AT Enviro Leadership—Congressional Opposition Blocks

Their internal link assumes the US is to be a player in international negotiations after it gets other countries on board – congressional opposition means that will never happen

Falkner, ’05 – Robert Falkner, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, 2005, "American Hegemony and the Global Environment," International Studies Review, Volume 7, Issue 4, pages 585-599

As the experience with US policy on biodiversity and climate change suggests, US presidential leadership abroad is easily trumped by Congressional opposition at home. The split between the executive and legislative branches of government became all too apparent in the 1990s. Because the Clinton administration lacked Congressional support for its international environmental ambitions, it had to backtrack from its support of the CBD and the Kyoto Protocol, and it was unable to live up to its earlier promises to take the country back into the multilateral policymaking arena. These two examples suggest that a critical condition for environmental leadership is, therefore, the building of domestic coalitions in support of an active foreign policy (Paarlberg 1997:137). Although the success of domestic coalition building will be influenced by the political landscape of the day, there are structural reasons to suggest that stable and broad-based coalitions are likely to be the exception rather than the norm, and that domestic fragmentation will remain a pervasive aspect of foreign environmental policy in the United States. One important reason for this fragmentation lies in the nature of the American political system. With its decentralized decision-making process and power separation between the executive, legislative, and judiciary, US environmental politics proceeds in an often erratic fashion and can lead to considerable deadlock between competing institutional interests (Kraft 2004:chap. 3). Presidential leadership can easily be blocked through concerted efforts on Capital Hill, where lobbyists are likely to find a receptive audience, especially in the runup to Congressional elections. And although the executive has greater room for initiative in foreign policy, the need for Congressional approval of international agreements and domestic programs acts as a dampener on international leadership efforts that are not backed by a broader coalition of interests at home. Congress's powerful position in US foreign environmental policy is based on its constitutional role in the policymaking process in three particularly sensitive areas: its authority to ratify international treaties; its budgetary and fiscal powers that affect proposals for environmental taxation, international environmental aid, and other environmental spending programs; and its general legislative role in establishing and reviewing environmental regulations. All three of these areas are critical to foreign environmental policy. They affect the ability of the United States to accede to agreements it has negotiated and signed; they determine the extent to which US environmental leadership is backed up by promises of international environmental aid; and they influence the ability of the United States to provide a model for policy innovation through effective domestic regulation. Decentralization and the separation of powers in the American political system make it more difficult for the government to sustain support for international environmental institutions. The example of global biodiversity policy shows how limited the powers of the White House can be when faced with determined opposition in Congress. Despite achieving major concessions at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the United States refused to sign the CBD, mainly over concerns for intellectual property protection and in response to intense industry lobbying. The Clinton administration sought to reverse the image of the United States as a global environmental laggard and negotiated with leading biotechnology firms a solution that would allow the country to sign the Convention. This was to be done through an interpretation to be submitted with the US signature, which would prevent the convention from infringing on patent rights or commercial opportunities for research and innovation. In the end, however, it was Congress that refused to ratify the Convention, despite a broad consensus between industry, environmental groups, and the White House. Until today, Republican opposition to this particular Convention has prevented full participation by the United States in this area of international environmental regulation (Falkner 2001:169–171).

AT Enviro Leadership—Not K2 Heg

**Climate leadership is not key to overall US leadership**

Falkner 5 – Robert Falkner, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, 2005, "American Hegemony and the Global Environment," International Studies Review, Volume 7, Issue 4, pages 585-599

Second, there is no simple and straightforward correlation between America's hegemonic position and the type of environmental diplomacy it is likely to pursue. The fact of hegemony as such does not determine whether the United States will promote or oppose the creation of international environmental governance. To some extent, a link can be established between US predominance in the international political economy and the rise of global environmentalism since the late 1960s, analogous to the way in which it promoted global economic cooperation after 1945. But unlike trade and monetary policy, environmental policy has never been central to the US effort to create international order. At times, the US government has used its economic strength and political influence to promote global environmental objectives. On other occasions, it has acted as a veto power, blocking progress toward multilateral policymaking. This suggests that we have no convincing structural theory that can explain the direction and evolution of US foreign environmental policy.

