## notes

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## Marxist Geography Kritik

### 1NC

#### The aff is just a shift from the *coercive strategy* of capitalist exclusion to the *incorporative strategy* for furthering capital production by subsidizing elements of basic consumption and creating new avenues of exploitation. “Integration” is the ruse of choice for elites to ensure that the underprivileged think that they have dignity and rights, when really they are only being abused for their labor

Gough et al 6 (James, senior lecturer in town and regional planning at Sheffield university, Aram Eisenschitz, senior lecturer in the school of health and social science at Middlesex university, Andrew McCulloch, senior lecturer at northumbria university, Spaces of Social Exclusion, p. 65, JG)

Despite these evasions, active policies to manage the poor and poverty have been implemented since the sixteenth century. The causes of these interventions are complex, the poor have been seen by the ruling class as a threat to order, whether because oftheft and violence by individuals and gangs, riols. or. mosl seriously, aggressive political organisation. Second, capital has sometimes sought to mobilise the poor as a real "reserve army of labour'. This may be done through coercion into work, but may also imply raising the living standards of the poor to make their labour power more useful. Third, the poor and the working class themselves have exerted pressure for the provision of waged work and for better living standards. These sometimes conflicting, sometimes parallel, class pressures have formed poverty policies and ideologies. Each wave of capitalist development since the sixteenth century has reproduced anew these political pressures: the disruption of work and communities has posed problems of individual disorder, new spatial concentrations of workers have organised politically, and capital has sought to channel the unemployed into growth industries and areas. As already Implied, policies for the poor have two modes, coercion and incorporation. Coercion stigmatises and tends to separate the poor from the rest of the working class, whereas incoqioration seeks to integrate them. For capital these are both possible tactics to secure an appropriate labour force and contain discontent; for the poor incorporation is clearly preferable. They are always both present but often one is dominant. There are many forms of coercion. There is direct violence by the state using the military, the police and the criminal justice system. Forms of coercion have been most consistently applied to the unemployed. Under the Tndors those unable to survive in the market were put in the houses of correction, the Bridewells, which also served as prisonsVagrants, criminals and the mentally ill were incarcerated in order to work and thereby to learn to take responsibility for themselves (Melossi and Pavarini, 1981:14ft). The rise of the industrial town saw the breakdown of the paternalist control of squire and magistrate. The recalcitrant poor were put in the workhouse, imprisoned or transported, and thus spatially separated from the honest labourer to avoid 'contamination'. Today, so-called sink estates and prison have the same effect. Coercive management of labour uses a number of levers. State management of money and finance can be used coercively (Clarke. 1988; Bonefeld et al, 1995), Deflation can create high unemployment, which encourages employers to impose greater work discipline and cut wages and conditions. Capital flows out of die country putting pressure on labour to make concessions. This pressure can be increased by cutting unemployment benefits and tightening eligibility for them. Repression of trade unions aids the process. All these policies were used by governments in the 1920s and 1930s, and again by the Conservatives in the 1980s, This type of labour relation tends to elicit, and to benefit from, particular workingclass cultures—self-denial, self-control, and inner determination. For workers these make hard work more tolerable and meaningful, while for employers they encourage workers to accept work-discipline. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the churches, civil society and the state created an interlocking set of ideas about work, taking responsibility for oneself and one's family, and abouL community and nation. Methodism, for instance, eave work a moral dimension as an antraole to idleness, vice and crime {Thompson,19bo:oo!)[l). ihcsc ideas Helped lo create the cage ot circumstances in which the majority grew up (Nairn. 1972). In the late twentieth century this became the language of enterprise and competition, standing on your own feet, and the inevitability of inequality. Incorporation of the poor, on the other hand, is pursued by support for those without access to wage income, by subsidising elements of basic consumption, and by education and public services, all paid for by progressive taxation. There may be attempts to provide jobs for the unemployed through make-work schemes, through reflationary monetary policy, or through national controls over capital flows. Employers may tolerate, and even welcome, trade unions. A working-class voice in government and governance is grudgingly accepted. These have been responses to pressure from the working class, but have also sometimes been supported by enlightened sections of capital: those seeking a skilled, stable work force, and those with the foresight to avoid rebellion (1.Cough. 1982). In contrast to coercion, this social-democratic approach aims to integrate the poor both socially and spatially with the rest of the working class: that is, the span of inequality should be limited; the poor should benefit from statutory employment rights; housing for the poor should be mixed with (hat of the better off and so on. Most importantly, upward mobility from poverty should be facilitated. Incorporation therefore propagates Ideas of common good and one nation. The poor, as much as the rest of the working class, are encouraged to feel that they have dignity and rights.Over the history of capitalism in Britain, there have been numerous swings in the emphasis between coercion and incorporation, and varied melding of the two. In the most general terms it has depended on three processes: the cycle of profitability and growth; the balance of demand and supply for labour; and the political confidence of labour and capital respectively; these are related but partially independent. Thus, when profits are low, capital is concerned to impose greater discipline over labour, welcomes unemployment to support this discipline, and is not prepared to shoulder the costs of reproducing the poor; when profits are high business may tolerate greater bargaining power for labour and financial support for the poor. If labour is plentiful—through depression or through immigration domestically or internationally—then capital may use the opportunity to push down wages; if there are labour shortages, capital may seek to mobilise the labour power of the poor and to incorporate them socially. Finally, workingclass political pressure for incorporationist strategies can occur not only in times of full employment but also during circumstances, often international, such as revolution and war. We can perceive these pressures in the alternations of policy since the eighteenth century. The first stage of industrialisation between 1780 and 1840 was strongly coercive. Existing working practices were dislocated, creating a large reserve army of labour. Little organised resistance was possible to the appalling conditions for the industrial workforce. Moreover, the ruling class was panicked by the French and American revolutionsRepression occurred through (he factory, (he army, the workhouse, the criminal justice system, (he Combination Laws, and deportation of (he "underclass' to (he colonies {Hughes. 1988). extending to stepped-up repression of male homosexuality (Crompton, 1985). As long as labour supplies were forthcoming and skills were low, worker loyalty and motivation counted for little. Work could be intensified, with no thought about where the next generation of workers was to come from. In the century to 1850 real wages fell by at least 10 per cenl. (he working day was lenglhcned. If productivity dropped because of the conditions of work, the working day was lengthened yet further. In addition, the quality of food fell, accidents Increased, and fines, high rents and payment in kind reduced workers' income.administered Ihe Poor Law were established. Long run by local elites, some succumbed to democratic control. This potentially gave the working class and poor considerable power, since the propertied subsidised (he properly-less at a rate determined locally. 'litis threat was met by transferring responsibility from the locality to central government: 'It... look just a decade-and-a-half of full participation by the poor in their own relief to remove the element of local responsibility which had lasted for more than three centuries' (Vincent. 1991:62). Administered centrally, the pattern of redistribution was changed to be within the working class, from those in work to the unemployed and from smaller to larger families. Similarly, from the 1920s to 1940s the local authorities had key sectors for anti-poverty policy transferred to central government—power, transport, police, health and. to a large extent, housing. Even then, the local authorities have been regarded with distrusl by (he ruling class as possible foci of working class influence, as was demonstrated by Lansbury in Poplar. Their actions have to fall under powers specifically bestowed by parliament, they are subject to detailed central government direction, and they have received (an increasing) majority of their funding from the centre, as their powers to raise taxes locally have been restricted. When the Metropolitan (city region) councils tried to implement left policies in the 1980s as explicit alternatives to Thatcherism. they were simply abolished. Second, from the nineteenth century the dominant politics of the trade unions and the Labour Party, most strongly expressed by their leaderships, has been rooted in Puritanism, self-help and the traditions of the male craft worker. They have seen their legitimacy as flowing from parliamentary democracy with its established structures, and they have been suspicious of direct action such as the National Unemployed Worker's Movement in the interwar period; they have thus failed to develop a properly Jacobin tradition. In the early twentieth century the leadership of the labour movement was suspicious of the poor, expecting thai (hey would indulge in shirking and welfare fraud, and therefore rejected high taxation to finance benefits (Vincent, 1991). Due to these conservative pressures, the state welfare services, which were the most important aim of working-class enfranchisement, have been run in a highly bureaucratic fashion. This contrasts with the democracy, cooperation and mutuality (hat had organised welfare for the skilled working class in the mid-nineteenth century. The poor have been prevented from controlling the administration of benefits and public services. The state, having initially appeared as a saviour of the poor's living standards, turned out to be remote and controlling.

#### Resisting reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility, the current social order guarantees social exclusion on a global scale

Zizek and Daly 4 (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### Our alternative is to completely withdraw from the ideology of capital, this is essential to destroy the fetish that allows capital to survive

Johnston 4 (interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, Adrian, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259 page infotrac)

Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Zizek's recent writings isn't a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Zizek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance (Zizek, 2001d, pp 22-23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Zizek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of "magic," that is, the belief in money's social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance's powers. The "external" obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, "internally" believe in it--capitalism's life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others' belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism's frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic's fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Zizek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the "desert of the real"): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction ("Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism").

### 2NC Link

#### Elites rely on proposals like the plan to mask their capitalist agenda

Sampaio 3 (Clarissa, Architect, Federal University of Ceará, Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Urban Planning in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND INCREASED SOCIOSPATIAL INEQUALITIES IN FORTALEZA, BRAZIL: THE ROLE OF PLANNING, <http://www.urban.illinois.edu/academic> programs/mup/capstones/example\_capstones/Urban%20Development\_Miraftab\_03.pdf,JG)

David Harvey’s work tends to focus on the former aspect, the creation of spatial inequalities between productive activities and non-productive ones. His work suggests that productive sectors’ spatial agenda eventually ruled the placement of investments within the urban space. Thus, for him, the city form is shaped by the spatial requirements of the prevalent economic activities. He sees the logic of capitalist modes of production as the most powerful force driving urbanization, and therefore as the main cause for geographical differentials. He understands Marx’s “annihilation of space through time” as the successive efforts in reducing the costs of transportation of goods and services, in an “endless search to maximize profits”. This is met by the production of a series of “spatial fixes”, relatively fixed infrastructure networks that are essential to serve the productive sectors of the economy. These productive activities need to be inserted somewhere in the metropolitan territory, and the infrastructure logistic to support them easily becomes a more important factor than the location itself. Therefore these complex demands for investments determine the decision on where to place such networks (Harvey, 2000). The logic of capital accumulation is what ultimately rules the socio-spatial changes within the city, albeit with the intervention of State (and urban planning) to facilitate economic growth. This market-driven process does not work to fade inequalities but rather to use space to perpetuate conditions of social inequalities.

#### The affirmative is the reform of a limited area aimed at reducing social exclusion that allows elites to moralize the capitalist system

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Poverty in the world's richest societies is an embarrassment to the elite, who have responded partly through evasion. First, poverty may simply be denied. In the nineteenth century, the middle class generally regarded poverty as the natural state of the working class: 'the poor are always with us'. In the 1980s, Conservative ministers sometimes maintained that there was no poverty in contemporary Britain because low income people had living standards which were much higher than 50 or 100 years ago or than those of the Third World poor. We offer a critique of this view in section 3.1. Second, when poverty cannot be ignored, discussion focuses only on its symptoms. Particular manifestations of poverty are seen as the problem, such as poor housing and environment, or overuse of drink or drugs. Reform of a limited area can then be undertaken, with predictably meagre results. One symptom is said to be the cause of another, or is conflated with it: well into the twentieth century poverty, lunacy and crime overlapped each other and were treated in similar ways (Marcus, 1969:43). Moral ism can then easily substitute for analysis: late nineteenth-century thought saw the moral and physical weakness of the poor as one; in the contemporary USA and UK, the supposed lack of work ethic of the poor and the decline of the traditional family are conflated (Murray, 1990; Deacon, 1999). Third, the poor themselves are blamed for their situation. Two favourite targets, constantly vilified over 500 years, are the 'sexually irresponsible' young woman and the out-of-control young man; these produce 'dangerous areas'—dangerous because of sex and violence. These have loomed large in recent discourses concerning the poor— teenage mothers, yobs (Levitas, 1998). These fears have often crystallised in moral panics against the unsettled—vagrants, travellers, the homeless, beggars, asylum seekers. Another constant theme has been the work-shyness of the poor. Work was first linked to morality in the sixteenth century: welfare was to clamp down on the wilfully and inexcusable idle. Populations surplus to business's current demands, a potentially explosive issue, have been vilified as savages (the Highlanders), as obstructions to modernisation (coal mining communities), or as criminals (inner city residents).

#### The affirmative is a “spatial fix” – which only perpetuates the conditions of social innequalities

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David Harvey’s work tends to focus on the former aspect, the creation of spatial inequalities between productive activities and non-productive ones. His work suggests that 13 productive sectors’ spatial agenda eventually ruled the placement of investments within the urban space. Thus, for him, the city form is shaped by the spatial requirements of the prevalent economic activities. He sees the logic of capitalist modes of production as the most powerful force driving urbanization, and therefore as the main cause for geographical differentials. He understands Marx’s “annihilation of space through time” as the successive efforts in reducing the costs of transportation of goods and services, in an “endless search to maximize profits”. This is met by the production of a series of “spatial fixes”, relatively fixed infrastructure networks that are essential to serve the productive sectors of the economy. These productive activities need to be inserted somewhere in the metropolitan territory, and the infrastructure logistic to support them easily becomes a more important factor than the location itself. Therefore these complex demands for investments determine the decision on where to place such networks (Harvey, 2000). The logic of capital accumulation is what ultimately rules the socio-spatial changes within the city, albeit with the intervention of State (and urban planning) to facilitate economic growth. This market-driven process does not work to fade inequalities but rather to use space to perpetuate conditions of social inequalities. Castells also suggest that the State uses urban planning to favor capitalist classes. However for him, State does that by facilitating social reproduction of labor power, which reproduces class relations. By providing instrument of collective consumption such as schools and parks, or piped water and housing State takes up services not profitable to private sector. While for Harvey productive sectors invariably have the power over non-productive ones, Castells (1978) looks at distinct social reproduction interests. Castells tends to focus on the pattern of segregation among different socio-economic groups and how power imbalances among them cause collective services to concentrate in rich neighborhoods. He explained intraurban differentials as the outcome of a political struggle between urban residents, and he shifted productive activities to the regional scale. For Castells, urban social movements are formed according to the way in which different groups consume space, which is not necessarily identical to class structure because residents of similar class might differ in their utilization of urban services, or homeownership conditions for instance. In this regard Gottdiener (1985) has a similar point. He is critical of “productionist” perspectives (such as that of early Harvey’s work) because he identifies different fractions of capital competing with each other for urban investments. Castells’ focus on the power of a given group to determine the reorganization of the city according to its interests is also in line with the literature on urban politics. Such literature concentrates on unraveling the strategies that urban elites, for example, use to control the developmental agenda of the entire city (Fainstein, 1999). The existence of the so-called progrowth coalitions – alliances between State and productive sectors, such as real estate, and businesses – is suggested by studies on urban politics. Thus, it is not enough to identify the ruling class, or the productive sectors’ interests in the city. It is also necessary to understand the political strategies that they use to set the urban development scheme (Purcell, 1996), and the means used by the grassroots to challenge them (Castells, 1983). These analyses of urban politics suggest that for the most part the political struggle over urban space is based on matters ofcollective consumption and neighborhoods concerns, although economic interests are never outofsight.

