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Exploration and Development policies are anthropocentric, viewing outer space through a lens of purely instrumental value while treating the Earth as a disposable commodity

Viikari, Researcher, Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, 8

(Lotta, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future, p.52-54, Google Books)

Human space activities involve a variety of risks that can be termed environmental. The detrimental effects may concern the space environment per se, the atmosphere, the Earth, and/or human activities in these environments. The worst-case scenario includes danger even to terrestrial life. Admittedly, health risks posed by space activities to humans on Earth in particular may seem rather hypothetical at the moment. However, the situation may change dramatically—at least faster than the international community is currently able to react effectively, as already demonstrated by the space debris problem.

Environmental problems related to the use of outer space are mostly considered detrimental because of their negative impacts on human activities in economic and health terms: environmental degradation is harmful for current space utilization, can compromise potential future uses of outer space, or may impair the integrity of scientific investigation, for instance. Despite these human-centered perceptions, some also share a less anthropocentric concern for the changes our activities cause in the natural environment of outer space in many ways. For example, the Moon has no substantial atmosphere, weather or other natural processes which could effectively smooth its surface, meaning that even seemingly minor changes such as vehicle tracks and human footprints on the Moon are practically permanent.121 Concern for such changes is not very common, however. Furthermore, recent practices in space exploration have shown an alarming tendency towards recklessness. For instance, in 1999 the Lunar Prospector was targeted at the pristine lunar south pole, with the hope that the impact would liberate water molecules from suspected ice deposits. The Prospector had not been sterilized or actively decontaminated; what is more, it carried some cremated remains of lunar geologist Eugene Shoemaker.1"

In all likelihood, in the not too distant future we will witness a variety of new kinds of uses of outer space, all of which are not necessarily very benign from an environmental perspective. For instance, the launching of cremated human remains into Earth orbit is already even a business.123 Such deliberate launches of seemingly useless, potentially dangerous debris can hardly be considered a very sustainable use of outer space. They highlight the fact that, in addition to ascribing outer space little more than instrumental value for ourselves, we do not pay much attention to the rights of future generations.'2' The current extensive space utilization by satellites and other spacecraft has turned near-Earth outer space into one more environment impaired by the greed of the present generation. As space exploration expands further into outer space and takes more extensive forms, such as construction of permanent facilities and the utilization of natural resources for the support of missions, anthropogenic alterations of this environment and the related hazards will be of an order of magnitude far greater than those seen today.125

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This failure to (re)situate the human in the ecological and the non-human in the ethical makes risks all survival

Hintz, Department of Geography, University of Kentucky, 3

(Reviewed by John G., Human Ecology Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003, p.77-78, http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her101/101bookreviews.pdf

In the introductory chapter of EC. Plumwood lays out two challenges to be met if a transition to an environmental culture is to be successful. The first of these is "the (re)situating of the human in ecological terms"1 (p. 8). The second challenge is "the (re)situating of the non-human in ethical terms" (p. 8). What she is proposing, then, is a human ecology coupled with a non-anthropocentric ecological ethics. The ambitious breadth of the book should by now be quite clear. Few academics have attempted the scope of EC in an entire career, much less within one book. It is perhaps the scope of the book that makes it somewhat difficult to digest when read cover-to-cover. This is understandable, however, as it would be all but impossible to finalize the tasks set forth in EC in less than three hundred pages (or three thousand, for that matter). That being said, each individual section of the book is tight, effective, and convincing, and as such EC should make an excellent reference book and jumping-off point for students and academics in a variety of disciplines.

As the focus of the book is the ecological crisis of con­temporary Western society, one primary target of critique is (quite logically) science. For Plumwood. too much science has become a "form of monological and dualistic thinking, [where scientists] set themselves radically apart from objects of knowledge in a way that refuses objects elements of com­monality, mind, or intentionality" (p. 45). Under this ratio­nalist gaze, nature becomes not just objectified, wholly knowable. and technologically manageable, but literally replicable and replaceable as well. Such thinking is inherent­ly anti-ecological, overlooking (or ignoring) humanity's embeddedness in and interconnectedness with non-human nature. While this may be preaching to the congregation for many ecologists, Plumwood sees the dualistic model of sci­ence as actually increasingly its reach. With, for example, four out of five scientists now employed by corporations, sci­ence becomes less about *understanding* and more about *manipulating.* Knowledge acquisition is increasingly justi­fied solely along *instrumental* concerns.

Plumwood's critique goes well beyond social justice advocacy, however. Her concern for marginalized human social groups is mirrored by an equally sincere concern for non-human nature. In EC, Plumwood develops an exhaustive and sophisticated critique of anthropocentrism. In the same manner that radically rationalistic science can dismiss or ignore the concerns of marginalized human groups (seeing itself as privileged, as different), the "reason-centered" Western worldview fully bifurcates the world into separate realms of active, knowing 'subjects\* and passive, knowable 'objects.' The result is a "radical discontinuity'1 between humans (as the sole possessors of reason) and non-human nature (p. 100).

Plumwood lays out four ways in which this dualistic human-centeredness is inherently anti-ecological and radical-ly hubristic. Firstly, it justifies an ethics that fails to cross the "human-species boundary" (p. 105). All nature is homogenous in its lack of consciousness and therefore not subject to the ethical considerations that guide human relationships. Secondly, the human dependency upon nature is "backgrounded" or denied. Ecology becomes a mere "technological problem to be overcome" (p. 105), and a false sense of human autonomy thus develops. Thirdly, nature — which can only be defined by what it lacks in its non-humanness — becomes a purely negative space (lacking culture, lacking cultivation, lacking "improvements," etc.). Finally, nature's independent agency is erased, and its value can only be assessed where it coincides with human interests. These "blindspots of centrism and human self-enclosure" must be overcome if there is to be any hope "for both our own and nature's survival in an age of ecological limits" (p. 122).

1NC

Vote negative - Only through the alt can we as a species begin a self-reflection on our place in the universe and allow for an ethical transition

Peters, Professor Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Hung Department of Education, National Chiayi University, Taiwan, 09

(Michael A and Ruyu, Policy Futures in Education Volume 7 Number 3 2009, “Solar Ethics: a new paradigm for environmental ethics and education?,” <http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=7&issue=3&year=2009&article=5_Peters_PFIE_7_3_web>) page 327 accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

The solar system, consisting of our Sun and other celestial objects including planets, moons, dwarf planets and billions of small bodies, has been known since the sixteenth century. However, the replacement of geocentrism by heliocentrism in astronomy has not occurred in ethics. In the ethical field, human beings are the egocentric agent-dominators. Although there has been a call for biocentric or ecocentric ethics based on a critique of anthropocentrism, the biocentric or ecocentric view is still grounded on Earth. If the massive knowledge concerning our universe accumulated in the past centuries could help human beings to broaden their vision, to attempt to resituate themselves in a broader context, and try to image themselves as a (post-)modern cosmologist, the solar system might be an appropriate starting point. The first appeal of solar ethics is to ask Homo sapiens to taken themselves as members of the solar system. It is a request to examine our human self-position, self-location, self-knowledge and self-identification: how human beings conceive of themselves implies their understanding of the place where they are situated, more or less, explicitly or implicitly. Thus the primary significance of solar ethics is to call for an imagination of taking the solar system as an ethical frame of mind, which means the solar system may inspire us to reconceive human moral responsibility, decision and action. Some doubts might be cast on our solar ethics. First of all, its tenability could be in dispute as our solar system seems to be hardly influenced by human beings; the dynamics of Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and the other planets seems not (or not yet) to be subject to change by any human behaviours on Earth. Then it is unnecessary to take the whole solar system into our ethical consideration. This objection might be plausible in some respects, but it is limited in some other respects. We are proposing a thinking experiment, testing the meaning of the ideas of ethics, moral agent, moral responsibility, moral action, and moral decision. Is it necessary for an individual to have the same capability of a particular moral community to be included as a participant? If it is the case, then it is dubious to take children as moral agents, let alone future generations, nonhuman animals and nonliving environments because they are objects that cannot have equal interaction with or interinfluence us. Therefore, equal interaction or inter-influence is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition for an object to be included in a moral community. In this sense, the solar system can be included as a significant factor when we are making moral decisions. Furthermore, some might argue that children, as immature human beings, are ‘potential’ moral agents so that they are members of a human moral community; while the nonhuman and nonliving beings, that is non-potential moral agents, such as animals and environments, cannot be moral agents, potentially and actually, thus they could not be part of human ethics. In response to the objection above, we might suggest non-potential moral agents can be taken into moral consideration in the following two respects: consequentialist and deontological. Firstly, the conservation or protection of non-potential agents could result in benefits to human well-being. In this sense, the rights of nature or environmental rights, for example, are understood as the human rights to a safe or healthy environment (Nickel, 1993; Nickel & Viola, 1994). Secondly, the rightness of the actions themselves, rather than the consequences of the actions, is the core of moral consideration. It does not mean that we ignore the consequences of actions, but rather that the criteria for judging rightness or wrongness and evaluation hinge on the actions themselves to a larger extent. In this sense, environmental protection is supported for the sake of the action itself.

\*\*\*Links\*\*\*

Link – Space Exploration

Callicott, professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, 86

(J. Baird, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove)

In the still vital mythic human mind of the present age, the Space Age as it is often called, space exploration is portrayed essentially as a geometrical and techno¬logical projection of the European expeditions to the New World in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries—just as those explorations were mythically portrayed by the explorers themselves and their contem-poraries in terms of still earlier paradigms.1 Columbus, Cortez, and De Soto saw themselves as knights em¬barked upon a quest—if not for the Holy Grail, for the fabulous wealth of the Orient, the Fountain of Youth, or the lost Eden. They traversed a relatively vast ocean in relatively primitive and puny craft. The bold imagination and heroic temerity of the discoverers paid off, though not in terms of what they themselves actually sought. In fact they found vast new lands, populated by exotic flora and fauna and strange human beings. The fabulous me¬dieval-biblical mythic portrayal of the discovery of the New World eventually gave way to the pedestrian reality of conquest, colonization, domestication, exploitation, and intercontinental commerce.

Today we see interplanetary space as a larger, emp¬tier ocean, our current spacecraft as the Nina, Pinia, and Santa Maria and the planets as so many new continents. We expect to find no fountains of youth, cities of gold, or Edenic paradises (silly illusions of a bygone age) on Venus, Mars, or the moons of Jupiter and Saturn, but we do seriously entertain farming, mining, and colonizing our Sun's planets or those of some other. We project routine transport and commerce between worlds.2 Why? Partly just because we can, or think we can, but more practically because we must if our civilization is to have the resources and the real estate to continue to grow. Just like Europeans of the previous centuries who, after overpopulating Europe and overtaxing the natural re¬sources of that continent, moved their operations to the Americas and Australia and so avoided the conse¬quences, we will, upon overpopulating and exhausting Earth's resources, move our operations to new New Worlds with the same impunity.

I personally regard the prevailing notions of routine space travel and extraterrestrial-resource and real-estate development with their implicit supposition of a throw-away Earth as no less vacuous and no less potentially tragic illusions than those of the most extravagant Span¬ish conquistadores.3 The reality our adventures in space will disclose, I predict, and the sooner we realize it the better, is that we are, for all practical purposes, earth¬bound. Human life is evolved from, specifically adapted to, presently embedded in, integrated with, and utterly-dependent upon the exact and unimaginably complex physical, chemical, and biological conditions of the planet Earth. The realization and affirmation of our earthiness, our inseparability from the Earth, should be, and hopefully soon will be, the biggest payoff of space exploration. Europeans readily adapted North America to European patterns of settlement, methods of agricul¬ture, and manufacturing. South America and Australia have been somewhat less tractable. Humans will not find the Sun's other planets remotely so hospitable and sub¬missive.4 And interstellar exploration, discovery, and colonization is, as I shall explain, ruled out by the limita¬tions of physical laws, the statistical improbability of Earth-like planets in accessible regions of the galaxy, and the sheer immensities of cosmic spatiotemporal dimen¬sions in proportion to the relatively brief duration of a human lifetime.

Link – Space Exploration

Callicott, professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, 86

(J. Baird, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove)

I begin with this prevailing contemporary mythic representation of space travel and planetary exploration as a projection of earlier ocean navigation and continen¬tal exploration, because I believe it substantially shapes our uncritical expectation of what it would mean to find and interact with extraterrestrial life. In the most puerile and jejune science fiction—the pervasive popularity of which suggests, however, an implicit general credulity of its structural premises—our "starships" (with such revealing names as Enterprise) island hop among an ar¬chipelago of planets inhabited by only slightly strange-looking people in futuristic get-ups, or period costumes as the case may be. These planets and their unfortunate populations are often ruled by merciless, unearthly Ori¬ental potentates or beautiful, but bad, Eurasian seduc¬tresses. Our guys vanquish theirs and thus help make the universe safe for democracy and either native or colonial bourgeois developers and entrepreneurs.

But these silly fantasies occur only in the Buck Rog¬ers, Flash Gordon, Star Trek, and Star Wars type of science fiction, don't they? They also occur in the sup¬posedly more sophisticated specimens of the genre, of which Dune is the most celebrated representative.5 What is more astonishing and irresponsible, since it is not represented as science fiction but as scienceperie, is that equally fantastic notions are rife at the highest levels of scientific inquiry into the possibility of extraterrestrial life. Notice how A. Thomas Young, then Deputy Director of NASA's Ames Research Center and now Director of Goddard Space Flight Center, conflates life with human life:

We know of only one existence of life in the universe —that being ourselves on planet Earth. We know that our Earth is an enormously small part of our Universe. A perplexing question evolves as to whether life abounds [in the universe] or are we unique.6

Actually, it is most probably the case both that we— human beings—are unique and that life abounds else¬where in the universe. Young seems not only not to have thought of this possibility, but he gives no thought either to the ten to thirty million other species that with us comprise life on this planet. The explanation for this omission, I conjecture, lies probably in Young's partici¬pation in the now obsolete mechanistic world view pio¬neered by Descartes, whose conceptual segregation of living mankind from merely mechanical plants and ani¬mals has been compounded by subsequent militant hu¬manism and human technological self-insulation from nature.

Link – Space Development

Viikari, Researcher, Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, 8

(Lotta, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future, p.17 -18, Google Books)

The anthropocentric slant of the space sector derives from the historical phenomenon of industrial development. All human activities in outer space have been made possible by achievements of technology. Accordingly, the ideology prevailing within the modern space sector emanates from the fundamental concepts which this industrial tradition entails, above all the myth of unlimited industrial development. In such a setting, nature equals resources—resources which can be utilized to promote further industrial development. In a way. these resources are taken for granted; industrial development is dependent on technical and economic capacities rather than on the natural resource base— despite the fact that many natural resources are in fact limited.51 In the space sector, the limitedncss of the outer space resources which we are currently capable of utilizing cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the total resource base of outer space seems quite unlimited (to our understanding at least).52 It has even been hoped that space resources will provide a solution to the increasing shortage of resources found on Earth. The faster our technology improves, the more feasible the utilization of outer space becomes—and we surely seem eager to take all available advantage of it. Ultimately, the ideology of industrial development is based on the (absurd) thought that human society is able to achieve independence from nature. At the moment, the inherent extreme hostility of the space environment to humans still places significant restrictions on space activities, keeping us 'at the mercy' of this environment. However, the (increasingly realistic) visions of permanent space colonies, for instance, clearly reflect the familiar ideology of humans as masters of nature—even in outer space."

In keeping with the ideology of industrial development, the answers proposed to environmental problems such as resource depletion and pollution typically rely on scientific progress, better technologies (technology being the application of science") and better policies: further scientific, technological and political development is suggested to solve the very problems that development is causing.5'' This is true also in the space sector where the root causes to environmental problems created by space activities are often ignored. That is by no means surprising, considering the inherent connection between technological development and the use of outer space. Moreover, modern space activities are a large and multinational business, and large-scale industries typically result in accelerated environmental destruction. The salient ideology in the space business revolves around the maximization of economic profit. While recognized as valuable objectives, waste reduction, risk management, pollution control, energy efficiency, and the like should not cut into growth; on the contrary, if at all possible, they should enhance growth.57 This, however, often is an impossible goal.

Link - Human Spaceflight/Colonization

Spaceflight and colonization risk devastating contaminations

Viikari, Researcher, Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, 8

(Lotta, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future, p.51-2, Google Books)

The introduction of terrestrial substances onto a celestial body, for instance, could permanently jeopardize the existence of possible indigenous life forms. If such life were to exist, interaction with organic substances from Earth could cause mutations, destroy the indigenous life forms or otherwise alter the natural development of life on the celestial body. Terrestrial contaminants could cause deleterious environmental consequences to celestial environments in many other ways, too. Analogously, extraterrestrial substances, transported via satellites or other spacecraft, might cause equally catastrophic consequences on Earth or in inhabited space tacilitics.11" Furthermore, the re-introduction to terrestrial surroundings of Earth organisms possibly mutated during a space mission— through irradiation, for instance—might have dramatic consequences. Although such threats obviously pertain mainly to space missions involving the landing of a spacecraft on a celestial body, it is at least theoretically possible that orbiting space objects could also introduce harmful organic substances into outer space, and possibly back to Earth if they return. Although there is no consensus among the scientific community on the threat of cross-contamination risks, the possibility of exobiological contamination from space activities cannot be excluded from potential scenarios either. Traditionally, main concern regarding biological contamination of non-Earth environments has not, however, been primarily an environmental one but rather one about the integrity of scientific experiments.'20

Link - Get off the Rock/Space Manufacturing

Space manufacturing treats Earth as disposable planet

Byerly, former staff director of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the U.S. House of Representatives, 86

(Radford, Jr., p.91, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove)

Finally, the NASA report suggests that a space manu-facturing facility would have major social and philosoph¬ical benefits. The report states that "the spirit of the American people has taken an introspective turn. Many are no longer convinced that unexplored horizons still exist. Predictions of global calamity are commonplace . . . however, establishing an SMF opens new horizons with the recognition that planet Earth is just one poten-tial source of matter and energy. Recognition of the availability of lunar and asteroidal materials and the abundant energy of the Sun can revitalize the traditional American belief in growth as a positive good and can generate a new spirit of adventure and optimism. It is unnecessary to speculate on the directions of growth and its various dimensions because it is clear that American society would continue its historic tradition of exploring new horizons and avoiding stagnation in an ever-chang¬ing Universe." In other words, manifest destiny can be resurrected. Let me quote a little more on the putative social benefits of a space manufacturing facility: "On a more fundamental level, the proposed mission is spe¬cies-survival oriented. Earth might at any time become suddenly uninhabitable through global war, disease, pol¬lution or other man-made or natural catastrophies. A recent study has shown that an asteroid collision with Earth could virtually turn off photosynthesis for up to five years ... the proposed mission assures the continued survival of the human species by providing an extra¬terrestrial refuge for mankind. An SMF would stand as constant proof that the fate of all humanity is not inextri¬cably tied to the ultimate fate of Earth."

These words generate several reactions. On the one hand, their naivete is charming. They recall the New Yorker cartoon by James Thurbcr in which a host—one who today would be called an arrived "yuppie"—is serv¬ing wine to his dinner guests. He says, "It's a naive little wine, but I think you'll be amused by its impertinence." Optimism is good; if we don't have some optimism we will spiral downward in negativism. On the other hand, the report is striking in its naivete. Its authors seem totally oblivious of the fact that we already have a per¬fectly good space manufacturing facility, one to which we are well adapted. It is called Earth, and we could, if we chose, take care of it. Thus, the authors completely ig¬nore the basic question: If we can't learn how to take care of Earth, then how can we learn how to take care of a space manufacturing facility in orbit around Earth?

Link – Extinction on Earth Inevitable

Their depiction of inevitable extinction of Earth depicts space as an endless frontier of available resources

Billings, Research Associate at SETI Institute, 7 (Linda, PhD,, Societal Impact of Space Flight, p. 486-487)

Author Ishmael Reed has made the link between progress and spaceflight in an essay called "Progress: A Faustian Bargain": In order to justify its programs, NASA, in its brochures, describes the Earth as a dying planet, a fact which for them justifies colonizing the universe . . . .You can understand why, in many science fiction movies, the goal of the invaders is to destroy this planet, lest this progress be extended to their neighborhoods.15 Historically and presently, the rhetoric of space advocacy advances a conception of outer space as a place of wide-open spaces and limitless resources—a space frontier. The metaphor of the frontier, with its associated images of pioneering, homesteading, claim-staking, and taming, has been persistent in American history. In the rhetoric of spaceflight advocacy, the idea of the frontier is a dominant metaphor. It is worth noting that the root of the word "frontier" is the Old French word for "front." In the English language, that word "front" conveys a complex of meanings, ranging from the most common definition—the part of anything that faces forward—to the definition that probably comes closest to the meaning of "front" in "frontier": an area of activity, conflict, or competition. A common military definition of 'front" is also tied up in the meaning of "frontier." that is, the area of contact between opposing combat forces. Other meanings of "front" that should be considered in assessing the meaning of the frontier metaphor are: a facade; a position of leadership or authority; and a person or thing that serves as a cover for secret, disreputable, or illegal activity. What meanings are advocates intending to convey, and what meanings are they in fact conveying, when they talk about the space frontier?"' Historian Frederick Jackson Turner's century-old essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" is perhaps the best-known articulation of the frontier metaphor.17 It is a powerful and evocative piece of writing. In making the case for spaceflight, advocates continue to cite, directly or indirectly, Turner s frontier thesis and the related, potentially dangerous, idea of manifest destiny, seemingly oblivious to a changed cultural context and critiques of Turners thinking. As Wright and Sale did with progress, Richard Slotkin, in his trilogy of books about the history of the American West, has deemed the idea of the frontier a myth—a myth in which the United States is "a wide-open land of unlimited opportunity for the strong, ambitious self-reliant individual to thrust his way to the top."'\* Patricia Nelson Limerick has pointed out that space advocates cling to the frontier metaphor, conceiving "American history [as] a straight line, a vector of inevitability and manifest destiny linking the westward expansion of Anglo-Americans directly to the exploration and colonization of space." Limerick has warned that in abusing this metaphor,"[S]pace advocates have built their plans for the future on the foundation of a deeply flawed understanding of the past, |and[ the blinders worn to screen the past have proven to be just as effective at distorting the view of the future."1''

Viewing the Earth as disposable is an ethical crime

Billings, George Washington University research professor, 7-19-10

(Linda, “Should we care about other planets?” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1665/1> accessed:07-06-11)TJL

One of the worst, and most common, rationales put forth for human expansion into space is to ensure that humankind survives, if and when Earth can no longer sustain us. If we can’t even keep our own house clean, we have no business going elsewhere, let alone staying…

Link – Nuclear/Ecological Catastrophe

**Bryant,University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 55) TJL

The re-visioned Earth posited by the environmentalists was suffused with this discourse of survival. A pervasive nervousness about the fate of humanity seemed to issue naturally from the nuclear culture within which the U.S. manned space program, the image of the Earth from outer space and the environmental movement itself came into being. Adlai Stevenson's application of the spaceship metaphor before the United Nations invoked both the environmental and nuclear dangers threatening humankind. Likewise, Barbara Ward identified "potential nuclear destruction" as one of the factors giving Earth the "intimacy and vulnerability of a spaceship." The characterization of Earth as frail and vulnerable automatically implied these nuclear and environmental threats. In an important sense, nuclear annihilation represented nothing so much as the ultimate ecological catastrophe.

Viewing the Earth as a spaceship that humans must pilot only reifies the anthropocentrism of the status quo

**Bryant,University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 53) TJL

Apart from the irony behind the spaceship metaphor, there was also the issue of the metaphor itself. In the logic of Spaceship Earth, spaceships seem more Earth-like, perhaps more naturalized and less artificial. At the same time, Earth becomes more like a spaceship—that is, more like a product of human technology, to be operated and even fixed by humans armed with the proper manual. Further, the main purpose of its existence is to carry humans about and provide for their needs. Effectively, the Earth is seen as the instrument of humankind.

Link – Resources

Status quo ideology views everything as a commodity

Naess, Deep Ecology Founder,3

(Arne, Environmental Ethics An Anthology, Ed. Light and West, p. 265 Google Books)

Economic growth as it is conceived of and implemented today by the industrial states is incompatible with points (1) through (5). There is only a faint resemblance between ideal sustainable forms of economic growth and the present policies of industrial societies. Present ideology tends to value things because they are scarce and because they have a commodity value. There is prestige in vast consumption and waste (to mention only several relevant factors).

