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\*\*Lasers DA – Aff Answers

UQ – ABLs Now

Non-Unique – momentum for funding now

Koski 7/4 Olivia Wired Staff Writer http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/laser-plane-gets-more-cash-to-blow-up-more-stuff-up/ TBC 7/6/10)

Once a half-billion-dollar a year operation, the Missile Defense Agency’s flagship laser weapon program got just $40 million this week to continue experiments. Boeing has to make due with a mere $330,000/day from June until September to keep the Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB) going. The money brings the ALTB’s total budget this year to $146 million. In February, the modified 747 destroyed a missile in flight with nothing but coherent light, but by then the Obama administration had already decided to all-but-end the program. According to a Defense Department announcement, the money will fund “additional missile engagement scenarios and flight testing to include all required support.” In other words: we’re gonna blow more stuff up! There is $100 million set aside for the laser weapon in the 2011 defense budget. ALTB proponents hope to slip in at least another $50 million – a drop in the budget compared to the $10 billion or so that the Missile Defense Agency is supposed to get next year. In a markup yesterday of the Fiscal Year 2011 defense authorization bill, a House Armed Services Committee panel proposed adding more funds to revive the program. “It was clear that the budget request was not sufficient to support further flight testing using the Airborne Laser Test Bed,” said Rep. Michael Turner of Ohio, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

Non-Unique – funding now

Hodge 10 (Nathan May 13 Wired Magazine http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/zombie-laser-plane-returns-to-haunt-washington/ TBC 7/6/10)

But some members of Congress love their flying lightsaber. In a markup yesterday of the Fiscal Year 2011 defense authorization bill, a House Armed Services Committee panel proposed adding more funds to revive the ABL program. “It was clear that the budget request was not sufficient to support further flight testing using the Airborne Laser Test Bed as well as mature innovative directed energy technologies,” said Rep. Michael Turner of Ohio, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Backers of ABL would like to see more tests like the one pictured here, in which the current test aircraft destroyed what the Missile Defense Agency described as a “threat representative” short-range missile back in February. And they’d also like to pour more money into the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program, which involves stationing interceptors in Alaska and California. The markup supports the completion of a second interceptor field in Alaska. It’s too early to say if ABL will actually stage a comeback: The Senate has a say in this, and appropriators need to pony up the cash. But it’s starting to look as if ABL is a candidate for our growing list of zombie weapons programs. And there’s good reason to expect that the final version of the authorization bill will be padded with extras. In a statement released this morning, Rep. Jeff Miller of Florida, the top Republican on the Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, said his panel had included additional funds to address “unfunded requirements” for U.S. Special Operations Command. In other words, it’s a continuation of an old ritual: Congress adding money for things the services have not asked for — at least formally.

Link D – Military Doesn’t Want ABL

No usage – DOD hates ABL

Duffy 10 (Thomas Vol. 93, No. 4 April Airforce Magazine publisher of Inside Washington Publishers’ Defense Group http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/April%202010/0410laser.aspx TBC 7/6/10)

When he appeared before the House Appropriations defense subcommittee last year, Gates pulled no punches in his assessment of ABL. “I don’t know anybody at the Department of Defense, Mr. Tiahrt, who thinks that this program should, or would, ever be operationally deployed,” Gates said in answer to a question posed by Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-Kan.). “The reality is that you would need a laser something like 20 to 30 times more powerful than the chemical laser in the plane right now to be able to get any distance from the launch site to fire.” Gates continued his stinging criticism of the program. “The ABL would have to orbit inside the borders of Iran in order to be able to try and use its laser to shoot down that missile in the boost phase,” he told Tiahrt. “And if you were to operationalize this you would be looking at 10 to 20 747s, at a billion-and-a-half dollars apiece, and $100 million a year to operate.” There is “nobody in uniform that I know who believes that this is a workable concept,” Gates added. “I have kept the first—the prototype—because we do need to continue the research on directed energy and on lasers, and that will be robustly funded because we do need to continue developing a boost-phase capability, but, operationally, this first test, for example, is going to be from a range of 85 miles.” The two recent tests don’t seem to have changed Gates’ mind any. During a Feb. 18 Pentagon press briefing, Gates’ spokesman Geoffrey S. Morrell said the Secretary has never been against the idea of a laser weapon for missile defense. “He had issues with the platform. The [concept of operation] on the platform didn’t work,” Morrell said.

Link Turn – Withdrawal 🡪 Contractors

**Contractors get new work managing troop withdrawals – Kuwait and Iraq prove**

World Tribune 4/22 (“Contractors to expedite U.S. withdrawal, shrink infrastructure in Kuwait,” http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me\_gulf0335\_04\_22.asp) GAT

The U.S. military has selected contractors to help reduce its presence in Kuwait. Officials said the Defense Department has been awarding contracts to U.S. firms to facilitate the reduction of forces in Kuwait. They said the U.S. military would thin its huge logistics and training infrastructure in Kuwait as the withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq concludes in September 2010. "We could have a much smaller footprint in Kuwait once there is no longer a need to support a combat presence in Iraq," an official said. On March 31, the Pentagon awarded a $46 million contract to Combat Support Associates, based in Fort Worth, Texas. Under the contract, Combat Support would help in the flow of U.S. troops and equipment from Kuwait. The company has already been under contract to the U.S. military. "This procurement is for base operations support services, including security and logistics for supplies and services, which are critical to accomplishing the mission and functions of assigned and tenant units moving into, out of, and within the country of Kuwait," the Pentagon said on April 6. Officials said the U.S. military has nearly 20,000 soldiers in Kuwait to help in the withdrawal from Iraq. They said this has marked an increase in American personnel based in the Gulf Cooperation Council sheikdom in an effort to enhance security and other functions. "Base operation services also support the Coalition/Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration mission; promotes security and stability within the region; and provides operational support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while simultaneously fulfilling international security commitments and theater deterrence in support of the Defense Cooperative Agreement between the United States and Kuwait," the Pentagon said. Officials said the U.S. military has been copying elements of its command and control network in Iraq for installation in Afghanistan. They said the Pentagon has awarded a $14 million contract to FedTech Services to develop an information technology solution in Afghanistan — termed Theater Network Management Architecture — that would be similar to that operating in Iraq. The contract with Combat Support would take place in Kuwait through September 2010. The statement said one bid was solicited and received. The Pentagon also awarded a $77 million contract to DRS Technical Services to assist in the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq. Under the contract, DRS would support the transition of the military's command, control, communications and computer capabilities from several locations within Iraq to the Baghdad International Zone, the U.S. embassy, and other enduring forward operating bases. "The majority of the services involve project management, program planning and analysis, telecommunications engineering, systems and network engineering and integration, and communications infrastructure installation to include inside and outside plant architecture," DRS said on April 7.

ABLs Good – 2AC\*\*

ABL is key to peace in the nuclear era – deterrence, accidental launch, terrorism, Russia, China, and rogue states

Strategic Comments 4 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Volume 10, issue 6, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-10-2004/volume-10---issue-6/the-impact-of-missile-defence-in-asia/)JFS

The decision to supplant the old deterrence-by-punishment approach with a new emphasis on strategic defences derived from the perception that the new threats to American security emerged from two different directions simultaneously: command-and-control infirmities in established or emerging nuclear states that could lead to accidental launches or mistaken authorised launches against the US homeland or American facilities overseas; and nuclear coercion by rogue regimes, terrorists, or emerging small nuclear powers. The strategic defence programme developed in response to these threats has taken the form of a layered system that is intended to have the capability to intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of flight – boost, midcourse and terminal – and act against short-, medium-, intermediate- and long-range threats. This programme has been structured in a series of two-year ’blocks’ that build iteratively upon each other. The Block 2004 objective, for example, consists of fielding an initial capability to defend against a small number of re-entry vehicles (probably not more than four) targeting the United States. The first step towards this goal occurred on 22 July 2004, when the first Ground Based Interceptor was emplaced at the Missile Defense Complex at Fort Greely, Alaska. A total of about 15 interceptors are expected to be in place by the end of 2005. The Block 2006 objective consists of increasing the depth and breadth of this initial capability by adding more interceptors, additional deployable radars and integrating these systems to maximise their performance. The Block 2008 objective, building on these mid-course intercept capabilities already deployed, focuses on protecting US forces deployed overseas and coalition partners abroad, and seeks to add an initial technological capability, probably via the airborne laser, to defeat missile threats in the boost phase. As these defences mature, the critical challenge facing the Bush administration and its successors will be getting the offence-defence mix right, if the new nuclear regime is to be stable over time. Specifically, that means that the new American BMD systems must be robust enough to defeat legitimate threats, but not so strong as to threaten the retaliatory capabilities of various national deterrents. Satisfying this condition will require a cooperative transition to the new global regime, because so long as offence-dominance prevails in the nuclear realm – meaning that offensive missiles have cost- and mission-advantages over their defensive counterparts – all capable state adversaries will be able to defeat US strategic defences in principle. If at some point in the future defence dominance were to obtain in the nuclear realm, the imperative of cooperative transitions would become less pressing. Until that point, however, effective and creative US diplomacy, as well as some measure of acquisition restraint, will be required to convince the established nuclear powers, particularly Russia and China, that the future American BMD capabilities are intended solely to deal with the problem of accidental or unauthorised launches and nuclear coercion by rogues, terrorists or unfriendly emerging nuclear powers, rather than to undermine their national deterrents. As long as US strategic defences consist of limited mid-course and terminal defence systems, reassuring traditional state competitors like Russia and China will not be difficult. But once the defensive ‘system of systems’ expands to include airborne or space-based lasers, as is scheduled after 2008, this task will become more complicated, as these boost-phase intercept systems can sanitise large areas of the globe and intercept offensive missiles more easily when they are relatively slow and before they deploy decoys. While boost-phase intercept capability is therefore ideal when dealing with rogue missile threats, it can also serve to undermine many of the features that make the Russian and Chinese missile deterrents relatively invulnerable today.

ABLs Good – 2AC\*\*

No risk of your turns – ABL is inevitable and solves conflict with Russia, North Korea, and Iran

Kramnik 10 (Ilya, RIA Novisti military commentator, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100216/157899270.html)JFS

Speaking of a hypothetical Russian-U.S. conflict, airborne laser weapons would have to be deployed in Russian air space in order to be able to intercept Russian missiles in their boost phase and during the separation of their multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In fact, they would have only 3-5 minutes to accomplish this objective. However, even Russia's problem-ridden air-defense system would not allow a B-747 to roam free in national air space. Airborne laser weapons present a greater threat to strategic ballistic missile submarines which either patrol Russian territorial waters or international waters. However, there is one limitation. As the submarines spend most of their time underwater, laser-carrying aircraft could not quickly reach the optimal firing position necessary for a successful missile interception. Consequently, this project's current version threatens only countries such as Iran or North Korea which have a small territory and are therefore unable to deploy missile bases far from their borders. In the next several decades, the potential for laser weapons may be enhanced, especially if it becomes possible to deploy them on hypersonic suborbital platforms operating in the upper atmosphere where laser dissipation is minimized. However, it would be pointless to deploy such weapons aboard spacecraft, unless payload mass is increased drastically because it would otherwise prove impossible to orbit high-power laser units. It is impossible to struggle against the development of laser weapons. Practical experience shows that legal documents seldom effectively limit technical progress. Consequently, we must start preparing for a new round of the arms race now. It is common knowledge that Russia is currently developing new-generation ballistic missiles which will be able to breach missile-defense systems with laser weapons. This objective can be accomplished by reducing a missile's boost phase, enhancing the maneuverability along this flight leg, etc. Analysts are discussing other measures that can shield missiles from laser beams. Naturally, Russia must conduct independent research in this area to be able to manufacture airborne laser weapons and to effectively cope with similar enemy systems. Media reports about the reinstatement of the A-60 program are particularly important in this context.

ABL solves all scenarios for conflict and is coming fast

Ennerson 9 (Shane 10/3 Freelance Writer http://www.goarticles.com/cgi-bin/showa.cgi?C=2136872 TBC 7/6/10)

More flight tests are being conducted, and later this year the high-energy laser will be installed in the aircraft. The program now is just two years away from demonstrating that it can hit and destroy a missile in the boost phase. Nearly all the hardware has been built and most of the cost has been paid. It is important to finish testing this advanced technology to find out whether high-energy lasers will be practical weapons in future warfare. An Airborne Laser patrolling near Iran could defend U.S. bases in the Middle East as well as Israel and other allies. And ABLs flying over the Western Pacific could protect U.S. bases in the area, in addition to our allies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In a letter to Congress last month, U.S. Army Gen. B.B. Bell, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, noted that North Korea has some 800 ballistic missiles able to carry conventional and chemical weapons. Intercepting them in the boost phase "would be a huge combat multiplier," he wrote. Gen. Bell urged Congress to restore funding for the ABL test program.

ABL is inevitable and good

Ellison 10 (Riki Feb 12, Chairman and Founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/laser-shoot-down-forces-congress-to-challenge-obama-missile-defense-budget-84229437.html TBC 7/6/10)

"The ABL is initially proven and should continue to be developed, tested and even deployed if necessary. The successful test on February 12th gives weight to the release last week of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review endorsement of Missile Defense development by the President and the Secretary of Defense who have recognized the quantitative and qualitative threat to our nation, allies and deployed forces from ballistic missiles. Furthermore, in lieu of Iran's recent and continued nuclear developments, the ability of our Military to use the ABL with U.S. air superiority to engage and destroy multiple Iranian missiles in seconds over Iran could be a critical asset if in the future a situation arose between Iran and the United States. This capability would have similar relevancy for the United States in the Korean peninsula in regards to North Korean's ballistic missile threats and nuclear capability in the region." "The ABL should be given priority, further developed and be funded to be kept a fully viable defensive weapon system as a credible hedge against ballistic missile threats. The U.S. Congress will inevitably challenge the Department of Defense and the administration to fully fund and further develop this system to have an ability to deploy this system in crisis regions providing our armed forces and allies' necessary protection."

ABLs Good – Bio-D 2AC

ABL key to restoring natural fish habitats

IANS 9 (Indo Asian News Service, Feb, http://www.india-forums.com/news/article.asp?id=157861, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Washington, Feb 23 (IANS) Lasers beamed from airplanes are greatly sharpening images of streams and rivers and interpreting how well water bodies can help maintain or expand fish stocks, according to a new study. 'It's kind of like going from your backyard telescope to the Hubble telescope,' says Boston College Geologist Noah P. Snyder. 'Restoring fish habitat is just one example. For the fisherman, backpacker, forester, land-use planner or developer - anyone who uses map data - this new technology is the next revolution in mapping.' Airborne laser elevation (Lidar) surveys provide a 10-fold improvement in the precision with which topographical features are measured. Lidar represents the latest technology to improve digital topographical maps - known as digital elevation models (DEM). Pulsing laser beams released by a Lidar device from a plane overhead bounce off of rocks, trees, soil, even water, and send signals back to the device, which makes topographical calculations based on the time it takes the laser signal to return at the speed of light. Hundreds of beams produce a dynamic topographical picture, Snyder said. In the case of streams and rivers, the technology means that channel features such as water surface, bank edges, floodplains, even the slope of a stream, can be measured, he reports in the journal. In addition, Lidar provides new types of data about the vegetation that covers a particular watershed, such as the height and density of the tree canopy, Snyder said. 'We can look at much finer scale features in streams using a remote mapping technique, as opposed to field work over the entire lengths of streams,' says Snyder, chairman of the steering committee of the National Centre for Airborne Laser Mapping. 'Digitally, we can now connect topographical features to habitat characteristics or the habitat that needs to be restored,' he said, according to a Boston release. That means geologists and other earth scientists will be able to digitally search large swathes of Lidar-mapped territory for a particular feature of interest - like salmon habitat or particularly steep sections of streams - then narrow down likely candidates for field study.

Collapse of fish habitats destroys biodiversity

Nuttal 6 (Nick, Head of Media Services for United Nations Environment Programme, “Overfishing: a threat to marine biodiversity,” http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=800) AJK

Despite its crucial importance for the survival of humanity, marine biodiversity is in ever-greater danger, with the depletion of fisheries among biggest concerns. Fishing is central to the livelihood and food security of 200 million people, especially in the developing world, while one of five people on this planet depends on fish as the primary source of protein. According to UN agencies, aquaculture - the farming and stocking of aquatic organisms including fish, molluscs, crustaceans and aquatic plants - is growing more rapidly than all other animal food producing sectors. But amid facts and figures about aquaculture's soaring worldwide production rates, other, more sobering, statistics reveal that global main marine fish stocks are in jeopardy, increasingly pressured by overfishing and environmental degradation. “Overfishing cannot continue,” warned Nitin Desai, Secretary General of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, which took place in Johannesburg. “The depletion of fisheries poses a major threat to the food supply of millions of people.” The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation calls for the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which many experts believe may hold the key to conserving and boosting fish stocks. Yet, according to the UN Environment Programme’s (UNEP) World Conservation Monitoring Centre, in Cambridge, UK, less than one per cent of the world’s oceans and seas are currently in MPAs. The magnitude of the problem of overfishing is often overlooked, given the competing claims of deforestation, desertification, energy resource exploitation and other biodiversity depletion dilemmas. The rapid growth in demand for fish and fish products is leading to fish prices increasing faster than prices of meat. As a result, fisheries investments have become more attractive to both entrepreneurs and governments, much to the detriment of small-scale fishing and fishing communities all over the world. In the last decade, in the north Atlantic region, commercial fish populations of cod, hake, haddock and flounder have fallen by as much as 95%, prompting calls for urgent measures. Some are even recommending zero catches to allow for regeneration of stocks, much to the ire of the fishing industry.

Species loss outweighs nuclear war

Tobin 90 (Richard, “The Expendable Future, p 22) AJK

Norman Meyers observes, no other form of environmental degradation “is anywhere so significant as the fallout of species.” Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson is less modest in assessing the relative consequences of human-caused extinctions. To Wilson, the worst thing that will happen to earth is not economic collapse, the depletion of energy supplies, or even nuclear war. As frightful as these events might be, Wilson reasons that they can “be repaired within a few generations. The one process ongoing…that will take millions of years to correct is the loss of genetic and species diversity by destruction of natural habitats.

ABLs Good – China/Rogues 2AC

Airborne Laser systems are key to solve impending threats from Iran, North Korea, al Qaeda, and China

Rayburn 10 (Maj. Gen. Bentley B., March 5 is the former commandant of the Air War College http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/05/killing-airborne-laser-jeopardizes-america/ TBC 7/6/10)

Many of us had hoped when the Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet Union disintegrated and, under the leadership of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the West won the Cold War without firing a shot, the world would be a safer place. The opposite has turned out to be the case. Into the vacuum left by defeated Soviet troops in Afghanistan stepped the Taliban and al Qaeda. China remains an aggressive rival of the U.S., its military and economic ambitions growing. Iran funds Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. North Korea and Iran both stand on the nuclear precipice, thumbing their nose at the civilized world and destabilizing Asia and the Middle East. Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed to fight "the U.S. and the Zionist regime" from the deck of a newly minted cruise-missile destroyer in the Persian Gulf. This kind of saber-rattling from the leading state sponsor of terrorism poses a threat, not only to the U.S., but to moderate Arab states, Israel and Europe. This is why the development of anti-ballistic-missile technology is so essential to U.S. security. Off the coast of California on Feb. 11, an American high-powered laser weapon shot down a ballistic missile in the first successful test of an airborne anti-missile laser system. That's not the opening line of a new science fiction thriller; in fact, it's science fact. The so-called Airborne Laser aircraft is capable of training a megawatt-class laser on a missile traveling at 4,000 mph long enough to destroy it in flight. The potential for such lasers goes well beyond missile defense. Since the laser can be aimed with great precision over long distances, and fired for shorter or longer periods of time, it is a versatile tool in our arsenal for any number of situations requiring high mobility, precision and variable force levels. And in the same week, we were also reminded of why we are developing the Airborne Laser defense system: Iran recently claimed the ability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels and has been steadily developing its missile technology. North Korea, which already possesses nuclear weapons, is pursuing the same course. These and other persistent threats are ominous reminders that it falls to the United States to defend ourselves and our allies against rogue regimes, armed with conventional and unconventional missile technologies. The successful airborne laser test was as welcome and encouraging to most Americans as the ugly face of Iran's dictatorship was unwelcome and menacing. Unfortunately, the Pentagon budget is sorely out of sync with these realities. Congress and the Obama administration are actually defunding the very same Airborne Laser project that has just succeeded in doing something once relegated to science fiction movies.

ABLs Good – Democracy 2AC

**ABL good- prevents conflict and facilitates democracy**

**Curtis and Carafano 9** (Lisa and James, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/01/US-India-Strategic-Partnership-on-Laser-Based-Missile-Defense, date accessed: 7/6/2010) AJK

The United States and India share many security concerns, such as the threat of ballistic missiles. V. K. Saraswat of the Defense Research and Development Organization rightly told the Press Times of India: "If you have a laser-based system on an airborne or seaborne platform, it can travel at the speed of light and in a few seconds, [and] we can kill a ballistic missile coming towards [India]." India's Interest in developing directed energy defenses is understandable, as lasers have several distinct advantages. **Such weapons: Can** use a high-powered beam of energy to **disable electrical components or detonate explosives**, rendering the attack means such as the warhead or body of a missile useless; Come with an almost infinite magazine--as long as **the weapons** have power, they **can be recharged and fired again; Can be aimed effectively using existing target acquisition systems** (such as radars) and command and control systems (such as a computer battle management network); and Can be employed with a minimum of risk toward surrounding civilians, buildings, or vehicles (such as aircraft, cars, and ships). In addition, lasers are versatile. While high-powered lasers address ballistic missile threats, low-powered lasers have a number of potential security uses, from disabling small boats to downing shoulder-fired missiles to intercepting rockets and mortars. All these uses have application to Indian security concerns. It is also worth noting that **missile defenses, such as high-powered lasers, limit the potential for regional conflict. Missile defenses serve as important deterrents, undermining the effectiveness of enemy threats.** **They** also **provide an alternative to massive retaliation in the face of an actual attack.** The security provided by **missile defenses** actually **limits the likelihood of armed escalation or an arms race and makes diplomacy more effective**. It is no coincidence that the greatest strides in reducing the nuclear arsenals came in the late 1980s, at the same time the U.S. was pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative. **A world with effective missile defenses is safer and more stable.**

**Turns the Aff – democracies limit military involvement and sustain development**

**Diamond 95** (Larry, senior researcher at the Hoover Institute, 1995 “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/4.htm , date accessed: 7/6/2010) AJK

Second, regardless of how they perform economically, **democracies** with more coherent and effective political institutions **will be more likely to perform well politically in maintaining not only political order but a rule of law, in ensuring civil liberties, in checking the abuse of power, and in providing meaningful representation, competition, choice, and accountability.** Third, well-institutionalized **democracies** **are** also **more likely to produce**, over the long run, workable, **sustainable, and effective economic and social policies**, because they have more effective and stable structures for representing interests and because they are more likely to produce working legislative majorities or coalitions that can adopt and sustain policies. Moreover, **a strong party system facilitates governability and effective macroeconomic management even in the face of prolonged economic crisis**.82 Finally, and largely because of all these factors, **democracies** with capable, coherent democratic institutions **are better able to limit military involvement in politics and assert civilian control over the military.**

ABLs Good – Iran Scud Attack 2AC

ABL is key to prevent devastating scud attack from Iran

Carafano 10 (James Heritage Foundation Feb 22 http://www.opposingviews.com/i/dumping-airborne-laser-leaves-america-vulnerable-to-nuclear-attack TBC 7/6/10)

On the other hand, here is what the administration won’t admit. There are other threats already out there that the Airborne Laser is well-suited to counter. One such danger is the “Scud in bucket” scenario. Scud missiles are shorter-range weapons, originally manufactured and proliferated worldwide by the Soviets. Today, several other countries make their own versions. These missiles are so readily available — and cheap — that several years ago a U.S. arms collector bought one and tried to ship it home. Iran’s Shahab-3, an advanced Scud variant, seems capable of traveling 1,000 kilometers and carrying as much as a 10-kiloton warhead. It couldn’t reach Washington from Tehran, but then, it wouldn’t have to. Iran could easily extend the missile’s reach simply by moving it to a commercial freighter and firing it from nearby using an improvised vertical launch tube disguised as cargo. In many ways, Scud in a bucket is the ultimate weapon. It could sail close to U.S. waters without being subject to inspection by the Coast Guard or Customs. The enemy could fire the missile and scuttle the ship, leaving no record of who launched the attack. If Iran has one missile and nuclear weapon, it might have two. It could detonate one over New York in a low-altitude air burst that would kill up to a half-million and cripple Manhattan forever. Iran could fire a second at high altitude over the mid-Atlantic states, creating an electro-magnetic pulse that would take down a large portion of the national grid and plunge Washington, D.C., into permanent darkness. America would be crippled in a flash, with no obvious enemy at which to shoot back. An ABL could help neutralize this threat, and others. Advancing the technology alone will give the U.S. a dramatic advantage over potential adversaries. But if the administration has its way, we’ll see the ABL in the Smithsonian, rather than defending our coasts.

ABLs Good – Nuclear Terror 2AC

ABL checks nuclear terrorism before it happens

Smith 9 (W. Thomas former Marine rifle-squad leader, military/defense issues analyst, 9/15/, Airborne Laser Could Save Us From Terrorist Nightmare Scenario, Human Events, p. <http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=33538>)JFS

Perhaps one of the most frightening terrorist-attack scenarios is one wherein a nuclear-tipped missile is launched by terrorists from a seemingly harmless cargo ship somewhere off the coast of the United States. In such an attack, the missile could be hurtling skyward almost before our current missile-defense system had time to blink. The missile’s warhead could then be remotely detonated somewhere 20 to 60-plus miles above the visual horizon, and -- in addition to killing everyone in the blast and radiation radius -- trigger an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), which would basically fry every single electrical circuit in the blast’s line-of-sight for hundreds of miles in every direction. An EMP would effectively knock out all electrical grids, aircraft, trains, ships, automobiles, computers, medical equipment, ATM machines, cooling and heating systems, TVs, radios, telephones, blackberries, flashlights, electric toothbrushes, and children’s toys in an instant. In less time than that required to take a breath, a huge section of North America would be catapulted back to the 18th century. Yet because we are so completely dependent upon 21st century technology, the ensuing chaos, crime, starvation, and disease would be something unimaginable. A single enemy missile could do this to us. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, however, have an answer to this threat in the Airborne Laser (ABL) program, essentially a high-energy laser-beam system housed in a Boeing 747-400 aircraft. (Boeing is the primary ABL contractor. Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are partners developing the laser-weapon system.) The ABL system is designed to kill enemy ballistic-missiles -- short, medium, and long-range -- during the boost-phase portion of the missile’s flight, shortly after the missile has been launched. And being that the system is airborne, ABL is capable of patrolling the U.S. coastline as well as near-and-above “potential enemy ballistic-missile hotspots,” worldwide.

**Extinction**

**Sid-Ahmed 4** (Mohamed, political analyst, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

**What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists?** Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. **It would** also **speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.** But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This **could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war** which ends when one side triumphs over another, **this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.**

ABLs Good – Nuclear Terror 1AR

**ABL key to solve terror attacks**

**Echevarria and Tussing 3** (Antulio J. and Bert, Director of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies and Professor of National Security Affairs for the Center for Strategic Leadership, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub210.pdf, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Applying the same principle of enhanced visibility to other endeavors, the concept of global defense-in-depth can assist in defeating any number of threats. For example, by reading residual 7 effusions in the air, **laser** remote optical sensing **systems mounted on aircraft can determine whether chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons** (as well as narcotics) **are being produced** at any given location.25 **They can also track the movement of such weapons or illegal substances** by monitoring the effusions from a cargo container, a vehicle, or even an individual who has handled the weapons or substances. If arrayed in depth globally, such **airborne lasers could provide early warning of the preparation and approach of dangerous or illegal materials**, which military forces or appropriate law enforcement officials could then intercept. **We should not forget that terrorists need not transport chemicals, nuclear materials, and biological agents themselves, but could simply target any one of the 38,000 facilities within the United States that store hazardous materials**, or one of our more than 100 nuclear power plants.26 Indeed, some sources report that **such an attack is more likely than scenarios in which terrorists smuggle dangerous materials into the United States**.27 Such a capability could also augment our defense against cruise missiles, many of which might otherwise be launched from offshore container ships or similar types of land vehicles with little or no warning.

ABLs Good – US-ROK 2AC

**Continuing ABL programs key to US-ROK alliance**

**Klinger 8** (Bruce, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/06/Transforming-the-US-South-Korean-Alliance , date accessed: 7/6/2010) AJK

Washington will have to balance achieving U.S. security objectives with sensitivity to South Korean domestic political constraints. Although **the U.S. will need to push South Korea in order to achieve progress toward a strategic alliance**, it must not appear domineering. Washington risks triggering strong public reactions due to lingering South Korean animus from the perceived superior-subordinate relationship. The scope and vehemence of the protests triggered by South Korea's April 2008 decision to reopen its market to U.S. beef imports showed the extent of latent anti-Americanism. **Overstressing the newly improved relationship with excessive demands would be counterproductive.** Of course, the two allies' perceptions of what constitutes "excessive" will differ. The Bush-Lee Camp David summit, seen as wildly successful in the U.S., generated accusations in South Korea that Washington was taking advantage of Lee's desire to improve bilateral relations to levy excessive new demands. The U.S. asked for an increased Korean cost share for U.S. troop presencein South Korea and base relocation, as well as Seoul's involvement in the proliferation security initiative, missile defense, and deploying troops to Afghanistan. U.S. officials correctly pointed out that these have all been long-standing requests. The Korea Times warned President Lee not to let his "self-declared pragmatic diplomacy be taken hostage for the alliance with the U.S.&hellip; The Lee administration should not sacrifice South Korea's national interests under the name of alliance."[19]  Chosun Ilbo editorialized that "if the U.S. piles up its demands on Korea like overdue homework, it will end up frustrating our side and may result in growing skepticism about the alliance and give anti-American factions an excuse to raise their voices."[20]  What the U.S. and South Korea Should Do Washington must not abandon its vision for a more comprehensive alliance, but it should prioritize its alliance objectives and lower expectations to conform to local South Korean realities. **Both governments must ensure that Seoul's quest for a broader global footprint is not depicted as an attempt by the U.S. to offload its security needs onto a reluctant ally**. The Bush and Lee administrations must set a positive tone in bilateral consultations and address developing issues before they become contentious. To this end, **U.S. policymakers should:** Affirm the importance and benefits of the alliance even while modernizing and transforming it. Continue efforts for Seoul to assume a larger responsibility for its defense consistent with a continued U.S. military presence and commitment to the defense of South Korea. Affirm unequivocal commitment to defending South Korea by maintaining existing U.S. force levels and deterrent capabilities, including missile defense, attack helicopter, and ground combat units. Support joint efforts to sustain and improve C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) to enhance integrated command capabilities**. Maintain the development of high-altitude air defense, airborne laser, and Aegis ballistic missile defense to provide layered missile defense capability and deploy additional PAC-3 missiles to South Korea.**

**US-ROK alliance deters terrorism- Navy and NPT**

**Denmark 9** ( Abraham Denmark, Center for a New America Security, CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

**One area** in which the **ROK** has already **demonstrated the alliance’s extra-peninsular context has been in the global war on terror.** **South Korea played** a significant **role in Iraq, providing the third-largest ground contingent, and in Afghanistan, where it provided logistics and medical support**. Yet, there are many other areas of potential growth; **Korea’s** proven record of **peacekeeping operations** in **places such as East Timor** and Lebanon show that **Seoul** can **play an increasingly prominent leadership role in other areas of domestic instability including Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific island nations**. The ROK **Navy can perform important regional tasks to maintain freedom of navigation in Asian waters. Korea’s** emphasis on **nuclear power makes it** a major player in efforts to **move countries** such as **China away from carbon-based strategies to cleaner and more carbon-neutral energy** development. Additionally, Korea’s **record as** a **responsible** Non-Proliferation Treaty (**NPT**) member could **become even stronger in the future through the potential leadership role** that **Seoul** could **play** in d**ismantling a nuclear program** inherited from a collapsed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (**DPRK**). Seoul is also seeking to enhance its global profile as a provider of development assistance, in particular by helping countries make the transition into modernity through assistance in information technology.

ABLs Good – Russia Civil War

**ABL key to solve Russia- Georgia war**

**Carafano 8** (James, Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/08/Russia-Georgia-War-Highlights-Need-for-Directed-Energy-Defenses, date accessed: 7/6/2010) AJK

For the second time in recent years, the United States has witnessed another wake-up call for the importance of fielding directed-energy weapons capable of shooting-down mortar and artillery fire, as well as intercepting short-range rockets and missiles.The Pentagon, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Congress need to place more emphasis on fielding working prototypes of these systems as quickly as possible. People as Targets Terrorism continues to be the scourge of the 21st century, but the age of conventional wars is far from over. In recent years we have had plenty examples where both means of warfare have employed conventional weapons to target civilians. Specifically, indirect fire weapons from mortars to short-range missiles have been directly targeted against innocents or employed against military targets in urban areas, putting civilian populations at risk. Terrorists in North Africa attempted to shoot down a commercial airliner with a short-range surface-to-air missile. In Iraq, insurgent groups used mortars to fire on administrative buildings, as well as military facilities in Baghdad and other urban areas. Even more troubling, however, is the use of these conventional weapons in combat zones aimed at the heart of civilian populations. In the 2006 battles between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hezbollah's Katyusha rocket attacks killed and wounded dozens of Israelis, destroyed property, and sent thousands to bomb shelters. The rain of rockets threatened to spark a larger regional conflict. Another Rage of Rockets **The Russian incursion into Georgia last week saw the use of rockets in urban areas by both sides.** According to reports in The New York Times, Georgia fired BM-21 rockets, a system similar to the Katyusha, at separatist military headquarters. Although the rockets appear to have been aimed at legitimate targets, the risk of damage to the surrounding civilian community from these inaccurate weapons may have been high. According to other press and eyewitness reports, during the massive Russian military offensive, **ground troops fired dozens of SS-21s, a short-range ballistic missile that can carry a high-explosive warhead.** It is not clear whether these weapons were fired at legitimate military targets. In addition, **the large SS 21 high-explosive warhead can carry either fragmentation bombs or mines making the risk of civilian causalities in urban areas very high**. The Promise of Directed Energy Despite repeated warning signs that both unconventional and conventional combatants have no problem using the weapons of war to target both military and civilian populations, **the United States has shown little sense of urgency in developing effective countermeasures for either equipping military forces or safeguarding civilian populations.** **Directed energy weapons**, such as the Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL), **demonstrate tremendous potential against all kinds of mortar, artillery, rocket, aircraft, and missile threats. Directed energy can be used against short-range threats like the Katyusha rockets being fired at Israel and against ballistic missiles like the SS-21s fired at Georgia.** **Such systems could also be used for homeland security, such as protecting critical infrastructure, national security events** (such as the presidential nominating conventions) and commercial air traffic from terrorist attack. Concluding that the THEL was not sufficiently mobile and robust for battlefield use, the U.S. Army decided to forgo its full development. Meanwhile, though the Department of Homeland Security has experimented with some systems to defend commercial flights against surface-to-air missiles, it too has not deployed any operational systems. The Clock Is Ticking Rather than deploy the THEL, the national security community has turned to a new generation of lasers for developing suitable directed-energy protective systems. These lasers employ a solid-state technology, incorporating multiple industrial thin disk lasers into a single high-powered energy devise. The military is currently developing prototypes for a mobile version of this system. Congress should insist and the administration should press to field operational prototypes of these systems as quickly as possible for both defense and homeland security applications. Both land-based and air-based platforms (mounted on manned and unmanned aircraft) should be fielded as soon as possible. **Putting a system in the field now would provide** some limited operational capability and **invaluable operational experience on how to use these systems.**

**Civil war in Russia would go nuclear**

**David 99** (Steven, Professor of Poli Sci at John Hopkins University, “Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars, p 103-104, date accessed:7/7/2010) AJK

Only three countries, in fact, meet both criteria: Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Civil conflict in Mexico would produce waves of disorder that would spill into the United States, endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans, destroying a valuable export market, and sending a torrent of refugees northward. A rebellion in Saudi Arabia could destroy its ability to export oil, the oil on which the industrialized world depends. **And internal war in Russia could devastate Europe and trigger the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, civil war in a cluster of other states could seriously harm American interests. These countries include** Indonesia, Venezuela, the Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and China. In none, however, are the stakes as high or the threat of war as imminent.

Impact D – ABLs = Effective

ABL works – really well

Brinton 10 (Turner Space News June 18 http://www.spacenews.com/military/100618-airborne-laser-gears-for-next-shoot-down-test.html TBC 7/6/10)

Boeing Defense, Space & Security of St Louis is the ABL prime contractor; Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems of Los Angeles developed the high-power chemical laser; and Lockheed Martin developed the beam control/fire control system. The modified Boeing 747-400 aircraft made its long-awaited debut in February. In one test flight, the ABL fired on and destroyed a boosting sounding rocket known as a MARTI. Eight days later, the aircraft succeeded in its first attempt to shoot down a threat-representative, liquid-fueled target missile. During the same flight test, it fired on a second liquid-fueled missile, but a problem caused the weapon system to shut itself down before the target was destroyed. The MDA will not reveal the aircraft’s distance from its target in any of those tests. The most important lessons from the ABL’s first intercept tests were that it actually worked, and it was more efficient and lethal than expected, said U.S. Air Force Col. Robert McMurry, the MDA’s ABL program manager. “What I think it’s proven is the beam control system and the atmospheric compensation and the power out of the laser are all working extraordinarily well to put power on target,” McMurry said in a June 16 interview.

**ABL is key to protect vulnerable infrastructure**

**Spencer and Carafano 4** (Jack and James, Research fellow and Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/08/The-Use-of-Directed-Energy-Weapons-to-Protect-Critical-Infrastructure, date accessed: 7/6/2010) AJK

**America's critical infrastructure--e.g., power plants, transportation hubs, and telecommunications facilities--is becoming increasingly vulnerable to precision missile attacks.** Guided missile technology and the missiles themselves have been available for years, but **the emergence of global terror networks, sophisticated smuggling techniques, and the post-September 11 security environment have made the threat of precision missile attacks even more serious**. While technology transfer legislation and international agree-ments may help to control the spread of some technologies, relying solely on these mechanisms is wholly insufficient, especially when proliferation has already occurred. Therefore**, it is essential that the United States actively defend its most vital nodes of critical infrastructure.** **1 To be effective against close-range missile attacks, such defenses must be cost efficient, safe, and swift.** Although **the United States** is not currently prepared to protect domestic targets against these threats, it **does have the technology to do so with directed-energy weapons** (DEWs), which include lasers, microwaves, electromagnetic pulses, and high intensity radio frequency waves. In 2000, for example, the Army used the Tactical High Energy Laser to shoot down a rocket carrying a live warhead--the first time a laser has destroyed a missile in flight. To ensure that these promising technologies are effectively fielded in a timely manner: Congress should fully fund directed-energy programs; The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should cooperate fully on their respective directed-energy efforts;1 DHS should conduct a national needs assessment of critical infrastructure; and The United States should facilitate the sharing of directed-energy technology with its allies.

Impact D – ABLs = Efficient

ABLs are cost efficient

Rayburn 10 (Maj. Gen. Bentley B., is the former commandant of the Air War College March 5 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/05/killing-airborne-laser-jeopardizes-america/ TBC 7/6/10)

Airborne laser defenses are a model of cost-benefit success, costing less than $5 billion over 15 years. While it may be difficult to quantify the deterrent effects of missile defense, we know how terribly expensive a single terrorist strike or a barrage of missiles coming from terrorist safe havens can be. At the very least, the Pentagon should restore the Airborne Laser project to full funding, add money to explore additional applications of the technology and, once the system has proven through further testing that it is capable and reliable, make the single prototype aircraft available to the military during high-threat emergency situations.

\*\*China DA – Aff Answers

SCO Good – Separatism, Sino/Indo/Russian Relations

Expansion of the SCO is critical to China’s fight against separatism and domestic terrorism, as well as relations with Russia and India

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

The major manifestation of this deepening alliance was the SCO-wide military maneuvers, dubbed as "Peace Mission 2007." These maneuvers were conducted on August 9-17, 2007 in Chelyabinsk in Russia's Urals region, followed by its final phase carried out in Urumuqi, Xinjiang, China. The exercises involved 6,500 troops, 80 aircraft and 500 combat vehicles from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. China and Russia supplied all of the combat vehicles, as well as 3,700 troops. "For the SCO...the war games mark its most ambitious attempt yet to build an integrated military-security apparatus to complement expanding political and commercial collaboration."26 Some observers suspect that Peace Mission 2007 "resembles less of an anti-terrorism drill than a full-scale, state-on-state conventional fight."27 The SCO has never held a full-scale military exercise involving all member states, although China and Russia have held several joint exercises under the auspices of the SCO. In 2005, they held large-scale amphibious landings on China's Yellow Sea Coast, which many observers believed were intended for Chinese separatists in Taiwan.28 These maneuvers, however, were massive in their scope as they were conducted on land, in air, and at sea in southeast of the Shandong Peninsula in China. The stated goal of each drill--held in 2007 and 2005--was to fight separatism and terrorism. China faces problems of separatism in Tibet and Taiwan, and terrorism in Xinjiang, while Russia is confronted with the twin menace in the wide swath of its northern territories. Similarly, India is battling enduring separatist movements in its west and northeast. Although India, which is an observer at the SCO, sat out of the 2007 drills, it was scheduled to hold joint army exercises with China in December 2007 in its southwestern province of Yunnan.29 The planned exercises are being billed as "historic" since the two giants have come a long way from active hostilities to strategic partnership. In their luncheon meeting in Singapore on November 21, 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh further signified the import of these exercises by reiterating their commitment "to take their strategic cooperative partnership to a next level."30 Prime Minister Singh, in his statement, added that "India and China ties are beyond and above bilateral matters. They are related to peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world beyond...India and China are...friends and partners."31 The Indian Prime Minister, who has just returned from his state visit to Moscow, is now scheduled to visit China early next year.

SCO Good - Afghanistan

Withdrawal from Afghanistan would allow an SCO role in a multilateral peacekeeping force, improving relations with the US

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

Above all, the U.S. enjoys worldwide economic and military superiority that allows it to force its way through closed doors, if needed. As the world's strongest nation, multilateralists argue, the United States serves its interests best when it works in a multilateral framework on which China, India and Russia all agree. A starting point for multilateralism can be war-torn Afghanistan where the SCO and CSTO both want a piece of action. The U.S. should welcome both to share in counter-insurgency operations for which both China and Russia have a long-standing career. This will free up 25,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, which can be exclusively deployed for counter-terrorism; while NATO forces can undertake reconstruction work that has long remained frozen. If it happens, it will turn Afghanistan into the North Star of multilateralism. To the U.S.' further advantage, India's alliance with China and Russia would privilege multilateralism over multipolarism. The latter, as Indian Foreign Minister Sinha in his 2003 address cautioned, has the potential to reprise the cold war rivalries that could set the world on a dangerous course. Multilateralism, on the other hand, would further strengthen the continuing economic integration worldwide, and thus lay the foundation for political integration as well.

SCO Good – Asian Stability

China’s SCO alliance with other nations does not mean conflict with the US, but will promote multilateral solutions and create regional stability

Wu 2000

(Wu Xinbo is currently a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, “Managing U.S.-China Relations”, IR China Global Beat, November, <http://www.irchina.org/en/xueren/china/view.asp?id=843>)

Then what should China do? To be sure, China is far inferior to the U.S. in the regional and bilateral balance of power. This means Beijing does not have much leeway to adjust its posture. However, as a rising power, China needs to assure the U.S. (and others) that it has no intention to upset the existing regional order, and that as long as its legitimate security interests are accommodated, it can live with a regional security structure in which the U.S. plays a leading role. Beijing can also take the following steps as an adjustment of its policy. First, it should give due credit to Washington for its role in regional peace and stability. In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. played a significant role in resisting Soviet expansion in Asia. In the post-Cold War era, it is still an important force for stability. Due to ideological constraints and suspicion of U.S. strategic intentions, Beijing does not want to overtly give credit to U.S. influence in Asian security. However, acknowledgement of the positive aspect of the U.S. role will help dispel Washington’s concern that China’s long-term strategy is to drive the U.S. out of East Asia. It will also give more weight to Beijing’s criticism of the downsides of U.S. policy and make Beijing’s position on regional security more reasonable. Second, China should promote security community-building in the Asia-Pacific and encourage the U.S., along with some other countries, to take a leading role in such an endeavor. As a major power, China has a predictable preference for self-help in its security practice. However, evolving political and economic trends in the point toward greater regional integration. Although Beijing may be afraid of getting constrained in such a community, its experience with the ASEAN Regional Forum and security cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan should provide it with adequate confidence. The past several years have witnessed a positive change in Beijing’s attitude toward multilateral security. Yet Beijing has to make substantive efforts, both conceptually and practically, to advance security community-building and bring the U.S. along.

SCO Good - Terrorism

SCO expansion will help combat terrorism and foster economic growth in the Middle East

The Daily Times 10. (“EDITORIAL: SCO opens up new avenues.” The Daily Times, a Pakistani newspaper. June 14, 2010. <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\06\14\story_14-6-2010_pg3_1>). LRH.

India and Pakistan are said to get the SCO membership within a couple of years. From a Pakistani perspective, being a member of the SCO will go a long way, both economically and in countering terrorism. The SCO vowed to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation with its observers, and actively join regional anti-terrorism cooperation. This would benefit Pakistan as many of the Taliban members are from Central Asia. Terrorism is a menace that the world has to fight together. Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks no longer operate from one country alone and are not homogenous. By coming up with a better system of intelligence sharing, the SCO can help not only Pakistan but the region as a whole. This in turn will help Afghanistan, which can lead to overland trade in the region as well. In addition, SCO membership could also present Pakistan with the prospect of technology in the field of heavy industrial undertakings.
In a world where economic deprivation has led many people to be seduced by terrorist networks, the SCO can play an integral role by opening up new avenues for trade. All in all the SCO may just be the perfect prescription for the economic progress of the region, and additionally a strong factor to resolve the global balance of power equation. \*

SCO expansion is key to checking terrorism in the Middle East

Noor 10. (Muhammad Asif, Executive Editor The Diplomatic Insight. “SCO Summit: Prospects & perspectives.” The Pakistan Observer. July 4, 2010. <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=39582>). LRH.

Here the role of Uzbekistan is commendable first of all of it’s hosting of this summit and on Pakistan’s perspective its bid to support Pakistan’s permanent member status in this grand regional grouping. For Pakistan SCO is also very much important, which has been reflected by the presence of President Asif Ali Zardari, to be part of since of its Counter Terror Strategy of Regional Anti Terrorism Structure (RATS) which has its headquarters in Tashkent. RATS is a permanent agency of SCO to counter the threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism and is designed for assisting, coordinating and interacting the competent agencies of member states to counter the relevant threats. Since Pakistan is a frontline state in War on Terror(WoT) and is not only facing the internal threat of terrorism and extremis but has work ahead of its capacity to fight the war against the insurgents while cooperated with International community Pakistan is the only country that has suffered more than any country in war on terror.

SCO Good – Central Asia

The SCO is key to Central Asian stability
Bhadrakumar 10. (Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar, a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, [Kuwait](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LF26Ag01.html) and Turkey. “US, Russia fail to grip Kyrgyz helm.” Asia Times. June 26, 2010. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LF26Ag01.html>). LRH.

The editorial made a specific suggestion that ''a meeting convened by foreign ministers of neighboring countries is not only an option but could be a first step to signal that China does not intend to sit back while the situation unravels in its neighborhood. A stable Central Asia is in China's interest.''  The influential daily pointed out that Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan is "but just a little over an hour by flight from Urumqi" and that a Balkan-type crisis "would be a nightmare to China". Urumqi is the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where Beijing is acutely sensitive over the possibility of unrest among the Uyghur population.  Beijing can be expected to counter the US strategy to project the OSCE into the security vacuum in Kyrgyzstan. Beijing's first choice lies in a Moscow-led CSTO initiative, while it also harps on a role for the SCO "to help stabilize the situation and bring order" to Kyrgyzstan.  The Global Times editorial concluded: Without any historical baggage of association and inability to influence the politics of nations in the region, China has been quite detached. But with economic cooperation gaining, whether China should stick to the policy of remaining detached and what would best ensure peace and stability in Central Asia are questions that need pondering. Viewed in the above perspective, the statement issued by the SCO on Monday assumes much significance.  The statement identified that the ethnic strife was engineered with the intent of arousing a Kyrgyz-Uzbek "confrontation". It was hopeful that the situation would stabilize "at an early date". More important, it banked on the "wise Kyrgyz people" to safeguard peace and stability - implying outside intervention isn't a crying need. Finally, it expressed grave concern over the situation and pointedly said that "the stability of the situation in Kyrgyzstan is of great significance for peace and stability in Central Asia".  The SCO has put its hat into the ring, reiterating its pivotal role in the collective security of Central Asia that no outside power can afford to overlook.

SCO Good – AT: Lashout

China’s expansion of the SCO is purely defensive, even an expanded SCO would never risk conflict with the US

Niazi 2007

(Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, “Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 20, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance>)

The SCO's geopolitical pushback to the unipolar-unilateral makeover of the world is, however, defensive. Both China and Russia are being protective of their turf. Their internal divisions caused by "extremism, splitism, and terrorism" further unnerve them at even a slight hint of U.S. or NATO proximity to their "near-abroad." They have created the SCO and CSTO, and formed the Caspian Sea Alliance to put distance between their respective "spheres of influence" and NATO-US presence. Many argue that this alliance-building is a reaction to U.S. unilateralism. These alliances, however, cannot threaten U.S. security interests in the region. The allied nations have been consistently reassuring the U.S. that their alliances are not directed at "third party." In fact, SCO member states have helped the U.S. to protect its security interests in the region. In the run-up to U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001, the Russian President Putin, according to Bob Woodward, stunned the top U.S. policy makers with his unsolicited offer to let U.S. combat jets use the Russian airspace to strike the Taliban government in Kabul.32 The Bush White House was not even sure if Russians would agree to U.S. airbases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for which it sought Putin's consent. More importantly, China, which shares a long border with Kyrgyzstan and is next door neighbor to Uzbekistan, went along with the U.S. bases in both countries. Besides, and it is noteworthy for American policy makers, the three nations that broke out in spontaneous outpouring of sympathy for 9/11 victims were not Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but Russia, Iran and China--in that order--where hundreds of thousands of marchers held candle-lit vigils and mourned the tragic deaths of 3,000 Americans in terrorist attacks. In strictly strategic sense, the U.S. by itself and together with its allies, especially Australia, Britain and Japan, continues to be the dominant force in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, which are the key sources and supply routes of energy shipments for China and trade goods for Central Asia. This makes China and the region vulnerable to U.S. retaliation in the event of any perceived or real threat to U.S. security interests.

SCO Good – No Challenge

No threat- SCO is small and insignificant, NATO checks any issues

**Cohen 6** (Ariel, Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation, The Dragon Looks West: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) KGL

Despite Russia's and Chi­na's joint denunciation of the American military presence in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has allowed the United States to maintain its base at Manas, and Kazakhstan will even host NATO's Steppe Eagle exercise in September. The SCO is not yet a cohesive entity in challenging the United States militar ily or economically. NATO may explore expanding relations with the SCO. Options for cooperative efforts may go beyond the existing NATO-Russia Council, and the Partnership for Peace, of which most Central Asian states are members. NATO members have a degree of cohesion and unity of values not yet present among SCO members and observer states, which often demonstrate considerable differences of approach and interest. Equally important, the SCO is a relatively small organization, still in its infancy, with an operating budget less than $30 million and a staff of a few dozen people. NATO, being larger, stronger, and more experienced in transnational security issues, can engage the SCO in discussions of strategic issues facing the region and develop paths for cooperation along the lines of the Partnership for Peace.

Asian Instability = War

Asian instability is the most probable scenario for war.

Manno 9 (Sharon, International Political Activist, “World War II Will Be Waged in the Asian Pacific” Analista Internacional, http://www.sharonmanno.com/world-war-iii-will-be-waged-in-the-asia-pacific/) MKB

Friedberg argued **that the probability for increasing tension in Asia seems high: there is a considerable concentration of military** and economic **capabilities, unsettled territorial disputes, and rivalry between major powers**. Likewise**, the absence of a solid sense of a shared identity and the lack of a multilateral structure to deal with these challenges effectively, make the region potentially very unstable and full of uncertaintie**s. Furthermore, China’s rapidly growing military capacity makes some scholars expect that it will soon become the dominant military power in the region, and its economic development ‘would make Chinese military expenditures far larger than those of any other country except for the United States of America’. This situation may affect the future balance of power in the region and encourage polarization in Asia.

The increased military capabilities of Asian nations do not have to make us presume that they will go to war just because of that. For instance, although **China’s rise and its concomitant increase in military expenditures may contribute to** generate fears in the region, at present arms competition is not significant in Asia Pacific. Great **powers are acquiring new military equipment to defend themselves and to use them as deterrent tools**; they are not engaged in a ‘race’ as were the USSR and the USA during the cold war.

**Another** perceived **possible reason for war is territorial disputes**. **They have brought Asian countries to the verge of war in the past,** but at present, countries are much more inclined to solve their border disputes by political and diplomatic means. No doubt**, the Kashmir issue is a major concern because two nuclear powers are involved**.

\*Pan K

Pan K: Shell

The depiction of China as a threat legitimize a power politics, making the “China threat” a self- fulfilling prophecy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

Construction of the “Chinese threat” results in an increase in the sense of vulnerability in China, thus making nuclear war more likely

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93)

For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely.

We must reject the threatening assumptions about China by questioning their motivations and accuracy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

Pan K: A2 “China Threat” is Real

The “China Threat” is merely imagined in order to justify Western liberalism.

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

At first glance, as the "China threat" literature has told us, China seems to fall perfectly into the "threat" category, particularly given its growing power. However, China's power as such does not speak for itself in terms of an emerging threat. By any reasonable measure, China remains a largely poor country edged with only a sliver of affluence along its coastal areas. Nor is China's sheer size a self-evident confirmation of the "China threat" thesis, as other countries like India, Brazil, and Australia are almost as big as China. Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the particular mode of U.S. self-imagination. As Steve Chan notes:

China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient legacy, or current or projected relative national power.... The importance of China has to do with perceptions, especially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source, or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cosmopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions of democracy and capitalism. China is a reminder that history is not close to an end. (39)

The “China threat” was created under the assumption China will follow the same path as the US and will thus eventually become the hegemon. These “threats” aren’t grounded in reality because China differs from the US.

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Needless to say, the United States is not unique in ethnocentric thinking. For centuries, China had assumed it was the center of the world. But what distinguishes U.S. from Chinese ethnocentric self-identities is that while the latter was based largely on the Confucian legacy, the former is sanctioned by more powerful regimes of truth, such as Christianity and modern science. For the early English Puritans, America was part of a divine plan and the settlers were the Chosen People blessed by covenant with God. (30) With the advent of the scientific age, U.S. exceptionalism began taking on a secular, scientific dimension. Charles Darwin once argued that "the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection." (31)

The United States has since been construed as the manifestation of the law of nature, with its ideas and institutions described not as historically particular but as truly universal. For example, in his second inaugural address in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson declared that U.S. principles were "not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of a liberated mankind." (32) In short, "The US is utopia achieved." (33) It represents the "End of History." (34)

What does this U.S. self-knowledge have to do with the way in which it comes to know others in general and China in particular? To put it simply, this self-knowledge is always a powerful analytical framework within which other societies are to be known. By envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the United States places other nations on a common evolutionary slope and sees them as inevitably traveling toward the end of history that is the United States. For example, as a vast, ancient nation on the other side of the Pacific, China is frequently taken as a mirror image of the U.S. self. As Michael Hunt points out,

 we imagine ourselves locked in a special relationship with the Chinese, whose apparent moderation and pragmatism mirror our own most prized attributes and validate our own longings for a world made over in our own image. If China with its old and radically different culture can be won, where can we not prevail? (35)

Pan K– A2: “China Threat” is Real

The “China Threat” isn’t real: we fear China only because we are uncertain about its future

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China," (55) argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)." (56)

The “China Threat” was imagined to justify realist thought and establish American identity

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Indeed, the construction of other is not only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it. For example, by taking this particular representation of China as Chinese reality per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable of knowing the "hard facts" of international politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith" than in "historical experience." (41) On the other hand, given that history is apparently not "progressively" linear, the invocation of a certain other not only helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United States, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?" (42) In this way, it seems that the constructions of the particular U.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

Some may suggest that there is nothing particularly wrong with this since psychologists generally agree that "individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others." (43) This is perhaps true. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure tells us, meaning itself depends on difference and differentiation. (44) Yet, to understand the U.S. dichotomized constructions of self/other in this light is to normalize them and render them unproblematic, because it is also apparent that not all identity-defining practices necessarily perceive others in terms of either universal sameness or absolute otherness and that difference need not equate to threat.

Pan K: Link- China/ Taiwan War Scenario

The construction of China/ Taiwan war scenarios has empirically made the impacts more likely: the threats didn’t exist until the US created them

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

While the 1995-1996 missile crisis has been a favorite "starting point" for many pundits and practitioners to paint a frightening picture of China and to justify U.S. firm response to it, what is often conveniently overlooked is the question of how the "China threat" discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis. Limits of space forbid exploring this complex issue here. Simply put, the Taiwan question was created largely as a result of widespread U.S. perceptions of China as a "Red Menace" in the wake of the "loss of China" and the outbreak of the Korean War. To thwart what it saw as an orchestrated Communist offensive in Asia, the United States deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait as part of its Cold War containment strategy, thereby effectively preventing the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. While the United States abandoned its containment and isolation policy toward China in the 1970s and the two countries established full diplomatic relations in 1979, the conventional image of the "Red Menace" lingered on in the United States. To manage such a "threat," the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act shortly after the normalization of U.S.-China relations, renewing U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense even though diplomatic ties with the island had been severed. (73)

This confrontational policy serves not only to shore up Taiwan's defense capabilities but also to induce its independent ambition and further complicate cross-strait relations. As former U.S. defense official Chas Freeman remarked, "U.S. arms sales to Taiwan no longer work to boost Taipei's confidence that it can work out its differences with Beijing. Instead, they bolster the view that Taiwan can go its own way." (74) For instance, amid growing sympathy from the Republican-dominated Congress and the elite media as well as the expanded ties with the United States, Taiwan responded coolly to Beijing's call for dialogue in January 1995. In June 1995, Taiwan's flexible diplomacy, designed to burnish its independent image, culminated in its president Lee Teng-hui's high-profile visit to the United States. This in turn reinforced Beijing's suspicion that the real U.S. intention was to frustrate its reunification goal, leaving it apparently no other choice but to prepare militarily for what it saw as a worst-case scenario. All this constituted the major context in which the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile exercises took place.

Pan K: Link- Realism

The realist mindset proves the link to the K: rather than actually getting to know China, we view it as an “other” which only thinks in terms of strategy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism.

Pan K: Internal Links

The logic behind their construction of the “China Threat” is rooted in otherization

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated.

US placement of China in the “threat” category is a form of otherization

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Yet, in a world of diversity, contingency, and unpredictability, which is irreducible to universal sameness or absolute certainty, this kind of U.S. knowledge of others often proves frustratingly elusive. In this context, rather than questioning the validity of their own universalist assumptions, the people of the United States believe that those who are different should be held responsible for the lack of universal sameness. Indeed, because "we" are universal, those who refuse or who are unable to become like "us" are no longer just "others," but are by definition the negation of universality, or the other. In this way, the other is always built into this universalized "American" self. Just as "Primitive ... is a category, not an object, of Western thought," (36) so the threat of the other is not some kind of "external reality" discovered by U.S. strategic analysts, but a ready-made category of thought within this particular way of U.S. self-imagination.

Consequently, there is always a need for the United States to find a specific other to fill into the totalized category of otherness. In the early days of American history, it was Europe, or the "Old World," that was invoked as its primary other, threatening to corrupt the "New World." (37) Shortly after World War II, in the eyes of U.S. strategists, the Soviet Union emerged as a major deviance from, hence an archenemy of, their universal path toward progress via the free market and liberal democracy. And after the demise of the Soviet Union, the vacancy of other was to be filled by China, the "best candidate" the United States could find in the post-Cold War, unipolar world. Not until the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington had China's candidature been suspended, to be replaced by international terrorism in general and Saddam's Iraq in particular. (38)

Pan K: Alternative Solves

Our current mindset only serves to further otherize China and create the “China threat.” We can only solve the “China threat” by changing this mindset.

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate." (62) At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. (63) "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly." (64) It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China (65) or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. (66) Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy.

If we refuse to reflect on how threats about China actually create the threat, the threats will become a self-fulfilling prophecy

Pan 4. (Chengxin, PhD in Poli Sci and International Relations. “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.  June 01, 2004.) LRH

Rather than reflecting on how their new containment policy might have contributed to this incident in the first place, many U.S. realist analysts hastily interpreted it as further objective proof of the long-suspected "China threat." As Allen S. Whiting put it, the collision "focused attention anew on Beijing's willingness to risk the use of force in pursuit of political objectives." (84) It was as if the whole incident had little to do with U.S. spying, which was seen as "routine" and "normal." Instead, it was the Chinese who were said to be "playing a dangerous game," without regard to the old spy etiquette formulated during the Cold War. (85)

For other observers, China's otherness was embodied also in its demand for a U.S. apology. For example, Merle Goldman, a history professor at Boston University, said that the Chinese emphasis on apologies was rooted in the Confucian value system: "This kind of internalized consensus was the way China was ruled for thousands of years." (86) From this perspective, China's request for an apology was preordained by a fixed Chinese tradition and national psyche and had nothing whatsoever to do with the specific context of this incident in which China was spied on, its sovereignty violated, and one of its pilots lost.

Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the contrary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative columnists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] ... the only appropriate response to Chinese behavior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace." (87) Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, torpedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan--particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats--this is a sensible and timely package." (88)

\*\*CMR DA – Aff Answers

NU – Gates

Gates is mad now – mcchrystal

CNN 6/24 (http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/24/pentagon-official-gates-wanted-to-keep-mcchrystal/)JFS

Defense Secretary Robert Gates backed keeping Gen. Stanley McChrystal on the job because he was vital to the war effort in Afghanistan, but he was overruled, a senior Pentagon official told CNN's Barbara Starr.

The official has direct knowledge of the events but declined to be identified because of the internal administration discussions.

President Barack Obama relieved McChrystal of command of the Afghan war on Wednesday, a day after Rolling Stone published critical comments about top White House officials by members of McChrystal's staff.

Gates was initially furious about the article, but said McChrystal had to stay in command because the war is at such a critical point, a second source - who also asked not to be named on internal administration discussions - told CNN.

NU – McChrystal

The McChrystal incident proves that a lapse of civil-military relations has no impact

Feaver 10 (Peter, writer for Foreign Policy, 6/30, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/30/tom\_ricks\_gets\_the\_mcchrystal\_affair\_mostly\_rightbut\_not\_entirely) PJ

Now I supported McChrystal resigning -- calling it "clearly a firing offense" -- and I wholeheartedly agree that the disrespectful command climate that the *Rolling Stone* interview revealed was corrosive of healthy civil-military relations. But it was meaningfully *less* corrosive than the MacArthur incident on several dimensions and it is both unfair and unwise to equate the two. MacArthur vigorously opposed Truman's Korea policies of restraint, sought to lift them, and was colluding with friendly reporters and political allies back in Washington to thwart them. And he made no bones about this disagreement, as his post-firing Congressional lobbying makes clear.  McChrystal and President Obama both claimed that there was no policy dispute at issue, neither in the *Rolling Stone* interview nor in the larger civil-military dustup. McChrystal's disrespectful comments were directed at members of Obama's team who, in McChrystal's views, were not doing enough to implement Obama's policies. This is a distinction that may not matter in terms of McChrystal keeping his job, but should influence what we learn from the incident (and may justify giving McChrystal a dispensation to retire at 4-star pay.

McChrystal breached civil-military relations norms

Cohen 10 (Eliot A, writer for the Wall Street Journal, 6/23, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704853404575322800914018876.html) PJ

President Obama should, nonetheless, fire him. Gen. McChrystal's just-published interview in Rolling Stone magazine is an appalling violation of norms of civilian-military relations. To read it is to wince, repeatedly—at the mockery of the vice president and the president's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, at the sniping directed toward the U.S. ambassador, at a member of his staff who, when asked whom the general was having dinner with in Paris said, "Some French minister. It's so [expletive deleted] gay." The quotes from Gen. McChrystal's underlings bespeak a staff so clueless, swaggering and out of control that a wholesale purge looks to be indicated. The larger predicament here is not the general's fault. The Obama administration has made three large errors in the running of the Afghan war.

NU – Obama

Obama is being tougher on the military

Alter 10 (Jonathan, writer for Newsweek, 5/15, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/15/secrets-from-inside-the-obama-war-room.html) PJ

The first of 10 “AFPAK” meetings came on Sept. 13, when the president gathered 16 advisers in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House. This was to be the most methodical national-security decision in a generation. Deputy national-security adviser Tom Donilon had commissioned research that backed up an astonishing historical truth: neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War featured any key meetings where all the issues and assumptions were discussed by policymakers. In both cases the United States was sucked into war inch by inch. The Obama administration was determined to change that. “For the past eight years, whatever the military asked for, they got,” Obama explained later. “My job was to slow things down.” The president had something precious in modern crisis management: time. “I had to put up with the ‘dithering’ arguments from Dick Cheney or others,” Obama said. “But as long as I wasn’t shaken by the political chatter, I had the time to work through all these issues and ask a bunch of tough questions and force people to sharpen their pencils until we arrived at the best possible solution.”

Obama’s policies are causing a rift in civil-military relations, but they’re safe for now

Ellis 6/23 (Aaron, writer for Thinking Strategically, http://thinkstrat.wordpress.com/2010/06/23/%E2%80%98quick-and-dirty%E2%80%99-obama-mcchrystal-and-petraeus/) PJ

At *Permissible Arms*, Karaka describes President Obama’s press conference today dismissing McChrystal as ‘quick and dirty’. It’s a phrase that can be used to describe the whole episode, like a fight which everyone involved feels embarrassed about afterwards. A good commander has been dismissed because of poor judgement; an administration has been humiliated by some apt ridicule; it’s been taken up by some on both the Left and the Right to advance agendas, and used as a proxy war between COINistas and those pushing for withdrawal/drawdown. The only person to come out of it all well and arguably more powerful is General Petraeus, who steps down as head of CENTCOM to replace McChrystal. Bernard Finel has fortunately kept his head in assessing the appointment, but there are some points that I think are important. To me and many outside the United States, this isn’t a great crisis in civil-military relations; one could say because it’s not our military, but I’d guess many Americans think the same too. It has exposed a rift between the administration and some military personnel, but I’d argue that responsibility for the rift lies ultimately with President Obama. He himself has created weaknesses in his own policy on Afghanistan, either matching goals with inadequate resources or by tolerating divisions within his team. That has formed the environment in which a breakdown in civil-military relations often occurs, with weak policy and indecisive leadership creating a vacuum that politically-savvy generals fill while maintaining the fiction of civilian control. As I said yesterday, this happened in Britain and France during the First World War and has happened to some extent over Afghanistan with the Obama administration. McChrystal’s behaviour is the symptom of a breakdown in civil-military relations, therefore; not its cause – the fault is with the president.

NU – Relations Low

Relations low now – withdrawal timeline proves

Feaver 10 (Peter, writer for Foreign Policy, 6/30, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/30/tom\_ricks\_gets\_the\_mcchrystal\_affair\_mostly\_rightbut\_not\_entirely) PJ

Establishing the provenance of the timeline is useful not merely for the historical record but also as an antidote to a potentially dangerous gambit that some of Obama's political advisors may have been attempting. According to Jonathan Alter's account of the Fall 2009 Afghan Strategy Review, the White House sought to pin the military down on the timeline so as to give the White House political cover to abandon the Afghanistan surge; they wanted to be able to pin the blame for any failure on the military and the timeline played a key role to this end.  This kind of gamesmanship is bad strategy and makes for bad civil-military relations. Identifying who proposed what and why is helpful.

Relations low now – they’ve been eroding for years

The Washington Post 6/23 (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/06/after\_mcchrystal\_time\_to\_chang.html) PJ

Gen. Stanley McChrystal has submitted his resignation. Or he's been fired. In any case, it was time for him to go. His departure will help slow the increasing erosion in civil-military relations -- aided by both political parties over the last 20 years -- which has threatened civilian control of the military. It also means we can now turn to a more fundamental exit debate: How do we change course and craft a responsible strategy to end the war in Afghanistan? It is critical we have this debate. Here's one good reason: McChrystal's top aide believes this war is unwinnable. In the most important quote in Rolling Stones' fascinating article, Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville argues that the only way we win in Afghanistan is to redefine failure as victory: "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win. This is going to end in an argument."

Relations low now – McChrystal proves

Kabalan 9 (Marwan Al, writer for Gulf News, 12/20, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/us-civil-military-relations-are-strained-1.529859) PJ

Civil-military relations in the US have always been a matter of hot debate. Outside the US, however, the topic has rarely been discussed. The widely held belief that in democracies the military salute and obey has made it almost impossible for foreign observers to see how complicated the relationship between elected officials and army officers is. Tension in civil-military relations is perceived, hence, as a peculiar characteristic of non-democratic countries. A closer look at the issue shows a different picture, however. Earlier this month, analysts throughout the region were surprised by the souring relationship between the Obama administration and the military establishment. It all started when General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, in an address in London described as "short-sighted" Vice President Joseph Biden's preferred strategy of using Predator and cruise-missile strikes to cut US losses in Afghanistan. Furthermore, McChrystal leaked his assessment of the situation there to the press. He advised that the US should shift its strategy to population security and dedicate up to 40,000 additional troops to the war. Days later, he revealed that he had spoken to US President Barack Obama only once since his appointment as commander of US troops in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, McChrystal's public statements offended the Obama administration, drawing bitter criticisms from senior officials. National security adviser General James Jones told CNN that it is "better for military advice to come up the chain of command". Secretary of Defence Robert Gates reinforced this message when he said, "It is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations — civilians and military alike — provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately". This was not, however, the first time that tension has risen between civilian and military officials in the US. In 2003, former Army chief of staff Eric Shinseki criticised in public the Bush administration's proposed force levels for the invasion of Iraq, describing them as too low. There are many other occasions in which relations between generals and civilians in the US government turned sour, especially in times of war.

NU – Relations Low

Relations low now and leading to disaster

Leon 6/27 (Michael, writer for Veterans Today, http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/27/nothing-is-going-right-for-usa-in-final-phase-in-afghanistan/)

Although Gen McChrystal has been sacked and replaced with Gen David Petraeus but not without creating tension in civil-military relations. In case the situation in Afghanistan spins out of control and coalition forces are forced to hurriedly exit in disgrace, or fatalities mount up, it is bound to further aggravate civil-military relations in USA. However, prompt action by Obama has dispelled the lingering impression that Pentagon has become more powerful than White House. He has reasserted his authority by this act and demonstrated that he is in full command.  Replacement of military commanders is not the solution to the problem particularly when Petraeus and McChrystal were on one frequency. At no stage there was any difference of opinion between the two. Petraeus task will be more arduous since he will have to hop between his two offices of CENTCOM and US-NATO Command HQ in Kabul . Unless the US leadership undertakes some revolutionary and well meaning steps to get rid of weak areas, the US will not be able to overcome its host of problems and final phase will end up in complete disaster.

Alt Causes

**Alt Cause for CMR**

**A. Afghanistan, budget, DADT, RMA**

**King, 2009** (Will, Fort Weathenworth Lampoon, Army News, “Panel discusses civil-military relations at Fort Leavenworth”) JFS

**"The president has arranged it so that he is free to ignore** the advice of **his** uniformed **chiefs** **and** field **commanders** because he will have cover of General Jones by his side, and other senior military in his administration," Kohn said, "**and at the same time demonstrates that he has been reaching out to the military** and wants to have military judgment." **The four areas** **where Kohn sees** potential **civil-military problems** in the future **are** in **Afghanistan**, the **budget**, **gays in the military** **and the restructuring of military forces** away from Cold War structure. He said budgetary issues would create the most problems of those four areas.

**B. Obama is too slow**

**Feaver 9**  (Alexander F. Hehmeyer Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), and former special advisor on the National Security Council Staff – ‘Foreign Policy: Woodward discloses troops needed” <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583>)

Here is the crucial bit: "... But **Obama's deliberative pace** — he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal's report so far — **is a source of growing consternation within the military. 'Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let's have a discussion,' one Pentagon official said.** 'Will you read it and tell us what you think?' **Within the military**, this official said, **'There is** a frustration. A **significant frustration**. A serious frustration.' "**The civil-military dimensions of the challenge confronting** President **Obama could hardly be more clearly spelled out.** This is significant and serious.

**C. NMD**

**Smith 9-21** (Jeffrey, Staff Writer – Washington Post, “Missile Defense's Shelving Reflected Military's Concerns”, Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002532.html>)JFS

**Call it another revolt of the generals.** More than 13 years ago, the nation's **military leaders told civilian** defense **officials** **they wanted to limit** spending on **missile defenses** **and** to **emphasize** the protection of **forces** deployed **overseas** over defense of the American homeland against a long-range missile threat. **Last week**, after a lengthy internal Pentagon review and against the backdrop of new limits on overall military spending, **the generals** again **threw their weight behind a** relative **contraction** **of the** **effort to defend against** long-range **missile attacks**. They cited needed budgetary savings and more immediate threats in demanding faster work to protect overseas forces and bases against shorter-range attack. The latest shift shelved a plan to deploy in Europe an advanced radar and interceptors of long-range missiles by 2017. And **it adds impetus to the Pentagon's request** earlier this year **for** **a cut of** about **15 percent in** overall **missile defense spending**, a scaling back of the deployment of long-range missile interceptors in Alaska and California, and the cancellation of three costly Reagan-era missile defense programs that officials say had threatened to balloon out of budgetary control.

**D. Tensions inevitable – Iraq, budgets, Cold War, social issues**

**Kohn 8** (Richard, World Affairs Journal, Prof of History @ U of North Carolina, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html)JFS

**While civil-military relations at the beginning of the Republic involved** real **fears of a coup**, for the last two centuries **the concern has revolved around** relative **influence: can** the **politicians** (often divided among themselves) **really “control” the military?** **Can** the **generals** and admirals **secure the necessary resources and autonomy to accomplish** the government’s **purposes** with minimal loss of blood and treasure? Until World War II, **the influence of the regular military** even in its own world **was limited.** **After the war, the integration** **of** foreign and **military policies,** the creation of the intelligence community, new weapons systems, **and other** elements of the **Cold War national security establishment** decidedly **enhanced the military’s say in policy deliberations.** **The end of the Cold War** and an operational tour de force in the first Persian Gulf War **cemented the military’s position as the public’s most trusted** and esteemed **institution**. During the Clinton administration, **the military leadership had a virtual veto over military policy,** particularly the terms and conditions of interventions overseas. The power of the military has waxed and waned since the 1940s, but not a single secretary of defense has entered office trusting the armed forces to comply faithfully with his priorities rather than their own. **Four problems**, in particular, **will intensify** the **normal friction**: the endgame in **Iraq,** unsustainable military **budgets, the mismatch between twenty-first century threats and a Cold War military establishment, and social issues, gays in the military being the most incendiary.**

Alt Causes

**E. Tensions are inevitable**

**Sewall and White 09**(Sarah and John, The boston globe, 1-29, The civil military challenge, lexis)JFS

One finding is that senior **civilian and military leaders** often **lack a common understanding of** roles and reciprocal **responsibilities within the partnership.** The traditional shorthand that "civilians make policy and the military executes" is overly simplistic, masking the intricate mutual dependence of the parties. For example, **civilians may not see their policymaking role as accompanied by a responsibility to** ensure that **military concerns** about policy implementation have been fully addressed. **Military leaders may define their** substantive **advising role narrowly and perform it only in response to civilian inquiry. These misunderstandings have proven costly in national security decision-making.** In addition, the parties largely fail to harness the inherent frictions in the relationship. **The roles of** various **civil and military actors** abut and **overlap** in practice, particularly when multiple civilian authorities (including members of Congress) are engaged. **Managing** the inevitable **tensions without** rancor or **overreaction is** a **key** responsibility of the civilian leadership. **Transparent and consistent decision-making processes would** also **help** clarify roles and **build trust in civil-military relations,** particularly in terms of reinforcing the importance and scope of military advice. When that process is inclusive, it is viewed by military actors as more satisfactory - even if the outcomes are not preferred by military actors. Still, **there are no good options for military leaders who disagree with civilian decisions.** Expressing professional views to civilians is part of the military's responsibility. But once decisions have been made, continued expressions of disagreement undercut civilian authority. At the same time, **civilian leaders must** publicly assume **accountability for their** policy **decisions**. **Hiding behind military advice** undermines the military's professional independence and **is an abdication of civilian responsibility.** Our research highlighted both the importance and fragility of the military's apolitical and nonpartisan status. **Civilians should refrain from viewing military officers as "part of"** or "loyal to" **the administration** during which they were appointed. The military participants found their most difficult challenge to be fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities to serve both the administration and the Congress objectively and professionally. We found that **partisan political activities of** retired **senior officers fueled civilian distrust of** currently serving **military officers**. **Retaining trust that the** uniform **military serve in an apolitical capacity is vital for a healthy civil-military dynamic.** The retired community should carefully consider its public involvement in partisan activity.

Turn – Civilians Good

Civilians must make strategic decisions that must be enforced

**Owens 10** (Mackubin T, Professor of Strategy and Force Planning at the Naval War College in Newport, 6/13, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006133105/civil-military-relations-and-the-us-strategy-deficit.html)

Unfortunately, **the failure of the current civil-military framework to provide strategic guidance for integrating the operational level of war and national policy** is obscured by the myopic focus of students of civil-military relations on the issue of civilian control. Rectifying this situation requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain adjust the way they do business. On the one hand, the military must recover its voice in strategy-making while realizing that politics permeates the conduct of war and that civilians have a say, not only concerning the goals of the war but also how it is conducted. On the other, **civilians must understand that to implement effective policy and strategy requires the proper military instrument. They must also insist that soldiers present their views frankly and forcefully throughout the strategy-making process**.

**The impact to CMR decline will take decades to occur, and turn - solutions will be opposed by the military**

**Cohen 97** (Eliot Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins, “Civil-military relations – Are US Forces Overstretched?” ORBIS)JFS

**The ills besetting civil-military relations in the U**nited **S**tates **are the deeply rooted product of historical developments dating back several decades or longer. Remedies will take time to have an effect.** More important, **they will require tough and imaginative civilian leadership,** because **they will be opposed by important** (though by no means all) **segments of military opinion and will be relatively unattractive politically.** The military opinion will be bolstered by civilian allies, including military retirees (who can speak far more freely than those in uniform) and that large group of civilians who occasionally confuse unthinking support of military traditions and practice with patriotic support for the armed forces.

Turn – Conflict Good

**Tensions good – military will respect the president, that’s overall better for cmr
Ackerman 8** [Spencer, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible” Washington Independent, <http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible>]JFS

During **Clinton’s** transition from candidate to president, he seemed to suggest **lifting the ban on gays serving openly,** an implication seized on by conservatives and **met with furor from the armed services. His response was to back down** **— which set a tone to the military that** an uncertain **Clinton could be rolled.** Defense Dept. officials today still believe Clinton’s early capitulation set a troublesome precedent. “**If Clinton has simply ordered the military to lift the ban** on gays in the military — as Truman did with racial integration against near universal opposition,” said one Pentagon official who requested anonymity, “**he would have been much better off in dealing with the military for the rest of his administration.** There would have been a big fuss, but they would have respected him more.” **The lesson for Obama**, this official continued, **is “not to get rolled** or railroaded **by the top brass,** as Clinton and his civilian team were by Colin Powell,” who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

**Plan is a win – unilateral withdrawal boosts CMR**

**Ackerman 8** (Spencer, writer for The Washington Independent, http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible) GAT

Robert Mackey, a retired Army officer, said that both Petraeus and the new Iraq commander, Gen. Ray Odierno, can work with Obama despite disagreements on Iraq. “I think that **both are pretty good thinkers**, **more than able to understand that change is going to occur and that their job is to complete whatever mission [Obama] orders them to do,**” Mackey said. “**They don’t have to be Obama’s buddies to do the job.** In fact, **that would most likely reflect poorly on the administration within the military.”** Indeed, **the differences between Obama and Petraeus or Odierno on Iraq might turn out to be healthy for civilian-military relations**. Judging from how the July meeting with Petraeus in Baghdad went, “Obama should be in good shape,” said the Pentagon official. “It will be a refreshing change from recent years, when civilian political leaders have shirked off tough questions about — and responsibility for — their war policies by claiming, in effect, that they’re just taking directions from the commanders on the ground, in effect, hiding behind the skirts of the military.” Moss agreed. **Institutional pushback is “not a bad thing” necessarily**, he said. “If anything, **the major lesson from the past decade should be that the solutions to the challenges we face must be approached from multiple angles, and that is what Obama has signaled as his intention.”** Like Feaver, the anonymous senior Army officer expected Obama to make Petraeus a partner on Iraq and other issues. “Once President-elect Obama is in office,” the officer said, “he can very easily shift his view based on advice he has received, as well as the situation on the ground at the time, since he has left himself an out or two over time. It would be surprising to see him go completely against Gen. Petraeus, since I would think [Obama] would rather have him in uniform than out — where he would then be free to provide commentary on the decisions that have been made.”

No Impact – CMR = Resilient

**CMR is resilient – SOP checks collapse.**

**Hooker 3**(Richard National War College Army Staff, Winter, “Soldiers of the State,” Parameters,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_4\_33/ai\_111852934/print)

In American academe today the dominant view of civil-military relations is sternly critical of the military, asserting that civilian control of the military is dangerously eroded. (1) Though **tension clearly exists in the relationship, the current critique is largely inaccurate and badly overwrought.** Far from overstepping its bounds**, America's military operates comfortably within constitutional notions of separated powers, participating appropriately in defense and national security policymaking with due deference to the principle of civilian control.** Indeed, **an active and vigorous role by the military in the policy process is and always has been essential to the common defense.**

**CMR resilient – inherent patriotism and support for the troops**

**Carafano 8** (James Jay, senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation, “Soldiers, Civilians, and ‘The Great War’” accessed 7-22, http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed050808b.cfm)JFS

Civil-military relations are back in the news. There could not be a better time for fresh views on this vital subject. Nancy Gentile Ford's The Great War and America: Civil-Military Relations During World War I is a welcome contribution. Ford, a professor of history at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, provides a broad historical survey of the critical issues that confronted the United States leading up to, during and after World War I. In The Great War and America, Ford argues that this period of American history is worthy of particular attention—and she is absolutely right. The dawn of the 20th century was a turning point for how America's military and American society are interwoven. **Many of the fundamental military institutions that we rely on today, from recruiting military officers from civilian universities to relying on the National Guard, emanate from this era. The United States has traditionally enjoyed a remarkably resilient and healthy civil society. When civil society is strong, relations between soldiers and the state tend to remain pretty stable. The Great War and America supports this thesis. America's sudden entry into World War I and the rush of transforming a constabulary force scattered throughout the United States into a mass citizen army to fight on the world's first "high-tech" battlefield raised innumerable concerns and challenges. America survived them all—and helped win the war.**

**CMR resilient – military leaders willing to cooperate**

**Schake 09** (Kori, “So far so good for civil-military relationg under Obama”, online)

It should go without saying that **it is not the** National Security **Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels**, although that is what Jim Jones is [reported](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811.html) to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. **Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious** to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When [the Bob Woodward article](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811.html) recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary **Gates** **and** Admiral **Mullen** commendably **defended McChrystal's independence.** **It** **is** also **curious that the one person invisible in this debate,** as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, **is** the CENTCOM commander, General **Petraeus**. But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy **debates over the war** in Afghanistan **indicate** **that** the system of **civil-military relations is clearly working as designed.** **We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process** **from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.**

No Impact – CMR = Managed

**No negative impact to tensions – they’re managed and key to national security**

**Biddle 9** (Stephen, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/20283/us\_policy\_toward\_afghanistan.html)JFS

**As far as** the **civil-military relations** aspects of this **go, we have civilian control of the military**.  The military does not make U.S. national strategy.  **The military does not** even **make** theater **strategy**.  **The civilians are** constitutionally **in charge** of this. Now, what we would like is I think what Eliot Cohen has termed "an unequal dialogue," in which both sides are respectful of the other and interacting with the other in dialogue, but that **dialogue is unequal because**, at the end of the day, **the civilians** are the ones who **have** the legal **responsibility** -- not just the right, but the responsibility **to make the decisions,** and to be held accountable for the results as a result. In that setting, it seems to me the appropriate role for a theater commander -- and remember that General McChrystal is commander of forces in Afghanistan.  We are engaged in conflict in multiple theaters around the world, so this is just one of them.  **The responsibility of the** theater **commander** **is to produce an** objective, clear-eyed, sort of, rigorous **analysis of the situation,** the way forward, **the prognosis**, and the required costs of pursing the best strategy for his theater. **That** then **goes up the chain**, **and superiors, both military and civilian** above him in the chain of command, **have** just as much of a **responsibility** as he does **to** rigorously critique and **evaluate what he said** -- in light not just of checking for the internal validity of what the theater commander has said about his theater, but especially in terms of considerations that are broader than the theater commander's writ. **One of the obvious ones,** in this instance, **is Iraq**.  We have ongoing, serious military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  I'm on record as having said in the past that I think U.S. interests engaged in Iraq are very important and require a continued presence, at least as far as the Iraqis will permit. That is not General McChrystal's job to worry about.  It's not General Odierno's job to worry about.  **It's** General **Petraeus's**, Admiral **Mullen's**, the secretary of Defense, **and the president's job to worry about the relationship between theaters** in an environment where the same forces are in demand by more than one theater and in which the prospects in any theater would be improved by getting somebody else's forces to come and help out.  (Chuckles.) So **I** **see** a degree of **inherent tension, not just between civilian and military,** given the difference of backgrounds and purview and responsibilities, **but between different theater commanders** at the theater level within the military chain of command. **And that tension is healthy and appropriate, as long as it's adjudicated properly by the people above them** in the food chain -- **both the military people** above them in the food chain, Petraeus and Mullen, **and by the civilians.** Now, if this produces, kind of, endless analysis without decision, it would satisfy academics like me who love that sort of thing.  But **it** obviously **wouldn't serve the national interest.  We** will eventually **need a decision**. I would personally prefer that these analyses be aggressively challenged, critiqued and assessed, and that the administration take the time it thinks it needs to do that. I think in terms of the consequences of getting the strategy wrong, which are enormous, the consequences of taking another couple of weeks to avoid that are minor -- are modest.

No Impact – CMR = Insolvable

**You can’t solve CMR**

**Hsai 9** (Tim, Today’s Alternative News, http://www.todaysalternativenews.com/index.php?event=link,150&values[0]=&values[1]=6296)JFS

**Did the end of the draft**, and the beginning of an all volunteer force **dissolve society’s relationship with the military? What is the status of c**ivil-**m**ilitary **r**elations **today?** Is watching the movie the Hurt Locker, a recent movie about Army explosive ordnance soldiers, as close as Americans can get to feeling like a nation at war. At West Point one of the most spirited debates I witnessed as a cadet revolved around a discussion concerning civil-military relations. The class was divided into three camps, **one group** which **argued** that **the military was a microcosm of American society, a small circle within a larger circle.** **Another group claimed that the military shared some beliefs with society**, but also had values which were incompatible, and hence the relationship was better represented by two circles which overlapped in some areas. **A third group** of cadets disputed both groups, and **contended that the American military and society were** really **two distinct circles** sharing only one point in common, a commitment to the Constitution. **The discussion** and questions **raised** in that class **have increasing relevance as the** duration of the **wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have lasted longer than the combined time** which the United States was engaged **in** fighting during **W**orld **W**ar **I**, **W**orld **W**ar **II**, **and the Korean War.** The questions raised should not be confused with shouldering burdens, as **the recession’s impact has been felt** far and widespread **amongst many Americans** who are struggling to put food on the table and find jobs. Moreover, **the new G.I. Bill**, the first lady’s outspoken commitment to military families, **and the** overall **support by Americans for the troops has been incredible**. **But can Americans** honestly **say this country is at war, when less than one percent of the country wages war?** Perhaps **the** blanket **support for troops is merely a coping mechanism** for Americans in order to wash away any psychological discomfort for not feeling more involved in the nation’s supposed wars. If this is the case, then **the country could be entering an era of persistent conflict,** not because of the threats the U.S. faces, but rather because society has become inoculated to the concept of the ever-present war. Are Americans less averse to war as long as it means not me or my family? But Americans cannot feel guilty for not feeling at war when the nation has not even officially declared war. Or perhaps **this undeclared state of war is just an extension of society’s general disconnect with the military**, or awkwardness with being at war but not feeling at war? Worse yet, do we not declare war so we can conveniently support wars we are winning, while also allowing us the flexibility to move out of conflicts which are difficult and necessary but do not receive favorable press? Since leaving that class that day, my classmates and I have debated these questions in our heads for years. **There seems to be no clear-cut answer,** and sometimes the answers seem too hard to confront. But from the class, I now realize why the instructor always stressed that it was important to leave the ego in the hallways. Because **presuming one had the answers and not listening to others, was a clear sign of** moral and intellectual **laziness**.

\*\* Iranian Hegemony DA – Aff Answers

\*Afghanistan

Aff- Afghanistan- Presence 🡪 US-Iran Conflict

Presence creates instability which makes Afghanistan a flashpoint for war

Mir 8 (Haroun, http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=121&Itemid=50, date accessed: 7/2/2010) AJK

The US and Iran have locked horns, undermining political and economic stability in countries throughout the greater Middle East, especially Afghanistan. Most countries in the region have the resources to absorb the impact of any eventual military confrontation in the Persian Gulf, but Afghanistan does not. The growing US-Iran enmity is affecting Afghanistan’s fragile economy and worsening the political situation. Iran has historically enjoyed great political and economic influence over Afghanistan. Unlike Pakistan, Iran does not have any territorial disputes with Afghanistan. However, the dispute over the use of water from the Hirmand River remains unresolved and could prove a flashpoint for any future conflict between the two countries. Iran’s Afghan policy over the past three decades has been consistent with its geo-strategic interest. Iran considers Afghanistan its backyard and so Iranian authorities assisted mujahideen fighters, particularly the Shia groups, during the Soviet invasion. They provided assistance to anti-Taliban groups and, since the fall of the Taliban, have been positively engaged with the Afghan government, although they have resented the presence of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Iran has kept close ties with former mujahideen leaders and commanders. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e-Islami and on the UN’s list of individuals belonging to or are associated with the Taliban, has enjoyed special relations with Iran, where he received safe-haven from 1996 to 2001. After the collapse of the Taliban, he was allowed to secretly re-enter Afghanistan, regroup his militia, and create a base in the tribal zone in Pakistan. From there, he declared a new “Holy War” against the presence of coalition forces in the country. In the past three decades, more than two million Afghan refugees have lived in Iran. According to the UN’s refugee commission, close to one million Afghan refugees still live there. There are also a considerable number of illegal refugees, who return back to Iran every year. While a small number of Afghan refugees have integrated into Iranian society, the majority live in precarious conditions and under tremendous pressure from Iranian authorities. Iran, after Pakistan, has become the second major trade partner of Afghanistan, and its trade volume with the country has been increasing steadily over the course of the last several years. Iran is a large source of private investment in Afghanistan, with a number of Iranian companies involved in major construction projects throughout the country. Iran wants to invest more but Afghan authorities are sceptical about Iranian economic influence. Most of the time, Iranian companies partner with Afghans in joint investments in order to avoid US and Afghan scrutiny. Afghanistan, after Iraq, has become another field for possible military confrontation between the US and Iran. Recently, US military officials accused Iran of delivering arms and ammunitions to the Afghan insurgents through the countries’ 936 km border. Iranian intelligence services have conducted covert intelligence and military activities for almost three decades.

\*Generic

 Aff- Generic- N/ UQ- US ≠ Check

US Cant check Iranian influence – border sharing, economics, and religion

Beehner and Bruno 8 (Lionel and Greg, Lionel – term member and former senior writer at the Council on Foreign Relations and Geg – staff writer @ Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), CFR, 3/3/8,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/12521/irans\_involvement\_in\_iraq.html) JPG

Military. The Quds Force, a special operations wing of [Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps](http://www.cfr.org/publication/14324/), is accused by U.S. officials of [furnishing Shiite militias (USA Today)](http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070131/1a_offlede31_dom.art.htm) with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), or roadside bombs, as well as rocket-propelled grenades and Katyusha rockets. Specifically, the United States alleges that it supports, trains, and finances militias like the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of one of Iraq’s most religious Shiite parties whose base is in southern Iraq. “The Quds Force is to the Shiite militias as al-Qaeda in Iraq is to the Sunni insurgent groups,” [writes Rick Francona](http://hardblogger.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/01/26/42746.aspx), a retired military intelligence official and former U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel, on MSNBC.com. Some experts estimate as many as thirty-thousand Iranian operatives may be in Iraq. In October 2007 the U.S. State Department designated the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force supporters of terrorism, and imposed [sweeping economic sanctions](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/10/94133.htm) on both. Religious. Iran has sent more than two thousand religious students and scholars to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. One-third of them belong to [Iranian intelligence (PDF)](http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-IranContributionIraq.pdf) and some are operatives sent to Shiite shrines to influence voters ahead of elections, writes Mounir Elkhamri, a military analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There is also a booming cross-border religious tourism business. Tens of thousands of Iranians and Iraqis cross borders to visit holy sites each year; Iran is even building an airport in Najaf to facilitate this exchange of religious visitors. Economic. Iran has emerged as one of Iraq’s largest trading partners, with Iranian exports to Iraq [topping $1.8 billion (PDF)](http://87.107.85.223/documents/document/12429/12430/Exportation-According-to-Country-of-Destination-Part-1.aspx) in 2006, according to the Iranian Custom Administration, up from $800 million in 2004. A free-trade zone in southern Iraq has brought a surge of Iranian goods into shops in Basra, including kerosene and cooking gas. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, a professor of international relations at Britain’s University of Durham, says southern Iraq is the only place outside of Iran where Iranian currency—the rial—is used. “That demonstrates Tehran's economic influence on its neighbor,” Ehteshami told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Iran is constructing a highway to link Basra with Iranian commercial centers across the border. Tehran also plans to build a branch of its national bank in Baghdad and provide assistance for Iraq’s economic reconstruction, according to Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq. Social. Many powerful Shiite political parties made Iran their home base during the reign of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni Baath Party. One of the most prominent was Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of Iraq’s largest Shiite political party and commander of the Badr Brigade, its military wing. After a brief uprising by Iraq’s Shiites in the southern port city of Basra in 1991, the group returned to Iran and competed for influence with other exiles. When Saddam was ousted in 2003, Iraqi Shiites returned, followed by Iranian leaders seeking to [cement ties (PDF)](http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr156.pdf) with a new era of Iraqi politicians. Those relationships continue to dominate Iraqi politics in Baghdad.

US doesn’t check Iran influence

Alani 6 (Dr Mustafa, senior adviser and Director of the Security and Terrorism Programme at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai, 10/24/6,

http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section=opinion&xfile=data/opinion/2006/october/opinion\_october77.xml) JPG

Iran’s interventionist policy in Iraq has already attained a significant part of its objectives. In fact, despite US forces occupying the country, Iran has more influence over developments in post-Saddam Iraq than ever before.

Aff- Generic- Relations Resilient

Relations resilient—both sides see each other as indespensible

Yeni Sefak 9 (Website, February 9, “Columnist upbeat about prospects for Turkish-US cooperation” LexisNexis)jn

We often see superficial approaches that disregard the importance and the multiple dimensions of Turkish-US relations. Groups that raise objections to the effect that "we may lose the United States" whenever Turkey levels some criticism; those who think that the United States would write off Turkey as soon as the Armenian and Jewish lobbies go into action; and those who are looking for opportunities to bash the United States fail to see the dimensions of the alliance between the two countries. Those who raised a storm after the [ 1 March 2003] authorization bill affair also made the same mistake. Any arguments that the United States might favour the Kurds over Turkey in the region or that it might be pressured by Israel to take a different posture with regard to Turkey are largely dissociated from reality. The alliance with the United States has always been very important for Turkey. The role the United States has played in Turkey's Westernization process is no less than that played by Europe. Nor was Turkey's importance and value [for the United States] associated with the Cold War period only. Those who thought that Turkey's importance would decline after the end of the Cold War and that the [Turkish-US] alliance relationship would lose its significance were proven wrong. Today, Turkey occupies a more important place than it did in the past. Obama needs to analyse Turkey's importance well and echo this in his policies. Think about it: If President Obama went to any European, Balkan, or Middle Eastern country today, how many issues would he have on his agenda? Which of these issues would he discuss and how long would such a meeting last? Most probably, the agenda items could be counted on the fingers of one hand and most of them would be related to the expectations of that country from the United States. Now, if President Obama came to Turkey how many files would have in his briefcase? How many items would he have on his agenda? How many of these would be Turkish expectations and how many would be US requests?