#### New infrastructure is a red herring for new modes of expansion – every road is an instrument of gentrification aimed at marginalizing the poor residents of any given community

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Paradoxically, this neoliberal spatial praxis has only confirmed an old logic of using urban development to perpetuate the dominance of powerful sectors. According to the old urban practices, the state was responsible for providing the instruments of collective consumption necessary for the reproduction of class relations, strictly confirming Castells’ early work. At that time, the urban state was visibly more concerned with the reproduction needs of the residents than it is today. However it is also true that the spatial requirements of productive capital and elites have never ceased to be priorities. If urban social movements were able to challenge old policies that segregated the poor from the rich part of the city, neoliberalism brought new political strategies to achieve the same goal of producing the city for a few privileged sectors. The following case claims that Fortaleza’s elites have always effectively controlled the production of the city through the placement of transportation corridors. Influenced by neoliberal ideologies, opening new roads has become a convenient mechanism for opening new real estate frontiers while, at the same time, addressing the housing needs of some of the poorest residents. What this strategy conceals is that these projects have introduced an instrument of gentrification and market-led evictions into “strategic” sites for investments that are currently occupied by the urban poor. These new road-opening projects parallel, in some sense, the old segregationist policies that evicted the poor from well located settlements.

#### New infrastructure is at best dual-use, urban infrastructure projects are empirically rooted in capitalist expansion

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Outside this differentiated and more accessible small part of Fortaleza, the social transformation that even a small street effects is remarkable. Based on a statistical analysis of a sample of Fortaleza’s poorest settlements, Bezerra (1999) concluded that street pavement is the type of infrastructure more likely to cause forced displacement of squatters’ dwellers – the socalled market evictions. In other words, the study attests that the pavement of a residential street in popular settlements increases the value of a property more than the existence of piped water or sewer collection services. The mapping of information collected through interviews with residents of a squatter settlement depicted in the following illustration further attests the economic value of road connection. It suggests that the best socio-economic indicators are found at the houses located at the roads on the edge of the settlements, as opposed to those located at narrow irregular streets typical of the inner areas of such settlements. That is because the road helps to make their small businesses more visible to middle class clients that pass by the road. Thus, the road helps providing a source of income to the families located along it, an advantage that the other squatter residents don’t have. Extrapolating these findings to the larger metropolitan scale, Pequeno (2001) identified a series of development and degradation corridors constituting the intra-urban structure of Fortaleza. Not accidentally, all development corridors coincided with the major roads of the metropolitan region. Although not all the major regional routes were able to attract the amount of public and private investments that the southeast corridor did, the vicinity of such avenues generally present better infrastructure and socio-economic indicators than their immediate neighborhoods. On the other hand, Pequeno’s degradation corridors consist of the combination of poverty and environmental decay along the majority of rivers and dunes, which I have been calling leftover environments.I have suggested earlier in the last chapter that when urban development goes in the direction of some of these leftover environments they become strategic sites for investments. In fact, my account of the occupation of Fortaleza’s natural environment showed that the poor populations currently established in expensive land had settled prior to valorization of the land. As the urban expansion (and thus accessibility) surrounded these areas, they were already so densely populated that their forced eviction would be extremely costly, in both economic and political terms. This situation created pockets of (relative) poverty located at the very core of the privileged part of the city. The arrival of the “formal city” in those areas starts by the opening of a road, clearing up the necessary area from squatters. A delicate political negotiation process takes place between state government and the settlements’ leadership. Only the houses on the way of the road are “condemned”. The road cuts through the settlement and the houses left adjacent to the new road rapidly incorporate commerce in their ground floor. The subhuman environments of inner houses are untouched by State policies. The hidden places have, however, a tendency to increase their density as an effect of the recent arrived economic opportunities nearby. More density means worsening of their risky living conditions. The access road of the new international airport precisely followed this process32, albeit in parts hidden behind the walls hidden along the freeway that takes tourists to the new urban centrality.

### 2NC Root Cause

#### Cap is the root cause of spatial innequality

Gough et al 6 (James, senior lecturer in town and regional planning at Sheffield university, Aram Eisenschitz, senior lecturer in the school of health and social science at Middlesex university, Andrew McCulloch, senior lecturer at northumbria university, Spaces of Social Exclusion, p. 65, JG)

The divide between poor and better jobs is. in part, a territorial one (section 3.6). The spatial division of labour created by investment flows and territorial competition allocates jobs very unevenly. Industries with high productivity and innovation tend to be spatially agglomerated into particular territories, whether localities, regions, nations or continents. Agglomeration enables the production and reproduction of a workforce with the skills and attitudes desired by employers, through training within and outside of production and through social life. Its spatial stability helps to foster cooperative relations between firms and their employees. It facilitates networking, collaboration and changing divisions of labour between firms for flows of goods, services. Information and personnel. It helps suppliers of finance to develop a deep knowledge of the industry. And the state within the territory can develop responsiveness to the particular needs of the industry's firms in its provision of material and informational infrastructures, fiscal arrangements and regulation. These virtuous circles of agglomeration tend to the strongest in the production of complex goods and services which require strong knowledge generation and application and which use relatively skilled labour (Storper and Walker, 1989). In short, high value added industry is often based on the strong socialisation of production within a territory. This high value added i an then be partly appropriated by workers in the form of good wages and conditions. This logic, however, powerful though It Is, Is always in tension with the pressures of market discipline. Agglomeration tends to raise the price of labour and other inputsLabour's bargaining power tends to be increased, and managers' control within the workplace eroded. Stability may make other firms or the state unresponsive or excessively demanding and, rather than innovating, firms may try and repeat previously successful solutions (Gough. 1996b). In the face of this ossification, investment may flow elsewhere—to where costs are lower, labour more malleable, other actors more responsive. These pressures are particularly strong in industries or stages of production which produce standardised goods or services, where little new knowledge is generated or deployed, and where tasks are relatively low skilled. These types of production tend to be located in low cost locations with plentiful supplies of non-skilled labour. Since these conditions can be found in many regions of the developed countries and in most of die Third World, this production is relatively footloose, moving from one location to another in search of yet lower wages, more pliant workers, or new state subsidies.The oulcomc of Ihcsc conIradiclory pressures—which acl on all industry, albeit in varied ways—is highly differentiated spatial development. On a world scale, and focusing on the last 50 years or so. high value-added manufacturing, high level finance, business services and research and development work have remained strongly rooted in the developed countries. Within these countries, these sectors (end to be highly concentrated in particular localities and regions. These are usually places where the industry, or industries from which it evolved, have been located for many decades. However, other localities can lose their inherited socialisation of production: rural areas where agricultural and associated service employment have declined, regions where mining and manufacturing have collapsed, or towns where old-fashioned tourism has disappeared. In these areas, formerly successful socialisations have been destroyed by internal contradictions or new external competition, and new forms of coherence have not been constructed (Harvey. 1989). Capitalism often has Its revenge on areas of previous worker prosperity. New investment in these areas is largely confined to standardised, cost competitive manufacturing and low level office based services such as back offices and call centres. The great majority of these jobs are poor. They have often been split off from higherlevel work In the same firm or production chain precisely in order to separate them spatially and socially (Massey, 1984). Moreover, these localities are differentiated from each other merely because of cost and are therefore in sharp competition with each other, so that, once fixed investments have been depreciated, the firms and their jobs are liable to move on. In consequence, the unemployment created by the decline of old industries is often not absorbed by new investments. We thus have what we may call 'core' and 'peripheral' localities—though with the caveats that there is a continuum between these poles and that the pattern of advantage and disadvantage is never static (Sawyers and Tabb, 1984). The final element in this picture is services such as retailing, catering and leisure, which, because they are delivered locally to consumers, are ubiquitous. Most firms in these sectors design their jobs to be low skilled and 'numerically flexible', and offer low wages and poor conditions and security (Bryson eta/., 2004). Core and peripheral areas create poverty in distinct ways. In the peripheral areas the majority of jobs are poor. Substantial levels of unemployment are chronic. Even relatively privileged sections of labour are threatened by the flightiness of peripheral types of production and, because most jobs are designed to be relatively low skilled, their replacement by others threatens most workers. It is hard for unions to be active, or even to recruit, in this environment. The informal and criminal economics usually form a large proportion of economic activity. If this situation persists over decades, as it often docs, the dominant cultures of work are stamped by it. Expectations regarding wages, conditions, skill and career are low. sometimes zero; (he self-confidence of individuals as economic agenls is minimal. Economic exclusion thus affects the majority of the population in these areas. The core areas also create poverty, however. Consumer service jobs, whether in the private or public sector or in domestic st^cc^Sre as poor in these areas as in others and.driven by lhe high incomes ol lhe core sectors, these tend to torm a higher proportion ot all jobs than in poorer regions. The markets in land and property, dominated by core production activities and core workers, raise the cost of living; those in poor jobs may lack the bargaining power to raise their wages to meet these higher costs, and may thus Copyrighted Material Copyrighted Material Spaces of Social exclusion 66 be even worse off in core regions than in peripheral ones (Fainstein el ai, 1992: Sassen, 1991: Hamnctt. 2002). Furthermore, social and spatial segmentation of labour tend to be an even greater problem in core regions than peripheral ones. A relatively low aggregate unemployment rate across a region may disguise high rates of unemployment and underemployment for those with a poor work history, for ethnic minorities, and for people living in stigmatised neighbourhoods. Migrants naturally try to settle predominantly in core rather than peripheral regions. But the work of these migrant communities, at least for several decades, is typically in the consumer service sectors, in the informal economy, or in businesses owned by people of their own ethnicity; the latter may form minority-ethnic enclave industries within which bonds of ethnicity are used to create particularly poor jobs (Kakios and van der Vclden. 1984; VValdinger and Lapp. 1999). Contrasts and divisions in life chances thus tend to be particularly large in core regions. Economic exclusion appears as internal rather than external to the region. This has important ideological consequences. Whereas in weak regions economic exclusion can be the majority culture, a widely shared experience represented in dominant discourses, in core regions disadvantaged workers and the poor appear as anomalous because they have somehow failed to share in the 'general' prosperity; the cultures of the poor tend to be more suppressed, and indeed seen as threatening, within the region's dominant discourses (Stedman Jones, 1971; 1983). Schematically, we may say that, whereas in the weak regions capital mobility undermines collective organisation, in the core regions divisions within labour undermine collective organisation (Gough, 2003a).

Sampaio 3 (Clarissa, Architect, Federal University of Ceará, Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Urban Planning in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND INCREASED SOCIOSPATIAL INEQUALITIES IN FORTALEZA, BRAZIL: THE ROLE OF PLANNING, <http://www.urban.illinois.edu/academic> programs/mup/capstones/example\_capstones/Urban%20Development\_Miraftab\_03.pdf, JG)

David Harvey’s work tends to focus on the former aspect, the creation of spatial inequalities between productive activities and non-productive ones. His work suggests that productive sectors’ spatial agenda eventually ruled the placement of investments within the urban space. Thus, for him, the city form is shaped by the spatial requirements of the prevalent economic activities. He sees the logic of capitalist modes of production as the most powerful force driving urbanization, and therefore as the main cause for geographical differentials. He understands Marx’s “annihilation of space through time” as the successive efforts in reducing the costs of transportation of goods and services, in an “endless search to maximize profits”. This is met by the production of a series of “spatial fixes”, relatively fixed infrastructure networks that are essential to serve the productive sectors of the economy. These productive activities need to be inserted somewhere in the metropolitan territory, and the infrastructure logistic to support them easily becomes a more important factor than the location itself. Therefore these complex demands for investments determine the decision on where to place such networks (Harvey, 2000). The logic of capital accumulation is what ultimately rules the socio-spatial changes within the city, albeit with the intervention of State (and urban planning) to facilitate economic growth. This market-driven process does not work to fade inequalities but rather to use space to perpetuate conditions of social inequalities.

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The urban space comes to be understood as the outcome of conflicting social interests. Organized groups compete for public services and infrastructure, because they have different spatial requirements. Homeowners, for example, may seek investments in their neighborhoods while renters experience losses with valorization of their neighborhoods. Productive sectors also have important role in shaping the urban environment. A distinction between the production and social reproduction functions of the urban space helps in explaining the question of spatial inequalities. On one hand, productive sectors such as industries, commerce and real estate see the city mainly as an instrument of profit. Productive activities may prefer one area to the other due to the availability of infrastructure proximity to input goods and labor market. Residents, on the other hand, tend to think of spatial differentials in terms of proximity to different services such as housing, leisure facilities and schools. For the residents, although their houses have a monetary value, the prime function of the city is to reproduce their social relations. This different function of the city leads to different definitions of spatial inequalities: “First there are inequalities in terms of the dominant form of economic activity; second there are inequalities in terms of the various indicators of social well–being”

Peet 78 (Richard, foremost scholar in radical geography, Materialism, Social Formation and Socio-Spatial Relations : an Essay in Marxist Geography, <http://www.erudit.org/revue/cgq/1978/v22/n56/021390ar.pdf>, JG)

Capitalism is a System propelled through time through the development and interaction of its inhérent contradictions. The longer it exists in any région the more intense and interlocked thèse contradictions tend to become, and the more drastic their social and environmental conséquences. In the old centers of capitalist production two types of highly developed contradiction are most évident. First, contradiction between the forces and the social relations of production, revealed in class struggle largely of an economistic type, yielding higher wages for the organized working class, the diversion of some surplus value away from the capitalist class, and lower rates of profit. This contradiction is also reflected in social problems of various kinds which hâve to be contained and controlled by a state supported by high taxes, which constitue a further drain on surplus value and profit. Second, contradiction in the environmental relations of capitalist production, revealed in shortages and high priées for raw materials, high direct and indirect costs from pollution and other damages to the natural world, hence lower rates of profit (Peet, 1979). One of capital's response to its development of thèse contradictions is to abandon the old industrial régions of the center (Northern England, New England, etc.) in search of virgin environments (to dispoil), ideologically and politically virgin labor forces (to exploit), and higher profits. Hence, for example, the rapid growth of free trade zones in areas of cheap labor and rigid social control in Southeast Asia (Takeo, 1978). The internationalization of production is the spatial response to the intense development of contradiction at the center. intensification of régional or urban-ghetto aliénation in areas abandoned by Capital. At the periphery, the old form of contradiction between local urban center and rural periphery may be altered, and new forms of urban contradictions (those of rapid industrialization) émerge. This new build-up is counteracted by the imposition of commodity fetishisms into the minds of the masses in the Third World via radio, télévision and ail the instruments of the «consciousness industry» (Enzensberger, 1974). In terms of the world capitalist System (center and periphery), the level of industrial production and consumption rises and the contradictions with the natural environment are both internationalized and intensified. In late capitalism the contradiction with earth becomes fundamental, structuring the other contradictions. And the effects of this structure of contradictions on the revolutionary consciousness of the world's population are counteracted by the most sophisticated manipulation of the mind and émotions ever known in human history. This struggle between the contradiction with earth and the ideological manipulation of man will dominate our lives in the waning years of the twentieth century. It should be the focus of an emerging marxist geography.