Must resist depiction of the more than human world as simply resources to be fragmented and consumed

Naess, Deep Ecology Founder, 3

(Arne, Environmental Ethics An Anthology, Ed. Light and West, p. 268 Google Books)

Shallow Approach: Landscapes, ecosystems, rivers, and other whole entities of nature are conceptually cut into fragments, thus disregarding larger units and comprehensive gestalts. These fragments are regarded as the properties and resources of individuals, organizations or states. Conservation is argued in terms of "multiple use" and "cost/benefit analysis." The social costs and long-term global ecological costs of resource extraction and use are usually not considered. Wildlife management is conceived of as conserving nature for "future generations of humans." Soil erosion or the deterioration of ground water quality, for example, is noted as a human loss, but a strong belief in future technological progress makes deep changes seem unnecessary. Deep Approach: The earth does not belong to humans. For example, the Norwegian landscapes, rivers, flora and fauna, and the neighboring sea are not the property of Norwegians. Similarly, the oil under the North Sea or ans should defer to the latter. The ecological destruction now going on will not be cured by a technological fix. Current arrogant notions in industrial (and other) societies must be resisted. anywhere else does not belong to any state or to humanity. And the "free nature" surrounding a local community does not belong to the local community. Humans only inhabit the lands, using resources to satisfy vital needs. And if their non-vital needs come in conflict with the vital needs of nonhumans, then hum

Link - Self Replicating Space Manufacturing

Self-replicating manufacturing colonizes the universe

Byerly, former staff director of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the U.S. House of Representatives, 86

(Radford, Jr., p.91-93, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove)

The second activity that the NASA conference con¬sidered was a "self-replicating lunar factory." The argu-ment is that as terrestrial resources are consumed, the development of an industrial capacity on the Moon becomes increasingly desirable. "Given the expense and danger associated with the use of human workers in such a remote location, the production environment of a lunar manufacturing facility (LMF) should be automated to the highest degree feasible." The conference, how¬ever, saw a problem in that such facilities would wear out and become obsolete. Therefore, it was proposed that these facilities would be self-replicating. That is, the LMF would be "capable of constructing duplicates of itself, which would themselves be capable of further rep¬lication." According to the NASA report, this opens great possibilities. They see that "the initial LMF may be viewed as the first step in a demonstration-development scenario leading to an indefinite process of automated exploration and utilization of nonterrestrial resources." These replicating factories would be able to make "space probes, planetary landers, and transportable 'seed' fac-tories for siting on the surfaces of other worlds." There is more than a suggestion that interstellar exploration could be carried out on a grand scale by these automa¬tons. This leads one to question whether such activities would qualify as space exploration. From the point of view that "the most fundamental role for human beings in space is, simply, to be there,"40 the answer would be negative. One could ask whether or not turning such automatons loose into space would not amount to the most pungent example of mindless progress ever envi¬sioned. To the credit of writers of this report, they do acknowledge that the use of such self-replicating systems on Earth would pose "many problems." They say "a com¬pact, freely replicating system released on the surface of the Earth potentially could compete with humans for resources such as living space and energy. It could also smother us in its waste products." However, we are assured that there is nothing to worry about, because when these machines usher in the age of plenty, "human soci¬ety will be sufficiently wealthy to regard environmental integrity and beauty as indispensable outputs of any manufacturing system. These functions may be designed into machines as a matter of course." If this means that the use of such SRS will be postponed until we fully understand how the Earth functions as a living system, then by that time humans also should have made a great deal of social progress and may even be able to deal with the more difficult problems of how humans will interact with such machines and with each other. In other words, the problem is not achieving sufficient wealth, rather sufficient wisdom.

Link - Solar Power Satellites

Solar power satellites have a negative environmental impact

Viikari, Researcher, Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, 8

(Lotta, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future, p.49 - 50, Google Books)

One still largely unpredictable source of environmental risks in space activities is the use of solar power satellites. Solar power satellites would collect solar energy in space, convert it first to electricity and then to microwave beams for transmission to Earth, where it would he reconverted into electricity. This would in principle be a non-polluting, practically unlimited power source.10' Solar power satellites can be positioned so that they receive constant direct sun light, which would enable the use of solar power also at night time and during less than optimal cloud conditions. Other advantages of solar power satellites are that there would be no need to use large terrestrial land areas, unlike with ground-based solar collectors.105

Solar power satellites may, however, have serious impacts on the space environment, and the possible transmission of solar power to Earth may not only harm the ozone layer but also impact life on the surface of the globe directly. Furthermore, it could result in harmful electromagnetic interference with aerial navigation systems, for instance, 106 of particular concern is the long-term impact of exposure on humans and biota on the ground in the receiving area and in the airspace that the beams transverse.'0. Exploitation of solar power will also require orbital positions for the satellites, which will be potentially very large in size'"8 and thus more susceptible to collisions than smaller space objects.xm It is likely that not all of the risks connected to the utilization of solar power satellites are even known in detail yet. Moreover, later on, lunar materials are likely to be used for the construction of solar power satellites and solar cells. This would entail new kinds of environmental concerns. Considering in particular the plans to establish permanent lunar colonics."" and the fact that a research group has already managed to use simulated moon dust to make a key component of a working solar cell.1" such concerns might become topical surprisingly soon.

Link - SETI

Lack of terrestrial intelligence programs demonstrates anthropocentris of SETI

Callicott, professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, 86

(J. Baird, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove)

In the face of this sort of giddy enthusiasm for com¬municating with "intelligent life" on other planets, it is both sobering and irritating to observe that those involved in SETI, the search for extraterrestrial intelli¬gence, have not first established—as a kind of prelimi¬nary benchmark or data base, so that they would have some idea of what communicating with an exotic intelli¬gence would be like—communication with nonhuman forms of intelligent life on Earth. Cetaceans carry the biggest brains on this planet, with richly fissured cerebral cortexes and a brain-to-body weight ratio comparable to that of humans.8 Like us they are social mammals. But they live in an environment, relatively speaking, very different from ours. Hence, theirs is a world apart from ours, a terrestrial analog of an extraterrestrial environ¬ment. And they engage, apparently, in complex vocal communication, of which we to date understand not one word—or rather click, grunt, or whistle.9 What this omission reveals is not only an arrogant disregard for nonhuman terrestrial intelligence; it also clearly shows that by "extraterrestrial intelligence" those involved in SETI mean something very like, if not identical to, human intelligence.

Link – Mars Colonization

**Hubris to advocate human colonization of Mars**

**Sparrow, PhD Candidate Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia National University, 99**

(Robert, Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia, “The Ethics of Terraforming,” <http://arts.monash.edu.au/bioethics/staff/papers/rsparrow-envireth-terraforming.pdf>, Environmental Ethics Volume 21, Number 3 - 1999) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

Second, we might attempt more directly to flesh out the idea of our own proper human place.

We could try to gain a sense of possible limits to the ambitions which are appropriate to human beings. When considering terraforming, because the limit we are considering here is the physical limit of being confined to a single planet, it seems fair to invoke the metaphor of our proper place in a spatial sense. However, this metaphor can also be understood more generally to pose the question of our proper place in the scheme of things or the limits of the sphere of human activity .26To say that some location or area is our proper place is not an empty thought. It implies a certain relation of appropriateness in our presence there. A proper place is one in which one can flourish without too much of a struggle. It is one that we can live in and sustain. It is a place in which one fits and does not appear uncomfortable or out of place. It is prima facie implausible to suggest that Mars is our proper place. The vast amount of effort required for us to sustain a presence there, even to the point of entirely transforming the planet, indicates that it is not a natural environment for us. Our presence there would be analogous to that of a penguin in the Sahara or a rabbit underwater. If we have to wear space suits to visit and to completely remodel it in order to stay, then it's simply not our place. Another way to try to understand our proper place is by relating it to the idea of a home. It seems natural to say of most creatures, at least as individuals and perhaps as species, that they have a home. This is a place which nurtures them, in which they grow up, reproduce and which offers them some semblance of safety. It is difficult to say of human beings collectively, who have colonized all reaches of the globe, where our home is. But "Earth" looks like a plausible answer. Planets seem to have a certain status as possible homes for creatures because of their nature as whole systems on which life can evolve. The relation between the idea of a home and the idea of our proper place that I am suggesting is an ethical one. Our proper place is at home until we have shown that wc are mature enough to leave it. Whether or not people are ready to leave home depends on how well they live at home and how they look after that home. On this last, the human species does not look well qualified to start moving out to other planets.

We must show that we are capable of looking after our current home before we could claim to have any place on another. For the moment, at least, our proper place is on Earth and the desire to colonize other planets is indicative of hubris.

Link – Mars

Their epistemology is flawed because their lack of exposure has created a skewed view as to what constitutes “life”, allowing destructive policies to proliferate-new discoveries prove

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas, 2008

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg144-145)TJL

Beside Earth, the most likely place in our galaxy to support life is Mars (McKay 1982). There are two possibilities here: either there is currently life of some sort on Mars, or the planet is abiotic but could, with modifications, support future life. Currently Mars is thought to be far too cold and dry to allow the sort of life found on Earth, but this con- clusion could be wrong. Scientists’ understanding of life is necessarily limited to terrestrial biology; there is no real way to know what biochemical forms life might take elsewhere in the universe. Recent discoveries of extremophiles have proven that even on Earth life is remarkably persistent and can exist in extremely harsh environments. Microorganisms have been found a foot beneath the sands of the Chilean Atacaman Desert— one of the driest places on Earth and previously thought sterile (Mahoney 2004). Whole ecosystems thrive in hydrothermal vents 2000 meters below sea level, in complete absence of sunlight. Microbes discovered under ice in Greenland have survived at least 120,000 years (and perhaps as long as a million years) in subzero temperatures, low oxygen levels, and minimal nutrients (Britt 2004). Halobacteria live in highly concentrated saline environments such as those that might exist, or may have existed, in many locations on Mars (Landis 2001). These and other similar recent discoveries have renewed scientists’ hope that some form of life could survive the harsh Martian environment, either present or past.9

Link - Terraforming

Terraforming must be evaluated on ethical implications

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas, 2008

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg144-145)TJL

Of course, the issue of terraforming is not exclusively a scientific or technological one. Indeed, a number of talented scientists have noted that terraforming must be dealt with by those qualified to address ontological and theological questions about the nature of life (e.g., Haynes 1990).12 Few philosophers have approached the question—the majority of literature considering the ethics of such a project has been written by scientists. Those who have written about the ethical implications of terraforming (both scientists and philosophers) have tended to appeal to the intrinsic value issues involved in introducing terrestrial life to Mars. The questions usually take the following forms: Is life better than non-life? Is there value in nature absent the presence of life? Should we preserve the natural state of the red planet, or might we have an ethical obligation to populate the universe?

Terraforming Mars ignores the intrinsic value of even the inorganic systems that they have, creating an ethical dilemma that must be rejected

**Sparrow, PhD Candidate Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia National University, 99**

(Robert, Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia, “The Ethics of Terraforming,” <http://arts.monash.edu.au/bioethics/staff/papers/rsparrow-envireth-terraforming.pdf>, Environmental Ethics Volume 21, Number 3 - 1999) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

The ethics that I develop in what follows is agent-based. At first sight an agent-based virtue ethics looks like an extremely odd choice upon which to base conclusions in environmental ethics. Because it founds all of its ethical claims in claims about the way in which certain actions reveal the character of human hcings, such an ethics seems to be paradigmalically anthropocentric. However, given the primary example that I am examining in this paper, the tcrraforming of Mars, it is hard to sec where else we could found an ethics. I have already ruled out claims based on the sufferings or rights of other living things. The .only other possible source of obligation on us is the hypothetical and mysterious intrinsic value, which complex inorganic systems are sometimes said to possess.10 Given the many problems which beset claims about intrinsic value, the virtue ethical approach is at least worth a try." The advantage of an agent-based virtue ethics over the more familiar and less ambitious agent-focused ethics is that an agent-based approach avoids the need for any account of the value of complex inorganic systems. An agent-focused ethics still seems to require some account of the value of such systems, or why it might be wrong to alter them, which is available independently of its claims that a virtuous person would not do so. Although the only way to tell that it is wrong to act in a certain way toward the nonliving environment is that a virtuous person would not do it, the reason why the virtuous person would not act that way is because it is in fact independently wrong to do so (even if it is difficult to specify why). Thus, an agent-focused ethics seems to let claims about the moral status of inorganic systems in via the back door. By making the intuitions about the virtues fundamental, an agent-based ethics avoids this difficulty.12

Link - Terraforming

**The aff’s demands to terraform Mars reveals the moral flaws in the Status Quo. Even if life doesn’t exist on Mars, the action of using other worlds for personal gain is an ethical dilemma that must be rejected.**

**Sparrow, PhD Candidate Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia National University, 99**

(Robert, Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia, “The Ethics of Terraforming,” <http://arts.monash.edu.au/bioethics/staff/papers/rsparrow-envireth-terraforming.pdf>, Environmental Ethics Volume 21, Number 3 - 1999) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

To what moral considerations could we turn to give us cause to pause before we embark on this project, given that we can't use consequentialist or rights based calculations? As I have described the example (and deliberately so), there are no good arguments based on the interests of humans or even other living organisms for not terraforming Mars. The only thing slopping us from radically reshaping Mars—and in doing so destroying the character of a whole planet—is lack of technical knowhow. If true, this example reveals, I believe, a shocking moral bankruptcy at the heart of our attitude toward the environment. It suggests that we have no obligation to approach the world around us with a certain humility or respect: our obligations are only to the organisms which happen to live in it. Are there any ethical considerations then which might give us cause to resist terraforming? I believe that a significant set of reasons regarding projects such as tei in­forming can be found in the realm of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics directs our concern to the character of agents. It asks us to pay attention to the virtues and vices that we display through our actions.4 The particular virtue ethics that I wish to develop here draws on a distinction made by Michael Sloic between two varieties of virtue ethics which he calls "agent-focused" and "agent-based. ethics."5 Agent-focused virtue ethics are the familiar ethics of Aristotle and most contemporary virtue ethicists. According to this kind of ethics, if we wish to act rightly, rather than attempting to develop a theory of the good or of right action, we should cultivate the virtues. Despite the attention paid to the virtues, however, it is not an act's nature as a virtuous act that makes it right. For an agent-focused virtue ethics, the rightness or wrongness of an action is indepen­dent of the character of the actor and instead is presumably a function of states of affairs in the world or perhaps of some unspecifiable set of duties or obligations. The reference to the character of the agent is made necessary by the epistemology of ethical action. Only the virtuous person can perceive what the correct thing to do is in a morally complex situation. Thus, if we wish to act rightly in a particular instance, we should follow the example of the virtuous person and, if we wish to act rightly throughout our lives, we ourselves should cultivate the virtues. The acts that we perform, however, are acts of indepen­dent worth and retain their value even if they are performed out of different motives.6

Link - Terraforming

Terraforming further promotes the destruction of life for our own selfish needs

**Sparrow, PhD Candidate Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia National University, 99**

(Robert, Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia, “The Ethics of Terraforming,” <http://arts.monash.edu.au/bioethics/staff/papers/rsparrow-envireth-terraforming.pdf>, Environmental Ethics Volume 21, Number 3 - 1999) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

The first vice that terraforming would demonstrate in us is a reprehensible aesthetic insensitivity—on a massive scale. Destroying the unique natural landscape of an entire planet to turn it to our own purposes reveals us to be vandals and brutes. It shows that we lead impoverished lives, being unable to respond appropriately to the beauty which is in the world (and on the worlds) around us.14 The argument that the destruction of natural environments may reveal in us a problematic aesthetic insensitivity has been made before.15 What I wish to emphasize in my account, however, is that the virtue ethics I am applying allows that a vice may be demonstrated simply because of the character it reveals in the agent and regardless of any considerations of the consequences it may have. There arc two cases which suggest that an aesthetic insensitivity is a vice that may render the destruction (or neglect) of beauty wrong simply in itself. First, the act of destroying beauty is itself reprehensible independent of any consequences that may flow from it. Even if the beauty destroyed would replace itself, it would still be wrong to destroy it precisely because doing so demonstrates an aesthetic insensitivity. This claim is best illustrated by use of an example. Consider a person who goes hiking in the Snowy Mountains early one morning and discovers, by the edge of a cutting, a stunning array of icicles, a thing of great beauty, formed when the creek which ran over the cutting at that point froze over. Moreover, the hiker knows that this display is formed anew every night and occasionally disappears completely by the end of the day. He or she also knows that no one else will be hiking that path that day. Yet, isn't it still the case that if the hiker destroys the icicles, he or she will have demonstrated a significant defect of character and lessened him or herself as a person in doing so? The person who casually runs a stick across them, thus destroying them for no reason but a petty act of will, demonstrates an insensitivity to their beauty which is gross and disturbing. The destruction of the icicles suggests that the hiker has not seen them clearly. If the hiker had truly seen and comprehended their beauty, he or she could not have destroyed them. The fact that they were destroyed is not important here, except in that it points to the insensitivity of the vandal. What is significant is the blindness the hiker has displayed to beauty even though no one else may suffer from its loss. This blindness is a failing on the hiker's part. It is a vice. The second way in which one may demonstrate a troubling insensitivity to beauty, although without destroying it, is by using it for one's own purposes in ways that make no reference to its beauty. I illustrate this point by use of another example. Take the case of someone who finds an original Van Gogh— another "Sunflowers" on hardboard-—in the musty attic of his or her new house. Although this painting is an object of great—nay, extraordinary—beauty, our hypothetical discoverer merely glances at it, puts it aside, and later turns it upside down and places it on top of a crate in order to make a table on which he or she can store tins of paint. Let us suppose that doing so does not damage the painting in any way and that, because no one knew of the existence of this painting, nobody suffers any loss by virtue of its use in this fashion. Nonetheless, someone who acts in this way demonstrates that he or she is blind to the beauty of the world around him or her. The way in which someone sees the object is not the way he or she should sec it. Such a person neglects what any normal person would recognize as the most significant property of the painting—its beauty. This failure to recognize beauty is deplorable. In each of these examples, although the presence (and neglect) of beauty is necessary to demonstrate the existence of the vice, it is not the fact that beauty is destroyed or neglected that is the source of our condemnation. It is not the consequences of the action which arc significant. They are, in each case, benign. Instead, it is the character flaw itself which invites our disapproval. It is true that bad consequences may flow from the vice. For instance, we would lead impoverished lives if we could not see the beauty around us. However, this fact is not the reason we should avoid the vice. To be insensitive to beauty is deplorable simply in itself, regardless of the consequences that may follow from it.16

Links - Terraforming

Terraforming allows humans to “play god” with universe, leading to ecological disaster on a universal scale

**Sparrow, PhD Candidate Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia National University, 99**

(Robert, Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia, “The Ethics of Terraforming,” <http://arts.monash.edu.au/bioethics/staff/papers/rsparrow-envireth-terraforming.pdf>, Environmental Ethics Volume 21, Number 3 - 1999) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

Planetary engineering strikes me as a good candidate for the sort of project which would demonstrate hubris. We would be playing god. This sentiment is never far from the literature. The rhetoric of terraforming is quite self-consciously a rhetoric of transformation and transcendence. Terraforming is not just another project. It is a project that would make us world makers.22 It would mark the next stage of human destiny and the beginning of the conquest of space. But what about someone who denies that there are any limits on human activity? Someone who holds that there are no gods, no one to challenge, and that human beings can and should forge a glorious destiny? It is obviously unsatisfactory to rely on theistic claims about the proper place of humaniiy. For the argument to be convincing in modern circumstances, we must be able to give a non-thcistic account of hubris. There are two strategies we may pursue to develop such an account. The first and the easiest is to focus on the character and phenomenology of the vice of hubris. To do so, wc must provide a description of hubris as an attitude and show that the project of terraforming is both the result of and a source of such attitudes. As noted above, the proponents of terraforming often seem to demon­strate an attitude which is a good prima-facic candidate for hubris. Classically, hubris involves glorying in one's own powers, a false optimism about them, and a haste to put them to the test. A lack of self-knowledge and self-reflection is also characteristic of hubris, as is a dismissive attitude toward both critics and past failures. All of these traits are sometimes evidenced in the discussion of terraforming. The project attracts interest simply because it *is* so dramatic and because of the proof it could provide of the supremacy of human spirit and engineering skill. This enthusiasm for terraforming looks particularly damning in the light of past technological disasters on Earth. There is little self-reflection going on in the debate about terraforming, which is largely a technical debate about feasibility and methods and which allows little room for questions about why wc would want to engage in such a project.23

Failure to recognize our species own hubris will inevitably lead to a failure in terraforming

**Sparrow, PhD Candidate Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia National University, 99**

(Robert, Philosophy Program at Research School of Social Sciences of Australia, “The Ethics of Terraforming,” <http://arts.monash.edu.au/bioethics/staff/papers/rsparrow-envireth-terraforming.pdf>, Environmental Ethics Volume 21, Number 3 - 1999) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

The first moves indirectly toward an account of our limits by focusing on the nature of our actions and by arguing that certain features are characteristic of projects which seek to transcend our proper limits. There is often a significant relation between our actions and the projects they are part of. In the case of hubris, acts of hubris are usually large, dramatic, and unprecedented acts. They are usually punished by disaster. The pride and the fall go hand in hand. The possibility of disaster, then, of failure which would bring us low, operates as a sign of hubris. Terraforming certainly involves the possibility of catastrophic failure. Given the scale of the project and the amount of energy involved, failures are likely to be disastrous. Instead of a habitable planet, wc may produce one with a poisonous atmosphere or without water or lashed by continual typhoons. Indeed, given the amount of resources and human effort which would need to be dedicated to terraforming, anything other than complete success would be a disaster. Note that it is the possibility of disaster rather than its probability which is important here. I am not arguing that the risks are too great or that the costs of failure are too high

Instead, the possibility of a catastrophic failure which would reveal our ambitions as arrogant and futile acts as an indication that the project is one which oversteps the limits of our wisdom and abilities.

Links – Terraforming

Terraforming re-entrenches the belief that the universe is an object for us to use and manipulate

Lee, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, 94

(Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, Lancaster University, UK, “Awe and Humility: Intrinsic Value in Nature: Beyond an Earthbound Environmental Ethics,” <http://cseserv.engr.scu.edu/StudentAccounts/ENGR019Winter2003/DFlores/Keekok_Lee.pdf>, Cambridge Journals Volume: 36 (suppl., Pages: 89-101) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

As already argued, that conception rests on three strands—the No-Teleology, the Autonomy and the Asymmetry theses. Would these hold in the case of Mars? It is not obvious that they do not. For a sun to say that Man exists to serve human ends is more patently implausible than it is to claim that Earth does. Humans at least exist on Earth and have been evolved to do so. But Mars has no humans. Instead, with our advanced technology we threaten to, and probably could, transform it into an object of use to ourselves. But this possibility of instrumental value does not undermine, in any way. the contention that ig ntugw d'etre has nothing to do with' human ends. It exists for itself, no more and no less. It is botn an illusion and a fallacy to hold that whatever we humans happen to find useful, in the light of our technology, must have come into existence just for the purpose of serving our ends—or that its existence is to be justified solely in terms of su'-.h a purpose. The genesis of Mars long antedated the appearance of humans on Earth. Its continuing existence has nothing to do with humans. What happens there is totally independent of us. It might once have had water (as is speculated) but today it is said to be waterless. But neither state of affairs is due either to human effort or design. Earth's atmosphere, its biosphere upon which human survival and flourishing depends, in turn depend on Mars and other planets in the solar system rotating and exerting gravitational pull on one another in certain ways. So while the existence of humans depends on the existence of Mars, the existence of the latter would not be affected should humans, as a species on Earth, become extinguished. Awe and humility would then be the appropriate attitude to Mars, fceepjny 1 rf<p\*rrfiil Hitrance, from it :s also entailed However, satellites sent to probe its history, its composition, etc. merely to enlarge our knowledge about the workings of Nature,' past and present, would be consonant with such an attitude. But: any attempt to go beyond cognitive understanding would consti-/ tute a violation of our recognition that it has a value entirely inde-j pendent of ourselves which ought to constrain any impulse wel may have to make it over to our own design, to transform its status; as Nature to a status as Artefact.