Aff- Generic A2 – No Iran Influence

Iran influencing Turkey now

Steiner 10(Tommy, June 25, senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy , “Exploiting the Mideast power vacuum”, http://www.haaretz.com/magazine/week-s-end/exploiting-the-mideast-power-vacuum-1.298271, accessed 7/2/10)jn

To appreciate the shifting tectonic plates in the politics of the Middle East, it might be useful to invoke the NATO Istanbul summit, which took place six years ago this month. The summit was intended to herald the recovery of the transatlantic partnership from the tensions caused by the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and to underscore NATO's primary global role, by having allies on both sides of the Atlantic commit to promoting a stable, more democratic and socioeconomically developed Middle East. Turkey was to be the paradigm of this endeavor. Standing beside Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, president George W. Bush claimed: "Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world." Bush also took upon himself to actively advocate Turkey's admission to the EU, stating: "America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both." Now, a mere six years later, the dwindling influence of the transatlantic powers and their decision to relinquish their efforts to promote progress in the Middle East are molding a new regional balance of power. Mired by overwhelming economic crises and other domestic concerns, the United States and Europe have been scaling down their international roles. The new American course is far more significant than Europe's. American officials and opinion-shapers justify the apparent U.S. scaling down in terms of a "post-imperialist pragmatic realism." The desire to achieve more substantial results with far fewer resources, and to concentrate efforts on the domestic agenda for the sake of rebuilding U.S. power, has led engagement to become the epicenter of U.S. strategy. Yet, this strategy can't help but adversely affect the perception of American political and strategic prowess in the region. This not only entices America's adversaries to raise their stakes; it also drives U.S. allies to fend for themselves. Enter, Turkey. The power vacuum created by dwindling Western influence in the Middle East, far more than its realization that EU membership is not on the cards, is guiding Turkey in shaping a neo-Ottoman regional strategy. To be sure, this strategy has not emerged overnight; it was, rather, based on an incremental build-up of Turkey's own economic power and a warming of relations with two states it previously regarded as adversaries, Iran and Syria. Turkey and Iran now share extensive commercial ties. For instance, Iran accounts for 30 percent of energy-resource imports to Turkey, while the latter is becoming a major investor in the former's gas sector. Turkey has also sought to cultivate closer relations with Syria, marked by a high-profile joint military exercise in 2009. Furthermore, the future of Iraq appears to have solidified this triangular relationship into a strategic partnership: With the upcoming departure of U.S. troops, Iran's, Turkey's and Syria's complementary interests and aspired-to spheres of influence in Iraq are encouraging the formation of a political crescent of allies, stretching across the northern periphery of the Middle East, with Iraq's future to be determined. Emboldened, the two more powerful partners seek to jointly enhance their projection of power across the Middle East - hence their respective involvement in allegedly supporting the Palestinian cause. However, the Iranian and Turkish pro-Palestinian campaigns are at odds with the Palestinian Authority, and are, rather, aimed at supporting Hamas, an Iranian proxy backed by Syria. As the U.S. is viewed in the neighborhood as incapable of containing the expanding power of the northern crescent, the two main Arab regional powers, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are forming a southern crescent to protect their vital interests - from Iraq, through the Arabian Peninsula to Gaza - and to contain a potentially nuclear-backed northern alliance.

Aff- Generic- Presence 🡪 Iran Influence

Presence expands Iranian influence

Zambelliz 6/19 (Chris, an author and researcher with [Helios Global, Inc](http://www.heliosglobal.com/), specializes in Middle East politics, 6/19/10, Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LF19Ak03.html) JPG

Iran's push into the Americas would have never have materialized without the active encouragement of eager partners in the region. Yet how did the Islamic Republic manage to win so much goodwill from the Caribbean to the Southern Cone? Iran's diplomatic achievements cannot be understood without taking into account the tectonic shift to the left that saw an eclectic mix of leftist populists of various stripes take over the reins of power throughout the hemisphere beginning in the late 1990s. United in their skepticism toward US foreign policy and eagerness to [charter](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF19Ak03.html) independent paths for their countries away from the neo-liberal economic orthodoxies preached by Washington, the rise of a new revolutionary politics determined to defy the US-led status quo in the region has provided Iran with a receptive audience for its overtures and an ample supply of friends.

Aff- Generic- Presence 🡪 Expansionism

Presence is THE impetus for Iranian expanionism

MEPC 3 (Middle East Asian Policy, 3/7/3, MEPC Policy Breif # 10, http://www.mepc.org/forums\_briefs/3-7-03.asp) JPG

Were the United States to continue efforts to reduce Iran's threat to Iraq and other Gulf states through traditional counter/nonproliferation efforts, the question would arise as to whether an increased US military and economic presence in the region would dissuade Iran from pursuing WMD, or conversely, whether it would drive Iran to accelerate its alleged weapons program. At present, Iran perceives a threat in the growing US military presence at its borders. US forces are currently based in Afghanistan, Bahrain Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen and elsewhere in Central Asia.5 Iran is also sensing increasing isolation. According to many experts, Iran is experiencing a pivotal political year. It is difficult to predict the outcome of the many on-going internal political battles. However, changes in Iran's domestic political situation may have only a minimal impact on its conduct of foreign and security policy given the internal Iranian consensus on the threats to the country's security and on its response options (such as the alleged development of WMD). Iran's role in any future regional security framework is critical. Iran and North Korea could eventually gravitate towards each other, especially given their present status as pariahs in the view of US foreign policy.6 Proliferation on the part of either or both countries has the potential to be seriously destabilizing. This said, the nature of Iran's geo-strategic environment is helpful in understanding its alleged desire to pursue a policy of WMD development. In particular, the existence of unresolved issues between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, alongside a possible long-term US military occupation in Iraq provide arguments for those in Iran who advocate accelerated plans to develop a nuclear weapons option. Such arguments are reinforced by fear that the United States has designs to force regime change in Tehran. Therefore, priority should be placed on engaging in dialogue with Iran. Countries in the Gulf should involve Iran in multilateral frameworks, especially those that promote specific confidence-building measures. International agencies could engage Iran by encouraging increased transparency regarding any undeclared nuclear facilities, or by accepting Iran's offer of inspections "anytime, anywhere."7 As a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran could be encouraged to allow greater monitoring of its dual-use chemical facilities and programs. In order to alleviate fears of possible US/Iraqi border incursions, international monitors could be placed on the Iraq-Iran border. Involving Iran in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, particularly with UN humanitarian relief agencies that work with Afghan refugees is an example of a cooperative initiative that could help mitigate Iran's sense of isolation. At the bilateral level, the United States should be mindful of the threats Iran perceives to its security, especially following the war with Iraq and in view of the likely long-term US presence in the region. In addition to reassessing its current sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) - given the measure's questionable effectiveness - US strategy should focus on making the bilateral relationship more predictable through the creation of consistent expectations of each side's role in regional security. The United States could make it clear that its intentions are not to impose WMD disarmament by force, but rather to encourage countries to abide by the WMD-related agreements to which they are parties, which should simultaneously make regional and bilateral relationships more predictable. More predictable relationships are desirable as they allow for improved political relations, which ultimately lead to greater security for both sides. Predictability in the US-Iranian bilateral relationship can be attained in a number of ways. First, the United States could calm Iran's fears through declaratory policies, i.e. by stating that Iraq will not become a staging ground for incursions into Iran. It could also give Iran the negative security assurance that there will be no US attacks on a country that neither possesses nor seeks to possess WMD. Second, the United States could seek to establish functional security relationships, for example increasing contacts between the US and Iranian armed forces. Although normalization is not likely to occur in the near future, functional contacts can diminish the prospects for armed conflict. Any future framework for regional security must address Iran's growing concern with the security threats it senses around its borders. Otherwise, it is doubtful that Iran will become committed to meaningful regional cooperation on nonproliferation or other vital issues.

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense – Iran is Strong

Irans military capabilities are lie – Iran wont go on the offensive

Darling 10 (Daniel, int’l military markets analyst @ Forecast International, Faster Times, 4/28

http://thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2010/04/28/iranian-smoke-and-mirrors/) JPG

But Iran’s impressive manpower strength belies underlying military weaknesses, including outdated and atrophying equipment, substandard technologies and a lack of both airborne early-warning and air- and naval-power-projection capabilities. While Iran has plenty of combat aircraft, many are aging American platforms (F-4 Phantoms, F-5Es and F-14s) dating back to the pre-Revolution era of the Shah. Against this array of jet fighters the Gulf nations hold a numerical advantage of nearly two-to-one - plus they have the added benefit of flying advanced platforms such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, F-18 Hornet and F-16E/F Block 60. The Gulf Arab states also spend roughly $60 billion on defense versus around $9 billion for Iran, with Saudi Arabia alone allocating $41 billion for military/security purposes in 2009. Though militarily capable enough to match its Arab neighbors, an Iranian first-strike against these countries is at best a remote possibility, particularly with U.S. forces stationed in the region. There are also economic concerns that render direct aggression unlikely, including the [$12 billion](http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8702110574) in trade conducted between the UAE and Iran. And despite its provocative statements about blocking the Strait of Hormuz, such an action - if Iran could indeed [pull it off](http://defensetech.org/2010/04/22/iran-begins-military-exercises-in-the-gulf/#more-6698) - would itself damage the Iranian economy by choking off the channel through which most of its own oil exports pass. Instead Iranian conventional military strength is publicly amplified for intimidation purposes through martial displays and military exercises, while serpentine measures are used to expand Iran’s regional influence. This bifurcated strategy has ably served Iran, allowing it to extend its reach beyond its immediate borders while intimidating its Gulf neighbors. Its ballistic missile capabilities notwithstanding, in truth the Iranian military is better suited to play defense than to launch an offensive against its neighbors. On its own turf the IRGC presents a formidable foe whose use of asymmetrical warfare would prove damaging to any invader. But outside its own boundaries Iran seems content to stick to its game plan, which is to bleed its adversaries through use of proxies and to promote itself as the implacable foe of Western interference in the Muslim world.

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense– Iran Expansionism

Iran wont expand – US deterrence, weak economy, and national interests

Newby 10 (Vanessa, PhD candidate @ Griffith Asi Inst., published @ Lowy Inst. For Intl Policy,

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/03/19/Reader-riposte-Iran-as-regional-power.aspx) JPG

Raoul Heinrichs [makes a good point](http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/03/12/Between-Iraq-and-a-hard-place.aspx) about the potential for Iran to extend its power in the region after a US troop withdrawal. But at this stage it should only be seen as potential and nothing more.

He should be clearer about exactly what influence he thinks Iran plans to project into Iraq. He mentions military incursions, but it's hardly likely that Iran is going to risk reinvigorating military confrontations with Iraqi forces, unless the Supreme Leader has a breakdown and decides it's the only way to recover his political legitimacy. It's no secret that maintaining the security of oil supplies in the Gulf is a key US priority, so it's unlikely Iran is under the impression that US troops are going very far away. If we are talking about the 'invisible threads' of influence that Iran can weave in Iraq through its Shi'ite connections, recent works by [Rodger Shanahan](http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=961) and [Laurence Louer](http://www.amazon.com/Transnational-Shia-Politics-Religious-Political/dp/0231700407/ref%3Dsr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1268953350&sr=1-1) have demonstrated that national concerns predominate over religious networks in most cases. In terms of political influence, Shi'ite Iraqi political parties might maintain good relations with Iran, but getting too close is not a domestically popular move. As for the nuclear threat, [Stephen Walt's comments](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/05/how_not_to_contain_iran) in Foreign Policy succinctly sum up Iran's potential for regional hegemony: Iran's population and economic potential raise the possibility that it might one day be the dominant power in the Gulf, but it is nowhere near that capacity now. Getting a nuclear weapon won't change that fact, because nuclear weapons are only useful for deterrence and confer little positive leverage over others. Finally, in order to influence others, the hard power of a good economy comes in handy, and as Iran's economy is in a pretty poor state right now, it's unlikely that Iran will have a lot of economic leverage over Iraq in the future.

Aff Impacts- Generic- Defense– Iranian Proliferation

Iran wont spread nukes

Hemmer 7 (Christopher, Associate Prof of Int’l Security Studies @ Air War College, PhD @Cornell University with a specialty in Intl Relations, Parameters, August 2007 ed., Find Articles,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/pg\_7/?tag=content;col1) JPG

There has also been a good deal of international media reports related to the fear that Iran might provide nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. Ironically, the very use by Iran of surrogate terrorist organizations, rather than more overt attacks, is evidence that Tehran is sensitive to the calculations associated with the strategy of deterrence. It is also an affirmation that the Iranian leadership is attempting to minimize the risks to its foreign policy objectives. Such acts argue strongly against any possibility that Iran might provide terrorist organizations with nuclear weapons. Any move of this nature carries with it a great amount of risk; Iranians would lose control over the employment of the weapons while still having to worry that they might be blamed and targeted for response. (10)

Aff Impacts- Generic- Offense- Econ Collapse/ WOT/ Destabilize

US engagement of Iran leads to economic collapse, failure in the war on terror, and destabilize the region

Hemmer 7 (Christopher, Associate Prof of Int’l Security Studies @ Air War College, PhD @Cornell University with a specialty in Intl Relations, Parameters, August 2007 ed., Find Articles,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/pg\_7/?tag=content;col1) JPG

Any attempt to disarm Iran through the use of military options would in all likelihood damage America's interests in the region. While a military option might inflict significant damage on Iran's infrastructure by damaging or destroying its nuclear weapons program, disrupting its regional ambitions, and possibly serving as a deterrent to future proliferators, the likely costs would far outweigh the benefits. First, any military action against Iran would send seismic shocks through global energy markets at a time when the price of oil is already at record highs. Since Iran relies heavily on the income derived from oil exports, it is unlikely that it would withhold petroleum from global markets. Iran may, however, threaten to disrupt the flow of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz or sponsor attacks on key oil infrastructure on the territory of America's Gulf allies. Such actions could hurt the US economy and potentially bolster Iranian revenue by raising the price of oil. While it is true that the world market would eventually adjust to such actions, as James Fallows has noted, that is a bit like saying eventually the US stock market adjusted to the Great Depression. (2) Any direct military action against Iran could also have a significant impact on America's war on terrorism. Such action would only serve to confirm many of Osama bin Laden's statements that the United States is at war with the world of Islam. This charge would be difficult to counter, given the fact that the United States has looked the other way for years with regard to Israel's nuclear program, accepted India as a legitimate nuclear-state, and is negotiating with North Korea regarding its nuclear ambitions. Any military action against Iran would also undermine America's nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to possible Iranian retaliation in both countries. While Iranian efforts toward stabilizing these two states have been sporadic at best, and purposively obstructive at worst, there is little reason to doubt that Iran could make achieving US objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan far more difficult. Although mostly bluster, there is some truth to former Iranian President Ali Rafsanjani's argument that as long as American troops maintain a formidable presence on Iran's borders, "it is the United States that is besieged by Iran." (3) The same holds true regarding Iran's ties to Hezbollah and its presence in Lebanon. By targeting Iran's nuclear program the United States would unwisely encourage Iranian escalation in a number of these arenas.

\*Turkey

Aff- Turkey- US Relations Brink/Iran Relations Up

U.S. Turkey relations are on the brink—Turkey is succumbing to Iranian influence

Zacharia 10(Janine, Staff Writer at the Washington Post, April 8, “Turkey works to build economic ties, influence in Middle East”, *The Washington Post,* A Section, Page A-11, Lexis)jn

The thriving trade is a sign of Turkey's rising influence with Syria, part of its effort to reach out to neighboring countries to build economic ties it hopes will also stabilize political relationships and expand its influence in the region. Those efforts, which include business ventures with Iran, illustrate to some extent how futile U.S. efforts to isolate those countries with sanctions have become. They've also raised concerns in Washington and in Israel about whether this key Muslim member of NATO is undergoing a fundamental realignment. Turkey's efforts, however, seem as much about economic expansion as they do about foreign policy, with an aggressive strategy of seeking new markets for Turkish businessmen, many of them backers of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party. "We want to have an economic interdependency between Turkey and neighbors and between different countries in these regions. If you have an economic interdependency, this is the best way to prevent any crisis," said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The push has included an effort to broker a resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks, easing tensions between Syria and Saudi Arabia -- the main power brokers in Lebanon -- to help avert a political crisis there, and trying to mediate an end to the West's dispute with Iran over its nuclear program. With wealth garnered in emerging markets and growing self-confidence as a new member of the G-20, Turkey is reaching out as much to former European enemies, such as Greece, as to its Muslim neighbors. In the past year and a half, Davutoglu and his predecessor made roughly twice as many trips to Europe as they did to the Middle East. A Turk serves as president of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. To some analysts, Erdogan doesn't seem as much of an ideologue as a pragmatic capitalist trying to make money and create markets. When he visited Tehran in October, he described the Iranian nuclear program as "peaceful,'' causing U.S. officials to bristle. Less noticed was Erdogan's push for a free-trade agreement. Accompanying the Turkish leader on the trip was Rizanur Meral, chief executive of Sanko Holding's Automotive Group and president of TUSKON, a Turkish business association representing 50,000 small and medium-size Turkish companies. Business leaders are playing an important role in Turkey's foreign policy, serving as unofficial ambassadors and advisers. Syrian businessmen in Gaziantep pushed for the relaxation of the visa requirements. When President Abdullah Gul visited Cameroon last month to sign a free-trade accord and open a new embassy, he was accompanied by three cabinet ministers, four members of parliament -- and 147 businessmen. Erdogan took similar-size delegations to India, Iran and Libya. "The business consideration is very important for this government," said Ismail Hakki Kisacik, general coordinator of Turkey's Taha Group, which controls the country's largest clothing chain and joined government officials on the recent Africa trip. "If you're developing your business with countries, it means your relations improve.'' The United States may be an exception. Washington's relations with Turkey took on a sour tone in February when the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution calling Turkey's killing of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 "genocide." Turkey recalled its ambassador, Namik Tan. The Obama administration has insisted that it does not support the panel's move. Over the past year, U.S. officials have shown muted tolerance toward Turkey's outreach to Syria and outright disapproval of Turkey's rhetoric on Iran. The United States has openly chastised Turkey -- which is heavily dependent on Iranian-supplied energy sources -- for undercutting the U.S. push to isolate Iran internationally over its nuclear program. "It seems, to me at least, that Turkey is contemplating a fundamental realignment,'' said Rep. Steve Israel (D-N.Y.), a member of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Phil Gordon, the assistant secretary of state for Europe, said recently that the United States doesn't necessarily believe that Turkey is turning away from its Western allies. He said Turkey's move to improve relations with its neighbors was understandable, but warned that that effort "should not be pursued uncritically or at any price," especially at the expense of its relationship with Israel. Relations between Israel and Turkey were good until Israel launched a military offensive in the Gaza Strip in December 2008. Erdogan's popularity soared after he lectured Israeli President Shimon Peres about the attacks in January last year. His criticism, which has continued, contributes "negatively to the way Israel is perceived in Turkey," said an Israeli diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations between the two nations. "It's not clear which direction Erdogan is taking Turkey." But to Turkish officials, the direction is obvious. As their nation has grown economically, it is only natural for Turkey seek a bigger role in global affairs. Turkey, meanwhile, is also looking to export some of its cultural influence. In recent years, the country has had about 30 television shows broadcast across the Arab world.

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Influencing now

U.S. Turkey relations are on the brink—Turkey is succumbing to Iranian influence

Zacharia 10(Janine, Staff Writer at the Washington Post, April 8, “Turkey works to build economic ties, influence in Middle East”, *The Washington Post,* A Section, Page A-11, Lexis)jn

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Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Influence Up- Turkey

Iran influencing Turkey now

Steiner 10(Tommy, June 25, senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy , “Exploiting the Mideast power vacuum”, http://www.haaretz.com/magazine/week-s-end/exploiting-the-mideast-power-vacuum-1.298271, accessed 7/2/10)jn

To appreciate the shifting tectonic plates in the politics of the Middle East, it might be useful to invoke the NATO Istanbul summit, which took place six years ago this month. The summit was intended to herald the recovery of the transatlantic partnership from the tensions caused by the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and to underscore NATO's primary global role, by having allies on both sides of the Atlantic commit to promoting a stable, more democratic and socioeconomically developed Middle East. Turkey was to be the paradigm of this endeavor. Standing beside Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, president George W. Bush claimed: "Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world." Bush also took upon himself to actively advocate Turkey's admission to the EU, stating: "America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both." Now, a mere six years later, the dwindling influence of the transatlantic powers and their decision to relinquish their efforts to promote progress in the Middle East are molding a new regional balance of power. Mired by overwhelming economic crises and other domestic concerns, the United States and Europe have been scaling down their international roles. The new American course is far more significant than Europe's. American officials and opinion-shapers justify the apparent U.S. scaling down in terms of a "post-imperialist pragmatic realism." The desire to achieve more substantial results with far fewer resources, and to concentrate efforts on the domestic agenda for the sake of rebuilding U.S. power, has led engagement to become the epicenter of U.S. strategy. Yet, this strategy can't help but adversely affect the perception of American political and strategic prowess in the region. This not only entices America's adversaries to raise their stakes; it also drives U.S. allies to fend for themselves. Enter, Turkey. The power vacuum created by dwindling Western influence in the Middle East, far more than its realization that EU membership is not on the cards, is guiding Turkey in shaping a neo-Ottoman regional strategy. To be sure, this strategy has not emerged overnight; it was, rather, based on an incremental build-up of Turkey's own economic power and a warming of relations with two states it previously regarded as adversaries, Iran and Syria. Turkey and Iran now share extensive commercial ties. For instance, Iran accounts for 30 percent of energy-resource imports to Turkey, while the latter is becoming a major investor in the former's gas sector. Turkey has also sought to cultivate closer relations with Syria, marked by a high-profile joint military exercise in 2009. Furthermore, the future of Iraq appears to have solidified this triangular relationship into a strategic partnership: With the upcoming departure of U.S. troops, Iran's, Turkey's and Syria's complementary interests and aspired-to spheres of influence in Iraq are encouraging the formation of a political crescent of allies, stretching across the northern periphery of the Middle East, with Iraq's future to be determined. Emboldened, the two more powerful partners seek to jointly enhance their projection of power across the Middle East - hence their respective involvement in allegedly supporting the Palestinian cause. However, the Iranian and Turkish pro-Palestinian campaigns are at odds with the Palestinian Authority, and are, rather, aimed at supporting Hamas, an Iranian proxy backed by Syria. As the U.S. is viewed in the neighborhood as incapable of containing the expanding power of the northern crescent, the two main Arab regional powers, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are forming a southern crescent to protect their vital interests - from Iraq, through the Arabian Peninsula to Gaza - and to contain a potentially nuclear-backed northern alliance.

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Iran Relations Up

Iran-Turkey relations building—economic ties
Pupkin 10 (David, correspondent for Bloomberg, “Iran-Turkey Economic Relations: What Their Rapid Growth Means for Iran’s Nuclear Program”, http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/iran-turkey-economic-relations-what-their-rapid-growth-means-iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-program, accssed 7/2/10)jn

According to Turkish and Iranian sources, since the beginning of 2009, cross-border trade has continued its upward trend. According to Iranian media reports, non-energy trade between the two nations climbed to $2.7 billion in 2009. Iran exports industrial products – such as cathodes, polymers, propylene – and consumer goods to Turkey while Turkey exports textiles, machinery, steel, and chemicals to Iran.[13] This trade represents for Iran an 11 percent increase over the same period from the year before in non-energy exports to Turkey, making Turkey the sixth largest consumer of Iran’s non-oil goods.[14] Beyond non-energy trade, there have been many other signs of increased economic cooperation since January of 2010. In February of 2010, the Central Bank of Iran approved the establishment and operation of a Turkish-owned bank in Bandar Abbas.[15] In that same month, Iran signed a customs memorandum of understanding with Turkey that opened up the Bazergan, Khoy, Saro, and Maku border points for trade. This agreement has also mandated the revival of the joint border markets in Kuzrosh and Salmas. [16] Several days later, a second round of talks produced agreements about the creation of a joint industrial town on the border of the two nations, a project that appears to be moving forward.[17] Finally, Turkey was one of just twelve nations with which Iran signed preferential and free trade agreements, highlighting the Islamic Republic’s desire to further improve trade relations.[18]

Turkey has positive relation with Iran

Katzman et al 10, (Kenneth, Jan 13, specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf page 21 accessed 7/2) CM

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey has Islamist roots and a foreign policy doctrine of seeking “zero problems” with neighbors and of nurturing beneficial relations with all, including Iran. Powered by a robust economy, the AKP government has continued the realistic pragmatism or pronounced self-interest of its predecessors toward Iran. Since AKP came to power in 2002, Turkish-Iranian relations have expanded markedly. Officials have exchanged numerous visits, culminating in Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey in August 2008. The AKP government hosted him in Istanbul, thereby working around Ahmadinejad’s antipathy to Turkish secularism by enabling him to avoid a usually obligatory visit in the capital of Ankara to the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Turkish President Abdullah Gul reciprocated by visiting Iran for a regional summit in March 2009, when he met both Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i and President Ahmadinejad. Turkey’s pragmatism or realpolitik was evident in official reactions to Iran’s June 12, 2009, presidential election as President Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were among the first international leaders to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his re-election. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu later declared controversies over the outcome to be an internal Iranian affair. AKP’s domestic critics charged that these “reflexive and premature” actions may have undermined Turkey’s stature and credibility as an interest in stability embodied in the status quo appeared to trump values.50 Prior to visiting Iran in October 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan told the British newspaper, *The Guardian*, “There is not doubt he (Ahmadinejad) is our friend…. As a friend, so far we have good relations and have no difficulty at all.”51

Aff- Turkey- N/UQ- Relations Resilient

Turkey will align will Iran – Kurds and regional interests

Wehrey et al 10 ( Jan Frederic , adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service , Rand Institute, http://www.ncci-library.org/jspui/handle/123456789/445 Page 39 accessed 7/2) CM

Although recent U.S. support for Turkish actions against the PKK in northern Iraq is certainly welcome in Ankara, the Kurdish challenge is likely to continue to be a source of friction in U.S.–Turkish relations in years to come. The Kurdish issue also aligns Turkish inter- ests with those of key American adversaries, particularly Iran. As dis- cussed earlier, Turkey shares fundamental security and extensive eco- nomic interests with Iran (as well as Syria) that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring Turkey into a firmly pro-Western camp.84 As Turkey asserts greater interest and activism in the Middle East arena, U.S. policymakers will need to contend with what some analysts view as a more independent- aminded and nationalist Turkish orientation (see Larrabee, 2008).

Aff Impacts- Turkey- Offense- Turkey Econ

Iranian influence is key to the Turkish economy

Katzman et al 10, (Kenneth, Jan 13, specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf page 23 accessed 7/2) CM

Turkish-Iranian relations have a very strong economic component. About 1.5 million Iranian tourists visit Turkey annually, visa-free. Trade is growing and reached $10 billion annually in 2008, with Iranian exports of oil, oil products, and gas to Turkey accounting for $7.2 million of the total.56 Officials of both governments have said that they hope to increase trade to $30 billion a year in the next few years.57 A pipeline commissioned in 2001 carries natural gas from Tabriz to Ankara. In 2007, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the state-run Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to be granted the right to develop natural gas fields in South Pars, to extract up to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) of additional gas, and to transport it via a new 1,850 kilometer pipeline to Turkey. Turkey is to invest an estimated $3.5 billion and receive 50% of the gas produced. Both governments hope that the new pipeline will eventually link with the planned 3,300-kilometer Nabucco pipeline. Scheduled to be completed in 2014, Nabucco is intended to carry natural gas from the Caspian/Central Asian region via Georgia and Turkey to Austria, bypassing Russia. Iranian gas has the potential to make Nabucco more viable especially if Russia dissuades the Central Asian states from using it and China competes for their resources as well. Turkey and Iran have formed a joint company to transfer the gas to Europe. However, the European partners in Nabucco (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Germany, and Austria) have declared, “No Iranian gas will be accepted unless the nuclear problem is solved” and U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Ambassador Richard Morningstar has stated, “At present, we do not support Iran’s participation in the project.”58 Turkey opposes all energy-related sanctions on Iran mainly because of its energy needs. In addition, in 2007, Turkey signed an MOU to build three natural gas-fired power plants in Iran and to import 3 to 6 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually. The two neighbors also have plans for an ambitious new road and rail transportation network to link the Turkish Black Sea port of Trabzon and the Iranian Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas, and to establish a free industrial zone on their border. In private, Turkish officials have voiced some security concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran and about the impact that such a development would have on the regional balance of power. They note that Turkey is Iran’s closest neighbor and easily within range of its missiles -- even though Iran has not threatened Turkey. These concerns may have prompted Turkey’s possible purchase of U.S. Patriot air defense missiles.59 As noted above, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul have criticized the West’s policy on the issue and charged it with “double standards,” suggesting that Iran is being judged more harshly than presumed nuclear power Israel. In November 2008, Erdogan told a Brookings Institution audience, “We do not find it correct to tell just one country to scrap nuclear weapons. We do not think this is an honest approach. Whoever has nuclear weapons should scrap them first then let us all be rid of them.”60 The two leaders have repeatedly put Turkey forward as a possible mediator between Iran and the United States and Turkey accepted an IAEA suggestion that it act as a repository for Iran’s uranium, but Iran rejected the

\*\*Israel Politics – Aff Answers

Netanyahu is weak now

Credibility of Netanyahu is low in Israel.

Mitnick 10 (Josh; correspondent, *The Christian Science Monitor,* July 7, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0707/Obama-Netanyahu-make-show-of-mending-US-Israeli-ties) CH

Though the two administrations have been at odds over how to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and how to confront Iran’s nuclear ambitions, President Obama insisted the differences had been exaggerated by the American and Israeli media. The president also said that he believes Mr. Netanyahu wants peace, echoing similar praise that former President George W. Bush bestowed on former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2002. Both leaders smiling, Obama responded to reporters questions about the leaders’ chilly relationship by saying, “I’ve trusted Prime Minister Netanyahu since I met him” – a compliment that many Israelis might find ironic because of the domestic credibility deficit often ascribed to the prime minister by politicians and analysts. The summit was complemented by a meeting between First Lady Michelle Obama and Netanyahu’s wife, Sara. “They really bent over backwards to make it seem like business as usual,” says Mitchell Barak, who runs the Israeli polling firm, Keevoon. “But it doesn’t lend credibility when the leaders don’t acknowledge that there was a crisis and [pretend that] everything was fine all along... Israelis already have a problem with credibility of politicians.”

The Israeli right wing have lost their confidence in Netanyahu.

Shamir 10 (Shlomo, staff writer, Haaretz, June 20, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/quiet-over-brooklyn-1.297141) EH

As soon as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's right-wing government took office in Jerusalem, it seems the American Jewish right fell asleep. The fierce controversy over construction in East Jerusalem, U.S. President Barack Obama's harsh statements about Israel, the Goldstone report accusing Israel of war crimes, the torrent of international condemnations in the wake of the flotilla raid - all failed to draw rabbis and community activists out in mass demonstrations of support for Israel. In fact, one can confidently say that Israel's political problems have been taken off the agenda of Orthodox synagogues and rabbinical organizations like the Rabbinical Council of America and Young Israel and were ushered out of the public discourse of the community's right wing. "I can't explain the silence of the Orthodox community," admits Dov Hikind, a former aide to Meir Kahane, who today serves as a New York State assemblyman for Boro Park and parts of Flatbush. "It's not laziness or tiredness," says a veteran community activist in Brooklyn, who asked to remain anonymous. "Some from the generation of rabbis and politicians who led the struggle against the Oslo Accords have died, and others are in retirement homes. Israel's political elite does not have a single figure with whom they can identify and use as an example of dedication and loyalty to values." There has not been a consensus about any Israeli issue since the long-gone days of protest on behalf of the Soviet Jews. But the right always loved controversy that stirred the enthusiasm of rabbis, politicians and the rank and file. The Oslo Accords, for instance, prompted protests against the government of Israel and especially against then-prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. But it seems the last time the right wing had an opportunity to actively protest was against the Gaza disengagement. Recent studies have claimed that many in the Jewish community, especially its liberal wing, are distancing themselves from Israel and feel alienated by its current policy. It now transpires that the Orthodox, who constitute the majority of the right-wing camp and who once would have seen neglecting to support a right-wing Israeli government as nothing short of heresy, have lost their trust and confidence in the Netanyahu government.

Netanyahu is weak now

Mistakes by Netanyahu weaken his status.

Debkafile 10 (Debkafile provides an intelligence and security news service, July 1, http://www.debka.com/article/8882/) EH

The "Turkish flotilla effect" continues to plague Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, leading him into one misstep after another with the result that he arrives in Washington on July 6 for talks with President Barack Obama with a divided government. debkafile's Jerusalem sources report that Thursday, July 1 finds Netanyahu scrambling to stabilize his cabinet lineup and recover from the fallout of his disastrous decision to let infrastructure minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer meet Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu for supposedly secret talks in Brussels to try and narrow the widening rift between Ankara and Jerusalem. It was leaked that same day, causing a huge uproar in Jerusalem - both because the initiative which failed was seen to be a crass error at a time that the Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan's anti-Israel campaign was in full flight, and because the prime minister neglected to update foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman of the event. Lieberman, who heads the right-wing Israel Beitenu, publicly accused Netanyahu of breach of trust. All day Thursday, he refused to answer the prime minister's phone calls. The result: total disconnect between the head of government and his foreign minister less than a week before the Israeli prime minister meets the US president. Another key member of the Netanyahu cabinet, defense minister Ehud Barak, leader of the Labor party, is suspected by broad political circles of engineering the Israeli minister's rendezvous with Davutoglu - not just for a reckless bid to melt the Turkish wall of hostility, but to edge the foreign minister and his party out of the government coalition. He has denied this charge - according to debkafile's sources, to avoid being associated with a second fiasco after the fumbled Israeli commando raid of the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship heading for Gaza on May 31. The defense minister understands that his complicity in the Brussels encounter could weigh against him when he testifies before the public inquiry commission Israel established to find out how the flotilla incident came to end with nine Turkish activists dead and six Israeli soldiers injured. Its findings could damage Barak's career irretrievably. The panel, headed by ex-justice Jacob Turkel with two foreign observers, is to be given a broader mandate and real teeth. Instead of preparing calmly for a hardheaded discussion with the US president on a long list of tough issues, Netanyahu must now concentrate all his efforts on hauling his government coalition out of a morass. It is hard to see him managing this uphill job in the four days left before he boards a flight to Washington. He will therefore arrive at the White House with his government in disarray and his personal standing uncertain.

Netanyahu is weak now

Netanyahu is weak, his policies are being overturned by EVERYONE.

Kaufman 10(Amy, Israeli Journalist and contributor to the Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ami-kaufman/everyone-except-obama-kno_b_470792.html>, 2/21)dc.

Over the past year, Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from coalition members and from his own party that has made him renege on so many of his initiatives, it's hard to keep count. Here are just a few examples: Value added tax on fruits and vegetables Netanyahu backed down from a plan to impose a Value Added Tax on fruits and vegetables after he met strong opposition from the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, a partner in his coalition. Shas Chairman Eli Yishai said that the tax would harm the weaker sectors of society. Eventually, Netanyahu claimed that "A central part of my job is to listen to the will of the people. I've reached the conclusion that now is not the time to impose this tax." The drought tax The government had a great idea to hike up water prices to make people use less of this disappearing resource. But the huge public outcry meant that Netanyahu had to let this initiative go down the drain. Expulsion of the children of foreign workers Netanyahu's government isn't exactly known for its tolerance of minorities and foreigners. So, when he and his Interior Minister Yishai decided it was time to kick out the children of foreign workers in Israel, the public outcry worked once again. The deportations won't begin until August 2010, assuming he sticks to his guns this time... The Highway and Railroad Plan Just two weeks ago, Netanyahu unveiled his plan to spend over 80 billion shekels ($20 billion) on new highways and railroads connecting the Galilee to the Negev. But officials in the Treasury got up on their hind legs and seem to have derailed this plan, as well. 1/2 National Heritage Sites And just this morning, Netanyahu added two controversial sites to a list of sites that would be granted 400 million shekels (100 million dollars). After pressure from right-wingers, Netanyahu added the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem to the list. The "Jobs" Law This would have allowed municipalities across the country to appoint dozens of deputy mayors to public offices at a huge cost to the public coffers. The huge public outcry did it again (thank G-d for Israeli public outcry...). The Absorption Budget When Foreign Minister and head of the extreme right-wing Yisrael Beitenu party Avigdor Lieberman heard that the Absorption Ministry's budget would be cut along with all the other ministries, he called a press conference and announced his party wouldn't be voting with the coalition. Bibi quickly put in a call, and invited him in for a chat at his office to promise it wouldn't happen. Right to vote for Israelis living abroad Netanyahu's initiative to allow all Israelis abroad to vote will probably change drastically, if not vanish totally into thin air. The goal, of course, was to strengthen his fan base, since most of the several hundred thousand Israelis living abroad are known to lean to the right. Netanyahu has met strong opposition from his coalition partners, mainly Ehud Barak and the Labor Party. It now seems the privilege will be given only to those who left the country one year before elections. And this is just a partial list, from one year in office. So, why is it that small-town politicians, officials and public outcry can twist Bibi's arm, but the leader of the free world can't even beat him in a thumb-wrestling match? Simple. Everyone knows Bibi is "Lachitz", and everyone knows his weak spots. Everybody knows he cares what people think of him, that he can't take the pressure, and most importantly: all he wants is to do what most prime ministers never do - finish a full term without going to elections. You might ask then, "Why is it that when it comes to Iran and the peace process he doesn't give in"? Well, that's because those are precisely the areas where he has no pressure to do otherwise - not from abroad, and not at home. U.S. administrations have rarely put any pressure on Israeli governments

Netanyahu weak - Obama demanding huge concessions

The alliance with Israel is on the brink

CBS 10 (Dan Raviv, The national Correspondent for CBS, *The CBS News, 3/28/10,* [*http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543\_162-20000509-503543.html*](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20000509-503543.html)*) CS*

Foreign policy analysts who constantly take the pulse of America's alliance with Israel are using the word "crisis," and some believe that President Obama seems intent on making it even more bitter -- not less -- in what seems like an effort to change the government coalition in Jerusalem. Trying to meddle in a foreign country's internal politics is like playing with fire, but in the cause of pushing for progress toward Israeli-Arab peace it looks to many as though Obama is brandishing a big box of matches and a large jerrycan of gasoline. Instead of calming suddenly choppy seas between Washington and Jerusalem, he is demanding that Israel instantly make some concessions that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may consider politically impossible.The State Department spokesman, P.J. Crowley, today confirmed that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked Netnayahu for specific commitments - but Crowley refused to say what is being requested. This follows the annoying timing of Israel's government announcing an expansion of a Jewish neighborhood in the captured eastern half of Jerusalem -- just when Vice President Joe Biden was visiting Israel last week.

Netanyahu’s Coalition is collapsing – Obama working to delegitimize

World Tribune 10 (Newspaper, 4-28-2010, <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/ss_israel0350_04_28.asp>) CM

WASHINGTON — The administration of President Barack Obama has launched what officials termed a psychological warfare campaign meant to topple Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Sources in the administration and Congress asserted that the White House and State Department have sought to destabilize Netanyahu's government by forcing him to agree to an indefinite freeze on Jewish construction in the West Bank and most of Jerusalem as well as the establishment of a Palestinian state by 2012. They said the campaign sought to replace Netanyahu with opposition leader and former foreign minister Tsipi Livni. ”Bibi is extremely vulnerable to pressure," a source familiar with the White House effort said. "We know this from his first term in office and believe he will collapse this time as well." The sources said the administration's strategy aimed to de-legitimize Netanyahu in his government and right-wing constituency, Middle East Newsline reported. They said Obama and his aides have sought to portray Netanyahu as a weak and unstable politician who will destroy relations with Washington as Israel seeks U.S. support for a military option against Iran. "There seems to be a general belief in the circle around the president that the democratically-elected government in Israel is drunk at the wheel," Steven Rosen, a veteran pro-Israeli lobbyist now with the Middle East Forum, said. "They clearly will use pressure tactics to bring Israel around." In April 2010, former U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk began a series of attacks on Netanyahu in the Israeli media. Indyk, a former assistant secretary of state under then-President Bill Clinton, has called for the toppling of Netanyahu while his right-wing partners accept a more pliant prime minister.

No Peace Process - Palestinian Refusal

Palestinians might say no to direct peace talks.

Mitnick July 8 (Joshua, Christian Science Monitor commentator, Christian Science Monitor is an international news organization, July 8, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0708/Palestinians-brace-for-US-pressure-after-Netanyahu-s-White-House-visit) EH

After the Obama administration pushed Mr. Netanyahu over the past year to rein in West Bank settlements, there are signals in the wake of Netanyahu's White House visit on Tuesday that US pressure could shift to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Mr. Abbas has refused to engage in face-to-face peace talks with the Israelis without a permanent freeze on Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but Mr. Obama may now ask him to compromise on that point. "People are upset…. We doubt the potential to change Israeli policy regarding the peace talks, regarding the settlements, and lifting the curfew in Gaza,'' says Nashat Aqtash, a communications professor at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank. "They are going to put pressure on us, not the Israelis, to start direct negotiations without any assurances.… We are starting negotiations without anything.'' Palestinian officials held firm following the meeting, insisting that Israel's 10-month building moratorium must remain in place and that Netanyahu must be more forthcoming about a deal on borders and security. While Palestinian analysts and columnists were disappointed that Obama seemed more friendly toward Israel, a government spokesperson said this was not a surprising development. "Palestinian officials are aware of the nature of Israel-American relations, and they don't expect a break,'' says government spokesman Ghassan Khatib. "The problem is that in the indirect talks, the Israelis didn't show any seriousness at all. We presented full-fledged negotiating proposals on these two issues – borders and security – and the other side didn't bother to present anything or react to our proposals.''

Israel committed to building settlements, kills peace

Israel’s will to continue to building hurts relations with U.S. and Palestine

Ravid & Mualem 10 (Barak Ravid, staff writer for Ha’aretz, Mazal Mualem, Political correspondent for Ha’aretz, *Ha’aretz,* 3/15/10

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Monday said that Israel would continue to build in Jerusalem in the same way that it has over the last 42 years. "The building in Jerusalem - and in all other places - will continue in the same way as has been customary over the last 42 years," said Netanyahu at a Likud party meeting. Israel drew angry reactions from the U.S. and the Palestinians by announcing last week the construction of 1,600 new housing units in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Ramat Shlomo during a visit by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden last week. Netanyahu did not specifically address the [diplomatic crisis with the U.S.](http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1156467.html)over Israel's announcement about the East Jerusalem construction. However, when asked by MK Tzipi Hotovely what would happen in September, when the 10-month settlement freeze ends, Netanyahu responded that construction would continue unabated. Under U.S. pressure, Netanyahu imposed a limited moratorium on new housing starts in West Bank settlements in November but excluded Jerusalem from the 10-month partial freeze.

Israel’s secret building construction in West Bank could endanger peace talks

BBC 10 (*BBC News,* 3/8/10, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8555300.stm>) CS

The planned apartments are in the settlement of Beitar Illit, which has a mostly Orthodox Jewish population. Israeli ministers said the buildings would be allowed to go ahead because of what they termed called "safety issues". A statement from the defence ministry said the building was needed to plug a potentially dangerous 40-yard gap between two existing buildings. "Beitar Illit is an exceptional permit that came about following safety problems in the infrastructure," the statement said. The building permits were issued under the previous government of Ehud Olmert and before the settlement pause was announced. The Palestinian leadership in the West Bank had demanded a complete stop to settlement building as a precondition to re-engaging in talks which broke down more than a year ago. They agreed "grudgingly", reports said, and came after many months of shuttle diplomacy from Mr Mitchell. The talks should be limited to four months, Palestinian officials said. Under heavy US pressure, the Israeli government agreed in November to a temporary and partial pause in building. It said that work which had already started on 3,000 homes should be allowed to continue, and further exceptions to the pause were possible. Israel has refused to stop building in East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians say they want as the location of a future capital of a Palestinian state. In February, the Israeli government revealed that work had been continuing in many settlements despite the promise of a pause. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said the move put the talks at risk. US Vice President Joe Biden arrives in Israel "If the Israeli government wants to sabotage Mitchell's efforts by taking such steps, let's talk to Mitchell about maybe not doing this if the price is so high," he was quoted by the Associated Press as saying. Israeli Environment Minister Gilad Erdan said the settlement was "an exception" to the building pause. "At the end of last year the government decided to freeze construction, but this decision provided for exceptions in cases of safety problems for infrastructure projects started before the freeze," he told Army Radio. Peace Now, an Israeli group, said the announcement raised questions about Israel's commitment to the peace process. "The Israeli government is welcoming the US Vice-President by demonstrating, to our regret, that it has no genuine intention to advance the peace process," the group's settlement expert Hagit Ofran told AP. All settlements in the the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are considered illegal under international law, although Israel disputes this.

Netanyahu committed to settlements, kills peace

Netanyahu is sticking to building plans – he is killing peace talks possibilities and setting Israel up for conflict.

Cole 10(Juan, Professor at University of Michigan, Juancole.com, <http://www.juancole.com/2010/04/netanyahu-commits-to-colonizing-east-jerusalem-first-palestinian-expelled-under-new-policy.html>, 4/23)dc.

Netanyahu, an Israeli hawk and expansionist, slapped President Barack Obama in the face again Thursday when he confirmed that he refused to halt construction of new homes in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is militarily occupied by Israel. Netanyahu’s announcement is probably the nail in the coffin of any two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (in which the Israelis have thrown most Palestinians now living beyond the Green Line off their land and deprived them of citizenship in a state and all the rights that go with such citizenship). Palestinians are so despairing that only 57 percent even believe in having an independent Palestinian state any more. The rest are resigned to becoming Israelis in the distant future, when demographic realities and perhaps world-wide boycotts of Israel for its Apartheid-style policies toward the occupied Palestinian will force Israel to accept them. At the same time, Netanyahu tried to throw sand in peoples’ eyes by talking about recognizing an ‘interim’ Palestinian state with “temporary” borders. Palestinian leaders reject this formulation, which is intended to allow the Israelis to continue aggressively to colonize Palestinian territory while pretending that they are engaged in a ‘peace process.’ The Palestine Authority, established in the 1990s, was already a sort of interim state then, and Palestine’s borders were then ‘temporary.’ So temporary that Israel has made deep inroads into them through massive colonies and building a wall on the Palestinian side of the border, cutting residents off from their own farms and sequestering entire towns and cities. Netanyahu’s various moves this week, from illegally expelling a Palestinian from the West Bank to Gaza– to blowing off the president of the United States and hitching his wagon to massive increased colonization of Palestinian land– all of these steps are guaranteed to mire Israel in violent disputes for years and perhaps decades. And the US, which has already suffered tremendously in Iraq and elsewhere from its knee-jerk support of illegal and inhumane Israeli policies toward the Palestinians, will suffer further. Meanwhile, in the wake of a vicious attack on Barack Obama by New York senator Chuck Schumer, Steve Clemons of the Washington Note frankly wonders whether Schumer understands he is in the US Senate or whether he is under the impression he is serving in the Israeli Knesset.

Netanyahu won’t renew the settlement “Freeze”

Reuters 7/8 (Jeffrey Heller, editor-in-charge in the Jerusalem bureau of UPI, Doina Chiacu, Journalist and sub-editor at Reuters, *Reuters,* 7/8/10, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66709920100708>) CS

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signaled on Thursday he would not extend beyond September a 10-month moratorium on new housing starts in Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. "I think we've done enough. Let's get on with the talks," he said, when asked in an appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations whether he would extend the limited freeze he put in place to coax the Palestinians into peace negotiations. At the forum, Netanyahu repeated a call to the Palestinians to move from indirect talks that began in May under U.S. mediation to face-to-face negotiations on statehood. But he gave no details of the "concrete steps" he promised, during White House talks on Tuesday, to take within weeks to encourage Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to upgrade the peace process. "I think we should seize the moment. And it is a challenging moment and an important moment. We have the ability to negotiate a peace," Netanyahu said at the international affairs think tank in New York. "And I'm prepared to take risks," Netanyahu added, while stressing that would not entail any move that could jeopardize Israel's security. "But we have to get on with it. We should just stop all the delays and start now, next week, in two weeks - get the talks going. Because only if we start them, we can complete them." Netanyahu said he intended "to confound the skeptics and critics." But he added: "I need a partner." The future of settlements, he said, would be addressed in the so-called final status talks with the Palestinians. Netanyahu said in a U.S. television interview on Wednesday that Israel intended to deal with that issue "right away" once direct negotiations got under way. Extending the limited freeze could pose significant political risks for Netanyahu, whose coalition government is dominated by pro-settler parties, including his own Likud**.**

Netanyahu Continuing Settlements

Netanyahu confirmed the continuation of Jewish settlements.

Heller July 8 (Jeffery, editor-in-charge in the Jerusalem bureau, Reuters, July 8, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66709920100708) EH

(Reuters) - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signaled on Thursday he would not extend beyond September a 10-month moratorium on new housing starts in Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. "I think we've done enough. Let's get on with the talks," he said, when asked in an appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations whether he would extend the limited freeze he put in place to coax the Palestinians into peace negotiations. At the forum, Netanyahu repeated a call to the Palestinians to move from indirect talks that began in May under U.S. mediation to face-to-face negotiations on statehood. But he gave no details of the "concrete steps" he promised, during White House talks on Tuesday, to take within weeks to encourage Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to upgrade the peace process. "I think we should seize the moment. And it is a challenging moment and an important moment. We have the ability to negotiate a peace," Netanyahu said at the international affairs think tank in New York. "And I'm prepared to take risks," Netanyahu added, while stressing that would not entail any move that could jeopardize Israel's security. "But we have to get on with it. We should just stop all the delays and start now, next week, in two weeks - get the talks going. Because only if we start them, we can complete them." Netanyahu said he intended "to confound the skeptics and critics." But he added: "I need a partner." The future of settlements, he said, would be addressed in the so-called final status talks with the Palestinians. Netanyahu said in a U.S. television interview on Wednesday that Israel intended to deal with that issue "right away" once direct negotiations got under way. Extending the limited freeze could pose significant political risks for Netanyahu, whose coalition government is dominated by pro-settler parties, including his own Likud.

Netanyahu confirmed that the 10-month settlement freeze has come to an end.

Press TV July 9 (Press TV is the first Iranian international news network, July 9, 2010, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134032&sectionid=351020202) EH

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled that he will not extend a 10-month freeze on illegal settlement activities in the occupied West Bank. The Israeli premier, who was addressing the influential US foreign policy think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Thursday, said that a freeze put in place in August 2009 has so far failed to spur the Palestinian Authority to enter direct peace talks, Reuters reported. Netanyahu had earlier told a US television network that the future of the illegal settlements would be addressed in the so-called final status talks with the Palestinians. The Israeli prime minister's remark on the potential resumption of settlement activities came on the final day of a three-day visit to Washington. The Palestinian Authority (PA) froze direct negotiations in December 2008 when Israel launched a deadly offensive against the Gaza Strip. The PA says Israel must end the occupation of Palestinian territories before any negotiation. Recently, Tel Aviv revealed plans to build 2700 new settlements in the West Bank immediately after the existing settlement freeze expires on September 27. This comes despite the latest UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's criticism of Israel, in which he said that Israel has violated international law by expanding its settlements in the occupied Palestinian land, including al-Quds (Jerusalem).

Netanyahu Continuing Settlements

The Israeli coalition will stay the same following the end of the settlement freeze.

Sofer 10 (Roni, Israeli News writer, Ynetnews, June 22, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3909157,00.html) EH

Counting the days until the end of the freeze – Israel's governing coalition will not be changing after the end of the settlement freeze in September, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman says. Lieberman, who spoke during a meeting with political correspondents in Jerusalem, added that "The real test for the country will take place in September, upon the end of the temporary construction freeze in the settlements. "However, there is no alternative to the coalition in my view. This coalition won't be changing," he said. Also in September, Turkey will become the rotating president of the Security Council, during which the General Assembly of the UN will meet to discuss the Secretary-General's interim report over the Goldstone Report, which he will submit during the second half of July. "Everything is happening in September, it won't be boring over here," said a senior government source. The source added that he does not see Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas as a viable partner: "He does not represent Judea and Samaria, or the residents of Gaza. The presidential campaign is still taking place and as of today there are 110 streets named after Palestinian 'martyrs' – from Dalal Mughrabi to Yahya Ayyash. This whole song of praise for terror is unreasonable," he said.

Lieberman confirmed the end of the settlement freeze.

Ackerman July 6 (Gwen, writer, Bloomberg Business Week, July 6, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-06/lieberman-says-israel-won-t-extend-settlement-freeze.html) EH

July 6 (Bloomberg) -- Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said there was “no chance” Israel will extend a partial freeze on West Bank construction. “It is important that direct talks resume and the government supports this but will not agree to pay for this,” Lieberman said in comments sent from Helsinki by text message. His remarks came as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prepares for talks in Washington with President Barack Obama later today. Netanyahu announced the 10-month halt in West Bank settlement construction in November. Palestinians, the U.S. and the European Union say the communities are an obstacle to a peace agreement that would establish an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The U.S. is mediating indirect talks between Israelis and Palestinians, and Netanyahu has called on Palestinians to agree to face-to-face meetings. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has linked participation in such talks to a freeze on construction in the settlements. Speaking on Army Radio earlier today, Culture and Sport Minister Limor Livnat, a member of Netanyahu’s Likud party, also said that West Bank construction will resume when the freeze expires. About 300,000 Israelis live in West Bank settlements, and the population growth rate in those communities in 2008 was almost three times faster than in Israel as a whole, the Jerusalem-based human rights group B’Tselem said.

Netanyahu won’t extend the settlement freeze.

Amayreh 10 (Khaled, Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper writer, Al-Ahram, June 8-14, 2010, Issue No. 1006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1006/fr1.htm) EH

Abbas is reported to have refused to move from indirect to direct talks with Israel unless three conditions are met: an Israeli undertaking to restart talks from the point where they were left off during the term of the previous Israeli government; a recognition by Israel that a Palestinian state would have to encompass an area equal in size to the territories occupied in 1967, and a general freeze of settlement expansion. It is unlikely that Netanyahu will accept these conditions, especially the settlement freeze. His coalition partners, supported by some Likud cabinet ministers, are already demanding that the half-hearted settlement expansion moratorium, due to expire in September, not be extended under any circumstances. The Hebrew press reported this week that at least 2,700 settler units are scheduled to be built in the West Bank as soon as the freeze ends. Haaretz newspaper also reports that settler councils throughout the West Bank are making preparations to step up settlement construction ahead of 27 September, when the current partial freeze is due to end.

**Settlement Freeze Fail**

Netanyahu said that the settlement freeze didn’t encourage peace talks with the Palestinians.

Weizman July 8 (Steve, AFP staff writer, AFP, July 8, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iT-ciIuyrKrOoJdlJ4mBrfnWNTaw) EH

NEW YORK — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday that a freeze on Jewish settlement construction in the occupied West Bank had so far failed in its objective of spurring Palestinians to enter direct peace talks. But he did not say specifically that there would be no restraints on building after the moratorium expires in September. "I decided, unlike any previous government, to freeze the construction in new settlements for a 10-month period to encourage the Palestinians to enter peace talks," he told foreign policy experts in New York. "So far seven months have passed and they haven't come in," Netanyahu said in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations. "They should have come in 12 months ago, seven months ago," he said. "We should not waste any more time." Netanyahu was speaking on the final day of a three-day US visit, during which he had a publicly upbeat meeting with President Barack Obama in Washington and gave a slew of media interviews in which he constantly emphasized his willingness to meet the Palestinian leader immediately. "I don't think we should wait any longer," he said in his speech on Thursday. "I think we should seize the moment." While the Palestinians and the United States describe Israeli settlements as obstacles to peace, the freeze is deeply resented among members of Netanyahu's Likud and other hawkish parties on which his coalition government leans. Netanyahu indicated that he could be willing to make concessions to the Palestinians that could cause a political backlash in Israel. I'm prepared to take risks," he said. "I'm not prepared to take security risks but I'm prepared to take political risks.

Kadima won’t join the government

Kadima is not interested in saving Netayanhu’s government – they want to form a new government

Hoffman 10 (Gil, chief political correspondent and analyst, *The Jerusalem Post,* 6-22-2010, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=179119>) CM

The sources denied reports that Kadima was en route to the government or that progress had been made in talks behind the scenes. They said neither Netanyahu nor Livni had changed their original positions that have prevented a government between them in the past. Kadima still opposes joining the current government without setting new coalition guidelines in favor of taking steps to expedite the diplomatic process, and Netanyahu still opposes showing the door to any of his current coalition partners. “There is no chance that Netanyahu has changed his mind,” Hanegbi said. “He asked us what we thought about widening the government. We said we cannot join the coalition as-is, but Kadima would have no problem with going back to square one and forming new guidelines. If the other parties want to stay, they can.” Livni told the Kadima faction on Monday said she was not interested in saving the current government but in changing its policies and the makeup of the coalition. “

Coalition will collapse – Settlement Freeze

The Settlement Freeze Issue will inevitably collapse Netanyahu’s Coalition

Berkman 7/6 (Matt, researcher for a Middle East policy institute in New York. , *Human Rights,* 7-6-2010, <http://humanrights.change.org/blog/view/as_tensions_escalate_in_east_jerusalem_netanyahu_gets_a_heros_welcome>) CM

The uncharitable interpretation is that Obama is again sacrificing principle on Israel/Palestine for short-term political gain. But, more charitably, Shiffer’s article also suggests that, once the cameras have departed, Obama plans to put the screws to Netanyahu in private, urging him to fully lift the siege on Gaza. Other sources have reported that he will also push Netanyahu hard on the issue of renewing the 10-month settlement freeze set to expire in September. This would put Netanyahu in an uncomfortable position: his own party has already voted to oppose such a move (a vote from which Netanyahu conspicuously absented himself), and just yesterday, Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition partners issued a joint declaration warning that any attempt to renew the freeze would imperil the “preservation of Israel as an autonomous state.” For their part, members of the “left-leaning” Labor party have threatened to withdraw from Netanyahu’s coalition if the freeze is not renewed. The best we can hope from Obama is that his backroom pressure will heighten the contradictions that already plague Netanyahu’s government, bringing about either a reconfiguration that will shift the coalition to the center-left, or a full-scale collapse resulting in new elections.

The United States and the Coalition government of Israel disagree on the building freeze.

Gedalyahu 10 (Tzvi Ben; staff writer, *Arutz Sheva: Israel Nation News,* July 7, 2010, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/138475) CH

Defense Minister Ehud Barak tip-toed closer to the coalition government policy Wednesday and called on Abbas to resume direct talks without pre-conditions for a building freeze. He told visiting Senators Joe Lieberman, John McCain and Lindsey Graham that he believes direct talks will resume in several weeks. Speaking on Army Radio, the Defense Minister and Labor party chairman brushed aside the demands for an extension of the temporary freeze, saying that obstacles can be worked out once direct discussions resume. The Labor party has been the lone holdout from coalition leaders’ insistence that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu uphold his promise that the 10-month freeze on building for Jews in Judea and Samaria will not be extended. If Barak and the Obama administration were hoping for cracks in the coalition, they were sorely disappointed. Prime Minister Netanyahu avoided a difficult session with U.S. President Barack Obama Tuesday by leading a successful campaign against an initiative to require Knesset approval for a building freeze. However, the Prime Minister and president got a clear message from the will of coalition party whips, all of whom—except Labor—signed a letter opposing any extension of the freeze.

Netanyahu Internal Link Turn

Splitting from Obama when the US undermines Israel’s interest is key to Netanyahu’s credibility

Glick 10 (Caroline, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Center for Security Policy and Deputy Managing Editor of JPost, The Jerusalem Post, 5/28, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=176741>)

Second, Netanyahu must not become Obama’s spokesman. As part of his unsuccessful bid to convince Obama to change his policies towards Israel, Netanyahu and his advisers have gone on record praising Obama for his support for Israel. These statements have stymied attempts by Israel’s US supporters to pressure Obama to change those policies.

The Israeli official who has been most outspoken in his praise for Obama and his denial that Obama’s policies are hostile towards Israel has been Ambassador Michael Oren. Oren has repeatedly praised Obama for his supposedly firm support for Israel and commitment to Israel’s security – most recently in an appearance on Fox News on Wednesday. Moreover, according to eyewitness reports, in a recent closed-door meeting with American Jews, Oren criticized the Republican Party for attacking Obama for his animosity towards Israel.

This quite simply has to end. As foreign officials, Israeli diplomats should not be involved in US partisan politics. Not only should Israeli officials not give Obama undeserved praise, they should not give Republicans undeserved criticism.

At the end of the day, American Jews have the luxury of choosing between their loyalty to the Democratic Party and their support for Israel. And in the coming months, they will choose.

The government of Israel has no such luxury. The government’s only duty is to secure Israel and advance Israel’s national interests in every way possible. Netanyahu must not permit Obama’s public relations campaign to divert him from this mission.

Turn: Removing troops give US moral ground to pressure Israel

TURN: The aff reduces US human rights violations in Iraq, which gives us leverage to pressure Israel over incursions into Gaza

Bowers 10 (Chris, Co-Founder OpenLeft.com, fellow at the New Organizing Institute and Commonweal Institute, OpenLeft.com, June 1, <http://www.openleft.com/diary/18926/us-withdrawal-from-iraq-on-schedule-but-total-number-of-troops-overseas-the-same-for-now>)

Whenever talk of Israel flares up in the media, my first reaction is to think about Iraq and Afghanistan. Sure, what Israel is doing is really bad (I will write more about that in a bit), but it terms of numbers it is utterly dwarfed by what we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just in Iraq, there were a minimum of 110,000 violent deaths through only April of 2009. This compares to about 1,400 in the latest large-scale Israeli invasion of Gaza. It is certainly crass and morbid to compare body counts this way, as it trivializes very real human suffering. However, the discrepancy is pretty eye-popping., none the less

I guess what I am saying is that while it would be nice if the U.S. wasn't issuing statements on Israel that are entirely out of step with international opinion, the first priority of making the United States a better player in international diplomacy is to stop engaging in conflicts that result in the violent deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Somehow, none of that ends up in the news anymore, as it just can't seem to draw headline the same way that Israel-Palestine can.

Netanyahu Coalition Prevents Peace

Israeli coalition is an obstacle to the peace process.

JTA June 29 (JTA in-depth coverage of political, economic and social developments affecting Jews in North and South America, Israel, Europe, Africa and Australia, June 29, 2010, http://www.jta.org/news/article/2010/06/29/2739824/erdogan-turkey-is-still-israels-friend) EH

(JTA) -- The government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is “the biggest barrier to peace” in the Middle East, Turkey's prime minister said in a television interview. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking Monday night with PBS's Charlie Rose, reportedly said he thought Israel's government impeded Middle East peace attempts and that "at the moment, the problem in Israel is the coalition government. The coalition government is the biggest barrier to peace." "Israel hasn’t really accepted a two-state solution," Erdogan added, according to Haaretz, saying that "while Israel's governments spoke about it, they in fact did nothing to advance it." The Turkish leader called on Israel to lift its blockade of Gaza, to apologize for "recent events" and to pay compensation to the families of those killed in the Gaza-bound flotilla violence and the people of Gaza. Erdogan called for the United States to "take ownership" of the aftermath of Israel's interception of the flotilla on May 31 in which nine people were killed "because there was an American involved.” Eight of the dead in the raid of a ship attempting to break Israel's blockade of Gaza were Turks; the ninth was a dual Turkish-American citizen. Erdogan said that despite recalling its ambassador from Israel, cancelling several planned military exercises and preventing Israeli military planes from using its airspace, Turkey remains “a friend to Israel."

Peace process Fails – Palestine

Peace Process Fails – Palestine will not have self-determination.

Nafaa 8(Hassan, Professor and Chairman of Political Science Department at the University of Cairo, Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8058>, 2/12)dc.

Obviously, there can be nothing remotely resembling equality in a relationship between such disparate states. A Palestinian state so encumbered by restrictions and conditions can only be an Israeli dependency subjected to total Israeli control. This is not a situation conducive to lasting peaceful coexistence, because the very conditions of dependency and subordination to Israeli must inevitably continue to fire the Palestinian urge for true national independence and expression. At the same time, it is difficult to perceive how such a state, so crippled at birth that it is little more than an Israeli protectorate, could eventually evolve into a fully-fledged viable state capable of safeguarding Palestinian rights and fulfilling their aspirations. There are several reasons for this. First, Israel has given no indication of a willingness to set aside its policy of imposing de facto realities by force of arms in favour of the search for a historic compromise, which means that Israel will perpetually seek to sustain its qualitative superiority -- military superiority in particular -- not only over the Palestinians but over all Arab and Islamic nations combined. Second, the US can no longer maintain even a façade of impartiality now that its positions on the Middle East conflict have become virtually identical to those of Israel. In fact, some powerful and influential forces in the US are more pro-Zionist than Israeli Zionists and have pitted their weight behind the most extreme forces in Israel, which reject out of hand a settlement founded upon a historic compromise with the Palestinians. It is, therefore, impossible to envision an American government willing and able to pressure Israel into accepting the conditions for a just and lasting settlement. Third, joint US-Israeli efforts have succeeded in excluding the UN from any involvement in the peace process, with the result that this process has been effectively stripped of any framework of international legitimacy. It is patently obvious that all relevant international resolutions and instruments have been discarded as bases for negotiations, with the sole exception of Resolution 242, which favours Israel's negotiating position and paves the way for a settlement that reflects the actual balance of powers on the ground as opposed to the principles of justice and fairness enshrined in all other UN resolutions and instruments. Fourth, the Palestinian cause no longer occupies the priority it once had on the agenda of the official Arab order. What was once a central and unifying Arab- Islamic cause has been effectively reduced to a local problem that primarily concerns the Palestinians alone. Arab governments hide behind the current Palestinian rift, which they played no small part in precipitating, to conceal their shift in stance, and they have thus effectively become accomplices in Israel's criminal blockade of the Palestinian people, which is intended to force the Palestinians to their knees and to accept Israeli conditions for a settlement. Again, there are no signs that this situation is about to change in the near future. Clearly, then, the so-called Palestinian state that is supposed to arise from the current "peace process" is never going to lead to a just and lasting solution to the conflict. Indeed, that conception of a state has been specifically designed to help Israel ward off what it regards as the foremost threat, which it unabashedly terms the "Palestinian demographic bomb". With considerable perseverance and dexterity, Israel managed to steer negotiations currently taking place with the Palestinian Authority into a long, dark tunnel, the only glimmer of light at the end of which is a congenitally disfigured state that will ultimately prove a means for inflaming tensions rather than ending them.

Peace Process Fails – Too complex

The Nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is complex, making solution unlikely

Nafaa 8(Hassan, Professor and Chairman of Political Science Department at the University of Cairo, Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8058, 2/12)dc

Is there truly hope for the establishment of a viable, sovereign Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel in peace? Sadly, I doubt it very much, at least in the foreseeable future, in view of current local, regional and international conditions. The creation of a Palestinian state should not be regarded as an end in itself, but rather as a means for resolving a long and complex historical conflict. Accordingly, our judgement on a formula for a proposed state should rest not so much on whether it complies with necessary formal and legal conditions as whether it meets that overriding criterion: will it serve to draw to a close, once and for all, that protracted conflict? After all, the concrete existence of a Palestinian state with certain specifications could, in itself, become an instrument in the conflict as opposed to a step towards its solution. The conflict between the Palestinians and the Zionist movement is not over disputed borders or material interests and, therefore, resolvable by merely coming to an agreement over permanent borders and a give-and-take over material interests. Rather, it is a conflict between two identities, each of which claims sole propriety right over a given territory. Such a conflict cannot be solved by the same means that are brought to bear on conventional international conflicts. Identity conflicts can only be solved by two means, either by the overwhelming defeat of one side by the other, or through compromise, after both sides finally reach the conviction that continuing the zero-sum game, whereby a gain for one side must result in an equal loss for the other, will not result in victory over and elimination of the other side. I believe that in identity conflicts compromise is only possible when there is mutual recognition of the other party's equal rights. If we were to apply this concept to the Palestinian- Zionist conflict, a compromise solution would require that both sides commit themselves fully to two indispensable, mutually complementary conditions. The first is for them to accept the fair and equal partition of the territory under dispute. The second is for them to agree to complete equality in rights and duties in the process of building peaceful, friendly, mutually beneficial relations. Unfortunately, there are no signs that these conditions can be met today or even in the foreseeable future. The total land area designated for a Palestinian state, as a proposed solution to the conflict, amounts to no more than 10 per cent of the actual territory under dispute, which is historic Palestine. Moreover, that designated area is not geographically contiguous, but rather consists of disconnected and isolated patches of territory. If and when that state is founded, it will not have an army or any autonomous means to defend itself and its borders will be subject to constant surveillance by land, sea and air. But if it is to be founded at all, that phantom state will first have to recognise Israel's right to 90 per cent of the disputed territory, the purely Jewish character of that state and, hence, its right to remain eternally open to Jews from around the world, along with the right of that state to an immensely powerful army equipped with every available type of weapon, including nuclear missiles.

Peace process will fail – Damage done to Palestine by Israel is incorrigible.

Roy 10(Sara, Harvard Scholar on Gaza, Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/noam-chomsky/a-middle-east-peace-that_b_554178.html?view=print>, 4/27)dc.

Gaza is an example of a society that has been deliberately reduced to a state of abject destitution, its once productive population transformed into one of aid-dependent paupers.… Gaza’s subjection began long before Israel’s recent war against it [December 2008]. The Israeli occupation — now largely forgotten or denied by the international community — has devastated Gaza’s economy and people, especially since 2006…. After Israel’s December [2008] assault, Gaza’s already compromised conditions have become virtually unlivable. Livelihoods, homes, and public infrastructure have been damaged or destroyed on a scale that even the Israel Defense Forces admitted was indefensible. “In Gaza today, there is no private sector to speak of and no industry. 80 percent of Gaza’s agricultural crops were destroyed and Israel continues to snipe at farmers attempting to plant and tend fields near the well-fenced and patrolled border. Most productive activity has been extinguished.… Today, 96 percent of Gaza’s population of 1.4 million is dependent on humanitarian aid for basic needs. According to the World Food Programme, the Gaza Strip requires a minimum of 400 trucks of food every day just to meet the basic nutritional needs of the population. Yet, despite a March [22, 2009] decision by the Israeli cabinet to lift all restrictions on foodstuffs entering Gaza, only 653 trucks of food and other supplies were allowed entry during the week of May 10, at best meeting 23 percent of required need. Israel now allows only 30 to 40 commercial items to enter Gaza compared to 4,000 approved products prior to June 2006.

Peace Process Fails – Israel

Peace Process will fail – Empirically denied, Israel doesn’t really want an agreement and Palestine doesn’t believe a deal will actually be made

Ephron 10 (Dan, Jerusalem-based correspondent, *Newsweek,* 3-23-2010, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/22/death-by-proximity.html>)CM

Are Israelis and Palestinians heading back to the bargaining table? That might be the upshot of President Obama's meeting in Washington with Prime Minister "Bibi" Netanyahu. If so, the two sides will be seated at different tables this time, in different cities, for what the parties are calling "proximity talks." Proposed by the United States as a way of getting around Palestinian objections to face-to-face negotiations, the talks will be begin next month, with American mediators shuttling back and forth between the two sides. The good news is that the Middle East peace process is finally recommencing, after a 14-month impasse. The bad news: these talks are probably doomed from the start. Here's why. 1. Proximity talks have never worked. Israel and Syria tried them during 2008, with the Turks acting as message carriers (Turkish officials are now offering to do so again). The two delegations actually stayed in the same hotel in Istanbul during four sessions but never interacted in person. The result was a series of interesting exchanges but no concrete decisions, not even the obligatory confidence-building measures. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization have also engaged in indirect talks, but not since the early 1990s, when the two sides had no formal relations; they never went anywhere. Former Israeli pol Yossi Beilin, the architect of the Oslo peace process and the man most identified with Middle East negotiations, says moving away from direct engagement is a huge regression. "We were married and now you're asking the matchmaker to introduce us?," Beilin told NEWSWEEK recently. "Who is the idiot who suggested it?" (Apparently, it was U.S. envoy George Mitchell.) 2. Israeli leaders don't really want an agreement—at least not one involving the deep compromises Palestinians are expecting. Yes, Netanyahu apologized for the timing of the announcement earlier this month—just as Vice President Biden began his visit to Israel—that 1,600 new homes would be built in East Jerusalem. And yes, the White House rewarded him by scheduling a meeting with President Obama. But Netanyahu remains a hardliner whose coalition partners include the most hawkish figures in Israeli politics. Appeasing them requires the kind of statements Netanyahu made just before a flight to Washington this week: "As far as we are concerned, building in Jerusalem is like building in Tel Aviv," he told his cabinet, according to the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth. "Israel's position is very clear, and it will also be clear during my visit to the U.S. capital." What does Netanyahu want? A drawn-out negotiation that will keep the Americans off his back and Palestinians off the streets but won't actually test his coalition; in short, more process than peace. 3. Palestinian leaders don't believe a deal is possible—at least not the deal they want. President Mahmoud Abbas negotiated for more than two years with Netanyahu's predecessor, Ehud Olmert, who at one point showed him a map of a proposed Palestinian state on 96 percent of the West Bank (plus 4 percent in land swaps). Palestinians say the offer was never officially tendered and became moot once police indicted Olmert for graft. But the proposal, well beyond what Netanyahu would presumably offer, now stands as the baseline for Palestinian expectations—anything less will be scoffed at. Far from pinning his hopes on the negotiations, Abbas is hoping that once they break down, the Obama administration will offer its own plan and compel the Israelis to accept it. According to an Israeli official involved in the process who did not want to be named discussing behind-the-scenes contacts, Palestinians asked Washington to promise it would assign blame in that case, but they were rebuffed.

Peace Process Fails – Israel

Israel not ready for peace process

Slater 10(Jerome, Professor Emeritus of political science, SUNY Buffalo, Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerome-slater/the-israeli-palestinian-c_b_499010.html>, 3/16)dc.

The prospects for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have never been worse, primarily because of the rightward shift of the Israeli government and public opinion and, secondarily, because of the end of any expectations that the United States would help "save Israel from itself." Is there any hope at all? The best chance for peace would be a sea-change within Israeli public opinion. However, Israeli peace groups have not succeeded in convincing mainstream opinion in their country that Israel's policies are both a moral and a long-term security disaster. For this reason, many on the Israeli left have long hoped that the U.S. would bring serious pressures to bear on their government to agree to a just and viable peace settlement. However, the Obama administration's abandonment of its mild initial efforts to persuade Israel to change its policies has now dashed those hopes: in the absence of a major shift in public and congressional attitudes, there is no chance of change in the traditional US policies of near-unconditional support of Israel. Consequently, the primary function of the leading U.S. peace groups -- Americans for Peace Now (APN) and, more recently, J Street -- must be to persuade American opinion that those traditional policies are detrimental to the best interests of Israel and, for that matter, of the U.S. itself. Even those who deny the existence of an Israel lobby that dominates U.S. policies towards Israel are not likely to deny that the Jewish community is the most important sector of American public opinion on all issues pertaining to Israel. Consequently, domestic politics ensures that there will be no change in American government policies in the absence of strong Jewish support for sustained pressures on Israel. And if they are to have any chance of success, those pressures must include making U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military assistance of Israel conditional on major changes in its policies. While there has been increased dissent within the U.S. Jewish community over Israel's policies, the dominant majority still supports them -- even despite the much-criticized Israeli attack on Gaza last year and the subsequent Goldstone report (hereafter referred to as Gaza/Goldstone). In light of mainstream opinion in this country, it is undeniable that APN and J Street confront a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, an open acknowledgment of the true depth of Israel's moral collapse and even its capability of recognizing and acting on its rational self-interest might backfire: if the peace groups move too far to the left of the mainstream they may well be seen as illegitimate and lose even more influence. On the other hand, the situation is desperate, requiring a more forthright strategy, whatever the risks: if the peace groups continue to be too timid in their criticisms of Israeli policies and the complicity of the United States in them, they will become increasingly ineffectual and irrelevant.

Peace Process Fails – US involvement Bad

US backing of Israel prevents peace process – Israel leaving Gaza and Palestinians desolate making peace unlikely.

Chomsky 10(Noam, Institute Professor emeritus in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/noam-chomsky/a-middle-east-peace-that_b_554178.html?view=print>, 4/27)dc.

After its formal withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel never actually relinquished its total control over the territory, often described realistically as “the world’s largest prison.” In January 2006, a few months after the withdrawal, Palestine had an election that was recognized as free and fair by international observers. Palestinians, however, voted “the wrong way,” electing Hamas. Instantly, the U.S. and Israel intensified their assault against Gazans as punishment for this misdeed. The facts and the reasoning were not concealed; rather, they were openly published alongside reverential commentary on Washington’s sincere dedication to democracy. The U.S.-backed Israeli assault against the Gazans has only been intensified since, thanks to violence and economic strangulation, increasingly savage. Meanwhile in the West Bank, always with firm U.S. backing, Israel has been carrying forward longstanding programs to take the valuable land and resources of the Palestinians and leave them in unviable cantons, mostly out of sight. Israeli commentators frankly refer to these goals as “neocolonial.” Ariel Sharon, the main architect of the settlement programs, called these cantons “Bantustans,” though the term is misleading: South Africa needed the majority black work force, while Israel would be happy if the Palestinians disappeared, and its policies are directed to that end

Peace Process Fails – Palestinian rejection

Peace Process Fails – Palestinian Rejectionism

Foxman 10 (Abraham H., National Director, Anti-Defamation League, 3-28-2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/opinion/l02israel.html>)

One doesn’t have to agree with every action and policy of the government of Israel to recognize that the fundamental problems that have surfaced are far more a product of Palestinian rejectionism and extremism than alleged Israeli intransigence. It is the Palestinians, not Israel, who have refused to return to negotiations. Unfortunately, the Obama administration gave the Palestinians an excuse not to come to the table by making settlements the central issue. In fact, over the years there have been negotiations despite the settlement issue. Had the Palestinians accepted Israel’s generous offers under two prime ministers for a Palestinian state, the issue of settlements would have been resolved. The Obama administration has gone off track not only in its excessive focus on settlements and its overreaction to Israel’s faux pas in announcing new construction while the vice president was in Israel, but also by suggesting that Israel is harming American interests in the region. This is a misguided and counterproductive view. Ultimately, America’s interests in the region will rise or fall on its willingness to support its true friends there and its ability to distinguish between moderates who want peace and rejectionists who want to undermine it. There is no doubt that Israel is a true ally and peacemaker.

Peace Process Empirically denied – Palestinians more interested in attacking Israel than their own state

Jacoby ‘9 ( Jeff, Global Columist, Boston.com, 5-20-2009, <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/05/20/peace_isnt_arab_goal/>) CM

 International consensus or no, the two-state solution is a chimera. Peace will not be achieved by granting sovereignty to the Palestinians, because Palestinian sovereignty has never been the Arabs' goal. Time and time again, a two-state solution has been proposed. Time and time again, the Arabs have turned it down. In 1936, when Palestine was still under British rule, a royal commission headed by Lord Peel was sent to investigate the steadily worsening Arab violence. After a detailed inquiry, the Peel Commission concluded that "an irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country." It recommended a two-state solution - a partition of the land into separate Arab and Jewish states. "Partition offers a chance of ultimate peace," the commission reported. "No other plan does." But the Arab leaders, more intent on preventing Jewish sovereignty in Palestine than in achieving a state for themselves, rejected the Peel plan out of hand. The foremost Palestinian leader, Haj Amin al-Husseini, actively supported the Nazi regime in Germany. In return, Husseini wrote in his memoirs, Hitler promised him "a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world." In 1947, the Palestinians were again presented with a two-state proposal. Again they spurned it. Like the Peel Commission, the United Nations concluded that only a division of the land into adjacent states, one Arab and one Jewish, could put an end to the conflict. On Nov. 29, 1947, by a vote of 33-13, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, partitioning Palestine on the basis of population. Had the Arabs accepted the UN decision, the Palestinian state that "the whole world wants" would today be 61 years old. Instead, the Arab League vowed to block Jewish sovereignty by waging "a war of extermination and a momentous massacre." Over and over, the pattern has been repeated. Following its stunning victory in the 1967 Six Day War, Israel offered to exchange the land it had won for permanent peace with its neighbors. From their summit in Khartoum came the Arabs' notorious response: "No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel." At Camp David in 2000, Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians virtually everything they claimed to be seeking - a sovereign state with its capital in East Jerusalem, 97 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, tens of billions of dollars in "compensation" for the plight of Palestinian refugees. Yasser Arafat refused the offer, and launched the bloodiest wave of terrorism in Israel's history. To this day, the charters of Hamas and Fatah, the two main Palestinian factions, call for Israel's liquidation. "The whole world" may want peace and a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians want something very different. Until that changes, there is no two-state solution.

A2: Peace Process

Peace process is all talk and no action.

Schmidt July 8 (Christophe, writer for AFP, AFP, July 8 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hhYvXu-9gjp-ZKdtcaj91sYtsTOQ) EH

WASHINGTON — A resumption of long-stalled direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians could be on the horizon, but swift progress towards sealing a peace deal remains a long way off, analysts say. After months of US-hosted proximity talks which have seen US envoy George Mitchell shuttling between the two sides, direct talks are likely to resume "within the next two months," said former US diplomat Aaron David Miller. But, he cautioned: "It's not a blessing, because direct negotiations will only reveal how large the gaps are between the two sides." Hopes of new talks have been spurred by the visit to the United States this week of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who emerged from White House talks with US President Barack Obama pledging he wanted a deal. Obama said he hoped direct talks would start before an Israeli freeze on settlement building in Arab east Jerusalem expires on September 25. Netanyahu said there were concrete measures the Israelis were willing to make to pave the way, but he has not yet promised to extend the freeze. "Unlike any previous government" he had decided "to freeze the construction in new settlements for a 10-month period to encourage the Palestinians to enter peace talks," Netanyahu said Thursday in a speech to a US think-tank. "We should not waste any more time," he added. In an interview with CNN, the Israeli premier also renewed a call for Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas to enter negotiations "right now, we don't need any pretext or precondition." The United States and Jordan both voiced hope Thursday that Israelis and Palestinians would start direct negotiations soon. "We both believe that moving to direct talks as soon as possible is in the best interest of Israelis, Palestinians, the region and the world," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said alongside Jordan's Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh. "If the Obama administration wants direct talks, he probably will get them," agreed Nathan Brown, a Middle East expert with the Carnegie Institute. "The larger question is what will happen in those talks." "There is no indication that the fundamental conditions working against a negotiated two state solution right now -- the opposition of the Israeli government and the impotence of the Palestinian government -- has changed." Jordan's Judeh said he believed the signs emerging from the proximity talks "seem to be encouraging." "But I think what we need to refrain from now is unilateral action and provocation, whether it is in the form of deportations or evictions or demolitions," he said referring to the settlement constructions. The White House meeting this week -- which took place in a warmer atmosphere than Netanyahu's frosty visit to the US earlier this year -- was seen as a major step towards kickstarting direct talks. It was "critical for trying to coordinate how to avert there being a September crisis, and a September breakdown in negotiations," said Robert Danin, former Jerusalem bureau chief for the Middle East Quartet. September is set to be a key month in the stagnant peace process. Abbas is due to report to the Arab League on the results of the proximity talks. And the Quartet -- comprised of the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States -- will meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to discuss the peace process. Many thorny issues remain unresolved, despite decades of negotiations. Chief among them are the right of return for Palestinian refugees left homeless after the creation of Israel in 1948, and the final status of the holy city of Jerusalem claimed by both as their capital. To reach a deal, both sides will need to make significant compromises on long entrenched positions which are likely to prove unpopular among their people. "I don't believe Israelis and Palestinians are prepared to pay the price," said Miller, adding a resumption of direct talks would "put the Palestinians in a very difficult position." "Even if the settlements moratorium continues, Israelis will be doing other things on the ground in East Jerusalem that will likely embarrass Mahmud Abbas," he said. And he warned the peace process is likely to bedevil the US administration in the same way that a long trail of broken deals has frustrated successive American presidents. "If the direct talks don't produce, it's going to mean that the administration will be expected to save the peace process," Miller said.

Peace Process causes terrorism and Civil War

The Peace Process would allow terrorist infiltration of the West Bank, which causes terrorist attacks on Israel, collapse of the Palestinian State, and a Civil War in Jordan

Gold 10 (Dore, former Prime Minister of Israel's Foreign Policy Adviser and later as Ambassador to the United Nations, *Dore Gold,* 3-20-2010, <http://www.dore-gold.com/2010/03/what-happened-to-the-jordan-valley.php>) CM

IT IS now well-understood by the Israeli public that the most crucial error of disengagement was abandoning the Philadelphi Corridor between the Gaza Strip and Egyptian Sinai, which allowed Hamas to build a vast tunnel network, with minimal Israeli countermeasures, and smuggle a huge arsenal into the Gaza Strip. From 2005, when Israel left Gaza, to 2006, the rate of rocket fire increased by 500%. New weapons, like Grad missiles, were fired for the first time at Ashkelon after the pullout. It does not require much imagination to understand what would happen in Judea and Samaria if Israel left the Jordan Valley - which should be seen as the Philadelphi Corridor of the West Bank. For example, up until now, Israel has not had to deal with SA-7 shoulder-fired rockets that could be aimed at aircraft over Ben-Gurion Airport, because it is difficult to smuggle them into the West Bank as long as the area is blocked by the IDF in the Jordan Valley. Nor has Israel had to face Islamist volunteers who reinforce Hamas and could prolong a future war, like those who joined the jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen or Somalia, because Israel can deny them access to the West Bank. In fact, in its annual survey for 2009, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) noted that while there has been a decrease in the terrorist threat to Israel, the only exception to this positive trend is the increasing involvement of global jihadi groups, who at present are building up a presence in the Gaza Strip. Clearly they would be in the West Bank if they could get there. The fact of the matter is that if Israel withdrew from the Jordan Valley and it became known among the global jihadi groups that the doors to the West Bank were open, the scale of the threat would change and the Jordanians would find it difficult to effectively halt the stream of manpower and weaponry into their territory. Clearly Jordan itself would be destabilized by this development. This is exactly what happened in 2005 when al-Qaida in Iraq set up an infrastructure in Jordan and attacked hotels and government buildings. This is also what happened during Black September in 1970, when the Jordanian army had to confront a massive Palestinian military presence and a civil war ensued. Besides, should Jordan have a common border with a Palestinian state, Palestinian irredentism toward the East Bank would undoubtedly increase.

Peace Process Bad – 2 state solution prolongs conflict

Two-state Solution prolongs the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Nafaa 8 (Hassan, professor of political science at Cairo University, *Weekly Al Ahram*, 2-12-2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8058>) CM

After all, the concrete existence of a Palestinian state with certain specifications could, in itself, become an instrument in the conflict as opposed to a step towards its solution. The conflict between the Palestinians and the Zionist movement is not over disputed borders or material interests and, therefore, resolvable by merely coming to an agreement over permanent borders and a give-and-take over material interests. Rather, it is a conflict between two identities, each of which claims sole propriety right over a given territory. Such a conflict cannot be solved by the same means that are brought to bear on conventional international conflicts. Identity conflicts can only be solved by two means, either by the overwhelming defeat of one side by the other, or through compromise, after both sides finally reach the conviction that continuing the zero-sum game, whereby a gain for one side must result in an equal loss for the other, will not result in victory over and elimination of the other side. I believe that in identity conflicts compromise is only possible when there is mutual recognition of the other party's equal rights. If we were to apply this concept to the Palestinian- Zionist conflict, a compromise solution would require that both sides commit themselves fully to two indispensable, mutually complementary conditions. The first is for them to accept the fair and equal partition of the territory under dispute. The second is for them to agree to complete equality in rights and duties in the process of building peaceful, friendly, mutually beneficial relations. Unfortunately, there are no signs that these conditions can be met today or even in the foreseeable future.

Peace Process Fails – 2 State Solution won’t work

Two-state peace process won’t solve – won’t see results.

Black 10 (Ian; Middle East editor, *Guardian,* April 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/28/middle-east-meron-benvenisti-peace-process) CH

Meron Benvenisti has been talking, writing and arguing about the Israel-Palestinian conflict for much of the last 40 years. Now aged 76 he is as forceful, articulate and unconventional as ever – and convinced that President Barack Obama is doomed to fail in his attempt to cajole the two sides to hammer out a solution at the negotiating table. Benvenisti, the Cassandra of the Israeli left, has long held the view that the occupation that began after the 1967 Middle East war is irreversible and that Israelis and Palestinians need to find an alternative to the elusive two-state solution that has dominated thinking about the conflict in recent years. Controversial and iconoclastic when he first advanced it, his thesis is gaining ground. "The whole notion of a Palestinian state now, in 2010, is a sham," he told the Guardian at his Jerusalem home as the US intensified efforts to get the long-stalled peace process moving again. "The entire discourse is wrong. By continuing that discourse you perpetuate the status quo. The struggle for the two-state solution is obsolete." George Mitchell, the US envoy charged with launching "proximity talks" between Binyamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas – in the absence of direct negotiations – does not agree. Nor do Israelis who believe that without an end to the occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state the Jewish majority and democratic character of their own state cannot survive. Abbas and his technocratic prime minister, Salam Fayyad, are working towards independence, though Palestinian opinion seems increasingly sceptical about the prospects. Benvenisti's book, Sacred Landscapes, is one of the very best written on the conflict, interweaving the personal and the political. It is also deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians and their attachment to the land. He defines the Zionist enterprise bluntly as a "supplanting settler society" but also warns that using labels is a way of shutting down debate. He is wary of Holocaust-deniers and antisemites who try to recruit his dissident views to serve their anti-Israel goals. Benvenisti, a political scientist by training, served as deputy mayor of Jerusalem after the 1967 war and was heavily influenced by his academic research on Belfast, another bitterly divided city. In the 1980's his West Bank Data Project collated and analysed the information that showed how the settlers were becoming fatefully integrated into Israeli society – under both Likud and Labour governments. Israel's domination, he says, is now complete, while the Palestinians are fragmented into five enclaves – inside Israel, in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the diaspora. In this situation, the concept of two states is misleading. "What does it mean, a state? It's a solution for less than one quarter of the Palestinian people on an area that is less than 10% of historic Palestine." Palestinian leaders who are ready to accept this "are a bunch of traitors to their own cause". Ramallah, prosperous headquarters of Abbas's Palestinian Authority and the recipient of millions of dollars in foreign aid, is a "bubble in which those who steal the money can enjoy themselves". Benvenisti's territorial assumptions are not based on the 2000 "Clinton parameters" which Yasser Arafat turned down, nor proposals submitted by Ehud Olmert to Abbas – which talk of Israel withdrawing from some 97% of the West Bank with compensating land swaps – but a far smaller area hemmed in by Jewish settlements, settler-only roads and military zones. "For the last 20 years I have questioned the feasibility of the partition of Palestine and now I am absolutely sure it is impossible," he says. "Or, it is possible if it is imposed on the Palestinians but that will mean the legitimisation of the status quo, of Bantustans, of a system of political and economic inequality which is hailed as a solution by the entire world – unlike in South Africa. "The entire paradigm is wrong. We are doing this because it is self-serving. It is convenient for us to stick to the old slogan of two states as if nothing has happened since we began advocating it in the 1980s." Taken the salience of the settlement issue in the peace process – rows over Netanyahu's temporary freeze in the West Bank and new building in East Jerusalem triggered the recent crisis in US-Israel relations – it is startling to find that Benvenisti is so dismissive of it. "Israel's domination of the West Bank does not rely on the numbers of settlers or settlements," he argues. "The settlements are totally integrated into Israeli society. They've taken all the land they could. The rest is controlled by the Israeli army." Benvenisti relishes overturning conventional wisdom. "The Israeli left would like to make us believe that the green line (the pre-1967 border) is something solid; that everything that is on this side is good and that everything bad began with the occupation in 1967. It is a false dichotomy. The green line is like a one-way mirror. It's only for the Palestinians, not for Israelis." He avoids speculating about future scenarios and makes do with the concept "bi-nationalism" – "not as a political or ideological programme so much as a de facto reality masquerading as a temporary state of affairs … a description of the current condition, not a prescription." And he sees signs that the Palestinians are beginning to adjust to the "total victory of the Jews" and use the power of the weak: demanding votes and human rights may prove more effective than violence, he suggests. "The peace process," Benvenisti concludes, "is more than a waste of time. It is an illusion and it perpetuates an illusion. You can engage in a peace process and have negotiations and conferences - which have no connection whatsoever to reality on the ground."

2 state solution fails - discriminates against Palestinians

Two-State Solution allows for human rights abuses

May 9 (Todd, Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University, *Counterpunch,* 9-9-2004, <http://www.counterpunch.org/may09092004.html>) CM

To privilege a single people on a land that supports others as well is to create two intertwined problems. First, it implicitly accords a greater moral worth to that people. We who live in the United States should be viscerally aware this, given our history with native Americans and people of African descent. Second, according this greater moral worth erases the moral limits that any person or people should enjoy relative to others. Once those moral limits are erased, the door is open to abuses of the kind that are rife in Israel's history. Think, for example, of the recent issue of terrorism. How many of us are ready to ascribe terrorism to suicide bombings but not to the destruction of homes with people still in them or the enforced starvation of towns and villages or the indiscriminate firing on nonviolent protestors? This imbalance is never far to seek, and even those of us who support the Palestinians find ourselves on the defensive. However, we who have supported a two-state solution have negligently endorsed the framing of the issue that allows this to happen. We endorse a "right to exist" that seems to apply to a particular nation but in fact applies only to a particular people within that nation: Jewish people. Furthermore, that right is exercised at the expense of others whose rights, as the Bush administration does not cease to remind us, must be earned by renouncing their struggle against occupation. The core of the problem lies here. To privilege politically a single people is to lay the foundation for all subsequent abuses. This is not to say that those abuses follow logically from this privileging. Nor is it to say that they were historically inevitable. Rather, it is that the struggle against such abuses concedes at the outset what it should not: that there is a certain privilege legitimately accorded to Israeli Jews. We should deny this privilege, and anything that follows from it. One of the things that follow from it is a two-state solution in which Jews enjoy privilege in one of those states (and, presumably, non-Jews in the other one). We should endorse what we should always have endorsed: a single state that privileges nobody, a state where the primary address from one of its members to another is that of "citizen."

Israel will stay in Jordan Valley permanently

Israel will never withdraw from the Jordan Valley

Lis 10 (Jonathan, writer, *Haaretz*, 2-3-2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-israel-will-never-cede-jordan-valley-1.266329>) CM

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Tuesday that Israel would never agree to withdraw from the Jordan Valley under any peace agreement signed with the Palestinians. Netanyahu told the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Jordan Valley's strategic importance along the eastern border of the West Bank made it impossible for Israel to withdraw, according to a meeting participant. Netanyahu also told delegates to the meeting that he was set on preventing the smuggling of rockets into the Palestinian Authority, attacking opposition leader Tzipi Livni for what he called her inability to secure Israel against such a threat. "I see that for you, a piece of paper is enough to make sure that rockets don't enter the Palestinian territory," Netanyahu said, his words directed at Livni. "I was elected to make sure that this actually happens."

\*\*Israel Relations DA – Aff Answers

Non Unique

U.S. Israeli relations are low

Sherwood 10(Harriet, Staffwriter@The Irish Times, 6/28, "'Tectonic rift' in relations between Israel and US ally", Lexis)jn

RELATIONS BETWEEN Israel and its most staunch ally, the US, have suffered a tectonic rift , according to Israel s ambassador to Washington. Michael Oren briefed Israeli diplomats on the deterioration between the countries ahead of Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu s visit to the White House early next month. Mr Oren said the situation had moved beyond a crisis that eventually passes. There is no crisis in Israel-US relations, because in a crisis there are ups and downs, he told the diplomats in Jerusalem. Relations are in the state of a tectonic rift in which continents are drifting apart. His analysis will alarm Israel s political establishment, which is feeling isolated internationally and under pressure to take concrete steps over the blockade of Gaza and settlement building in the West Bank. Mr Oren said President Barack Obama made judgments about Israel on the basis of cold calculation, in contrast to predecessors George W Bush and Bill Clinton, who were motivated by historical and ideological factors. He suggested Mr [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9698950070&returnToId=20_T9698951796&csi=142626&A=0.0029389981132246223&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P) was less likely to be influenced by pro-Israel supporters inside or outside the White House. This is a one-man show, he was quoted as saying.

Non Unique—Housing Developments

Non Unique – The US and Israeli relations are dead – housing project

Lobe 10 (Jim, Asia Times, Mar 17, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LC17Ak01.html)KFC

While the ongoing public crisis was clearly sparked by the coincidence of Biden's visit and the East Jerusalem housing announcement - almost universally described by the mainstream US media as a "slap in the face" at the vice president and by extension at Obama himself - its seriousness appears to be rooted in what Biden told Netanyahu and other top Israeli officials in private. According to an account in Israel's mass-circulation Yediot Ahronoth newspaper, Biden "warned his Israeli hosts that since many people in the Muslim world perceived a connection between Israel's actions and US policy, any decision about construction that undermines Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem could have an impact on the personal safety of American troops fighting against Islamic terrorism". "This is starting to get dangerous for us," Biden reportedly said. "What you're doing here undermines the security of our troops who are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. That endangers us and it endangers regional peace.'"