#### **Root cause of spatial inequality is industrial capitalist development – specific to US and developed countries**

Kim 8 (Sukko, ociate Professor of Economics Research Associate at Wash U, Spatial Inequality and Economic Development: Theories, Facts, and Policies, <http://soks.wustl.edu/spatial_inequality.pdf>, JG)

For developed countries, the evidence on regional spatial inequality is much more robust and consistent across countries. Despite important variations, the main source of spatial inequality in developed nations seems to be driven by geographic differences in industrial concentration. Since some industries such as textiles are much more geographically concentrated than industries such as food or electrical machinery, spatial inequality is caused by the spatial variations in concentrated industries. In general, other industries such as agricultural and mining tend to contribute to spatial inequality as natural resources are distributed unequally, whereas most services, especially those that serve local markets, tend to reduce spatial inequality. For the United States, there is considerable evidence for a long‐run inverted U‐pattern of regional inequality, especially in the manufacturing sector. Kim (1995) finds that U.S. regions became more specialized or unequal between the mid‐nineteenth and the turn of the twentieth centuries and then became significantly despecialized in the second half of the twentieth century. Similar results are obtained from industrial localization patterns over time. Based on the locational Gini coefficient at the 2‐digit and 3‐digit industries, Kim (1995) finds that manufacturing industries became more localized between 1890 and the turn of the twentieth century, but then became significantly more dispersed over the second half of the twentieth century.15 At any given point in time, the traditional, low‐tech industries such as textiles, apparel, and tobacco were much more localized than the medium‐ to high‐tech industries such as electricity, transportation, and so forth. Consequently, the gradual shift in manufacturing from low‐tech to high‐tech industries contributed to the general dispersal of manufacturing over time.

Kim 8 (Sukko, ociate Professor of Economics Research Associate at Wash U, Spatial Inequality and Economic Development: Theories, Facts, and Policies, <http://soks.wustl.edu/spatial_inequality.pdf>, JG)

One of the most basic measures of urban inequality is the urban‐rural wage gap. Because urban wages are typically higher than rural wages, urbanization introduces spatial inequality in wages and incomes between cities and rural areas as well as cities of different sizes. Rosenthal and Strange (2004), summarizing the evidence from numerous studies that estimate the level of urbanization economies, report that productivity increases approximately between 3 to 8 percent as a city’s size doubles. Similarly, Glaeser and Maré (2001) find that U.S. workers in cities earn 33 percent more than those in rural areas. The urban wage premium is also found by Wheeler (2004) and Kim (2006) among others.

Fuchs and Demko 79 (Roland, PhD Association of American Geographers, George, PhD Association of American Geographers, Geographic inequality under socialism, Taylor and Francis, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2563073>, JG)

ISSUES of social and economic inequality, the subject of study in other social science disciplines for some decades, have recently received much attention from geographers.' While the concern of other social sciences has generally been with inequalities among occu- pational, social, and demographic groups, the focus of geographic studies has generally beenon territorial or spatial inequalities, i.e., varia- tions in social and economic indices when areal divisions are taken as the units of observation. The initial emphases in this geographic work were on the identification of appropriate terri- torial indicators and the map portrayal and analysis of patterns of inequality. These studies, not surprisingly, have demonstrated the exis- tence of marked spatial inequalities not only in developing nations, but also in developed, Western market and mixed-economy welfare states.2 More recently such studies have gone be- yond map portrayal and technical analyses. Geographic inequalities have been almost casu- ally equated with geographic inequities and ex-plained in terms of structural flaws in the pre- vailing social, economic, and political system.3 Capitalism is increasingly seen by many writers as the root cause of territorial inequalities while the modern welfare state is viewed as capable only of remedial action which must stop short of elimination of the basic causes of spatial disparities.4 In the United States, a school of "radical geographers" has adopted a Marxist framework of analysis, and espouses revolu- tionary solutions for problems of spatial dis- parities and other perceived societal ills.5 This group has generally addressed problems of spa- tial inequalities in developing and developed Western societies, while avoiding examination of geographic inequalities in those national states already under Marxist-socialist political and economic systems.6 To help remedy this peculiar geographic biaswe review in this paper evidence of geographic inequalities in the industrially advanced social- ist countries of Eastern Europe with particular reference to the Soviet Union, Poland, Hun- gary, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia. Our paper draws upon writings by Western and socialist scholars and literature in geography, economics, sociology, and plan- ning. A brief discussion of the ideological com- mitment to geographical equality and equity in these societies is followed by an examination of patterns of spatial inequalities from various perspectives: regional contrasts, urban-rural comparisons, inequalities within rural areas and within urban networks, and intraurban dis- tinctions.

Kim 8 (Sukko, ociate Professor of Economics Research Associate at Wash U, Spatial Inequality and Economic Development: Theories, Facts, and Policies, <http://soks.wustl.edu/spatial_inequality.pdf>, JG)

This paper surveys the recent developments in theoretical and empirical works on spatial inequality to better understand the benefits and costs of spatial inequality and to draw inferences concerning appropriate policy responses for dealing with spatial inequality. This section concludes with a summary perspective and suggestions for further inquiry. Why do spatial inequalities arise? The survey of the literature highlights two classes of explanations based on first and second natures of geography. The neoclassical model emphasizes the role of first nature such as resource endowments and geographic proximity to rivers and ports. The increasing returns model emphasizes the role of second nature created by the density of human interactions. Because economic development allows regions to take advantage of first and second natures of geography, an increase in spatial inequality may be beneficial as productivity is increased. However, because congestion costs may not be internalized by individuals, spatial inequality in the form of excessive urban concentration or urban primacy may be harmful. Thus, theory suggests that there is an optimal level of spatial inequality. There are many reasons why policy makers may be concerned with spatial inequality. From an efficiency standpoint, policy makers want to obtain the optimal level of spatial inequality. Because most of the second nature explanations imply market imperfections and inefficient levels of agglomeration, policy makers may want to adopt policies to correct these failures. From an equity or an egalitarian standpoint, even when spatial inequality is beneficial, policy makers may want to reduce the effects of uneven spatial development. Finally, policy makers may be concerned that sharp regional divergence in economic fortunes of different regions may contribute to deep political divisions that may impose significant social costs. Yet, implementing effective policies in fostering or reducing spatial inequality is likely to be much more challenging than suggested by the standard literature. Economic development often involves major shifts in economic and social structures of societies. A successful shift from a traditional agricultural‐based society to modern manufacturing‐ and service‐based society is likely to involve a successful transition from a traditional small‐scale society based on personal exchanges to a modern society based in impersonal exchanges. Because the developmental transition tears at the fabric of society held together by traditional family and inheritance institutions as well as traditional gender roles, making a successful transition is significantly more challenging than suggested by the models surveyed in this paper. More importantly, political elites in many developing nations may not possess the incentives to treat problems associated with too little or too much spatial inequality. In China, local political elites have little incentive to remove the restrictions on the mobility of workers. Likewise, the political elites in Asia and Latin America may possess little incentive to reduce problems associated with urban primacy if they benefit from politics of corruption and patronage. Thus, if spatial disparity is fundamentally driven by political institutions, then implementing difficult political reforms may be a necessary first step toward addressing problems associated with spatial inequality.

### 2NC Alt

**Liberation of thinking via intellectual resistance is critical---acto-mania gets coopted**

Johnston 4 (interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, Adrian, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259 page infotrac)

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, he sees the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.

Withdrawal avoids the gaze of the big Other and any permutation dissolves the split between parallax

**Butler 10** (Senior Lecturer in the Department of English, Media Studies and Art History at the University of Queensland Rex International Journal of Zizek Studies 4.1 <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/228/321>)

For all of the criticisms of Zizek there, accusing him of misreadings, of getting the facts wrong, of internal logical inconsistencies, we get the uncanny feeling reading the book that what it desires more than anything is the approval of Zizek himself, as though he would read what was written about him and suddenly change his ways.) This is why, for Lacan, the birth of the Enlightenment is inseparable from a kind of interpassivity or objective cynicism (one of the little remarked-upon lessons of Lacan’s ‘Kant with Sade’ and one of his objections to Descartes’ “provisional morality”).8 But, for Zizek, the “passive aggressivity” or “withdrawal” involved in thought is not like this. Like psychoanalytic speech, it does not seek to work through the Big Other. It is not fundamentally a case either of belief or the lack of belief. It does not understand itself as the search for a hidden or repressed truth that would expose the underlying state of affairs (the meaning of the “obviousness” or even “stupidity” of Zizek’s examples). Zizek’s work is split, but not in terms of desire, what is missing from the work, but in terms of drive, what is missing in the work. It is exactly because the work has no other end than itself, its own internal consistency, that it is forever divided, unable to be completed. It continues as an incessant reflection upon its own “speaking position”, a reflection (the question of cynicism) with which it first began. All of this is to say that when Zizek returns to Sublime Object in Parallax View, it is to grasp the unconscious and the commodity as an effect of parallax. We move from an early conception of thought as critique, which still relies on a notion of a truth outside of the work, to a form of parallactic remarking, which proposes no such “end” to the work. We move from the split of the symptom elaborated in Sublime Object (which still implies a certain exception to a universal) to a parallactic self-splitting that keeps on repeating (which implies a certain lack of exception in an inconsistent not-all totality). We move from a democratic desire that always fails (and in which the position of truth must always be kept empty) to a Marxist drive (a parallactic self-splitting, in which failure is not an outside or exception but the very aim). Parallax View is not a critique by Zizek of his earlier work, but a kind of folding of it onto itself, a remarking of what is excluded from it to make it possible. The drive of parallax is not so much outside of desire and the symptom as the endless repeating or playing out of them. As writes: “While the goal is the object around which drive circulates, its (true) aim is the endless continuation of this circulation as such” (61). That is to say, parallax is not simply the shifting between two different perspectives (this is only an effect of what is really at stake), but a splitting between something and what allows it to be symbolically registered. And the passive aggressivity or withdrawal that Zizek advocates is again not opposed to cynicism (which is also, of course, a kind of “withdrawal”, a look “behind” appearances), but rather a cynicism without a Big Other guaranteeing it and that does not seek symbolic recognition. Passive aggressivity or withdrawal – the passive aggressivity or withdrawal that we find in analysis, for example – is an attempt to make the positions of enunciation and enunciated the same. In this, it would be “opposed” to cynicism, which always finally wants to preserve an empty point of enunciation outside of what it speaks of (to echo Kant, in the “transcendental apperception” of cynicism, the empty position of the cynical subject is echoed by the empty position of the Big Other as “transcendental object” [Zizek 1993: 17]). Passive aggressivity or withdrawal is an attempt to remark the cynical position, to show the “void of its lack” (Zizek 2006: 15) that allows its so-called “neutral” position of enunciation.

### 2NC ! Ethics

Voting negative is the only ethical choice

Zizek and Daly 4 (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 18-19)

For Zizek, a confrontation with the obscenities of abundance capitalism also requires a transformation of the ethico-political imagination. It is no longer a question of developing ethical guidelines within the existing political framework (the various institutional and corporate ‘ethical committees’) but of developing a politicization of ethics; an ethics of the Real.8 The starting point here is an insistence on the unconditional autonomy of the subject; of accepting that as human beings we are ultimately responsible for our actions and being-in-the-world up to and including the constructions of the capitalist system itself. Far from simple norm-breaking or refining / reinforcing existing social protocol, an ethics of the Real tends to emerge through norm-breaking and in finding new directions that, by definition, involve traumatic changes: i.e. the Real in genuine ethical challenge. An ethics of the Real does not simply defer to the impossible (or infinite Otherness) as an unsurpassable horizon that already marks every act as a failure, incomplete and so on. Rather, such an ethics is one that fully accepts contingency but which is nonetheless prepared to risk the impossible in the sense of breaking out of standardized positions. We might say that it is an ethics which is not only politically motivated but which also draws its strength from the political itself. For Zizek an ethics of the Real (or Real ethics) means that we cannot rely on any form of symbolic Other that would endorse our (in)decisions and (in)actions: for example, the ‘neutral’ financial data of the stockmarkets; the expert knowledge of Beck’s ‘new modernity’ scientists, the economic and military councils of the New World Order; the various (formal and informal) tribunals of political correctness; or any of the mysterious laws of God, nature or the market. What Zizek affirms is a radical culture of ethical identification for the left in which the alternative forms of militancy must first of all be militant with themselves. That is to say, they must be militant in the fundamental ethical sense of not relying on any external/higher authority and in the development of a political imagination that, like Zizek’s own thought, exhorts us to risk the impossible.

### 2NC Alt Trick

#### The Alternative is a pre-requisite to the affirmative, solvency is unattainable absent a rejection of capital, our re-conceptualization works to obscure the underlying causes of poverty and exclusion

Sheilds 9 (Stuart, Stuart is interested in critical approaches to International Political Economy.  He completed his PhD on the transnational dimension of regime transformation in Eastern Central Europe at Aberystwyth's Department of International Politics, in February 2002, and joined Manchester in September 2003, Spaces of Social Exclusion, <http://search.proquest.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/docview/209698594?accountid=12861>, JG)

