barriers — gradients, ground surfaces, high curbs etc — that impeded travel on individual streets and the buildings in them. The collaborative project involved contributors with various physical distinctions who together categorized the urban barriers that were mapped within a small, eight-block area. The focus of their investigation was not access to the area but accessibility of buildings and sidewalks within it. The goal of the work, and similar projects elsewhere, was to identify those local, micro-geographic barriers that made otherwise accessible places inconvenient or inaccessible. "Overcoming space requires expenditure of resources, energy, and time, a charge that nature (including humans) attempts to minimize subject to constraints and other objectives" (Miller 2007, 203). Even if access is theoretically possible — if getting there is too time consuming, too expensive, or too arduous — those places are, effectively, "off the map." This work is typically restricted to a fine scale of concern, a few city streets and their buildings. Its relation to the city-at-large might be supposed but was unconsidered. A research program emerged that would use mapping technologies as one of its tools. First, it would be useful to carefully record my daily travel patterns, the "daily activities" and the times and methods of travel to work, stores, leisure destinations. Secondly, these origin-destination records could be compared both to my own, pre-surgical patterns of activity and to the travel times, as a measure of accessibility, of the average, motorized Vancouverite. This data would hopefully would lead to a more rigorous, general analysis of "transit disability" and what it means, a new way to make concrete the broad problem of accessibility and distance barriers. Daily Activities Listing Between 2002 and 2005 a series of recurring destinations were recorded in my daily travel journals. These included travel time from home to the Dept. of Geography, University of British Columbia, where I served as an adjunct professor of medical geography, and to Simon Fraser University's downtown campus where I was an adjunct professor of gerontology. There were as well trips to the food markets on Fourth Avenue (I lived on Thirteenth), Granville Island, and Commercial Drive. At another scale entirely daily activities included trips to a local coffee shop, neighborhood supermarkets, and other non-work locations frequently visited prior to my osteoarthritis. As a non-driver, these trips were largely undertaken on the public transit system except for a period of seven months in which post-surgical limits made bus travel on crutches impossible. During that time I was unable to get on local buses whose entry steps were too high for me to use. In Greater Vancouver the Coast Mountain Bus Company operates an integrated system of bus and electric trolley services under the provincially funded Translink agency serving the 21-municipality region that is Vancouver and its suburbs. Across the region the bus system is linked to an expanding light rail transit system with stations in downtown Vancouver and on Vancouver's Commercial Drive. On the general bus route two or three different styles of bus are in use, some with steep steps, some that kneel, making access easier, and others with full wheelchair capability. A subset of bus routes at the time of this work was wheelchair accessible. Since the study began in 2002 the number of kneeling and wheelchair accessible buses has increased on an annual basis and the number of wheelchair accessible routes has slowly expanded. The first map, therefore, would have to be blank, a map of the city I could not access except by taxi because I was unable to use public transit and cannot drive. Once I could both walk four blocks to the nearest bus stop and board the bus on crutches, the travel journal that would provide the data for my maps could be constructed. For each trip made I noted (a) walking time to a bus stop (b) time waiting for a bus (c) time traveling on a bus and (d) time from the destination stop to the destination itself. While on crutches, and then on a cane, my walking was approximately a third slower than that of the average walker. Informants walking the same route at the same time of day required an average of 6.5 minutes to walk from Arbutus and 13th to Arbutus and 9th (Broadway), I required 9.5 minutes to traverse that same distance. Later testing with others — including a person with familial dystonia — found the one-third time differential a fairly constant difference although several seniors on four-pronged walkers I timed took even longer. For comparison, I used bicycle travel time based on my own, prior travel journals and those of an assistant as well as travel time by automobile recorded by an assistant. The automobile is the assumed mode of travel in Vancouver although efforts are made to wean drivers from their cars to public transit. The bicycle was included as a potentially important indicator of the argument some might make that poverty is itself a disability as real as any physical limit. For those without the $2.25 (Canadian) one-way fare price, and without a car, the bicycle provides an alternative form of transportation. While extremely coarse, it serves as a first measure of the mundanely-abled for whom automobile use and transit use were unavailable. Differences were quickly evident at two very different scales of concern. These included variable access ranges at both the level of the metropolis and the level of the immediate neighborhood. The first involved non-neighborhood trips to work and other more distant locations. The second occurred at the very fine scale of the neighborhood. At this scale the result was a series of substitutions in which formerly frequented locations were abandoned for other, closer stores within a maximum four-block radius. The Metropolitan Scale Within an hour driving time of my home accessibility reached from the southern ferry terminal in Tsawassen, British Columbia's Gulf Islands, to the northern terminal at Horseshoe Bay that serves Bowen Island in How Sound, the Sunshine Coast, and Nanaimo on central Vancouver Island. Bus and bicycle ranges were more restricted, permitting access only to the central city. The oval shape of the transit systems general reach reflects the light rapid system that stretches from east Vancouver, a 32-38 minute bus trip from my house, to eastern suburbs. The more regular range of the bicycle commuting circle is based on my own cycling records, those of bicycle commuting friends, and a general assumption of an average speed of twenty to twenty five kilometers an hour in non-rush hour traffic. The conclusion is presented in Figure 1, a map of coarse ranges, based on an hour's travel time, for the three transportation modalities. Clearly, these reflect different access potentials. Destinations include, to the west, the University of British Columbia, and to the east, Commercial Drive shopping area from which the light rail transit system can be accessed. To the north of the central city are Simon Fraser University's Downtown Campus and the maritime Seabus terminal permitting access to North Vancouver. Included as gray lines are the major bus routes that traverse the city it symbolized with gray lines. Major roads not covered by the system are symbolized with white lines. The map serves as an imprecise if useful descriptor of the variable effect of transportation modalities across the urban system. It does not propose different spaces but rater suggests relative ranges based on transportation modes within a single constant space. As Kwan has claimed, "Individual accessibility is determined not by how many opportunities are located close to the reference location, but how many opportunities are within reach given the particularities of an individual's life situation and adaptive capacity" (1999, 212). Clearly, transit modality defines accessibility, providing predictably greater access within a finite time frame to a larger range of places than the bicycle or the public transit route. Thus, while reflecting my own eccentric travel the general differences in range at least theoretically serve to identify general differences from any point in the system for the varying travel modalities, the specific range shifting east or west, north or south, depending on the originating location. The simple transit modality range map does not express differences in travel time between locations embedded in the map, however. Implicit in the range map is one of travel time as a constant, albeit occurring at different but still constant rates (30 km. an hour for cars, perhaps 20 km. an hour for buses, and less for the bicycle). The daily activities log showed distance when measured by time to be a non-linear, complex space, however. Figure 2 is a table that catalogues the differences in travel time between representative locations in these ranges by modality. Reported times reflect the average duration of multiple trips from my home at Arbutus and Thirteenth Avenues based on my own and my informants' travel. Interestingly, within the immediate neighborhood represented by the Granville Island Market and those on Fourth Avenue the difference between car and bike was relatively minor. Between car and bus, however, the difference at the local scale was significant. In effect, the inability to drive meant that what for others would be brief excursions — for example to Fourth Avenue markets — became, for me, significant trips requiring significant expenditures of time. Further, these locations assumed an ability to walk at least four blocks with minimal discomfort. While on crutches, however, and on the first months with a cane, this assumption was unrealized. The approximately six-block distance from the nearest bus stop to the Granville Island market was too great to be attempted safely. It was added to the list only after post-operative recovery was well advanced. The difference in travel modalities are expressed graphically in Figure 3 through a simple scaling technique that gives some idea of the effect of travel modality on trip times. Each single arrow is ten minutes travel and multiple arrows are additives of ten minutes, or a fraction of it. Everything is close when travel is by automobile, further when travel is by bus. The bicycle is a surprisingly effective substitute for the automobile for short-range trips, albeit one that was unavailable to me. Effectively, travel time constraints permitted, at most, one interurban trip by normal transit — for example to UBC or to SFU or to Commercial Drive. That time, with chores as the destination, effectively made a trip that might be for a car driver a brief expedition an expedition that was, for me, at least a half-day round-trip. While travel across the system was possible in theory, travel time became a prohibitive in trips outside of the core city, for example to the Tsawassen (southern terminal, figure 1) or Horseshoe Bay (northwestern figure 1) ferry terminals. More importantly, the result presented a time-space that was not smooth and constant but wrinkled and irregular. The local coffee shop I had patronized, one a few minutes from my house, became a more distant destination, for example. At issue was not raw accessibility — I could get there by a bus using two transfers —but the distance in time was far more complex, and variable (less constant), than a Euclidian space measured in kilometers would have predicted. Neighborhood Scale The effect on daily living patterns was especially notable in the neighborhood I had, prior to surgery, unthinkingly inhabited. During much of the study period my walking time was a third that of average citizens and limited to a range of four to a maximum of five city blocks. Any distance farther than four blocks required a several-minute rest period to permit the pain to decrease. Within Greater Vancouver that made some destinations, while theoretically accessible, practically unavailable. Included in the list of inaccessible sites would be those homes or shops on slopes greater than perhaps 8 degrees. While relatively few, they were still noticeable — for example the home of a friend at Third and Yew a block north of the Fourth Avenue coffee shop. Included as well were a large part of Pacific Spirit Park and homes on Eighth to Six Streets between Granville and Cambie, principal homes and commercial areas of the city. More importantly, perhaps, because of limits in walking distance or cycling, neighborhood shopping that had required little time now required a 28-32 minute bus trip. Because no bus runs along Arbutus to Fourth Avenue, for example, it was necessary to travel west to Broadway and Alma to transfer to an eastbound bus or to Granville and Fifth for a westbound bus. Thus to travel to the stores previously patronized required two buses, with their attendant waiting times, and one transfer. As a result, my daily purchase patterns shifted from Fourth Avenue to Broadway Avenue stores near Arbutus, from small specialty stores to a single supermarket for food. Travel to Commercial Drive, Granville Market, and the North Shore became full day trips rather than afternoon excursions. In effect, my travel range for daily necessities was altered, restricted by the time a bus-transfer trip would require for food, shopping, afternoon coffee, etc. At night, when transit is less frequent, the situation worsened. The shifting range of transport disability is graphically described in Figure 4 where shops on Fourth Avenue and the Granville Market are shown outside a darker, home-centered rectangle that was the post-operative travel range. Discussion All of this may seem obvious, confirming what is known, and certainly commonsensical. Inability to drive is in this study certainly a disadvantage — it takes longer to get there from here — exacerbated by ambulatory limits. Travel took longer and not all equidistant points were equally accessible: some places came off my daily map because of distance from a transit stop, or became excursions rather than simple trips. For those who are wheelchair users in my neighborhood, the lack of accessible stops would be, at least for those who do not drive, not disadvantageous but disastrous. There is no wheelchair access to the transit system within 1.5 kilometers of the Arbutus and Thirteenth Avenue epicenter of this study. In a wheelchair, or again with limited mobility on crutches, one is literally off the map. Equally disadvantaged are those whose poverty inhibits both transit use and automobile ownership although for some the bicycle may serve as a local-and mid-distance substitute. Whether the result is "disabling" depends as much on one's understanding of the adjective "disability" as it does on the limits of either the transit system or the potential transit rider him or her self. In a similar vein, this experience affirmed the observation by Golledge (1993) quoted earlier, and more recently rephrased by others, that differing abilities require people to move differently through the environment which is transformed by individual capabilities (Church and Marston 2003, 9096). Automobile drivers, irrespective of other impairments, access the city in a way that I — and others without cars — could not. Persons with mobility limits who have a limited range have different access levels than those whose ambulation is more or less mundane. Not obvious either in the maps or the literature is what all this means. If **"transit disability" is embedded in the system** then how can it be defined and expressed across the system? The experiences detailed in **this paper**, and by others with mobility limits, **suggests a difference space in which the regular metrics of time-distance transit planning are** modified or **suspended in the reality of daily use.** **In the design of urban systems we assume distance is a constant that expands in a regular and consistent, linear fashion**. If it is five minutes to "x" location at this speed; a distance twice as far requires twice as much time. **And while that may be generally true for some, the reality experienced here was different. Space is in effect wrinkled, an irregular surface in which hills of time create barriers for some that for others are simple planes of distance.** In addition, **mobility limits may impose absolute barriers for some** — for example a 6-block walk for me — **that for others are not impediments at all.** Like all very personal studies the results are limited to the nature of the individual experience. Even if one accepts the commonality of my experience, what is the reality of those who require wheelchair access to the transit system? Not all paraplegics can drive. Nor can all those who require scooters and other motorized ambulatory aides. Within Greater Vancouver transit access for those who use wheelchairs is restricted not only by temporal wrinkling but by the system itself. **They are limited absolutely to a small number of routes that permit access at specific times of the day. The question of wheelchair users is not simply one of a distinct range but of accessibility itself.** Clearly, simple mapping of eccentric daily activity routes do not serve to express the general reality experienced here. More fundamentally, the traditional assumptions of transportation and urban analysis reflected in this paper's map, assumptions of distance measured in time as a regular constant, require a different analytic. How does one argue a "wrinkled" space that is generally non-constant and in parts practically inaccessible even if system maps make the systems that traverse them appear accessible to all? Future Works First, there would need to be a map depicting the lines and stops of the system. Those would become the raw data from which travel time surfaces based on different travel modalities would be developed. Centered on a single location, what was required was a surfacing of the space-time of the city for different travel modalities if a very plastic and variable travel space based on modality were to be created. In future studies automobile use would be the necessary travel mode against which other travel spaces were measured. This would require either a number of drivers logging travel points from the central location to all other locations, or a travel-time algorithm that would generate those points. In comparison, a time accessibility analysis based on transit system lines would need to be generated in a manner that reflected real travel time, including time walking from the origin point to transit access nodes, time waiting at access nodes and transfer points, and time walking to destinations. Finally, a parallel study based on transit accessibility and time for wheelchair accessible transit routes would need to be created for the region. Surface analysis uses data points to generate a continuous space in which a single variable — travel time, cost, etc. — can be created across an area in which origin and destination points can be identified. This inverts traditional transit mapping in which such points are the focus within a space that is assumed to be constant and linear. Developing the data to map a complex surface on the basis of cost, time, or some other variable is not a trivial problem. It requires first a well-developed dataset and secondly a method of testing the accuracy of the resulting surface. As a first step, I applied for and received from Coast Mountain Bus Company (CMBC) map files that described all routes within the Greater Vancouver Regional District and all bus, trolley, and light rapid transit system within the region. CMBC officials also provided the location of individual transit stops on each route. Online schedules for the period of December 2006 to April 2007 permitted travel time and transfer time to be added to all routes. To analyze this data, and develop an approach that would serve for the various modalities, I applied for assistance to several colleagues. They include, to date: adjunct professor of geography Ray Torchinsky, Simon Fraser University (Vancouver, BC); University of British Columbia transport and urban geographer Ken Denike, and Simon Fraser University transportation and urban geographer Warren Gill. Together we created the Vancouver Transit Access Study Consortium, to develop a system of accurately assessing the relative accessibility of the city by varying modalities for persons with different physical limits. Aware that all travel is dependent on traffic levels, we decided to begin by limiting our work to non-peak travel hours during the weekday. To date a tentative system of mapping has been developed that permits surface maps analyzing travel time for automobile, transit, and wheelchair transit use. A second task, not yet complete, is to add to these transit maps multi-modal capabilities, including for example the time it takes to walk or wheel to and from a transit stop. Also to be added will be surface contours permitting streets with specific gradients to be taken off the map of mobility limited users Generation of the maps is only part of the exercise. The maps are the workbenches on which we hope to generate more precise mathematic descriptors of relative accessibility of these interrelated but distinct travel systems. We believe the methodologies evolving from this work will permit an accurate portrait of mobility constrained, locational accessibility measures for critical urban locations — city hall, hospitals, shopping malls, universities, etc. — as well as a general portrait of modal inaccessibility. In other words, we will be able not only to map generalities but specifics, to ask whether Vancouver City Hall is accessible to all or is its accessibility limited, and if so to what degree, to certain classes of citizens who can drive, afford a bus, or find wheelchair routes from home to the City Hall. This degree of specificity will require an analytic sufficiently flexible to focus on a wide variety of central points and to refashion the mapped perspective from a range of origins and destinations. **The research is academic to the extent that it seeks to find a consistent methodology encouraging the investigation of** urban **accessibility both in terms of characteristics of different modes of travel and of constraints on the mobility of individuals**. **It is academic in its critique of an existing assumption of space**. **The goal, however, is practical**, activist, and local. **The hope is to develop a methodology by which debates over** urban **accessibility can be pursued in a climate not simply of political dissent** (See, for example, Imrie and Edwards 2007; Valentine 2003; Gleeson 2000) **but instead grounded in clear expressions of concrete differences**. The hope is that development of this approach will serve both local communities of difference and transit officials who are making a strong, good faith effort to expand their service to assure the greatest possible ridership. At this writing the first surface models of the variable systems are being generated. Attempts to expand them to include more variables — including the effect of slope on walking, of absolute walking limits, speed variation and non-linearity of walking times, etc. — are soon to be begun. So, too, we hope to develop general algorithms that may modify those currently employed on the assumption of special regularity. That, however, is for the future. The program has to date received no outside funding. Nor has any been applied for. We believed it important to first investigate the potential of our approach before seeking support for further research. This report therefore presents a first statement of the pre-test and early modeling rather than of the results of our efforts. We hope within six months to a year to be able to begin a series of more detailed reports expanding the eccentric and personal critique presented here into a more general, system-wide exploration whose methodology encompasses the traditional planner's focus on locations of origin and destination in a general surface analytic we believe will best serve to express the effect of physical limits on urban access using different transportation modalities. We believe with that **the need to equal the playing field to assure equal access to all will be not simply a political ideal but a social goal in transit planning.**

#### The medical model of disabilities justifies atrocities against human rights

**Ndi 2012 -**  University Of Bamenda, Republic Of Cameroon ( Alfred 2012 Setting The Stage Of 'Ab/Normality' In Rehabilitative Narratives: Rethinking Medicalization Of The Disabled African Body http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3195/3066)bs

 The presumption underlying modern rehabilitation was that the effects, functions and uses that would be made of the medicalization of impairments and disability would be rationalizable and utilitarian. This turned out to be false because the post-modern uses of medicalization had to do more with social control and public 'hygiene' than with rehabilitation of the disabled person. For example, the medicalization method led to the direct ill-treatment of mentally deranged persons in African countries like Kenya where patients, seen as sub-humans (abnormal) by a Charity Society, were 'locked up and forgotten' for several years resulting in the infliction of bodily injuries and psychological humiliation (see, for example, the programme titled 'World Untold Stories' in website CNN.com/WUS). Although this handling of the body was considered as cruel and uninformed by society, it continued to exist in different forms in several African countries where deranged persons were arrested from public spaces of 'normality' like streets, particularly prior to and during important political and social events. This action was often justified by the claim that activities of mentally ill persons were unhygienic and the public space needed to be cleaned to render it agreeable for 'normal' society. In this way, medicalization led to new forms of social discrimination, control and stigma that really had nothing to do with their brains but more to do with their minds, that is, their moods, attitudes and conducts considered to be 'abnormal'. Yet, it was not their minds that were sick (for which they were being detained and drugged) but their mental faculties that did not need incarceration to be treated or cured. The brain was treated as if it was the same thing as the mind; whereas one could be sick in the brain without necessarily being sick in the mind. Even when these incidents of abusive confinement were reported to the media, and photographed in public, the deprivation of their freedom was seen as a normal requirement whereas there was nothing normal in equating mentally deranged people with imprisoned criminals.

I argue here that this modernist model from which rehabilitation was inspired created these kinds of postmodern conditions of violation of human rights based on the presumption that the 'normal' public was at risk of potentially fatalistic contact with the 'abnormal' population of the mentally deranged population. Consequently, the latter's rights to freedom were waived or withdrawn without subjecting them to due processes of the law on protection of those rights. In addition, with disconnectedness between processes of the brain and the thoughts and sensitivities of the human mind, it was very easy for various organizations to take advantage of this very fluid situation to claim that they had remedies for the problem. For example, in Bamenda city of the North West region of Cameroon, different associations were created to mobilize mentally ill patients to beg for money from the public. In this way, the intention was to take advantage of the medically abnormalized conditions of patients for economic gains rather than to treat or cure them. However, over and beyond economic gains, was the vitally important fact that there was no documented follow-up process of engagement with the associations to see if the technologies of control they had evolved could be developed further and supported for the benefit of the mentally insane persons. Understandably, these associations sought financial support from the public but when the flows were not regular, they had to end their activities that could have been explored for the benefit of the mentally ill persons.

#### This projection is the root cause of genocidal violence

Elden 2, politics at University of Warwick, (Stuart *Boundary 2* 29.2)

The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. **Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms**, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the **technology of power** (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.

A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, **one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies**, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, **the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated**, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. **If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers**, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’’ (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir :

**Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended**; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. **It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed.** (VS, 180; WK, 136)

#### Federal action is key – devolving authority is an act of dismissing responsibility – this form of politics 🡺 serial policy failure

Fine & Hall 10 - Prof of Economics U of London & Director of the Public Services International Research Unit – U of Greenwich(Ben & Contesting Neoliberalism: Public Sector Alternatives for Service Delivery Working Paper for the Milan European Economy Workshops 2010 http://www.economia.unimi.it/uploads/wp/DEAS-2010\_27wp.pdf)

Other areas of policymaking, as with industrial and regional policy, health, education and welfare, R&D, and skills and training, have all been profoundly influenced by neoliberalism, quite apart from the pressure for ’flexibility’ in labour markets, signifying a race to the bottom in wages and working conditions. The priority assigned to private participation in delivery has both squeezed public sector alternatives and the rationale for, and capacity to deliver, them. As already suggested, the logic and practice is to push for what the private sector can deliver with limited regard to broader social and economic objectives or the presumption that these should be picked up by other compensating policy measures. Whether this ever happens is a moot point as opposed to journeying further down the evaluatory trap. There is also significant reliance upon devolution and decentralisation with the presumption of greater local and democratic participation whereas this can often turn out to be the passing on of responsibility for delivery by an authoritarian central state without provision of support for necessary resources.

In short, neoliberalism is not just marked by policy and ideology favouring the private over the public sector, but this has itself been institutionalised within government capacity itself and the commercial pressures to which it responds. And this has been devastating for the potential for formulating and implementing alternative forms of public provision.

For, government and international policy-making itself is subject to institutionalised corporate capture/influence through the extensive use of management consultants and business appointees. These consultancies are themselves made up of a small group of multinational firms - such as Price-Waterhouse, Deloittes, Ernst and Young - which act as a policy replication mechanism. Another form of this is the appointment of increasing numbers of businessmen and women to government policy positions which would normally be held by career civil servants. The process can also be seen at an international level, most obviously in the collaboration between companies, donors and development banks over privatisations.

#### Universal design deconstructs the medical model through infrastructure investment

Sullivan 11 - Franklin W. Olin College of Engineering, 5/2/11 ( Kathryn The Prevalence of the Medical Model of Disability in Society”, Ebsco)bs

 Many designers are now beginning to acknowledge the social model of disability by recognizing that in designing, they have the power to create or eliminate disability. A badly designed interface might unnecessarily create a population of users who are “disabled” with respect to that system (Mankoff 4). This lends to the importance of designing inclusively, to avoid marginalizing atypical users. Universal design seeks to design all products, buildings and interiors to be used by all people to the greatest extent possible regardless of their physical abilities (Bailey). Some key principles of Universal Design include equitability and flexibility in use, as well as avoiding the stigmatization or segregation of any set of users (1997 NC State University, The Center for Universal Design). These principles “provide designers with the tools to effectively eliminate disabilities caused from barriers within the environment” (Bailey). Examples of features in line with universal design principles include closed captioning on televisions, and visual and audio display of information in subway cars. When the needs of different people are considered in design, this is a step towards the social model of disability and towards acceptance of people with disabilities. Assistive technology is beneficial because it can allow greater independence and functionality to people with disabilities, bridging the gaps that might exist between what the people would like to do and what the existing social infrastructure doesn.t yet allow them to do (Hersh 15). However, assistive technology can often have a strong health or rehabilitation flavor. After WWII, most assistive technology research and development focused on medically related technology such as prosthetics and orthotics (Albrecht 675). This has linked the technology needs of people with disabilities with the health domain. Since the medical model focuses on the physical and functional limitations a person may demonstrate, assistive technology designers often see this as a clear design objective that would have measurable results (Mankoff 4). Thus when the medical model is used in the design of assistive technology, there is typically less emphasis on aesthetics or form, since the rehabilitative function has priority. In one study, people with disabilities indicated a belief that manufacturers of proprietary technology do not appear to make an effort to make their devices aesthetically appealing (Shinohara 5). Assistive technology designed for medical purposes such as “fixing “ the impairment has historically been designed for use in an institutional setting; this institutional appearance can stigmatize the individual and confirm the “otherness “ of disability (Bailey). The medical model of assistive technology depict its users as passive and dependent on others.(often professionals.) impressions of what is best for them. People with disabilities might often not be considered users or consumers, but rather poor and powerless patients (Newell 172). This is devaluing to people with disabilities. Letting the designers make decisions on behalf of people with disabilities without valuing them as users leads to the persistence of medical model views. Designers may have assumptions and stereotypes about people with disabilities that can become embedded within the design (Ratzka). A solution is to apply many of the universal design principles to the design of assistive technology: It is better to lean towards the social model in the design of assistive technology, where there is more of a focus on solving problems of access, rather than on fixing a person.s impairment. When the social model is incorporated, people with disabilities are valued as customers, consumers, and people in the design process (Newell 173). They thus have more of a say in the design of products and services they will use, and can take more charge of their lives rather than having someone else decide what is best for them. The US Government.s website on Disability Technology advocates for “Access and Independence through technology”, rather than treatment or assistance ("Technology: Disability.gov."). This phrasing represents steps towards acceptance of the social model of disability. Much assistive technology that exists has been designed with the medical model in mind, which serves to portray people with disabilities as deficient and dependent. When designers value those with disabilities as users and not as patients, the medical model is less prevalent. Universal design of technology is a step towards granting more access to all citizens and portraying people with disabilities as normal members of society. However, even with the growing popularity of universal design principles, the pre-existing attitudes of many designers (influenced by the media and other factors) may still be present in the design of technology. The medical model can portray people with disabilities as abnormal, dependent, and inferior, as less-valued members of society. We need to be conscious of these negative attitudes and how we may be reinforcing them. A solution is to aim for the adaption of more humanistic models of disability such as the social and diversity models. Attitudes and policies in line with these models recognize people with disabilities as important contributing members of society. Pushing towards these models of disability, towards less ableist views, and towards reduction of negative portrayals of those with disabilities, is optimal. While strides have been made towards this goal, the medical model unfortunately still remains entrenched in society to some extent and so long as it is, people with disabilities will be seen as different from “normal” people and will be marginalized in society. The Olin College survey showed that students held attitudes that were based primarily off the social model but still had some medical model tendencies. It is my hope that this paper will allow the reader to be more conscious and aware of how the models of disability influence their beliefs and attitudes, and to try to avoid thinking of people with disabilities as deficient or less capable people, but rather as unique individuals who have a lot to offer to society.

### Solvency

#### the status quo renders the impaired bodies invisible by focusing on efficiency and economic planning – the plan opens up a discussion place for impaired bodies in the debate round – discussion alone is a valuable scholarship to the debate community

Imrie 2000 - Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London( Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf)bs

The dys-appearance of disabled people's bodies is not unconnected to the work of transportation planners and operators who, as Whitelegg (1997, page 14) notes, make ``decisions about what kinds of travel are important and which journey purposes and destinations are to be favoured''. In particular, the impaired body is largely invisible in transportation planning and policy or, as Law (1999, page 566) notes, ``bodies appear in conventional transportation models as discrete entities with independent trajectories''. As Whitelegg (1997) suggests, this leads to the provision of transportation infrastructure which tends to prioritise the movement and mobility of ``productive bodies'' between a limited range of destinations (also, see Marshall, 1999). Thus, mobility policies largely revolve around the provision of commuter networks between home and the workplace, seeking to facilitate movement which is limited to specific social, geographical, and temporal ranges. (6) The effect is, as Huxley (1997, page 2) observes, one of reducing mobility to ``predictable, purposeful trips, origins and destinations'' rather than seeking to conceive of mobility as ``a messy, unpredictable, diverse and changeable reality''.

#### Status quo Transportation planning is exclusionary and violent – transportation infrastructure education can only be valuable when we can interrogate the bad justifications for it

Imrie 2000 - Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London( Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf)bs

Such discourses see disability as a social burden which is a private, not public, responsibility. The impairment is the focus of concern, and biological intervention and care are seen as the appropriate responses. The problem of immobility is seen as personal and specific to the impairment; that it is this that needs to be eradicated, rather than transformations in sociocultural attitudes and practices, if mobility is to be restored. In particular, political and policy assumptions about mobility and movement are premised on a universal, disembodied subject which is conceived of as neutered, that is without sex, gender, or any other attributed social or biological characteristic (see Hall, 1996; Imrie, 1994; Law, 1999; Whitelegg, 1997). The hegemony of what one might term the mobile body is decontextualised from the messy world of multiple and everchanging embodiments; where there is little or no recognition of bodily differences or capabilities. The mobile body, then, is conceived of in terms of independence of movement and bodily functions; a body without physical and mental impairments.

The hegemony of the mobile body is also reinforced by professional discourses which seek to measure, characterise, and understand disability through the movement and mobility of disabled people's body parts. Such conceptions see disabled people as neither sick nor well but in a liminal state which is characterised by a (potential) movement from one bodily state to another (also, see Ellis, 2000; Leder, 1990; Paterson and Hughes, 1999). The underlying objective is the disciplining of the deviant or impaired body through the restoration of movement in body parts to facilitate independence of mobility (and the restoration of the `whole person'). For Ellis (2000), such (welfare) discourses emphasise the importance of individuals attaining an `independent body', or a body which revolves around self management, personal responsibility, and the projection of desirable bodily characteristics. As Ellis (2000, page 17) suggests, it is a carnality which propagates the aestheticisation of the body while seeking to exclude those (impaired) bodies which are, so some claim, a source of anxiety in contemporary culture (see, for instance, Lupton, 1994)

Indeed, as Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 604) argue, ``the information that animates the world is dominated by non disabled bodies, by a specific hegemonic form of carnality which excludes as it constructs''. These send out specific signals or codes which favour the corporeal status of nonimpaired people, or at least do little to facilitate the independent ease of movement of people with physical and mental impairments. (5) This, for Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 606), is indicative of ``a subtle interplay of micro and macro relations of power'', where specific design features, for example, prioritise forms of movement based on the bodily needs of the neutered body (which is devoid of physical and mental impairments). In this sense, intercorporeal encounters between the hegemonic world of the mobile body and disabled people tend to reinforce the former's sense of presence and the latter's sense of absence, in other words a recognition of disabled people being there but being unable to interact with the social or physical structures which surround them. It is, in Leder's (1990) terms, a projection of the absent body or bodies which ``dys-appear'' when confronted with the embodied norms of everyday life [see Paterson and Hughes (1999) for an amplification of these points].

#### As students participating in political debates we have an obligation to put disability at the center of our discussion of democracy because what we debate about here says a lot about human conduct on a larger scale—this is not a meta-theoretical quibble but central to change the way that disability is represented and conceived writ large

Michael Bérubé, ‘3 (Paterno Family Professor in Literature at Pennsylvania State University, “Citizenship and Disability”, Spring, <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=506>)

Of course, many of us would prefer to believe that our children have intrinsic human rights and human dignity no matter what; irrespective of any form of human social organization; regardless of whether they were born in twentieth-century Illinois or second-century Rome or seventh-century central Asia. But this is just a parent's—or a philosophical foundationalist's-wishful thinking. For what would it mean for Jamie to "possess" rights that no one on earth recognized? A fat lot of good it would do him. My argument may sound either monstrous or all too obvious: if, in fact, no one on earth recognized Jamie's human dignity, then there would in fact be no human perspective from which he would be understood to possess "intrinsic" human dignity. And then he wouldn't have it, and so much the worse for the human race.

In one respect, the promise of the IDEA, like the promise of the ADA, is clear: greater inclusion of people with disabilities in the social worlds of school and work. But in another sense the promise is unspecifiable; its content is something we actually cannot know in advance. For the IDEA does not merely guarantee all children with disabilities a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. Even more than this, it grants the right to education in order that persons with disabilities might make the greatest possible use of their other rights-the ones having to do with voting, or employment discrimination, or with life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. IDEA is thus designed to enhance the capabilities of all American children with disabilities regardless of their actual abilities-and this is why it is so profound a democratic idea. Here again I'm drawing on Nancy Fraser, whose theory of democracy involves the idea of "participatory parity," and the imperative that a democratic state should actively foster the abilities of its citizens to participate in the life of the polity as equals. Fraser's work to date has not addressed disability, but as I noted above, it should be easy to see how disability is relevant to Fraser's account of the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution. This time, however, I want to press the point a bit harder. Fraser writes as if the promise of democracy entails the promise to enhance participatory parity among citizens, which it does, and she writes as if we knew what "participatory parity" itself means, which we don't. (This is why the promise of disability rights is unspecifiable.)

LET ME EXPLAIN. First, the idea of participatory parity does double duty in Fraser's work, in the sense that it names both the state we would like to achieve and the device by which we can gauge whether we're getting there. For in order to maintain a meaningful democracy in which all citizens participate as legal and moral equals, the state needs to judge whether its policies enhance equal participation in democratic processes. Yet at the same time, the state needs to enhance equal participation among its citizens simply in order to determine what its democratic processes will be. This is not a meta-theoretical quibble. On the contrary, the point is central to the practical workings of any democratic polity. One of the tasks required of democrats is precisely this: to extend the promise of democracy to previously excluded individuals and groups some of whom might have a substantially different understanding of "participatory parity" than that held by previously dominant groups and individuals.

Could anything make this clearer than the politics of disability? Imagine a building in which political philosophers are debating, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the value and the purpose of participatory parity over against forms of authoritarianism or theocracy. Now imagine that this building has no access ramps, no Braille or large-print publications, no American Sign Language interpreters, no elevators, no special-needs paraprofessionals, no in-class aides. Contradictory as such a state of affairs may sound, it's a reasonably accurate picture of what contemporary debate over the meaning of democracy actually looks like. How can we remedy this? Only when we have fostered equal participation in debates over the ends and means of democracy can we have a truly participatory debate over what "participatory parity" itself means. That debate will be interminable in principle, since our understandings of democracy and parity are infinitely revisable, but lest we think of deliberative democracy as a forensic society dedicated to empyreal reaches of abstraction, we should remember that debates over the meaning of participatory parity set the terms for more specific debates about the varieties of human embodiment. These include debates about prenatal screening, genetic discrimination, stem-cell research, euthanasia, and, with regard to physical access, ramps, curb cuts, kneeling buses, and buildings employing what is now known as universal design.

Leftists and liberals, particularly those associated with university humanities departments, are commonly charged with being moral relativists, unable or unwilling to say (even after September 11) why one society might be "better" than another. So let me be especially clear on this final point. I think there's a very good reason to extend the franchise, to widen the conversation, to democratize our debates, and to make disability central to our theories of egalitarian social justice. The reason is this: a capacious and supple sense of what it is to be human is better than a narrow and partial sense of what it is to be human, and the more participants we as a society can incorporate into the deliberation of what it means to be human, the greater the chances that that deliberation will in fact be transformative in such a way as to enhance our collective capacities to recognize each other as humans entitled to human dignity. As Jamie reminds me daily, both deliberately and unwittingly, most Americans had no idea what people with Down syndrome could achieve until we'd passed and implemented and interpreted and reinterpreted a law entitling them all to a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. I can say all this without appealing to any innate justification for human dignity and human rights, and I can also say this: Without a sufficient theoretical and practical account of disability, we can have no account of democracy worthy of the name.