No Link—Israel Doesn’t Care

Turn – Israel has no consideration for the status of US troops in the Middle East

Karon 10 (Tony, TIME.com, Mar 25, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LC25Ak02.html)KFC

A peace process that requires Israel and the Palestinians to reach a bilateral consensus on the distribution of land and power under the prodding of US matchmakers is a non-starter - and therefore unlikely to lead to a goal which is of increasing urgency in America's national interest. Arguably, it's increasingly important even for the Israelis, since the status quo has already eroded prospects for a two-state solution to the point where both sides may be consigned to an even longer and bitterer conflict. Hence, the necessity of correcting Biden: progress in the Middle East will not come until the US changes Israel's cost-benefit analysis for maintaining the status quo. The only Israeli leader capable of accepting the parameters of a two-state peace with the Palestinians, which are already widely known, is one who can convincingly demonstrate to his electorate that the alternatives are worse. Right now, without real pressure, without real cost, with nothing but words, there is simply no downside to the status quo for Israel. Until there is, things are unlikely to change, no matter the peril to US troops throughout the Middle East.

Link Turn—Withdrawal Helps Relations

U.S. Israel relations strained now—withdrawal solves

Haselkorn 10(Avigdor, Strategy Analyst, April 9, “Relations of Mutual Liability”, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/relations-of-mutual-liability-1.733, accessed 7/8/10)jn

The bottom line is that Middle Eastern radicals have been able to turn the tables on America, and indirectly, Israel as well. Instead of Iran and Syria feeling hemmed in by the expanded presence of U.S. forces on their borders, it is Jerusalem that is increasingly fearful of a multi-pronged attack. Rather than keeping regional radicals in check, the U.S. deployment has become a handicap for Israel. The setback for Israel is due to U.S. efforts to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan by co-opting local adversaries, coupled by the Obama administration's principal shift toward an "extended hand" policy vis-a-vis its regional enemies. In turn, any Israeli military initiative is viewed in Washington as "unhelpful," if not downright dangerous, as it may cause an Arab/Muslim backlash against America and endanger U.S. regional assets. Last September, Zbigniew Brzezinski, president Jimmy Carter's national security adviser in the 1970s, even went so far as recommending that U.S. pilots shoot down Israeli aircraft if they crossed into Iraq's airspace to attack Iran's nuclear facilities and refused to turn back. As a result of this approach, the U.S.-Israeli relationship today is one of mutual liability. Israel is increasingly perceived as a strategic liability in Washington, because its actions threaten to derail the courting of Arab/Muslim radicals deemed central to America's global "war" on terror. At the same time, the United States is a growing burden on Israel, given the Obama administration's efforts to deny it the strategic initiative that is vital for preserving its national security. In hindsight, the first Gulf War model, which saw the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq as soon as the guns fell silent - even though Saddam Hussein remained in power, a move that was roundly criticized in Israel - was more in tandem with long-range Israeli security interests than the model of the second conflict. Ironically, Jerusalem and the Obama administration now share a desire to see the U.S. troops return home: The sooner America's soldiers leave Iraq, the quicker the two countries' security interests will become more compatible and bilateral relations will be more harmonious.

Relations Cause Terrorism

Our constant interaction with Israel has actually served to make our terrorism problem worse, not make it better

Mearsheimer and Walt 6 (John, Prof. of Poli. Sci. at Univ. of Chicago; Stephen, Prof. of International Affairs at Harvard; London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 3-12) GAT

Beginning in the 1990s, and even more after 9/11, US support has been justified by the claim that both states are threatened by terrorist groups originating in the Arab and Muslim world, and by ‘rogue states’ that back these groups and seek weapons of mass destruction. This is taken to mean not only that Washington should give Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians and not press it to make concessions until all Palestinian terrorists are imprisoned or dead, but that the US should go after countries like Iran and Syria. Israel is thus seen as a crucial ally in the war on terror, because its enemies are America’s enemies. In fact, Israel is a liability in the war on terror and the broader effort to deal with rogue states. ‘Terrorism’ is not a single adversary, but a tactic employed by a wide array of political groups. The terrorist organisations that threaten Israel do not threaten the United States, except when it intervenes against them (as in Lebanon in 1982). Moreover, Palestinian terrorism is not random violence directed against Israel or ‘the West’; it is largely a response to Israel’s prolonged campaign to colonise the West Bank and Gaza Strip. More important, saying that Israel and the US are united by a shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards: the US has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around. Support for Israel is not the only source of anti-American terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war on terror more difficult. There is no question that many al-Qaida leaders, including Osama bin Laden, are motivated by Israel’s presence in Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinians. Unconditional support for Israel makes it easier for extremists to rally popular support and to attract recruits.

\*\*Japan Econ DA – Aff Answers

Non-UQ – General

Japan’s economy is dead and is only still here due to waning international demand.

Fernando 5/28 (Vincent, writer for The Money Game w/ a B.S from Tufts U, [http://www.buzzbox.com/top/default/preview/japan-rocked-by-accelerating-deflation-and-new-unemployment/?id=1597010&topic=japan:may-28] AD: 6/21/10)JM

Japan has been rocked by accelerated deflation and a spike in unemployment. Consumer prices fell 1.5% in April, which was faster than the 1.2% experienced in March. Moreover, the unemployment rate hit 5.1%, the highest level since January according to the Associated Press. Here's the most telling fact of them all -- exports surged 40% in April. Japan's economy is still dead, only kept on life support by surging international demand. Its GDP is comprised of a rotting domestic core kept hidden by a shiny export shell, yet one which is rapidly being eroded thin by other Asian manufacturers moving up the value chain and towards Japan's vaunted position for capital equipment and electronics.

Japan’s economy is bad – it’s on the verge of collapse.

BBC News 6/11 (BBC News, world's largest broadcast news organization, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/10290933.stm] AD: 6/21/10)JM

Japan is at "risk of collapse" under its huge debt mountain, the country's new prime minister has said. Naoto Kan, in his first major speech since taking over, said Japan needed a financial restructuring to avert a Greece-style crisis. "Our country's outstanding public debt is huge... our public finances have become the worst of any developed country," he said. After years of borrowing, Japan's debt is twice its gross domestic product. ANALYSIS Pessimists have long warned that rising debt and a falling population mean Japan is headed for a point of no return. For 20 years the government has been borrowing to spend, hoping to revive the stagnant economy, amassing the biggest debt-to-GDP ratio in the industrialised world. The Japanese themselves have been buying those bonds at low interest rates. But as Japan ages, the thinking goes, households will save less. The Government will have to look abroad to borrow, and the higher interest rates demanded could tip the world's second biggest economy into the abyss. Now the new Prime Minister Naoto Kan has stepped into the debate in his first policy speech to the Diet, warning Japan could face similar debt problems to Europe.

Japan’s economy is undergoing record contraction

Nakamichi 6/20 (Takashi , reporter for the Washington Post and Dow Jones Newswires, [http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100620-705217.html?mod=WSJ\_World\_MIDDLEHeadlinesAsia] AD: 6/21/10)JM

The planned revision underscores how a recovery in the global economy is helping to offset Japan's domestic problems, which include entrenched deflation and stagnant consumer spending. The world's second largest economy contracted 2.0% in the last fiscal year after posting a record 3.7% contraction in the preceding year, according to the Cabinet Office.

Non-UQ – General

No Japanese economic recovery – debt, deflation, and a lack of consumer confidence will stop it.

Tachikawa 5/28 (Tomoyuki, journalist for the Wall Street Journal, [<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704269204575271163917338150.html>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

TOKYO—Japan's economy remained mired in a stubborn deflationary trend last month and consumer spending was still fragile with the job market worsening, government data showed Friday, suggesting the economic outlook is not optimistic despite steady growth in exports. The nation's core consumer price index, which excludes volatile fresh food prices, fell 1.5% from a year earlier in April, compared with a 1.2% slide in March, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications said. One factor in the fall in consumer prices was the elimination of public high school tuition in the month, one of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan's measures to free up cash for consumers to spend elsewhere. But the drop in the core CPI was still the 14th in a row and missed the median forecast for a 1.4% decline forecast by private economists, adding to evidence that the current economic recovery has yet to help boost domestic demand and prevent prices from decreasing further. The jobless rate increased for the second straight month to 5.1% in April from 5.0% a month earlier. Overall household spending slipped 0.7% on year in real terms during the same period with income conditions worsening, posting the first decline in two months, the internal ministry said. Such results indicate that a domestic demand-led economic recovery is far off in Japan as persistent price falls are likely to weigh on corporate profits and prompt firms to cut payrolls, while an expansion in exports to emerging economies such as China continues to support the economy. Some analysts say deflation may worsen as the recent stronger yen could put pressure on Japan's export-oriented economy and reduce the prices of oil, food, metals and other commodities that the country buys from overseas. That might force the Bank of Japan to take additional monetary easing measures, despite its forecast that the core CPI will turn positive next fiscal year. "We cannot be optimistic about the Japanese economy as it's inevitable that it will slow down if the debt problem in Europe keeps rattling the global financial market and causes the yen to rise sharply," said Norinchukin Research Institute chief economist Takeshi Minami. "Under such circumstances, it's unlikely that Japan will get out of deflation in the next fiscal year as the BOJ says."

Non-UQ - General

Japan’s economy is failing.

Jackson 5/26 (Eric, Ph.D. from the Columbia University Graduate School of Business, [<http://www.thestreet.com/story/10765683/2/sounding-the-alarm-about-japan.html>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

But the numbers are very grim when you start to dig into Japan. Rather than the "land of the rising sun," Japan appears to be the "land of the setting sun." Here are some quick facts about Japan to sober you up: Japan's debt-to-gross domestic product ratio is now over 200% and approaching 250%, putting it far ahead of its G8 and developing-country peers. Japan will issue $500 billion in new bond sales in this fiscal year and $600 billion and $650 billion in the next two years, respectively. Its population is aging faster than any other country in the world. Ten years ago, it was estimated there would be less than two workers for every retiree in Japan. The current government numbers suggest the ratio is actually 1.3 workers for every retiree today. Japan's population is expected to shrink by 30% to 90 million from 2007 to 2055. By 2014, all the baby-boomers will have hit the retirement age of 65 and begin drawing down their savings. Japanese debt service as a percentage of its tax revenue is now 60%, up from 32% 10 years ago. As the population shrinks, however, tax revenue will decrease. A rise in interest rates on servicing the debt could also be a major problem for the country. With low interest rates, the Japanese are able to meet their steep debt service obligations. However, when interest rates on the 10-year Japanese bond go above 3.5% (rates are currently at 1.5%), the Japanese government will have major problems.

Non-UQ – Deflation

Japan’s economy is battling with deflation

BBC News 6/18 (BBC News, world's largest broadcast news organization, [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/10353784.stm>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

It said it aims to defeat deflation by April 2011, but revealed few details on how it would achieve this. The government also said it would cut corporate tax from 40% to nearer 25%. Earlier this week, Japan's central bank announced plans for up to 3 trillion yen (£22bn; $33bn) in loans to spur economic growth. The plans mark the first time Japan has set a time frame for tackling deflation, which has plagued the economy for much of the last two decades. Persistent deflation has hampered economic growth, with consumers opting to hold off on making major purchases, expecting prices to fall even further. However, the ambition of the new government was met with scepticism by some analysts. "The growth targets don't sound like anything new to me, just wishful thinking," said Junko Nishioka at RBS Securities. Japan's growth averaged just 1.3% a year before the recession brought on by the financial crisis. Like many other developed economies, Japan is also suffering from high levels of sovereign debt. Its plans for cutting borrowing levels are due to be announced next week. New Prime Minister Naoto Kan has made cutting the country's deficit his priority.

Deflation will collapse the Japanese economy.

Masters 9 (Coco, reporter for Time Magazine with degree from Columbia University, [[http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1941210,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0%2C8599%2C1941210%2C00.html)] AD: 6/21/10)JM

During his Nov. 13 visit to Tokyo, U.S. President Barack Obama emphasized that Japan, as the world's second largest economy, has a special role in the global marketplace. One week later, it's becoming clear the country may be special for another reason. While much of the rest of the planet frets about a coming rise in inflation — a consequence of economic recovery, massive stimulus spending and a weakening dollar — Japan faces the opposite problem: a potentially devastating bout of deflation.

Figures released this week indicated Japan may be climbing out of its worst recession in decades. Third quarter GDP growth came in at an annualized rate of 4.8%. But other statistics painted a more troubling picture. The price of goods and services slid by 2.6% in the third quarter, the biggest drop since 1958. Consumer prices have dropped for seven straight months. "The recent price falls are not right and worrisome," Japan's Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii said at a Nov. 20 press conference. "This is one of the major policy issues right now." Deputy Prime Minister Naoto Kan was even more blunt. He stated flatly this week that the country is "in a deflationary state." While a little inflation is considered normal and healthy for growing economies, a prolonged deflationary period is a recipe for economic misery. Falling prices drag down corporate earnings, wages, consumer spending and investment by businesses, and can lead to a deflationary spiral like the one the world experienced during the Great Depression. "If price deflation leads to asset deflation and that leads to further deterioration, then that will lead to the collapse of the economy," says JPMorgan Securities chief economist Masaaki Kanno. Deflation has periodically plagued the Japanese economy for the last 15 years, ever since a spectacular asset bubble burst in the early 1990s. One of the country's revered economic figures is Korekiyo Takahashi, a former prime minister and finance minister who is credited with reining in raging deflation in the early 1930s, sooner than the U.S. was able to fend it off.

Non-UQ – Deflation

Japan’s economy is unstable – deflation is sending their economy into turmoil.

The Economist 6/3 ([<http://www.economist.com/node/16274363>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

Deflation is also harder to fight than inflation. Over the past two decades central bankers have gained plenty of experience in how to conquer excessive price increases. Japan’s ongoing inability to prevent prices falling suggests the opposite task is rather less well understood. Although it is true that heavily indebted governments might be tempted to erode their debts through higher inflation, there are few signs that political support for low inflation is waning (see article).

Add all this together and the world’s big three central banks—in America, the euro zone and Japan—should worry most about falling prices. The scale of budget belt-tightening suggests these banks’ policy rates could stay way down for several years. But this will cause problems elsewhere. Near-zero interest rates in the big, rich economies send capital flooding elsewhere in search of higher yields, making it harder for the healthier countries to keep their economies stable.

Deflation has wracked the Japanese economy with debt – they are on the verge of collapse.

Picerno 6/15 (Jim, journalist w/ a B.A. in journalism and history from Rutgers U, [<http://www.greenfaucet.com/economy/still-worrying-about-deflation/17715>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

If a wave of deflationary threatens the global economy’s rebound, will Japan be the canary in the coal mine. Probably. It’s certainly a high risk country, in part because it’s already loaded to the gills with debt from efforts at fighting deflation over the past 20 years. There are no guarantees in macroeconomic analysis, but if Japan’s already cheerless outlook takes a turn for the worse, it may signal that deflationary winds are set to blow harder in the rest of the world. Gross public debt in the Land of the Rising Sun is at 200% of the Japanese economy--the highest in the developed world. "It is difficult to continue our fiscal policies by heavily relying on the issuance of government bonds," Japan’s prime minister, Naoto Kan, said last week. "Like the confusion in the eurozone triggered by Greece, there is a risk of collapse if we leave the increase of the public debt untouched and then lose the trust of the bond markets," the former finance minister advised. The FT's Martin Wolf argues that Japan could easily inflate away its debt problem…if it chooses to. But it's not obvious that Japan is willing to embrace higher inflation as a way out of its debt problems. In fact, some economists say that Japan's long-running on-again/off-again troubles with deflation, and weak economic growth, are self-inflicted. Scott Sumner, for example, laid out the case this way:

Non-UQ – Deflation

Deflation spells economic catastrophe.

Kumar 9 (G, astrologer, academician & programmer, Nov 30, 2009, [<http://www.articlesfactory.com/articles/wisdom/deflation-is-more-dangerous-than-inflation.html>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

If deflation is prolonged, then it is very dangerous, more dangerous than inflation. It will engender crisis and recession. More than prices falling, it is the expectation that prices will fall, that is more dangerous. If consumers believe that prices will fall furthur, investment decisions will be delayed. My friend was saying he will not buy a flat of 80 lakhs now, as he will get it for 40 lakhs after two years. Consumer judges that it is a Bear Phase and will not invest and will wait for prices to fall. Let it be Stock Market or Realty, the intelligent will only enter at the end of the Bear Phase and not at the beginning. ! Inflation is the phase where the prices of products and services go up in a bullish curve and Deflation is the phase where the prices of products and services go down in a bearish curve ! The prices of some commodities - particularly foodstuffs - are rising during even the deflationary phase. The Wholesale Price Index is based on 430 commodities. Ordinary people are bothered only about the prices of foodstuffs, rice, sugar, wheat, fish, vegetables etc. The prices of copper, coal, aviation fuel etc, ( which is also included in the 430 commodities ) are something the common man is not bothered about. The common man does not benefit when the price of aviation fuel comes down. But the prices of foodstuffs do not come down and this explains why prices of some commodities are rising during deflation. Now this inexplicability is resolved when everything is based on the CPI, the Consumer Price Index. The Wholesale Price Index on June 06, 2008 was 236.5 and on June 06, 2009 was 232.7 and hence Deflation is 1.61%. Now Consumer Price Index can be followed as it highlights the prices of essential commodities and if we follow the CPI, we have an inflation at 8% ! Inflation was 11% when oil was ruling at 140 dollars per barrel. The inflation of today is merely a statistical aberration. People will delay their buying during Deflation. During inflation, when people thought price of rice was bound to go up, they bought heavy quantities of rice. Now the reverse phenomenon will happen during deflation. The buying of rice, wheat, medicines etc which are essential will be deferred. There will be less demand. The manufacturers will have to slash down output. There will be retrenchment of employees as business becomes slack, unemployment will rise and the whole economy will be affected considerably.

Non-UQ – Debt

The Japanese economy is shrinking and is on the brink of collapse.

Moran 4/11 (Andrew, journalist for the Digital Journal, [<http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/290419>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

Tokyo - Financial experts are cautioning Japanese officials that their economy may go bankrupt as early as next year because of their high public debt figure.

As global financial markets watch Greece very closely, economic analysts are warning that Japan’s economy may go bankrupt because of its astronomical public debt figure, according to AFP.

Dai-ichi Life Research Institute sounded the alarm this week when they said a Japanese bankruptcy could occur as early as 2011 when the public debt is expected to hit 20 per cent of the gross domestic product.

It is estimated, reports Press TV, that the public debt of Japan will surge to 950 trillion Yen ($10.2 trillion) next year and experts are cautioning the government that the only way they can avoid bankruptcy is if they issue more government bonds.

“Japan’s revenue is roughly 37 trillion yen and debt is 44 trillion yen in fiscal 2010. Without issuing more government bonds, Japan would go bankrupt by 2011,” said Hideo Kumano, chief economist at Dai-ichi Life Research Institute, reports the Manila Times.

The Japanese economy shrank by 5.2 per cent in 2009 due to debt, deflation and a decline in domestic demand. Digital Journal reported in December that Japan released its record 92.9 trillion Yen ($1 trillion) budget as they increased spending for child support and attempted to slash spending on public projects.

Non-UQ- Jobs

Japanese econ crippled by deflation- no immediate recovery possible

The Daily Yomiuri 6/3[June 3, 2010Page 2, Lexis] KLS

The Japanese economy has staggered through the storms of the financial crisis and the global recession, but it is now enveloped by the cold fog of deflation. Making matters worse, the nation faces a downsizing of its economic activity as the aging population drops due to the falling birthrate. This is a fiendish problem. The Japanese economy is standing at a crossroad--will it find a sustained growth path or crumble under the deflationary pressure and spiral down into oblivion? The government and the Bank of Japan must take every possible policy measure at their disposal to save the economy by overcoming deflation. The government admitted in March 2001 that the economy was in deflation. Since then, the government has not been able to declare that the nation has broken free from the shackles of deflation. In fact, it had to restate in November that the economy was still in a deflationary phase. In reality, the economy has been wallowing in chronic deflation for more than a decade since the times of financial recession sparked by the collapse of a number of banks.

Non-UQ- Jobs

Japanese econ plunging into deeper recession- price wars cripple profit

The Daily Yomiuri 6/3[June 3, 2010Page 2, Lexis] KLS

In recent times, price wars have been erupting in many sectors. The battles have quickly spread from jeans priced at less than 1,000 yen at supermarkets and mass retailers, to foods including beverages, takeout lunches and gyudon beef-over-rice bowls at chain stores. Consumers like to buy things as cheaply as possible, while manufacturers resort to cutting prices to promote sales. Their actions, which seem entirely reasonable to each, could end up tightening deflation's stranglehold. As price wars intensify, manufacturers become unprofitable and make less money. This often forces them to restructure their organizations and cut employees' salaries. The result is a vicious spiral that dampens already fragile consumer spending. According to government statistics, consumer prices have been steadily declining as workers' monthly salaries have been decreasing for the past 18 months on a year-on-year basis.

Non-UQ- Jobs

Japanese economy destroyed- job unavailability, foreign demand down

The Daily Yomiuri 6/3[June 3, 2010Page 2, Lexis] KLS

Japanese industries, especially export-led companies, have accelerated drastic production and job cuts since the global recession that started in 2008 caused foreign demand to plunge. Although exports, mainly to Asian countries, are gradually recovering, they remain at only 70 percent of peak volume before the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. Jobs hard to come by Companies that are increasing facilities and employees to raise output are still thin on the ground, and recoveries of capital spending and employment have been slow in coming. The percentage of students fresh out of high school and university who have found jobs has seen a record drop, causing concern that the nation could be on the brink of a return to a so-called employment ice age. The yen's excessive appreciation will knock the wind out of the sails of the export industry and aggravate deflation by lowering prices of imported goods. The government should not hesitate to intervene in the currency market to prevent this.

Link Turn- General

US presence hampers local economies – Okinawa proves

Meyer 3 (Carlton, Sergeant in US military, Served one year with the US Marine Corps in Asia and participated in the massive TEAM SPIRIT 1990 military exercise in Korea & writer for military magazines, G2Mil.com, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm) JPG

Okinawa is a small island south of mainland Japan where U.S. Marines established bases as World War II ended. They protected the island from possible Chinese invasion and it remained under the direct control of the U.S. military until 1972. Okinawans have their own culture and wanted independence and the closure of most American bases, but the island was given back to Japan with an understanding that American bases would remain. Over 27,000 U.S. military personnel and their 22,000 family members are stationed on Okinawa. The U.S. Air Force maintains the large Kadena airbase on the island while the Army and Navy maintain several small bases. The Marines have a dozen camps and a small airbase at Futenma where loud helicopters [anger nearby residents](http://www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp/2556/2581/2582/27745/27746.html).Discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the foreign military presence has been rising for years. Their chief complaint is that Okinawa hosts over half of U.S. forces in Japan, which hampers economic development. After a series of violent criminal acts by U.S. servicemen, the U.S. military agreed in 1996 to reduce the impact of their presence. A few minor military facilities were consolidated while training and operational procedures were changed to reduce noise. The most significant concession was a promise to close the Marine Corps airbase at Futenma by 2003.The Japanese government in Tokyo agreed to build a new airbase for the Marines elsewhere in Japan, yet the Marines insisted the airbase must be on Okinawa. The idea building a multi-billion dollar airbase in northern Okinawa was studied for years. While that area is less populated, the noise from an airbase would destroy the peace of tropical beaches enjoyed by tourists. That idea was dropped, so the Okinawans were promised that 8000 Marines would move to Guam. The Japanese government agreed to build new facilities on Guam, until presented with an outrageous price tag. Japanese political opinion hardened and some leaders now assert that Japan had the right close any U.S. military facility without compensation.

Link Turn- Productivity

US withdrawal improves local economies by allowing them to develop sustainable and more productive business – these outweigh benefits from military bases

GenuineSecurity.org No Date Given (GenuineSecurity.org, Women for Genuine Security is a U.S. based organization that promotes a world of genuine security based on justice and respect for others across national boundaries, a world free of militarism, violence and all forms of sexual exploitation,

www.genuinesecurity.org/partners/report/Okinawa.pdf) JPG

Under Governor Ota (1990-1998) the Okinawa Prefecture developed a plan for phasing out the U.S. bases by the year 2015. The centerpiece of this plan was to be a new Cosmopolitan City, a “grand design for a new Okinawa aiming at the 21st century” with underlying principles of peace, coexistence and self-sufficiency.15 The idea was to make use of Okinawa’s “geographical location, natural environment, and historical experiences to expand on international exchanges and build trusting ties with foreign countries, especially the Asian countries, not only through economy but through science, culture, and training programs for personnel.”16 The emphasis would be on greater economic independence for Okinawa, the use of information technology, restoration of the natural environment, sustainable development, and the establishment of research institutes including a center for peace education and research. The planned and phased return of land currently used by the U.S. military was an essential element in this overall concept. After Inamine took over the Governor’s position, this plan disappeared, following pressures from the Japanese government. However, thinking continues about an important peaceful role in Asia for Okinawa, using its central position, as the prefecture is pursuing IT industries to locate in Okinawa.One strand of this development debate is that Okinawa should achieve economic parity with the mainland. The post-war development of Japan has entailed massive industrialization, destruction of forests, contamination of land and water, and a “salaryman” culture. Some Okinawan environmentalists and women activists oppose this type of development as inherently unsustainable. They argue that the U.S. military should allocate funds for the base-conversion process, including environmental cleanup. Jobs, education, and training must be provided for people now dependent on the bases. Sustainable development must take priority over multinational corporations or tourism. Local people should control planning and decision-making for conversion.

Link Turn- Japanese Econ

Removal of bases allows local economies to develop sustainable forms of growth

**Ushikoshi 97** (Hirofumi, Senior economist @ Nippon Life Insurance Research Institute, NLI Research no date published, http://www.nli-research.co.jp/english/economics/1997/eco9704.html) JPG

Assuming the return of U.S. military bases and implementation of present economic development policies， Okinawa's economy could average 4-5% growth annually over the next 20 years. But public works spending will need to be kept above the national average; as reducing or eliminating it would spell slower or even negative growth. For self-sustained growth， the economic structure must eventually discard its heavy dependence on public works spending. But in the near term， while the economy continues its dependence on public works spending， progress will be necessary in the phased return of U.S. military bases and establishment of linkages with the Asia economy. The Okinawa economy has been dependent on U.S. military bases in the postwar period， and after reversion to Japan in 1972， also came to rely heavily on public works spending (especially of the central government). The economy thus has a small manufacturing sector and excessively large tourism industry， giving Okinawa the nation's lowest per capita income and very high unemployment.In light of recent developments such as the consolidation and realignment of U.S. bases， more forceful demands on the central government (to enhance the free trade zone， abolish visa requirements， etc.)， and development policies of the central government， there is growing interest in whether Okinawa can become self-sustaining within the Asia economy. By shifting from a structural dependence on U.S. bases， public spending， and tourism to an economy based on information related industries， Okinawa hopes to harness the dynamism of the Asian economy.The key to success lies in private investment， the most important and promising source being Taiwan. With the reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997， Taiwan has been pursuing an "Asia Pacific Operation Center Plan" to become the next Hong Kong. But with the difficulty in direct travel between China and Taiwan， Taiwan has been considering giving this role to Okinawa. Due to political tensions with China， there is also interest in policies to divert investment from China to Okinawa. Another important factor is that Taiwan has played the leading role in redeveloping Subic Bay in the Philippines.By 2015 (when Okinawa aims to complete its "Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept")， Okinawa's economy could grow at a 4-5% average annual rate if Okinawa's demands including base reversion are realized， the central government's development policies are implemented， and investment from Taiwan and elsewhere is equivalent to the Subic Bay redevelopment project. However， the growth rate could be limited to 2-3% if public spending is phased down to the national average， or the economy could even contract if public spending is eliminated. Our prediction assumes a growth rate excluding policy factors of 2%.

Link Turn- Japanese Spending

Japanese defense spending leads to economic growth

Ma Ma Myo 9 (Khin, PhD in International Relations @ Yangon Univ & MA in Development from @ Int’l Univ of Japan, Scribd, 2/2/9, http://www.scribd.com/doc/11581997/Military-Expenditures-and-Economic-Growth-in-Asia-by-Khin-Ma-Ma-Myo) JPG

For Japan, the military spending has traditionally been capped at 1 per cent of GDP. However, as the economy was so large that its military expenditure was the biggest in Asia and Oceania. This is partly due to the involvement in peacekeeping operations and perceived increased threat from China and North Korea. The absolute level of defense spending has been concerns for most of its neighbors. Despite of this, Japanese defense industry contributed to high levels of economic growth with the production of highly sophisticated weapons including F-15 fighters and E-2C early warning airborne system. Japanese industrialists and defense planners seem to be inclined to be self sufficient with respect to future weapons research. (Dolan, 1994)

Link Turn- US Econ

US presence in Japan wastes taxpayer dollars – immediate withdrawal saves the military millions and shifts jobs back into the US economy

Meyer 3 (Carlton, Sergeant in US military, Served one year with the US Marine Corps in Asia and participated in the massive TEAM SPIRIT 1990 military exercise in Korea & writer for military magazines, G2Mil.com, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm) JPG

After his election, President Obama [proclaimed:](http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2008/11/obama_vows_line.html) "We cannot sustain a system that bleeds billions of taxpayer dollars on programs that have outlived their usefulness, or exist solely because of the power of a politicians, lobbyists, or interest groups. We simply cannot afford it." Downsizing the U.S. military presence in Japan is overdue. It would lessen political tensions, save the U.S. military millions of dollars a year, and shift a billion dollars in annual military spending and several thousand support jobs into the U.S. economy. Moreover, moving ships, aircraft, and military families out of the range of North Korean, Russian, and Chinese tactical missiles and aircraft would protect them from surprise attack.Unfortunately, Generals and Admirals instinctively dislike change, especially if it will close "their" bases. They will characterize this proposed downsizing as drastic, even though it would remove only around 10,000 of the 50,000 U.S. military personnel from Japan, close only two of six airbases, and leave two major naval bases and a dozen bases for ground forces. They will insist a detailed study is required, followed by years of negotiations. Meanwhile, Japanese and American corporations that benefit from the current arrangement will use their influence to sabotage the effort. This is how they have evaded demands to close Futenma and Atsugi.If they can stall for a couple of years, President Obama may lose interest, or possibly the 2012 election. If the President persists, the solution they devise will cost billions of dollars and a decade for new construction, environmental studies, and base clean ups. In reality, the U.S. military can implement this plan within two years because excess base capacity already exists. Since personnel are rotated every three years, it costs nothing to divert them elsewhere. The Japanese government would happily pay for any relocation and clean-up costs. Meanwhile, Americans are waiting to see if President Obama will show the courage to eliminate government waste by closing military bases "that have outlived their usefulness."

No MPX- Japanese Econ Collapse =/= Global

Japanese econ rife with structural problem from 98 crisis- collapse poses no threat to global econ

Pritchard 1 [Simon, Director of Mergers at the United Kingdom's Office of Fair Trading March 19, South China Morning Post, Page 14, Lexis]

FOR THOSE PRONE to worry that a Japanese economic collapse might lead the world into depression, last year saw a soothing notion take hold. Spurred on by gargantuan government spending and financial-sector reform, the Japanese economy appeared to be off the critical list. Coming after the 1998 financial crisis - when ordinary Japanese were on the brink of losing all confidence in their politicians, banks and economic future - the pull-back was impressive. By last summer, sharply rebounding economic growth prompted the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates to avert an imagined inflationary expansion. Corporate restructuring, driven by paradigm-busting foreign takeovers, and a fresh crop of world-beating companies, such as mobile -telecommunications provider NTT DoCoMo, suggested a new Japan was emerging. That the dawn proved cruelly false perhaps explains the chaotic, still impending demise of deeply unpopular Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. Even by Japanese standards, the slow-motion process of ending his one-year term has turned to farce. The population's disgust with politics is at a record high, though the people remain stoic in their suffering.

No MPX- Japan Defense

**No impact- Japan currently funds its own defense**

**Carpenter 95** (Ted Galen, Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ CATO inst., CATO Inst. Policy Analysis no. 244, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html)

Japanese policymakers, of course, vehemently deny that Japan engages in free riding. They point out with pride that their government pays most of the costs of the U.S. military units stationed on Japanese territory and that the amount of that host-nation support has been rising steadily for several years--reaching more than $5 billion this year. They also note that Japan's actions are in marked contrast to the parsimonious behavior of Washington's other allies, including the NATO members and South Korea. (Even the Pentagon's 1995 report conceded that "Japan supplies by far the most generous host-nation support of any of our allies.")(6)

Japanese Econ Resilient

Japanese econ is a shapeshifter- one sector down, others grow

Yamazaki 01 [Hiroshi, Senior Staff Writer, June 4, Nikkei Weekly, Lexis]

While public expectations for Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's economic initiatives are growing, the Japanese economy shows signs of slowing down. Hideo Hayakawa, head of the Bank of Japan's research and statistics department, spoke about his diagnosis of the Japanese economy and the possible economic impact of Koizumi's reforms. Following are excerpts from the interview: Q: What is your interpretation of the current economic situation in Japan? A: Japanese industries are now in the consolidation phase due mainly to falling exports. This is indicated by the slowdown of industrial production, which was caused by the economic downturn in the U.S. and other countries. However, I do not think the full impact of industrial consolidation has reached the Japanese economy yet. Q: What do you mean by that? A: The information-technology sector is in a serious economic trough after riding an animated boom. Output in this sector is taking a plunge. But non-IT sectors have been relatively resilient with regards to the effects of consolidation. Although overall capital spending is likely to peak soon and turn downward, there is no sign at the moment that expenditures by non-IT companies will dip sharply, as they have in the IT sector. Q: What are your thoughts on consumer spending? A: It is more resilient than we had expected. Demand for electrical appliances surged in the January-March quarter ahead of the April 1 introduction of a new recycling law (which requires buyers to shoulder the cost of disposing used appliances). Other products also fare well. Here we can also see further evidence that demand for IT products is shrinking, but it has produced little effect on other sectors.

Japanese Econ Resilient- Banks

Japanese economy resilient- sustainable banking sector

NYT 08 [February 22, New York Times, Lexis]

The governor of the Bank of Japan, Toshihiko Fukui, said on Friday that the global economy continued to expand but that a slowdown in the United States, if it deepens, could affect growth in other parts of the world. ''We need to bear in mind the possibility that further disruptions in global financial markets or a slowdown in the U.S. economy may have adverse implications not only for major economies but also for emerging economies,'' Mr. Fukui said at a seminar. He said there was no change to the bank's basic monetary policy stance, which is to adjust rates by closely examining upside and downside risks. Market adjustments amid repricing of risks would take time, making it unavoidable for banks to incur losses, Mr. Fukui said. At a financial committee in parliament's lower house, Mr. Fukui said that Japan's economy had become more resilient to external shocks, but that ''downside risks to the global economy are heightening and their impact on Japan's economy remains uncertain.'' ''We will fully examine not just our main economic scenario'' but the risks to the country in guiding monetary policy, said Mr. Fukui, whose term expires next month. The Bank of Japan has long said it will raise rates gradually, as its current policy rate of 0.5 percent is so low it could lead to overheating in the economy in the long term. But shaky global markets, concern over slowing American growth and growing pessimism over Japan's economic outlook have kept the bank from raising rates for a year. A recovery in share prices since late January has led investors to cut back expectations of a rate cut this year. Mr. Fukui said Japan's growth was slowing partly because of a slump in domestic housing investment. But it has become more resilient to external shocks than in the past and a positive cycle of output, incomes and spending remains intact, he said. ''It is highly likely that the Japanese economy will continue to expand moderately,'' he said. Some economists say the upbeat tone is becoming harder to swallow given growing concern that the American economic slowdown could gradually affect global growth and hurt exports.

Bank of Japan ensures stability

Economic Times 08 [July 30 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3304495.cms?prtpage=1]

The IMF meanwhile praised the Bank of Japan (BoJ) for its liquidity operations, saying its proactive stance had helped underpin the country's financial markets during global market turmoil. The BoJ has kept interest rates pegged at 0.50 per cent since February. BoJ chief Masaaki Shirakawa said earlier this month that the Japanese economy was slowing, but predicted it would avert a recession. The losses of commercial Japanese banks, who invested in US mortgage securities, have risen to eight bn dollars, but such losses pale in comparison to the vast losses sustained by some US banks, a small number of which have gone out of business this year. The IMF said the profits and capital held by Japan's banks should enable them to comfortably absorb the eight bn dollars in losses endured so far by their exposure to the US housing downturn. Citrin added that the economic policies of Japan's government had been "broadly appropriate."

Japanese Econ Not Key to World

Japan is being overtaken by China- no longer a major player due to population decrease

Kosai 09 [Yutaka, Senior adviser Japan Center for Economic Research, September 24, Nekkei Weekly, Lexis]

A: What is vital for today's world economy is international cooperation. The global economy is mired in the

worst recession since the Great Depression in the 1930s. But countries' efforts to hold emergency financial summits and devise fiscal measures and monetary easing in a concerted manner are gradually producing results. In the 1930s, the failure to forge such a framework of cooperation led to the violent depression. The new Japanese government needs to calmly re-examine the position of Japan in the world economy. The country will give over its status as the world's second-biggest economy to China before long. The main reason is that Japan's population has begun falling. However, if the government thoroughly pursues anew the growth strategy of focusing on heightening the productivity of individual Japanese, it is possible that Japan can continue to flourish as an economic power.

Japanese economy affected by global trends, export dependence makes it of little importance to the global econ

Nikkei Weekly 08 [December 22, Lexis]

 It's true that Japanese financial institutions have suffered much smaller losses than their Western counterparts. But unlike the collapse of Japan's bubble, which was basically a domestic problem, the current crisis is truly global, with entities around the world holding asset-backed securities that have fallen in value. When Japan was suffering from its collapsed bubble, the rest of the world was basically in good economic health. This time, however, it is the rest of the world economy that has been battered, and it has serious implications for Japanese exports. The sharp rise in raw materials prices has also delivered a blow to the Japanese economy. Companies like Toyota Motor Corp. have seen their profits plunge, and consumer confidence is falling. Our institute predicts that the Japanese economy will contract by 0.9% in 2008 and 1.3% in 2009. We think the economy will bottom out in 2009 and start recovering in 2010. There will be no replay of the Great Depression. Even so, it's possible that the financial crisis will worsen further.

\*\*JASA Bad DA – Aff Answers

Relations Up – Kan

**Relations are stabilizing – Kan and Obama are increasing dialogue**

**Green 6/13** (Michael, senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University, Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703433704575303592164774492.html?mod=wsj\_india\_main) JPG

**Both governments will** also **need a strategy to rebuild support in Okinawa** for the air base replacement facility. Mr. **Hatoyama's flip-flopping and populism have left Mr. Kan with a real political mess** on the island. In the worst-case scenario, an antibase candidate could capitalize on mounting frustration with Tokyo to win the gubernatorial election in November. Mr. Kan would then have to abandon his pledge to Washington on base realignment or pass legislation in the Diet overruling the governor. **The damage to Mr. Kan and the alliance would be bad** either way. **Things are looking better for the U.S.-Japan alliance**. **Mr. Kan has taken important steps to remove uncertainty about Japan's foreign policy trajectory** under the DPJ. Now the rest of Asia—**friends and foes alike—will be watching to see if** the **Obama** administration **has a strategy with Japan that goes beyond defense of the status quo.**

**Washington is assured by Kan**

**Rogin 6/16** (Josh, writer for Foreign Policy Magazine and Congressional Quarterly, Foreign Policy, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/16/will\_obama\_hit\_the\_reset\_button\_on\_us\_japan\_relations) JPG

For now, **the battle over** the **Futenma** air station **seems to be tabled**, with the new prime minister, Naoto Kan, pledging to largely stick to the deal struck in 2006. **But there are lingering doubts as to whether either Washington or Tokyo is ready to revamp the rest of the alliance, which needs an update** as it crosses the 50-year threshold.

So far, **Kan seems to be sounding the right notes**.

**"The new prime minister has done everything possible to underscore the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance**," an administration official close to the issue told The Cable. "**This is a very complex set of interactions but we're reassured by what we've heard so far from Prime Minister Kan**."

Japan **hands in Washington note that Kan**, in his swearing-in remarks, **affirmed the U.S.-Japan alliance as "the cornerstone" of his country's diplomacy** and pledged to honor the 2006 agreement. But Kan also said he would place equal emphasis on improving ties with China.

That struck many in Washington as a sign that the Democratic Party of Japan, which took power last year for the first time[, is still hedging](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/05/japanese_lawmaker_obama_pushing_us_toward_china) against what party leaders see as an Obama administration that just isn't giving Japan the respect and attention it feels it deserves.

As for the recent cooling in relations, "**I don't think it's over, but a change in leadership is a chance to reset,**" said Randall Schriver, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia. **The U.S. problem with Hatoyama was personal,** based on his style and inability to meet his own deadlines, **resulting in a lack of trust**, Schriver said.

**US-Japan alliance is strong – Kan and Obama are pals**

**Hayashi 6/7** (Yuka, writer @ Wall Street Journal, WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704002104575289940923637452.html?mod=WSJ\_latestheadlines) JPG

TOKYO—Japan's new prime minister, Naoto **Kan, told** President Barack **Obama that the alliance with the U.S. will remain the linchpin of Tokyo's foreign policy** in a call Sunday that took place while the premier was shaping his cabinet. Two days after Yukio Hatoyama stepped down as leader following his botched effort to relocate a controversial U.S. base in Okinawa, Mr. **Kan pledged to solve the issue in accordance with a recent bilateral agreement that led to his predecessor's departure**. In a call the U.S. requested, Messrs. **Kan and Obama reaffirmed the importance of the security alliance between their nations and agreed to work in lockstep to solve issues** facing both, such as the tensions in Iran and North Korea, the Japanese foreign ministry said. **The White House said the two leaders "agreed to work very closely together."**

Relations Up – AT: Collapse Inevitable

**Relations are strong and wont change**

**AP 10** (6/2/10,

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jBNtvewQHZM2q35LVUaMKfsQ9ljg) JPG

WASHINGTON — **The White House said** Wednesday **Japan was one of America's "best friends" in the world, and** that **the relationship would not be** adversely **affected by the departure of** Prime Minister Yukio **Hatoyama.**

Hatoyama stepped down after a brief tenure disrupted by a political and diplomatic row over a US air base in Japan, after taking office vowing to forge a more equal relationship with Washington.

"We respect the Japanese political process and Prime Minister Hatoyama?s decision to step down," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said in a statement.

"The selection of Japan's next prime minister is a matter for the Japanese people and political process.

"**The US-Japan bilateral relationship is very strong and deeply rooted** in our common interests and values.

"**Our alliance has flourished under each Japanese prime minister** and US president for the past half century **and will continue to strengthen in the years to come**," Gibbs said.

Earlier, Gibbs's deputy Bill Burton told reporters that Japan was "one of our best friends in the world and **that alliance is not going to change** as a result of any change in leadership in that country."

Relations Up – Assorted

**The US and Japan are BFFs**

**Straits Times 6/3** (Staff, http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Asia/Story/STIStory\_534736.html) JPG

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'The selection of Japan's next prime minister is a matter for the Japanese people and political process. **'The US-Japan bilateral relationship is very strong and deeply rooted in our common interests and values... Our alliance has flourished under each Japanese prime minister** and US president for the past half century and will continue to strengthen in the years to come,' Mr Gibbs said.

Earlier, Mr Gibbs's deputy Bill Burton told reporters that **Japan was 'one of our best friends in the world and that alliance is not going to change as a result of any change in leadership in that country**.'

'We'll watch the political process take its course and be waiting like everybody else to see who the next prime minister will be,' Mr Burton said on Air Force One as Mr Obama flew to Pittsburgh. – AFP

**US-Japan relations are on the rise – Hatoyama resignation, rise of China and North Korean threats, and Ozawa resignation**

**Twining 6/2** (Dan, journalist @ Foreign Policy, 6/2/10, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/02/the\_implications\_of\_hatoyama\_s\_downfall\_for\_the\_us\_japan\_alliance) JPG

First, Hatoyama misread the domestic politics of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which polling shows to have stronger support in Japan than at almost any time in the past. **Hatoyama's decline and fall were due in large measure to the crisis in U.S.-Japan relations he helped create** by opposing a carefully negotiated plan for the redeployment of American forces on Okinawa. **His missteps** in first blowing up the deal -- then after nine painful months coming around to embrace it after inflating the expectations of the Okinawan people and his own party -- **put him on the opposite side of both the United States and a still pro-American Japanese public.** **The good news is that the political logic of maintaining strong U.S.-Japan ties overcame that of running against the U.S. for political gain.**

Second, in a perverse way we may have Kim Jong-Il to thank for this turn of events. **North Korea's sinking of the** South Korean destroyer **Cheonan** and ensuing threats to bring war to East Asia should South Korea retaliate **reminded Japan's leaders and people that they continue to live in a very dangerous neighborhood**. Aggressive Chinese naval maneuvers in waters near Japan have also reminded Tokyo that Hatoyama's lofty rhetoric about "East Asian fraternity" has its limits. **North Korean and Chinese bullying underscored how potentially risky Japan's alliance dispute with America was**, and how necessary it was to move rapidly to repair it by agreeing to the U.S. troop realignment on Okinawa. But Hatoyama's abrupt about-face in securing it only hastened his political downfall.

Third, **of greater importance to alliance solidarity** going forward **may be the resignation** not of Prime Minister Hatoyama but **of** Ichiro **Ozawa**, the shadowy leader of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) **whose Machiavellian political instincts** and alleged corruption **challenged the DPJ's** reformist **ambitions.** How could the party achieve its goals of increasing transparency and accountability in Japanese politics when it was led by the ultimate political insider? Ozawa's role as the power behind the throne did much to undermine Hatoyama by intensifying perceptions of the prime minister's weakness and indecisiveness. Ozawa has also long been viewed as belonging to the "China school" in Japan that sees relations with Beijing, not Washington, as ultimately more important to Japan's future. Last year, he led the largest delegation of parliamentarians ever to Beijing in what looked uncomfortably like the deferential tributary missions of the pre-modern era. Ozawa is a political survivor so it is too early to count him out. Nevertheless, **his departure as party leader bodes well for both Japanese politics and relations with Washington.**

JASA Good\*\*

**The US-Japan security alliance is key to check the rise of China and control several scenarios for conflict escalation**

**Denmark and Kliman 10** (Abraham and Daniel, Abraham – Fellow @ CNAS and Daniel – visiting Fellow @ CNAS, Center for a New American Security, June 2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/USJapanPolicyBrief\_DenmarkKliman\_June2010.pdf.) JPG

**The alliance** must become more than a hedge against China’s rise; it **should become a means of** **shaping China’s future** trajectory**. For the alliance to effectively influence** the strategic choices **China** makes, **the United States and Japan will have to act in concert**. Prime Minister **Hatoyama’s dismissive approach** to the possibility of a serious clash with China, **and his assumption that retaining leverage over** a rising **China** was not as essential as the United States contended, **posed a problem for bilateral coordination.** Despite Hatoyama’s resignation, the potential for the United States and Japan to dif- fer over their respective China policies remains. To avoid the kind of miscoordination epitomized by Hatoyama’s East Asian Community concept – an ill-defined proposal for a regional bloc that initially excluded the United States – political leaders and bureaucrats on both sides should map out a shared vision of China’s desired role that transcends the generality of a “responsible stakeholder,” i.e., a state that abides by the norms and practices of the current international order and contributes to its upkeep. They should also hold a dialogue exploring the potential consequences of failing to confront the challenge that China poses, as this would serve to educate some members of the DPJ who, like Hatoyama, retain unwarranted optimism about China’s future course. In the years ahead, **the alliance should contribute to the defense of the global commons – the maritime, air, space and cyber domains that no country exclu- sively governs**.**5 The United States and Japan are highly dependent on the global commons for secu- rity and prosperity**. Their commerce and energy supplies traverse the world’s oceans, their militaries are dependent on space-based sensors, and their societies are highly networked. Consequently, the United States and Japan have a strong interest in countering threats to the global commons, prefer- ably in tandem and working through the alliance. As two of the world’s foremost maritime powers, **the United States and Japan can play a pivotal role in combating piracy** not only by dispatching ships, which they already do, but also by bolstering the navies and coast guards of key littoral states. As global spacefaring nations, **they can credibly cham- pion a treaty banning the first-use of anti-satellite weapons** and advance other measures to prevent the ultimate high ground from becoming a combat zone. And as two of the world’s leading providers of information technologies, **the United States and Japan can pool resources to counter cyber espio- nage** and foil debilitating cyber attacks. Lastly, **the alliance can complement existing initiatives to address “natural security” threats – environmental challenges like global warming and resource competition**.6 To date, the alliance agenda has yet to take up natural security con- cerns in any serious way. This is unfortunate. Although removed from the more traditional threats the alliance has traditionally countered, natural security threats pose a considerable chal- lenge to the United States and Japan given their reliance on energy imports and the centrality of critical minerals to their high-technology sectors. Moreover, with two of the world’s leading science establishments, **the United States and Japan have an unparalleled capacity to address natural security threats.** Putting natural security squarely on the alliance agenda will ensure it receives adequate attention from high-level policymakers rather than languishes as one of many areas comprising the bilateral relationship. Under the auspices of the alliance, the United States and Japan should launch bilateral collaboration to develop clean energy technology, establish a common U.S.-Japan standard for mitigating greenhouse gases and work to devise substitutes for critical minerals. To be sure, **natural security will never displace the many traditional security challenges the alliance confronts, but it constitutes an important future area for alliance cooperation**.

JASA K2 Check Korea/China

**A renewed US-Japan security alliance is critical in checking North Korea and China**

**Denmark and Kliman 10** (Abraham and Daniel, Abraham – Fellow @ CNAS and Daniel – visiting Fellow @ CNAS, Center for a New American Security, June 2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/USJapanPolicyBrief\_DenmarkKliman\_June2010.pdf.) JPG

The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is celebrat- ing its fiftieth anniversary. Although the alliance’s original Cold War backdrop has long faded into history, **the importance of the alliance remains undimmed.** Indeed, **China’s rise and growing assertiveness, not to mention North Korea’s bel- ligerence** amidst a precarious leadership transition, **have only elevated the utility of the alliance.** With its prospective contributions to the defense of the global commons and the mitigation of natural security threats, **the alliance is clearly essential to the future security of the United States and Japan.** Yet **these two longstanding allies can only achieve that security if they renew their alliance**. With a new prime minister in Tokyo and an agreement on Futenma in place, **this is a propitious time to pur- sue** an ambitious, future-looking agenda, one that gets **the alliance** fundamentals right **and expands U.S.-Japan security cooperation to meet the many challenges of the 21st century.**

JASA Good – AT: US-China Relations

**US forward deployment in Japan kills US-Sino relations**

**Xinbo 00** (Wu, professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, and the Vice-President, Shanghai Institute of American Studies, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs, Dec2000, Vol. 22 Issue 3, p. 479-498, http://www.irchina.org/en/xueren/china/wxb.asp) JPG

In the post-Cold War era, **Washington has been advocating an Asia-Pacific security structure**, **with the United States as the sole leader, and with U.S.-led bilateral alliances as its backbone**.[1] This is, in essence, the idea of hegemonic stability. **Beijing believes**, however, **that regional security rests on the co-operation of regional members** and a blend of various approaches deemed useful, such as unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, institutional and non-institutional, Track I and Track II, and not just on one country establishing a set of bilateral security alliances.[2] Unilateral Security vis-a-vis Mutual Security The United States currently possesses the most powerful armed forces in the world. However, it continues to invest heavily in its defence industries to develop even more sophisticated weapons systems, so as to keep its superiority in both conventional and strategic weaponry. At the same time, Washington has been endeavouring to develop both national missile defence (NMD) and theater missile defence (TMD) systems, protecting itself from possible attack by other countries. Once the United States has upgraded its offensive and defensive capabilities, its security would be much enhanced. However, this kind of **unilateral security would be at the expense of the security of other countries. The Chinese believe that security is always mutual**, and when one side tries to enhance its security, it has to take into account the impact on the security of others. In other words, while any country has the legitimate right to develop its defensive and offensive capabilities as it deems fit, **a responsible power should avoid seeking unilateral security, and instead promote mutual or common security**. **In this regard, Beijing has criticized the U.S.** effort to build NMD and TMD because these would undermine both regional and global strategic stability. Absolute Security vis-a-vis Relative Security In terms of capability, the United States is now the most secure country in the world. Any other country that initiates an attack on the United States would invite destructive retaliation from the formidable American war machine. Gauged in terms of a national security coefficient, the United States is now 99 per cent secure in dealing with external military threats. Yet, **Washington seems intent on seeking absolute, or 100 per cent securit**y by continuing to invest heavily in research and development (R&D) for both defensive and offensive weapon systems. Nevertheless, **if the United States were 100 per cent secure, then other countries would be 100 per cent insecure, and totally subject to threats** or coercion **by the former**. To avoid such a situation, **they would certainly react by developing their own means**, and this would very likely create a vicious cycle of arms build-up, wasting resources and, at some point, increasing tensions. **The Chinese**, on the other hand, **believe in relative** over absolute **security.** They would be more contented with preserving a reliable deterrence capability, both conventional and strategic, than with seeking 100 per cent security. As **Chinese security experts have contended, there is** simply **no such thing as absolute security**, and any effort geared in that direction is both irresponsible and futile. Military Security vis-a-vis Comprehensive Security In the post-Cold War era, with the decline of the likelihood of war between the major powers and the rise of non-traditional security challenges, military means have become less relevant in the national security equation. Nonetheless, **the United States remains heavily dependent upon military approaches, emphasizing the preservation of superior military power, strengthening security alliances, and maintaining forward-deployed military forces.** Ironically, the United States has used force even more frequently over the past decade than it did during the Cold War.[3] In contrast to the force-prone military security approach of the United States, **China has been advocating comprehensive security** since the end of the Cold War. In Beijing’s view, security can best be enhanced by improving political relations, expanding economic interactions and pursuing security co-operation, such as transparency, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and military-to-military relations. China believes that over-reliance on military approaches is not only unhelpful for resolving disputes, but also **runs counter to the prevailing trend of peace and development** in the post-Cold War security environment.[4] Alignment Security vis-a-vis Non-alignment Security During the Cold War era, the United States forged security alliances with many countries in the world to pursue strategic competition with the Soviet Union and to contain the communist countries. **With the end of the Cold War, Washington** expanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe and **reaffirmed its security alliance with Japan**. American policy-makers have continuously suggested that **security alliances, together with forward military deployments, remain the basis for U.S. security strategy** **in the Asia-Pacific**. **From a Chinese perspective, security alliances are relics of Cold War** and bloc **politics.** With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, there should be no reason to preserve, much less expand or strengthen, military blocs. **Beijing believes that security cannot be pursued either through an excessive military build-up or security alliances**. Military blocs, while enhancing the security of some countries, undermine that of others, causes suspicion and division, and even encourages confrontation among regional states. Therefore, China advocates the replacement of military blocs with regular state-to-state relations, and with a stress on improving and enhancing political and economic relations.[5] **The differences in security concepts between China and the United States arise from** a range of factors. One is **the difference in their respective world-views**. **Washington believes that this is a unipolar world**, with the United States as the lead power, and the idea of hegemonic stability is nothing but a corollary to this logic. **On the other hand, Beijing insists on the trend of multi-polarization** and rejects the idea of security under U.S. leadership. The second factor arises from the different situations confronting the United States and China today. The United States, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War world, feels less subject to external constraints on the use of force. With more resources than any other country in the world, it has the material means for seeking military superiority and absolute security. **China**, as a developing country, **would rather devote most of its limited resources to its economic development, valuing a peaceful international environment in which disputes between nations are managed by peaceful means**. <CONTINUED>

JASA Good – AT: US-China Relations

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A third factor relates to different historical experiences. The United States benefited from its alliance arrangements during the Cold War and seems to want to preserve these arrangements in the post-Cold War world. China, on the other hand, does not have good memories of its alliance with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the **U.S. alliance arrangements in Asia were** once directly or indirectly **aimed at China**, **and Beijing suspects** that, if necessary, **Washington would once again use them against China**. **Beijing has aired such concerns with regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance,** particularly its possible impact on the Taiwan issue. The last factor is the divergence in philosophical thinking about security between the United States and China. The Americans are basically technology determinists and believe in the power of technology. In their view, with technological progress, everything is possible**. The Chinese** are more dialectical in their thinking. They **believe nothing is absolute, and everything is relative and constantly changing**; if one side develops capable defensive or offensive weapons systems, then the other side will respond by developing its own means to nullify that capability.

\*\*Kan DA – Aff Answers

UQ – Kan Credibility Up

**The DPJ is popular now – Kan appointment**

**Sakamaki and Hirokawa 6/11** (Sachiko and Takashi, both writers for Bloomberg.com, Business Week, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-11/japan-s-ruling-party-vows-to-balance-budget-by-2020-slash-debt.html) JPG

Polls show **the DPJ’s popularity has jumped since Hatoyama**, 63, stepped down on June 2. Kan served as Hatoyama’s finance minister and deputy premier. **Kan’s government had an approval rating of 60 percent** in an Asahi newspaper survey published June 10, **compared with Hatoyama’s rating of 17 percent** in late May. Some **39 percent of respondents said they will vote for the DPJ in the next election, up from 33 percent in last week’s poll.** The June 8-9 telephone survey of 1,088 people didn’t provide a margin of error. Kan’s government plans to hold upper- house elections on July 11, media organizations including Kyodo News have reported.

UQ – Reforms Pass

**Sales tax increase is gaining credibility, but builds opposition**

**Nishikawa 6/21** (Yoko, reporter for Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTOE65K01D20100621

HOW DID IT PLAY OUT IN THE PAST?

[**Japan**](http://www.reuters.com/places/japan) **last raised the rate** to 5 percent from 3 percent **in 1997, a move that was followed by a sharp economic downturn and a big** election **defeat for the ruling party.**

**But people may now be more willing to tolerate a rise because of worries about creaky pension and health care systems and the spectre of a Greek debt tragedy.**

A poll by Yomiuri newspaper showed on Monday that **48 percent of voters supported Kan's remarks on possibly doubling the sales tax in the future**, against 44 percent who did not.

**Kan's gamble may be less risky than precedent suggests**. But voter support for his government, which had jumped right after he replaced Hatoyama, has slipped slightly with one public opinion survey showing an increase in opposition to the government among those who do not favour the sales tax hike.

No Vote Switching – 2AC

Opposition will hold strong

Kusimodo, Sumida and Weaver 6/18 (Hana, Chiyomi, and Teri, ALL reporters for Stars and Stripes, 6/18/10,

<http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa/futenma-fight-could-linger-despite-japan-s-new-prime-minister-1.107689>) JPG

**Japanese and U.S. leaders also are looking to see whether opposition dies down**.

Despite Kan’s cooler approach**, that seems unlikely**. Already this month, Okinawa’s capital city council adopted a resolution seeking a recall of the latest base agreement with the United States.

“**There is no expectation that the strong opposition will collapse**,” Maeda said.

**Hatoyama’s attempt to renegotiate awakened many in Okinawa** who for years had reluctantly accepted the U.S. bases in return for jobs and other economic development, according to Yoichi Iha, the mayor of Ginowan. **Those opponents are not ready to give up their new passion**.

“**They felt**, for the first time, because **there was a real possibility that bases might be removed** outside of the prefecture, they [could] change their position,” the mayor said at a press conference in Tokyo on Wednesday. “**You cannot change back the clock**.”

Others adamant about fighting the plan agree.

**“People will risk their lives**” to prevent construction of any new base on Okinawa, said Kiyomi Tsujimoto, a Social Democratic Party Diet member at a press conference in Tokyo last week.

No Link – Troops ≠ Key

**Troop presence doesn’t spill over to a national issue**

**Kusimodo, Sumida and Weaver 6/18** (Hana, Chiyomi, and Teri, ALL reporters for Stars and Stripes, 6/18/10,

<http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa/futenma-fight-could-linger-despite-japan-s-new-prime-minister-1.107689>) JPG

Still, **even staunch protesters against the new air station admit it will be hard to keep Okinawa’s issues in the national spotlight. “Mainland people’s interest is fading away**,” said Okinawan protester Sakae Toyama.Activists like Toyama hope a series of Okinawa elections, including the prefecture’s gubernatorial seat, will serve as referendums on the Futenma issue as the year wears on. A new governor could attempt to block construction that involves the public waterways; the plan, so far, proposes to build a new runway into the waters off Camp Schwab. Other trouble about the landfill runway looms: the Pentagon is appealing a 2008 federal court decision that says the military failed to study the environmental impacts of building the air strip out in the waters of Oura Bay. Most expect the debate about Futenma to remain primarily an Okinawa issue, for now. **“It is highly unlikely that Futenma will come back to a national political scene, at least for a time being,”** said Haruo Tohmatsu, a professor at the National Defense Academy in Japan. But he quickly added: **“Unless there is something earth-shattering occurs on Okinawa involving military bases.”U.S. military leaders may have the same mind-set**. Despite a two-year drop in off-base crimes among U.S. personnel, U.S. Marine commanders last week imposed a midnight to 5 a.m. curfew for troops on Okinawa. The new rule bans service members from being in bars, or other businesses whose main trade is alcohol, during the early morning hours.The curfew policy came out first thing in the morning June 11. By noon, newscasters in Tokyo were reporting it in their lunchtime reports.“Okinawa,” Tohmatsu said, “is like a time bomb.”

**Troops are on the backburner – economy will stay at the top of the docket**

**Loo 6/10** (Tze M., Asst. Prof of East Asian history @ Univ of Virgina @ Richmond, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/opinion/11iht-edloo.html) JPG

Hatoyama cast his resignation as taking responsibility for failure on the Futenma issue, but this too, looks likely to hurt the situation. **Since his resignation, Japanese media and popular attention to the Futenma issue has collapsed, and Okinawa’s base issue faces the very real risk of getting lost in the transition to the new government**. Indeed, the new prime minister, Naoto **Kan, has made the Japanese economy his primary focus.** Regarding Futenma, **he reaffirmed the government’s commitment to the May 28 agreement with the U.S. while promising** (vaguely) **to give attention to reducing Okinawa’s base burdens.** Kan did, however, mention at a press conference that he had recently started reading a book on Okinawa to deepen his understanding of its history. Let’s hope that his reading helps him understand the weight and complexity of the base issue, and that it gives him enough of a sense of history to see why he must not lose sight of it.

Link Turn – Focus

**US presence allows Japan to focus on fiscal reform as opposed to China and North Korea**

**Harris 6/20** (Tobias, Japan Analyst @ Int’l Affairs, PhD student @ MIT in Poli Sci, East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/20/the-third-way-has-belatedly-arrived-in-japan-with-prime-minister-kan/) JPG

Moreover, the Kan government’s overtures to the US can be overstated: even the formulation of support for the alliance voiced in Kan’s address last week was [more like](http://www.observingjapan.com/2008/05/new-fukuda-doctrine.html) former LDP Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo’s, in which the alliance is viewed largely in terms of its role in providing stability in Asia, than the vision of the alliance as resting on a foundation of shared values and dedicated to the promotion of democracy in the region. Like Fukuda, **Kan recognises that** stable, constructive **relations with Japan’s neighbors**, China most of all, **are essential, and that the US-Japan alliance is valuable insofar as it contributes to Japan’s Asia policy aims.** But in the Kan government’s unflinching support for last month’s agreement on Futenma, the new government is clearly interested in bolstering the US pillar of Japan’s foreign policy. What I wonder is whether **the DPJ’s renewed interest in the security relationship is a function of** its focus on **deficit reduction**. As the government looks to reduce spending, DPJ officials may increasingly be coming to the realisation that **austerity combined with regional uncertainty means** that for the foreseeable future **Japan will be dependent on US deterrent power**. While the new government is quietly hedging against the possibility that the US commitment to Asia might weaken through its focus on bilateral cooperation with regional powers and its growing acceptance of the need to loosen restrictions on arms exports (which would lower the cost of bolstering Japanese’s own conventional capabilities), **the DPJ clearly accepts that for the foreseeable future it will be necessary to maintain a constructive security partnership with the US**, even if the party continues to hope for an ‘equal’ partnership. It is open to debate whether austerity is leading the Kan government into a more enthusiastic embrace of the US (or even whether the embrace is more or less enthusiastic than the Hatoyama government’s or any LDP government’s for that matter). **The DPJ** may simply be free or cheap riding irrespective of concerns about austerity in the future. Or it **may sincerely believe** that **the status quo is** more or less **the best option for Japan when it comes to coping with** the rise of **China.** However, I think the proposal to relax the three arms-exporting principles is a sign that the DPJ is sensitive to the costs of defending Japan and, therefore, that while the alliance may provide the most cost-effective means of national defence (provided measures are introduced to lessen the domestic political costs of US bases on Japanese soil), the government should look for ways to reduce the costs of Japan’s providing its own defence in due time. In short, at home and abroad **the DPJ is performing balancing acts, pursuing multiple and at times conflicting goals that require flexibility** on the part of the government — precisely the reason why Ozawa and other politicians have called for a stronger Westminster-style executive over the past two decades. Whether the government will be up to these challenges even with reform remains to be seen.

Impact D – Japan Econ Resilient

**Japan wont collapse like Greece – our evidence is compartive**

**Financial Express 6/19** (FE Vol. 18 No. 171, 6/19/10, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?news\_id=103491&date=2010-06-19) JPG

The economy of Japan, the second largest in the world after the USA, is stagnant. This is an open secret. What is startling is that Japan's new Prime Minister, Naoto **Kan, fears Japanese economy is in danger of collapsing like that of Greece.** Only a week into his premiership, Kan gave this warning in his first policy statement in parliament on June 11. **Japan is burdened with the largest gross public debt-to-GDP ratio in the world at an unbelievable figure of 189 per cent**. In comparison, Greece's public debt is 115 per cent of its GDP. **The plight of Japan is not**, however, **as bad as that of Greece. Greece is heavily indebted to foreign banks while most of the Japanese public debt is domestically held** as the government bonds are purchased by domestic investors. Greece was on the brink of bankruptcy when its government was in no position to servicing foreign loans. **Japan will not face such a humiliation** until the time -- some time in the future -- when its greying population begin to retire and cash in their bonds and the number of domestic investors dwindles forcing the government to look for foreign sources for financing. Nevertheless, Japan needs to take measures to restore its financial health. International ratings agency Standard & Poor's downgraded Japan's sovereign debt rating in January on the ground that the country did not appear to have any plan to contain its debt.

Impact Turn – Econ Reform Good

**Economic Reform will balance the budget and increase foreign investment**

**Sakamaki and Hirokawa 6/11** (Sachiko and Takami, both writers for Bloomberg.com, Business Week, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-11/japan-s-ruling-party-vows-to-balance-budget-by-2020-slash-debt.html) JPG

June 11 (Bloomberg) -- **Japan’s ruling party pledged to balance the country’s budget by 2020** and address what Prime Minister Naoto Kan called an “unsustainable” dependency on public borrowing that threatened a crisis similar to the one that erupted in Greece.

“**We can see from the eurozone confusion that began in Greece that our finances can go bankrupt if we don’t address our rising public debt**,” Kan said today in his first policy address to Parliament. “It’s difficult to wipe out Japan’s massive debt overnight so we have to get working right away.”

**Kan called for cross-party cooperation** in tackling Japan’s fiscal burden a month before elections that will determine his government’s ability to pass legislation on its own. **Japan’s debt burden**, the world’s largest, **is approaching 200 percent of annual economic output**, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

“**The DPJ can change its irresponsible image as the public wants fiscal health and feels tax increases are inevitable**,” said Tsuneo Watanabe, senior fellow at the Tokyo Foundation, a think tank. “**This is** positive for the government as an election strategy and **effective in giving foreign investors hope for the future of Japan’s economy.”**

**Tax hikes are inevitable – they are critical to preventing an economic collapse**

**Martin 6/25** (Alex, staff writer for Japan Times, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100625f1.html) JPG

Despite misgivings in his own party, Prime Minister Naoto **Kan has pledged to raise the 5 percent consumption tax in** a few years **to fund snowballing social security costs and avoid a fiscal crisis like the one that engulfed Greece.**"We decided to break the ice and mention it in our manifesto," the Democratic Party of Japan leader said last week, calling for full debate on tax reform and crediting an opposition plan to double the sales tax to 10 percent. **Even when the dangers of ignoring fiscal reform are obvious, talk of raising taxes is a political taboo** **because the parties that attempt it usually get slapped** in subsequent elections. **But experts said Kan's bold move was backed by the DPJ's newfound popularity** since he took over from Yukio Hatoyama. **He is confident he can win voters over, given** national concern that **a fiscal meltdown could devastate the economy for years,** they said. "**Considering the nation's poor fiscal health, it's quite obvious that a tax hike will eventually be necessary**," said Satoru Matsubara, an economics professor at Toyo University. "So it was a question of finding the right timing," he said, adding that Kan's firsthand experience monitoring the economy as finance minister in the previous Cabinet lends a sense of urgency to the situation.That urgency may be justified. Kan has voiced frequent warnings about the nation's enormous public debt since Greece entered crisis earlier this year. **Now that the crisis has forced fiscal reform to spread through Europe, Kan said Tuesday he would stake his political career on the issue.** A consensus on a tax hike has emerged on both sides of the political divide. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party, the leading opposition party, said June 17 it would campaign on the need to double the consumption tax to 10 percent. The DPJ said it might use that figure as a reference point. Before Kan broached the issue, **a majority of voters appeared surprisingly supportive of raising taxes.** According to a June 8-9 Kyodo News survey, **60 percent of respondents backed a consumption tax hike while 40 percent opposed it. This may have emboldened Kan.**

Impact Turn – Econ Reform Good

**Japan risks economic collapse without Kan’s reforms – Greece proves**

**Mmegi Online 6/14** (Vol. 11 No. 22, http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=4&aid=2955&dir=2010/June/Monday14) JPG

Naoto Kan, in his first major speech since taking over, said **Japan needed a financial restructuring to avert a Greece-style crisis.**"**Our country's outstanding public debt is huge... our public finances have become the worst of any developed country**," he said.
After years of borrowing, **Japan's debt is twice its gross domestic product**. For 20 years, the government has been borrowing to spend, hoping to revive the stagnant economy, amassing the biggest debt-to-GDP ratio in the industrialised world. The Japanese themselves have been buying those bonds at low interest rates. But **as Japan ages**, the thinking goes, **households will save less**.
The Government will have to look abroad to borrow, and the higher interest rates demanded could tip the world's second biggest economy into the abyss. Now the new Prime Minister Naoto Kan has stepped into the debate in his first policy speech to the Diet, warning **Japan could face similar debt problems to Europe**.

But not everyone is convinced Japan, with its huge trade surplus, is doomed.

And Kan may simply be easing the way towards raising consumption tax and reneging on spending pledges made during last year's election.

"It is difficult to continue our fiscal policies by heavily relying on the issuance of government bonds," said Kan, Japan's former finance minister.

"Like the confusion in the eurozone triggered by Greece, **there is a risk of collapse if we leave the increase of the public debt untouched and then lose the trust of the bond markets**," he said.

Despite the prime minister's hair-raising words, markets did not bat an eyelid, with the Japanese yen, the Nikkei stock market index and Japanese government bonds unmoved.

**"Fiscal austerity measures are long overdue**," said Chris Scicluna, deputy head of economics at Daiwa Capital Markets in London.
He forecasts that the government's budget deficit will be 8% of GDP this year, a number that Kan has promised to reduce to zero by the end of the decade.

However, Scicluna said the government does not face any immediate fiscal crisis, unlike some European countries, and probably will not start tackling its budget deficit for at least another year or two. Unlike Greece or Spain, Japan is a net lender to the rest of the world, to the tune of 2.5% of its GDP last year.

The Japanese government is effectively the only borrower in Japan, and raises all of the money it needs from the savings of its own citizens. Some 95% of the government's debts are held by Japanese investors, and the government can currently borrow for 30 years at a mere 2% interest rate. But Scicluna says Japan does have serious medium-term problems related to its ageing population. As more and more Japanese citizens retire in the next few years, they are likely to start selling their government bonds to pay for their retirements. This means that **Japan will need to start borrowing from the rest of the world, and the government may have a hard time convincing foreign lenders to let it borrow** at such a low interest rate. Kan did not detail the fiscal changes he may impose to revive Japan's economy after years to stagnation. But in the past, Kan has advocated increasing Japan's sales tax, a move that would be unpopular.

He said: "It is unavoidable to launch a full reform of the tax system. If we maintain the current level of issuance of new bonds, **outstanding debt will surpass 200% of GDP** in a few years.

"It's been 20 years since the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s. **Because the Japanese economy had been in the doldrums, people have lost the trust they had and fear the uncertainty of the future,"** he said.

**Reform is key to public investment – investor confidence**

**Japan Today 6/2** (Staff, 6/2/10, http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/next-pm-tasked-with-putting-economy-on-growth-path-rebuilding-finances) JPG

On the heels of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s announcement to resign**, market attention is focused on if his successor can demonstrate leadership in laying out and implementing a credible growth strategy and fiscal discipline target** for the world’s second-largest economy.Economists say that **the immediate repercussions of** **his resignation** on the financial markets **are limited, as the Democratic Party of Japan**, **which has an outright majority** in the powerful House of Representatives, **will likely stay in office until the next general election**, which does not have to be held until 2013. But some are concerned that the development could delay the announcements scheduled for the end of this month of medium-term fiscal policies and growth strategies, while government officials are rushing to sooth such worries.‘‘**The administration should not have any intervals, so we will try to take steady action especially when the market is nervous**,’’ Parliamentary Secretary of Finance Hiroshi Ogushi said at the Finance Ministry on Wednesday afternoon.

Impact Turn – Econ Reform Good

**Kan’s reforms are key to the economy but cant do it without cooperation**

**JapanToday 6/3** (Kyodo News,

http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/next-pm-tasked-with-putting-economy-on-growth-path-rebuilding-finances) JPG

**Kan**, a former DPJ chief who took up the current post to replace Hirohisa Fujii in January, **has been leaning toward more fiscal responsibility and tax increases** amid lingering concerns over the debt debacle in the eurozone economy. **Markets are expected to welcome his basic stance**, but there are a dearth of materials to determine if **Kan is fully capable of putting the economy on a stable growth path and rebuilding state finances at a time when Japan’s public debt to GDP ratio is almost 200%.** Kyohei Morita, chief economist at Barclays Capital Japan Ltd, said that national policy minister Yoshito **Sengoku**, **who** also **prioritizes fiscal health, could be tapped for a key post in the new cabinet**, which is expected to be launched Monday. **But the fiscal issue could be a headache for the cabinet as the issue of a U.S. Marine base troubled the Hatoyama government, which led the Social Democratic Party to break away from the DPJ,** if the DPJ fails to find a consensus on the direction of fiscal consolidation with the People’s New Party, another coalition partner led by Shizuka Kamei who seeks massive fiscal stimulus, he said. Since the closely watched House of Councillors election is drawing near, however, the DPJ may become cautious about setting any clear targets for a tax hike especially when the party struggles with critically low support ratings. Hideo Kumano, chief economist at the Dai-ichi Life Research Institute, warned, however, that **if the DPJ puts off the schedule for a sales tax increase, that could give ‘‘an extremely bad impression’’ to the global market** which has been sensitive to sovereign risks since Greece’s debt crisis. Market eyes are also watching to see if the DPJ moves to tie up with other parties after the upper house election in July, in which the DPJ seems unlikely to rack up a majority of the 121 seats up for grabs.**The** 12-year-old **DPJ**, which won a landslide victory in last year’s general election, **still needs cooperation** from other parties in the upper chamber **to ensure smooth passage of legislation**.

\*\*Karzai DA – Aff Answers

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai credibility gone- pro-American activities destroyed his Pashtun base

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

 Hamid Karzai is walking on a tight rope. Ever grateful to Washington for getting the prized post of president of Afghanistan , he has been pursuing American dictates faithfully. He agreed to give all the major portfolios to non-Pashtun Northern Alliance members in his government and to sideline his own Pashtun community enjoying distinct majority. He allowed Indian influence to expand in his country on American insistence and let Afghan soil to be used for subversive activities against Pakistan . Mossad was also allowed a firm toehold in Afghanistan . On the prompting of his mentors he has all along maintained a hostile stance towards Pakistan . By following pro-American policies he became highly unpopular in his country.

 To make himself useful, he fed an idea to Washington that given the resources and backing, he would be able to win over majority of Taliban leaders through bribes and incentives and would affect an in-house coup within Taliban ranks after isolating Mullah Omar led hardliners. Once he was given a green signal in 2007, he began to establish contacts with former and current members of Taliban Shura and other resistance groups. By 2009 he was able to make good gains among former Taliban ministers, Hizb-e-Islami and others. Among present Shura, Mullah Ghani Baradar was his big catch. He had made secret contacts with him through his half brother Ahmad Wali Karzai but didn’t disclose this breakthrough to USA . His efforts got stalled because of unexpected successes achieved by Taliban against coalition forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan from June to September 2009 putting ISAF on the back foot.

US- Karzai relations dead and credibility gone- elections, mandates

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

The US leaders began to have second thoughts about Karzai when situation in Afghanistan began to slip out of their hands. He failed to muster requisite votes in August 2009 presidential election. Although he managed to get re-elected in November because of rigging he further lost his credibility. He however felt convinced that it was America ’s doing to weaken his political standing. He was warned by Obama to improve governance, get rid of corruption in various departments and to improve his standing among Pashtuns in particular and Afghans in general so as to become a bridge between Americans and Pashtuns. These unfriendly acts gave second thoughts to Karzai about US sincerity as well.

Karzai credibility gone- corruption

McManus 6/17 [Doyle, Staff Writer, Los Angeles Times, 2010, Lexis] KLS

The news from Afghanistan has been bad lately. The military campaign to win control of Kandahar, the country's second-largest city, has slowed to a crawl. Taliban insurgents have filtered back into parts of southern Afghanistan that U.S. Marines had cleared in the spring. President Hamid Karzai, the erratic leader of Afghanistan's civilian government, has given only halfhearted support to the U.S.-led military effort -- and has done little to clean up the corruption that undermines public support for his regime

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai’s credibility lost- distant, erratic, unfocused

King 6/7 [Laura, Staff Writer, 2010, Los Angeles Times, Pg 1, Lexis] KLS

But other analysts regard the president's behavior as erratic, and they attribute it to various factors: Karzai's isolation in his presidential palace, his over-dependence on an insular clique of advisors, a tendency toward emotionalism that is exacerbated by stress and weariness. "Some of those in the [presidential] palace try to keep him happy with the wrong analysis, the wrong information," said lawmaker Shukria Barakzai. "And there is the problem of micromanagement, of not enough thinking of the country's broader interests." Observing Karzai at close range, some see years of pent-up frustration bursting forth. "He was very unhappy and very, very angry," said lawmaker Daoud Sultanzoy, recounting Saturday's stormy meeting with parliament members. Parliament's lower house had sought to curtail Karzai's power to pick the overseers of parliamentary elections scheduled to take place this year, and the president reacted with fury. Some senior Western diplomats in Kabul are sanguine about Karzai's heated language, calling it an effort to blow off steam and create a bulwark against criticism from opponents if he accedes to the wishes of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization on some points. There are ample opportunities for Karzai to disassociate himself from specific Western actions, such as military actions that cause civilian casualties, while not challenging overarching policy goals. NATO said Tuesday that four civilians had died in an airstrike in southern Afghanistan. Separately, it said it was investigating the deaths of a child and three other apparent civilians during fighting with insurgents in the east. Also this week, NATO acknowledged responsibility for the February deaths of five civilians in Paktia province, including a teenage girl and two pregnant women. But even if Karzai can rally public support on issues such as civilian casualties, many observers see him as essentially adrift in his leadership role. "He has never had a real agenda; he just reacts to events," said Aziz Rafiee, the director of the Afghan Civil Society Forum, a pro-democracy group. "There is no long-term vision for the country."

Massive public support for Taliban, Karzai hated

Duff 6/22 [Gordon, UN Diplomat, Defense Specialist, Senior Editor, 2010, Veteran’s Today http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/22/gordon-duff-mid-east-sitrep-time-to-walk-away-and-clean-our-own-house/] KLS

Do we actually call what we are doing in Afghanistan a war?  Recent estimates are that 88% of the people support what we call “the enemy.”  The German’s were much more popular than us during their occupation of France during World War 2.  What does that say about our friends?  Even Petain and Laval, the French Vichy traitors, had more public support that Karzai has in Afghanistan. There is some indication that Afghanistan would rather have us change sides, fight Karzai, our Indo-Israeli puppet, and let us leave, believing we had won.  What have we accomplished?  We have created the greatest narcotics empire in the history of the world, recruited tens of thousands to fight against us and have bankrupted, not only ourselves but fragile Pakistan, whose flirtation with democracy is being smothered.  We could have simply attacked ourselves and cut out the middle man, unless, of course, the plan was for things to end up exactly as they are right now.

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai’s credibility gone- corruption, dirty brother, 8 year lame duck prove

Murphy 6/24 [Dan, Staff Writer, 2010, Christian Science Monitor, Lexis] KLS

Petraeus will be saddled with a strategic partner - the administration of President Hamid Karzai - that is increasingly unpopular and at times seems out of touch. The election that brought Karzai to power was badly marred by fraud. After the "clear" phase in Marjah, where the Taliban were partly able to take power because of the predations of corrupt central government officials and local warlords, the government McChrystal sought to install has yet to take root. In Kandahar, the next major push for the international effort, Mr. Karzai's half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, is one of the local warlords and has grown wealthy since the war began. Locals have accused him of seizing land by force and being involved in smuggling. Many Afghans say he's involved in the opium trade, a charge he has denied. "In eight years [President Karzai] hasn't been able to bring democratic, accountable government so I don't know why anyone would think he will now," says Rahman Oghli, a member of parliament from the northern Faryub Province and an opponent of the government. "The people in government and around Karzai have been lining their pockets and the people know this." In a leaked diplomatic cable last year, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, said Karzai was an ineffective partner that called into question the ability to carry out COIN successfully.

Karzai ineffective, corrupt, lacks credibility- no risk of an impact

Robinson 6/18 [Eugene, Staff Writer, The Washington Post, Lexis] KLS

Which he has not done. Karzai, who seems not to have gotten the memo on how a U.S. puppet should behave, alternates between grudging cooperation and petulant defiance. Most alarming is that Karzai is effectively sabotaging the effort to win hearts and minds in Kandahar, the heartland of the Taliban insurgency, by leaving the local power structure in the hands of his thuggish and corrupt half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai. In Washington, the hawkish interpretation of events is that the timeline itself is now the problem -- that, in the words of Sen. John McCain, it tells "the key actors inside and outside of Afghanistan that the United States is more interested in leaving than succeeding in this conflict." This sounds like a reasonable argument until you think about it. Karzai, the Taliban, the warlords and the Afghan public already know that U.S. and NATO forces will leave someday. The only way to make them think otherwise would be to announce that we intend to stay forever -- and clearly that's not the case. From the Afghan point of view, it doesn't make much difference whether the interlopers depart in one year or in five. It might make a difference, of course, if there were an honest, capable Afghan government that could use more time to build its capacity and earn the people's trust. Everyone knows, however, that such a government does not exist.

Afghans and the international community have lost faith in Karzai

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

When he dared to accuse his allies of eight years, including UN, EU and U.S. representatives, of "massive fraud" to undermine him, Karzai crossed the Rubicon to become seriously unreliable in the eyes of those who have spent more than $200 billion of taxpayers money and lost more than 1,700 soldiers supporting him. Fourth, he is therefore now much more a problem than a solution; this includes his brother. Fifth, he has become a 'loose cannon' in the fight for freedom in Afghanistan. He is now another risk factor, as seen in his infamous Kandahar speech to tribal elders, where he spoke of appeasement to them and challenged the long-planned offensive against the Taliban by both his own troops and ISAF. It is hard to manage too many risks concurrently, and makes failure of both the latest offensive and ISAF itself more likely.

Karzai Cred Low – 2AC

Karzai lacks credibility- corruption, poppy production

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Seven, only two ministers were not corrupt in Karzai's previous government. Corruption remains endemic, as does poppy production, and the quality of his rule is low indeed. The West was naïve to hand over billions of dollars of aid without direct control. When the German Minister for Development met him two weeks ago, Karzai asked once more for free money - he will not change his demands.

Karzai’s credibility shot- loss of Pashtun community

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Nine, his reputation in Pakistan is near zero and remains very low even within the Pashtun community that is the backbone of the insurgency. He never stopped hating Pakistan.Yet peace without both Pakistan and a consensus with the Pashtuns, peace-making is impossible for NATO.

Karzai Collapse Inevitable

Karzai collapse inevitable

Coghlan 6/22 [Tom, Staff Writer, 2010, The Times, Lexis] KLS

In October 2008, while Ambassador in Kabul, he was alleged to have told a diplomat:"The foreign forces are ensuring the survival of a regime which would collapse without them... They are slowing down and complicating an eventual exit from the crisis, which will probably be dramatic." According to the account, which was denied by the Foreign Office, he said that only "an acceptable dictator" would bring order to the country and that public opinion should be primed for this.

Reunification No Pass – 2AC

No chance of Reconciliation- Karzai’s credibility shot, Taliban ideologically opposed

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Afghanistan needs a fresh, unconsumed and credible president. It needs good leadership, not someone jumpy and nervous at the top. Second, Karzai's hopes for a personal reconciliation with the Taliban are naive. There is unfortunately no chance at all for this. Hardcore Taliban will hate him forever; they have tried to kill him several times, and will continue trying. Third, his brutal manipulation of the 2009 elections was not a sin so much as an act of incompetence and hunger for power. It destroyed his credibility - or what remained of it - primarily in the eyes of his own people.

Reconciliation wont be implemented- Taliban won’t negotiate

Massoud 6/5 [Waheedullah, Staff Writer, 2010, Agency French Press, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iBld6N8Da\_\_f8T64xeZuVSNQ\_EJQ] KLS

Leaders of the Taliban insurgency have said they will negotiate with the Afghan government only after foreign forces have left the country and the Afghan constitution has been amended. "I do not think the decisions made at the jirga will convince the opposition to come and join the peace process," said another political analyst and commentator, Waheed Mujda. "Most of the points in the declaration were a repetition of what has been said over the past years... the decisions made means that the Taliban must come and surrender and I don't think the Taliban will accept this," he said.

Reconciliation won’t pass- no faith in Karzai

ICG 5/12 [International Crisis Group, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190-a-force-in-fragments-reconstituting-the-afghan-national-army.aspx]

Where the Afghan government might once have had limited potential to be a legitimate guarantor of a broad negotiated peace, the Karzai regime’s unrestrained pursuit of power and wealth has bankrupted its credibility. Under these conditions, reconciliation and reintegration, as currently conceived by Kabul and the U.S.-led coalition, does not represent a route to a permanent peaceful settlement of the conflict. Nor is it an exit strategy. Rather, it is an invitation for the country to descend further into the turmoil that led the Taliban to give succour to al-Qaeda and other violent extremists in the first place. The current debate on reconciliation with the Taliban also threatens to widen factionalism within the army.

Reconciliation won’t be implemented- Obama opposed

Porter 5/14 [Gareth, Editor in Chief Global Geopolitics & Political Economy, Global Politics http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/05/14/obama-karzai-still-split-on-peace-talks-with-taliban/] KLS

WASHINGTON, May 13 (IPS) – U.S. President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai sought to portray a united front on the issue of a political settlement with the Taliban in their joint press conference Wednesday. But their comments underlined the deep rift that divides Karzai and the United States over the issue. Karzai obtained Obama’s approval for the peace jirga scheduled for later this month – an event the Obama administration had earlier regarded with grave doubt because of Karzai’s ostensible invitation to the Taliban to participate. On the broader question of reconciliation, however, Obama was clearly warning Karzai not to pursue direct talks with the Taliban leadership, at least until well into 2011.

Reunification No Pass – 2AC

Obama deeply opposed to Reconciliation- it’s a no go

Porter 5/14 [Gareth, Editor in Chief Global Geopolitics & Political Economy, Global Politics http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/05/14/obama-karzai-still-split-on-peace-talks-with-taliban/] KLS

An administration official who is familiar with the Obama-Karzai meeting confirmed to IPS Thursday that the differences between the two over the issue of peace talks remained, but that the administration regards it as positive that Karzai was at least consulting with Obama on his thinking. Before the Karzai-Obama meeting, the official said, ”A lot of people were jumping to the conclusion that [Karzai and the Taliban] are talking about deals. Now he is talking to us before making any back room deals.” The official indicated that the Obama administration is not open to the suggestion embraced by Karzai that reconciliation might be pursued with some of the Taliban leadership. ”We’d have a lot of problems with someone saying ‘these Taliban are acceptable, but these people aren’t',” the official told IPS.

Link UQ – 2AC

No link- Troop withdrawal going to happen already

McManus 6/17 [Doyle, Staff Writer, Los Angeles Times, 2010, Lexis] KLS

Yet when Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. military commander in Kabul, delivered an assessment of the state of the war last week, he said -- very cautiously -- that he is succeeding at his initial goal: interrupting the Taliban's momentum. "We see progress everywhere, but it's incomplete," McChrystal said. "It is slow, but it's positive." In McChrystal's words lies the central dilemma President Obama will face later this year, when he reviews his policy in Afghanistan: The war isn't being lost anymore -- but it isn't being won yet, either.When Obama agreed to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, he imposed an American timetable on the war. He gave his generals a year to show results, saying he'd review the situation in December 2010. He also set a target date of July 2011 for starting to draw down U.S. troops.

Mitigated link- military support decreasing in the squo

Siddiqui 9 [Haroon, Staff Writer, February 12, Toronto Star, Lexis] KLS

A fundamental shift is underway in American policy on Afghanistan. And Canada should be scrambling to be part of the process. If we don't, Barack Obama will be handing us, and all the NATO members in the Afghan mission, a fait accompli in about two months. We saw what he did Monday at his first presidential press conference. He greased the skids under Hamid Karzai. And he committed the U.S. to a broad military, diplomatic and development strategy in a "regional approach," with Pakistan as "a stalwart ally." That was only a hint of what's happening behind the scenes in Washington and publicly in Asia, where Obama's special envoy Richard Holbrooke is on the road. The Harper government seems clued out. There was a touch of naivete when Admiral Mike Mullen, chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, came calling Tuesday. Ottawa's reaction was: Whoopee! He didn't ask for our military commitment beyond February 2011. In fact, the U.S. has not only given up on the allies contributing more troops, it has decided to fight the Taliban with an overwhelmingly American force rather than co-ordinate the NATO forces.

Link D – Plan not Key

Kandahar operation key to stopping insurgency and winning the war- last chance

DeYoung 5/23 [Karen, Staff Writer, 2010, The Washington Post, Lexis]

The Obama administration's campaign to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan's second-largest city is a go-for-broke move that even its authors are unsure will succeed. The bet is that the Kandahar operation, backed by thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars, will break the mystique and morale of the insurgents, turn the tide of the war and validate the administration's Afghanistan strategy. There is no Plan B.

Link Turn – 2AC\*\*

Plan is the only way to restore Karzai’s political capital and pass Reconciliation and Reintegration program

BBC 6/7 [BBC Asian Monitoring, 2010, Lexis] KLS

Afghanistan's Jirga for Reconciliation and Reintegration overwhelmingly supported Afghan President Hamid Karzai's plan to negotiate with Taliban. The Jirga went smoothly with minor incident of the Taliban's attack on the first day of the meeting. However, it was a tactical failure and did not succeed to disrupt the conference in any way. There were 1600 members with 200 foreign dignitaries. The Jirga was part of President Karzai's efforts to broadly shape public opinion in Afghanistan and the region for getting a mandate to engage with the Taliban. Afghan President has firm eyes on the post-US Afghanistan. Karzai is trying to bring an end to insurgency. The Jirga aimed at three layers of the Taliban. The first is the foot soldiers whom the President wants to "peel away" from the insurgents by providing more economic opportunities and incentives. The Jirga proposed an amnesty for these Taliban and promised help if they turned over their weapons. Because of poor economic conditions, there are a lot unemployed youth who have joined hands with the Taliban for good pay, food and clothing. The Jirga sent a message to the second layer of Taliban by saying they be involved in any peace negotiations: this group comprise the famous Taliban commanders like Jalaluddin Haqqani with whom Pakistan might have an influence. Here the US has accepted Islamabad's role to help distinguish between the reconcilable and the irreconcilable Taliban given Pakistan decades long relations and hobnobbing with Afghan militants who could potentially act as proxy for Islamabad in extending its influence in Afghanistan. The third category is the Taliban's top leadership layer led by Mullah Mohammad Umar. His role is important: we do not know to what extent he is under the influence of al-Qaeda. Though some senior level Taliban who are not fighting now had indicated that Mullah Mohammad Umar may not be on the same page as as al-Qaeda is when it comes to launching transnational attacks. The Jirga was aiming at this layer when it demanded of President Karzai to announce a timetable for the US withdrawal. The Jirga demanded immediate talks with high level senior Taliban. Earlier, the US was opposed to any such move but in February the US Central Command Gen David Petraeus for the first time indicated the US would be willing to deal with senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Umar. So the Jirga's proposal is a kind of support for both Mr Karzai's and the US position. Another proposal was removal of senior Taliban insurgents from the US and UN blacklists. The senior Taliban leaders, including its ex-foreign minister Abdul Wakeel Mutawakel cannot travel internationally because of travel restrictions by the UN and the US. It was part of UN sanctions on Taliban regime imposed in the wake of 9/11 attacks. The Jirga also demanded a time table for handing important military installations, including Bagram air base. If the US starts to withdraw from Afghanistan, part of first symbolic gestures will be handing over of these bases to Afghan hands. Hence the Jirga wanted to know when these measures are going to be announced. All these proposals were aimed at the Taliban. The Jirga for the first time recognised Taliban as opposition group that needed to be co-opted in the post-US Afghanistan. However, Jirga did not touch upon the US's big demand that Taliban part ways with al-Qaeda. But we already know that senior Taliban in the past intimated that they would be willing to confine themselves within the territories of Afghanistan if the US was prepared to leave the country. Hence, there might already be a tentative understanding reached. But there were critics of the Jirga as well. The ex-presidential candidate Dr Abdullah Abdullah rejected the Jirga. However, he could not disagree more with the outcome of the Jirga so as General Rashid Dostum who had also opposed the holding of the Jirga. The Jirga, however, boosted the hands of President Karzai. Although the Jirga's decisions are not binding but it was a referendum for Karzai to have a political capital to engage w ith the Taliban and a support for the United States to be part of any high level negotiations with them. The Jirga offered maximum concessions to the Taliban. And it is highly likely that the Taliban would view the Jirga in a positive light. For the first time the Jirga set bench marks for the US to create conducive conditions in line with its drawdown time table. Afghanistan's neighbouring countries, including Pakistan, would have closely followed the developments as Jirga's proposals sign posted the way ahead in diffusing the Taliban insurgency. By holding this Jirga, Karzai has set off a momentum for a process that may end up seeing Taliban joining a broadbased set up in Afghanistan.

Link Turn – 2AC\*\*

American withdrawal key to reconciliation

Rasgotra 6/11 [ Maharajakrishna, president, ORF Centre for International Relations, Hindu News http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm] KLS

The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan is inevitable; the sooner it comes, the better for all concerned. An honourable way of achieving it with peace and stability in Afghanistan is still available. President Obama should convene a conference in Kabul, attended by heads of state or government of all countries sharing borders with Afghanistan, as well as China, India, Russia, Britain, France and the U.N. Secretary General. The conference should give credible guarantees for Afghanistan's integrity, independence and sovereignty, and for immunity against interference or intervention by any of its neighbours and, indeed, any other power. The result should be formally endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, which should also station in Afghanistan an adequate peace-keeping force for a sufficient period to allow the Afghan Army and police to assume full responsibility for internal and external security. The conference should then convert itself into a consortium for aiding Afghanistan's rapid economic development over 10-15 years.

Link Turn – Cred

US troops reaffirm Karzai as a puppet President

DeYoung 5/23 [Karen, Staff Writer, 2010, The Washington Post, Lexis]

Shaping" operations for the offensive began late last winter as Special Operations forces began killing or capturing insurgent leaders. The Taliban has also begun an assassination campaign against people working for foreigners or the Afghan government. U.S. civilian officials are simultaneously trying to wrest control from local power brokers and to correct imbalances that favor one tribal group. They plan to set up 10 administrative districts, each with a representative council and money to spend. Success has been only vaguely defined, and progress will be monitored through what the military calls "atmospherics reporting," including public opinion polls and levels of commerce in the streets. A senior military official said the central question, which the administration will pose and answer for itself, is: "Are we moving toward a solution in Kandahar that the people support?" Public descriptions of the balance between the offensive's military and civilian aspects have fluctuated in response to Afghan sensibilities in a region that is arguably more hostile to foreign intervention and the government in Kabul than to the Taliban. Senior U.S. military officials briefing American reporters in Kabul early last month described extensive "clearing operations" planned in the outlying Kandahar districts of Zhari, Argandab and Panjwai, where the Taliban is entrenched. But Afghan President Hamid Karzai said last week that military force would be used only "if and when and where needed . . . in consultation with the community." Although the administration has pledged to consult with Karzai every step of the way, and Karzai with Kandaharis, it remains unclear whether consultation equals a veto. "It's not a military operation in the normal sense of the word," an administration official said. "Maybe they just should have done it," and not talked about it first, "but you couldn't . . . bring so many troops in" without an explanation, he said, referring to the 10,000 additional U.S. troops that have begun to flow into the Kandahar area. The name of the offensive -- Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, or Cooperation for Kandahar -- was carefully chosen to avoid the word "operation," which suggests violence. The administration official described it benignly as a "military presence" and Karzai has defined it as a "process." Last week, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, called the offensive "a unique challenge."