As a trope of contemporary political economy, social exclusion seems indelibly linked to the New Labour project. Ironically, I am putting the final touches to this review in the hours following British Chancellor Alistair Darling's speech to the 2008 Labour Party conference, in which he proselytised, [I]f you want reasons to be confident about our future, look no further than right here in Manchester. Over the last decade this city has been transformed. There are thousands more jobs and homes in a magnificent rebuilt city centre. A credit to the vision of Manchester City Council to the efforts of the private sector and the energy of the local community. (Darling, 2008) The themes of Darling's speech are direcdy related to the content of this book, and illustrate just how central the whole notion of regeneration has become, incessantly stressed in the light of the enormous disparities of wealth in the UK. As part of this, public-private partnerships, formal and informal networks between local authorities, community groups, voluntary organisations and private enterprise have attempted to remedy the extant problems in urban communities. However, despite more than a decade of New Labour rule, the Manchester venue for Darling's speech was paradoxically indicative of the wider problems associated with regeneration, poverty, social exclusion and the response of labour and workers to the pressure of multiple deprivations. The conference took place a matter of metres from the gleaming steel-and-glass examples of successful urban regeneration; and yet it is also next to the site of the Peterloo massacre, and just a few miles away in most directions can be found some of the poorest wards in the UK. As Gough, Eisenschitz and McCulloch alert us, urban poverty and social exclusion are 'logical outcomes of capitalist societies' and 'social-spatial unevenness is ... an intrinsic part of how the mechanisms of exclusion have their effect' (pp. 139-40). Gough, Eisenschitz and McCulloch identify a deluge of publications dedicated to such concerns in recent years. Much of this literature is narrowly focused on reifying the primacy of the national scale, but one of the main strengths of this book is its genuinely multi-scalar treatment of poverty and exclusion as economic, social and political processes and spatial constructions. As the authors recognise, a veritable cottage industry of national, comparative and global studies of social exclusion (and its corollary, social inclusion) has emerged (p. xi). Gough, Eisenschitz and McCulloch are to be commended in that not only have they not settled for merely making this observation, but they have managed to say something far more profound and original in such a well occupied field. Spaces of Social Exclusion is divided into three main sections. The first section focuses on the reality, ideologies and management of poverty. The authors are careful to indicate how, despite the manifold factors contributing to the management of the poor, these processes have 'had a central role in the class relations of the society as a whole' (p. 11), and that 'particular social relations of production and social life, which have become more strongly capitalist over time, have created poverty' (ibid.). They explore the dominant theorisations of social exclusion over some 500 years of the production of poverty, clarifying how certain continuities of social relations in Britain persist regarding poverty and the poor, and these themes run through the book. These broader themes are, first, that capital, state managers and governments have done their best to evade responsibility for poverty; second, that part of this evasion has been an emphasis on the symptoms of poverty and the limited reformism thus engendered, rather than the causes, and finally, the intensification of blame directed at the poor themselves for their own feeble irresponsibility. While our strategy for understanding poverty must be embedded in these capitalist relations, so too must our resistance strategies for the alleviation of poverty. Not only are there spatial strategies for configuring this, but space needs to be part of our theorisation of contesting it. Here, the way that space comes to be a central element in the processes contributing to exclusion is drawn out. The authors argue that such ideologies work to obscure the underlying causes of poverty and exclusion, and this is central to the overall politics of this book. Part 2 of the book concentrates on the causes of social exclusion. The reduction of social exclusion to the persistence of the market will be alien to many orthodox urban geographers and sociologists, but it is an idea convincingly explored through an analysis of three interconnected socio-spatial realms (the economy, the state, and the domestic). Here, Gough, Eisenschitz and McCulloch start their discussion by looking at the role of (un)employment and poor jobs (pp. 68-9), lucidly revealing in the chapters that follow the significance of the internal relations of these three realms and their mutual coconstitution. The section builds cumulatively from this base, assessing how the state itself reproduces poverty and the class, gender and racialised forms of social exclusion. It is this relational theorisation of multiple social spaces and overlapping scales which explains how and where poverty and social exclusion are configured. The remainder of the book is devoted to orthodox strategies developed to address poverty and exclusion, and the final section of the book revolves around three such strategies: neoliberalism, conservative interventionism and associationalism. The authors rebuff the neoliberal ideal that liberalisation and de-regulation enhance competitiveness to create economic growth and prosperity for all, and instead show how the neoliberal era has witnessed 'an offensive by capital to restore both its authority and its rate of profit' at the expense of the poorest members of society (p. 140). The problem of undistilled neoliberalisation, however, has its apparent limits. Given the successful disciplining of labour and the reliance on market mechanisms in ever more areas of life, an attempt to defuse the worst antagonisms has emerged in the shape of conservative interventionism. This renewed call for competitiveness and protection should not be taken to imply that the market mechanism has been abandoned. The growing socio-spatial contradictions and tensions at the heart of the New Labour project accept the main thrust of neoliberalism, but acknowledge the need to alleviate the worst excesses through piecemeal intervention. Associationalism is similarly wracked with tensions and contradictions, the central tension being an inability to reconcile socially productive forms of intervention with the increasingly concentrated polarisation of economic and power relations. Once Gough, Eisenschitz and McCulloch have critically evaluated these three positions, they turn to their own alternative. I suspect that for many outside of more critical and Marxist geography, this section of the book will present the greatest challenge. The authors move here from critical engagement to critique. Following their review and dismissal of these three perspectives, they offer a socialist strategy for inclusion. The starting point is the principle that poverty and social exclusion are the products of capitalist society, and that combating poverty means collectively resisting the class relations of that society. The urban space plays a vital role in this resistance, as cities encompass the major axes of repression and liberation. It seems churlish, given the overall quality of this book, to pick up on two minor criticisms. First, given the ambiguity surrounding social exclusion, it does appear odd that the same level of criticism is not directed towards social inclusion, which is accepted as is. Surely notions of inclusion are ideological constructions just as much as the notion of exclusion? Second, there remains a lack of concern for contingency and nuance in places, given the zero-sum nature of the social inclusion/exclusion dyad. Therefore, urban spaces appear the same, lacking distinctiveness. While I remain convinced by the more abstract arguments made concerning inclusion/ exclusion as embedded in structural conformities of die circulation of capital-human, commodity and finance; are some of the intricacies of our built environment absent? However, these are minor quibbles; Spaces of Social Exclusion remains a genuinely important book. It sheds a clear and penetrating light on what David Harvey (1973: 143) once called the 'sordid drama' of contemporary poverty, which is too often ignored in mainstream accounts that lack the subtle and historicised account proffered here. Gough, Eisenschitz and McCulloch should be congratulated for having produced such a theoretically sophisticated book while retaining such an engaging clarity. Spaces of Social Exclusion illustrates how there is little new in contemporary discussions of social exclusion, as the capitalism of today's urban experience replicates far too many of the symptoms of its predecessors. It is no mean achievement to be this astute in dealing with the articulation of poverty inherent to the social and class relations of capitalist reproduction. This is a book that deserves to be read well beyond the academy - if someone were to slip a copy into Alistair Darling's pocket, perhaps?

### AT Perm

The aff's reformist-incorporation makes radical politics impossible

Sunley 8 (Peter, Professor of Economic Geography 1988-2003, lecturer and senior lecturer, University of Edinburgh,  2003- Professor, University of Southampton, Spaces of Social Exclusion, <http://search.proquest.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/docview/235684430?accountid=12861>, added [with])

This text promises to stand out from the literature on social exclusion by providing a deeper analysis of its causes, examining a range of policy options, and giving a cant role to space, place, and scale. It concentrates on Britain and aims to overturn recent policy consensus that social and cultural processes exclude certain individuals from mainstream society and thereby produce poverty. Instead, it argues capitalist and other oppressive social relations necessarily produce poverty-the to participate in normal social interactions and failure to reach minimum norms necessary for social participation. The book has three parts. The first part argues that state strategy toward poverty has swung between coercion and incorporation and has always mixed the two. It identifies some strong continuities and traces them to the contradictory needs of capital. Turning to territories and scale poverty management, it argues that the classification of some areas as deviant and poor elides people and place and justifies superficial environmentally determinist explanations of exclusion. This section also reviews the extent of poverty in contemporary Britain, noting that whatever measure of poverty is used poverty remains a horrendous problem. It outlines the main social groups who suffer from poverty and explains how race, gender, and sexuality both cause poverty and worsen the experience of The second part focuses on three main causes of social exclusion: the economy labor market, the state, and the sphere of social reproduction, particularly housing. argues that all three have been worsened by the long crisis in capitalist since the 1970s. The results have been falls in real wages and job security, the cation of work, and the rise of informal and illegal work. The state has become exclusionary with the adoption of neoliberal reforms, and these reforms have unevenness in poverty and produced "postcode lotteries" in access to services. adoption of welfare-to-work strategies has forced the poor into any available work thereby reduced conditions at the bottom of the labor market. Taxation has become progressive and has been shifted from corporations to labor. These reforms have the growing spatial segregation of poor groups in low-quality housing. The argue that increasing commodification and the growth of women's paid employment have led to a certain degree of social fragmentation and the decline of neighborhood support. They suggest that increasing property crime is a logical reaction among the poor commodity culture and that it receives especially harsh treatment from the state. The third part critiques consensus poverty policies, and it insists that [with] engagement the market cannot be a solution because markets fail the poor. Targeted area-based ventions are too small. Decentralized public services and community initiatives do have enough distance from the market to be socially inclusive, and new forms of ship governance only continue class biases. Finally, the book reviews four main types political philosophy: neoliberalism, conservative interventionism, associationalism, socialism, and as one may expect, the authors are not keen on the first three. neglects the need for the socialization of production and reproduction and leads and the state to abandon poor neighborhoods. The policies of Major and Blair are to represent a form that devalues unpaid caring work. These weak welfare policies of interventionism have been undermined by the neoliberal economy. They have failed improve the distribution of income, and services remain poor and class divided. Conservative interventionism is unable to blend an economic neoliberalism with an organic conservatism that improves social linkages and political inclusion. Similarly, the book argues that associationalism's enthusiasm for social enterprise is too optimistic. Associationalism unrealistically tries to abstract the good dimensions of capitalism-autonomous work, innovation in social enterprises-from its nasty features and thus neglects the ways in which social enterprises are constrained by capitalism. It leads to a socially and spatially fragmented politics. The authors prefer a socialist strategy that builds working-class collectivities within projects for social provision. It involves a range of egalitarian policies, such as narrowing wage differentials, spending more on state services, switching taxation to businesses, increasing investment in social housing, and placing all land under public ownership. All major economic assets should be controlled and owned, and investment planning would allow waged employment for all.

### Alt: Socialism

Socialist spatiality is necessary

Fuchs and Demko 79 (Roland, PhD Association of American Geographers, George, PhD Association of American Geographers, Geographic inequality under socialism, Taylor and Francis, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2563073>, JG)

The Marxist-Leninist form of socialism, as typified in the socialist states of Eastern Europe, shares with other forms of socialism an ideo- logical commitment to the elimination of major disparities in economic and social well-being.7 Within these ideological systems equality is de- fined not only in terms of occupational, social, and ethnic groups but is also given an explicit spatial context. The goal of spatial or geo- graphic equality is considered as including equalization of regional levels of economic de- velopment and per capita living standards and measures of welfare.8 In the theoretical works of Marxism-Leninism, in planning directives and documents, and in party programs, equal- ization of regional levels of economic develop- ment and living standards, and the elimination of social and economic differences between urban and rural areas, are repeatedly cited as goals.9 Therefore in these socialist nations equality among regions and other spatial sec- tors can legitimately be considered a standard against which to measure success in achieving a major ideologically derived planning goal.

## Privatization Equity Counterplan

### 1NC

#### TEXT: The 50 states and relevant subnational governments should end all highway and transit subsidies, end diversions of highway fees to transit, and provide mobility assistance to those who lack automobility. The United States federal government should phase out subsidies to transit and all other forms of transportation and eliminate nonformula funds.

#### That solves best

Randal **O’Toole 10** is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit The Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf>

A Privatization Action Plan Instead of the “complex and nebulous” goals identified by Lave in 1994, urban transit should have a single goal: to efficiently move people who are willing to pay for that transportation. As illustrated by the large differences in costs between buses that are contracted out and buses that are directly operated by public agencies, private businesses are more efficient than publicly owned transit systems. To achieve this goal, federal, state, and local governments should take the following steps: 1. **State and local governments should stop subsidizing highways**. In the decade ending in 2008, some $444 billion in general funds were spent on roads (after adjusting for inflation to 2008 dollars). This was partly offset by $234 billion in diversions from highway user fees to transit and other nonhighway programs. Even if this offset is not counted, ending the $444 billion in subsidies will not pose a hardship on drivers, as the subsidies amount to just 1.5 cents for each of the 29 trillion vehicle miles driven in those years. At the same time, ending the subsidies will provide an important object lesson for the transit industry: transportation can and should pay for itself. Ending highway subsidies will also take away the argument of transit advocates that, since highway users receive subsidies of less than a penny per passenger mile, transit users should receive subsidies of more than 70 cents per passenger mile. The best way to end the subsidies would be to switch from gasoline taxes to vehicle-mile fees as the basis for paying for highways. As noted by Jim Whitty of the Oregon Department of Transportation at a recent conference on mileage-based fees, electronic fees can be collected for every road, with funds going to the government agency that owns or manages that road; they can vary by the level of traffic in order to minimize congestion; and they can be charged without invading driver privacy. 113 Mileage fees will be more politically palatable to drivers provided, first, that the vehicle-mile fee is a replacement for—not an addition to—existing gasoline taxes and, second, that the collected fees are spent only on highways, roads, and streets, and not diverted to other activities. 2. **Congress should phase out subsidies to transit and all other forms of transportation**. To the extent that transportation is interstate in nature, Congress should ensure that transportation programs are fiscally prudent. This means that, whenever possible, they should be privately operated and always funded out of user fees, not taxes. If there is a special need to federally fund some program, such as a program aimed at reducing air pollution, federal funds should be spent on projects that directly address that problem. The idea that funding indirect programs such as transit to reduce congestion, save energy, clean the air, and solve other problems simply leads to wasteful spending on projects that do not really address any of those problems. 3. Congress should eliminate New Starts, Small Starts, the Congestion Mitigation/Air Quality fund, and other nonformula funds. These funds have become “open buckets” that encourage transit agencies to plan wasteful projects in order to get larger shares of federal funds. “Formula funds”—federal funds that are distributed on the basis of such factors as population, land area, and/or actual use—are much better because they are fairly fixed and thus state and local transportation agencies have little incentive to spend on inappropriate projects because more spending will not lead to more federal grants. **4. Congress should include user fees in the formula funds**. Funds distributed on the basis of the user fees collected will give transit and other transportation agencies incentives to focus on better service to users rather than on pleasing politicians. For example, a formula that distributes funds to states based 50 percent on user fees, 45 percent on population, and 5 percent on land area initially results in a distribution similar to today’s distribution of highway funds, but in the long run rewards states (and transit agencies within each state) that increase the share of their transportation systems paid out of user fees. Once transit agencies are more focused on user fees, it will be easier for them to privatize transit operations. **5. States should end diversions of gas taxes and other highway fees to transit**. In 2008, California diverted more than $800 million, Pennsylvania diverted more than $600 million, and other states diverted nearly $3.7 billion in gas taxes to transit. California also diverted $1.2 billion, and other states diverted $2.6 billion, in motor vehicle registration fees to transit. New York diverted almost $500 million, and other states diverted $200 million more, in road tolls to transit. 114 This unearned money gives transit agencies a license to spend on programs that have no economic or financial justification. They also reduce the public faith in highway user fees, making it difficult for state and local agencies to raise the fees they need to maintain and improve roads. **6. States should end other transit subsidies**. In addition to highway user fees, states dedicated more than $5 billion in income, sales, property, and other taxes to transit operations. Phasing out this money would encourage transit agencies to privatize their operations. **7. States may want to provide mobility assistance to low-income, disabled, and other people who lack automobility**. Instead of giving transit agencies billions of dollars and hoping they will use it to help people who cannot drive, states could give mobility vouchers to such people. These vouchers could be applied to any common carrier form of transportation: airlines, Amtrak, intercity buses, urban transit, or taxis. **8. Transit agencies should privatize their systems in ways that promote efficient services to people in their cities or districts.** Where possible, privatization should encourage, or at least allow for, competition. But transit agencies should consider a variety of options (such as franchises, curb rights, and unrestricted competition) to determine what might be best for their particular urban areas.

### Overview

#### We just have to win the counterplan is sufficient

Salmon 7 – Upstart business journal [Felix, May 3, 2007, “In Praise of Infrastructure Privatization,” <http://upstart.bizjournals.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2007/05/03/in-praise-of-infrastructure-privatization.html?page=all>]

With the market for infrastructure still in its infancy, every deal is different. The ideal blend of up-front payment, toll hikes, and revenue sharing hasn't been found. Privatization doesn't need to be "ideal" to be a good idea. The benefits of privatization come immediately, and can make a positive difference to millions of peoples' lives. I doubt the kids whose schools aren't built with the funds that the government doesn't get from not selling its toll roads would thank anybody for holding out until the "ideal blend" was found.