Perhaps some of our fellow citizens with developmental disabilities would not put the argument quite this way; even though Jamie has led me to think this way, he doesn't talk the way I do. But those of us who do participate in political debates, whether about school funding in a specific district or about the theory and practice of democracy at its most abstract, have the obligation to enhance the abilities of our children and our fellow citizens with disabilities to participate in the life of the United States as political and moral equals with their nondisabled peers-both for their own good, and for the good of democracy, which is to say, for the good of all of us.

#### Ablenationalist scholarship must be rejected

Snyder & Mitchell 2010 (Introduction: Ablenationalism and the Geo-Politics of Disability Sharon L. Snyder David T. Mitchell Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, Volume 4, Number 2, 2010, pp. 113-125)

As a result, Disability Studies in McRuer's point of view should continue to affiliate with scholarship that describes the systemic oppression of others and the deliberate, or simply neglectful, public institutions that continue to murder spirits in the guise of Eleanor Bumpurs. Higher Education provides collective think-tank opportunities where the ideals of equity run hard against forces of inequity. Consequently, much is at stake in academic deliberations as one of only a few remaining cultural spaces where the inevitable crossings of these conflicts can continue to be examined.

With respect to the conflation of minority identities discussed at length by Erevelles-Minear and McRuer, Chris Ewart's contribution to this special issue, "Terms of Disappropriation: Disability, Diaspora, and Dionne Brand's What We All Long For," examines the degree to which disability is used as a spur to overcoming narratives for the hybrid identities that characterize diasporic communities. In media and literary narratives of the insufficiencies of multi-ethnic groups, Ewart contends that disability appears as an evaluative marker for judging impoverished populations as a source of their own problems. If exceptional examples of disabled individuals come to the light of media attention, then why, for all intents and purposes, should struggling ethnic communities not be able to succeed in spite of debilitating conditions of existence? Successful, singular examples of compensation for disability, in other words, clandestinely operate as an opportunity to critique the inadequacies of those who fail to thrive amid rampant social inequities. For Ewart, then, disability-based analyses of diasporic representations offer a productive opportunity to assess ways in which the dis-ease of neo-liberal perspectives of race, class, and ethnicity enter through the backdoor.

To demonstrate the potential importance of disability to the languages of diaspora, Ewart re-creates a history of debilitating European and American [End Page 122] influences through an examination of our analysis of the Eugenic Atlantic. The international space of the Eugenic Atlantic involved national collaborations based on the exchange of debasing information about people with disabilities as threats to a country's hereditary integrity and, ultimately, racial superiority. In referencing this history, the article comes to its close reading of Dionne Brand's novelization of Vietnamese diasporic histories in Canada. Brand employs disability as an all-purpose metaphor for the failing fortunes of a group of second-generation youths in Toronto. Their efforts to create meaningful alternative identities out of the shards of their parents' pasts—hybrid communal formations that straddle multiple cultures—find their primary expression in metaphors of the evasion of madness and "slipping body parts."

In undertaking this characterization method, Brand's tale in effect equates psychiatric disability with an inability to cope with feelings of ethnic displacement. Yet, at the same time, the practice of entertaining an "excessive degree" of identification with disability to narrate diasporic identities also pushes the novel's characters beyond the limits of dominant cultural concepts of belonging and the normative markers that such identifications inevitably entail. For instance, one protagonist interprets limping as an indicator of toughness of body rather than more traditional associations of personal incapacity and immoral psychic dispositions. Suggestively, Ewart ascribes this unevenness of representational impulses with regard to disability as an outgrowth of diasporic literature in transition—the divergent outcomes of a literary discourse in search of new vocabularies of non-normative experience. Brand's novel "stumbles," in other words, into a potentially fruitful contemplation of the ways in which disability might be understood to assist concepts of diaspora in articulating meaningful alternatives to normative beliefs of national belonging, citizenship, and the homogenizing forces of globalization.

In closing we gesture to our own contribution in addition to the productive discussions of alternative valuation systems with regard to people with disabilities. In "Disability as Multitude: Re-working Non-productive Labor Power" we employ Hardt and Negri's concept of "multitudes" in order to re-fashion contemporary understandings of people with disabilities and their overriding ouster from guiding concepts of productivity within late Capitalism. Rather than continue necessary lines of thought regarding contemporary social barriers to disability and meaningful employment, we undertake a discussion of disability as an alternative to existing models of consumption. In so doing we seek to recognize disability as a pragmatic category for engaging enactments of nationalism and normative expectations of citizenship. We call this imperative to conform to the demands of competitive labor markets and their attendant [End Page 123] normative expectations of participation Ablenationalism. Ablenationalism involves the implicit assumption that minimum levels of corporeal, intellectual, and sensory capacity, in conjunction with subjective aspects of aesthetic appearance, are required of citizens seeking to access the "full benefits" of citizenship. As such, most people with disabilities are excluded by falling short of this participatory bottom line and, as such, key guiding principles of democracy are left unrealized.

#### Util marginalizes the disabled and pushed the impaired bodies to the sidelines

Light, 2007 -, Research and Publications Director at Disability Awareness in Action, (Richard “A Real Horror Story: the Abuse of Disabled People’s Human Rights”, July 1, http://www.disabilityworld.org/04-05\_03/violence/horrorstory.shtml)bs

There is, however, a horror which has remained almost invisible: the ongoing and, in many cases, the systematic, abuse of disabled people. Contrary to what some would have us believe, human rights are not a sword to smite good intentions; they are a shield to deflect oppression. Human rights, for example, by the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html), should be a minimum below which no society falls. Instead, they too often remain an ideal to which many can only aspire. Those of us who live in what we like to describe as the 'developed world' are too often complacent. The majority are spared crippling poverty, have access to a host of consumer goods and services and rely, when the need arises, on a moderately supportive state welfare system. We have complex systems of justice, a police service that is - to a greater or lesser extent - accountable to the people it polices and politicians elected by a democratic process. As we shall see, such complacency is not something that disabled people (amongst others) can necessarily share. For too long, our ideas of human rights have been heavily influenced by the ideal of the **'greatest good for the greatest number', a cliché that serves to hide obscene exploitation and abuse of minorities**, both within individual nation states and globally. The equally unsatisfactory alternative has been a pluralism that claims to respect all, but is reluctant to take a stand against any issue. We must find a route through this impasse, if only because the alternative would seem to be even greater social stresses than those that already exist.

#### Utilitarian politics are founded on a theory of violence- the only alternative to endless war is ethics

**Xiangchen** **08-** Professor of Philosophy at Fudan Univ, China(Sun, “Emmanuel Levinas and the Critique of Modern Political Philosophy” http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121573478/HTMLSTART?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0)bs

According to Hobbes's logic, there is initially a natural state of war. In order to escape violent death, people want to enter into political society, and finally morality is established to guarantee peace and stability within this political framework. This logic is opposed by Lévinas, who holds to a logic according to which we have no possibility of escaping war. For Lévinas, war is a normal state of the Western world, and the Second World War is the necessary result of the Western political tradition. We can even say that it resulted from traditional Western philosophy, which has a possessive orientation, as the extreme expression of the Western ontological tradition. Even in ancient Greece, Heraclitus had already held that being reveals itself as war. The modern world shows this tendency to war more strongly than ever, but the root of this tendency is still in the ancient ontological tradition, which pursues sameness and totality, implying some kind of violence. I think that this is the ultimate reason why Lévinas is prepared to struggle with the whole Western philosophical tradition. The defect of this tradition is not, as claimed by Heidegger, in the oblivion of Being, but is in the oblivion of the other, or rather, in the suppression of the other. Hegel seemed to pay more attention to the other than other philosophers in the Western tradition, but in fact what Hegel does is to transform the other into his own wholeness. Lévinas's position is totally different, opposing this tradition from Greece to Heidegger, including the Hegelian attitude to the other, by placing not ontology but ethics as first philosophy. From this point of view, he also opposes the structure of modern society by claiming that society should be based on the ethical and not the political. If politics is the basis of the whole society, Lévinas's question in the preface to Totality and Infinity, "whether we are not duped by morality" would be crucial. Because war, which is behind modern politics, suspends the strength of morality, Hobbes held that morality could be a cheat. For political reasons, the sovereign could even burn all the books of geometry, which Hobbes regards as the sole gift from God.2 Because this is precisely what Lévinas cannot accept, he must seek another foundation for society in order to limit the logic of politics and violence within politics. Lévinas wants to establish a prepolitical ethics, which can overturn the logic of war underlying the political. Lévinas thinks that modern political theory is based on individualism and calculation, by which modern society is built up. If so, there is no chance to avoid violence and war. From the viewpoint of Hobbes, there are only two kinds of peace: Cold peace, in which people are scared of each other and keep a terrible balance, and the peace of sovereignty, in which there is one sovereignty with the rest of the population as subjects. We can imagine that the background of this theory of peace is war. From Hobbes to utilitarianism, the inner logic of calculation is same. By this calculation, peace is temporary, utilitarian, and only the interval between wars. Regarding the question of whether the basis of society is political or ethical, Lévinas's answer is clear: It is definitely ethical. When Lévinas tries to resolve the tension between the political and the ethical, he does not rest on the political, like modern philosophers. He seeks to justify a prepolitical ethical life-world to serve as the foundation of the political. This is what Lévinas has done in Totality and Infinity. He appeals to other resource of thought in the world, such as Jewish tradition, although he does not refer to it directly. He considers that the only real peace is a kind of messianic peace: Morality will oppose politics in history and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the canons of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the eschatology of messianic peace will have come to superpose itself upon the ontology of war.

Apocalyptic rhetoric should be abandoned as a political strategy – it incorrectly levels questions of probability and actual magnitude of events

Gross new media strategist & Gilles domestic abuse advocate 2012 Matthew Barrett & Mel The Atlantic 4/23

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/

In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media portrays as apocalyptic is not. The apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster -- from meteor impacts to supervolcanic eruptions -- are extraordinarily rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable, and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true -- their probability is either low or can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable.

The danger of the media's conflation of apocalyptic scenarios is that it leads us to believe that our existential threats come exclusively from events that are beyond our control and that await us in the future -- and that a moment of universal recognition of such threats will be obvious to everyone when they arrive. No one, after all, would ever confuse a meteor barreling toward Earth as anything other than apocalyptic. Yet tangled up in such Hollywood scenarios and sci-fi nightmares are actual threats like global warming that aren't arriving in an instant of universal recognition; instead, they are arriving amid much denial and continued partisan debate.

#### The relega tion of disability to the periphery via security is a tool of neoliberal empire that masks ongoing biopolitical action against people with disability

McRuer, '10 - Professor of English and Deputy Chair of the Department of English at George Washington University, Robert "Disability Nationalism in Crip Times", Project Muse)

Murderball, however, is just one prominent sign—whether marking at this point simply an emergent discourse or not—that something else is also going [End Page 172] on. And disability cultural studies in the academy is arguably another such sign—a multivalent sign, certainly, but a sign nonetheless. Disability studies, in other words (and this is of course bigger than any individual scholar or activist), is caught up in relatively new biopolitical processes; to call back Puar, disability studies does in fact seem concerned (and rightly so) with the "securitization and valorization" of various lives and populations. This vital political project, however, is inescapably non-innocent, caught up in the larger geopolitical processes Foucault describes in The Birth of Biopolitics:

On the horizon of this analysis we see instead the image, idea, or the program of a society in which there is an optimization of systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players, and finally in which there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals.(259-60)

Puar's contribution to transnational queer studies is not only her analysis of the ways in which new forms of "tolerance" are linked to securitization and valorization and thereby "optimized" by and for the neoliberal state and for Empire, but also of the ways in which this environmental intervention simultaneously masks ongoing necropolitical projects.

Cripping Guantanamo

In this geopolitical context, disability studies should continually ask questions about the risks that always attend our most urgent projects, questions about how or whether "the deferred death of one population" recedes in the wake of the securitization and valorization of another. My brief reading of Guantanamo in this final section is thus intended on one level merely as a caution—a call for vigilance and rigor, an attentiveness to the varied and contradictory ways in which our political and scholarly projects are taken up, resignified, made useful. More pointedly, however, I argue in this section that the receding or deferred death Puar theorizes is facilitated the more we depend on (and keep writing into Disability Studies 101 theses) identity and state-based appeals (appeals that may, of course, nonetheless remain indispensable—necessary but simply and always insufficient).

There are innumerable examples of such appeals in disability studies; they are appeals that have arguably become foundational to disability studies as it is currently constituted. Consider, for instance, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson's argument that the Americans with Disabilities Act marks a shift, now "requiring that [End Page 173] disabilities be accommodated"; this shift that moves us "from a politics of sympathetic advocacy to a politics of affirmative identity" (106-7). Or Paul Longmore's state- and nation-based demand for "an end to . . . discriminatory government policies," when he writes, "We, like all Americans, have talents to use, work to do, our contributions to make to our communities and country. . . . We want access to opportunity. We want access to work. We want access to the American Dream" (258). Or, finally, of Tobin Siebers's repeated positioning of disability identity politics as the answer: "Individuals begin to constitute themselves as a minority identity, moving from the form of consciousness called internal colonization to one characterized by a new group awareness" (19). All of these arguments have been incredibly generative to both the field and the movement. Can we at this point begin to trace the limits of the "new group awareness" for which Siebers argues, especially as that awareness is not simply dismissed but taken seriously, noticed, and utilized by state and market? How does "the group" grapple with those figures who do not, or cannot, or will never "constitute themselves as a minority identity"? And to translate Puar's theorizing about queer times, how does the current geopolitical order, even as it very partially acquiesces in some locations to the targeting of certain disabled subjects for life, simultaneously crip other bodies (and I intend for crip here to mark both an ongoing metaphorical process of marking certain bodies as excessive and monstrous and the sometimes quite literal processes of physically and mentally debilitating certain bodies)?

There are two figures from Guantanamo that haunt me as I ask these questions, figures that can never quite congeal or materialize around state and identity in the ways that, say, Mark Zupan and the other proud American athletes from Murderball do. In Brittain and Slovo's production, a speaker named Mr. Begg introduces the first figure, his son Moazzam Begg, who is, eventually, interred at Guantánamo Bay. Reflecting on his son's early years, Mr. Begg muses:

Moazzam did his initial schooling [in the UK] and one day he said: "Dad I want to make a society" and I smiled [because he was too young to talk about society] and said: "what kind of society are you going to make son?" He said: "A society to help older people, feeble people, and people with disabilities and all that." So, I said, "This is a very good thing, it's a noble thing. I'll not stop you doing that." I don't know how far he went. (7)

Over the course of the production, we learn of Moazzam's detention in Islamabad by Pakistani authorities, of his eventual transfer to American custody, and of the debilitating circumstances of incarceration at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Facility. Paradoxically, even as his father's own health improves in the UK (he had been hospitalized earlier in the drama), Moazzam's deteriorates. Initially [End Page 174] writing from Guantánamo that "I am in good health and ok" (26), his situation rapidly shifts. We learn that his daughter back home, according to Mr. Begg, "gets at times nightmares. She says at times, 'my father is being beaten up, his head is bleeding'" (37), and we learn that bodily and mental changes are, in fact, taking place. Moazzam himself writes to his family, "I am in a state of depression and am beginning to fight against depression and hopelessness. Whilst I do not at all complain about my personal treatments, conditions are such that I have not seen the sun, sky, moon etc. for nearly a year!" (56). There are, additionally, censored portions of this letter, which Brittain and Slovo represent by instructing the actor playing Moazzam to mouth words that have been removed by American authorities. Mr. Begg, as the story continues, begins to wonder whether Moazzam's "hands are working, or his eyes are working or his brain is working" when he learns that "today I hear that they were giving injections to detainees" (57). And, eventually, around the time of an improbable confession that Moazzam was planning on using a drone aircraft (price tag 50 million dollars) to drop anthrax on the House of Commons, his solicitor reports, "We have very good reason to think he's been driven into mental illness from oblique and unattributable comments that have been made to us. . . . We believe he's in a very bad way" (57-8).

The other figure is Ruhel Ahmed, who simply writes, upon arrival at Guantánamo, "I receive your letters and photos. Well about my eyes u can send me contact lenses. Get them from Sandwell hospital [Eye Clinic] and solution from Boots. It's called [Boston advance care] . . . and I need protein tablets to clean them . . . [Total Care tablets for hard contact lenses]. Both solution and tablets for hard contact lenses. Its going to cost a total of £30.00" (30-31). Ahmed eventually is returned to Britain, although the negotiations are extended, and initially "there is no date given" (47). He waits, and waits, and waits, even though he has been officially "released." CONTINUED - NO

His story ends in severe visual impairment, according to his solicitor: "And one of the young men had problems with his eyes, which require contact lenses, they require them to stop something horrible happen[ing] to the eyes, he hasn't had them for two years. Ultimately the eye breaks if it isn't held in" (50). According to Ruhel's father, when he is reunited with his son, "he is my son, he is a young boy and I am old man . . . [and] . . . he could not see anything. So I am crying myself. And he said, don't cry, this time is gone" (50).

Guantánamo, external and internal to the nation, has been a hypostasized site for practices associated with what Michelle Brown and others have called "the prison nation," which is why I use Brittain and Slovo's representation of it as a site for reflecting on and through, with and against, disability nationalism in crip times, and on the processes of quarantine and incorporation that [End Page 175] have been sketched in queer theory but not so much, yet, in disability studies. Brown argues that "the sparse amount of research that addresses the psychology of supermax confinement provides evidence for increased problems with concentration, thinking, impulse control, and memory, as well as the development of severe anxiety, paranoia, psychosis, depression, rage, claustrophobia, and hallucinations" (988-9). One of my main arguments in this article is that such impairments, like Moazzam Begg's and Ruhel Ahmed's, are not exactly comprehensible as "disabilities" as we have come to think we know them. They are impairments that exist at the limits of both identity and the nation-state and thus for me raise important questions about disability movements' and disability studies' focus on both.

That is not, however, to give up on Moazzam Begg's beautiful, if childish (and what is so bad about that, anyway?), dream of making a new, disabled, society. Or, for that matter, on the dreams that disability studies gives us. Despite my concerns about the limits of identity and state-based appeals, the tentative sketch of crip processes I've given here is not in any way intended, simplistically, to blame disability studies for them. On the contrary, in solidarity with those already (and always) expanding the movement and the field (beyond identity, beyond borders), this analysis intends to tease out, from within disability studies, the conditions of possibility for crip critique.

Crip critique has affinities with queer of color critique as Ferguson theorizes it—not surprisingly, given that queer of color critique emerges from 1970s women-of-color feminism, with its profound attentiveness to shifting forms of embodiment in the new geopolitical order. Ferguson argues that queer of color critique always runs "contrary to canonical claims" in a discipline. It is "always shaped out of heterogeneity [and] never neatly contained within . . . presumed homogenous boundaries." For queer of color critique, that heterogeneity is productive and has the potential "to inspire new horizons for thought and action" and to "incite other ways to be" (ix). Disability studies has always incited other ways to be, perhaps most obviously through its critique of the medical model's hegemonic singularity. Largely because it remains an emergent and still often-marginalized field, however, disability studies has hitherto rarely questioned its canonical claims (or, put differently, named any of its claims as "canonical"). The geopolitics of disability in the new world order (or the geopolitics of disability in crip times), nonetheless, demands such a questioning. The ongoing re-cognition that emerges from that questioning—a recognition of bodies beyond boundaries, bodies not (yet) legible according to the terms of our canonical claims—will continue to open up new horizons for thought and action, for solidarity and coalition. [End Page 176]

# \*\*\*2AC’s/ 1AR’s

##  Case

### 2AC - Util

#### Utilitarianism excludes the disabled

**Griffith 3** J Clapton, University, 20’03, [Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, Tragedy and catastrophe: contentious discourses of ethics and disability, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/j.1365-2788.2003.00533.x/pdf>]

Ethical perspectives and principles, then, are either underpinned by notions of either pathos or control. Both of these notions may be practised within the Discourse of Tragedy and, therefore, may invoke utilitarian, duty-based or virtue-based ethics. Principles such as beneﬁcence, nonmaleﬁcence, autonomy, mercy, compassion and care underpin actions aimed at preventing, protecting, providing care for, and enhancing the prosperity of individuals or families, and are offered in spite of the personal burden or tragedy of disability. The Discourse of Catastrophe, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the quality of the greater population, and invokes utilitarian or bio-utilitarian ethics (Vehmas). In this discourse, the view is expressed that it is a logical choice of rational subjects to reject the possibility of disability (Harris). Therefore, these ethics may support eugenic processes that ascertain that some lives are not worth living because of presumed suffering or burden. Legal jurisdictions of the notions of ‘wrongful life’ and ‘wrongful birth’ (Ossorio are also embedded in such a moral views.

#### Util marginalizes the disabled and pushed the impaired bodies to the sidelines

Light, 2007 -, Research and Publications Director at Disability Awareness in Action, (Richard “A Real Horror Story: the Abuse of Disabled People’s Human Rights”, July 1, http://www.disabilityworld.org/04-05\_03/violence/horrorstory.shtml)bs

There is, however, a horror which has remained almost invisible: the ongoing and, in many cases, the systematic, abuse of disabled people. Contrary to what some would have us believe, human rights are not a sword to smite good intentions; they are a shield to deflect oppression. Human rights, for example, by the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html), should be a minimum below which no society falls. Instead, they too often remain an ideal to which many can only aspire. Those of us who live in what we like to describe as the 'developed world' are too often complacent. The majority are spared crippling poverty, have access to a host of consumer goods and services and rely, when the need arises, on a moderately supportive state welfare system. We have complex systems of justice, a police service that is - to a greater or lesser extent - accountable to the people it polices and politicians elected by a democratic process. As we shall see, such complacency is not something that disabled people (amongst others) can necessarily share. For too long, our ideas of human rights have been heavily influenced by the ideal of the **'greatest good for the greatest number', a cliché that serves to hide obscene exploitation and abuse of minorities**, both within individual nation states and globally. The equally unsatisfactory alternative has been a pluralism that claims to respect all, but is reluctant to take a stand against any issue. We must find a route through this impasse, if only because the alternative would seem to be even greater social stresses than those that already exist.

#### Utilitarian politics are founded on a theory of violence- the only alternative to endless war is ethics

**Xiangchen** **08-** Professor of Philosophy at Fudan Univ, China(Sun, “Emmanuel Levinas and the Critique of Modern Political Philosophy” http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121573478/HTMLSTART?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0)bs

According to Hobbes's logic, there is initially a natural state of war. In order to escape violent death, people want to enter into political society, and finally morality is established to guarantee peace and stability within this political framework. This logic is opposed by Lévinas, who holds to a logic according to which we have no possibility of escaping war. For Lévinas, war is a normal state of the Western world, and the Second World War is the necessary result of the Western political tradition. We can even say that it resulted from traditional Western philosophy, which has a possessive orientation, as the extreme expression of the Western ontological tradition. Even in ancient Greece, Heraclitus had already held that being reveals itself as war. The modern world shows this tendency to war more strongly than ever, but the root of this tendency is still in the ancient ontological tradition, which pursues sameness and totality, implying some kind of violence. I think that this is the ultimate reason why Lévinas is prepared to struggle with the whole Western philosophical tradition. The defect of this tradition is not, as claimed by Heidegger, in the oblivion of Being, but is in the oblivion of the other, or rather, in the suppression of the other. Hegel seemed to pay more attention to the other than other philosophers in the Western tradition, but in fact what Hegel does is to transform the other into his own wholeness. Lévinas's position is totally different, opposing this tradition from Greece to Heidegger, including the Hegelian attitude to the other, by placing not ontology but ethics as first philosophy. From this point of view, he also opposes the structure of modern society by claiming that society should be based on the ethical and not the political. If politics is the basis of the whole society, Lévinas's question in the preface to Totality and Infinity, "whether we are not duped by morality" would be crucial. Because war, which is behind modern politics, suspends the strength of morality, Hobbes held that morality could be a cheat. For political reasons, the sovereign could even burn all the books of geometry, which Hobbes regards as the sole gift from God.2 Because this is precisely what Lévinas cannot accept, he must seek another foundation for society in order to limit the logic of politics and violence within politics. Lévinas wants to establish a prepolitical ethics, which can overturn the logic of war underlying the political. Lévinas thinks that modern political theory is based on individualism and calculation, by which modern society is built up. If so, there is no chance to avoid violence and war. From the viewpoint of Hobbes, there are only two kinds of peace: Cold peace, in which people are scared of each other and keep a terrible balance, and the peace of sovereignty, in which there is one sovereignty with the rest of the population as subjects. We can imagine that the background of this theory of peace is war. From Hobbes to utilitarianism, the inner logic of calculation is same. By this calculation, peace is temporary, utilitarian, and only the interval between wars. Regarding the question of whether the basis of society is political or ethical, Lévinas's answer is clear: It is definitely ethical. When Lévinas tries to resolve the tension between the political and the ethical, he does not rest on the political, like modern philosophers. He seeks to justify a prepolitical ethical life-world to serve as the foundation of the political. This is what Lévinas has done in Totality and Infinity. He appeals to other resource of thought in the world, such as Jewish tradition, although he does not refer to it directly. He considers that the only real peace is a kind of messianic peace: Morality will oppose politics in history and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the canons of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the eschatology of messianic peace will have come to superpose itself upon the ontology of war.

#### The prior question is whether the plan on its-face affirms a worthy ethical principle. To void this obligation in the name of future consequences is literally an absurd notion — it fails to establish any coherent moral framework and makes your decision impossible

Finnis, 1980 (John, Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy at Oxford, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 120-122)

To choose an act which in itself simply (or primarily) damages a basic good is thereby to engage oneself willy-nilly (but directly*)* in an act of opposition to an incommensurable value (an aspect of human personality) which one treats as if it were an object of measurable worth that could be outweighed by commensurable objects of greater (or cumulatively greater) worth. To do this will often accord with our feelings, our generosity, our sympathy, and with our commitments and projects in the forms in which we undertook them. But it can never be justified in reason. We must choose rationally (and this rational judgment can often promote a shift in our perspective and consequently a realignment of initial feelings and thus our commitments and projects). Reason requires that every basic value be at least respected in each and every action. If one could ever rightly choose a single act which itself damages and itself does not promote some basic good, then one could rightly choose whole programmes and institutions and enterprises that themselves damage and do not promote basic aspects of human well-being, for the sake of their 'net beneficial consequences’. Now we have already seen that consequences, even to the extent that they can be 'foreseen as certain', cannot be commensurably evaluated, which means that 'net beneficial consequences' is a literally absurd general object or criterion. It only remains to note that a man who thinks that his rational responsibility to be always doing and pursuing good is satisfied by a commitment to act always for best consequences is a man who treats every aspect of human personalitv (and indeed, there, treats himself) as a utensil. He holds himself ready to do anything (and thus makes himself a tool for all those willing to threaten sufficiently bad consequences if he does not cooperate with them). But the objection I am making to such is not that programmes of mass killing, mass deception, etc. would then be morally eligible (though they would) and indeed morally required (though they would), but that no sufficient reason can be found for treating any act as immune from the only direction which we have, viz. the direction afforded by the basic practical principles. These each direct that a form of good is to be pursued and done' and each of them bears not only on all our large-scale choices of projects (in which attainment of the objective will indeed be the good consequence of successful deployment of effective means), but also on each and every choice of an act which itself is a complete act (whether or not it is also a step in a plan or a phase in a project). The incommensurable value of an aspect of personal full-being (and its corresponding primary principle) can never be rightly subordinated to any project or commitment. But such an act of subordination inescapably occurs at least whenever a distinct choice-of-act has in itself no meaning save that of damaging that basic value (thus violating that primary principle). Such, in highly abstract terms, is the seventh requirement, the principle on which alone rests (as we shall later see) the strict inviolability of basic human rights: VIII.7. There is no human right that will not be overridden if feelings (whether generous and unselfish, or mean and self-centered) are allowed to govern choice, or ifcost-benefit considerations are taken outside their appropriate technical sphere and allowed to govern one's direct engagement (whether at the level of commitment, project, or individual act) with basic goods. And the perhaps unfamiliar formulation which we have been considering should not obscure the fact that this 'seventh requirement' is well recognized, in other formulations: most loosely as `the end does not justify the means'; more precisely, though still ambiguously, as 'evil may not be done that good might follow therefrom'; and with a special Enlightenment flavour, as Kant's 'categorical imperiative;: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only'.12

#### Its arbitrary

**Grisez 78 -** emeritus Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount St. Mary's University in Emmitsburg, MD ( Germain, 1978 “ Against Consequentialism” [http://www.twotlj.org/against-consequentialism.pdf)bs](http://www.twotlj.org/against-consequentialism.pdf%29bs)

First, the seemingly obvious statement that it is right to bring about the greater good or the lesser evil assumes what is not obvious, namely, that goodness is measurable and that diverse forms of it are commensurable. If there are nonmeasurable goods toward which human acts should be oriented, then acting only in view of measur able good will mean ignoring goods which cannot be measured but should not be ignored. If the consequences of one act include several goods and evils, how can one tell which good is greater, which evil is lesser?

### -- 1AR - AT: Util = Moral

#### Lies

**Grisez 78 -** emeritus Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount St. Mary's University in Emmitsburg, MD ( Germain, 1978 “ Against Consequentialism” [http://www.twotlj.org/against-consequentialism.pdf)bs](http://www.twotlj.org/against-consequentialism.pdf%29bs)

Clearly, the necessary meaning of "good" cannot be specified in moral terms. What Rawls says of utilitarianism is true of all con sequentialism: Its point is to define "good" independently of "right" and to define "right" in terms of "good." And, in general, consequen tialists see this requirement and try to meet it.11 If consequentialists said that ethical considerations determine what a good consequence is, they would either be going in a circle or setting off on an infinite regress. If the single meaning of "good" which consequentialism needs can not be specified by moral principles, how can it be specified? If human persons have a single, well-defined goal or function, set for them by nature or by God, then "good" has the necessary, univocal meaning. Acts are right or wrong insofar as they do or do not bring one to this goal or fulfill this function.

### 2AC – Framework

#### We meet we defend our plan.

####  Counter interp – advantage ground is derived from a topical plan text and so is negative ground- ground is proportional

#### Disability is central to transportation planning – society has been built up to favor “able bodies” while subjecting those who are not “able bodied” to the sideline. Disability became a stigma because the way the world developed was not compatible with the “disabled body” . The medical model of disabilities has perpetrated society and constructed persons as inferior because the environment does not suit their unique abilities. as debaters we have an obligation to advocate on behalf and try to change representations and the way disability is mapped onto citizens through the medical gaze disabilities are the elephant in the room, they are the part of society that is know but ignored in hopes that inaction somehow relegates authority to someone else —only breaking away from the dominant framework is able to change debate from a forensic society dedicated to abstraction and remember that these debates set the terms for how we conceive of disability

#### Our plan is key

Imrie 2000 - Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London( Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf)bs

Ultimately, the configuration of political debates and movements around mobility and movement will depend on particular combinations of contextual factors, including the social, political, and institutional structures of local (geographical) environments (see Imrie, 2000a). However, such environments ought to be enabling or, as Gleeson (1999, page 149) suggests, aiming ``to establish social independence for all inhabitants'' by empowering people ``to meet their own needs within a network of mutual obligations rather than within a hierarchy of dependency relationships (e.g. care giver/care receiver)''. Indeed, disabled people's mobility and movement are entrenched in, and defined by, hierarchical relationships which are also implicated in defining (place specific) hierarchies of where disabled people can and cannot go to. There is, then, no alternative to the development of a politics of mobility because to be with little or no movement or mobility is ``to be a non person for whom power, choice and participation are meaningless'' (Corker, 1998, page 75).

#### Transportation planning is riddled with violence and exclusion“transportation infrastructure education” is only valuable if we can interrogate the bad justifications behind TI policy—their framework forces us to accept exclusionary TI policies promoting a bad form of education and decision making skills

**Ethics are inseparable from politics—their interp attempts to separate the two—that’s illogical and explodes ground— If we win our impact framing, ethics outweighs fairness and education**

#### Limits explosions are inevitable and ground is arbitrary but our CI solves it

**Reasonability – good is good enough**

### -- AT Fiat

#### Their interpretation of fiat is anti-educational ---- it makes unpredictable assumptions about how one homogenous state can make decisions to act

Claude 1988 (Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, p18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom.  Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice.  Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists.  One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest.  We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour.  Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy.  We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state.  I am inclined to call this the Genesis theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’.  I suspect that, in the realm of government,policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement.  Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done.  And what states do, they may never have decided to do.  Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions.  They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it.  As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge.  I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable.  The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world.  Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation.  More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think.  Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness.  Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments.  To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it.  To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made.  To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue.  We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

#### Destroys our agency - forcing us to defend policymaking turns debate into a spectator sport and distances us from realizing true ethical potential

**Mitchell 98** (Gordon R., Associate Professor of Communication and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh. “Pedagogical possibilities for argumentative agency in academic debate”. Argumentation and Advocacy, Volume 35, Issue 2. Fall 1998.  [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6699/is\_2\_35/ai\_n28720712/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6699/is_2_35/ai_n28720712/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

As two prominent teachers of argumentation point out, "Many scholars and educators term academic debate a laboratory for testing and developing approaches to argumentation" (Hill and Leeman 1997, p. 6). This explanation of academic debate squares with descriptions of the study of argumentation that highlight debate training as preparation for citizenship. As a safe space that permits the controlled "testing" of approaches to argumentation, the academic laboratory, on this account,constitutes a training ground for "future" citizens and leaders to hone their critical thinking and advocacy skills. While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from other spheres of deliberation beyond the schoolgrow taller and less permeable. When such barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998). The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments.For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life" (1991, p. 8)

#### Links to our aff - Their interpretation of fiat prevents an ethical connection with the Other by forcing us to legislate commands

**EPSTEIN 1999** (Mikhail, Associate Professor in the Department of Russian and East Asian Languages and Cultures at Emory University, Transcultural Experiments: Russian and American Models of Creative Communication, p. 166-168)

Though ethics is usually presented as a set of rules and norms of behavior, this does not imply that the contents of ethics should be as normative and prescriptive as its forms are. Ethical prescriptions include the freedom from prescriptions. This paradoxical element of ethics cannot be fully eliminated. When Christ said, "Know the truth, and the truth will set you free," He expressed in prescriptive form the freedom from all prescriptions.

If we look at the most elementary forms of ethics, such as politeness and courtesy, we find that even these most routine models of morality are based on the presumption of human freedom. If you need somebody to give you a glass of water, the polite way to express this need will be not an imperative or a command but a suggestion, "Would you please be so kind as to bring me a glass of water?" "Would it be possible for you to do this or that?" The politeness is implied in the modality "would," which transforms the action from the actual or imperative modality to a subjunctive mode. My need has to be transformed into somebody else's possibility or opportunity in order to be presented ethically (politely). The imperative "Do this" is applied only between parents and children or officers and soldiers, thus marking the relation of power or authority. But insofar as ethics challenges this power relation, it has to transform any command into a suggestion, every imperative into a subjunctive.

If this is true on the level of elementary politeness, how much more important it must be on the level of the higher moral initiatives that are addressed to others. Even in the most fundamental and global issues of war and peace, power and freedom, authority and equality, discipline and responsibility, ethics should appeal to possibilities rather than impose necessity and constraints. Often the same person who uses the subjunctive "Would you" when asking for a glass of water would use a categorical imperative, demanding that humanity obey his grand ethical schemes and prescriptions. Almost all our discourses and the **procedures of teaching** and writing are imbued with the imperative mode: Do as I do, do as I say, do as I write. Every interpretation avers its conclusive truthfulness instead of suggesting itself as just a possibility, a discourse in a subjunctive mode. **All disciplines of scholarship** and interpretation would benefit by incorporating these zones ofpoliteness, potentiality, and imagination, which are not only an "excess" of aesthetic subjectivity but are first of all modes of ethical responsiveness that **multiply the levels of freedom** in our readers, students, interlocutors, instead of forcing their minds into our own persuasions.