US presence cripples governmental credibility, harboring ill will

Constable 9 [Pamela, Washington Post Foreign Service, October 4, Christian Science Monitor, Lexis] KLS

A melon vendor named Turan Amoor complained that as Western influence has grown in Afghanistan, "we have begun to see the open faces of women in the bazaars and a lot of un-Muslim activities." "This shows that the foreign troops are a bad influence," Amoor said. "If we get a better government, maybe things will settle down. Otherwise, one day we will go for jihad against the foreigners, and they will leave as they came." Shomali has not been a focus of insurgent attacks, in part because it is home to the vast U.S. military base at Bagram Airfield. Yet even though the base has provided protection, jobs and funding for community projects, such efforts have failed to create much goodwill among local Afghans. Meanwhile, reports of civilian casualties and allegations of abuses by foreign troops seem to be instantly believed. Many people here associate the international forces with Karzai's government, which has increasingly lost credibility because of corruption, poor performance and the latest charges of electoral fraud. During his Western-backed tenure, they have seen aid money vanish, drug traffic flourish and security worsen. Now they worry that the next five years will bring more of the same.

Link Turn – Cred

**Troop presence hurts Karzai’s credibility- growing anti- American sentiment**

Landay 9 [Johnathon S. Staff Writer, November 2, McClathy NewsPaper, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/11/02/78214/exclusive-us-drafts-afghan-compact.html]

As long as the population views its government as weak or predatory, the Taliban's 'alternative' style of delivering security and some form of justice will continue to have traction," says a U.S. government document that outlines part of the proposed Compact and was obtained by McClatchy. "We would have to see some really concrete actions on the part of Karzai to be able to take this seriously," said Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department intelligence analyst, now at the Middle East Institute. "It looks great on paper." Bolstering the credibility of Karzai's government is essential to the Obama administration's efforts to curb the worsening Taliban-led insurgency amid growing casualties and shrinking public support for a war that entered its ninth year last month. The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has requested as many as 80,000 additional U.S. troops as part of an ambitious counter-insurgency plan to strengthen the Afghan government and expand its security forces. "Increasing our military footprint will exacerbate the perception among Afghans that the U.S. intends to occupy their country in support of a government many see as illegitimate," said Sen. Russ Feingold,

Link Turn – DEA

US involvement in counter opium production decreases the legitimacy of the Afghan government

Feickert 6 [Andrew, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, December 11, CRS Report for Congress http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33503.pdf] KLS

Counternarcotics Operations The current U.S. military policy on counternarcotics operations and NATO’s mandate for participating in counternarcotics operations may come under congressional scrutiny. While “burning poppy fields” and conducting combat operations on narcotics-related facilities might be too extreme a course of action for U.S. and NATO troops, a more active role short of direct action might have an impact on insurgent activities. According to one report, while the solution to the illegal opium problem requires an interdisciplinary approach due to the central role opium production plays in Afghanistan’s economy, NATO [and U.S. forces] should play a greater role “in targeting drug laboratories, opium stockpiles, and trafficking routes” as this would “not only help Afghan counternarcotics efforts but also curtails the flow of drugs to Europe, which gets 90 percent of its heroin from Afghanistan.”73 Opponents of a more active U.S. and NATO counternarcotics role could argue that these efforts would shift resources and focus away from helping to stabilize the security situation, which could undermine the credibility of the Afghan central government.

Link Turn – Parliament

Plan increases Karzai’s credibility- appeases parliament

Siddiqi 4/29 [Shahid R, Staff Writer, 2010, Foreign Policy Journal, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/04/29/is-karzai-heading-for-the-end-game/] KLS

Looking beyond the American withdrawal, Karzai, like many other collaborators, must begin to move to the center, distancing himself from the U.S. to improve his acceptability among Afghans opposed to American occupation. To survive in the treacherous political environment of Afghanistan, he must have a supportive new parliament and neutralize the threat from Taliban groups led by Mullah Omar. This explains his desperation to control the Election Commission and lead the reconciliation effort.

Link Turn – Pashtun Module

A. Pashtuns control Karzais legitimacy- dominate party

Trefzger 6/11 [Henderson, Wake Forest University, 2010, http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/blog/case-karzai] KLS

The fact is that the sectarian environment in Afghanistan makes it impossible for any viable contender to emerge and compete against Karzai. Since he is a member of the country’s majority ethnic group, the Pashtuns, Karzai has been able to obtain significant electoral support and strike pragmatic alliances with a large part of the Afghan electorate. This creates a situation in which, despite decreasing public support for him recent years, Karzai will never lose the support of the majority Pashtun community to a competitor or a minority candidate. According to a February 12th 2009 article of the *Economist*, Karzai has maintained high approval ratings with the vital Pashtun tribes of southern and eastern Afghanistan. As long as this president can maintain this credibility in the Pashtun tribes, no other Pashtun will run against him and no other ethnic minority candidate will be able to unseat him.

B. Withdrawal appeases pashtuns

UNHCR 3 [December 31, UN Refugee Agency http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MARP,,AFG,4562d8cf2,469f3a5112,0.html ] KLS

Pashtuns have a high risk for continued rebellion. They are geographically concentrated, have multiple militant organizations with standing militias, and do not feel they are adequately represented in the current government. Furthermore, the Afghan government remains weak and unable to exert control over extensive areas of territory. Pashtuns also resent the continued presence of U.S. military personnel in the country.

Link Turn – Public

Public opposition to troop presence- Taliban sympathy

Barnes 4/29 [Julia, Staff Writer, Los Angeles Times, Lexis] KLS

The next phase of U.S. strategy is expected to begin in the coming weeks, as U.S. and Afghan forces step up operations around the city of Kandahar, the spiritual capital of the Taliban movement. The new report offers a grim take on the likely difficulty of establishing lasting security, especially in southern Afghanistan, where the insurgency enjoys broad support. The conclusions raise the prospect that the insurgency in the south may never be completely vanquished, but instead must be contained to prevent it from threatening the government of President Hamid Karzai. The report concludes that Afghan people support or are sympathetic to the insurgency in 92 of 121 districts identified by the U.S. military as key terrain for stabilizing the country. Popular support for Karzai's government is strong in only 29 of those districts, it concludes.

Appeasement to the West promotes hatred of Karzai

Toronto Star 4/6 [Pg A16, Lexis] KLS

In a claim that defies belief, Karzai blamed the United Nations and other "foreigners" last week for conspiring against him in last year's tainted election. That's absurd, if only because the ballot-stuffing mostly favoured him. He sounded frankly delusional. He also warned that Canadian troops and others who risk their lives to support his government are walking a fine line between "invasion and co-operation," and that the Taliban gains respect as "a national resistance" if they misstep. He even went so far as to threaten to "join the Taliban" if the Afghan parliament refuses to strengthen his authority over elections, and if he comes under more foreign pressure. That sounded both delusionary and erratic. Finally, he promised tribal leaders in Kandahar that a military campaign against the Taliban this summer won't go ahead "until you are happy." That just sounded improbable. It's no coincidence that Karzai's sudden bravado comes on the heels of U.S. President Barack Obama's trip to Kabul 10 days ago. Far from being a moment for Karzai to bask in reflected glory, it was a humiliation. Obama told Karzai that he must provide better, cleaner, more lawful rule, and get more insurgents to give up the fight. Now Karzai is pushing back in a bid to recover domestic credibility and insulate himself from criticism over the Kandahar campaign. He wants Afghans to believe that he was elected "despite foreign opposition and therefore enjoys full legitimacy," as the Afghan newspaper Hasht-e Sobh put it. Fair enough. But this is a short-sighted strategy. Making the UN and coalition the enemy and legitimizing the Taliban will confuse Afghans, embolden the insurgents, and erode fragile foreign support. That doesn't bode well as Karzai prepares to convene a loya jirga, or major council, to discuss the nation's future.

Link Turn – Withdrawal

US troops decrease Karzai’s waning credibility

Rubin and Filkinsn 6/25 [Alissa, Dexter, Staff Writers, 2010, Inernatioanl Herald Tribune, Lexis]

But Afghanistan is a very different war in a very different country. Where Iraq is an urban, oil-rich country with an educated middle class, Afghanistan is a shattered state whose social fabric and physical infrastructure have been ruined by three decades of war. In Iraq, the insurgency was in the cities; here, it is spread across the mountains and deserts of the country's forbidding countryside. Indeed, to prevail in Afghanistan, General Petraeus will need all of his skills - and a dose of good fortune at least as big as the one he received in Iraq. At the moment, every aspect of the war in Afghanistan is going badly: The military's campaign in the strategic city of Kandahar has met with widespread resistance from the Afghan public; President Hamid Karzai is proving erratic and unpredictable; and the Taliban are resisting more tenaciously than ever.

Withdrawal plans inspire Karzai to improve his political standing

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

Once Obama announced withdrawal timeline of July 2011 and stuck to it despite strong opposition from Karzai , India and Israel , he realized that the US would again leave Afghanistan in a lurch and his fate will not be different to Babrak Karmal or Dr Najibullah. He also assessed that US-Nato had lost the will and was not in a position to defeat Taliban movement.  It was in the backdrop of these lurking fears that he hurtled some anti-US and pro-Taliban statements to win the confidence of latter. He also tried hard to allay the heart burnings of Pakistan by making series of friendly statements. While throwing feelers of goodwill towards Taliban and Pakistan , he is still not ready to lose the goodwill of USA and India since the situation at the moment is highly fluid. While he has smelt that USA has lost the war, coming six months are crucial. In this period, it will be decided which side the balance tilts.

Link Turn – US Relations

End of relations increases Karzai’s credibility- appeases Taliban

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

Arrest of Baradar, deputy of Mullah Omar, by Pak security forces in January at the pointing of CIA was a setback for him since Baradar’s participation in loya jirga scheduled at Kabul in April would have made a huge difference. When he failed to get him released, he went ahead with the jirga on 2 June which was attended by 1600 people from almost all strands of Afghan society. His plan of re-integration of Taliban through negotiations was endorsed by all. His plan is however not entirely in line with US plan which hinges on first defeating the Taliban on battlefield and then negotiating with them from a position of strength. Americans are sticking to this plan since they want to leave behind a regime of their choice which could safeguard their future interests and also agree to a sizeable military presence in Baghram and Kandahar air bases.

US input cripples Karzai’s credibility, fueling Taliban counterattacks

Raja 6/24 [Asif Haroon, Defense and Political analyst, 2010 Veteran’s Todayhttp://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/24/is-hamid-karzai-sincere-in-his-overtures-towards-pakistan/]

Rocket attacks on the jirga were certainly the handiwork of anti-Karzai and anti-Taliban forces. The chief suspect is Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh who was very peeved over Karzai’s change of stance towards Pakistan . He is completely influenced by RAW and Mossad and is a vehement enemy of Pakistan , particularly ISI. He has contributed a lot towards coloring perceptions of US officials based in Afghanistan against Pakistan and in assisting RAW in recruiting agents and launching them into Balochistan and FATA. Interior Minister Hanif Atmar is another anti-Pakistan Afghan official. Both are US men and have been taking commands from Washington and New Delhi . Their sacking by Karzai is a big loss for USA and India especially because of highly turbulent security situation and the US having no clear cut strategy for exit. In the wake of Marjah operation and much hyped operation Kandahar planned in September, the Taliban instead of going on the defensive have become more assertive. Rate of attacks have accelerated and so is the casualty rate of occupation forces. June is proving to be the most deadly month since 2001. In case Kandahar operation turns into another fiasco, it will have grave ramifications for USA . It will lose whatever leverage it still has on certain groups and spaces it controls. The situation has become dicey because of ouster of Gen McChrystal who had conceived the offensive plan and was making hectic preparations. Morale of occupation troops is already very low. Many feel that their civil leaders and war merchants have turned them into sacrificial lambs to upkeep their mercantile interests. Disgraceful dismissal of their commander may be resented by them and further erode their resolve to fight a losing battle.

 In 1989, the US abandoned Afghanistan in haste since it was a victor and had fulfilled all its objectives. The situation now is altogether different. It has not achieved even a single objective and is bound to lose the war. Under such adverse circumstances, it may not be possible for coalition troops to pullout easily and safely. It will be highly costly withdrawal. Afghans revenge against defeated foe is horrifying since they believe in total massacre and that too in most brutal ways.

Impact D – Karzai Not k2 Stability

Afghan stability doesn’t rest with Karzai- other Presidential options

Hoffmann 4/12 [Dr. Hubertus, advisor in the European Parliament, US Senate and German Bundestag World Security Network News, 2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=18267,18190,18148,18194]

Six, Karzai is not needed. Several others could do a much better job. Diplomatic dogma so far has been that there is no alternative to him. This is totally wrong. One option is Abdullah Addullah, but there are several others. Afghanistan needs a new beginning and a credible, not rotten, government. A relatively unknown newcomer, coming out of the blue like Obama, could achieve this. Afghanistan needs a new and younger man representing hope for this ancient land, not a burned-out, unreliable president.

Impact D – Reunification Fails

Reconciliation fails- Taliban refuses to comply

Pratt 6/11 [David, Staff Writer, 2010, The Herald, Lexis] KLS

Not only were there few grass roots representatives invited, but those that were present came at great personal risk. Knowing full well that the coalition are relying on recruiting local officials to try to build up the Afghan government in contested provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, the Taliban have been ratcheting up a campaign of targeted assassinations on those from within that very community. One tribal elder at the recent peace jirga told of how another was killed by unknown armed men after returning from a similar meeting just a few weeks ago. Yesterday, David Cameron congratulated President Hamid Karzai on convening the jirga, and trying to encourage elements of the Taliban to come back into the political mainstream. But the inescapable fact remains that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani network the three main forces fighting international troops in Afghanistan all refuse to recognise the jirga process and were never going to be part of that meeting.

Reintegration has been a farce since 2005

Siddique 2/26 [Abubakar, Radio Free Europe http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1016&Itemid=66]

Sibghatullah Mojaddedi the head of Afghan Senate and a key Karzai ally, resigned from his post on February 20, claiming his "advice" was not being taken. But Kabul insiders have told RFE/RL that the octogenarian cleric and former president had sought to head the foreign-backed reintegration effort. The Karzai administration, the sources say, was reluctant to give him the sensitive post because of his failures in delivering tangible results while overseeing a government reconciliation body since 2005.

Impact Turn – Karzai Bad

Support of Karzai’s crooked government legitimizes Taliban insurgency, sparks war between Pakistan and India

Mull 6/19 [Josh, Staff Writer, 2010, Enduring America http://enduringamerica.com/2010/06/19/afghanistan-hamid-karzai-joining-the-taliban-the-story-behind-the-headline-mull/] KLS

It’s worth noting, however, that this is not a rationale for more war in Afghanistan. This maneuvering is happening now, in the middle of a massive US escalation. Our military involvement does nothing but exacerbate these effects on Afghanistan. Our violent war against the Taliban legitimizes them as freedom fighters. Our support of the crooked Karzai regime gives him credibility to run a sovereign state, as well as assuming all of the economic responsibilities that entails. And our support for Pakistan’s military dictatorship, at the expense of their democratically elected civilian government, enables the Pakistani national security strategy of perpetual war against India, whether through terrorism, trade, or conventional means.

Karzai encouraging opium production- opposed to eradication measures

Feickert 6 [Andrew, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, December 11, CRS Report for Congress http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33503.pdf] KLS

Perhaps in recognition that Afghan government and NATO efforts to combat drug trafficking are proving to be inadequate, other approaches are reportedly being considered. The Afghan government has reportedly sought assistance from the Colombian government, seeking advice in how to improve its counternarcotics operations.65 Colombian counternarcotics police visiting Afghanistan have reportedly suggested ways which the Afghan government can improve their training, organization, airport surveillance, and evidence-gathering procedures.66 Despite reported opposition from President Karzai and many Afghan officials, the Afghan government is reportedly considering the possibility of spraying poppy fields with herbicide — including aerial spraying — to help reduce the size of next year’s poppy crop.67

Impact Turn – Reconciliation Bad – Karzai\*\*

Reconciliation plans are a guise to destabilize Karzai’s government

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html]

Actually imperialist powers need any leadership for specific time. After achievements of objectives that leadership is ignored or removed from the scene. It happened after Afghan Jihad too. Now as America has decided or pretends to get out of Afghanistan so they need new leadership of Taliban that can make new promises. These new promises are not possible to make for the previous leadership. As Mullah Omer has constantly repeated his demand of withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan so Taliban support for coalition government under Mullah Omer is not possible. ISI is also excluded from these new American decisions. That’s why Nawaz Sharif has recently said that Pakistan could start these negotiations. Taliban has also rejected London Conference.

Impact Turn – Reconciliation Bad – China

Reconciliation viewed as threatening to Chinese interests

Hotneus 6/27 [Hotneus News, 2010, http://www.hotneus.com/afghan-reconciliation-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan.html]

This new development has also disturbed the regional powers. Chinese journalists have expressed their views regarding Chinese military bases in Pakistan. We know that whatever is published in Chinese media that will have to come across strict censorship. It means that there is some truth in this news. China might get frightened by the new American policy about Afghanistan that’s why she is going to take this step. But regional powers must understand one thing that American game can only be contested by making political policies rather than military one.

Reconciliation brings Sino-Afghan relations to a high, ending US input

Bhadrakumar 3/30 [M K, Indian Ambassador to Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey*,* 2010, Asian Times, http://inthesenewtimes.com/2010/03/30/karzais-china-iran-dalliance-riles-obama/] KLS

On the eve of Karzai’s departure for Beijing, he received a delegation from the opposition Hizb-i-Islami group headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Washington is ambivalent about Hekmatyar, but in the joint statement issued after Karzai’s visit, Beijing expressed support for the reconciliation and reintegration process in Afghanistan and affirmed “respect for the Afghan people’s choice of development road suited to their national conditions”. Ahmadinejad’s consultations in Kabul, followed by Karzai’s dash to Islamabad, and now his visits to Beijing and Tehran – the sudden spurt of high level exchanges suggest a pattern. What should alarm Washington most is that the Chinese position on Afghan national reconciliation meshes with Karzai’s political agenda and accords with Iran’s overlapping concerns and interests. The China-Afghan joint statement affirms Beijing’s readiness to expand economic cooperation, trade and investment while upholding the principle of “respect for the Afghan people’s choice of development road suited to their national conditions”. Washington will factor in that it is quite within China’s financial capacity to reduce Karzai’s dependence on Western largesse, in turn encouraging the Afghan leader to shake off the West’s attempts to dominate him.

Impact Turn – Reunification Bad – Af-Pak 2AC\*\*

A. Reconciliation sparks civil war that escalates, drawing in regional hegemons ending in a partition of Afganistan

Rasgotra 6/11 [ Maharajakrishna, president, ORF Centre for International Relations, Hindu News http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm] KLS

The strategy devised at the London Conference in January 2010 on Afghanistan — “reintegration and reconciliation” — is a veiled scheme to hand over Afghanistan, once again, to Pakistan. President Obama's rhetoric on the “Way Forward in AF-PAK” has the same thrust. The consequences of this dangerous scheme are not hard to foresee: the return of the brutal Taliban rule in Kabul, the resumption of a civil war which will suck in the neighbouring countries; and spread of terrorism and bloodshed farther afield. The end result will be a virtual partition of Afghanistan into Pushtoon and non-Pushtoon countries and the eventual rise of a larger, independent Pushtoonistan incorporating Pakistan's own Pushtoon lands. I would not wish that fate for Afghanistan or Pakistan.

B. Partition of Afghanistan sparks fundamentalist uprisings necessitating terrorism, border clashes and Pakistan-India nuclear strikes, culminating in global nuclear war
Morgan 7 [Stephen J, Former Member of British Labour Party Executive Committee, June 3, <http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639>] KLS

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

Impact Turn – Reunification Bad – Af-Pak XT

A Pakistan controlled by extremists sparks Indian pre-emptive strike- 25 war games prove

Ricks 1 [Thomas E. Washington Post Staff Writer,Washington Post. Oct 21, 2001. Page A19. \_\_http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27875-2001Oct20?language=printer\_\_] KLS

The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games.

AT: Afghanistan Instability

No impact escalation- Afghanistan still protected by extended US security

Phalnikar 5/11 [Sonia 2010, Deutsche Welle http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5553954,00.html] KLS

In the first of a series of meetings, Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Tuesday met US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who reassured him that the US would remain committed to providing security in Afghanistan even after US troops have left. "As we look toward a responsible, orderly transition in the international combat mission in Afghanistan, we will not abandon the Afghan people," Clinton said. Karzai, meanwhile, reiterated that his country would stick to its responsibility to further develop Afghanistan's civilian and democratic structures.

Jirga will stop terrorism and bringing peace but Karzai’s credibility key to implementation
Niazi, 7 [Tarique, Staff Writer, August 17, Asian Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/IH17Df03.html] KLS

If the jirga was not a complete success, it was not a failure, either. After all, it was the grandest gathering of Pashtun leaders since the Durand Line was drawn in 1893 to divide Pashtun territories between Afghanistan and the British Raj. The lineup included pre-eminent Pashtun leaders who tower over even Karzai and Musharraf: Senator Asfandyar Wali Khan, who leads the Awami National Party, and Mehmood Khan Achakzai, who heads the Pashtun Milli Awami Party. Both scorn Musharraf for dumping Arab and non-Arab al-Qaeda members into Pashtun tribal areas and then committing what they call genocide against Pashtuns by ruthlessly bombing them. The jirga, which represented the 50 million Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, further bolstered the standing of Karzai as a Pashtun leader. His embrace by the leading lights of the Pashtun nation sends a strong message to the Taliban that they do not have a monopoly on Pashtun nationalism. Finally, from the US standpoint, the jirga was a success for its unequivocal commitment to end terrorism and eliminate al-Qaeda from Pashtun territories. Since September 11, 2001, no such commitment was ever made at such a grand forum of Pashtun leaders. The jirga's call shatters the vogue idiom of "Pashtun terrorists", "tribal badlands", and "lawless tribal areas" that cast Pashtuns in bad light. At the jirga, Pashtuns demonstrated their stake in peace within and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet the jirga was "long on generalities and short on specifics". US and NATO leaders should engage this institution to supply the missing "specifics" to foster peace. It is deceptively simple to dub the Afghan resistance "Taliban militancy" or "al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism". Although Pashtuns reject al-Qaeda and its terrorism, as the Kabul jirga resoundingly demonstrated, they are resentful of their loss of power in Kabul, which they held for 200 years, to the ethnic-minority-dominated and US-backed Northern Alliance. The Taliban, who are predominantly Pashtuns, are drawing on this sense of exclusion among the majority community to sustain their struggle. An ethnic balance to the current distribution of power, therefore, would help drain the Afghan resistance of energy and serve as well the long-term security interests of the Northern Alliance. Karzai, aided by the 50-member Tribal Council, is best placed to pull off this feat. He is a devout Muslim, a former cabinet officer of the Taliban government, a member of the Pashtun royalty, a nominee of the ruling Northern Alliance, and the only hope for the international community to bring peace in Afghanistan.

AT: Cred k2 Democracy

Plan solves the DA and ensures democracy- puppet Karzai illegitimate

Pape 9 [Robert A, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, October 15, Lexis] KLS

AS President Obama and his national security team confer this week to consider strategies for Afghanistan, one point seems clear: our current military forces cannot win the war. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, has asked for 40,000 or more additional United States troops, which many are calling an ambitious new course. In truth, it is not new and it is not bold enough. America will best serve its interests in Afghanistan and the region by shifting to a new strategy of off-shore balancing, which relies on air and naval power from a distance, while also working with local security forces on the ground. The reason for this becomes clear when one examines the rise of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in recent years. General McChrystal's own report explains that American and NATO military forces themselves are a major cause of the deteriorating situation, for two reasons. First, Western forces have become increasingly viewed as foreign occupiers; as the report puts it, ''over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged the International Security Assistance Force's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.'' Second, the central government led by America's chosen leader, Hamid Karzai, is thoroughly corrupt and viewed as illegitimate: ''Local Afghan communities are unable to hold local officials accountable through either direct elections or judicial processes, especially when those individuals are protected by senior government officials.''

\*\*Kuwait Camp Arifjan – Aff Answers

No Middle East Escalation

Middle East stable – empirically, wars have not escalated

Fettweis 7 (Christopher, Prof. of National Security Affairs @ National Security Decision Making Department of the US Naval War College, Dec 2007, [http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a783986391~db=all~order=page](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content%3Da783986391~db%3Dall~order%3Dpage)) LL

No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique.

Middle East wars don’t escalate and US forces do little to prevent escalation

Yglesias 7 (Matthew, Associate Editor of The Atlantic Monthly, Sept 12, , <http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/09/containing_iraq.php>) LL

Kevin Drum tries to throw some water on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also make this point briefly in Democracy: "Talk that Iraq’s troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Also worth mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at, realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some cross-border military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously not a problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert hunting a possibly mythical terrorist organization.

Several conflicts prove – no escalation

Dru, 7 (Kevin, CBS, Sept 9, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/09/politics/animal/main3244894.shtml>) LL

Having admitted, however, that Iraq is a problem that can't be solved by the U.S. military, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

US Presence 🡪 ME Conflict

US presence interferes in Iran’s sphere of influence – the impact is extinction

ICFI 10 (International Committee of the Fourth International, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/apr2010/pers-a20.shtml, AD: 6/28/10) jl

Virtually nothing is said of this publicly. But the strategists of US imperialism recognize a war with Iran could ignite a military-political firestorm that would engulf the entire region, from Afghanistan and Iraq to Israel-Palestine—a conflict that in its size and scope could be the largest since at least the Korean War.

To limit this potential, a US strike against Iran would from the outset have to take the form of a “shock and awe” campaign aiming at destroying Iran’s infrastructure and ability to function as a modern state.

Washington’s launch of such a war would invariably have an explosive impact on world geopolitics, on the relations of the US with all the other great powers, and on class relations in the US. Russia and China, in particular, would in all likelihood see such a war, directed as it would be in ensuring US control over the world’s principal oil-exporting region and projecting US power into Eurasia, as constituting a fundamental threat to their strategic interests.

By the same token, however, the US cannot retreat from the drive to assert its domination over the Middle East. If this was imperative in the decades after World War II when the position of American capitalism was unchallenged, it is all the more so now that its world position has been so demonstrably undermined.

Thus the White House and Pentagon continue to prepare for “all contingencies” and invoke these war plans to strong-arm the other great powers into supporting yet another round of punishing sanctions against Tehran.

Whatever its particular form, a new Middle East war would have catastrophic consequences for the people of the Middle East—Iranian, Arab, and Jewish—and potentially the world.

US Intervention 🡪 Terrorism

US overseas intervention leads to more terrorist attacks

Eland 98 (Ivan, CATO: Foreign Policy, Dec 17, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb50.pdf>) LL

According to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, terrorism is the most important threat the United States and the world face as the 21st century begins. High-level U.S. officials have acknowledged that terrorists are now more likely to be able to obtain and use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons than ever before. Yet most attention has been focused on combating terrorism by deterring and disrupting it beforehand and retaliating against it after the fact. Less attention has been paid to what motivates terrorists to launch attacks. According to the Pentagon's Defense Science Board, a strong correlation exists between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. President Clinton has also acknowledged that link. The board, however, has provided no empirical data to support its conclusion. This paper fills that gap by citing many examples of terrorist attacks on the United States in retaliation for U.S. intervention overseas. The numerous incidents cataloged suggest that the United States could reduce the chances of such devastating--and potentially catastrophic-- terrorist attacks by adopting a policy of military restraint overseas.

US intervention attracts terrorism

Eland 98 (Ivan, CATO: Foreign Policy, Dec 17, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb50.pdf>) LL

The logic behind the claim that there are other primary causes for terrorism against the United States needs to be examined. Many other Western nations are wealthy; have an extensive industrial and commercial presence overseas; export their culture along with their products and services; and believe in religious freedom, economic opportunity, and respect for the rights of the individual. Yet those nations-- Switzerland and Australia, for example--seem to have much less of a problem with worldwide terrorism than does the United States. According to the U.S. State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, one-third of all terrorist attacks worldwide were perpetrated against U.S. targets.11 The percentage of terrorism targeted at the United States is very high considering that the United States--unlike nations such as Algeria, Turkey, and the United Kingdom--has no internal civil war or quarrels with its neighbors that spawn terrorism. The major difference between the United States and other wealthy democratic nations is that it is an interventionist superpower. As Betts notes, the United States is the only nation in the world that intervenes regularly outside its own region. The motives for some terrorist attacks are not easy to discern. They may be protests against U.S. culture or overseas business presence. Two incidents in 1995--the deadly attack by two gunmen on a van from the U.S. consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, and the bombing of a "Dunkin Donuts" in Bogotá, Colombia--could fit into those categories. But with no statement of motives by the terrorists, such attacks could just as easily have been responses to the perceived foreign policies of a global superpower. Even if some terrorist attacks against the United States are a reaction to "what it is" rather than "what it does," the list of incidents later in this paper shows how many terrorist attacks can be traced back to an interventionist American foreign policy. A conservative approach was taken in cataloging those incidents. To be added to the list, a planned or actual attack first had to be targeted against U.S. citizens, property, or facilities--either at home or abroad. Then there had to be either an indication from the terrorist group that the attack was a response to U.S. foreign policy or strong circumstantial evidence that the location, timing, or target of the attack coincided with a specific U.S. intervention overseas. Although the Defense Science Board noted a historical correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States, the board apparently believed the conclusion to be so obvious that it did not publish detailed data to support it. Some analysts apparently remain unconvinced of the relationship. The data in this paper provide the empirical evidence.

No Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism is all hype – it’s not based on data

Gertz and Lake 10 (Bill - a reporter covering foreign policy and international developments for The Washington Times, Eli - Washington Times Staff Writer, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/obama-says-terrorist-nuclear-risk-is-growing/, AD: 6/28/10) jl

The Obama administration is warning that the danger of a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons is increasing, but U.S. officials say the claim is not based on new intelligence and questioned whether the threat is being overstated.

President Obama said in a speech before the 47-nation Nuclear Security Summit, which concluded Tuesday, that "the risk of a nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up."

The two-day meeting concluded with an agreement by participants to take steps to prevent non-state actors like al Qaeda from obtaining nuclear weapons, either through theft of existing weapons or through making their own with pilfered nuclear material.

The joint statement called nuclear terrorism one of the most challenging threats to international security and called for tougher security to prevent terrorists, criminals and others from acquiring nuclear goods.

But Henry Sokolski, a member of the congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, said that there is no specific intelligence on ongoing terrorist procurement of nuclear material.

"We were given briefings and when we tried to find specific intelligence on the threat of any known terrorist efforts to get a bomb, the answer was we did not have any."

Arifjan Doesn’t Deter

Arifjan doesn’t deter aggression – terrorist try to bomb it

Reuters 9 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57A35F20090811, AD: 6/28/10) jl

An Interior Ministry statement said all six members of the al Qaeda-linked cell had confessed after being arrested. It did not say if the targeted facilities included oil industry plants in Kuwait, the world's fourth-largest oil exporter.

"The state security has uncovered a terrorist network following al Qaeda, and includes six (Kuwaiti) citizens who have planned to carry out a plan to bomb Arifjan Camp, the state security building and other important facilities," the ministry said.

Camp Arifjan is located south of Kuwait City and serves as a staging ground for forces deploying in Iraq.

In Washington, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell applauded the Kuwaiti government action and said it looked like an attack on U.S. interests had been imminent.

"I can just tell you at this point, with what little information I have, that -- that it does, indeed, look as though this group was attempting to target U.S. forces," Morrell said.

"I don't think it is clear at this point that Camp Arifjan was necessarily where they were plotting their attack, but clearly U.S. forces were among those they wanted to hit, based upon our initial assessment."

Terrorism – No Impact

No impact to terrorism

Milholin 2 (Gary, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/2002/terror-bomb.htm, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Despite the reports, and despite the attendant warnings, the risk that a terrorist group like al Qaeda could get the bomb (or a "dirty" substitute) is much lower than most people think. That is the good news. There is also bad news: the risk is not zero. THERE ARE essentially two ways for a terrorist group to lay its hands on a nuclear weapon: either build one from scratch or somehow procure an already manufactured one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Building a bomb from scratch would confer the most power: a group that could build one bomb could build several, and a nuclear arsenal would put it front and center on the world stage. But of all the possibilities, this is the unlikeliest--"so remote," in the words of a senior nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, "that it can be essentially ruled out." The chief obstacle lies in producing the nuclear fuel--either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium--that actually explodes in a chain reaction. More than 80 percent of the effort that went into making America's first bombs was devoted to producing this fuel, and it is no easy task. To make bomb-grade uranium, a terrorist group would need thousands of high-speed gas centrifuges, machined to exact dimensions, arranged in series, and capable of operating under the most demanding conditions. If they wanted to produce the uranium by a diffusion process, they would need an even greater number of other machines, equally difficult to manufacture and operate. If they followed Saddam Hussein's example, they could try building a series of giant electromagnets, capable of bending a stream of electrically charged particles--a no less daunting challenge. For any of these, they would also need a steady supply of natural uranium and a specialized plant to convert it to a gaseous form for processing. Who would sell these things to would-be nuclear terrorists? The answer is: nobody. The world's nuclear-equipment makers are organized into a cooperative group that exists precisely to stop items like these from getting into unauthorized hands. Nor could a buyer disguise the destination and send materials through obliging places like Dubai (as Iran does with its hot cargoes) or Malta (favored by Libya's smugglers). The equipment is so specialized, and the suppliers so few, that a forest of red flags would go up. And even if the equipment could be bought, it would have to be operated in a place that the United States could not find. If manufacturing bomb-grade uranium is out of the picture, what about making plutonium, a much smaller quantity of which is required to form a critical mass (less than fourteen pounds was needed to destroy Nagasaki in 1945)? There is, however, an inconvenient fact about plutonium, which is that you need a reactor to make enough of it for a workable bomb. Could terrorists buy one? The Russians are selling a reactor to Iran, but Moscow tends to put terrorist groups in the same category as Chechens. The Chinese are selling reactors to Pakistan, but Beijing, too, is not fond of terrorists. India and Pakistan can both build reactors on their own, but, for now, these countries are lined up with the U.S. Finally, smuggling a reactor would be no easier than buying one. Reactor parts are unique, so manufacturers would not be fooled by phony purchase orders. Even if terrorists somehow got hold of a reactor, they would need a special, shielded chemical plant to chop up its radioactive fuel, dissolve it in acid, and then extract the plutonium from the acid. No one would sell them a plutonium extraction plant, either. It is worth remembering that Saddam Hussein tried the reactor road in the 1970's. He bought one from France--Jacques Chirac, in his younger days, was a key facilitator of the deal--hoping it would propel Iraq into the nuclear club. But the reactor's fuel was sabotaged in a French warehouse, the person who was supposed to certify its quality was murdered in a Paris hotel, and when the reactor was finally ready to operate, a squadron of Israeli fighter-bombers blew it apart. A similar fate would undoubtedly await any group that tried to follow Saddam's method today. IF MAKING nuclear-bomb fuel is a no-go, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium. There are hundreds of reactors in the world, and they crank out tons of the stuff every year. Surely a dedicated band of terrorists could get their hands on some. This too is not so simple. Plutonium is only created inside reactor fuel rods, and the rods, after being irradiated, become so hot that they melt unless kept under water. They are also radioactive, which is why they have to travel submerged from the reactor to storage ponds, with the water acting as both coolant and radiation shield. And in most power reactors, the rods are welded together into long assemblies that can be lifted only by crane. True, after the rods cool down they can be stored dry, but their radioactivity is still lethal. To prevent spent fuel rods from killing the people who come near them, they are transported in giant radiation-shielding casks that are not supposed to break open even in head-on collisions. The casks are also guarded. If terrorists managed to hijack one from a country that had reactors they would still have to take it to a plant in another country that could extract the plutonium from the rods. They would be hunted at every step of the way. Instead of fuel rods, they would be better advised to go after pure plutonium, already removed from the reactor fuel and infinitely easier to handle. This kind of plutonium is a threat only if you ingest or inhale it. Human skin blocks its radiation: a terrorist could walk around with a lump of it in his front trouser pocket and still have children. But where to get hold of it? Russia is the best bet: it has tons of plutonium in weapon-ready form, and the Russian nuclear-accounting system is weak. Russia also has underpaid scientists, and there is unquestionably some truth behind all the stories one hears about the smuggling that goes on in that country. But very little Russian plutonium has been in circulation, with not a single reported case of anything more than gram quantities showing up on the black market. This makes sense. Pure plutonium is used primarily for making nuclear warheads, it is in military hands, and military forces are not exactly keen to see it come back at them in somebody else's bombs. One source of pure plutonium that is not military is a new kind of reactor fuel called "mixed oxide." It is very different from the present generation of fuel because it contains weapon-ready material. But precisely because it is weapon-ready, it is guarded and accounted for, and a terrorist group would have to win a gun battle to get close to it. Then they would probably need a crane to move it, and would have to elude or fight off their pursuers. If terrorists did procure some weapon-ready plutonium, would their problems be over? Far from it: plutonium works only in an "implosion"-type bomb,

>CONTINUED<

Terrorism – No Impact

>CONTINUED<

which is about ten times more difficult to build than the simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima. In such a device, a spherical shock wave "implodes" inward and squeezes a ball of plutonium at the bomb's center so that it explodes in a chain reaction. To accomplish all this, one needs precision machine tools to build the parts, special furnaces to melt and cast the plutonium in a vacuum (liquid plutonium oxidizes rapidly in air), and high-precision switches and capacitors for the firing circuit. Also required are a qualified designer, a number of other specialists, and a testing program. Considering who the participating scientists are likely to be, the chances of getting an implosion bomb to work are rather small. THE ALTERNATIVE to plutonium is bomb-grade uranium--and here things would be easier. This is the fuel used in the Hiroshima bomb. Unlike the implosion bomb dropped on Nagasaki, this one did not have to be tested: the U.S. knew it would work. The South Africans built six uranium bombs without testing; they knew their bombs would work, too. All these devices used a simple "gun" design in which one slug of uranium was shot down a barrel into another. The problem with buying bomb-grade uranium is that one would need a great deal of it--around 120 pounds for a gun-type bomb--and nothing near that amount has turned up in the black market.

The odds of terrorists constructing and detonating a nuclear weapon is one in over three billion

Choong 9 (William, Senior Writer at The Straits Times, Lexis) jl

This leaves the second route: terrorists building a nuclear device themselves. And arguably, nuclear terrorists can find do-it-yourself instructions for a nuclear weapon, albeit crude ones, on the Internet.

Having the blueprint for a weapon, however, does not guarantee the production of that weapon. In the estimation of Professor John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio University, terrorists will have to successfully navigate about 20 steps to build an improvised nuclear device - and all the steps must be achieved. These include processes centred on producing, transporting and detonating the device.

If the terrorist group has a 50 per cent chance of success for each step, the odds of the group pulling off all the steps would be one in a million. If each step involves a 33 per cent chance of success, the odds of pulling off all of them would drop to one in over three billion, Prof Mueller says in an e-mail in reply to questions by this newspaper.

\*\*Kuwait Econ DA – Aff Answers

No UQ- Down- General (1/2)

**Turkish economy destroyed- banks, investment losses, regulation**

Elias 6/21[ Diana, Staff Writer, 2010 Rueters http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49489620100621] KLS

(Reuters) - A better-late-than-never set of financial regulations will help rid Kuwait's investment sector of zombie firms and make it more attractive but won't turn the Gulf Arab state into the financial centre it aims to become. The central bank of the world's fourth-largest oil exporter has given the loosely regulated investment firms two years to comply with tougher leverage rules after risk management at many was found woefully lacking in the financial crisis. Kuwait's numerous trading and holding companies known as investment houses were hard hit by the meltdown, which prompted a government economic rescue package worth 1.5 billion dinars ($5.15 billion) last year. Critics note the houses require no banking licenses despite offering investment banking services, some real estate firms are licensed to operate as investment companies, and others lend without having to fulfil reserve requirements like banks. "This measure is just an attempt to accelerate the process of cleaning up the market," said independent economist Jassem al-Saadoun. "(The central bank) believes that if things are left without controls, companies will remain hanging between life and death for a long time and that is harmful to shareholders and to confidence in the market." Saadoun estimated some 40 percent of Kuwait's investment firms were too weak to survive, and 40 percent were in good condition. The rest, like Global Investment House and Investment Dar, were "too big" to be allowed to fall. Their keeling over would be "catastrophic" for banks, asset prices, individuals who invest in their funds and even the judicial system that could be swamped in the aftermath, he said. Global has reached a deal with creditors to reschedule $1.7 billion in debt, and Investment Dar, which is struggling to restructure about $3.48 billion of debt, has applied for support under the rescue package. The central bank demanded in its new directives to all investment companies that their debts not exceed double the size of their capital. Cash and cash equivalents should cover at least 10 percent of liabilities, and a company's investments or contracts outside the country were no longer allowed to account for more than 50 percent of its capital, the regulator said. In an interview with local daily al-Rai published on June 15, central bank governor, Sheikh Salem Abdul-Aziz al-Sabah, said 49 of the 100 investment companies already comply with all of these regulations. The rest adhere to only one or two. John Sfakianakis, chief economist at Banque Saudi Fransi, said some Kuwaiti firms had already learned a lesson about the dangers of heavy exposure to international markets, but they nonetheless "need to feel the arm of the state" and possible penalties if they digress from regulations. Because of the small size of Kuwait's economy, investment companies go abroad. "They accumulated a lot of risk based on huge amounts of leverage, the risk was not properly contained and they got hit," he said. Anwar al-Kandari, financial adviser to the chief executive of al-Imtiaz Investment Co, said it will take less than two years for the country's investment sector to slim down. "At the end of the day, the number of investment companies will go down either through mergers, liquidation or requests to cancel licenses," he said.

No UQ– Econ Down- General (2/2)

Expert opinion is that Kuwait’s economy is already failing.

Odion-Esene 6/14 (Brai, reporter for Need to Know News, [http://www.automatedtrader.net/real-time-news/43833/mideastwatch-moodys-maturing-debt-to-challenge-gulf-issuers] AD: 6/24/10)JM

In a separate report, Moody's also said it continues to maintain a negative outlook on three banking systems in the Arab Gulf region, namely those of Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, citing ongoing struggles from the credit crunch and the fall-out from plummeting real estate market. In a report commenting on credit risk for Arab companies, Moody's warned that the credit environment for select corporate issuers in the GCC region will remain challenging. "This is particularly true for more vulnerable corporate issuers which need to address significant bullet maturities over the coming 18 to 30 months," it said. These issuers also face rolling over short-term debt on an ongoing basis while grappling with a difficult operating environment, it said, "which could moderately benefit from government spending programmes." Moody's noted that access to capital and liquidity remains constrained, mainly because of volatility in the capital markets, limited investor appetite for debt not issued by Middle East government-related firms, and the heavy exposure of banks to pockets of Middle East credit risk at a time when they face a rise in non-performing loans. "The 2012 wall of maturing debt poses a major challenge for many non-GRIs and GRIs, with low support assumptions as $28 billion worth of debt -- nearly one fifth of an estimated US$145 billion of total debt outstanding -- will mature that year," Moody's warned. Dubai- and Abu Dhabi-based institutions account for the majority of this debt. The most exposed sectors are investment holding companies and real estate developers. Of all the Gulf nations, Moody's said the banking systems of Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE "have been the most affected by the liquidity drought, the sharp fall in asset prices (especially those of properties) and the dramatic negative impact suffered by specialized institutions (like investment houses and real estate companies) as a result of a concentrated, wholesale funding strategy and massive asset impairments."

No UQ- Down- Laundry List

Kuwait econ terrible- banking, low diversification, investment, stock exchange

Thabet 6/15 [Mokhtar, Staff Writer, 2010 Global Arab Network http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201006156218/Finance/kuwait-negative-banking-outlook-weak-diversification-oil-reliance.html] KLS

The outlook for the Kuwaiti banking system remains negative, although implementation of the government’s four-year development plan could stimulate the weakened operating environment, according to Anouar Hassoune, VP-Senior Credit Officer at Moody’s. This negative outlook is driven by the Kuwait economy weak diversification and its heavy reliance on the performance of oil sector even if the Kuwaiti state remains affluent. The state-owned oil industry is cash-rich and does not require external funding. Therefore, banks’ lending activities in recent years have been limited to only a few growth areas: personal lending (with around one-third of personal credit used for purchasing securities); real estate and construction; non-bank financial institutions; and, to a lesser extent, trade. The negative outlook for domestic banks also reflects the lackluster performance of the Kuwaiti stock exchange and the slow recovery of the real estate market, together with the weakening credit standing and rising indebtedness of consumers.

No UQ- Down- Automotive Industry

Kuwait economy in recession- automotive industry proves

Press Office 6/17 [http://www.officialwire.com/main.php?action=posted\_news&rid=163021] KLS

Car sales fell in Kuwait in 2009 to 119,133 units, from 122,623 in 2008. The impact of the international economic crisis was felt in the Gulf state's economy; plunging oil prices in the latter half of 2008 and early 2009 had a serious effect on the country's income, while tightening credit also curtailed economic growth. The Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) estimates that the country slid into recession, in 2009, with us estimating a 2.4% contraction. As a consequence of these factors, the automotive sector, heavily reliant on consumer confidence, took a knock, though the fall in sales is nowhere near as drastic as in many other countries. Dealers have reported that second-hand car sales have been holding up considerably better than those of new vehicles, the Kuwait Times reported in June 2009. While new model sales had dropped by around 50%, used vehicle sales had only fallen by 10-15%, the newspaper said. However, as the market picks up as expected in 2010, this trend may be weakened as buyers in Kuwait - particularly Kuwaitis - show a clear preference for new vehicles. Recovery in the economy will be slow to arrive, providing little impetus to consumer confidence. We forecast car sales rising to 121,861 in 2010, still below 2008 levels. By 2014, the market should reach a value of 140,361 units.

No UQ- Down- Bank Failures

Kuwait economy destroyed- key bank failures

The Banker 6/1 [2010, Lexis] KLS

Banking difficulties The banking sector's performance has mirrored Kuwait's economic woes in many ways. In the same way that the global financial crisis triggered an economic slowdown affecting oil prices, the same crisis has had implications on a number of key Kuwaiti banks. The most notable case concerns Gulf Bank, Kuwait's third largest bank, which had engaged in faulty derivatives transactions that led to the bank recording a Kd359.5m ($1.23bn) net loss in 2008. This was a particularly chastening experience; Kuwait's government via its central bank and its investment fund, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), supported Gulf Bank through its troubles.

Kuwait economy destroyed- bank failure

The Banker 6/1 [2010, Lexis] KLS

Recent regional developments, namely the Dubai World debt crisis and the defaults concerning Saudi Arabia's Saad and Ahmed Hamad Algosaibi & Brothers (AHAB) conglomerates, have also cast a shadow over the Gulf's banking sector. However, local bankers were keen to note that local banks were largely immune to those problems. "Kuwaiti banks have not yet reported any exposure to Dubai World, and the likelihood of such is remote as well," says Mr Ahmed. Mr Dabdoub adds: "The fallout from the Dubai World debt crisis and the default of Saad/AHAB groups had no effect on NBK as we had no exposure to either. NBK's management believes that establishing strong, long-term banking relationships with clients is key to a successful operational model. We have thus limited our exposure to only core banking activities and invested in businesses we understand." Future outlook Current commentary on Kuwait's banking sector suggests that it will be another difficult year for the country's banks. In a report published in February of this year, Standard & Poor's (S&P) outlines its belief that Kuwait-based banks will suffer from the effects of unfavourable economic conditions on their profitability and asset quality.

No UQ- Down - Investment

Kuwait economy depressed- lack of domestic activity and foreign investment

The Banker 6/1 [2010, Lexis] KLS

The financial crisis has thrown up a number of additional obstacles for the local banking market, according to Kuwait International Bank (KIB). A statement released to The Banker from KIB says: "The impact of the global financial crisis imposes some challenges on the local banking market, the most important of which are a slackening in demand for credit facilities being affected by the slow recovery mode of the overall domestic activity; shrinking market values of some mortgaged assets; and the probability of continued application of cautious financial provisioning policies." For its part, KIB, in spite of reporting a loss of Kd8.2m in 2009, intends to open eight new branches and introduce more advanced banking services in the domestic market over the course of 2010.

No UQ-Down- Oil

Kuwait economy shot- oil sector sparked deflationary spiral

The Banker 6/1 [2010, Lexis] KLS

Last year was a year of introspection for Kuwait. For the first time this century, the world's fourth largest exporter of oil recorded a decline, following eight years of consistent growth. While oil prices reached an all-time high of $147 a barrel in July 2008, they dropped dramatically by the end of that year, plummeting to $32 a barrel. Kuwait's oil export-dependent economy has been subject to the whims of the global market. Oil prices only seemed to recover by June 2009, when they crept above the $70 a barrel mark for the first time that year. Those developments have had important implications on the Kuwaiti government's finances. The country's current account balance was estimated to have fallen to 25.4% of gross domestic product (GDP), from 41.2% of GDP in 2008. In addition, current and capital spending was said to have decelerated in response to oil prices. Last year was also marked by significant deflation, considerable underperformance of the Kuwait Stock Exchange and policy stagnation resulting in no new investment. Kuwait's saving grace was that it recorded its 11th consecutive annual surplus in the 2009/10 financial year, with $28.9bn of revenue in the first 11 months.

No Link- Proximity

US presence has no effect on local economies- no urban input

Bowman 8 (Bradley, Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow, Spring 2008, Washington Quartetly, Spring 2008, www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring\_bowman.pdf) JPG

Yet, the unique conditions in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE make these five countries less susceptible to radicalization sparked by a U.S. military presence, thus allowing a minimal U.S. posture to continue. In Kuwait, the distance between the primary population center of Kuwait City and the bulk of U.S. military forces largely places U.S. forces “out of sight, out of mind.” Prudent adjustments by Central Command in recent years have further reduced the visibility and footprint of U.S. military operations in Kuwait. Furthermore, despite the strong disapproval of U.S. foreign policy by the average Kuwaiti, the United States still enjoys a significant reservoir of goodwill thanks to the U.S. military’s 1991 liberation of Kuwait from Saddam. Instability in southern Iraq and the increasingly assertive Iranian regime only serve to increase the desire of Kuwait to maintain a significant long-term U.S. military presence.

Link Turn- Investment, Immigration

US military presence destroys Kuwaiti economy- deters investment and immigration

Kamen and Kendrick 90 [Al, Keith, Staff Writers, August 12, Washington Post, Page A1, Lexis] KLS

"All foreigners in Kuwait want to leave because there is horror and because there is a heavy Iraqi military presence. They are killing civilians," he said. South Korea was hesitant to criticize Saddam, special correspondent Peter Maass reported from Seoul, because it receives almost all of its oil from the Middle East and has a large number of construction contracts and workers in Iraq and Kuwait. Like South Korea, Japan receives most of its oil from the Middle East. There are 376 Japanese in Iraq and 276 in Kuwait, according to the Japanese Embassy here. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, in deciding how to respond, took into account the almost 1 million Egyptian nationals in the area, staff correspondent William Claiborne reported from Cairo. Egyptian officials have been quick to point out that the human dimension was significant in the weighing of such decisions as whether to send Egyptian troops to the region. Egyptians, who number 700,000 in Iraq and 150,000 in Kuwait, are managing to leave the area at the rate of 2,500 a day, many of them through the Red Sea port of Nuweiba, Claiborne reported. An estimated 75,000 have returned from the area since Aug. 2. Turkish President Turgut Ozal, who has given permission for the United States to use Turkish air bases in the event of hostilities, has about 60,000 of his countrymen living and working in Iraq and Kuwait, according to the Turkish Embassy here. Along with the Egyptians, 300,000 Palestinians are the linchpin of the Kuwaiti economy, filling jobs in sectors from construction and services to big business and finance. The money they send home also plays an important role in the economies of the West Bank and Gaza, staff correspondent Jackson Diehl reported from Jerusalem. Because the Palestine Liberation Organization has sided with Saddam, it is not likely they would be under any threat.

No MPX- Kuwait Pays

Kuwait pays for the majority of expenses of US presence

Hajjar 2 (Sami, March 2002, PhD in Poli Sci @ University of Missouri-Columbia – Director of Middle East Studies @ US Army War College, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&v33=106358&id=47256) JPG

Of all the Arabian Peninsula states, Kuwait is decidedly the most supportive of U.S. presence fundamentally because there has not been a regime change in Iraq since the 1990 invasion. Kuwait is understandably Iraq-centric and “Kuwaitis overstate the threat [from Iraq] to us; if the threat changes, Kuwait might change its attitude toward U.S. presence.”109 Consequently Kuwait is very satisfied with the terms of the Defense Cooperative Agreement (DCA) it has with the United States and “when that agreement is up for renewal, Kuwait will not ask to renegotiate it.”110 Indeed since the Gulf war, Kuwait has become very serious about its defense, and in the past decade the United States has sold it upward of $6 billion worth of military equipment, including F18 fighters. Additionally, Kuwait pays the bulk of the expenses associated with U.S. military involvement in the country. At the same time, however, and despite the strong support for U.S. presence, “the perception among the average citizen is that by paying for all the expenses associated with U.S. military presence, Kuwait is being taken advantage of.”111 Such a perception has led the government to emphasize that the military bases housing U.S. military personnel and equipment [primarily Camp Doha at the outskirts of the capital] are Kuwaiti and not U.S. bases; “the government also does not wish to publicize that air strikes against Iraq are initiated from Kuwait.”112 A fair assessment would be that Kuwait strongly supports measures to change the regime in Iraq so that sanctions could be lifted. Until then, however, and despite popular sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi people, Kuwait would oppose a change in the sanctions regime. As one high-ranking Kuwaiti officer opined, “The United States should be weary of Arab calls to lift the sanctions; Arabs are ‘emotional’ and their reference to the suffering of the Iraqi people is based on emotional considerations as opposed to rational calculations. As long as Saddam is in power, Iraq is a major threat.”113

No MPX- A2 Arms Sales

The US-Kuwait defense relationship is a pre-requisite cooperation across the board

Kuwait Times 10 (2/22/10, http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read\_news.php?newsid=Njk3ODQzNjMz) JPG

Congratulating the Kuwaiti leadership, government and people on the 49th National Day and the 19th Liberation Day, Jones noted that for those who had seen the destruction that was wrought on Kuwait during the invasion, "now it's really an oasis in a very difficult neighborhood." This oasis, she explained, was brought about by Kuwait's system of governance, a freely elected parliament, an open and free press, and a highly educated populace that was guaranteed to keep Kuwait in the forefront.She described the Kuwaiti-US relationship as "mature" and one of "honest friends," but said that "we have obligation not only to keep developing ourselves, but to do it so that we can be stabilizing factors in the world around us, and that we can be the enzymes for positive change in the world. That's why I believe in this relationship." Asked about areas of cooperation, she said that as in any mature relationship, there was cooperation "across the board." "Obviously we have a very important security relationship, and that remains the case because Kuwait remains essential to our logistical support for operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the region in terms of regional security ... But we consult regularly on a broad range of regional security issues, including Iran and Yemen, Al-Qaeda, etc.," she explained.

MPX T/- A2 Arms Sales- Poverty Module

A. Kuwaiti nationalization of oil trades off with productive sectors of the economy which are key to reducing poverty

Chemingui 7 (Mohamed Abdelbasset, Head of UN Economic Commission for Africa, International Food Policy Research Institute, May 2007, http://www.ifpri.org/publication/public-spending-and-poverty-reduction-oil-based-economy) JPG

This study is part of a collaborative project between the International Food Policy Research Institute and the Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait on public policy and poverty reduction in the Arab region. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of an increase in public spending in priority areas on economic growth and poverty reduction in Yemen. To accomplish this objective, the study builds a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model to provide a baseline scenario of changes in the economy and poverty levels in Yemen during the period 1998-2016. Alternative scenarios are then compared to isolate the specific impact of several policies on poverty. The scenarios assume an increase in public spending devoted to three priority area (agriculture, education, and health), which affect the economy through an increase in sectoral or economy-wide technical factor productivity. Results of public spending experiments show that targeting increased amounts of public spending towards education and health services will generate more economic growth and poverty reduction than increasing public spending solely on the agricultural sector. However, when an oil sector is a prominent part of the economy, as in Yemen, additional public spending on health and education does not improve productivity in the oil sector. Therefore, spending on agriculture becomes the most important channel for poverty reduction and economic growth. While increasing public spending in priority areas appears to be the best solution available for the government to reduce poverty during the next decade, the road is still long for Yemen to be able to achieve its Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction. Re-allocating public expenditures from defense to key sectors appears to be an additional option for reducing poverty, given the financial constraints facing Yemen. However, in the current context of terrorism concerns, it will be difficult to convince policy-makers to reduce spending on defense and security. Seeking additional resources from international donors seems to be the only option available to increase benefits from increased public spending in the priority areas identified and assessed in this study.

B. Strife is the root cause of war in the Middle East

Yildrim et. Al. 5 (Julide, Ph.D in Economics @ Univ. of Manchester, Defence and Peace Economics, 2005, Vol. 16(4), August, pp. 283–295, maliyesempozyumu.pamukkale.edu.tr/ocalyilsezg.pdf) JPG

American intervention during the first Gulf War did not solve the long-term security problems of the southern Gulf States, Saudi Arabia (SA), Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and UAE, even though it restored Kuwaiti independence. Iraq has been subdued but Iran has long been seen as a threat, especially by SA. Ismael (2001) argues that the Saudi and Iranian regimes are inherently incompatible for political, economic and ideological reasons. As these countries cannot build military forces to defeat any possible Iranian or Iraqi challenge, a mutual defence pact between the Southern Gulf States, Egypt and Syria was signed in 1991. Moreover, Kuwait and USA signed a ten-year defence pact in 1991. The attempts to establish a security umbrella by Southern Gulf Countries have been shattered by the continuous strife among these countries and their national pride. Since Egypt signed a peace deal with Israel at Camp David, Syria has been seeking the leadership of the Arab world. Syria has the single largest military force bordering Israel. However, after the first Gulf War, Egypt had an active role in bilateral negotiations in the Arab–Israeli peace process.

MPX T/- A2 Arms Sales- Econ Module (1/2)

Kuwaiti defense spending kills the economy – 7 warrants

Looney 94 (Robert E., Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 30 No. 2 April 1994 pp. 377-384, [JStor]) JPG

The above studies provide valuable insights in which military expenditures affect economic performance in the Arab world. They are, however, somewhat silent about how these effects occur. In particular, it is not always apparent whether in these studies the military burden simply acts in some way as the statistical proxy for government expenditures. As noted, the size of the government is likely to have a positive direct effect (Keynesian). A negative indirect effect (crowding out) on private sector activity is also a possibility. Are the net impacts of these effects similar or opposite for defense and non-defense governmental expenditures? In this regard, defense expenditures may retard industrial development because of their potential to cause: (1) Decreases in private consumption because fewer resources (including foreign exchange) are available to the civilian sector. (2) Decreases in civilian imports, and even balance of payments difficulties due to increased military imports. (3) Increases in inflation due to increased government budget deficits. (4) Distortions in the pricing system because military procurements are not made in open, competitive markets. (5) Shortages of managerial skills and skilled workers in a labor-constrained civilian sector, leading to reduced productivity and growth. (6) A distribution of income for the military and against the civilian sector, and (7) Increases in the political power of the military. In turn, this may result in the preempting of goods from the civilian sector. Many of these effects combine in the oil exporting countries to produce the so-called ‘Dutch Disease effect – the increased profitability, through exchange rate movements and international inflation, of non-traded activities such as services and construction and, simultaneously, the reduced profitability of traded goods such as agricultural and industrial products. In developed countries (in particular Holland) where this phenomenon was first observed, de-industrialization has taken place. In the case of OPEC members, the result has been a fall in domestic production of traded agricultural and industrial goods, and an expansion of construction and services. The traditional Dutch Disease oriented approach to the analysis of oil booms stresses the factors associated with the appreciation of the real exchange rate, driven by a rise in the relative price of non-traded goods and a fall in theoutput of traded goods. Returns to capital in non-traded activities rise while returns in traded activities fall. THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES In sum, empirical studies of oil-based government expenditures have been pessimistic. Studies focusing on the impact of defense expenditures stress the retarding effect of these allocations on overall growth. Studies focused on general or total governmental expenditures, especially in oil-rich countries, indicate that the side effects associated with these expenditures often depress industrial investment and development.

MPX T/- A2 Arms Sales- Econ Module (2/2)

Oil and military spending cripples the Kuwaiti economy – crowd out

Al-Ebraheem 96 (Yousef, dean of the College of Administrative Sciences and associate professor of economics @ Kuwait University, Middle East Quarterly*,* Sept. 1996*, http://www.meforum.org/312/kuwaits-economic-travails) JPG*

Government revenues. In real terms, oil revenues have declined sharply during the past decade. Adjusted for inflation, the price of a barrel of oil in dollars is now below its level in 1974. TB: I have a graph from the NYT somewhere showing this DP Furthermore, the exchange-rate value of the dollar against major currencies has declined by 50 percent since 1980. Despite this precipitous decline, oil remains the dominant source of GCC government revenues for the simple reason that the governments have not succeeded in generating other sources of revenues.

Population. The population size in the GCC has more than doubled in twenty years, increasing from about 10 million persons in 1975 to about 25 million in 1995. Of this number, 30-80 percent of the population are expatriates (Oman and Saudi Arabia are at the low end, UAE at the high). The growing number of residents increases the government expenditures needed just to maintain the existing benefits of medical care, education, jobs, and a host of subsidies. The continued reliance on expatriate labor also has other, non-economic implications, leading to a variety of social and (potential) political problems.

Budget deficit. Budget deficits are the paramount issue on the economic docket throughout the GCC. True, the budget deficit began in the mid-1980s, a result of much lower oil revenues (from $150 billion in 1980 to $25 billion in 1986), but at that time these countries could offset the decline in oil revenues by tapping their enormous financial reserves, which by then had reached over $300 billion. Those reserves are now much reduced, making the deficit far more of a problem. The budget deficit now affects the balance of payments, the rate of inflation, economic growth, the overall welfare system, and the very social fabric of the GCC societies.

Military spending. The military is a permanent and major component of government expenditures. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, GCC countries in the aggregate ranked in the top twelve countries in terms of military spending. According to the International Monetary Fund, the GCC spent 13 percent of its GDP on arms, compared with the whole of the Middle East, which spent an already very high 5 percent of GDP.2 Just reducing their military spending to the average Middle Eastern level would have saved the GCC countries around $30 billion a year before 1990.3 Published government documents show that the GCC devoted on average a third of its total financial resources on security-related purposes.4

Military spending has only increased since the Kuwait war, so that it is now about 20 percent higher than the pre-1990 level. The total amount is estimated to be more than $50 billion ($5 billion in arms purchases from the United States in 1994 alone). The actual numbers may be higher because all the GCC budgets except for Kuwait's lack transparency and accountability; some major spending items are either not included or buried under an "unspecified expenditure and transfers" rubric. Military spending has crowded out expenditures on other important matters, such as health care, education, and infrastructure. Moreover, military spending generally causes subsidies to be reduced and taxes increased, thereby leading to an increase in income inequality.

Job opportunities and economic activity. Mix a very high rate of population growth (3.5 percent per annum) with a failed educational system and you have a profound imbalance between economic demands and the competence of the labor corps. To exacerbate matters further, most citizens work for the government, not in business. This situation has led to a great influx of foreign labor, to the point that it now constitutes on average 80 percent of total labor force.5

To absorb the growing population, GCC economies need to create 200,000 jobs per year. The real decline in oil revenues means that governments cannot continue providing jobs for their nationals. But private enterprise is not able, at present, to create all these job opportunities. The GCC is heading to a situation of increasing unemployment, with all the attendant social and political maladies. Bahrain, with a 20 percent unemployment rate, appears to be leading the way; indded, its high rate of unemployment is a major factor contributing to the violence and social unrest experienced in that country since late 1994.

A2 2NC Arms Sales Module Xtensions

No trade-off between oil and productive sectors

Emirates Business 5/30 (5/30/10, http://www.business24-7.ae/economy/regional-economy/kuwait-set-for-3-growth-this-year-2010-05-30-1.249652) JPG

The real estate sector has been showing improvement in recent months and is returning to levels of activity not seen since 2007-08, except in commercial real estate, where oversupply is weighing on the sector. The so-called "productive" sectors such as trade, industry and construction are tentatively showing signs of life, after a protracted period of stagnation. The oil sector too, is recovering along with world demand, and is expected to grow 1.4 per cent this year in real terms. The non-oil sector should grow four per cent this year, to yield a three per cent overall performance. NBK said the preliminary budget numbers for 2009-10 financial year showed a surplus of KD8.2 billion (Dh103bn). "We expect that number will be revised close to KD6bn, when the final accounts are released."

Nationalization is comparatively better in Gulf States

Kuwait Times 7 (9/27/7, http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read\_news.php?newsid=NzMyNzMxODA) JPG

Assaf noted that nationalisation is a topic of rising importance. While there was a consensus that nationalisation was a necessary goal for the region and the companies that operate here, participants also agreed that for nationalisation drives to progress, there needs to be greater emphasis on education and training of potential job candidates, rather than a sector- or position-based quota system, particularly where it involves penalties for non-compliance. If you limit yourself to quotas and penalties, it becomes a numbers game," said Tina Mascarenhas, Manager - Human Capital, Metito, the world leader in water and waste water treatment technology. "Emiratisation must be one of the company's strategic objectives. Mascarenhas' words reflected the prevailing sentiment at the roundtable, which saw some spirited debate concerning the pros and cons of enforced nationalisation. "We should recruit on a need basis rather than quotas," said Ahmed Al Tenaiji, Marketing Manager, Zabeel Investments, a UAE-based multi-diversified investment firm. "Penalties don't work. Added Ala Atari, Chief Operating Officer, Medcare Hospital, a private hospital in Dubai: "We should only think of the organisation's benefit and hire on that basis." He added that this principle is especially important in the healthcare sector. "We cannot compromise on quality," he said, adding, "There are no university hospitals here, so recruiting [nationals] is a challenge. Responding to participants' concerns, Abdul Rahim Sultan of Tanmia stressed that enforcement of the quota system - which in the UAE has been restricted to a handful of key industries, such as banking and insurance - has become less of a priority. Indeed, he said, the response to the Emiratisation drive has been so positive that hiring UAE nationals was now seen as an essential business objective by many companies.

No MPX- A2 Democracy Module

Their impact is the wrong direction- Kuwait democracy pushed to sustain econ

Righter 90 [Rosemary, Staff Writer, October 15, The Times, Lexis]

When the emir dissolved the assembly in 1986 and imposed censorship on what had been the freest press in the region, the official reason was the threat posed by pro-Iranian extremists to Kuwait's security. The real reason may have been the parliament's investigations of the ruling family's conduct of government business and its role in the traumatic collapse of Kuwait's unofficial stock exchange in 1982 leaving $97 billion in paper debts. The belief that the emir was trying to shield the al-Sabahs from accountability was the spur to the pro-democracy movement led by former MPs which burst into life last winter. In November, the emir refused to accept a petition, signed by 25,000, to bring back the assembly. A series of demonstrations followed, some of which were broken up by police, before the government announced elections to a national council with largely consultative powers; one third of its members would be appointed. A committee would then, over four years, draw up plans for reviving parliament. The elections in June were boycotted by the opposition, which continued to press for reconstitution of the assembly. Kuwait at the time of the invasion, then, was in the middle of a battle for political rights, albeit for a small minority. The al-Sabahs were caught between the need to avoid offending Saudi Arabia, which is thoroughly hostile to parliamentary democracy, even Kuwait-style, and fears that without concessions, opposition might one day reach the point of questioning their right to rule. Iraq's invasion has rallied Kuwaitis behind their rulers. Even the opposition demands that the country be ''left alone to determine its future''. But the Iraqi occupation vastly complicates the task of building democracy. Up to 1.4 million people have fled, including half Kuwait's 600,000 citizens. Thousands of Iraqis and Palestinians have moved in from Baghdad.

Impact non-unique- democracy a farce in Kuwait

The Economist 98 [June 6, Lexis] KLS

WITH ceremony, on June 1st, Sheikh Saad al-Sabah, Kuwait's crown prince and prime minister, promised to carry out long-awaited reforms. Kuwaitis felt they had been there before. In 1991, after the Iraqi occupying force had been thrown out of their country, their princely rulers had reluctantly agreed, under American pressure, to turn over a new leaf. No more procrastination, they said: democracy would be restored, the economy would be liberalised, and migrant labourers would never again be allowed to outnumber Kuwaitis in their own country. Seven years on, the limited democracy reintroduced after the Gulf war is being undermined by petty squabbling, economic reform still exists only on paper, and foreigners once again make up two-thirds of the population.

MPX T/- A2 Democracy Module

Democracy destroys the environment – several reasons.

Li and Reuveny 7 [Li, Professor of Political Science at Penn State, and Reuveny, Professor of public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana U, Quan and Rafael, “The Effects of Liberalism on the Terrestrial Environment” http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/3/219] KLS

According to the *policy inaction argument*, facing environmental degradation, democracy can often exhibit policy inaction for several reasons (Midlarsky, 1998: 159). First, democracy seeks to please competing interest groups. As such, it may be reluctant to alleviate environmental degradation because some groups are expected to benefit (or lose) from environmental policies more than others. Second, “corporation and environmental groups can fight each other to a standstill, leaving a decision making vacuum instead of a direct impact of democracy on the environment.” Third, when budgets are tight democracies may ignore environmental problems, perceiving economic issues to be more pressing.

Democracies start more wars

Henderson 2 [Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 146] KLS

Are Democracies More Peaceful than Nondemocracies with Respect to Interstate Wars? The results indicate that democracies are more war-prone than non-democracies (whether democracy is coded dichotomously or continu­ously) and that democracies are more likely to initiate interstate wars. The findings are obtained from analyses that control for a host of political, economic, and cultural factors that have been implicated in the onset of interstate war, and focus explicitly on state level factors instead of simply inferring state level processes from dyadic level observations as was done in earlier studies (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal and Ray, 1997). The results imply that democratic enlargement is more likely to increase the probability of war for states since democracies are more likely to become involved in—and to ini­tiate—interstate wars.

MPX Turn – Terrorism

Middle East instability prevents terrorism

Davies and Cetron 7 (Owen and Marvin J., researchers for the Futurist, September 2007 [http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/26265546/WORSTCASE-SCENARIO-THE-MIDDLE-EAST ] AD: 6/24/10)JM

Velamoor suggests that Iraq may quickly become a Shi'ite theocracy on the model of Iran, slowly growing more liberal in the years ahead. Others hold that Iran is stirring the chaos in Iraq not so much to dominate its neighbor as to keep U.S. troops mired there. That way, if President Bush decides to attack Iran, Teheran will have 200,000 U.S. hostages at hand right next door. Even so, the idea of a generalized war in the Middle East appears credible enough and its potential impact on the West serious enough to merit examination. It is the worst-case scenario and needs to be understood and either defended against or, if possible, turned to the West's advantage. To date, most commentators have simply assumed that a generalized war in the Middle East would be a bad thing, and today's concerns have limited their analyses to policy implications for the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Certainly, wholesale carnage is never to be welcomed, and the risk of unrestrained slaughter must be factored into any decision the United States makes about the land it chose to occupy. Yet, the United States will not remain in Iraq forever, forced comparisons with Korea notwithstanding, and its departure is likely to leave a power vacuum in that country. Under the circumstances, there are questions that need to be answered in some detail. What would a regional war in the Middle East imply for the United States and its allies? And what should the West do to influence the situation to its advantage, now and in the future? Thus far, many possibilities have been overlooked. For example, the Iraq war has inspired, recruited, trained, and battlehardened a new generation of future terrorists who, when freed from Iraq, are likely to turn their attention to the United States and its allies, especially in the U.K. and France. Having September-October 2007 www.wfs.org 17 Left: Terrorist acts such as car bomb explosions are certain to grow significantly in number in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, but can't effectively be prevented by a U.S. military presence in the Middle East either, the authors argue. Below: An Israeli military jeep parked by the infamous wall that cuts across the Israeli Palestinian boarder. NICHOLAS BURKE / ISTOCKPHOTO.COM "The United States must be seen to seek peace in between Israel and its neighbors in a way that most Muslims will view as fair to the Palestinians. It is the only thing Washington can do to insulate its nation, even in part, from violence once it leaves Iraq." a Middle Eastern war to keep them occupied may be the West's only protection against a jihad that could make terrorism to date seem relatively tame.

Kuwait Econ Not Key to World

Kuwait economy not key to world- dependent on global trends

Jamieson 6/11 [Lee, Staff Writer, Arabian Business.com, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/590034-taking-care-of-business] KLS

However, recent economic turbulence has made Kuwait acutely aware of how reliant it is on the global economic system. The Kuwait Stock Exchange experienced a loss of US $10 billion early last year, high inflation is an ongoing concern and the number of expatriate workers, which make up 50% of its overall population, has dropped for the second year in a row.

Kuwait Econ Resilient- Hotel Investors

Kuwait economy resilient- hotel investors

Jamieson 6/11 [Lee, Staff Writer, Arabian Business.com, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/590034-taking-care-of-business] KLS

Despite this turbulence, the Kuwaiti government has proved to be resilient throughout the economic storm, in part thanks to its vast financial reserves, and has proved itself to be a safe harbour for hotel investors. "The fact that Kuwait has remained economically buoyant despite the world recession is a key factor driving investment into the country," explains InterContinental Hotels Group Middle East and Africa vice president of development, Phil Kasselis.

Kuwait Econ Resilient- Banking

Kuwait econ resilient- banking, liquidity, efficiency

Thabet 6/15 [Mokhtar, Staff Writer, 2010 Global Arab Network http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201006156218/Finance/kuwait-negative-banking-outlook-weak-diversification-oil-reliance.html] KLS

Thanks to a comfortable banking sector’s aggregate equity to total assets and a good liquidity system supported by the availability of ample government funding, Kuwaiti banks are able to weather significant pressure. Nonetheless, despite some improvement, banks’ risk management practices need further enhancement, as shown by the significant portfolio concentrations on the stressed Kuwaiti investment company and real estate and construction sectors. Unlike excellent profitability undergone by Kuwaiti banks before the financial crisis (benefiting from the booming local and regional economies), Moody’s expects the yearend 2009 results to show a significant increase in system NPLs due to increased provisioning charges and adversely affecting returns. Elevated provisioning charges are likely to continue to affect some banks’ profits throughout 2010. Moody’s expects banks with higher concentrations in their loan books or weaker credit standards to report weaker results than those of their peers. The Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) relaxing its rule on the loans to deposits ratio did not impede a loan growth slowdown since the crisis started. Eventually, the efficiency of Kuwaiti banks in terms of cost-to-income ratios is excellent in global terms, although some deterioration in efficiency ratios as a result of the weakened operating conditions could exert pressure on profits.

Kuwait Econ Resilient- Oil

Kuwaiti economy resilient – oil

Oxford Economic Country Briefings 8 (1/18/8, “Kuwait,” Oxford Economic Country Briefings [Magazine] ) JPG

Kuwait has a relatively undiversified economy, dominated by the oil industry and government sector, with oil accounting for about half of GDP, 95% of export revenues and around 80% of government revenues. During the 1970s, the economy grew strongly on the back of rapidly rising oil prices, but in the 1980s it was hit by a securities market crash and sharply lower oil prices, followed up by the 1990 Iraq invasion. In exile during the Iraqi occupation, the government drew down over half of its US$1 OObn in overseas investments to help pay for reconstruction. The economy has enjoyed a period of prosperity since the US-led invasion of Iraq, with many companies in Iraq establishing offices in Kuwait and procuring goods through Kuwaiti companies, with banking and construction having grown particularly strongly. Sharply higher oil prices in the last few years have also given the economy another big boost, with real GDP growth jumping to over 15% in 2003 and averaging about 10% in 2004-05. The oil sector has led the way, climbing to almost 60% of GDP in 2005, but non-oil sectors, in particular services, have also been boosted by the impact of booming oil revenues. However, the pace of economic reform has been slow, hampering the growth of private sector involvement in the economy. \* Crude oil reserves are officially said to be almost 10Obn barrels, or 8% of world reserves, making Kuwait a key player within OPEC and world oil markets. The Saudi-Kuwaiti neutral zone, shared by the two countries, holds an additional 5bn barrels, lifting Kuwait's total oil reserves to over 100bn barrels, enough for over 100 years of production at the 2005 level of around 2.5m b/d. Under the US$7bn Project Kuwait, the government is hoping it will reach 3.0m b/d by 2008 and 4m b/d by 2012, but these plans are thought unlikely to be met. And there have also been industry reports that proven oil reserves are only about half of the officially quoted level, which in turn would cast doubt over the sustainability of any sharp increase in production. \* As a result of booming oil revenues, the country's traditional balance of payments surpluses have been swollen further in recent years, with the current account surplus rising to over US$50bn in 2006, equal to about 50% of GDP. These surpluses have enabled the government to rebuild its external assets, which were heavily depleted after the Iraq invasion but are now thought to be approaching the US$100bn level again. As well as rising external surpluses, which have helped to support the dinar (KWD, pegged to the US$ from January 2003 to May 2007 and now to a trade- and investment-weighted basket of currencies), the government has also posted rising budget surpluses, estimated at 30% of GDP in 2005 and 2006. These have enabled total gross debt to be brought down to 13% of GDP at end-2005, and the acquisition of foreign assets has made Kuwait one of the world's largest net external creditors. Along with the other states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Kuwait is planning to form a currency union by 2010, but doubts about the feasibility of this plan have surfaced in the past year, especially following the May 2007 KWD revaluation.

\*\*NATO – Afghanistan Aff Ans

UQ > Link

**Uniqueness overwhelms the link – the NATO operation in Afghanistan will be gone by the end of 2010**

**The Guardian 10** (Ian Traynor, Feb 22 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/21/dutch-government-falls-over-afghanistan)IM

The Dutch government collapsed at the weekend, making it the first European and Nato administration to fall because of the war in Afghanistan. The fourth fall of a government under the prime minister, Jan-Peter Balkenende, in eight years could end his career and is certain to usher in a period of political uncertainty that could bring big gains for the extreme anti-Muslim right. The end of Balkenende's centrist coalition, mainly of Christian and social democrats, means that the almost 2,000 Dutch troops in Afghanistan, based around Uruzgan, south-west of Kabul, will start pulling out in August and be withdrawn by the end of the year. "If nothing else will take its place, then [the Afghan mission] ends," Balkenende told Dutch television yesterday. "The image of the Netherlands is far from flourishing abroad. They do not understand what we are doing." The Netherlands could set a precedent, encouraging other European countries to get cold feet about their presence in Afghanistan. "The moment the Netherlands says as sole and first country we will no longer have activities at the end of 2010, it will raise questions in other countries and this really pains me," Balkenende said. While the prime minister sought to extend the Afghan mission, under strong pressure from Nato allies and Washington, his Labour party coalition partner opposed the extension and walked out of crisis talks on Saturday, spelling the end of the government two years into its term. The Dutch withdrawal is a blow to President Barack Obama and comes as the US and Nato troops mount their biggest operation in Afghanistan for years. The Americans have been pressing for more European troops in Afghanistan and voiced satisfaction with European pledges of some 9,000 extra forces in recent weeks. But the Americans are demanding that the Europeans supply 2,000 trainers for the Afghan army and police.

No Link

Overhaul from Washington checks any backsliding in US-NATO relations

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

The flurry of activity comes in response to fears that, by making a habit of unilateral action, the United States - which is way ahead of Europe in military technology and defence spending - could marginalize the alliance. But instead of snubbing NATO, Washington is now leading efforts to revitalize it. WASHINGTON SEEKS OVERHAUL: The senior official said that US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would propose a review of NATO's command structure, raising the question of whether it still needs a Supreme Allied Commander based in North America (SACLANT) as well as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). And Britain's Sunday Telegraph reported this week that the Pentagon would also propose that NATO set up small, highly mobile units for risky missions. NATO officials said such a plan would be in keeping with the alliance's push for "smart" forces that can be deployed quickly and sustainably to far-flung troublespots.

NATO is initiating reforms to regain primacy – its actions will check the impacts of US withdrawal from Afghanistan

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

BRUSSELS, June 3: NATO is drawing up a new "military concept" to define its role in the fight against global terrorism and put an end to the identity crisis which has plagued it since September 11, officials said on Monday. Sidelined by the US military campaign in Afghanistan, NATO is working to make itself relevant for threats and security challenges that may lie far beyond the borders of Europe that it guarded during the Cold War. Defence ministers from the 19-nation alliance will kickstart the process at a meeting in Brussels on Thursday and the package of measures will be agreed at a summit in Prague next November. They will consider plans to streamline NATO's cumbersome military command structure and start work on a shopping list of military hardware to defend against weapons of mass destruction and get boots on the ground quickly when crises erupt. "The main function of this new military concept is to define NATO's role, and in particular the military role in relation to terrorism," a senior NATO official said. It will consider what role NATO could play in attacks on non-member countries outside its traditional area of operations and how it can contribute to international coalitions.

NATO is committed to remaining in Afghanistan

**Poppelwell 9** (Teresa, Forced Migration Online, FMO Research Guide: Afghanistan,, July 2009, p. 9, www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo006/fmo006.pdf)IM

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed authority for the ISAF mission with the aim of creating a common command structure to enable better planning and coordination. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510) which created the legal conditions for the expansion of the mission. As of January 2007, there are currently 37 Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) with a total of approximately 32,800 troops. In addition, the American led ‘Enduring Freedom’ has approximately 8,000 troops which continue to focus on hunting down Al Queda. Around the country there are five Regional Commands (RCs). Each of the Regional Commands has a varying number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams – each led by various contributing nations, which report to them. Recent events indicate that NATO/ISAF’s engagement in Afghanistan will continue for the long term. On 6 September 2006, President Karzai and the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer signed the ‘Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’ which is a framework for long term cooperation and partnership. This declaration, as well as the fact that the NATO presence in the region is an important element on the ‘war on terror’, indicates that NATO and the ISAF mission will have an enduring presence in Afghanistan for a number of years. ISAF will remain in Afghanistan until ‘the people of Afghanistan have developed government structures and security forces that are sustainable and capable of ensuring the security of all Afghans without outside support.’ ISAF’s primary role is to support the Government of Afghanistan in providing and maintaining a secure environment that will be conducive to establishing democratic structures, to facilitate the reconstruction of the country and to assist in expanding the influence of the central government. ISAF’s key military tasks include: assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in coordination with the Afghan national security forces: mentoring and supporting the Afghan national army; and supporting Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups.

No Link

Turkey would take the place of the US – strong military and second largest standing army

**Aorere 9** (Manatu, NZ Ministry of For. Affairs and Trade, June 25 2009, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Middle-East/Turkey.php)IM

There have been signs that relations were improving between Armenia and Turkey ever since President Gül attended an Armenian/Turkish World Cup qualifying football match in Armenia’s capital Yerevan in September last year (the first visit by a Turkish leader to Armenia). Since then, intense discussions have occurred at all levels between the governments of Armenia and Turkey, with the possible outcome an historic reconciliation between two traditional enemies divided by strategic differences in the Caucasus and by the Ottoman Empire’s killing of Armenians in 1915. Turkey is currently a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It is a member of NATO and maintains one of the largest standing armies in the world, and the second largest in NATO behind the United States. As a result, its defence spending places a heavy burden on both the government budget and the balance of payments. Turkey has been engaged in Afghanistan, having led the UN-authorised International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), for six months in 2002-3 and again from February to August 2005. It established a Provincial Reconstruction Team in November 2006, in Wardak, the province next to Bamyan, where New Zealand’s PRT is based. Turkey also plays an active role in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Alliance of Civilisations, an interfaith forum New Zealand also participates in.

Link Turn – Afghanistan x Readiness

NATO engagement in Afghanistan strains US military effectiveness

Ruhle 9 (Michael, Oct 21, ,Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit of the NATO Secretary GeneralStrategic Insights, <online>http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Sep/ruhleSep09.html date accessed 7/6)CM

At NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in April 2009, the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government agreed that work should start on the development of a new Strategic Concept. The momentum for such a decision had been building up for quite some time. Over the past few years, NATO’s growing number of operations and missions, and in particular its engagement in Afghanistan, have put strains both on the Allies’ military capabilities and their political consensus. In addition, Russia’s new assertiveness, and notably the war in Georgia in August 2008, fueled a debate on the proper balance between collective defense at home and expeditionary missions abroad. Finally, the fact that new threats, such as a cyber attack or an energy cut-off, do not affect all Allies in quite the same way, has also led to calls for a re-definition of the meaning of Alliance solidarity. In short, ten years after the publication of the current Strategic Concept, there were found to be a number of good reasons to develop a new document. Initially, nuclear issues did not really feature among these reasons. Despite the long battle of a range of NGOs against NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons on the soil of some European Allies, NATO’s nuclear “acquis” has long been considered as essentially sound. Neither doubts in expert circles about the military utility of aircraft armed with nuclear gravity bombs, nor occasional anti-nuclear sentiments in the Parliaments of some NATO countries, would trump the logic of Alliance reassurance and risk-sharing. However, several recent developments now require NATO to revisit its nuclear dimension and to carefully consider how this is reflected in the new Strategic Concept. In particular, heightened concern about nuclear proliferation has prompted a change in U.S. rhetoric and policy. Guided by the conviction that restoring an eroding non-proliferation regime requires the United States to lead by example, President Obama’s Prague speech of April 2009 espoused the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. To be sure, the President qualified this long-term objective with the proviso that as long as other states possessed nuclear weapons, the United States would maintain a nuclear deterrent of its own, including for the protection of its friends and Allies. In doing so, he remained within the tradition of every U.S. President since Harry Truman. In the public perception, however, these qualifications received little attention. Although the U.S. President did not touch upon NATO’s nuclear policy or posture, some European politicians were quick to interpret his plea for a nuclear-weapon-free world as support for their own goal to see U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons removed from Europe. Predictably, several NGOs reacted in similar ways, interpreting the President’s speech as an invitation to unilateral gestures by the United States and NATO. As a result, while U.S. policy on NATO’s nuclear dimension may not necessarily have changed, the public debate is characterized by expectations to the contrary.

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Afghan Stability\*\*

NATO aid is only quick fixes, doesn’t address the underlying causes of poverty, is poorly executed and causes heightened instability

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

Undoubtedly, Afghans have seen some improvements, particularly in the expansion of access to healthcare and education. While it costs approximately $1 million a year to support the deployment of one US soldier in Afghanistan, an average of just $93 in development aid has been spent per Afghan per year over the past seven years.2 Far too much aid has focused on “quick fixes” and band-aid approaches rather than on what will produce positive and lasting results for Afghans over the long term. As political pressures to “show results” in troop contributing countries intensify, more and more assistance is being channelled through military actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined. Development projects implemented with military money or through (the) military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability and, in some cases, military involvement in development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by anti-government elements. As eight non-governmental organizations, working in Afghanistan for up to fifty years and currently serving over 5 million Afghans across the country, we are deeply concerned about the harmful effects of this increasingly militarized aid strategy. As leaders from 70 nations gather in London to debate the future of Afghanistan, we urge them to revaluate this approach to development and reconstruction.

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

The NATO strategy in Afghanistan is too heavily based on aid to be effective

**IRIN 10** (Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 29 2010, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/3d2a779c198dea11eae7303662874d2f.htm)IM

But according to research by the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, it is corruption and the ineffectiveness of the government rather than poverty that is at the root of Afghanistan's current insecurity. "A COIN strategy premised on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a competitive environment where the Taliban are perceived by many to be more effective in addressing the people's highest priority needs of security and access to justice." In the report of a conference discussing the COIN strategy in March 2010, researchers argued that ill-conceived, poorly implemented aid projects with weak oversight has done more harm than good for the international coalition in Afghanistan. "There is a need for much greater awareness regarding the destabilizing effects of aid in terms of creating perceived winners and losers, promoting a destructive war/aid economy, and fuelling corruption," the report noted. "Donors should avoid setting development aid up to fail by expecting it to deliver on unrealistically ambitious stabilisation objectives for which it is not well-suited."

NATO aid puts civilians on the front lines, creates new targets, are ineffective and not long-term solutions

**Afghanaid 10** (Jan 27 2010, Ashley Jackson, Head of Policy and Advocacy, http://www.afghanaid.org.uk/news.php/12/press\_release\_27.01.10\_aid\_agencies\_sound\_alarm\_on\_the\_militarisation\_of\_aid\_in\_afghanistan\_0)IM

 As Foreign Ministers gather in London for a major conference on Afghanistan, leading aid agencies warn that the international militaries' use of aid as a “non-lethal” weapon of war that may even be putting Afghans at greater risk. A US army manual for commanders in Afghanistan and in Iraq defines aid as a non-lethal weapon designed “to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents”. The Afghan government estimates international forces have already spent $1.7 billion on “aid” in Afghanistan. The US military alone has budgeted an additional $1 billion for the coming year – more than Afghanistan’s state budget for agriculture, health and education combined. The eight international agencies are concerned that the militarization of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict. Afghans say that the military places them at greater risk when they build schools and clinics which then become targets of armed opposition groups. The agencies say that “quick impact” projects provide a quick fix rather than sustainable development. Military-led humanitarian and development activities are driven by donors’ political interests and short-term security objectives and are often ineffective, wasteful and potentially harmful to Afghans. International guidelines agreed by ISAF and the UN state that “the military is primarily responsible for providing security, and if necessary, basic infrastructure and urgent reconstruction assistance limited to gap-filling measures until civilian organisations are able to take over” The agencies say that the international forces are going way beyond their remit. Ashley Jackson, head of policy for Oxfam International in Afghanistan, says: “There are no 'quick fixes' in Afghanistan and nobody should be cutting corners - the people here deserve better. Afghan people have coped with decades of grinding poverty, conflict and disorder and need real, long-term solutions.”

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

NATO’s training efforts kill Afghan soldiers and drain public and political support for NATO troops

**Al-Jazeera 10** (July 7 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/07/2010778313947561.html)IM

At least five Afghan soldiers have been killed by a Nato air raid in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing took place in Ghazni province, where the soldiers were carrying out a pre-dawn raid against Taliban fighters, according to a spokesman for the Afghan defence ministry. "Isaf aircraft bombed and martyred five of our soldiers," Zaher Azimi, a spokesman for the ministry, said, referring to the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). "We condemn this incident and regret that this is not the first time such an incident has occurred. We hope it will be the last time." Two other soldiers were injured in the air raid. Josef Blotz, a Nato spokesman, confirmed the attack. He said he regretted the incident and that Isaf would launch an investigation. "The reason for this is perhaps a co-ordination issue," Blotz said. "We were obviously not absolutely clear whether there were Afghan national security forces in the area." He extended the personal condolences of General David Petraeus, the newly arrived commander of Nato and US forces in Afghanistan, to the families of the victims. So-called "friendly fire" incidents continue to occur in Afghanistan, despite tighter new rules of engagement designed to limit the use of air raids. A Nato air strike killed four Afghan soldiers in Wardak province in January and the German army accidentally killed five Afghan soldiers in April in a "friendly fire" incident in Kunduz province. Such incidents have been repeatedly condemned by the Afghan government, which highlights the effect the negative effect that they have on attempts to get the Afghan public, and the government, to support efforts against the Taliban.

NATO hurts Afghanistan – ineffective, unsustainable, corrupt, creates dependency and ill equipped

 **Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

Military-dominated institutions, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), often lack the capacity to manage effective development initiatives, even where civilians are inserted into these structures. They are unable to achieve the level of local trust, engagement and community ownership required to achieve positive and lasting improvements to Afghan lives. In many cases, PRTs in insecure areas rely on local contracting companies that have limited capacities, weak links to communities and are widely seen as wasteful, ineffective and corrupt.3 Part of the problem is that the militarized aid approach focuses not on alleviating poverty but on winning the loyalty of Afghans through the provision of aid. In “Commanders’ Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” a US army manual for troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, aid is defined as “a nonlethal weapon” that is utilized to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents.”4 In a country where some 6,000 schools are needed, it is difficult to argue that those with the resources should refrain from building them. However, this approach to assistance is more likely to create dependencies rather than increase the self-sufficiency of communities. And given that it is so often poorly implemented, it is highly unlikely to achieve even its intended security objectives. One school constructed by a PRT in Kapisa province was found to have problems with its structural integrity and serious design flaws, with latrines emptying just above a stream that the community used as a water source. Another PRT-constructed school in the same province was found to have “design and safety issues” and “presented an unsafe environment in its current state” due to the absence of a retaining wall to prevent potential rock and mudslides.5 Achieving sustainability and local ownership is also a challenge: a review of PRTs by the US Congress found that “the lack of planning led PRTs to pursue short-term ‘feel good’ projects (with success measured by money spent or satisfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic and capacity-building implications.”6 Schools, for example, require much more than just buildings to function. They must have trained male and female teachers, relevant textbooks and curricula, a safe environment to enable children (especially girls) to attend and a sense of community ownership as well as links with the Ministry of Education (MoE) to ensure sustainability. PRTs, however, are scarcely equipped to provide anything beyond basic infrastructure, particularly given that the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, which support the assistance activities of US PRTs and battalions, are explicitly prohibited from being used for project maintenance or upkeep.7 In the words of one tribal leader from Paktia, “we have a common saying, it is better to have less from a sustainable source than having a great deal just once…we really do not need somebody to distribute biscuits to us and do not need construction projects that fall down after a year.”

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

NATO presence creates heightened conflict, civilian casualties and terrorism

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

There is also increasing evidence that military involvement in development activities may be putting Afghans on the frontlines of the conflict. A recent report released by CARE, the MoE and the World Bank found that schools supported or constructed by PRTs were perceived by Afghans to be at higher risk of being attacked.12 With anti-government elements increasingly targeting education, schools built by the military in insecure areas are putting teachers and students at even greater risk.13 Many fear that, by extension, the same applies to health clinics and other community facilities constructed by PRTs or other military actors. As one aid worker said, “We try to keep PRTs away from our offices and do not interact with them because it brings threats from insurgents and suspicion from our target communities.”14 A related concern is that with so much international assistance directed towards counter- insurgency and military objectives, vulnerable populations are being forgotten. Chief among these are returning refugees from Pakistan and Iran and internally displaced people have been forced to flee their homes due to natural disasters or conflict. This problem will likely be exacerbated by the potential escalation of the conflict in 2010. Another practice that is putting civilians at risk is the use of aid as an incentive to extract information. US commanders are authorized to offer rewards “paid in cash or in the form of like-kind benefits such as food, local amenities, necessities, vehicles or communal rewards” to individuals who they believe can provide valuable intelligence.15 Offering food and other aid in exchange for information in a country where a third of the population is at risk of hunger is not only unethical, it puts Afghans in potential danger of being targeted by anti- government groups. In 2009, nine Afghans, including at least one community leader, were assassinated each week – nearly double the rate of assassinations in 2008.16

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Dehum

NATO presence causes dehumanization and conflict in Afghanistan

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

The militarized aid approach is not working for Afghans, and more of the same is unlikely to yield different results. The overemphasis on military issues at the expense of efforts to promote genuine development and good government matters not only because of the resulting dehumanizing cost, but also because poverty, unemployment and weak, corrupt government are important drivers of conflict. Ultimately, these factors must be effectively addressed if there is to be any sustainable improvement in security and a lasting peace for Afghans. In order to address the problems of militarized aid and focus on solutions that work for Afghans, we urge world leaders meeting in London to: \* Provide stronger support for successful programming like Community-Based Education. Ensure that these programs remain separate from the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and are not recipients of military funding. \* Establish and implement a plan to gradually phase out PRT-provided and other militarized forms of aid. At the same the time, the capacity of and funding for national and international civilian organizations should be increased. \* Increase the ability of local organizations to design and implement development projects. \* Ensure that aid is equitably delivered throughout the country based on development and humanitarian needs, and in line with national development plans. \* Improve the capacity, responsiveness and transparency of local government. Afghans overwhelmingly want a government capable of delivering basic services and the rule of law, yet these systems remain weak and largely ineffective at the local level. \* Support the UN to take on a greater role in delivering and coordinating aid, particularly in under-resourced provinces and districts. NATO must also be more forceful in coordinating aid efforts, preserving their independence and improving their effectiveness, accountability and transparency.

NATO has weakened the Afghan government’s accountability and created dehumanizing conditions

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

While some PRT projects have helped address immediate needs and contributed to reconstruction efforts, they have also slowed the process of rebuilding Afghan institutions. In assuming some of the responsibilities that the Afghan government should be fulfilling, PRTs may weaken government accountability to the Afghan people. The military does have a role to play in providing assistance to save lives and alleviate suffering in situations where no civilian actor is able to do so, but it must be provided impartially and on the basis of need. The Civil Military Guidelines, agreed upon by ISAF and the UN, state that only “in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort, military assets…may be deployed for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance.” PRT Policy Note 3 also specifically states that humanitarian assistance “must not be used for the purpose of political gain, relationship building or ‘winning hearts and minds’…and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality,” – neither of which describe the PRT’s actions.