### Econ DA Turns Case

#### Economic decline turns case – tax dependence

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Further, dependence on tax dollars makes transit agencies especially vulnerable to economic downturns because the sources of most of their operating funds—generally sales or income taxes, but in some cases annual appropriations from state legislatures—are highly sensitive to the state of the economy. Sales and income taxes are particularly volatile, while property taxes are less so. 9 Yet property taxes provide only about 2 percent of transit operating funds, while sales and income taxes provide more than a quarter of operating funds. 10

### Business Solve

**Privatization solves**

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The Effects of Privatization Private transit providers will focus on reducing costs and focusing scheduled transit 19 services on high-demand areas where they can fill a high percentage of seats. To reduce costs, they would employ transit technologies that have minimal infrastructure requirements, use the appropriate size of vehicle for each area served, and economize on labor. **Privatization would probably improve transit service in the inner cities**, where most transit patrons live, while it would reduce service in many suburbs, where most people have access to cars. Privatization would also greatly alter the nature of transit services in many cities. Private investors would be unlikely to expand or upgrade high-cost forms of transit such as light rail, streetcars, and automated guideways. Private operators might continue to run existing rail lines until the existing infrastructure is worn out, which tends to be after about 30 years of service. Rather than rebuild the lines, private operators would probably then replace the railways with lowcost, flexible bus service. Private operators might find it worthwhile to maintain a few heavy-rail (subways and elevateds) and commuter-rail lines in the long run. Fares cover more than 60 percent of the operating costs of subways/elevateds in New York, San Francisco, and Washington; more than half the operating costs of commuter trains in Boston, Los Angeles, New Jersey, New York, and Philadelphia; and more than half the operating costs of subways/elevateds in Boston and Philadelphia. It is possible that private operation could save enough money to cover operating costs, with enough left over to keep infrastructure in a state of good repair in many of these cities. Most other rail lines, including virtually all of the ones being planned or built today, would not pass a market test, mainly because buses can attract as many riders at a far lower cost. Bus services would change as well under private operation. In heavily used corridors, private transit services would offer both local bus services (that stop several times per mile) as well as bus rapid transit services that connect major urban centers and rarely stop between those centers. In low-demand areas, private operators would likely substitute 13- to 20-passenger vans for the 40-seat buses currently used by most public agencies. In even lower-demand areas, private companies may elect to focus on SuperShuttle-like demandresponsive services that pick anyone—not just disabled passengers—up at their doors and drop them off at their destinations.

**Private sector solves – empirics**

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Despite the almost complete socialization of America’s transit industry, there remain a few examples of private transit. Though most states have made public transit agencies legal monopolies, there have also been a few new private start-ups in places where private transit is permitted. The Atlantic City Jitney Association is a group of private bus owners that operate scheduled service on eight routes in Atlantic City. Four of the routes connect the New Jersey Transit rail station with hotels and, being subsidized by the hotels, charge no fares. The other four routes charge fares of $2.25. 91 The jitneys are all 13-passenger minibuses, individually owned by their operators, which run 24 hours a day. The association was first created in 1915 and claims to be “the longest running nonsubsidized transit company in America.” 92 A more extensive jitney or shared taxi service is provided by the públicos, or public cars, of Puerto Rico. Like the Atlantic City jitneys, they tend to be individually owned and most are 17-passenger vans. Routes and fares are fixed by a public service commission, and the públicos travel both within and between cities. Although San Juan has its own public bus and rail system and several other Puerto Rico cities have public buses, the públicos carry more people more passenger miles each year than all the public transit services combined. Público fares average $1.02 per trip, about twice the fares on San Juan’s public buses. 93 Similar services operate in many other countries going by such names as colectivo (Chile, Columbia, and Nicaragua); alternativo (Brazil); combi (Argentina); and, when not legally sanctioned, taxi pirata (Costa Rica and Mexico). Indeed, similar jitney services have appeared in Miami, New York City, and northern New Jersey. Sometimes called dollar vans, many are registered with state public utility commissions, but some operate illegally. They tend to mainly serve recent immigrants and other minority populations. 94 More than a dozen different jitney companies serve the Miami-Dade County area, for example, often competing directly with, and charging lower fares than, the publicly subsidized MiamiDade bus service. 95 One line that is more upscale is the Hampton Jitney, a bus service that has connected Manhattan with wealthy Long Island enclaves for more than 30 years. Offering comfortable long-distance buses, some of which have two-and-one seating and chef’s galleys, and charging around $24 per oneway trip, the Hampton Jitney attracts 600,000 passengers per year, belying the claim often made by rail advocates that welloff people will only ride trains, not buses. 96 Another private transit service in the New York–New Jersey area is the NY Waterway system of ferryboats and buses. With the construction of bridges, highway tunnels, and transHudson subways, ferry service across the Hudson River ceased in the 1960s, and no public agency considered restarting the service. But truck company owner Arthur Imperatore, who owned land on both the Manhattan and New Jersey sides of the river, started a ferry service in 1986. Fares included bus service to destinations throughout midtown and downtown Manhattan. The initial operation was so successful that NY Waterway eventually added more than two dozen more routes. The system was almost too successful for its own good. After the September 11, 2001, destruction of the World Trade Center interrupted Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PATH) subway service. NY Waterway borrowed heavily to add enough boats to its fleet to meet the increased demand for ferry service. When subway service was restored at the end of 2003, the decline in ferry patronage almost bankrupted the company. It was saved by selling some of its routes to BillyBey Ferry Company. In addition to borrowing money after 9/11, NY Waterway received several million dollars in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) subsidies to provide an alternative to the shutdown subways. 97 When PATH wanted to start new ferry routes, it provided terminal space to NY Waterway. Otherwise, NY Waterway has been entirely unsubsidized. The National Transit Database reports that, in 2007, NY Waterway earned $33 million in fare revenues and spent $21 million on operations; in 2008, it earned $35 million in revenues and spent $25 million on operating costs. 98 BillyBey reported $7.6 million in fares and the same amount in operating costs in 2007, and $8.4 million in revenues and $7.3 million operating costs in 2008. 99 Debt service is not included in operating costs or reported in the National Transit Database, so it is unknown how much of a profit NY Waterway actually made. But it is clear that NY Waterway is doing well, despite facing competition from subsidized buses and PATH subway trains. At least two private transit services have started in the last year. The Washington Wave, a new jitney service in Houston, is aiming for a more upscale clientele than the one served by New York–New Jersey dollar vans. The jitneys are mainly serving the entertainment districts that are growing around the downtown Houston area. Unlike most cities, Houston has legally allowed jitneys for years, but this is the first time in more than a decade that someone has started such a service. Clayton County, Georgia, is the previously mentioned county that completely terminated all public bus service in 2010. In response, a private individual purchased buses and is offering service on some of the routes formerly subsidized by Clayton County. 100 The new service charges $3.50 per ride (with discounts for seniors, children, and the disabled), compared with average fares of $1.10 for the subsidized buses. 101 Although not true privatization, many transit agencies save money by contracting out 18 transit services to private operators. The success of such operations demonstrates how much more efficient private companies are than public agencies. The Colorado legislature requires that Denver’s Regional Transportation District (RTD) contract out half of its bus service to private operators. Despite having to pay taxes and fees that RTD is exempted from, the private operators billed taxpayers $5.01 per bus mile in 2008, which was just 52 percent of the $9.65 per bus mile spent by RTD on the buses it operates itself. Nationally, about 16 percent of bus operations are contracted out, at an average cost of $6.34 per bus mile compared with $9.80 for in-house operations. 102 While not urban transit, intercity buses provide a private transportation success story whose lessons are useful for public transit. Beset by competition from subsidized Amtrak and discount airlines, intercity bus service declined steadily through about 2005. But since then it has staged a revival, particularly in well-traveled corridors of the Northeast, Midwest, and California. The revival actually began in 1998, when a Chinese immigrant named Pei Lin Liang started a discount bus service called Fung Wah (“magnificent wind”) between New York and Boston. With the Internet as its reservations clerk, drivers selling tickets to walk-ons, and curbsides serving as bus stations, Fung Wah kept its overhead low and charged half the fares then being charged by Greyhound for the same route. Soon, other individuals and companies imitated Fung Wah’s success, and such “Chinatown buses” were seen as attractive, low-cost alternatives for travel in the Northeast. 103 Eventually, Greyhound and Peter Pan Bus Company formed a joint venture, Bolt Bus, to compete with the Chinatown buses. A British company, Stagecoach, also stepped in with its double-decked Megabuses. Bolt and Megabus offer free wireless Internet service, leather seats, extra legroom, and fares starting as low as $1.50 and averaging about $15 for travel from New York to Washington or Boston. Today, around a dozen different companies offer bus service in the Boston-to-Washington corridor, charging fares that are typically about onethird of Amtrak’s conventional trains and onetenth of Amtrak’s high-speed Acela trains. While exact ridership numbers are not available, the American Bus Association reports that the average intercity bus fills about twothirds of its seats. 104 Even if Boston-toWashington buses fill only half their seats, they carry as many or more riders as Amtrak. Generally, these buses run nonstop or with only one stop. For example, bus riders can take their choice of individual buses running from New York to Philadelphia; New York to Baltimore; New York to Rockford, Maryland; New York to Washington; and New York to Norfolk, Virginia. Megabus also offers service throughout the Midwest, but after a one-year experiment it left the California market in late 2008. 105 Other discount bus companies, including CABus, California Shuttle, and USAsia, operate in the Los Angeles–San Francisco and California–Las Vegas corridors, with fares starting as low as $5. 106 Chinatowntype buses can also be found in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, North and South Carolina, and Washington State. 107 The American Bus Association estimates that, nationally, scheduled intercity buses carry about 15 billion passenger miles per year. 108 That’s about 2.5 times as many passenger miles as Amtrak, which receives subsidies averaging nearly 30 cents per passenger mile compared with subsidies to buses that are nearly zero. Including capital costs, transit agencies spend an average of more than $1 per passenger mile on bus service, but intercity buses earn a profit charging less than 15 cents per passenger mile. 109 They do so by going where people want to go and filling at least half to two-thirds of their seats. By comparison, the average public transit bus fills less than a quarter of its seats and, when standing room is counted, just 15 percent of its capacity. 110

**Privatization solves best**

Randal **O’Toole 10** is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit The Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf

The Case for Privatization All the problems identified in this report are a direct result of public ownership of transit systems: • Transit productivity has declined because transit managers are no longer obligated to ensure that revenues cover costs. In fact, in the world of government, agency managers are respected for having larger budgets, which leads transit managers to use tools and techniques that actually reduce productivity. • Transit’s tax traumas during the recession are typical of government agencies that create new programs during boom periods that are not financially sustainable in the long run. Private businesses do the same thing, but are able to slough off marginal operations during recessions. Public agencies have a difficult time doing so because each program and each transit line has a built-in political constituency demanding continued subsidies. • Public agencies are also more likely to run up debt because political time horizons are so short: what an agency provides today is much more important than what that service will cost tomorrow. This is especially true when it comes to pensions and other worker benefits whose true costs can be postponed to the politically distant future. • The tendency to build expensive infrastructure whose maintenance cannot be supported by available revenues is a particular government trait. As one official at the U.S. Department of Transportation says, politicians “like ribbons, not brooms.” In other words, they like funding highly visible capital projects, but they gain little from funding the maintenance of those projects. • The failure to innovate and the tendency to turn to social engineering when people will not behave the way planners want are inconsistent with the values of a free society.

**Only the private sector has incentives for innovation**

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The Transit Innovation Crisis **America’s socialized transit industry has completely lost its ability to innovate and respond to changing times**. While private transit companies in the 20th century rapidly replaced high-cost rail transit with low-cost buses, public transit agencies have gone backwards, substituting high-cost rail for low-cost buses. The most recent real innovation in the transit industry was demand-responsive transit, sometimes called “dial-a-ride.” Conceived in the 1970s, this system allowed people to schedule a pickup with a telephone or other telecommunications device. A small bus or van would arrive at or near their door and take them to their destination, stopping to pick up or drop off other passengers along the way. The only transit agency to make a serious attempt at a broadly available dial-a-ride system was San Jose’s Santa Clara County Transit District, and that experiment ended because it was too successful. Demand for the service was so high that the telephone call center was overwhelmed, and thousands of potential customers were turned away each day by their inability to schedule a pickup. Moreover, the local taxi industry successfully convinced a state court that the service infringed on its exclusive franchise to carry people door to door, and the agency was given a choice of abandoning the service or effectively buying out the taxi companies. It chose the former. 72 Today, automation via the internet would solve the call-center problem. While most transit agencies provide a dial-a-ride service, they limit its use to disabled passengers. With such a small customer base, the average dial-a-ride bus operates at just 12 percent of capacity, and subsidies average $3 per passenger mile and $27 per trip, making it the most expensive form of transit in the country. 73 **Meanwhile, private companies** such as SuperShuttle **profitably operate dial-a-ride services in almost every major city,** but are generally limited by state or local laws to carry passengers only to or from airports. American cities have millions of people traveling between millions of homes and millions of other destinations. Instead of relying on “small-box transit” that caters to these travel patterns, as dial-a-ride would do, many transit agencies have gone in the opposite direction and focused on big-box transit using obsolete technology that serves a very limited set of destinations. For example: •In the 1970s, Atlanta, Washington, DC, and the San Francisco Bay Area built subway/elevated systems using technologies dating back to 1904, when New York City installed the first electric-powered subway. • In the 1980s, San Diego, Portland, Buffalo, and other cities built light-rail systems using technologies dating to 1939, when virtually identical light-rail transit connected Oakland with San Francisco. • In 2001, Portland started the streetcar fad, using technologies dating to 1888 when Richmond, Virginia installed the first successful electric street railway. Since then, Cincinnati, Dallas, Tucson, and numerous other cities are planning or building streetcar lines. Since people do not live in patterns that 13 Instead of relying on “small-box transit,” which caters to modern travel patterns, many transit agencies focus on big-box transit using obsolete technology that serves a limited set of destinations. 26327\_Marker\_1stClass:PaMaster.qxd 10/21/2010 11:31 AM Page 13are conducive to successful big-box transit, transit agencies have become social engineers, trying to use the power of government to coerce people into living patterns that will lead them to ride these expensive trains more frequently. Enticements come in the form of subsidies to so-called transit-oriented developments: high-density, mixed-use developments that combine housing with shops and are usually located near a rail station. 74 Coercion comes in the form of urban-growth boundaries that drive up the cost of singlefamily housing, which most people prefer. 75 These policies have not been successful: despite these policies, rail transit continues to carry less than 1 percent of passenger travel in Portland, San Diego, San Jose, Sacramento, and other regions that opened their first new rail lines after 1976. 76

#### Private investors are more efficient

Hanke 8 – Professor of Applied Economics at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. He was advisor to former President Suharto in 1998. [Steve, April 2008, “In Praise of Private Infrastructure,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/praise-private-infrastructure>]

Adam Smith answered this question in the Wealth of Nations (1776). He concluded as follows: "No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign," since people are more wasteful with the wealth of others than with their own.¶ He thought public ownership and administration were negligent and wasteful because public employees do not have a direct interest in the commercial outcome of their actions.¶ Comparative cost analyses of private versus public provision of goods and services give support to the conclusion that private firms are more cost-effective than public firms. Considerable evidence suggests that the public cost incurred in providing a given quantity and quality of output is about twice as great as private provision. This result occurs with such frequency that it has given rise to a rule-of-thumb: "the bureaucratic rule of two."¶ With the private provision of infrastructure, however, there is a potential problem: introducing and maintaining competition. This potential problem can arise because of the so-called natural monopoly character of many infrastructure projects.¶ In short, even if there are no artificial barriers to entry, a monopoly will likely emerge because a single firm can produce goods and services more cheaply than multiple firms (multiple ports, bridges, etc. at the "same" location are not economically feasible).¶ Opponents of infrastructure provided by the private sector are quick to raise the specter of a monopoly but there is a way to solve the natural monopoly problem and introduce competition into the provision of private infrastructure.¶ It involves a system of competitive bidding for privately owned infrastructure franchises. Though competition within a market may be impossible, the benefits of competition for that market may be attainable.¶ So long as there is vigorous bidding for an infrastructure franchise, the best of both worlds - avoidance of redundant facilities together with competitive prices - can be had. In theory, such a system could ensure that the favorable incentive effect normally associated with private ownership and management of a firm (i.e. that private owners will control costs, enhance efficiency, etc. as a way of maximizing their profits) will actually come about.