Ethics is the domain of requests rather than commands, the domain of imagination rather than obligation. The commandments pronounced by God cannot help but be obligatory if we identify ourselves with the people of God and recognize the hierarchy that connects heavenly Father and earthly children. However, if ethics should be understood as a specific domain regulating the relationship between brothers and sisrers and distinct from the religious domain regulating the relationship between Father and children, we should formulate the principles of this ethics in a noncommanding mode, as a system of requests and proposals appealing to the freedom of the other person, to his "maybe or maybe not." Certainly, this ethics "in the subjunctive mood" is much more favorable to the work of the transcultural imagination than an ethics that **prescribes us to obey already established laws**.

Thus, in addition to the golden rule of commonness, we need a differential and interferential ethics based on imagining others as different from ourselves and **imagining ourselves as possibilities for others**.

### -- 1AR Framework

#### Aff framework

**Imrie and Thomas -**  a Department of Geography, King’s College London, London; b Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardif ( Rob and Huw August 2008 “ The interrelationships between environment and disability” ebsco)bs

Heylighen’s paper, which begins to explore why architects ﬁnd it so difﬁcult to learn from users of the environment, recognises the signiﬁcance of social relations in producing and using knowledge relating to both sustainability and disability. The debate, as it is currently constituted, emphasises the need for academic knowledge production to be “relevant” and for academics to “learn” how to translate and transmit their knowledge to other users. The emphasis is on a one-way or unidirectional transfer of knowledge and learning. In contrast, Heylighen reassesses this formulation by asking questions about what expectations can be placed on other actors in the network; in this case, architects. This is very important for 482 R. Imrie and H. Thomas

#### **Discussing PWD is uniquely key in the context of transportation investment**

**AADP 2/22/12**, American Association of People with Disabilities, the country's largest cross-disability membership association, organizes the disability community to be a powerful force for change – politically, economically, and socially (“Facts about Equity in Transportation Infrastructure” http://www.civilrights.org/transportation/disability/facts.html)

Though people with disabilities live in every community, our transportation policy has undermined the Americans with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) promise of equal opportunity in transportation for people with disabilities, resulting in isolation from jobs, housing, health care, and education. As policymakers discuss such important issues as how best to rebuild and repair our nation’s roads, bridges, railways, and ports, and where and how to prioritize investments in public transportation, it is vital that they take into consideration the needs of people with disabilities. People with disabilities make up about 6 million (40 percent) of the almost 15 million people in this country who have difficulties getting the transportation they need.[1] Because many people with disabilities do not have the option to drive cars, lack of access to other modes of transportation disproportionately harms them. About 560,000 people with disabilities never leave home because of transportation difficulties.[2 ] Twenty years after passage of the ADA, transportation choices for people with disabilities are still extremely limited. The ADA has led to major improvements in transit systems across the United States; however, there are persistent gaps in compliance that continue to create significant barriers for people with disabilities. Accessible transportation options—including accessible buses, railway systems, taxis, and paratransit—allow people with disabilities important opportunities in education, employment, health care, housing, and participation in community life. People with disabilities who live in rural communities face even greater barriers to accessible transportation. A significant lack of funding to rural communities means that public transportation, and especially accessible transportation, is often in very short supply. The unemployment rate of people with disabilities is 12.9 percent. The unemployment rate for people without disabilities is 8.7 percent.[ 3] The lack of transportation options in many communities is a major barrier to employment opportunities for people with disabilities. Without access to transportation, people with disabilities will not be part of society’s economic environment and will continue to be alienated from the economic mainstream, thus causing a myriad of other problems, like homelessness and institutionalization.

#### **Debaters have an ethical obligation to bring a discussion of disability into education about public policy.**

Frank 2 – Prof in the Department of Educational Philosophy with the University of Miami (Fitch E., Fall, “Disability and inclusion: From labeling deviance to social valuing,” [Educational Theory](http://search.proquest.com/pubidlinkhandler/sng/pubtitle/Educational%2BTheory/%24N/34718?accountid=10422)[)bs](http://search.proquest.com/indexingvolumeissuelinkhandler/34718/Educational%2BTheory/02002Y10Y01%2423Fall%2B2002%243b%2B%2BVol.%2B52%2B%24284%2429/52/4?accountid=10422)

Signs are part of an ideological struggle that attempts to create aparticular regime of representation that seeks to legitimate a certain cultural reality.54 Disability has historically played a central role in signifying otherness and justifying discrimination among other subordinate groups. Disabled people continue to be subject to a regime of representation that maintains a segregationist system of "special" and "regular" education. The significance of traditionalist discourse in maintaining this particular cultural reality is difficult to overestimate; it has perpetuated a dual system that remains deeply entrenched in the social commitments of categorically defined special interest advocacy groups; in the structure of health, education, and welfare programs at direct service levels; in the staffing of teacher training institutions; in other professional training programs and in general public thinking.55 The traditionalist or medical model of disability intersects with forms of oppression in complex and pervasive ways. It plays a pivotal role in maintaining an "ability" tracked system of education that covertly segregates by race, class, and ethnicity. As long as disability retains its naturalized biological status, it will continue in the service of domination. Labeling deviance theory has played a key role in challenging this regime of representation. In highlighting the linguistic, socially constructed nature of disability it has helped to problematize normal/deviant boundaries. However, because it has not recognized the ideological, normative, and discursive dimensions of power it has been less than transformative. It has failed to offer an alternative discourse that can effectively cross these boundaries, that can move beyond the contradictions and limitations of an affirmative approach. A discourse of transformative valuing offers a way to finesse these limitations. I have sketched what it would mean to adopt a transformative versus an affirmative discourse across various educational settings. Displacing traditionalist discourse and eliminating the dual system of special and regular education will require a long struggle. In addition to building on the emerging alliance between inclusive and multicultural education, disability studies must become an integral part of multicultural curricula in general. If the goal of critical multiculturalism is to render the ideological modes of domination visible, disability can no longer be overlooked as a site of political contestation and transformation. Any conceptual frame of reference or theory obscures some facts while rendering others visible and comprehensible. As outlined here, a transformative discourse of social valuing suggests an alternative language and perspective on the "facts" or "problem" of disability. Conceptualizing the nature and location of the problem has significant policy implications for general and special education, multicultural education, disability studies, and the inclusion movement. It renders visible the dimensions of power in the construction of disability and the legitimization of exclusion. It invites the kind of discourse and pedagogy that can help identify what represses and how it can be altered.56 It envisions the role of educators as transformative intellectuals who work to build alternative, inclusive public spheres.57 It opens up the potential to "analyze hitherto undreamt of possibilities by putting new linguistic and other practices into play and enacting new social constructs."58

### 2AC – Predictions fail

#### Predictions fail and cause bad politics

**Sa, 04** – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE: UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, scholar)

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major policies **revert back to** the uncertainty and **chaos.** Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known, it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein 1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency, ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change. What results is uncertainty from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of; disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as; faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception. Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes that predictions of the future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one (Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that **prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.**3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal relationships.

### -- 1AR Predictions fail

#### Expertism and prediction are doomed---reject their scenario-planning

Jonah Goldberg 11 is a visiting fellow at AEI "Seduced by the Cult of Experts" Aug 30 [www.aei.org/article/104068](http://www.aei.org/article/104068)

Seduced by the Cult of Experts It isn't surprising that Obama and his economic advisors' predictions have been wrong.

When asked what posed the greatest challenge to statesmen, Harold Macmillan, the former British prime minister, responded, "Events, my dear boy, events."

That's because events tend to throw everybody off their plan. For example, Hurricane Irene ended President Obama's vacation early. And the hurricane's steady deterioration upset the plans of news producers who anticipated something more dramatic for their wall-to-wall coverage.

In a similar fashion, Obama and his advisors predicted the economy would do better--much better--than it has, and those predictions were wrong. The president blames events: the European debt crisis, the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, the political tsunami of the 2010 elections. Some of that is plausible, but the two years of anemic job and economic growth that preceded those events can hardly be blamed on them. And it's that economic performance that has scuttled Obama's plans for an easy reelection in 2012.

That sluggish growth seemed to catch a lot of people by surprise.

My National Review colleague Jim Geraghty has chronicled how, over the last few years, the media have greeted bad economic news by saying it is unexpected. For instance, Bloomberg reported "Sales of U.S. previously owned homes unexpectedly dropped in July." Reuters tells us that "Consumer spending unexpectedly fell in June." And so on.

Many who've been following the trend point to media bias. The press corps, writ large, wants Obama to succeed, argues Michael Barone, so "they characterize economic setbacks as unexpected, with the implication that there's still every reason to believe that, in Herbert Hoover's phrase, prosperity is just around the corner."

I certainly think there's more than a little truth to that. The media get hooked on a story line--hurricanes are getting worse because of climate change, Obama's a pragmatist doing the smartest things to fix x economy--and when the facts contradict the story line, it's, well, unexpected.

But it can't be simply media bias because the experts reporters call for quotes also are surprised. As Geraghty notes, groupthink is a culprit too. The guys on Wall Street use the same Keynesian computer models as the folks in the White House.

There are no more devout members of the cult of expertise than mainstream journalists. They rely on experts for guidance about what is "mainstream" and accurate and what is not. Sometimes, that's fine. Surgeons are extremely reliable sources to explain how a heart attack happens. They're less reliable at telling you who will have one, save in a statistical sense, and even less reliable at telling you when a specific person will have one.

That's because prediction is hard. Experts--in politics, economics, climate--are very, very bad at telling people what will happen tomorrow, let alone next year or the next century. How many of the economists who tell us what to do now failed to see the mortgage debt crisis coming? Nearly all of them.

Philip Tetlock's 2005 book, "Expert Political Judgment," documents that the predictions of even the most credentialed and experienced experts are often worse and very rarely better than random guessing. "In this age of academic hyperspecialization," he writes, "there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals--distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on--are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in 'reading' emerging situations."

#### Their predictions are doomed to failure—studies prove

Menand, ‘5 (Louis, Former Professor of Political Science at MIT, December 5, “Everybody's and Expert,” http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/05/051205crbo\_books1?printable=true)

“Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

### 2AC - Civil rights add on

#### K2 civil rights

**AAPD 12 –**  American Association of People with Disabilities ( 2/22/12 Equity in Transportation for People with Disabilities http://www.civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/transportation/final-transportation-equity-disability.pdf)bs

Transportation and mobility play key roles in the struggle for civil rights and equal opportunity in the disability community. Affordable and reliable transportation allows people with disabilities access to important opportunities in education, employment, health care, housing, and community life. Because our nation’s investments in transportation infrastructure have disproportionately favored cars and highways, those who cannot afford cars or do not drive cars often lack viable transportation options. People with disabilities—particularly in rural areas— need accessible, affordable transportation options that bring employment, health care, education, housing, and community life within reach.

### 2AC - Social equity add on

#### Transportation is an intergral part of society its key to social equity

**DOT 2003 -**  Report to the President On Executive Order 13217 prepared by Marc Brenman Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Civil Rights Office of the Secretary ( Delivering on the Promise: U.S. Department of Transportation Self-Evaluation to Promote Community Living for People with Disabilities http://www.hhs.gov/newfreedom/final/pdf/dot.pdf)bs

Transportation represents a major portion of consumer, business and government expenditures. It gives people the opportunity to access goods, services and activities that provide benefits. It helps determine where people can live, shop, work, go to school and recreate. It affects individuals’ opportunity to access education, employment, goods, services and activities. For all these reasons, transportation has major impacts on equity

### **2AC – Civic engagement add on**

#### Transportation is key—civic engagement

Kessler Foundation 10 (Kessler Foundation and National Organization on Disability, text taken from article titled, “The ADA, 20 Years Later,” published July 2010. Text found at [http://www.2010disabilitysurveys.org/pdfs/surveyresults.pdf] by Hirsh)

Access to Transportation Accessible transportation is critical to the ability of people both with and without disabilities to participate in all aspects of society, including work, education, socializing, and religious, civic, and political activities. Accommodations made in each of these venues are essentially meaningless if people are unable to reach them. As has been the case since 1998, the availability of accessible transportation remains an obstacle, with over one-third (34%) of people with disabilities reporting inadequate transportation. Of these, half (18% overall) claim it is a major problem. By contrast, only one out of six (16%) people without a disability has a problem with inadequate transportation, bringing the gap between the two populations to 18 percentage points. The percentage of people without disabilities who cite inadequate transportation as a problem has increased slightly since 2004 (13% in 2004 vs. 16% in 2004), which could likely be a result of the economic downturn. Nevertheless, people without disabilities still remain significantly less affected by inadequate transportation than those who have disabilities. (Table 6A) Unfortunately, transportation is a much larger obstacle for people with severe disabilities. People with very severe disabilities are twice as likely to think transportation is a major problem as even people with a somewhat severe disability (36% and 18%, respectively) and over three times as likely as those with a slight (10%) or moderate disability (11%) to name it as a major problem. (Table 6B)

#### It’s only gotten worse

Kessler Foundation 10 (Kessler Foundation and National Organization on Disability, text taken from article titled, “The ADA, 20 Years Later,” published July 2010. Text found at [http://www.2010disabilitysurveys.org/pdfs/surveyresults.pdf] by Hirsh)

Trends The transportation gap between people with and without disabilities has actually widened by five percentage points since 1998, when the survey began collecting data on this measure. Access to transportation has not improved at all since 1998 for people with disabilities, and although there was some measured progress for people without disabilities from 1998 to 2004, the issue appears to have worsened again for people without disabilities over the past six years. (Table 6D)

### 2AC: Spatiality add on

#### Status quo models of helping persons with disabilities re-entrenches exclusion through forced normalization and otherization

**Pineda 8**, Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” <http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment>)

According to the US and UK disability studies literature our society mostly operates under twodominant models of disability, the charity model and the medical model (Oliver 1990; Irmie 1996;Mitchell 1997; Linton 1998; Shakespeare 1998a;Gleeson 1999). Under both of these models, it is the deviant’s responsibility to correct the abnormality order. Failure results in humiliation and shame. These normalized and a-spatial models inscribe defects on disabled individuals and hold deviants responsible for adapting to their environment. The charity model uses a moral and cultural im-perative to help the needy. It is informed by religiousteachings or moral philosophies that equate impair-ment with misfortune. The paternalistic approach of the charity model inuenced societal perceptions of people with disabilities as dependent and in need of benevolence. The medical model rose to prominence with the advancement of rehabilitation medicine between World War I and World War II. The ap-proach called for an impairment to be treated as faras possible and for institutional care to be providedfor those who could not be treated or cured. Forillustrative purposes, I will take the liberty to slightly alter these terms. I will use the term medical abnormality model to refer to the medical model, and I will use theterm personal tragedy model to refer to what is commonly called the charity model. I have chosen to modify thecommon labels to stress the set of assumptions aboutspace and its embedded social constructs under whicheach model operates. The Medical Abnormality Model The medical abnormality model views disability as a medical defect, an individualistic and physiological, biological, or genetic inferiority that is in no way connected to space. Medicine and technology carry modernist ideas of optimal functionality. In thismodel, it is necessary to normalize an individual’s functions for optimal growth, health, labor and efficiency. Physical or genetic abnormalities are seen as dangerous to the growth and stability of a society and must be eradicated. People who deviate from the norm are seen as ill and in need of fixing. This dynamic is exacerbated by the doctor-patient relation-ship, which suffers from asymmetric power relations where functional-limitations and imperfect lives are solvable challenges for experts. If knowledge can defeat ignorance, then medicine can defeat disease. In such a model there is no cure, only normalization. Citizenship rights, duties and privileges are denied— at times, disabled persons are even denied human recognition and status. In the fields of philosophy, theology, and bioethics for example, the definition of “person” may exclude adults with mental and developmental disabilities who are incapable of certain kinds of thought. Infirmity and disease are seen as linking physical, mental and moral weakness, leaving ‘abnormal’ individuals to be feared and spurned, marked as less than human. People with disabilities are discouraged to occupy or embrace their impairments. It is ultimately the responsibility of the individual to fit into oppressive, exclusionary, discriminatory, and otherwise unaccommodating spaces of stigmatization and marginalization The Personal Tragedy Model The personal tragedy model views disability as a great misfortune, a chance of life, an act of god, a losing hand of cards that were dealt. This model moves tragedy into the personal sphere. It sees all people with disabilities as victims of circumstance deserving pity. The real danger of the personal tragedy model is that what is presented as compassion too often plays out as pity. Patronizing benevolence thus perpetuate ignominy and disabled people’s dependence, while their marginality, second-class status and subservi-ence are reinforced. People with disabilities are all too often objectified by the personal tragedy model, which is more generally referred to as the charity model because it manipulates people’s emotions for financial gain. Politicians and charities disseminate patronizing posters to fundraise for causes, thus furthering the notion that these are people “who suffer,” are “confined to wheelchairs,” and “will never amount to much without your support.” Donors pay to alleviate their selfish discomfort and remove the “suffering” from their view. Although this perspective views philanthropy as self-interested, it is most problematic in that it perpetuates fear of human difference. The charity aspects of the personal tragedy model impose terms and require the beneficiary’s gratitude. These terms, which are oftentimes oppressive, lead to a loss of autonomy and choice for the benefciary. The tragedy is thus doubled, (i.e. you are seen as bad if you don’t accept pity; you are seen as worse, in terms of dignity, self-respect and empowerment, if you do). In all, the personal tragedy model is defined by the conflict between the confinement of the impaired and the ideals of freedom and equality. Like the medical abnormality model, it fails to address the environment as an active disabling factor.

#### Viewing disability dependent of the environment is key to break down social norms of otherization

**Pineda 8**, Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” <http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment>)

Careful analysis of disability as a lived phenomenon reveals that one is only disabled with respect to an environment, especially the way in which an environment conceptualizes and distributes space. People see,hear, walk, talk, remember, and learn in different ways. We experience life differently. We interact with our environment within a biological and physical spectrum of capabilities and functions. We are categorized by these differences in capabilities and functioning into education, employment, and housing situations that segregate individuals, limit choice, and in some cases architects and planning practitioners who build the public and private spaces we inhabit. Despite gains made in legislative and regulatory approaches in mainstreaming people with disabilities since the 1970s, unnecessary barriers continue to limit disabled people’s mobility and access to public resources; planning practitioners have failed to fully recognize the enabling or disabling powers of physical space. Many battles to eradicate barriers in transportation, housing, education, and information and telecom-munication services have been fought and won by civil rights and disability rights activists without particularattention to the unique role of space in inhibiting justice. The Berkeley Independent Living movement is a notable exception that I revisit in this text, arguing that spatially just perspectives of disability it forwarded have not fully penetrated planning policy, practice, or research. The challenge of thinking spatially about disability is, I argue, further exacerbated by the two dominant models of disability—the medical and charity models—that consider disability as a property heldby an individual. I analyze these a-spatial models andargue that disability is not a property of an individual alone, independent of an environment, but a function of an individual in an environment. Furthermore, existing models of justice—like existing models of disability—do not adequately account for the dis-abling role of the built environment. In this paper, Ibuild upon certain aspects of John Rawl’s Theory of Justice (1971), as well as Henri Lefebvre and EdwardSoja’s conceptions of spatiality, to develop a spatially informed model of justice for a variety of people with disabilities and functional impairments. This socio-spatial model has practical importance; it can be used by planning practitioners, researchers, and disability rights advocates to produce environments that are spatially just.

#### **Only a spatial view allows for equal rights for PWD to emerge**

**Pineda 8**, Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” <http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment>)

Contemporary legal definitions of disability (who is disabled and what constitutes a disability) are not overtly spatial. They do not elaborate a definition of disability in which space is a central and fundamental dimension along which discrimination and injustice should be measured. To do so would radically and fundamentally alter our understanding of equal rights. Current legal definitions of what constitutes a disability were drawn for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and were used almost verbatim for the draft-ing of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) of 1990 (United States 1991). The most progressive and unique aspect of the ADA is that it does not stipulate a list of medical conditions that are covered. Instead, the architects of the ADA sought a definition that could encompass a diverse cross-section of society. It uses a broad definition of disability based on a spectrum of functional limitations; according to the ADA, a person is considered disabled if she or he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. A physical impairment means any physiological disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana -tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. A mental or psychological disorder includes conditions such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities (United States 1991). As stipulated in the ADA, these conditions, diseases, and ailments must “substantially limit” one or more major life functions to count as a disability, meaning one is unable to perform or is significantly restricted in performing a major life activity that the average person in the gen-eral population can perform. A representative—but not exhaustive—list of major life activities includes functions such as: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Although the legal definition of disability used in the ADA calls attention to a diverse set of mental and physical conditions that can be considered debilitating relative to the general population—and it is among the most progressive in the world—it falls short of informing a radical understanding of disability that Critical Planning Summer 2008 113 accounts for the relationship between an individual and their environment. The absence of a spatial context is the great weakness of this definition. It fails to consider where major life activities are carried out, and under what circumstances. Thus, this legal definition of disability misses the philosophical preeminence of space. I propose a spatially relative view of disability. My thesis is simple: rather than maintain that person is disabled without consideration of the environment, we ought to think of person A as being disabled with respect to environment E This simple, yet superior, philosophical con-ception shows, by way of contrast, that the ADA definition is predicated on such a thing as a normal city environment. By not considering the role of the environment in enabling or disabling people, city space—in the legal definition—is essentially fixed and dead. My conception recognizes that the city’s form is flexible and un-normalized; environment E is a variable instead of an absolute. Out of this a potentially powerful line of progressive thought can emerge:i.  Modern humans inhabit socially and politi-cally constructed environments that distribute space in specific ways. ii.  A socially constructed environment enables an individual to the degree that it maximizes the transformation of specific functions of daily living, such as feeding, dressing and moving at will.iii.  A socially constructed environment disables an individual to the degree that it fails to maximize the transformation of specific functions of daily living for the individual iv.  One way in which an environment can fail to maximize the transformation of specific functions for an individual is in virtue of how the environment distributes space.

#### **Otherization of disabled bodies sets the foundation for all violence**

Pfeiffer, 2002 - Ph.D., Professor of Public Management at Suffolk University (David, , Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22 No. 2, Spring, p. 3-23)bs

It is here contended (as the result of the author's research) that accepting the Greek, Christian, or modern ontology, as here outlined, leads to a fanaticism in which the "other" should be, needs to be, must be destroyed. A fanaticism in which giving one's life in the destruction of the lives of the "other" is the highest moral, ethical, and religious act possible. In the US during the nineteenth century many persons conceived of a manifest destiny for the country to bring democracy to the rest of the world. The US built up quite an empire doing it. The US entered World War I to make the world safe for democracy. The US entered World War II to defend democracy. The US fought in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, and now in Afghanistan to protect freedom and capitalism. The wording changed a little as did the emphasis, but the ontology was the same: the US knows truth, justice, goodness, beauty, and what is best for the rest of the world and it is are ready to kill others to prove it. But the US is not the only country to adhere to this ontology. Some Japanese in the 1920s and 1930s conceived of their people as having a pure spirit unsoiled by Western culture. Therefore, their military campaigns during the 1930s and 1940s were to purify East Asia and to destroy the influence of the "white devils." Some Germans in the 1920s and 1930s conceived of their people as having a pure spirit unsoiled by Western culture. Therefore, their military campaigns during the 1930s and 1940s were to purify Europe and to destroy the influence of the "Christians, liberals, and Jews." The English did it, the Russians did it, the Germans did it, the French did it, the Spanish, the Italians, the Japanese did it, the Balkan nations, the Chinese - they all did it. In fact, no nation and no religion avoided killing others (if they had the resources to do so) in the name of truth, justice, goodness, and even beauty. In all of these cases value systems embodied in utility functions based on respect and more importantly based on the equality of people, of gender, of race, and of differing intellectual viewpoints were the enemy which had to be destroyed. As well discussed in Buruma & Margalit (2002), they had to be destroyed because they undermined the ideal of the pious, uncorrupted peasant who worked hard and always obeyed authority. The religious leaders and the political leaders worked together to keep society stable - and therefore their privileged position. According to the religious and political leaders it is the soul of the peasant which is in danger from these values. It is no accident that West European and US missionaries go to other lands to save souls. And they go into the country side and into the urban slums in all parts of the world to save souls. It is primarily the skeptical intellect which is the target of missionaries. The peasant must become pious (as defined by the religious leaders) and obey the law (as defined by the political leaders). The scientists present the "facts" which support the definitions of the religious and the political leaders. Intellectuals who question motives and means must be removed and silenced. Law is based upon divine revelation and implemented by leaders. It is this view which unites right wing Christians in the US, ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel, fascists in many dictatorships around the world, far right Islamists, and any authoritarian group. It was far right Islamic terrorists who crashed those planes on September 11. It was right wing Christians Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson who said it was punishment from God (their god of course) for the denial of God (again their god) in US society. They both had the same ultimate goal: to chastise the US populace in order to force them to embrace their ontology, their epistemology, their value system. People with disabilities are seen in the US today as the "other" which is concretely involved with the world of experience. Any ontology which presents a world of experience as inferior to a world of divine law will lead to the oppression of people with disabilities. Any ontology which emphasizes ablism and normality dooms people with disabilities to destruction. Any ontology which presents an epistemology based on authority and conformity results in the death of people with disabilities.

#### Persons with disabilities are viewed as having weaknesses and characterized as less than human.

**Pineda 8**, Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” <http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment>)

Citizenship rights, duties and privileges are denied— at times, disabled persons are even denied human recognition and status. In the fields of philosophy, theology, and bioethics for example, the definition of “person” may exclude adults with mental and developmental disabilities who are incapable of certain kinds of thought. Infirmity and disease are seen as linking physical, mental and moral weakness, leaving ‘abnormal’ individuals to be feared and spurned, marked as less than human. People with disabilities are discouraged to occupy or embrace their impairments. It is ultimately the responsibility of the individual to fit into oppressive, exclusionary, discriminatory, and otherwise unaccommodating spaces of stigmatization and marginalization

#### Disability theories without a spatial lens jeopardize justice and democracy

**Pineda 8,** Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” [http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling\_Justice\_Spatializing\_Disability\_In\_the\_Built\_Environment](http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

The real victory of the independent living move-ment was in challenging and altering the distribution of space. According to Judith Heumann, a founder of the rst Center for Independent Living, these efforts were “a natural evolution of justice” (Heumann andStoddard 2002). So, any environment that fails to distribute space in a way that maximizes the distribu-tion of space for the least well off stakeholder is an unjust environment. The independent living move-ment can also be understood within a greater contextof social and political norms that act as disabling environmental barriers. **Such a formulation would take into account both the physical and social factors that continuously and actively disable people**.By using events surrounding the independentliving movement, I have argued that the distribution of space is an important aspect of realizing justice for disabled persons. Out of this notion a larger setof theories of justice can be criticized and a new and broader theory of justice can be formulated.**If,**however, **disability is** continuously held as a property of **an individual independent of an environment, just theories of disability can never emerge**. The phi-losophies of the independent living movement and their political struggles in appropriating space have uncovered new truths about space and the inequity of its distribution but have not achieved the full potential possible with a spatial lens. Justice and democracy itself is at risk if spatial exclusion persists. Let the lessons learned and the struggles fought inform us and help us shape an open and more perfect union not just for people with disabilities but for everyone

#### **K2 social justice and democracy**

**Pineda 8**, Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” <http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment>)

The real victory of the independent living move-ment was in challenging and altering the distribution of space. According to Judith Heumann, a founder of the rst Center for Independent Living, these efforts were “a natural evolution of justice” (Heumann andStoddard 2002). So, any environment that fails to distribute space in a way that maximizes the distribu-tion of space for the least well off stakeholder is an unjust environment. The independent living move-ment can also be understood within a greater contextof social and political norms that act as disabling environmental barriers. Such a formulation would take into account both the physical and social factors that continuously and actively disable people.By using events surrounding the independentliving movement, I have argued that the distribution of space is an important aspect of realizing justice for disabled persons. Out of this notion a larger setof theories of justice can be criticized and a new and broader theory of justice can be formulated. If,however, disability is continuously held as a property of an individual independent of an environment, just theories of disability can never emerge. The phi-losophies of the independent living movement and their political struggles in appropriating space have uncovered new truths about space and the inequity of its distribution but have not achieved the full potential possible with a spatial lens. Justice and democracy itself is at risk if spatial exclusion persists. Let the lessons learned and the struggles fought inform us and help us shape an open and more perfect union not just for people with disabilities but for everyone

### AT: UD impossible

#### UD is possible

Audirac 8 - Florida State University ( Ivonne 5/16/2008[“Accessing Transit as Universal Design”, Journal of Planning Literature 2008, Sage Journals, http://jpl.sagepub.com/content/23/1/4.full.pdf+html)bs

UD applied to transit is an inclusionary strategy that seeks to redress the aforementioned forms of social exclusion. Accessible transportation focused previously on technical solutions to removing physical barriers affecting specific disabled groups and providing dial-a-ride or specialized demand services. These strategies largely segregated and stigmatized users as “seniors” or “disabled.” Instead, UD emphasizes transportation that caters to all users regardless of age and ability in a single integrated system that combines both mass transit and real-time demand-responsive systems (Grieco 2003; Mitchell 1997). Enabled by ICT and borrowing from freight logistics, the European literature refers to this systemas the “complete transportation chain” (Mitchell 1997; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2000; Ståhl 1999), while the American literature terms it the new “mobility management model” (TCRP 1999, 2000, 2002). These models require seamless integration of the supply side (i.e., system’s operation, infrastructure, and quality of service delivery) with the demand side (i.e., mobility needs of the widest number of users). Consequently, this often entails a complete reorganization of transit operations from traditional fixed-route, hub-and-spoke, and setschedule systems to flexible schedule systems with intelligent reservation centers that can identify passenger needs and aggregate individual preferences in real time, providing door-to-door service (Hine and Grieco 2002). Despite its technical feasibility in the current ICT era, institutional, organizational, legal, and old market structures remain important barriers to the full realization of these integrated-transit models touted as the means to bring about “a new relationship between accessibility, mobility and the previously socially excluded” (Hine and Grieco 2002, 4). In a conceptual discussion of UD and accessibility, Iwarsson and Stahl (2003) differentiate between three dimensions of physical accessibility5: (1) micro accessibility related to the immediate proximal environment, (2) meso or neighborhood or city-level accessibility, and (3) macro or metropolitan or regional accessibility. This article applies these scales of accessibility to the previously discussed dimensions of mobility-related social exclusion (i.e., immobility) to assess the transit features requiring a UD approach. As shown in Table 3, a UD perspective applied to transit underscores the notion that: 1. Addressing physical exclusion at the micro level of accessibility involves planning, designing, and operating transit systems that are easy for all users. This includes not only passengers with physical, sensory, or cognitive impairment but also those with language or cultural barriers, people with children, individuals carrying baggage or parcels, or those who are new to the area (Suen and Mitchell 1999). Micro-level accessibility requires barrier-free retrofitting of the existing physical built environment; however, future development to be served with transit requires planning for UD to avoid the need for retrofitting or readaptation. This includes consideration of pedestrian infrastructure and streetscape (e.g., sidewalks, traffic signals, crosswalks, street crossings, and street furniture) and their interface with automobile facilities (e.g., park and ride, kiss and ride), and transit passenger facilities (e.g., terminals, stations, stops). Universally designed transit accessibility at the micro level requires bus-stop boarding pads and street curbs that are leveled with low-floor buses. This not only makes shorter and easier bus boarding and alighting for all (i.e., wheelchair passengers, frail and/or ambulant disabled people, patrons with small children or those carrying baggage or parcels), it also reduces bus dwell time. Low-floor buses with lifts or ramps meet barrier-free design criteria, but strictly speaking, ramps and lifts are ADA bus design readaptations that increase bus dwelling time and stigmatize wheelchair users or anyone needing them. Thus, although they are a form of inclusive design, they are not UD solutions to micro-level transit accessibility.

### AT: Aff = Exclusionary / worse

#### exclusions is nonunique and the aff solves it – Transportation infrastructure hinders equal access into society

casas 8 - IRENE CASAS is an Assistant Professor in the Geography Department at the University at Buffalo, SUNY. ( 29 Feb 2008 Social Exclusion and the Disabled: An Accessibility Approach http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9272.2007.00635.x)bs

A generally accepted view of sustainability presents a society in which all members are provided with equivalent environmental, social, and economic qualities (Charter 1994; Litman and Burwell 2003; Steg and Gifford 2005). In transportation, this is reﬂected in the ability of the transport system to provide to all members of a society the same level of access to different opportunities. When access/social rights are not secured and a population is at a disadvantage, social exclusion occurs (Bhalla and Lapeyre 1997). Groups at a potential disadvantage often include people with disabilities, women, the elderly, children, those living in certain areas (urban/rural), and people who are subject to certain forms of prejudice, including race or sex (Torrance 1992; Hine and Grieco 2003)

#### Transportation policies are crucial to provide access to persons with disabilities

casas 8 - IRENE CASAS is an Assistant Professor in the Geography Department at the University at Buffalo, SUNY. ( 29 Feb 2008 Social Exclusion and the Disabled: An Accessibility Approach http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9272.2007.00635.x)bs

Traditionally social exclusion indicators have been based on local indices of deprivation that do not account for the transport system (Bhalla and Lapeyre 1997; DETR 2000; Grieco, Turner, and Hine 2000; Hodgson and Turner 2003; Litman 2003). These indices are not suitable in certain disadvantaged groups, such as the disabled, where local clusters are not the norm and where exclusion is not necessarily based on lack of access to the transport system. Rather, for the disabled, difﬁculties are more in terms of mobility, which can be related to deﬁciencies in the transport system or to a particular impairment affecting access level.

#### Persons with disabilities are transport excluded

casas 8 - IRENE CASAS is an Assistant Professor in the Geography Department at the University at Buffalo, SUNY. ( 29 Feb 2008 Social Exclusion and the Disabled: An Accessibility Approach http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9272.2007.00635.x)bs

Being disabled is deﬁned as having an impairment, including difﬁculty standing or walking, being in a wheelchair or using a cane, being deaf or blind, or having a mental illness. A common characteristic among the disabled is their dependence on the transport system to reach destinations/opportunities. The disabled are identiﬁed as transport-excluded if they have a reduced level of access to opportunities when compared to the rest of the population.

### AT: Mini-high platforms

#### **mini high platforms don’t solve**

NCD 5 - Lex Frieden, Chairperson, Texas¶ Patricia Pound, First Vice Chairperson, Texas¶ Glenn Anderson, Ph.D., Second Vice Chairperson, Arkansas¶ Milton Aponte, J.D., Florida¶ Robert R. Davila, Ph.D., New York¶ Barbara Gillcrist, New Mexico¶ Graham Hill, Virginia¶ Joel I. Kahn, Ph.D., Ohio¶ Young Woo Kang, Ph.D., Indiana¶ Kathleen Martinez, California¶ Carol Novak, Florida¶ Anne M. Rader, New York¶ Marco Rodriguez, California¶ David Wenzel, Pennsylvania¶ Linda Wetters, Ohio¶ Staff¶ Ethel D. Briggs, Executive Director¶ Jeffrey T. Rosen, General Counsel and Director of Policy¶ Mark S. Quigley, Director of Communications¶ Allan W. Holland, Chief Financial Officer¶ Julie Carroll, Senior Attorney Advisor¶ Joan M. Durocher, Attorney Advisor¶ Martin Gould, Ed.D., Senior Research Specialist¶ Geraldine Drake Hawkins, Ph.D., Program Analyst¶ Mark Seifarth, Congressional Liaison¶ Pamela O'Leary, Interpreter¶ Brenda Bratton, Executive Assistant¶ Stacey S. Brown, Staff Assistant¶ Carla Nelson, Office Automation Clerk ( National Council on Disability Members and Staff June 13, 2005 http://disabledinaction.org/ncd\_print.html#railtransit1)bs

 Are trains consistently stopping at mini-high platforms? Everyone else has a covered area but, often, the mini-high platform is 30 to 40 yards down the station with no shelter and unshoveled snow in the winter. A friend once called them monuments to the idea of accessibility.