AT Envrio Leadership—Alt Causes

Alt causes to climate leadership –

--lack of public statements/taking a stand

--backlash from environmental community

--alt energy policy

--EPA regulations (climate fights with Republicans, private sector disobedience)

--legislative empirics (didn’t do last year’s gw bill, screwed up cap and trade)

--personal problems – can’t even put panels on his house

Politico, ’11– respected news source [Politico Pro, 6/22/2011, “Gore voices left's climate grumbling,” <http://www.seattlepi.com/national/politico/article/Gore-voices-left-s-climate-grumbling-1435262.php#ixzz1bTu1Nm6a>, DS]

Al Gore has gone public with his complaints about President Barack Obama's environmental record and leadership on climate change - legitimizing a groundswell of grumbling from the left and throwing open the door for more of the same. Gore has had his own issues of late, including his separation from his wife, Tipper, but he remains something of a patron saint among environmentalists. And his open attack on Obama from the man who was once the next president of the United States makes it safe for others to follow. It's bad news for the White House - especially coming on the heels of a new poll showing that only 30 percent of Americans say they definitely plan to vote for Obama in 2012. "President Obama has never presented to the American people the magnitude of the climate crisis," the former vice president wrote in a 7,000-word essay for Rolling Stone. "He has simply not made the case for action. He has not defended the science against the ongoing, withering and dishonest attacks. Nor has he provided a presidential venue for the scientific community - including our own National Academy - to bring the reality of the science before the public." For Obama to win a second term, he knows he'll need to generate more enthusiasm among a Democratic base that largely sat on the sidelines and watched the Republican wave in the 2010 midterms. But the mood on Obama's left isn't good. Liberals booed White House Communications Director Dan Pfeiffer last Friday over his response to a gay marriage question during the Netroots Nation conference in Minneapolis. And agitation appears to be growing among some top brass in the environmental community, too, over what many see as an unnecessary capitulation to Republicans and industry. "Unfortunately, President Obama's instinct seems to be to avoid tough battles, relying on the argument that even as his record falls short, his administration is better on conservation than the previous one and better than any likely to succeed him should his reelection effort fall short," Defenders of Wildlife President Rodger Schlickeisen wrote in a long blog post Tuesday. Betsy Taylor, a philanthropic adviser to several climate donors and foundations, said Obama has disappointed greens by sending them mixed messages. Obama did call for a clean energy standard during the State of the Union in January that promoted wind, solar and geothermal power. But he also would allow coal and nuclear power into the mix. In the same speech, Obama called for long-standing oil industry tax breaks to be slashed but his Interior Department later gave drillers permits to begin exploring again in the Gulf of Mexico. "His defining characteristic, at least his initial one, was this sense that this man knows what matters and he has a strong moral fiber," said Taylor, a co-founder and board president of the environmental group 1Sky. "When you see him swinging in the wind, it's just deeply disappointing. We know he has a capacity to lead in a historic way. Instead, we see moments of this brilliance and then you can literally see him back-peddling after the oil companies visit, or the donors, or his inside staff." White House officials did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the Gore article. But Obama and his aides have tried to make it clear they're doing what they can to tackle the climate issue. "We've had some setbacks, and some things haven't happened as fast as people wanted them to happen," Obama said during a New York fundraiser this spring. "I know. I know the conversations you guys have. Oh, you didn't get the public option - and, gosh, I wish that energy bill had passed. I understand the frustrations. I feel them too." Greens have been tormented with Obama's handling