### Businesses Will Invest

#### Businesses will fill in

Stempel 8 – Reuters [Jonathon, Aug 1, 2008, “Roads, airports on the block as budgets tighten,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/01/us-infrastructure-idUSN0134060620080801>]

Cash-strapped U.S. state and city governments are likely to sell or lease more highways, bridges, airports and other assets to investors desperate for stable returns after being frazzled by the credit crisis. The trend is set to pick up speed given worsening budget deficits in state capitals and city halls nationwide. It will also be welcomed by Wall Street bankers hoping to help create and market so-called "infrastructure" transactions at a time many debt markets remain paralyzed, and after major U.S. stock indexes fell into bear market territory. "When you are nervous about everything else, you put your money in a toll road," said John Schmidt, a partner at the law firm Mayer Brown LLP in Chicago. "That's the logic of infrastructure. Returns are stable and predictable. You won't get fabulously rich, but you'll get stable cash flow." The latest enthusiasm for at least partially privatizing infrastructure assets came on July 30 from New York Gov. David Paterson, who is trying to plug a budget deficit caused in part by lower tax revenue as Wall Street retrenches. "We're just looking at ways to be more efficient and that's why I used the term public-private partnerships -- trying to find some creative solutions," Paterson said. "The reason I'm avoiding taxes is because I think taxes are addictive." Bankers and others in the industry say there is pent-up demand from dedicated infrastructure funds and public pension funds to invest in hard assets -- perhaps $75 billion to $150 billion of equity capital -- but not enough supply. "Economic conditions are tough, and are going to be very harsh on the performance of state budgets in 2008 and 2009," said Greg Carey, co-head of infrastructure banking at Goldman Sachs Group Inc (GS.N). "States are looking for long-term solutions in running businesses. A public-private partnership is a tool in their toolboxes." A high-water mark came in May, when a group led by Spain's Abertis Infraestructuras SA (ABE.MC) and Citigroup Inc (C.N) agreed to pay $12.8 billion to lease the Pennsylvania Turnpike for 75 years. The total could reach $18.3 billion, including promised improvements. Legislators must approve the lease. Other transactions have included the $1.8 billion lease of the Chicago Skyway toll road bridge in 2005, and a $3.8 billion lease of the Indiana Toll Road the next year. Chicago Mayor Richard Daley is preparing to lease Midway Airport this year. For Wall Street, infrastructure can be a bright spot at a time of deep job cuts and expected declines in bonuses. "We've seen an unprecedented number of headhunters recruiting for positions on the buy and sell sides," said Rob Collins, head of Americas infrastructure banking at Morgan Stanley (MS.N). "Infrastructure investing can be counter-cyclical to economic trends." John Ma, the other Goldman infrastructure chief, added: "We're very committed to this space. Our business activity has increased dramatically, even this year."

#### Companies are demanding investment

Gilroy and Kenny 12 – Real Clear Markets [Leonard Gilroy is the director of government reform and Harris Kenny is a policy analyst at Reason Foundation, a Los Angeles-based think tank. May 17, 2012, “States and Cities Going Private With Infrastructure Investment,” http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2012/05/17/states\_and\_cities\_going\_private\_with\_infrastructure\_investment\_99671.html]

States and municipalities across the U.S. continue to grapple with the lingering effects of the Great Recession. City leaders continue to struggle with depressed revenues, and 30 states are expected to close budget deficits totaling $49 billion this year, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Further, many government bodies are struggling to maintain their credit ratings in an uncertain economy. As public debts grow, cities and states simultaneously face pressing needs to repair and modernize critical infrastructure assets that can't wait if citizens hope to keep goods and services moving in the economy. For example, many interstate highways, which are owned and maintained by states, are reaching the end of their useful lives and will cost tens of billions of dollars to reconstruct. Yet, projected federal and state fuel tax revenues will come nowhere close to covering the bills. When factoring in similarly large investment needs in water, aviation, schools and other public infrastructure facilities, it becomes abundantly clear that new infrastructure financing models and sources of capital will be the only viable option to support and sustain growth. Enter the private sector, where investors are demonstrating a willingness and capability to partner with governments to modernize and expand infrastructure, according to Reason Foundation's recent Annual Privatization Report 2011. The report finds that the amount of capital available in private infrastructure equity investment funds reached a new all-time high last year. And since 2006, the 30 largest global infrastructure investment funds have raised a total of $183.1 billion dedicated to financing infrastructure projects; the bulk coming from U.S., Australian and Canadian inventors. In fact, eight major privately financed transportation projects were under construction in the U.S. in 2011 totaling over $13 billion. For a preview of the future, just look to Puerto Rico, where innovative infrastructure financing has been a priority of Governor Luis Fortuño's administration. Prior to his tenure, massive budget deficits and weak credit ratings left the territory with a limited ability to finance infrastructure. In fact, public infrastructure investment (as a share of GDP) had been on a steep decline in Puerto Rico since 2000. Put simply, if Puerto Rico was going to maintain-much less expand and modernize-its infrastructure, it was going to need outside help. Policymakers proactively adopted a 2009 law authorizing government agencies to partner with private firms for the design, construction, financing, maintenance and/or operation of public facilities across a wide spectrum that includes transportation, ports, schools and other asset classes. The law also established a Public Private Partnership Authority (PPPA), a new unit of the Government Development Bank, to conduct due diligence on these infrastructure partnerships and take worthy projects to market in competitive procurements. So far it's been a smashing success. Last fall the PPPA finalized its first major highway deal, closing on a 40-year, $1.5 billion lease of two toll highways to a private concessionaire now responsible for operating the facilities and making major capital investments in pavement, signage, lighting and other safety enhancements. Lawmakers are also poised to privatize operations of San Juan's Luis Muñoz Marin International Airport this summer. Two weeks ago PPPA officials selected two consortia eligible to compete for a $1 billion, 50-year lease expected next month. The deal pays off $900 million in public debt, and results in a virtual reconstruction of the entire airport, pursuant to officials' goal of turning the airport into the preeminent gateway to the Caribbean. PPPA is also in the middle of a new K-12 school modernization program whereby officials are contracting with private developers to design, build and maintain a package of approximately 100 schools in 78 municipalities across the territory. This effort will address a severe need to upgrade aging, deteriorating schools and tackle chronic deferred maintenance. Puerto Rico isn't alone though. For example, Chicago Mayor and former Obama chief of staff Rahm Emanuel stood with former President Bill Clinton last month to propose an ambitious $7.2 billion infrastructure program that will rely heavily on public-private partnerships and private financing for a broad spectrum of projects including roads, water, transit and more. To implement this program, city policymakers recently created a new Chicago Infrastructure Trust, a nonprofit infrastructure bank that can package deals and blend public and private financing to advance projects. Early pledges of up to $1 billion in private capital from several financial institutions, including Citibank, Macquarie and JPMorgan suggest the model may be viable. Elsewhere, both Texas and Connecticut enacted broad-ranging laws to authorize private sector financing for state and local assets in 2011. In New York, The Yonkers Public Schools recently hired a team of financial, legal and technical consultants to evaluate the potential to tap private financing to help deliver a $2 billion K-12 school modernization program. Like Puerto Rico, Yonkers has a number of aging facilities over 70 years old that need reconstruction, yet lacks the ability to undertake large-scale renovation through traditional taxes and bonds given current fiscal and financial constraints. Ultimately, policymakers are beginning to realize that the status quo of financing infrastructure through taxes and municipal debt is broken. Fortunately the private sector is poised and ready to invest in infrastructure, with hundreds of billions of dollars in privately sourced capital sitting on the sidelines looking for worthy public infrastructure projects in which to invest. While governments continue to struggle even with the basics of balancing budgets, much less long-term crises like entitlement spending and underfunded public pensions, the question is not if, but when, will more policymakers like Fortuño and Emanuel step up and embrace the private sector? Infrastructure represents the arteries and capillaries of our economy, and if we let those deteriorate, the heart itself will soon follow.

CCGA 10 – The Chicago Council on Global Affairs is a leading independent, nonpartisan organization committed to influencing the discourse on global issues through contributions to opinion and policy formation, leadership dialogue, and public learning [September 2010, “No Free Money: Is the Privatization of Infrastructure in the Public Interest?” <http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Emerging%20Leaders%20Program/ELReport2010_Privatization.pdf>, Page 26]

3. private infrastructure funds are an attractive investment vehicle for certain investors, making infrastructure privatization appealing to potential bidders. It may strike some as a curious fact that a once little-known Australian bank is among the largest players in infrastructure privatization globally. Indeed, Macquarie Bank was a key member of the consortium that acquired the Chicago Skyway and, soon thereafter, the Indiana Toll Road. Macquarie also manages an infrastructure investment fund that holds, among other assets, Thermal Chicago, the world’s largest district cooling system, which supplies steam and chilled water to approximately 100 buildings in downtown Chicago for cooling and heating under a long-term contract. Macquarie was an early mover in infrastructure investment funds in part because of a 1992 Australian pension reform. Anticipating an increase in pension liabilities that would strain the public budget, Australia created a compulsory retirement scheme involving private investments. By 2006 Australians had more money in managed funds per capita than any other developed country. 14 This, in turn, drove a creative search for places to invest pension assets, including infrastructure. Fortunately for Macquarie, the Australian government was privatizing toll roads at the same time, which allowed Macquarie to package toll roads into a bond-like investment vehicle. The longterm, stable cash flow of infrastructure (e.g., tolls for ninety-nine years) offers the predictability of a bond with the added advantage

### Federal Action Fails

#### Government action fails – failed focus

Randal O’Toole 10 is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit the Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf>

The term “socialism” has been much abused in recent years, with people applying it to bailouts, regulation, and other government activities that fall short of actual government ownership. But **one industry has unquestionably been socialistic for decades: urban transit**, more than 99 percent of which is today owned and operated by state and local governments. The results have not been pretty. Since 1964, the year Congress began giving states and cities incentives to take over private transit companies, worker productivity—the number of transit trips carried per operating employee—has fallen more than 50 percent. 1 After adjusting for inflation, operating costs per rider have nearly tripled, while fare revenues increased by a mere 8 percent. 2 “It’s uncommon to find such a rapid productivity decline in any industry,” the late University of California economist Charles Lave observed of U.S. transit in 1994. 3 Today, urban transit is the most expensive way of moving people in the United States. Airlines can transport people at a cost of less than 15 cents per passenger mile, barely a penny of which is subsidized. 4 Driving costs less than 23 cents per passenger mile, which also includes about a penny of subsidy. 5 Socialized Amtrak costs close to 60 cents per passenger mile, about half of which is subsidized. 6 But urban transit costs nearly one dollar per passenger mile, with fares covering only 21 cents per passenger mile and subsidies paying for the rest. 7 **These horrendous financial results are obscured by** the **mountains of propaganda** issued by the Federal Transit Administration, individual transit agencies, the American Public Transportation Association, and various other transit advocates claiming transit saves people money, saves energy, and protects the environment. In fact, **it only saves people money by imposing most of their transport costs on other taxpayers**. Nor is transit particularly energy efficient or environmentally friendly, as the average transit system uses about the same amount of energy and emits about the same amount of pollution per passenger mile as the average car. In fact, a majority of transit systems use far more energy and pollute far more per passenger mile than the average car. 8 The fact that more than three out of four transit dollars come from taxpayers instead of transit users has several negative effects on transit programs. For one, transit agencies are more interested in trying to get dollars out of taxpayers, or federal and state appropriators, than in pleasing transit riders. This leads the agencies to focus on highly visible capital improvements, such as rail transit projects, dedicated bus lanes, and supposedly multimodal transit centers, that are not particularly useful to transit riders. Moreover, the agencies neglect to maintain their capital improvements, partly because most of the taxpayers who paid for them never ride transit and so do not know about their deteriorating condition. Further, dependence on tax dollars makes transit agencies especially vulnerable to economic downturns because the sources of most of their operating funds—generally sales or income taxes, but in some cases annual appropriations from state legislatures—are highly sensitive to the state of the economy. Sales and income taxes are particularly volatile, while property taxes are less so. 9 Yet property taxes provide only about 2 percent of transit operating funds, while sales and income taxes provide more than a quarter of operating funds. 10 **Privatization** of public transit systems **would solve all of these problems**. **Private operators would have incentives to serve customers, not politicians, with cost-effective transport systems.** **The few examples of private transit operations that can be found show that private operators are more efficient and can offer better service than government agencies.**

#### Government is inefficient – too little risk

Randal O’Toole 10 is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit the Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf>

Ironically, the real problem with public transit is that it has too much money. The addition of tax dollars to transit operations led transit agencies to buy buses and other equipment that are bigger than they need, to build rail lines and other high-cost forms of transit when lower-cost systems would work as well, to extend service to remote areas where there is little demand for transit, and to offer overly generous contracts to politically powerful unions. Privatizing transit would solve these problems. Private transit operators would have powerful incentives to increase productivity, maintain transit equipment, and avoid transit systems that require expensive infrastructure and heavy debts. While private transit systems would not be immune to recessions, they would respond to recessions by cutting the least-necessary expenses. In contrast, public agencies often employ the “Washington Monument Syndrome” strategy: they threaten to cut highly visible programs as a tactic to persuade legislators to increase appropriations or dedicate more taxes to the agency, such as New York MTA’s proposal to eliminate discounted fares for students.