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law

NATO presence undermines international law

**Kabul Press 9** (Matthew Nasuti, US State Dept official, Nov 8 2009, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4239)IM

NATO operates 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, with a goal to add teams to every one of its 34 provinces. The PRTs primarily consist of military personnel, with a mix of civilian aid officials and technical experts. They serve a dual function of supporting military operations and aiding civilian reconstruction and are an integral part of NATO’s counterinsurgency (COIN) war plan. C. Stuart Calison, Ph.D, a Senior Development Economist with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), recently released the October 2, 2009 memo he wrote to the Director of USAID in which he complained that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was interfering with USAID’s COIN projects and objectives in Afghanistan’s border region. The memo reflects a growing reality, which is that all American aid seems cloaked with military goals and objectives. One of the many problems with such a transformation in policy is that it violates international law. Another is that militarizing aid places civilian aid personnel at risk as they are seen as simply a tool of the Pentagon. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Part I, Article 5, essentially provides that if a military force such as the Taliban “is satisfied” that a civilian aid worker “is definitely suspected of” hostile activity, such aid worker could lose his or her protected status and would become a legitimate target. Thus, civilians who accompany or provide services and support to the armed forces could fall outside of the definition of “civilians” as set out in the Third Geneva Convention, Article 4. Major General Michael Tucker of ISAF-Kabul was quoted by Kevin Baron in the September 15, 2009, edition of Stars and Stripes as stating that NATO uses humanitarian aid as a “key factor” in its “population-centric operations.” This prompted Stephen Cornish, the director of bilateral programs for CARE Canada, to state that: NATO had placed “a counterinsurgency umbrella” over humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, which now places aid workers at risk. He went on to tell Stars and Stripes that aid organizations are being targeted if there is any suspicion of collaboration with the American forces. Stars and Stripes then interviewed a Taliban spokesman who stated: “We only respect truly neutral and independent aid organizations that do not work at the behest of American and Western forces.”

International law is crucial to uphold human rights for all

**UDHR 9** (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Aug 27 2009, http://www.udhr.org/history/question.htm)IM

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the primary international articulation of the fundamental and inalienable rights of all members of the human family. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, the UDHR represents the first comprehensive agreement among nations as to the specific rights and freedoms of all human beings. Among others, these include civil and political rights such as the right not to be subjected to torture, to equality before the law, to a fair trial, to freedom of movement, to asylum and to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression. The rights outlined in the UDHR also include economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to social security, to work, to equal pay for equal work, to form trade unions and to education. Originally intended as a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations", over the past fifty years the Universal Declaration has become a cornerstone of customary international law, and all governments are now bound to apply its principles. Because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights successfully encompasses legal, moral and philosophical beliefs held true by all peoples, it has become a living document which asserts its own elevating force on the events of our world. While the record shows that most of those who adopted the UDHR did not imagine it to be a legally binding document, the legal impact of the Universal Declaration has been much greater than perhaps any of its framers had imagined. Today, direct reference to the UDHR is made in the constitutions of many nations that realized their independence after the document was adopted. Prime ministers, presidents, legislators, judges, lawyers, legal scholars, human rights activists and ordinary people throughout the world have accepted the Universal Declaration as an essential legal code. Dozens of legally binding international treaties are based on the principles set forth in the UDHR, and the document has been cited as justification for numerous United Nations actions, including acts of the Security Council. As oppressed individuals turn increasingly to the Universal Declaration for protection and relief, so governments have come to accept the document not just as a noble aspiration, but as a standard that must be realized. Because it is universal, a central and integral part of our international legal structure, the Universal Declaration is widely accepted as a primary building block of customary international law -- an indispensable tool in upholding human rights for all.

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Taliban

NATO military presence in Afghanistan fuels the Taliban

**Mercier 10** (Gilbert, The Post, May 6 2010,

http://newsjunkiepost.com/2010/05/06/afghanistan-us-and-nato-are-still-losing-hearts-and-minds/)IM

The military operation in Marjah, launched in February 2010, was the first deployment after the surge of 30,000 additional troops decided by the Obama administration. The planning of the operation emphasized the needs of the Afghan people, and the importance of winning “hearts and minds”. However, according to a new report just released by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), this objective was not met. The reality on the ground did not match the rhetoric, and the attack turned out to be a recruiting tool for the Taliban. The ICOS report reviews the local perception of the operation from more than 400 Afghan men from Marjah, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar interviewed by the ICOS in March 2010. The report reveals that Operation Moshtarak has contributed to “high levels of anger among local Afghans”, with 61 percent of those interviewed feeling “more negative about NATO forces than before the military offensive”. In other words, the objective of winning “hearts and minds”-one of the fundamental tenets of the new counter-insurgency strategy- was not met. The report finds a few key factors at plays, and mistakes made that have translated into more recruits for the Taliban, especially in the context of a much larger city such as Kandahar. The legitimate grievance of the people of Marjah are used by the Taliban who will seek to recruit the region’s angry young men. Of those interviewed, 95 percent believed more young Afghans have joined the Taliban in the last year. 78 percent of the respondents were “often or always angry”, and 45 percent stated they were “angry at the NATO occupation, civilian casualties and night raids”. The report says that Operation Moshtarak, and similar operations in the future, provide a perfect propaganda tool for the Taliban in their recruitment strategy. The report recommends the adoption of a new “Counter insurgency impact equation to balance any negative impact, and ensure that the positive impact is greater than the negative impact”. Another point highlighted by the report has to do with the refugee situation created by the offensive, and the shortcomings to deal with it. The report found that despite advance planning, very little aid or infrastructure was made available for refugees. 97 percent of Afghans interviewed by ICOS said that the operation had led to new flow of internally displaced people. Thousands of displaced Afghans were forced to move to non existent or overcrowded refugee camps with insufficient food, medical supplies and shelters. 59 percent of those interviewed believed the Taliban will return to Marjah after the operation. 67 percent did not support a strong NATO-ISAF presence in their province, and 71 percent stated they wanted NATO forces to leave. Afghans are also very sceptical about NATO’s chances to win against the Taliban with 67 percent of those interviewed stating they did not believe “NATO and the Afghan government would win against the Taliban”, and 14 percent saying that “NATO would never win”. “The lack of humanitarian planning has been a propaganda victory for the Taliban, who will use the grievances of local Afghans to radicalize and recruit young men,” said Jorrit Kamminga Director of Policy Research at ICOS.

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Terrorism

NATO presence increases violence and terrorist activity in Afghanistan

**AP 10** (Robert Reid, Associated Press, June 19 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeq M5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD9GEFQ980)IM

KABUL, Afghanistan — The United Nations reported Saturday that insurgent violence has risen sharply in Afghanistan over the last three months, with roadside bombings, complex suicide attacks and assassinations soaring over last year's levels. The three-month report by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the U.N. Security Council appeared at odds with Pentagon assertions of slow but steady progress in Afghanistan — an assessment that was challenged by U.S. lawmakers during recent hearings on Capitol Hill. In the report, Ban said the overall security situation in Afghanistan has not improved since his last report in March and instead the number of violent incidents had "increased significantly compared to previous years and contrary to seasonal trends." The most "alarming trend" was a sharp rise in the number of roadside bombings, which soared 94 percent in the first four months of this year compared with the same period in 2009, Ban said. Moreover, assassinations of Afghan government officials jumped 45 percent, mostly in the ethnic Pashtun south, he said. NATO has launched a major operation to secure the biggest southern city, Kandahar, the Taliban's spiritual birthplace. At the same time, suicide attacks are occurring at the rate of about three per week, Ban said, half of them in the south. Complex attacks employing suicide bombers, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire were running about two a month, double the number in 2009, he added. During testimony Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee, senior Pentagon official Michele Flournoy said the percentage of complex attacks had fallen steadily since a peak in February and were averaging below last year's levels. She gave no figures. "The shift to more complex suicide attacks demonstrates a growing capability of the local terrorist networks linked to al-Qaida," Ban said. He attributed the rise in violence to increased NATO and Afghan military activity in the south during the first quarter of the year, including the U.S.-led attack on the Taliban stronghold of Marjah. He also cited "significant anti-government element activities" in the east and southeast of the country. "The majority of incidents continue to involve armed clashes and improvised explosive devices, each accounting for one third of the reported incidents," Ban said, referring to the military term for roadside bombs.

NATO presence creates more targets for terrorists ad causes innumerable civilian casualties

**Kabul Press 9** (Matthew Nasuti, US State Dept official, Nov 8 2009, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4239)IM

NATO operates 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, with a goal to add teams to every one of its 34 provinces. The PRTs primarily consist of military personnel, with a mix of civilian aid officials and technical experts. They serve a dual function of supporting military operations and aiding civilian reconstruction and are an integral part of NATO’s counterinsurgency (COIN) war plan. C. Stuart Calison, Ph.D, a Senior Development Economist with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), recently released the October 2, 2009 memo he wrote to the Director of USAID in which he complained that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was interfering with USAID’s COIN projects and objectives in Afghanistan’s border region. The memo reflects a growing reality, which is that all American aid seems cloaked with military goals and objectives. One of the many problems with such a transformation in policy is that it violates international law. Another is that militarizing aid places civilian aid personnel at risk as they are seen as simply a tool of the Pentagon. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Part I, Article 5, essentially provides that if a military force such as the Taliban “is satisfied” that a civilian aid worker “is definitely suspected of” hostile activity, such aid worker could lose his or her protected status and would become a legitimate target. Thus, civilians who accompany or provide services and support to the armed forces could fall outside of the definition of “civilians” as set out in the Third Geneva Convention, Article 4. Major General Michael Tucker of ISAF-Kabul was quoted by Kevin Baron in the September 15, 2009, edition of Stars and Stripes as stating that NATO uses humanitarian aid as a “key factor” in its “population-centric operations.” This prompted Stephen Cornish, the director of bilateral programs for CARE Canada, to state that: NATO had placed “a counterinsurgency umbrella” over humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, which now places aid workers at risk. He went on to tell Stars and Stripes that aid organizations are being targeted if there is any suspicion of collaboration with the American forces. Stars and Stripes then interviewed a Taliban spokesman who stated: “We only respect truly neutral and independent aid organizations that do not work at the behest of American and Western forces.”

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law – Impact XT

Promotion of international law is key to preventing nuclear and genocidal conflicts

**Shaw 1** (Martin, Int. Relt’s @ Sussex, Review of International Studies 27(3), October 2001)IM

The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognise three fundamental truths. First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organisations and civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centers of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war. 84 Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way: the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we need to tame them too, to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held 85 . It will also require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. This is not a separate problem: social and economic reform is an essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal power; these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies. Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop international political interventions, legal institutions and robust peacekeeping as strategic alternatives to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid. 86 As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western and other governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions. 87 What I have outlined is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into partial defeat, or degenerate into new genocidal wars – and perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law – Democracy !

Citing foreign law is key to democracy – it avoids external economic, political and legal pressures

**Benvenisti 8** (Eyal, Law @ Tel Aviv University, American Journal of International Law, April 2008)IM

[\*241] Not so long ago the overwhelming majority of courts in democratic countries shared a reluctance to refer to foreign and international law. Their policy was to avoid any application of foreign sources of law that would clash with the position of their domestic governments. Many jurists find recourse to foreign and international law inappropriate. n1 But even the supporters of reference to external sources of law hold this unexplored assumption that reliance on foreign and international law inevitably comes into tension with the value of national sovereignty. Hence, the scholarly debate is framed along the lines of the well-known broader debate on "the countermajoritarian difficulty." n2 This article questions this assumption of tension. It argues that for courts in most democratic countries--even if not for U.S. courts at present--referring to foreign and international law has become an effective instrument for empowering the domestic democratic processes by shielding them from external economic, political, and even legal pressures. Citing international law therefore actually bolsters domestic democratic processes and reclaims national sovereignty from the diverse forces of globalization. Stated differently, most national courts, seeking to maintain the vitality of their national political institutions and to safeguard their own domestic status vis-a-vis the political branches, cannot afford to ignore foreign and international law.

Global democracy prevents nuclear wars

**Muravchik 1** (Joshua, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf)IM

The fall of Communism not only ended the Cold War; it also ended the only universalist ideological challenge to democracy. Radical Islam may still offer an alternative to democracy in parts of the world, but it appeals by definition only to Moslems and has not even won the assent of a majority of these. And Iranian President Khatami's second landslide election victory in 2001 suggests that even in the cradle of radical Islam the yearning for democracy is waxing. That Freedom House could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974. That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law – AT: Alt Causes

Every instance of international law is key

**Eriksen 9** (Asmund, Counselor to the UN for Norway, Oct 14 2009, http://www.norway-un.org/Statements/Committe-Meetings/Rule-of-law/)IM

States protect their interests through the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states. They recognise the need to establish clarity, certainty and predictability in their international relations. All states undertake treaty obligations for a reason. If international obligations are not honoured by a state, that state runs the risk of other states taking counter measures or presenting claims for compensation. A state’s lack of respect for international law may thus undermine its ability to protect its own interests and collapse the system of global cooperation. Therefore, all states, whether big or small, have a genuine self interest in fully respecting their international obligations and being perceived as a responsible actor on the international stage. In other words, it is in every state’s interest to promote the rule of law at the international level. A vital question for us in this regard is how support and respect for international law can be strengthened. We believe that a key factor is strengthening the sense of ownership of international law. Although a state must explicitly consent to being bound by treaty obligations, we see how important it is to ensure that treaties, which are essentially universal, are developed within a framework where all states have the opportunity to present their views and needs. An open and inclusive negotiating process will serve to strengthen all states’ ownership of the end product and hopefully lead to increased support and respect for the treaty in question. There are at least two concrete conclusions that can be drawn from this observation. First, there must be an arena, a level playing field, which is accessible for all states. The United Nations provides such an arena and we should all aim at strengthening its role in this respect. Second, all participants must have the opportunity and capacity to contribute meaningfully to the discussions in this arena, so that they can exert a real influence. In this regard, we commend all the parts of the UN that are involved in capacity-building to that end. It is vital that international organisations also respect the rule of law. In Norway’s view, the UN and the Security Council should set an example in this regard by scrupulously adhering to the Charter and international law. Finally, let me say a few words about the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group and the Rule of Law Unit. Norway welcomes the establishment of these bodies, with a view to improving coordination and coherence in the UN’s rule of law activities. In our view, these bodies will help to improve the effectiveness of the UN, lead to synergies and reduce duplication of work. We have taken note of the activities carried out so far, with great interest, and we look forward to further steps to implement the Joint Strategic Plan for 2009 – 2011. We also commend the transparency and openness that characterise the work of the two bodies, and encourage them to continue their practice of open consultations with Members States. It is important to ensure that the Rule of Law Unit is provided with the necessary financial and human resources to carry out its important tasks in a proper manner.

\*\*NATO – Turkey Aff Ans

Link Turn – Withdrawal S Prolif

Withdraw of nuclear weapons provides a disincentive for the pursuit of nuclear weapons

Espinosa, 94 (Paul E, December, Navel Postgrad School, Monterey, California http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/1994/Dec/94Dec\_Espinosa.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

The second issue to consider is the continued relevance of extended deterrence. There are two arguments to examine. The first is a complete rejection of extended deterrence on the basis that it is no longer necessary.' This argument assigns to French and British nuclear forces the task of deterring any rejuvenated Russian nuclear threat to Europe. Two underlying tenets of this argument are that it is in the interests of both Britain and France to provide nuclear protection for Germany and that this alternative is acceptable to the Germans. The second argument acknowledges the need for the United States to continue providing a nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. while rejecting the role of tactical nuclear weapons in achieving this objective. Instead, it is argued. reassurances backed up by capable forward-deployed conventional forces and U.S.-based strategic nuclear forces would still allow the United States to meet its security commitments while eliminating the necessity for the overseas deployment of U.S. nuclear forces?' Both arguments reject the need for the United States to uphold extended deterrence commitments in the traditional manner, thereby eliminating the need for any nuclear weapons other than those required to support central deterrence. The third issue supporting the central deterrence argument considers the consequences of assigning new roles for nuclear weapons - for example, using nuclear weapons to deter or respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons. It is argued that, if nuclear weapons were assigned such a role, it would demonstrate to states potentially threatened by chemical or biological weapons that nuclear weapons provide an acceptable response, thereby legitimizing the need to obtain and/or use nuclear weapons.' According to Wolfgang Panofsky and George Bunn, "including deterrence of chemical and biological weapon activities as a mission for nuclear weapons enhances the perceived leverage of nuclear weapons."' Thus, assigning a new role for nuclear weapons legitimizes them as a military weapon, which could prompt some countries to acquire them. Based on this analysis, the only role for nuclear weapons in the post-cold war security environment is central deterrence because it is the only credible role remaining. If necessary. it is argued, strategic nuclear weapons could be used to support existential deterrence and to reassure U.S. allies. Any other threat would be more credibly deterred, and if necessary responded to. with conventional forces If central deterrence is indeed the one credible role remaining for nuclear weapons, and it is reasonable to suggest that there is no conceivable instance in which the United States would initiate a strategic nuclear strike, NFU proponents argue, then a NFU pledge could be made without jeopardizing either U.S. interests or its ability to meet security commitments. While it is feasible to make a NFU pledge, do the potential benefits warrant such a declaration? For many the answer to this question is an unequivocal "yes." The central deterrence rationale allows tactical nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Europe and replaced by explicit reassurances of a continued U.S. commitment to European security. The exact form these assurances take would depend on the specific ally, but they would likely entail some comprehensive mix of political, diplomatic, economic, and conventional military elements. NFU proponents contend that a NFU policy declaration, reinforced by the removal of U.S. nuclear forces deployed in Europe, would demonstrate U.S. resolve in diminishing the value of nuclear weapons. This could, NFU proponents add, reduce the incentives for other states to acquire nuclear weapons. It is essential that the NFU declaration be made in conjunction with the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from Europe, NFU proponents suggest: or the declaration may be perceived as an empty gesture.' Similarly, if the declaration could be made in concert with Russia. Britain. and France and with a reaffirmation by China, it would go a long way toward creating a "global taboo."' The ultimate goal is to foster a global climate in which acquisition and/or use of nuclear weapons is beyond acceptable international behavioral norms. NFU

\*\*NATO Bad

NATO Bad – Top Shelf\*\*

**US hegemony through NATO could spark WW3**

**Marshall 10** (Andrew Gavin, June 29, is a Research Associate with the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). He is currently studying Political Economy and History at Simon Fraser University, Global Research http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19951 accessed 7/8) CM

For the first time in the last 500 years, the East has risen – with China and India – as new global powers, rising within the system not against it; marking the first time that nation-states have not risen against the global power, but with the global power. China and India are being brought within a new global political and economic system that is being constructed: a global totalitarian system of continental colonies to a global state. In 1998, then Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, gave a speech in which he said:   It is my general contention that humanity and democracy - two principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order - can serve as guideposts in crafting a new international order, better adapted to the security realities, and challenges, of today's Europe.[40]   Further, he explained, “the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration.” **Thus, to truly have global power, the international system of nation-states must be ‘re-imagined’ and altered:** first, into continental governance structures, and ultimately a global structure. As Solana said, “In the United Nations, the ideal of a global institution including all nations became a reality,” and “the ideal of European integration was set in motion.” He elaborated:   But an integral part of the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance was the idea of reconciliation: the integration of our militaries, the common project of collective defence, and the willingness to work towards a common approach to defend the Alliance's common values.   Unfortunately, also **out of the same ashes of the second world war** **emerged the East-West confrontation that left Europe deeply divided for more than four decades**. As our century comes to an end, **we at last have the opportunity to overcome this division and to set free all the creative energies this continent can muster to build the new security order which will lead us into the 21st century**.[41**]   It is a difficult balancing act for global powers – particularly the United States** **– to** manage the integration of China into the ‘new world order’, while simultaneously both of them compete for **control of global resources**, located primarily in regions of the world which are experiencing the most rapid and extensive ‘awakening’**. The imperial mindset** – like that of Brzezinski’s – **seeks to rationalize global power as being equated with ‘global stability’**, and that without empire**, there is only ‘chaos’**. Thus, **imperial logic dictates that America must seek to dominate as much of the world as fast as possible**, **and** hence **control global resources**, which will allow it to determine the terms of China and other powers’ inclusion in the new world order. **This has the potential to spark a global war – a World War III type of scenario between the NATO powers and the China-Russia alliance** – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – who seek to share power, not to be dominated. **Global populations at home and abroad have never been so challenging to control: global war is inevitable in the imperial mindset**. As Brzezinski himself stated in a speech to Chatham House in London in 2009:   But these major world powers, new and old, also face a novel reality: while the lethality of their military might is greater than ever, their capacity to impose control over the politically awakened masses of the world is at a historic low. **To put it bluntly: in earlier times, it was easier to control one million people than to physically kill one million people; today, it is infinitely easier to kill one million people than to control one million people**.[42]

NATO Bad – Top Shelf\*\*

Reducing NATO’s role key to accelerate EU security development – solves conflict and other benefits from the alliance

**Bandow ’08** [Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire, “Incoherent Empire: The Case for Getting Out of NAT”, Dec 18, http://www.takimag.com/site/article/incoherent\_empire\_the\_case\_for\_getting\_out\_of\_nato/]

Europeans have little more enthusiasm for defending Europe. EU ministers recently agreed on creating a deployable force of 60,000 EU troops—but only “in the years to come,” whatever that means. The people and politicians of Europe may view the risk of war as too small to warrant devoting more resources to their militaries. They may decide that the Eastern Europeans and beyond are not in real danger or are not worth saving. That’s fine too. After six decades of treating Europe as a helpless dependent, Washington should metaphorically kick its child out of the house, leaving the Europeans with full control over—and responsibility for—their own destiny. Moreover, turning NATO over to Europe would in no way limit formation of future “coalitions of the willing” to cooperate in military expeditions elsewhere. Recognizing the threat to European commerce posed by increasing piracy caused the EU to send a small naval force to patrol waters off Somalia. Nevertheless, most European states are unlikely to enthusiastically join in real conflicts requiring real forces: witness the reluctance to send a peacekeeping force to Congo or transform the ceasefire monitoring mission into a peacekeeping operation in Georgia, let alone engage in combat in Afghanistan. At best, the alliance encourages some countries which otherwise wouldn’t participate to mollify Washington by reluctantly send minimal forces hobbled by national caveats. The price to the U.S. of such “help” isn’t worth paying.

EU better – common goals, Russian aggression, entanglement

**Conry ’95** [Barbara, former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia “The Western European Union As NATO's Successor”, Sept 18, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html]

Washington unwisely clings to outdated Cold War policies instead of devising new policies that better address America's security requirements in the post-Cold War era. Nowhere is that more evident than in the effort to maintain or even expand NATO, even though the enemy it was created to face, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, and the United States and Europe now have relatively few common security interests. The Western European Union, the security arm of the European Union, should replace NATO as the primary guarantor of European security. A robust WEU would have a number of advantages over NATO. WEU member states have many common security interests, in contrast to the increasingly divergent U.S. and European perspectives that have already produced serious disarray in NATO. The West European nations have ample economic resources and are capable of providing for their own defense without a U.S. subsidy. Finally, Moscow is likely to view the WEU as less provocative than a U.S.-dominated NATO--especially an enlarged version that expands to Russia's borders. Maintaining NATO as the primary European security institution both is expensive and risks drawing the United States into military entanglements even when no vital American interests are at stake. Replacing NATO with the WEU would emphasize that most disputes in Central and Eastern Europe are more relevant to the European nations than to America and that dealing with such problems is properly a European responsibility. Moreover, once the West Europeans develop a full independent military capability, the WEU would be a strong partner for the United States in the event of a future threat to mutual U.S.-European security interests.

NATO Bad – Top Shelf\*\*

No impact – NATO obsolete and can’t solve conflict

- No Russia threat – EU Solves – No troops/military support – Predictive ev, judge

**Guttman 5-1-09** [Robert Guttman, Director of the Center on Politics & Foreign Relations (CPFR) at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. where he co-hosts a series of conferences on politics and foreign policy with the Financial Times newspaper group, “Happy 60th Birthday NATO; Time to Go Out of Business?”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-guttman/happy-60th-birthday-nato\_b\_181734.html]

But, the Soviet Union is gone and has been for a long time. The main threat from Russia comes not from their military but from their economic role as a provider of natural gas and oil to Europe. Europeans fear a cutoff of energy from Russia more than any type of military action. NATO was successful in its original goal and Europe is a peaceful place these days; the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact no longer exist; and the European Union now encompasses most of the countries of Europe. It is a completely different situation now than in the 1940s and during the Cold War years. NATO was successful and NATO was competent and NATO kept the peace but a new era is upon us and NATO is grasping for a new role and it may not have a role to play in **2009 and beyond.** The main threat today to Europe and the United States is the economic meltdown and the huge financial crisis we are all facing. Certainly we are facing terrorist threats but is NATO really the organization to keep terrorists at bay? The crunch for President Obama will come in Strasbourg when he asks for more troops for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, the reply from many of our NATO allies will be sorry but we will not provide any more troops because we do not see Afghanistan as that large of a problem. Europeans are more inward looking today. They see no huge threat to their countries from Afghanistan. President Obama is seeking more NATO troops from countries who do not want to provide them and if they do provide them have certain restrictions--not going into battle in the southern part of the country--that makes them almost useless. We now have a military alliance where many of the members do not want to engage in military operations. This is hardly a recipe for a successful future for NATO. When I interviewed NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer several years ago he told me: "We cannot lose in Afghanistan. We have to succeed in Afghanistan. If we fail, then who will have confidence in us again? Our credibility as NATO, as the Euro-Atlantic community is on the line. And our credibility is one of our strongest assets. To preserve it, we have no choice but to succeed. NATO has a tradition to keep. NATO has never made empty promises. So NATO should not make empty promises now." Well, NATO is not succeeding in Afghanistan at the moment and the political will seems to be missing from many of our NATO allies to continue the mission in that war torn nation. There are many military threats in the world today that will rear their ugly head and take over the headlines from the economic crisis in the near future but the question is: Is NATO the right military organization to deal with these crises? Maybe we should call NATO a huge success, pat every one on the back and dissolve the military organization and move on. Could the European Union take on the military role? Could a new military organization take the place of NATO? Instead of planning new missions around the globe for NATO why not ask the basic question: Is NATO still necessary anymore? NATO did its original job and the peace was kept in Europe and Soviet tanks did not attack during the Cold War--its goals were met and met successfully so why keep coming up with new out of area missions that do not have the full backing of most of the members. Re-think NATO. It may be time to say **happy birthday and goodbye.**

NATO Bad – Patriarchy

NATO hurts Afghan women

**Foxley 9** (Tim, Researcher @ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 1 2009, The Shadow NATO Summit, p. 5)IM

Selmin Caliskan(medica mondiale) spoke about the critical and deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan, including increases in maternal mortality rates (around 2,600 per year and higher than military casualties), forced marriages (around 80% of all marriages) and the militarisation of development. She also focused on the difficult civil-military relationship and on the importance of having an exit strategy from the conflict. About half of women prisoners in Afghanistan are convicted of moral ‘offences’ and only 1% of civilian funds are directed towards women. Ms. Caliskan concluded that both extremist and NATO actions in Afghanistan worked against the interests of women, and that ultimately only women and civil society could provide the basis for peace. Conflict resolution starts, she said, in families and community projects, not with arms.

NATO Bad – US-Russia War

**NATO is useless military and actually risks the US being drawn into a nuclear war with Russia**

**Carpenter 9** (Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D., is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, CATO [http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/ pa635.pdf](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa635.pdf) accessed 7/8) CM

Although **NATO has added numerous new members during the past decade**, **most of them possess minuscule military capabilitie**s. **Some of them also have murky political systems and con­tentious relations with neighboring states**, **including (**and most troubling) **a nuclear-armed Russia**. Thus, **NATO’s new members are weak**, **vulnerable**, **and provocative—an especially dan­gerous combination for the United States in its role as NATO’s leader**. **There are also growing fissures in the alliance about how to deal with Russia.** The older, West European powers tend to favor a cautious, concil­iatory policy, whereas the Central and East Euro­pean countries advocate a more confrontational, hard-line approach. **The** **U**nited **States is caught in the middle of that intra-alliance squabble**. Perhaps most worrisome, the **defense spending levels and military capabilities of NATO’s princi­pal European members have plunged in recent years**. The decay of those military forces has reached the point that **American leaders now wor­ry that joint operations with U.S. forces are becoming difficult, if not impossible**. **The ineffec­tiveness of the European militaries is apparent in NATO’s stumbling performance in Afghanistan**. **NATO has outlived whatever usefulness it had**. Superficially, it remains an impressive institution, but **it has become a hollow shell**—far more a politi­cal honor society than a meaningful security orga­nization. Yet, while the alliance exists**, it is a vehicle for European countries to free ride on the U.S. mil­itary commitment instead of spending adequately on their own defenses and taking responsibility for the security of their own region.** American calls for greater burden-sharing are even more futile today than they have been over the past 60 years. **Until the United States changes the incentives by withdraw­ing its troops from Europe and phasing out its NATO commitment**, the Europeans will happily continue to evade their responsibilities. Today’s **NATO is a bad bargain for the United States**. We have security obligations to countries that add little to our own military power. Even worse, **some of those countries could easily entan­gle America in dangerous parochial disputes. It is time to terminate this increasingly dysfunctional alliance.**

**NATO’s Article 5 policy makes nuclear war with Russia inevitable**

Carpenter 9 (Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D., is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, CATO http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/ pa635.pdf accessed 7/8) CM

**The new members the alliance has admit­ted since the end of the Cold War are weak client states that expect** **the United States to defend them**. That was largely true even of the first round of expansion that added the mid-sized countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. It was more evident in the second round that embraced such tiny military players as Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. **Such micro allies are security consumers, not security producers. From the standpoint of American interests they are not assets, they are liabilities**—**and potentially very dangerous liabilities. Taking on the obligation to defend the Baltic countries was especially unwise, because NATO now poses a direct geopolitical chal­lenge to Russia right on Moscow’s doorstep. Relations between Russia and its small Baltic neighbors are testy**, to put it mildly. At the moment, **Russia may be too weak to challenge the U.S./NATO security commitment to those countries, but we cannot be certain that will always be true**. **The endorsement of NATO membership for Croatia and Albania confirms that the alliance has now entered the realm of farce**. The military capabilities of those two countries are minus­cule. According to the 2009 edition of *The Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Croatia’s military budget is a mere $962 million, and its military force consists of 18,600 active-duty personnel. Albania’s budget is $233 million, and its force is 14,295. They will augment Estonia’s $425 mil­lion and 5,300 troops, Latvia’s $513 million and 5,187 troops, Lithuania’s $500 million and 8,850 troops, and Slovenia’s $756 million and 7,200 troops. By not offering membership to Macedonia, though, NATO will have to do with­out Skopje’s $163 million and 10,890 troops.5 Collectively, those countries spend less on their militaries in a year than the United States spends in Iraq in two weeks. **Such new allies are not merely useless; they are potentially an embarrassment to the alliance**, **and possibly a serious danger**. When Vice President Dick Cheney asserted during a visit to the Balkans in 2006 that the proposed members would help “rejuvenate” NATO and rededicate the alliance “to the basic and fun­damental values of freedom and democracy,” he showed how out of touch with reality U.S and NATO policy had become.6 **Croatia is just a few years removed from the fascistic regime of Franjo Tudjman** and contin­ues to have frosty relations with neighboring Serbia. **Albania is a close ally of the new, pre­dominantly Albanian state of Kosovo, an entity whose independence both Serbia and Russia** (as well as most other countries) do **not recognize and vehemently oppose**. <CONTINUED>

NATO Bad – US-Russia War

<CONTINUED>

**Albania also is notori­ous for** being under the influence of **organized crime**. Indeed, the **Albanian mafia is legendary throughout Europe, controlling much of the gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking**.7 Efforts to add Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, a policy that the Bush administration pushed and the Obama administration en­dorses, would be even worse than the previous rounds of expansion. Ukraine’s relationship with Russia is quite contentious. Georgia’s relationship, of course, is even worse than that, as last summer’s warfare confirmed. Rational Americans should have breathed a sigh of relief that Georgia was not a NATO member at the time the conflict erupted. Proponents of NATO’s enlargement east­ward sometimes act as though the alliance is now merely a political honor society. Their underlying logic is that, because the nations of Eastern Europe have become capitalist de­mocracies, they deserve to be members of the West’s most prominent club. But nearly all the newer members of NATO, which are the most concerned about possible adverse security developments emanating from Russia, consid­er the alliance to be more than a political body. They are counting on tangible protection from depredations by their large eastern neighbor. And, equally important, **Moscow does not view the current incarnation of NATO as merely political in nature**. The Georgian conflict should remind us that NATO is still officially much more than a political club. It remains a military alliance with extensive obligations—especially for the United States. **Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one mem­ber is an attack on all. That means the United States is obligated to assist in the defense of every member—no matter how small, how mil­itarily or economically insignificant, or how strategically exposed that member might be** That comes perilously close to being a risky strategic bluff. **The war between Russia and Georgia illustrates the hollow nature of NATO’s ability to protect small, vulnerable members**. True, Georgia was not a member of the alliance, and therefore, Article 5 did not apply. But the country was clearly a client— albeit an informal client—of the United States. U.S. leaders repeatedly hailed Georgian presi­dent Mikheil Saakashvili as an American friend and as a symbol of democratic reform in that part of the world. The conventional wis­dom assumed that Russia would never molest such a client. And the Georgians certainly seemed to expect assistance when trouble arose. As New York Times correspondents Andrew E. Kramer and Ellen Barry reported from Georgia during the early days of the fighting, when retreating Georgian troops met Western journalists, “they all said the same thing: Where is the United States? When is NATO coming?”9 Yet the United States and the rest of NATO did little more than fuss and fume about the Russian military offensive and offer postwar reconstruction aid to Tbilisi. The anemic response of both NATO and the European Union infuriated hardliners in the West. A Wall Street Journal editorial derisively described the policy as one of “Stop! Or We’ll Say Stop Again!”10 Some analysts expressed confidence that, if Georgia had been a NATO member, Russia would have been deterred. Columnist George Will, for example, posed the question: “If Georgia were in NATO, would NATO now be at war with Russia? More likely,” he stated, “Russia would not be in Georgia.”11 Perhaps. But there is reason to be skeptical about that conclusion. **The reality is that if Washington and its NATO partners endeav­ored to carry out their commitments under Article 5 because a fight erupted between Russia and a small alliance member, they would risk war with a nuclear-armed adver­sary**. Such a threat may have had reasonable credibility during the Cold War, when the stakes involved keeping democratic Europe—a major economic and strategic asset—out ofthe orbit of an aggressive, totalitarian power. **The declared willingness to risk a war with nuclear implications is far less credible when the casus belli is merely a dispute between an authori­tarian Russia and one small neighbor—which in the case of the Georgian war was a dispute over the political status of two secessionist regions in that neighbo**r. Not only might deterrence lack credibility in that situation, basic prudence should dictate that such a degree of risk not be incurred except in the defense of vital interests. Georgia’s trou­bles with Russia—and for that matter, the vari­ous disputes that **other tiny nations on Russia’s border have with Moscow—do not come close to meeting that test even for Europe’s major powers, much less for the United States. It seems more likely than not that Washington, if faced with the terrible potential consequences of confronting Russia militarily over such mea­ger stakes, would blink**. And ifthe United States didn’t act, the secondary NATO powers cer­tainly would not. The alliance’s nonresponse to Russia’s offensive against Georgia suggests that the security expectations of NATO’s new mem­bers and prospective members may be wishful thinking.

NATO Bad – A2: Terrorism

NATO is a poor mechanism for dealing with terrorism—unilateral approach solves best

**Asmus ‘02** [Ronald, senior fellow for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, NATO Review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/english/debate.html#top]

Finally, you want the Alliance to focus on the new security threats, like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of course NATO should do what it can against such threats, but how well suited is it to play a leading role? The fight against terrorism surely requires the sharing of intelligence and speedy decision-taking. A large multinational bureaucracy with — soon, perhaps — 25 members may not be well suited to such a struggle. The same argument applies to WMD. Is not NATO too leaky and slow-moving to manage an offensive operation that would, for example, destroy biological weapons factories? I suspect that the Pentagon would rather fight terrorism and WMD on its own, or with a small group of allies that can be trusted to keep a secret, provide skilled forces and accept US command.

NATO not suited to solve terrorism.

**Bredaun ’03** [Deaglán de Bréadún, The Irish Times centrist, February, 2003 NATO's Growing Pains, NATO: Bigger, Not Better at Fighting Terror, World Press Review, http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/893.cfm]

And yet, there are question marks over [NATO’s] its future and even its current usefulness. The tragic events of Sept. 11 were brought about by a small group of determined zealots wielding nothing more lethal than boxcutters. What use are nuclear weapons in such a scenario? The attacks of Sept. 11 could have been prevented by better intelligence-gathering, sharper police work, proper airport security, a more watchful immigration service, and greater vigilance among ordinary citizens. NATO is no more suited to this job than a bear is to catching wasps. The summit saw a renewal of vows in the war against terrorism. But Al-Qaeda was hardly trembling in its shoes. When this terrorist organization sends out its deadly packages, there is no return address. How can you strike against an enemy when you don’t even know where he lives?

NATO is not key to the War on Terror

**Nevers ‘07** [Renée de, Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, “NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era” The Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Spring, Lexis]

NATO's contribution to ongoing efforts to prevent terrorist attacks is thus important, but it may not be central to U.S. policy. While OAE's surveillance activities contribute to tracking potential terrorist movements, the intelligence developed through OAE may be more directly relevant to law enforcement than to military missions. To be sure, U.S. officials agree that many NATO members have strong intelligence capabilities, and they can provide valuable intelligence that the United States does not possess. But the most important elements of intelligence gathering in Europe take place outside NATO and are conducted by domestic intelligence organizations. This intelligence is more likely to be shared bilaterally, rather than through NATO. Bilateral intelligence sharing among key allies continued despite severe strains in political relations in the months prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as revelations about German intelligence cooperation with the United States to designate military targets and civilian locations just prior to the invasion made clear. n41 Five European states with substantial terrorism concerns developed their own forum for intelligence cooperation in March 2005. In 2006 the alliance established a new intelligence "fusion center" to ensure that needed intelligence can be distributed to troops in the field. It also created the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit to provide a forum for joint analysis of nonclassified information. But these are better means to share and interpret information. n42 NATO as such does not generate raw intelligence useful to preventing terrorism. Finally, NATO's effort to develop new defense technologies to protect against terrorist attacks reinforces the U.S. goal of promoting allied defense transformation. Whether the program will contribute to NATO or U.S. defense remains to be seen.

NATO Fails

The US is loathe to coordinate with NATO, and its effectiveness is empirically denied – Kosovo

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

NATO was un- able to provide a command structure—or even substantial capabili- ties—that would override U.S. concerns about using the NATO ma- chinery. European contributions were incorporated on a bilateral basis, but NATO as an organization remained limited to conducting patrols over the United States and deploying ships to the eastern Mediterranean. This U.S. policy choice did not surprise many in the United States. Many U.S. policymakers believed that NATO’s war in Kosovo was an unacceptable example of “war by committee,” where political inter- ference from the alliance’s 19 members prevented a quick and deci- sive campaign. The policymakers were determined to retain sole command authority in Afghanistan, so that experience would not be repeated.37 The deployment of the NATO AWACS demonstrates this point. The United States did not want to deploy the NATO AWACS directly to Afghanistan, because it did not want to involve the North Atlantic Council in any command decisions. Instead, the NATO AWACS backfilled U.S. assets so the assets could redeploy to Afghanistan.38 A military official later described the U.S. decision in these terms: “If you were the US, would you want 18 other nations watering down your military planning?”39

\*\*PMC DA – Aff Answers

Aff- N/UQ- Afghanistan

And surge of 56,000 to Afghanistan in December makes DA non unique

Pincus 9 (Walter, WA Post Staff writer, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html , Dec 16-9) ET

The surge of 30,000 U.S. troops into Afghanistan could be accompanied by a surge of up to 56,000 contractors, vastly expanding the presence of personnel from the U.S. private sector in a war zone, according to a study by the Congressional Research Service.

and, congressional reports warrant that number of contractors was increase to 160,000 last December in Afghanistan alone- non unique

Pincus 9 (Walter, WA Post Staff writer, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html , Dec 16-9) ET

CRS, which provides background information to members of Congress on a bipartisan basis, said it expects an additional 26,000 to 56,000 contractors to be sent to Afghanistan. That would bring the number of contractors in the country to anywhere from 130,000 to 160,000. The tally "could increase further if the new [administration] strategy includes a more robust construction and nation building effort," according to the report, which was released Monday and first disclosed on the Web site Talking Points Memo.

Contractors make up more than half of Afghanistan’s military force- non unique

Pincus 9 (Walter, WA Post Staff writer, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html , Dec 16-9) ET

The CRS study says contractors made up 69 percent of the Pentagon's personnel in Afghanistan last December, a proportion that "apparently represented the highest recorded percentage of contractors used by the Defense Department in any conflict in the history of the United States." As of September, contractor representation had dropped to 62 percent, as U.S. troop strength increased modestly. As the Pentagon contracts out activities that previously were carried out by troops in wartime, it has been forced to struggle with new management challenges. "Prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, contracting was done on an ad-hoc basis and was not adequately incorporated into the doctrine -- or culture -- of the military," according to the CRS report. Today, according to Defense Department officials, "doctrine and strategy are being updated to incorporate the role of contractors in contingency operations."

And, contractors are increasing so much in Afghanistan that they are making a subcommittee for them in the senate

Pincus 9 (Walter, WA Post Staff writer, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html , Dec 16-9) ET

The Pentagon's Joint Contracting Command in Afghanistan has increased the size of its acquisition workforce and is adding staff to monitor performance. To enhance oversight, Congress has appropriated $8 million for an electronic system that will track all contract-related information for Iraq and Afghanistan. On Thursday, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs ad-hoc subcommittee on contracting oversight, led by Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), is scheduled to hold a hearing on the increase in the number and value of Afghanistan contracts. She plans to focus on ensuring that contracts are adequately managed and "whether contracting oversight lessons learned from Iraq are being applied in Afghanistan," according to her staff members.

Aff- N/UQ > 50% Now

And, PMCs are on the rise now- make up more than half the forces and have been growing progressively in proportion during each war

Lendman 10 ( Stephen, Progressive Radio News Hour on The Progressive Radio Network, *The People’s Voice*, Jan19-10, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2010/01/19/outsourcing-war-the-rise-of-private-mili ) ET

The Current Proliferation of PMCs According to PW Singer, author of "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry:" Included are companies offering "the functions of warfare....spanning a wide range of activities. They perform everything from tactical combat to consulting (to) mundane logistics....The result is that (the industry) now offers every function that was once limited to state militaries."Warfare, in part, has been privatized so that "any actor in the global system can access these skills and functions simply by writing a check." In the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon employed one PMC operative per 50 troops. For the 1999 Yugoslavia conflict, it was one for every 10, and by the 2003 Iraq War, PMCs comprised the second largest force after the US military.

Aff- N/UQ- Going Global

And, PMC’s have been increasing in global conflict- look at relative empirics in civil wars

Lendman 10 ( Stephen, Progressive Radio News Hour on The Progressive Radio Network, *The People’s Voice*, Jan19-10, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2010/01/19/outsourcing-war-the-rise-of-private-mili ) ET

They've also been used in numerous civil wars globally in nations like Angola, Sierra Leone, the Balkans throughout the 1990s, Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere. From 1990 - 2000, they participated in 80 conflicts, compared to 15 from 1950 - 1989.

And, PMCs increasing now- downsizing military- non unique

Lendman 10 ( Stephen, Progressive Radio News Hour on The Progressive Radio Network, *The People’s Voice*, Jan19-10, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2010/01/19/outsourcing-war-the-rise-of-private-mili ) ET

Singer cites three reasons why, combined into "one dynamic:" 1. Supply and demand Since the Cold War ended in 1991, the US military downsized to about two-thirds its former size, a process Dick Cheney, as defense secretary, called BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure, followed by privatizing military functions. But given America's permanent war agenda, the Pentagon needed help, especially because of the proliferation of small arms, over 550 million globally or about one for every 12 human beings, and their increased use in local conflicts.

And, privatization is rapidly increasing- it’s a mentality that’s going global (DJ Russell)

Lendman 10 ( Stephen, Progressive Radio News Hour on The Progressive Radio Network, *The People’s Voice*, Jan19-10, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2010/01/19/outsourcing-war-the-rise-of-private-mili ) ET

3. The "privatization revolution" Singer calls it a "change in mentality, a change in political thinking, (a) new ideology that" whatever governments can do, business can do better so let it. The transformation is pervasive in public services, including more spent on private police than actual ones in America. And the phenomenon is global. In China, for example, the private security industry is one of its fastest growing. By privatizing the military, America pierced the last frontier to let private mercenaries serve in place of conventional forces

Aff- N/UQ- Hidden Contracts

And, we are always uncovering more contracts- your claims about decreasing don’t assume the hidden contracts USAID makes all the time

Entous 9 (Adam, journalist, 22 Apr, *Reuters*, http://paltelegraph.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=620:usaid-contracts-with-firms-headed-by-abbass-sons&catid=43:world-economics&Itemid=160 ) ET

April 23 (Reuters) - Among the business dealings of companies headed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's sons are previously undisclosed U.S. government-funded contracts to repair America's image and the West Bank's roads. Here are the details about the contacts: PUBLIC RELATIONS Records show USAID's prime contract with Tarek Abbas's Sky Advertising took effect on May 5, 2006, following Hamas's victory in a Palestinian parliamentary election that January.

And, US also hires private contractors for image building- means demand will always be up non unique

Entous 9 (Adam, journalist, 22 Apr, *Reuters*, http://paltelegraph.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=620:usaid-contracts-with-firms-headed-by-abbass-sons&catid=43:world-economics&Itemid=160 ) ET

Kareem Shehadeh, a lawyer for Tarek and his brother, said bidding on the contract began before the election

The Sky contract was supposed to total $659,600 (455,306 pounds). But Sky received $998,495 through September 2008, records show. Sky was hired as part of a campaign to bolster the U.S. government's image and "reduce the negative attitudes and scepticism held by many Palestinians towards economic assistance from the American people," according to the USAID contract. "The purpose of this activity is to increase the Palestinian people's awareness of the contributions of the American people to their well-being. The contractor will build and execute a strategy that effectively targets and reaches USAID's audience in the West Bank and Gaza," the contract states.

Aff- N/UQ- Military Complex

Contractors aren’t decreasing any time soon- they make up a vital part of the military complex that is used to compose national security

Goodman July 7th ( Melvin, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070610c.html , *Consortium News* 7.7.10) ET

This complex, according to Tom Barry of the Center for International Policy, has now “morphed into a new type of public-private partnership — one that spans military, intelligence, and homeland-security contracting — that amounts to a ‘national security complex’.” Over the past three decades, despite the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, U.S. presidents have done next to nothing to challenge or limit the national security complex, which continues to drain the federal treasury and block any potential political threat to the military-industrial status quo.

Aff- N/UQ- Rising Now

Non Unique- contractors rising in afghanistan and iraq and DoD says trend will continue now

Scahill June 1st (Jeremy, Puffin foundation writing fellow @ National Institute, *Truthout*, http://www.truth-out.org/060309B , 6.1.10) ET

 Newly released Pentagon statistics show that in both Iraq and Afghanistan the number of armed contractors is rising. The DoD says it sees "similar dependence on contractors in future." A couple of years ago, Blackwater executive Joseph Schmitz seemed to see a silver lining for mercenary companies with the prospect of US forces being withdrawn or reduced in Iraq. "There is a scenario where we could as a government, the United States, could pull back the military footprint," Schmitz said. "And there would then be more of a need for private contractors to go in." When it comes to armed contractors, it seems that Schmitz was right.

Non Unique- 29% increase in last year alone

Scahill June 1st (Jeremy, Puffin foundation writing fellow @ National Institute, *Truthout*, http://www.truth-out.org/060309B , 6.1.10) ET

 According to new statistics released by the Pentagon, with Barack Obama as commander in chief, there has been a 23% increase in the number of "Private Security Contractors" working for the Department of Defense in Iraq in the second quarter of 2009 and a 29% increase in Afghanistan, which "correlates to the build up of forces" in the country. These numbers relate explicitly to DoD security contractors. Companies like Blackwater and its successor Triple Canopy work on State Department contracts and it is unclear if these contractors are included in the over-all statistics. This means, the number of individual "security" contractors could be quite higher, as could the scope of their expansion.

Non Unique- contractors are on the rise- they now make up half of american forces abroad in the middle east

Scahill June 1st (Jeremy, Puffin foundation writing fellow @ National Institute, *Truthout*, http://www.truth-out.org/060309B , 6.1.10) ET

 Overall, contractors (armed and unarmed) now make up approximately 50% of the "total force in Centcom AOR [Area of Responsibility]." This means there are a whopping 242,657 contractors working on these two US wars. These statistics come from two reports just released by Gary J. Motsek, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support): "Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, IRAQ, and Afghanistan and "Operational Contract Support, 'State of the Union.'"

Non Unique- contractors will continue rising- size unfixed makes them more convenient

Scahill June 1st (Jeremy, Puffin foundation writing fellow @ National Institute, *Truthout*, http://www.truth-out.org/060309B , 6.1.10) ET

 "We expect similar dependence on contractors in future contingency operations," according to the contractor "State of the Union." It notes that the deployment size of both military personnel and DoD civilians are "fixed by law," but points out that the number of contractors is "size unfixed," meaning there is virtually no limit (other than funds) to the number of contractors that can be deployed in the war zone.

The deployment is rising in Iraq now even if there was an overall decrease

Scahill June 1st (Jeremy, Puffin foundation writing fellow @ National Institute, *Truthout*, http://www.truth-out.org/060309B , 6.1.10) ET

 At present there are 132,610 in Iraq and 68,197 in Afghanistan. The report notes that while the deployment of security contractors in Iraq is increasing, there was an 11% decrease in overall contractors in Iraq from the first quarter of 2009 due to the "ongoing efforts to reduce the contractor footprint in Iraq."

Aff- N/UQ- UN Sending them In too

And the UN is now using contractors- means they increase with or without US

Lynch 10 (Colum, WA post staff writer, *Foreign Policy*, Jan 17.10, http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un\_embraces\_private\_military\_contractors ) ET

For years, the U.N.'s top peacekeepers have been among the world's staunchest critics of private security contractors, often portraying them as unaccountable mercenaries. Now they are clients. As the U.N. prepares to expand its operations in Afghanistan, it is in talks with a British security firm to send in scores of additional Nepalese Gurkhas to the country to protect them.

The UN accelerates worldwide use of contractors

Lynch 10 (Colum, WA post staff writer, *Foreign Policy*, Jan 17.10, http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un\_embraces\_private\_military\_contractors ) ET

The U.N.'s top security official, Gregory Starr, the former head of U.S. State Department Security, has

also been advocating an increase in the use of private security firms in Pakistan, where U.N. relief workers have been the target of kidnappings and killings, according to U.N. officials. The embrace of a private security contractor marks a shift for the United Nations, which has relied on governments to supply peacekeepers to protect U.N. staff. In Iraq, the U.N. used a contingent of Fijian peacekeepers for protection. But it has accelerated its move toward hired guns in Pakistan since the Taliban launched an October attack against a U.N. residence, killing five U.N. employees, including two Afghan security guards, and triggered the withdrawal of U.N. personnel from the country.

UN’s top security advisor defends contractors- builds their reputation worldwide

Lynch 10 (Colum, WA post staff writer, *Foreign Policy*, Jan 17.10, http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un\_embraces\_private\_military\_contractors ) ET

Those officials will return along with an additional 800 U.N. staff that have been budgeted for the Afghan mission. The latest drive has been led by Starr, who relied heavily on private security contractors to protect American diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan. Starr who joined the U.N. last May, once defended the security company Xe Services, formerly known as Blackwater USA, following allegations that it killed Iraqi civilians. "Essentially, I think they do a very good job," he told Reuters in 2008.

The UN is backing contractors and uses them in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Lynch 10 (Colum, WA post staff writer, *Foreign Policy*, Jan 17.10, http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un\_embraces\_private\_military\_contractors ) ET

Starr declined to discuss the U.N.'s policy. But a U.N. spokesman, Farhan Haq, responded on behalf of Starr. "He wanted you to know that our understanding of the current usage of the term ‘Private Security Contractors' typically refers to contractors doing close protection work for movement security, such as Blackwater/Xe, Triple Canopy, Dyncorps, Aegis, and many other companies providing this type of service. However, the U.N. doesn't avail itself of this type of service. We do use some private companies to provide static security guards at some sites in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but primarily rely on host countries to provide our security."

Aff- N/UQ- UN Sending them

The UN is transitioning from peacekeepers to PMCs – makes PMC surge inevitable

Lynch 10 (Colum, WA post staff writer, *Foreign Policy*, Jan 17.10, http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un\_embraces\_private\_military\_contractors ) ET

But a study by the Humanitarian Policy Group of security by the U.N. and other humanitarian organizations shows that U.N. peacekeepers have been quietly turning to private security, particularly in hazard stations like Somalia and Afghanistan. And the U.N.'s secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, recently confirmed that his organization will have to turn to the private sector to protect its people. In Afghanistan, the U.N. has contracted an Afghan subsidiary of the London-based company, IDG Security Ltd., to provide 169 Gurkhas, according to figures compiled by the U.N. Mission in Afghanistan (some U.N. officials say there may be as many as 400 Gurkhas protecting U.N. officials). They are charged with supplementing security provided by the Afghan National Police.

Aff- N/UQ A2: Budget Cuts

And, their budget cut arguments don’t apply- this budget is the highest defense budget in post WWII history

Goodman July 7th ( Melvin, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070610c.html , *Consortium News* 7.7.10) ET

Through this period, reaching from Ronald Reagan to Obama, military spending has continued to increase, with the United States outspending the entire rest of the world on weapons systems. The $708 billion defense budget for 2011 is higher than at any point in America’s post-World War II history. It is 16 percent higher than the 1952 Korean War budget peak and 36 percent higher than the 1968 Vietnam War budget peak in constant dollars. Yet some Pentagon leaders see this spending level as restraint. Defense Secretary Robert Gates argues that the budget plan “rebalances” spending by emphasizing near-term challenges of counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and stabilization operations.

And the budget increases defend spending and grows each year

Goodman July 7th ( Melvin, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070610c.html , *Consortium News* 7.7.10) ET

But the current budget plan makes no effort at prioritizing these near-term commitments against funding for long-term commitments. Instead, it increases funding for both near-term and long-term programs. Despite complaints from deficit hawks, the military-industrial hawks still rule the roost. Overall procurement spending will rise by nearly 8 percent in the 2011 budget, covering virtually all of the equipment the services wanted. Historically, the costs to operate and maintain the U.S. military tend to grow at about 2.5 percent. Not this year. The basic defense budget request seeks more than $200 billion, or an 8.5 percent increase, in funding for Operations and Maintenance.

And the defense budget is growing and grew more than 50% in recent years- non unique

Goodman July 7th ( Melvin, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070610c.html , *Consortium News* 7.7.10) ET

Over the past three decades, the military tool also has become the leading instrument of American statecraft. The defense budget is 13 times larger than all U.S. civilian foreign policy budgets combined, and the Defense Department’s share of U.S. security assistance has grown from 6 percent in 2002 to more than 50 percent in 2009, when Obama was inaugurated. There are more members of the military in marching bands than there are Foreign Service Officers, and the Defense Department spends more on fuel ($16 billion) than the State Department spends on operating costs ($13 billion). More than half of U.S. discretionary spending is in the defense budget, and war spending only accounts for half of the increase in defense spending since 1998.

Aff- N/UQ A2: Budget Cuts

All the US presidents have increased the budget since 81- non unique

Goodman July 7th ( Melvin, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070610c.html , *Consortium News* 7.7.10) ET

All U.S. presidents since 1981 have contributed to the militarization of national security policy. President Ronald Reagan was responsible for unprecedented peacetime increases in defense spending even though the Soviet Union was in decline; he also endorsed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 that enhanced the political role of the regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and marginalized the State Department. President George H.W. Bush’s deployment of 26,000 troops (Operation Just Cause) to Panama only one month after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, indicated that the use of force would play a greater role in the new international environment, which Bush dubbed “the new world order.”

Aff- N/UQ A2: Budget- Supplemental

And contractors are 70% of the budget- they aren’t facing any cuts

Goodman July 7th ( Melvin, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070610c.html , *Consortium News* 7.7.10) ET

 The attacks on 9/11 and the declaration of “the war on terror” brought a new dimension to the national security state: the formation of largely unaccountable security contractors, such as Blackwater, without any code of conduct, and various consulting agencies that act as intermediaries between the federal government and the defense contractors. The illegalities of Blackwater (now called Xe) are well known and, thanks to Tom Barry, we have a better understanding of the consulting agencies managed by former high-level officials of the Bush administration, including Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, national security adviser Stephen Hadley, directors of homeland security Michael Chertoff and Tom Ridge, and CIA director Michael Hayden. Nearly a quarter of the federal budget is devoted to contracts to the private sector, with the new Department of Homeland Security and Office of National Intelligence serving as conduits for this money. Private contracts are now responsible for 70 percent of the intelligence budget, and private contractors represent more than half of the employees of the new National counterterrorism Center. The trumpeting of “cyber war” marks the next cash cow for the defense industry.

And pentagon is increasing intelligence funding- goes to PMCs

Goodman July 7th ( Melvin, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070610c.html , *Consortium News* 7.7.10) ET

In addition to unprecedented military spending, the Pentagon has gained increased leverage over the $70 billion intelligence community as well as increased influence over the national security and foreign policies of the United States. With the State Department and the CIA in decline, the Pentagon’s role in intelligence, nation building, and Third World assistance grows significantly. Congressional armed services committees have become sounding boards for the Pentagon, and the increased absence of military experience on the part of congressional representatives contributes to less oversight. Recent presidents also have retreated from the principle of meaningful civilian control over military policy. George W. Bush, for instance, identified the chief lesson from the Vietnam War as the need to avoid interference from politicians in Washington with the military commanders on the ground. As for Obama, while deliberating whether to escalate the war in Afghanistan, he allowed himself to be blindsided by the self-serving leak of Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s recommendation for more troops, a policy also pushed by Gen. David Petraeus and one that Obama ultimately bowed to.

Aff- N/UQ A2: Funding Issues

Contracts are currently being given out hugely- military is awarding funding left and right

Pincus 9 (Walter, WA Post Staff writer, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html , Dec 16-9) ET

Contracts, in the meantime, continue to be solicited and awarded. Over the past week, the military awarded a $44.8 million contract to a Florida firm to provide dogs and their handlers for operational use in areas of southern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border, where some of the most violent fighting is taking place.

US government demand up now- budget is obviously not an issue

Pincus 9 (Walter, WA Post Staff writer, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html , Dec 16-9) ET

The U.S. command in Afghanistan also published a notice that it would be seeking intelligence analyst services from a contractor that include "collecting, analyzing and providing recommendations necessary for the government to produce and disseminate intelligence products in several subject areas." The contract would be for one year, plus options for four additional years.

Defense Agency hiring now

Pincus 9 (Walter, WA Post Staff writer, *Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html , Dec 16-9) ET

The Defense Logistics Agency disclosed that it is looking for a contractor that can provide distribution and warehousing services for U.S. and NATO forces in the Kandahar area, which is near the center of fighting. The contractor is to supply the workforce needed to receive, store, inventory and prepare shipment of up to 4,000 items using government-provided warehousing facilities and open storage areas.

A2: Impacts- Offense– Civil Unrest/Conflict Escalation

PMC’s solve civil unrest better than the UN – they are superior to peacekeeping troops in speed and skill.

Schreier and Caparini 5 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper - №6, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies” Fred and Marina Geneva, March http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/op06\_privatising-security.pdf)KM

• PMCs and PSCs could improve the quality of UN missions. The UN is slow to deploy peacekeeping troops and the troops are often poorly trained and underequipped soldiers from developing countries. Not only are these types of operations less controversial when carried out by private companies, they are less costly. PMC operations in Sierra Leone cost about 4 percent of the costs of a subsequent UN peacekeeping operation.277 It is estimated that the intervention in Liberia would have cost 15 times more if US troops were used.278 One PMC claimed that it could have intervened to stop the killing in Rwanda within 14 days of hire at a cost of $600,000 per day. The UN Operation took much longer, cost $3 million per day and did not stop the genocide.279 A subsequent UN report emphasized the importance of rapid deployment and on-call expertise for peacekeeping operations.280

PMC’s stabilize failed states that international powers ignore – solves terrorism.

Schreier and Caparini 5 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper - №6, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies” Fred and Marina Geneva, March http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/op06\_privatising-security.pdf)KM

PMCs can bring stability to conflicts in the developing world. Stabilizing “failed states” is important for reducing the threat of international terrorism and organized crime, and the provision of security is a prerequisite for such stabilization. Despite the prevailing distaste for mercenaries, the record of some PMCs speaks to their potential for resolving conflicts and establishing peace and order in countries that would otherwise be ignored by the world’s leading powers.282

PMC’s empirically solve conflicts before they escalate and allow for peace negotiations to be made.

Fitzsimmons 5 (*Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall , Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2005 “DOGS OF PEACE: A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN PEACE IMPLEMENTATION” Scott , Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jmss/jmss\_2005/v8n1/jmss\_v8n1g.pdf)KM

In the twenty-one months that Executive Outcomes was deployed in Sierra Leone and with fewer than 500 foreign specialists, it was able to drive back rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) troops from around the capital, Freetown, retake key mines from the RUF, and destroy the RUF's headquarters. Furthermore, and most important in any discussion of security guarantees, EO was able to respond to threats from RUF forces geared towards disrupting the first official democratic election in Sierra Leonean history, thereby violating the November 1995 ceasefire. EO accomplished this by conducting reconnaissance missions to determine the location of RUF forces around Freetown and then eliminating them before a disruption of the election could spark a widespread outbreak of hostilities.11 This action had the additional benefit of bringing RUF leader Foday Sankhoh to the negotiating table and ultimately contributed to his signing a peace agreement with the government in November of 1996.12 EO's superior knowledge of military tactics appears to have greatly contributed to its successes. The style of warfare that characterized the Sierra Leonean conflict before EO's arrival was roadside ambushes followed by quick withdrawals. EO's tactics included constantly pursuing RUF forces from the air and on the ground and forcing the RUF to commit to standup battles that put the unskilled rebel force at a severe disadvantage.13 Veterans of EO's campaign described their tactics as being so effective that compelling the RUF to stop fighting was "child’s play."14 Similarly, P.W. Singer's assessment of EO actions in Sierra Leone concluded that the PMC’s small but tactically proficient force played a decisive role in compelling the RUF to stop fighting and negotiate with the government for the first time.15

A2: Impacts- Offense- Heg

And, contractors are key to US heg

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

"To the extent a population is called upon to go to war, there is resistance, a necessary resistance to prevent wars of self-aggrandizement, foolish wars and in the case of the United States, hegemonic imperialist wars. Private forces are almost a necessity for a United States bent on retaining its declining empire. Think about Rome and its increasing need for mercenaries."

And, getting rid of PMCs would destroy the military- downsizing

Lendman 10 (Stever, MA @ Harvard, *Steve Lendman Blog*, jan 19-10) ET

In the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon employed one PMC operative per 50 troops. For the 1999 Yugoslavia conflict, it was one for every 10, and by the 2003 Iraq War, PMCs comprised the second largest force after the US military. They've also been used in numerous civil wars globally in nations like Angola, Sierra Leone, the Balkans throughout the 1990s, Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere. From 1990 - 2000, they participated in 80 conflicts, compared to 15 from 1950 - 1989. Singer cites three reasons why, combined into "one dynamic:"

1. Supply and demand Since the Cold War ended in 1991, the US military downsized to about two-thirds its former size, a process Dick Cheney, as defense secretary, called BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure, followed by privatizing military functions. But given America's permanent war agenda, the Pentagon needed help, especially because of the proliferation of small arms, over 550 million globally or about one for every 12 human beings, and their increased use in local conflicts.

PMC’s are used more than military forces- Iraq and Afghanistan

Lendman 10 (Stever, MA @ Harvard, *Steve Lendman Blog*, jan 19-10) ET

In 2005, 80 PMCs operated there with over 20,000 personnel. Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, it's grown exponentially, according to US Department of Defense figures - nearly 250,000 as of Q 3, 2009, mostly in Iraq but rising in Afghanistan to support more troops. Not included are PMCs working for the State Department, 16 US intelligence agencies, Homeland Security, other branches and foreign governments, commercial businesses, and individuals, so the true total is much higher. In addition, as Iraq troops are drawn down, PMCs will replace them, and in Afghanistan, they already exceed America's military force.

A2: Impacts- Offense – Profit Motive Good

Profit motive is good – PMC’s ensure the job gets done, while domestic peacekeeping forces don’t have enough invested in conflicts to solve them.

Fitzsimmons 5 (*Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall , Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2005 “DOGS OF PEACE: A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN PEACE IMPLEMENTATION” Scott , Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jmss/jmss\_2005/v8n1/jmss\_v8n1g.pdf)KM

The final critical component of strong security guarantees is that intervention forces must be committed to the success of peace enforcement operations. As Barbara Walter rightly suggests, if potential belligerents are to believe in the strength of security guarantees, then outside interveners should be self-interested in upholding their promise to provide security even in the face of opposition from belligerents.66 Executive Outcomes' interests during its peacemaking operations were fairly obvious: if the company failed to coerce the rebel forces in Sierra Leone and Angola to stop fighting, it would not have been paid. Furthermore, the PMC's long-term reputation would have been tarnished and, as a result, its chances for securing future contracts while competing against other major private security firms like MPRI or Armourgroup would have been greatly reduced. Although pragmatically lacking the honour sometimes associated with public military service in defence of one's own state, long-term profit appears to have been a powerful motivating force in these cases. Indeed, the company stayed on largely unpaid until it was forced to leave Sierra Leone in 1996 due to pressure from an international community that had misinterpreted its role in the conflict.67 Faced with the prospect of being paid eventually by the Sierra Leonean government so long as EO could keep it in power or not being paid at all if EO stood back and allowed the RUF rebels to take over, the PMC rationally chose the former option.68 Similarly, EO only left Angola in 1995 because the MPLA cancelled its contract under pressure from the United States and the United Nations. The PMC had previously committed to maintaining a presence in the country as a stabilizing force for as long as was necessary.69 The United Nations' altruistic interest in providing security guarantees in Rwanda were seemingly far less powerful than EO's profit motive. For all the permanent members of the UNSC but France, Rwanda was largely a peripheral interest.70 To assess the priority placed on humanitarianism and security in Rwanda by the great powers, one has only to examine the efforts by the US delegation to the United Nations to initially cap the total number of peacekeepers sent to that country at a mere 500 personnel.71 With respect to Angola, no permanent UNSC member possessed significant interest in the fate of the Marxist MPLA or the UNITA rebels following the end of the Cold War. As a result, the UNSC denied the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' initial request for the 15,000 soldiers, police, and military observers to staff UNAVEM III.72 That body subsequently authorized a deployment of 7,000 total personnel.73 As discussed earlier, even fewer personnel were actually sent to Angola and the largest contribution from a permanent UNSC member was Russia's 151 soldiers followed by 15 soldiers from France.74

A2: Impacts- Offense – Profit Motive Good

PMC’s solve conflicts – profit motive makes up for lack of political will other militaries experience.

Fitzsimmons 5 (*Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall , Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2005 “DOGS OF PEACE: A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN PEACE IMPLEMENTATION” Scott , Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jmss/jmss\_2005/v8n1/jmss\_v8n1g.pdf)KM

To provide strong security guarantees in a conflict zone, a third party intervener must be able to demonstrate resolve behind their commitments in the face of opposition.78 Executive Outcomes demonstrated resolve during its peacemaking operations in Angola and Sierra Leone through stationing a full battalion of elite soldiers with heavy air and ground combat equipment in each country or more than half of the company’s entire supply of readily available soldiers. The very presence of this force was a signal to all parties that stability and security would be provided even at a high cost. Furthermore, when EO's forces met with setbacks, such as the 20 deaths that the force suffered in Sierra Leone, the PMC pressed on and ultimately coerced the RUF to stop fighting and return to peace talks with the government.79 The 20 deaths suffered by the force in Angola appeared to strengthen rather than weaken the company's resolve to fulfill their contract. As EO's Colonel Hennie Blaauw argued, "once we had some of our people killed, they could see we were serious."80 This contrasts sharply with the UN forces' response to setbacks, for example, after the UNAMIR force experienced casualties in the spring of 1994. Following the planned murder of 10 Belgian soldiers, Brussels released a public statement on April 12, 1994, announcing that their entire force of 440 soldiers was dropping out of the mission, thus depriving UNAMIR of what was by far its strongest and most capable unit.81 The Belgian government also attempted at that time to persuade the Security Council to cancel the mission entirely, but were only successful in encouraging the mindset that led to a reduction of the mission to a mere 270 personnel.82

Profit motive is good – it provides the strongest incentive for PMC’s to fulfill their duties and actually solve conflicts.

Fitzsimmons 5 (*Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall , Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2005 “DOGS OF PEACE: A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN PEACE IMPLEMENTATION” Scott , Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jmss/jmss\_2005/v8n1/jmss\_v8n1g.pdf)KM

Based on EO's performance during its peacemaking operations, it is reasonable to deduce that if a third party like the UN contracted a PMC to provide security guarantees and if payment was contractually conditioned on successfully fulfilling this task, then the PMC could be expected to fulfill the contract even in the face of opposition from the belligerents. Indeed, reputation and profit could provide even stronger motivations for successful performance in operations where a PMC is contracted by the UN because the UN could possibly award additional contracts to good performing PMCs in the future. Even a single poor performance would reduce a PMC's competitiveness against other firms vying for a finite number of peace enforcement contracts. As a result, the contracted PMC would not only be motivated to perform well in order to be paid for each individual operation, it would also be motivated to perform well in order to be considered by the UN for additional future contracts.

A2: Impact- Offense- Prolif w/ Impx Calc

PMC’s are critical to US counterproliferation efforts.

Smith 4 (Richard Victor University of Western Ontario “Can Private Military Companies replace Special Operational Forces?” http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/smith04.pdf)KM

In the case of the United States the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was created on October 1, 1998 as part of the Defense Reform Initiative of the DoD. Its mandate is to coordinate DoD counterproliferation elements "into a single focal point, creating synergy between the programs and providing onestop shopping for information."36 DTRA involves several DoD entities that focus on "arms control verification, acquisition and development of counterproliferation technology, and implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program." 37 This counterproliferation effort involves military and civil service personnel as well as government experts from other agencies, industry and academia. As early as 1999, this counterproliferation effort involved private advisors and private military contractors.38 The clearest way to example the role that these contractors take on in counterproliferation is to examine the disposing of Iraq munitions and weapons. On September the 14th , one American private military contractor was killed and two were wounded by a terrorist attack that Tuesday morning, north of Baghdad. These three men were employees of EOD Technology, Inc. and were working in Iraq under contract to provide project specific security to the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), formerly the Coalition Provisional Authority.39 In March, United States Army Corps of Engineers awarded a contract worth $3.45 million to help clear ordnance and explosives from Iraq. Under a pre-existing contract, EODT has also received tasks orders worth at least $66,947,670.95 for the disposing of Iraq munitions. 40

And, prolif causes extinction from arms races and miscalculations

Utgoff 2(Deputy Director of the Strategy Forces, and Resources *Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, Victor*, Volume 44, Number 2, Summer) ET

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the, late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Proliferation is a conflict escalator

Taylor 1 (Theodore, Chairman of NOVA, Former Nuclear Weapons Designer, 2001, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html) LL

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

A2: Impacts- Offense – Surge Capacity/Disaster Response

PMC’s provide necessary surge capacity for rapid responses to natural disasters and catastrophes.

McCormick Tribune Foundation 6 (“Understanding the Privatization of National Security” http://www.mccormickfoundation.org/publications/privatization2006.pdf)KM

One area where cost is perhaps less relevant is when the government has an immediate mission and quickly needs “surge capacity.” “It’s a question of getting it done,” noted moderator Suzanne Spaulding. “It’s the need for speed,” added a private sector executive. Whether it’s responding to Hurricane Katrina, a bio-terrorism event, or an outbreak of violence in Iraq, private contractors play an important role in supplementing government capabilities during a crisis or emergency situation. “What private contractors can do very well is pull together highly qualified people and hand-pick them and task-organize them, and do it very quickly. And this is an enormous asset to our country,” noted a public policy expert. “We have chosen not to have a military draft,” added a defense industry expert. “Therefore, when there is a surge in demand… there’s an inevitability toward our use of contractors.”

PMC’s solve modern conflicts – they provide rapid surge capacity at a lower cost than state actors.

Sullivan 10 (*CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW* VOLUME 42 FEBRUARY 2010 NUMBER 3, “Private Force / Public Goods” SCOTT M., Assistant Professor of Law, LSU, http://connecticutlawreview.org/documents/ScottM.Sullivan-PrivateForce-PublicGoods.pdf)KM

2. Policy Advantages of National Security Privatization a. Surge and Diffusion Capacity The increased lethality of non-state insurgents and terrorist organizations enhances non-state actors’ ability to influence state action through isolated, but deadly, incidents of force. Identifying these decentralized threats is difficult; effectively countering them requires a degree of deployment flexibility and expediency that would be enormously difficult and expensive for the public military to attain. Similarly, private contractors do not have to be rotated out of theater as do public soldiers. Thus, the government can hire fewer contractors and receive more fulltime- equivalent service for their deployment than is possible with public troops. The ability to hire and deploy contractors quickly not only provides a needed surge capacity in the midst of armed conflict, but also facilitates the deployment of a small number of troops to parts of the world where the State has little presence.174

A2: Impacts- Offense – Terrorism

PMC’s key to war on terrorism.

Smith 4 (Richard Victor University of Western Ontario “Can Private Military Companies replace Special Operational Forces?” http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/smith04.pdf)KM

Combating Terrorism Similar to counterproliferation, combating terrorism also makes use of PMCs to augment SOF involvement. It has been estimated that the United States spends at least 30 cents on the dollar for PMCs in the fight against terrorism.41 The United States current War on Terrorism has provided according to D. B. Des Roches, spokesman for the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency, an active source of employment for PMCs.42 "Contractors are indispensable," said John J. Hamre, deputy secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. "Will there be more in the future? Yes, and they are not just running the soup kitchens." From cleaners to providing protection to valuable public works, Private Military Corporations are filling an important necessitate for the war on terrorism. The United States department of defense issued two contracts worth $2,608,794.74 for MPRI to devise a plan to put ex-soldiers to work on public works programs.43 Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is corporately structured "with a Board of Directors, President, Chief Financial Officer, corporate staff, three operating groups, and a full time staff of 800…MPRI provides an extensive array of services, including training and education, simulation and war gaming support, equipment fielding support, democracy-transition assistance, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, antiterrorism, force protection, consequence management, and non-military services."44

A2: Impacts- Offense – War

Relying on PMC’s for the war is good – warfare has moved away from large interstate conflicts. Traditional ideas of state control of violence don’t apply anymore.

Douthat 7 (Ross is a senior editor at The Atlantic, 28 Sep, “Reihan: Why Private Military Contractors Are A Good Thing”, http://rossdouthat.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/09/reihan\_why\_private\_military\_co.php)KM

A debate has erupted over US reliance on private military contractors in Iraq and elsewhere. My sense is that the brilliant and decidedly uneven Robert Young Pelton, a staunch critic of PMCs, has set the tone for the debate. My own view is different. We do depend on PMCs, we're likely to depend on them even more over time, and this is a very good thing. Consider John Robb's thoughts on the subject. The defining fact of our time, as John Mueller has argued, is the decline of war. This, of couse, contradicts the Colin Gray view and I can see how it might seem strange given the bloody conflicts that dominate the headlines. But this doesn't change the normative shift that has taken place over the last century, from a time when military aggression was seen as both inevitable and acceptable to the present, when it is seen as an offense against all things good and decent. A similar normative shift was behind the decline of enslavement in the West, which began long before the vile practice became economically impracticable. Ideology matters. The kind of conflicts we're seeing and are likely to see are far more like crime, pervasive and opportunistic, than like conventional interstate warfare. The patriotic sentiments that motivated volunteer armies in the past are harder to apply to campaigns designed to strengthen vulnerable foreign states, or to limit the extent of bunkering and other criminal activities that have no obvious ideological valence. And so we will need to rely on skilled professionals to help police the world. To be sure, there are legitimate concerns about abuses committed by PMCs. That is a failure of the US and Iraqi governments, but not of PMCs as a matter of principle.

PMC’s fill the gap the military leaves – asymmetrical warfare and increased need for peacekeeping missions are more suited to entrepreneurship.

McCormick Tribune Foundation 6 (“Understanding the Privatization of National Security” http://www.mccormickfoundation.org/publications/privatization2006.pdf)KM

The increased use of unconventional warfare by our enemies is another key driver of privatization. “How do you fight a global war on terror?” asked a participant. The government is “doing the right thing by being very entrepreneurial. Just like any corporation, you would bring in experts on short-term contracts.” PMCs are often better suited to respond to asymmetric threats. “Al-Qaeda is basically a new war-making entity,” noted a law enforcement expert. “This is in fact a new form of warfare that’s evolving. It’s not state-on-state conventional warfare, but the new form of warfare that’s developing with non-state actors.” “This is a global change,” concurred another law enforcement official, “where you see crime and war blurred. You see domestic and foreign blurred. And this has particularly important ramifications.” One ramification is the need for better intelligence. “During the Cold War, information was hard to come by,” noted one expert. “Power came from the control of information. The world is becoming increasingly complex … and the intelligence function above all has to be accurate and it’s got to be fast. [The government] can’t cover everything.” As a result, contractors are increasingly being employed in the intelligence field. One industry leader noted that another big change is the increased need for peacekeeping missions. “The military, of course, hates doing peacekeeping,” he stated. “So what are we going to do about that? Well, we’re probably going to go to the private sector again. Do you need to send a hundred 1st Airborne to eastern Congo to do peacekeeping operations? Not necessarily.”

A2: Impacts- Defense – War

PMC’s don’t have a propensity for violence – they generally employ retired soldiers and demand high levels of experience.

Sullivan 10 (*CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW* VOLUME 42 FEBRUARY 2010 NUMBER 3, “Private Force / Public Goods” SCOTT M., Assistant Professor of Law, LSU, http://connecticutlawreview.org/documents/ScottM.Sullivan-PrivateForce-PublicGoods.pdf)KM

2. A Propensity for Violence? The claim that private actors threaten human rights and larger U.S. policy goals emanates from a presumption that contractors are intrinsically more likely to use force, both lawful and unlawful, in the field.97 At the institutional level, the perceived propensity for violence stems from the tie between destruction in the field and the need for reconstruction contracts. At the individual level, critics suspect that selection effects and responsibility to private authorities for job performance result in a contracting base that is especially prone to violence and is apathetic toward larger collective policy goals. Gideon Sjoberg has characterized the institutional concern as a military animation of “Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction as the foundation of capitalist endeavor takes on new meaning in Iraq: the greater the destruction the greater the demand for goods and services.”98 Under this view, PMCs are inclined to inflict more damage than necessary as part of a larger commercial incentive to reap the benefits of the reconstruction contracts that would follow. The quintessential example of this pattern is Halliburton, which has garnered over $15 billion in reconstruction contracts in Iraq, often through no-bid administrative award processes.99 As part of their reconstruction costs, Halliburton sub-contracts security services to other PMCs like Blackwater Worldwide.100 In a different but related vein, MPRI, which offers a diverse portfolio of military services, has been accused of manipulating information of foreign political circumstances to secure foreign military training contracts, the result of which potentially increased the level of fighting on the ground.101 At the individual level, it is commonly accepted that “security contractors are more likely to commit violations of the laws of war when they become involved in difficult security operations.”102 The “prone to violence” claim against PMCs has also been cited by legislators as a fundamental basis for barring PMCs from certain activities.103 The data, however, does not bear out these claims. The likelihood of both PMCs and public soldiers using violence, especially unlawful violence, reflect independently associated variables such as training level and military experience.104 As in the public military, PMCs possess varying degrees of training and military experience. Over seventy percent of the PMCs employed in Iraq are believed to have served in a Western military institution.105 During the course of their military service, many future contractors act as part of their military’s special operations forces, requiring the highest level of training one typically receives in military life.106 Private contractor experience also provides crucial experience in military-oriented nation building roles, such as civilian policing, of which the public force is otherwise completely bereft.107

Demographics prove – PMC’s steer clear from illegal or unnecessary violence.

Sullivan 10 (*CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW* VOLUME 42 FEBRUARY 2010 NUMBER 3, “Private Force / Public Goods” SCOTT M., Assistant Professor of Law, LSU, http://connecticutlawreview.org/documents/ScottM.Sullivan-PrivateForce-PublicGoods.pdf)KM

Other demographic factors also tend to indicate that PMCs—especially security contractors—are no more likely to engage in unlawful violence in their employment. Demographic factors of age, education, marital status, and the presence of children correlate with a lower likelihood to engage in crime generally, and unlawful violence in particular.110 PMCs serving abroad are on average 54% older than their public soldier counterparts (averaging 40 years old in comparison to 26 years old for public soldiers in the Army).111 Contractors are more than twice as likely to have a post-high school diploma (67% of civilian contractors possess a post-high school diploma, compared to 32% of soldiers in the Army).112 PMCs are also more than twice as likely to be married at the time of their service (73% to 44%)113 and are almost twice as likely to have children than those in the public military (1.2% to 0.64%).114

A2: Impacts- Defense – War

PMC’s are driven by the desire to serve the public good – private motive arguments don’t apply.

Sullivan 10 (*CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW* VOLUME 42 FEBRUARY 2010 NUMBER 3, “Private Force / Public Goods” SCOTT M., Assistant Professor of Law, LSU, http://connecticutlawreview.org/documents/ScottM.Sullivan-PrivateForce-PublicGoods.pdf)KM

One might think that the overarching profit-motive aspect of private actors may somehow create selection effects that would render traditional gauges of violence propensity inapplicable. Specifically, the idea that PMCs work for monetary gain is manifestly different than the motivating factors for public troops.115 Such analysis ignores empirical evidence that pecuniary gain also serves as the predominant reason for individuals to join (and remain in) the armed forces. Similarly, the desire to serve the public good represents an equivalent reason for PMCs to become public soldiers and enlist.116

A2: Impacts- Defense- War

And, contractors are a stabilizing force- they keep stabilize governments

Bellamy 8 ( Paul, UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, *Know Your Law*, http://www.knowyourlaw.com/Uploads/docs/Private%20Military%20Firms%20in%20Occupation.pdf ) ET

Deborah Avant, associate professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and eminent specialist, writes: „[..] military contractors do not always undermine State power. They can enhance the power of individual states, as when failed states like Sierra Leone essentially buy an army. Contractors are also quite useful to powerful nations such as the US, which is managing the chaos in Iraq with fewer troops than many believed necessary by increasing its (private) personnel pool. States that embrace private security have a flexible new foreign-policy tool partly because private forces ease the political restraints typical among democracies. Those states that do not tap into the market lose relative power. Ultimately however, contractors undermine states' collective monopoly on violence. The fact that the US, Britain, Australia, and the United Nations hire private security makes it hard for nations that oppose military contracting to restrict security firms based in their country.‟66

\*\*Reverse Spending DA – Aff Answers

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

Terminally NU: The administration is slated to increase the DoD’s budget in the coming years, which has nearly doubled since 1998. Gate’s “budget cuts” are anything but.

Preble 6-30 (Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a member of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/30/toward-a-responsible-defense-budget/) NAR

In a recent article in The Daily Caller, Chet Nagle claims that the Obama administration “plans to eliminate over a trillion defense dollars in the next ten years.” Unfortunately, he has no basis for saying so. The Department of Defense is one of the only government agencies slated to receive real increases in spending over the next few years, according to the administration’s budget submissions. Nagle pretends that the cuts proposed in a recent report by the Sustainable Defense Task Force have the administration’s support. This is not the case. As a member of the task force, I actually wish Nagle were right. Even modest cuts to military spending — which has grown by 86 percent since 1998 — would show that the administration had reconsidered the approach to U.S. military power that has prevailed in Washington since the end of the Cold War. But like the last one, this administration seems to believe that U.S. troops should answer every 911 call, with American taxpayers footing the bill. Perhaps Nagle was misled by a series of speeches by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in which Gates questioned the need for expeditionary fighting vehicles when we haven’t landed Marines on a hostile shore since the Inchon landing in September 1950. Perhaps Nagle confused Gates’ pledge to eliminate waste and inefficiency within the Pentagon’s budget as a sign that the secretary was serious about cutting military spending. Far from it; Gates is mainly shifting spending within the Pentagon’s budget. T he bottom-line figure continues to grow. Equally misguided is Nagle’s claim that eliminating the bomber leg of the nuclear triad is a step toward unilateral disarmament. This proposal finds support in a report published by the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, not the province of peaceniks and anti-nuclear activists. A separate article published by the chief of the Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division and two Air Force War College professors concluded that as few as 311 nuclear warheads would constitute an effective and credible deterrent. The U.S. simply does not need the same nuclear force structure — bombers, missiles, and submarines — that it had during the height of the Cold War. The key shortcoming of Nagle’s article is his failure to confront the logic underlying our proposed cuts. Most of what Americans think of as “defense” spending isn’t really intended to defend the U.S. Rather, our military is structured toward defending other countries that can and should defend themselves. Sheltered under the American security umbrella, our allies have allowed their own military capabilities to atrophy.

The DoD is already pushing for modernization – DA is NU

Government Executive 6-21 (http://www.govexec.com/story\_page.cfm?articleid=45529&oref=todaysnews)NAR

For its part, the Pentagon recently announced a five-year effort to find more than $100 billion in savings within the Defense Department's budget and reinvest that money into higher-priority force structure and modernization accounts. Two-thirds of the savings are expected to come from unnecessary overhead costs, which make up roughly 40 percent of the Pentagon's budget. The rest will come from cuts to weapons systems and other investment accounts that the military deems it no longer needs -- a painful prospect for the armed services and lawmakers on Capitol Hill, who are reluctant to cut programs they've championed for years. The cost-cutting effort is designed to make the Pentagon able to live within a base budget that is expected to have only 1 percent real growth annually -- a relatively modest raise for a department whose base budget has nearly doubled in size since 2001. At the same time, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., has announced that his panel will launch a review to find cost savings, presumably starting with the fscal 2012 budget. "It's not just a matter of dollars; it's how you spend them," Skelton said recently. "You spend [it] all on bows and arrows in a bigger budget, you don't have much."

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

Budget is fairing fine – recent military stimuli proves

Xinhua News 7-2 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-07/02/c\_13380724.htm)NAR

The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday approved the additional war funding bill that President Barack Obama requested for the military buildup in Afghanistan. The new measure, once approved by both chambers, would raise the total funding for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade to one trillion dollars. But the bill is believed unlikely to be signed into law by the president before the July 4 recess as it had hoped, because the bill will need to go to the Senate, which has gone into recess for a week and a half. The House and the Senate must approve the bill with exactly the same language before it can go to the president for signature. And the House has made changes to some provisions by adding billions of non-military spending, so the bill must return to the Senate for another vote. The changes that House Democratic leaders made to the bill made it harder to gain support from Republicans, who have been advocating for a "clean bill" with no unrelated domestic spending. So it is unclear whether the Senate Democrats can garner enough votes for the bill's passage. Obama asked Congress in February for 33 billion dollars to pay for his troop surge in Afghanistan. That was on top of about 130 billion dollars that Congress already approved for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars through Sept. 30 of this year.

DoD already engaging in cost-saving program – means they are obtaining excess money at no cost to their effectiveness.

The Wall Street Journal 6-28 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335180991820498.html)NAR

The Department of Defense on Monday unveiled a new series of measures to wring more cost savings out of the roughly $400 billion it spends annually on weapons, equipment and services. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, held closed-door sessions Monday with top defense industry executives and defense procurement officials to explain the new initiative, which is part of a larger austerity drive within the department. Over the past decade, U.S. defense budgets have seen consistent, double-digit growth, but Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in May that the post-9/11 defense spending boom was coming to an end. In an interview, Mr. Carter said the department wanted to "do more without more" by realizing 2% to 3% in annual savings through productivity enhancements and greater efficiencies. "If we can achieve that, we can avoid the alternative, which is instability, uncertainty, broken programs, and broken faith and confidence with the taxpayer that we're capable of delivering value for the defense dollar," he said.

Gates already doing trade-offs to get excess cash.

The Wall Street Journal 6-28 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335180991820498.html)NAR

Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told reporters on Monday he was confident that Mr. Gates could make the right tradeoffs to preserve military capabilities without commensurate budget increases. "If anybody can do it, Gates can," Mr. Levin said. Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, said Mr. Gates had already been "dropping hints" about significant weapons program cuts. "You are seeing three pressure points," Mr. Krepinevich said. "One is a budget that's being squeezed from the top down; second, a budget that is being eaten from the inside out by manpower costs; and the third is cost overruns."

Gates is committed to opening space for the DoD’s budget.

Statesman 6-28 (http://www.statesman.com/news/nation/nation-digest-mcchrystal-tells-army-hell-retire-study-775186.html)NAR

Pentagon looks to save $100 billion Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he wants to trim some of the billions of dollars the Pentagon spends on weapon systems and contractor services, part of a Pentagonwide effort to find $100 billion in savings in the next five years. Gates said the Defense Department will focus on unnecessary spending by defense contractors that provide the military with everything from fighter jets to janitors.

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

Gates is committed to freeing money and avoiding unnecessary costs – F35 engines prove

Washington Post 6-8 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704832.html?hpid=topnews)NAR

"The American people deserve a government that spends every taxpayer dollar with as much care as taxpayers spend their own dollars -- where money is spent not out of inertia, but only when it contributes to achieving a clear national priority," Emanuel and Orszag write in the memo, according to an early draft. The approach is modeled on a Defense Department program, announced in early May by Secretary Robert M. Gates, aimed at encouraging the military and civilian bureaucracy to find $7 billion to help cover the cost of combat operations. Emanuel said similar programs have also been used successfully by state and local governments. Gates seems to be something of a budget-cutting inspiration for Obama. Less than two weeks ago, the president threatened to veto a defense authorization bill now working its way through Congress unless lawmakers canceled funding to develop an alternative engine for the F-35 warplane, which Gates has deemed unnecessary.

Gates is making every dollar count – he will free up room for needed operations

UPI 6-18 (http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2010/06/18/Lockheed-backs-Gates-on-budget/UPI-88271276875930/)NAR

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is on track with his calls to redefine defense spending to meet the 21st century threat environment, Lockheed Martin said. Gates complained to lawmakers this week that the Defense Department budget was focused on non-combat operations. "If you took a broad look at our budget, about 50 percent of our procurement budget is for what I would call long-term modernization programs to deal with near-peer countries," he said. Bob Stevens, chairman and chief executive officer at Lockheed Martin, said the defense secretary was right to refocus military spending. "(Gates) has been relentless and eloquent in demanding a new kind of focus -- from the Department of Defense, the Congress and the defense industry as well, to be extremely rigorous in determining what our requirements really are ... to align our priorities with real world needs ... and to ensure we do everything possible to make every dollar count," he said. Stevens added his company was "disciplined" in setting its priorities to meet its customers need and fulfill its obligation to support national security.

Major weapon programs have already been cut by Gates – the main focus is our combat troops.

Star Telegram 6-28 (http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/06/28/2299559/defense-official-meets-with-defense.html)NAR

Carter said the Pentagon "has concluded that we cannot support our troops with the capabilities they need" without dramatic cost savings from the $400 billion spent annually on weapons, supplies and services. He said he was looking for what the private sector calls productivity growth, 2 to 3 percent annual cost savings without buying fewer weapons or supplies. The goal is to achieve $100 billion in savings between 2012 and 2016. "In effect, doing more without more," Carter said. "In the real economy, we expect that every year. But in the defense economy, more has been costing more." Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in remarks to the news media, said major weapons programs have been cut and more would probably be cut, but other ways must be found to reduce defense expenditures so the military services can pay salaries, benefits and support troops serving around the world. Defense industry officials said they welcomed Carter's invitation to discuss changes to contracting policies and government requirements that would help lower costs. In a statement issued after the Pentagon meetings, Lockheed Martin Corp. Chief Executive Robert Stevens praised Carter's initiative and promised cooperation. "We see the world through exactly the same lens as Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter, and we intend to be relentless in focusing on program execution, on continuously improving our quality, and on driving affordability into every process and every program," Stevens' statement said. "We've already made changes with the Secretary's goals in mind -- and those changes have resulted in reduced costs in several areas -- but we've just started."

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

The DoD is planning on making cost-effective reforms to several factors of its industry

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

It's not the first time the Defense Department has attempted far-reaching cost-saving measures. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced a similar business overhaul on Sept. 10, 2001, but that plan was quickly overtaken by the 9/11 attacks. This time around, the Pentagon is promising to look across the board, from personnel to health care. Here are a few of the areas likely to be targeted:

A.)Health Care reform

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

At around $50 billion annually and growing, health care is one of the top drivers of the Pentagon's budget. But cutting it will also be the most contentious. Congress has repeatedly resisted any attempts to cut Tricare, the military health care plan, and in recent years lawmakers have moved to expand the program.

B.)Equipment reformatting

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

Though the Pentagon has said it would like to see more cuts from its weapons-buying accounts, that's easier said than done. Even when it tries to cut weapons the military says it doesn't want, it has to contend with Congress. For example, the administration is in a standoff with Congress over an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The cost of the engine, which the Pentagon insists it doesn't need? $3 billion.

C.) Base closing

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

When the Pentagon wants to shed real estate, it's not as easy as just closing up shop. To close a base in the United States, the administration has go through the Base Realignment and Closure Act, a formal process that can take several years. The last BRAC recommendations were finalized in 2005. The next round hasn't even been scheduled yet and might not happen until 2013.

D.) Personnel cuts

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

Specifically singled for cuts are personnel, particularly headquarters staff. Of course, some people are already pointing out that the desire to cut staff seems to go directly against the Pentagon's stated goal of "in-sourcing" jobs, meaning hiring government workers to perform jobs that over the past decade have gone to private contractors.

E.) Logistics improvements

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

Gone is the day of the $600 hammer, at least from congressional hearings. Instead, the military is facing sticker shock for basic supplies, such as water. Although estimates vary, one study pegs the cost of delivering drinking water to soldiers in theater at as high as $11.81 a gallon. No easy solution exists to cut the cost of logistics, but the Pentagon could explore different basing options or supply routes.

Non-Uq – Congress

They got it the wrong way – Congress supports giving 33 billion to the DoD, budget is fine.

NY-Times 7-2 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/us/politics/03cong.html) NAR

The debate in Congress over an $82 billion war spending bill has opened up a war of a different sort — a fierce clash between House Democrats and the Obama White House over two highly sensitive issues: the nation’s huge budget deficit and the lingering wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To help entice liberal Democrats to approve $33 billion for military operations overseas that they do not support, House leaders added more than $20 billion in new domestic spending to the bill, including $10 billion to save teachers’ jobs. In the process, the House also voted to cut $800 million from President Obama’s marquee education initiatives. House Democrats, led by Representative David R. Obey of Wisconsin, the departing chairman of the Appropriations Committee, said redirecting the education money, including about $500 million from the competitive grant program called Race to the Top, was a small price to pay to avert as many as 140,000 teacher layoffs this year.

Budget Cuts won’t lead to modernization – only 20% of the budget is spent on combat.

Foreign Policy 7-2 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/02/this\_week\_at\_war\_the\_pentagons\_own\_private\_welfare\_state)NAR

A recent report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) explained the dismal trends that are bogging down the Pentagon's budget. Over the past decade, the budget, after subtracting out inflation, has almost doubled. Yet during that time, the number of aircraft and warships has declined and those that remain have gotten older. Funding has expanded at Reagan-like levels. But compared to the Reagan years, there has been relatively little modernization resulting from all of that spending. The operational costs of fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are a large part of the problem. According to the CSBA, 20 percent of defense spending (including supplemental budgets) between 2001 and 2010 went to operational costs of those two wars. But the remaining 80 percent of the spending doesn't seem to have produced much new capability. The rapid escalation in the cost of new weapons -- partly caused by frustrating mismanagement in research and procurement practices -- has resulted in a bleak return on investment for taxpayers. In 1985, during the peak of the Reagan defense buildup, the Pentagon bought 338 new tactical fighter aircraft and 23 new warships, among other items. In 2008, procurement spending was 33 percent higher after adjusting for inflation, yet the department could afford only 56 new airplanes and 7 new warships. One wonders whether the increases in weapons quality have been worth the inflation in unit costs. But it is the Department's personnel costs that will pose the biggest headache in the future. Just like entitlement spending in the domestic budget, salaries, health care, and family services benefits granted today compound into the future and are politically impossible to retract. In order to reduce stress on ground troops making repeated deployments to the war zones, Defense Secretary Robert Gates expanded Army and Marine Corps headcounts by 92,100 immediately after taking office in late 2006. Meanwhile, Congress has consistently upped the ante on the Pentagon's salary requests. Just like everywhere else in the economy, the Pentagon's health care bill has run wild, tripling the rate of inflation in the rest of the economy since 2001 -- it now consumes nearly a tenth of the Pentagon's base budget. And in order to retain experienced personnel constantly separated from their families, Congress has expanded a variety of family benefits. The result has been a growth in inflation-adjusted personnel costs from $73,300 per head in 2000 to $126,800 in the 2011 budget. When it comes time for Congress to roll back defense spending, this compensation will be untouchable. Training, maintenance, and equipment modernization will suffer the cuts.

Non-Uq – No Obama Bill

There is a desire to get defense cuts to free up money – but it isn’t going to pass through congress.