Link – Planetary Development

Abiotic Earth-like planets have the same value as biotic places- oceans and mountains prove

Cockell Open University Professor of Geomicrobiology, 2006

(Charles S., “The Ethical Relevance of Earth-like Extrasolar Planets”, Environmental Ethics vol 28 pg 308-309 accessed:7-06-11 <http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=450>) TJL

The required holistic view of extrasolar planets gives them a unique ethical property. Our sense of respect for the planet and its life become linked into a single perspective. On Earth, for instance, we can respect life, but we can also respect inanimate objects such as mountain ranges and oceans as independent entities. Although it is possible for us to respect an extrasolar planet independent of its life, in practice the spectroscopic signatures of life will become bound into our view of the characteristics of that world. Thus, when we talk of the moral considerability of a life-bearing extrasolar planet, the life-bearing characteristic will have an overwhelming influence on our view of its moral considerability. For some extrasolar planets, life will become their defining characteristic, bound inseparably with their moral considerability as worlds. What of the case of lifeless Earth-like planets or at least those that display no obvious spectroscopic signature of life? The discovery of many lifeless Earthlike planets should equally be considered within an environmental ethic. Holmes Rolston, III provides a compelling case for preserving natural value in the Solar System, even for lifeless objects. One sentence within his essay, where he states that “the class of habitable places is only a subset of the class of valuable places,”12 summarizes succinctly the conclusion of his analysis. He holds that any natural place that has a proper name is worthy of respect. Since we can name extrasolar planets, then we could posit that they have value, regardless of whether they are lifeless or life-bearing. A close ethical analogy we can find for these worlds is Christopher Stone’s call to extend legal rights to oceans, rivers, and other inanimate objects.13 As we do not expect to visit extrasolar planets any time in the near future, it is unlikely that lifeless worlds require legal rights to be protected from human use or misuse as envisaged by Stone, but we might at least consider them to be worthy of our respect anyway. Thus, the underlying precept behind Stone’s analysis—that inanimate objects have value worthy of our consideration (even if, on Earth, they are part of an ecosystem)—has some applicability to lifeless Earth-like extrasolar planets.

Link – Abiotic Nature

Intrinsic value of abiotic life ignored

Lee, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, 94

(Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, Lancaster University, UK, “Awe and Humility: Intrinsic Value in Nature: Beyond an Earthbound Environmental Ethics,” <http://cseserv.engr.scu.edu/StudentAccounts/ENGR019Winter2003/DFlores/Keekok_Lee.pdf>, Cambridge Journals Volume: 36 (suppl., Pages: 89-101) accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

It is assumed that there are only three possibilities as far as abiotic Nature is concerned—(i) that it has (economic) resource value for humans, (ii) that it has psychological or aesthetic value for humans, and (iii) that it neither (i) nor (ii) obtains, then it must be valueless as it cannot have a value independent of humans. But all three views stem from strong anthropocentrism. presupposing that humans are the source and focus of value.. Such a standpoint entails that either Mars has" potential instrumental value for humans or it is valueless.

However, we have seen that even a non-anthropocentric perspective which is biocentric does not make it conceptually possible for one to say that abiotic Nature has a value which is independent of biotic Nature itself. Such a perspective allows for only two possibilities—either (i) abiotic Nature has instrumental value for biotic Nature or (ii) it is in danger of being valueless. It follows from it that Mars is valueless since it supports no biota. It is true that organic life has an identity' and even a self-identity (in some instances) which it strives to maintain and sustain. But inanimate nature only has an identity the persistence or the undermining of which is determined entirely by teleomatic processes as they are in biotic Nature. But it would be ‘biocentric chauvinism” to say that abiotic Nature is valueless unless it has instrumental value for biotic Nature.

Link - Science

Our reliance on science has embedded a culture of human-kind as the dominant species

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville, 01

(Richard R, "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Protest And Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid, Ed. Patrick Giddy, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>) LK

Understanding the magnitude of the environmental crisis and the potential threat it poses to life on this planet, it is clearly not an option to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. A popular option is to turn to science, which helps provide adequate material needs for everyone and also extends the richness of our non-material lives. Playing such a socially prominent and important role, science constitutes a major element of the "cultural filter" through which Western society views the environment (Pepper 1996: 240). Classical science, which is still very dominant, has developed into a dualist paradigm in which the scientific observer is separate and distinct from his or her observations. This has contributed to a conception of the world consisting of independent material objects, each having independent properties, with the behaviour of the whole explainable by the behaviour of its constituent parts. Nature is viewed as separate from humanity, machine-like and reducible to basic components, which can be known objectively and predicted. This science represents the source of absolute truths on which to base decisions and is often regarded as the most respectable way to know nature.

Link – Ethics

Applying traditional ethical framings to outer space anthropocentric

Hargrove, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Georgia, 86

(Eugene C., Currently University of North Texas, Professor Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove, p. xi)

In applying environmental ethics to the Solar Sys¬tem, two conceptual hurdles need to be overcome. First of all, environmental ethics is a relatively new field in philosophy and its theoretical foundations are still very much up in the air. From the standpoint of traditional ethics, ethics applies only to human beings and not to animals, plants, ecosystems, or natural objects. Environ¬mental intuitions, nevertheless, seem to demand some kind of moral considerability for these kinds of entities, and environmental ethics is in large measure a search for the proper foundations for these intuitions. If this search is successful, then ethics will be transformed into some¬thing that transcends the human moral communities of the past. Although many of the issues discussed in this book can be dealt with in terms of a traditional con¬ception of ethics—specifically, the social-political and scientific-technical issues—the attempts to apply envi¬ronmental concepts to the Solar System represent a sig¬nificant challenge for environmental ethics, since so far as we know at present the Solar System, except for Earth, IS A collection of nonliving natural objects, the kind of entity that offers the greatest conceptual difficulties for environmental ethics.

Ethics is inherently anthropocentric because it acts under the assumption of a human being

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville, 01

(Richard R, "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Protest And Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid, Ed. Patrick Giddy, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>) LK

Ethical theories offer moral criteria in order to determine how far one should extend moral standing. If a being is recognised to have moral standing, its interests must be taken into account when deciding what actions are permissible (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 7). The well-being and interests of what lacks moral standing do not count in any morally relevant way. A value theory is anthropocentric when it recognises the moral standing of human beings alone. The term 'anthropocentrism' is ambiguous. It is commonly defined by making reference to the location of values. It is largely accepted that humans are the centre of all value. Accordingly, anthropocentrists would argue that since all value originates from humans, non-human entities and objects have value only in relation to humans. A further understanding of anthropocentrism defines value as the satisfaction of human preference. From this, two forms of anthropocentrism have developed. Strong anthropocentrism which explains value by making reference to the satisfaction of subjective preferences, and weak anthropocentrism, which explains value by making reference to objective preferences Strong anthropocentrism prioritises the satisfaction of immediate human needs and desires, no matter how trivial Weak anthropocentrism. on the other hand, acknowledges that not all human needs and desires are rational and thus recognises the need to deliberate regarding established value-systems (Pierce & VanDeVeer 1995: 184). Humans are commonly viewed to be "valuable in and of themselves. . (while) the non-human world is valuable only insofar as it is of value to humans- (Fox 1990: 149). Humans are seen to possess intrinsic value, while all non-humans are seen to hold only instrumental value. Since "the base class of traditional Western ethics is coextensive with the class of human beings" (Callicutt 1998. 9), only humans are recognised to have direct moral standing. Anthropocentric ethical approaches do not accord moral standing to non-human beings as they are seen to be morally inferior. Lacking the required qualifications for ethical consideration, non-humans are treated as things or means to human ends, rather than as ends in themselves (Hlliot 1995- 35).

Link – Ethics

Ethics create a hierarchy of morality, with humans at the top

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville, 01

(Richard R, "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Protest And Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid, Ed. Patrick Giddy, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>) LK

The three classes of ethical theories (ideological, consequential and deontological) have for the most part, been interpreted and applied in anthropocentric ways.\* While Aristotle believed that all living entities have a tc/o.s, or natural purpose to which they are inclined, he analysed this further into three fundamental activities or powers of life: nutrition, sensation, and thinking. All living entities were seen to possess the first power, all animals the first two. but only human beings possess all three. These three powers were arranged hierarchically, with the power to think at the apex, thereby establishing rationality as a moral criterion. Aristotle's teleology specifically favoured human beings and resulted in him seeing that all "animals exist for the sake of man.... for the use he can make of them as well as for the food that they provide" (Aristotle 1962: 40). Aquinas' development of Aristotle's teleology did little to change the human-centred moral criterion. Animals were seen to have "no independent moral standing" (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: IS), it being accepted as divine providence that human beings have the natural world at their disposal.'

Ethics is the creation of anthropocentric Western Ideology

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville, 01

(Richard R, "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Protest And Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid, Ed. Patrick Giddy, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>) LK

Apart from being manifest in the formulation of traditional ethical theories, anthropocentric assumptions hold a predominant place in the modern Western value system. Historically, these assumptions can be traced through Western religious, scientific and philosophical traditions. Western European civilisation, although in many respects a post-Christian civilisation, is deeply influenced and impregnated by Christian values (Attficld & Dell 1998:141). Pre-scientific Christian views assumed human superiority, placing human existence at the centre of the universe, with 'man\* created in God s image (Genesis 1: 26), a free being responsible for his own actions An anthropocentric view of the world was interpreted from the scriptures, as the Word of God instructed that we "be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it" (Genesis I: 28). This was taken as a legitimising claim for human domination over nature. In contrast. Genesis 2: 15 puts 'man' into the Garden of Eden "to work ii and take care of it". This was interpreted to place humankind in a position of stewardship, watching over the earth for the sake of God Accordingly, it was understood to be humanity's role to look after the Lord's creation, and not to misuse it or destroy It.

Link – State

State based solutions can never solve – only grassroots efforts create change

Shantz, Gerenal Defense Committee lawyer, 2002 (Jeffrey, “The Feminization of Earth First” The Feminist Review, No. 70, pg. 21, JSTOR, accessed: 7/4/11, SL)

(Purchase, 1997: 28) In her view the power that manifests itself as resource extraction in the countryside manifests itself as racism and exploitation in the city. An effective radical ecology movement (one that could begin to be considered revolutionary) must be organized among the poor and working people. Only through workers' control of production and distribution can the machinery of ecological destruction be shut down. Ecological crises become possible only within the context of social relations that engender a weakening of people's capacities to fight an organized defence of the planet's ecological communities. Bari (1994) understood that the restriction of participation in decision-making processes within ordered hierarchies, a prerequisite to accumulation, has been a crucial impediment to ecological organizing. This convinced her that radical ecology must now include demands for workers' control and a decentralization of industries in ways that are harmonious with nature. It also meant rejecting ecological moralizing and developing some sensitivity to workers' anxieties and concerns. And it seems to me that people's complicity should be measured more by the amount of control they have over the conditions of their lives than by how dirty they get at work. One compromise made by a white-collar Sierra Club professional can destroy more trees than a logger can cut in a lifetime. (Ban, 1994. 105) Bari asked how it could be that there were neighbourhood movements targeting the disposal of toxic wastes but no workers' movement to stop the production of toxins. She argued that only when workers are in a position to refuse to engage in destructive practices or produce destructive goods could any realistic hope for lasting ecological change emerge. The only way to bring the system to a standstill is through mass-scale non-cooperation, what an earlier generation of syndicalists knew as the 'General Strike\*. Ban's vision for Earth First! combined a radicalization of the group's initial ideas of biocentrism and an extension of the decentralized, non-hierarchical, federative organization, the nascent syndicalist structure of EF!, into communities and workplaces. While agreeing with the old guard that efforts should be made to preserve or reestablish wilderness areas, Bari saw that piecemeal set-asides were not sufficient. The only way to preserve wilderness was to transform social relations. This meant that Earth First! had to be transformed from a conservation movement to a social movement. Earth First! needed to encourage and support alternative lifestyles.

Link – Spaceship Earth

Viewing the Earth as a spaceship that humans must pilot only reifies the anthropocentrism of the status quo

**Bryant,University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 53) TJL

Apart from the irony behind the spaceship metaphor, there was also the issue of the metaphor itself. In the logic of Spaceship Earth, spaceships seem more Earth-like, perhaps more naturalized and less artificial. At the same time, Earth becomes more like a spaceship—that is, more like a product of human technology, to be operated and even fixed by humans armed with the proper manual. Further, the main purpose of its existence is to carry humans about and provide for their needs. Effectively, the Earth is seen as the instrument of humankind.

Link - Heidegger

Heidegger makes a blatant distinction between human Dasein and animal perception-reinforcing anthropocentrism

Zimmerman, University of Colorado, Boulder Professor of Philosophy, 2002

(Michael, “Encountering Alien Otherness” in The Concept of the Foreign, ed. Rebecca Saunders accessed: 7-06-11, pg11-12 [http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/paper\_zimmerman\_Alien\_Otherness.pdf) TJL](http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/paper_zimmerman_Alien_Otherness.pdf)%20TJL)

Early Heidegger, for example, radically distinguished between human Dasein and other entities. Lacking human language, he maintained, animals cannot constitute a "world" in which entities can be encountered as entities. Describing solipsism as a psuedo-problem, he insisted that human Dasein is always already "with" others in a world of shared concern. Even in later years, as he sought to overcome a residual anthropocentrism, Heidegger insisted that an abyss lies between animals and humans, who alone are appropriated capable of "dwelling on the earth."19 Hence, he ignored the possibility that other beings--including dolphins and whales, not to mention --may be endowed with ontologically disclosive capacities analogous to and possibly even superior to our own. Opposed to space exploration, he was horrified by photos taken of the hidden side of the Moon by a space probe.20

Link - Levinas

Levinas strengthens the anthropocentric regime by stating that only humans can be otherized

Zimmerman, University of Colorado, Boulder Professor of Philosophy, 2002

(Michael, “Encountering Alien Otherness” in The Concept of the Foreign, ed. Rebecca Saunders accessed: 7-06-11, pg11-12 [http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/paper\_zimmerman\_Alien\_Otherness.pdf) TJL](http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/paper_zimmerman_Alien_Otherness.pdf)%20TJL)

Until recently, the status of non-human others was only infrequently addressed by

continental philosophers, including those, such as Levinas and Derrida, who have explored

in much greater depth than did Heidegger the moral claims that the other makes upon me,

the socio-linguistic constitution of self and other, and how the binary of majority ("self") vs.

minority ("other") is used to justify oppression. In his ethics of heteronomy, Levinas

argues that the look of the other makes upon me a moral claim, obligating me to intervene

on behalf of the weak and oppressed. Though such attempts to emphasize the other are

laudable, they have assumed that only human beings constitute the class of the "other”. 21

\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

Impact Calculus - AT: Case Outweighs

The aff’s impact calculus is flawed, humans and even Earth are insignificant as opposed to the damage humanity can do to the universe

Peters, Professor Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Hung Department of Education, National Chiayi University, Taiwan, 09

(MICHAEL A and Ruyu, Policy Futures in Education Volume 7 Number 3 2009, “Solar Ethics: a new paradigm for environmental ethics and education?,” <http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=7&issue=3&year=2009&article=5_Peters_PFIE_7_3_web>) page 327-328 accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

However, in our view, solar ethics is an ethical frame of mind which may go beyond the divide of consequentialism and deontology. First of all, the solar system definitely brings about human well-being because the Sun is the irreplaceable and inexhaustible source of energy for all living beings on Earth. In other words, the Sun can be understood as the source of life. It may die, eventually. In 5 to 6 billion years, it will enter a red giant phase and then turn into a white dwarf. Then the Sun is no more the Sun that we know, yet there may not be any mourning for the death of our Sun because at that time there will be no more humankind alive. However, compared with the vastness and grandeur of the Sun and whole solar system, human beings are incomparably tiny creatures. In this sense, the Sun is the inexhaustible source of living and meaning for all ordinary, practical purposes. What can we imagine ourselves to be when we find that the Sun as a source of life-energy and nourishment is open to all beings on Earth, and even to all things existing in our solar system, in the past, present and future? What can we learn from the openness of the Sun and the solar system? This pondering may be in tune with an ensnaring and unanswered question posed by Swimme & Berry (1992): what is it to be a solar personality? Solar ethics now might suggest an answer: the solar personality could be a person who is sensitive and attentive to one’s own situation and position in the solar system. On this ground, we propose a solar ethics as an ethical frame of mind, which may indicate an extension of environmental ethics and also a basis for the study of environmental education.

Risk calculation ignore multiple factors that forces policymakers to continue promoting anthropocentric science

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas, 2008

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg142)TJL

How much risk is too much? Rather than being solely addressed through disciplinary science, risk evaluation involves a consideration of our values, including our notion of progress and the relationship between humans, the environment, and technology. Policy makers have long sought scientific certainty to guide legislation, but it has become increasingly obvious that policy also depends on a complex and ambiguous network of human values, political capital, and public opinion—issues that cannot be disaggregated from each other.

Impact Calculus

Reiman, Department of Political and Economic Studies University of Helsinki, 2010 (Saara, “On Sustainable Exploration of Space and Extraterrestrial Life” Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 12, 3894-3903, October-November 2010, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars141.html>, accessed: 7/6/11, SL

The human race should not simply explore space. For moral beings, all choices, actions and activities also have a moral dimension. Space exploration is no exception: our policies and decisions always reflect our underlying moral values, whether we are conscious of what those values are or not. We can explore space economically, in a spirit of international cooperation and peace. It is easy to see how these underlying abstract principles can have a huge impact on the manner in which the actual project is carried out. So, I suggest that we should, above all else, explore space sustainably. Sustainable exploration means considering all our activities from a wider historical perspective and taking into account the long term consequences of our planned actions. It is closely related to Aristotle’s concept of prudence (Aristotle 1980.) According to Aristotle, a prudent person is one who is able to deliberate carefully concerning what is good and expedient for his living well in general, not only in questions regarding some particular, small-scale matters. In other words, a prudent person is one who can see the big picture behind everyday decisions. Such a person understands what are important constituents of a good life and what are less important or even harmful in the great scheme of things, and is able to make his moral decisions accordingly. In space exploration, seeing the big picture is difficult. While few space professionals would actually advocate a slash and burn philosophy for space exploration, some have also advocated the exploitation of land rights and mineral resources of Mars so as to fund a mission to Mars and the colonization of the red planet (Joseph 2010), and some might choose to turn a blind eye to the occassional pollution or degradation event in favor of budgets, project timelines or personal advancement (Williamson 2003). Space exploration is no different than other ambitious pursuits, in that lowering and compromising ethical standards often seems beneficial. This "benefit" usually refers specifically to short-term benefits as seen on Williamson’s examples. The "human nature" mentioned by Williamson, can be interpreted to mean the persistent human tendency to think that temporal closeness means greater importance. The concept of sustainability can challenge this view. However, it needs to be incorporated into the architecture of the exploration effort, specifically into the COSPAR planetary protection policy (COSPAR 2005, Rummel et al. 2010), and not left as a concern of individual researchers or project participants.

Impact

Must challenge anthropocentrism or risk destruction of the terrestrial and extra terrestrial

Watson, 97

(David, “Empire Of Extinction”, New Internationalist, Issue 288, http://www.newint.org/features/1997/03/05/empire/)

This civilization’s arrogance is evident in our scientific tradition’s urge to expand what Francis Bacon called ‘the empire of man’. But it goes back even further. The Judaeo-Christian biblical edict granted us ‘dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’ Now many animals mentioned in the Bible are going the way of the Dodo – Jonah’s whale, the Persian Wild Ass on which Jesus rode into Jerusalem, the Nubian Ibex, the Arabian Oryx which Isaiah tells us was trapped in nets.

Human dominion has done these creatures little good; most have fallen forever into our nets. The image of a human imperium oppressing the rest of nature is no mere metaphor. It conforms to an actual pattern of imperial conquest, plunder, eventual exhaustion and collapse. Our century has given a privileged layer of humanity an industrially organized life more opulent, more wasteful yet also more frenetic, alienated and depressed than that of any ancient hierarch. We’ve transformed the earth into a giant mine and waste pit, its forests and meadow lands into enormous feed lots for billions of stock animals, its waters into cesspools devoid of life, its skies into orbiting junkyards of contaminated rocket debris. The world’s tallest mountains are littered with expedition trash. Ships at sea do not go a single day without seeing plastic garbage. Giant nets 30 miles long drag the oceans killing millions of sea creatures, including birds and mammals. These are simply ‘by-products’ to be tossed overboard. The whole planet has become a war zone generating a bio-crisis not just for individual species, but for entire webs of life.

Human beings are now altering the basic physiology of the planet. Industrial smog can be found everywhere over the oceans, and weather patterns are so distorted that climatologists now discuss ‘climate death.’ Industrial contamination is pervasive, even in the fat cells of Antarctic penguins. The rain is not only acid but toxic. Whether industrialism warms or cools the atmosphere, its unprecedented chemical experiment threatens to reconfigure life in ways barely imaginable, but undoubtedly for the worse.

All empires turn out to be relatively short-lived enterprises that finally betray their own subjects. Despite its enormous cost to the rest of life, modern civilization has engendered a mode of existence that fails to provide even the barest essentials for a fifth of humanity or to satisfy the fundamental psychic needs of the rest. Strangely, our very anthropocentrism may be our own undoing. Pragmatic self-interest alone should teach us that we must change before nature exacts inevitable revenge. And nothing can be done, North or South, without social strategies that create institutions to provide practical alternatives and thus opportunities for people to change.

Impact - Extinction

Modernity’s ideology of anthropocentrism otherizes nature and reinforces the structural violence of the status quo causing extinction

Zimmerman, University of Colorado, Boulder Professor of Philosophy, 2002

(Michael, “Encountering Alien Otherness” in The Concept of the Foreign, ed. Rebecca Saunders accessed: 7-06-11, pg4-5 [http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/paper\_zimmerman\_Alien\_Otherness.pdf) TJL](http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/paper_zimmerman_Alien_Otherness.pdf)%20TJL)

Recently, concern about foreign immigrants has grown in Western countries to which people from poorer countries (including former colonies) are flocking to escape political oppression and to find work. For many tourists, encountering otherness-- distinctive clothing, different skin color, odd cultural practices, unusual cuisines--is the whole point of traveling. Having those exotic others immigrating to one's own country is another matter altogether, however. Politicians frequently try to gain political power by turning foreigners--and even citizens who can be portrayed as sufficiently other--into scapegoats for the country's woes. In the U.S., for example, immigrant-bashers play on the fears that some people have about losing their jobs to immigrants, even though job loss is more often due to decisions taken by powerful transnational economic interests. Even people not immediately threatened by outsiders will often join in disparaging or expelling them. People tend to project mortality and evil onto outsiders, aliens, others. By dominating or even destroying the death- and evil-bearing other, the dominant group feels as if it has conquered death and evil.10 Due to surging human populations, rapid shifts in capital investment and economic structures, environmental degradation, and greater ease of travel, mass migrations will only increase. Given the destructive capacity of current weapons, humanity may either have come to terms with otherness, or else risk destroying itself. Just as people have used differences in skin color, religion, gender, cultural practices, language, ideology, and economics to justify violence against other humans, people have also used differences between humans and other life forms to justify needless violence against plants, animals, and entire ecosystems. For centuries, people have claimed that one trait or another--from tool using to linguistic ability--demonstrates human superiority over other life. The nineteenth century doctrine of Manifest Destiny proclaimed that a united American people (white, of European descent) was bound to "develop" the continent's natural resources from coast to coast. Modernity’s ideology of anthropocentric humanism, which “others” nature by depicting it solely as an instrument for human ends, generates enormous ecological problems. In recent decades, the “dark side” of modernity has come in for deserved criticism. Despite its undeniable problems, however, modernity has also made possible great improvements in political freedom, material well-being, scientific knowledge, and human lifespan.

Impact – Aff Can’t Solve

Failure to act from an inclusive ecological ideology makes policy failure and unintended consequences inevitable

McLaughlin, Professor of Philosophy, City University of New York, 93

(Andrew, Regarding nature: industrialism and deep ecology, p.145-47

Although the notion of "internal relations" can be obscure and lead to murky philosophical waters, the basic meaning is, however, readily at hand. We all experience internal relations when we engage in conversations.4 In a conversation, experience is shaped by the participatory relationship of the situation that extends beyond either individual participant's experience. A genuine conversation has a "life of its own," and the experience of each participant is internally related to the larger whole. During a conversation, my experience at any moment is internally related to the responses of the other participants. Each of our experiences is a part of a larger whole that is the conversation. An inclusive ecological image involves taking interrelatedness as the central aspect of a situation and, thus, directs attention to the larger context within which individuals exist. By noticing our essential relatedness to the rest of nature, we may increase our appreciation of the unity of humanity with the rest of nature.5 It also facilitates an understanding of why many people experience an identification with other parts of nature, for such connections are real.

There are several reasons to favor this inclusive ecological ideology over any reductive ideology of nature. First, it can explain both the success and the limitations of the reductionist orientation toward nonhuman nature. If nature is conceived of as interconnected communities of relations, then reductive science can be understood as an attention to separate strands within those networks. The reductionist orientation involves the search for the most relevant operative factors in the simplified situations of experimental science. These factors can be understood as single threads of a complex whole. What is obscured in this approach are the interconnections among the threads, that is, the larger community within which those threads exist.