of climate change regulations via the EPA. The issue has yet to play itself out completely, with House Republicans itching to revoke the EPA's authority through legislation and greens demanding repeated White House veto threats. Power plants will be regulated for greenhouse gases under new EPA rules due in May 2012. And fuel economy limits are coming later this fall, with environmentalists pushing for standards as high as 62 miles per gallon. But a resurgent Detroit and foreign automakers are pushing back against the most aggressive numbers. "There's no question that there's a lot of frustration with the lack of progress on climate policy to date," said Dan Lashof, director of the Natural Resources Defense Council's climate center. "We're going to be looking very carefully at what happens over the next few months on the rules within EPA's authority to decide." Schlickeisen, who is set to retire later this year, questioned Obama's dedication to the EPA given that the president did not follow through last year on global warming legislation and did not pushing harder for oil drilling safety laws in the wake of the BP oil spill. "Given its weak performance to date, it is reasonable to wonder just how firmly the White House will continue to stand by Lisa Jackson, EPA's strong administrator, and fight future efforts to limit EPA's authority," he wrote. Even the administration's failure to meet a self-imposed end-of-spring deadline to put solar panels on the White House roof has drawn catcalls from the left. "This was a no-brainer," 350.org founder and solar roof campaigner Bill McKibben said Monday. "Republicans couldn't filibuster it, the oil companies weren't fighting it, and it still didn't get done when they said it would. "Barack Obama told his supporters after the election that he needed constant pressure - from now on we'll do our best to provide it, and on issues even more significant than this," McKibben added. In his Rolling Stone article, Gore credited Obama for making historic investments in clean energy technology as part of the stimulus package. But he also said the president "did nothing to defend it when Congress decimated its funding." Gore also faulted Obama on cap-and-trade legislation. While the president deserved kudos for helping the House in 2009 to pass a bill, he left the issue to wither in the Senate while alienating his allies by making "concessions to oil and coal companies without asking for anything in return." The former vice president's criticism also reached into energy policy. "He has also called for a massive expansion of oil drilling in the United States, apparently in an effort to defuse criticism from those who argue speciously that 'drill, baby, drill' is the answer to our growing dependence on foreign oil," Gore wrote. Many environmentalists are struggling to come to grips with exactly how hard it is to swing at an Obama White House already at war with a Republican Party full of new tea party conservatives who question any linkage between humans and global warming. "There are more than a few on the left who see themselves as members of the president's extended team," said Frank O'Donnell, president of Clean Air Watch. "There are many others, including me, who are less angry than very disappointed in the president's rather conventional timidity." O'Donnell added that Obama's leading critic may not be the best person to make the case for stronger White House action. "Gore has exactly the right message, but he is a flawed messenger given he ducked the climate issue when he ran for president in 2000," he said. In his article, Gore also challenged the media to do a better job picking up on the link between extreme weather and climate change. He also acknowledged how tough it is for the president to navigate the issue with an already full plate. "Assuming that the Republicans come to their senses and avoid nominating a clown, his reelection is likely to involve a hard-fought battle with high stakes for the country," he wrote. "All of his supporters understand that it would be self-defeating to weaken Obama and heighten the risk of another step backward. Even writing an article like this one carries risks; opponents of the president will excerpt the criticism and strip it of context. "But in this case," Gore added, "the president has reality on his side."