This issue of how to provide access on commuter rail — whether with fully accessible train platforms that provide level boarding to each railcar, mini-high platforms, or another option — has become an important policy issue. The ADA requires full platform access in new commuter rail stations unless not structurally or operationally feasible, most often due to oversized freight traffic on the same rail lines. However, even in such cases, other design options, such as a passing siding or gantlet track, are often possible to provide full platform access. Dennis Cannon of the U.S. Access Board explains these alternative designs:

### AT: Imrie 96

#### Plan solves and at worst it’s the best first step

**Imrie 96 –**  Professor in Human Geography, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London ( Rob, 1996 “ Inclusive design, disability and the built environment” http://www.etn-presco.net/workshop/presentations/R\_Imrie.pdf)bs

While the barriers to disabled people's inclusion in the built environment are many and varied there are possibilities for positive action to redress disablist and disabling design. Foremost, the mobility and access right's of disabled people have to become enshrined in statute to provide the possibilities for legal redress against individuals and/or institutions that persist in reproducing inaccessible environments. Inclusive design should also address the possibilities for overturning the barriers of the pre-existing built environment rather than just seeking to influence access in new developments. This will place some onus on more flexible, imaginative and responsive methods for refurbishing and readapting the existing built environment. In Sweden, for example, it is common practice for barrier-free design features to be incorporated into essential road repair and pavement work, while utility companies, such as gas and electricity providers, routinely provide dropped kerbs and tactile surfaces on completion of regular repair or service work.

**Imrie 96 –**  Professor in Human Geography, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London ( Rob, 1996 “ Inclusive design, disability and the built environment” http://www.etn-presco.net/workshop/presentations/R\_Imrie.pdf)bs

One factor is that the building and design professions have little recognition of bodily and/or physiological diversity and there is a tendency for architects and designers to design to specific standards and dimensions which revolve around a conception of what the normal body is like. For most designers this is based on classical conceptions of the fit and able body, the body as a machine, mechanical, fixed, taut, up-right, masculine, and pregiven to interaction. Indeed, most architects seem to conceive of architecture as an abstract, often twodimensional, visual art rather than conceiving of it as something which should be sensitised to what Moore and Bloomer (1977: ix) refer to as the complexity of 'the human body which is our most fundamental three dimensional possession'. Not surprisingly, then, most design is insensitive to the infinite range of bodily variations by producing 'standard-fit' design.

Most designers also conceive of disabled bodies as mobility or ambulant-impaired, with little perception of the wider range of physical and/or mental impairments which need to be catered for in producing inclusive design. Where designers do produce design for disabled people's needs it tends to be for wheelchair users. However, wheelchair users in the UK make up only 5% of registered disabled people yet the stereotype of disabled people as wheelchair-dependent remains problematically ingrained in the psyche of society. Inclusive design is also inhibited by the enduring attitude that disability is, first and foremost, an individual impairment and disease which can be treated and cured. In this sense, a person's inability to gain access to a building is seen as a function 2 of their impairment or physiological condition, rather than poor design. In turn, the onus is on the individual either to be cured or to adapt themselves to the circumstances. Such views tend to 'blame the victim' for their inability to get around the environment, rather than insensitive and poorly conceived design. The statutory and legal provisions underpinning the construction of barrier-free environments are also weak or non existent in most countries. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the building regulations are the main mechanism in requiring developers and designers to provide access to buildings for disabled people. However, the regulations are weak and ineffectual in requesting developers to make 'reasonable provisions' for disabled people and only in new public buildings and major renovations. Because no one really knows what a reasonable provision might be, developers can get away with providing more or less nothing. The regulations are also unhelpful because they stress that developers should build to a minimum standard of accessibility, rather than encouraging them to build to the highest possible standards. Planning controls over developers are also weak in the UK, with planners having limited powers to development or enforce inclusive design measures.

### AT Race Turns

#### Plan breaks down the dichotomy and spills over

**Imrie and Thomas 8 -**  a Department of Geography, King’s College London, London; b Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardif ( Rob and Huw August 2008 “ The interrelationships between environment and disability” ebsco)bs

In this respect, activists in the disability movement may need to enhance their understanding of the signiﬁcance of processes way beyond their immediate experiences, as part of a broader raising of awareness and politicisation of their activities. This includes, for example, the development of understanding of how environmental change and processes do not just impact in negative ways on some disabled people, but are also related to issues that affect others, in particular, around the racialisation and gendering of space (see Matrix 1984, Thomas 2000). Part of this task, of connecting together seemingly disparate and separate spheres of existence, of race, gender, and disability, relates to the work of environmental activists. There is a need to work more closely together with relevant organisations and groups, to explore the complexities of how to struggle for, and achieve, social justice in a broad sense as an integral component of environmental sustainability.

### Impact exts

#### The conception of health is a necessary precondition for conflict - violence is only possible when we seek to eliminate the deviant or unhealthy

**Campbell 92**  Professor of Political Geography at the University of Durham (David, Writing Security, 92-101)bs

Danger, argues Mary Douglas, is always present at the border. Danger might involve pressure on the external boundaries; it might involve the violation of internal boundaries; it might be located in the margins of the boundary; or danger might arise with contradictions from within.29 Were there no borders, there would be no danger — but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the containment of contingency, and the delineation of borders. In other words, given that difference is a requisite for identity, danger is inherent to that relationship: 'Where there is no differentiation there is no defilement.'30 As such, danger is not an external condition that can be either tempered or transcended; danger is a part of all our relationships with the world. And as Jean Delumeau concluded with respect to fear, danger can be experienced positively as well as negatively: it can be a creative force, 'a call to being, that provides access to the world.31 The issue, then, is how do we orient ourselves to danger, particularly at an historical juncture in which many novel dangers seem to abound? Can we do more than simply extend the old register of security to cover the new domains? What modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? Do we have an alternative to the continued reproduction of sovereign communities in an economy of violence? However one might begin to fathom the many issues located within those challenges, our current situation leaves us with one certainty: because we cannot escape the logic of differentiation we are often tempted by the logic of defilement. To say as much, however, is not to argue that we are imprisoned within a particular and permanent system of representations. To 'be sure, danger is more often than not represented as disease, dirt, or pollution. As one medical text argues: 'Disease is shock and danger for existence.'32 Or as Karl Jaspers maintains: 'Disease is a general concept of non-value which includes all possible negative values.'33 But such concerns have less to do with the intrinsic qualities of those conditions than the modernist requirements of order and stability: 'Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a positive effort to organize the environment.'34 One might suggest that it is the extent to which we want to organize the environment — the extent to which we want to purify our domain — that determines how likely it is that we represent danger in terms of dirt or disease. Tightly defined order and strictly enforced stability, undergirded by notions of purity, are not a priori conditions of existence; some order and some stability might be required for existence as we know it (i.e., in some form of extensive political community), but it is the degree of tightness, the measure of strictness, and the extent of the desire for purity which constitutes danger as dirt or disease. But the temptation of the logic of defilement as a means of orienting ourselves to danger has more often than not been overpowering, largely because it is founded upon a particular conceptualization of 'the body'; in its use since at least the eighteenth century, this conceptualization demands purity as a condition of health and thus makes the temptation to defilement a 'natural' characteristic. This has endowed us with a mode of representation in which health and cleanliness serves the logic of stability, and disorder is rendered as disease and dirt. In the eighteenth century — when state forms were becoming the most prevalent articulations of extensive political community — these modes of representation began to take a new turn which intensified the capacity of representations of disease to act as discourses of danger to the social.

In the case of France, around the time of the Revolution, a number of notions that would be fundamental to the medicalization of society materialized. Including the myth of a clergy-like national medical profession and the supposition that pacific republics would be totally free of disease, these notions altered the conception of medical and changed the functioning of the body politic metaphor. In this context, Foucault argues medicine shifted from simply being an ensemble of practices for curing ills, to a concern with the knowledge of the healthy, non-sick, and model man.35 In association with a more wide-spread intellectual shift from juridical discourses which promulgated natural rules to a concern with codes of normalization, this development meant that medicine reoriented its principal focus from that which is healthy to that which is normal. In this context, 'When one spoke of the life of groups and societies, of the life of the race, or even of the "psychological life," one did not think first of the internal structure of the organized being, but of the medical bipolarity of the normal and the pathological.'36 This development did not mean that representations of danger ceased to function in terms of disease, dirt, or some other form of defilement. Rather, it meant that just as 'the body' functioned as a trope for the social, 'disease' now functioned as a trope for the pathological in opposition to the normal. While the bipolarity of normal/pathological appears to derive its authority as a regulative ideal for society from its medical origins, this fact should not obscure the contested and problematic nature of such an understanding within the practice of medicine. Although the common effect of this bipolarity is to assume that 'normal' refers to natural or desired health marked by the complete absence of disease, there have been many debates within medicine concerned with the extent to which disease itself is something of a biological norm.37 That is, few if any people are marked by the complete absence of ailments or physical problems, and most surveys show that large numbers of people who live in a perfectly happy and satisfactory way possess physiological characteristics which depart markedly from statistical averages and would be a source of ill-health to some.38 As a result, a medical conclusion would be that; 'If the normal does not have the rigidity of a fact of collective constraint but rather the flexibility of a norm which is transformed in its relations to individual conditions, it is clear that the boundary between the normal and the pathological becomes imprecise.'39 Most importantly, the variability inherent in physiological norms, and their subsequent lack of universality, means that the imputation of a clear distinction between health and disease — which is the regulative desire of the bipolarity of normal/pathological in the political realm — is an understanding effected by a social and cultural logic. It is not something mandated by medical knowledge. In consequence, proclaims Canguilhem: `Pathological constants have a repulsive and strictly conservative value.4o The operation of the normal/pathological bipolarity as a politically regulative ideal can be observed in terms of the nineteenth and early twentieth-century concerns for degeneration and social hygiene.'" Although this was a period renowned for its faith in the idea of progress, it exhibited —in much the same way as the golden age of the Renaissance gave rise to a plethora of anxieties42 — a widespread feeling of uneasiness in which a preoccupation with degeneration (in many ways no more than an update on the earlier cultural obsession with the decomposition of the body) served as `the institutionalization of fear.'43 For example, in his study of the medicalization of cultural crises in France from the mid nineteenth century to the end of World War I, Robert Nye argues that the general sense of degeneration and national decline which permeated that country was located in individual conditions understood as pathologies (e.g. alcoholism, madness, and criminality), such that domestic health and national security were part of the same frame of analysis.44 What emerged, however, was not a program for national health, but a philosophy of 'social defense' in which there was a very low tolerance for deviance. Manifested in the 'political dentistry' of nineteenth-century European comic art — where bad teeth represented political dangers, and which is a testament to 'the broad acceptance of the inevitability of violent and/or painful 'surgical' intervention as a means of preserving or restoring the health of the body politic'45 — this philosophy was spurred on in France, Nye argues, by a high level of public concern about the nation's ability to respond effectively to German diplomatic and military assertiveness. One of its consequences was to effect another episode of grande peur on the part of the French bourgeoisie, who by the turn of the century came to be preoccupied with the violent street crimes of groups known as 'the apaches.'46 The wider community was equally transfixed. One analyst of the almanacs which served as major sources of information for those outside of French cities noted that they were concerned with, [a]bove all, fear, fear, fear: of brigands, thieves, rape, fire, hail, floods, rabies, epidemics, violence of all sorts.'47 What is especially noteworthy about this period is the way in which the concern for degeneration came to be preoccupied, not just with the pathologies of health/illness, but also with pathologies of deviance, particularly pathologies of sexual deviance, such as homosexuality. For example, Austrian always psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing — who was the author of the mammoth Psychopathia Sexualis (1886) — warned that 'episodes of moral decay always coincide with the progression of effeminacy, lewdness and luxuriance of the nations.'48 A popular manifestation of this attitude was to be found in Germany in the first decade of the twentieth century, where there was a national scandal concerning homosexuals in the top echelons of government. Indeed, 'The links between decadence, homosexuality, and effeminacy were so strong that political cartoons of the period regularly connected them, delighting especially in the irony of homosexuals dressed in military garb.'49 Equally, the fin-de-siecle controversy surrounding prostitution in Victorian England exhibited a similar concern for social purity and hygiene.' What these and other examples demonstrate about the pathologies of health/illness and normality/deviance is that although problems may be formulated in medical terms, they are largely animated by moral concerconcerns.51 It is not to deny the reality of illness; on the contrary, it is to reaffirm the seriousness of disease for the health of patients by distinguishing the social functions of medical discourse from the physiological effects of the disease.52 Representing perceived moral concerns and social dangers in medical terms has a number of consequences. Informed by a 'received view' of medical practice, it casts the danger as an aberration which deviates from the norm of health and threatens the integrity of the body or its habitual functions; it establishes a power relationship in which the authority making the diagnosis occupies the position of a doctor vis-a-vis their patient, thereby reproducing the notion that the health (or security) of the larger population is dependent upon the specialized knowledge of an elite; it renders complex problems simplistically as the symptoms of an alien infection which is external in origin; and it mandates (often violent) intervention as the appropriate course of action which will result in a cure.One salient example that illustrates many of these dimensions was the statement, common in the 1980s, that popular opposition to nuclear weapons in countries such as Denmark, Japan, and New Zealand was symptomatic of a 'nuclear allergy**:53** This metaphor suggested that a worldwide nuclear warfare infrastructure was normal and desirable; that popular discontent was the result of a viral-like irritation in the polity, most likely carried and spread by outsiders; and that the national security managers occupied positions akin to doctors, enabling them to effectively diagnose and deal with the infection. The effects of what we might call socio-medical discourse infiltrate the realms of both clinical medicine and political practice. Haraway and others have noted the salience of military metaphors within immunology.5 Equally, the panoply of military metaphors that permeates the medical discourse on cancer — references to attack and counterattack, invasion and defense, cells that colonize, patients that are bombarded, or bodies that are subverted — has manifest consequences for understanding and treating that disease.55 By constituting the disease as the 'barbarian within,' and by producing a discourse which is taken in some contexts to impute guilt, prescribe punishments, and incite violence, the figurative nature of medical discourse has consequences for clinical practice.56 This should not come as much of a surprise: there is no reason why medical discourse should be immune (so to speak) from the tropical nature of language. Indeed, given the encounters with the unknown in the discoveries of scientific and medical research — encounters that can only be made available for under- standing through metaphor — scientific discourse may be particularly prone to tropical discourse.57 But there is an important implication to be drawn from the symmetry of medical and military discourses. As Canguilhem's argument made clear, the regulative ideal of normal/ pathological was not derived from or grounded in the knowledge of medicine; on the contrary, the scientific caste of this regulative ideal is a consequence of its social efficacy. Equally, the symmetry of medical and military discourse is not a situation brought about by the inherent truth value of one or other of these domains. To be sure, our culture regards few arenas as more 'real' than the practice of medicine or the conduct of war, yet neither can escape the tropical character of representation. The authority of each thus stems from a mutual referentiality in which the representations of one authorize the other: the imputed realism of military discourse brings meaning to medical practice just as the assumed facticity of medicine legitimates certain forces in the social and political field. Indeed, it is the overtly tropical nature of medical discourse which enables it to be so effectively marshalled against those who constitute a danger. Consider Ronald Reagan's declaration — in response to the 1985 hijacking of a TWA aircraft in Beirut, when he was considering the option of military retaliation — that 'When terrorism strikes, civilization itself is under attack. No nation is immune . . . If we permit it to succeed anywhere it will spread like a cancer, eating away at civilized societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere.'58 In such discourse, there are no gray areas, no complexities, no historicized understandings, no doubts about the self, and no qualms about the nature of the response.

### Social inclusion exts

#### Transportation is the root cause of social exclusion / plan solves

Imrie 2000 - Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London( Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf)bs

The inequities of mobility and movement are connected to sociocultural values and practices which prioritise mobile bodies or those characterised by societally defined norms of health, fitness, and independence of bodily movements. Such bodies are, as Ellis (2000, page 5) notes, ``naturalised as a biological given'' and projected as ``the legitimate basis of order in a humanist world''. Illustrative of this are the plethora of metaphors of mobility and movement which are infused with conceptions of bodily completeness and independence, of the (normal) body far removed from those with physical and mental impairments. Such representations counterpoise the mobile body to reinforce what Oliver (1990) refers to as a ``legacy of negativism'', or values which mark out disabled people as ``problems because they are seen to deviate from the dominant culture's view of what is desirable, normal, socially acceptable, and safe'' (Corker, 1999, page 20; in addition, see Abberley, 1987; Paterson and Hughes, 1999).

In this paper, I argue that assumptions of unrestricted movement and mobility in contemporary Western societies are hegemonic in prioritising specific bodies and modes of mobility and movement. (2) In particular, mobility and movement are defined through discourses which serve to alienate impaired bodies and to prioritise the movement of what one might term `the mobile body'. In exploring such ideas, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part is a discussion of the hegemonic discourses of the body in relation to mobility and movement. This is followed by an empirical exploration, through self-testimonies, of disabled people's experiences of movement and mobility. I conclude by exploring some of the practical and political possibilities for challenging the hegemonic discourses of the body, mobility, and movement.

#### The aff modifies space which is the root cause of exclusion

**Kitchin 10**, Director of the National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA is an interdisciplinary and inter-institutional research institute focusing on issues of planning and development, creating knowledge societies, and building sustainable communities) served on a number of government boards and consultative panels, doctorate from the University of Wales, Lecturer in the School of Geosciences at Queen's University of Belfastand the Department of Geography at the National University of Ireland, (Rob, 7/1/10, “ Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09687599826678>)

Imrie (1996) suggests that current urban planning is underscribed by a `design apartheid’ whereby planners, architects and building control of®cers are guilty of constructing spaces which `lock’ disabled people out; which prioritise the dominant values of the `able-bodied’ community. Here, the dominant underlying ethos is one that follows the State’s line of integration or assimilation to bring people back to `normality’ . As such, policy is aimed at trying to make disabled people more `normal’ rather than changing the system to accommodate disabled people for who they are. Furthermore, while the rhetoric alludes to independent living, the reality is a dependency upon community and welfare provision. Some spaces are designed to deliberately segregate and `protect’ the public from disabled people and vice versa (e.g. special schools, asylums). Philo (1987, 1989) provides a detailed historical account of how space has been explicitly organised to separate people with mental impairments or people who are mentally ill from the rest of society. By shifting through back issues and analysing the articles and editorials contained within the Asylum Journal, a quasi-academic journal concerning mental health institutions and practice, he provides a detailed geo-historical account of asylums in nineteenth century Britain. Thinking at this time was dominated by a medico-moral discourse that promoted segregated institutions sited in tranquil, healthy and rural environments. These sites not only segregated `patients’ but were thought to offer suitable environments for treatment and recovery. The segregation of mentally impaired people continues today, usually accompanied by treatment aimed at making `patients’ more `normal’ , or sedation or sterilisation to protect `sane’ people and themselves from self-harm. People with physical and sensory impairment have also been encouraged and forced to live in different spatial spheres. Segregated schools are still common place for deaf, blind, physically and hidden impaired children, and segregated employment training and day-care units are not uncommon. Even within public spaces, disabled people are separated and marginalised to the peripheries. For example, where there are disabled accessible public toilets (and these are still uncommon) they are mostly separate from able-bodied toilets, asexual (both sexes share the same space), and usually locked, whereas the able-bodied can visit the toilet at any time, disabled people often have to search for the key (sometimes held in an inaccessible part of the building!). Theatres generally restrict wheelchair users to certain areas within the auditorium, usually towards the back or the side. Imrie (1996) argues that segregation, whilst promoted as ways to help assimilate disabled people in society through empowerment and independence, perpetuates disablism by labelling disabled people as different, as needing specialised and segregated facilities. Segregation thus propagates and reproduces the position and status of disabled people. As such, popular misconceptions concerning disabled people are reproduced.

### **Disability = Enviroment**

#### Disabilities are a result of the environment

**Imrie and Thomas 8 -**  a Department of Geography, King’s College London, London; b Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardif ( Rob and Huw August 2008 “ The interrelationships between environment and disability” ebsco)bs

In this context, both movements involve profound re-thinking of what it is to be a person – corporeally and in a broader social and ecological context. In both cases, the attack is on the disembodied Cartesian ego, so central to Enlightenment rationality: an ego that is (a) totally distinct from the rest of the cosmos; (b) “housed” in a body, but not part of it (therefore “ﬁddling” with the body has no implications for the self); and (c) socially isolated – i.e. has an identity that is not socially constituted. Rather, disability and environmental activists are conjoined by a commitment to exploration and understanding of the self through the co-construction of nature and culture. Thus, the disabled body is the product not just of impairment, or defective nature, but also of complex interactions between organic and socio-environmental and cultural relations.

### **Ableism = societal entrenchment exts**

#### Ableism transcends every aspect of society

**Cambell 7** - Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka ( Fiona “Exploring internalized ableism using critical race theory” Ebsco)bs

Despite the remarkableness of Cox’s proposition no further exploration was made by Delgado to explore intersections between the experiences of racism and ableism. As a conceptual tool ableism transcends levels of governance related to the procedures, structure, institutions and values of civil society and locates itself clearly in the arena of genealogies of knowledge. Ableism is deeply and subliminally embedded within the culture. At the outset it is important to refute an essentialized understanding of ableism. The intention here is not to propose ableism as another explanatory ‘grand narrative’, a universalized and systematized conception of disability oppression. Rather, my approach indicates a convergence of networks that produce exclusionary matrices and ontologies. Focusing on the study of ableism instead of disability/disablement may produce different research questions and sites of study. Whilst the players in the government of disability may change, other formations, such as the use of regimes of law and medicine, remain constant. Campbell (2001, 44) maintained that ableism is:

#### Disableism is contextualized against those who can abide by societal norms

**Cambell 7** - Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka ( Fiona “Exploring internalized ableism using critical race theory” Ebsco)bs

The corporeal standard has an illusory self-evident permanence but is always in a state of flux. Commenting on a recent dictionary definition of ableism as a kind of discrimination in favour of able-bodied people, Simi Linton (1998, 9) added that this definition also ‘includes the idea that a person’s abilities or characteristics are determined by disability or that people with disabilities as a group are inferior to non-disabled people’. Linton, however, pointed out that, unlike discourses of racism and sexism, there is little consensus amongst the general public (and scholars) as to what practices and behaviours constitute ableism. The nuances of ableism close off certain aspects of the imagination. As Judith Butler put it:  *The operation of foreclosure is tacitly referenced in those instances in which we ask: what must remain unspeakable for the contemporary regimes of discourse to continue to exercise power? (Butler 1997a, 139)*

#### Ableism is pushed to the peripheral and ignored

**Cambell 7** - Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka ( Fiona “Exploring internalized ableism using critical race theory” Ebsco)bs

The processes of ableism see the corporeal imagination in terms of compulsory ableness, i.e. certain forms of ‘perfected’ materiality are posited as preferable. A chief feature of an ableist viewpoint is a belief that impairment (irrespective of ‘type’) is inherently negative which should, if the opportunity presents itself, be ameliorated, cured or indeed eliminated. What remain unspeakable are readings of the disabled body presenting life with impairment as an animating, affirmative modality of subjectivity. Instead of ontological embrace, the processes of ableism, like those of racism, induce an internalization which devalues disablement. Unspeakable silences exist regarding the study of certain aspects of race. Pyke and Dang (2003) noted that there is an intellectual taboo/fear surrounding the study of internalized racism – attention to internalized racism may undermine the political potency of the African-American rights movement and eclipse liberalism’s black ‘success’ stories. What then about the hidden stories of the ‘can do’ generation of successful professionals with disability? One might be led to believe that the pathologization of the disability ‘problem’ has, in contrast to matters of race, meant an acceptance and awareness of internalized ableism.

### Medical Model bad exts

#### Medical model of disability enforces the dichotomy between the abled and disabled – real bad

**Ndi 2012 -**  University Of Bamenda, Republic Of Cameroon ( Alfred 2012 Setting The Stage Of 'Ab/Normality' In Rehabilitative Narratives: Rethinking Medicalization Of The Disabled African Body http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3195/3066)bs

The medicalization approach to rehabilitation of 'disabled persons' 1 was a professionalized legacy of the post-industrial revolutionary epoch, based on a pathological set of procedures that defined disability as a 'diseased state', an 'abnormality' that needed to be treated/cured after the diagnosis of symptoms and syndromes of the physical body had been effected. 'Disability' in this sense denoted any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being. To be 'handicapped' meant having a disadvantage possessed by a given individual, resulting from an impairment or disability, that limited fulfilment of a role that was normal (depending on age, sex and social and cultural factors) (WHO, 1980: 29). It was presumed that there was an objective condition to which the concept of normality of the body was to be referred, and the role of the rehabilitation professional was to make changes on the body of the disabled person in order to bring it as closely as possible to the condition of normality. The aim of the medicalization approach was to 'cure' the physical state of the disabled person so that it became 'normal' again and the dis/abled person could re-integrate themselves into what was seen as 'normal' society. The ideological implication of this approach was that disabled persons were biologically and psychologically inferior, were different from members of ordinary society, were not fully 'human' in their nature in comparison to able-bodied persons and did not have the ability to make decisions for themselves. The further interpretation from this was that disability was a personal tragedy of the individual, seen as someone, who could have committed an act that was abnormal. The process of 'curing' an illness involved identifying the cause of the illness clinically and 'controlling' it in order to change the condition of the patient in conventional society. Therefore, the 'normal' society had to invest a lot of resources in sectors like public health care in order to 'cure' disabilities medically, and improve functionality. This task was to be carried out by professionals in the medical field.

#### The medical model stigmatizes and dehumanizes PWD through forced normalization

**Pineda 8**, Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” <http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment>)

The Medical Abnormality Model The medical abnormality model views disability as a medical defect, an individualistic and physiological, biological, or genetic inferiority that is in no way connected to space. Medicine and technology carry modernist ideas of optimal functionality. In thismodel, it is necessary to normalize an individual’s functions for optimal growth, health, labor and efficiency. Physical or genetic abnormalities are seen as dangerous to the growth and stability of a society and must be eradicated. People who deviate from the norm are seen as ill and in need of fixing. This dynamic is exacerbated by the doctor-patient relation-ship, which suffers from asymmetric power relations where functional-limitations and imperfect lives are solvable challenges for experts. If knowledge can defeat ignorance, then medicine can defeat disease. In such a model there is no cure, only normalization. Citizenship rights, duties and privileges are denied— at times, disabled persons are even denied human recognition and status. In the fields of philosophy, theology, and bioethics for example, the definition of “person” may exclude adults with mental and developmental disabilities who are incapable of certain kinds of thought. Infirmity and disease are seen as linking physical, mental and moral weakness, leaving ‘abnormal’ individuals to be feared and spurned, marked as less than human. People with disabilities are discouraged to occupy or embrace their impairments. It is ultimately the responsibility of the individual to fit into oppressive, exclusionary, discriminatory, and otherwise unaccommodating spaces of stigmatization and marginalization

## T

### Increase = Preexisting

#### We Meet – we increase the current transportation infrastructure that is exclusionary

#### We are existing infrastructure investment

EEA 12 - European Environmental Agency ("Transportation Infrastructure Investments" European Environment Agency, February 17, 2012 <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/infrastructure-investments>)bs

Investment expenditure on infrastructure covers expenditure on new construction and extension of existing infrastructure, including reconstruction, renewal and major repairs of infrastructure.

#### CI – increase doesn’t have to be preexisting

**Reinhardt, 05** – U.S. Judge for the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Stephen, JASON RAY REYNOLDS; MATTHEW RAUSCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees., lexis)

Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased [\*\*23] before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, under [\*1091] the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor--such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record 8 --regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct.

 “Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("The cost or price of an article, service, etc."). Nothing in the definition of these words implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.

#### Reasons to prefer

#### a.) aff ground – best affs are not being done in the status quo – key to future education decision making skills and fairness

#### b.) Topic education – best lit comes from new policies incentives indepth case specific strategies – the just draw a bright line to exlude us

#### reasonability – good is good enough – any other interperation allows the neg to move the goal post to always exclude the aff means no case specific debate

#### at worst reject the extra t parts on the plan and we still solve

### 2AC/ 1AR - Rail is T

#### **Rail projects fall under transportation infrastructure**

Fdgc 8 – federal geographic data committee ( Part 7b: Transportation - Rail http://www.fgdc.gov/standards/projects/FGDC-standards-projects/framework-data-standard/GI\_FrameworkDataStandard\_Part7b\_Transportation\_Rail.pdf)bs

The transportation infrastructure is the physical component of the entire transportation system. Thus, the Transportation theme includes many modes, or subthemes. Geospatial data depicting airport facilities, rail, road, transit, and inland waterway systems represent the transportation infrastructure that make up this part of the Framework Data Content Standard. Each subtheme has developed a part that accommodates the uniqueness of that mode. The Rail part is a companion document to the Transportation Base and deals only with railways.

### 2AC/ 1AR Dbils are T

#### Transportation infrastructure includes investment in accommodations that increase accessibility for the disabled

CS 2002 - Cambridge Systematics (Community and Social Benefits of Transportation Investment, NCHRP Project 8-36, Task 22 Demonstrating Positive Benefits of Transportation Investment, <http://www.transportation.org/sites/planning/docs/nchrp22_3.pdf> January 2002)bs

Investments in our nation’s transportation infrastructure can yield important community and social benefits. They can increase mobility and access, provide a greater choice of travel modes, improve safety, enhance the visual appearance of our communities, cities, and natu- ral landscape**s**, and increase community cohesion. In short, transportation investments can improve the quality of life. While social benefits are more difficult to quantify than eco- nomic and environmental benefits, they are nonetheless every bit as important. Making a neighborhood, city, or region more livable can spur economic development by making it more attractive for businesses and residents to relocate there.

#### The Aff is a transportation infrastructure investment

Carpenter et al, No Date Given (Matt, Senior Planner with the Sacramento Area Council of Governments, “Senior and Disabled Mobility Study”, Sacramento Area Council of Governments)

With participation from concerned residents, **a** walkability **audit was completed to document infrastructure needs and suggest improvements** to the pedestrian environment **for all users, especially** seniors and **persons with disabilities, including looking at street widths, crossing times, pedestrian signals and curb cuts.** From the audit, proposals for a walking group and a defined community walking route emerged, and ideas for infrastructure improvements and other projects to promote walking and community were presented to neighborhood representatives.

#### The accommodations that our Aff invests in are “transportation infrastructure”

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2000 (, “Improving Transport for People with Mobility Handicaps”, European Conference of Ministers of Transport)bs

Over the last ten years or so there has been considerable progress in making transport more accessible for people with mobility handicaps. Low-floor wheelchair accessible buses are coming into service in ever increasing numbers; new light rail systems are now built to be fully accessible and many existing metro and heavy rail systems are gradually being refurbished and made more accessible. Air and maritime transport now provide much improved access for mobility handicapped passengers. **Transport infrastructure** has also improved, and **for example** much more use is now made of **tactile warning and guidance surfaces; ramps and lifts** are provided where formerly there were only steps. New technology is also playing an important role in **making travel easier for many disabled people**, particularly in providing better, more immediate and useable information both before and during journeys.

### 2AC/ 1AR - Related to transportation is T

#### Transportation infrastructure means facilities related to all modes of transportation

**Maine Revised Statutes, 12** (Title 23: HIGHWAYS Part 1: STATE HIGHWAY LAW Chapter 3: OFFICIALS AND THEIR DUTIES Subchapter 1: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 2/1,

<http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/23/title23sec52.html>

52. General powers and duties

The Department of Transportation, referred to in this chapter as "the department," may from time to time make and shall enforce rules and regulations relating to the planning, design, engineering, construction, improvement, maintenance and use of transportation infrastructure. The department may from time to time make and shall enforce rules relating to the manner of conducting all investigations and hearings and the administration of its office, powers and duties. The department shall direct the expenditure of all money for the planning, design, engineering, construction, improvement, demolition, maintenance and use of all transportation infrastructure for which state funds are provided by law. The department may conduct traffic survey interviews and other statistical studies on the state highway system as considered necessary for the use in planning and development of the statewide highway system. The department may obtain leases for such land and office space as the department considers necessary for the performance of its duties. As used in this section, "transportation infrastructure" means infrastructure related to all modes of transportation, including highways, bridges, railroads, ferries, mass transit, airports and bicycle and pedestrian facilities, as well as all buildings, utilities, facilities and other appurtenances related to such modes. [2007, c. 306, §1 (AMD).]

### 2AC / 1AR - Investment = maintenance

#### Infrastructure investment includes renewals and repairs

EEA 12 - European Environmental Agency ("Transportation Infrastructure Investments" European Environment Agency, February 17, 2012 <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/infrastructure-investments>)bs

Investment expenditure on infrastructure covers expenditure on new construction and extension of existing infrastructure, including reconstruction, renewal and major repairs of infrastructure.

## Kritiks

### 2AC- Cap

#### Role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing the role of disability in society

#### Practical analysis of government policy is a prerequisite to positive change

**McClean 01** (David, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Case is a disad – Berube says inclusion is only possible if we center our discussions around disability – means the alt perpetuates exclusion

#### Pure capitalist focus fails to address the multiple axes of ableism

**Kitchin 10**, Director of the National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA is an interdisciplinary and inter-institutional research institute focusing on issues of planning and development, creating knowledge societies, and building sustainable communities) served on a number of government boards and consultative panels, doctorate from the University of Wales, Lecturer in the School of Geosciences at Queen's University of Belfastand the Department of Geography at the National University of Ireland, (Rob, 7/1/10, “ Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09687599826678>)

It is increasingly clear that the relationships between disability and society cannot be framed within either strict economic and political terms or purely socio-cultural processes, but must encompass a mixture of the two. In a mixed approach, disabled people are excluded not only because of capitalist mode of production, but also because of socially constructed modes of thought and expression enshrined in cultural representations and cultural myths. The neo-Marxist might claim that such representations and myths are a particular manifestation or expression of capital. Such claims can be rejected: all behaviour and action are not predicated upon capital concerns. For example, exclusionary processes within Northern Ireland between Nationalist and Unionists are predominantly predicated upon territory and power, not capital. Whilst it could be argued that the sociospatial nexus in Northern Ireland was a result of feudal capital relations, the current con¯ ict has shifted in emphasis. Class, whilst important, is only one axis of oppression within society with disability, gender, race, sexuality, religious beliefs and nationality providing the context in which other power relations operate: there are multiple, interacting ®elds of power (Pile, 1997). Processes of oppression can arise out of the social mobilisation of groups of individuals with con¯ icting interests. The focus of attention should therefore shift from capital and class to power in its various manifestations.

#### Perm – endorse the aff and \_\_\_\_\_ - incorporating the aff’s political strategy is key to the success of the alt

**Russell\* and Malhotra\*\* 2 - \*** writes on the political, social and economic aspects of disablement her socio-economic analysis has been published in the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, the Review of Radical Political Economy, the Journal of Disability Policy Studies, Disability & Society, Monthly Review, Disability Studies Quarterly, Left Business Observer, Real World Micro, 9th edition, Socialist Register 2002, and the Backlash Against the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reinterpreting Disability Rights (Corporealities, Discourses of Disability) University of Michigan Press, 2003.\*\* is a Canadian disability rights activist and a member of the New Democratic Party. He will be commencing graduate legal studies at Harvard Law School. ( Marta and Ravi 2002 “ CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY “ <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGIQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsocialistregister.com%2Findex.php%2Fsrv%2Farticle%2Fview%2F5784%2F2680&ei=jhgBUKG6LISgrAHTmr2xDA&usg=AFQjCNEDtkX47uj4Imi2fVc7F2paQx8Dsw&sig2=VXxaIg9tUlRjG_f8_yOi0g)bs>

While new social movements fighting against racism, patriarchy and homophobia were gaining prominence in many Western countries in the 1960s,45 movements of disabled people, with more or less coherent programmes and ideologies, also slowly emerged. Unlike other social movements, the various disability rights movements46 to date have received relatively little attention from socialists, union activists or academics, even in the USA, which arguably has one of the strongest and oldest disability rights movements.47 Yet an examination of their various trajectories suggests useful insights that those seeking to challenge capitalism in other struggles can learn from and incorporate in them. To the extent that widespread accommodation to the needs of disabled workers would necessarily transform the workplace and challenge expectations of ever increasing productivity rates, the disability rights movement can be seen as radically democratic and counter-hegemonic in potential and scope.