If nature is aptly understood as a community of communities, then one can anticipate that a reductive approach will succeed as long as there is slack in the system. Given sufficient slack, instrumental action by any element of the system may be successful for a long time. However, when that slack diminishes, continuing the instrumental action ought to gener-ate, at an increasing rate, surprising consequences that do not follow past patterns of successful action. Types of actions that were once satisfactory might begin to generate unwanted side effects, because less slack in the network causes changes in one part to reverberate more loudly in other parts. Over time, the tempo of unintended consequence would increase. Tall smokestacks, built to eliminate local pollution, lead to the acidification of rain, with far reaching and unanticipated consequence. The use of fossil fuels for convenience and speed lead to pollution of air and unwanted changes in global climate, as well as vast changes in patterns of habitation, agriculture, and family life.6 The accelerating rate of unintended side effects suggests serious limits of the tunnel vision of reductive science.

Impact – Universal Damage

Humans could effect solar systemic processes

Rolston, professor of philosophy at Colorado State University, 86

(Holmes III, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.176

Over perhaps five billion years, the evolutionary de-velopment on Earth has climbed from zero to over five million species. A deplorable thing that the lately arrived humans are doing is shutting down the speciation pro¬cesses by habitat depletion and extinctions, at a rate that is potentially catastrophic. They are thwarting the forma¬tive biological processes. Similarly, we ought not to de¬grade the solar-planetary creativity. In the solar system, as much time lies ahead as behind us (perhaps five billion years in both directions). Perhaps Earthlings cannot greatly affect the solar-systemic evolution on broad scales; but perhaps they can shut down locales of active development, and that would be a pity.

Impact

Anthropocentrism

Peters, Professor Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Hung Department of Education, National Chiayi University, Taiwan, 9

(Michael A and Ruyu, Policy Futures in Education Volume 7 Number 3 2009, “Solar Ethics: a new paradigm for environmental ethics and education?,”

<http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=7&issue=3&year=2009&article=5_Peters_PFIE_7_3_web>

Anthropocentrism is the key assumption identified by authors such as Dave Foreman in Confessions of an Eco-Warrior (1991) and Christopher Manes in Green Rage (1990) as the primary cause of the current ecological crisis. Val Plumwood (1993, 1996) also critiques anthropocentrism as the ‘standpoint of mastery’ which centrally applies to the domination of nature, and goes on to argue that anthropocentrism plays an analogous role in green theory to androcentrism in feminist theory and ethnocentrism in anti-racist theory. Her Environmental Culture: the crisis of ecological reason (Plumwood, 2002) extends and refines her earlier work to show, as one reviewer puts it, that current ecological crises are:

the result of arrogant cultures (based in arrogant philosophical views) that deny the fact that humans are dependent on nature, men are dependent on women, and those with economic and decision-making power are dependent on disempowerment of others. Cultures built on the legacies of Platonic dualism (which posits reason as separate from and superior to nature, or matter) and empiricism (which admits that nature is relevant to knowledge, but debases it nonetheless) fail to acknowledge the existence and importance of ‘the Other’ – nature, women, indigenous people, and anyone identified with the less powerful side of the reason/matter dualism. They therefore allow for and encourage mindsets and practices that harm those ‘others’ on which the privileged at the center of reality depend. (Cuomo, 2002)

Impact - Environmental, Energy Crisis & Overpop

Anthropocentric logic causes environmental, energy crisis and over population

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville, 01

(Richard R, "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Protest And Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid, Ed. Patrick Giddy, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>) LK

Three most significant and pressing factors contributing to the environmental crisis are the ever increasing human population, the energy' crisis, and the abuse and pollution of the earth's natural systems. These and other factors contributing to the environmental crisis can be directly linked to anthropocentric views of the world. The perception that value is located in, and emanates from, humanity has resulted in understanding human life as an ultimate value, superior to all other beings. This has driven innovators in medicine and technology to ever improve our medical and material conditions, in an attempt to preserve human life, resulting in more people being born and living longer. In achieving this aim, they have indirectly contributed to increasing the human population. Perceptions of superiority, coupled with developing technologies have resulted in a social outlook that generally docs not rest content with the basic necessities of life. Demands for more medical and social aid, more entertainment and more comfort translate into demands for improved standards of living Increasing population numbers, together with the material demands of modern society, place ever increasing demands on energy supplies. While wanting a better life is not a bad thing, given the population explosion the current energy crisis is inevitable, which brings a whole host of environmental implications in tow. This is not to say that every improvement in the standard of living is necessarily wasteful of energy or polluting to the planet, but rather it is the cumulative effect of these improvements that is damaging to the environment The abuses facing the natural environment as a result of the energy crisis and the food demand are clearly manifestations of anthropocentric views that treat the environment as a resource and instrument for human ends. The pollution and destruction of the non-human natural world is deemed acceptable, provided that it docs not interfere with other human beings.

\*\*\*Alternative\*\*\*

Alt Solves Case

Cosmocentric ethical framing is pre – requisite to addressing extra-terrestrials issues

Logsdon, systems engineer for NASA and Lupisella, Director of the Space Policy Institute, 97

(Mark and John, “Do We Need a Consmocentric Ethic?” International Astronautical Congress, accessed: 7/6/11, SL, <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:p77iocKLgWMJ:citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.25.7502%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf+Do+We+Need+a+Cosmocentric+Ethic%3F&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShckQy-y5c7I1HtJZ1_WDVuadsUkQ7ERzaJVaeXr3sSs3kb5Mwl0yGzmsRiQ6cyMcjcTmiauR7YmtpBYCp8wy6CvX5UwJgizgOD-NdgBxQ6s9BynVMwf7O33uPMR5FEtODiDukM&sig=AHIEtbTnxUTsh0cbCTHovT7AlTdEPGvnsA>)

A cosmocentric ethic might be characterized as one which (1) places the universe at the center, or establishes the universe as the priority in a value system, (2) appeals to something characteristic of the universe (physical and/or metaphysical) which might then (3) provide a justification of value, presumably intrinsic value, and (4) allow for reasonably objective measurement of value. At first glance, talk of a cosmocentric ethic might seem paradoxical. How can an ethical view be centered or focused on “all that is”? From egocentrism to geocentrism, we are able to center, focus, and prioritize value because there is some other, generally larger frame of reference which is relatively de-valued. Nevertheless, we suggest that such an ethic may be helpful in dealing with value based questions involving extraterrestrial issues such as interaction with indigenous primitive extraterrestrial life forms.

Alt Solves the K

Only by taking an environmentally ethical stance can we hope to solve for our anthropocentric tendencies

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville, 01

(Richard R, "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Protest And Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid, Ed. Patrick Giddy, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>) LK

It is clear that humanity has the capacity to transform and degrade the environment Given the consequences inherent in having such capacities, "the need for a coherent, comprehensive, rationally persuasive environmental ethic is imperative" (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 2). The purpose of an environmental ethic would be to account for the moral relations that exist between humans and the environment, and to provide a rational basis from which to decide how we ought and ought not to treat the environment. The environment was defined as the world in which we are enveloped and immersed, constituted by both animate and inanimate objects This includes both individual living creatures, such as plants and animals, as well as non-living, non-individual entities, such as rivers and oceans, forests and velds, essentially, the whole planet Earth This constitutes a vast and all-inclusive sphere, and, for purposes of clarity, shall be referred to as the "greater environment". In order to account for the moral relations that exist between humans and the greater environment, an environmental ethic should have a significantly wide range of focus.

Alt – Solar Ethics

Must take the solar system as the ethical frame for the debate

Peters, Professor Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Hung Department of Education, National Chiayi University, Taiwan, 09

(Michael A and Ruyu, Policy Futures in Education Volume 7 Number 3 2009, “Solar Ethics: a new paradigm for environmental ethics and education?,” <http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=7&issue=3&year=2009&article=5_Peters_PFIE_7_3_web>)

Among the innumerable galaxies, the star systems and planetary systems in our universe, each

one is unique, containing its own dynamics. Yet the solar system is the one closest to us; we are

part of it; it has been observed numerous times (although not yet from outside it) and taken as the

frontier of science since the time of Nicolaus Copernicus. Even modern science encompasses many

theories and models to explain phenomena outside our ‘tiny’ solar system. We still hesitate to argue that we have the same confidence about understanding other star systems as we have of our

own solar system, let alone other universes. In this sense, the solar system provides a unique –

compared with other star systems – and novel – compared with biocentric or ecocentric contexts –

perspective for conceiving human/nonhuman relationships.

The solar system, consisting of our Sun and other celestial objects including planets, moons,

dwarf planets and billions of small bodies, has been known since the sixteenth century. However,

the replacement of geocentrism by heliocentrism in astronomy has not occurred in ethics. In the

ethical field, human beings are the egocentric agent-dominators. Although there has been a call for

biocentric or ecocentric ethics based on a critique of anthropocentrism, the biocentric or ecocentric

view is still grounded on Earth. If the massive knowledge concerning our universe accumulated in

the past centuries could help human beings to broaden their vision, to attempt to resituate

themselves in a broader context, and try to image themselves as a (post-)modern cosmologist, the

solar system might be an appropriate starting point.

The first appeal of solar ethics is to ask Homo sapiens to taken themselves as members of the

solar system. It is a request to examine our human self-position, self-location, self-knowledge and

self-identification: how human beings conceive of themselves implies their understanding of the

place where they are situated, more or less, explicitly or implicitly. Thus the primary significance of

solar ethics is to call for an imagination of taking the solar system as an ethical frame of mind,

which means the solar system may inspire us to reconceive human moral responsibility, decision

and action.

Solar Ethics

To begin ethically questioning Humanity’s place in the universe and our relationship with nature. Voting neg is key to solving the ongoing ecological crisis on Earth and the universe abroad

Peters, Professor Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Hung Department of Education, National Chiayi University, Taiwan, 09

(MICHAEL A and Ruyu, Policy Futures in Education Volume 7 Number 3 2009, “Solar Ethics: a new paradigm for environmental ethics and education?,” <http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=7&issue=3&year=2009&article=5_Peters_PFIE_7_3_web>) page 324-325, accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

When space exploration opens a vast and grand world beyond our planet, when the stories of the universe have started to be unfolded, when fascinating secrets of the cosmos are being revealed, when the destiny of our Earth is found to be closely related to the other planets and the Sun, when the environmental crisis on the Earth alerts us to re-examine the human/nature relationship, some questions demand our exploration: What is the relationship between human beings and nature when the nature we know is no longer limited to our own Earth? What is an ‘appropriate’ relationship between human beings and nature when environmental changes on Earth sound an alarm about a sustainable human/nature relationship? These questions bring us to an attempt to envisage an ethics which may lead us towards a wider sustainable frame of mind: a solar system ethics. Solar ethics is an ethical frame of mind which may help to reposition human beings within nature. Don Cupitt published a small book entitled Solar Ethics in 1995, in which he points out that what drives him to think about solar ethics is moral anxiety or even panic about contemporary moral problems. For him, the present social and moral disorder makes explicit the failure of the traditional moral philosophy, whether it be emotivism or moral objectivism or realism. It is the starting point to conceive of a new ethics. Thus he states: if you agree that tradition has failed, and that moral philosophy as we have been doing it has been addressing itself to all the wrong questions; and you further agree that we need a moral philosophy better fitted to our cosmology and our culture – then you may be ready for solar ethics. The Sun sees no reason at all to apologize for making such an exhibition of itself all the time; it simply is its own outpouring self-expression ... It has no ‘inwardness’; that is, it is not inwardly subject to something unseen that is authoritative over it. It does not experience the moral order ... it is purely and only affirmative. It coincides completely with its own joyous, headlong process of self-exteriorization ... (Cupitt, 1995, pp. 8-9)

“Reverence for Life” Alt

Using a “reverence for life” solves best because it refuses to make assumptions about the composition of life-

Cockell Open University Professor of Geomicrobiology, 2006

(Charles S., “The Ethical Relevance of Earth-like Extrasolar Planets”, Environmental Ethics vol 28 pg 307-308 accessed:7-06-11 <http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=450>) TJL

Albert Schweitzer’s “reverence for life”7 is useful if we apply it on the integrated planetary scale because it makes no assumption about the nature of life. His “reverence for life” predates the land ethic and was one of the early twentieth century attempts to fashion a phrase that would create an intuitive sense of the intrinsic value of life, independent of its instrumental value to humans. Remarkably, he even said of his phrase: “The ethic of Reverence for Life is the ethic of love widened into universality.”8 Schweitzer, of course, did not intend his ethic to be applied to other planets; when he spoke of “universality” he was speaking about all earthly life. However, he did not presuppose any specific facets of life. He did not talk of “reverence for DNA-based life” or “reverence for Earth-like biotic communities,” just “reverence for life” in its widest manifestation. To apply Schweitzer’s reverence for life to extrasolar planets merely requires that we interpret his word universality in its very literal sense, rather than in its geocentric sense. Schweitzer had an atomist view of biotic communities. He respected individual creatures, rather than necessarily species or their communities, but that was before the birth of the ecology movement and an understanding of the way in which biotic communities are linked. On Earth, this atomist approach to an ethic for life is often impractical, as we could not live normal lives if we had to respect every creature. This problem was recognized by Schweitzer9 and has been more recently discussed in the context of the attempt to formulate an ethic for the treatment of microbes,10 which present a particularly acute case of a requirement for a community view or holistic view of environmental ethics versus the ethics of protecting the individual. However, Schweitzer’s reverence-for-life ethic has a universal appeal precisely because it has a type of naiveté built into it—it makes no assertions about the nature of life and how it is interconnected. This type of early simplified general view of life may be inappropriate for our treatment of the terrestrial biosphere because it fails to address many of the complexities of terrestrial ecology that we now understand, and which have become essential components of an environmental ethic. However, it is suited to planets where we know there is life, but we have no idea about the nature of it, and more specifically, the knowledge we do have of it is based on an integrated light signature from the whole planetary disc. Schweitzer’s atomist views on the treatment of life can be ignored as, in the absence of visits to these other planets, the problems of atomism in our everyday treatment of the biota are irrelevant.

“Think like ET” Alt

Thinking like an extratrerrestrial is the best way to avoid anthropocentric understandings of life

Cockell Open University Professor of Geomicrobiology, 2006

(Charles S., “The Ethical Relevance of Earth-like Extrasolar Planets”, Environmental Ethics vol 28 pg 310-311 accessed:7-06-11 <http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=450>) TJL

Leopold once asked us to “think like a mountain”15 to emphasize that our view of the Earth and its biosphere is often an anthropocentric one. If we want to try and understand how we should treat mountains, for instance, we should think like a mountain (granted this is practically impossible, but his point about our biased outlook is valuable). Similarly, perhaps a universal view of life requires us to “think like an extraterrestrial.” An intelligent extraterrestrial visiting the Earth would not understand our biotic communities. It might take some guesses based on some initial observations, but without a considerable body of research it would not know which animals are predators, which ones are herbivores, and which ones have been around for the longest. Indeed, it would know very little about the ecological interdependence of various species and the functioning of biotic communities. However, it might revere the biosphere as a unique product of the unique experiment of evolution on the Earth. It might have visited many life-bearing planets, but none will have been like the Earth, and it might view the Earth with a commensurate respect.

\*\*\*Answers To\*\*\*

AT: Perm

It is a question of sequencing, must attend to environmental ethics of space exploration prior to deciding course of actions

Hargrove, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Georgia, 86

(Eugene C., Currently University of North Texas, Professor Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove, p. ix – xi)

Although the Earth has been in the Space Age since 1957 with the launching of Sputnik, very little has been written about the environmental implications of the ex-ploration of our Solar System. Indeed, most people have acted as if there are no environmental implications at all. Curiously, science-fiction writers, with only a few excep¬tions, have ignored the very possibility of an environ¬mental dimension in their short stories and novels. Comments in professional philosophy papers on envi-ronmental ethics have made only passing remarks about space, the stars, and the Solar System, and these have generally suggested that extraterrestrial natural objects are safe from human interference and exploitation and thus not proper objects of environmental concern. Even among environmentalists, concern about off-planet en-vironmental issues has been slow in developing. The concept of "Spaceship Earth," for example, although inspired by space exploration, remains steadfastly focused on earthbound environmental issues.

Since the mid-1960s, nevertheless, scientists have been concerned about the biological contamination of other planets—and this has led to disputes between the United States and Russia—but this concern is not really an environmental one. The sterilization procedures used by space scientists in preparing space probes for land¬ings on other planets are not employed for the purpose of protecting non-Earth environments for the long term, but rather only until all appropriate scientific experi¬ments have been conducted.

Despite the lack of attention that the Solar System has received so far from philosophers, scientists, engi¬neers, and environmentalists, the time for careful reflec¬tion on ethical issues concerning the space program and on environmental issues related to the Solar System as a whole is now long overdue. We human beings not only have the ability to reach the Moon, but most other plane¬tary bodies in the Solar System as well. Russia has al¬ready landed unmanned spacecraft on Venus, and the United States has landed them on Mars. Many of the planets are partially or completely mapped and photo¬graphed, and only the most distant planets remain com¬pletely unvisited. It is really only because of reduced spending levels after the success of the Apollo missions that the United States does not have a space station in orbit and men living on the Moon and Mars.

While it may be tempting to say that we do not need to face the environmental issues involved in our explora¬tion of the Solar System for many decades to come, such an attitude overlooks the fact that planning for space missions also begins decades in advance so that the tech¬nology needed for the missions can be developed. If serious planning begins without adequate ethical and environmental input, then future NASA and associated industrial/commercial projects in the Solar System may simply produce a new environmental crisis that dwarfs our current one. To avoid such a crisis scientists, engi¬neers, environmentalists, and philosophers must get to¬gether, clarify the issues involved, and begin solving them. This book is intended as a first step toward the accomplishment of these goals.

AT: Perm

The alt is a pre requisite to the plan

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas,8

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg140)TJL

This anthropocentric and geocentric environmental perspective shows cracks when we try to extend it to the cosmic environment. The few national or international policies currently in place that mention the environment of outer space (e.g. NASA’s planetary protection policy, United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) consider the preservation of planetary bodies for science, human exploration, and possible future habitation, but there is not yet any policy that considers whether these anthropocentric priorities should supersede the preservation of possible indigenous extraterrestrial life, or the environmental or geological integrity of the extraterrestrial environment. Anticipating the need for policy decisions regarding space exploration, Mark Lupisella and John Logsdon suggest the possibility of a cosmocentric ethic, “one which (1) places the universe at the center, or establishes the universe as the priority in a value system, (2) appeals to something characteristic of the universe (physical and/or metaphysical) which might then (3) provide a justification of value, presumably intrinsic value, and (4) allow for reasonably objective measurement of value” (Lupisella & Logsdon 1997, 1). The authors discuss the need to establish policies for pre-detection and post-detection of life on Mars, and suggest that a cosmocentric ethic would provide a justification for a conservative approach to space exploration and science—conservative in the sense of considering possible impacts before we act.5 A Copernican shift in consciousness, from regarding the Earth as the center of the universe to one of it being the home of participants in a cosmic story, is necessary in order to achieve the proper environmental perspective as we venture beyond our home plane.

AT: Perm – Do Both

Cannot combine development of environmental ethics with anthropocentric actions of the plan

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville ,01

(Richard "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Cultural Heritage 2(7): 103 – 116 (2001))

I argue that anthropocentric value systems are not suitable to the task of developing a comprehensive environmental ethic. Firstly, anthropocentric assumptions have been shown to be largely responsible for the current environmental crisis. While this in itself does not provide strong support for the claim, it does cast a dim light on any theory that is informed by such assumptions. Secondly, an environmental ethic requires a significantly wide range of focus. As such, it should consider the interests of a wide range of beings. It has been shown that anthropocentric approaches do not entertain the notion that non-human entities can have interests independent of human interests. "Expansionist", "conservationist" and "preservationist" approaches only acknowledge a value in nature that is determined by the needs and interests of humans.

Thirdly, because anthropocentric approaches provide a moral account for the interests of humans alone, while excluding non-humans from direct moral consideration, they are not sufficiently encompassing. An environmental ethic needs to be suitably encompassing to ensure that a moral account is provided for all entities that constitute the environment. It could be argued that the indirect moral concern for the environment arising out of an anthropocentric approach is sufficient to ensure the protection of the greater environment. In response, only those entities that are in the interest of humans will be morally considered, albeit indirectly, while those entities which fall outside of this realm will be seen to be morally irrelevant. Assuming that there are more entities on this planet that are not in the interest of humans than entities that are, it is safe to say that anthropocentric approaches are not adequately encompassing. Fourthly, the goals of an environmental ethic should protect and maintain the greater environment. It is clear that the expansionist approach, which is primarily concerned with the transformation of nature for economic return, does not meet these goals. Similarly, neither does the conservationist approach, which is arguably the same as the expansionist approach. The preservationist approach does, in principle satisfy this requirement. However, this is problematic for such preservation is based upon the needs and interests of humans, and "as human interests and needs change, so too would human uses for the environment" (Des Jardins 1997: 129). Non-human entities, held captive by the needs and interests of humans, are open to whatever fancies the interests of humans. In light of the above, it is my contention that anthropocentric value systems fail to provide a stable ground for the development of an environmental ethic. It is fair to say that the success of the environmental movement is largely "a result of the power of anthropocentric arguments, for the general population began to realise that the degradation of the natural environment would have serious consequences for human health, safety, and survival" (Katz 1999: 378). This is of little relevance when regarding the development of an environmental ethic, for the awareness raised by anthropocentric arguments is restricted to the consequences affecting humans alone. Above I argued that anthropocentric value systems are unsuitable to the development of an environmental ethic. Traditional ethical theories (teleological, utilitarian, and deontological) were shown to be anthropocentric. This makes such theories unsuitable to the development of an environmental ethic. Clearly a wider and more encompassing ethic is required, one which extends moral concern beyond human boundaries. What is required is a "change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations" (Zimmerman 1998: 17), with the assumptions of an environmental ethic being "broader and more inclusive than the mere consideration of human interests" (Katz 1999: 378). Whether and how such an ethic is possible is the task of another paper.

AT: Hartmann Perm

Hartmann’s argument treats planet as dispoable

Callicott, University Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy , University of North Texas 89

(J. Baird, In defense of the land ethic: essays in environmental philosophy, p. 308)

3. Ibid. Hartmann denies that extraterrestrial resource development and colonization, which he enthusiastically recommends, would lead to a " 'disposable planet mentality'" (p. 229). Yet he apparently forgets this disclaimer and later writes, "the possibilities of self-sustaining colonies of humans... on other planetary surfaces are really increasing the chances for survival of the human race against [political and environmental! disasters." If we think we can escape these disasters by emigrating off the Earth, we shall have less incentive to try to avert them.

Hartmann would vote neg, the justifications for your advantages short circuit the perm

Hartmann, senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute, 86

(William K, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.124

All of this leads to two important points about space exploration. First, it should not be carried out as a tech¬nological boondoggle or expression of militaristic/na-tionalistic exhibitionism. Rather it should be viewed as an extension of the intellectual curiosity that makes us human in the first place. If we woke up one morning on an island in the midst of a vast sea dotted with other islands, our first enterprise after acquiring food and water would be to explore our own island and find out what resources or peoples might exist on the other is¬lands. We were, in fact, born onto an island in the vast-ness of space; we know that there are other islands nearby and we want to find out about them.

AT: Perm – SETI

SETI policy should combine ethical attention to risk with doing the plan

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas, 2008

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg143-144)TJL

Notably, there are no corresponding guidelines for addressing the detection of non-intelligent life forms, nor is there any NASA or international policy for the proper handling of extraterrestrial life.7 Detection by SETI of radio signals light years away poses no immediate risk, but would still raise culturally portentous ethical, philosophical, and theological questions. Even the discovery of microbial life would be a shock. Evidence of microbial life on another planet in our solar system would also require immediate decisions about safe handling, biological risk, experimentation procedures, scientific, legal, and societal ownership, and the proper means of communication to governmental agencies, the scientific community, and the public. These policies should be developed now, before anything is found, for the excitement incurred by such a significant discovery and the need for immediate action will likely affect our ability to formulate appropriate responses (how, for instance, would NASA break the news? How might the news be introduced to school children? How would NASA engage and respond to religious communities?) These are humanities policy as much as science policy questions.

AT: Nuclear War Hurts Env.