**Failure to participate in treaties destroys US influence**

Ivanova & Esty 8 – Maria Ivanova is Assistant Professor of Government and Environmental Policy at The College of William and Mary and the Director of the Global Environmental Governance Project at the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. \*\*AND Daniel C. Esty is the Hillhouse Professor of Environmental Law and Policy at Yale University. He holds faculty appointments in both Yale’s Environment and Law Schools. He is the Director of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for Business & Environment at Yale. Summer-Fall 2008, "Reclaiming U.S. Leadership in Global Environmental Governance," SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 28, Number 2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v028/28.2.ivanova.html#back

However, the United States has since retreated from its global environmental leadership role. The George W. Bush Administration has obstructed progress on a number of international environmental initiatives: protecting **[End Page 57]** biodiversity, regulating the trade in genetically modified products, and instituting a legally binding treaty banning mercury. The high watermark—or perhaps the low tide—of U.S. obstructionism, however, came with the U.S. “unsigning” of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001 and once more at the 2007 international climate negotiations in Bali, Indonesia. The only developed nation not having ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the United States was the main opponent in Bali to a proposal for greenhouse gas reductions by 25 to 40 percent by 2020 from 1990 levels. As the United States balked at the emerging Bali consensus, an extraordinary diplomatic breech occurred: the U.S. delegation was booed. Lest there be any doubt, Nobel Laureate Al Gore weighed in, observing that the United States was “obstructing progress.”
The list of international environmental initiatives that the United States has failed to join has become longer. The United States has yet to ratify the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, the 1992 Basel Convention on Export of Hazardous Waste, the 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity, and, of course, the Kyoto Protocol (see [Table 1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v028/28.2.ivanova.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22tab01) for a chronological overview of main international environmental conventions and the status of U.S. participation). The Bush Administration’s “go-it-alone” strategy in security issues has mirrored a similar unilateralism in the international environmental domain. Once a leader in international environmental policy, the United States has lost much of its political influence today. What is more, U.S. withdrawal from multilateralism has left the United Nations—the imperfect but important instrument for international cooperation—“in limbo, neither strengthened nor abandoned,”[1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v028/28.2.ivanova.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f1) threatening the ability of the world community to resolve fundamental global problems.

Wikileaks makes US environmental leadership impossible

Newman in 11 – (January 24, 2011. “ WikiLeaks Exposes: U.S. & EU Climate Bullying, Bribery & Espionage ” The New American. Vol. 27, Iss. 2; pg. 25, 4 pgs. Proquest.)

A series of secret U.S. diplomatic cables released during the United Nations COP 16 global- warming summit in Cancun by the whistle-blower group WikiLeaks exposed American and European officials' use of monetary incentives, threats, and even espionage to advance their "climate" agenda at the COP 15 in Copenhagen last year and beyond. The worldwide reaction to the leaks has ranged from fury to gloating and everything in between. Only a fraction of the more than 250,000 cables has been released so far, and just a few of those were related to the "climate" negotiations in late 2009. But even what little has come out thus far - analysts are calling it the "tip of the iceberg" -is raising eyebrows and generating more anti-U.S. sentiment around the globe. And the revelations probably didn't help the COPI 6 "climate change" negotiations in Cancun, either. CIA-State Department "Climate" Espionage It turns out that, at the behest of the Central Intelligence Agency and the American "intelligence" apparatus, the U.S. State Department sent out secret diplomatic cables seeking intelligence on United Nations bosses, foreign officials, and others. The American regime was seeking compromising information, Internet passwords, credit-card numbers, DNA and biometrie data, evidence of non-cooperation with international climate decrees, and much more. News reports claimed such an operation - basically using diplomats with immunity as spies - could be considered a violation of international law. For its part, the State Department, while conceding that its staff does gather information around the world, was insistent that American diplomats should not be considered spies. But experts disagreed, saying the use of diplomats for intelligence gathering - including the identification of foreign officiais' "vulnerabilities" and dirt that could be used for leverage - is blatantly improper, not to mention unlawful. The "Negotiations" In terms of the climate shenanigans revealed in the cables, the U.K. Guardian, an establishment newspaper that received the cables prior to their official release by WikiLeaks, summed it up well: "Hidden behind the save-the-world rhetoric of the global climate change negotiations lies the mucky realpolitik: money and threats buy political support; spying and cyberwarfare are used to seek out leverage." The newspaper described some of the revelations in the diplomatic cables, saying they showed "how the US seeks dirt on nations opposed to its approach to tackling global warming; how financial and other aid is used by countries to gain political backing; how distrust, broken promises and creative accounting dog negotiations; and how the US mounted a secret global diplomatic offensive to overwhelm opposition to the controversial 'Copenhagen accord.'"