#### Ridership declines – people don’t use government transit

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The Transit Productivity Crisis While private transit operators had a simple goal—earn a profit by providing transit where people would pay for it—Lave pointed out that public agencies were expected to reach a “complex and nebulous” set of goals, including “solve urban problems, save the central city, provide cheap mobility for the poor, transport the handicapped, and so on.” 14 Perhaps just as important, public agencies cast their tax-collecting nets wide, charging sales, property, or income taxes over as broad an area as possible. But this left them obligated to provide transit service to many areas that had few transit customers. Whether it was to meet nebulous goals or to justify broader taxation, “routes were extended into inherently unprofitable areas,” noted Lave. 15 One result is that the average number of people on board an urban transit bus declined from 12 in 1977 (the earliest year for which data are available) to 9 in 2008, while the number of people boarding a bus, per bus mile, declined by nearly 40 percent from 1964 to 2008. 16 The number of transit riders carried per transit worker declined even more. Figure 1 shows the number of annual trips carried by America’s transit systems for every operating employee for the years 1931 (the earliest year for which data are available) through 2008. The figure shows that transit carried about 60,000 people per employee during the 1930s, surging to more than 90,000 during the war years when gas rationing forced many people to take transit instead of driving, then falling back to around 60,000 trips per worker after the war. While worker productivity then remained constant for a decade, **once government took over it declined by more than 50 percent.**

**Fed sucks at urban transit**

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While worker productivities and energy efficiencies declined, costs rose. From 1965, when the federal government began subsidizing transit, through 2008, the latest year for which data are available, adjusting for inflation using the consumer price index (CPI), fares collected per trip declined by nearly 24 percent, while operating costs per trip rose by 125 percent. When adjusting for inflation using gross domestic product deflators, fares per trip declined only 4 percent but costs per trip rose 184 percent. Total operating subsidies have grown from $0.6 billion in 1965 to $24.5 billion in 2008 (adjusted using GDP deflators). 20 One reason for the rise in costs is that Congress required transit agencies whose employees were represented by labor unions—meaning most of them—to obtain union support to be eligible for federal grants. As Charles Lave noted, the unions used this as leverage to win generous pay and benefit contracts. 21 The New York Times reports that more than 8,000 of the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s 70,000 employees earned more than $100,000 in 2009, with one commuter-train conductor collecting nearly $240,000. One locomotive engineer earned a $75,000 base salary, $52,000 in overtime, and $94,600 in “penalty payments,” extra pay for driving a locomotive outside of the yard in which he worked. Engineers would earn two days pay for driving two different kinds of locomotives—electric and diesel—in one day. 22 Overtime alone costs the MTA $560 million a year. 23 That includes $34 million in “phantom” overtime paid to workers while they were on vacation. 24 When Los Angeles’ transit agency attempted in 2000 to save money by, among other things, hiring more employees to reduce overtime costs, union workers went on strike for 32 days until the agency backed down. 25 The MTA is not alone; tales of bus drivers earning more than $100,000 per year can be found throughout the United States. The highest-paid city employee in Madison, Wisconsin, is a bus driver who earned nearly $160,000 in 2009. 26 San Francisco Muni paid 4 Figure 1 Transit Trips per Operating Employee Source: 2010 Public Transportation Fact Book, Appendix A: Historical Tables, Tables 1 and 12 (Washington: American Public Transportation Association). 26327\_Marker\_1stClass:PaMaster.qxd 10/21/2010 12:26 PM Page 4nearly 20 percent of its employees more than $100,000 (including benefits) in 2009. 27 Another reason costs have increased is that transit agencies have invested heavily in high-cost transit systems when lower-cost systems would work as well. Between 1992 and 2008, more than 35 percent of transit capital investments have been spent on commuter- and light-rail systems. In 2008 these modes accounted for more than 15 percent of operating costs, yet carried only 9 percent of transit riders. 28 Since 1965, federal, state, and local taxpayers have provided more than $500 billion (inflation-adjusted) in operating subsidies to transit. Complete data on capital funding are not available before 1988, but evidence suggests that capital subsidies typically equal about 60 percent of operating subsidies. 29 Thus, it is likely that taxpayers have provided more than $800 billion (inflation-adjusted) in subsidies to transit since 1965. At best, all this money has done is arrest the decline in transit ridership. In 1944, about 84 million Americans lived in urban areas, and they rode transit an average of 275 times a year. Since that year, per capita urban ridership declined steadily to 60 trips per year in 1965 and less than 50 trips per year in 1970. Since then, it has fluctuated—mainly in response to gasoline prices—between about 40 and 50 trips a year, settling at 45 trips per year in 2008. 30 Although the national average is 44 trips per urban resident, fewer than two dozen urban areas out of the more than 320 that provide transit service exceed this average. Transit systems in nearly half of all urban areas with transit service attract fewer than 10 rides per resident per year. As Table 1 suggests, urban areas with high rates of transit ridership tend to have large concentrations of jobs at the urban core (such as New York City; San Francisco; and Washington, DC) or are college towns (as in State College, Pennsylvania; Ames, Iowa; and Champaign–Urbana, Illinois). The presence or absence of expensive rail transit does not seem to be an important factor in the overall use of transit. While per capita ridership may have remained steady at about 40 to 50 trips per year, transit’s share of travel has declined as per capita urban driving has grown.

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5. Because the private sector can often deliver greater efficiencies than government, privatization can result in better service at lower cost. The present wave of privatizations can also be viewed in the context of the broader liberalization programs ushered in with Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and to a lesser degree by Ronald Reagan in the United States. Thatcher’s privatization of large state-owned corporations such as British Gas was driven by her conviction that “the imperfections of State intervention in the economic field are likely to be not merely equal to, but greater than, the imperfections of the market.” Poorly run private businesses must fix themselves or perish; state-run enterprises face no such constraint. 15 Today, the United Kingdom is arguably the most market-oriented of all states when it comes to infrastructure, having sold everything from the rights to operate individual London bus lines to on-site management of concessions in hospitals and elementary schools. Reagan similarly made privatization a theme of his presidency, describing the 1987 divestment of Conrail, a large freight railroad, for $1.575 billion as “the flagship of privatization and the first of what we hope will be many government functions returned to their rightful place in the private sector.” 16 While his two terms in office did see the privatization of many services through government contracting, intentions to privatize government corporations and assets gained little traction despite the creation of the high-profile Commission on Privatization. 17 Today, much empirical evidence supports the claim that private companies are generally more efficient operators than government entities. 18 The reasons for this are various and include management incentives tied to performance, a better capacity to fund capital investments, greater operating leverage, the introduction of proprietary technology, and the de-politicization of pricing and other operational decisions (e.g., raising tolls or cutting money-losing routes). Broadly speaking, the public appears to have more general confidence in the efficiency of the private sector than was the case several decades ago, when the fear of private monopolies outweighed concerns about public inefficiency. However, the backlash in Chicago against the poorly executed parking meter privatization has almost certainly jaded local opinion against infrastructure privatization, at least in the short run. There is also a heightened skepticism and distrust of Wall Street, as reflected by a May 2009 Pew Research Center study showing that 67 percent of the public surveyed say that “Wall Street only cares about making money for itself.” There would thus likely be skepticism of many of the financial players that would be involved in any future privatization deal as well.

### Devolution/Privatization

#### Devolution to the states key to solve -

Randal O’Toole 6is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit The Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #559, Jan 5, “A Desire Named Streetcar How Federal Subsidies Encourage Wasteful Local Transit Systems,” <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa559.pdf>

The nation’s transit system is a classic example of how special interests prevail over the needs and interests of voters and taxpayers. Total inflation-adjusted subsidies to transit—local buses and trains—have more than doubled since 1990, yet transit ridership has increased by less than 10 percent. The result is that the average cost to taxpayers for every transit trip has increased by 95 percent, from $1.68 to $3.28 in 2003 dollars. Prior to 1964, when Congress began subsidizing transit, the industry was mostly private, and, though it was losing riders, it operated at an overall profit. Since then, the industry has been almost entirely taken over by state and local governments. Today more than three of every four dollars spent on transit come from taxpayers, not transit riders. The reason localities continue to fund train systems that are surprisingly underused, expensive, and wasteful can be traced directly to federal subsidies for transit. Since mass transit agencies depend on taxpayers rather than users for most of their revenue, they focus on highly visible and expensive services such as light-rail transit to suburban areas. The transit industry’s core market consists of people who don’t drive and who mostly live in inner cities. To pay for high-cost suburban rail transit routes, transit agencies often raise fares or cut back on services to inner-city areas. The result is that taxpayers often end up paying heavy subsidies for projects that **reduce overall transit ridership and often harm transit-dependent families.** In addition to the huge subsidies offered by Congress to transit agencies, specific incentives in federal law encourage agencies to waste money and exacerbate the problem. Instead of helping localities solve real transportation problems, **federal subsidies encourage redirecting taxpayer money to projects that are likely to fail.** **The net result is that the federal government has succeeded in creating a system that promotes wildly extravagant spending on train systems.** The desires of train supporters end up trumping the demands of everyone else. The ideal solution would be to end federal transit subsidies and **devolve transit and other transportation funding entirely to state and local governments by letting them keep their fuel tax dollars.** Short of that, Congress should reform the federal transportation funding system to minimize the adverse incentives it creates.

### Budgets Solvency

**privatization sovles budgets**

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2. Privatization can provide a source of immediate revenue for strained public budgets. Policymakers are increasingly turning to privatization as a way to deal with strained public finances. The demographic trends in most industrialized societies—and in some industrializing societies such as in China—will impose huge additional costs on the public sector in coming decades. Citizens around the world are generally living longer (spending much longer stretches in retirement) and, especially in industrialized countries, having fewer children. While this is a healthy trend in many ways, it also puts new stresses on the traditional mechanisms for funding old-age benefits, since the ratio of retirees receiving public benefits to workers paying for those benefits is growing steadily. In Japan, for example, the proportion of the population over age 65 will increase from roughly 20 percent in 2005 to 29 percent in 2020. 12 This trend has been mitigated to some extent in the United States by a relatively high rate of immigration. 13 Still, Medicare and Social Security benefits for U.S. retirees are projected to grow in coming decades at a far greater rate than the revenue streams that were designed to pay for them, leaving policymakers with an undesirable but inevitable choice between cutting benefits and raising taxes. In any case, aging societies—including America’s large baby boom cohort, which has now reached retirement age— will create a more or less permanent fiscal crunch around the globe. The present financial crisis exacerbates the structural challenge within aging societies. Like the federal government, states and municipalities are reeling from increased financial claims just as their tax revenues are at cyclical lows. Privatization offers a large source of immediate revenue to help meet these budget challenges. that tolls (as well as airport landing fees, port fees, etc.) generally rise with inflation, giving investors a natural hedge against inflation. Many banks around the world have since launched similar infrastructure funds to help meet the investment requirements of aging baby boomers. Financial investors have been attracted to infrastructure-related investments by the premiums they often yield over corporate and public bonds.

#### Privatization solves budgets

Mansour and Nadji 6 – Real Estate Research Center [Asieh Mansour and Hope Nadji, September 2006, “US Infrastructure Privatization and Public Policy Issues,” <http://www.irei.com/uploads/marketresearch/69/marketResearchFile/Infr_Priv_Pub_Policy_Issues.pdf>]

The Movement Towards Privatization Two significant trends are driving the movement towards privatization. First, governments at all levels are strained for financial resources. Privatization is a means for providing needed and popular infrastructure without further straining the public budget. Second, the private markets are capital rich, seeking to invest increasing quantities of capital at attractive risk-adjusted yields. Investment in privatized infrastructure can offer attractive opportunities. The federal government traditionally has heavily funded much of the infrastructure currently targeted for privatization. During the past few decades, efforts to reign in the federal budget have resulted in declining resources for roads, bridges, airports, seaports, and water systems. These budget reductions have impacted both capital and maintenance costs. As a result, these burdens have shifted to state and municipal budgets. Increasing revenue at the state and local levels, however, is politically very difficult. Thus, privatization is viewed as a mechanism for providing infrastructure without negatively impacting a state or municipal government’s fiscal position. Over the past decade, it has been the regional governments in the US that faced severe fiscal pressures that have predominantly privatized. This issue impacts both capital costs of developing new infrastructure and maintenance costs for older infrastructure. Infrastructure investment needs in the US fall into two basic categories. The first involves growth areas, including booming new suburbs and areas of regional growth, such as the southern and western portions of the nation. The needs in these areas are for capital to develop infrastructure to support this growth. With federal funds more limited, states and municipalities need to be more creative in financing these needs. Privatization of the new infrastructure is an obvious solution. The second category involves curing deferred maintenance of older infrastructure. Older communities, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest, are served by old infrastructure. Typically, these regions suffered from under-investment in the maintenance of this infrastructure. With slow economic growth, little fiscal capacity exists to fund what is often substantial deferred maintenance. Once again, privatization offers a potential solution. The private sector can provide desperately needed capital for investing in the crumbling infrastructure across the US. There has been severe underinvestment in US infrastructure over the past decade. The supply of infrastructure assets has failed to meet growing demand as exemplified by an aging infrastructure, expanding demand for services with a growing population, and state/local government deficits that have not only restrained needed expenditures, but also had to accommodate competing priorities, such as health care. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) has released its most recent Report Card for America’s infrastructure, grading the top infrastructure categories. The summary results are reported in Exhibit 1 below. The grade point average has deteriorated to a “D” overall with an estimated $1.6 trillion needed in further investments to bring conditions to acceptable levels. Therefore the question of why privatize is that for many state and municipal governments, it may be the only way to provide or maintain needed infrastructure for their local constituents. Infrastructure investments, whether private or public, are a necessary input to expand the productive capacity of an area. Capital investment in infrastructure, private as well as public, goes hand in hand with economic activity. Empirical studies have shown that infrastructure has substantial payoffs, and currently in the US, public infrastructure is undersupplied and higher levels are warranted.

### Roads Solvency

#### Businesses can solve roads – experience

Mansour and Nadji 6 – Real Estate Research Center [Asieh Mansour and Hope Nadji, September 2006, “US Infrastructure Privatization and Public Policy Issues,” <http://www.irei.com/uploads/marketresearch/69/marketResearchFile/Infr_Priv_Pub_Policy_Issues.pdf>]

In the US, privatization of surface roads is gaining momentum. In Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6, two forms of road privatization arrangements are presented. The first covers PPP arrangements where the second includes the use of concessions. Exhibit 7 presents some of the latest toll road proposals. The long-term concession model, or lease, is the privatization model used more frequently in the US, especially in the transport sector. Two notable examples are the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road. (Please refer to Exhibit 6) The Chicago Skyway is one important example of privatization in the transport sector. The Chicago Skyway is a toll road and bridge that was built in the 1950s. Chicago received $1.83 billion for that asset from a private operator that the city could now put to work on other projects. In return, the private operator received a 99-year lease for the Skyway. In the case of the Skyway, there was no loss in jobs because of how the deal was structured between the City of Chicago and Cintra/Macquarie, the private operators. The deal provided that anyone who had been working on the Skyway that did not want to work for the new private operator could move into other city jobs. The 75-year lease of the Indiana Toll Road for $3.85 billion has been the major highway privatization in 2006. Unlike the Chicago Skyway transaction, whose proceeds were used to pay off debt and fund other municipal balance-sheet items, the Indiana privatization is key to fully funding the state’s proposed 10-year highway program. This program calls for the upgrade of Indiana highways over the next decade, critical transportation investments that ultimately should boost overall growth in Indiana. Experience with privatization in the US and elsewhere, in general, has not meant massive layoffs. Most operating contracts call for downsizing only through attrition and the assumption of the public payroll wages and benefits commensurate to those that existed in the public sector. In the following section, a review of the regulatory environment surrounding infrastructure privatization initiatives is presented followed by recent federal and state legislative initiatives.