Nuclear war impact claims ignore the ongoing nuclear disasters inflicted on the more than human world

Pölling-Vocke. Master of International Relations. Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 5

(Bernt, “’The End of Poverty’: The globalization of the unreal and the impoverishment of all,” http://www.hockeyarenas.com/berntpv/jeffreysachs/endofpovertydeepecology.pdf)

These world affairs are “dark”, “and the old rough equivalency of GNP with “Gross National Pollution” still holds.280 “Hundreds of millions of years of evolution of mammals and especially of large, territory-demanding animals will come to a halt”281 and perceptions, as by Jeffrey Sachs, that “that which is not of value to any human being is not of value at all”, are egocentric. “Newton’s laws were made by Newton, but stones fall without him”, and value statements are only uttered by Homo sapiens, but not necessarily the only values, just because values are formulated not “by mosquitos in mosquito language”282. Humanity uses its uniqueness and “special capacities among millions of kinds of other living beings” for constant domination and mistreatment283, but “life is fundamentally one”284. For millions of animals, disasters feared by humans are commonplace, as “these animals live and die in a nuclear war today”, locked away in laboratories and tortured for experiments285. A lack of identification leads to indifference286. Wilderness has become so scare that many national parks are “so overloaded with people that extremely strict regulations have been introduced” – “instead of entering a realm of freedom, one feels that one is in some kind of museum ruled by angry owners”287. Responsible participants of contemporary societies have “slowly but surely begun to question whether we truly accept this unique, sinister role we have previously chosen”, our roles within a “global culture of a primarily techno-industrial nature”288. How dire are these world affairs? The threat of ecocatastrophe has become apparent289. “Apocalypse now” is happening all around, and only continued deterioration of human life conditions may strengthen and deepen the deep ecological movement, hopefully resulting in major changes in economic, political and ideological structures290.Then, human development might follow another path and abandon Jeffrey Sachs’ ladder of modern, economic growth. The process is probably slow and its “direction revolutionary”, but its “steps are reformatory”291.

AT: Consequences

Virtue ethics provide explorers with ethical decision making while consequentialism leads the explorer to resort to uneducated guesswork

Reiman, Department of Political and Economic Studies University of Helsinki, 2010 (Saara, “On Sustainable Exploration of Space and Extraterrestrial Life” Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 12, 3894-3903, October-November 2010, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars141.html>, accessed: 7/6/11, SL

The constraints humans ought to impose themselves should be principle-based, that is, the basis for ethics should be moral principles instead of efficiency or short-term results. Some have suggested a deontological approach, but to me it seems that a virtue ethical approach would work even better. Deontological ethics consists of those ethical theories where the general idea is to identify a set of good moral rules and define praiseworthy action as adherence to these rules (for further information on deontological ethics, see eg. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Virtue ethics, on the other hand, is all about principles, attitudes and motives. As such, it is also suitable for poor epistemic conditions that characterize space exploration. It is, after all, difficult to understand how we could find good rules to guide actions that take place in environments that are poorly understood. Even if we could identify some rules, it is easy to imagine new and surprising situations where strict adherence to these rules would be disastrous and the reasonable course of action would be to make an exception. However, a moral agent always has access to reliable knowledge considering his or her own attitudes, motives, and the particular moral principles that are currently being applied in this particular situation. Improvements in the epistemic condition, that is, when our explorer gains more information via studying the object of his or her interest, certainly help virtue ethical moral decision making. But one can begin with much less, and, if one acts wisely, the moral decision making process can still give the agent recommendations that are sustainable more often than not. In comparison, a consequentialist –someone who tries to foresee the consequences of all potential courses of action and base his or her judgment on risk/benefit analysis– needs to be well informed in order to be able to reliably determine the best possible course of action. When sufficient information is not available (as is necessarily the case when we explore space environments), he must resort to uneducated guesswork before he can act. If it later turns out that his guess went wrong, the results can be disastrous. The deontologist is not much better off. The constant problem in a rule-based ethics is, that if the rules are made flexible enough to enable one to act in completely novel situations, they probably are not practical enough for providing effective guidance and vice versa.

AT: Earth key not Space

Human project ethics & value onto space

Cheston, President of the Institute for the Social Science Study of Space, 86

(T. Stephen, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove, p. 20-21)

One of the intriguing aspects of space is its evocative quality. Its seemingly unlimited size, extreme tempera¬tures and gravitations, strange chemistries, and exotic visual images excite the intellect and emotions with end¬less energy. Humans have projected upon space their hopes, fears, analytic abilities, and other paraphernalia of their psyche with unending vigor. Be it the Inca rite of "tying down" the Sun during the winter solstice or the cool hum of computers calculating the trajectories of distant planetary probes, we see the human mind and spirit trying to react, learn, control, and, finally, recon¬figure itself with nature and its own essence through the medium of space. Human interactions with space draw upon culture's entire baggage of myths, science, accom¬plishments, and destructions. To view space from other than this fuller context can be intellectually and ethically misleading.

Prior to the twentieth century space was wonderfully inaccessible and therefore a vent for the brimming exu¬berance of the human imagination. The gods and their heavens were located there and exerted beneficent or malevolent control over human affairs. Divination of the night sky guided the affairs of the state and the in¬dividual. The inventions of astrology and primitive cosmology in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt were well-springs for their articulations in Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian cultures.1 To venture into the heavens held the specter of violating the domain of the divine or the eating of the forbidden fruit of knowledge by the unclean, imperfect human. This subconscious imagery still haunts our reactions to the achievements of the space-flight revolution of the twentieth century.

The space-flight revolution has made it imperative, however, that we come to grips with the fundamental phenomenon of the physical marriage of human culture with space. Not to do so would condemn us to be prison¬ers of our unconscious predispositions, misdirecting our energies or, in the extreme case, laying the seedbed for the extinction of civilization. To do so can enrich the entire fabric of human knowledge, shine fresh light on old questions, and generally elevate the human condi¬tion. The work is just beginning and, no doubt, much of what we do now will someday be seen as alchemy, as further manifestation of the ability of humans to delude themselves in the face of obvious reality. But the first childlike steps are being taken. We should hope that we gain a slightly broader perspective, a deeper capacity for analysis, and a greater sense for the interrelationship between man and the environment.

AT: Exploration Solves Impact

“Environmentalists” view Earth as a conduit for the expansion of capital into uncommodfied areas

**Bryant, University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 47) TJL

The environmental movement had converted America into a nation of environmentalists, yet had failed to effect any meaningful improvement in the environment. An understanding of how this could happen lies partly in the movement's reconceptualization of the human/nature relationship. The new terms of that relationship were crystallized in the image of Earth from space. Re-visioning Earth through its image was not solely the province of either environmentalists or progressives, however. As much as it was a site of conflict, the image of Earth was also a point of confluence, in which the two perspectives revealed their similarities. It is in these similarities, and in the image itself, that a third perspective emerges, one in which the image of Earth from outer space evinces the onset of the postmodern and the operation of consumer capitalism. From this third perspective, which takes into account the apparent practical failure of both ideologies, neither the environmentalists nor the progressives were successful in appropriating the image of the Earth to suit their ends. Rather, the efforts of both were subverted and superseded by the cultural formation of postmodernity. The image defied attempts to fix it within either structure of ideological meanings and served, in the end, as a conduit for the "expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas."9 As a result, a re-vision of the Earth did take place following NASA's historic photo opportunity, but not the one the environmentalists intended.

AT: Exploration Solves – Heg

Outward desire for space exploration is a mask for national pride and leadership

**Bryant, University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 48-49) TJL

From the perspective of the outward response, the image of Earth from outer space was a look backward. It was like a cinematic last glance at one's childhood home at the moment of departure into the great world beyond—affectionate, sentimental, but ultimately dismissive. In this view, humans had outgrown the Earth. It appeared small, tired, conquered, used-up, and unpromising of further challenge. Equipped with the tools of science, "we no longer need to see ourselves, in Sagan's words, as 'restricted to a single world' but as inhabitants of the solar system and possessed of a solar-system consciousness."13 The literary response documented by Weber was ostensibly shared by the people and institutions behind the manned space program. In fact, the spirit of exploration and the quest for knowledge that characterized the progressive ideology of the outward perspective were deliberately set forth as justifications for the space program at its inception. According to Michael L. Smith, however, these justifications represented only the "candy coating" around the real motivations behind the enormous project, namely, national power and prestige.14 "The overwhelming concern—the only substantive concern—of the political leaders, military strategists, and aerospace engineers and scientists who implemented the manned space program, " writes Smith, "was its propaganda value, abroad and at home." Following a highly technologized war, punctuated by the explosion of atomic bombs, political and military leaders around the globe became convinced that power and security in the post-war world would accrue to the nation that could demonstrate scientific and technological superiority. With the Soviet launching of the first ICBM and later Sputnik — compounded by the launchpad explosion of the United States' first satellite rocket—American leaders of the late 1950s grew insecure about the nation's ability to compete with the Soviets and began to perceive this putative loss of technological ground in terms of a lack of "national purpose." The manned space program, according to Smith, was initiated to address these perceived inadequacies, to engage in the technological race with the Soviets and to give the nation "if not purpose, then the image of purposefulness." But even more than this, in the contest for global prestige, it was important for the U. S. to couch its space program in terms of benevolent exploration rather than a power struggle, thereby "lending the nation the appearance of a self-assured, mature state seeking knowledge for all humanity among the stars." The noble aims and fulfillment of destiny attributed to the manned space program by subscribers to the outward perspective, then, may have been largely manufactured, or at least exploited, for strategic or, as Smith would put it, "display" purposes designed to mask geopolitical posturing.

AT: Overview Effect Solves

The Spaceship Earth metaphor robbed the new environmental movement of any momentum or radicalism

**Bryant,University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 49-50) TJL

One powerful mechanism for merging these desired sensibilities—of an awareness of the sensual reality of the planet on the one hand, and a universal notion of humankind on the other—was through the metaphor Spaceship Earth. This metaphor, employed as a tool in the popularization of ecological conscious- ness, was emblematic of the environmentalists' radically reconstituted human/ nature relationship, but ultimately worked against that relationship by advancing a discourse on the environment which undermined its radical potential.

The metaphor mobilizes the public support for environmentalism and contains it-dooming it to failure

**Bryant,University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 54) TJL

This is not to say that the environmentally concerned individuals who first employed the metaphor of Spaceship Earth ever intended to undermine the radical potential of the ecology movement. Rather, they were no doubt confident in the metaphor's ability to help effect meaningful change. Nor is this to say that the metaphor itself somehow created the conditions whereby the environment would be depoliticized through abstraction and environmentalism would proffer an instrumentalist human/nature relationship. The metaphor shows the evidence of a discourse that simultaneously mobilized a public and contained it, a containment that has contributed to the failure of the social practice of environmentalism.

AT: Regulations Solve

Regulations on us of space fail to protect the environment

Viikari, Researcher, Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, 8

(Lotta, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future, p.321, Google Books)

The increasing utilization of outer space also means increasing environmental threats. It has become obvious that the effective management of environmental problems related to space activities is impossible using the current international law of outer space only. Degradation of the space environment is already a severe problem, with the porencial to threaten not only the exploration and exploitation activities of the present generation but also the opportunities of generations to come to use outer space and its resources. Obviously, it is an even more significant threat in the eyes of those who see outer space as having some value beyond its utility to humanity.

AT: Precautions Solve Contamination

Despite international Committee on Space Research regulations, always risk of contamination

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas, 2008

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg141-142)TJL

Since the beginning of the U.S. space program, NASA has taken care with the question of possible contamination—whether so-called forward contamination of space from Earth, or back contamination of Earth from hitchhiker organisms (NASA 1999). In 1958 the International Council of Science (ICSU) established the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), an international body charged with the coordination of worldwide space research including the prevention of interplanetary contamination. In 1964 COSPAR established a quantitative, probabilistic framework based on microbial risk, for the development of planetary protection standards (COSPAR 1964). The UN Space Treaty of 1967 asserts: States party to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter, and where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. (United Nations 1967, Article IX) By 1982—that is, after a large number of landings on the Moon, Mars, and Venus—COSPAR determined that the quantitative measure of risk it had been using (an assessment of the probability that life will replicate on a given planet or celestial body) was based on highly subjective speculation. In response, COSPAR adopted qualitative standards of spacecraft cleanliness based on the different life-detection priorities for planetary bodies. Different types of missions require increasing levels of cleanliness: a fly-by mission has less contamination risk than a lander or sample-return mission, and a mission to Mars or Europa would be held to higher standards than one to a planet deemed unlikely to harbor life (for example, Venus). This shift in perspective highlights the nature of speculative science: outside the controlled environment of the lab, science progresses through what is essentially refined guesswork. The science of space travel makes assumptions about acceptable levels of risk, but risk (from localized effects to planetary destruction due to human error, technical malfunction, or unanticipated factors) is ubiquitous.

Scientific considerations of risk fail to account for environmental value

Byerly, former staff director of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the U.S. House of Representatives, 86

(Radford, Jr., p.95, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove)

Writings on space law have dealt with the space envi¬ronment, but typically these writings are legalistic in na¬ture and devoid of ethical considerations. The type of legalisms that occur are exemplified by the following statement: "A working group of experts was established with the resulting report concluding that nuclear power could be used safely in outer space, providing that all the necessary safety requirements were met."44 The same paper indicates a typical lack of consideration of ethical values in the following sentence: "The determination of 'harmful contamination' or the potential of same should be a matter of fact, not law or political philosophy." Of course, the determination of "harmful contamination" has to be first a matter of values—the opposite of facts.

AT: Science solve Env

Science uses a “power over nature” mentality to try and fix our problems. This approach inevitably fails because of the anthropocentric roots of this mentality that further the problems they try and fix

Sivil, lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, University of Durban Westville, 01

(Richard R, "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Protest And Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid, Ed. Patrick Giddy, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>) LK

The dimensions of environmental issues are seldom, if ever, restricted to the specific parameters of any one scientific discipline (DesJardins 1997:5). Moreover, most major issues facing humanity stretch beyond being mere scientific problems, involving as they do, society, politics, law, economics, etc. Covering such a broad spectrum, it is evident that science, widely distinguished by the compartmentalisation of knowledge, cannot deliver comprehensive solutions to global issues (McMichael 1993: 326). The task of assessing the impacts of ecological imbalances and disruptions on human and other life forms entails significantly more than the classical scientific paradigm of hypothesis formation, data collection and data analysis. Leaving environmental problems in the hands of science would, therefore, effectively result in a narrow understanding of the problem at hand, and by correlation a limited and short-sighted solution. Furthermore, classical science asserts that "scientific knowledge equals power over nature" (Pepper 1996: 240), and that the manipulation of nature can be used for social progress. This has resulted in science being used in many modern developments, of which some exert a negative impact on the environment (e.g. inorganic fertilisers, pesticides, industrial processes, nuclear energy, and nuclear threat, to name but a few). In this light, science should not be viewed as the ultimate source of hope for the future, and clearly should not be given full responsibility for addressing the environmental crisis.

Faith in endless technical advancements is just an illusion of human superiority

Lee, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, 94

(Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, Lancaster University, UK, “Awe and Humility: Intrinsic Value in Nature: Beyond an Earthbound Environmental Ethics,” <http://cseserv.engr.scu.edu/StudentAccounts/ENGR019Winter2003/DFlores/Keekok_Lee.pdf>, Cambridge Journals Volume: 36 (suppl., Pages: 89-101)Page 94 accessed 7/8/11 by LGK

A proper reflection upon the Autonomy and Asymmetry theses would enable one to see that human arrogance and superiority towards Nature are totally misplaced. Humans are, indeed, capa­ble of an exceptionally sophisticated level of abstract thinking, which we have used in the last 250 years or so to develop ever-increasingly powerful technologies to appropriate Nature for our own ends, far exceeding the capacity of any other life-form to do likewise. This gives us the illusion that Nature is entirely under our control, at our disposal and ought to be so. But human superi­ority lies in another direction—in our cognitive capacity ro under­stand the complex workings of Nature, our critical capacity to construct rhetoric and arguments and to test and assess them, and our ethical capacity for responsibility, for assuming duties towards those which themselves have no conception of the ethical. From our cognitive engagement with the world, we know that caus££\_and effects in the biosphere are nonlinear, leading to com­plex interdependence between its parts, and that our increasingly powerful technology produces effects which can and do upset its delicate functioning integrity. Such understanding could be deployed critically to show that a revised ethical attitude to Nature is called for—not one of arrogance and domination but of awe and humility.

AT Current Space Law Solves

Current space law is devoid of any ethical consideration

Byerly, former House Science and Technology Committee chief of staff, 198

(Radford, Beyond Spaceship Earth: Environmental Ethics and the Solar System, Ed Hargrove, pg 95) TJL

Writings on space law have dealt with the space environment, but typically these writings are legalistic in nature and devoid of ethical considerations. The type of legalisms that occur are exemplified by the following statement: "A working group of experts was established with the resulting report concluding that nuclear power could be used safely in outer space, providing that all the necessary safety requirements were met."44 The same paper indicates a typical lack of consideration of ethical values in the following sentence: "The determination of 'harmful contamination' or the potential of same should be a matter of fact, not law or political philosophy." Of course, the determination of "harmful contamination" has to be first a matter of values—the opposite of facts.

AT: Outer Space Treaty Solves

Outer space treaty fails to protect the space environment

Uhlir, senior staff officer of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences and BISHOP, former acting assistant administrator of the National Satellite, Data, and Information Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 86

(Paul F. and William P., Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.196-197)

The existing body of space law regarding environ¬mental protection and resource utilization is a hodge¬podge of ill-defined or conflicting provisions and principles. The linchpin of the present legal framework is the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known simply as the Outer Space Treaty.17 This treaty includes a number of provisions that are normally associated with the protection and use of earthly wildernesses.

Nonappropriation. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes space and everything in it as "the province of all mankind." Article II goes on to say that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation. . . ." Prohibiting pri¬vate ownership of wilderness areas is, of course, a funda¬mental wilderness principle.

Demilitarization. Article IV prohibits "nuclear weap¬ons or any other weapons of mass destruction" from outer space and celestial bodies. Also, the Moon and other celestial bodies must be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes," and "the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celes¬tial bodies shall be prohibited."

Freedom of scientific investigation. This right, generally associated with public use of wilderness areas, is pro¬tected in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.

Noncontamination. Article IX stipulates that "States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, Moon and other celestial bodies, and con¬duct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environ¬ment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose." This provision, though vague, is significant in calling for additional envi-ronmental safeguards to be developed in the future.

Despite these laudable attempts at protecting the outer-space wilderness, the provisions fall short of creat¬ing any designated wilderness areas. Nor do they estab¬lish adequate guidelines or set up the institutional framework for preserving the outer-space environment. Absent from the treaty's provisions or even from its pre¬amble are any of the nonmaterialistic wilderness values discussed in Part II, above. The Outer Space Treaty simply tries to set forth the basic principles necessary for the orderly exploration and exploitation of space.

Unfortunately, the treaty fails even in establishing the minimum acceptable standards of conduct. This is largely because of the vagueness of terminology and dis¬agreement in interpretation of the provisions. For in¬stance, an important definitional dispute concerns the term "harmful contamination" in Article IX. A broad range of possible interpretations exists.18 A narrow in¬terpretation would obviously be less protective of the space environment than a broad one. Additional prob¬lems with the Outer Space Treaty include the lack of adequate enforcement capabilities19 and the fact that the Moon and other celestial bodies are all lumped together with outer space in applying the principles.20

AT: Ethics Bad

Generic ethics bad args do not apply

Barry, Teacher School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast, 99

(John, Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress, p. 28)

McLaughlin (1994), in a chapter tellingly entitled 'Beyond Ethics to Deep Ecology', highlights this aspect of deep ecology. According to him**: The social dependency of ethical theory is a serious problem for any j attempt to develop a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. If the issues posed by ecological crises go to the very roots of industrial society, then it is unlikely that any ethical theory that is grounded in reflection on current social practice will penetrate deeply enough. . . . Thus, the possibility of grounding ethical argument for any radical transformation of humanity's relations with the rest of nature requires going far beyond ordinary ethical discourse.** (1994: 169, emphasis added)

Goedel's Proof

Byerly, former staff director of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the U.S. House of Representatives, 86

(Radford, Jr., Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove, p.97-99)

I must confess that I had not given serious thought to this subject until asked to write this paper. Nevertheless, I believe that we need a way to structure right and wrong outside of and beyond Earth. Of course, this structure will ultimately be based on human values that are not necessarily logically derived, but I believe that we cannot simply extrapolate concepts derived from the specific conditions of Earth. For example, in my opinion, the concept of wilderness implies something wild, and therefore something alive. I suggest that we now do not have a good ethical basis for space explora-tion and that the creation of one will be a major step forward for our species because it will be based on widely shared human values, not mere assumptions. We need an ethic that will have the political toughness to convince all the nations of the Earth of its correctness. It will define right and wrong for activities outside Earth. This will be very difficult because we currently agree on very few things here on Earth, and most nations are worried only about getting their share of the benefits of space, not about costs. But we have to begin. As Leopold has suggested, development and acceptance of such an ethic will be further human evolution.

Goedel's Proof seems always to arise when the human condition is considered. Goedel, a mathemati¬cian, proved an astounding mathematical theorem. He proved that if one takes a set of mathematical axioms, within that set of axioms there are theorems that are true but cannot be rigorously, logically proved starting only with the given axioms. In order to prove these theorems, one must add another axiom to the original set. What you find then is that this new, enlarged set of axioms will contain new theorems that again are true but cannot be proven. Perhaps we are in a situation like that right now. Perhaps we perceive environmental truths beyond Earth that cannot be proved. Perhaps when we add another axiom, an environmental ethic for extraterrestrial space, we will have taken an evolutionary step and will then be able to go on to an even higher level of truth.

AT: Virtue Ethics Bad

Virtue ethics forms a usable framework in situations beyond normal comprehension

Reiman, Department of Political and Economic Studies University of Helsinki, 10 (Saara, “On Sustainable Exploration of Space and Extraterrestrial Life” Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 12, 3894-3903, October-November 2010, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars141.html>, accessed: 7/6/11, SL

The key ingredient to successfully practicing agent-prior virtue ethics, is a set of core values instead of rigid guidelines. This core will enable the agent to adapt himself to new situations. Furthermore, while rules can sometimes be seen as arbitrary and impractical by the people who should put them into practice, the value approach highlights the fact that ethics is a tool and an essential component for making good science. It guides us to make excellent science rather than delaying progress. The practical manifestation of a sustainable attitude could be the principle of caution: avoid harming that which you do not yet understand, and try to avoid causing harm you are in practice unable to repair. These guidelines should be understood as rules of thumb rather than strict rules. Exceptions to rules that are meant to guide actions in alien environments are not only easily imaginable but also sometimes necessary. That is not a weakness of the virtue approach, but on the contrary, it is precisely the feature that makes it as flexible as necessary for an ethical framework to be when acting in epistemically poor circumstances.

**AT: Ethics Normative**

Our ethics aren’t normative-we cannot practice these actions towards these worlds until we visit them. Rather, understanding how we would treat other worlds enriches our ethics.

Cockell Open University Professor of Geomicrobiology, 2006

(Charles S., “The Ethical Relevance of Earth-like Extrasolar Planets”, Environmental Ethics vol 28 pg 305 accessed:7-06-11 <http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=450>) TJL

It may be many millennia before humans visit an extrasolar planet, if we ever do at all. Nevertheless, if we were to find planets that looked “habitable” to humans, even if we cannot visit them directly, we might discuss plans for how we could colonize them. This possibility suggests that we need to understand where these worlds would fit within an environmental ethic. Such an ethic is not strictly normative (at least it cannot inform our practical behaviour toward these worlds until we actually visit them). However, our view of these worlds and how we would treat them allows us to deepen our understanding of our intentions to our own planet and others that are close enough for us to explore in our Solar System. Thus, even if we cannot visit extrasolar planets, it would be intellectually poor not to expand the boundary of moral discourse to consider them, in light of the opportunity they offer to enrich the depth and breadth of environmental ethics.