#### Case is a prerequisite to the K – ableism makes classism and other oppression inevitable

**Siebers 10** - (Disability Aesthetics” Tom Siebers 2010)bs

Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority

#### Plan breaks down the system

Mitchell AND. Snyder, ’10 -PhD Michigan and executive director of the Institute on Disabilities, AND Assistant Professor of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois, Chicago (David T. and Sharon L “Disability as Multitude Re-working Non-Productive Labor Power” Temple University and Independent Scholar, Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies 4.2 (2010), 179-194)

It may seem strange to cite disability movements in the context of a definition of multitude that is not based on identity. After all, disability seems to mark a horizon of contemporary identity-based politics based on variable bodily capacities, appearances, and experiences of stigma developed without common community institutions or practices of everyday life. For Negri, "the multitude is the power of the singularities that are brought together within cooperative constellations; and the common precedes production" ("Kairos," 215). This characterization better captures the productive multiplicity that characterizes movements of disabled people's goals at a micro and, ultimately, macro level.

First, disability does not constitute a shared social condition. Instead, disabled people recognize the intense differences that constitute their bodies (what Negri calls "resistant singularities") as their greatest commonality. The embrace of idiosyncrasy, functional diversity, and aesthetic impropriety across bodies has both an empirical and socially derived utility. This embrace is empirical in the sense that disability movements contest inadequate universalist categories of medicine and rehabilitation. According to Disability Studies, the imprecision of medical taxonomies of deviance simultaneously pathologizes and groups disparate experiences as shared when they may in fact be disparate in a phe-nomenological sense. The embrace is socially derived because the "unity" of disabled people fighting for their rights seeks a radical edge that is essential to revolutionary politics: The [multitude], the producers of the common formula from which they are—nonetheless—excluded, are the motor of the materialist teleology, because only the multitude of the poor can construct the world under the sign of the common, pressing forth relentlessly beyond the limit of the present. (Negri, 185)

As explained above, cross-cultural efforts by disability groups to seize the commons in the name of universal accessibility for all bodies contests the neo-liberal state's justification of privatization. Disability movements, as opponents to "accumulation by dispossession," play a critical role in the expose of neo-liberal practices that disenfranchise people from access to shared public space (Harvey, 43)-Beyond these two important applications of Disability Studies to critiques of postmodern capitalist containment strategies, disability may also be approached in a manner that, perhaps, no other political theory allows. Rather than focusing on more traditional Marxist objects of resistance—such as the "worker" or "the masses" or "class conflict"—Hardt and Negri expand the boundaries of effective political culture not only beyond identity (particularly that of nation), but also beyond the critical Marxist category of surplus labor power. Whereas surplus labor power denotes a concept of an ever available pool of laborers that assists in keeping wages down, job security tenuous, scab labor a prevalent threat against worker agency, and a misdirection of identification between the proletariat, potential proletariat, and the bourgeoisie, the category leaves entire populations outside of the definitions of resistance. Negri puts the question in this manner:

But can those who are excluded from work still be considered part of a living labor? Of course, since even the excluded are part of the common. And the poor person, who is more excluded than anyone, i.e. the singularity at the greatest risk at the edge of being—at the point where Power closes off the teleological striving towards the to-come—the poor, therefore, are the most common. For if it is only the common that produces production, those who are excluded but participate in the common are also the expression of living labor. ("Kairos," 225)

#### We control terminal uniqueness – persons with disabilities are excluded now but our movement breaks down barriers that the capitalist system has constructed there is nothing inherently evil about a ramp – it’s the social construction that surrounds it.

#### Representations of capitalism as hegemonically dominant preclude the realization of actual social change. Changing this view is a pre-requisite to the alt.

**Gibson-Graham 06** – J.K., pen name shared by feminist economic geographers Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson (“The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy”, pg 2-5)

The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) problematizes "capitalism" as an economic and social descriptor.4 Scrutinizing what might be seen as throwaway uses of the term - passing references, for example, to the capitalist system or to global capitalism - as well as systematic and deliberate attempts to represent capitalism as a central and organizing feature of modern social experience, the book selectively traces the discursive origins of a widespread understanding: that capitalism is the hegemonic, or even the only, present form of economy and that it will continue to be so in the proximate future. It follows from this prevalent though not ubiquitous view that noncapitalist economic sites, if they exist at all, must inhabit the social margins; and, as a corollary, that deliberate attempts to develop noncapitalist economic practices and institutions must take place in the social interstices, in the realm of experiment, or in a visionary space of revolutionary social replacement. Representations of capitalism are a potent constituent of the anticapitalist imagination, providing images of what is to be resisted and changed as well as intimations of the strategies, techniques, and possibilities of changing it. For this reason, depictions of "capitalist hegemony" deserve a particularly skeptical reading. For in the vicinity of these representations, the very idea of a noncapitalist economy takes the shape of an unlikelihood or even an impossibility. It becomes difficult to entertain a vision of the prevalence and vitality of noncapitalist economic forms, or of daily or partial replacements of capitalism by noncapitalist economic practices, or of capitalist retreats and reversals. In this sense, "capitalist hegemony" operates not only as a constituent of, but also as a brake upon, the anticapitalist imagination.5 What difference might it make to release that brake and allow an anticapitalist economic imaginary to develop unrestricted?6 If we were to dissolve the image that looms in the economic foreground, what shadowy economic forms might come forward? In these questions we can identify the broad outlines of our project: to discover or create a world of economic difference, and to populate that world with exotic creatures that become, upon inspection, quite local and familiar (not to mention familiar beings that are not what they seem). The discursive artifact we call "capitalist hegemony" is a complex effect of a wide variety of discursive and nondiscursive conditions.7 In this book we focus on the practices and preoccupations of discourse, tracing some of the different, even incompatible, representations of capitalism that can be collated within this fictive summary representati n. These depictions have their origins in the diverse traditions of Marxism, classical and contemporary political economy, academic social science, modern historiography, popular economic and social thought, western philosophy and metaphysics, indeed, in an endless array of texts, traditions and infrastructures of meaning. In the chapters that follow, only a few of these are examined for the ways in which they have sustained a vision of capitalism as the dominant form of economy, or have contributed to the possibility or durability of such a vision. But the point should emerge none the less clearly: the virtually unquestioned dominance of capitalism can be seen as a complex product of a variety of discursive commitments, including but not limited to organicist social conceptions, heroic historical narratives, evolutionary scenarios of social development, and essentialist, phallocentric, or binary patterns of thinking. It is through these discursive figurings and alignments that capitalism is constituted as large, powerful, persistent, active, expansive, progressive, dynamic, transformative; embracing, penetrating, disciplining, colonizing, constraining; systemic, self-reproducing, rational, lawful, self-rectifying; organized and organizing, centered and centering; originating, creative, protean; victorious and ascendant; selfidentical, self-expressive, full, definite, real, positive, and capable of conferring identity and meaning.8 The argument revisited: it is the way capitalism has been "thought" that has made it so difficult for people to imagine its supersession.9 It is therefore the ways in which capitalism is known that we wish to delegitimize and displace. The process is one of unearthing, of bringing to light images and habits of understanding that constitute "hegemonic capitalism" at the intersection of a set of representations. This we see as a first step toward theorizing capitalism without representing dominance as a natural and inevitable feature of its being. At the same time, we hope to foster conditions under which the economy might become less subject to definitional closure. If it were possible to inhabit a heterogeneous and open-ended economic space whose identity was not fixed or singular (the space potentially to be vacated by a capitalism that is necessarily and naturally hegemonic) then a vision of noncapitalist economic practices as existing and widespread might be able to be born; and in the context of such a vision, a new anticapitalist politics might emerge, a noncapitalist politics of class (whatever that may mean) might take root and flourish. A long shot perhaps but one worth pursuing.

### -- Particularism

#### Particularism is good

**Laclau** **6 -** is an Argentine political theorist graduating from the Universidad Nacional de Buenos received a PhD from Essex University ( Ernesto Why Constructing a People Is the Main Task of Radical Politics [http://cmsorg.wikispaces.com/file/view/ELaclauConstructingPeople.pdf)bs](http://cmsorg.wikispaces.com/file/view/ELaclauConstructingPeople.pdf%29bs)

Zizek’s two objections have utterly missed the point. Let us start with the ﬁrst. Although Zizek refers to the tension request/claim around which our notion of demand is explicitly constructed, he is entirely unaware of its theoretical consequences. In our view, any demand starts as a request; institutions of local power, for instance, are asked to meet the grievances of people in a particular area—for example, housing. This is the only situation that Zizek envisages; those in power are asked to graciously acquiesce to the request of a group of people. From this perspective, the situation would be utterly uneven; granting the demand would be a concession from those in power. But to reduce the issue to that case is to ignore the second dimension of our analysis, the social process through which a request is transformed into a claim. How does this mutation take place? As I have argued,it happens through the operation of the equivalential logic. People whose demands concerning housing are frustrated see that other demands concerning transport, health, security, schooling, and so on are not met either. This triggers a process that I have described *in extenso* in my book. It boils down to the following: the frustration of an individual demand transforms the request into a claim as far as people see themselves as bearers of rights that are not recognized. These claims are, however, limited, for the referential entity to which they are addressed is perfectly identiﬁable—in our example of housing, the town hall. But if the equivalence between claims is extended—in our example: housing, transport, health, schooling, and so on—it becomes far more diﬃcult to determine which is the instance to which the claims are addressed. One has to discursively construct the enemy—the oligarchy, the establishment, big money, capitalism, globalization, and so on—and, for the same reason, the identity of the claimers is transformed in this process of universalization of both the aims and the enemy. The whole process of the Russian revolution started with three demands: “peace, bread, and land.” To whom were these demands addressed? The more the equivalence expanded, the more clear it became that it was not just to the tsarist regime. Once we move beyond a certain point, what were requests within institutions became claims addressed to institutions, and at some stage they became claims against the institutional order.When this process has overﬂown the institutional apparatuses beyond a certain limit, we start having the people of populism. We could ask ourselves, Why should social actions always be conceived as demands? The reason, as I have explained in On Populist Reason, is that the subject is always the subject of lack; it always emerges out of an asymmetry between the (impossible) fullness of the community and the particularism of a place of enunciation. That also explains why the names of fullness will always result from a radical investment of universal value in a certain particularity—again: the elevation of a particular object to the dignity of the Thing. But it is important to realize that this investment does not leave the particular object unchanged. It “universalizes” that object through its inscription within an infrastructure of equivalential relations. That is why this can never be a pure matter of reiﬁcation, as Zˇ izˇek argues. (Reiﬁcation involves, as we have said, an inversion by which particularity and universality exchange places without changing their identities, while the hegemonic relation presupposes contamination between the particular and the universal.) This situation, by which a certain particularity is nevermere particularity because it is always crisscrossed by equivalential relations that “universalize” its content, is enough to answer the second of Zˇ izˇek’s objections namely, that one-issue mobilizations, having particularistic aims, cannot constitute wider political identities. This is a complete illusion. The ostensive issue could be particular, but it is only the tip of the iceberg. Behind the individual issue, a much wider world of associations and aﬀects contaminate it and transform it into the expression of much more general trends. To take the one-issue character of mobilization at face value would be the same as reducing the analysis of a dream to its manifest content. The French and Dutch referenda are good examples. The issue was a punctual one but, as Zˇ izˇek himself shows, a whole world of frustrations, fears, and prejudices found its expression in the No. And everybody knows that what is at stake in the tax referenda in the U.S. are deep political displacements of communitarian common sense. The conclusion is that the latent meaning of a mobilization can never be read oﬀ its literal slogans and proclaimed aims; a political analysis worthy of its name only starts when one probes the overdetermination that sustains that literality.

### -- 1AR Foucault

#### Insert Tag here

**Tremain 5** has a PhD in Philosophy and teaches philosophy at Wilfrid Laurier University. ( Shelly, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory http://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472098764-intro.pdf)bs

 An understanding of bio-power’s capacity to objectivize people in this way illuminates Foucault’s remarks about the dual meanings of the term subject as they pertain to the circumstances surrounding disabled subjects. For Foucault, to be a subject is, in one sense, to be subject to someone else by control and dependence and, in another sense, to be tied to one’s own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both senses of the term imply a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault 1982). Because he refused to conceive relations of power in strictly juridical terms, furthermore, Foucault maintained that analyses of power should not aim to identify some overarching or distant font of subjecting power, but rather “should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects.” Hence, work on bio-power and the dual nature of the subject can help us to “discover how it is” that disabled subjects “are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, desires, thoughts, [and so on]” (Foucault 1980a, 97).

A Foucauldian analysis of disability would show that the juridical conception of disability that is assumed within the terms of the social model and most existing disability theory obscures the productive constraints of modern (bio-)power. A Foucauldian approach to disability would hold that the governmental practices into which the subject is inducted and divided from others produce the illusion that they have a prediscursive, or natural, antecedent (impairment), which in turn provides the justification for the multiplication and expansion of the regulatory effects of these practices. That the discursive object called “impairment” is claimed to be the embodiment of a natural deficit or lack, furthermore, conceals the fact that the constitutive power relations that define and circumscribe “impairment” have already put in place broad outlines of the forms in which that discursive object will be materialized (Tremain 2001). In short, an argument about disability that takes Foucault’s approach would be concerned to show that there is indeed a causal relation between impairment and disability, and it is precisely this: the category of impairment emerged and, in many respects, persists in order to legitimize the governmental practices that generated it in the ‹rst place.

#### The notion of a single power structure dictating all is a lie- structures exist outside of capitalism – the affirmative breaks down relevant barriers to exclusion in the squo

Pickett5 **[Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College *On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics* pp. 10-11]**

Axel Honneth, among others, points out that Foucault's conception of power is a reworking of Nietzsche's idea of the will to power.6 **Power**, in this view, is not a fixed property held by one class or group; it is the outcome of conflict between a number of actors. It is not stable; it is continually in flux and any truces must be considered temporary. Power is ubiquitous in the linguistic, bureaucratic, moral, and other structures in which agents act. For instance, although determined by power, the fundamental rules of morality are often seen as natural rather than contingent products of history: "It is true that it is society that defines, in terms of its own interests, what must be regarded as crime: it is not therefore natural. . . . [But] by assuming the form of a natural sequence, punishment does not appear as the arbitrary effect of human power." By revealing the origins and historical shifts of our basic moral and cultural distinctions, it is possible to show that what seems to be natural and self-evident is in fact contingent and arbitrary. What appears as nature is in fact the workings of power. Furthermore, the will to knowledge is the expression of power. There is a battle for truth; knowledge is the spoils of victory.9 Both Nietzsche and Foucault deny that there is a timeless, a historical truth. Instead, truth is a thing of this world, and as such, it is subject to the contingency, error, mendacity, and struggle that characterize this world. Hence, Nietzsche argues that every philosophy is an expression of the will to power of the philosopher who wrote it.10 Foucault argues that the human sciences operate on the basis of hierarchical relations, such as those between doctor and patient, or teacher and student, and that these sciences in turn have effects of power.11 For these reasons, power must not be considered as an essentially negative force, as something which is "poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous . . . incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself."12 Instead, power is capable of producing knowledge, rules of morality, and the basic distinctions and denotations of a language. For Nietzsche power is creative and concerned with the continual increase in force. For Foucault, modern power is the same: unlike power in the classical age, it is inventive and concerned with the increase in social forces. Nietzsche and Foucault's views of power culminate in the claim that power produces identity. Each agent is the creation and expression of power. Both are anti-naturalists; they deny that there is something "natural" at the bottom of who we are. There is no fixed human nature or subjectivity. Instead, power produces agency: it creates animals capable of, for example, promising and confessing. A central aspect of both philosophers' work is an attack on the philosophy of the subject, that is, on some concept of an ahistorical metaphysical agent that is the "doer" behind our thoughts and deeds. Instead of positing a subject which is the foundation of all knowledge and action, philosophy should undermine its attachment to this "subject without a history."13 We need to see the subject as simply the outcome of the correlation of forces, relations, and practices that constitute him.

### -- 1AR Gibson & Graham

#### Representing capitalism as a bounded, monistic entity precludes noncapital alternatives and furthers hegemonic, capitalocentric modes of thought

**Gibson-Graham 06** – J.K., pen name shared by feminist economic geographers Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson

(“The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy”, pg 43-45,)bs

What interests me most here is the question of why the economism of which capitalism is the bearer is so difficult to moderate or excise. And what may account for the economic monism or hegemonism that accompanies most representations of capitalist society and development? Here a partial answer may be found in the metaphysics of identity that Althusser sought to undermine. Operating under an "imperative of unity" (Hazel 1994: 4) western conceptions of identity entail both the unity of an object with itself (its self-resemblance) and its one-to one relation with the sign by which it is known: one word with one meaning, corresponding to one thing. To such an essentialist reading of identity "capitalism" designates an underlying commonality in the objects to which it refers. Thus we are not surprised to encounter a capitalism that is essentially the same in different times and places (despite the fact that sameness as the precondition of meaning is exactly what various structuralist and poststructuralist traditions have sought to undermine.) By virtue of their identification as capitalist settings, different societies become the sites of a resemblance or a replication. Complex processes of social development - commodification, industrialization, proletarianization, internationalization - become legible as the signatures of capitalism rather than as unique and decentered determinations. When capitalism exists as a sameness, noncapitalism can only be subordinated or rendered invisible (like traditional or domestic economic forms). Noncapitalism is to capitalism as woman to man: an insufficiency until and unless it is released from the binary metaphysics of identity (where A is a unified self-identical being that excludes what it is not).34 If capitalism/man can be understood as multiple and specific; if it is not a unity but a heterogeneity, not a sameness but a difference; if it is always becoming what it is not; if it incorporates difference within its decentered being; then noncapitalism/woman is released from its singular and subordinate status. There is no singularity of Form to constitute noncapitalism/woman as a simple negation or as the recessive ground against which the positive figure of capitalism/man is defined. To conceptualize capitalism/man as multiple and different is thus a condition of theorizing noncapitalism/woman as a set of specific, definite forms of being. It is easy to appreciate the strategic effectiveness of reading the texts of capitalism deconstructively, discovering the surplus and contradictory meanings of the term, the places where capitalism is inhabited and constituted by noncapitalism, where it escapes the logic of sameness and is unable to maintain its ostensible self-identity (see chapter 10). But overdetermination can be used as an additional anti-essentialist theoretical strategy to complement and supplement the strategy of deconstruction. Taken together these strategies have the potential to undermine capitalism's discursive "hegemony" and to reconceptualize its role in social determination. Representations of society and economy cannot themselves be centered on a decentered and formless entity that is itself always different from itself, and that obtains its shifting and contradictory identity from the always changing exteriors that overdetermine it. Just as postmodernism obtains its power from modernism (its power to undermine and destabilize, to oppose and contradict),35 so can an overdeterminist approach realize its power and strategic capacity by virtue of its oppositional relation to the preeminent modes of understanding both language categories and identity/being. To the extent that we conceptualize entities as autonomous, bounded, and discrete (constituted by the exclusion of their outsides), and as the unique referents that give each sign a stable and singular meaning, to that extent does the strategy of thinking overdetermination have the power to destabilize theoretical discourse and reposition the concepts within it.36 Through the lens of overdetermination, identities (like capitalism) can become visible as entirely constituted by their "external" conditions. With an overdeterminist strategy we may empty capitalism of its universal attributes and evacuate the essential and invariant logics that allow it to hegemonize the economic and social terrain. Overdetermination enables us to read the causality that is capitalism as coexisting with an infinity of other determinants, none of which can definitively be said to be less or more significant, while repositioning capitalism itself as an effect. That the capitalist economy often escapes reconceptualization and so continues to function as an organizing moment, and an origin of meaning and causation in social theory, cannot be understood as a simple theoretical omission. It is also a reassertion of the hegemonic conceptions of language and determination that overdetermination is uniquely positioned to contradict. It is a testimony to the power of overdetermination that it has allowed certain post-Althusserian theorists to envision an "economy" that is not singular, centered, ordered or selfconstituting, and that therefore is not capitalism's exclusive domain.37 But it testifies to the resilience of the dominant conceptual context (it should perhaps be called a mode of thought) in which the objects of thought exist independently of thought and of each other that an autonomous economy still exists and operates in social representation. One can say that representations of the capitalist economy as an independent entity informed by logics and exclusive of its exteriors have allowed capitalism to hegemonize both the economic and the social field. One can also say, however, that overdetermination is a discursive strategy that can potentially empty, fragment, decenter and open the economy, liberating discourses of economy and society from capitalism's embrace. But that process, far from being over or even well on its way, has hardly begun.

### 2AC Neoliberalism

**McRuer 9** - Professor of English and Deputy Chair of the Department of English at George Washington University ( Robert Cripping Queer Politics, or the Dangers of Neoliberalism http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-agenda/cripping-queer-politics-or-the-dangers-of-neoliberalism/)bs

The project of building crip/queer solidarity is not as “straightforward” as it might first seem, however. In particular, the current political and economic system, called neoliberalism by political theorists (see Lisa Duggan’s essay in this issue for a description of neoliberalism), sometimes offers a limited recognition to representative gay or disabled people. This recognition depends on an acceptance of dominant norms, but for the singular difference of being gay or of being disabled. So for example, Lisa Duggan has argued that some proponents of a narrow version of gay rights have built a “homonormativity,” that mirrors dominant norms—white, middle-class and family-oriented—but for the single difference of same-gendered partners in marital relationships. Similarly, disabled people who seek to mirror the dominant society but for the single difference of physical ability can create a politics that excludes queers and others whose identities set them apart from the dominant norms of white, middle-class family life. Such a politics of singular difference can shut down coalition across identities—such as the crip/queer solidarity I am arguing for here—and can also undermine organizing around issues (poverty, health care, the destruction of the environment, and so forth) not directly connected to identity.

Neoliberalism is the dominant economic and cultural system of our time. It is a system that positions the market as the answer to everything. Any problem is supposed to be best addressed—most effectively and efficiently—through the market. Neoliberalism positions the move of previously public functions into the private sphere of the market as an unequivocal good and unquestionable common sense. As a corollary, any barriers to the workings of that market (and barriers to the flow of capital) should be eliminated through various kinds of deregulation. Proponents of neoliberalism advocate deregulation even if that deregulation requires (or has required in practice) an increasing regulation on the movement of peoples. And neoliberalism, while promising unparalleled freedom and unstoppable growth, exacerbates all kinds of inequalities around the globe. Neoliberal ideology displays a special genius at making lopsided growth, wealth for a few, and immiseration for many more, seem sexy, progressive, and “modern.”

This positioning of neoliberalism as more progressive than conservative regulation, and as the wave of development and the future, means that activist projects can become vehicles for neoliberal policies rather than for social change that will actually challenge the distribution of wealth and power in contemporary societies. “Neoliberalism is,” as Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy write, “a predatory system:” it is predatory on the liberatory energies our movements have generated, the resistant identifications we shape, the resources we might access, and the radical openness to alternative futures that (appears to be a common desire) across progressive movements.[1]

LGBT and disability movements have not been immune to these dangers. Neoliberal cultural and economic forces have unevenly mainstreamed LGBT and disability movements. For example, activism on behalf of same-sex marriage often positions gay people as the perfect neoliberal subjects. Because neoliberalism depends on private solutions to all problems, “the family” takes on an increasingly important role as the provider of goods and services like caring labor for those who are young or elderly. Some gay marriage advocates have happily embraced the idea that gay people will take up these responsibilities for their newly formed families without asking anything more of the government than the right to marry. Such narrow campaigns for gay marriage do not support the right to develop a multitude of different kinds of relationships that might provide caring labor, nor do they support social responses, such as government-supported day care, to the question of who is to provide labor. In other words, when gay marriage is promoted in neoliberal terms, gay marriage activists are willing to accept and even promote privatized understandings of the need for care in exchange for mainstream “acceptance” of gay relationships. And as both LGBT and disability movements have, in different ways, accepted this type of mainstreaming and “gone to market,” as Alexandra Chasin has put it, they have narrowed their political vision and sacrificed commitments and solidarities that formerly defined them.[2] The desire to be different (to, for example, form caring relationships that do not follow the model of heterosexual marriage), is sacrificed to the hope for political acceptance and market solutions. As a result, solidarity with all those who persist in doing things differently is also undermined.

#### Plan first

**McRuer 9** - Professor of English and Deputy Chair of the Department of English at George Washington University ( Robert Cripping Queer Politics, or the Dangers of Neoliberalism http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-agenda/cripping-queer-politics-or-the-dangers-of-neoliberalism/)bs

 Disability, not queerness, was—in uneven, but discernible ways—neoliberalism’s magic sign in Nairobi. Disability provided a site for the extensive use of a language of “poverty” and “development” that is also the language of policies promulgated by neoliberal institutions like the World Bank. Arguably, if the World Bank did manage to get a place at the table at the 2007 WST, it did so because disability got it a ticket inside. The ways in which disability could be the site for both an activist movement and the extension of neoliberalism into a space that was specifically formed to provide an alternative—another world—should underscore what I asserted about the predatory system’s flexibility and contingency. To put a new spin on a well-known disability studies slogan—“all of us will become disabled if we live long enough”—all of us can become neoliberalism’s magic sign if we live long enough.

### 2AC - Fem

#### Role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing the role of disability in society

#### Case is a disad – Berube says inclusion is only possible if we center our discussions around disability – means the alt perpetuates exclusion

#### No link – the medical model of disability does not discriminate along gendered binaries it is universal and is always already engrained in the psyche – the plan breaks down

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the plan without gendered representations

Imrie 2000 - Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London( Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf)bs

Such discourses see disability as a social burden which is a private, not public, responsibility. The impairment is the focus of concern, and biological intervention and care are seen as the appropriate responses. The problem of immobility is seen as personal and specific to the impairment; that it is this that needs to be eradicated, rather than transformations in sociocultural attitudes and practices, if mobility is to be restored. In particular, political and policy assumptions about mobility and movement are premised on a universal, disembodied subject which is conceived of as neutered, that is without sex, gender, or any other attributed social or biological characteristic (see Hall, 1996; Imrie, 1994; Law, 1999; Whitelegg, 1997). The hegemony of what one might term the mobile body is decontextualised from the messy world of multiple and everchanging embodiments; where there is little or no recognition of bodily differences or capabilities. The mobile body, then, is conceived of in terms of independence of movement and bodily functions; a body without physical and mental impairments.

The hegemony of the mobile body is also reinforced by professional discourses which seek to measure, characterise, and understand disability through the movement and mobility of disabled people's body parts. Such conceptions see disabled people as neither sick nor well but in a liminal state which is characterised by a (potential) movement from one bodily state to another (also, see Ellis, 2000; Leder, 1990; Paterson and Hughes, 1999). The underlying objective is the disciplining of the deviant or impaired body through the restoration of movement in body parts to facilitate independence of mobility (and the restoration of the `whole person'). For Ellis (2000), such (welfare) discourses emphasise the importance of individuals attaining an `independent body', or a body which revolves around self management, personal responsibility, and the projection of desirable bodily characteristics. As Ellis (2000, page 17) suggests, it is a carnality which propagates the aestheticisation of the body while seeking to exclude those (impaired) bodies which are, so some claim, a source of anxiety in contemporary culture (see, for instance, Lupton, 1994)

### 2AC - Rationality

#### No link – planners plan for an inclusive society

#### Alt is worse – no way persons with disabilities get to the forum – also means alt doesn’t solve

#### Role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing the role of disability in society

#### Case is a disad – Berube says inclusion is only possible if we center our discussions around disability – means the alt perpetuates exclusion

#### **The aff is a link turn**

**Pineda 8**, Ph.d at UCLA, expert in disability policy, planning and regional development, taught courses on Policy Evaluation, Community Development, and International Disability Rights, advised international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations, as well as state and federal governments, in the development and implementation of programs and policies that include people with disabilities, joined the Dubai School of Government as a Visiting Fellow to study the implementation of the UAE Disability Act of 2006, worked as an associate with the U.S. Treasury, obtained degrees in Political Economy, Business Administration, and a Master’s in City and Regional Planning, awarded the Fulbright-Hays and Sheikh Qassemi Fellow at the Dubai School of Government, (Victor Santiago Pineda, “Enabling Justice: Spatializing Disability in the Built Environment” <http://berkeley.academia.edu/VictorSantiagoPineda/Papers/251651/Enabling_Justice_Spatializing_Disability_In_the_Built_Environment>)

The real victory of the independent living move-ment was in challenging and altering the distribution of space. According to Judith Heumann, a founder of the rst Center for Independent Living, these efforts were “a natural evolution of justice” (Heumann andStoddard 2002). So, any environment that fails to distribute space in a way that maximizes the distribu-tion of space for the least well off stakeholder is an unjust environment. The independent living move-ment can also be understood within a greater contextof social and political norms that act as disabling environmental barriers. Such a formulation would take into account both the physical and social factors that continuously and actively disable people.By using events surrounding the independentliving movement, I have argued that the distribution of space is an important aspect of realizing justice for disabled persons. Out of this notion a larger setof theories of justice can be criticized and a new and broader theory of justice can be formulated. If,however, disability is continuously held as a property of an individual independent of an environment, just theories of disability can never emerge. The phi-losophies of the independent living movement and their political struggles in appropriating space have uncovered new truths about space and the inequity of its distribution but have not achieved the full potential possible with a spatial lens. Justice and democracy itself is at risk if spatial exclusion persists. Let the lessons learned and the struggles fought inform us and help us shape an open and more perfect union not just for people with disabilities but for everyone

#### Only specific legislation can ensure the protection of the disabled

**NCD 3** (National Council on Disabilities 9/9/03 , http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/news/2003/r03-436.htm)bs

The National Council on Disability (NCD) today released its report, Foreign Policy and Disability: Legislative Strategies and Civil Rights Protections to Ensure Inclusion of People with Disabilities, concluding that the inclusion of people with disabilities in U.S. foreign policy will be achieved **only when specific legislation is enacted.**

The report examines legislative changes that will ensure the inclusion of people with disabilities in all foreign assistance programs under the direction of the U.S. Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development. It is a follow-up to NCD's 1996 Foreign Policy and Disability (<http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/foreign.html>) report that found continued barriers to access for people with disabilities in U.S. foreign assistance programs.

According to NCD chairperson Lex Frieden, "In 1996, NCD recommended a series of policy changes at the State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to ensure inclusion of people with disabilities in all foreign assistance programs, including the establishment of specific objectives for inclusion with a time-table for their fulfillment. Seven years later, NCD has concluded that inclusion of people with disabilities in U.S. foreign policy will only be achieved when specific legislation is enacted to achieve that purpose."

#### Our methodology is key to creating an inclusive information and transportation system

**Carmien et al ‘6**

[Stefan Carmien, Melissa Dawe, Gerhard Fischer, Andrew Gorman, Anja Kintsch, and James F. Sullivan, Jr. Cognitive Levers Project, Carmien is a senior researcher at the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Information Technology “Socio-Technical Environments Supporting People with Cognitive Disabilities Using Public Transportation,” <http://l3d.cs.colorado.edu/~gerhard/papers/tochi-social-issues-final.pdf>]

7. RESPONSIBLE SOCIO-TECHNICAL DESIGN AND HCI CHALLENGES

Even when transportation systems are designed to serve the 95th percentile of a population, they will be of no use to a large number of people within a large population [Norman 1988]. But more unfortunate, when transportation systems are built this way, they may not serve those who are most dependent on them such as the physically or cognitively disabled and the elderly. **Our methodology challenges conventional approaches by responsibly designing systems that support that 5–7% of the population who have the greatest difficulties in traveling**. Our hypothesis is that such systems will not only result in a more inclusive system, but will provide information architectures upon which to build systems that are more usable for mainstream travelers as well.

#### experts are not categorically bad in the context of disabilities – they are key

**Imrie and Thomas -**  a Department of Geography, King’s College London, London; b Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardif ( Rob and Huw August 2008 “ The interrelationships between environment and disability” ebsco)bs

A major front in the struggle of the disability movement continues to be challenging inappropriate control by experts, and pressing for recognition of the value of the experiential knowledge of disabled people. Yet, this vital struggle must be informed by a grasp of the importance and usefulness, in appropriate circumstances, of the specialised knowledge of the expert. The struggles of the disabled people’s movement have emphasised the practical signiﬁcance of the insight that knowledge is not disembodied and abstract, but is produced in concrete social relations. The tricky problem is not one of reconciling abstract bodies of technical and experiential knowledge but, rather, one of re-shaping the social relations within which these kinds of knowledge arise and make sense. It is a social struggle, not just an epistemological one.

#### ( ) Communicative rationality will fail and is more epistemological flawed – it ignores pragmatic realities. This is also a disad to their f/w

Flyvbjerg ‘2

(et al, Bent Flyvbjerg is founding chair of the Geography Program at Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning – In Philip Allmendinger and Mark Tewdwr-Jones, eds., Planning Futures: New Directions for

Planning Theory. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 44-62. Also available at: http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf)

For students of power, communication is more typically characterised by non-rational rhetoric and maintenance of interests than by freedom from domination and consensus-seeking. In rhetoric, ‘validity’ is established via the mode of communication--e.g., eloquence, hidden control, rationalisation, charisma, using dependency relations between participants--rather than through rational arguments concerning the matter at hand. Seen from this perspective Habermas (1987, 297-8) seems overly naive and idealistic when he contrasts ‘successful’ with ‘distorted’ utterance in human conversation, because success in rhetoric is associated precisely with distortion. Whether the communicative or the rhetorical position is ‘correct’ is not important here. What is decisive, rather, is that a non-idealistic point of departure for planning theory must take account of the fact that both positions are possible, and even simultaneously possible. In an empirical scientific context, something to which Habermas otherwise takes great pains to define himself, the question of communicative rationality versus rhetoric must therefore remain open. The question must be settled by concrete examination of the case at hand. The researcher must ask how communication takes place, and how politics, planning and democracy operate. Is communication characterised by consensus-seeking and absence of power? Or is communication the exercise of power and rhetoric? How do consensus-seeking and rhetoric, freedom from domination and exercise of power, eventually come together in individual acts of communication? The basic question being raised here is whether one can meaningfully distinguish rationality and power from each other in communication and whether rationality can be viewed in isolation from power, as does Habermas. To assume an answer to this question a priori is just as invalid as presuming that one can ultimately answer the biblical question of whether humans are basically good or basically evil. And to assume either position ex ante, to universalise it and build a theory upon it, as Habermas does, makes for problematic philosophy and speculative social science. This is one reason we have to be cautious when using the theory of communicative rationality to understand and act in relation to planning.