AT Envrio Leadership—AT US-EU

Relations are resilient—

Ayoob and Zierler, ‘05 [Mohammed Ayoob is a University Distinguished Professor of International Relations, and Matthew Zierler is a visiting Assistant Professor of International Relations at James Madison College, World Policy Journal, Spring, Volume 22, “The Unipolar Concert: The North-South Divide Trumps Transatlantic Differences”]

Second, disagreements within the concert are often over policy choices, as opposed to fundamental rules of the system or basic objectives. Deterring and punishing “rogue” states and denying unconventional capabilities to those outside the club are shared objectives from which no member of the concert dissents. This was very clear in the runup to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. A reading of the U.N. Security Council debates on Iraq from 1991 to 2003 makes it obvious that there were hardly any differences among the club of powerful states on taking steps that would severely derogate Iraq’s sovereignty and eventually bring about a regime change. The imposition of no-flight zones and invasive inspections under U.N. auspices between 1991 and 2003 clearly demonstrated this unity of purpose. The differences were over the tactics to achieve these ends. The same applies to the concert’s objectives regarding Iran. The shared objective is to deny Iran nuclear weapons capabilities and to curb its regional influence; the debate is about how best to attain these goals. A similar situation prevails in the economic arena. While there may be differences over details and even intra-concert bickering about certain issues, for example, the American attempt to impose tariffs on European steel, there is a basic consensus about prying open world markets under the guise of free trade and liberal investment policies, thus making it easier for developed countries to market their high-value-added products and to invest in profitable ventures abroad. This is accompanied by imposing conditionalities, or structural adjustments, on Third World economies that would ostensibly help to reduce their fiscal deficits. It is clear that this can only be achieved through multilateral mechanisms, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization. The concert of industrialized states, working through the G-7 in particular, harmonizes its economic policy in such a fashion that it can effectively use these multilateral forums to promote its neoliberal agenda. We do not mean to suggest that the current multilateral arrangements and initiatives are set in stone. However, it is unlikely that the instrument will be jettisoned, if only because of the deep commitment on the part of the concert to maintain it. Moreover, multilateral institutions in the North are being strengthened as the states from Eastern Europe seek membership in the European Union and NATO. The deepening and broadening of multilateral institutions in the North have had the added effect of reinforcing the divide between those in the concert and those outside. In short, multilateralism has not proved to be antithetical to unipolarity. In fact, the two have worked in tandem to promote the interests of the North in both the economic and security spheres.

Too many alternative causalities to solve the impact

Ahearn, Archick, Belkin, ‘07 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division [Raymond Ahearn, Kristin Archick, Paul Belkin “U.S.-European Union Relations and the 2007 Summit” may 14, 2007 http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22645.pdf/]

The U.S. Congress and successive U.S. administrations have supported the EU project since its inception as a way to foster a stable Europe, democratic states, and strong trading partners. The United States has welcomed EU efforts since the end of the Cold War to expand the political and economic benefits of membership to central and eastern Europe, and supports the EU aspirations of Turkey and the western Balkan states. The United States and the EU share a huge and mutually beneficial economic relationship. Two-way flows of goods, services, and foreign investment now exceed $1.0 trillion on an annual basis, and the total stock of two-way direct investment is over $1.9 trillion. Nevertheless, the U.S.-EU relationship has been challenged in recent years as numerous trade and foreign policy conflicts have emerged. The 2003 crisis over Iraq, which bitterly divided the EU and severely strained U.S.-EU relations, is most notable, but the list of disagreements has been wide and varied. Although Europeans are not monolithic in their views, many EU member states have objected to at least some elements of U.S. policy on issues ranging from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to U.S. treatment of terrorist detainees to climate change and aircraft subsidies. Since 2003, however, both sides have made efforts to improve relations, and successive U.S.-EU summits have sought to emphasize areas of cooperation and partnership. At the same time, challenges and some tensions remain in the U.S.-EU relationship.

No impact—relations are resilient

Ward, ’05 [Ian Ward, Prof. of Law at the Univ. of Newcastle, Spring 2005, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 13 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 5, lexis]