AT Cede the Political

We don’t cede the political – the only way to confront macro forces is to participate in democratic politics

Shantz, Gerenal Defense Committee lawyer, 2002 (Jeffrey, “The Feminization of Earth First” The Feminist Review, No. 70, pg. 15, JSTOR, accessed: 7/4/11, SL)

According to Judi Bari, a truly biocentric perspective must further challenge the system of industrial capitalism, which is founded upon the 'ownership' of the earth. In her view, industrial capitalism cannot be reformed since it is founded upon the destruction of nature, the profit drive of capitalism, which insists that more be token out than is put back (be it labour or land). Bari extends the Marxist discussion of surplus value to include the elements of nature. She argues that a portion of the profit derived from any capitalist product results from the unilateral (under)valuing, by capital, of resources extracted from nature. Because of her analysis of the rootedness of ecological destruction in capitalist relations Bari turned her attention to the everyday activities of working people, as noted above. Workers would be a potentially crucial ally of environmentalists, she realized, but such an alliance could only come about if environmentalists were willing to educate themselves about workplace concerns. Bari held no naive notions of workers as privileged historical agents. She simply stressed her belief that for ecology to confront capitalist relations effectively and in a non-authoritarian manner the active participation of workers is required. Likewise, if workers were to assist environmentalists it was reasonable to accept some mutual aid in return from ecology activists. To critics, this emphasis on the concerns of workers and the need to overcome capitalist social relations signified a turn towards workerist analysis which, in their view, undermined her ecology. Criticisms of workers and 'leftist ecology' have come not only from deep ecologists, as discussed above, but from social ecologists, such as Murray Bookchin and Janet Biehl, who otherwise oppose deep ecology. Social ecology guru Bookchin has been especially hostile to any idea of the workplace as an important site of social and political activity or of workers as significant radical actors. Bookchin repeats recent talk about the disappearance of the working class (Bookchin, 1997), although he is confused about whether the working class is 'numerically diminishing' or just 'being integrated'. Bookchin sees the 'counterculture' (roughly the new social movements like ecology) as a new privileged social actor and in place of workers turns to a populist 'the people' and the ascendancy of community. Underlying Bookchin's critique of labour organizing, however, is a low opinion of workers who he views contemptuously as 'mere objects' without any active presence within communities20 (Bookchin, 1980). Lack of class analysis likewise leads Biehl (1991) to turn to a vague 'community life\* when seeking the way out of ecological destruction. Unfortunately, communities are themselves intersected with myriad cross-cutting and conflictual class interests which, as Bari showed, cannot be dismissed or wished away. Notions of community are often the very weapon wielded by timber companies against environmentalist 'outsiders'. Biehl recognizes the ecological necessity of eliminating capitalism but her work writes workers out of this process. This is directly expressed in her strategy for confronting capital: 'Fighting large economic entities that operate even on the international level requires large numbers of municipalities to work together' (Biehl, 1991: 152). Not specific social actors or workers with specific contributions to make, but statist political apparatuses municipalities. To confront 'macrosocial forces like capitalism... [Biehl proposes]... political communities' (Biehl, 1991: 152). All of this is rather strange coming from someone who professes to be an anarchist. Biehl even states that the 'one arena that can seriously challenge' current hierarchies is 'participatory democratic politics' (Biehl, 1991: 151) but makes no reference to the specificity of the workplace in this regard, yet, within capitalist relations, the workplace is one of the crucial realms requiring the extension of just such politics. And that extension is not likely to occur without the active participation of people in their specific roles as workers. Bari, concerned with encouraging this participation, did not have the luxury of overlooking the everyday concerns of workers. As a longtime feminist and unionist Judi Bari was well aware of tendencies within the labour movement, and the left generally, to treat concerns of gender or environment as subordinate to the larger movement or, worse, as distractions. Bari was no vulgar materialist given to economistic analyses, however, and she rejected Dave Foreman's characterization of Local 1 as simply 'leftists' or a 'class struggle group'. She too remained sharply critical of Marxist socialism and what she saw as its acceptance of the domination of nature.

AT: K is Anti Human

Our alt does not support anti-human action

Drengson, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Victoria, 99

(Alan, Ecophilosophy, Ecosophy And The Deep Ecology Movement, p. http://www.deep-ecology.org/drengson.html)

No supporters of the deep ecology movement as characterized above could be anti-human, as is sometimes alleged. Some vociferous environmentalists who claim to be supporters of the movement have said and written things that are misanthropic in tone. They have not explained how such statements are consistent with commitment to platform principle number one, which recognizes the inherent worth of all beings, including humans. Supporters of the deep ecology movement deplore antihuman statements and actions. They support Gandhian nonviolence in word and deed. Arne Naess says that he is a supporter of the ecofeminist, social ecology, social justice, bioregional, and peace movements. He believes that the platform principles of the deep ecology movement are broad enough to be this inclusive.

AT: Eco – Fascism

Holistic theory retains intrinsic value of individuals that makes fascism impossible

McLaughlin, Professor of Philosophy, City University of New York, 93

(Andrew, Regarding nature: industrialism and deep ecology, p

Matthews develops a monistic metaphysic based on Einstein's General Relativity theory. She argues persuasively that the criterion of autopoiesis can be used as a principle of individuation in such a system. Individuals are, then, those systems that maintain themselves through growth, repair, and reproduction. This amounts to a deep way to discern, define, and respect individuals within a holistic perspective.46 The crux of such an argument lies in granting some sort of intrinsic value to systems that take themselves as an end. 47 Such a conception of the status of individuals within a larger holism is an effective counter to the charge of fascism against holistic theories.

AT: K is anthropocentric

Our argument is not anthropocentric, we do not objectify the more than human world

Rolston, professor of philosophy at Colorado State University, 86

(Holmes III, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.177- 180

Humans ought to preserve those places that radically transform perspective. Just as it was a good thing for medieval Europe to be dislodged from its insularity, challenged by the Enlightenment and the Scientific Rev¬olution, it will be a good thing for Earthlings to be un¬leashed from the Earth-givens. We can reduce human provinciality with the diverse provinces of solar-plane¬tary nature. In space, so much is scrambled—what counts as day or night, year or season, hot or cold, up or down, bizarre or normal, what counts as land, sea, sky, the feel of gravity. These disorienting, unsettling discoveries will expand our juvenile perspectives. For intellectual and moral growth one wants alien places that utterly renegotiate everything in native ranges. These will prove radical places to understand, not merely in the anthropic sense that our roots lie there, but in the nonanthropic sense that they uproot us from home and force us to grow by assimilating the giddy depths and breadth of being. Those who cannot be seriously confounded by nature have not yet seriously confronted it.

Some will say that this makes instrumental use of solar-planetary nature, finding its appreciation a means to larger human experiences. We preserve those places that act as intellectual fertilizer. That is true, but not the end of the account. Sooner or later, humans will concede that these places have high transformative value because they have exotic formed integrity. They fertilize the human mind because nature is creatively projecting something there. In this sense Rule 6 is the upshot of Rules l through 5.

A principal thing to get transformed in space is our earthbound value system. Out there few places are warm or comfortable, there is no sentience, no pain, pleasure, interests, much less felt preferences satisfied. There is no resource use, no adaptation for survival, no genetic sets defended. Nothing seeks anything; there are no means to ends. There is neither love nor freedom. There is only indifference. All is blah! So we incline to judge, from our relative earthen reference frame, that these are valueless places. Values happen on Earth, not elsewhere, unless Earthlings go elsewhere.

But there are mysteries that ride on the Sun's rays, majesties in the swirling gases and chunks of matter, and humans will benefit by learning to see other worlds, other events where they are for what they are, as surely as they benefit by having air, water, and soil. The histori¬cal struggle, repeated now in ourselves, has always been to get a big enough picture; and we now stand at an exciting place: one world trying to figure out the others.

The human genius takes an interest outside its own biological sector. Nonhuman species take an interest (bi¬ological or psychological) merely within habitat, in prey or predator, in resource or shelter. Only the human spe¬cies can value at a distance that which does not stand in its own lineage, underpinning, or life-support system. The initial challenge of environmental ethics has been to press that task in the earthen environment. A space ethic extends the challenge into the astronomical environ¬ment. We require a space metaphysics to go with space physics. Space exploration must also be value explo-ration.

Later on, humans become excited (in the psychologi¬cal sense) when they get let in on these things. Earlier on, what is first happening is that these places, planets, moons, with their winds, clouds, tectonic movements, volcanism, electromagnetic fields, are getting excited (in the geophysical sense) by energy fluxing over matter, by heat engines within, by solar radiation, by radioactivity, by kinetic and other creative forces of nature. In the order of knowing, the excitement is first in the human beholder and then in the systems beheld. But the excite¬ment, in order of being, is first in objective, energetic, material nature, and only much later in human subjectiv¬ity. It need not follow that every excitement of physical nature can or should excite value in a human beholder (not in more than foundational, baseline ways), but the more lofty excitements of physical nature will regularly produce valued excitement in human beholders. Until we have a value theory that takes things in proper order, we have not yet enjoyed the transformative value that solar-planetary nature has to offer.

Some will complain that all this is wrestling with shadows; there is no value in solar-planetary nature, only an illusion that appears when humans come on stage. But I think not; we are wrestling with creativity. Positive creativity is no illusion, but rather the principal value in the universe, from which all else derives, and which above all needs appreciation and protection. Some will complain that, even if there is extraterrestrial value, any present concern about preserving it is far-fetched. Per¬haps so, but sooner or later the far-fetched can become farsighted.

\*\*\*AFF\*\*\*

No Link

Space exploration does not conceptualize the Earth as a disposable planet

Hartmann, senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute, 86

(William K, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove, p.122)

It is unlikely that the disposable planet philosophy can ever gain wide conscious acceptance, in view of the latest findings in space. The only known planetary bodies are those in our own solar system, of which about twenty-five are larger than 1,000 kilometers across; innu¬merable others are smaller. Of all these the Earth is the only one with a breathable atmosphere and with liquid water trickling across its surface.

The Earth turns out to be a Hawaii in a solar system full of Siberias. This is not to say that Siberia is uninhabi¬table; it is just to say that Siberia lacks some of the attrac¬tions of Hawaii. Earth is the only known place where we can stand naked in the light of a nearby star and enjoy our surroundings. Unlike some early frontiersmen who exhausted one farmland and moved on to the next, we will find no rational motivation for destroying the planet to which we are umbilically linked and then attempting to move on. The plains of the Moon or Mars are, al¬though beautiful, barren. To say that we should not even explore them for fear of writing off the Earth is akin to arguing that we should never hike into the wilderness, either out of curiosity to see what nature has produced there, or out of sheer reveling in our ability to do it, for fear we will therefore neglect our home environments. We may be messing up New York, but it's not because we're being lured by the deserts of Nevada.

AT: Colonies/Get off the Rock Links

Justifications to ensure survival of the human race does not treat the planet as disposable

Hartmann, senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute, 86

(William K, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.134-5)

Putting questions of natural disasters aside, there is a question of survival that involves political disasters. One can say with all good intention that we should work to solve our political problems on Earth before export¬ing ourselves to other planets. Nonetheless, such an atti¬tude ignores a real possibility that nuclear warfare or accidental disaster (such as destruction of the ozone layer) could devastate life on Earth. The visionaries who discuss the possibilities of self-sustaining colonies of hu¬mans, either in orbit or on other planetary surfaces, are really increasing chances for survival of the human race against such disasters. Self-sustaining space colonies, if we create them, will have the side effect of giving human¬ity an extra insurance policy. This is not saying that it is all right to ruin the Earth because we can always go someplace else. This is merely recognizing that the space environment may provide the opportunity for self-sus¬taining colonies that could give humanity an extra option on survival.

**AT: State Links**

**Only political change can solve the K**

**Sapontzis, Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Hayward, 95**

(S.F, The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 3, Spring, The Nature of the Value of Nature, <http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1995.spring/sapontzis.1995.spring.html>)LK

Finally, if the motivating concern about the value of nature really is practical, it must be political. In order to overcome the environmental crisis, we must convince peoples and governments to change their behaviors and institutions in the ways necessary to achieve that end. If the peoples and governments which are devastating nature are anthropocentric, then environmentally enlightened anthropocentric arguments have an immediate relevance to political debates concerning environmentally significant practices. In contrast, arguments employing ideas of the overriding, objective value of nature are politically irrelevant until these anthropocentric, nature-devastating peoples and governments come to believe that nature has such value. While neither task is easy, convincing peoples and governments to change their fundamental value systems seems a far more problematic and time-consuming task than convincing them that continuing their nature-devastating practices is contrary to their anthropocentric values. Especially in a time of crisis, pursuing the less problematic and time-consuming course of argument is the course to take to make a real, political difference. Consequently, the practical motivation of overcoming the environmental crisis does not direct us to establish the overriding, objective value of nature; rather, it directs us to develop politically compelling, anthropocentric arguments for environmentalism.

Terraforming Good

Terraforming is moral if there isn’t life on Mars

Fogg, Ph. D. planetary science, 1999 (Martyn, “The Ethical Dimensions of Space Settlement” pg.5, Probability Research Group, IAA-99-IAA.7.1.07, The International Astronautical Federation, <http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~mfogg/EthicsDTP.pdf>, accessed: 7/6/11, SL)

Ecocentrism (also known as biocentrism) is claimed by its proponents to be the first true environmental ethic since it is based on holistic principles. To the ecocentrist, all life is sacred and has the right to exist and flourish. The living world itself has intrinsic value: not just at the level of individual organisms, but also the ecosystems of which they are a part 29,30 . Humans are not regarded as a superior species 31 , but as just one part of this greater whole—“plain biotic citizens” is a term often used—with no right to assert themselves over and above the will of nature. Moral behaviour within this system entails serving the welfare of life as a whole: following a Principle of Respect for Life, often defined as, “… preserving the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. 29 ” Since humans have no privileged place within this community, ecocentrists urge that we dismantle our energy and resource-intensive civilisation, reduce our population, and adopt a simpler lifestyle in harmony with nature. Since ecocentrism subordinates the rights of the individual to those of an holistic abstraction, it has been criticised as a misanthropic and totalitarian ideology 32 . This is not without some justification, as much of the progress in ethics over the past few centuries has involved the extension of individual rights—many of which ecocentrism would require us to abandon. However, much of this criticism only fully applies to the more extreme versions of ecocentrism. Half the human population, big though it is, cannot be allowed to starve, however much this might suit the abstract purposes of the biosphere. This really would be immoral. The original “Land Ethic” of Leopold has thus been interpreted by some to mean something more akin to 33 : the survival needs of humans outweigh the survival needs of non-humans, but the survival needs of non-humans outweigh the nonsurvival needs of humans. An ethic such as this stands not too far removed from some “enlightened self-interest” versions of anthropocentrism. Vast and fuzzy though the expanded set of rights holders within ecocentrism is, the system still does not assign intrinsic value to inanimate objects. Life is the basis of value: planets and the rocks they are made of provide an instrumental stage within which life can play out its destiny. Thus, despite ecocentrism’s hostility towards human technology, space settlement and terraforming are not necessarily immoral within an ideology such as this. In fact quite the contrary: maximising the diversity of life is one of the principles of ecocentrism. Undoubtedly however, extraterrestrial life, of whatever kind, would also be assigned intrinsic value from the ecocentric perspective 20 . We would have to further the interests of whatever life forms we encounter in space. Bacteria at home on Mars would have moral priority over humans. Their scientific usefulness to us would be irrelevant as a criterion for their preservation. They would be entitled to this by right. To the ecocentrist, terraforming Mars is only moral if it is truly a barren world.

**Terraforming Good**

Terraforming is just as natural as any celestial body

Fogg, Ph. D. planetary science, 1999 (Martyn, “The Ethical Dimensions of Space Settlement” pg. 6, Probability Research Group, IAA-99-IAA.7.1.07, The International Astronautical Federation, <http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~mfogg/EthicsDTP.pdf>, accessed: 7/6/11, SL)

The reason is that only humans are subject to moral praise or blame. It is our own values that are at issue, not fictional ones ascribed to unconscious or non-living entities. They are the only values we can know to be real and the only ones that can motivate both action and restraint. It is thus the conscious enactment of change that preservationists most object to, in the same manner that ecocentrists object to it on Earth. But is there anything fundamentally unnatural or wicked inherent in this ability? No. Whilst we are right to regard the Universe, with all its projects, from the vast to the microscopic, with wonder and a degree of humility, the Universe does seem to be a reasonable place. It seems to be showing us that it is comprehensible, if not all comprehended. It is subject to cause and effect, to free will. Reason therefore, as suggested by Plato and Kant, has a transcendent and autonomous nature. It can be projected as well as contained within the self. Its province is the Universe at large. Reason can enact intentional change. It can legitimately stand against what is, for ideals of what ought to be. Human consciousness, culture, creativity—and the technological artefacts produced thereby— are thus not unnatural. They have arisen from the same physics that gave birth to the cosmos and the same process of biological evolution that followed the genesis of the first living cell. They are as natural as sex, photosynthesis, aerobic respiration, and a host of other biological processes, all of which were invented some considerable time after life’s origin and all of which changed the Earth drastically and forever. Would Mars be a better place transformed into a living world? Preservationism would say no, but its movement from what is descriptively true of Mars to a prescriptive claim is arbitrary and unconvincing. The argument amounts to saying that humans actually have the lowest degree of intrinsic worth of any class of formed object. Rocks are free to rust and crumble over the aeons, asteroids and meteorites free to batter the Martian surface, and microbes free to hitch a ride if they can survive the trip and there to evolve in to new forms that are Martian. Only humans should be constrained from fulfilling their evolutionary potential according to this philosophy. Yet if space- faring is a legitimate activity for microbes, why should it not be so for humans? The allied ideologies of misanthropy and sentimentality cannot provide a satisfactory answer. There is no fundamental moral objection to bringing life to Mars as opposed to it originating there, or arriving there by accident. If life begins on Mars during the planet’s middle age, as opposed to its youth, then this is more an issue of timing than of morality. Life might change Mars but it will not detract from the planet’s uniqueness. This is not to say that there are no moral issues inherent in space settlement—there will still be right and wrong ways to go about it—but we will have to appeal to our own values in order to resolve them.

AT: Intrinsic Value

**Intrinsic value is a faulty concept**

**Sapontzis, Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Hayward, 95**

(S.F, The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 3, Spring, The Nature of the Value of Nature, <http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1995.spring/sapontzis.1995.spring.html>)LK

[36] Third, the phrase `respect for nature' is frequently used in discussing environmental issues. `Respect' can refer to certain behaviors, where it means `taking into account' or `not interfering with.' In these senses, `respecting' nature is non-controversial. But, as discussed above, `respect' also refers to feelings whose intentional objects have ideal value. Now, as already noted, it is non-controversial that some people find elements of nature to have ideal value, but controversy arises when it is claimed that nature has such value independent of human beings. Such ideal value would require that there be a nonhuman subject or subjects of sufficient intellectual ability to entertain ideals for whom nature is the object of feelings of respect, and demonstrating that that requirement has been met is again difficult, at best. Furthermore, the imperative implications for us of nature having ideal value for some other subject or subjects are also not obvious.

[37] Finally, let us conclude with three comments concerning comparative evaluations, and for purposes of this discussion, let us presume that human and nonhuman animals provide the only subjective bases for the values of nature. First, perhaps the most obvious priority value of nature arises from its originary value as a necessary condition for the possibility of life and, thereby, of all other values. However, the practical significance of that priority is unclear, due both to uncertainties about how much nature can be changed without destroying life on earth and to concerns with what is required for preserving quality of life and not just the fact of life.

[38] Second, things of ideal value thereby acquire high priority. Consequently, to the extent that people come to have feelings of respect for certain states of nature, preserving or regaining those states will have high priority for them. However, bringing people to have such feelings on the basis of moral argument will be difficult, at least in the West, since our traditional moral principles and concepts have tended to contrast the ideal with the natural, e.g., the lion lying down with the lamb vs. nature red in tooth and claw.

[39] Third, since all values emanate directly or derivatively from immediate values, things of immediate value have a kind of logical priority to other things of value. That is, the value of things of direct or derivative value always depends on the value of things of immediate value, while immediate values are inherent, even though the existence of things of immediate value depends on the existence of some things of direct or derivative value. Now, insofar as affective experiences are part of subjectivity, subjectivity shares in this priority, and insofar as sentient subjects are part of nature, nature also shares in this priority. To those extents, then, treating nature as lacking immediate value involves a mistake. Also, to the extent that our moral concerns direct us not to disregard the immediate value of things by treating them as mere means, directs us to maximize positive or minimize negative immediate value, or otherwise directs us to give a high priority to respecting all things of positive immediate value, at least in the sense of not interfering with them, nature can share in that moral priority.

Turn – Overview Effect

Exploration should be done to produce the overview effect- enlightening humanity to the fragility and beauty of every aspect of creation in order to prevent extinction

**Bryant, University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg 49) TJL

This changed relationship was precisely the goal of the environmental movement and the reason the picture of the whole Earth became so important to it. Framed in environmentalist terms, the image of Earth from outer space showed the planet in all its "sensual reality" as beautiful, frail, and vulnerable to the depredations of avaricious industry and technology. Further, the image emphasized the common origins, conditions, and fate of people all over the planet. For the first time, one could look at the place where "everyone had lived and everything had happened." As poet Archibald MacLeish put it, "to see the Earth as it truly is. . . is to see ourselves as riders on the Earth together."18 In the environmentalist ideology, care taken in the way humans interacted with the Earth was paramount to the survival of the entire species

Exploration solves environment

Space exploration broadens environmental knowledge

Hartmann, senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute, 86

(William K, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove, p.128-130

We would not have admired some Neanderthal who refused to cross the next range of hills to see what was beyond. We do not admire the clerics who would not look through Galileo's telescope because the view of moons going around Jupiter demolished their concep¬tion of an Earth-centered universe. Similarly it seems premature and hardly admirable, in an era of population pressures and material shortages, to refuse to seek out further facts about the space environment around us. These indeed might present better options for humanity in dealing with questions of progress as if survival matters. The purpose of the environmental movement is not, after all, to prevent any further utilization of resources by humanity. That is impossible, even in a recycling society, due to the unaffordability of 100-percent recycling efficiency. Rather, we seek a more optimum interaction of mankind with nature, with the goal of pre-serving the Earth's environmental quality. We recall the slogan of the Friends of the Earth: ". . . dedicated to the preservation, restoration, and rational use of Earth and its resources."

Space exploration gives a potential option for implementing this slogan. Implementing such slogans, however, will be no easier than it has been for the rest of the environmental movement. In 1980, the governor of California became a presidential candidate who advocated a plank of "preserve the Earth, serve Mankind, explore the Universe," and was promptly ridiculed in the national press as "Governor Moonbeam," the "science-fiction candidate."

Rather than winding down the space program and crippling any possibility of learning more about the space options open to us, we should pursue a vigorous program of exploration of the space environment. For the next few years space exploration should be a reconnaissance designed to give us the facts we need to decide what to do next. It should be conducted in several parts similar to the programs pursued at NASA today. One part should be physical exploration by spacecraft and by humans. Another part should be a strong support program of Earth-based studies through astronomical, laboratory, and theoretical techniques. A third part should be engineering studies to reveal future human options on Earth and off Earth by means of space operations. For example, large space structures can intercept significant amounts of energy from the great nuclear power plant in the sky . . . the Sun. This collected energy can either be used in space colonies (which, once constructed, could process resources with absolutely no terrestrial pollu¬tion) or beamed down to the Earth (providing power sources with minimal terrestrial pollution). The princi¬pal objection to the latter has been the effects of the microwave radiation if the energy is beamed by mi¬crowave to Earth. In addition, there has been a philo¬sophic objection to power being supplied by large centralized stations dependent on high technology. In spite of our push for decentralized power sources, such as solar collectors at the level of individual family con-sumers, some centralized, high-output power stations appear necessary for manufacturing. Therefore, trade¬offs should be further considered between the solar-power satellite concept and other more polluting processes such as coal-burning power generators and nuclear generators.

Space exploration helps develop environmental ethics

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas, 2008

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg136)TJL

While this cultural reflection was taking place, the community of professional philosophers was closeted in arcane debates. Since Dewey’s death in 1952, the profession had overwhelmingly become a disciplinary domain whose research was written by and for philosophic experts. But despite the silence of philosophers (including environmental philosophers) on the subject, there is in fact a powerful link between our exploration of space, the reflections it elicits concerning the fate of our home planet, and the development of environmental ethics. This essay explores these connections, arguing that our thinking about both the future habitability of the planet ethics and the exploration of space is sharpened by bringing the two into more explicit contact.

Space Expands Resources

Space expands finite resources

Hartmann, senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute, 86

(William K, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.125

Second, the opportunity to explore space changes one of the fundamental underpinnings of the environ¬mental movement: it means the frontiers are not, after all, gone. There is an expanding frontier in the infinity of space if we choose to explore it. Of course, the amount of planetary surface in our solar system (that nearby part of space that we've been exploring for the last two decades) is not infinite, but is still large by Earth stan¬dards. The amount of land area on all known planetary bodies smaller than the Earth is over twice the total area of the Earth and about eight times the land area of the Earth. Of course, it is not as readily habitable as most of the Earth's land area, but it raises opportunities regard¬ing the availability of resources. (The total area of the four giant planets is about 240 times the Earth's area or about 840 times the Earth's land area, but these surfaces are relatively inaccessible because of the extremely strong gravitational fields and uncertain surface proper¬ties of these planets, which make landings and takeoffs questionable.)