Plan resulted from consulting the public

NCD 5, National Council on Disability, independent federal agency charged with advising the President, Congress, and other federal agencies regarding policies, programs, practices, and procedures that affect people with disabilities, comprised of a team of fifteen Senate-confirmed Presidential [appointees](http://www.ncd.gov/council_and_staff/ncd_council_members) , an Executive Director appointed by the Chairman, and eleven, full-time [professional staff](http://www.ncd.gov/council_and_staff/ncd_staff). (“The Current State of Transportation for People with Disabilities in the United States”, June 13, 2005, <http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2005/06132005#section12>)

Great strides have been made in the accessibility of public transportation in this country since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, yet significant gaps remain for many sectors of the disability community, including people who live in rural areas, those who rely on paratransit to get to work or medical appointments, and those with visual impairments who rely on bus stop announcements. This report has reviewed how well a great variety of surface transportation systems serve people with disabilities. The assessment is based on anecdotal evidence from riders and advocates, the viewpoints of transit operators, and research conducted by experts in the field. The cumulative knowledge from these varied sources strongly suggests that ridership on fixed-route public transit and paratransit systems has increased dramatically in the past decade. Use of other systems such as rail, taxis, and privately funded transportation modes has also increased. Flexibility in bus service planning has resulted in the implementation of hybrid services that may provide more options for people with disabilities in rural and suburban communities. At the same time that progress has been made on many fronts, the underfunding of public transportation in general has directly limited the mobility of large sections of the disability community who are unable to use a car. This report has documented some of the regulatory changes that affect the mobility of the disability community, and the impact that disability involvement has had in achieving changes in the transportation environment. It also sets forth a variety of recommendations for service improvements and additional research that will lead to greater options for the 6 million Americans with disabilities who have difficulties obtaining the transportation they need. However, the problem will not be fully addressed without a fundamental shift in funding priorities to greatly improve public transportation as a whole

### 2AC - Universal disability

#### FW – the Role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing the role of disability in society

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the alternative – if it’s a floating pik they are a voter

**a.) steal the 1ac puts us 8 minutes behind and cant garner offense based on solvency means the aff would always lose**

**b.) not falsifiable – nothing in the 1ac took a stance on the social model of disability – yet they were able to pik out of it – means its either illegit because they could pik out of methodologies tangentially related to the aff or if they win a link the permutation would solve**

**c.) neg doesn’t get fiat – piks justify the worst atrocities against the aff – there is no counter –resolution they just have to prove the aff is a bad idea**

#### Ablism is a prism – its how we are socialized to understand difference it becomes a cognitive schema for organizing the world. Difference is organized around dichotomies like normal/abnormal and strong / weak which are normalized through hierarchies with the ‘able-bodied’ being the goal.

#### Heres the kicker - We have not contested the fact that disability is universal – I would agree that there are issues that I struggle with as I am sure there are issues you struggle with but society does not exclude you or I because of our ‘impairment’ because in their eyes we are ‘hygenic’ – the inability to distinguish us in a crowd allows us to be complacent with the system but people who do not look like you or I are stereotyped – they are outcasted from society because they cannot be productive and they make the community uglier. The affirmative remedies this because the REASON exclusion occurs is because there is dichotomy created by transportation infrastructure

#### absent of a hypothetical change in infrastructure changing transportation infrastrure –the idea itself is a reason to vote aff because its an ethical step towards a break down of dichotomies – extinction is inevitable affirming our ethics now is the only thing that matters - clark

#### Politicization is key – this is a question of change – either the alternative fails or the perm solves

**Imrie and Thomas 8 -**  a Department of Geography, King’s College London, London; b Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardif ( Rob and Huw August 2008 “ The interrelationships between environment and disability” ebsco)bs

In this respect, activists in the disability movement may need to enhance their understanding of the signiﬁcance of processes way beyond their immediate experiences, as part of a broader raising of awareness and politicisation of their activities. This includes, for example, the development of understanding of how environmental change and processes do not just impact in negative ways on some disabled people, but are also related to issues that affect others, in particular, around the racialisation and gendering of space (see Matrix 1984, Thomas 2000). Part of this task, of connecting together seemingly disparate and separate spheres of existence, of race, gender, and disability, relates to the work of environmental activists. There is a need to work more closely together with relevant organisations and groups, to explore the complexities of how to struggle for, and achieve, social justice in a broad sense as an integral component of environmental sustainability.

#### the alternative would get coopted but the plan or perm would solve

**Imrie and Thomas 8 -**  a Department of Geography, King’s College London, London; b Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardif ( Rob and Huw August 2008 “ The interrelationships between environment and disability” ebsco)bs

In this context, both movements involve profound re-thinking of what it is to be a person – corporeally and in a broader social and ecological context. In both cases, the attack is on the disembodied Cartesian ego, so central to Enlightenment rationality: an ego that is (a) totally distinct from the rest of the cosmos; (b) “housed” in a body, but not part of it (therefore “ﬁddling” with the body has no implications for the self); and (c) socially isolated – i.e. has an identity that is not socially constituted. Rather, disability and environmental activists are conjoined by a commitment to exploration and understanding of the self through the co-construction of nature and culture. Thus, the disabled body is the product not just of impairment, or defective nature, but also of complex interactions between organic and socio-environmental and cultural relations.

#### **The alternative leads to biological reductionism cant solve and is worse for persons with disability**

Hughes 2009 - Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University (Bill Wounded/monstrous/abject: a critique of the disabled body in the sociological imaginary Disability & Society 24.4 Taylor & Francis)bs

The position taken by Turner (2001) and Shakespeare and Watson (2002), in which vulnerability is universal and frailty the fate of all, suggests, in Timpanaro’s (1975, 20) words, ‘a common morality, based on the solidarity of all men [sic] in the struggle against nature’. The common morality derived from the essential ontological identity of all, egalitarian though it is, seems to me to be unable to escape from the problem of biological reductionism, a charge that is regularly levelled at the medical model of disability. Not only does the category of disability disappear into the universal siblinghood of our wounded lives – lives inevitably tarnished by physical and mental limitation – but also the issues of exclusion, discrimination and oppression that are associated with a disabled identity become superfluous. They can no longer be constituted as experiences of specific political import to disabled people. If we are all fragile/wounded, ergo disabled, then either all or none of us are oppressed, and if it is the former, then perhaps we can be content with our poor but equal treatment. It may be ‘good for the soul’ to admit to ourselves that we are, or one day might become, the other that we (once) despised, but such moral clarity is unlikely to improve disabled people’s standard of living or bring down the barriers that exclude them from participation in social and economic life. Furthermore, the appeal to vulnerability as an essence of being human should be rejected on the grounds that it is an attempt ‘to normalise disability at an anthropological level by invoking the empirical universality of impairment’, where impairment finds itself thrust into a ‘sociological limbo dominated by a pre‐social notion of life as limit’ (Hughes 2007, 679). One can appreciate that the emphasis placed on the natural limits of the body is an attempt to ward off the crass relativism of strong forms of social constructionism, but even if one is sympathetic to the backlash against postmodernism, there is a mistake inherent in the argument that makes disabled people of us all. It assumes that because the body declines and calls time on everyone, it is the perfect example of that which is beyond discourse and represents the final moment when human matter reveals itself unambiguously as nothing but nature. However, it is important to argue that, despite its vulnerability, the body’s materiality is indeterminate and its limits negotiable (James and Hockey 2007). Furthermore, the body is not just a limit. It also embodies a set of possibilities. It is clear that the disabled body is ubiquitously represented in negative ontological terms and its limitation and deficits dominate the literature. It is difficult to escape the representation of the disabled life as doomed and tragic or to avoid the melancholia that surrounds non‐disabled people’s accounts of disabled people’s lives. To make disabled people of us all adds pessimism to essentialist naturalism. Would it not be better – as recent proponents of the ‘rhizomatic’ potential of people with learning disabilities have done (Goodley 2007; Braidotti 2002) – to admit that all of us, disabled or not, are bursting with possibilities and capabilities? In the universalist discourse ‘lack’ haunts us all. For those who embrace the tropes of monstrosity and abjection ‘lack’ is a status reserved for disability.

### 2AC - Mobility

#### Perm do both

####  [Insert analytics]

#### **The alternative wouldn’t break down physical obstacles that hinder movement of persons with disabilities – no solvency**

Imrie 2000 - Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London( Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf)bs

Mobility and movement are core to people's identities, life experiences, and opportunities. This is particularly so for those whose mobility and movement patterns are constrained by wider social or situational circumstances over which they have little or no control. For instance, research by the Royal National Institute for the Blind (1995, pages 17 ^ 18) shows that many people with vision impairments are isolated and trapped in their homes, ``with many dependent on sighted assistance for such tasks as shopping''. Likewise, wheelchair users are prevented from entering into and using most buildings and transport; for example, 80% of London's underground stations are inaccessible to wheelchairs. Physical obstacles and barriers are compounded by social barriers too, with many disabled people often experiencing combinations of violence, verbal abuse, and hostile or negative reactions in public places (Barnes et al, 1999; Butler and Bowlby, 1997). Such expressions of societal aversion to the public presence of disabled people are commonplace and do little to encourage disabled people to move around. For most disabled people, then, daily reality is of restricted mobility, no mobility, or forms of mobility and movement which serve to highlight their impairment and difference. (1)

The inequities of mobility and movement are connected to sociocultural values and practices which prioritise mobile bodies or those characterised by societally defined norms of health, fitness, and independence of bodily movements. Such bodies are, as Ellis (2000, page 5) notes, ``naturalised as a biological given'' and projected as ``the legitimate basis of order in a humanist world''. Illustrative of this are the plethora of metaphors of mobility and movement which are infused with conceptions of bodily completeness and independence, of the (normal) body far removed from those with physical and mental impairments. Such representations counterpoise the mobile body to reinforce what Oliver (1990) refers to as a ``legacy of negativism'', or values which mark out disabled people as ``problems because they are seen to deviate from the dominant culture's view of what is desirable, normal, socially acceptable, and safe'' (Corker, 1999, page 20; in addition, see Abberley, 1987; Paterson and Hughes, 1999).

In this paper, I argue that assumptions of unrestricted movement and mobility in contemporary Western societies are hegemonic in prioritising specific bodies and modes of mobility and movement. (2) In particular, mobility and movement are defined through discourses which serve to alienate impaired bodies and to prioritise the movement of what one might term `the mobile body'. In exploring such ideas, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part is a discussion of the hegemonic discourses of the body in relation to mobility and movement. This is followed by an empirical exploration, through self-testimonies, of disabled people's experiences of movement and mobility. I conclude by exploring some of the practical and political possibilities for challenging the hegemonic discourses of the body, mobility, and movement.

#### The alt would be worse for persons with disability and means the case is a da to the alt

Hughes 2009 - Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University (Bill Wounded/monstrous/abject: a critique of the disabled body in the sociological imaginary Disability & Society 24.4 Taylor & Francis)bs

The position taken by Turner (2001) and Shakespeare and Watson (2002), in which vulnerability is universal and frailty the fate of all, suggests, in Timpanaro’s (1975, 20) words, ‘a common morality, based on the solidarity of all men [sic] in the struggle against nature’. The common morality derived from the essential ontological identity of all, egalitarian though it is, seems to me to be unable to escape from the problem of biological reductionism, a charge that is regularly levelled at the medical model of disability. Not only does the category of disability disappear into the universal siblinghood of our wounded lives – lives inevitably tarnished by physical and mental limitation – but also the issues of exclusion, discrimination and oppression that are associated with a disabled identity become superfluous. They can no longer be constituted as experiences of specific political import to disabled people. If we are all fragile/wounded, ergo disabled, then either all or none of us are oppressed, and if it is the former, then perhaps we can be content with our poor but equal treatment. It may be ‘good for the soul’ to admit to ourselves that we are, or one day might become, the other that we (once) despised, but such moral clarity is unlikely to improve disabled people’s standard of living or bring down the barriers that exclude them from participation in social and economic life. Furthermore, the appeal to vulnerability as an essence of being human should be rejected on the grounds that it is an attempt ‘to normalise disability at an anthropological level by invoking the empirical universality of impairment’, where impairment finds itself thrust into a ‘sociological limbo dominated by a pre‐social notion of life as limit’ (Hughes 2007, 679). One can appreciate that the emphasis placed on the natural limits of the body is an attempt to ward off the crass relativism of strong forms of social constructionism, but even if one is sympathetic to the backlash against postmodernism, there is a mistake inherent in the argument that makes disabled people of us all. It assumes that because the body declines and calls time on everyone, it is the perfect example of that which is beyond discourse and represents the final moment when human matter reveals itself unambiguously as nothing but nature. However, it is important to argue that, despite its vulnerability, the body’s materiality is indeterminate and its limits negotiable (James and Hockey 2007). Furthermore, the body is not just a limit. It also embodies a set of possibilities. It is clear that the disabled body is ubiquitously represented in negative ontological terms and its limitation and deficits dominate the literature. It is difficult to escape the representation of the disabled life as doomed and tragic or to avoid the melancholia that surrounds non‐disabled people’s accounts of disabled people’s lives. To make disabled people of us all adds pessimism to essentialist naturalism. Would it not be better – as recent proponents of the ‘rhizomatic’ potential of people with learning disabilities have done (Goodley 2007; Braidotti 2002) – to admit that all of us, disabled or not, are bursting with possibilities and capabilities? In the universalist discourse ‘lack’ haunts us all. For those who embrace the tropes of monstrosity and abjection ‘lack’ is a status reserved for disability.

### 2AC – Defense of methodology

#### Our methodology is key to creating an inclusive information and transportation system

**Carmien et al ‘6**

[Stefan Carmien, Melissa Dawe, Gerhard Fischer, Andrew Gorman, Anja Kintsch, and James F. Sullivan, Jr. Cognitive Levers Project, Carmien is a senior researcher at the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Information Technology “Socio-Technical Environments Supporting People with Cognitive Disabilities Using Public Transportation,” <http://l3d.cs.colorado.edu/~gerhard/papers/tochi-social-issues-final.pdf>]

7. RESPONSIBLE SOCIO-TECHNICAL DESIGN AND HCI CHALLENGES

Even when transportation systems are designed to serve the 95th percentile of a population, they will be of no use to a large number of people within a large population [Norman 1988]. But more unfortunate, when transportation systems are built this way, they may not serve those who are most dependent on them such as the physically or cognitively disabled and the elderly. Our methodology challenges conventional approaches by responsibly designing systems that support that 5–7% of the population who have the greatest difficulties in traveling. Our hypothesis is that such systems will not only result in a more inclusive system, but will provide information architectures upon which to build systems that are more usable for mainstream travelers as well.

### 2AC – Defense of Reps

#### Representations of disabilities are key to change

Bérubé, ‘3 ( Micheal, Paterno Family Professor in Literature at Pennsylvania State University, “Citizenship and Disability”, Spring, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=506)bs

 It is striking, nonetheless, that so few leftists have understood disability in these terms. Disability is not the only area of social life in which the politics of recognition are inseparable from the politics of redistribution; other matters central to citizenship, such as immigration, reproductive rights, and criminal justice, are every bit as complex. Nonetheless, our society's representations of disability are intricately tied to, and sometimes the very basis for, our public policies for "administering" disability. And when we contemplate, in these terms, the history of people with cognitive and developmental disabilities, we find a history in which "representation" takes on a double valence: first, in that people who were deemed incapable of representing themselves were therefore represented by a socio-medical apparatus that defined—or, in a social-constructionist sense, created—the category of "feeblemindedness"; and second, in the sense that the visual and rhetorical representations of "feebleminded" persons then set the terms for public policy. One cannot plausibly narrate a comprehensive history of ideas and practices of national citizenship in the post-Civil War United States without examining public policy regarding disability, especially mental disability, all the more especially when mental disability was then mapped onto certain immigrant populations who scored poorly on intelligence tests and were thereby pseudo-scientifically linked to criminality. And what of reproductive rights? By 1927, the spurious but powerful linkages among disability, immigration, poverty, and criminality provided the Supreme Court with sufficient justification for declaring involuntary sterilization legal under the Constitution.

## Counterplans

### 2AC- States

**Uniform fiat is a voting issue – it’s not a real thing, it’s a mdae up debate trick - it avoids the only offense we can generate from the literature and diverts education from realistic policymaking**

**Perm do both – double solvency is a thing**

**Perm do the counterplan – the states would have to act inevitably**

**Cant solve**

* **Relegation authority – allowing the states to take control is the excuse that policymakers always use to avoid non existence hypotheticals – it marganilizes authority and reinforces the system**
* **If we win our ethics matter or that their impacts don’t then it’s a reason why giving the states authority of transportation planning will lead to marganilzation – this is not a question of fiat because even if they can fiat through most solvency deficits – mindset shifts have to come from the top – only way to change the system**

#### Their entire strategy is based on an overly rational bureaucracy that enables mass violence against disabled populations in the first place

Hughes, 2002 (Bill, Glasgow Caledonian University, School of Social Science, Bauman's Strangers, Disability & Society, Vol. 17 No. 5, p. 571-584, EBSCO)

Bureaucracy is ultra-rational, driven to embrace the abnormally normal. It makes cruelty and barbarism possible because it has no sense of suffering and should it be asked to provide a moral justification for its actions then it can always appeal to a banal utilitarian ethic like social Darwinism. The bureaucratic machine thrives on social distance and makes no direct or emotional contact with the flushed face of the doomed stranger. The totalitarian state violence that sponsored the genocide of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, disabled people and other ‘undesirables’ was produced by unique cultural and historical conditions, but nonetheless, the holocaust must be understood as ‘an extraordinary example of the irrationality of modern rationality’ (Beilharz, 2000, p. 98). Modern culture—in Bauman’s view—is both heterophobic and morally indifferent, and as such will be well disposed to any means that proposes the extirpation of difference. Given this position, it is little wonder that in the 1990s, Bauman tries to inject moral sensibilities into cultural critique by drawing on Levinas’ (1981) argument that ethics is ‘first philosophy’ and that responsibility for the other is paramount to the extent that moral action precedes rational calculation. Modern history suggests that when the reverse is the case, disabled people will suffer at the hands of power. Mitchell & Snyder (2001, p. 213) argue that the ‘desired eradication’ of disability ‘is countered only with the ferocity of an ultimate recalcitrance to … violent “utopian” solutions.’

* **Their counterplan text puts them in a double bind – either they devolve total authority over transportation infrastructure which means it fails because the states cant maintain funding**

De Rugy and Mitchell 11 — Veronique de Rugy, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, former resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and research fellow at the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, holds an M.A. in Economics from the University of Paris IX-Dauphine and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne, and Matthew Mitchell, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from George Mason University, 2011 (“Would More Infrastructure Spending Stimulate the Economy?,” Mercatus Center Working Paper Number 11-36, September, Available Online at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/infrastructure\_deRugy\_WP\_9-12-11.pdf, Accessed 06-12-2012, p. 6)

Cost overruns are the rule rather than the exception: The most comprehensive study of cost overruns examines 20 nations spanning five continents. The authors find that nine out of 10 public works projects come in over budget.30

Cost overruns dramatically increase infrastructure spending: Overruns routinely range from 50 to 100 percent of the original estimate.31 For rail, the average cost is 44.7 percent greater than the estimated cost at the time the decision is made. For bridges and tunnels, the equivalent figure is 33.8 percent, and for roads 20.4 percent.32 On average, U.S. cost-overruns reached $55 billion per year.33 Even if they lead to localized job growth, these investments are usually inefficient uses of public resources.

**Or they only control local and state level infrastructure which means they don’t solve things like Amtrak which makes a mindset shift impossible because mass transit is key – that’s imrie**

**Condo - dispo**

#### The social signals sent by federal law matter: Congressional treatment of persons with disabilities has reinforced the medical model that writes them off as less than human.

**Drimmer, 93 –** Editor, UCLA Law Review. J.D., UCLA (Jonathan, “CRIPPLES, OVERCOMERS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS: TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND SOCIAL POLICY FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES” 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, June, lexis

Both the medical and social pathology interpretations (and a majority of federal legislation) function under the assumption that something within the individual with a disability is wrong and must be fixed. This locates the "problem" within the individual with a disability, stigmatizing and labeling that person with a status of physiological inferiority. n32 According to many sociologists, the major problem faced by people with disabilities is learning to conquer [\*1350] not their own physical handicaps, but social stigma. n33 Most commentators think that "[s]tigmatizing actions harm the individual in two ways: They inflict psychological injury by assaulting a person's self-respect and human dignity, and they brand the individual with a sign that signals her inferior status to others and designates her as an outcast." n34 With regard to the latter effect of stigma, the "dominant group has systematically used stigmatizing labels against" people with disabilities n35 and has developed a social system of laws, practices, and cultural mores that devalues people with disabilities, treating them as different from, and inferior to, the norm. n36 The [\*1351] laws and practices effectively define people with disabilities as inferior, exclude people with disabilities from society, and rationalize such treatment as justified and natural. As to the psychological damage of stigma, the true harm comes when a person with a disability accepts the values developed by a society that labels disability as a sign of inferiority. n37 With society continually reinforcing these beliefs through the law, cultural practice, and a denial of participation for people with disabilities, it is difficult for a person with a disability not "to accept at least part of the version of their identities imposed by the stigma." n38 For these people the "injurious effects of stigmatizing inequalities are both psychological and tangible. It hurts to confront, day after day, the denial of your individual humanity." n39

**Justification for the counterplan is just as important as solvency – the counterplan/net benefit logic is an attempt to capture our ethical stance with an artificial scenario for violence – this plays into the status quo logic of knowledge production and replicates 1ac impacts**

**State fiat is a voting issue**

**a. Logically irrelevant – no single person can decide whether the states or federal government should do the plan- the counterplan lets the neg duck out of answering the question of whether the USfg should act**

1. **No lit base – authors who describe state vs. federal action don’t assume the uniform action that the neg gets via the counterplan – we can’t find offense or a solvency deficit against something no one writes about**
2. **Not real world –states have never acted in unison - neg wastes debate time by reading a counterplan that teaches us nothing about sensible decisionmaking**
3. **Interpretation – the negative can read counterplans that use the resolutional actor; solves their offense because they can have the fed pressure states to do the plan**

#### Fed government action key to be modeled globally

Capozzi 11 - Executive Director, U.S. Access Board ( David November 17, 2011 The Americans with Disabilities Act and Accessible Transportation: Challenges and Opportunities http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Capozzi1.pdf)bs

My experience has shown me that over the past twenty five years after passage of the Air Carrier ¶ Access Act and twenty years after passage of the ADA, that many other countries are closely ¶ watching our progress. Countries have modeled their own legislation on ours. Standards ¶ development efforts around the globe are informed by what we do here in the United States. ¶ Many want to learn from our successes and challenges. Implementation of the Convention on ¶ the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will further this desire. Just last week the Access Board ¶ sponsored an information exchange with the government of Ontario, Canada and representatives ¶ from the European Commission. Both are developing accessibility provisions that will be ¶ greatly informed by what we have done here. We can certainly learn from other countries and ¶ their experiences with accessibility – but it is clear that the United States still serves as a model ¶ of inclusion and accessibility. The Access Board’s new guidelines and the update of existing ¶ provisions will certainly improve the transportation landscape in America. But, issues remain in ¶ implementing the laws and regulations that are in effect today. We have many successes that we ¶ can be proud of but we can still do better.

#### States fail at implementation

Weber ‘95 ., Professor at DePaul University, (Mark C, 1995“Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: the Relationship between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Acthttp://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?page=1089&handle=hein.journals%2Fwmlr36&collection=journals)

State Law A. Prohibition of Discrimination in Access to Facilities The ADA Title II regulations provide broad protection against discrimination at facilities, and we found that **all states have laws** specifically **requiring government-owned buildings to be accessible. Nonetheless, we found ambiguities regarding these statutes' coverage and problems with their enforcement**. First, while every state appears to require that public "buildings" be accessible to individuals with disabilities,25 it is unclear in some states whether this rule applies more broadly to all government-owned entities. Second, **fifteen states do not have clear, effective**, private **enforcement mechanisms for their accessibility policies.** We will discuss these enforcement problems in Part II.C, but those problems are noted in boldface type in Table I infra. ADA Title II covers state property that encompasses far more than the buildings themselves. Under ADA Title II, streets and sidewalks" as well as parks and recreational facilities must be accessible.27 Accessible sidewalks are a particularly important right guaranteed by ADA Title II. **Without accessible sidewalks, a person with a disability might never get to the front door of a public building.** Indeed, one of the earliest appellate court decisions on ADA Title II was a successful class action suit against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the Commissioner of the Philadelphia Streets Department which sought to compel the city to install curb ramps on streets that had been resurfaced since the effective date of the ADA.28 Most state statutes specifically cover both "buildings" and "facilities" which indicates that their scope is equivalent to the coverage found in ADA Title II. Many states also adopt the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG)29 or accessibility standards promulgated by the American National Standard Institute (ANSI),30 which cover a broad range of facilities.31 Still others have state statutes that specifically include sidewalks and curb ramps.32 **Determining whether sidewalks and other facilities like state parks are covered is problematic**, however, **in** three **states that limit their accessibility rules** to state "buildings."33 For example, Ohio has a state statute requiring "all buildings" to be accessible to individuals with disabilities,34 and presumably this statute covers state-owned buildings; but it does not have a public accommodations statute which clearly applies to the state and would cover all state facilities.35 Similarly, Tennessee has a state policy to make all "public buildings" accessible; the definition of "public buildings" does not mention state parks or sidewalks.36 Wisconsin has a state statute requiring public "building[s]" to be accessible to individuals with disabilities.37 It does not appear to have a broader public accommodation statute that would be broadly applicable to all state facilities.38 **Although** these **states adopt** ADAAG or ANSI **standards**,39 we do not know if these standards would apply to sidewalks because **sidewalks might not come within the scope of the state statute.** Table I shows whether there is a state statute requiring government-owned facilities to be accessible as well as any ambiguities or problems with respect to coverage or enforcement. **For states with ineffective private enforcement mechanisms**, which we will discuss in Part II.C, **the coverage of streets and sidewalks may be of little consolation to a person with a disability who has no remedy if the state does not follow its own law**. ADA Title H covers far more than physical access—it bars discrimination in the "services, programs, or activities of a public entity."41 **While some states have statutes barring disability discrimination** in state "services," **many do not provide this specific protection**. Therefore, we looked to statutes barring disability discrimination by "public accommodations" to see if they provided such protection. We found two problems in assessing state coverage in this area: (1) whether the state public accommodation statute barred "services" discrimination, and (2) whether public accommodations statutes which specifically bar services discrimination applied to the state. The sparse case law in this area indicates that these ambiguities can be significant. Accordingly, we have concluded that **only twenty-four of fifty-one statutes clearly cover services discrimination by the states**.42 The first problem with state public accommodations laws is that twenty-four states do not have statutes which explicitly cover "services" discrimination.43 This may not be a significant issue in four of the states, however, because they have adopted language clearly modeled after section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which states that people with disabilities shall not "be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."44 While this language does not explicitly list "services" discrimination, we assume that a state court would interpret it broadly and therefore imply such coverage.45 **Three states, however, do not have a broad public accommodation statute that applies to discrimination on the basis of disability**.46 Hence, it is not possible for a court to find a nondiscrimination policy in the provision of state services in those states. **The remaining seventeen states have public accommodation statutes that do not clearly state whether they apply to services**.47 In eight of those states, the public accommodation statute does not apply to the state, so whether it applies to services discrimination is not relevant to the present inquiry.48 Of the remaining nine states where coverage of services was ambiguous, courts have interpreted two of the statutes to only apply to "places" or "physical structures." Specifically, in Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority\*9 **the Washington Supreme Court held that the state's public accommodations statute did not apply to paratransit services**.50 The statute at issue prohibited any person from committing an act which "directly or indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or discrimination, ... in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement" because of an individual's disability.51 The parties agreed that public transit was a "public accommodation," and the plaintiffs argued that the relevant "place" of public accommodation was the transit authority's entire service area.52 The court rejected this argument, saying that the statutory language "ma[de] it very clear that the reach of the statute extends to places and facilities, not services. "S3 It noted that "Titles II and III of the ADA . . . distinguish services from places of public accommodation," and further stated: What must be very clear ... is that the [state] statutory mandate to provide access to places of public accommodation is not a mandate to provide services. While entitlement to services may be in the ADA, the Legislature has not enacted a counterpart to the ADA in Washington creating such entitlements.5\*

#### Only the government can do it

**The economist 11 –** ( Amtrak's true costs http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2011/11/road-v-rail)bs

AMTRAK, America's government-run passenger rail service, received $1.4 billion in taxpayer subsidies in 2011. Critics reckon that's too much, and say that the company should either be self-sufficient or privatised. Some surveys suggest that the majority of Americans agree. But Amtrak's defenders are striking back, arguing that the railroad actually receives fewer dollars per passenger mile (ppm) than highways. David C. of the blog GreaterGreaterWashington published a classic in this genre late last month. "When indirect subsidies are considered, Amtrak's total subsidy comes out to a little less than 44¢ ppm," he argues. "Motoring's subsidy rises up to almost 45¢ ppm." You can click through to Mr C's analysis for the details, but here's the nickel version in a chart:

### 2AC – Statement Cp

#### Their entire strategy is based on an overly rational bureaucracy that enables mass violence against disabled populations in the first place

Hughes, 2002 (Bill, Glasgow Caledonian University, School of Social Science, Bauman's Strangers, Disability & Society, Vol. 17 No. 5, p. 571-584, EBSCO)

Bureaucracy is ultra-rational, driven to embrace the abnormally normal. It makes cruelty and barbarism possible because it has no sense of suffering and should it be asked to provide a moral justification for its actions then it can always appeal to a banal utilitarian ethic like social Darwinism. The bureaucratic machine thrives on social distance and makes no direct or emotional contact with the flushed face of the doomed stranger. The totalitarian state violence that sponsored the genocide of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, disabled people and other ‘undesirables’ was produced by unique cultural and historical conditions, but nonetheless, the holocaust must be understood as ‘an extraordinary example of the irrationality of modern rationality’ (Beilharz, 2000, p. 98). Modern culture—in Bauman’s view—is both heterophobic and morally indifferent, and as such will be well disposed to any means that proposes the extirpation of difference. Given this position, it is little wonder that in the 1990s, Bauman tries to inject moral sensibilities into cultural critique by drawing on Levinas’ (1981) argument that ethics is ‘first philosophy’ and that responsibility for the other is paramount to the extent that moral action precedes rational calculation. Modern history suggests that when the reverse is the case, disabled people will suffer at the hands of power. Mitchell & Snyder (2001, p. 213) argue that the ‘desired eradication’ of disability ‘is countered only with the ferocity of an ultimate recalcitrance to … violent “utopian” solutions.’

#### The social signals sent by federal law matter: Congressional treatment of persons with disabilities has reinforced the medical model that writes them off as less than human.

**Drimmer, 93 –** Editor, UCLA Law Review. J.D., UCLA (Jonathan, “CRIPPLES, OVERCOMERS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS: TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND SOCIAL POLICY FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES” 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, June, lexis

Both the medical and social pathology interpretations (and a majority of federal legislation) function under the assumption that something within the individual with a disability is wrong and must be fixed. This locates the "problem" within the individual with a disability, stigmatizing and labeling that person with a status of physiological inferiority. n32 According to many sociologists, the major problem faced by people with disabilities is learning to conquer [\*1350] not their own physical handicaps, but social stigma. n33 Most commentators think that "[s]tigmatizing actions harm the individual in two ways: They inflict psychological injury by assaulting a person's self-respect and human dignity, and they brand the individual with a sign that signals her inferior status to others and designates her as an outcast." n34 With regard to the latter effect of stigma, the "dominant group has systematically used stigmatizing labels against" people with disabilities n35 and has developed a social system of laws, practices, and cultural mores that devalues people with disabilities, treating them as different from, and inferior to, the norm. n36 The [\*1351] laws and practices effectively define people with disabilities as inferior, exclude people with disabilities from society, and rationalize such treatment as justified and natural. As to the psychological damage of stigma, the true harm comes when a person with a disability accepts the values developed by a society that labels disability as a sign of inferiority. n37 With society continually reinforcing these beliefs through the law, cultural practice, and a denial of participation for people with disabilities, it is difficult for a person with a disability not "to accept at least part of the version of their identities imposed by the stigma." n38 For these people the "injurious effects of stigmatizing inequalities are both psychological and tangible. It hurts to confront, day after day, the denial of your individual humanity." n39

#### Fed government action key to be modeled globally

Capozzi 11 - Executive Director, U.S. Access Board ( David November 17, 2011 The Americans with Disabilities Act and Accessible Transportation: Challenges and Opportunities http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Capozzi1.pdf)bs

My experience has shown me that over the past twenty five years after passage of the Air Carrier ¶ Access Act and twenty years after passage of the ADA, that many other countries are closely ¶ watching our progress. Countries have modeled their own legislation on ours. Standards ¶ development efforts around the globe are informed by what we do here in the United States. ¶ Many want to learn from our successes and challenges. Implementation of the Convention on ¶ the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will further this desire. Just last week the Access Board ¶ sponsored an information exchange with the government of Ontario, Canada and representatives ¶ from the European Commission. Both are developing accessibility provisions that will be ¶ greatly informed by what we have done here. We can certainly learn from other countries and ¶ their experiences with accessibility – but it is clear that the United States still serves as a model ¶ of inclusion and accessibility. The Access Board’s new guidelines and the update of existing ¶ provisions will certainly improve the transportation landscape in America. But, issues remain in ¶ implementing the laws and regulations that are in effect today. We have many successes that we ¶ can be proud of but we can still do better.

## Disads

### 2AC – Politics (generic)

### 2AC - Politics (generic)

#### Predictions fail and cause bad politics

**Sa, 04** – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE: UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, scholar)

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major policies **revert back to** the uncertainty and **chaos.** Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known, it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein 1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency, ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change. What results is uncertainty from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of; disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as; faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception. Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes that predictions of the future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one (Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that **prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.**3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal relationships.

#### Issues in Congress are compartmentalized – political capital not key

**Dickinson, 09** – professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt (5/26/09, Matthew, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/, JMP)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is **rarely influenced by anything a president does**. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

#### The political process is rigged to exclude the disabled – to make your decision based upon political capital and bargaining is to render your decision complicit in the systematic exclusion of the disabled – the impact is our case

Orentlicher 96- Professor of Law at Indiana University,( David 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 49, Winter)

A more expansive interpretation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act would better realize the purposes of the principle of reasonable accommodations. The principle of reasonable accommodations recognizes two important truths. First, it recognizes that disability is not simply an intrinsic characteristic of a person but is the result of the interaction between a person's intrinsic qualities and the environment. [87](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n87#n87" \t "_self) Second, the principle recognizes that the environment is shaped not simply by natural, inevitable forces but also has been shaped to serve the interests of some segments of society at the expense of others. The socio-political environment **cannot** [\*67] always **be justified** by the operation of neutral or objective principles or by principles that are otherwise morally valid. [88](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n88#n88" \t "_self) Indeed, there is nothing "natural" or ineluctable about the fact that **most aspects of socio-political organization respond primarily to the needs of persons without disabilities**, [89](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n89#n89" \t "_self) just as there is nothing inevitable about the fact that the post office and many businesses cease operations on Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, rather than on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, or Friday, the Moslem Sabbath. Social norms develop not because they are pre-ordained, but because they serve the needs of social groups that are dominant either in numbers or power. Often, social arrangements develop around a social norm of a person without disabilities because of inattention to the needs of persons with disabilities. In addition, in some cases, society purposefully creates its institutions for the convenience of persons without disabilities while aware of the hardship imposed on persons with disabilities. For example, it is commonly the case that mentally retarded persons are perceived to be physically unattractive. Yet, with a little assistance in grooming, many of these individuals can take on an "attractive" appearance. [90](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n90#n90" \t "_self) Some institutions for the mentally retarded have intentionally neglected the grooming of their wards to discourage them from entering into romantic or sexual relationships. [91](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n91#n91" \t "_self) The operators find that such relationships complicate their work; in addition, non-retarded persons are often unwilling to permit sexual or romantic activity by retarded persons. [92](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n92#n92" \t "_self) In short, persons without disabilities may compromise the interests of persons with disabilities for their own convenience and psychological comfort. How a social norm develops, then, may depend much more on **considerations of popularity or political power** than upon alternative visions of distributive justice that often have greater moral weight. Because socio-political forces frequently exacerbate the impact of a disability **without sufficient moral justification**, anti-discrimination law requires [\*68] modifications of social policies to ameliorate the deleterious effects of socio-political forces on disability.