The idea that the transatlantic alliance has "unravelled" has gained popularity. The two protagonists, according to Richard Sinkin, are "on very different political paths." [250](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n250" \t "_self) "Transatlantic relations," Christina Schweiss posits, "are arguably worse today than at any point since the Second World War." [251](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n251" \t "_self) Stanley Hoffmann agrees, suggesting that a wide  [\*38]  range of issues, from the Kyoto Protocol to the International Criminal Court and the role of the United Nations, sign these apparently divergent paths. [252](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n252" \t "_self) At present, he concludes, EU-U.S. relations are in "limbo," and the "days of relative harmony" have seemingly passed, at least for now. [253](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n253" \t "_self) Metaphorical recourse is common. Joseph Nye prefers to describe a bickering couple who "will remain partners rather than divorce and go their separate ways." [254](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n254" \t "_self) Deploying the same metaphor, Ivo Daalder suggests that whilst "divorce" is unlikely, further "drift" is not. [255](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n255" \t "_self) Moreover, he adds pointedly, this may not be to Europe's disadvantage. [256](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n256" \t "_self) According to Daalder, there is a stark disparity, in terms of global politics, between the multilateralism of Europe and the unilateralism of the United States. [257](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=596af5653d5afc78cc9ab20bf6147199&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAV&_md5=15abbc0522f2ea771e2853f1f0717b6e&focBudTerms=transatlantic%20relations&focBudSel=all&taggedDocs=2Z2:" \l "n257" \t "_self)

AT Enviro Leadership—AT US-EU—Turkey Rel Turn

US-EU relations broadens US-Turkey relations

Oguzlu, lecturer IR, 4

[Tarik Oguzlu, lecturer in the department of international relations at Bilkent University in Turkey, Spring 2004, Middle East Policy Journal, Volume XI, Number 1, http://www.mepc.org/public\_asp/journal\_vol11/0403\_oguzlu.asp]

One of the greatest challenges to Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Iraq War era concerns the changing dynamics of Turkey-EU relations. In analyzing them, one needs to take into consideration that the dynamics of Turkey-U.S. and U.S.-EU relations have also been exposed to significant challenges in the aftermath of the war. First, from now on, Turkey's relevance to the United States will be dependent less on Turkey's military capabilities and geostrategic location, as used to be the case, and more on its identity. If the Americans were seriously committed to nation-building in predominantly Muslim societies, particularly those possessing the potential to nurture global terrorism, then Turkey's ideational and civilizational position would matter a lot. The true inclusion of a predominantly Muslim country in the community of developed liberal-democratic states would certainly strengthen the soft power of the United States in its fight against global terror. However, the degree of Turkey's attractiveness for American policy would increase if Turkey could solve its external and internal (mainly radical Islamist and separatist Kurdish movements) security problems through domestic pluralization and liberalization and thus reach a more stable relationship with the European Union. Such a Turkey would not only feel more self-confident but less burdened by its unbalanced relations with the United States. Second, it seems that there is now a serious crisis of confidence between the parties, mainly stemming from their divergent security interests. Third, the gradual drifting apart of the United States and the European Union in terms of their geopolitical priorities and assessment of security threats1 will likely affect the tone of Turkey's relations with Europe. The important questions are how the EU Defense and Security Policy will evolve and how it will relate to NATO's own transformation. The greater the convergence of these two processes and the more the United States and the EU view threats to their national security in similar terms, the easier it will be for Turkey to cooperate with the West. Turkey might find it difficult to synchronize its policies towards the EU and the United States, particularly if Turkey is exposed to diverging demands from each.

Trades off with US-Russia relations

Bagci and Kardas 03

[Hüseyin Bagci and Saban Kardas, both of the Middle East Technical University, 12 May 2003, CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm#ftnref112]

A more definite reality, which speaks against Turkish ambitions in this region, is the changing shape of U.S.-Russian relations. Under Putin, Russia has chosen a non-confrontational type of relationship with the United States. Moreover, Putin has already come a long way toward restoring Russian power and influence in the region, and cementing Moscow's primacy, without being opposed by Washington.[64] In this regard, following September 11, Russia cooperated with the United States and did not resist U.S. military deployment in Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the same time, partly in return for its concurrence with U.S. engagement in the region, Russia also tried to utilize the international atmosphere and use the discourse of fighting against terrorism to justify its own activities in the region, thus strengthened its position.[65] Based on these developments, there are also some arguments that a U.S.-Russian rapprochement might better provide security and stability in this region, therefore the United States should also recognize Russian interests there. If events follow such a course, that will clearly create some problems for Turkey, since Turkey and Russia have been competing with each other in this area.