Perm

Should not abandon practical application of space exploration

Hartmann, senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute, 86

(William K, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.122-4

A different opposition to space exploration appears to come from a subtle extension of the environmental¬ists' logic. A solid chain of reasoning leads from Earth's finiteness to a concern over the materials we consume and the wastes we exhaust into our atmosphere, oceans, and bodies. It leads to a concept of stewardship over the planet that we occupy and to our views that "small is beautiful," that we should pursue "progress as if survival mattered." A look at the rate at which we are altering Earth's atmosphere, waters, and urban environment leads to recognition that we cannot continue unlimited industrialization of the Earth. The momentum of these arguments, however, has carried some environmental¬ists on to the position that since technological discov¬eries have allowed overpopulation, pollution, and rapacious consumerism, technology itself is the culprit. In some quarters this idea has been carried beyond the rejection of technology (the application of discoveries about nature) to a rejection of science itself (the attempt to observe nature and learn the properties of the natural world). An undercurrent in late twentieth-century cul¬ture is a rejection of verifiable problem-solving ap¬proaches to daily life and of intellectual curiosity about the cosmic environment around us, as illustrated by the popularity of astrological superstitions and other subjec¬tive cults.

Environmentalists are still sorting out these compet¬ing modes of thought about the future directions of ter¬restrial civilization. Our general conclusion has been to espouse a simpler, less consumerist approach to daily life, but we have not abandoned the human intellect and its quest for new information, new understandings, new experience. Some environmentalists have been criticized for adopting an overly romanticized, Rousseau-like vi¬sion of rural agricultural homesteads planned "in har¬mony with nature." These visions lead to questions of how far back we are willing to go in abandoning such technological improvements as fabricated metal tools, hot and cold running water in our homes, indoor toilets, electricity, etc. The "small is beautiful" ethic espoused by many of us is simply a recognition that we must adopt the limited, simple levels of technology suitable to a pleasant and productive life style. It should not become a wholesale rejection of the technological base that has made our civilization possible and that provides the ma¬terial foundation for artistic and scientific enterprises. The goal of learning about our natural surroundings on Earth and in space remains a valid and healthy goal. It is an expression of our innate human curiosity, our sense of adventure, and our hope of improving human life in a practical way. Having learned many basic facts about Earth's geography, we are now trying to learn some basic facts about the radiation and particle environment near Earth, the origin of our system of worlds, the evolution of their strange surface landscapes and atmospheres, and the causes of dramatic climate fluctuations that ap¬pear to have occurred in the past on some of them (in¬cluding Earth).

Perm

Scientific research crucial to establishing ethics

Viikari, Researcher, Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, 8

(Lotta, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future, p.18, Google Books)

In most areas—and definitely in the space sector—increased environmental awareness is an imperative without which any activity will eventually become impossible. Whether humans understand and accept these conditions and react to them soon enough is a question largely dependent upon the development of a new environmental ethic. Obviously, scientific research can contribute to creating a more environmentalist (preservationist) ideology by revealing new knowledge about natural phenomena, their interrelatedncss, and importance for human activities. It can also gradually broaden our appreciation of the environment as such—including the space environment. However, scientific research alone cannot produce a new awareness. "[S]cientific research can only answer scientific questions": it can help to implement an ethic but is not (alone) capable of establishing one. Neither is science capable of determining political preferences."

Must act even under epistemically imperfect conditions

Reiman, Department of Political and Economic Studies University of Helsinki, 2010 (Saara, “On Sustainable Exploration of Space and Extraterrestrial Life” Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 12, 3894-3903, October-November 2010, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars141.html>, accessed: 7/6/11, SL

Explorative science is characterized by the need to act in epistemically imperfect conditions, that is, in conditions characterized by uncertainty and ignorance about facts normally considered important for moral decision making. In a new environment, it is very difficult to properly anticipate all possible scenarios or weigh the actual risks attached to suggested actions. In a Mars mission, this condition is highlighted since communication to Earth will be slow. Astronauts will need to be able to make big moral decisions independently, without consultation with the mission control center on Earth. In making such decisions, there is great ignorance regarding important factors that might affect our decisionmaking. In risk theory, Aven and Renn (2009) have stated that "Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value." Arnould and Debus (2008) have elegantly summed up the problem: in an ideal world, we would wait until we understood things before we did them. But in the actual world, we usually need to act in partial ignorance in order to gain understanding. Somewhere along the journey from ignorance to understanding, is experience. Science, by definition, is all about making that journey of discovery. The beginning of sustainability, then, is acknowledging this need to act in ignorance and adopting an ethic that can work under these conditions. In space exploration, the risks can not be reliably measured and all possible outcomes of actions can not be anticipated. For the purposes of moral decisionmaking, risk analysis does not work well in an exploration situation. Fortunately, there are better alternatives available.

Perm

Perm do both: Ecocentrism and technocentrism are not mutually exclusive ideologies as they both display elements of eachother

**Thorburn, MA in Sociology Qualitative Research, 2010**

(Stephanie, “The Astrosociological Imagination and the Space Renaissance Initiative. A Discourse Analytical Perspective” The Space Renaissance Initiative, pg. 6, accessed: 7-07-11 [www.spacerenaissance.org/papers/Abridged\_STR.pdf](http://www.spacerenaissance.org/papers/Abridged_STR.pdf) pg6)TJL

The SRI manifesto is though, more radical than any form of social ecology that has been attempted on Earth and is necessarily concerned with further, a redefinition of the stereotypical view of ‘technocentrism’. In the second chapter of ‘The Roots of Modern Environmentalism’, John Perkins progresses toward ‘The Roots of Technological Environmentalism’, thus defining ‘technocentrism’ as the official, dominant set of attitudes to the environment, interconnected to the exercise of power. Rationality and the manipulation of nature for man’s own ends are therefore often justified by technocentrists through their belief in objectivity. The scientific revolution of the 16th to the 18th century and the subsequent growth in capitalism historically gave rise to classical science and in essence the 'technocentrism' perspective. Technocentric thought seeks to resolve problems from rational science, using the laws of physical science and is connected to belief in the superiority of high over lower technology, the management of the environment and is further defined through an unfortunate ‘irrational faith’ in the ability of advanced capitalism to maintain itself. In fact, the ideological framework utilised in the definition of ‘technocentrism’ and the converse manifestation of ‘ecocentrism’ are shown by Pepper to be not mutually exclusive classifications, with some groups displaying elements of ecocentrism and technocentrism. The characteristics of these tendencies are illustrated further through a descriptive chart by O’Riordan, 1981. Ecocentric traits that resonate to an extent with the SRI include value on the humanitarian importance of nature, the development of small scale communities and improvements in work and leisure, (in context of space settlements.) Technocentric traits might include optimism regarding man’s ability to improve the lot of the world’s people and belief that ‘man’ can always find a way out of any difficulty either political, scientific or technological. In reality, the SRI probably possesses more clear- cut technocentric beliefs, but have certainly incorporated the spirit of ecocentric virtues into their humanitarian ethics. It is within this context that I would suggest the SRI standpoint could be allied to not only ‘astro humanism’, but a form of ‘techno humanism’, in combining elements of traditional technocentrism with a level of social egalitarianism not envisaged within conventional critiques of technocentric rationality. Aspects of such ‘techno humanism’ can be found too, within the work of scientist and ecologist James Lovelock, who although controversial, shares some elements of common ground philosophically with the SRI in his advocacy of science and technology.

[NOTE: SRI- Space Renaissance Initiative]

Perm

Framing the debate with a philosophical questioning about with the relatedness between humanity and the universe in combination with a pragmatic approach to environmental problems is the best and most responsible means of developing both the science and policy for the exploration of the space

Daly, graduate student School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, and Frodeman, chair of Department of Philosophy at University of North Texas, 2008

(Erin and Robert, “Separated At Birth, Signs Of Rapprochement Environmental Ethics And Space Exploration” Ethics & the Environment Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2008 accessed: 7-02-11 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v013/13.1.daly.html> pg148)TJL

Such reflection should be performed by philosophers, metaphysicians, and theologians in regular conversation with the scientists who investigate space and the policy makers that direct the space program. The exploration of the universe is no experimental science, contained and controlled in a laboratory, but takes place in a vast and dynamic network of interconnected, interdependent realities. If (environmental) philosophy is to be a significant source of insight, philosophers will need to have a much broader range of effective strategies for interdisciplinary collaborations, framing their reflections with the goal of achieving policy-relevant results. If it is necessary for science and policy-makers to heed the advice of philosophers, it is equally necessary for philosophers to speak in concrete terms about real-world problems. A philosophic questioning about the relatedness of humans and the universe, in collaboration with a pragmatic, interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems, is the most responsible means of developing both the science and policy for the exploration of the final frontier.

Use the aff as a political catalyst for the ecological movement

Revington, volunteer with the Rainforest Information Centre, 95

(John, “Deep Ecology is not Enough,” <http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/deep.htm>)LK

True, humanity's underlying problems are not political. True, working on a purely political level is futile in the long run. But that does not mean that looking for political solutions is futile; in fact, it is essential in the short run. If we fail to find political solutions in the short run, there isn't going to be any long run. The Terania Creek rainforests are a few kilometres from where I live. They wouldn't be there, had it not been for the hundreds of people who protested their planned logging in the early 1980s. Those protests were clearly political, and they resulted in a political solution to the threat posed by the timber industry to NSW rainforests. Interestingly, this political action was for many of the protesters a deeply spiritual experience which has provided the impetus for further political action in defence of forests. There are countless examples of natural places all over the world that would no longer exist, had human beings not engaged in political action to save them from other human beings. Without political action, there would be no more natural world to be Ecologically Deep about. And the example of Terania Creek shows that political action and a sense of reverence for the natural world can go together. They don't exclude each other; they complement each other. Political action is essential, and in many cases, it is the insights of Deep Ecology which inspire political action.

Perm

Perm solves, ecological movements alone fail to create change

Revington, volunteer with the Rainforest Information Centre, 95

(John, “Deep Ecology is not Enough,” <http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/deep.htm>)LK

As I have said, I think Deep Ecology is misused by those who appear to believe it can be employed as a yardstick to make moral and practical judgements in all situations. Part of the problem here is a failure to make distinctions about the kinds of knowledge we are dealing with. Deep Ecology and the analysis of human society are concerned with fundamentally different spheres. When the thinking used in one sphere is used to make decisions in the other, then problems arise. We need different ears for different spheres. Deep Ecology is about values, about fundamental beliefs and ways of looking at the world. It does what religion tries -- and, for more and more people, fails -- to do. It touches the heart rather than the intellect. It offers answers to questions like "Who am I?" and "What matters?". It offers a way of understanding the world which gives human beings a sense of purpose beyond themselves and connection with the all the other species in the world.. Social and political analysis, on the other hand, is primarily about how to operate in the world. It has basic values as well, usually about social justice and the betterment of people's lives, but mostly it is not about values. It tells us "this is how people operate" rather than "this is what matters". So if I use the tenets of Deep Ecology as the sole basis on which to run a campaign to protect a forest against logging, I won't do a very good job. I would be using the wrong tool, like using a violin to sweep the floor. Deep Ecology may be the inspiration for my campaign, and it may be used as a source of arguments to inspire others, but it won't tell me how to issue a press release, promote social justice, form alliances with other groups or run a meeting on strategies. So it is inappropriate to use theories about ethical value as one's only guide in practical situations. It is also inappropriate to use ostensibly "factual" and "value free" analysis as the sole basis for practical decision making. This is also a case of using the wrong tool for the job. Economic rationalism, with its pseudo-scientific approach, and its failure to acknowledge its own implicit values, is an example of this. But that's another story.

Perm - Mars

Mars policy must combine pragmatic with the ethical

Reiman, Department of Political and Economic Studies University of Helsinki, 2010 (Saara, “On Sustainable Exploration of Space and Extraterrestrial Life” Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 12, 3894-3903, October-November 2010, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars141.html>, accessed: 7/6/11, SL

The possibility of discovering life in places like Mars also raises several important philosophical and ethical questions. Addressing these questions in advance, before anything has actually been discovered, is important. As McArthur and Boran (2004) have noted, humans have a deplorable record in dealing with each other and with their fellow species here on Earth. According to them, it is possible that speculating about our moral obligations towards extraterrestrials serves as a call to improve our record here on Earth (McArthur & Bodan 2004, Cockell 2007). Philosophy of space exploration is similar to the technology of space exploration in that it has the potential to improve the lives of many of those who are not directly involved in the exploration effort. The current declining state of our environment (Ceballos et al., 2010; Cains 2010; Moriarty and Honnery 2010; Reese, 2010; Trainer 2010) proves clearly that our traditional way of evaluating environmental ethical questions is far from sound (Ceballos et al., 2010; McKee 2010; Jones 2009; Tonn 2010). But theorizing will not be enough. As Mark Williamson (2006) has noted, environmental ethics (of which space ethics can be seen as one subcategory) is, and should be, practical ethics. Philosophical research related to space exploration not only has the potential of producing better understanding of how we should act in space – it could also guide us into treating our own planet more gently. In these times of climate change, widespread species extinction and other threats to the global ecosystem, this knowledge would be of extreme importance. Space and any possible ecosystems on other planets, may represent a fragile frontier (Williamson 2006). Among other things, this could mean that errors in moral judgment are in many ways more serious and less easily repairable than errors made on Earth. In this paper, I will introduce and develop the concept of sustainable exploration. I suggest that virtue ethics is an ethical theory well suited to space exploration, and that sustainability should be a key virtue for space exploration. A manned Mars mission will be the most ambitious exploratory effort humanity has ever undertaken. It should go into history books as an exploration mission where we for once got things right, not just in terms of technical success, but also in terms of ethical excellence.

On Balance space exploration better

If environmental scenarios are accurate than space exploration is necessary

Hartmann, senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute, 86

(William K, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove p.137-8

Of course, we cannot fully foresee the future, and to try to force the future into a restrictive plan is to lose the chance to develop unforeseen discoveries. We cannot guarantee consequences of space exploration, though it appears to be a form of research that has a likelihood of expanding our options. Consider this alternative scenario for the future. We use the remaining fossil energy resources to develop alternative energy technologies. We establish a capability of space operations. Our planet becomes recognized as a unique haven in the solar system, to be protected and cherished. A zero-growth population of passengers on the spaceship Earth maintains Earth's population consistent with the carrying capacity of Earth. As David Brower notes in his "Third Planet Operating Instructions": "The planet is self-maintaining, and the external fuel source will provide exactly as much energy as is needed or can be safely used."9 We soon see an end to the gouging of ever-deeper layers of Earth in search of new raw materials and fossil fuels, because replacement materials are to be found outside the spaceship Earth. Self-sufficient space settlements, in orbit and on smaller planets, provide new resources in a viable economy based on trade with Earth, which comes to be viewed more and more as a haven from the other environments of the Solar System. The mining and refining of the new resources, and some manufacturing, are done in orbit. Only product, not pollution, is delivered to Earth's biosphere. If the space economy were as vigorous as one might hope, new settlements could be built with no consumption of Earth materials, since solar energy, metals, hydrogen, oxygen, and building materials are abundantly available in space. Humanity grows, not by crowding Earth, but by seeking adventure and life elsewhere.

In short, consideration of terrestrial civilization's evolution and its long-term relation to its space environment suggests only three broad classes of outcomes: (1) accidental or deliberate destruction of life on Earth through expanding consumerist technology or warfare; (2) slow decay of a civilization that restricts itself to a finite Earth and either runs out of materials or is irreparably damaged by a cosmic accident; or (3) expansion of civilization into the space environment with attendant diversification, utilization of space resources, and consequent greater insurance against accidents that could damage all of mankind at once. Space exploration is no panacea—there are no panaceas—but it holds promise for long-term amelioration of many problems we sense on a distressingly finite Earth.

On Balance space exploration better

Rolston, professor of philosophy at Colorado State University, 86

(Holmes III, Beyond spaceship earth : environmental ethics and the solar system, Ed. Hargrove, p.154-157)

Overlaying anthropic nature on accidental nature, we can still paint a further picture, with some of the old pictures still showing through. I plan to conserve the facts under a different value theory, one neither acci¬dental nor anthropic, but one portraying projective nature. Nature's "projects" are regularly valuable, as are its "ob¬jects" and its "subjects," sometimes more, sometimes less. True, Earth lies critically on a main sequence, com-plex with intrinsic values; but it does not follow that non-Earth places are wayward lines without intrinsic value. Analogously to the way in which it is arrogant anthropocentrism for humans to value themselves and disvalue jumping spiders, it is Earth chauvinism for Earthlings to value Earth and disvalue Jupiter. Both the jumping spider and Jupiter are formed in the wonder¬land of projective nature. There are disanalogies with which we must deal: a jumping spider has organic integ¬rity; Jupiter has site integrity. But both are projects with their glory. Nature is energetic and fertile, evidenced at length in life and mind. That does involve some accident, but it cannot be all accident; it is an immanent property of systemic nature that natural history results. We live in what K. G. Denbigh calls "an inventive universe."17 Projective nature is restless. There is a throwing for¬ward of dynamic events that often culminate in natural kinds, products with wholeness—stars, comets, planets, moons, rocks, mountains, crystals, canyons, seas. The biological and psychological processes that on Earth cul¬minate the astronomical and geological processes are still more impressive, but to be impressed with life in isolation from its originating matrix is to have but half the truth. The original meaning of nature, from the Latin natans, "giving birth," suggests that value in nature lies in its generation of life. A better cue lies in the meaning of physics, the Greek word for nature, a "bringing forth." Systemic nature is valuable as a productive system, with Earth and its humans only one, even if perhaps the high¬est in richness or complexity, of its known projects. Na¬ture is of value for its capacity to throw forward all the storied natural history. On that scale, humans on Earth are latecomers, and it seems astronomically arrogant for such late products to say that the system is only of instru¬mental value, or that not until humans appear to do their valuing does value appear in the universe. It is less short-sighted but still seriously myopic to value the system only for its production of life, although this is of great moment within it. Nonbiotic things have no information in them, no memory, no genome, much less sentience or experience. There are no cells, no skin, no centered control. Impressed with the display of life and personality on Earth, humans correctly attach an ethical concern to persons and to organisms, but we may incorrectly assume that mere things even on Earth, much less on Mars, are beyond appropriate and inappropriate consideration. The astronomical and geological phases in nature are, on some of their tracks, precursors of life. They are of value on that account, and when life is reached, everything else can seem far "down below," short of the fullness of being displayed in life, and thus without value. But their distance "down below" does not make them merely of instrumental value, nor does it make those places that are "sidetracked" of no value. All the elevated forms have bubbled up "from below," and the basic stratum is of value for its projective tendencies, which are value-able, able to produce value wher¬ever they result in formed integrity. Crystals, volcanoes, geysers, headlands, rivers, springs, cirques, paternoster lakes, buttes, mesas, canyons—these are also among the natural kinds. They are constantly being built, altered, and their identity is in flux. They do not have organic integrity or bounded individuality. They defend nothing. They do not have "character," and there seems in them no conflict and resolution. Nothing there can be afraid, disappointed, frustrated, hurt, or satisfied. So they may seem to have no integrity that can be valued. But they are recognizably different from their back¬grounds and surroundings. They may have striking par¬ticularity, symmetry, harmony, grace, spatio-temporal unity and continuity, historical identity, story, even though they are also diffuse, partial, broken. They do not have wills or interests, but rather headings, trajectories, traits, successions, beginnings, endings, cycles, which give them a tectonic integrity. They can be projects of quality. Nature is not inert and passive until acted upon re¬sourcefully by life and mind. Neither sentience nor con¬sciousness is necessary for inventive processes to occur. There is genesis, Genesis, long before there are genes. Inventiveness in projective nature lies at the root of all value, including sentience and consciousness, and na¬ture's created products regularly have value as inventive achievements. There is a negentropic constructiveness in dialectic with an entropic teardown, a mode of work¬ing for which we hardly have yet an adequate scientific much less a valuational theory. Yet this is nature's most striking feature, one which ultimately must be valued and is of value. In one sense we say that nature is indifferent to planets, mountains, rivers, microbes, and trilliums. But in another sense nature has bent toward making and remaking them for several billion years. These performances are worth noticing—remark¬able, memorable—and they are not worth noticing just because of their tendencies to produce something else, certainly not merely because of their tendency to pro¬duce this noticing by our subjective human selves. They are loci of value so far as they are products of natural formative processes. The opening movements of a sym¬phony contribute to the power of the finale, but they are not merely of instrumental value; they are of value for what they are in themselves. The splendors of the heav¬ens and the marvels of the geomorphic Earth do not simply lie in their roles as a fertilizer for life. There is value wherever there is positive creativity. It is productive power, not merely experiential power, that produces value.

Alt is Anti Human

Environmentalists perpetuate the problems they criticize by existing- they will never solve ecological issues and should commit suicide-solves overpopulation

Huebert, J.D. at University of Chicago, and Block, Ph.D at Columbia University 1-12-07

(J.H. and Walter, “Space Environmentalism, Property Rights, and the Law” The University of Memphis Law Review, Volume 37, pg 289, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/9685684/Space-Environmentalism-Property-Rights-and-the-Law-by-J-H-Huebert-and-Walter-Block> accessed: 7-07-11)TJL

We do not intend to attack the radical ecocentric environmen- talists directly in this paper. The absurdity of “intrinsic” value or value independent of the existence of human beings has been well refuted elsewhere,35 so we need not rehash those arguments here. Besides, we assume rather reasonably that the majority of our readers are anthropocentrists or at least moderate ecocentrists who do not favor the human race’s demise over and above any distur- bance of the rocks of the solar system. And, of course, there is little use in trying to rationally persuade adherents of a religion, including nature worshipers, with rational arguments—they will believe what they will believe regardless of what we may write here. Further, their position amounts to a logical or internal con- tradiction. They wax eloquently about overpopulation.36 Yet they all, each and every one of them, have the power to reduce the number of the earth’s inhabitants by precisely one. The fact that they are still here, complaining bitterly of too many people utiliz- ing too few resources, shows that they do not take their own views seriously. If they do not, why should we? These people might likely argue (not totally unreasonably, given their premises) that they reduce the population more by sticking around and persuading others not to have children, etc. If this were true, however, then when they were no longer able to convince people of the merits of their position (say, due to old age or infirmity), they would commit suicide. They might well do so publicly, in order to better promote the overpopulationist movement. To the knowledge of the authors of the present paper, this hasnever been done. Actions speak louder than words.

Revington, volunteer with the Rainforest Information Centre, 95

(John, “Deep Ecology is not Enough,” <http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/deep.htm>)LK

Deep Ecology, uninformed by a social awareness, risks entrenching the exploitation and prejudice that is currently directed against minorities in our culture. Sexism and racism will not go away unless confronted directly, and sexism and racism help keep our exploitative power structures intact. Edward Abbey, the American author of the environmental classic, The Monkey Wrench Gang, cared deeply about wilderness but proudly proclaimed his lack of interest in the fate of "all the Wogs of Hindustan" (Abbey p.84). I wonder if he ever made a connection between his country's assault on the Earth and its exploitation of the Third World. So long as he thought of the poor in Third World countries as "Wogs", Abbey was not likely to see that their liberation, and the liberation of the Earth, are completely dependent on each other. No organisation has been more influenced by Deep Ecology than Earth First!, and Abbey enjoyed a guru-like status among Earth First!ers in the United States. Abbey appeared to enjoy portraying himself as being cantankerous, narrow-minded and intolerant. "Am I not only a fascist, a racist, a cultural chauvinist" he asks, "but -- God forbid -- a male sexist pig as well?" (quoted in Seager p.227) -- hardly the kind of attitude that is likely to promote the unification of diverse groups in a struggle against exploitation and injustice. The fact that so much respect is given to Abbey does not say much for Earth First!'s commitment to social justice. I am convinced that for some people, Deep Ecology is attractive because it seems to provide a justification for their hatred of the human race -- a hatred that is ultimately self-hatred. This can result in a blanket condemnation of the human race, and a disdain for delving into the affairs of humanity. Can we ever understand something we hate? Can we ever change for the better something we fail to understand? As Joni Seager points out, "the generalisations of deep ecologists blur distinctions not only of gender, but of race, class, and nationality too" (Seager p.231). Such an approach, says Seager, ... lacks social perspective -- it is analytically unsound to make no distinctions among peoples, nations or cultures in assigning accountability for ecological destruction. Humanity is not an undifferentiated whole, and it is not credible to lay equal "blame" for environmental degradation on elites and minorities, women and men, the Third World and the First, the poor and the rich, the colonized and the colonizers [ibid p.231].