#### This makes global destruction inevitable — the pursuit of the short-term gains of political expediency sacrifices any hope of sustainable peace

Bassiouni 3 - Professor of Law at DePaul University, (M. Cherif, 35 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 191, Spring)

The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the attraction of realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik involves the **pursuit of political settlements** unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations. As such, this approach often **runs directly counter to the interests of justice**, particularly as understood from the perspective of victims of gross violations of human rights. Impunity, at both the international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of realpolitik which **favors expedient political ends** over the more complex task of confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals of both retributive and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict resolution as premised upon responsibility and requires sanctions for those responsible, the establishment of a clear record of truth and efforts made to provide redress to victims. The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the more immediate problems of a conflict, but, as history reveals, **its achievements are frequently at the expense of long-term peace**, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to achieve genuine peace without addressing victims' needs and without [\*192] providing a wounded society with a sense of closure. A more profound vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a series of interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred, punishing those most directly responsible for human suffering, and **offering redress** to victims. **Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; it is the restoration of justice**, and the use of law to mediate and resolve inter-social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing justice and accountability for the immediacy of realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over more enduring human values.

### 2AC – Obama Bad

#### No one is paying attention yet- the Olympics are starting

**Tracinski, 07/19** (Robert Tracinski writes daily commentary at TIADaily.com. He is the editor of The Intellectual Activist and a contributor to RealClearMarkets and is also an elections analyst for RealClearPolitics, "How the Election Will Play Out (and why Romney will win)" on July 19, 2012 from www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/07/19/how\_the\_election\_will\_play\_out\_and\_why\_romney\_will\_win\_114848.html/ak)

Then there is the calendar. Outside of Washington and the media, most voters are not paying much attention to the race yet. And in exactly eight days, the Olympics begin.¶ The Olympics are the crucial dividing point, because they will dominate the airwaves and the news, sucking away whatever attention anyone is now paying to the election. So Obama's negative campaign blitz has to have whatever effect it's going to have in those eight days. But what happens when the Olympics start? To begin with, the Olympics provide an opportunity for Mitt Romney to highlight the best part of his record, his successful turnaround of the 2002 Winter Olympics. And he can do so without having to do very much or spend much money. It will be natural, after all, for the sports reporters covering the Olympics to mention Romney's history with the movement.

#### Obama will win

Cardona, 07/20 (Maria Cardona is a Democratic strategist, a principal at the Dewey Square Group, a former senior adviser to Hillary Clinton and former communications director for the Democratic National Committee, as well as a policy analyst for CNN; "GOP's Obama obsession will lose it the election" on July 20, 2012 from www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/opinion/cardona-romney-latino/index.html/ak)

**(CNN)** -- A month ago, when Mitt Romney addressed the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials during its annual conference in Orlando, Florida, many thought he was on a path to adopting a more nuanced tone on immigration and coming up with an aggressive strategy to woo Latino voters to his side.¶ Instead, he lately seems to have adopted U.S. Rep. Michele Bachmann's messaging strategy, using a version of the Minnesotan's line from the 2008 campaign when she [went on a rant](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/17/gop-rep-channels-mccarthy_n_135735.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) about the views of then-Sen. Barack Obama and his wife being "very anti-American."¶ Romney is not making it easier for Latinos to support him. In fact, the strategy will continue alienating this critical demographic group, along with independents and women.¶ We heard former New Hampshire Gov. John Sununu, one of Romney's top surrogates, use similar language on Tuesday.¶ "I wish this president would learn how to be an American," he said.¶ Granted, he apologized for it later that day, but the subtext is still there. Romney himself is using a version of the line when he says that Obama's way of doing things seems["foreign."](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-romney-campaign-20120718%2C0%2C7508037.story%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) To many voters, that is code for "un-American."

#### Programs for persons with disabilities are popular

Suter 7- Associate Commissioner of Employment Support Programs at the Social Security Administration, (Sue Congressional Quarterly, June 21)bs

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Social Security Administration's (SSA) efforts to assist beneficiaries with disabilities in addressing the barriers that make it difficult for them to return to work. Providing opportunities forbeneficiaries with disabilities to return to work has been part of the disability program since its inception more than 50 years ago. In 1999, Congress **expressed its bipartisan support** for building on these efforts by passing the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. This legislation has become an important tool in our ongoing return to work efforts. SSA's programs to reduce employment-related financial disincentives also support The President's New Freedom Initiative, which integrated all federal agencies in a process of including more Americans with disabilities into the workforce, through training, education, and reduction of programmatic barriers. The President and the Administration have put into place an array of supports, of which this program is one SSA serves a diverse population of individuals with disabilities through the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. SSDI and SSI beneficiaries represent various age groups and have different impairments, levels of education, work experience, and capacities for working. Assisting beneficiaries with disabilities to return to work has been among one of the most challenging issues facing SSA, and helping individuals with disabilities take advantage of employment opportunities remains one of SSA's highest priorities.

#### Predictions fail and cause bad politics

**Sa, 04** – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE: UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, scholar)

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major policies **revert back to** the uncertainty and **chaos.** Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known, it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein 1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency, ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change. What results is uncertainty from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of; disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as; faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception. Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes that predictions of the future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one (Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that **prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.**3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal relationships.

#### The political process is rigged to exclude the disabled – to make your decision based upon political capital and bargaining is to render your decision complicit in the systematic exclusion of the disabled – the impact is our case

Orentlicher 96- Professor of Law at Indiana University,( David 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 49, Winter)

A more expansive interpretation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act would better realize the purposes of the principle of reasonable accommodations. The principle of reasonable accommodations recognizes two important truths. First, it recognizes that disability is not simply an intrinsic characteristic of a person but is the result of the interaction between a person's intrinsic qualities and the environment. [87](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n87#n87" \t "_self) Second, the principle recognizes that the environment is shaped not simply by natural, inevitable forces but also has been shaped to serve the interests of some segments of society at the expense of others. The socio-political environment **cannot** [\*67] always **be justified** by the operation of neutral or objective principles or by principles that are otherwise morally valid. [88](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n88#n88" \t "_self) Indeed, there is nothing "natural" or ineluctable about the fact that **most aspects of socio-political organization respond primarily to the needs of persons without disabilities**, [89](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n89#n89" \t "_self) just as there is nothing inevitable about the fact that the post office and many businesses cease operations on Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, rather than on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, or Friday, the Moslem Sabbath. Social norms develop not because they are pre-ordained, but because they serve the needs of social groups that are dominant either in numbers or power. Often, social arrangements develop around a social norm of a person without disabilities because of inattention to the needs of persons with disabilities. In addition, in some cases, society purposefully creates its institutions for the convenience of persons without disabilities while aware of the hardship imposed on persons with disabilities. For example, it is commonly the case that mentally retarded persons are perceived to be physically unattractive. Yet, with a little assistance in grooming, many of these individuals can take on an "attractive" appearance. [90](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n90#n90" \t "_self) Some institutions for the mentally retarded have intentionally neglected the grooming of their wards to discourage them from entering into romantic or sexual relationships. [91](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n91#n91" \t "_self) The operators find that such relationships complicate their work; in addition, non-retarded persons are often unwilling to permit sexual or romantic activity by retarded persons. [92](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n92#n92" \t "_self) In short, persons without disabilities may compromise the interests of persons with disabilities for their own convenience and psychological comfort. How a social norm develops, then, may depend much more on **considerations of popularity or political power** than upon alternative visions of distributive justice that often have greater moral weight. Because socio-political forces frequently exacerbate the impact of a disability **without sufficient moral justification**, anti-discrimination law requires [\*68] modifications of social policies to ameliorate the deleterious effects of socio-political forces on disability.

#### This makes global destruction inevitable — the pursuit of the short-term gains of political expediency sacrifices any hope of sustainable peace

Bassiouni 3 - Professor of Law at DePaul University, (M. Cherif, 35 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 191, Spring)

The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the attraction of realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik involves the **pursuit of political settlements** unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations. As such, this approach often **runs directly counter to the interests of justice**, particularly as understood from the perspective of victims of gross violations of human rights. Impunity, at both the international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of realpolitik which **favors expedient political ends** over the more complex task of confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals of both retributive and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict resolution as premised upon responsibility and requires sanctions for those responsible, the establishment of a clear record of truth and efforts made to provide redress to victims. The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the more immediate problems of a conflict, but, as history reveals, **its achievements are frequently at the expense of long-term peace**, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to achieve genuine peace without addressing victims' needs and without [\*192] providing a wounded society with a sense of closure. A more profound vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a series of interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred, punishing those most directly responsible for human suffering, and **offering redress** to victims. **Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; it is the restoration of justice**, and the use of law to mediate and resolve inter-social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing justice and accountability for the immediacy of realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over more enduring human values.

### 2AC – Obama Good

#### To far off

**Tracinski, 07/19** (Robert Tracinski writes daily commentary at TIADaily.com. He is the editor of The Intellectual Activist and a contributor to RealClearMarkets and is also an elections analyst for RealClearPolitics, "How the Election Will Play Out (and why Romney will win)" on July 19, 2012 from www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/07/19/how\_the\_election\_will\_play\_out\_and\_why\_romney\_will\_win\_114848.html/ak)

Then there is the calendar. Outside of Washington and the media, most voters are not paying much attention to the race yet. And in exactly eight days, the Olympics begin.¶ The Olympics are the crucial dividing point, because they will dominate the airwaves and the news, sucking away whatever attention anyone is now paying to the election. So Obama's negative campaign blitz has to have whatever effect it's going to have in those eight days. But what happens when the Olympics start? To begin with, the Olympics provide an opportunity for Mitt Romney to highlight the best part of his record, his successful turnaround of the 2002 Winter Olympics. And he can do so without having to do very much or spend much money. It will be natural, after all, for the sports reporters covering the Olympics to mention Romney's history with the movement.

#### Obama will lose now – but its close

**Dinan 7-10** – Washington times ( Stephen 7-10-12 Obama loses ground to Romney in key measures of poll [http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/9/obama-loses-ground-to-romney-in-key-measures-of-po/)bs](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/9/obama-loses-ground-to-romney-in-key-measures-of-po/%29bs)

Mitt Romney continues to hold a whisker-thin 1-percentage-point lead over President Obama in a head-to-head election match-up, but the former Massachusetts governor is eating into the president’s air of inevitability, according to the latest The Washington Times/JZ Analytics poll released Monday night. The poll found Mr. Romney leading 43 percent to 42 percent — about the same margin as the poll in May, but Mr. Obama slipped on several key measures, including fewer voters who say they expect him to win, and fewer who say they are voting for him because he’s the best candidate.

#### **The plan sparks political backlash that decimates Obama**

Percy, 2001 (Stephen, Ph.D., Indiana University A.B., Hamilton College, Political Science Professor at the University of Milwaukee, “Disability and Federalism: Comparing Different Approaches to Full Participation”, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=q5F8Oqks7oUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=Disability+and+Federalism:+Comparing+Different+Approaches+to+Full+Participation&ots=vhr2r60Sh2&sig=yknyDwNkcNyX66RQv7Zyl-ahnNQ#v=onepage&q&f=true)

The issue of ADA costs will remain at the forefront of the political whirlwinds that surround the implementation of this law to protect people with disabilities. Given the scope of the Act and insufficient information on such things as the number and type of employment accommodations and the extent of architectural barrier-removal projects that will be needed, it is extremely difficult to estimate the total costs of achieving nation-wide compliance with the ADA. While many types of accommodation can be made with little cost, substantial costs will be incurred in such areas as providing paratransit services, making key transit stations accessible, and making physical changes in services and facilities used by the public. One partial yet plausible set of estimates on ADA compliance was prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which estimated that the cost to the federal government in implementing the ADA would range from about S5 million in the first year to $31 million by 1995.7' But the real cost of compliance is with the content of the ADA — unlike other disability rights policies borne by state and local governments and private sector establishments, of course — will be substantially higher. With regard to the compliance costs to slate and local governments. CBO estimated that it would cost $20-30 million per year over several years to purchase additional lift-equipped buses. $15 million annually to provide maintenance to these buses, and several hundreds of millions of dollars over 30 years to make key rail and transit stations accessible. Still other dollars will be required to achieve compliance with other ADA mandates, including reasonable accommodation in employment and housing. Cost issues and the elevated opportunities for people with disabilities has the potential to generate a backlash against the ADA and its strong regulatory mandates. While significant political revolts against the ADA have not yet materialized, complaints have arisen in some quarters about expansiveness of ADA mandates and the fiscal requirements needed to achieve compliance. Communities, large and small, have complained about compliance costs for such things as major building renovations and interpreter services. Complaints range in scope from mandated actions that represent little more than anger about the "nuisance" of compliance to accommodations that represent substantial fiscal outlays (e.g., provision of paratransit services). Academics have entered the fray, challenging whether disability policies which advance the opportunities of people with disabilities are fair and just or whether they can enable undeserving claims to "jump the queue" while other more deserving public needs are left unmet.71 And while these critiques from practitioners and academics remain, these seem unlikely to derail the ADA. One analyst warns state and local governments that: "Given the militancy of the disabled, the activism of the [US Justice Department and the sympathies of most of the judiciary, ignoring the 'little things' [adherence to ADA mandates] can turn out to be the riskiest strategy of all."71

#### Predictions fail and cause bad politics

**Sa, 04** – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE: UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, scholar)

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major policies **revert back to** the uncertainty and **chaos.** Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known, it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein 1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency, ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change. What results is uncertainty from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of; disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as; faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception. Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes that predictions of the future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one (Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that **prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.**3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal relationships.

#### The political process is rigged to exclude the disabled – to make your decision based upon political capital and bargaining is to render your decision complicit in the systematic exclusion of the disabled – the impact is our case

Orentlicher 96- Professor of Law at Indiana University,( David 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 49, Winter)

A more expansive interpretation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act would better realize the purposes of the principle of reasonable accommodations. The principle of reasonable accommodations recognizes two important truths. First, it recognizes that disability is not simply an intrinsic characteristic of a person but is the result of the interaction between a person's intrinsic qualities and the environment. [87](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n87#n87" \t "_self) Second, the principle recognizes that the environment is shaped not simply by natural, inevitable forces but also has been shaped to serve the interests of some segments of society at the expense of others. The socio-political environment **cannot** [\*67] always **be justified** by the operation of neutral or objective principles or by principles that are otherwise morally valid. [88](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n88#n88" \t "_self) Indeed, there is nothing "natural" or ineluctable about the fact that **most aspects of socio-political organization respond primarily to the needs of persons without disabilities**, [89](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n89#n89" \t "_self) just as there is nothing inevitable about the fact that the post office and many businesses cease operations on Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, rather than on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, or Friday, the Moslem Sabbath. Social norms develop not because they are pre-ordained, but because they serve the needs of social groups that are dominant either in numbers or power. Often, social arrangements develop around a social norm of a person without disabilities because of inattention to the needs of persons with disabilities. In addition, in some cases, society purposefully creates its institutions for the convenience of persons without disabilities while aware of the hardship imposed on persons with disabilities. For example, it is commonly the case that mentally retarded persons are perceived to be physically unattractive. Yet, with a little assistance in grooming, many of these individuals can take on an "attractive" appearance. [90](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n90#n90" \t "_self) Some institutions for the mentally retarded have intentionally neglected the grooming of their wards to discourage them from entering into romantic or sexual relationships. [91](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n91#n91" \t "_self) The operators find that such relationships complicate their work; in addition, non-retarded persons are often unwilling to permit sexual or romantic activity by retarded persons. [92](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n92#n92" \t "_self) In short, persons without disabilities may compromise the interests of persons with disabilities for their own convenience and psychological comfort. How a social norm develops, then, may depend much more on **considerations of popularity or political power** than upon alternative visions of distributive justice that often have greater moral weight. Because socio-political forces frequently exacerbate the impact of a disability **without sufficient moral justification**, anti-discrimination law requires [\*68] modifications of social policies to ameliorate the deleterious effects of socio-political forces on disability.

#### This makes global destruction inevitable — the pursuit of the short-term gains of political expediency sacrifices any hope of sustainable peace

Bassiouni 3 - Professor of Law at DePaul University, (M. Cherif, 35 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 191, Spring)

The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the attraction of realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik involves the **pursuit of political settlements** unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations. As such, this approach often **runs directly counter to the interests of justice**, particularly as understood from the perspective of victims of gross violations of human rights. Impunity, at both the international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of realpolitik which **favors expedient political ends** over the more complex task of confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals of both retributive and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict resolution as premised upon responsibility and requires sanctions for those responsible, the establishment of a clear record of truth and efforts made to provide redress to victims. The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the more immediate problems of a conflict, but, as history reveals, **its achievements are frequently at the expense of long-term peace**, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to achieve genuine peace without addressing victims' needs and without [\*192] providing a wounded society with a sense of closure. A more profound vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a series of interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred, punishing those most directly responsible for human suffering, and **offering redress** to victims. **Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; it is the restoration of justice**, and the use of law to mediate and resolve inter-social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing justice and accountability for the immediacy of realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over more enduring human values.

### -- Elections Link turn

#### Plan allows disabled people to vote—physical access to polling stations—that’s Schwartz

#### Disabled people support Obama—2008 proves

Kessler Foundation 10 (Kessler Foundation and National Organization on Disability, text taken from article titled, “The ADA, 20 Years Later,” published July 2010. Text found at [http://www.2010disabilitysurveys.org/pdfs/surveyresults.pdf] by Hirsh)

People with disabilities have historically been much more likely to vote for the Democratic Presidential candidate with the exception of 2004 when they appeared to be more likely to vote for the Republican candidate, President George W. Bush. In 2008, we saw a return to historical voter patterns though people with disabilities were not as likely to vote for the Democratic candidate as they were prior to 2004. Half (50%) of people with disabilities supported Senator Obama as compared to 40% for Senator McCain. (Table 9B) In addition, while in years prior to the 2004 election people with disabilities were more likely than those without disabilities to support the Democratic candidate, they were actually just as likely as those without disabilities to support the candidates in this recent election.

#### Link turn outweighs—there are over 2 million disabled people in the US

### 2AC – Jackson Vanik

#### Won’t pass until after the election and does nothing for relations

**Reuters 7/12** (“House vote on Russia trade bill in doubt” [http://news.terra.com/us-house-vote-on-russia-trade-bill-in-doubt,adda666a77d78310VgnVCM10000098cceb0aRCRD.html](http://news.terra.com/us-house-vote-on-russia-trade-bill-in-doubt%2Cadda666a77d78310VgnVCM10000098cceb0aRCRD.html) 7/12/12)

The Congress appears increasingly unlikely to approve a controversial bill to upgrade trade relations with Russia before the November elections, despite a push by the White House and U.S. business groups for votes this month. "I think practically speaking no one expects Congress to deal with (permanent normal trade relations) before the lame-duck" session after the elections, said Gary Hufbauer, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, referring to the period between the November 6 congressional elections and the start of the new Congress in January, 2013. "I think there's a background fear that this will become a political football if the House moves forward," Hufbauer said. Congress is under pressure to lift a Cold War human rights provision known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment and approve "permanent normal trade relations," or PNTR, because of Russia's expected entry into the World Trade Organization in August. If it does not act, Russia could deny U.S. firms some of the market-opening concessions it made to join the WTO, putting those companies at a disadvantage to foreign competitors in one of the world's 10-largest economies. However, the push to pass the legislation comes at a low point in U.S.-Russia relations, with many U.S. lawmakers angry over Moscow's support for the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and questioning Russia's commitment to democracy and human rights. "Members are rightly concerned over recent developments in Russia, as well as Russia's policies with respect to Syria and Iran. This makes it incumbent upon the President to show leadership and for these issues to be addressed in a bipartisan fashion, enabling PNTR to move forward," a House Republican aide said.

* Do not endorse the ablest language in this evidence

#### Fights coming on tax cuts

O’Brien 7/9/12 (Michael, NBC news, “Obama calls for extending most tax cuts, setting up election year fight”, <http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/07/09/12643446-obama-calls-for-extending-most-tax-cuts-setting-up-election-year-fight?lite> // Veevz)

President Barack Obama urged Congress on Monday to extend expiring tax cuts for most American households, injecting the issue of tax fairness into the 2012 campaign. The president, speaking early this afternoon at the White House, again voiced support for allow tax cuts for households earning over $250,000 per year to expire at the end of 2012, while also preserving existing rates for households earning less than that. “We don't need more top-down economics. We tried that theory ... we can't afford to go back to it,” Obama said. “That's why I believe it's time for the tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans, including myself, to expire.” Congress is likely to do anything but that, though. Republicans who control the House of Representatives quickly rejected Obama’s proposal as a tax hike, though the president sought to decouple the middle class tax cuts from the high-end breaks. Obama urged lawmakers to act now to extend most of the expiring tax cuts, and have a second debate – likely to be decided in November’s election – on the tax cuts for the wealthiest. "My opponent will fight to keep them in place; I will fight to end them,” Obama said in reference to Mitt Romney, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee.

#### No pc

Politico 7/18/12 (“Biden: Obama knew health care would cost him”, [http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/07/biden-obama-knew-health-care-would-cost-him-129410.html //](http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/07/biden-obama-knew-health-care-would-cost-him-129410.html%20/) Veevz)

Vice President Biden said Wednesday that President Obama was fully aware of the political backlash that passing health care reform would cause — but did it anyway. "Every single time he's made a decision — and i'm not exaggerating to you — he sits there, knows the pain it's gonna cost him politically," Biden said on a call with Obama campaign volunteers. "Let's take health care," Biden said. "He used up all his political capital." "He knew — we discussed — if he pushed that, he knew he was going to spend virtually all his capital," Biden said. The decision to pursue health care reform over more stimulus or other economic measures is one of the most controversial decisions of Obama's presidency — and one that split his advisers. The bill ignited a firestorm of opposition on the right and united a dispirited Republican Party.

#### Issues are compartmentalized – especially in an election year – senators vote on ideology, bloc preference and constituents

#### The plan is supported from both sides of the isle

Heasley 12 - Founder and Writer for DisabilityScoop.com – a leading news source for disability issues,( Shaun “Disability Rights Treaty Gains Support”, May 29, http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/29/disability-treaty-support/15735/)bs

In a rare show of bipartisan support, a group of senators said they want the United States to ratify an international convention on the rights of people with disabilities. The U.S. already signed the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2009, but approval from the U.S. Senate is needed to make the move official. President Barack Obama transmitted the treaty to the Senate earlier this month and asked the body to ratify it. Now, a group of seven senators representing both political parties is voicing support for the treaty as well. “All people deserve to be granted full and equal basic human rights, regardless of their physical or mental capabilities. I strongly support ratification of this critical treaty, and urge my colleagues to do the same,” said Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del. The treaty calls for greater community access and a better standard of living for the estimated 650 million people around the world with disabilities. In addition to Coons, other lawmakers coming out in support of the convention include Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa; Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz.; Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill.; Sen. Jerry Moran, R-Kan.; Sen. John Barrasso, R-Wyo.; and Sen. Tom Udall, D-N.M. Currently, 153 countries have signed the disability treaty and 112 have ratified it, according to the U.N.

####  Fear of instability and conflict encourages scapegoating of disability

Bill Hughes, ‘7 (Glasgow Caledonian University, “Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies”, Disability & Society Vol. 22, No. 7, December 2007, pp. 673–684)

Whilst borrowing from black culture smacks of cool and complicates but adorns the self-identity and existential coherence of some white people, non-disabled people are very unlikely to open themselves in a similar fashion to the ‘disabled other’, since it raises the question of their own vulnerability and embodied coherence and illuminates the challenges posed by the very existential questions from which they try to protect themselves. The love of coherence and order, the ‘natural attitude’ that people adopt to shield themselves from the vicissitudes of existence, particularly in our age of anxiety, forms a force field that keeps the threat of vulnerability, the approaching stranger, at bay. It is, to put the argument another way, **the normative, invulnerable body of disablist modernity that is the problem**. Indeed, the invulnerable self is a fantasy and form of self-deception associated with carnal ‘normalcy’. It is widely used by non-disabled people to create and sustain social distance between disabled and non-disabled people. One can use Tom Shakespeare’s work from the mid 1990s to develop this argument. Shakespeare (1994, p. 298) argued that non-disabled people ‘**project their fear of death, their unease at their physicality and mortality onto disabled people, who represent all these difficult aspects of human existence’**. There are two important elements involved in this psychoemotional and social process that results in the ‘**disavowal of disability’** and its invalidation as a worthwhile existential status. One is psychological and the other ontological. The first is fear of physical frailty, bodily difference and social vulnerability that is projected onto the disabled other and the second is the process by which the social distancing associated with projected fear is frozen into a binary of being that embodies a hierarchy of existence. Ironically**, the ontological insecurity of non-disabled identity is the original sin that pushes disabled people to the margins of the human community**. Disability is not an outcome of the infraction of social norms about ‘normalcy’ but a product of the failure of carnal normalcy to take proper account of itself, to indulge in ‘bad faith’ and delude itself into thinking that it is exempt from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. **The problem rests with the normative body that does not want to be reminded of its own vulnerability or to admit that abjection and death is its fate.** In this context the disabled body is troublesome because it ‘exposes the illusion of autonomy, self-government and self-determination that underpins the fantasy of absolute able bodiedness’ (Thomson, 1997, p. 45).

Readers may have noticed in this very preliminary and adumbrated account of what a critical social ontology for disability studies might look like a measure of intellectual affinity with one of the key building blocks of the critique of the individual and medical model’s of disability (and ergo of the social model of disability), namely ‘personal tragedy theory’ (Oliver, 1990). This concept need not be reduced to issues of compensation, entitlement or therapeutic interventions (Oliver, 1996, p. 131; Kumari Campbell, 2005) but is closely articulated with the negative and invalidating way in which non-disabled people relate to disabled people and the threat that this poses to the ‘psycho-emotional well-being’ of disabled people (Thomas, 1999). Fiona Kumari Campbell (2005, p. 109) argued that, almost without fail in modern discourse, disability ‘is assumed to be ontologically intolerable, that is, inherently negative’ and ‘always present … in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization and humanness’. The assumption that a disabled life is ubiquitously, even invariably, blighted and aberrant is spliced into the emotion of pity that underpins disability charity (Smith, 2005), into the ‘practices and effects of the law’ (Kumari Campbell, 2005), into conceptions and practices of care (Hughes et al., 2005), into the humiliations and violations of institutional life (Malacrida, 2005), into the order of things, into everyday subjectivity. One could go one better, extending the (recently researched) list of realms in which the authenticity of disability is implicitly or explicitly questioned, the blight of oppression felt and ontological recognition denied. It is the task of a critical social ontology for disability studies to claim authenticity for disability whenever it is denied, be it in the cold logic of Peter Singer’s (1995) ‘preference utilitarianism’ that revokes personhood from those who are unable to engage reflexively with their own temporality or in the most mundane everyday words or deeds that exclude or invalidate.

#### Predictions fail and cause bad politics

**Sa, 04** – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE: UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, scholar)

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major policies **revert back to** the uncertainty and **chaos.** Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known, it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein 1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency, ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change. What results is uncertainty from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of; disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as; faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception. Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes that predictions of the future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one (Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that **prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.**3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal relationships.

#### The political process is rigged to exclude the disabled – to make your decision based upon political capital and bargaining is to render your decision complicit in the systematic exclusion of the disabled – the impact is our case

Orentlicher 96- Professor of Law at Indiana University,( David 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 49, Winter)

A more expansive interpretation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act would better realize the purposes of the principle of reasonable accommodations. The principle of reasonable accommodations recognizes two important truths. First, it recognizes that disability is not simply an intrinsic characteristic of a person but is the result of the interaction between a person's intrinsic qualities and the environment. [87](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n87#n87" \t "_self) Second, the principle recognizes that the environment is shaped not simply by natural, inevitable forces but also has been shaped to serve the interests of some segments of society at the expense of others. The socio-political environment **cannot** [\*67] always **be justified** by the operation of neutral or objective principles or by principles that are otherwise morally valid. [88](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n88#n88" \t "_self) Indeed, there is nothing "natural" or ineluctable about the fact that **most aspects of socio-political organization respond primarily to the needs of persons without disabilities**, [89](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n89#n89" \t "_self) just as there is nothing inevitable about the fact that the post office and many businesses cease operations on Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, rather than on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, or Friday, the Moslem Sabbath. Social norms develop not because they are pre-ordained, but because they serve the needs of social groups that are dominant either in numbers or power. Often, social arrangements develop around a social norm of a person without disabilities because of inattention to the needs of persons with disabilities. In addition, in some cases, society purposefully creates its institutions for the convenience of persons without disabilities while aware of the hardship imposed on persons with disabilities. For example, it is commonly the case that mentally retarded persons are perceived to be physically unattractive. Yet, with a little assistance in grooming, many of these individuals can take on an "attractive" appearance. [90](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n90#n90" \t "_self) Some institutions for the mentally retarded have intentionally neglected the grooming of their wards to discourage them from entering into romantic or sexual relationships. [91](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n91#n91" \t "_self) The operators find that such relationships complicate their work; in addition, non-retarded persons are often unwilling to permit sexual or romantic activity by retarded persons. [92](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n92#n92" \t "_self) In short, persons without disabilities may compromise the interests of persons with disabilities for their own convenience and psychological comfort. How a social norm develops, then, may depend much more on **considerations of popularity or political power** than upon alternative visions of distributive justice that often have greater moral weight. Because socio-political forces frequently exacerbate the impact of a disability **without sufficient moral justification**, anti-discrimination law requires [\*68] modifications of social policies to ameliorate the deleterious effects of socio-political forces on disability.

#### This makes global destruction inevitable — the pursuit of the short-term gains of political expediency sacrifices any hope of sustainable peace

Bassiouni 3 - Professor of Law at DePaul University, (M. Cherif, 35 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 191, Spring)

The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the attraction of realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik involves the **pursuit of political settlements** unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations. As such, this approach often **runs directly counter to the interests of justice**, particularly as understood from the perspective of victims of gross violations of human rights. Impunity, at both the international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of realpolitik which **favors expedient political ends** over the more complex task of confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals of both retributive and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict resolution as premised upon responsibility and requires sanctions for those responsible, the establishment of a clear record of truth and efforts made to provide redress to victims. The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the more immediate problems of a conflict, but, as history reveals, **its achievements are frequently at the expense of long-term peace**, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to achieve genuine peace without addressing victims' needs and without [\*192] providing a wounded society with a sense of closure. A more profound vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a series of interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred, punishing those most directly responsible for human suffering, and **offering redress** to victims. **Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; it is the restoration of justice**, and the use of law to mediate and resolve inter-social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing justice and accountability for the immediacy of realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over more enduring human values.

**The idea Russia is a threat is a dirty lie that conflates the current system with a paranoid fear that triggers the threat spiral causing a self fulfilling prophecy.**
**Jæger** **00** (Øyvind, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2 “Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practice of the Baltic States” shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf”,)

Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labeling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.15 The typical operations are **speech-acts** and the modality threat-defence sequences. That is, **perceiving** and **conveying** **threats** and **calling** upon **defence** hold back the **alleged threat**. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause **increased** **sense** **of** **insecurity** and new calls for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, **triggering** the **spiral**, might be **perceived of otherwise,** namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security **will not eliminate threats and dangers**. It **is a call for more insecurity** as it will **reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem.** As Wæver (1994:8)16 puts it:"Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 –so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and **naming** **threats**, thereby **delineating** **Self** **from** **Other** and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside". **To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger** inter-subjectively **depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat** – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a **binary** **opposition** constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable – indeed underscored – state focus in the works of both David Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state – transcending sovereignty – on the other. Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the very theoretical substance, and by implication – empirical viability – of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or post- modern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states – firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s enlargement – to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia, the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger: The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of **a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat** **through** what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call **a discursive "chain of equivalence**". In this the value of one side in a **binary opposition** is **reiterated** in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value **"Russia"** in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also **denoted by "instability**", "Asia", **"invasion", "chaos",** "incitement of ethnic minorities", **"unpredictability", "imperialism",** "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, **this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode**, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows.

### 2AC – Inflation

ARRA

Empirically denied – stagflation didn’t lead to war

#### The Fed will intervene to prevent hyperinflation—no risk.

Baker 10 — Dean Baker, Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2010 (“Why printing money makes sense,” *Guardian*, October 12th, Available Online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/oct/11/useconomy-usemployment, Accessed 09-08-2011)

As is the case with the counterfeiter's illicit stash, the stimulus spending need not even create any long-term debt burden. The Fed could simply buy and hold the bonds issued to finance the spending. When the economy returns to more normal levels of employment, the Fed would raise interest rates, as it always does, to prevent inflation from posing a serious risk.

#### Inflation low and stable

Mullaney 7/17/12 (Tim, USA Today, “Inflation index is flat in June as energy prices drop”, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2012-07-16/inflation-cpi-june/56266030/1)

Inflation stayed cool in June, as the falling price of gasoline outweighed the a slight pickup in the cost of food. A gallon of unleaded gas could be purchased for less than $3 a gallon July 2, 2012 near Maysville, Ky. The consumer price index was unchanged for the month, the Labor Department reported this morning. That includes a 1.4% drop in the cost of energy and a 0.2% rise in food prices. The rest of the index, known as the core inflation rate, rose 0.2%. Core inflation for the last 12 months was 2.2%, the department said. The inflation data has been one of the few bright spots in recent economic news. Retail sales dropped for a third month in June, while data from the Institute of Supply Management suggest the manufacturing sector is shrinking for the first time since 2009. STORY: After drop, gas prices rising again Tuesday the Federal Reserve said factory output rose 0.7% last month, after falling by the same amount in May. Factories produced more machines and vehicles used by businesses. Auto production rebounded after its first decline of the year.

#### **The affirmative’s notion of “economic security” based on the states is paired with and supports traditional conceptions of IR**

Tooze 5 – Visiting Professor of International Relations at City University (Roger, “The Missing : Security, Critical International Political Economy, and Community” Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth (pg. 146-147)

Economic Security The consideration of the economic in the theory and practice of security, and security in the theory and practice of political economy, has taken place on the basis of prevailing discourses in economics, political science, political economy, and international political economy. As we have seen, these discourses not only embody deep commitments to specific (orthodox) methodology, epistemology, and ontology; they also construct both economics and politics, and the relationship between them, in very particular ways. This seems to have led to the possibility of a twin track for investigations into security by political economy and into economics by security. One track starts with politics (the traditional concerns of security) but with economic added on as a new domain of threat to states. The other track starts with a (repoliticized) economics, leading to a whole literature on economic security, vulnerability, and systemic risk (with particular reference to the global financial system). But the way that the economic is then related to the political (and vice versa) seems to depend upon prior ideological commitments as to the nature of the relationship between economics and politics, normally expressed in paradigmatic terms of perspectives or contesting approaches. For instance, a liberal interpretation of economic security is conditioned by the prior assumption of the between economic prosperity and war based on the assumed beneficial rationality of markets. In this sense, economic security as a concept and as an issue has been clearly constructed as an extension of statist, positivist IPE, which brings together the twin tracks by grafting the agenda of economics onto the classic concerns of state security via neorealism. Of course, the tradition of mercantilist thinking, or economic nationalism, as Robert Gilpin prefers to describe it, clearly locks economic security into physical security—but on, and only on, a state basis. In this tradition, power and wealth, and hence national security, are inseparable and complementary, particularly in what are regarded as strategic industries, that is, those industries whose healthy development is considered necessary for the maintenance of national military-political security.58 Notwithstanding the mercantilist imperative for both states and theorists, the post-1945 international economic structure emerged as a U.S. hegemony that was articulated and developed on the public basis of a liberal trade and investment order with a constituting, rationalizing, and legitimating ideology of liberal political economy. Hence, for twenty years after IR and economics were theoretically ed in mainstream academic practice, it was only to the extent that a strong, broad-based modem economy was regarded as necessary to maintain security. However, the early intimations of the failure of U.S. policy to keep apart the Bretton Woods institutional twin-track system set up after World War II—separating international politics (as politics) and international economics (as technical management)—manifested themselves in the problems of the dollar and U.S. payments in the late 1960s. The unwillingness of the United States to tolerate a massive outflow of dollars forced a reconnection at the policy level of politics and economics, and this led to an upswing of interest in the international politics of economic conflict. The possibility of trade wars was mooted.59 But the real spur to the study of what became labeled "economic security" came with action by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 and the resultant oil-supply threats and related price shocks for the international economic system.60 The changing structure of the international political economy at that time, with the move to floating exchange rates and the rediscovery by the West (and the South) of economic vulnerability, brought forth a large number of studies on the issue and problems of economic security.61 The studies of economic security stemming from the crises of the 1970s defined their focus principally in terms of the interests of the state. Equally significant, their definition of economics prioritized issues of trade and trade relations and tended to ignore other potentially significant elements. This meant that deep structures of international political economy— finance, production, and knowledge62—and the changing international division of labor (and its implications) were not seen as part of this conception of economic security. In effect, IPE and IR (including that branch conceiving itself as security studies) meekly adopted the agenda of U.S. policy economists. After all, from the perspective of this approach, what matters when all states have adopted the goal of long-term economic growth are threats to the economic security of the state, and the territorial economy of the state, in terms of the ability of the state to deliver on its claimed economic goals. Such is particularly the case when this ability is made vulnerable by an apparent change in trade relationships or is made more sensitive to the problems of deepening economic interdependence.