Raw-Story 6-11 (http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0611/commission-outlines-1-trillion-defense-budget-cuts/)NAR

A bipartisan commission of defense experts has released a plan that would reduce the US's defense spending by nearly $1 trillion over 10 years -- a plan sure to gather support from progressives and libertarians, but unlikely to pass through Congress. The commission's report comes at a time when public concern about the US's national debt has hit a fever pitch, and the claim that nearly $1 trillion can be saved from defense spending will certainly color future debates about what government services to cut. The Sustainable Defense Task Force, put together at the behest of Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) to "explore options for reducing the defense budget’s contribution to the federal deficit without compromising the essential security of the US," recommends saving $200 billion by reducing the presence of US troops in Western Europe and the Far East, and reducing total troop strength to 1.3 million. The report (PDF) also recommends eliminating "costly and unworkable weapons systems," for a savings of $130 billion, and reducing the US's nuclear arsenal to 1,050 warheads, for a savings of $113 billion.

Non-Uq – Supplemental Now

Bill will be passed by August – besides, plan would pay for military salaries and cover civilian furloughs, not experimental research. Prefer our evidence, it is future predictive.

Marine Times 7-1 (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/military\_warsupplemental\_congress\_063010w/)NAR

Congress won’t make Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ July 4 deadline for passing a war supplemental funding bill, but there is now a glimmer of hope that lawmakers might get the measure passed before August, when the military would begin to face severe cash-flow problems. The holdup on the bill has been in the House of Representatives, but Rep. David Obey, D-Wis., the House Appropriations Committee chairman, announced Wednesday that a $93.5 billion supplemental appropriations bill would be considered by the House this week that includes $37 billion for troops in Iraq. The bill also includes $13 billion to cover a planned expansion of Agent Orange disability benefits to more Vietnam veterans. Gates warned lawmakers that the Navy and Marine Corps would have to start dipping into peacetime budgets to cover war-related expenses as early as next week if Congress did not pass a final supplemental war funding bill before leaving town for its Fourth of July recess. He also warned the Army would face severe budget pressure in August, including the potential for civilian furloughs and insufficient funds to cover military pay.

Non-Uq – SDTF

The SDTF will free up 960 billion for the DoD.

Taxpayers for Common Sense 6-11 (http://www.taxpayer.net/resources.php?category=&type=Project&proj\_id=3550&action=Headlines%20By%20TCS)NAR

A new report identifies $960 billion in Pentagon budget savings that can be generated over the next ten years from realistic reductions in defense spending. The report was produced by the Sustainable Defense Task Force, a group convened in response to a request from Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) to explore options for reducing the defense budget’s contribution to the federal deficit without compromising the essential security of the United States. The report comes at a time when the federal deficit is drawing increasing attention from policymakers in Washington. President Obama has appointed a National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform to look at long-term budgetary trends; the administration’s new National Security Strategy has argued that we need to “grow our economy and reduce our deficit” if we are to ensure continued U.S. strength and influence abroad; Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has spoken of eliminating unnecessary weapons systems and reducing overhead costs at the Pentagon; and key Congressional leaders are speaking of a bottom-up review of defense spending to look for potential cuts.

SDTF proposition may reach 1.1 trillion in excess funds

Virtue Online 6-30 (http://www.virtueonline.org/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=12831)NAR

Last month a "Sustainable Defense Task Force" proposed cutting $1.1 trillion of a projected $7 trillion cost over a decade. How? Reduce the number of nuclear weapons in half to 1,000, saving $113 billion. Reduce conventional forces by 200,000 saving $395 billion and pare the number of ships from 287 to 230, saving $177 billion. Only a quarter favored an income tax hike of 10% to 20% to raise up to $381 billion in 2025. Half supported a 20% jump for the rich, yielding $174 billion, and two-thirds back an extra 5% for those earning over $1 million. That would pull in $34 billion with another $20 billion by raising capital gains - if these folk don't move to the Bahamas. Nearly half supported limiting itemized deductions to 28% of income, though couples earning over $210,000 deduct 33% to 35%. Half support reforming the entire tax code, to reduce rates and earmark 10% to 30% for deficit reduction. To summarize, half of participants agreed on how to cut $1.2 trillion; another 18% agreed on paring $1 trillion. "You have restored my confidence in the ability of citizens to challenge the politicians," said Alice Rivlin, Co-Chair of a Bi-partisan Debt Reduction Task Force.

Non-Uq – Savings Inevitable

Congressional backlash to funding benefits mounting, future cuts to this are likely

Maze 7-3 (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/07/army\_benefits\_070210w/)NAR

A task force formed at the urging of Frank, Jones, Paul and Wyden is proposing a $1.1 trillion reduction in defense spending over 10 years, including $628.5 billion in personnel programs. Frank, who is leading the bipartisan effort, said he isn’t singling out the military for cuts, but he doesn’t want it singled out for special protection, either. “We need to bring focus on a long-term reduction in the deficit. We believe that one item has not gotten enough attention: military spending,” he said. “Everything has got to be on the table.” The report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force was sent to the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, an 18-member panel that is supposed to report to the White House and Congress in December with recommendations on how to reduce the federal deficit. Because the 2011 defense budget could be completed before the commission completes its report, cuts in personnel programs are not likely this year, according to congressional aides who asked not to be identified. But talk about cutting future benefits could discourage efforts to increase benefits now. A House Armed Services Committee aide said most lawmakers on both sides of the aisle wouldn’t support major cuts in the number of military personnel, nor in pay and benefits — but this could change after the November elections. If a freshman class of lawmakers arrives in Congress next year believing that cutting spending is their top priority, support for the military and its personnel could erode, congressional aides warned.

Cost savings inevitable – overhead cost reductions

Wheeler 6-10 (Winslow Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project, Center for Defense Information , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winslow-t-wheeler/nightmare-budget-scenario\_b\_607421.html) NAR

While Gates and Obama won that Titanic F-22 fight last year, they waffled on the C-17 and let 18 more be produced. This year, Gates says he means it on the C-17, but the C-17 porkers are laying in wait for him in the Senate where they have the votes, and the House C-17 porkers lust to tag along. More problematic is Gates' selection of the second F-35 engine to take a stand on. In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) repeated a previous internal DOD study saying the second engine, bought competitively, could save money. Nonetheless, Gates -- now with Obama belatedly backing him -- says he'll get the bill vetoed if it endorses any competition between F-35 engines. Gates' $102 billion reduction in overhead is a cumulative goal for five years, not one, and the bigger savings don't arrive until the elusive (may-never-happen) out-years. This will be after Gates, maybe even Obama, is long gone. The first year savings ($7 billion) is a puny 1.2 percent of the 2012 Pentagon spending plan. The public schedule includes no savings in the next fiscal year, the one for 2011 that doesn't even start until next October. According to an internal Defense Business Board study, DOD spends 40 percent of its funds on overhead. If the whole $102 billion is saved, and if it all comes out of overhead (which is not the plan), DOD spending for bureaucratic fat will be reduced only 8.5 percent. The administrative bloat would go down, but only from 40 percent to 37 percent of total DOD spending. Similar timidity and procrastination is recommended by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Ike Skelton, D-MO. Having finished shepherding the 2011 DOD authorization bill through the House of Representatives last month, Skelton now announces that next year will he look at saving money. The only sum he would identify is "X amount." Expect little to nothing from this diffidence, and you will not be disappointed. Others are less timid. Congressman Barney Frank, D-MA, has put together an alternative DOD budget plan to reduce spending there by $1 trillion over ten years. He has logic on his side: since 2000, the Pentagon's "base" budget has gone up by the same amount ($1 trillion), in addition to the $1 Trillion also spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Non-Uq – Savings Inevitable

US military already obtaining savings via their ‘Lean Six Sigma’ programs – savings reaches billions

Minitab 8 (http://www.minitab.com/en-US/company/news/news-basic.aspx?id=364&langType=1033, July 1st 2008) NAR

The U.S. military is saving billions of dollars by implementing quality improvement methods such as Lean Six Sigma, and these savings could grow even faster as the Department of Defense takes steps to expand these initiatives throughout the armed services. For example, the Department of Defense recently selected Minitab Inc., the leading provider of software and services for quality improvement, for a General Services Administration Blanket Purchase Agreement. The agreement makes Minitab’s solutions for quality improvement, data analysis, Lean, and Six Sigma more easily accessible at a time when all branches of the military are implementing such initiatives. Since the U.S. Army deployed Lean Six Sigma in 2005, nearly 2,000 personnel have been trained, more than 1,000 projects have been completed, and more than 1,600 remain active. The Army credits these projects with achieving nearly $2 billion in savings so far. The Department of the Navy has trained more than 5,000 sailors and Marines as Six Sigma green or black belts since 2006. The Navy estimates savings from its projects for 2006 and 2007 to be $450 million, a 4-to-1 return on investment. The U.S. Air Force has trained more than 500 Six Sigma belts, and its Air Logistics Centers received two Shingo Prizes for quality improvement last year. The Air Force has committed to a 40,000-manpower reduction without impairing its operational capabilities due in part to efficiencies gained from its initiatives. As more military personnel begin applying the tools of Six Sigma, they are likely to encounter Minitab’s products, including Minitab Statistical Software, Quality Companion by Minitab, and Quality Trainer by Minitab. “Minitab’s software is used by the most successful Six Sigma companies, and this agreement gives the military easy access to the same tools and solutions,” says Paul Engle, commercial sales leader for Minitab Inc. Many DoD agencies already use Minitab’s products, Engle notes, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. “Our hope is that this blanket purchase agreement will make it easier for the armed services to implement their quality improvement initiatives at home and abroad.”

Gates has a commitment to saving money – Will find $100 billion in the next 5-years

Washington Post 6-28 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/AR2010062803269.html?nav=rss\_business/industries)NAR

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Monday he wants to trim some of the billions of dollars the Pentagon spends on weapons systems and contractor services, part of a Pentagon-wide effort to find $100 billion in savings in the next five years Gates, who already plans to pare down the Pentagon's huge bureaucracy to save money, said that the Defense Department will focus on unnecessary spending by defense contractors that provide the military with everything from fighter jets to janitors. Gates said it is "a matter of principle and political reality to make sure every taxpayer dollar counts." His goal is to shift money from overhead expenses to supporting U.S. troops spread around the globe. The Pentagon will spend about $400 billion of its $700 billion budget on weapons and services from defense contractors. The new plan calls for annual savings of about 2 percent to 3 percent through measures like contracts that require the defense companies to shoulder cost overruns and encouraging competition between contractors.

Non-Uq – Savings Inevitable

Gates already saved roughly $65 billion in the F-35 fiasco

Washington Post 6-28 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/AR2010062803269.html?nav=rss\_business/industries)NAR

For example, Gates fired the head of the F-35 fighter program in February after the cost per plane nearly doubled to $113 million from 2001. Lockheed Martin, which is the lead contractor on the $323 billion project to build 2,450 aircraft, said earlier this month that it plans to cut the cost of the jet by nearly 20 percent.

Over $400 billion will be saved by Carter and Gates

Wall Street Journal 6-28 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335180991820498.html)NAR

WASHINGTON—The Department of Defense on Monday unveiled a new series of measures to wring more cost savings out of the roughly $400 billion it spends annually on weapons, equipment and services. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, held closed-door sessions Monday with top defense industry executives and defense procurement officials to explain the new initiative, which is part of a larger austerity drive within the department. Over the past decade, U.S. defense budgets have seen consistent, double-digit growth, but Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in May that the post-9/11 defense spending boom was coming to an end.

Non-unique – Afghanistan costs will be slashed in the status quo – it’s the most expensive military occupation right now.

The Christian Science Monitor 10 (“Will Petraeus cut costs in Afghanistan as he did in Iraq?” June 24, lexis)KM

One military medal Gen. David Petraeus did not receive from President Bush for his success in Iraq - even though he deserves it - was for reducing US costs. Now, under President Obama, he has replaced Gen. Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan and may yet be rewarded if he can rein in that war's expenses. As an officer astute about politics, Petraeus knows the new politics of austerity in Washington. Congress is in little mood to add to the debt. Afghanistan now costs more than Iraq, or some $70 billion this year, even as a troop surge goes on. Mr. Obama warns he has a budget limit for Afghanistan. "We simply cannot afford to ignore the price of these wars," he says. He seeks a balance between domestic priorities, especially the economy, and the threat of violence from Al Qaeda or its affiliates in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. The president also promises to address the war costs "openly and honestly." A strategy review is planned for December with a drawdown of forces set to begin mid-2010 - depending on local conditions, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates puts it. "We are in this thing to win," he says. Defining victory, however, remains illusive and divisive among Obama's security team, one reason for McChrystal's ill-spoken words to a reporter. Rather than wait until December, Obama should use this change of command to give a clear explanation of the current trade-offs between the war's costs and the evolving security threats. Is he still set on denying a haven for Al Qaeda, as promised - even if, for instance, the coming offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar fails and drags the war into 2012 and beyond? The president dislikes an open-ended commitment to the war. And he uses the threat of withdrawal to pressure Kabul to quickly boost its forces and the economy. But squaring his goal of securing that country enough to prevent another 9/11 with the budget pressures back home will require Obama to keep a running dialogue with the American people. Since last year, they have largely found the war not worth fighting. It takes more than one good general to win a war. The home front is a battleground, too.

Non-Uq – Reinvestment Inevitable

Gates is already making programs to save money – will invest that money into new weapon systems.

Government Executive 7-4 (http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/060410cdpm1.htm?oref=rellink)NAR

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is ordering a department wide, five-year effort to find more than $100 billion in cost savings in the Pentagon's budget and redirect that money to pay for military weapons systems and force structure. In the next several days, Pentagon leaders will direct the military services and defense agencies to scrub their budgets to find $7 billion in savings for the fiscal 2012 budget, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said Friday. Each of the three services will be responsible for coming up with $2 billion in savings for the fiscal 2012 budget request. But as a strong incentive, the services will keep within their budgets whatever costs they cut over the next five years to pay their force structure and modernization bills. The initial cost-savings plans are due by July 31, Lynn said. After the $7 billion savings in fiscal 2012, the annual cost savings appear to increase significantly to reach a total of $100 billion by fiscal 2012.

No I/L – Cuts Redirected Elsewhere

Budget cuts will be used to pay for the war and soldier salaries.

FireDog Lake 6-17(http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/17/congress-presses-pentagon-on-afghanistan-funding-withdrawal-date/) NAR

Defense Secretary Robert Gates told senators Wednesday that the Pentagon will have to do “stupid things” if Congress doesn’t approve a $33 billion supplemental spending request by July 4. The military sought passage of the wartime spending bill before Memorial Day, but that slipped by, making the July 4 recess the next must-pass deadline. Funding for the Navy and Marine Corps will begin to run out in July, forcing the Pentagon to disrupt other programs. And by early to mid-August, the military may have to start furloughing civilians and might not be able to pay members of the active-duty military.

Cost savings cover inflation, not specific weapons programs

Washington Post 6-10 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/09/AR2009060902647.html) NAR

For the Defense Department to merely tread water, a good rule of thumb is that its inflation-adjusted budget must grow about 2 percent a year (roughly $10 billion annually, each and every year). Simply put, the costs of holding on to good people, providing them with health care and other benefits, keeping equipment functional, maintaining training regimes, and buying increasingly complex equipment tend to grow faster than inflation. This is, of course, no more an absolute rule than is Moore's law about changes in computing capacity. But like Moore's law, it tends to hold up remarkably well with time, especially when downsizing the Defense Department's force structure is not really an option, and it is not today. It is easiest to understand this by examining the four main categories of Pentagon spending: military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research and development. Regarding the first, there were times in the 1970s when we starved personnel accounts, but the result was a dispirited and "hollow" force. At a time of war, when we are asking so few troops to do so much for so long, this is not a viable option. In fact, over the years of the Bush presidency, personnel spending increased 100 percent. About 25 percent of that was due to the cumulative effects of inflation and another quarter to mobilizing reservists and enlarging the force. But the remaining half was real cost growth averaging 5 percent a year. Even if we slow the trend, we can't realistically end it. Operations and maintenance costs are always what budgeteers want to cut -- and always the area where they overestimate the potential for savings. This was the case in the 1990s; almost every year the Clinton administration hoped to economize on such expenses through new types of efficiencies, but almost every year it wound up needing to add to those accounts retroactively. Among defense budget specialists, the real debate is whether inflation-adjusted operations and maintenance costs per person grow at 2 percent annually or 3 percent or somewhere in between. Procurement and research and development are the chief areas in which Defense Secretary Robert Gates has sought savings in the proposals he announced in April. He has proposed cuts to programs including the F-22 fighter, the DDG-1000 destroyer, the Army's Future Combat System, the presidential helicopter fleet, the transformational communications satellite, aircraft carrier production runs, the airborne laser missile defense program and the next-generation bomber. These are solid proposals; he could make additional cuts to the V-22 Osprey and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programs, as well as existing nuclear weapons platforms.

Excess military money is used to by antiquated weaponry.

The Atlantic 6-16 (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/06/cut-the-military-budget/58282/)NAR

The other reason is that Congress tends to think about boondoggle weapons systems in the context of jobs, not deficits. Killing a turkey is viewed as eliminating a major employer. (Last month, Frank voted over the objections of the defense secretary to fund a duplicate F-35 engine built in Lynn, but says he'd kill the fighter altogether if it came to a vote.) So we still buy useless weapons, over the protests of reformers and defense officials. That kind of backward thinking could start to change. Bringing the deficit under control is a zero-sum game. Eventually, we'll have to raise taxes and cut spending. As budget pressure grows, the nearly $1 trillion in military cuts proposed by the task force could look appealing. One way of getting this done is through the president's Deficit Reduction Commission, which will recommend a package of cuts to Congress in December for an up-or-down vote. The Sustainable Defense Task Force is lobbying the commission to do what Obama wouldn't: consider military cuts, and in the context of the entire federal budget. Members like Frank and Paul say they'll vote against any package that doesn't, and encourage congressional colleagues to do likewise.

Link Turn – PMC’s Save Money

Using PMCs extensively saves the military money

DCAF 4 (Geneva Centre of Democratic Control of Armed Forces, http://www.dcaf.ch/pfpc/proj\_privmilitary.pdf)

Contracting out to private companies, agencies, or other intermediate types of administration has a place in efficient government. And there are functions that PMFs perform better than governments. According to US SecDef Donald Rumsfeld, using contractors saves money and frees up the military to concentrate on its core mission.

PMCs save the military money

Lendman 10 (Steve, Centre for Research on Globalization, 1/19, http://sjlendman.blogspot.com/2010/01/outsourcing-war-rise-of-private.html)

Singer noted how PMCs have been involved in some of the most controversial aspects of war - from over-billing to ritual slaughter of unarmed civilians. Yet none of them have ever been prosecuted, convicted or imprisoned, an issue Singer cites in listing five "dilemmas:" 1. Contractual ones - hiring PMCs for their skills, to save money, or do jobs nations prefer to avoid. Yet unaccountability injects a "worrisome layer of uncertainty" into military operations, opening the door to unchecked abuses. 2. PMCs constitute an unregulated global business operating for profit, not peace and security when skilled killers are hired - former Green Berets, Delta Force soldiers, Navy Seals, and foreign ones like the British SAS.

PMCs save money

Brownfield 4 (Peter, writer for FOXNews, 4/18, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,117239,00.html)

These hired guns, who number more than 15,000, generally prefer the term "private military contractors." They are a mixture of ex-military, mostly from Great Britain and the United States, but also from Australia, South Africa and elsewhere, including Fiji, Nepal and even Iraq. They serve many roles that are traditionally seen as the responsibility of soldiers, including guarding supply convoys for military contractors, training Iraqi soldiers and even supplying guards for Coalition Provisional Authority (search) Administrator L. Paul Bremer. With the military having shrunk by one-third since the Cold War, the Pentagon has had to rely increasingly on contractors. Some industry insiders say well-run operations can boost military effectiveness and save money. But, company executives and industry analysts say that the private military business, which has ballooned since the Iraq war, is in need of better regulation. At the same time, after recent murders and kidnappings of security contractors, including an Italian who was executed on Wednesday, Democratic lawmakers are calling on the Pentagon to review the use of contractors.

PMCs save money – companies take fatality responsibiliy

Scahill 9 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at the Nation Institute, http://www.voltairenet.org/article159859.html)

Hiring private guards is less expensive than hiring new officers. Oakland — facing a record $80 million budget shortfall — spends about 65% of its budget for police and fire services, including about $250,000 annually, including benefits and salary, on each police officer. In contrast, for about $200,000 a year the city can contract to hire four private guards to patrol the troubled East Oakland district where four on-duty police officers were killed in March. And the company, not the city, is responsible for insurance for the guards. As in many cities, this is a contentious issue in Oakland, which has struggled to deal with substantial violence on the one hand and police brutality on the other. According to the San Francisco Chronicle: The areas where the armed guards were supposed to have been deployed have a disproportionate share of homicides, assaults with deadly weapons and robberies… The crime rate in the area, according to a 2003 blight study, is between 225 and 150 percent higher than the city as a whole.

PMCs save billions

People’s Geography 7 (news site, 5/14, http://peoplesgeography.com/2007/05/14/going-blackwater-profiteering-and-private-armies/)

3. Civilian contractors doing the military support, reconstruction, and security in Iraq are overwhelmingly Iraqis, the people who should be leading such efforts in Iraq. Americans make up only 17 % of Department of Defense contractors, something critics prefer to overlook. 4. Good oversight and accountability are good for good companies. While oversight has improved since 2003, overwhelmed contract officers have had a detrimental effect on the private sector’s ability to fulfill their contracts. In terms of accountability, companies can and are frequently held accountable through standard contractual methods. For individuals, there are a number of laws on the books, including the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), which can be used to try contractors in Federal courts. As a trade association, we believe these laws could be more energetically enforced by the Department of Justice. 5. The U.S. military is designed to be the most capable organization in the world, it is not designed or expected to be particularly cost effective. Outsourcing needs to the private sector brings huge economies of scale and efficiencies that save billions of dollars while reducing burdens and enhancing services to the soldiers in the field.

Link Turn – South Korea Withdrawal Expensive

South Korea withdrawal is expensive – would make billions spent in vain

Ahn 9 (writer for the Korea Policy Institute, 1/31, http://www.kpolicy.org/documents/policy/090131christineahnexpensivedivision.html)

The United States has committed to spending $10 billion on base construction in South Korea, and South Korea has begun to increase its military budget annually by 10 percent under its $665 billion Defense Reform 2020 Initiative. John Feffer, editor of *Foreign Policy In Focus*, estimates that spending will go towards purchasing "expensive, high-tech systems, such as new F-15k fighters from Boeing, SM-6 ship to air missiles, and rapid response teams with 2,000 advanced armored vehicles to handle a possible North Korean collapse." South Korea is also preparing for 2012, when it will assume control of the U.S. Forces in Korea and bear the primary responsibility of the defense against North Korea. Although the 27,000 American troops now in South Korea will be reduced, thousands of American troops and a couple of U.S. military bases, in Pyongtaek and Osan, will remain to secure U.S. interests in the region. The two huge bases in Pyongtaek and Osan are now major listening posts for the U.S. military. Investigative journalist and longtime contributor to *The Nation* Tim Shorrock, while conducting exhaustive research for his book *Spies for Hire* on the privatization of U.S. intelligence, uncovered unsavory evidence that the U.S. military bases are eavesdropping on Korean civilian activities. According to Shorrock, Pyongtaek has become a key overseas intelligence outpost for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Although the primary target is the DPRK, U.S. intelligence activities at Pyongtaek and Osan also monitor China, Vietnam, and other countries in Asia. "Scariest of all is their potential power to monitor South Korean communications," states Shorrock. Shorrock asserts that while the NSA must follow certain legal procedures to spy on Americans inside the United States, there are no restrictions on the NSA's monitoring of overseas communications. Since 9/11, what is considered a threat has widened to include almost any activity that questions or challenges U.S. dominance. According to Shorrock, "That means that political activity aimed at curbing the buildup at Pyongtaek is very closely monitored. There may be certain restrictions on ROK authorities spying on Korean citizens; but the gloves would be off for U.S. authorities doing that." In the course of his investigation, Shorrock discovered an article by a U.S. Forces in Korea official on U.S. cooperation with ROK police in monitoring U.S. bases: "It's an amazingly frank assessment that tells me that the anti-bases movement is being as closely monitored, and probably more so, than Al Qaeda - and basically puts the movement in the same camp as global terrorists." According to Jae-Jung Suh, professor at Johns Hopkins University, the U.S. military aims to transform into a 21st century global fighting machine, which includes realigning bases and further enmeshing South Korea and Japan into the U.S. military alliance. Not only does increasing the militarization of South Korea intensify military pressure against North Korea, Suh predicts that in the long run, it will exert pressure on Asian allies to fortify their militaries. This new arms race will further punctuate a deepening fault line between the U.S.-Asia alliance. But there are more than economic costs associated with increasing the militarization of Korea. According to Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy, "The subsidy provided by the U.S. presence enables South Koreans to postpone hard choices concerning how fast and how far to move toward reunification." In other words, the U.S. military presence enables South Korea to provide a high level of defense against North Korea at a reduced cost. "The withdrawal of U.S. forces would force Seoul to decide whether it should seek the same level of security now provided by the U.S. presence by upgrading defense expenditures," writes Harrison, "Or whether instead, the goal of accommodation and reunification with the north would be better served by negotiating a mutual reduction of forces with the north."

Link Turn – South Korea Withdrawal Expensive

Removing troops from South Korea results in enormous at-home basing expenses

Congressional Budget Office 4 (http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5415&type=0&sequence=4)

Following the approach that the Army uses in South Korea, this option would make 90 percent of tours in Europe unaccompanied to reduce the size and cost of the Army's infrastructure in the region. Thus, most of the approximately 60,000 soldiers assigned to Europe would serve one-year tours without their dependents. As a result, the Army would need to provide housing, schools, and other support for only a small fraction of the roughly 80,000 dependents of active-duty personnel stationed in Europe. However, because the Army would need to provide additional housing suitable for unaccompanied soldiers and would have to pay to move personnel every year rather than every three years, this alternative would cost $825 million up front to implement and about $75 million per year thereafter, CBO estimates (see Table 3-3). The largest expense associated with this option would be a one-time investment of $1.7 billion for construction--primarily to build barracks in Europe for soldiers on unaccompanied tours (who, like single soldiers, typically live together in barracks). The Army could convert housing units that are now used by soldiers with families into housing for unaccompanied personnel, which would be less expensive than constructing new barracks. But doing so would result in higher annual costs thereafter, because barracks are cheaper to operate and maintain than family housing units. Nearly half of the $1.7 billion in new construction costs would be offset by money that the Army would save by cancelling construction projects that would otherwise be needed to replace facilities for soldiers' families in Europe on the schedule that DoD has set as its goal. CBO estimates that over the 10-year implementation period assumed in this analysis, those one-time construction savings would total $875 million, bringing the net cost of carrying out this option to $825 million. On an ongoing basis, this approach would significantly reduce the size of the student body at DoD-supported schools in Europe. Currently, more than 20,000 dependent children of Army personnel in Europe attend DoD schools. If demand for those schools was reduced to a level commensurate with that experienced in South Korea, the number of students would fall to around 3,500, producing annual savings of about $125 million.(12) Another $50 million in annual savings would result from reduced construction costs for family housing. Conversely, some annual costs would rise after this alternative was implemented. An additional $100 million per year would be needed to maintain quarters for soldiers in Europe and to pay housing allowances for families left in the United States. Moreover, the annual cost of moving soldiers and their belongings for a permanent change of station would rise by $225 million as a result of making PCS moves to Europe more frequent. Because those recurring costs would exceed the recurring savings described above, CBO estimates that converting three-year accompanied tours in Europe to one-year unaccompanied tours would end up raising annual costs by $75 million.

Link Turn – Opium Eradication

Ending opium eradication shifts focus to spending on finding traffickers

Drug War Chronicle 9 (International organization working for policy reform in US drug laws and criminal justice system, 7/3, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/592/afghanistan\_US\_stops\_opium\_poppy\_eradication)

Thousands of US Marines poured into Afghanistan's southern Helmand province this week to take the battle against the Taliban to the foe's stronghold. But in a startling departure from decades of US anti-drug policy, eradicating Helmand's massive opium poppy crop will not be part of their larger mission. US envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke told members of the G-8 group of industrialized nations Saturday that attempting to quash the opium and heroin trade through eradication was counterproductive and bad policy. Instead, the US would concentrate on alternative development, security, and targeting drug labs and traffickers. "Eradication is a waste of money," Holbrooke told the Associated Press during a break in the G-8 foreign ministers meeting on Afghanistan. "The Western policies against the opium crop, the poppy crop, have been a failure. It might destroy some acreage, but it didn't reduce the amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar. It just helped the Taliban, so we're going to phase out eradication," he said. "The farmers are not our enemy; they're just growing a crop to make a living. It's the drug system," Holbrooke continued. "So the US policy was driving people into the hands of the Taliban." The Taliban insurgents are estimated to earn tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars a year from the opium and heroin trade, which generates multiple streams of income for them. Taliban commanders tax poppy farmers in areas under their control, provide security for drug convoys, and sell opium and heroin through sm1quggling networks that reach around the globe. As late as last year, US policymakers supported intensifying eradication efforts, with some even arguing for the aerial spraying of herbicides, as has been done with limited success, but severe political and environmental consequences in Colombia. That notion was opposed by the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai, as well as by the US's NATO partners, particularly Britain, which supports expanded manual eradication of the poppy fields.

These drug investigations cost billions

Francis 9 (Diane, writer for the Huffington Post, 4/19, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-francis/americas-war-on-drugs-a-f\_b\_188269.html)

As the western hemisphere's leaders begin their Summit of the Americas today in Tobago, the issue that dare not speak its name should be front and center but won't be. The issue involves America's foolish and expensive War on Drugs which has not worked and threatens to ruin Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador as it has ruined Colombia. The issue was articulated this week at the World Economic Forum confab in Rio de Janeiro when Columbia's former president made an impassioned appeal for leaders in Latin America to condemn the U.S. War on Drugs because it threatens the stability of many countries in the hemisphere. Canada is also increasingly harmed by America's vast appetite for drugs, with cartels infesting the country which is a transshipment nation for narcotics. There are increasing numbers of gangland slayings in Vancouver, for instance, and the proliferation of "grow ops" across the country which are producing high-grade marijuana for export. While worrisome in Canada, the American prohibition against drugs, and failure to address the underlying causes, are devastating to the Caribbean and Latin America. "Drug usage is unstoppable and the cartels have coyotes [people smugglers] planting on the streets hundreds of thousands of illegals selling drugs.," said Cesar Gavaria, president of Colombia between 1990 and 1994. "The U.S. consumption has stayed level despite huge costs and the jailing of millions of people." Colombia was the first casualty in the drug wars. It's economy collapsed, unemployment reached 20%, 200 municipalities in the rural areas were "destroyed" and four million residents fled, along with jobs. American military help to Colombia for the past several years has stopped mass kidnappings, political and police assassinations and helped curb "paramilitaries." But the growing of cocaine, opium and marijuana is unabated, said Gavaria. His passionate plea mentioned the fact that Europe and Canada realizes is that drug usage is a health issue, not a police matter. He said the Americans must recant, and abandon, their drug Prohibition policies and adopt European-style health care to deal with the problem. Because they have not, Mexico now has the drug interdiction problem that has resulted in 10,000 drug-related murders in 2008. Mexico is engaged in a huge military battle with narcotics traffickers who have taken over the gigantic business from Colombia's cartels. Drugs used to go from Colombia to the U.S. and now flow via the Caribbean and Mexico and Canada. Mexico the next casualty "Mexico is now fighting this battle and must do that, but cannot win," he said, meaning that it may restore security but won't stop the flow of drugs anymore than Colombia has been able to do. Mexico's second most powerful politician, President Felipe Calderone's successor, is believed by many skeptics to have been assassinated by the cartels, along with the former head of drug interdiction, on the U.S Presidential Election Day as a result of a fiery crash of their private jet into downtown Mexico City during rush hour. In the past year, some 4,000 police chiefs, judges, mayors and politicians have been assassinated in Mexico, of the 10,000 drug-related murders, as the country is now gripped in an all-out war against the drug gangsters. This is the type of "war" that ruined Colombia's economy, democracy and society which is, after years of trouble, slowly rebuilding. Likewise, the U.S. is badly damaged by this unneeded "war", said Gavaria. "The U.S. has half a million people in jail for drug trafficking," said the former president. "Another 100,000 people who are in jail are there for offenses related to drugs. This is more people in American prisons than are in all the prisons in Europe." The U.S. is spending US$40-billion a year on this plus its drug interdiction system and courts -- all to "keep drug consumption where it has been for years," he said.

Link Turn – Opium Eradication

Eradication is the most cost-effective option

Perl 3 (Raphael, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 10/16, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB88093.pdf)

Proponents of vastly expanded supply reduction options, and specifically of herbicidal crop eradication, argue that this method is the most cost-effective and efficient means of eliminating narcotic crops. They maintain that, coupled with intensified law enforcement, such programs will succeed since it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field than to locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities. Put differently, a kilogram of cocaine hydrochloride is far more difficult to detect than the 300 to 500 kilograms of coca leaf that are required to make that same kilogram. Also, because crops constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers will devote fewer economic resources to prevent their detection than to concealing more expensive and refined forms of the product. In addition, eradication successes have been recorded in individual countries. According to INL’s *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* of 2002, for example, Pakistan has reduced opium cultivation by more than 95% since 1995 and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan accomplished a similar feat in a single year, eliminating more than 62,000 hectares or 97% of the opium crop between 2000 and 2001. However, INL reports that cultivation surged again to 31,000 hectares in 2002 under the relatively weak Afghan political authority that succeeded the Taliban, suggesting that an effective central government presence in drug crop areas is critical to the success of eradication projects.

Shift from eradication leads to interdiction

Ward and Byrd 4 (Christopher and William, consultant and advisor for the World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/01/06/000012009\_20050106091108/Rendered/PDF/311490PAPER0AF100SASPR0no051Dec0171.pdf)

The Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) was created in October 2002 to coordinate Afghanistan’s counter narcotics struggle. The Directorate has prepared a national strategy, signed by the President, which targets a 70% reduction in opium production by 2008, and its elimination by 2013. The mechanisms are an alternative livelihoods approach coupled with progressive enforcement of a cultivation ban, interdiction and prosecution of trafficking and processing, and forfeiture of drug-related assets. The strategy provides a sound framework for action. It acknowledges the difficulties faced and proposes many sound and necessary actions. It has a provision for action plans, coordination, monitoring etc. The proposals link to existing activities and programs rather than proposing yet more initiatives for an already overloaded system. Broad consultations are needed to get ownership of the strategy and to develop a sequenced action plan and investment program. The overall targets are ambitious, prompting the question whether the measures proposed are sufficient to achieve them. A “paradigm shift” may be needed to cope with such an unprecedented problem. Institutional capacity is another question, particularly the capacity of CND to do all that is expected of it. Strengthening of counter-narcotics institutions is under consideration, including the possibility of establishing a ministry responsible for counter-narcotics efforts. The International Counter Narcotics Conference in February, 2004 demonstrated the Government’s determination and top-level commitment, created some ownership, and put on the table a number of the more difficult issues. Key points from the strategy are now being worked out in implementation plans, although some implementation proposals appear at variance with the strategy, particularly the balance between eradication and interdiction, and the sequencing of alternative livelihoods programs and eradication.

Interdiction is expensive

Ward and Byrd 4 (Christopher and William, consultant and advisor for the World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/01/06/000012009\_20050106091108/Rendered/PDF/311490PAPER0AF100SASPR0no051Dec0171.pdf)

Extensive regional and international cooperation around Afghanistan contributes to substantial seizures of opiates. International concern and action has intensified with concerns over the explosive growth of the Afghan heroin trade and its possible links to terrorism. International experience is that interdiction beyond the frontier increases risk premia but is expensive and can stop only a small proportion of the trade. Effectively, interdiction needs to begin within Afghanistan – evidence suggests that demand reduction or interdiction beyond the frontiers will do little to reduce the drug problem in major producing countries like Afghanistan. Without strong domestic interdiction, Afghanistan will continue to export increasing quantities of opiates. Export routes out of the country are many and shift quickly in response to attempts to suppress them. Trade and processing are even more “footloose” than production in terms of how quickly they can shift. Demand for heroin in Western Europe is not growing, but Afghan opiates are supplying expanding markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, and even the best organized states cannot really control trafficking or local demand. HIV/AIDS is growing fast in these new territories. Prospects for a reduction in aggregate demand or producer price through increased risk premia beyond Afghanistan’s frontiers are poor.

Link Turn – Incirlik

We would redeploy

Bolme 7 (Selin M, SETA Ankara & Ankara University, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7057/is\_3\_9/ai\_n28498510/pg\_7/)

Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the Bush Administration will be able to convince the House. In 1975, despite the opposition of President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger plus two vetoes, Congress passed the arms embargo against Turkey. (29) Hence, it can be said that the Armenian Genocide Resolution may still pass despite Turkey's Incirlik card. On the other hand, is there any plan as to what happens after closing the Incirlik Air base as a response to possible passage of the Armenian Resolution or inadequate American support in the fight against PKK? During crises of embargo in 1975, the bases were opened again to the US use after the lifting of the embargo. But the Armenian Genocide Resolution is a different matter in that there would be no reversal of the process once Congress passes the resolution. So, if Incirlik is vital for the U.S., they may play other cards against Turkey, like a new arms embargo. Such a card is likely to cause difficulties for Turkey in her fight against PKK. Turkey needs to consider all scenarios before taking any action. Furthermore, Incirlik is not the only base or facility that is used by the US. According to US Department of Defense Base Structure Report in 2004, air bases in Batman, Cigli and Mus are active bases of US Air Force without permanent personnel. There is an administration office with 43 personnel in Ankara. Izmir Air Station is another active facility with 117 military members. Izmir Storage Annex No 2 and Yumurtalik Petroleum Products Storage Annex are other installations that are mentioned on the report. The name of the twelve other installations are not mentioned as they are too small (less than 10 acres in area or their plant replacement value are under $10 million) According to the report, total military members of those facilities is 14.

Redeployment costs billions

Abercrombie 5 (Neil, hairs the House Armed Services subcommittee on air and land forces, http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army\_backtalk\_redeploy\_071105/)

There is broad agreement that thoughtful planning is needed for the eventual redeployment of our troops. Yet most people are unclear about the feasibility of redeploying more than 160,000 troops, support personnel and equipment out of a hostile country. Some argue that strategic redeployment is too slow. Others want to “stay the course,” and claim that such redeployment plans are pointless. But redeployment is a complex military operation demanding serious thought and planning, especially if we have forces under fire or caught between factions in a civil war. One hundred and eighty-one House Republicans have joined 169 Democrats to pass legislation that would require the Bush administration to report to Congress on its planning for redeployment from Iraq. The companion measure was quickly introduced in the Senate by Ken Salazar, D-Colo., and Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., and also has solid bipartisan support. Our legislation requires that redeployment planning addresses: Protecting U.S. forces in Iraq. Protecting U.S. civilians, contractors, third-party forces and Iraqi nationals who have assisted the U.S. Maintaining and enhancing the ability of the U.S. to eliminate and disrupt al-Qaida and other terrorists. Preserving military equipment necessary to defend U.S. national security interests. It also specifies that missions for the troops remaining in Iraq should be limited to: Protecting U.S. national security interests. Conducting counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Protecting U.S. civilians and U.S. diplomatic and military facilities. Supporting and equipping Iraqi forces to take responsibility for their own security. One of the first issues is deciding which military units will be redeployed, in what order, from which geographic areas and over what time period. This includes the possibility of consolidating bases and relocating some units within Iraq during redeployment, deciding which forces might have to stay in Iraq and Kuwait and for how long. We’ll need detailed cost figures. Some experts estimate as much as $10 billion will be needed to get our forces and most of their equipment home from Iraq. By comparison, we’re spending about $10 billion every month to stay there.

Link Turn – Missile Defense Alternative to TNWs

Spending will trade off from TNWs to missile defense systems

Young 10 (Thomas, writer for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 5/1, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/missile-defense-the-future-of-nato-burden-sharing)

"If you are a NATO member, you have to work for collective security," Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov recently [remarked](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61B24K20100212?type=politicsNews) in response to reports that his country is positioning itself as a potential host for components of the reconfigured European missile defense system. Borisov's statement encapsulates the spirit of NATO burden sharing: allies collectively shouldering the costs, risks, and responsibilities of maintaining adequate defenses. Those who argue for keeping forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe (maintained under the auspices of NATO defense commitments) frequently cite the need for burden sharing. And despite claims that nuclear sharing undermines the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), many see the arrangement as a source of NATO cohesion that has helped prevent a two-tier alliance of nuclear haves and have-nots. Such a divide is further avoided by allies' conventional contributions toward an effective nuclear strike package, including the provision of combat air support, reconnaissance, surveillance, and midair refueling. Moreover, the stationing of nuclear weapons on the continent symbolically affirms the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. Although the perceived value of these weapons for Western European allies has waned considerably since the end of the Cold War, the security assurances that they embody continue to be important to countries on NATO's eastern periphery (e.g., Poland, Estonia, and Turkey). Historically, Washington has viewed deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe as a contribution to nonproliferation, arguing that it prevented allies such as Germany from seeking their own nuclear weapon capability. Although this role is less relevant today, it continues to be applicable to Turkey--an alliance member that attaches particular value to NATO security assurances. In particular, NATO can influence Ankara's threat calculations (especially vis-à-vis Iran) by reassuring it of the alliance's commitment to defend its territory--something that is currently achieved, in large part, by the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons hosted at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. And yet, there's a growing consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that the weapons should be withdrawn. A decision will have to be made soon: The dual-capable aircraft tasked with carrying out NATO's nuclear mission are unlikely to remain in service beyond 2020. If the weapons are removed, then it's preferable that there be some form of replacement that makes withdrawal more palatable to NATO countries that face regional security challenges (i.e., Turkey). Exactly what would constitute a suitable replacement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons? One suggestion is that the alliance simply rely on the extended deterrence offered to non-nuclear weapon allies by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, Britain, and France. But this would contribute to perceptions of a two-tier alliance and could be seen as a weakening of Washington's commitment to Europe's defense. Another option is to reassure allies in Eastern Europe that there are conventional plans in place to protect them in the event of a crisis. Yet force planning of this type is likely to require military exercises--something that Moscow will vociferously oppose on the pretext that they're aimed at Russia. An alternative solution: missile defense. If countries agree to station interceptors on their territory or contribute missile defense assets such as Aegis ships, they would, in effect, be sharing the burdens and risks of collective defense in much the same way Germany, Turkey, and Italy do by hosting nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This option also has the added benefit of shifting the burden east toward those countries that are more skeptical of any symbolic weakening of the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. Further, the ability for mobile missile defense capabilities to be surged into regions at times of crisis creates the need for regular consultations within the Nuclear Planning Group or a similar NATO forum, thereby providing allies with continued influence over U.S. defense policy.

Missile defense systems cost billions

Coyle 6 (Philip E, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, 1/24, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=163)

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the Department of Defense has been spending about $10 billion per year on missile defense. The President's goal is to be able to shoot down enemy missiles of all types - short range, medium range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles - with interceptors launched from land, from sea, from aircraft and from space. It's called a layered defense. The idea is that if one layer misses the next one won't. Pentagon briefings picture the United States covered by a series of overlapping glass domes, and we are meant to imagine that enemy missiles will bounce off those domes like hail off a windshield. In a recent report the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that missile defense spending could double by 2013 to about $19 billion per year. The CBO also proposes an evolutionary approach that would reduce missile defense spending to only $3 billion per year by focusing on research and development, rather than continuing to deploy unproven hardware.

Link Turn – TNWs

Removal of TNW’s would still incur the same costs as keeping them.

Kelleher and Warren 9 (Catherine M., Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and Scott L. executive director of the nonprofit Generation Citizen “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_10/Kelleher)KM

The possibility exists in the near future for a reduction to a new symbolic level, for example, to 100 tactical weapons on the U.S. side, although the costs for infrastructure and security will remain near present levels. Because it is generally agreed that the present numbers are already purely symbolic, further reductions would be a signal and a commitment to the future, rather than a concrete measure such as elimination. A specific attempt should be made now to identify and eventually destroy any remaining British and French systems now in storage.

The process of dismantling nuclear weapons totals in the billions

Alger and Findlay 9 (Justin, a research assistant for the Nuclear Energy Futures Project, and Trevor, CIGI Senior Fellow, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Alger\_Findlay\_Cost\_of\_Disarmament.pdf)

A study by Stephen Schwartz et al published in 1998 deserves an honourable mention for opening the discussion on how much nuclear weapons cost—both to keep and to get rid of. The authors delve into the costs of nuclear weapons, including building, deploying and dismantling them.7 The study approaches the question of disarmament from the angle of reducing nuclear weapons expenditures in the aftermath of the Cold War rather than that of complete nuclear disarmament, so some of the challenging questions about how to dismantle the nuclear weapons complex writ large (along with the costs of verification) are not addressed directly. However, the study does reveal how challenging it is to account for nuclear weapons costs, especially on the disarmament side, particularly with respect to the difficult question of the disposition of excess fissile material. Schwartz et al estimate the cost of dismantling American nuclear weapons between 1940 and 1990 at $40.6 billion.8 Of this total, 47.2 percent ($19.2 billion) was for plutonium disposition—making it one of the most expensive parts of the process.9 The authors also caution that these numbers reflect dismantlement costs in an era when warheads were being replaced rather than retired, which limited the amount of surplus material that needed to be permanently disposed of.10 In these instances the material taken out of a warhead to be retired was often held for future use in a replacement weapon. Complete nuclear disarmament would, in contrast, entail the additional cost of disposal of weapons grade material to render it unusable for a nuclear weapon. The options for such material disposition are numerous and include ‘burning’ it in fast reactors, using plutonium in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for civilian power reactors, blending high-enriched uranium (HEU) down also for civilian power reactor use, or vitrification with other fission products as waste. These options vary wildly in their potential cost.11 Disposing of all of the fissile material from large nuclear programs will be costly. Most of such states will already have facilities for handling, storage and long-term if not permanent disposal of such material, not just from their military programs but from their civilian nuclear power programs. In such cases the additional expense may not be as great as might be expected.

TNW’s are expensive even in relocation – soldiers must be stationed and on stand-by for any potential changes.

Meier 6 (“News Analysis: An End to U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe?” Oliver, *Arms Control Association* July/August http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2088)KM

From NATO’s perspective, such an arrangement of “virtual” nuclear sharing might have a number of technical and political disadvantages. NATO member states may be reluctant to redeploy nuclear weapons in times of crisis for fear of sending a wrong, escalatory signal. The United States currently deploys specially trained Munitions Support Squadrons of approximately 125-150 soldiers each at every base where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. These units would either have to remain stationed at bases where nuclear weapons could be redeployed or kept on standby in the United States for possible relocation in Europe. Both are expensive options and may be difficult to justify, given how unlikely it is that NATO nuclear weapons would ever actually be used. There is also a fear at NATO headquarters in Brussels and national defense ministries that NATO’s nuclear policy may over time fade into irrelevance if the real weapons are withdrawn.

Link Turn – Japan – 2AC Guam

**Turn: Guam Relocation**

**A. Withdrawal means redeployment to Guam**

Straits Times 9 (Feb 17, Asian News Source, http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory\_339485.html)JFS

HOPING to give new momentum to a plan to rework the deployment of US troops in the Pacific, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signed an agreement Tuesday with Japan that will move 8,000 Marines off the southern Japanese island of Okinawa to the US territory of Guam. The framework of the transfer had already been agreed on in 2006, but several major points remain to be worked out, including the location of a base to replace Okinawa's Futenma air station, a major hub for the Marines there. Officials on both sides have agreed to relocate the operations of the base to another, less crowded part of Okinawa, but local opposition has stalled progress.

B. Redeployment to Guam costs $10 billion

Fujita 10 (Akiko, writer for Public Radio International’s “The World”, 1/4, http://www.pri.org/world/asia/us-military-buildup-guam1816.html)

The population of Guam is expected to increase by 50 percent in the next four years. That's because the U.S. military plans to redeploy thousands of Marines and their families from the Japanese island of Okinawa. The move could bring an economic boom to the Pacific island but it threatens to strain Guam's infrastructure. The US and Japan agreed to the troop transfer three years ago, to reduce US troop presence in Okinawa. Joe Arnett with the Guam Chamber of Commerce says the move will transform the island. "This investment into Guam in unprecedented. Guam has never seen this level of investment into the island ever before." Arnett expects the military buildup to create 30,000 new jobs on the island. Many will be temporary construction jobs filled by foreign workers. But Arnett says high paying; permanent jobs will stay in the community. It sounds like a good opportunity for an island struggling with eight percent unemployment. But Senator Judi Guthertz says Guam isn't ready to shoulder the load. "We're not going to be ready unless resources are made available to the civilian community," said Guthertz. Guthertz oversees the legislative committee for the military buildup. She supports the Marine transfer, but says the American government isn't doing enough to support Guam. While the US and Japan has pledged 10 billion dollars for the buildup itself, they haven't guaranteed large investments in the civilian communality. Guthertz says that's a concern in light of a recent environmental impact statement. It said the buildup will attract tens of thousands to the island, perhaps as much as a 50 percent jump in a few years.

Link Turn – Japan – Move to Guam

Military withdrawal from Japan results in troop going to other islands

Brown 10 (Peter J, writer for the Asian Times, 2/20, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LB20Dh01.html)

Webb is mindful that the presence of US forces on Okinawa has been a political hot potato for years. Former governor Keiichi Inamine, for example, proposed a complete withdrawal of US military personnel from Okinawa in 2003. Webb even wrote an article in early 2001 for Parade magazine entitled "Should We Leave Okinawa?" in which he mentioned that former Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto "speaks often of 'the suffering of the Okinawan people' as a result of the American bases, implicitly supporting their removal". "Okinawa - 350 miles [563 kilometers] from Taipei, 700 from Seoul, 800 from Manila and about 1,500 from Singapore - is ideally situated not only for the defense of Japan but also for rapid deployment to a wide array of potential crises," Webb wrote. "Ironically, some US defense planners believe that the limits American forces have placed on themselves in order to satisfy the Okinawan people are too restrictive, leading them to recommend a substantial withdrawal from the island." Webb also highlighted a US National Defense University study in 2000 which recommended a "diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region" of US forces on Okinawa.

Japan stationed troops get redeployed to Guam

**Yoshida 6/28** (Kensei, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/3378)JFS

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, located in the middle of a residential area of the city of Ginowan (population 91,000) north of the capital Naha, reportedly stations 2000 to 4000 personnel of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. Helicopters and fixed/wing aircraft are constantly flying low in circles over the residences, schools and hospitals for embarkation and touch-and-go exercises, creating roaring noise and the danger of crashes. People are so concerned that they have long been demanding its closure and return, with particular urgency since 2004 when one of Futenma’s heavy helicopters spiraled into the wall of the administration building of a university right across the fence and splattered its broken pieces all over during the summer break. In 2006, the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed to relocate many Okinawa-based Marines to Guam by 2014 to lessen the Okinawan people’s burdens or to accommodate “the pressing need to reduce friction on Okinawa.” MCAS Futenma would be returned, but only after being replaced by a new facility that Japan would construct within Okinawa.

Troops get redeployed to Guam

Shuster 6/21 (Mike, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127932447)JFS

"The U.S. government [has] repeatedly said that [it wants] to relocate to a place where [it] will be welcome. That welcome is simply not there in Okinawa at the moment," Nakano says. The U.S. says it will transfer 8,000 Marines to Guam and move a portion of the base to another part of Okinawa.

Link Turn – Japan – Guam Move Expensive

Redeployment costs billions

McCurry 6 (Justin, writer for the Guardian, 4/25, http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/japan-pay-60-costs-moving-t20834.html)

After weeks of stalled negotiations, Japan has agreed to pay almost 60% of the cost of transferring thousands of US marines from Okinawa to Guam in a move designed to reduce the US's military burden on one of its closest allies. Japan's defence minister, Fukushiro Nukaga, announced the deal after more than three hours of talks in Washington on Sunday with the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. "I had not expected that such an agreement was possible," Mr Nukaga told reporters. "Japan and the United States were still wide apart on the issue and I thought 'It won't go anywhere unless I directly meet Mr Rumsfeld for talks aimed at a breakthrough.'" Under the agreement, which is part of Washington's plans to realign its forces around the world, Japan will pay $6.1bn (£3.4bn) towards the $10bn it is expected to cost to move 8,000 marines and their families to Guam, a US territory located roughly midway between Japan and Australia. Japan will pay $2.8bn in grants, with the remainder coming in various loans. Japan had refused US demands to pay 75% of the total while it struggles to rein in its huge public debt. Many Japanese also blame the bases for causing pollution, accidents and crime. Mr Rumsfeld said he and Mr Nukaga "have come to an understanding that we both feel is in the best interests of our two countries". Okinawa comprises a fraction of Japan's total area, but is home to around half of the 50,000 US troops stationed in the country. "One big goal of this realignment was to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa, and our thought is to carry this out as quickly as possible," Shinzo Abe, a Japanese government spokesman, told reporters. "Our burden was unavoidable in order to speed up the process."

Redeployment costs billions

Associated Press 9 (2/17, http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory\_339485.html)

TOKYO - HOPING to give new momentum to a plan to rework the deployment of US troops in the Pacific, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signed an agreement Tuesday with Japan that will move 8,000 Marines off the southern Japanese island of Okinawa to the US territory of Guam. The framework of the transfer had already been agreed on in 2006, but several major points remain to be worked out, including the location of a base to replace Okinawa's Futenma air station, a major hub for the Marines there. Officials on both sides have agreed to relocate the operations of the base to another, less crowded part of Okinawa, but local opposition has stalled progress. 'This agreement reflects the commitment we have to modernise our military posture in the Pacific,' Mrs Clinton said. 'It reinforces the core of our alliance - the mission to defend Japan against attack and to deter any attack by all necessary means.' Japan's Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone also hailed the agreement. 'We believe this Guam agreement shows the strength of our alliance,' he said. 'We agreed to work toward the implementation of the 2006 pact in a manner that does not compromise readiness or capability.' There are currently about 13,000 Marines stationed on Okinawa, and 23,000 US troops there overall. They are part of about 50,000 US troops deployed in Japan under a post-World War II mutual security pact. The cost of the realignment plan has generated intense debate in Japan. Guam's transformation is expected to cost at least US$15 billion (S$23 billion) and put some of the US military's highest-profile assets within the fences of a vastly improved network of bases. In the pact signed on Tuesday, Japan agreed to give Washington $2.8 billion for the transfer costs, though its contribution is expected to go higher.

No Link – Japan Bases are Inexpensive

Comparatively – keeping troops in Japan is cheaper than having them in the US

Onishsi No Date (Kenichi, writer for the Newsletter for a Multicultural Japan, http://www.tabunka.org/newsletter/canjapan.html)

Let me give you some information on U.S. bases in Japan. U.S. bases in Japan number 94, when only those bases for U.S. use are counted, and their aggregate size is over 316 square kilometers. Besides these, there are 42 bases of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces which are designated for common use with the U.S. forces as needed. This means that a total of 136 bases are available for the U.S. forces in Japan. The bases for the U.S. use have somewhat decreased, but common use bases have substantially increased so that the aggregate size is 1.9 times greater than that of 20 years ago. The U.S. Department of Defense's East Asia Strategy Report, published in February 1995, regards Japan as supplying "by far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies." As U.S. administration officials point out, "it is actually less expensive to the American taxpayer to maintain our forces forward deployed than in the United States."

No Link – Troop Reductions are Expensive

Short term costs of troop withdrawals are expensive

Eaglen 9 (Mackenzie, Heritage Foundation's Research Fellow for National Security Studies, 4/30, http://www.speroforum.com/a/19140/Obamas-military-budget-to-decrease-over-10-years)

Congress must also consider several other billpayers knocking at the Pentagon's door that are certain to consume any potential real growth in the Obama defense budget--even before the details are available in May. In the same floor speech earlier this week, Senator Inhofe highlighted the difference in war funding requests for 2009 by Presidents Bush and Obama. Congress approved $65.9 billion in emergency supplemental funds for the first part of FY 2009, yet President Obama's supplemental request of $75.5 billion for defense needs is supposed to pay for invoices that actually run much higher. This six-month supplemental for the second half of FY 2009 is supposed to fund ongoing operations, a significant 21,000-troop increase in Afghanistan, and the expensive beginning of a withdrawal from Iraq. While it may appear to be cheaper to take troops out of Iraq, in the short-term it actually costs much more to get military servicemembers and their gear out. Senator Inhofe also discussed a recent General Accountability Office report that characterizes the cost to redeploy significant force levels from Iraq as a "massive and expensive effort" with rising near-term costs.[2] The report states the cost of equipment repairs and replacements--along with closing and turning over 283 military installations in Iraq--and finally moving troops and equipment home "will likely be significant." Senator Inhofe and others are rightly sounding an alarm bell that defense spending on current warfighting operations is decreasing in FY 2009 by $10.7 billion.

Withdrawal is a long, expensive process

Scahill 9 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at the Nation Institute, 3/30, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/35899.html)

First, there's the money. "Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs, GAO has seen from previous operations â€¦ that costs could rise in the near term," according to the 56-page report, which is titled "Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight." In addition to the massive funds required to move tens of thousands of troops, the GAO points out that the Army estimates "it would cost $12 billion to $13 billion a year for at least two years after the operation ends to repair, replace and rebuild the equipment used in Iraq." The cost of closing U.S. bases will also "likely be significant;" even after military units leave Iraq, the Pentagon will need to invest in training and equipment to return these units to levels capable of performing "full spectrum operations." (The GAO report does not even mention the costs of providing much-needed medical and mental health services to veterans.) The Obama administration is likely to portray the costs of "withdrawing" from Iraq as a painful necessity made inevitable by the Bush administration. But there are already calls for Obama to not allocate any new funds for such an operation. Retired Army Col. Ann Wright, a veteran diplomat who reopened the U.S. embassy in Kabul after Sept. 11 (and, while in the military, worked on plans for an Iraq invasion), says, "Everyone in the Department of Defense -- military and civilian -- knows well the expense of going to war and the expense of bringing troops back to the United States.

No Link – Troop Reductions are Expensive

Withdrawing is expensive business

Carpenter 8 (Ted Galen, Council on Foreign Relations, 2/28, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15586/when\_should\_the\_us\_withdraw\_from\_iraq.html)

It is important to clarify the real strategic choice in Iraq. It is not between a U.S. withdrawal in the next 6 to 12 months or a withdrawal sometime in the next 5 years or so. It is a choice between a prompt withdrawal and trying to stay in Iraq for decades—or in Senator McCain’s flippant formulation, a century. The creation of numerous “enduring” military bases and the building of an embassy nearly as large as Vatican City confirms that the U.S. intends to stay a very long time. A long-term occupation would be an extremely costly proposition, both in lives and dollars. The mission currently costs more than $10 billion per month. Even if the level of violence remains relatively low, and Washington ultimately achieves its long-delayed objective of reducing troop levels below 100,000 (neither of which is certain), the monthly cost would still run $7 billion to $8 billion. And that is merely the direct financial drain. It does not take into account such indirect costs as the care of thousands of additional wounded veterans over the coming decades—an obligation that will add tens of billions more to the tab. A long-term mission in Iraq is a multi-trillion-dollar commitment.

Removal of equipment alone is expensive

Fishel 10 (Justin, writer for FOXNews, 4/12, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/02/military-embarks-costly-complicated-removal-iraq-equipment/)

The U.S. Army plans to spend tens of billions of dollars over the next year and a half to refurbish and move equipment out of Iraq as the military focus shifts to a build-up in Afghanistan.  Third Army Commander Lt. Gen. William Webster told Pentagon reporters Friday there are 2.8 million pieces of equipment in 88,000 containers that need to be moved out of Iraq, calling it the largest operation "since the build-up for World War II."  The equipment drawdown coincides with the troop drawdown President Obama outlined in 2009. The president wants 50,000 troops left in Iraq by the end of the summer while surging 30,000 forces into Afghanistan in that same period. The rest of the U.S. presence in Iraq is supposed to be gone by the end of 2011.  Webster said the military will salvage whatever it can during that time, taking items to Kuwait to be rebuilt and shipped directly to the battlefield in Afghanistan. Items that are not fit for battle will make their way back to the United States for training purposes.  The toughest part of the job, Webster said, is determining what to keep and what to leave behind for the Iraqis -- decisions based in part on whichever option is cheaper. The Army Material Command and Defense Logistics Agency has thousands employees making those decisions.  For example, humvees and mine-resistant vehicles are considered to be worth refurbishing and bringing to Afghanistan. The mine-resistant truck, better known as the M-RAP, is taking over as the new workhorse of the military. The reinforced V-shaped hull beneath them shields its passengers from roadsides bombs, protection that's desperately needed in Afghanistan.  However, the thousands of SUVs used by military and civilian officials in and around Baghdad aren't worth taking anywhere. A truck bought for $30,000 in 2004 is worth only $5,000-$8,000 dollars today, and the cost of shipping one of the SUVs exceeds that value.  In addition, many of these trucks were not built to U.S. emission standards and would face the added cost of upgrading the exhaust system. "So in some cases, it's cheaper for us to turn that over to the government of Iraq through the -- the right programs and let them keep it," Webster said.  Another example of equipment that the U.S. plans to leave behind is the common jersey barrier, or T-wall as it's known in Iraq. The walls, shaped like an upside-down "T," lined the roads throughout Baghdad at the height of the war and served to protect government and commercial buildings from bombs and other attacks.  Webster said depending on their size it costs between $800 and $5,000 to pour a T-wall, but it would also cost $5,000 to ship it.  "And so it doesn't make any sense," Webster told reporters Friday. "It's cheaper, more beneficial to our government to buy them in Afghanistan or adjacent countries. And that, of course, then contributes to businesses in Afghanistan."  Despite the enormous cost of the undertaking, Webster said decisions like this have saved the Army and the taxpayer lots of cash.  "We saved about $3.8 billion last year by finding those redundancies and efficiencies in our processes and either cost avoidance or cost savings, and we were able to apply that $3.8 billion towards last year's build-up in Afghanistan," he said.  But moving equipment is one of the most costly undertakings in a foreign war. Webster acknowledged that at the height of the Iraq surge, about $20 billion dollars was spent repairing equipment and supplying

No Link – Iraq Withdrawal

With over 200 bases and thousands of troops, Iraq withdrawal will be expensive

DeYoung 9 (Karen, staff writer for the Washington Post, 3/25, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402741.html)

The removal of about 140,000 U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 will be a "massive and expensive effort" that is likely to increase rather than lower Iraq-related expenditures during the withdrawal and for several years after its completion, government investigators said in a report released yesterday. "Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs," the Government Accountability Office said, withdrawals from previous conflicts have shown that costs more often rise in the near term. The price of equipment repairs and replacements, along with closing or turning over 283 U.S. military installations in Iraq, "will likely be significant," the GAO reported. Even the smallest facilities, with 16 to 200 combat troops, will take up to two months to close, the report said. Several dozen large installations -- such as Balad Air Base, with 24,000 inhabitants -- are likely to take 18 months or more. The report, "Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," lists other challenges for the withdrawal and post-withdrawal periods, including uncertainties about security for civilian officials, the enormous size of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi government's ability to sustain basic services and infrastructure.

No Link – Afghanistan Opium

The government doesn’t spend a lot on opium interdiction

Mercille 10 (Julien, writer for Counterpunch a prominent political newsletter, 6/30, http://counterpunch.org/mercile06302010.html)

All this said, there is one way in which Afghanistan does have a drug problem, namely, its increasing number of addicts. A recent UNODC report estimated that drug use had increased dramatically over the last few years and that around one million Afghans now suffer from drug addiction, or 8% of the population—twice the global average. Since 2005, the number of regular opium users in Afghanistan has grown from 150,000 to 230,000 (a 53% increase) and for heroin, from 50,000 to 120,000 (a 140% increase). This spreads HIV/AIDS because most injecting drug users share needles. But treatment resources are very deficient. Only about 10% of addicts have ever received treatment, meaning that about 700,000 are left without it, which prompted UNODC chief Antonio Maria Costa to call for much greater resources for drug prevention and treatment in the country. But the problem is that the Obama and Bush administrations could not care less: since 2005, they have allocated less than $18 million to “demand reduction” activities in Afghanistan—an amount less than 1% of the $2 billion they spent on eradication and interdiction. [10] Clearly, US priorities have nothing to do with fighting a war on drugs.

No I/L – Space Militarization

U.S. avoiding space militarization now – doesn’t have the budget and no programs developed yet.

Hitchens, Hyman & Lewis 6 (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 1, March 2006, Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman and Jeffrey Lewis, Hitchens- Center for Defense Information Vice President, Hyman - holds a BS in Physics with a Minor in Technology and Policy from Carnegie Mellon University., Lewis - Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/131hitchens.pdf) NAR

From analyzing current Pentagon budget documentation, we conclude that, for the moment, support for ‘‘space superiority’’ and ‘‘space control’’ systems remains largely rhetorical\*with little actual budgetary support. The Bush administration has expressed interest in these new military missions in outer space. That interest has been reflected in statements by Pentagon officials about space dominance, as well as official military documents, especially those emanating from the Air Force. However, this interest has not yet been reflected in budget requests. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. Based on current levels of technological development and anticipated levels of budgetary support, we conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer microsatellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes. The Pentagon is not\*at least in the unclassified budget\*actively developing capabilities, such as new ground- or airlaunched ASATs, that might be seen in a relatively short time.

U.S. won’t be developing space weapons, at a minimum, until 2015.

Space Review 5 (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/394/1, June 20th 2005) NAR

Since then, there has been almost no work done on space-based missile defense systems and, according to recent reports, the MDA does not plan to ask for any money before 2008. Under current plans, the Pentagon will not even think about deploying any sort of “son of Brilliant Pebbles” until around 2015. Instead, they are working on a ground-based system, called the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI): a missile that would only be launched after an enemy missile has left its silo or launch pad, and would then chase until hopefully hitting and destroying it; that is, being “down” and shooting “up.” Not only that, but the KEI’s would have to be based in nations near the sites from which enemy missiles might be launched. This gives those nations where these interceptors would be based an effective veto over whether the US could or could not defend itself.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Deters Arms Race

US space dominance checks arms races – stops anyone from escalating conflicts and capabilities.

Dolman 6 (Everett C. "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." *SAIS Review*. XXVI, No. 1 Winter-Spring p171, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2311/)KM

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote.

US militarization now prevents arms races in the future – entry costs into space are too much and conventional balancing would be minimal.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism should suddenly acquire the means to place quickly and cheaply multiple weapons into orbit? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-dependent military force could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the US dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America could respond. And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Global Stability

US space dominance wouldn’t create a anarchic world of first strikes and arms races, the US wants to pursue stable space development.

Lambakis 2 (Steven. “"Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1632/)KM

Second, enhanced military power in the hands of states that uphold the rule of international law can work to improve peace and stability in the world. Treaties dealing with the space environment are written to establish stability and order on the space frontier. And this is good. Washington has never considered space to be a domain of anarchy. Indeed, it is in the U.S. interest to develop proper laws and exercise force in a restrained and responsible manner to prevent space from devolving into a lawless, disorderly realm.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Diplomacy

Space capabilities solve diplomacy – gives the US more options when dealing diplomatically with threats.

Lambakis 2 (Steven. “"Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1466)KM

There are sound political and strategic justifications for looking to space. First, a weapon that exploits Earth's orbit may increase the number of foreign policy and military options available to our leaders and commanders. More options mean that a leader may not be forced to take a more destructive or weaker course of action, that he has choices on how his country should act in a dynamic, complex, and often dangerous world. Effective military options, in other words, can work to improve deterrence and stability and help leaders deal more intelligently, even more diplomatically, with surprises.

Space control is key to diplomatic power – a globalized economy depends on communications tech in space.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

From its initial emphasis in the late 1950s as a means of superpower competition, through today’s use of space assets to enable terrestrial military forces, space power has conferred diplomatic advantages to those nations able to employ it. Even so, its potential remains underdeveloped. Since space is the newest medium in which military forces operate, it is to be expected that policy makers have not used space assets as tools of diplomacy to the same degree they have used other, more traditional means. Yet, their lack of focus on this particular tool or means is perplexing. Such esteemed space theorists as James Oberg have misunderstood the power of space assets to affect diplomatic objectives. He states, “Space power, alone, is insufficient to...ensure the attainment of terrestrial political objectives.”159 As affirmed in Colin Gray’s statement above, space professionals have given insufficient thought to (among other strategic implications of space assets) codifying precisely how, when, and where to use space assets for diplomatic purposes short of combat. The analysis that follows seeks to fill part of this void by classifying the diplomatic uses of space assets.160 While the model presented is holistic in its applicability across the spectrum of conflict, its rudimentary nature is evidence that future theorists and strategists still need to accomplish much work. Exploiting space systems to directly achieve diplomatic objectives is a capacity available now, and this opportunity is due to a confluence of trends. First, an increasingly important characteristic of the post-Cold War world is the escalating impact of globalization and interdependency among states. Particularly among the most developed states, those participating heavily in the information age, the development and distribution of knowledge is replacing the manufacturing and distribution of goods as society’s central source of wealth, prestige, and power.161 The linkages connecting these states to the outside world and to elements within their own societies are becoming indispensable, as these are the conduits for information exchange. Especially for states with global trade and military interests, and despite the enormous growth of fiber optics technology for data transmission and communications, space assets are a critical component for these information transactions. The same holds for lesser-developed states, particularly if their internal communications infrastructures are rudimentary or fragmented. For the United States, DoD Directive 3100.10, Space Policy, states the case flatly: “The globally interdependent information- and knowledge-based economy as well as information-based military operations make the information lines of communication to, in, through, and from space essential to the exercise of United States power.”162

Impact Turn – Space Good: Diplomacy

Space allows for diplomatic power through tech partnerships.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The second component of space assets’ diplomatic power is the ability to induce international actors toward desired behaviors, or away from undesirable behaviors, through the granting or termination of technology partnerships. Although this power is fundamentally coercive in nature, it is generally perceived as a relatively benevolent form relying on the promise of benefits to the target state rather than threatening punishment. Called “persuasive influence” by Lt Col Gregory M. Billman, he defines it as “action taken…to benefit another side in some way. Noteworthy is the lack of threatening force to effect a change in an entity’s behavior.”181 Interestingly, “Cooperative uses of the armed forces have occurred far less frequently than have coercive uses.”182 As such, this is an area ripe for investigation. Since, by its very nature, the ability to negotiate and carry out technology partnerships occurs over long time periods (measured in years and decades rather than weeks and months), this facet of space assets’ diplomatic power is normally only effective during peacetime. Further, since the nature of a partnership implies an ability by both parties to contribute to their mutual goals (although the contributions may not be equal), space technology partnerships are most effective among first and second world countries with some industrial or scientific capacity capable of being oriented toward space technologies.

Space-based tech partnerships are effective tools to shape the behaviors of other states.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

While the ISS offers a useful case study in understanding how technology partnerships have been used to influence Russian behavior, the ISS and Space Shuttle have also been used to shape the behavior of American allies such as Canada, Japan, and the European Space Agency. Canada’s contribution of its Robotic Arm to both projects, the Japanese Experimental Module, and the European Space Lab flown on Shuttle missions are all efforts at lowering the cost of space exploration for the American taxpayer while supporting the space ambitions of American allies. Through such partnerships, trade, technological, and military relationships are strengthened, while also increasing the interdependency of these states on the American space effort. Space technology partnerships offer a powerful inducement to promote or dissuade nations from specific behaviors. By offering other states the opportunity to more easily access space, and thereby receive the concomitant prestige associated with space programs, or to partner with other spacefaring states to lower the cost of a specific space function, the United States can achieve both economic savings in its space programs and shape the behavior of other states.

Space dominance provides the opportunity to provide space services as a new form of foreign aid diplomacy.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The third aspect of space assets’ inherent diplomatic power is the ability to provide no-cost, or low-cost, access to space services to states who do not otherwise have access to such services. Similar to technology partnerships in that access to space services is a form of constructive coercion through persuasive influence, three factors make this component distinct. First, rather than collaborate with another state toward some common goal, access to space services resembles traditional foreign aid in that the country granting the access to its space services does not expect a significant monetary or technological payback for the services it provides. Second, providing access to space services does not require the state receiving the services to be industrially or technologically advanced. In fact, some of the best opportunities for achieving diplomatic leverage in this area may very well be among third world states. The third unique factor of access to space services is that it offers the opportunity to achieve diplomatic advantage in a quicker timeframe than technology partnerships. Since providing access to space services can theoretically occur very quickly, depending on the training and hardware that must be provided to the target state, diplomatic effects can be readily realized.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Diplomacy

That diplomatic power is key to deterring conflicts before they start- Persian Gulf War proves.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The second category of access to space services concerns high-end services such as high-resolution imagery, missile warning data, advanced communications, and launch services. Focused more toward technologically sophisticated states, those with advanced elements within their economies, providing high-end space services can be an inducement as it allows access to services that are currently beyond their means. For example, providing missile warning data (along with Patriot missile batteries and crews, and an intense air interdiction effort) to Israel during the Persian Gulf War led directly to achieving the United States’ diplomatic objective of persuading Israel not to retaliate militarily against Iraq. Israeli retaliation could have severely fractured the American-led coalition, and the use of military assets (space, air, and ground) in this diplomatic capacity was one of the most important strategic operations of the entire conflict.

Space diplomacy power prevents conflict escalation and maintains US dominance globally.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The Space-Diplomacy model argues that access to space services is an effective diplomatic tool throughout the spectrum of conflict. In peacetime, the United States can provide access to space services to encourage desired behaviors from other states. In addition, providing access to space services maintains the United States’ leadership position in space by dissuading other states from building competing systems to those operated by the United States and provided for their access. An interesting example is the fact that no viable system has arisen to compete with the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS). Although European allies have expressed reservations that the GPS system cannot be relied on for their civil purposes since the American military controls it, and hence could degrade or deny the signal in some future crisis, they have been unable to bring together the political and financial resources to field their own systems. According to René Oosterlinck, head of the navigation department at the European Space Agency, "Europe cannot accept reliance on a military system which has the possibility of being cut off."189 While the latest indications are that the Europeans will go forward with their Galileo navigation constellation, there is doubt whether they will actually see the project through to fruition since the United States provides its GPS signal free to the entire planet.190 During periods of crisis response, the United States can provide access to space services (such as imagery) that would stabilize a situation, reassure an ally, or prevent escalation. Finally, during war, the United States can achieve diplomatic objectives by providing vital space services (such as missile warning) to coalition partners to take, or avoid taking, actions that directly bear on the war’s outcome.

Impact Turn – Space Good: World Peace

Empirically proven, world peace and growth directly coincides with unilateral dominance.

Dolman 6 (Everett C. "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring) page 172, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2310/)KM

There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over the last 60 years, and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every president since Eisenhower did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected for space.

Space is key in the nuclear age to transcend nuclear nihilism and create a global golden age of peace in the revolution of conflict.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position that it must make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, there appears no one best option. No matter the choice selected, there are those who will benefit and those who will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. And yet, in the process of choosing, it has a great advantage—the moral ambiguity of its people regarding the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is a dangerous thing, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for selfrestraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. It is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible. Perhaps the most important insight to come from a discussion of transformation in war is the notion that space weapons, along with the parallel development of information, precision, and stealth capabilities, presents in our era a true revolution in military affairs. As such, these technologies and capabilities will propel the world into an uncertain New Age. For better or worse, the future can be denied only by a spasm of nuclear nihilism. The states that move forward against the fears of the many, and harness these new technologies to a forward-looking strategy of cooperative advantage for all, have the potential to initiate humanities’ first global golden age. The very nature of space requires that the ultimate use of it must be both encompassing and incorporating, but the nature of international relations and the lessons of history dictate that it begin with the vision and will of a few acting in the benefit of all.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Heg

The US has already crossed the line – space is key to all military function, only further development creates a peaceful transition into space-enabled hegemony.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

The United States has embarked on a revolutionary military transformation designed to extend its dominance in military engagements. Space capabilities are the lynchpin of this transformation, enabling a level of precision, stealth, command and control, intelligence gathering, speed, maneuverability, flexibility, and lethality heretofore unknown. This twenty-first century way of war promises to give the United States a capacity to use force to influence events around the world in a timely, effective, and sustainable manner. And this is a good thing, a true transformation from conflicts past. That the process of transformation was well underway became evident in 1991, when the world’s fourth largest military was defeated in just ten days of ground combat. Unfathomably complicated battle equipment, sleek new aircraft, and promising new missile interceptors publicly debuted. Arthur C. Clarke went so far as to dub Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) the world’s first space war, as none of the accomplishments of America’s new look military would have been possible without support from space. Twelve years later, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), assertions as to the central role of space power could no longer be denied. America’s military had transitioned from space supported to a fully space enabled force, with astonishingly positive results. Indeed, most of the nation’s current space power functions were successfully exercised in OIF, including space lift, command and control, intelligence including rapid battle damage assessment, timing and navigation, and meteorological support. The tremendous growth in space reliance from OSD to OIF is evident in the raw numbers. Despite engaging with a 60 percent smaller force (fewer than 200,000 personnel v. over 500,000), satellite communications usage increased four-fold, from 200 to 800 Mbps (Megabits per second) capacity. Newly possible operational concepts such as reach back (intelligence analysts in the United States sending information directly to frontline units) and reach forward (rear-deployed commanders able to direct battlefield operations in real time) reconfigured the tactical concept of war. The value of Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), completely reliant on satellite communications and navigation for their operation, was confirmed. Special Forces units, paradoxically tethered to satellite support and yet practically unfettered in their silent movements because of them, ranged throughout Iraq in independent operations that were extremely disruptive. But the paramount effect of space-enabled warfare was in the area of combat efficiency. Space assets allowed all weather, day-night precision munitions to provide the bulk of America’s striking power. Strikes from standoff platforms, including Vietnam-Era B-52s, allowed maximum target devastation with extraordinarily low death and collateral devastation. In ODS, 90 percent of munitions used were unguided. Of the ten percent that were guided, none was GPS capable. By OIF, 70 percent were precision guided, more than half of those from GPS satellites. In ODS, fewer than five percent of aircraft were GPS-equipped. By OIF, all were. During ODS, GPS proved so valuable to the army that it procured and rushed into theater over 4,500 commercial receivers to augment the meager 800 military-band ones it could deploy from stockpiles, an average of one per company (about 200 personnel). By OIF, each army squad (6-10 soldiers) had at least one military GPS receiver. With such demonstrated utility and reliance, there is no question the US must guarantee space access if it is to be successful in future conflicts. Its military has stepped well over the threshold of a new way of war. It is simply not possible to go back to the violently spasmodic mode of combat typical of pre-space intervention. The United States is now highly discriminating in the projection of violence, parsimonious in the intended breadth of its destruction. For the positive process of transformation to continue, however, space weapons must enter the combat inventory of the United States.

Space is key to maintaining precision technologies – the alternative is to revert back to indiscriminant killing in war.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

Space weaponization is a critical and necessary component in the process of transformation well under way, a process that cannot be reversed. Once America demonstrated the capacity to strike precisely, it could only go back to the kind of indiscriminant targeting and heavy collateral damage that characterized pre-space warfare if it were engaged in a war of national survival. And if there are future technological, economic, and perhaps social benefits to be derived from developing and deploying weapons, they will certainly not come from increasing the stock of current systems. They will only come, if at all, from the development of new, highly complex and scientifically heuristic space, stealth, precision, and information systems.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Heg

US militarization is better than any alternative – it continues the status quo status of American hegemony rather than challenge it, causing arms races and military engagement.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

This rationality does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. This would clearly be threatening, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state doing so. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the status quo, there is also a sense that it is at least tolerable to the majority of states. A continuation of it is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working towards its demise. So long as the US does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. On the other hand, an attempt by any other state to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order, with the weaponizing state at the top. The action would be a challenge to the status quo, not a perpetuation of it. Such an event would be disconcerting to nations that accept the current international order (including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it) and intolerable to the US. As leader of the current system, the US could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside.

Space prevents hegemonic power struggles.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the US is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race is space. From low-Earth orbit (LEO), the enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space, or to readily engage and destroy terrestrial ASAT capacity, makes the possibility of large scale space war and or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote. Moreover, if the US were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the US use its advantage to police the heavens (assuming the entire cost on its own), and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. Much in the manner that the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights , the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Benign Heg

Space is the only way to a benign hegemon – budget tradeoffs force a reduction of ground forces that threaten state sovereignty while funding space tech as limited force projection.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

It is an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the army, navy, and marines are profound—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the ability of the US to do all three will wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so. Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is misplaced. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. They offer no advantage if the target set considered is not global. But they also offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of weapons employed in their stead. A state employing offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor state, but is in a poor position to challenge its sovereignty. The transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons inhibits their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states will recognize that the US does not threaten self-determination internally, though it challenges any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and has severely restricted its own capacity to do so. America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. The operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the US must forego some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because its capacity to do so will have been diminished in the budgetary trade-offs required. Transformation of the American military assures that the intentions of current and future leaders will have but a minor role to play in international affairs. The limited requirement for collateral damage, need for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and tremendous cost of space weapons will guarantee they are used only for high value, time sensitive targets. Whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor is not necessary to an opposing state’s calculation of survival. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a spacedominant American military will subside. The US will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Inevitable

Space weapons are inevitable – US deployment is key to preventing competition and arms races in the future.

Dolman 5 (Everett "Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere." *High Frontier Journal* Vol. 3, No. 1 Winter p33, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1848/)KM

Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors to try. On the other hand, should the US reject the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is most likely if the US follows its counsel.

Weaponization is inevitable – capabilities have existed for 60 years.

Lambakis 2 (Steven “"Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002 p23 http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1630/)KM

Second, there is historical context to consider. Critics of expanding the military uses of space are wont to make a clean-cut distinction between 'militarizing' space, on the one hand, which they say already has happened, and 'weaponizing' space on the other, which they say has yet to occur. But this is a distinction without a meaningful difference, because the combat or force function, which naturally involves the use of arms, is a potential part of any military activity. Even some peacekeepers carry arms. Viewed in this light, the term 'weaponization' may be used, in a general way, to characterize activities that countries have undertaken for nearly 60 years. In other words, the so-called weaponization of space is happening under our very noses.

Space militarization is inevitable – China has already pushed the world past the point of no return.

Kueter 7 (Jeff. "Crossing the Rubicon in Space Again: Iacta Alea est." . January 23, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1143)KM

"The die is cast," Suetonius reports Julius Caesar said as he exhorted his men to cross the river Rubicon and created the popular idiom for a point of no return. The long-held Rubicon in space, the deployment and use of so-called space weapons, was crossed long ago by both the former Soviet Union and the United States. Still, many have claimed that it is possible to turn back history’s pages and preserve space as a sanctuary. If there were ever serious doubts about the impossibility of that dream, they are dispelled now. Last fall, when reports that China had used lasers to "blind" a U.S. satellite were made public, the Rubicon of space was crossed (again) and now we learn that China has demonstrated successful anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities launched from earth.1 In destroying their own satellite, China has signaled to the world its capability to threaten essential satellites directly, by physically destroying them, and indirectly, by using lasers and other jamming techniques to deny free use of them.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Accidents

Their impact turns rely on unrealistic apocalyptic rhetoric – states would prioritize accidents on Earth over space.

Lambakis 1 (Steven. On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. p 259 http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1210/)KM

Even if a spacecraft were shot down by accident, the implications would not be so grave when compared, for example, to an accidental launch of a nuclear tipped missile. So, asked Walter McDougall, "why is it more important to protect pristine space, where nothing lives, than the crowded earth?" This is a good question. It is a question that has never been addressed fully by the space sanctuary enthusiasts (apart from making the apolitical, astrategic point that attacking unmanned targets in space makes wars "more likely" or is escalatory), who tend to use only one "strategic" framework for assessing the implications of space weapons: the framework of apocalypse. Any use of weapons in or from space will bring doom to "our planet." Arms races will drain the life blood out of that national budget. Interception of nuclear-tipped ICBMs in space is a precursor to a treacherous instability, that kind that could lead to nuclear holocaust. A decision by the United States to use the space environment for protection will bring the acrimony of the entire world against Washington, asphyxiating U.S. national and economic security. This is not strategic though -- this is the worst case, even unimaginable-case scenario played to the hilt.

Their impact turns would be solved by existing international law and protocol.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9 (“Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century” 2009. p 91, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1427)KM

Further, even if a [Brilliant Pebble] “got away” to “run wild,” it would quickly burn up in the atmosphere. And in the case of an accidental shoot-down involving the mistaken identity of someone’s “innocent” missile (such as one carrying a communications satellite), Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocols and international notification procedures that have long governed an unwarranted response by offensive nuclear weapons against another nation: when a country plans to launch a nonthreatening rocket – such as for a weather or communications satellite or to ferry astronauts and supplies to the international space station or the moon or to send robots to Mars or to orbit telescopes – those powers possessing offensive nuclear weapons are notified well in advance, so as to avoid a terrible misunderstanding that could trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike against the country of origin. Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocol of advance notification and, of course, their automated systems would be switched off, even as offensive nuclear weapons would be taken off hair-trigger alert and ordered to “stand down.”

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – US-Russia War

War would not break out in satellite miscommunication – US and Russia have multiple communication outlets.

Lambakis 1 (Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. February, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1851)KM

In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Indo-Pak War

India has no capabilities to develop space technology. No risk of escalation.

Chellaney 7 (Brahma. "India's Vulnerability Bared." Japan Times. February 9, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM

Before it can think of developing a counter-capability to shield itself from an ASAT menace, it will have to deal with two obtrusive mismatches that hobble its deterrence promise. The first mismatch is between its satellite and launch capabilities. Greater operational capability necessitates large satellites. While India has first-rate satellite-manufacturing expertise, it still needs a foreign commercial launcher like the Ariane 5 of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company to place its INSAT-4 series satellites in geostationary orbit. The second mismatch is in the military realm -- between the technical sophistication to build nuclear warheads and the extent to which they can be delivered reliably by missiles. Nearly a decade after it went overtly nuclear and almost a quarter-century after the missile program launch, India still lacks the full reach against China. The thermonuclear warhead India tested with a controlled yield in 1998 still awaits a delivery vehicle of the right payload range.

India lacks infrastructure, funding, and planning to implement any space programs.

Asia Times 8 ("India goes to war in space.". June 18, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM

India's expression of its intentions to set up an aerospace command and its announcement of the Integrated Space Cell has raised concern in some quarters that India is entering the arms race in space. Such fears might be premature, given that the Integrated Space Cell is at a very rudimentary stage. "India is just putting in place a very minimal budget initiative that will take several years to develop," argued Prabhakar. "Besides satellites in space, India's space architecture of offensive and defensive systems are yet to be conceived, built and deployed," said Prabhakar, pointing to the different kinds of satellites, space-based laser systems, space stations and ground-based laser stations for offensive space operations that the "space superpowers" - the United States, Russia and China - have.

India doesn’t have rudimentary defense capabilities – space is a long way away.

Asia Times 8 ("India goes to war in space.". June 18, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM

In the event of their satellites being knocked out by enemy action during a crisis, the US, Russia and China have the capability to launch substitute satellites into space at short notice. The US can move its satellites from one orbit level to another, higher level to escape being taken out by an enemy anti-satellite system (ASAT). India can program a satellite launch only on a programmed sequence basis and not on short notice for rapid launches to replenish lost satellites, Prabhakar said. "India doesn't have even preliminary capability to defend its satellites," he said, adding "it will take another 15 to 20 years or more before India can put these systems in place." For all its impressive achievements in building and launching satellites, India is decades away from establishing a fully-operational aerospace command. It has formidable capability in building satellites. It is now trying to find a way to defend them.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Counterbalancing

No one could counterbalance the US if it established space dominance.

Hyten 00 (John E. A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Urbana-Champaign, IL: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, April http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1766/)KM

[Samuel] Huntington implies that other nations would only enter an arms race to preserve the balance of power. But what if that balance of power was already overwhelming in favor of one side to begin with? Currently the United States has no peer in the world either economically or militarily. The United States has become the world's sole remaining superpower. If the United States added space weapons to its already massive arsenal of weapons, would this change the balance of power sufficiently to require other nations to respond? This is doubtful. Any other nation -- China, Russia, France, and others -- would have to simultaneously develop a robust terrestrial military capability while at the same time engaging in an arms race in space. Having the ability to control space without at least a minimally effective force on the ground would be impractical. The Russians and the Chinese currently are the closest competitors to the United States when it comes to military power. The collapse in 1989 of the Soviet Union demonstrated to the world that entering an enormously expensive arms race (which space weapons would certainly be) would have catastrophic results for a nation. No nation today has the combined military or economic wherewithal to enter an arms race in space with the United States.

Militarizing space puts us so far ahead of the rest of the world that no one could hope to compete with us.

Dolman 6 (Everett C., Karl P. Mueller et al. "Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space." Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, March 10, 2006 page 24 http://spacedebate.org/argument/2132)KM

DOLMAN: Nonetheless, we have a different system today and, as Karl has pointed out, it may be that if the United States were to unilaterally militarize space – and I am not advocating that necessarily, but it is an option – that it could in fact prevent an arms race. The trillions of dollars that would have to be spent to dislodge the United States from space, if it were to quickly seize control of the low-earth orbit, might be seen as not worthwhile to another state. However, if we wait fifteen or twenty years until a state is able to challenge the United States in space, then we will have a space race. By putting weapons in space to enhance its military capabilities the United States today is saying to the world that in this period of American hegemony, it is not going to wait for problems to develop overseas until they bubble over into its area of interest, and then massively and forcefully fix that problem. No. The American way of war today, based on precision and on space capabilities, is to engage early using less force, using more precise force and more deadly force in a specific area, but with far less collateral damage. That is the new American way of war and we really cannot get out of it.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Debris

Debris is inevitable and has no impact.

Dinerman 7 (Taylor. "Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris." The Space Review. January 22, 2007, http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597)KM

Dangerous space debris is both man-made and natural, in the latter case in the form of micrometeoroids. Confusing the two is a great way to make the issue into more of a problem than it already is. The environment around Earth is certainly filled with space junk, but if this was as dangerous as has been claimed, spacecraft would be breaking up on an almost weekly basis. Space junk is a problem and always will be. The international agreements designed to mitigate the dangers have been useful, but cannot halt the creation of more debris any more than recycling laws halt the production of garbage. The trend has been moving in the right direction, at least until our Chinese friends decided to make a statement.

Debris doesn’t outweigh military objectives – prefer our impacts.

Dinerman 7 (Taylor. "Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris." The Space Review. January 22, 2007, http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597)KM

Whatever happens the US should be wary of making too big a deal out of the orbital debris issue. All man-made activity in space produces debris. If the US or its allies worry too much about this question instead of simply deciding to live with it, the enemy will find ways of using this concern against the US, like in the case of the “collateral damage” question, where Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and others learned the lesson that when they kill civilians, they win, and when the US kills civilians, they win. If America’s space warriors concentrate on their primary mission, which is to defeat the enemy, destroy his space assets, and protect our own, all will be well. If, on the other hand, we end up concentrating on limiting the creation of space debris while avoiding the primary mission, we will hand the enemy a tool they will use to frustrate our goals. War is a dirty, messy business and cannot be waged cleanly, not in Baghdad nor in outer space.

Tech solves the impact – weapons can be developed with anti-debris capabilities.

Dinerman 7 (Taylor. "Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris." The Space Review. January 22, 2007, http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597)KM

Fortunately, a few years ago a proposal was floated for as class of weapons that would destroy target spacecraft without directly creating any debris. This type of "co-orbital" ASAT would approach its target and envelop it with an airbag covered in a type of sticky substance. It would then fire a thruster so that the conjoined satellites would burn up in the atmosphere. If it worked as designed, no debris would be created. In practice it would be no easy task to design, test, and operate such a weapon, but it is not beyond the state of the art and would not create any debris. Figuring out what kind of sticky material is right for such a system would, by itself, be a fascinating project. The substance might have applications in other military and perhaps civil space systems. If the sticky airbag solution proves too difficult, the same goals might be reached using an ASAT equipped with grappling arms that would grasp the target before pushing down towards the atmosphere. The challenges of such a system are evident, not the least of which would be the need for some sort of decision-making software that would choose the best places to seize the enemy satellite during the final moments before contact.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Readiness

A strong ground force is necessary – technological strength simply is not enough, Iraq proves.

O’Hanlon & Kagan 7 (http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan\_OHanlon\_07.pdf, Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, specializing in defense transformation, Michael O’Hanlon is senior fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U S defense strategy, the use of military force, and homeland security, April 2007) NAR

Moreover, if there was any doubt, Iraq proves technology will not let us cut back on people. Other recent operations in Afghanistan (as well as Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama, and so on) also revealed the ineffectiveness of attempting to replace people with machines on a large scale. In most of the post-conflict stabilization (or counterinsurgency) operations we have seen or can foresee, there can be no substitute for large numbers of trained and capable ground forces, deployed for a long time. It is unacceptable, therefore, simply to demand a zero-sum soldiers-versus-systems trade-off in the defense budget. Prioritizing systems at the expense of soldiers has had dreadful consequences. If we overcompensate by now doing the reverse, it would store up enormous danger for the future. The truth is that the nation is at war now, the strategic horizon is very dark, and armed forces that were seized in the strategic pause of the 1990s are inadequate today. Transformation must proceed, possibly with a change in its intellectual basis and its precise course, and the ground forces must be expanded significantly. Meeting both requirements will demand increased defense expenditures for many years into the future, although there are some approaches we could pursue to mitigate that increase. But whatever the cost, a nation at war and in a dangerous world must maintain military forces adequate to protect its vital interests, or else face an intolerable degree of national insecurity.

End-Strength is key to military strength – it isn’t all about GIs.

Creators 6 (http://www.creators.com/opinion/austin-bay/how-many-ground-troops-does-the-united-states-need.html, December 2006)NAR

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pete Schoomaker told Congress that the active duty Army needed more soldiers. The Army would grow to 547,000 by 2012, adding 65,000 new soldiers over a five-year period. However, the current Army chief of staff, Gen. George Casey, said last week that the Army needs 547,000 active troops within the next three years. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates supports Casey's boost. Gates also advocates expanding the Marine Corps' active force 27,000, from 175,000 to 202,000 Marines. I know it takes time to recruit and train soldiers, making a very rapid build-up unwieldy if not unrealistic, but in my opinion Casey's request is short by 100,000 troops. Last week, the Los Angeles Times featured a discussion between Phil Carter, a Los Angeles attorney who served with the 101st Airborne in Iraq, and me on military-related issues. Carter and I agreed that a 650,000-soldier U.S. Army is a more realistic figure given personnel demands and expected commitments. Carter argued that "America can no longer afford to run its steak-and-lobster national security strategy on a McDonald's budget." I agreed with his assessment, but pointed out that the personnel issue has another subtle dimension that stretches U.S. military personnel. America expects its military to win its wars, which means having war-fighters proficient with weaponry running from bayonets to smart bombs. But America also expects its military to competently use a trowel, auditing software and a doctor's bag, and occasionally provide legal, political and investment advice. That's been the military's burden since 1992, when the Era of Peacekeeping replaced the Cold War. Sept. 11 replaced the Era of Peacekeeping with a global war over the conditions of modernity, where the trowels and investment advice are often as important as combat skills. We need more troops. That will mean spending tax dollars — but with 300 million people, we have the recruiting pool to support a 650,000 soldier Army. We also need to get the skills of U.S. government civilian agencies into the field. That will take tax dollars and focused political leadership.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Readiness

Ground forces key – they’re critical to deterrence in multiple scenarios and need expansion now.

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)KM

Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re–learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large–scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Readiness

Increasing end strength immediately boosts morale—the perception of a force capable of reducing operational tempos is enough to enhance readiness and boost recruitment

Reed and Hagel, 04 (Jack and Chuck, US Senators, Federal News Service, “NEWS CONFERENCE WITH SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI) AND SENATOR CHARLES HAGEL (R-NE) RE: LEGISLATION TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF THE ARMY”, 3/4, lexis)KM

Q Could I ask you to elaborate some on the manifestations of the stress that the force is under? How do you see the stress? What are the consequences, and particularly as it affects the Guard? SEN. REED: I'll just start. I have two Military Police companies and a Military Police battalion in Iraq from the Rhode Island National Guard. They've done a magnificent job. And no one knows for sure what their reaction is going to be when they come back in about a month. But having deployed previously, about two years ago, to the Balkans, and now this second deployment, a very long, about 16-month, deployment, there is a feeling, at least, or an anticipation that some, if not many, of these soldiers will decide that they can't continue to serve. I think that feeling will be accelerated if we don't increase the size of the end strength of the Army because they can do the math, too. If the Army stays this size they're going again and they're going very quickly. I think we'll also -- and General Abizaid was asked today about the impact on force retention and recruitment, and he expressed some concern. He was confident that we could weather this storm -- he is more confident than I -- but he expressed concern about retention of young officers, which is a key factor in any military force, and younger NCOs. So these are beginning to show some stress, and the -- Q Will increasing the size of the Army relieve the pressure on the -- SEN. REED: It will certainly relieve the pressure on the National Guard, both I think initially in terms of perception -- perception as being there's a bigger active force, I'm not going to be called in six months to go -- but also reality. Eventually the active force will be doing more. Another point that we're looking at -- we're trying to find data. It's hard sometimes to do this. One of the major sources of recruitment for the National Guard and reserves are regular soldiers who are leaving and will go into the Reserve/National Guard. I wonder now, if regular soldiers are leaving the active force right now, whether they'll go into the Reserve/National Guard simply because my presumption is they're leaving because they don't want to go back again into Iraq or Afghanistan or someplace else, and they won't join the Guard because they know they'll be headed that way. SEN. HAGEL: The only thing I would say in addition to that, the recruitment/retention issue is an issue and it's going to become more of an issue, and not because I say it or Senator Reed says it, but we hear from people who we represent. We hear from their families. We hear from their employers. We hear from their communities. And we hear from them personally, and some are willing to go on the record with the press. When I was back in Nebraska over Christmas, I had two Reserve officers, captains, talk to the press about this. But also one additional point: morale, morale of the troops. And morale is a very significant factor because morale directs everything. Morale directs not just the feeling of the nobleness of the purpose and the cause, but there's an alertness factor. You drift into a dullness that is very dangerous in combat or in what we're doing in nation building and peacekeeping around the world. And if you lose the morale of the troops, then you've lost something that's irreplaceable and is very difficult to get back. And there's no question in my mind that this increase of force structure helps address this.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Terrorism

Intense ground-force presence is critical to providing stability to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Bruner 5 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42484.pdf, Edward F. Bruner, January 3rd 2005, Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) NAR

Specific types of forces needed will be defined by perceptions of future requirements, recent experiences, and response to current stresses. Congress influences the type of forces to be acquired by allocating end strength among the four Services. Further refinements occur as specific weapons systems and materiel are developed and procured, and through the oversight process. Whether or not to create dedicated “constabulary” forces remains an issue. Substantial ground combat forces will likely be needed as “stabilization” efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have no defined end point20 and other nations of concern, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea, retain a potential for future armed confrontation. Combat campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the value of U.S. Special Operations Forces. SOF strength is being increased and is particularly important to the War on Terrorism, but that strength is accounted for within the Services that contribute their personnel to SOF units. In Iraq, the ability of U.S. mechanized infantry and armored forces to survive and prevail against both regular and nonconventional enemy forces, even in urban areas, was striking. To reinforce success, some advocate maintaining and increasing units armed with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.21

End strength is key to solving terrorism – war is ground troop intensive.