Alt = No Value to Life

a utilitarian nightmare where people live only to survive in a valueless life.

Koontz, Bestselling author, 09

(Dean, Encounter Books ( an activity of Encounter for Culture and Education Inc), Forward for A Rat is a Pig is a Dog is a Boy, by Wesley J. Smith, page ix via Google Books)LK

A recognition of the world's complexity requires an acceptance of the truth that intentions and nuance matter. Puppy mills arc an outrage and should be shut down because they horribly abuse breeder dogs for no purpose but profit. This isn't the same as a scientist, following merciful protocols (as most do), using lab rats in search or cures tor disabling diseases. A sound argument might be made for the cruelty ot denying a wide-ranging and undomcsricable animal like an elephant the freedom to roam, keeping it chained to a stake tor no purpose but to entertain us with clever tricks in the circus; though a well-designed zoo park might not be cruel at all. Training a dog to do tricks is nor cruel, because dogs are pack animals and consider us members of their pack, because they would rather be with us than elsewhere, and because their natural inclination to play makes learning tricks a joy for them. Among orher things, this book, is a rational, reasonable argument tor the need to accept the nuanced complexity of the world and to resist the dangerous simplifications ot antihuman ideologies. Wesley J. Smith knows too well that if " the activists ever succeeded in their goals, it they established through culture or law that human beings have no intrinsic dignity greater than that of any animal, the world would not be a better place tor either humankind or animals. Instead, it would be a utilitarian nightmare in which the strong would destroy the weak, in which power-crazed leaders would destroy everyone who loved peace, in which the wealth ot the world would be coneenrrated in the hands of a murderous few, in which mercy would be unknown and the only virtue would be the ability to survive, in which the only right would be the right to die.

Alt Fails-Oppression

Alt fails- ecological movements are oppressive of movements like the perm,

Smith, a Senior Fellow at the Discovery Institute's Center on Human Exceptionalism, 09

(Wesley J, Encounter Books, A Rat is a Pig is a Dog is a Boy, page 15 via Google Books)LK

Now, consider why I felt it necessary ro make such an unusual disclaimer: Over the past thirty years, the concept of "animal rights" has seeped into the bone marrow of Western culture. (This is especially true among the young.) Part of the reason is that "animal rights" is used so loosely it is often taken to mean little more rhan being nicer ro animals. But this isn't true. Although animal rights groups do sometimes engage in animal welfare-type activism, the term animal rights" actually denotes a belief system, an ideology, even a quasi religion, which both implicitly and explicitly seeks to create a moral equivalence between the value ot human lives and those ot animals. This belief was succinctly expressed in 1986 when Ingrid Newkirk, the head of the animal righrs absolutist organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), told the Washington magazine.'A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy. They are all mammals"4 Animal rights ideologues embrace their beliefs with a fervency that is remarkably intense and sustained, to the point that some dedicate their entire lives ro'speakingfor those who cannot speak tor themselves."Some believe their cause to be so righteous that they are entitled to cross the line from legitimate advocacy to terroristic attempts at coercion. Indeed, what other than "true belief" can possibly explain the vicious campaign—of harassment and vandalism, criminal attacks, bombings, and even threats of murder—that has been launched in recent years against medical researchers, the fur and food industries, and others accused ot "animal abuse"?

Alt is Colonialist

Universalism is the mask for a cultural imperialism that redresses racism, genocide, and nuclear war

**Bryant,University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg56-57) TJL

This post-World War II universal man, says Haraway, was "launched into the future and unearthed from the past." From the progressive perspective, the astronauts in their bold mission beyond the confines of Earth were universal man; for the environmentalist, the picture of Earth from outer space was a self-portrait of him. In some ways the construction of universal man succeeded in redressing racists (though not sexist, as Haraway points out) conceptions of "man." By the 1960s, the concept was a mainstay of liberal ideology, justifying in a new way the use of a universal "we" to describe the generic state of human affairs. But as Jean- François Lyotard argues, use of the universal "we" can be a kind of cultural imperialism, denying the specificity of history, colonizing difference, and masking responsibility.38 With the American flag planted on the moon there would seem to be little doubt about the neo-colonial intentions behind the space program, but environmentalist ideology also advanced a kind of neocolonialism. Anxieties about separation from nature, owing to a perception of technology run amok, permeated the environmentalist discourse. But to whom did these anxieties belong? As Haraway argues, "It is [European and Euro-American "generic" man] who has been excluded from nature.. .he is being thrown out of the garden by decolonization and perhaps off the planet by its destruction in ecological devastation and nuclear holocaust." It was not the Third World that needed to reconnect with the natural environment, that needed a reconstituted human/nature relationship via a re-visioned Earth, but technological, Western, scientific man, who seemed able to stave off his ultimate expulsion from the garden only by re-colonizing the planet as a whole, by turning it into a mirror image of himself.

Alt is Capitalist

The environmental movement has been co-opted by capitalism establishing a “green market”

**Bryant,University of Iowa Ph.D. student American Studies, 1995**

(William, “The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Envronmentalism in Postmodern America”, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2791/2750> accessed: 7-06-11 pg56-57) TJL

Environmentalism also found its value in performativity in the form of the mainstream practice that emerged from the 1960s. The radical potential of the early movement was neutralized by the procedures (such as abstraction and instrumentalism) of the dominant discourse on the environment, and the movement evolved into a professionalized, elitist institution, disjoined from the masses it had converted.42 In its structure and modes of operation, environmentalism became completely compatible with the institutions it set out initially to undermine. Mainstream environmental organizations came to engage not in the activity of improving the condition of the environment but in the performance of environmentalism. Likewise, as consumer capitalism moved in to colonize new territory, build a "green" marketplace, and so inoculate itself against the disease of anti-consumption, the ecologically conscious individual was converted into the "green consumer," who did not have to practice environmentalism so much as perform it through "lifestyle" choices pivoting on the purchase of "Earthfriendly" products.

Cede the Political

Only the State can prevent the movement from being ceded to the elite

Revington, volunteer with the Rainforest Information Centre, 95

(John, “Deep Ecology is not Enough,” <http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/deep.htm>)LK

In an interesting counterpoint to Margaret Mead's oft-quoted statement about small groups of committed individuals changing the world, Larry Lohmann warns: "never underestimate the ability of modern elites to work out ways of coming through a crisis with their power intact"(Lohmann p.40). The power of modern elites is based on exploitation, both of environment and people. So long as their power remains intact, they will continue to exploit, no matter how deep the ecology of the people who try to oppose them. Look at the recent forest fires in Indonesia. Everyone knows that logging companies are largely to blame. Everyone knows that President Suharto is part of the elite which profits from the exploitation of Indonesia's dwindling forests. Everyone knows that Indonesia's ruling elite will come through the current crisis with its power intact, and by itself, no amount of Deep Ecology will change that. The only hope for change is through political action, and political action will not succeed unless it is born out of an understanding of political power and how to wield it. At the very least, an understanding of social structures is essential if protest is to be effective. Without such an understanding, environmentalists risk alienating those who are their natural allies. When green groups align themselves with oppressed minorities, they make allies of those who are desperate for change, who are driven by the hunger in their bellies. When they ignore such groups, or view their cause as being somehow less noble than their own, then they fail to recognise the forces at work in the exploitation of the Earth. Because almost without exception, exploitation of the Earth goes hand in hand with the exploitation of those who live closest to the Earth.

**2AC Ecofacism Turn**

**Turn: Ecological movements lead to ecofascism**

Biehl, writer for The Institute for Social Ecology, 95

(Janet, “'Ecology' and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-right,” <http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp001630/janet.html>)LK

The so-called 'New' Right today appeals to themes reminiscent of the völkisch movement in pre-Nazi Germany. It, too, presents itself as offering an 'ecological' alternative to modern society. In the view of the 'New' Right today, the destruction of the environment and the repression of nationalities have a common root in 'Semitic' monotheism and universalism. In its later form, Christianity, and in its subsequent secularized forms, liberalism and Marxism, this dualistic, homogenizing universalism is alleged to have brought on both the ecological crisis and the suppression of national identity. Just as Judeo-Christian universalism was destructive of authentic cultures when Christian missionaries went out into the world, so too is modernity eliminating ethnic and national cultures. Moreover, through the unbridled technology to which it gave rise, this modern universalism is said to have perpetrated not only the destruction of nature but an annihilation of the spirit; the destruction of nature, it is said, is life-threatening in the spiritual sense as well as the physical, since when people deny pristine nature, their access to their 'authentic' self is blocked. The dualistic yet universalistic 'Semitic' legacy is borne today most egregiously, in 'New' Right ideology, by the United States, in whose 'mongrel' culture -- egalitarian democracy -- all cultures and races are mixed together, forming a crass, soulless society. American cultural imperialism is genocidal of other cultures around the world, and its technological imperialism is destroying the global environment. The fascist quest for 'national identity' and ecological salvation seeks to counter 'Western civilization' -- that is, the United States, as opposed to 'European civilization' -- by advancing a notion of 'ethnopluralism' that seeks for all cultures to have sovereignty over themselves and their environment. Europe should become, instead of a modernized monoculture, a 'Europe of fatherlands,' with autonomy for all its peoples. Just as Turks should live in Turkey and Senegalese in Senegal, Germans should have Germany for themselves, 'New' Right ideologues argue. Ecology can easily be perverted to justify this 'ethnopluralism' -- that is, nationalism. Conceptions of one's region as one's 'homeland,' or Heimat, can be perverted into a nationalistic regionalism when a region's traditions and language are mystically tied to an 'ancestral' landscape. (The word Heimat connotes as well a turn toward the past, an anti-urban mood, a familiar community, and proximity to nature. For several decades the concept was looked upon with disfavor because the Nazis had used it, but intellectuals rediscovered it in the 1970s, after further decades of capitalist industrialization.) For a people seeking to assert themselves against an outside intruder, an 'ecologized' Heimat in which they are biologically embedded can become a useful tool not only against imperialism but against immigration, foreigners, and 'overpopulation.' Elaborate justifications for opposing Third World immigration are disguised as diversity, drawing on 'ecological' arguments against 'overpopulation.' Today it is not only fascists who invoke Heimat; in September 1989, for example, the head of the respectable League for the Protection of the Environment and Nature (Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz, or BUND), environmentalist Hubert Weinzierl, remarked that only when humanity's main concern, the diminution of the stream of overpopulation, has been accomplished, will there be any meaning or any prospect of building an environment that is capable of improvement, of configuring the landscape of our civilization in such a way that it remains worthy of being called Heimat. 6 An ecology that is mystical, in turn, may become a justification for a nationalism that is mystical. In the New Age milieu of today, with its affinities for ecology, the ultra-right may well find the mystical component it needs to make a truly updated, modernized authoritarian nationalism. As in Germany between the two world wars, antirational cults of the New Age -- primitivistic, esoteric -- abound in both the Federal Republic and the Anglo-American world. Such antirationalism and mysticism are appealed to by the 'New' Right; as anarchist publisher Wolfgang Haug observes, "The New Right, in effect, wants above all to redefine social norms so that rational doubt is regarded as decadent and eliminated, and new 'natural' norms are established." 7

2AC Ecofacism Turn- Genocide Impact

Ecofascism is bigoted and eventually culminates in genocide

Biehl, writer for The Institute for Social Ecology, 95

(Janet, “'Ecology' and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-right,” <http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp001630/janet.html>)LK

" A combination of nationalism, authoritarianism, and yearnings for charismatic leaders that is legitimated by a mystical and biologistic 'ecology' is potentially socially catastrophic. Just as the völkisch movement ultimately was channeled into the Nazi movement, so too new social movements that appeal to these concepts must be mindful of their potential for political and social catastrophe if they are channeled into a dangerous political direction that draws on mysticism. " A love of the natural world and alienation from modern society are in themselves innocent and legitimate ideas, and it was by no means a historical necessity that they be permutated into a justification for mass murder. Nor is 'ecology' limited to an interpretation as a social Darwinist racial jungle, or politicized along tribal, regional, and nationalist lines. Nor is 'ecology' inherently an antirational, mystical concept. Finally, the ecological crisis can hardly be dismissed; it is itself very real and is worsening rapidly. Indeed, the politicization of ecology is not only desirable but necessary. " Although this article has focused on the 'ecological' right in the Federal Republic, 'ecological' fascism is hardly limited to that country. In Britain, a wing of the National Front issues the cry, "Racial preservation is Green!" In the United States, the notorious white supremacist Tom Metzger remarks: I've noticed that there's an increased number of young people in the white racialist movement who are also quite interested in ecology, protecting the animals from cruelty and things like that, and it seems to me that as we are becoming more aware of our precarious state, the white man, the white woman's, state in the world, being only about 10 percent of the population, we begin to sympathize, empathize more, with the wolves and other animals." 123 " His colleague Monique Wolfing agrees: "Well, naturally. They're in the same position we are. Why would we want something created for ourselves and yet watch nature be destroyed? We work hand in hand with nature and we should save nature along with trying to save our race." 124 The noted U.S. deep ecologist Bill Devall, who is certainly not a fascist, has allowed anti-immigration themes to enter his views: He notes with apparent relief that while "population is beginning to stabilize in Western Europe and North America," there is a caveat -- "in-migration." Devall chastises those who would "justify large-scale in-migration to Western Europe and North America from Latin America and Africa" as guilty of "misplaced humanism." 125

2AC Ecofacism Turn-Internal Link Magnifier

Ecological movements are dangerous because of the fascist ends that it can and does justify

Biehl, writer for The Institute for Social Ecology, 95

(Janet, “'Ecology' and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-right,” <http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp001630/janet.html>)LK

" What is clearly crucial is how an ecological politics is conceived. If the Green slogan "we are neither left nor right but up front" was ever meaningful, the emergence of an 'ecological right' defines the slogan's bankruptcy conclusively. The need for an ecological left is urgent, especially one that is firmly committed to a clear, coherent set of anticapitalist, democratic, antihierarchical views. It must have firm roots in the internationalism of the left and the rational, humanistic, and genuinely egalitarian critique of social oppression that was part of the Enlightenment, particularly its revolutionary libertarian offshoot. " But an ecologically oriented politics must deal with biological phenomena warily, since interpretations of them can serve sinister ends. When 'respect for Nature' comes to mean 'reverence,' it can mutate ecological politics into a religion that 'Green Adolfs' can effectively use for authoritarian ends. When 'Nature,' in turn, becomes a metaphor legitimating sociobiology's 'morality of the gene,' the glories of 'racial purity,' 'love of Heimat,' 'woman equals nature,' or 'Pleistocene consciousness,' the cultural setting is created for reaction. 'Ecological' fascism is a cynical but potentially politically effective attempt to mystically link genuine concern for present-day environmental problems with time-honored fears of the 'outsider' or the 'new,' indeed the best elements of the Enlightenment, through ecological verbiage. Authoritarian mystifications need not be the fate of today's ecology movement, as social ecology demonstrates. But they could become its fate if ecomystics, ecoprimitivists, misanthropes, and antirationalists have their way."

2AC Ecofascism Turn-Ecology is Facist

Ecofascism is a serious movement that has remained hidden under the guise of ecological movements

**Staudenmaier, Marquette University - professor of modern German history, 95**

(Peter, “'Ecology' and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-right,” <http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp001630/peter.html>)LK

"We recognize that separating humanity from nature, from the whole of life, leads to humankind’s own destruction and to the death of nations. Only through a re-integration of humanity into the whole of nature can our people be made stronger. That is the fundamental point of the biological tasks of our age. Humankind alone is no longer the focus of thought, but rather life as a whole . . . This striving toward connectedness with the totality of life, with nature itself, a nature into which we are born, this is the deepest meaning and the true essence of National Socialist thought." 1 In our zeal to condemn the status quo, radicals often carelessly toss about epithets like "fascist" and "ecofascist," thus contributing to a sort of conceptual inflation that in no way furthers effective social critique. In such a situation, it is easy to overlook the fact that there are still virulent strains of fascism in our political culture which, however marginal, demand our attention. One of the least recognized or understood of these strains is the phenomenon one might call "actually existing ecofascism," that is, the preoccupation of authentically fascist movements with environmentalist concerns. In order to grasp the peculiar intensity and endurance of this affiliation, we would do well to examine more closely its most notorious historical incarnation, the so-called "green wing" of German National Socialism. Despite an extensive documentary record, the subject remains an elusive one, underappreciated by professional historians and environmental activists alike. In English-speaking countries as well as in Germany itself, the very existence of a "green wing" in the Nazi movement, much less its inspiration, goals, and consequences, has yet to be adequately researched and analyzed. Most of the handful of available interpretations succumb to either an alarming intellectual affinity with their subject." 2 or a naive refusal to examine the full extent of the "ideological overlap between nature conservation and National Socialism." 3 This article presents a brief and necessarily schematic overview of the ecological components of Nazism, emphasizing both their central role in Nazi ideology and their practical implementation during the Third Reich. A preliminary survey of nineteenth and twentieth century precursors to classical ecofascism should serve to illuminate the conceptual underpinnings common to all forms of reactionary ecology.

2AC Ecofacism Turn-V2L Impact

An ecological society oppress human individuality

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The reactionary ecological ideas whose outlines are sketched above exerted a powerful and lasting influence on many of the central figures in the NSDAP. Weimar culture, after all, was fairly awash in such theories, but the Nazis gave them a peculiar inflection. The National Socialist "religion of nature," as one historian has described it, was a volatile admixture of primeval teutonic nature mysticism, pseudo-scientific ecology, irrationalist anti-humanism, and a mythology of racial salvation through a return to the land. Its predominant themes were 'natural order,' organicist holism and denigration of humanity: "Throughout the writings, not only of Hitler, but of most Nazi ideologues, one can discern a fundamental deprecation of humans vis-à-vis nature, and, as a logical corollary to this, an attack upon human efforts to master nature."25 Quoting a Nazi educator, the same source continues: "anthropocentric views in general had to be rejected. They would be valid only 'if it is assumed that nature has been created only for man. We decisively reject this attitude. According to our conception of nature, man is a link in the living chain of nature just as any other organism'." 26 Such arguments have a chilling currency within contemporary ecological discourse: the key to social-ecological harmony is ascertaining "the eternal laws of nature's processes" (Hitler) and organizing society to correspond to them. The Führer was particularly fond of stressing the "helplessness of humankind in the face of nature's everlasting law."27 Echoing Haeckel and the Monists, Mein Kampf announces: "When people attempt to rebel against the iron logic of nature, they come into conflict with the very same principles to which they owe their existence as human beings. Their actions against nature must lead to their own downfall."28 The authoritarian implications of this view of humanity and nature become even clearer in the context of the Nazis' emphasis on holism and organicism. In 1934 the director of the Reich Agency for Nature Protection, Walter Schoenichen, established the following objectives for biology curricula: "Very early, the youth must develop an understanding of the civic importance of the 'organism', i.e. the co-ordination of all parts and organs for the benefit of the one and superior task of life."29 This (by now familiar) unmediated adaptation of biological concepts to social phenomena served to justify not only the totalitarian social order of the Third Reich but also the expansionist politics of Lebensraum (the plan of conquering 'living space' in Eastern Europe for the German people). It also provided the link between environmental purity and racial purity: Two central themes of biology education follow [according to the Nazis] from the holistic perspective: nature protection and eugenics. If one views nature as a unified whole, students will automatically develop a sense for ecology and environmental conservation. At the same time, the nature protection concept will direct attention to the urbanized and 'overcivilized' modern human race.30 In many varieties of the National Socialist world view ecological themes were linked with traditional agrarian romanticism and hostility to urban civilization, all revolving around the idea of rootedness in nature. This conceptual constellation, especially the search for a lost connection to nature, was most pronounced among the neo-pagan elements in the Nazi leadership, above all Heinrich Himmler, Alfred Rosenberg, and Walther Darré. Rosenberg wrote in his colossal The Myth of the 20th Century: "Today we see the steady stream from the countryside to the city, deadly for the Volk. The cities swell ever larger, unnerving the Volk and destroying the threads which bind humanity to nature; they attract adventurers and profiteers of all colors, thereby fostering racial chaos."31

2AC Ecofascism Turn- Racial Genocide Impact

Ecological rhetoric creates a race for “natural purity” that justifies genocide of those that don’t fit into the movement

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To make this dismaying and discomforting analysis more palatable, it is tempting to draw precisely the wrong conclusion --namely, that even the most reprehensible political undertakings sometimes produce laudable results. But the real lesson here is just the opposite: Even the most laudable of causes can be perverted and instrumentalized in the service of criminal savagery. The "green wing" of the NSDAP was not a group of innocents, confused and manipulated idealists, or reformers from within; they were conscious promoters and executors of a vile program explicitly dedicated to inhuman racist violence, massive political repression and worldwide military domination. Their 'ecological' involvements, far from offsetting these fundamental commitments, deepened and radicalized them. In the end, their configuration of environmental politics was directly and substantially responsible for organized mass murder. No aspect of the Nazi project can be properly understood without examining its implication in the holocaust. Here, too, ecological arguments played a crucially malevolent role. Not only did the "green wing" refurbish the sanguine antisemitism of traditional reactionary ecology; it catalyzed a whole new outburst of lurid racist fantasies of organic inviolability and political revenge. The confluence of anti-humanist dogma with a fetishization of natural 'purity' provided not merely a rationale but an incentive for the Third Reich's most heinous crimes. Its insidious appeal unleashed murderous energies previously untapped. Finally, the displacement of any social analysis of environmental destruction in favor of mystical ecology served as an integral component in the preparation of the final solution: To explain the destruction of the countryside and environmental damage, without questioning the German people's bond to nature, could only be done by not analysing environmental damage in a societal context and by refusing to understand them as an expression of conflicting social interests. Had this been done, it would have led to criticism of National Socialism itself since that was not immune to such forces. One solution was to associate such environmental problems with the destructive influence of other races. National Socialism could then be seen to strive for the elimination of other races in order to allow the German people's innate understanding and feeling of nature to assert itself, hence securing a harmonic life close to nature for the future.64

2AC Ecofascism Turn- Biopower Impact

Ecology creates a natural order that demands to elimination of those not part of it

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The experience of the "green wing" of German fascism is a sobering reminder of the political volatility of ecology. It certainly does not indicate any inherent or inevitable connection between ecological issues and right-wing politics; alongside the reactionary tradition surveyed here, there has always been an equally vital heritage of left-libertarian ecology, in Germany as elsewhere.66 But certain patterns can be discerned: "While concerns about problems posed by humankind's increasing mastery over nature have increasingly been shared by ever larger groups of people embracing a plethora of ideologies, the most consistent 'pro-natural order' response found political embodiment on the radical right."67 This is the common thread which unites merely conservative or even supposedly apolitical manifestations of environmentalism with the straightforwardly fascist variety. The historical record does, to be sure, belie the vacuous claim that "those who want to reform society according to nature are neither left nor right but ecologically minded."68 Environmental themes can be mobilized from the left or from the right, indeed they require an explicit social context if they are to have any political valence whatsoever. "Ecology" alone does not prescribe a politics; it must be interpreted, mediated through some theory of society in order to acquire political meaning. Failure to heed this mediated interrelationship between the social and the ecological is the hallmark of reactionary ecology. As noted above, this failure most commonly takes the form of a call to "reform society according to nature," that is, to formulate some version of 'natural order' or 'natural law' and submit human needs and actions to it. As a consequence, the underlying social processes and societal structures which constitute and shape people's relations with their environment are left unexamined. Such willful ignorance, in turn, obscures the ways in which all conceptions of nature are themselves socially produced, and leaves power structures unquestioned while simultaneously providing them with apparently 'naturally ordained' status. Thus the substitution of ecomysticism for clear-sighted social-ecological inquiry has catastrophic political repercussions, as the complexity of the society-nature dialectic is collapsed into a purified Oneness. An ideologically charged 'natural order' does not leave room for compromise; its claims are absolute. For all of these reasons, the slogan advanced by many contemporary Greens, "We are neither right nor left but up front," is historically naive and politically fatal. The necessary project of creating an emancipatory ecological politics demands an acute awareness and understanding of the legacy of classical ecofascism and its conceptual continuities with present-day environmental discourse. An 'ecological' orientation alone, outside of a critical social framework, is dangerously unstable. The record of fascist ecology shows that under the right conditions such an orientation can quickly lead to barbarism.