### 2AC - Federalism

#### No link – plan doesn’t hurt federalism

Prince 10- Faculty of Human and Social Development at the University of Victoria, (Michael, “What About a Disability Rights Act for Canada?: Practices and Lessons from America, Australia, and the United Kingdom”, Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 36 No. 2, June, Project Muse)bs

**One feature of the ADA particularly interesting** to a Canadian audience, **given our system of federalism, is how the legislation relates to intergovernmental relations.** **With the** legislation **ADA, Congress claimed the dominant role in creating and enforcing non-discrimination mandates to protect the rights of people with disabilities** (Percy 1993). Intended to create national standards across the United States, the ADA placed disability rights mandates and obligations on state and local governments. Specifically, **the ADA rests on the exercise of “pre-emptive power”** **which**, under the supremacy clause of the American Constitution, **enables a federal law to displace a state or local law** **thus allowing a clear and comprehensive national mandate.**1 This exercise of federal power is regulatory federalism—in which the federal government legislates and enforces compliance in state, local, and private spheres—an approach thought to be more effective than the practice until that time of using the federal spending power to attach conditions to federal transfer payments to state governments (Percy 2001b). **The legislation therefore represents a strong assertion of national government authority**—a centralized approach with national standards justified in terms of a civil rights discourse and legal protection culture that resonates in American politics. In short, **the American federal government has** greater **jurisdiction** compared to the Canadian federal government. Another noteworthy difference between the American and Canadian political context is the active role the courts have played in defining what is a disability and in shaping the effect of this national rights legislation (Cameron and Valentine 2001; Gostin 2003; Jones 1995; Percy 2001a), a factor that eventually prompted Congress to clarify and amend the legislation.

#### Federalism low – Arizona immigration policy

**McDaniel 6/28/12**

**(Chris McDaniel, state senator, “McDaniel – Immigration ruling: federalism eroded by federal judiciary,” Y’all Politics, 6/28/12,** <http://yallpolitics.com/index.php/yp/post/32584/> /mr)

During the past ten years, over a third of the nation’s illegal border crossings occurred in the State of Arizona. ¶ It has experienced the brunt of the republic’s illegal immigration problem, with its citizens describing themselves as under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social services and even place their lives in jeopardy. ¶ Although the people of Arizona have long demanded federal action to assist in curbing the tide, our national government has refused to protect its border integrity. The state therefore had little choice but to pass legislation designed to address the problems associated with unfettered illegal immigration. In 2010, it passed SB 1070, known as “The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act."¶ In response, the US Department of Justice filed a lawsuit on July 6, 2010, requesting that it be declared invalid since it interferes with powers vested in the federal government. ¶ After the matter was appealed from a lower court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that four of the provisions were unconstitutional. Arizona then fought to reverse that decision. The Supreme Court, in December of 2011, agreed to consider the case.¶ On June 25, the Court issued a surprising majority opinion which affirmed much of the Ninth Circuit’s injunction against enforcement of the four challenged provisions, declaring it unconstitutional for Arizona to make it a state crime for an immigrant not to be carrying papers, to allow for warrantless arrests in select situations and to forbid illegal immigrants from working in Arizona.¶ In an about-face, it then upheld the most controversial part of the law -- a provision which requires law enforcement officers to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped, detained or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is in the country illegally.¶ In striking down three of the four provisions, however, the majority opinion ignored the states’ traditional role in regulating immigration. Before the ratification of the Constitution, each state had the authority to prevent itself from being burdened by an influx of persons. The Constitution, upon adoption, did not strip them of that power.¶ There is nothing improper, traditionally speaking, with states prohibiting actions already prohibited by federal law, just as there is nothing wrong in assisting with enforcement when federal laws are violated. As noted by Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent, Arizona did nothing more than attempt to protect its sovereignty. It was not in contradiction of federal law, but in complete compliance with it. SB 1070 did not extend or revise federal immigration restrictions, but merely enforced those restrictions more effectively. ¶ "What this case comes down to," Scalia argued, "is whether the Arizona law conflicts with federal immigration law -- whether it excludes those whom federal law would admit, or admits those whom federal law would exclude. It does not purport to do so. It applies only to aliens who neither possess a privilege to be present under federal law nor have been removed pursuant to the Federal Government’s inherent authority." ¶ He eloquently explained, "federal power over immigration comes from the same source as state power over immigration: it is an inherent attribute – perhaps the fundamental attribute – of sovereignty. The States, of course, are sovereign, the United States being a Union of sovereign States. To be sovereign is necessarily to possess the power to exclude unwanted persons and things from the territory.”¶ In short, the Court essentially deprived Arizona of what most would consider the defining characteristic of its sovereignty, which is the power to exclude those who have absolutely no right to be there. ¶ Spin doctors on both sides of the immigration debate will attempt to paint the Court’s majority opinion as a victory. And to be sure, both sides will be correct.¶ But the states will suffer because core features of federalism continue to be eroded by the federal judiciary. ¶ And, in large part, Arizona still remains at the mercy of the central government’s refusal to enforce the nation’s immigration laws.

**[ K IMPACT]**

**The concept of “failed states” is derived from a Western ideal of success – targets states modeled by non-American principles**

**Bello 7** (Walden, “Selling US Wars”, senior analyst of Focus on the Global South and professor of sociology at the University of the Philippine, p. 6-7)

State failure, David Sogge tells us, has many labels—"weak states, fragile states, crisis states, Countries at Risk of Instability, Low-income Countries Under Stress." But it is a term that panders to Western condescension and to its strong sense of superiority. This discourse of state failure emerges really after the end of the Cold War. Before that the West, led by the US, was much more concerned about the "threats" represented by "strong" but enemy states to the world order, which therefore needed the benevolent guardianship of the US and the Atlantic Alliance. In the 1990s "state failure" became the source of danger. According to some right-wing ideologues, what was happening in the Balkans, Asia, and Africa reflected an encroaching "anarchy," a "re-primitivization" of man's behavior, a resurfacing of barbarisms and ethnic hostilities inconceivable in the more "civilized" parts of the world. Left to fester, these places would become hotbeds of terrorism and retrograde forms of development antithetical to the needs of a globalizing economy and to the associated stability that only the West (led by the US) could provide. After 9/11, these fears were further accentuated. While some of the characteristics of a weak state—inadequate provision of vital public services, great country-wide lawlessness, immense difficulties in establishing and giving effect to collectively binding decisions—are clearly recognizable, they can fit a very wide array of countries. The more important question is "failure for whom"? Who decides the norms according to which failure is to be judged? And why? The disturbing answer here is that it is invariably the powerful countries of the West who decide. For them "success" is measured by the degree of "fit" of other states in the developing world (whether in the Balkans, Central, West, or South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, or the Americas) to the current scheme of things—neoliberal globalization stabilized by, above all, the power and authority of the US. Thus recalcitrant states unwilling to accept the rules as laid down by the US as well as those states well-endowed with valuable raw materials but poorly governed, can all be designated as "failed" or "failing" states with the sword of Damocles - the threat of external intervention —hanging over them. -The part of the world where the stigma of "failed states" is most likely to be applied (though far from being the only geographical area) is sub-Saharan Africa, where internecine strife, often connected to issues of control over scarce or valued material resources (minerals, timber, oil, diamonds, et cetera) of considerable importance to Western powers, has been of great intensity. This has drawn in the Western powers, including the US, and led to direct or indirect (via the UN) forms of military intervention. The US has generally seen the strategic importance of these regions in terms of the resources they possess rather than considering them of geopolitical significance. Thus, human rights abuses, whether in Sudan or Rwanda or in the Republic of Congo, have not been taken as realities that compel military interventions by the US or other Western powers. Geopolitical rather than moral considerations have usually been a much stronger spur to direct military interventions. Moreover, interventions can be covert as well as overt, indirect as well as direct, partial as well as comprehensive. Direct intervention is one way of "punishing" recalcitrant states and creating "friendly" ones. But at another level, low-intensity warfare against "undesirables" (be they the forces of politicized Islam or other anti-US currents) will do. After all, state failure comes in many degrees and guises and the response to it need not always be regime change but different forms of "nation-building," "state-building," and "institution-building." Yet those who most talk of the dangers of state failure and its spreading ambit refuse to recognize the reasons most responsible fir it. For Sogge, there are two crucially important reasons for this. First, neoliberal forms of economic globalization demand that states greatly reduce their involvement in the economy but bemoan their failure to overcome the negative consequences neoliberal recipes for growth and development—rising debt, escalating inequalities, and greater poverty in much of Africa and elsewhere. Export-oriented primary production as the main source - elites only reinforces their disregard for widespread domestic development. Unmotivated dependent studies, says Sogge, show clearly that the two sources for state breakdown and deep instability are rising socieoeconomic inequalities (not just poverty) and the criminalization and informal privatization of state apparatuses mean to serve the public but now suborned to the pursuit of powerful sectional interests.

### 2AC - Plan unpopular

#### **The plan sparks political backlash that decimates Obama’s political capital**

Percy, 2001 (Stephen, Ph.D., Indiana University A.B., Hamilton College, Political Science Professor at the University of Milwaukee, “Disability and Federalism: Comparing Different Approaches to Full Participation”, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=q5F8Oqks7oUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=Disability+and+Federalism:+Comparing+Different+Approaches+to+Full+Participation&ots=vhr2r60Sh2&sig=yknyDwNkcNyX66RQv7Zyl-ahnNQ#v=onepage&q&f=true)

The issue of ADA costs will remain at the forefront of the political whirlwinds that surround the implementation of this law to protect people with disabilities. Given the scope of the Act and insufficient information on such things as the number and type of employment accommodations and the extent of architectural barrier-removal projects that will be needed, it is extremely difficult to estimate the total costs of achieving nation-wide compliance with the ADA. While many types of accommodation can be made with little cost, substantial costs will be incurred in such areas as providing paratransit services, making key transit stations accessible, and making physical changes in services and facilities used by the public. One partial yet plausible set of estimates on ADA compliance was prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which estimated that the cost to the federal government in implementing the ADA would range from about S5 million in the first year to $31 million by 1995.7' But the real cost of compliance is with the content of the ADA — unlike other disability rights policies borne by state and local governments and private sector establishments, of course — will be substantially higher. With regard to the compliance costs to slate and local governments. CBO estimated that it would cost $20-30 million per year over several years to purchase additional lift-equipped buses. $15 million annually to provide maintenance to these buses, and several hundreds of millions of dollars over 30 years to make key rail and transit stations accessible. Still other dollars will be required to achieve compliance with other ADA mandates, including reasonable accommodation in employment and housing. Cost issues and the elevated opportunities for people with disabilities has the potential to generate a backlash against the ADA and its strong regulatory mandates. While significant political revolts against the ADA have not yet materialized, complaints have arisen in some quarters about expansiveness of ADA mandates and the fiscal requirements needed to achieve compliance. Communities, large and small, have complained about compliance costs for such things as major building renovations and interpreter services. Complaints range in scope from mandated actions that represent little more than anger about the "nuisance" of compliance to accommodations that represent substantial fiscal outlays (e.g., provision of paratransit services). Academics have entered the fray, challenging whether disability policies which advance the opportunities of people with disabilities are fair and just or whether they can enable undeserving claims to "jump the queue" while other more deserving public needs are left unmet.71 And while these critiques from practitioners and academics remain, these seem unlikely to derail the ADA. One analyst warns state and local governments that: "Given the militancy of the disabled, the activism of the [US Justice Department and the sympathies of most of the judiciary, ignoring the 'little things' [adherence to ADA mandates] can turn out to be the riskiest strategy of all."71

### 2AC- Plan popular

#### Programs for persons with disabilities are popular

Suter 7- Associate Commissioner of Employment Support Programs at the Social Security Administration, (Sue Congressional Quarterly, June 21)bs

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Social Security Administration's (SSA) efforts to assist beneficiaries with disabilities in addressing the barriers that make it difficult for them to return to work. Providing opportunities forbeneficiaries with disabilities to return to work has been part of the disability program since its inception more than 50 years ago. In 1999, Congress **expressed its bipartisan support** for building on these efforts by passing the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. This legislation has become an important tool in our ongoing return to work efforts. SSA's programs to reduce employment-related financial disincentives also support The President's New Freedom Initiative, which integrated all federal agencies in a process of including more Americans with disabilities into the workforce, through training, education, and reduction of programmatic barriers. The President and the Administration have put into place an array of supports, of which this program is one SSA serves a diverse population of individuals with disabilities through the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. SSDI and SSI beneficiaries represent various age groups and have different impairments, levels of education, work experience, and capacities for working. Assisting beneficiaries with disabilities to return to work has been among one of the most challenging issues facing SSA, and helping individuals with disabilities take advantage of employment opportunities remains one of SSA's highest priorities.

#### The plan is supported from both sides of the isle

Heasley 12 - Founder and Writer for DisabilityScoop.com – a leading news source for disability issues,( Shaun “Disability Rights Treaty Gains Support”, May 29, http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/29/disability-treaty-support/15735/)bs

In a rare show of bipartisan support, a group of senators said they want the United States to ratify an international convention on the rights of people with disabilities. The U.S. already signed the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2009, but approval from the U.S. Senate is needed to make the move official. President Barack Obama transmitted the treaty to the Senate earlier this month and asked the body to ratify it. Now, a group of seven senators representing both political parties is voicing support for the treaty as well. “All people deserve to be granted full and equal basic human rights, regardless of their physical or mental capabilities. I strongly support ratification of this critical treaty, and urge my colleagues to do the same,” said Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del. The treaty calls for greater community access and a better standard of living for the estimated 650 million people around the world with disabilities. In addition to Coons, other lawmakers coming out in support of the convention include Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa; Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz.; Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill.; Sen. Jerry Moran, R-Kan.; Sen. John Barrasso, R-Wyo.; and Sen. Tom Udall, D-N.M. Currently, 153 countries have signed the disability treaty and 112 have ratified it, according to the U.N.

#### Disabilities policies popular with the GOP - UN Treaty proves

**Pecquet 7/26,** The Hill, (GOPers approve UN disabilities pact despite abortion concerns) <http://hallnj.org/topics/35-health-care/769-the-americans-with-disabilities-act-a-20th-anniversary-of-the-unfinished-mission>

Three Republicans helped pass the United Nations treaty on people with disabilities out of committee on Thursday despite concerns over abortion.¶ Sens. Dick Lugar (R-Ind.), John Barrasso (R-Wyo.) and Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.) joined the 10 Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to pass the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which has the support of advocacy groups across the country. Proponents say it would merely require the rest of the world to catch up to the United States' high standards created by the Americans With Disabilities Act while protecting Americans with disabilities abroad, but opponents — including a number of home-schooling groups — have raised concerns about international standards being imposed on America.¶ The treaty, said panel Chairman John Kerry (D-Mass.), “raises the standard to our level without requiring us to go further.”¶ Abortion was the only issue to divide lawmakers along partisan lines.¶ Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) proposed language saying the treaty “does not create any abortion rights.” All nine Republicans on the panel voted for it.

#### Disabilities policies bipartisan

**NCD 10**, National Council on Diabilities, July 26, 10 “Equality of Opportunity The Making of the Americans with Disabilities Act” <http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED512697.pdf>)

The ADA truly was “a watershed public policy,” as Marca Bristo and Gerben ¶ DeJong wrote in the original Foreword, and the ADA’s history still has much to teach ¶ us today. “Passage of the ADA is a story of political leaders on both sides of the aisle ¶ who put aside personal and partisan differences to do what they thought was the right ¶ thing to do,” states the original Foreword, and kept the ADA from falling victim to a ¶ venomous public debate. There is a long record of bipartisan achievements on¶ disability issues—the ADA chief among them. Recounting the history of the ADA is ¶ therefore an opportunity to remind ourselves of the potential for disability issues to ¶ help build bridges across partisan divides. Bipartisan collaboration will not be easy in ¶ the current environment, but the future of effective disability policy depends on it. ¶

#### Coordination possible despite current political gridlock

**NCD 10**, National Council on Diabilities, July 26, 10 “Equality of Opportunity The Making of the Americans with Disabilities Act” <http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED512697.pdf>)

Passage of the ADA also indicates that coordination is both possible and ¶ necessary to remedy longstanding barriers. Passage of the ADA required separate ¶ review, analysis and coordination of multiple House and Senate committees, as well ¶ as support from the White House and executive agencies. It also required ¶ coordination among various stakeholders, including with various business groups—¶ even if such coordination was far from harmonious. Many of the barriers to ¶ advancing the ADA’s disability policy goals revolve around breakdowns in ¶ coordination—among federal agencies, across all levels of government, and among ¶ various stakeholders. The success of the ADA was never a foregone conclusion any ¶ more than solving many difficult disability policy issues is today. But enactment of ¶ the ADA reminds us that coordination is possible even if often overwhelming.

#### **Congressional support for disability promotion**

Diament 12 Co-founder of DisabilityScoop.com – a leading news source for disability issues, (Michelle, “Congress Takes on Outdated Disability Terminology”, May 10, <http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/10/congress-outdated-terminology/15582/>)bs

More than a year after the federal government replaced “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability” in many laws, officials are looking to shift away from other terms also deemed offensive to those with disabilities. Under a bill proposed last month, two U.S. senators want to remove the word “lunatic” from federal law. The term, which originates from Latin and first referred to a type of insanity spurred by changes in the moon, is now considered derogatory by those with mental illness and other disabilities. Much like the 2010 passage of Rosa’s Law replaced “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability” without changing the meaning or intent of any laws, Sen. Mike Crapo, R-Idaho, and Sen. Kent Conrad, D-N.D., say their 21st Century Language Act is simply an effort to reflect more modern terminology. “The continued use of this pejorative term has no place in the U.S. Code,” Conrad said on the Senate floor, reports BBC News Magazine. “‘Lunatic’ is an unnecessary term and… its removal will have no impact on the broader federal law.”

### 2AC – Tradeoff disads

Lol really?

## Impacts

### 2AC - Econ

####  Their input-output understanding of the economy doesn’t account for the complexity of human behavior – their predictions become self-referential and fail

**Arthur, 95** – W. Brian, Morrison Professor of Economics and Population Studies, Stanford University (“Complexity in Economic and Financial Markets,” Complexity, vol. 1, no. 1, April 1995, https://www.google.com/search?num=100&hl=en&q=%E2%80%9CComplexity+in+Economic+and+Financial+Markets%E2%80%9D&oq=%E2%80%9CComplexity+in+Economic+and+Financial+Markets%E2%80%9D&aq=f&aqi=g-K2g-mK1&aql=&gs\_l=serp.3..0i30l2j0i5i30.286168.287687.0.288309.2.2.0.0.0.0.135.258.0j2.2.0...0.0.cIhmcawH2B4)

One way to look at the economy, the standard way in fact, is to view it in physical terms as a collection of activities, technologies, and needs, all interacting though a market system peopled by decision-making agents such as firms, banks, consumers, and investors. A very different way—the one I want to explore here—would be to view the economy in psychological terms: as a collection of beliefs, anticipations, expectations, and interpretations; with decision-making and strategizing and action-taking predicated upon these beliefs and expectations. Of course, the two views are related. Activities follow from beliefs and expectations. And beliefs and expectations are mediated and sculpted by the physical economy they find themselves in. Why might a psychological or cognitive view of the economy be useful? Economic agents make their choices based upon their current beliefs or hypotheses (I will use these terms along with the jargon terms expectations or predictions) about future prices, or future interest rates, or competitors’ future moves, or the future character of their world. And these choices, when aggregated, in turn **shape the prices, interest rates, market strategies, or world** these agents face. The beliefs or hypotheses that agents form in the real economy are largely **individual and subjective.** They are often private. And they are constantly tested in a world that forms from their and others’ actions—a world that is ultimately formed from their and other agents’ subjective beliefs. Thus at a sub-level, we can think of the economy ultimately as a vast collection of beliefs or hypotheses, constantly being formulated, acted upon, changed and discarded; all interacting and competing and evolving and coevolving; forming an ocean of ever-changing, predictive models-of-the-world. This view is useful, I believe, because it forces us to think about how **beliefs create economic behavior**—and how economic outcomes create beliefs. And it leads to different insights. Beyond the simplest problems in economics, this ecological view of the economy becomes inevitable; and it leads to a **world of complexity.** The standard way to handle predictive beliefs in economic analysis is to assume identical agents who possess perfect rationality and arrive at shared, logical conclusions or expectations about the situation they face. When these expectations induce actions that aggregatively create a world that validates them as predictions, they are in equilibrium and are called rational expectations. Rational expectations are useful in demonstrating logical equilibrium outcomes and analyzing their consequences. But in the real world they **break down easily.** If some agents lack the computing power to deduce the posited outcome; or if some arrive logically at different conclusions from the same data (as they might in a pattern recognition problem); or if there is more than one rational expectations equilibrium with no means to coordinate which is chosen; then some agents may deviate in their expectations. And if some deviate, the world that is created may change, so that others should logically predict something different and deviate too. And so **rational expectations** can **unravel easily.** Unless there are special circumstances, **they are not robust.** There is a game in economics that illustrates this unraveling of rational expectations beautifully. It is the Guessing Game, where N players choose a number between 0 and 100, and the winner is the one closest to 2/3 of the average guess (see Nagel [16]). Obviously here, beliefs of what constitutes a good guess depend on one’s view of others’ beliefs of what constitutes a good guess. Now, uniform predictions of zero would constitute rational expectations; they would be self-validating in that if agents expected other agents to choose zero they should also choose zero. Therefore expectations that everyone will choose zero would be in equilibrium. And no other real number, if chosen by all, would constitute an expectational equilibrium. But does that mean that zero will necessarily be chosen? If I, as a reference player, suspect that some players—or even one player—may choose non-zero, then logically I ought to choose non-zero. And if I believe that others believe that someone may choose non-zero, I will deduce that they too will choose non-zero. Thus beliefs that some may choose non-zero lead others to expect non-zero and choose non-zero. The game leads to a self-referential sequence of “If they choose x, I and others should choose y. But if I and others choose y, they will have to choose z.” There is no closure here, and ultimately beliefs or expectations in this game are deductively indeterminate, no matter how logical or rational the agents are.1 Consider as a second example my Bar Problem (Arthur [2]). One hundred people must decide independently each week whether to show up at their favorite bar (El Farol in Santa Fe, say). The rule is that if a person predicts that more that 60 (say) will attend, he will avoid the crowds and stay home; if he predicts fewer than 60 he will go. This seems innocuous; but it destroys the possibility of long-run shared expectations. If all believe few will go, than all will go, thus invalidating these expectations. And if all believe many will no, no one will go, invalidating those expectations. Predictions of how many will attend depend on others’ predictions, and others’ predictions of others’ predictions. Once again there is **no rational means** to arrive at deduced a-priori predictions. These two problems are of course toy problems, concocted like the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma to make a point. But they illustrate a foundational difficulty in economics. Where forming expectations means predicting an aggregate outcome that is formed in part from others’ expectations, expectation formation can become self-referential. The problem of logically forming expectations then becomes ill-defined, and **rational deduction finds itself with no bottom ground to stand upon.** This indeterminacy of expectation-formation is by no means a rarity or anomaly within the real economy. On the contrary, **it pervades all of economics and game theory.**

### -- 1AR Econ

#### Economic predictions are subjective – the aff’s model can’t account for relationships between actors

**Arthur, 95** – W. Brian, Morrison Professor of Economics and Population Studies, Stanford University (“Complexity in Economic and Financial Markets,” Complexity, vol. 1, no. 1, April 1995, https://www.google.com/search?num=100&hl=en&q=%E2%80%9CComplexity+in+Economic+and+Financial+Markets%E2%80%9D&oq=%E2%80%9CComplexity+in+Economic+and+Financial+Markets%E2%80%9D&aq=f&aqi=g-K2g-mK1&aql=&gs\_l=serp.3..0i30l2j0i5i30.286168.287687.0.288309.2.2.0.0.0.0.135.258.0j2.2.0...0.0.cIhmcawH2B4)

Actions taken by economic decision makers are typically predicated upon hypotheses or predictions about future states of a world that is itself in part the consequence of these hypotheses or predictions. When we attempt to model how such predictions might be generated we become stymied: the predictions some economic agents might form depend on the predictions they believe others might form; and the predictions these might form depend upon the predictions they believe the original group might form. Predictions or expectations can then become self-referential and deductively **indeterminate**. This indeterminacy pervades economics and game theory. This paper argues that in such situations agents predict not deductively, but inductively. They form **subjective expectations** or hypotheses about what determines the world they face. And these expectations are formulated, used, tested, and possibly changed, in a world that forms from others’ subjective expectations. This yields individual expectations trying to prove themselves against others’ expectations. The result is an ecology of co-evolving, possibly **ever-changing expectations.** The resulting dynamics often can be analyzed only by computation. Inductive expectation formation is illustrated in an artificial computer-based stock market. Coevolution of expectations explains phenomena seen in real markets that appear as anomalies to standard finance theory.

### **2AC – Enviro**

**Nature is the epitome of chaos; trying to control ecology empirically fails**

#### Predicting the environment results in chaos because that’s what the environment is – no scenario for success

**Jervis, 97** – professor of international affairs at Columbia (Robert, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions”, Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, <http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/bibliography/comch03.html>)

Initial behaviors and outcomes often influence later ones, producing powerful dynamics that explain change over time and that cannot be captured by labeling one set of elements "causes" and other "effects." Although learning and thinking play a large role in political and social life, they are not necessary for this kind of temporal interaction. Indeed, it characterizes the operation of evolution in nature. We usually think of individuals and species competing with one another within the environment, thus driving evolution through natural selection. In fact, however, there is coevolution: plants and animals not only adapt to the environment, they change it. As a result, it becomes more hospitable to some life forms and less hospitable to others. Nature is not likely to "settle down" to a steady state as the development or growth of any life form will consume—and be consumed by—others, closing some ecological niches and opening others, which in turn will set off further changes. To some extent, organisms create their own environments, not only by direct actions (e.g., digging burrows, storing food, excreting waste products), but as their very existence alters the microclimates, nutrients, and feeding opportunities that will affect them and others. Indeed, not only does the amount of rainfall influence the vegetation that grows, but the latter affects the former as well. To take a more readily visible example, elephants thrive on acacia trees. But the latter can only develop in the absence of the former. After a while, the elephants destroy the trees, drastically changing the wildlife that the area can sustain and even affecting the physical shape of the land. In the process, they render the area uncongenial to themselves, and they either die or move on. The land is adapting to the elephants just as they are to it. One Maasai put it well: "Cows grow trees, elephants grow grasslands."18 Most consequentially, the very atmosphere that supports current life was produced by earlier forms, many of which could not survive in the new environment: long before humans, species of bacteria were so successful and generated so much pollution that they poisoned themselves.

### -- 1AR Enviro

#### Single notched solutions cant solve the environment – complexity is key

**Hendrick, 2009** – PhD in Conflict Resolution from Bradford University, contributor to the Oxford University Press (Diane, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications”, [http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf)](http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf%29//BZ)

The 1990s saw much attention being paid to the link between environment, population and conflict in the context of human security. There are significant debates about the nature of the processes at work and differing conclusions about how, and where, to intervene to reverse downward spirals. Thomas Homer-Dixon is one of the theorists in this field who stresses the value of a complexity approach. He advises that: “At the methodological level, we need to explore how causation works at the interface between the physical/ ecological and social worlds. Environment-conflict research brings us face to face with some of the most intractable issues in philosophy of science, specifically whether causal generalizations describing the social world have the same status as those describing the natural world. Because systems in both these domains are fundamentally complex—characterized by huge numbers of components, causal interactions, feedback loops, and nonlinearity—environment-conflict researchers can gain insights from complexity theory. We urge greater receptivity to the concepts and findings of this rapidly developing field.” (Homer-Dixon, 2000 p. 89) Homer-Dixon is scathing towards those who deny the relevance of complexity approaches rather than taking up the challenge to find new ways to research complex problems: “The problem of complexity exists in the real world. It cannot be wished away by assuming that it resides only in the mind of the researcher. ... Researchers in a variety of fields increasingly acknowledge the reality of complexity and are developing powerful theories to understand complex systems. These theories raise serious questions about conventional (often mechanistic) explanations of social phenomena and about the conventional methodologies used to study these phenomena (Cowan, Pines, and Meltzer, 1994). Rather than denying complexity’s existence, ... social scientists should explicitly acknowledge the problems it creates for their research and try to develop methods—such as those focusing on causal mechanisms—for dealing with it.” (Homer-Dixon, 2006 p. 87)

### 2AC – Heg

**Unipolarity impossible- in a world of chaos it is impossible to maintain power influence. Long term predictions of international affairs are impossible.**

**Kissane, 2007** – assistant dean at the Centre d'Etudes Franco-Americain de Management, lecturer at the University of South Australia, PhD from the University of South Australia in International Relations theory (Dylan, “The possibility for theoretical revolution in international politics”, [http://works.bepress.com/dylankissane/16)](http://works.bepress.com/dylankissane/16%29//BZ)

From the first two assumptions, it could be assumed that unipolarity in the system is a rare occurrence. If unipolarity is defined as the situation where, within a system, one actor is preponderant and controls more than half of the resources within that system, it should be rare under a chaotic system. This is for two reasons. Firstly, and largely from assumption one, it is understood that polarity will not be stable within a chaotic system. Assuming a system with a significant number and variety of actors (as the international system as described must be} then unipolarity can be expected to be much less common than multipolarity even bipolarity. Imagine, for example, 10 units in a system. There are only 10 ways in which the system could be unipolar but 45 different bipolar pairings and 968 ways the system can be multipolar. With reference to simple probability alone, it seems unlikely that unipolarity would be a normal state of affairs for the international system. Secondly, as it is assumed that actors will seek security to ensure their survival in the system, a sole power that dominates the system - as in a unipolar system - is likely to be interpreted as a threat by at least some of the other actors in the system (Layne 1993; Christensen 2001). Thus, while unipolarity is possible, it is likely to be challenged by other actors and last only a short time. No polar distribution is necessarily unstable In considering polarity, it should also be noted that in a chaotic system no particular polar distribution of power is necessarily more stable or ordered than any other. As Diana Richards has previously shown, under chaos unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity all have the potential to be stable. Unlike the anarchy of neorealist theory, chaos does not favour one distribution of power or security to another in terms of bringing stability to the system. As Richards has argued, a chaotic model includes "stable configurations ranging from unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, egalitarian multipolar [and] multipolar” (1993, 69). Interactions impact on non-interacting parties. Finally, and with reference to all three assumptions, in a chaotic system an actor can be sure that their interactions will have effects other than those intended by the actor. With small events having the potential for great impact on the wider system, it is unlikely that interactions between actors can ever be truly 'controlled' or 'limited'. Furthermore, in a chaotic environment it is impossible for actors to predict all of the impacts of their interactions (Gleick 1987, 21). This is not to say that they can predict none - for why else would an interaction take place if some result were not thought in some way to be likely to result? - but they cannot predict all of the impacts and eventual results. Thus, actors are perpetually in a state of being able to draw reasonably accurate short-term predictions about the results of interactions but without being able to draw long-term conclusions.

### -- 1AR Heg

#### Moves to American leadership are unpredictable – too many international interactions

**Lichtenstein, 2006** – Assistant Professor in Management at UMass (Benyamin, "Complexity leadership theory: An interactive perspective on leading in complex adaptive systems", part of a University of Nebraska-Lincoln Journal, <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub/8>)

Traditional, hierarchical views of leadership are less and less useful given the complexities of our modern world. Leadership theory must transi-tion to new perspectives that account for the complex adaptive needs of organizations. In this paper, we propose that leadership (as opposed to leaders) can be seen as a complex dynamic process that emerges in the interactive “spaces between” people and ideas. That is, leadership is a dynamic that transcends the capabilities of individuals alone; it is the product of interaction, tension, and exchange rules governing changes in perceptions and understanding. We label this a dynamic of adaptive leadership, and we show how this dynamic provides important insights about the nature of leadership and its outcomes in organizational fields. We define a leadership event as a perceived segment of action whose meaning is created by the interactions of actors involved in producing it, and we present a set of innovative methods for capturing and analyzing these contextually driven processes. We provide theoretical and practical implications of these ideas for organizational behavior and organiza-tion and management theory. Introduction As twenty-first-century management continues to emphasize decentralized organizing structures and co-evolutionary ecologies of firms, institutions, and markets, there is a growing recognition that traditional top-down theories of leadership are at best overly simplistic (Osborn et al., 2002). That is, leading-edge theorists and the leaders they inform are questioning the assumption that the essence of leadership rests within the character or the characteristic behaviors of effective supervisors (Seers, 2004). Worse, the notion that a leader exogenously “acts on” organizations in order to achieve the leader’s objectives may be misguided in the presence of the insight that orga-nizations are highly complex and nonlinear (Meyer et al., 2005). There is also a growing realization that effective leadership does not necessarily reside within the leader’s symbolic, motivational, or charismatic actions. If leadership is not “in” a leader or “done by” a leader, however, how are we to insightfully conceive exactly what constitutes leadership and from where it originates? A novel approach for answering these questions is grounded in complexity science, namely the notion that leadership is an emergent event, an outcome of relational interactions among agents. In this view, leadership is more than a skill, an exchange, or a symbol - leadership emerges through dynamic interactions (Bradbury and Lichtenstein, 2000). “Complexity leadership theory” investigates the role of leadership in expediting those processes in organizations through which interdependent actions among many individuals combine into a collective venture (Drath, 2001; Meyer et al., 2005). Founding the approach of this paper on complexity theory per se moves us to a whole- systems view and thus away from the more traditional approaches that focus on variables and component parts. Instead, we will focus on: • Expanding the locus of leadership from the isolated, role-based actions of individuals to the innovative, contextual interactions that occur across an entire social system; • Extending current theory and practice by focusing on micro-strategic leadership actions across all organizational levels and across organizational boundaries; • Increasing the relevance and accuracy of leadership theory by exploring how leadership outcomes are based on complex interactions, rather than “independent” variables; • Highlighting the relational foundations of change in emerging organizational fields, through the idea that leadership occurs in the “spaces between” agents; • Providing a new and rich foundation for explaining the constructive process of collective action as well as the influential “behaviors” of collective actors; • Connecting to innovative methodologies that can enrich our understanding of how leadership gets enacted and received in complex environments.