Kagan 6 (Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute August Frederick, Foreign Affairs, “The U.S. Military Manpower Crisis, July/August, www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24584/pub\_detail.asp)KM

Three hundred forty-five million dollars can, roughly speaking, buy one F-22 Raptor--the U.S. military's new stealth fighter plane--or pay the average annual cost of 3,000 soldiers (although it would cost far more to equip, maintain, and deploy either the fighter or the troops). The soldiers are a better investment. Yet U.S. military personnel, pundits, and policymakers have been downplaying the importance of ground forces since 1991. Even today, in the face of ongoing, manpower-intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration is emphasizing long-range strike capabilities over land forces. The recently released 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the president's budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 both reaffirm this priority. The administration has maintained this emphasis despite the fact that the long-term neglect of U.S. ground forces has caused serious problems in the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns. If not corrected, moreover, this neglect will cause even worse problems in the future. War is fundamentally a human activity, and attempts to remove humans from its center--as recent trends and current programs do--are likely to lead to disaster.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Inevitable

End strength changes are inevitable – empirically, they are temporary fluctuations in force size.

Bruner 5 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42484.pdf, Edward F. Bruner, January 3rd 2005, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)KM

Administration End Strength Initiative. Before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on January 28, 2004, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, testified that he had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense to increase end strength of the Army by 30,000 personnel on a temporary, emergency basis.9 He argued that a permanent, legislated increase would be unwise and unnecessary. He asserted that a permanent increase would create a burden on planned defense budgets in the out years, citing $1.2 billion annually for each increase of 10,000 troops. Some ongoing programs were presented as, over time, providing a more efficient and usable force structure within current Army end strength.

Debates about end strength are ongoing – changes are inevitable.

Bruner 5 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42484.pdf, Edward F. Bruner, January 3rd 2005, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)KM

Considerations for Congress. Congress debated the Administration’s end strength initiative in the FY2005 defense authorization bill. The Senate version, S. 2400, endorsed the Administration’s proposal to increase the Army by 30,000 temporarily over three years. The House version, H.R. 4200, boosted the Army by 30,000, added 9,000 Marines, and designated $1.2 billion of Iraq War funding towards associated costs. The result (P.L. 108-375) was to increase the Army by 20,000 and the Marine Corps by 6,000 in FY2005, allowing for a further increase in FY2006.11 Various considerations could influence the future debate. The “right” size for the military addresses military requirements now and in the future. The Administration acknowledges current stresses on the force, but interprets the situation as a “spike” in requirements that will return to a lower, more manageable “plateau.” Critics counter that the war on terrorism and occupation of Iraq could endure for many years and that the continuing potential for sudden, major crises, such as in Korea, requires a robust U.S. military force.12 One’s view of the future determines one’s idea of acceptable risk.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – A2: Modernization

Tech isn’t enough – a large ground force is key to solving all threats.

Peters 6 (Ralph, former Army officer, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” The Weekly Standard, 2/6,

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/649qrsob.asp)KM

From Iraq's Sunni Triangle to China's military high command, the counterrevolution in military affairs is well underway. We are seduced by what we can do; our enemies focus on what they must do. We have fallen so deeply in love with the means we have devised for waging conceptual wars that we are blind to their marginal relevance in actual wars. Terrorists, for one lethal example, do not fear "network–centric warfare" because they have already mastered it for a tiny fraction of one cent on the dollar, achieving greater relative effects with the Internet, cell phones, and cheap airline tickets than all of our military technologies have delivered. Our prime weapon in our struggles with terrorists, insurgents, and warriors of every patchwork sort remains the soldier or Marine; yet, confronted with reality's bloody evidence, we simply pretend that other, future, hypothetical wars will justify the systems we adore––purchased at the expense of the assets we need. Stubbornly, we continue to fantasize that a wondrous enemy will appear who will fight us on our own terms, as a masked knight might have materialized at a stately tournament in a novel by Sir Walter Scott. Yet, not even China--the threat beloved of major defense contractors and their advocates--would play by our rules if folly ignited war. Against terrorists, we have found technology alone incompetent to master men of soaring will--our own flesh and blood provide the only effective counter. At the other extreme, a war with China, which our war gamers blithely assume would be brief, would reveal the quantitative incompetence of our forces. An assault on a continent-spanning power would swiftly drain our stocks of precision weapons, ready pilots, and aircraft. Quality, no matter how great, is not a reliable substitute for a robust force in being and deep reserves that can be mobilized rapidly.

End strength key – no tech can substitute a large stabilizing force.

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)km

Moreover, if there was any doubt, Iraq proves technology will not let us cut back on people. Other recent operations in Afghanistan (as well as Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama, and so on) also revealed the ineffectiveness of attempting to replace people with machines on a large scale. In most of the post–conflict stabilization (or counterinsurgency) operations we have seen or can foresee, there can be no substitute for large numbers of trained and capable ground forces, deployed for a long time. It is unacceptable, therefore, simply to demand a zero-sum soldiers-versus-systems trade-off in the defense budget. Prioritizing systems at the expense of soldiers has had dreadful consequences. If we overcompensate by now doing the reverse, it would store up enormous danger for the future. The truth is that the nation is at war now, the strategic horizon is very dark, and armed forces that were seized in the strategic pause of the 1990s are inadequate today. Transformation must proceed, possibly with a change in its intellectual basis and its precise course, and the ground forces must be expanded significantly. Meeting both requirements will demand increased defense expenditures for many years into the future, although there are some approaches we could pursue to mitigate that increase. But whatever the cost, a nation at war and in a dangerous world must maintain military forces adequate to protect its vital interests, or else face an intolerable degree of national insecurity.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – A2: Costs

Personnel spending is lower in priority – it doesn’t have an effect.

Conetta 10 (“An Undisciplined Defense Understanding the $2 Trillion Surge in US Defense Spending” Carl COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE 18 January, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/~/media/Fiscal-Times/Research-Center/Budget-Impact/Think-Tanks/2010/01/18/An-Undisciplined-Defense.ashx?pid={8C2801AD-D4B2-47A4-B581-D5BC72F117FE}0)KM

Shifts in spending priorities: Looking at how the four main “accounts” have fared relative to each other shows O&M spending to have advanced most significantly. Its relative importance began to increase in the early 1990s. Research & Development funding followed a similar trajectory. Procurement, by contrast, has become more important relative only to military personnel spending, which has slipped in importance. The greater emphasis on modernization spending relative to personnel spending does not mean that US military power has become much more capital intensive than it was in 1989, however. This is because the principle budget shift, which has been toward a greater emphasis on O&M spending, actually involves a significant expansion of DoD’s workforce – by means of contract labor. 3.

Personnel costs are sustainable – reductions from the aff check back costs.

(“Toward a sustainable US defense posture: an option to save $60+ billion over the next five years” Carl Conetta Commonwealth Institute *Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #42* 2 August 2007)KM

Third, reductions in force structure are associated with direct savings in personnel, procurement, and operations and maintenance. They also make additional savings possible in central support structures and functions – such as basic training, central logistics, and the military base infrastructure. The estimate given above for savings from the proposed cuts only marginally takes the latter type of potential savings into account because these are likely to be realized only in the case of a more comprehensive program of retrenchment and restructuring.

High end strength retention makes costs sustainable.

National Journal ‘2 (‘High retention rates in military save Pentagon money’, Nov. 22, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1102/112202nj2.htm)KM

There is no disagreement at the top of the Pentagon that the higher retention rates mean fewer civilians have to be enticed to serve in the military, and that saves big bucks. The Pentagon pegs the cost of recruiting each new civilian at $12,300.

Impact Turn – A2: End Strength – Shifts to PMC’s

Lowered end strength causes dependency on PMC’s, not the other way around.

Gallup 8 (Heather L, 01-Mar “Blending the Battlefield: An Analysis of Using Private Military Companies To Support Military Operations In Iraq; AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, http://www.stormingmedia.us/77/7714/A771484.html)KM

Over the past fifteen years, the Department of Defense has experienced an increasing trend in the outsourcing and privatization of military operations. Key factors contributing to the growth include declines in military budgets, reductions in active duty end-strength, increases in operational deployments, advancements in weapon system technology, and evolutions in the nature of warfare. However, the continued escalation of incorporating Private Military Companies (PMC’s) on the battlefield creates unique challenges. The purpose of this exploratory and descriptive research is to identify utilization rates, describe the types of roles being fulfilled, and synthesize the challenges of augmenting military manpower with civilian contractors. For this effort, the research scope is primarily focused on exploring the use of PMC’s to support battlefield operations in Iraq. The research strategy involves the collection, reduction, and analysis of existing census data and secondary archival data from multiple sources. To add flexibility to the study, interactive data analysis techniques are employed using a combination of several qualitative methodologies. The conclusions drawn from the resulting data analysis framework are intended to facilitate a better understanding of the complexities of using civilian contractors in a war zone as well as outline key focus areas for improving the planning, management, and oversight of PMC operations. In addition, this research expands the existing body of knowledge on this dynamic topic.

\*\*Russia DA – Aff Answers

UQ – Containment Fails

Russia is expanding now – even attempts at containment are failing

Klein 8 (Brian P, International Affairs Fellow for Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17281/what\_goes\_around\_comes\_around\_for\_russia.html, AD: 7/5/10) jl

Russia invades an eastern European republic, sends its navy to Latin America for military exercises in America’s backyard, and threatens to cut off energy supplies to western Europe. This reads like a chapter out of Cold War history.

Yet 2008 has marked the re-emergence of Russia after a two-decade hiatus. Flush with cash from oil and gas revenue and a hefty grudge against perceived Western insults to its great power status, Russia has launched the opening salvo in a more muscular foreign policy.

While the United States and Europe hoped that Russia would become more integrated into the world system, talk of NATO expansion, support for nascent eastern European democracies, and plans for basing missiles in Poland have heightened Russia’s sense of alienation and its perception that it must not bend to the will of Western powers.

UQ – Afghanistan Influence Now

Drug war makes Russia’s influence in Afghanistan high

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

For Viktor Ivanov, the road back to Kabul has taken two decades. He first arrived in Afghanistan in 1987 as a young KGB officer, back when the country was the southernmost outpost of the Soviet empire. When he returned last month, Kabul was the outpost of a very different empire—one run by reluctant imperialists in Washington keen to get out as soon as possible. Though the official reason for Ivanov's return was to aid U.S. antinarcotics efforts—he's now Russia's drug czar—his real goal in Afghanistan was clear: to help recover some of Russia's lost influence there. As his Russian Air Force plane began its descent into the Kabul airport, Ivanov raised a glass of champagne with his aides and boasted, "Russia is back."

Influence now is crowding out the US

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

A lot of history stands in the way of Russia's new campaign. Local memories of the destruction wrought by the Soviets in their decade-long occupation remain fresh. But both the Afghans and the Americans have reasons to welcome Russia's reengagement. No one has a silver bullet for Afghanistan's rampaging drug trade, but with its vast intelligence assets across Central Asia and an operational group of Russian troops on the Afghan-Tajik border, Moscow could make a real difference. To win over the locals, the Russians have also offered to ramp up their involvement in the Afghan reconstruction, energy, and mineral sectors. Russian companies are currently negotiating to rebuild 142 Soviet-built installations across the country, including a $500 million deal to reconstruct hydroelectric plants in Naglu, Surobi, and Makhipar and a $500 million program to build wells and irrigation systems nationwide. Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil and gas giant, has commissioned a study of gas fields in Djarkuduk and Shebarghan that could lead to contracts yielding $350 million a year. Russian air-transport contractors are already working for NATO and the Afghan government. But all this cooperation comes with a price: increased Russian influence in Kabul. Moscow makes no bones about this: it seeks nothing less than to "reclaim its geopolitical share of Afghanistan," says its ambassador, Andrey Avetisyan.

US-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan on drugs now

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

It might seem surprising, given Afghanistan's history as a Cold War battleground, that it's the Americans who invited the Russians back in. But sure enough, last year U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, set up a series of contact groups on mutual security interests in the region. Ivanov and his U.S. counterpart, Gil Kerlikowske, have since sat down on many occasions to figure out ways Russia can help NATO choke off the Taliban's drug businesses.

Link Turn – General

U.S military presence is used to justify Russian aggression.

Young 9 (Cathy, Russian American journalist and writer, April, [http://reason.com/archives/2009/03/13/unclenching-the-fist/1] AD: 7/6/10) JM

It could even be argued that the Bush administration’s aggressive unilateralism on the war in Iraq, its often cavalier attitude toward human rights in the War on Terror, and its executive power grab on the home front emboldened Putin to behave similarly. While most of the alleged Bush-Putin parallels are specious, the actions of the Bush White House easily lent themselves to a self-serving interpretation by the Putin clique, validating its cynical conviction that democracy is just a cover for “might makes right.” The war in Iraq also made it far too easy to equate all efforts at “democracy promotion,” even peaceful activities such as assisting civil rights groups, with naked imperialism. This helped the Putin propaganda machine stoke Russian unease about the U.S. role in the “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, which replaced those nations’ governments with ones less devoted to Moscow. Many Russians certainly experienced the collapse of the USSR and the weakening of Russia’s influence abroad as a blow to their national pride. But the notion that the United States rubbed Russia’s face in its humiliation is a myth. (If the West rejoiced in Communism’s Cold War defeat, so did most of the Russian media and political elites at the time.) Yes, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics ranks high on the list of Russian grievances. But when NATO first began seriously considering admitting former Eastern Bloc states in the early 1990s, most supporters of expansion assumed that it could eventually include Russia—and Russia seemed receptive. These prospects were undercut by pressures from neo-Communists and nationalists in the Russian parliament, who wanted a less pro-Western stance, and by mixed signals and suspicions on both the Russian and the U.S. sides. It could be that the conflict is more contrived than real on Russia’s end. The belief that Kremlin rhetoric about the American threat is a faux paranoia, calculated to enable bullying at home and abroad, is shared by numerous commentators inside Russia, from the Carnegie Endowment’s Lilia Shevtsova to former top-level Soviet arms negotiator Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin. Writing in the independent online journal EJ.ru in April 2008, Dvorkin pointed out the obvious: Given Russia’s nuclear potential, a military attack by NATO troops on Russia is unthinkable, no matter how many of its neighbors join the alliance. The real danger to Russia, in Dvorkin’s view, is “civilizational isolation” if the country continues to resist democratization and modernization and finds itself surrounded by neighbors integrated into the West.

U.S presence diverts attention from Russia enabling expansionism.

Friedman 8 (George, Ph.D. in government at Cornell U, September 2, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev\_doctrine\_and\_american\_strategy] AD: 7/6/10)JM

In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force. The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.

Withdrawal is key to stop Russia.

Friedman 8 (George, Ph.D. in government at Cornell U, September 2, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev\_doctrine\_and\_american\_strategy] AD: 7/6/10)JM

Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.

Link Turn – General

Overseas bases give an incentive for Russia to engage in military adventurism.

Vine 9 (David, prof of Anthropology at American U, February 25, [http://www.fpif.org/articles/too\_many\_overseas\_bases] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Proponents of maintaining the overseas base status quo will argue, however, that our foreign bases are critical to national and global security. A closer examination shows that overseas bases have often heightened military tensions and discouraged diplomatic solutions to international conflicts. Rather than stabilizing dangerous regions, our overseas bases have often increased global militarization, enlarging security threats faced by other nations who respond by boosting military spending (and in cases like China and Russia, foreign base acquisition) in an escalating spiral. Overseas bases actually make war more likely, not less.

Link Turn – Afghanistan

We can’t deter Russia while still in Afghanistan.

Evans, Charter, and Philp 8 (Evans, award-winning syndicated journalist, David, journalist and Catherine, foreign correspondent for The Times, September 9, [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4709981.ece] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Those near neighbours already in Nato are the ones leading the charge to put the Russian threat back on the map. “Now, because of Georgia, there are Nato members such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states who are saying the alliance should stop thinking about expeditionary warfare and concentrate once again on old-style military structures to deter Russia,” a senior alliance source told The Times. “Their plea is 'Nato come home', but we can't ditch Afghanistan to shore up Poland or the Baltic states to deter an assertive Russia.” The division between those who still want to focus the main effort on Afghanistan and others who believe that resources should be switched back to confronting Russia's rediscovered imperialist ambitions has created turmoil within the alliance. Key to this conflict are the tough decisions to be made over who gets to join the alliance, and when.

Link Defense – Afghanistan – No Containment

Russia isn’t threatened by US presence in Afghanistan

Aljazeera 9 (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/03/200932752829665993.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

But while Moscow appears opposed to the US foothold in Central Asia, it wants the US presence in Afghanistan to prevent the expansion of terrorism and drug-trafficking to Russian borders.

Impact Turn – Afghanistan – Expansion Good

Withdrawal is inevitable – Russian influence stabilizes the region and prevents conflict

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

So far, such moves seem to elicit more relief than concern in Washington. The Obama administration has taken a big gamble with its surge, and everything is being done with an eye to July 2011, when the administration has promised to begin its withdrawal. For that to happen, Afghanistan's neighbors must shoulder more and more of the burden of helping fix its drug and infrastructure problems. If that means Afghanistan moving closer to Russia's orbit, then Washington, at least for now, seems to deem that a price worth paying. "The United States is not concerned about Russia coming back," says Anthony Cordesman, a respected analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. If history is any guide, having Afghanistan in Russia's sphere of influence would be far from ideal—but it would also be preferable to having it go it alone and spread violent mayhem across the region and the world.

Impact Defense – NATO Contains Russia

NATO contains Russian expansion

Wilkinson 97 (Paul, Prof of IR at U of St Andrews, http://www.fas.org/man/nato/hrpc\_nato\_xpn.htm, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The fundamental geopolitical reality in Central and Eastern Europe is the inherent imbalance of power between Russia and its immediate and near neighbors, either individually or in combination.  This age-old reality is reflected in Russian dominion over Poland, the Baltic nations, Finland, Belarus, and Ukraine in the 18th and 19th centuries, and over the vast imperium of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in the 20th century. The current eclipse of Russian military and economic power should not blind us to centuries-old realities of geography and economics.  An expanded NATO remains an essential shield against a resurgence of Russian power.  Even today, there is clear evidence of a revival of Russian expansionism:
Russia has achieved a "reunion" with Belarus, a nation of 10.5 million the size of Romania.   On April 2, 1997, Russian President Yeltsin and Belarussian President Lukashenka signed a treaty creating a union of the two countries with joint armed forces and common citizenship and currency, as well as a binational ruling body.  The union will again bring Russian power, after an absence of only six years, to the eastern borders of Poland and the Baltic states--700 miles farther west.  Russian commentators stressed that the "union" was a riposte to NATO expansion, and that it is open to other members.  As a result, Russia will have achieved an expanded union before NATO does. Russia has serious border disputes with Ukraine, and has refused to define its thousand-mile border.  Russia continues to claim the strategic Crimean Peninsula, as well as significant units of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet. Russia has repeatedly and brutally threatened the three Baltic Republics. TASS reported on January 9, 1997 that Russian Foreign Minister Y.M. Primakov stated at a cabinet meeting that "Russia should not be afraid to use economic sanctions" to in disputes with former Soviet republics over the status of their Russian minorities. A February 12, 1997 statement by the Russian Embassy in Washington warned that "entry of Baltic nations into NATO would... have an extremely negative impact on the prospects of formation of a long-term model of constructive cooperation in the region." That statement's insistence on "creating favorable transport conditions for the Kaliningrad region," prompted one analyst to observe: "If Poland becomes a member of NATO, Lithuania will be the only landbridge between the two.  And Moscow is thus making it very clear it will demand a transit accord with Lithuania, something Vilnius is unlikely to agree to willingly." Russia maintains significant military forces in the Kaliningrad enclave bordering Lithuania and Poland--forces not restricted by the CFE Flank Agreement limitations. Russia's armed forces have seized control of portions of Moldava, a small state physically separated from Russia by 325 miles of Ukrainian territory, but contiguous to NATO candidate Romania. Russia  has repeatedly intervened to destabilize and subvert the strategic Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus Mountains--the latter of which has newly-found, exceptionally important gas and oil reserves whose transit routes westward Moscow seeks to control. Russia has stationed its armed forces in Ukraine, Armenia and Tajikistan. And while tolerating dramatic deterioration in its Soviet-era force structure, the bankrupt Russian state still commits vast resources to military research and procurement that will bear fruit in the intermediate future--like the defeated German Reichswehr of the 1920's.  Russia’s revised military doctrine in essence neglects current military assets to concentrate on leapfrogging potential foes by developing next-generation technologies.  Since Russia observed the performance of U.S. high-tech assets in Operation Desert Storm, its doctrine "places new emphasis on the need for military technology advancements in C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence), long-range smart weapons, and increased mobility, especially in air and space."    Russian spending for research and development of high-technology weapons has increased nearly sixfold over the past three years, rising from $2.1 billion in 1994 to almost $13 billion today--versus other defense spending of $19 billion.  Current high-priority projects include production of an upgraded mobile ICBM, tactical nuclear weapons, miniature nuclear warheads, and a new Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile--all already in development or production.   And Jane’s of Britain reports that Russia has developed several new chemical and bacteriological weapons, including a new strain of anthrax which antibiotics cannot counteract.
Russia’s entire negotiating posture on NATO expansion reveals not a fear of aggression--which Russia’s leaders from Boris Yeltsin on down have disclaimed--but a conscious desire to dominate both the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact.  Why else would the current Russian Foreign Minister (and former Soviet KGB head) Y.M. Primakov have opened negotiations with the following demands: That NATO accept a 10-year moratorium on the accession of any other Central European nation after the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. That NATO forswear ever placing troops, nuclear or other heavy weapons, or even military infrastructure on the soil of those new members Moscow is prepared to countenance. That no former Soviet Union republic--including the Baltic states forcibly annexed by the USSR as part of the infamous 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact--ever be considered for NATO membership. These negotiating positions made sense only if Russia seeks the ability to blackmail or actually occupy the whole former Warsaw Pact, and direct military dominance over the mis-named "Commonwealth of Independent States."  Indeed, given the unfolding sequence of events, NATO expansion might fairly be characterized as a Western response to accelerating Russian efforts to revive the Soviet imperium. Promoting Democracy and Stability in the Former Warsaw Pact Beyond defending Western Europe from Soviet imperialism during the Cold War, NATO proved essential to fostering democracy and the rule of law in Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey.  So too will NATO membership today lend stability to states still trying to revive or create capitalism and democracy after generations of Communist autocracy.  NATO membership will in particular help inculcate the norm of civilian control of the military.  And just as membership in NATO helped abate the historic rivalry between Germany and France and contain disputes between Greece and Turkey, so too will NATO membership help diminish longstanding animosities between Central European nations.  Already, the mere prospect of NATO membership has helped promote settlement of outstanding issues predating the Second World War between Germany and the Czech Republic, and led Hungary and Romania to resolve their centuries-old territorial disputes.

Impact Defense – NATO Contains Russia

Russia won’t start a war – it knows NATO will smack it down.

Valasek 9 (Tomas, director of foreign policy & defence @ CER, November, [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp\_929\_nato\_nov09.pdf] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Are allies right to worry about a war? Some new NATO countries hold fears of Russia dating back to the Cold War; and it is not obvious that these can be “exorcised through contingency planning”, as one NATO insider put it.1 Equally, the Central Europeans have suffered real harassment and occasional ‘soft’ attacks (like cyber-strikes) from Russia in recent years. And their worries about Moscow’s intentions are shared by the Nordic countries. So can all fears of Russia be put down to historical animosities? And what precisely do the North and Central Europeans worry about? Does NATO have adequate measures in place to deter a potential conflict with Russia or defend against it? In principle NATO’s ‘all for one, one for all’ clause, known as Article V, should deter Russia from attacking any of the allies.2 And so should NATO’s military superiority. But could Russia have reasons to doubt that NATO would respond collectively to an attack on a Central European ally? And what is the state of NATO’s preparations for the defence of a member-state in Central or Northern Europe?

NATO is enough of a threat to contain Russia.

Ivashov 7 (Leonid, President of the Academy of Geopolitical, July, *Defense and Security*, 78, “Will America Fight Russia?”)JM

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.

NATO deters Russia and stops escalation.

Freeman 8 (Colin, journalist for the Telegraph, August 23, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2609100/Troop-surge-strategist-Fred-Kagan-calls-for-beefed-up-Baltic-defences-against-Russia.html] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Although any Russian action against a full Nato member would be a far greater act of aggression than its recent incursion into Georgia, Moscow might be tempted to try it in the Baltics as a way of testing Nato's resolve, knowing that the alliance might dither about deploying even conventional forces straightaway. Turning each country into a defensive "porcupine", he argues, would make such a move almost unthinkable in the first place. "I think that Russia does have designs on the Baltic states, and they have established a precedent in Georgia where they think they can use force to defend Russian minorities in other countries," he said. "The whole purpose of Nato is to deter war, and only secondly to fight if war breaks out. The Russians knew that Georgia would be easy, but I would like them to know that somewhere like Estonia would be very hard."

Impact Defense – NATO Contains Russia

NATO is deterring Russia now.

Blank 97 (Stephen, Ph.D. in History from the U of Chicago., November, [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146] AD: 7/7/10)JM

As in the past, European security organizations must deter and reassure Russia while enhancing the security of the littoral states.11 These organizations must also jointly share in any Baltic security plan so that no state or organization obtains a free ride. Free riding occurs when one or more states, or organizations, knowing or believing that some other state or organization can or will formulate solutions for major issues like Baltic security, effectively abstains from serious participation in the solution. Instead that state/s or organization/s then lets other states act alone, gaining a free ride at their expense. If free riding pervades an entire alliance as in the 1930s, security guarantees are devalued and could even become worthless.12 Accordingly, to stabilize the Baltic region, states cannot keep looking, as they are now tempted to do, for others to ensure regional security. Free riding undermines Baltic integration in Europe by dissolving the cohesion of the new NATO-led security system. It also fosters renationalized and unilateral security policies. Germany could incline further to make a bilateral deal with Russia over Central and Eastern Europe. As it is, Baltic cohesion, too, is already eroding. Lithuania poses, not as a Baltic state, but as a Central European one that seeks unilateral entry to European organizations, while forsaking Latvia and Estonia. Estonia follows suit regarding its future entry into the EU and supports admitting at least one Baltic state into NATO so that others might later gain a hearing. 13 Free riding and allied divisions regarding the Baltic could create new and unforeseen regional problems and clearly are due to the EU's and NATO's hesitations over Baltic issues.14 Regional cooperation, which is already weakened due to NATO and the EU's reluctance to expand, will further decrease where free riding and renationalized agendas prevail.15 Russia could then be tempted to extend an unwelcome protectorate over the Baltic states. To prevent such outcomes and protect the Baltic states, NATO must continue to provide security, deter Russia, reassure, and lead the non-NATO littoral states and Europe's other security organizations, the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), toward regional as well as European military-political integration. Failure to do so will have grave consequences. Ex-Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt wrote that Russia's Baltic policy is a litmus test of its European and security policies.16 Volker Ruhe, Germany's Minister of Defense, wrote that the Baltic states are the practical testing ground for meeting the challenges of reshaping NATO's missions, territorial scope, the relations between the United States and its European allies, the hoped for partnership with Russia, and, in general, for building the Europe we want to see.17 German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also stressed these states' importance for future European security.18

Impact Defense – No US-Russia Conflict

No chance of U.S-Russian war.

Perkovich 3 (George, dir of the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March/April, Foreign Affairs, 82(2), p. 2)JM

As for Russia, a full-scale war between it and the United States now seems inconceivable. Given the desires for larger cuts in nuclear forces that Russia displayed in negotiating the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russia hardly seems enough of a threat to justify the size and forward-leaning posture of America's present arsenal.

No Russia-U.S. conflict.

Manning 2K (Robert, Research Fellow at the FILENE Institute, March 10, *The Washington Times*, "Abbott and Costello nuclear policy," p. A18)JM

We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.

No Russian threat – their military and economy is in ruin.

Friedman and Logan 9 (Benjamin, PhD in econ from Harvard, and Justin, M.A in international relations from the U of Chicago, Spring, [http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/friedman\_logan\_hittingstopbuttononnatoexpansion.pdf] AD: 7/6/10)JM

This narrative is devoid of strategic logic. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, which deterrence renders unusable, Russia is not a great power, and is incapable of threatening Western Europe, let alone the United States. The World Bank predicts that Russia’s economy will shrink by 4.5 percent this year, and its unemployment will hit 12 percent. Even close to the height of oil prices, Russia possessed a gdp only roughly at 60 equivalent to that of Italy and Portugal combined. Its stock market is down by more than half since this time last year. Its defense spending totals about $70 billion annually (less than what the U.S. spends on defense research and investment alone), for what remains a second-rate military. This is a country strong enough to pummel weak neighbors like Georgia, but one that shouldn’t worry Europe, which spends roughly four times more. Balance of power theory tells us that if Russia grows more threatening, the members of the European Union—now collectively richer than the U.S.—will respond by investing more on defense than their current average of 2 percent of gdp, and by further integrating their military capacity. No longer driven by a revolutionary ideology, Russia also lacks the Soviet Union’s ambitions. True, Russia does not like the democratic governments on its flanks in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is because these governments are pursuing policies that anger Russia, not because they are democratic per se. What Russia wants are pliant neighbors. That desire is typical of relatively powerful states: The long U.S. history of violent interventions in Latin America undermines whatever lectures we might direct at Moscow.

Impact Defense – Expansion Fails

Russian influence expansion ventures fail – Georgia proves.

Klitsounova 9(Elena, Centre for European Policy Studies “Russia’s Response: Sovereign Democracy Strikes Back” Oct. 30)AQB

Yet, while Russian soft power instruments may predominate on paper in a wide variety of policy areas, they seem to lack power in practice. The Georgian crisis of August 2008 clearly showed Russia’s limited ability to expand influence over its immediate neighbours by pulling only on the levers of soft power. And the situation is likely to become even more complicated in the near future. As a result of the crisis, the Russian cabinet has already announced budget cuts, so establishing and expanding new areas of external aid on a shrinking budget will be extremely difficult. At the moment, some institutional features of Russia’s political model seem to be attractive to quite a number of regimes in the post-Soviet region. Moscow’s impetuous rebellion against the “intervention of democracy promoters” seems to be viewed with some sympathy in many post-Soviet capitals. Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate Russia’s political attractiveness. With a younger generation of politicians soon to come to power, Russia’s leadership is likely to lose a large part of its capital of personalised relationships with post-Soviet political elites. The ongoing world economic crisis may dramatically change the structures of interest and power in the region and thus undermine the effectiveness and attractiveness of non-competitive political regimes. And last but not least, the EU’s serious attempts at projecting its own political influence far beyond its borders may also change the expectations of political actors populating the EU-Russia common neighbourhood.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russia has no expansionist goals – even if it could expand, its main goal is stability.

Rivera 3 (David, assistant prof of government @ Hamilton College, Spring, *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(1), p. 84-85)JM

Other observers, however, painted a very different picture of post-Soviet Russia and defended the Kremlin against the imperialist charge. Explicitly taking issue with many of the aforementioned authors, Stephen Sestanovich argued in 1994 that “the dominant interest now guiding Russian policy is [not intimidation or destabilization but] stability. For now, the picture of an expansionist juggernaut is — at the very least — far ahead of the facts.”[ 6] U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas Pickering similarly maintained that “charges of resurgent Russian imperialism have been overstated…. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow pursued policies — such as drastically cutting military spending — that severely limited its ability to rebuild the empire, even if it had wanted to.”[ 7] In an overview of points of agreement and contention in U.S.-Russian relations given just prior to Bill Clinton's participation in the Moscow summit of May 1995, Pickering went even further by describing Russia's relations with its CIS neighbors as containing “some positive trends which we strongly support.” In particular, the Ambassador praised Russia for its policies toward Ukraine, the Baltics, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh.[ 8] Most dramatically, Leon Aron put the “Yeltsin revolution” in historical perspective by asserting that “not since the middle of the sixteenth century when the Russian expansion began, has there been a Russia less aggressive, less belligerent, less threatening to neighbors and the world than the Russia we see today.”[ 9] This debate over the nature of Russian policy also served as the backdrop for a parallel debate over Western policy. Given the prevalence of Clinton administration officials mentioned in the previous paragraph, it should come as no surprise that those analyses were frequently marshaled in defense of partnership and engagement with Russia.[ 10] In contrast, analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist generally argued that the primary restraints on even greater bellicosity were Russian weakness and efforts by outside powers to deter Russian encroachments. Hence, they were critical of the Clinton administration's approach to the region and advocated instead that Washington bolster the non-Russian states' tenuous independence and contain Russian expansion. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, “Russia is more likely to make a break with its imperial past if the newly independent post-Soviet states are vital and stable…. Political and economic support for the new states must be an integral part of a broader strategy for integrating Russia into a cooperative transcontinental system.”[ 11] Some also opposed Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, predicting that “without nuclear weapons, Ukraine … will be vulnerable to an expansionist Russian power. Once the nuclear weapons are gone Russia will interpret the economic grievances of ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine as violations of human rights.”[ 12]

Russian expansionist predictions are all hype – stability is Russia’s goal, not conquest.

Rivera 3 (David, assistant prof of government @ Hamilton College, Spring, *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(1), p. 101-102)JM

Nevertheless, the weight of evidence more strongly supports those who defended Moscow against the imperialist charge. For every former republic that fell victim to Russian intervention, an equal number successfully rid themselves of a Russian military presence without falling victim to such intervention. The military interventions that did occur were all small-scale operations. Discontented ethnic Russians received military protection in only one of the fourteen non-Russian states, and the Yeltsin administration did not pursue territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any former Soviet republics. In addition, the second half of the 1990s witnessed heightened Russian conciliation and peacemaking as well as the consolidation of the tenuous independence of several of Eurasia's previously “failed states.” Why Russia's neighbors so strongly supported Yeltsin during his campaign for reelection in 1996 and throughout his presidency is now apparent.[ 100] Consideration of the policies that Moscow did and did not pursue makes clear that Russia was, at most, selectively imperialist and that charges of Russian imperialism are exaggerated. The predominance of a nonimperialist orientation of Russian foreign policy is further shown by the fact that a central prediction made by analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist did not come to pass. The Yeltsin administration continued to ignore Crimea's ethnic Russian insurgents even after Ukraine denuclearized. Zbigniew Brzezinski similarly had warned that “Ukraine is on the brink of disaster: the economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion. Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in a larger Moscow-dominated framework.”[ 101] Now that the decade has closed it is evident that Russia under Yeltsin was not interested in exploiting such opportunities. The Kremlin thereby passed what was widely regarded as “the test case of whether Russia will remain a nation-state or seek to become again a multinational empire.”[ 102]

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russian foreign policy has no imperial ambition.

Rivera 3 (David, assistant prof of government @ Hamilton College, Spring, *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(1), p. 104-105)JM

However, there are grounds for optimism that a pacific, nonimperialist orientation will continue during Putin's reign. In response to Brzezinski, Sestanovich points out that when Putin speaks of “strengthening the Russian state,” the language he uses indicates that he primarily has the domestic, not international, dimensions of state power in mind.[ 115] More generally, Boris Yeltsin resigned the presidency in December 1999 in the expectation that his prime minister and favored successor would continue his international policies.[ 116] This expectation has so far been fulfilled as Putin's Kremlin has retained Foreign Minister Ivanov and, most important, has not undertaken the use of military force against any of the NIS. In fact, Putin's policies have been sufficiently moderate that even Brzezinski has begun to conclude that “the Russian elite is gradually shedding its imperial nostalgia.”[ 117] This moderation and restraint might be merely a function of preoccupation with the war in Chechnya, but it might also be more fundamentally rooted in lessons Putin has drawn from history. For instance, when asked whether the introduction of Warsaw Pact forces into Hungary and Czechoslovakia were mistakes, Putin replied, “In my opinion, those were huge mistakes. And the Russophobia which confronts us in Eastern Europe today stems precisely from those mistakes.”[ 118] He has also appealed to his compatriots to “abandon imperial ambitions.”[ 119] Hence, Washington should continue to give more weight to engagement over containment until the optimistic assumptions underlying such an approach are convincingly disproved by Russian actions.

There will be no red spread – economics and population issues will stop it.

Mearsheimer 6 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *International Relations*, 20(1), p. 119-120)JM

IR What about the prospect of another ambitious and powerful Russia, moving westwards and increasingly dominating a Europe which has been deserted by the United States? JM That is definitely not going to happen. Russia has roughly half the population of the former Soviet Union and it has a struggling economy, which is nowhere near as dynamic as the Chinese or German economies. IR But we are talking 20 or 30 years down the line, and your book importantly stresses the sweep of history. JM Most experts think that Russia’s population will shrink markedly over the next 20 to 30 years and that its economy will continue to face serious problems. I don’t think we have to worry about a second coming of the Soviet Union in the decades ahead.

Even if Russia is anti-west, they are not a revisionist power.

Aron 6 (Leon, dir of Russian Studies @ American Enterprise Institute, December, *Commentary,* 122(5), p.22)JM

This is not to suggest that Putin has sought to re-create Soviet foreign policy outright. Despite the muscular rhetoric emanating from the Kremlin, Russia is not a "revisionist" power like the Soviet Union or present-day China. It is not intent on reshaping in its favor the regional or global balance of forces. In the geopolitical competition, Moscow may complain about the score, but it is unlikely to take the risks associated with changing the rules of the game. Nor is Russia willing to commit the resources needed to sustain any such endeavor — unlike China, for instance, whose defense appropriations have grown annually by double-digit percentages over the past twenty years. Even in today's Russia, flush with petrodollars, the share of the GDP devoted to defense — just 2.9 percent in 2005 — is at least ten times smaller than during the days of the Soviet Union.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russia is all talk – its military isn’t prepared for expansionism.

Braithwaite 8 (Rodric, former British Ambassador to Russia, August-September, *Survival*, 50(40), p.174)JM

So what about Russia as a global military threat? Putin has gone some way towards reviving the demoralised remnants of the Soviet armed forces. But Russia still spends less than one-twenty-fifth of what America spends on defence. Russian published figures for defence expenditure are opaque,4 but the Russian government has repeatedly stated that it will not allow defence expenditure to drag down the economy as it did in the Soviet period. This is one lesson Russia’s leaders really do seem to have learned from the past.5 Lucas reluctantly recognises this. ‘On the face of it’, he says, ‘Russia is still an intimidating military power. It has one of the world’s largest armies, excellent special forces and some remarkable modern weapons’ (p. 0\*$). But he admits that Russia is still too poor and weak to do more than posture. ‘Russia [is not] a global adversary, despite its increasingly assertive presence on the international stage. Indeed, it often looks like a partner’ (p. #&). In a striking and apt phrase, he goes on: ‘[Russia] is too weak to have a truly effective independent foreign policy, but it is too disgruntled to have a sensible and constructive one’ (p. 0+$). But if this is so, what is all the fuss about?

The narrow-minded scholarship of the negative’s disadvantage is akin to a fairy tale – view it as suspect.

Mullerson 8 (Rein, prof of International Law @ King's College, July 1, *Chinese Journal of International Law*, p.585-586)JM

7. I understand why many Russian leaders in the rich tapestry of Russian history, where there is indeed too much red, want to emphasize only glorious victories and see only wrongs done against Russia and not by her. For politicians, Book Reviews 585 and even more for military men, an attempt to see problems from all possible angles may indeed lead to a political or strategic paralysis. Hence, a black and white picture of the world and a vision based on the principle: those who are not with us are against us. However, I cannot comprehend how somebody educated at the London School of Economics and Political Science cannot be more sophisticated and open-minded. Why a writer, journalist and academic, whose task should be to come as close to the truth as possible, never hoping of course to reach it, has to straighten one’s narrative, makes it so monodimensional. I am afraid that it may be caused by a combination of three d’s: dislike, disappointment and dread. Dislike, because Russia has indeed too often behaved like a big bully; disappointment since notwithstanding ‘‘the 1990s promises’’ she still refuses to become a ‘‘normal’’ country; dread because suddenly this ‘‘abnormal’’ entity is once again, like Phoenix, rising from the ashes. There is no doubt that Edward Lucas knows a lot and the book is informative. However, this book also proves that knowing does not mean understanding and that prejudice does not derive only from ignorance, especially if knowledge is mixed with fear and loathing. Of course, fans of Tchaikovsky, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov or Russian ballet may also extrapolate their admiration to all things Russian, closing eyes on negative aspects of Russia’s domestic and international politics. That is why any serious researcher needs to follow a recipe of Professor Karl Popper, who for many years taught at Edward Lucas’ alma mater: the surest test of any theory, vision or worldview is not trying to collect as many proofs of the point one holds dear (usually one can find a loads of them), but on the contrary, it is necessary to look for facts that would contradict your predilections, preconceived ideas and fears (often there are too many of those as well). Working with Russia as she is, not trying to isolate her or forcing her to become a ‘‘normal’’ State is the best way to not only avoid a new Cold War but also give democracy a better chance in Russia. One would be advised to approach Edward Lucas’ informative book as a shard of a broken mirror that shows Russia from a specific angle while other shards—other writings—contribute to a fuller picture; the search for the unbroken mirror be better left for those who believe in fairy tales.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russia isn’t prepared for imperial conquest.

Savodnik 8 (Peter, author and journalist, May 19, *Time International*, 171(20), EBSCO) JM

It's premature to call the still-unfolding rivalry a cold war. No doubt, Russia and the West have divergent interests. According to the Russian worldview, everything good that happens in the West is bad for Russia. Worse yet, Moscow seems willing to do almost anything to achieve great-power (if not superpower) status. Still, we're far from a Manichaean showdown. Russia is too weak to wage a cold war. Outside Moscow, St. Petersburg and a handful of other cities, most Russians live in Khrushchev- and Brezhnev-era hovels. The economy is diversifying but not diversified; for now, the oil and gas markets largely decide how much money flows into the Kremlin coffers. And the military is a wreck; Lucas points out, for instance, that the navy now has just 20 seaworthy surface ships. Most importantly, Russia lacks a clear political identity. Beyond its economic and strategic concerns, Russia doesn't know what it wants to be. This is an ideological, even ontological lassitude. The reason the postcommunist world is so unstable is not that Russia is on the verge of repatriating old turf. It's that Russia is navigating between two ideas of Russia: its former Soviet self and its current shadow of that former self--a cartoonish, hopelessly upside-down mythology versus a dispiriting reality. Russia will not transcend this dichotomy until it begins building a truly original future instead of trying to cobble together a distant past. Lucas is right that the West should set aside its differences and resist Russian aggression. But we should be clear about the nature of this aggression. The new cold war, thankfully, has yet to break out.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

The Georgian conflict didn’t prove Russia is an expansionist power– it proved the opposite.

Bush 8 (Jason, chief of BusinessWeek 's Moscow bureau, August 22, [http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europeinsight/archives/2008/08/the\_new\_cold\_war.html] AD: 7/6/10)JM

The Georgian crisis has been an interesting example of how Cold War stereotypes mould western perceptions about Russia, including those in the media. Reading western newspapers or listening to western politicians, and you are obviously supposed to think that Russia is Nazi Germany, Putin is Hitler, and Georgia is Czechoslovakia in 1938. The parallel has been drawn explicitly by a number of western pundits. See, for instance, this opinion piece by former state department official Robert Kagan, which begins with the extraordinary sentence: “The details of who did what to precipitate Russia’s war against Georgia are not very important.” Supposedly, this is all about a Russian master-plan to restore the Soviet empire, with Georgia as the first domino to fall while the West stands idly by. It is a false and misleading analogy, for the simple reason that the whole bloody mess was begun by the Georgians—an uncomfortable fact now publicly admitted by US diplomats. There is nothing at all mysterious about Russian policy. They have been in control of South Ossetia since the early 1990s and have had troops deployed there all that time. On 7 August, the Georgians launched a massive and well-prepared attack on the region, using multiple rocket launchers to attack residential areas of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, and killing several of the Russian soldiers after targeting their barracks. You only have to imagine what the US reaction would be if Fidel Castro decided one day to launch an all-out attack on Guantanamo Bay, in the process killing hundreds of US citizens and US military personnel. The Russian military reaction was inevitable in the circumstances. The real mystery of the whole affair is what President Saakashvili was hoping to achieve with his extraordinary gamble, and why he chose to strike when he did. Tension has been rising in the region for some time, partly because of recent events in Kosovo, which declared independence in February, with western backing. That sets a precedent for the break-away states in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to do the same (as they have long wanted to do), which may have panicked the Georgians. The Russians have been warning for years that independence for Kosovo would start a chain-reaction in the Caucasus. The crisis is certainly bad for East-West business ties and the investment climate. The investment climate in Russia is already reeling from one business scandal after another. As well as the TNK-BP affair, there have also been recent controversies connected with Mechel, Hermitage and Telenor. The biggest loser from a prolonged cool-off will be Russia though. One interesting angle of the Georgian crisis is the negative impact on the Russian economy. In the days after the outbreak of war, the stock market and even the rouble plunged, and Russian banks found it harder to get credit lines abroad. This shows how far the new globalized Russia depends economically on the outside world. This economic dependence increases the West's options, but also means that the West doesn’t necessarily need to take strong-arm measures to restrain the Russians. The danger is that the West will now over-react, punishing Russia unnecessarily because of the overblown fears and simplistic analysis of the numerous Cold Warriors back home. Amid the jumpy hysteria of recent days, many people in the West have assumed that quiet diplomacy is powerless. This isn't true, however, as the French-brokered peace plan showed. For diplomacy to be effective, though, the West has to be seen as an honest broker. Instead of that, we have typically seen knee-jerk support for Georgia, and the usual anti-Russian stereotypes. Unfortunately, there appear to be plenty of people in the West who are now arguing for a new Cold War. They have fallen into the trap of believing that Putin is the new Hitler and Georgia the new Czechoslovakia, so “the West must make a stand”. In effect, these people are arguing for a cure that is actually a lot worse than the disease.

Expansionism Good – Oil

Russian expansionism is necessary to access arctic oil reserves – the impact is Russian economic collapse and global oil shocks

Weir 8 (Fred, Correspondent for the CSM, May 28, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2008/0528/p01s04-wosc.html>, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The Kremlin often touts Russia's image as an "energy superpower," but now the country's oil production is declining. Some say Russia may have already reached peak oil output. Underscoring the urgency of the issue, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's new cabinet made its first order of business on Monday the approval of a package of measures to relieve the oil-production crisis. "It's a good first step," says Natalia Milchakova, an oil and gas analyst for Otkritiye, a Moscow-based brokerage firm. But she adds that "rapidly slowing" oil production, which was growing by more than 10 percent five years ago, isn't "something that can be quickly fixed with political declarations." As the world's second-largest oil exporter, Russia joins a growing number of top oil suppliers wrestling with how to address declining or peaking production. Like Venezuela and Mexico, Russia is heavily dependent on oil, which accounts for more than two-thirds of government revenue and 30 percent of the country's gross domestic product. Now, Moscow is trying to remedy a situation caused in part by outdated technology, heavy taxation of oil profits, and lack of investment in oil infrastructure. The Presidium of the Cabinet, as it is officially known, in its inaugural meeting Monday approved tax holidays of up to 15 years for Russian companies that open new oil fields and proposed raising the threshold at which taxation begins from the current $9 per barrel to $15. Oil companies welcomed the measures, but experts say that after almost two decades of post-Soviet neglect, which have seen little new exploration, it may be too little, too late. After rising steadily for several years to a post-Soviet high of 9.9 million barrels per day (bpd) in October, Russian oil production fell by 0.3 percent in the first four months of this year, while exports fell 3.3 percent – the first Putin-era drop. Russia's proven oil reserves are a state secret, but the Oil & Gas Journal, a US-based industry publication, estimates it has about 60 billion barrels – the world's eighth largest – which would last for 17 years at current production rates. Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko recently admitted the decline, but suggested it might be overcome by fresh discoveries in underexplored eastern Siberia or in new Arctic territories recently claimed by Russia. "The output level we have today is a plateau, or stagnation," he said. But Leonid Fedun, vice president of Russia's largest private oil company LUKoil, went one step further in an interview with the Financial Times last month. "Russian oil production has peaked and may never return to current levels," he said. That poses problems for Russia, which has talked of expanding beyond its main oil market – Europe – to China, Japan, and the US. In 2006, then-President Putin approved construction of an $11 billion pipeline across Siberia to the Pacific Ocean to carry eastward exports. Putin and his successor, Dmitri Medvedev, have insisted Russia can meet demand by increasing output but oil analysts around the globe are pessimistic that oil supplies can meet rising consumption in the coming decade.

Arctic oil reserves are key to the Russian economy

Wiedemann 6(Erich, author for Spiegel Online, [http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,405320,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/0%2C1518%2C405320%2C00.html), AD: 7/6/10) jl

Global warming isn't necessarily the catastrophe it's made out to be -- at least not for multinational oil companies. Shrinking ice caps would reveal the Arctic's massive energy sources and shorten tanker routes by thousands of miles. Ice-cap melting may be [bad news for the polar bears in Manitoba](http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0%2C1518%2C395014%2C00.html), Canada, but it is great news for Pat Broe of Denver. When the ice melts in the Arctic, the polar predators have to search for new hunting grounds or starve -- but Broe doesn't mind. He figures global warming will make him around $100 million a year. His friends laughed at him when he bought the run-down port in Churchill -- a tiny outpost of a thousand souls on the Hudson Bay. What could he possibly want with a harbor in one of the most deserted places on the planet that's frozen over a big chunk of the year? Wait and see, said Broe. He only paid a symbolic price of seven dollars -- not a bad price for a port. He knew that time was on his side. Temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere are rising twice as fast as in the southern half. The summers are getting longer and the pack ice is getting thinner. By 2015 the North Pole is expected to be navigable for normal ships six months out of the year. It's then that a golden age will dawn upon Churchill. Via Arctic waterways, an oil tanker only needs a week to make it from the Russian port city Murmansk on the Barents Sea to the east coast of Canada. That's only half the time it takes from Abu Dhabi on the Persian Gulf to Galveston, Texas. And from Churchill to Chicago on the Hudson Bay Railway, it's not much further than from Texas to the Windy City. Tankers from Venezuela to Japan can even save some 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles) by traveling over the pole. Of course, with rising ocean temperatures comes an increased danger of icebergs, but at least the Arctic oil fields aren't in a region plagued by political instability. No suicide bombers, no kidnappings, no explosions. What risk there is up north, is nothing big oil companies aren't happy to take on. The first cargo likely to be transported via the Northwest Passage is Russian oil from Siberia destined for North America. The melting ice will also make it easier to get to oil and natural gas fields that are still blocked by pack ice. The Arctic is a giant treasure trove for energy multinationals. A quarter of the world's oil and gas reserves are estimated to be hidden underneath its rapidly shrinking ice. At current market values they would be worth $1.5 to $2 trillion. There are even proven oil deposits at the North Pole itself.

Expansionism Good – Oil

Independently, Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war

David 99 (Steven, Professor of Political Sciences at John Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, Proquest, AD: 7/6/10) jl

AT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918-Zo has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups-the Russian Mafia-increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 5o percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation-personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia-even though in decline-does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,ooo nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

Expansionism Good – Oil

Oil shocks crush the US economy

Setser 4 (Brad, Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme at Oxford <http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/papers/OilShockRoubiniSetser.pdf> , AD: 7/6/10) jl

These effects are not trivial: oil shocks have caused and/or contributed to each one of the US and global recessions of the last thirty years. Yet while recent recessions have all been linked to an increase in the price of oil, not all oil price spikes lead to a recession. The 2003 spike associated with the invasion of Iraq is a good example. Private sector estimates generally suggest that a persistent 10% increase in the price of oil – say an increase from $30 to an average of $35 over the course of 2004 -- would reduce the US and the G7 growth rate by about 0.3%-0.4% within a year. Some (Goldman Sachs) are more pessimistic, and calculate that if oil prices were to increase further to levels closer to $45, the reduction in the G7 growth rate may be closer to 1% of GDP. Thus, private estimates of the negative effects of an oil shock currently range between 0.3% to 1% of US and G7 GDP growth. This means that the US economy, which was growing in Q4:2003 and Q1:2004 at about a 4.3% average rate could be expected to see a slowdown of its growth to a level between 4.0% and 3.3%. Global growth would also de-accelerate from its current very strong pace. And, indeed, the first estimate for Q2:2004 U.S. GDP growth was 3.0%, confirming that high oil prices in the first half of 2004 put a dent on real consumer demand. Looking ahead, persistence of oil prices at recent high levels of $43-44 per barrel (or even higher prices) could further slow down the U.S. economy below a 3% growth rate.

Extinction

Friedberg and Schoenfield 8 (Friedberg, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, WSJ, <http://online.wsj.vom/articles/SB122455074012352571.html>, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum**.** The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.

\*\*Russia Relations – Aff Answers

UQ – Relations Low – General

Spy scandal has derailed US-Russian relations

Engelstad 7/3 (Ryan, Newark Conflict Resolution Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/x-56495-Newark-Conflict-Resolution-Examiner~y2010m7d3-Spying-is-bad-With-Video, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The United States and Russia's relationship may again be on the rocks in light of recent espionage accusations against a ring of over 10 individuals, two of which were from Montclair, NJ. It was only last week when President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia were seen eating lunch together in Washington D.C. Now, President Obama's efforts to repair U.S.-Russia relations will surely be sidetracked. This is a conflict of a global nature, but these recent events can be compared to just about any relationship, and there are important lessons to be learned.  (For more information about this conflict, check this artice from the Newark Star Ledger.)

UQ – Relations Low – Missile Shield

Missile shield eroding relations now

Landay 10 (Jonathan S, McClatchy Staff Writer, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/01/89641/us-russia-treaty-stalls-over-obama.html, AD: 7/5/10) jl

WASHINGTON — Negotiations to complete a new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms treaty have stalled over a Russian demand for the option to withdraw unilaterally if Moscow determines that U.S. missile defenses would threaten its intercontinental nuclear missile force, a senior U.S. official said Monday.

Similar "unilateral statements" have been included in previous arms control treaties, and the former Bush administration used one in 2002 to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the former Soviet Union.

The Obama administration, however, has rejected the Russian demand, fearing that it could make it harder to win the Republican votes needed for Senate ratification of the new nuclear arms pact.

Biden is pissing Russia off – Missile Shield

Cooper and Kulish 9 (Helene and Nicholas - NYT Staff Writers, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/europe/07iht-07munich.20001384.html, AD: 7/6/10) jl

MUNICH — Vice President Joseph Biden of the United States rejected the notion of a Russian sphere of influence Saturday, promising that the new government under President Barack Obama would continue to press NATO to seek "deeper cooperation" with like-minded countries.

Biden, in a much-anticipated speech at an international security conference, also said the Obama administration would continue to pursue a planned missile defense system that has angered the Kremlin, provided the technology works and is not too expensive. The missile defense shield, Biden said, is needed to "counter a growing Iranian capability."

UQ – Obama Hit the “reset” button

Non-Unique: All the “reset” button has done is return the US to Cold war sentiments.

Trotman 7/6/10(Ricky member of the Young Leaders Program at the Heritage Foundation, “The Only Thing We Are Re-Setting is the Cold War” The Heritage Foundation)AQB

Peter Brookes presents an op-ed in the Boston Herald demonstrating this administration’s repeated failure to live up to its promise of transparency and open government. The administration’s reticence to give Senators the negotiating record for the new START treaty is yet another flagrant example. The reasons provided in the START hearings not to release the negotiating record are either false, or simply fly in the face of reason. The first, that negotiating records have not been released to the Senate in the past, is patently false given that they have for both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The second, that releasing such documents to the Senate would compromise the position of future negotiators, is appalling. There is no call for full, public disclosure, but rather release of the information to the Senate, who is responsible for fully vetting any treaty signed between the United States and a foreign nation. By not releasing the record, this administration is making it seem more and more likely that there is something in there that they don’t want the Senate to see. At stake here is nothing less than our national security. While this administration is seeking to reset US-Russian relations, the only thing that is being reset is a Cold War environment. The New START Treaty codifies strategic parity, threatens our ability to build upon our missile defense system, and keeps the mentality of Mutually Assured Destruction alive and well. Combine this with the revelation that ten people have been arrested for allegedly being undercover Russian spies and you have an environment bearing striking similarities to pre-1989 US-Russian relations. Fortunately, with the constitutional role afforded to the Senate, there is still hope for preventing this major step backwards. All this administration has to do is provide the full range of materials necessary to thoroughly vet this treaty and its implications for U.S. security policy.

UQ – Talks Failed

Recent talks have failed to replace old sentiments.

Keating 6/16/10(Joshua, Foreign Policy Magazine “A Short History of a Bad Metaphor”)AQB

As policy initiatives go, the "reset button" didn't exactly have the smoothest of rollouts. On March 6, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov with a literal button meant to symbolize the Obama administration's intention to repair frayed ties with Russia. Unfortunately, one misplaced syllable on the Cyrillic label meant that the button actually said "overcharge," not "reset," and Clinton was subjected to a few days of media mockery in both capitals. But despite (or perhaps because of) the initial gaffe, the phrase caught on. More than a year later, and just ahead of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Washington next week, "reset button" has become shorthand for the administration's entire Russia policy. Virtually every big-think article or op-ed written on U.S.-Russia relations since that day has referred to the reset button either admiringly or disparagingly. What's more, the phrase has gone viral. Commentators have invoked the reset button in discussions of U.S. policy on Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, Islam, Britain, Latin America, BP, climate change, Africa, health care, the economy, the war on drugs, and even the Obama presidency itself. Now, when hostile leaders like Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chávez talk about reaching out to the United States, they say they're "willing to press the reset button." When Obama makes a major policy address on a controversial topic like the Gulf oil spill, the question pundits ask is whether he will be able to "hit the reset button." One might almost get the impression that the U.S. political and media establishment has become one giant tech-support line, where the first response to any problem is, "Have you tried restarting the machine?" "It definitely became a much bigger metaphor than was originally intended," said one senior administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity. "It was not a conscious thing that we were going to go out and create this image. It's since been codified. Not by us, by the way." The phrase, in verb form, actually dates back to the presidential transition period when then President-elect Obama told NBC's Tom Brokaw that "it's going to be important for us to reset U.S.-Russian relations." But it entered the popular lexicon when Vice President Joe Biden used it during a widely touted foreign-policy address at a security summit in Munich in February 2009. "The last few years have seen a dangerous drift in relations between Russia and the members of our alliance," Biden said, referring to NATO. "It is time -- to paraphrase President Obama -- it's time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia." The basic premise of the strategy is that on the major priorities of U.S. foreign policy -- containing Iran, fighting international terrorism, and reducing the risk of nuclear weapons -- there's no reason for the United States and Russia to be at odds. By focusing on these areas, there's potential for "win-win" outcomes rather than "zero-sum" competition. "This was a fairly radical notion in U.S.-Russia relations," says the administration official.

Link Turn – Iraq – Improves Relations

Pullout from Iraq resolves tensions with Russia

Wishnick 4 (Elizabeth, Research Associate at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub383.pdf, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The U.S.-led war in Iraq has introduced new complications into security cooperation between the United States and Central Asia and revealed inconsistencies in the U.S. approach to regional security. The increased U.S. security focus on the region has led other regional powers--especially Russia, China, and India--to compete for influence there more overtly, and a continued American military presence is likely to create tensions in Russian-American relations in particular. Central Asian leaders concerned about the implications of the U.S. interest in “regime change” for their own rule, now have an added incentive to overstate terrorist threats facing their countries, while justifying the persecution of any political opposition and peaceful religious activity.

Link Turn – Generic – Improves Relations

Only the risk of a turn – expansion is inevitable, it’s just a question of aggressiveness – attempts at containment make lashout worse

Tymoshenko 7 (Yuliya, leader of Ukraine's parliamentary opposition, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62613/yuliya-tymoshenko/containing-russia, AD: 7/5/10) jl

In the name of peacekeeping in places such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniestria (restive regions within former Soviet republics), Russia has sought to reestablish its tutelage, and the West has largely not objected. The West has done little to enable the Soviet Union's successor states -- with the exception of the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- to achieve viable international standing. The activities of Russian troops in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the former Soviet states of Central Asia are rarely questioned, let alone challenged. Moscow is treated as the de facto imperial center -- which is also how it conceives of itself.

What can the West do to dissuade the Kremlin from pursuing Russia's age-old imperial designs? In the 1990s, an enfeebled Russia needed help from abroad. Unless oil prices unexpectedly collapse, no such leverage will be available in the near future. On the contrary, political pressure from outside is likely to aggravate rather than change Russian behavior. With the Kremlin once again firmly in control, Russia will change from within -- or not at all.

Link Defense – Afghanistan – No Impact

Russia isn’t threatened by US presence in Afghanistan

Aljazeera 9 (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/03/200932752829665993.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

But while Moscow appears opposed to the US foothold in Central Asia, it wants the US presence in Afghanistan to prevent the expansion of terrorism and drug-trafficking to Russian borders.

\*\*Sunni Alliance DA – Aff Answers

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Cyclical

**No impact—relations with Saudi Arabia are cyclical, and are in decline**

**Bronson 6**(Rachel, senior fellow and director of Middle East studies@the Council on Foreign Relations May 6, “5 Myths About U.S. Saudi Relations” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2006/05/19/AR2006051901758.html)

There's more to it than that. **Oil is**, of course, **critical to U.S.-Saudi ties** -- it can hardly be otherwise for the world's largest consumer and largest producer. **But Washington's relationship with Riyadh more closely resembles its friendly ties to oil-poor Middle Eastern states** such as Jordan, Egypt and Israel than its **traditionally hostile relations with oil-rich states** such as Libya and Iran. Deep oil reserves have never translated into easy relations with the United States. A major reason for the close ties between the two nations was their common Cold War fight against communism. Both countries worried about the Soviet Union, and that solidified their oil and defense interests, and minimized differences. In hindsight, by supporting religious zealots in the battle against communism, the two countries contributed to the rise of radical Islamic movements. 2 The 9/11 hijackers undermined otherwise strong U.S.- Saudi ties. Actually, **things were never that smooth. Historians refer to the "special relationship" established when Saudi Arabia's** King Abdel **Aziz and** President Franklin D. **Roosevelt met in 1945**. But **since then the relationship has endured oil embargoes, U.S. restrictions on arms sales** to Saudi Arabia, **and tensions around Israel and Palestine**. Dissension permeates the entire history of U.S.-Saudi relations. **Since the end of the Cold War, relations have become particularly fraught**, with the 9/11 attacks being the most recent issue. Oil, defense and some regional interests keep the countries together, but both sides have made clear that the relationship is less special today. In 2005, Rice stated that "for 60 years . . . the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither." Meanwhile, members of the Saudi royal family are debating the utility of close ties with the Americans.

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**Saudi Arabia views the war with Afghanistan as a threat to their security**

**Green 10** (R., March 3**,**a research fellow at MEMRI.The Middle East Media Research Institute http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm accessed June 27) CM

**Saudi Arabia views the ongoing war in Afghanistan as a threat to Pakistan**, **which, for many decades, has served as Saudi Arabia's strategic depth in the Muslim world, and whose stability is therefore of the utmost importance to the Saudis.** This was related in an article by Al-Watan's editor, Jamal Khashoggi: **"Saudi Arabia has a genuine interest to bring peace to Afghanistan because it will help stabilize Pakistan, a strategic ally of the kingdom**. [The Saudis] can use [their] connections with Afghan religious leaders to achieve [this aim]."[1] The daily Al-Jazirah likewise expressed Saudi Arabia's concerns about Pakistan, in an editorial published following a series of terrorist attacks in Pakistan cities: "**The growth of Taliban terrorist organizations and their spread throughout [strategically] important regions in interior Pakistan is a negative development, not just for Pakistan and Afghanistan, but for the [entire] Indian subcontinen**t... **The security crisis Afghanistan is experiencing**, and which Pakistan is currently struggling with, **represents a serious challenge to** both these **countrie**s, **as well as to the U.S. and to NATO as a whole**."[2] B) Saudi Arabia's Rivalry with Iran Saudi Arabia's interest in Afghanistan also stems from its ongoing rivalry with Iran, whose ties to Afghanistan go back centuries. The Safavid and Qajar dynasties (which ruled Iran from the early 16th to the early 20th centuries) both dominated the Herat region in Western Afghanistan and claimed it as part of their empires. **Afghanistan also has a large Shi'ite minority** (estimated at 20% of the population) **and** a number of ethnic minorities that speak Iranian languages. Today, **Iran views Afghanistan as part of its sphere of influence and as an arena for advancing its political, strategic, economic, and cultural interests**. **Saudi Arabia strongly opposes Iran's use of Afghanistan to boost its regional status and set up an additional front of confrontation with the U.S.**, and the Saudi dailies Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Watan have pointed to the heavy involvement of Iran in Afghanistan.[3] As a matter of fact, the current conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is just another phase in the long-standing rivalry between them. This rivalry intensified especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which generated immense solidarity with Iran in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia sought to counter this development and restore its supremacy in the Muslim world through two main courses of action, the first of which was a decade-long involvement in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. This war culminated in victory over the Soviets and in the demise of their empire, which greatly enhanced Saudi Arabia's prestige at the expense of Iran's. Second, the Saudis engaged in a global effort to spread Wahhabi Islam throughout the world by financing educational facilities and providing personnel to run them. This too was a Saudi victory, for the Saudi efforts were far more successful than Iran's attempts to export its revolution.

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**U.S. Saudi Relations low—Palestine-Israel**

**Pipes 9**(Daniel, January 26, Front Page magazine, “A Saudi Prince's Threat to the Obama Administration”, http://www.danielpipes.org/6151/a-saudi-princes-threat-to-the-obama-administration)

These credentials help gauge the import of the remarkable op-ed **Turki published** on Jan. 23 in London's Financial Times, "[Saudi Arabia's patience is running out](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a11a77b0-e8ef-11dd-a4d0-0000779fd2ac.html)." He begins it by recalling his own efforts over the decades to promote Arab-Israeli peace and especially the Abdullah Plan of 2002. "But after Israel launched its bloody attack on Gaza," he writes, "these pleas for optimism and co-operation now seem a distant memory." Then comes **a threat: "Unless the new US administration takes forceful steps to prevent** any **further** suffering and **slaughter of Palestinians**, the peace process, **the US-Saudi relationship and the stability of the region are at risk**." **He goes on to whack** George W. **Bush in a way not** exactly **usual for a former Saudi ambassador**: "**Not only has the Bush administration left a sickening legacy** in the region, but **it has** also, through an arrogant attitude about the butchery in Gaza, **contributed to the slaughter of innocents."** Then comes the threat again, restated more directly: "**If the US wants to continue playing a leadership role in the Middle East and** **keep** its strategic **alliances intact** - especially its ‘special relationship' with Saudi Arabia - **it will have to revise drastically its policies** **vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine**." Turki goes on to instruct in detail the new administration what to do: condemn Israel's atrocities against the Palestinians and support a UN resolution to that effect; condemn the Israeli actions that led to this conflict, from settlement building in the West Bank to the blockade of Gaza and the targeted killings and arbitrary arrests of Palestinians; declare America's intention to work for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, with a security umbrella for countries that sign up and sanctions for those that do not; call for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Shab‘ah Farms in Lebanon; encourage Israeli-Syrian negotiations for peace; and support a UN resolution guaranteeing Iraq's territorial integrity. Mr Obama should strongly promote the Abdullah peace initiative. Finally **Turki notes that** **Iran's** Mahmoud **Ahmadinejad has called on** "**Saudi Arabia to lead a jihad against Israel** [that] would, if pursued, create unprecedented chaos and bloodshed." **He** soothingly **notes that**, "So far**, the kingdom has resisted** these calls," **but then reiterates his threat a third time: "every day this restraint becomes more difficult to maintain**. … Eventually, the kingdom will not be able to prevent its citizens from joining the worldwide revolt against Israel."

**US Afghan surge undermined Saudi Arabian negations with the Taliban souring relations**

**Green 10** (R., March 3**,**a research fellow at MEMRI. **“**The Middle East Media Research Institute http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm accessed June 27) CM

**The announcement of Obama's decision to reinforce U.S. troops in Afghanistan** [[14]](http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn14%22%20%5Co%20%22) and ratchet up their military activities there **was greeted in the Saudi press with a wave of criticism over U.S. disregard of the Saudi recommendations for negotiations with the Taliban**. [[15]](http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn15%22%20%5Co%20%22) Operation Moshtarak, an offensive carried out by combined NATO and Afghan army troops against **Taliban strongholds in the south of the country, was likewise met with criticism over the war's continuation.** *Al-***Watan claimed that the NATO offensive would deteriorate the situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan arena, disrupting the Saudi mediation initiative before it had a chance to gather momentum**. The daily reiterated **Saudi disappointment at the U.S. rejection of the recommendations made by Turki Al-Faisal**, asserting that Saudi Arabia would intervene only on its own terms: "The deteriorating situation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan arena does not bode well. Most analyses [of the situation] suggest that matters will continue to decline... Military intervention and the solution [it offers] represent one alternative, diametrically opposed to the alternative of negotiations. This analysis is relevant to the situation in Afghanistan, where, ten years after the first coalition forces arrived, Al-Qaeda remains active... The most obvious proof of the failure of international policy in dealing with the overall situation is the Afghan president's recent appeal to Saudi Arabia to intervene and mediate in resolving this crisis. **"The tribal areas in southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan have become an independent emirate,** or a sort of autonomy, **and this must be recognized,** albeit tacitly**. That is the reality on the ground... which is the reason for Saudi Arabia's demands to reassess the policy being followed, especially the [push for] military resolution**, **which has exacerbated the mutual violence...** Reviewing some of the ideas published by Prince Turki Al-Faisal on this matter, [one will find] the most feasible plan of action for dealing with the ever-deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan region. "[In previous situations] **Saudi Arabia has served as mediator in the service of Islam, without any ulterior motives of its own, and is capable of doing the same again, as long as it is in accordance with its own positions and perspective.** **The latest offensive by NATO forces** in Helmand, which was the largest military operation since the arrival of coalition [forces] in Afghanistan, **does not very well serve efforts to initiate a Saudi mediation."****[[16]](http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn16%22%20%5Co%20%22)**

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**Civilian deaths in Afghan war has breed Saudi Discontent**

**Green 10** (R., March 3**,**a research fellow at MEMRI.The Middle East Media Research Institute http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm accessed June 27) CM

**Saudi columnists leveled even harsher criticism at the U.S., condemning its military operations in Afghanistan.** **Al-Madina**columnist Sa'id Muhammad Habib **accused the U.S. of war crimes in Afghanistan**, while lauding the Afghan combatants who, according to his statement, have a history of routing all occupying forces: **"[There are] early signs of an immense, resonating defeat that will be dealt to the U.S. and to its NATO-member allies in Afghanistan by that same great Muslim nation**... which has stood [throughout history] in arms against every imperialist... "**The difference between the past and the present [situation] lies in military technology: [today] the 'smart' bombs and deadly rockets dropped by the American planes take the lives of dozens and even hundreds of Afghans and Pakistanis** in an instant... most of them **defenseless civilians...** Despite all this, **the outcome of the Afghanistan war will reveal,** if Allah should will it, **the outright failure** and defeat [of the U.S. and NATO]... The London Conference revealed the extent of distress felt by the international community regarding America's war on Afghanistan. Notwithstanding all the resources being spent on Obama's 'good' war there, this war is lost, [even] according to the commanders of the U.S. military... The U.S. will not be able to continue its war crimes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries, and to operate according to hypocritical policies and despicable double standards, and still maintain the support of the people. Its corrupt policies ensure its defeat. The great nation of Afghanistan will prove its allegiance to Islam, not to the dollar... The prestige of America and NATO will crumble into the dust of Afghanistan, until the U.S. withdraws, receding back into itself. Today the historic role [of the U.S.] has passed to other [nations]. The world recognizes China's status, as it continues defy the U.S., which is arming Taiwan"

**Animosities because of 9/11 sour US- Saudi relations**

**Long 04,** (David E, Summer, Diplomat, Prof. and Author Consultant on Middle East and Gulf Affairs and Counter-terrorism, Mediterranean Quarterly,page 25)

**Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, US-Saudi relations have plummeted** from being one of the closest and most durable bilateral relationships between a major oil-producing state and a major oil-consuming state **to an all time low.** **A common perception of Saudi Arabia heard in the United States is that it is a corrupt, absolute monarchy that supports terrorism and provides financial aid to terrorist organizations, denies its people basic democratic freedoms and human rights, keeps its women in virtual bondage, is antisemitic, and uses its vast oil reserves as an instrument of political power against Israel and the United States.** At the same time, **Saudi feelings toward the United States have turned from admiration, emulation, and trust to feelings of betrayal.** **A new**, harsher **perception sees the United States as an arrogant, hypocritical country preaching racial and ethnic toleration but intolerant itself.** How could a relationship of three-quarterscentury duration deteriorate so quickly? And what is the future of the relationship likely to be? To explore those questions, let us look at the evolution of the relationship and the factors that have kept it together for so many years.

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**Saudi Arabia perceives the US military as weak**

**Blanchard 9,** (Christopher M., December 16, a analyst in middle eastern affairs for CRS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf> Page 25 Accessed June 27) CM

Saudi-U.S. relations have grown increasingly complex as the number of policy challenges facing both countries has multiplied and as both countries’ security and economic interests have become more intertwined. **The United States remains the principal external actor in the Middle East region, but** by most accounts, many regional policy makers, including those in **Saudi Arabia, perceive potential U.S. influence to be limited by current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Saudi confidence in U.S. influence and guarantees reportedly has diminished, and the ability of the United States to simultaneously pursue a political and social reform agenda and a close strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia remains in question. Saudi Arabia has weathered economic strains and a dangerous domestic terrorism campaign and arguably has emerged as the most economically and politically powerful Arab state.**51 Over the long term, growing demand for oil in developing countries, declining oil reserves outside of the Persian Gulf region, and expanding Saudi oil revenues are likely to further raise Saudi Arabia’s international profile and influence. **U.S. national security interests with regard to Saudi Arabia are likely to persist, while U.S. efforts to achieve policy goals may be complicated by these trends.** At present, formal U.S.- Saudi security and political relationships appear strong, in spite of differences in some areas. As noted above, the Obama Administration appears poised to promote U.S.-Saudi cooperation in education, trade, and investment while continuing to seek Saudi cooperation on global counterterrorism and regional security issues.

AFF: Iraq Link Turn

**The Saudis want the US to withdraw from Iraq**

 **Korb, Wadhams 10**, (Lawrence J., Caroline, May 19, is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. is the Director for South Asia Security Studies at American Progress http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/arab\_gulf\_trip.html Accessed June 27) CM

 **The Saudis**, like the Emirates**, focus on Iran as their number one security concern**. They are worried about what one official called the Iranian neoconservatives**, and** many **believe that the answer to a potential nuclear Iran is a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East**—including Israel. **They believe** that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—**the United States**, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France, and China—should take up this offer, which was originally made by Iran under the Shah, and enforce it through the United Nations. **Saudi officials overall do not advocate for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq**. **They believe that the United States should live up to the Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq and withdraw on schedule. They lament our invasion of Iraq, believe we handed Iraq to the Iranians on a platter, and worry about growing Iranian influence in Iraq following our withdrawal. And they argue that the world community needs to step in to help maintain unity in Iraq after the United States withdraws**. They do not support a particular individual for prime minister—in fact, they do not support any of the potential candidates, especially Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. And some are troubled that the Iraqis appear to be adopting the Iranian model for governance by relying on Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani to choose the next prime minister. The Saudis have aggressively undertaken counterterrorism efforts, especially in the past five years. They realized they had a real problem with extremism in their country following the 9/11 attacks and a number of terrorist activities in the kingdom in 2003 to 2005. And they have fired thousands of teachers and imams who they believe possess and promote extremist views. They have also promoted moderate Islamic messages in their media and established an elaborate rehabilitation program for convicted terrorists, including some who were interned at Guantánamo. Using both hard and soft power including art classes and counseling, they believe that they have attained a very low recidivism rate of 10 to 15 percent among the terrorists. These figures are higher among those who were imprisoned in Guantánamo. But their definition of moderate Islam may have a different version than our own; it seems to entail increased tolerance of the Saudi state and not necessarily non-Muslims.

AFF: Kuwait Link Turn

A. Saudis don’t support US interests if they are associated with the War on Terror

**Dobbs 3 [Michael, Washington Post Staff Writer, March 14, The Washington Post, Lexis]**

Historically, Freeman said, **Saudis saw the United States as "a wonderful partner" because it was a distant power without colonial designs in the Persian Gulf region.** But developments since the Gulf War, and particularly **since the onset of the war on terrorism, have changed that perception.**

**B. Kuwait bases service the function of “waging the War on Terror” and pursuing oil interests**

**Conteris et al 4** [Andres Conteris, Ben Moxham, Herbert Docena, and Wilbert van der Zeijden, January 17 & 20, World Social Forum http://www.yonip.com/main/APA/WSF%20USBases%20Report.pdf] KLS

As the pre-inaugural reports prepared under the direction of (now) Assistant Secretary of State

Armitage and (now) Ambassador Khalilzad recommended, in the Asia Pacific this meant

reaffirming the commitment to U.S. military bases and forward deployed troops across the region.

Yes, some bases will be close in Rumsfeld’s re-configuration, and some will be merged. But, this

will be done in the context of augmenting U.S. military power through “diversification”– moving

their center of gravity of **U.S. forward deployed troops and bases** from Northeast Asia further south. The **goals are to better encircl**e China, to **fight** the so-called “**War on Terrorism**” across Southeast Asia, and to more completely control the sea lanes over which Persian Gulf oil – the life blood of East Asia’s economies – must travel. Guam will again become a hub for U.S. Asia- Pacific forces. So much for its people and natural resources! U.S. bases in Australia will be augmented. The agenda is to build on the “Visiting Forces” and access agreements with the Philippines , and Singapore , and to open the way for U.S. forces in Thailand . In fact, as the Philippine press reports, U.S. military officials are privately exploring the possibility of reestablishing its bases in the former colony. With the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the way was opened to expand and to redesign the U.S. network of bases. Using the Bush Administration’s intimidating tactic of insisting that “for us or against us” (in the latter case being targeted for possible invasion,) dictatorships in Pakistan , Uzbekistan , Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were forced to surrender sovereignty and to invite the Pentagon to establish what will likely become permanent U.S. military bases. A year later, with Germany balking at joining in the invasion of Iraq and limiting the roles that U.S. bases there could play, Washington began “diversifying” its European military infrastructure . Threats to punish Germany by withdrawing all U.S. bases from Germany were made, although Germany will continue to “host” the most U.S. bases and troops in Europe for years to come. New bases were established in those bastions of democracy and human rights Romania and Bulgaria. To the south, under cover of **preparations for the war,** Bush and company removed one of the precipitating causes of the 9-11 attacks: **the majority of U.S. troops and bases in Saudi Arabia .** Many Moslems experienced those bases as sullying Islam’s holiest land. **These troops, bases and functions were transferred to Qatar and Kuwait**. Bases in Djibouti and Bahrain were expanded. And now, **in addition to plans for Iraq to serve the U.S. as a source of oil that can be used to leverage Saudi Arabia and OPEC, U.S. military planners look forward to Iraq serving as a bastion of U.S. military power in the Middle East for decades to come.**

AFF: Presence Link Turn

**US presence in middle east prevent cohesive middle eastern alliances**

**Conry 96,** (Barbra, September 29,Policy analyst for the CATO Institute, CATO institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-258.html accessed june 27) CM

Because Washington has made it clear that the United States is prepared to take ultimate responsibility for the security of the region, however, that incentive has been nullified. **The southern gulf states have not had to make serious efforts to build the cohesion that would be necessary for an effective alliance or even to form a functioning rapid-reaction corps.** At a December 1995 GCC conference, for example, **the question of strengthening the GCC rapid-reaction force, Peninsula Shield, "was sidelined before the summit began, when Saudi Arabia,** which dominates the alliance, **and Kuwait convinced their partners that only a limited expansion of Peninsula Shield is necessary as Western powers are committed to defending them under defence agreements."**[9](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-258.html#9) As Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) has commented, "**As long as the USA acts as if it's going to do it all for them, it's going to do it all for them."**[**10**](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-258.html#10) **Removing the incentive for the gulf monarchies to work out some of their differences not only hinders regional defense cooperation; it also contributes to a more dangerous environment in the region generally**. Genuine defense cooperation among the GCC states would do a great deal to defuse tensions in the region. **Because U.S. involvement in gulf security has removed the incentive to defuse those tensions,** they not only remain, **they threaten to embroil the United States in messy disputes among U.S. allies.** The United States will generally have little interest in those disputes, but its allies can be expected to attempt to draw Washington into them. Perry has conceded as much: A paradoxical risk posed by the United States' position as premier arbiter of Middle Eastern security is the high value Middle Eastern states now place on getting us involved in local conflicts.

\*\*South Korea Econ DA – Aff Answers

Non-UQ– Economy Down– Debt

Korea’s excessive debt is hurting growth.

SERI 6/14 (The Samsung Economic Research Institute, a South Korean economic think tank, “Global Financial Crisis and Deteriorating Fiscal Soundness,” [<http://www.seriworld.org/03/wldKetV.html?mn=E&mncd=0302&key=db20100614001&sectno=3>] AD: 6/20/10)JM

Due to such aggressive fiscal measures, Korea's budget balance deteriorated rapidly and public debts rose sharply. In 2009, consolidated budget deficit reached 17.6 trillion won, a switch from a surplus of 11.9 trillion won in 2008. Government debt also increased from 309.0 trillion won (30.1% relative to GDP) in 2008 to 359.6 trillion won (33.8% relative to GDP) in 2009. Public debt is expected to increase further in 2010 as the government -- cautious over the global economic recovery and possible external shocks to the Korean economy ? has not fully readjusted the level of spending from the inflated 2009 budget. According to the 2010 budget, government debt is expected to reach 407.2 trillion (36.1% relative to GDP). Without fiscal exit strategies, Korea's debt build-up can continue to rise in the future. To be sure, there is a possibility that government debt could spiral beyond administrative control because of current and future spending demands. Over the short term, the government has to cope with increasing mandatory spending such as repayment of government bonds. Major government programs including green growth and job-creation will make it difficult to reduce even discretionary spending. Over the long term, demographics will play a critical role in inflating fiscal spending. National pension and medical insurance outlays will rise in the coming decades because of the Korea's rapidly ageing population. At the same time the nation's prolonged low birth rate will hamper economic growth potential and weaken the tax base. Therefore, a combination of rising demand for budgetary spending and slower growth in tax receipts would make it more difficult for the government to balance its budget in the future.

Korea has a sizable deficit

The Korea Times 2/1 (The Korea Times, oldest newspaper in Korea, [<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/05/123_60054.html>] AD: 6/20/10)JM

South Korea posted a trade deficit of $470 million in January mainly due to a surge in energy imports caused by higher prices and a prolonged cold snap, Yonhap News Agency reported Monday. The deficit is a sharp turnaround from the $3.09 billion surplus tallied for the previous month, according to a monthly report released by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy. The deficit was the first since $3.76 billion reported in January 2009. Exports amounted to $31.08 billion last month, up 47.1 percent year-on-year and the sharpest gain since 1990, while imports jumped 26.7 percent to $31.55 billion. "Despite the sharp gains in exports, the rise in raw material imports and crude oil prices contributed to the overall trade deficit," Kang Myung-soo, head of the ministry's export and import division, was quoted as saying. He said the average price of Dubai brand crude, which makes up the bulk of the country's oil imports, hit $76.8 per barrel in January from just $44.1 a year earlier.

Non-UQ– Economy Down – GDP

GDP is an irrelevant and inaccurate measure of the success of a nation’s economy.

Woodward 8 (Jared, founder and contributing editor of Expiring Monthly: The Option Trader’s Journal, April 6, 2008, [<http://www.condoroptions.com/index.php/about/>] AD: 6/20/10)JM

Here are three reasons why we should scrap Gross Domestic Product as the key headline metric for analyzing the health of an economy:

Life is more than what happens at the office. Myopically focusing on GDP headline numbers skews our sense of what it means to have a healthy economy, and when we use GDP figures to assess the quality of life and strength of our society, we are minimizing or ignoring other extremely important variables. Domestic labor, volunteer work, and other forms of unpaid labor are not tracked by GDP, yet they are extremely important aspects of any economy. And the well-being of a country cannot be inferred solely from the measurements of its consumption and production: life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, education, literacy, and public health are just some of the crucial variables that are ignored by the GDP formula.A strong economy is a sustainable one. A high GDP does not necessarily indicate a sound economy, since GDP does not measure the long-term sustainability of visible growth. A country may be in the midst of an asset bubble (think housing, tech stocks), may be over-exploiting its natural resources (oil, mining, logging…), or may have a very low savings rate and/or misdirected investments; and thus will show an artificially high GDP number. What’s the point of measuring growth if we can’t tell whether that growth is sustainable over the long or even medium term?

Non-UQ– Economy Down – Investment

Even if South Korea’s economy has investment opportunities, the last 25 years of research indicate investment does not impact economic growth.

Blomstrom 96 (Magnus, professor of economics at the Stockholm School of Economics, The Quarterly Journal of Economies, 111(1), p. 275-276)JM

IV. CONCLUSIONS Relating the growth rate of real GDP per capita to the share of fixed investment or equipment investment in GDP, and to other variables over long periods, De Long and Summers [1991, 1992] and most other studies conclude that the investment ratio exerts a major influence on income growth. Dividing the post- World War II period into five-year subperiods, we find that per capita GDP growth in a period is more closely related to subsequent capital formation than to current or past capital formation. Moreover, the results of simple causality tests suggest that growth induces subsequent capital formation more than capital formation induces subsequent growth. Thus, we find no evidence that fixed investment (or equipment investment) is the key to economic growth. This conclusion is in line with the last 25 years of research in development economics, which shows that the path to growth and development is much more than simply raising saving and investment rates from 5 to 15 percent, as Arthur Lewis, Walter Rostow, and others suggested in the 1950s. Institutions, economic and political climate, and economic policies that encourage education, inflows of direct investment, lower population growth, and the efficient use of investment seem to be the chief foundations for economic growth.

Non-UQ– Economy Down – General

Due to South Korea’s defunct economy, unemployment and debt is the norm for many.

Oliver and Buseong 6/11 (Christopher and Kang, reporters for the Financial Times, a British international newspaper, [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b5bb3868-3b36-11df-a1e7-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss] AD: 6/22/10)JM

South Korea has some of the world’s most over-educated bakers. In one class in Seoul teaching muffin and scone-making, there are graduates in Russian, fine art and animation. For South Korean parents, the world’s highest spenders on their children’s education, something is going horribly wrong. “I wanted to ease the burden on my parents by earning just a little something and finding a job that could give me something more dependable than temporary work,” said one 29-year-old trainee baker. Since graduating in art she could only find part-time work as a waitress. Like so many young people asked about finding work in a socially competitive society where unemployment is a stigma, she was too embarrassed to give her name.

South Korea’s economy is so wracked with volatility and turbulence they are about to have another Lehman Brothers situation on their hands.

Janowski 6/13 (Tomasz, reporter for Reuters, [http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65C0HZ20100613] AD; 6/22/10)JM

(Reuters) - South Korea announced on Sunday long-anticipated currency controls, saying it aimed to curb rapid shifts in capital flows that were linked to short-term foreign debt and posed a risk to the world's ninth-biggest exporter. The authorities, alarmed by the won's sharp swings during recent market turbulence caused by Europe's debt problems, have been priming investors for weeks for action aimed at stabilizing its currency and cooling overseas borrowing. The well-flagged new restrictions slap limits on banks' and other financial institutions' currency forwards, cross-currency swaps as well as non-deliverable currency forwards. "These measures are aimed at reducing the volatility in capital flows that poses a systemic risk in the country," South Korea's finance ministry, two financial regulators and the central bank said in a joint statement. The new rules will cap domestic banks' and non-bank financial institutions' currency forwards and derivatives at 50 percent of their equity capital. The cap for foreign bank branches was set at 250 percent of equity to account for their lower capital, which on average is just 1/30 of that held by domestic banks. Officials brushed off suggestions that the regulations, which follow liquidity controls and curbs on companies' currency trades announced in November, could hurt investor confidence. "We will stick to a principle of an open market and liberalization of capital transactions. That is a promise we have globally made. We expect foreigners to invest more in the longer term thanks to reduced volatility," Deputy Finance Minister Yam Jong-yong told a news briefing. Officials said the new rules were, in fact, a part of a worldwide effort to better regulate financial institutions to avoid a repeat of the global financial crisis that pushed the world's economy into its deepest recession since the 1930s. LOPSIDED MARKET Seoul also argues that Asia's fourth-largest economy has special reasons to act as it is more exposed to market gyrations than its peers because of its high short-term foreign debt. The debt is equivalent to 60 percent of foreign reserves -- nearly twice the ratio in Indonesia or Malaysia -- and largely reflects an imbalance in the forward market caused by heavy dollar selling by shipbuilders and other big exporters. This drives down the cost of obtaining dollars, encouraging financial markets players, both foreign and local to borrow dollars and use the proceeds to buy South Korean assets. In addition, banks dealing with exporters borrow dollars to balance their positions, which additionally exposes South Korea to a sudden dollar squeeze, similar to that which followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Bankers said the authorities may succeed in somewhat curbing short-term dollar borrowing, but the controls may backfire when it comes to their ultimate goal -- limiting sharp market swings. "The measures may cause market volatility to rise further in the near term. Doing arbitrage trade in South Korea will be unprofitable to foreign banks and they may move it out of South Korea," a head of a foreign bank branch in Seoul said. Figures provided by authorities showed the new curbs, that have yet to be signed off by a presidential committee on regulatory reforms and are expected to come into force in October, would mainly affect foreign bank branches.

Non-UQ– Economy Down – General

South Korea’s economy has devastating structural problems – rigidity and a lack of investment and transparency are hurting it.

U.S State Department 5/28 (U.S Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, [<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm>] AD: 6/22/10)JM

Economists are concerned that South Korea's economic growth potential has fallen because of a rapidly aging population and structural problems that are becoming increasingly apparent. Foremost among these structural concerns are the rigidity of South Korea's labor regulations, the need for more constructive relations between management and workers, the country's underdeveloped financial markets, and a general lack of regulatory transparency. Korean policy makers are increasingly worried about diversion of corporate investment to China and other lower wage countries, and by Korea's falling foreign direct investment (FDI). President Lee Myung-bak was elected in December 2007 on a platform that promised to boost Korea's economic growth rate through deregulation, tax reform, increased FDI, labor reform, and free trade agreements (FTAs) with major markets. President Lee’s economic agenda necessarily shifted in the final months of 2008 to dealing with the global economic crisis. In 2009, the economy responded well to a robust fiscal stimulus package and low interest rates.

South Korea’s economy is unstable – a lack of investors and capital plagues it.

Olsen 6/13 (Kelly, Associated Press staff writer, [<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/economy/south-korea-announces-steps-to-battle-financial-volatility-caused-by-swings-in-capital-flows-96238644.html>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

South Korea has suffered when international capital flows suddenly reverse during periods of turmoil, such as the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and the 2008 meltdown, when investors take out their money and flee to assets — often dollar-denominated — perceived as safer. In both cases, South Korea saw capital rush out of the country. That caused the won to plunge and strongly crimped the ability of local banks and corporations with foreign currency loans to secure dollars to pay them back.

South Korea’s economy will remain unstable as investors won’t invest in a country that could go to war at any moment.

The Hankyoreh 5/26 (The Hankyoreh is a daily newspaper in South Korea, [<http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/422572.html>] AD: 6/21/10)JM

The “Korean Risk” has once again reared its head in the Korean financial market, already experiencing rising instability due to the European financial crisis, in the aftermath of the aftereffects of the sinking of the Cheonan. “Korean Risk,” also known as the “Korean Discount,” is a phenomenon in which the rating of the Korean economy falls due to the geopolitical dangers of inter-Korean confrontation, and has not been easy to find in the local financial market since the June 15 Joint Declaration of 2000. Three Misfortunes Over the Market On Tuesday, local stocks and the exchange rate fell by the largest amount this year. In particular, as the “North Korean risk” has appeared following the Cheonan sinking, the foreign exchange market went into a state of panic. For a fourth day, spooked foreign investors sold their Korean stocks, dumped won and bought dollars. After the government’s announcement that North Korea sank the Cheonan in a torpedo attack, the won-dollar exchange rate climbed 9 percent (103.4 won) in just four trading days. That is the extent of the falling value of the Won. The government and financial authorities intervened Tuesday to put out the flames, but could not stop distress selling. “The market was gripped by a trend in which figures and levels made no difference, and if it had not been for the intervention of authorities, the won would have shot past the 1300 mark,” said one foreign exchange dealer. Experts say that the turmoil in the local financial market Tuesday was due to three misfortunes: the continuing problems in Europe, with Spain nationalizing banks, U.S. President Barack Obama’s financial regulations, and Korea’s geopolitical risk. “A dumping is taking place because bad news is flooding in at once, and since nobody is buying, the stock prices are falling,” said Oh Hyeon-seok, head of the investment strategy team of Samsung Securities. “Since the market has been overshooting low, it could drop to as low as 1500.” Kang Hyeon-cheol, the head of the investment strategy team of Woori Investment and Securities, said Asian stocks had dropped by 2 percent in price due to the European risk, and in the local market, stocks dropped an additional 1 percent due to the North Korea risk. Government Seeking to Reduce Impact on Credit Rating Just last weekend, when the government was inspecting the impact of the Cheonan sinking, it believed the negative impact on the market would be temporary. This was mostly based on the Korean economy’s sufficient capability to absorb external influences, considering its quick economic recovery, financial health and sufficient foreign currency reserves. With the local financial market falling much further than expected, however, the government has begun holding emergency meetings to prepare measures. A Financial Supervisory Service official said it appears foreign investors believe the government’s measures following the sinking of the Cheonan to be stronger than expected.

No Link- South Korea Econ not affected by troops

US military doesn’t contribute in large to South korea economy

Lim 7 (Wonhyuk, Fellow @ The Korea Development Institute, Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online 07-086A, 11/27/7, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html#top>) JPG

As for the spillover effect on bilateral economic relations, it is important to recall that even the acrimonious exchange of words in the security area from 2002 to 2005 did not have a significant economic impact on investment and trade ties between the U.S. and ROK. For the United States, the ROK is now the seventh largest trading partner, ahead of such Western European countries as France and Italy; whereas, for South Korea, the United States is the third largest trading partner, after China and Japan. Although ROK-U.S. interaction has had a positive influence on the ROK's institution-building efforts in the economic area, this effect should not be overstated. On balance, the ROK's accession to the GATT/WTO, OECD, and other international norm-setting institutions has had a greater impact on economic liberalization than has the ROK's alliance relationship with the U.S. It should also be noted that many non-U.S. allies, including China, have adopted global economic norms as part of their requirements for joining international organizations. Moreover, the ROK's economic development since the 1960s has reduced its dependence on the U.S. In particular, as Figure 2 shows, China's increasing relative importance to the ROK in economic terms has become unmistakable in recent years. In 1991, the year before the ROK and China normalized relations, China bought only 1.4 percent of the ROK's exports while the U.S. accounted for 25.8 percent. By 2003, however, China's share of the ROK's exports had increased to 18.1 percent while the U.S. share had declined to 17.7 percent. Of course, as the controversy over the ancient kingdom of Koguryo in 2004 suggests, the increasing economic importance of China does not mean that the ROK would lean toward China at the expense of the U.S. The ROK's more diversified economic portfolio just means that it has more independence.(13)

No Link – Korea Fills-In

If the US withdraws, Korea will take over the bases which means no one loses jobs

Washington Times 9 (3/5/9, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/05/mission-changing-for-us-troops-in-korea/ ) JPG

The project will cost $13 billion, 90 percent of which is being funded by South Korea to persuade the [United States](http://www.washingtontimes.com/themes/?Theme=United+States) to keep its troops here. If the U.S. ever decides to withdraw those forces, the South Koreans will inherit the modern base.

These changes are part of a realignment of U.S. forces throughout the Pacific. Nearly half of the 17,000 Marines in Okinawa, Japan, are to be moved to Guam. That central Pacific island, which is U.S. territory, is being built into a major air and naval base. A small base in Singapore is coming in for more use; U.S. forces train more in Australia; and the U.S. hopes someday to gain access to Indonesian bases.

A2 – “US K2 Foreign Investment”

South Korea Foreign investment will stay strong from various sources – semiconductors and auto mobiles

Lammers 6 (David, News Editor @ Freelance Journalist, 5/4/6, EETimes India, <http://www.eetindia.co.in/ART_8800416738_1800007_NT_16b02381.HTM>) JPG

South Korea's economy is booming, led by strong advances in chip, display and cell phone production. But foreign electronics companies tend to overlook the country in the rush to gain a foothold in China, a South Korean official said.

Speaking on the opening day of the World Conference on Information Technology, Tong-Soo Chung, director of the [Korea Trade Investment Organization](http://www.eetindia.co.in/SEARCH/ART/Korea%2BTrade%2BInvestment%2BOrganization.HTM) ([KOTRA](http://www.eetindia.co.in/SEARCH/ART/KOTRA.HTM)), said foreign investments in the country are now only about one-sixth the total going to China. But sales per employee are higher for foreign companies investing in South Korea, he claimed, and about 85 per cent of foreign companies are making money in South Korea.

Foreign direct investment in South Korea was Rs.51,910 crore ($11.6 billion) in 2005, down from Rs.57,280 crore ($12.8 billion) in 2004, according to KOTRA. Much of that is in the auto industry, with GM-Daewoo ranked as the largest single investment, Chung said.

In addition, the country's electronics production is growing rapidly, increasing by 15 per cent in 2005. Chung said South Korea's electronics giants have big investment plans, both at home and abroad. Samsung Electronics, already the second largest semiconductor vendor with about Rs.76,075 crore ($17 billion) in revenues last year, plans to invest Rs.1,47,675 crore ($33 billion) over the next seven years in a domestic semiconductor-production complex. Samsung plans to triple its annual chip production to a staggering Rs.2,72,975 crore ($61 billion) by 2013, said Chung. Also, Samsung is said to spend several billion dollars on a 300mm wafer production facility, to be built alongside the company's existing 200mm wafer fab.

Link Turn– South korea Defense Spending Module

A.Empirically, US reduction in troops have led to increased Korean defense spending

Feffer 9 (John, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, Korea Economic Institute February 2009 4(2), http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:0W1bvIaCRigJ:www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf+Troop+Control+Would+Cost+W1+Trillion+in+Opportunities&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjlk5qYLOxQgZk7qfzKahAHBa7oWnjFsZbHXhxKAsOFxuHeTJ9r2JwMNUtCUxdOdih8HrlF1-56NO4UnQ8Ty77Hiz1vLCneWNoOx\_W0MNl\_dhsmGJHWuk3HX2xRm90EpQIkr6pF&sig=AHIEtbTmLYC1IZcgjlagPSrfJZSoZ9QEPA) JPG

Chief among these has been the United States. Signifi- cant spikes in South Korean military spending have oc- curred three times in South Korean history, each one corresponding with perceived or actual changes in U.S. defense posture in the region. The first, Park Chung-hee’s emphasis on a self-reliant defense, came in the wake of U.S. troop reductions pushed through by President Rich- ard M. Nixon in the early 1970s.28 The second came at the end of the 1980s when Roh Tae-woo used similar language—the “Koreanization of Korean defense”—in response to U.S. military transformation at the end of the Cold War.29 Finally, the efforts by Kim Dae-jung and par- ticularly Roh Moo-hyun have represented a third wave in Korean military spending, again a modernization effort in response to U.S. global force transformation. In this most recent modernization, the drawdown of U.S. troops, the relocation of U.S. bases, the removal of the U.S. trip wire, and the handover of wartime military con- trol—changes largely planned since the 1990s but accel- erated during the tenure of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—all contributed to intensifying fears of en- tanglement prominent among Roh Moo-hyun supporters and raising fears of abandonment.30 South Korean offi- cials began to look into acquiring many if not all of the high-tech capabilities provided by the United States in or- der to fill the anticipated gap. As military analyst Hamm Taik-young points out, the traditional “division of labor [was] between U.S. software and Korean hardware.”31 So, South Korea rushed to acquire surveillance and com- mand, control, computers, communications, and intelli- gence (C4I) capabilities. But in the alliance relationship, the United States has also traditionally provided naval and air force power, while South Korea has concentrated on the army.32 So, in its modernization, South Korea also began to beef up naval and air power (KDX-III, F-15K), and army firepower (self-propelled artillery).33 The shift in wartime military control created additional anxieties that U.S. forces—such as battle groups—would be either unavailable or delayed if requested by South Korea in an emergency.34 This anxiety persisted despite arguments that, although the shift in wartime control would weak- en alliance cohesion, “it would not necessarily trigger a reduction and withdrawal of American forces.”35 Gen. Walter Sharp’s recent reassurances about U.S. commit- ments and capabilities did little to assuage these anxieties since Washington is simultaneously planning to transfer 40 Apache helicopters from South Korea to Afghanistan, forcing Seoul to consider additional helicopter purchases to compensate for the loss.36 The United States influenced South Korean military spending in other ways as well. There are the costs of the alliance in general (South Korea will pay 760 billion won in 2009 for joint operations and will increase its share each year until 2013) and the ongoing base relocation in particular (South Korea will pay 5.59 trillion won for the Yongsan relocation while the United States will provide 4.4 trillion won). Then there is the cost of maintaining the interoperability of allied forces through the import of U.S. military goods. In 2007, South Korea bought about $900 million worth of arms, 95 percent of which came from the United States.37 This figure will likely grow as the U.S. Congress recently upgraded South Korea’s mili- tary procurement status to the level of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and NATO members. The United States has used interoperability as a way to influence South Korea’s purchasing decisions, for exam- ple, twisting arms to persuade South Korea to purchase Boeing F-15Ks rather than French Rafales or Russian Sukhoi Su-35s.38 Also, as the United States upgrades its forces in line with RMA, South Korea has no choice but to do the same, for the dance partner who fails to follow the lead will eventually be exchanged for another. These overall alliance costs fall into the category of “asset spec- ificity,” namely the capabilities that have built up over the course of the U.S.-ROK military alliance and that require continual funding to sustain.39 Also part of the economic equation is the large amount of money that United States Forces Korea has directly contributed, through purchas- ing, to the Korean economy.

Link Turn– South korea Defense Spending Module

A.Korean military spending significantly boosts exports and is the biggest stimulator for private sector innovation

Feffer 9 (John, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, Korea Economic Institute February 2009 4(2), http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:0W1bvIaCRigJ:www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf+Troop+Control+Would+Cost+W1+Trillion+in+Opportunities&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjlk5qYLOxQgZk7qfzKahAHBa7oWnjFsZbHXhxKAsOFxuHeTJ9r2JwMNUtCUxdOdih8HrlF1-56NO4UnQ8Ty77Hiz1vLCneWNoOx\_W0MNl\_dhsmGJHWuk3HX2xRm90EpQIkr6pF&sig=AHIEtbTmLYC1IZcgjlagPSrfJZSoZ9QEPA) JPG

Central to any self-sufficient military is an indigenous capacity to produce arms. The Park Chung-hee regime stressed the importance of heavy industry, whether ships or jet fighters, in building up the technological self-suf- ficiency of the country and reducing reliance on outside actors. This was equal parts national pride, strategic mili- tary thinking, and a belief in the positive interactions be- tween the military and civilian economies (through spin- on and spin-off effects). In the U.S. context, economic benefits are usually expressed through spin-off: namely, the technologies developed by the military then revolu- tionize the civilian sector (such as the Internet). But in Korea, as in Japan, the emphasis has been on spin-on: namely, the contributions that a developed civilian sector can have on the military (such as sophisticated commu- nications technology). There have been some spin-offs in Korea, such as the kimchi refrigerator that took advantage of imported Russia military technology.55 With spin-ons, however, the Korean defense industry has leveraged the know-how and resource base of already powerful firms

specializing in IT, electronics, shipbuilding, machine tools, and so on to turn ploughshares into swords.56 Now, after government assistance helped the defense industry through the difficult years when capacity rates were even lower than they are today and several firms went out of business, Korean firms make a range of prod- ucts.57 These include the K-1 tank, the KDX destroyer, surface-to-air missile systems, short-range ballistic mis- siles, and the K-9 howitzer. Between 2001 and 2007, when the Korean government focused investments in the IT sector, localization rates in defense sectors connected to IT and telecommunication rose from 72 percent to 85 percent. A similar rate increase took place in precision guidance weapons (56 percent to 74 percent during the same period), but there was a slight decline in the rate for aerospace.58 Still, after enormous effort, South Korea is not self-suffi- cient in arms production, except in a couple areas (small arms, ammunition, and armored vehicles). “Even after more than 30 years of significant public and private in- puts in infrastructure and technology, South Korea still possesses only limited capacities for self-reliant arms production,” conclude military analysts Richard A. Bitz- inger and Mikyoung Kim. “In general, indigenous arms production has turned out to be neither technologically feasible nor cost-effective.”59 But that hasn’t stopped South Korea (and many other countries) from pursuing this chimera.60 Indigenous arms production, however, does not simply reduce the costs of foreign inputs. It can also boost the economy through exports, a particular focus of Roh Moo- hyun.61 In 2006, Korean foreign military sales amounted to $250 million. By 2008, the figure had grown to more than $1 billion.62 These sales have included aircraft to Turkey, Indonesia, and the Philippines as well as war- ships to Malaysia. Arms exports allow manufacturers to reap greater economies of scale, gain necessary hard currency, and increase employment in the defense sector. They also raise the capacity of Korean defense industries, which operated between 1999 and 2004 at a roughly 50 percent rate compared with an industry average around the world of roughly 80 percent.63

Link Turn- US-South korea FTA Module

A.Troop reduction leads to stronger economic US- South korea alliance

Bandow 3 (Doug, Sen. Fellow @ CATO Institute & former foreign policy asst. to Former Pres. Reagan, CATO Institute Policy Analysis No. 474, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-474es.html>) JPG

Cutting the U.S. security commitment to South Korea does not mean ending close cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Intelligence sharing and port access rights would be beneficial for both nations. Depending on the direction inter- Korean relations take, the ROK might become interested in cooperating with Washington in developing a missile defense and possibly nuclear weapons. Cultural ties between the two states would remain strong. Family and friends span the Pacific, as a result of the millions of Americans who have served in South Korea and the hun- dreds of thousands of Koreans who have immigrated to America. More than 1.2 million Americans identified themselves as Korean in the 2000 census.117 Indeed, Americans are like- ly to receive a warmer welcome if our fractious military relationship is replaced by one based on commerce. An equal, cooperative relation- ship between the governments is more likely once the ROK is no longer dependent on America for its defense. Finally, economic ties will remain strong after an American troop withdrawal. Korea is America’s seventh largest trading partner, with two-way trade totaling $57.4 billion in 2001.118 An obvious step forward would be a free trade agreement. In May 2001, even before congressional approval of President Bush’s Trade Promotion Authority, Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.), then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced legis- lation authorizing the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate such an agreement.119 The ROK has already inked a trade accord with Chile and is discussing the possibility of doing so with Japan.120 Investment flows both ways. The United States is a leading source of foreign direct investment in South Korea. At the same time, total Korean investment in America rose above $3.1 billion, 40 percent of the ROK’s total. The United States competes with China as the lead- ing destination for Korean overseas investment and is ahead of all other nations.121 That trend is likely to continue as South Korean business- es grow in size, expertise, and resources. In sum, South Koreans have built a vital, powerful, and growing nation. The best way for America and the ROK to achieve the sort of “equal” relationship desired by so many Koreans is to eliminate the ROK’s status as an American defense protectorate.

Link Turn- US-South korea FTA Module

**B. free trade agreements in the pacific will bolster our position as the regions hegemon – without US-led free trade Russia and China will take over**

**Colucci 9** (6/8/Lamont, former State Department diplomat and asst professor of politics and govt at Ripon College in Wisconsin, “Free Trade Exigencies; South Korea Pact a Key to Our Pacific Position.” Questia, <http://www.questia.com/read/5031344032?title=Free%20Trade%20Exigencies%3b%20South%20Korea%20Pact%20a%20Key%20to%20Our%20Pacific%20Position>) JPG

In January, North Korea demanded that the United States normalize relations before the North would abandon its nuclear weapons program. North Korea since has launched a multistage rocket, quit the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, performed a second nuclear weapon test, test-fired two short-range missiles, announced its own version of the reset button by declaring the Korean War armistice over, and now plans to test launch an intercontinental ballistic missile. In this security context **the United States should push for the free-trade agreement with South Korea**, known as KORUS-FTA. In a prior column, this author discussed the necessity for **a U.S.-Japan free-trade** agreement, but that **cannot occur while the agreement with our other East Asian ally languishes**. **The KORUS-FTA is the linchpin for any future Asian free-trade agreements.** **The agreement** was signed by both nations in June 2007 and **would eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of most goods and services. South Korea is the 10th-largest economy**, our seventh-largest trading partner and our sixth-largest market for agricultural goods. A number of independent and government studies indicate that the KORUS-FTA would add $20 billion in bilateral trade, increase U.S. gross domestic product by up to $11.9 billion, and raise U.S. exports by 49 percent. On average, current American exports face higher tariffs in South Korea than the other way around. Although 70 percent of South Koreans believe it would promote friendly relations with the United States, there is great opposition by forces against free trade and various people in the new Obama administration. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, as a candidate for president, While I value the strong relationship the United States enjoys with South Korea, I believe that this agreement is inherently unfair. There have been outstanding issues over items like U.S. beef exports, pharmaceuticals and products produced at Kaesong industrial complex. However, **President Obama must reassure the world of his free-trade credentials**. There is consternation in many capitals over perceived protectionist sentiment and its dubious partner, isolationism. This issue is another victim of the lack of media attention to international affairs. Aside from South Korea and Japan, the other democracy in Asia with which a free-trade agreement is needed is Taiwan. This agreement would seem easier, as Taiwan is not only our ninth-largest trading partner, but it also would provide an overall boost for U.S. manufacturing (Taiwan exports no automobiles), agriculture and especially the high-tech sector. As with South Korea, the stakes are high politically and diplomatically. **Rejection of free-trade agreements with East Asia's democracies run counter to American values and economic interest**. **Bolstering free trade** with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan **sends a message of solidarity, stability and commitmen**t. **It is also a warning to potential aggressors**. The negative **outcomes of a KORUS rejection are legion and would send an ominous statement to Tokyo and Taipei. It will prove the unreliability of American diplomatic commitments** to a political and military ally, which has risked much domestically in pushing for the agreement. **Rejection would play into the hands of the expansionists in Moscow and Beijing who seek to diminish our influence in the entire Pacific**. There will be a chilling effect with other countries that plan to seek a free-trade agreement with the United States as this entire scene of political theater plays into the hands of the propagandists in Pyongyang. There is more at stake here than an economic agreement; **there is our entire presence in the Pacific**.

Presence Bad – Korean & US Econ

US presence in Korea has an overall negative effect on both economies and kills Korean productivity

Lutz 9 (Catherine, Professor @ Watson Inst. For Int’l Studies @ Brown Univ., 7/30/9, New Statesmen, http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2009/07/military-bases-world-war-iraq) JPG

Critics of US foreign policy have dissected and dismantled the arguments made for maintaining a global system of military basing. They have shown that the bases have often failed in their own terms: despite the Pentagon's claims that they provide security to the regions they occupy, most of the world's people feel anything but reassured by their presence. Instead of providing more safety for the US or its allies, they have ­often provoked attacks, and have made the communities around bases key targets of other nations' missiles. On the island of Belau in the Pacific, the site of sharp resistance to US attempts to instal a submarine base and jungle training centre, people describe their experience of military basing in the Second World War: "When soldiers come, war comes." On Guam, a joke among locals is that few people except for nuclear strategists in the Kremlin know where their island is.

As for the argument that bases serve the national economic interest of the US, the weapons, personnel and fossil fuels involved cost billions of dollars, most coming from US taxpayers. While bases have clearly been concentrated in countries with key strategic resources, particularly along the routes of oil and gas pipelines in central Asia, the Middle East and, increasingly, Africa, from which one-quarter of US oil imports are expected by 2015, the profits have gone first of all to the corporations that build and service them, such as Halliburton. The myth that bases are an altruistic form of "foreign aid" for locals is exploded by the substantial costs involved for host economies and polities. The immediate negative effects include levels of pollution, noise, crime and lost productive land that cannot be offset by soldiers' local spending or employment of local people. Other putative gains tend to benefit only local elites and further militarise the host nations: elaborate bilateral negotiations swap weapons, cash and trade privileges for overflight and land-use rights. Less explicitly, rice imports, immigration rights to the US or overlooking human rights abuses have been the currency of exchange.

The environmental, political, and economic impact of these bases is enormous. The social problems that accompany bases, including soldiers' violence against women and car crashes, have to be handled by local communities without compensation from the US. Some communities pay the highest price: their farmland taken for bases, their children neurologically damaged by military jet fuel in their water supplies, their neighbors imprisoned, tortured and disappeared by the autocratic regimes that survive on US military and political support given as a form of tacit rent for the bases. The US military has repeatedly interfered in the domestic affairs of nations in which it has or desires military access, operating to influence votes and undermine or change local laws that stand in the way.

No MPX- South korea Econ Not Key to World

South Korean economy is reactive to global trends- proves it’s not a front runner Business and Technology Report 10 [May 1, http://www.biztechreport.com/story/440-high-tech-and-educated-labor-force-will-take-korea-top-next-decade]

**Q: What are the important problems the Korean economy is facing today and what are your solutions to those problems?** A: South Korea is an export-based economy. When the international market isn't good, our exports decrease, but when the international market is vitalized, our exports also increase. So we need to make some changes to the export-based economy. The international market is in a period of recovery, so it wouldn't be a great hardship for us to change our export-based economy, however, in order for South Korea to be of help to the international economic recovery, we need to develop our domestic market as well. We need a new economic policy that can create a harmonious balance between our export-based economy and our domestic economy.

No MPX- Famine Module

No impact- Famine assistance used as a deterrent by North Korea

Marcus 3 [David, Clerk to Judge Allyne R. Ross, Eastern District of New York, April, American Journal of International Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 245, Lexis ]

The responses by the North Korean government to the food shortages range from the laughable to the counterproductive to the criminal. One initial response was the "Let's eat two meals a day" campaign. [n127](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277171978503&returnToKey=20_T9597337640&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.699450.3487401921" \l "n127) Another was the reduction of the grain ration to farm families by 35 percent, taking it far below subsistence level. This action further weakened productivity, as farmers faced the choice of letting their families starve or covertly squirreling away parts of their harvest, which led to urban food shortages. [n128](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277171978503&returnToKey=20_T9597337640&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.699450.3487401921" \l "n128) The government has stubbornly refused to reform its agro-economic practices, in spite of the undeniable evidence of their destructiveness. [n129](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277171978503&returnToKey=20_T9597337640&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.699450.3487401921" \l "n129) More disturbingly, North Korea has used famine victims as a political pawn, at times demanding food aid from Japan, the United States, and South Korea as a prerequisite to dialogue, [n130](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277171978503&returnToKey=20_T9597337640&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.699450.3487401921" \l "n130) and holding its own population hostage to make sure that the United States and others do not have too strong a bargaining position. [n131](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277171978503&returnToKey=20_T9597337640&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.699450.3487401921" \l "n131) This perverse treatment of its own citizenry reflects the North Korean government's desperate desire to hold on to power. [n132](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277171978503&returnToKey=20_T9597337640&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.699450.3487401921" \l "n132) As one official said, "'We're not going to beg too hard. We are not going to change and have openness. If those people die, they die.'" [n133](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277171978503&returnToKey=20_T9597337640&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.699450.3487401921" \l "n133)

No MPX- China Economy

China’s economy is resilient – its performance during the global recession proves.

Vassallo 1/27 (Sarah-Jane, journalist for Urban Magazine, [http://urbanemagazine.org/politics/chinese-policy-successes-in-the-recession/] AD: 6/22/10)JM

The People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) in particular has fared better than many Western nations due to a strict government oversight of banks and a meticulous, state-led capitalist structure. Fourteen months after the initial collapse, the P.R.C. has reemerged relatively unscathed. Since the turn of the century, the Chinese economy has grown at an unprecedented double-digit rate due in large part to its export market. Although the global economic crisis has caused exports to slow and global demand to plummet, China has been able to recover and sustain its gravity-defying growth rates due to the flexibility of its market. In the immediate aftermath of the recession, sources reported that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates in the P.R.C. were expected to fall as low as 5% per annum, and would continue to fall within the coming years. Reported statistics have not come close to this level. They are still hovering around 9% and recent reports show that rates have stabilized. Financial analysts note that if China is to manage a swelling labour force and facilitate the transition of millions of peasants from the agricultural to the urban sector, a growth rate of at least 9% will be necessary. The Chinese economy has once again defied the odds and managed to float above the ups and downs of the market and emerge with minimal damage. BusinessWeek reports that growth will accelerate to more normal levels of 9.5-10.5% in 2010. Not even ‘The Great Recession’ has obstructed China’s path toward becoming the largest economy in the world.

Professor Victor Falkenheim, a China specialist at the University of Toronto provides several explanations for China’s ability to circumvent the wrath of the greatest financial crisis in decades. The government responded to the crisis with a number of social and economic stabilizing measures. “They have sustained economic growth based on loosening credit and providing a domestic stimulus…attempting to encourage domestic consumption to replace exports,” says Falkenheim. According to Falkenheim, the multi-billion dollar stimulus package has generated growth in the housing market, and has also managed to maintain growth by implementing a number of policies to satisfy various social sectors. For instance, to counter unemployment of university graduates, the government has created public service opportunities including village teaching and internship positions that are reasonably well paid. This “has mopped up a lot of youth unemployment.” Professor Falkenheim also cites the emphasis on programs to create social harmony and government subsidies to sustain development.

South Korea won’t affect China’s economy – its strong domestic market will make the ROK irrelevant.

Chu 2/16 (Yun-han, Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University, [http://www.clubmadrid.org/img/secciones/Road\_to\_Sustainable\_Growth\_Eng\_Final\_Version.pdf] AD: 6/22/10)JM

Four factors contributed to the region’s stronger than expected economic rebound. First, the region was relatively well insulated from the global financial meltdown as it had inherited a relatively healthy state of financial systems prior to the sub-prime loan crisis and built up a huge foreign reserve as a hedge against a replay of the 1997 regional financial crisis. Asset bubbles were either not alarmingly threatening or they had been contained well before the current crisis as in the case of China. Second, most East Asian economies have shown considerable resilience, thanks in part to high household savings during good times on which they could fall back upon during lean times without having to make drastic cutbacks in private consumption. Third, the macro-economic fundamentals were quite healthy in most East Asian economies. Except for Japan, most governments were not heavily indebted and they still enjoyed spare fiscal capacity to borrow and spend. So most East Asian governments and central banks responded to the global financial crisis with decisive and firm fiscal and monetary actions. Last, but not least, the region’s resilience should be attributed to the rapid turnaround in the region's larger, less export-dependent economies. Although adversely affected, China and India are not in recession: their huge domestic sectors helped cushion the impact. Exports constitute just 35 per cent of China’s GDP and 22 per cent of India’s.

MPX T/- South Korea Econ Growth hurts Environment

Emerging IT and manufacturing industries force South korea pollution higher

 Business and Technology Report 10 [May 1, http://www.biztechreport.com/story/440-high-tech-and-educated-labor-force-will-take-korea-top-next-decade]

**Q: What do you think the main problem is in developing and implementing green technology in Korea and what can we do to solve it? What is your vision for Green Korea?** A: I don't think there are many domestic issues that are preventing the economic development of Korea. Citizens in Korea have been following the policies very well. But I do think there are problems internationally. A convention on global climate change was recently held in Denmark. Almost all nations were concerned about their own nation's situation and were passing on the blame and responsibility to other nations rather than trying to find and eliminate the causes of the contamination within their own country. It would be hard to immediately closedown the factories that were causing the pollution, and since the countries are trying to buy time, they are passing the responsibility to other nations. South Korea has already begun to show some changes in the amount of its carbon gas emissions. Korea has to continue to grow its IT industry to actively cooperate with other international countries.

South Korean attempts to curb massive environmental degradation have failed

Hunter 98 [Jason, Woodrow Wilson Program Officer, January 7, Woodrow Wilson Center, Lexis] (Tumen River Area Development Program=(TRADP))

This was the promise but not the reality of TRADP. By the end of the decade, TRADP's ambitious goals were crippled. Driven by animosity between countries, the pain of converting planned economies, core-periphery governance conflicts, a historically driven heightened importance of borders, and anemic supra-national support, TRADP members dropped a multilateral framework for a "concerted unilateralism" approach in 1995. In that year, member states agreed to focus TRADP's efforts on creating an "enabling environment" for investment in the three riparian countries' individual development plans within the TREDA region. (In essence, the plan would use UNDP involvement as a seal of approval to attract investment to the otherwise poor investment climate of the individual country programs.) This has allowed economic growth to continue-albeit with redundant infrastructure projects, competition between states driving down tax incentives to unrealistic levels, and little real work on trade facilitation-but more worrisome is that the breakdown of multilateralism is threatening the ecology of the region, which, placed within the region's greater historical, political, and economic context, threatens the future of economic development, as well as the political security of Northeast Asia. These are strong words, but this is an extraordinary case. The interaction between environmental degradation and economic cooperation is a security concern for three reasons: 1) The absence of exogenous incentives for capacity building have left state environmental governance weak or non-existent. In early plans for the TRADP, state capacity was to be developed, cleaner technologies made available, and eventual harmonization of environmental standards was to occur. Without a multilateral framework, efforts to increase capacity have faltered, thereby decreasing incentives for compliance and increasing driving forces contributing to the pollution of transboundary waterways. 2) This has led to a transboundary political vacuum, which, due to the absence of mitigative channels for resolving conflicts over chronic or exigent environmental problems, is increasing tensions between riparian states. Although the TRADP is based upon the geographic attributes of the region's shared resource-access to the Sea of Japan, and the Tumen, Hunchun, and Gaya Rivers-there is no coordination in the management of the transboundary resources. The implications are best illustrated in TRADP's geography: an upstream China and North Korea with a large number of heavily polluting factories and other sources of point and non-point pollution, and a downstream Russia with scant interest in TRADP, stricter environmental enforcement, and an economic sector based upon the river and coastal area's natural resources. Given the stakes, without proper mid-level channels of communication, environmental problems could seep into the political realm very quickly. 3) This has led to a "tragedy of the commons" scenario in the TREDA. As the multilateral effort has failed to develop a sufficient community of interests among riparian states and without a pooling of costs of shared development, the effort states are free-riding on the shared water resources. I will return to these issues in a moment, but first I would like to back-up for a moment and give a fingernail portrait of the region's environment, and the TREDA's impact on it.

MPX T/- South Korea Econ Growth hurts Environment

South korea economic growth led to massive pollution

Shin 08 [Hang-Sik, Professor at the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, KAIST, October 15, http://www.feiap.org/doc/South%20Korea.pdf]

The Republic of Korea has achieved rapid economic growth since the 1960s but is experiencing an extreme level of unbalanced development in terms of environmental preservation and social

integration. Its development-oriented economic growth resulted in pollution load that exceeded the environment’s auto-purification capacity and decreased social solidarity and increased conflicts between regions, classes and generations. Hence, the level of Korea’s national sustainability was evaluated to be weak. In the economic part, Korea’s economic size has increased and the people’s income has risen as shown in its GDP increase, whose ranking rose to the 10th place among the 30 OECD member countries. However, a shortage of consideration of environmental issues in the economic development and industrialization process led to a weak socio-economic structure in terms of pollution comprising industrial structure, production and consumption patterns and people’s attitudes. In the environmental part, there are limits in improving the environment as post-pollution treatment is much more focused than pollution prevention. Pollution load has exceeded the receiving capacity of the ecosystem, thus threatening the sustainability of environment and increasing conflicts between development-oriented policies and environmental policies.

Economic growth forces pollution of South korea’s rivers, decreasing quality of life

Nguyen 6 [Dan, Bachelor of Environmental Studies, April 5, http://www.kewpid.net/notes/globalisation\_sk.pdf]

With the advent of globalisation however, an opportunity cost exists between economic growth and environmental management, and is sometimes referred to as “equity vs. efficiency”. In relation to South Korea, economic growth has led to a general degradation of its natural environment, especially with the pollution of its major rivers of Han and Nakdong. As little priority is currently being given to the Korean environment, the inevitable outcome is that global pollution levels would increase and quality of life would decrease as a result. In order to maintain ecologically sustainable development for the future, governments must accept some trade off of growth to accommodate environmental protection.

South Korean Econ Resilient

South Korean economy resilient- strongest Asian tiger

Roach and Lam 10 [Stephen, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia Lam, Korea and Taiwan Economist at Morgan Stanley April 27, The Business Times Singapore, Lexis]

SOUTH Korea sailed through the 2008-09 financial crisis with remarkable aplomb. Despite its heavy reliance on exports, South Korea registered only a single-sequential quarterly decline in real GDP during the global downturn, thus avoiding full-fledged recession. By the third quarter of 2009, South Korean growth had bounced back to nearly 3 per cent while unemployment - which even in the worst of the crisis never rose more than a single percentage point - had already begun to ease. Indeed, it took barely three quarters for South Korea's production and consumption to regain pre-crisis levels. Among Asia's 'tiger-economies' South Korea suffered least from the crisis and recovered the most rapidly. Why was the South Korean economy so resilient? Because its businesses and government leaders recognised the opportunity this crisis presented. The familiar rap on South Korea is that its economy is 'stuck in the middle', trapped between an advanced Japan and a rising China. South Korea's great dilemma - or so it's often said - is that it falls short of Japan on quality and can't hope to match China on price. And yet South Korean producers' performance in the wake of the financial crisis suggests the middle ground may offer advantages. In the post-crisis era, consumers the world over have turned cautious. The new mantra is value for money. South Korean companies are well positioned to capitalise on that new ethos with products that optimise the quality and price trade-off. South Korean exporters have, in fact, gained market share during the crisis. South Korea's global market share in phone handsets, for example, rose to 33 per cent in the third quarter of 2009, from 22 per cent at the end of 2007. In fact, in the US market alone, South Korean mobile phones are currently taking up almost 50 per cent of the market share. Its LCD-TV global market share also jumped to 37 per cent in 2009, from 27 per cent at the end of 2007, and it will soon replace Japan as the world's number-one LCD-TV supplier. South Korea's automobile global market share climbed to 9 per cent in the third quarter of 2009, from 6.5 per cent in the final period of 2007.

South Korean Econ Resilient

South Korean Exports ensure resiliency

Roach and Lam 10 [Stephen, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia Lam, {Lam and Stephen are also having an affair- a juicy one} Korea and Taiwan Economist at Morgan Stanley May 10, Korean Times, Lexis]

There can be no mistaking the extraordinary resilience of the South Korean economy. On the heels of a 7.8 percent surge in real GDP in the first quarter of 2010, Moody's has just upgraded the sovereign bond ratings of Korean government debt. With good reason: Notwithstanding its high degree of dependence on exports and external demand, Korea sailed through the devastating 2008-09 financial crisis with remarkable aplomb. Moreover, it is now extending that impressive record in a still fragile post-crisis climate. This performance stands in sharp contrast with that of other economies in the region - all of which were hit extremely hard by the collapse in global trade. Not only did the Korean economy register just one quarter of sequential decline in real GDP during the Great Recession - thereby technically avoiding full-fledged recession - but the quality of its subsequent recovery is increasingly compelling. Significantly, South Korea's economic resilience is not just an outgrowth of the emergency policy actions that were put in place during the recent crisis. Instead, it is more a natural by-product of the nation's long standing commitment to a strategic development strategy. For an economy with exports running at about 35 percent of GDP in the four years heading into the crisis, that turned out to be key in the Great Recession. While the depreciation of the won in 2008 certainly played a supportive role in sustaining exports during the global downturn, it was hardly the decisive factor. In particular, Korean corporates were early in shifting their export focus to emerging markets - enabling them to temper the impacts of the crisis-related shortfall in the developed world. Emerging markets accounted for 45 percent of total Korean exports during 2000-05 and fully 54 percent in 2006-07. When the crisis led to a collapse in external demand from the developed world, the emerging markets share of Korean exports soared to 59 percent in 2008-09. In retrospect, this pre-emptive shift in the mix of Korean exports may well have been the most important factor behind the economy's remarkable resilience during the recent crisis. Moreover, South Korean producers' ability to thrive amid crisis reflects a relentless focus on improving product design and quality, as well as savvy and aggressive marketing efforts to enhance the global image and acceptance of South Korean brands. For example, less than a decade ago, Samsung Electronics had a reputation as a maker of lower-end consumer electronics, barely noticeable in global markets. But then the company figured out how to move up the value chain by building a strong brand image through product innovation. Those efforts have paid off handsomely: In 2009, Samsung ranked 19th on Inter-brand's Best Global Brands list - marking the sharpest improvement of any of the top 100 brands over the past decade. Moreover, Hyundai Motor and LG Electronics have made similar dramatic progress on the brand recognition front.

South Korean Econ Resilient

South Korean economy is a shapeshifter, ready to fill in when another area stagnates

Banker 10 [The, May 1, Lexis]

On the other hand, South Korea's large corporate sector has fared well in the past year, led by a resurgence in the IT, telecommunications and auto industries. What remains a relatively weak won exchange rate also helped exporters gain global market share. However, shipping and ship-building industries, a major source of export revenues for South Korea, the world's leading ship-builder, are still grappling with oversupply and diminished demand. "If the number of new ship orders does not pick up significantly in a few years, even big ship-builders may face difficulties," says Mr Chang. The construction sector, meanwhile, has stabilised after the Korean government's swift measures to boost domestic demand through infrastructure investment. Exporters in key industries are expected to continue to perform well as the global economy recovers. Mixed consumer outlook The outlook for the consumer segment in South Koreaor 2010 is mixed, however. Consumer sentiment has improved and the Korean economy is expected to grow between 3.6% and 5% in 2010. "As unemployment rates stabilise and start to decrease, we should observe stability in credit performance, helping to bring default rates down to pre-financial crisis levels," says Sergio Zanatti, head of the cards group at Citibank Korea.

South Korea’s economy is resilient – its government deals effectively with crisis.

Roach and Lam 5/10 (Stephen and Sharon, writers for the Joong Ang Daily, [http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2920179] AD: 6/22/10)JM

South Korea sailed through the 2008-09 financial crisis with remarkable aplomb. Despite its heavy reliance on exports, South Korea registered only a single sequential quarterly decline in real GDP during the global downturn, thus avoiding full-fledged recession. By the third quarter of 2009, South Korean growth had bounced back to nearly 3 percent while unemployment - which even in the worst of the crisis never rose more than a single percentage point - had already begun to ease. Indeed, it took barely three quarters for South Korea’s production and consumption to regain pre-crisis levels. Among Asia’s “tiger economies,” South Korea suffered least from the crisis and recovered the most rapidly. Why was the South Korean economy so resilient? Because its businesses and government leaders recognized the opportunity this crisis presented. The familiar rap on South Korea is that its economy is “stuck in the middle,” trapped between an advanced Japan and a rising China. South Korea’s great dilemma - or so it’s often said - is that it falls short of Japan on quality and can’t hope to match China on price.

\*\*Turkey Econ DA – Aff Answers

NUQ – Econ Down – Structural Problems

Short term econ stats deceptive, systemic problems remain that plague Turkish econ

Ankara 6/20 (Ali Aslan Kilic, 2010, Today’s Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213643-105-govt-pleased-by-falling-unemployment-rate-opposition-incredulous.html)

Deputy Prime Minister and Economy Minister Ali Babacan shared his prediction that the rate will continue to fall steadily to 10 percent during the summer season, in a meeting held the same day as TurkStat announced its “glad tidings” on unemployment. He was also bold enough to predict that while average unemployment figures continue to decrease in Turkey, they will rise in the EU in both 2010 and 2011. “The Turkish economy started its recovery earlier than everyone else, and this recuperation in the economy has brought a reduction in the unemployment rate. Employment rose by 1.59 million in Turkey in a single year, and there are no figures to match to this anywhere across Europe,” he asserted. Answering Sunday’s Zaman’s questions regarding the latest unemployment figures, Harun Öztürk, CHP İzmir deputy and a prominent voice shaping his party’s position on the economy, was skeptical of success. He claimed the drop was caused by seasonal factors and added, “Besides, looking at this year’s figures alone would be deceptive.” Still he didn’t hesitate to agree that there have been positive developments in the economy recently while also underlining that the sustainability of these figures would be manifest by fall.

NUQ – Econ Down – Efficiency

Turkish econ on the decline- cost control, efficiency

USSEC 9 (December 31, Filed April 1, 2010 United States Security and Exchange Commission,

EDGAR Online, Lexis )

As expected, the Turkish economy and domestic Turkish construction activity continued to contract in 2009. Implementation of strong cost-control measures and improved operating efficiencies helped partly to offset the downturn in domestic demand. Overall operating profit was lower.

NUQ – Econ Down – Investment, Confidence

Turkish econ permanently damned by 70’s coup- lack of capital investment, corruption and low confidence deters foreign investment

Ankara 5/28 (Ali Aslan Kilic, Staff Writer 2019 Today Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-211320-101-the-economic-repercussions-of-may-27-2-osman-demir-may-27-stabbed-the-economy-in-the-back.html)

Professor Demir asserted that the lack of capital accumulation is extremely detrimental to the economy, and the military coup of May 27 is a serious contender for being a major hindrance. Defining “confidence” as a key concept for a sustainable economy, Demir asked, “Is capital accumulation possible in a country that is worried about the military overthrowing the government at any moment?” Without accumulated capital, the economy cannot be competitive, he said, with this negative effect on an already feeble economy having repercussions in the future. “Under normal circumstances, small investors can use their profits to boost their capital and grow further. But if this process is obstructed, things cannot function as they should, and worse, if the banks are weakened by corrupt practices during these periods that lack transparency, is capital accumulation possible in such a country? How can we know what happens behind the scenes if the channels of communication are not as open as they are today? Capital accumulation is impossible in a non-transparent environment,” he said. The heaviest price paid with the process that was started by the May 27 coup was paid during the post-modern coup of Feb. 28, 1997. Demir indicated that the Turkish nation is still paying for the bad debts of the banks that went out of business during this coup. Demir reiterated that there were retired generals on the executive boards of these banks and argued that the general public’s concern about potential coups is well evidenced by the generals’ admission that they were invited by the banks to became board members. “There could be two explanations for this. Either the capital owners felt the need to maintain close or amicable relations with the power groups for survival, or they were guided by their ambitions for unfair profits. Can an economy function properly under such an atmosphere? As a consequence, many banks failed, with the nation paying the price. We are still paying it,” he said. Professor Demir added that international investors will not be inclined to invest in a country where local investors are reluctant to do the same. “If the country’s own investors prefer to invest in financial sectors abroad rather than investing in non-financial sectors in their own country, will international investors be eager to invest in that country?” he asked. Demir noted that economic, social and political relations are processes that complement each other and that unemployment inevitably emerges because employment opportunities cannot be created due to the lack of capital accumulation and appeal for international investors.

NUQ – Econ Down – Greece

Turkish econ experiencing the fallout from Greece crisis

Asian Pulse 5/9 (http://www.thefreelibrary.com/(ECO)+TURKISH+ECONOMY+MINISTER+SAYS+SEES+MINIMAL+FALLOUT+FROM+GREEK...-a0226011838)KLS

May 9, 2010 (TUR tur: see ibex. ) -- Turkish Economy Minister Ali Babacan on Saturday Saturday: see week; Sabbath.  said a debt crisis in Greece might have "indirect effects" on Turkey's economy, citing his country's "relatively isolated" position against the Euro zone. "An economic slowdown in the Euro zone may affect our exports as one might argue because the demand in the EU will go down. Our financial sector has no intricate ties with euro countries," Ali Babacan told reporters after a meeting in Istanbul. Babacan said Turkey's public finance system and its financial sector had become much safer but the country would "feel more or less if an economic storm breaks out." "The important thing is that Turkey retains its position better other countries, and everyone believes that it will," Babacan said.

NUQ – Econ Down – Euro

Turkish manufacturing taking a hit because of depreciation of the Euro

Turkish Weekly 5/31 (2010, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/102544/euro-decline-triggers-losses-for-turkish-exporters.html) KLS

The sovereign debt crisis in Europe is not only harming nations such as Greece and Spain, but it is also hampering efforts to increase exports from Turkey as well. A top executive from a Turkish truck maker said the depreciation of the European currency is hurting vehicle exports. “Due to the decline of the euro, we are enduring a serious exchange rate loss. We are losing 40,000 Turkish Liras in every bus we sell,” said Mehmet Buldurgan, chief executive of Temsa Global, a Turkish truck maker. Speaking to the Anatolia news agency, Buldurgan said the global economic crisis had “collapsed” the EU market and that the decline of the euro had affected exporting manufacturers severely, causing many problems. Buldurgan said a decrease in demand as well as a fluctuation in exchange rates had caused a remarkable exchange rate loss. “The consequences are now unbearable,” he said. “A few months ago, the euro was at 2.16 Turkish Liras. A truck we manufactured then would be sold today at a euro/lira exchange rate of 1.92. Thus, we are losing 40,000 liras per bus.” Dangers of ‘hot money’ “There is a serious hot money flow toward Turkey, which affects the Turkish economy negatively,” he said. “Hot money enters the market very easily, but it is for certain that it will cause much damage when it leaves the country. If the entrance of hot money weren’t this easy, it wouldn’t have made the exchange rates decrease as much. Precautions should be taken by the Central Bank of Turkey,” Buldurgan said.

No Link – Turkey Resilient

Turkish economy resilient- credit rating

BBC 6/12 (2010,BBC Asian Monitoring, Lexis) KLS

Ankara, 12 January: Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip Erdogan](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9606512628&returnToId=20_T9606512658&csi=10962&A=0.6981542158153414&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A592%23&searchTerm=Recep%20Tayyip%20Erdogan%20&indexType=P) said on Tuesday (12 January) that Turkey was included among 14 countries whose credit ratings have been increased during global economic crisis. The ruling Justice and Development Party Chairman Erdogan delivered a speech at his party's parliamentary group meeting. Erdogan said rise in credit rating of Turkish economy was an evidence of its resilience against economic crisis. Erdogan said Turkey was shown among countries which would record a great economic growth in 2010 and following years. "International rating agencies confirmed that Turkey will be among countries which will weather global economic easily," he added. Turkey has recently won upgrades from Fitch and Moody's, two international credit rating agencies.

Turkey has proven itself to be economic crisis-proof.

Paul 6/9 (Amanda, reporter for the TurkishPress.com, [http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352709] AD: 6/21/10)JM

TODAY'S ZAMAN- While Turkey's European friends are having difficulty with a $1 trillion bailout package, Turkey is emerging from the crisis in pretty impressive shape. While the Turkish economy has not been immune to the negative consequences of this crisis, it has nevertheless showed considerable resilience, having managed to maintain its macroeconomic balance. As neighbor Greece continues to suffer from its economic meltdown, Turkey has weathered the financial crisis far better than many other countries, including a significant number of European Union member states. As a result Turkey has become a more integrated and bigger player in the global economy, with a strong emerging economy making it one of only a few countries with post-crisis potential. Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey is boasting about this achievement at every opportunity, including last week when Turkey's dynamic and super-smart finance minister, Mehmet Simsek, was in Brussels. Indeed, after a number of meetings at the European Commission, he has come away 'feeling sorry' for the EU. Turkey has done incredibly well thanks to a sharp and visionary financial strategy. Ankara has learned from the financial catastrophes of the past. Indeed, Turkey is quite accustomed to financial crises and the recessions that usually follow them, with the recent global financial crisis being the fifth to hit the country in the last 30 years. However, Turkey was better prepared this time and managed to stay afloat as a result of its strong financial foundations, after making good progress in the financial sector in recent years with an increase of gross domestic product (GDP) from $230 billion in 2002 to $740 billion just before the crisis. Clearly the financial crisis rocked this growth, which led to a 4.7 percent decrease. But the last few quarters have shown a strong comeback, and Turkey is well on the road to recovery.

No Link – No Effect on Turkey Econ

Turkeys economy has stabilized and US aid has significantly decreased

Migdalovitz 8 (Carol, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 8/29/8, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf) JPG

Turkey’s geostrategic importance to the United States is symbolized by the Incirlik Air Base. Since the 1950's, with minor interruption, Turkish governments of all political persuasions have granted the United States forces permission to use the base under a bilateral defense cooperation agreement. In the past, the U.S. granted Turkey considerable foreign aid, tacitly in exchange for such access. In recent years as Turkey’s economy has grown, however, the United States has not provided it with much assistance. The following sections of this report describe Turkey’s policies on selected issues and, as appropriate, U.S. Administration and congressional views of Turkey in these contexts. The last section deals with Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, which symbolizes the unwavering geostrategic importance of Turkey for the United States, despite bilateral differences on a growing range of subjects.

Link Turn – Investment

U.S military presence is bad for the economy – it stunts investment and causes inflation in Turkey.

Gabelnick 99(Tamar, member of the Federation of American Scientists, May 1, 1999 [http://www.fpif.org/reports/turkey\_arms\_and\_human\_rights] AD: 6/23/10)JM

U.S. arms sales and continued conflict in Turkey also damage Turkey’s economy and prospects for economic cooperation with the West. The 1998 CIA Factbook states that Turkey spends about $7 billion a year on the war with the PKK, which contributed to a 99% inflation rate for 1998 and a national debt equal to half the government’s revenue. War-related political and financial instability has discouraged foreign investment. A U.S.-backed plan would route a Caspian Sea oil pipeline through territory where the PKK operates, leaving it susceptible to rebel attacks. An end to the war and improvements in human rights are also necessary preconditions for Turkey’s entry into the European Union (EU), which the U.S. believes would draw Turkey closer to the West. Turkey’s ceaseless provocation of Greece, again using U.S. arms, is another barrier to EU entry.

Link Turn – Leverage Bad

Military presence entails leverage and that hurts Turkey’s economy

Turks Us 3 (Turks Us, Turkish news agency, March 13, 2003 [http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030313081501982] AD: 6/23/10)JM

 ISTANBUL — The U.S. is exerting economic pressure to persuade Turkey's parliament to authorize the presence of U.S. combat troops for an Iraq war, and a leading U.S. credit rating service warned that Turkey's rating would suffer if it didn't go along. Turkish media on Wednesday termed the statement an ultimatum. As a result of the warning on Tuesday from Moody's Investors Service, the Turkish stock markets suffered losses in early trading Wednesday and by noon the market had not recovered. The Turkish lira also lost value against the U.S. dollar. On Tuesday, Moody's Turkish analyst Kristin Lindow told journalists that if parliament doesn't approve U.S. military cooperation soon, it would lose out on an aid package of about $30 billion in grants and loans. The economy would suffer as a result and Moody's would be obliged to cut Turkey's investment rating, he said. The Turkish daily Milliyet on Wednesday quoted Lindow as saying that "if the Turkish parliament waits it will be too late. I fear that if they wait more than about a week, the money involved in the ongoing negotiations will leave the table." Milliyet said Lindow's statement was "like an ultimatum." Turkey's population is overwhelmingly opposed to a war against Iraq and on March 1 parliament rejected the stationing of as many as 62,000 troops in Turkey for an expected Iraq invasion. Turkey's new government is expected to resubmit a troop authorization measure to parliament and it could be approved next week. U.S. officials have told Turkey they want approval by Monday, March 17, the date by which the U.S. had hoped it would receive U.N. authorization for military action against Iraq.

No Turkish political leverage post – The AKP failed.

Barkey 3 (Henri J., Cohen Professor of Inter- national relations at Lehigh University, 12 May, 2003 [http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm] AD: 6/23/10)JM

One potential ramification of these developments and changes is the civilianization of the Turkish-American relationship. This, however, depends very much on the performance of the new AKP government and does not mean that Turkey's military significance within NATO will be diminished. The AKP administration came to power promising first and foremost to focus on improving Turkey's chances with Europe which, in turn, meant the furthering of the democratization process, improving the economy and dealing with Cyprus. Such a development-especially when compared with the Islamist Welfare Party's discourse after its first-place finish in 1995-was welcome news to Washington. Should the AKP succeed in pushing forward on these then the Turkish-American relationship would improve significantly. For Washington, Turkey's EU aspirations are important because they represent the shortest route to long-term stability based on a working democracy and economic prosperity. So far, however, the AKP government has allowed itself to be checkmated-temporarily albeit-on Cyprus by the hard liners in the country and has made little progress if any on the other issues. It has wasted its precious time in foreign and domestic policy. In short, with the disappearance of Saddam Hussein, Ankara lost an important part of its leverage in Washington. Nothing of the same import is out there to replace it; Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Iran are important but Turkey's influence and abilities are not as vital as with Saddam's Iraq. Of course, if the US's Iraq experiment turns foul and a pluralistic regime does not succeed in rooting itself in Baghdad, Turkey will once again loom large in the American imagination. For the time being, however, the reevaluation of Turkey's contribution to the US will open new opportunities in the relationship. Perhaps what the US hopes from this new government is that it tries to emulate O¨zal's approach.

No Internal Link – Turkey Not Key to World Econ

Turkish economy will never rank supreme- export base precludes

BBC 6/3 (2010, BBC Monitoring, Lexis) KLS

Referring to economic targets, [Prime Minister Erdogan](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9606539803&returnToId=20_T9606584143&csi=10962&A=0.07757899791919043&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A592%23&searchTerm=Prime%20Minister%20Erdogan%20&indexType=P) said: "Our target is to become one of the world's first ten economies in 2023. We have adopted an economic understanding based on exports. Our exports increased fourfold to 102bn dollars in the last 7.5 years. Turkish economy became the 17th biggest economy of the world in this process. Now, we aim at increasing our exports up to 500bn dollars by the year 2023. It is not a dream. It is not an uncatchable target."

No Impact – No Middle East Escalation

**War in the Middle East will never escalate to all-out war – conflicts remain relatively localized – five reasons**

Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney, 7 (Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray, Senior Fellow For Middle Eastern Studies at the CFR, Suzanne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, June 28, , online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/why\_the\_iraq\_war\_wont\_engulf\_the\_mideast.html,) KLS

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

No Impact – No Terrorism

**A. Middle East instability prevents a rising wave of terrorism from hitting the West - without a war to keep jihadists busy**

**Cetron and Davies 7** (president of Forecasting International Ltd, Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future 2007, The Futurist, http://www.versaterm.com/about\_vtm/advisory/53TrendsNowShapingTheFuture.pdf) KLS

To date, most commentators have simply assumed that a generalized war in the Middle East would be a bad thing, and today's concerns have limited their analyses to policy implications for the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Certainly, wholesale carnage is never to be welcomed, and the risk of unrestrained slaughter must be factored into any decision the United States makes about the land it chose to occupy. Yet, **the United States will not remain in Iraq forever, forced comparisons with Korea notwithstanding, and its departure is likely to leave a power vacuum in that country**. Under the circumstances, there are questions that need to be answered in some detail. **What would a regional war in the Middle East imply for the United States and its allies? And what should the West do to influence the situation to its advantage, now and in the future?** Thus far, **many possibilities have been overlooked**. For example, **the Iraq war has inspired, recruited, trained, and battle-hardened a new generation of future terrorists who, when freed from Iraq, are likely to turn their attention to the United States and its allies, especially in the U.K. and France. Having a Middle Eastern war to keep them occupied may be the West's only protection against a jihad that could make terrorism to date seem relatively tame.**

No Impact – No Terrorism

**B. Middle East war inevitable, immediate stays central solving terrorism**

**Cetron and Davies 7** (president of Forecasting International Ltd, Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future 2007, The Futurist, http://www.versaterm.com/about\_vtm/advisory/53TrendsNowShapingTheFuture.pdf) KLS

In the long run, such a division conceivably could be the beginning of broader change. In the end, we might finally see the birth of an Islam comparable to modern Christianity and Judaism, one that is able to coexist with other religions and with secular authority and one with which the West would find it much easier to coexist in turn. We are not forecasting that a Muslim reformation would emerge from a Middle Eastern war. Such a change of heart in Islam is a long shot at best, and it is at least equally likely that war would spread fundamentalist extremism throughout the Muslim world. Yet a general war in the Middle East is the only possible trigger for a Muslim reformation we have ever recognized. The grimness of this potential war cannot be overestimated. Millions of people in that region would die needlessly. Many hundreds of millions elsewhere would face a period of economic chaos that could, if mismanaged, dwarf the Great Depression of the 1930s.

No Impact – No China War

A. Middle East war would cut off Iranian oil from China, which would set back their global power projection for years

Cetron and Davies 7 (president of Forecasting International Ltd, Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future 2007, The Futurist, http://www.versaterm.com/about\_vtm/advisory/53TrendsNowShapingTheFuture.pdf) KLS

**China** is well supplied with oil from Africa, which it has on long-term contracts. However, it **is even more dependent on Iranian oi**l, which it would be unlikely to receive. **This deficit would lead Beijing to develop its own oil shale, but its reserves are modest. Its hope of supplying its energy needs will continue to depend on the massive development of biomass, a process that is planned but has hardly begun. China is likely to find its economic growth, and its global power, reduced for many years.**

B. That prevents large-scale US-China war

Mearsheimer 5 (John J. distinguished service professor of political science at the University of Chicago http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16538) KLS

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United State and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam will likely join the united state to contain China’s power.

Impact Turn – Assistance Bad

The US-Turkish alliance formed around monetary exchange is used to suppress the Kurds in both Turkey and Iraq

Vann 2 (Bill, , 9/17/2, International Committee of the Fourth International, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/sep2002/iraq-s17.shtml) JPG

While Turkey will be dragooned into any US war on Iraq—its air bases at Diyarbakir and Incirlik are already being used in US-British air raids on the Arab country—the unstable government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has expressed grave concerns about an invasion’s impact on his country. In an attempt to allay the concerns of the Turkish rulers, Bush inserted in his speech a carefully worded reference to US support for a “united Iraq.” The phrase was designed to reassure countries in the region, especially Turkey, that Washington would suppress any move by Iraq’s Kurdish minority to realize its long-standing aim of creating a separate state in Iraq’s north and would back Ankara’s military campaign against Turkey’s own Kurds. At least 30,000 Kurds have already died in the 17-year counterinsurgency campaign in eastern Turkey. Turkish military forces have long conducted cross-border raids into Iraq “in pursuit” of guerrillas affiliated to the PKK Kurdish separatist movement. Money is also likely to change hands in assuring Turkey’s full cooperation in a US invasion. The regime in Ankara is anxious that Washington assure the favorable disbursement of a $16 billion credit already approved by the International Monetary Fund, and is seeking forgiveness on $5 billion in debt to the US for weapons contracts.

Impact Turn – Assistance Bad

US arms exchange with Turkey exports jobs and hurts our national security interests

Gabelnick et. al. 99 (Tamar, *Director of the Federation of American Scientists, Published on Federation of American Scientists, October 1999, http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#hr) JPG*

Coproduction arrangements with Turkey raise a number of economic and security questions. On the economic front, coproduction shifts jobs to Turkey from arms plants in the United States. Lockheed Martin now assembles or produces components of its F-16 fighter in 11 countries, with full assembly lines in South Korea and Turkey that rival its main U.S. line - in Fort Worth, Texas - in size. The assembly line in Turkey has been used not only to produce the planes purchased by Ankara, but also as the primary production site for an order of 40 F-16s that went to Egypt in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. The Egyptian deal - in which aircraft paid for by $1.6 billion in U.S. military aid were produced in Turkey - is a worst case example of how coproduction can result in the export of U.S. jobs. To add insult to injury, the Turkish facility has also been used to train South Korean workers in production techniques for use on the F-16 line in Seoul - only after unionized workers at the U.S. F-16 plant in Fort Worth, Texas refused to train their South Korean counterparts to do their jobs.[(21)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_21_) Similarly, FMC-Nurol's interest in exporting U.S.-designed M-113s and military trucks could cut into business that might otherwise go to U.S. firms - including FMC's own U.S. facilities.

On the security front, the massive transfer of arms production techniques has implications both for arms proliferation and for the ability of the United States to exert leverage over Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied systems. As Turkish firms master larger and larger shares of the production techniques needed to build U.S. systems, it will be harder for the U.S. government to influence Turkish behavior by cutting off spare parts. In addition, the involvement of Turkish firms in the production of sensitive systems based on U.S. technology - from ammunition production in conjunction with the U.S. firm General Defense to the participation of the Turkish firms Aselsan and Rokestan in a European consortium building the Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles - could eventually lead to a situation in which Turkey might become yet another significant source of light weaponry to regions of active conflict.

Impact Turn – Turkish Spending Bad

A. Turkish arms purchases are directly used to perform genocide on Kurds

Gabelnick et. al. 99 (Tamar, *Director of the Federation of American Scientists, Published on Federation of American Scientists, October 1999, http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#hr) JPG*

Turkey's arms buying plan has multiple rationales, ranging from assisting in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Kosovo to deterring regional rivals like Iran, Syria, and Greece to building a capability to project force eastward into the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union. But the most costly items on Ankara's shopping list have direct applications in Turkey's war against the Kurds.

Earlier this year the Turkish government speeded up its $560 million deal for Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters with the explicit intention of putting them to work ferrying troops to and from the front lines of the war with the PKK in the southeast. In order to expedite the deal, Turkish authorities agreed to buy the aircraft directly, without demanding offsets or coproduction in Turkey. As of late July of 1999, 10 helicopters out of the 50 ordered had already been delivered. Given past experience, there is a high probability that Turkey's planned fleet of 145 modern attack helicopters - for which the Boeing Apache and the Bell-Textron King Cobra are both strong competitors - would also be used to attack Kurdish villages, refugee camps, and mountain strongholds of the PKK or suspected PKK sympathizers. And Human Rights Watch has already documented the use of older generation U.S. tanks in the destruction of Kurdish villages, so there is a danger that some of the 1,000 new tanks sought by the Turkish army - for which the General Dynamics M-1A2 is a strong contender - could be used for similar purposes. A late 1998 sale of 140 U.S.-built armored personnel carriers and crowd control vehicles to the Turkish police has obvious applications in repressing popular dissent, both in Turkey as a whole and in the volatile southeastern region.

In announcing a 30-year weapons purchasing program all at once, Turkish authorities clearly have more than purely military objectives in mind. They want to get the world's arms manufacturers salivating over what appears to be a huge long-term market, in the hopes that they will pressure their governments to cast aside concerns about Turkey's human rights record and turn their efforts towards helping their home country's weapons makers close the deal on one or more major weapons sales to Ankara. This strategy has clearly worked with respect to U.S. arms makers, who have pressured Congress and the Clinton administration to clear the way for U.S. firms to win controversial contracts like the sale of 140 armored vehicles to the Turkish police and compete for deals like the $4 billion tender for 145 attack helicopters. And General Dynamics, which has been looking to foreign sales of its M-1 tank to Greece and Turkey to resuscitate a domestic tank production line which has been subsisting on upgrade funds from the Army, will no doubt put its lobbying muscle to bear in favor of substantial new U.S. government subsidies if it becomes a finalist in the competition for 1,000 new main battle tanks for Turkey. But advocates of arms sales to Turkey who base their case on economic and pork barrel arguments can expect to face stiff opposition from arms control and human rights organizations and their allies in Congress.

The most controversial recent U.S. arms sale to Turkey was the late 1998 decision to grant a license to the Michigan-based AV Technology division of General Dynamics to sell 140 armored vehicles to the Turkish anti-terror and anti-riot police. According to a description of the deal by Dana Priest of the Washington Post, the deal includes "11-ton, armored Patrollers, equipped with water cannons, ramming arms, and front gun ports for urban anti-riot police, and Dragoons, an armored personnel carrier that would transport anti-terror police." Because of the dismal human rights records of Turkey's anti-terror and anti-riot police and the intention to finance the deal using funds from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the deal triggered a review under the "Leahy Law" - Section 570 of the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Law sponsored by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) - which states that "no funds from the Foreign Operations Appropriations, including financing from the Export-Import Bank, can be used to provide equipment to foreign security units if credible evidence of gross human rights violations by specific units exists."[(50)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_50_)

B. Genocide leads to social death which is the precondition for killing

Card 3 (Claudia, Ph.D in Philosophy from Harvard, Hypatia Vol. 18 No. 1, Winter 2003 pp. 63-79, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hyp/summary/v018/18.1card02.html) JPG

Specific to genocide is the harm inflicted on its victims’ social vitality. It is not just that one’s group membership is the occasion for harms that are defin- able independently of one’s identity as a member of the group. When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heri- tage and may even lose their intergenerational connections. To use Orlando Patterson’s terminology, in that event, they may become “socially dead” and their descendants “natally alienated,” no longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), and projects of earlier generations (1982, 5–9). The harm of social death is not necessar- ily less extreme than that of physical death. Social death can even aggravate physical death by making it indecent, removing all respectful and caring ritual, social connections, and social contexts that are capable of making dying bear- able and even of making one’s death meaningful. In my view, the special evil of genocide lies in its infliction of not just physical death (when it does that) but social death, producing a consequent meaninglessness of one’s life and even of its termination. This view, however, is controversial.

\*\*US-ROK – Aff Answers

US-ROK – UQ

**US-ROK security alliance weakening – 4 reasons**

Robert E **Kelly, ‘9** – Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University. “Start Admitting that the US Commitment to SK is Weakening,” http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/start-admitting-that-the-us-commitment-to-sk-is-weakening.

The Korean press has been filled for months with the coverage of the US military’s redeployment from north to south of Seoul. Usually these reports include protestations from both sides that the military commitment of the US to the South has not diminished. I just can’t see how that can be the case. **I want the US commitment to remain strong, but** I think **this is wishful thinking. 1. The US has slowly reduced its ground forces in Korea over the last few decades. US force totals are now around 28k and may sink below 25k by 2015. By contrast, the US has about twice that number in Japan and Germany**, neither of whom are as directly threatened as SK. The common response is that the US can provide the same level of protection with fewer people because of today’s greater lethality per US warfighter, as well as the continuing cover provided by the US air force and navy. Essentially this is a Rumsfeldian transformation argument. The ‘transformation’ of the US military has made each US solider more individually effective, so you need fewer of them for the same job. This is achieved through better training, and use of IT to coordinate firepower better. Smart soldiers and combined arms have multiplier effects we didn’t enjoy during the Cold War. So instead of blowing up a whole valley to kill the enemy, you only need the firepower to blow up a part of it, because IT (‘the networked battlefield’) will tell you exactly which part the enemy is in. I find this moderately compelling, but the verdict is not really in yet on transformation. (See Thomas Ricks at Foreign Policy and Fred Kaplan at Slate, who have long chronicled the ups and downs of this notion.) While it seemed to work well in Afghanistan, it was an abysmal failure in Iraq, where low force totals were the single biggest US problem until the surge. **Transformation and smaller forces** also seem to **run against a basic military lesson – more is better**. Ceteris paribus, a larger force should improve options and create a greater cushion to absorb casualties and defeats. I think we all assume that NK’s military is clapped out, but it is over 1 million strong, and US totals seem awfully low. Also, should the US be involved in another war – as we are now – at the time of a conflict with the DPRK, more is again better. It just seems awfully risky. **2. US forces are being moved south of Seoul. To me, this is the most obvious sign of decreased willingness. During the Cold War, US troops were purposefully strewn along the DMZ, so that if there was a conflict, US lives would be lost almost immediately. Dead Americans would then rouse US public opinion to commit to the war**. NATO followed the same logic in central Europe. The more flags on the initial coffins, the more likely collective security would be honored. **It seems willful blindness to say that the US is not looking to avoid casualties and therefore the public opinion chain-gang effect by this southward move**. This may be good for the US. It lowers the likelihood of an immediate public outcry, and so gives DoD and the White House some time in a crisis. But if I were South Koreans, I would be nervous. Similarly, **US forces will no longer be located between Seoul, the capital, and the DMZ**. 20m people live in greater Seoul – 40% of the national population. It is extremely exposed. It is only 30 miles from the DMZ; it is extremely dense, and it is filled with skyscrapers and high apartment tower blocks that would fall easily if it hit by NK artillery. (Picture the horrifying WTC collapse happening dozens of times.) I imagine the ROK army will be put in the US place, but still if I were a Korean, I would be pretty spooked that the US is no longer protecting what would obviously be the primary target if the DPRK drove south. **3. In 2012, the US will relinquish wartime authority to control SK forces. This abolition of** Combined Forces Command (**CFC) is marketed as restoring sovereignty and control to the South, but an obvious extra for the US is that it is no longer obligated to command in the case of a war**. Again, this gives the US more wiggle room. 4. **Finally**, I think **US public opinion is hardly deeply committed the defense of SK anymore**. The Cold War is over. If SK were to go communist now, it would not matter to US security as much as before. And Americans are exhausted from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the general stress of the GWoT. To the extent Americans even know where SK is, most of their political images will be of a wealthy country (Samsung TVs, etc, etc) that should be able to defend itself. **The American attitude, and** probably **that of DoD, is burden-sharing**. Allies should carry more of their own defense. NK is SK’s problem, let them fix it; it’s their war, let them fight it. In sum, the bulk of smaller US forces will be 100 miles from the DMZ, south of Seoul, and **we don’t have the authority to command the SK military in a fight most Americans won’t see as critical for national security**. In other words, we are reserving options for ourselves, including just how much we want to commit.

US-ROK – UQ

**The NPR will decrease nuclear aid and call for SoKo to put up or shut up**

Park **Yong-ok, ‘9**. – Research Fellow Sejong Institute. “Nuclear Armed North Korea and Extended Deterrence ― Issues, Prospects and Suggestions,” December, Korea Focus, <http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume_id=92&content_id=102814&category=G>.

The **Obama** administration **is** currently **conducting another** round of Nuclear Posture Review (**NPR**). It is possible that **the 2009 NPR will produce a dramatically different outcome** from those of two previous NPRs, considering that President Obama is a strong advocate of a nuclear-free world. The 1993 NPR under the Clinton administration virtually followed the Cold War concept despite the changes in world situation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It maintained the offensive strategy based on the “nuclear triad” consisting of the land-based ICBM, submarine-based SLBM and strategic bombers all capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The 2001 NPR under the Bush administration reflecting the post-Cold War situation established a “new triad,” which consisted of the three types of offensive arms of the old triad (both nuclear- and conventionally-armed), defensive systems, including missile defense, and a responsive infrastructure for addressing unexpected developments. It combined both offensive and defensive strategies presupposing the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. The ongoing 2009 NPR of the Obama administration is inclined toward considerably reducing dependence on nuclear arms in accordance with the objective of a nuclear-free world. It is generally recognized that the previous nuclear posture of the United States has caused a burden to its nuclear nonproliferation and anti-terror efforts and that Washington needs to exercise strong leadership in realizing a nuclear-free world although the maintenance of nuclear capabilities is still necessary as a means of strategic deterrence. **Yet, it needs further observation to determine whether Obama`s NPR can completely depart from Bush`s** NPR. The Obama administration should accept the role and functions of nuclear arms in restraining foes and protecting friends, and it therefore faces the question of maintaining balance and harmony between nuclear deterrence and denuclearization. No consensus seems to have been reached in the United States and little change may be expected in its general nuclear posture for the time being. **What is clear, however, is that the concepts of nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence and their operational principles can be altered in accordance with the outcome of the current review** of the U.S. nuclear posture. **One possible area of changes is whether emphasis will be placed on unilateral U.S. assistance or increased role of allies** in the future mode of security cooperation. **In the event** that **Washington reduces the strategic importance of nuclear arms,** a drastic increase in the role of allies will be called for**. Changes will be unavoidable and South Korea will be required to equip itself with enough capabilities necessary for playing its role in any restructured security situation in the future.**

Link Turns

**Reduction of troop presence reduces tensions in the alliance**

**Campbell et. al 9** (Kurt, Assistant Secretary @ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf) JPG

**Despite the U.S.-ROK alliance’s efficiency**, **its Cold War-era constitution was in dire need of revision**, as aspects of both the regional and global environment changed in the post-Cold War era. For the United States, Korea presented an anomaly in terms of overall global force posture. It was a heavy, **ground-based presence built to deal only with a potential North Korean attack**. In this sense, the presence there did not fit with overall U.S. aspirations for its military deployments to be capable of deploying regionally and in global contingencies. At the same time, **the U.S. military’s large physical footprint in Korea** — most conspicuously at the 8th Army headquarters in central Seoul — **became increasingly anachronistic** in a country that was democratic, educated, and affluent, a far cry from the war-torn country that first hosted the American presence after the Korean War. A wakeup call came in the winter of 2002, when **a U.S. military court’s acquittal of two soldiers involved in the killing of two Korean schoolgirls** during a training accident led to widespread protests in Korea. **These trends impelled significant changes** in the location of American billets in South Korea. Since 2002, **the two governments have agreed on a major base realignment and restructuring** agreement **constituting** the most far-reaching changes in **U.S. presence** on the peninsula since the end of the Korean War. **Measures include the removal of U.S. forces from the Korean** Demilitarized Zone (**DMZ**), the move of U.S. Army headquarters (Yongsan garrison) out of the center of Seoul, and the eventual return of more than 60 bases and camps to the ROK. These base moves fit with larger U.S. military transformational needs, centering more air and naval capabilities out of Pyongtaek and Osan, but they maintain the same level of credible U.S. defense commitments to Seoul. Moreover, **the reduction of the large U.S. military footprint in the center of Seoul** — the equivalent of putting a foreign military installation the size of Central Park in New York City — **serves to reduce civil-military tensions in the alliance.**

**Removal bolsters US-RoK relations**

**Campbell et. al 9** (Kurt, Assistant Secretary @ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf) JPG

**More** work **can clearly be done** on both sides **to advance U.S.-ROK relations and to build the alliance for the future. Carrying out the basing moves and the realignment agreements are** clearly **an important task** for the new U.S. administration. Nevertheless, they are operational issues that do **ROK alliance remains one of America’s most stable and valuable alliances.** By all measures, **the alliance has proved its efficiency and durability**. A look at the history of the alliance demonstrates its remarkable ability to surpass expectations. **What began as a security guarantee among highly unequal parties has now evolved into a mature partnership between two strong and secure democracies**. When considering the future of the alliance, it is instructive to remember how far the alliance has come. Of course, the alliance, like all partnerships, will face challenges ahead. The difficulty of managing the peninsular question and reversing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions will continue to be a central focus of the alliance and a potential problem spot. **Past management of this challenge** — especially on the issues of denuclearization strategies, inter-Korean cooperation, and human rights in the DPRK — **has indicated the potential for gaps in alliance coordination**. Other potential problems spots include growing populism in South Korea and political obstacles to ratification of the ground-breaking KORUS FTA.

Link Turns

**Perceptions from both sides risk a collapse of the US-RoK alliance – plan solves**

**Hwang 5** (Balbina, PhD in Intl Relations @ Georgetown and guest lecturer in economics and foreign policy, 1/18, http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0505A\_Hwang.html/) JPG

However, despite the success of the formal alliance relationship and close economic and social ties, **the bilateral relationship has suffered in recent years with increased problems of perception** on both sides of the Pacific. Many **Americans have become** increasingly **concerned about** flare-ups of **anti-American sentiment**, including mass demonstrations against the United States staged in late 2002 to protest the death of two schoolgirls in a traffic accident involving U.S. military personnel.[ [1](http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0505A_Hwang.html#1) ] More disturbing are the less overt signs that **South Korean attitudes toward America have shifted**. For example, recent public opinion surveys reveal that **more South Koreans see the United States as a greater threat** to their security **than North Korea**.[ [2](http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0505A_Hwang.html#2) ] Today, **the feeling of trust** between the United States and South Korea that for decades has been taken for granted **is eroding. The formal alliance relationship**, which is critical to the security interests of both countries, **may also be in jeopardy**. Sources of the Gap Several factors have contributed to this divergence of views. One important factor is that **South Korea has undergone a profound** political, economic, and social **transformation** during the past two decades. Two decades ago South Korea was an authoritarian country. Today it is one of the most vibrant and thriving democracies in East Asia, with a vigorous civil society and freedom of expression, fueled in part by the explosive use of the Internet. South Korea's economy has rapidly grown from one of the poorest in the region at the end of the Korean War to a regional powerhouse and the 12th largest economy in the world. Today, South Korean society is dominated by the younger generation- in both number and influence-who are struggling to adjust to the immense challenges that accompany such changes. These include reconciling national pride and achievements with lingering feelings of inadequacy and dependency stemming from its recent bitter history as a Japanese colony, which was followed by division and war. Regrettably, **such "growing pains" are often manifested in nationalistic rhetoric, which is often couched in anti-American expressions.** At the same time, changes have also occurred in the United States. The events of September 11, 2001, changed not only the strategic orientation of the United States, but also the attitudes of the American people. After 9/11, **America**-both its government and its people-**is less inclined to tolerate anti-American sentiments and is less patient with and accommodating of allies** that hesitate to support the United States in endeavors that serve their mutual interests. North Korea Contributing to the growing gap between the United States and South Korea are their fundamentally altered and divergent views of North Korea. From the U.S. perspective, North Korea remains an imposing threat because of the regime's military strength, illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons, "military first" policy at the cost of mass starvation of its citizens, proliferation of arms and missiles, record of state-sponsored terrorism, continued hostile military stance toward South Korea and other neighbors such as Japan, and its continued widespread violations of the human rights of its own people. Yet from South Korea's perspective, the North Korean threat has less to do with its strength as a regime than its weakness. Today, **South Koreans fear a North Korean collapse more than an attack, because a collapse would unleash** social, political, and economic **chaos** that would impose unacceptable costs. Regrettably, because of this widespread perception gap, some **South Koreans have chosen to accept at face value the North Korean propaganda** that the United States is an obstacle to reconciliation and reunification. Many South Koreans seem to blame President Bush's principled stance against North Korea for slow progress in inter-Korean rapprochement and the break in dialogue with Pyongyang-even though North Korea is solely responsible for creating a nuclear crisis in the region. This perception was further reinforced when President Bush named North Korea a part of "the axis of evil." Nevertheless, **perceptions matter in foreign policy, and both Washington and Seoul should pay heed to the changing environments in both countries**. Various components of the leadership in both countries have been making concerted efforts to adjust the formal details of the alliance to reinvigorate the relationship and improve its efficiency. For example, as part of the Department of Defense's Global Posture Review, **the Pentagon and the ROK Defense Ministry have been discussing** the future of the alliance with the object of implementing **needed changes to the U.S. force structure on the Korean peninsula**. As part of the plan **to increase the** efficiency and **efficacy of the alliance** and the U.S. defense commitment, **they have agreed to a gradual drawdown** and repositioning of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

Link Turns

**Military presence will collapse the US-RoK alliance – plan solves**

**Duk-min 00** (Yun, Professor Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 7/22/00,

http://koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content\_print.asp?group\_id=1094) JPG

But to many Koreans**, the standing of and respect for the U.S. military in Korea has plummeted** from that of guarantor of Korean and regional peace and stability to a source of both personal and environmental wrongdoings. Why has anti-American sentiment spread throughout Korean society so suddenly? **This situation is very likely related to the success of the recent inter-Korean summit talks**. If nothing else, **the summit talks** between North and South Korea **have given rise to the thought that** the primary mission of U.S. troops in Korea, namely to deter **the military threat of North Korea, is coming to a close while the U.S. military presence is now seen as a possible impediment** to lasting peace and the unification of the Korean peninsula. Ironically, whereas North Korea has reportedly acknowledged the positive peace-keeping role that American forces play on the Korean peninsula at the recent summit meeting in Pyeongyang, **attitudes toward the American military among South Koreans have become increasingly negative**. Moreover, while opinion in South Korea is divided on the nature of the North Korean regime between conservatives and liberals, **there appears to be broad consensus on the issue of U.S. forces in the South**. Even **among South Korean conservatives, there is a deeply rooted tendency to view the American military as retarding the country's development** of a self-reliant military while also restricting its foreign policy autonomy. In this context, **anti-American sentiment may well be an outlet for venting Korean nationalism**. If inter-Korean relations continue to progress, **there will likely be growing demands for the withdrawal of U.S. forces** from the South so as not to hinder national unification. But one must wonder whether unification and related Korean issues could be resolved any more easily if the American troops were withdrawn from Korea.

Cheonan Incident False

Cheonan incident is a fallacy- Scientific Accuracy

KNS 10( Korean News Service, 6/22/10 http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201006/news22/20100622-14ee.html)

The "story about a torpedo attack by the north" is a sheer fabrication as it is devoid of scientific accuracy. As for the 1.5 meter-long propelling body, it is what dozens of U.S. and south Korean warships equipped with up-to-date radars failed to find out in more than 50 days of search operations. But they claim it was suddenly netted by a civilian fishing boat, something incredible and not understandable either. The group of traitors even produced a video showing the propelling body being netted by the fishing boat and helicoptered, and then took it to the UN in a bid to justify it. But it is clear to everybody that such video showing "the retrieval" of this mysterious thing can hardly serve as evidence proving the propelling body of the torpedo. A screw of propelling axis and an engine, etc. which they alleged were used for breaking "Cheonan" into two were neither bent nor damaged. Yun Tok Yong who headed the "joint investigation team" said its American and Australians concerned were "surprised" to learn that the propelling body was in very good shape. There is a rumor in south Korea that the story about the retrieval of the propelling body is just like asserting that "a stone picked up at roadside dates back to the Old Stone Age."  The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces claimed that the property of the metal used in making the propelling body is just the same as that of "the north's training torpedo" obtained 7 years ago and its design is also same as the design introduced in the "north Korea's torpedo brochure." This is sheer sophism

Cheonan incident false- Propaganda effort from the South

KNS 10( Korean News Service, 6/22/10 http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201006/news22/20100622-14ee.html)

Yun, when announcing the results, said that no comparison was made in the metal property between the two torpedoes. As for the brochure which he said he saw for himself, puppet Minister of Defence Kim Thae Yong later said that "it was recorded on CD", an indication that this "evidence" is also doubtful. As far as "No.1" written on the propelling body is concerned, there is need to call attention to the fact that the north and the south use the same language. If there is possibility that it was written in the writing style of the north it is similarly possible that it can be written in the style of the south. The puppet authorities, deliberately defying the stark reason, persistently asserted that it was written in the north's style. They have consistently dodged analysis of the felt-tip pen used for writing it. Kyunghyang Daily News of south Korea dated June 1, referring to the scientific discrepancy of the letter, said: The boiling points of general-use ink are 138.5℃, 110.6℃ and 78.4 ℃. Had the propelling body been heated up to 300℃ it might have been melted away. If the paint of the hull had burnt away, the letter "No. 1", too, might have done so. This is science. But high temperature-resistant paint burnt away while low temperature-resistant ink remained. The group of traitors presented "evidence" proving that absorptive found in the bow, stern, funnel and other parts of the ship is aluminum oxides that was found in the propelling body of the north's torpedo. This is unscientific. They asserted that this substance is a byproduct of fine aluminum powder that was mixed with the gunpowder in a bid to increase the effect of their propaganda that the warship was broken into pieces by the "north's torpedo attack", adding that this substance turned into non crystalline substance due to intense heat at the time of "explosion" and contact with cold sea water. A test and analysis of it conducted by a Korean professor at Virginia University of the U.S. at the request of a National Assemblyman from the south Korean Democratic Party proved that not all fine aluminum powder turn to crystalline substance in that case**.** The professor made public a paper on this test and sent it to the UN. Much upset by this, the "joint investigation team" officially admitted its investigation error at a session of the "National Assembly" on June 11.

Cheonan Incident False

**Cheonan incident is government propaganda- Survivors**

KNS 10( Korean News Service, 6/22/10 http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201006/news22/20100622-14ee.html)

Survivors of the sunken "Cheonan" said that they smelt no gunpowder at the time of sinking. But the puppet forces insisted on the "story about a torpedo attack by the north", turning down for no reason the public opinion about the possible formation of aluminum oxides in the course of the firing of artillery pieces from the warship. The "investigation results" are censured by south Koreans and the world public for their contradictions and doubtful points. The Solidarity for Democratic Society and the People for Achieving Peace and Reunification, the progressive organizations of south Korea, together with a Korean organization in the U.S. sent letters to the member nations of the UN Security Council on June 11 and 14.  The letters totally negated the "story about the north's torpedo attack," saying that had the "north's torpedo" exploded near "Cheonan", its fragments might have embedded in the warship body, leaving some deaf and some with broken bones, etc.  Fluorescent lamps of "Cheonan" remain intact and not a shoal of sand eels was found dead in the waters where the warship sank. Such humors as "magic fluorescent lamps" and "intelligent sand eel shoal in waters off Paekryong Islet" are rampant in south Korea, a refutation and derision of the authorities' "investigation results".

\*\*US-Turkey Relations DA – Aff Answers

Random QPQ Aff Card

Europe and Turkey aren’t barriers and quid pro quo fails—other concessions necessary and process is lengthy

Bergenäs 10 (Johan, research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 3/2, http://www.connectusfund.org/blogs/bombs-away-removing-tactical-nukes-europe)

First, some argue that the bombs stationed in Europe offer allies reassurance about the credibility of U.S. security commitments should the continent be attacked by a foreign power. But this argument is unrealistic in today's environment. Instead, Obama should reassure U.S. allies that Europe falls under the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons umbrella regardless of tactical nuclear weapons deployments, as former Defense Secretary William Perry did in the 1980s. Additionally, the combination of missile defense and conventional deterrence is more than sufficient to deter any perceived threats against Europe, including against Eastern and Central European states and the Baltic countries. Second, some suggest that NATO should utilize these outdated weapons as leverage in negotiations with Russia, seeking comparable reductions in the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal. But quid pro quo cutbacks with Russia should not be the guiding principle in removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. To begin with, Russia still has thousands of such tactical warheads and rejects asymmetrical reductions, so such an approach would need to include other costly concessions. Furthermore, if the START negotiations are any indication, this process would likely be a lengthy and painful one. Instead, Obama should prevent this scenario by taking action within the NATO context, thereby calling these weapons home without such lengthy and unpredictable negotiations with Moscow. A third barrier to removing these weapons is Turkey's perceived desire to keep them within its territory. However, senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they "would not insist" that NATO retain its forward-deployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara's security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella. But were NATO to remove its weapons from other nuclear-sharing nations, Turkey would be left as the sole nation hosting them. That's a scenario Ankara would prefer to avoid having to explain to its Middle Eastern neighbors, some of whom already view the current situation as a violation of the NPT.

Relations Collapse Inevitable

Relations collapse inevitable- failure of domestic politics

Walker ’07 [Joshua, Graduate Fellow & PhD Candidate Princeton, Washington Quarterly, Winter ’07-’08, http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter\_walker.pdf]

Although the United States and Turkey have had serious policy disagreements in the past, there has always been an overarching strategic vision to keep the alliance intact. Now, with the absence of a common threat from the Soviet Union and with new civilian-military dynamics in Turkey, the future of the U.S.-Turkish alliance needs to be carefully reexamined. Because of its Islamic roots and Muslim outlook, the AKP has brought with it an unprecedented willingness to reach out to Turkey’s Middle East- ern neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, which have traditionally been viewed as common enemies by Ankara and Washington. Articulating a new vision for Turkey that is not dependent on Washington while actively seeking ways to balance its relationships and alliances, the AKP still has many domestic hurdles to overcome. Although the AKP’s policy of maintaining optimal inde- pendence and leverage on the global and regional stage appeals to its Turkish constituency, this type of policy does not bode well for Turkey’s historic alli- ance with the United States. Although all relationships as complex as the U.S.-Turkish alliance experi- ence natural ebbs and flows, the rupture in strategic vision between these allies has been so egregious that some commentators have placed the blame squarely on the AKP. Given the internal tensions within Turkey surrounding the Islamist roots of the party and the sensitivities of Turkey’s secular estab- lishment, the argument goes that the U.S.-Turkish relationship has become the latest victim of domestic Turkish politics.1 The March 1, 2003, vote in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to reject the U.S. request to open a northern front against Iraq has come to symbolize the clear divergence of strategic interests between the United States and Turkey, and it has also erroneously been used to demonstrate the anti- American bias of the AKP. Yet, by tracking the ascent of the AKP from the November 2002 elections to the most recent ones, it is clear that, far from being the source of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the AKP represents an ideal partner for the United States in the region.

No Prolif

No risk of Turkish prolif - too many constraints

Kibaroglu, ‘8 [Mustafa, “Implications of a nuclear Iran for Turkey” Middle East Policy, 12-22-2008, <http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/western-asia-saudai-arabia/2282012-1.html>]

Hence, one particular condition for Turkey to go nuclear would be to secure the endorsement of such a power. This, however, is not imminent. Short of such support, the **only possible way of meeting the scientific and technological requirements would be through an illegal network** similar to that of Abdel Qader Khan, the "father of the Pakistani bomb," now under house arrest in Pakistan. The **magnitude and scope of illegal acquisition would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, in a country like Turkey**, where there are still small but effective groups of concerned people who would do their best to reveal such critical information to the world. **Should such a development take place, Turkey would be treated as a "rogue state, "something unthinkable and unacceptable given Turkey's record of nonproliferation efforts.  Notwithstanding** these difficulties, even if one considers for a moment that Turkey has decided to go nuclear and managed to get the support of a nuclear power, or that it has established a clandestine nuclear-weapons procurement network and gotten away with it without being noticed, **what will be the role of nuclear weapons in Turkey's security and foreign policies?** Will nuclear weapons enhance Turkey's security? Or, will they simply harm Turkey's interests?  The lead author of this article has spent years studying military history, superpower rivalry, arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. Even when looked at from these rich perspectives, no feasible scenarios are imaginable under which nuclear weapons would bring additional security to Turkey. On the contrary**, any attempt to illegally pursue, let alone acquire, nuclear weapons will be extremely damaging to Turkey's vital interests. Turkey is passing through a difficult domestic and international political conjuncture in which there are many sensitive issues** (social, economic, political) **to be exploited by its rivals. In addition, at a time when its relations with the United States and the EU are in decline, these countries may be of no help in dealing with the problems that will arise.**

Aff- Impact UQ

Turkey’s aligning itself with the Middle East

Tisdall 6/21 (Simon, assistant editor of Guardian, UTV, http://www.u.tv/News/Turkeys-zero-problems-policy-is-a-flop/892cc436-4130-415e-9ca8-5e26e23e34f8)

But the renewed fighting also poses a larger question: to what extent the policy espoused by Erdogan and his high-profile foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, of "zero problems with neighbours" is producing tangible, lasting results. On a range of fronts, high ambitions are colliding with intractable realities on the ground. Erdogan's fierce condemnation of the killing on Saturday of 11 soldiers by Kurdistan Workers party (PKK) fighters possibly reflected frustration that Ankara's pursuit of non-military solutions has produced little that is concrete in the eight years since his Justice and Development party (AKP) first came to power. "Today we will not make the traitors happy," Erdogan said during a visit to Van. "We will defend this ground heroically ... "I say here very clearly, they will not win. They will gain nothing. They will melt away in their own darkness ... they will drown in their own blood." Such rhetoric, echoing Erdogan's full-blooded attacks on Israel over Gaza, could not disguise widely felt dismay that a conflict that has claimed an estimated 40,000 lives since 1984 may be reviving, partly due to political failures. Citing continuing Turkish military attacks, the PKK announced this month it was ending a unilateral ceasefire. The decision followed the banning by Turkey's constitutional court of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society party (DTP), a ruling strongly criticised by Massoud Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the EU. Concern is now growing that further clashes could lead to a repeat of the 2008 Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq, where some PKK fighters are based. Such an outcome could strain Ankara's relations with Baghdad, where its efforts to encourage a role in government for Iraq's Sunni Muslim minority are already viewed as unwelcome meddling by some Shia politicians. Turkey's "zero problems" has also run into trouble around Azerbaijan's disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, where four ethnic Armenian and one Azeri soldier were killed in a skirmish on Saturday. Turkey and Armenia struck a supposedly historic peace accord last year but the deal backfired when close Turkish ally Azerbaijan angrily insisted the Nagorno-Karabakh stand-off be settled first. Instead of easing tensions, Erdogan's initiative inflamed them. Despite its aspirations to act as a regional powerbroker, Turkish talk has not been matched by persuasive actions in another troublespot – Cyprus. Elections earlier this year saw Turkish Cypriots vote in a new president who appears to favour the permanent partition of the island, notwithstanding the ongoing UN-sponsored reunification talks backed by Greece and the EU. Erdogan has certainly improved relations with one important neighbour: Iran. His decision to vote against the latest UN sanctions on Tehran dismayed the US and European countries while delighting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In contrast, relations with Israel are at low ebb after the Gaza flotilla debacle, with Turkish media reporting that diplomatic and military relations will be frozen indefinitely. Erdogan's regional foreign policy initiatives, his flirtation with Iran, his split with Israel, and his courting of supposedly suspect countries such as Syria have led western commentators to speculate about a "strategic realignment" in Turkish policy, away from the west and Nato and towards the Arab and Muslim worlds, in parallel with the AKP's pursuit of a neo-Islamist agenda at home. "Turkey's Islamist government [seems] focused not on joining the European Union but the Arab League – no, scratch that, on joining the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel," complained American columnist Tom Friedman.

Aff- Impact UQ

Turkey becoming aligned with the Middle East—anti-American propaganda and increasing Islamic influence

Rubin 10 (Michael, scholar at American Enterprise Institute, July/August, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/turkey--from-ally-to-enemy-15464)

A decade ago, Turks saw themselves in a camp with the United States, Western Europe, and Israel; today Turkish self-identity places the country firmly in a camp led by Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Hamas. Turkey may be a NATO member, but polls nevertheless show it to be the world’s most anti-American country (although, to be fair, the Pew Global Attitudes Project did not conduct surveys in Libya or North Korea). Nor do Turks differentiate between the U.S. government and the American people: they hate Americans almost as much as they hate Washington. This is no accident. From almost day one, Erdogan has encouraged, and his allies have financed, a steady stream of anti-American and anti-Semitic incitement. Certainly, many Turks opposed the liberation of Iraq in 2003, but this was largely because Erdogan bombarded them with anti-American incitement before Parliament’s vote, which withdrew the support promised to the operation. Much of Erdogan’s incitement, however, cannot be dismissed as a dispute over the Iraq war. In 2004, Yeni Safak, a newspaper Erdogan endorsed, published an enemies list of prominent Jews. In 2006, not only did Turkish theaters headline Valley of the Wolves, a fiercely anti-American and anti-Semitic movie that featured a Jewish doctor harvesting the organs of dead Iraqis, but the prime minister’s wife also publicly endorsed the film and urged all Turks to see it. Turkish newspapers reported that prominent AKP supporters and Erdogan aides financed its production. While much of the Western world boycotted Hamas in the wake of the 2006 Palestinian elections in order to force it to renounce violence, Erdogan not only extended a hand to the group but also welcomed Khaled Mashaal, leader of its most extreme and recalcitrant faction, as his personal guest. The question for policymakers, however, should not be whether Turkey is lost but rather how Erdogan could lead a slow-motion Islamic revolution below the West’s radar. This is both a testament to Erdogan’s skill and a reflection of Western delusion. Before taking power, Erdogan and his advisers cultivated Western opinion makers. He concentrated not on American pundits who found U.S. policy insufficiently leftist and sympathetic to the Islamic world but rather on natural critics, hawkish American supporters of Turkey and Israel who helped introduce Erdogan confidantes to Washington policymakers.

Turkey’s strengthening relations with Iran--Kurd minority and energy

Cook and Sherwood-Randall 6 (Steven, expert on Arab and Turkish politics, and Elizabeth, research scholar at Stanford, Council on Foreign Relations, No. 15, June)

Ankara’s policy toward Iran is similar to its posture vis-à-vis Syria. While Turkish officials acknowledge that the Iranian regime is a source of tension and instability in the region, they regard cordial relations with the Iranians as a means of guarding against potential Iranian meddling. In addition, the Turks have significant economic and energy interests in Iran. Trade between the two countries exceeded $4 billion by the end of 2005, and in a deal extending until 2022, Iran supplies Turkey with 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually. The energy agreement has, however, been a source of tension between the two countries. In late January 2006, the flow of gas from Iran to Turkey inexplicably dropped by 70 percent. Tehran blamed the decrease on technical problems, but the Turks remain wary of what they perceive to be Iran’s use of gas as a lever to intimidate Turkey at the same time that Ankara’s Western partners seek sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. Despite the dispute over gas supplies, Ankara and Tehran have sought to maintain good relations. In late February 2006, the eleventh Iran-Turkey High Security Council met in Tehran. This bilateral meeting, which was presided over at the deputy minister level, reaffirmed Turkish-Iranian trade relations and included discussions concerning border security and drug smuggling. Finally, the same logic that is driving close relations between Ankara and Damascus is at work in Turkey’s relations with Iran: the common desire to forestall Kurdish independence in northern Iraq. Like Turkey and Syria, Iran has a large Kurdish population that could agitate for political rights should Iraq’s Kurds achieve independence

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Turkey increasingly supports Iran’s nuclear program

Coughlin 6/10 (Con, a world-renowned expert on the Middle East and Islamic terrorism, Telegraph, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100043002/turkeys-alliance-with-iran-is-a-threat-to-world-peace/)

Turkey’s decision to veto the latest U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran should be of concern for all those, like me, who desire a peaceful resolution of the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme. The Turks are apparently upset that the West has not responded positively to the nuclear deal it recently negotiated with Iran, with Brazil’s assistance, whereby Tehran would ship some of its stockpile of enriched uranium to Ankara in return for fuel rods for its so-called research reactor in Tehran. In fact this deal was nothing more than a watered-down version of the agreement Iran negotiated with the world’s leading powers in Geneva last year, and then reneged upon. Crucially, it made no provision for Iran to call a halt to the controversial uranium enrichment programme at Natanz that allows it to produce another 100 kilos of fissile material each month. (Iran now has about 2.5 tons of enriched uranium, more than enough to make an atom bomb.) But the Iran-Turkey deal is indicative of a far more worrying trend in relations between the two countries. I now gather that Iranian officials were in close contact with the “aid” activists responsible for organising the flotilla that tried to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Turkey has, of course, become an increasingly vocal supporter of Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology in recent weeks, and my fear now that, having been thwarted in its attempts to negotiate an end to the nuclear crisis, it will be tempted to help Iran beat the new sanctions regime by smuggling goods across their joint border. This would be disastrous not just for the West, but for Turkey as well. If the sanctions fail, then the pressure will grow for more robust action to prevent Iran from achieving its aim of developing nuclear weapons. Does Turkey really want to be the country responsible for launching a war between Iran and the West? I sincerely hope not, and that Ankara comes to realise that, so far as its policy with Iran is concerned, it is playing with fire.

**Turkey is becoming more independent—Kurds, use of air bases, and Middle Eastern orientation**

Larrabee 8 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada479985&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

In the future, Turkey is likely to be a less predictable and more difficult ally. While it will continue to want good ties with the United States, Turkey is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the fallout from the crisis in Lebanon. As a result, the tension between Turkey’s Western identity and its Middle Eastern orientation is likely to grow. At the same time, the divergences between U.S. and Turkish interests that have manifested themselves over the last decade are likely to increase. Given its growing equities in the Middle East, Turkey is likely to be even more reluctant in the future to allow its bases, particularly Incirlik, to be used to undertake combat operations in the Middle East. President Özal’s willingness to allow the United States to fly sorties out of Incirlik during the Gulf War was the exception, not the rule. Since then, Turkey has increasingly restricted U.S. use of Incirlik for combat missions in the Middle East. The United States should therefore not count on being able to use Turkish bases, particularly Incirlik, as a staging area for combat operations in the Gulf and Middle East. Moreover, given the importance of the Kurdish issue for Turkish security, Turkey has strong reasons to pursue good ties with Iran and Syria, both of which share Turkey’s desire to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey’s growing energy ties with Iran have reinforced interest in that particular tie. Thus, Turkey is unlikely to support U.S. policies aimed at isolating Iran and Syria or overthrowing the regimes in either country. Rather, Ankara is likely to favor policies aimed at engaging Iran and Syria and to encourage the United States to open dialogues with both countries.

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Roots of tension are harder to solve than a simple change in policy

Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG899.pdf)

While some analysts have sought to blame the AKP for the growth of anti-Americanism, disenchantment with U.S. policy is widespread and is not limited to any one party. The growth of anti- Americanism is visible across the entire Turkish political spectrum. This is well illustrated by the political evolution of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition party. Traditionally one of the most pro-Western and pro-American parties in Turkey, the CHP has since 2003 increasingly adopted a more nationalistic and anti- American tone, largely in reaction to U.S. policy in Iraq and to the reluctance of the United States to support Turkey’s struggle against the PKK more actively. Significantly, the change in U.S. policy since late 2007 (discussed in more detail in a later section) has led to only a slight decline in Turkish anti-American sentiment.7 Turkey remains one of the most anti- American counties in the world. The “Obama bounce,” visible elsewhere in Europe, has been considerably weaker in Turkey. This suggests that disenchantment with the United States in Turkey has deep roots and reflects more than simple dissatisfaction with U.S. policy toward Iraq and the PKK. Thus, regaining support for U.S. policy in Turkey is likely to take longer and prove more difficult than elsewhere in Europe.8