### AT: Low Quality

#### The government is short sighted – private sectors think in longer terms

Salmon 7 – Upstart business journal [Felix, May 3, 2007, “In Praise of Infrastructure Privatization,” <http://upstart.bizjournals.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2007/05/03/in-praise-of-infrastructure-privatization.html?page=all>]

"There's reason to worry about the quality of service on deals that can span 100 years." Well, there's also reason to worry about the quality of service that the public sector will provide over the next 100 years. There's no particular reason to believe that the private sector will provide worse service; certainly the experience of private-sector infrastructure projects worldwide would indicate the opposite. What's more, most road maintenance done in the US by the public sector is done with the aim of short-term, not long-term savings. You can fix up a road for a small number of years for less money up-front, or you can do it properly for more money and save money in the long term. Governments tend to have four-year or six-year time horizons, however: they're not particularly interested in saving future administrations lots of money. A private-sector contractor with a 75- or 100-year contract, however, will be more efficient. And then if the private-sector contractor really fouls up, the state can simply repossess the project. That's happened before, it will happen again. It's no reason not to privatize in the first place; it's more of an insurance policy.

### 1NC Obama Good Elections NB

#### Its popular – Obama gets a boost while spending isn’t perceived

Stempel 8 – Reuters [Jonathon, Aug 1, 2008, “Roads, airports on the block as budgets tighten,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/01/us-infrastructure-idUSN0134060620080801>]

ALTERNATIVE TO TAX HIKES According to the nonprofit Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 29 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia may face a combined $48 billion of budget deficits in fiscal 2009. But politicians might be loathe to cut spending or raise taxes at a time mortgage debt, $4-a-gallon gas and rising food prices leave consumers -- of whom many vote -- dispirited. Tapping public debt markets might also be too costly. Meanwhile the American Society of Civil Engineers estimates $1.6 trillion is needed over five years to raise the often aged U.S. infrastructure to "good" condition. Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell in July called for the United States to establish a capital budget to pay for such repairs. It was a year ago August 1 that the Interstate 35W bridge in Minneapolis plunged into the Mississippi River, killing 13. Critics say some infrastructure transactions are short-term budget fixes that deprive governments of steady cash streams from taxpayer-funded assets. There is also the risk that private operators won't do their jobs well. Advocates of privatization say entities might do better managing assets than a government answering to voters. Politicians could also get a boost if they can take credit for reinvesting sale or lease proceeds in needed projects. "The argument for a public-private partnership is the private sector is a lot smarter about paying attention to costs, and because it has skin in the game will be more attentive to maintaining an asset over its life," said Joseph Giglio, a privatization expert and professor at Northeastern University's College of Business Administration in Boston. "Elected officials often shortchange funding of maintenance because they don't want to increase user fees or taxes to pay for it," Giglio added. "Their election cycle is four years. They can pass it on to someone else's watch." Collins, who also advised Pennsylvania on the turnpike, said infrastructure can also go beyond roads and airports. He said Morgan Stanley is advising Akron, Ohio, on exploring the leasing of its wastewater system, and Indiana on the possibility of private management for its state lottery. "Lotteries have infrastructure characteristics in that they have stable cash flows and high barriers to entry," he said. "They could even attract private equity investment because they are self-financeable and require minimal capital expenses."

### 2NC Obama Good Elections NB

#### It’s a politically salient solution

CCGA 10 – The Chicago Council on Global Affairs is a leading independent, nonpartisan organization committed to influencing the discourse on global issues through contributions to opinion and policy formation, leadership dialogue, and public learning [September 2010, “No Free Money: Is the Privatization of Infrastructure in the Public Interest?” <http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Emerging%20Leaders%20Program/ELReport2010_Privatization.pdf>, Page 26]

6. Privatization can be a politically expedient solution to public problems. Another advantage of the private sector, unrelated to efficiency or expertise, is that its executives do not have to run for re-election, although they do have to respond to shareholders. Private operators can do things that politicians are unwilling or unable to do, such as raise tolls or parking fees. This actually can work to the public’s advantage, because the price of a privatization deal reflects these additional revenues that will be recovered by the private operators. John Schmidt made this point with regard to the Chicago parking meter deal. He explained to the Chicago Reader, “I don’t think there’s any city that has consistently been able to price its street parking at a market level, which is a point that environmentalists have made for years, advocating not only higher parking rates but higher parking taxes. I think it’s the phenomenon where the incremental benefit of raising parking meter rates in any single year is going to be relatively slight but the political reaction to it is going to be significant. It’s not necessarily that everyone’s going to complain, but enough will that a politician is going to resist it.” 19

## Smart Growth CP

### Explanation

Smart growth is an urban planning and transportation theory that concentrates growth in compact walkable urban centers to avoid sprawl. It also advocates compact, transit-oriented, walkable, bicycle-friendly land use, including neighborhood schools, complete streets, and mixed-use development with a range of housing choices. Smart growth values long-range, regional considerations of sustainability over a short-term focus. Its goals are to achieve a unique sense of community and place; expand the range of transportation, employment, and housing choices; equitably distribute the costs and benefits of development; preserve and enhance natural and cultural resources; and promote public health.

### 1NC

#### **Text: The fifty states and all relevant territories should create a regional tax base to invest in Smart Growth.**

#### **Smart Growth Solves Better Than the AFF; Solves for more than just public transit**

Kushner 8 (James, April 4, SYMPOSIUM: THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER 40 YEARS: CONTINUING THE MISSION TO ELIMINATE HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION: Urban Neighborhood Regeneration and the Phases of Com-munity Evolution After World War II in the United States, Lexis Nexis)

The future will be about sustainability, health, and fairness. Smart Growth is growth that supports environmental, n111 economic, n112 and social sustainability. n113 Sustainability refers to policies that allow future generations to enjoy the resources and quality of life of today. n114 Really Smart Growth, as compared to the vague notion of improved urban design that has been advanced and implemented through variations of traditional development patterns, is growth based on urban design for the pedestrian rather than for the automobile. n115 Connectivity through public transport is a critical component. Government priorities must shift to improved public transport, n116 alternative energy sources, n117 [\*598] efficient building technology, n118 sustainable infrastructure, n119 and agricultural policies. n120 Truly Smart Growth emphasizes public transport, with transit-served urban and suburban communities developing in a model of heightened densification, infill, and access. n121 Urban growth boundaries n122 would be established, and development would focus on infill, brownfields, n123 and areas of the city that are lying fallow such as rail yards, former industrial sites, and [\*599] parking lots.¶ New Urbanism, largely led by developers, may influence and shape this phase. n124 New Urbanism calls for higher density, walkable communities developed at human scale to accommodate and enhance the experience of pedestrians. n125 Mixed-use higher density community design is an imperative of escalating population, fuel and commuting costs, and the rising cost of utilities that are making the single-family detached home-the icon of the twentieth century-the horse and buggy of the twenty-first century. Smart Growth would utilize New Urbanist designs to create pedestrian-friendly models of the European compact city, street car neighborhoods and suburbs, and the small industrial and mill towns that thrived prior to World War II. Linking destinations through public transit, increasing density, improving accessibility, and choices in the size and cost of homes would stimulate racial and ethnic diversity. n126 The Portland experience indicates that greater integration occurs if apartments are dispersed and available along convenient transit lines. n127¶ Although the Author remains an unadulterated integrationist, there is reason to question the value of integration and diversity in contemporary American culture. The questions of racial and ethnic cohesion, integration, and assimilation require a very different analysis from the simplistic segregation-integration dichotomy of the twentieth century. Robert Putnam, the author of the best selling book Bowling Alone, n128 an inquiry into the reasons for the withdrawal of Americans from community activities and civic participation, has recently published a massive study on the effects of community diversity. His study, which he was reluctant to release given testing results he was unhappy to find, concluded that the greater the diversity in a community, the fewer people vote, [\*600] the less they volunteer, the less they give to charity, and the less they work on community projects. n129 Additional findings were that ethnically and racially diverse neighborhoods lower social capital, generate distrust among neighbors, and increase television viewing. n130 Like myself, Putnam hopes and anticipates that this unsatisfactory phenomenon is transitory on the way to assimilation. Scott Page, a University of Michigan political scientist and author of the book The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies, n131 does not question the Putnam findings but suggests that, despite civic withdrawal, diversity has a positive impact on productivity and innovation because a greater likelihood of solving problems exists when utilizing different ways of thinking among people from different cultures. n132 Another study by economist Edward Glaeser of Harvard suggests that greater ethnic diversity in the United States is the reason for significantly lower social welfare spending in America as compared to Europe. n133 This "diversity paradox," or simply continued racial hostility, suggests that the politically correct rhetoric that we celebrate diversity fails to reflect the Nation's beliefs and a serious review of integration and immigration policies should be undertaken rather than avoided. A study by Patrick Bayer, Fernando Ferreira, and Robert McMillan, while finding that the college- educated are willing to pay $ 58 more per month to live in a neighborhood that has 10% more college-educated households, observed that blacks are willing to pay $ 98 more per month to live in a neighborhood that has 10% more black households. n134 Thus, African Americans are no more enthralled with integration than whites appear to be. n135¶ The failure of civil rights strategies to generate class and racial integration argues for higher density, mixed tenure of home occupancy, and income as the more attractive strategy to generate increased class and ethnic integration. n136 [\*601] Despite the ostensible lack of enthusiasm for diversity, I believe it is essential to overcome fear, distrust, and the walled metropolis as an essential component of community. Walkable and diverse urban neighborhoods are popular with a wide array of income, age, and ethnic groups suggesting that New Urbanism as a choice for community design will be popular. However, the New Urbanism in this new phase might differ from prior urban design improvement strategies in that it may be market-driven and promoted by developers. Presently, the spread of New Urbanist, walkable communities is constrained by unsound policies that discourage adequately funded public transit and by zoning codes written after World War II that have long ceased to serve health, welfare, or safety. n137 Yet, Putnam's work would sug-gest that a dispersed population does not necessarily generate an assimilated, socially cohesive society.¶ Current tax policies generate quality infrastructure for affluent communities, but inadequate services for those neighborhoods that are not wealthy. Communities segregated by income result in unsustainable and unstable districts housing the poor and prevent stability, economic growth, and regeneration. The antidote may be mixed- income neigh-borhoods. A regional tax base could further aid in equalizing infrastructure and reducing other barriers to an enhanced quality of life. If accomplished, suburbs would no longer need to compete with one another for retail centers nor ex-clude apartments. A shared tax base could encourage communities to aggressively pursue Smart Growth, transit-oriented development, and housing densification with sufficient tax proceeds to fund adequate infrastructure. n138 Cities that have lost their tax base could be regenerated in part by conversion to a regional shared tax base. This Article suggests that the United States may be entering a fifth post-World War II phase of community evolution-one of true Smart Growth.

#### Smart Growth solves Warming by decreasing CO2

Brawer and Vespa 8 (Judi and Matthew, judi Brawer is a solo-practitioner in Boise, Idaho. She specializes in environmental law, including public lands management, endangered species and land use planning., Matthew Vespa is a staff attorney at the Center for Biological Diversity in its Climate, Air, and Energy Program, ARTICLE: THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY: THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MINIMIZING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NEW DEVELOPMENT, LexisNexis)

The regulation of private development and land use is recognized as an inherent part of each state and local government's police power to protect their citizens' health, safety, and general welfare. n35 In the early twentieth century, land use regulation and zoning were just beginning, and their increased use was, in part, a response to a number of environmental, health, and safety concerns at that time. n36 Land [\*598] uses were segregated to reduce population density, separating housing from schools and commerce, and creating low density suburban housing over large tracts of land far away--and certainly not within walking distance--from commercial zones. n37 Driving was further facilitated and encouraged by mandating wide streets and parking lots. n38 Ironically, land use policies that were originally enacted to address environmental and health problems have created today's transportation and sprawl problems, resulting in traffic congestion; poor air quality; diminishing open space, bird and wildlife habitat, and agricultural lands; and, ultimately, global warming. n39 Now, just as land [\*599] use regulations were used to address the health and environmental problems of the early twentieth century, they are being re-examined and revised to respond to these new ones--and in particular greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. Greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation section represents one-third of the total emissions of the United States. n40 The IPCC identifies land use planning as a key practice for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. For example, in addition to more fuel efficient and hybrid vehicles, the report identifies "modal shifts from road transport to rail and public transport systems; non-motorised transport (cycling, walking); land-use and transport planning" as "[k]ey mitigation technologies and practices currently commercially available." n41 Ultimately, "much of the rise in vehicle emissions can be curbed simply by growing in a way that will make it easier for Americans to drive less." n42 Land use planning and design that reduces commuting requirements and the length and number of vehicle trips is essential to reducing the greenhouse gas contribution from the transportation sector. The Urban Land Institute describes needed transportation-related CO[2] emissions reductions as a three-legged stool, with one leg related to vehicle fuel efficiency, a second to the carbon content of the fuel itself, and a third to the amount of driving or vehicle miles traveled (VMT) . . . . Since 1980, the number of miles Americans drive has grown three times faster than the U.S. population . . . . Population growth has been responsible for only a quarter of the increase in vehicle miles traveled. A larger share of the increase [in VMTs] can be traced to the effects of a changing urban environment, namely to longer trips and people driving alone. n43 "Energy and climate policy initiatives at the federal and state levels have pinned their hopes almost exclusively on shoring up the first two legs of the stool, through the development of more efficient [\*600] vehicles (such as hybrid cars) and lower-carbon fuels (such as bio-diesel fuel)." n44 However, even implementation of the "more stringent standards for vehicles and [alternative] fuels" recently enacted in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007--which, among other things, requires the U.S. Department of Transportation to set tougher fuel economy standards for vehicles and increases the Renewable Fuel Standards n45 --will not result in the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions because projected increases in vehicle miles traveled offset gains made by increases in fuel efficiency and low-carbon fuels. n46 Meeting the emissions reduction from the transportation section also requires a sharp reduction in the "growth in vehicle miles driven across the nation's sprawling urban areas, reversing trends that go back decades." n47 Growth that focuses on compact development and community planning is known by a number of different names, such as "smart growth," "new urbanism," "walkable communities," and "transit-oriented developments." n48 These developments do away with single-use subdivisions and office parks and instead mix shops, schools, offices and homes and incorporate non-motorized and mass transit. n49 "Compact, transit accessible, pedestrian-oriented, mixed use development patterns and land reuse epitomize the application of the principles of smart growth." n50 Residents of such compact, mixed use developments drive significantly less than those who live in more sprawling areas. n51 One study in King County, Washington, found that "residents of the most walkable neighborhoods drive 26 percent fewer miles per day than those living in the most sprawling areas." n52 Another study determined that residents in higher density, mixed-use [\*601] developments drove approximately 33% less than those living in low-density sprawl. n53 Overall, evidence "shows that compact development will reduce the need to drive between 20 and 40 percent, as compared with [sprawling, single-use development]." n54 Assuming that all new U.S. housing were smart growth, with half greenfield and half brownfield, "the total nationwide savings after 10 years, based on a projected level of 24.3 million housing starts from 2005-2020, would be in the range of 977 trillion miles of travel reduced; 5,690,000 trillion Btu n55 saved; 49.5 billion gallons of gasoline saved; 1.18 billion barrels of oil saved; 595 million metric tons of CO[2] . . . emissions reduced; and $ 2.18 trillion savings. n56 It is estimated that "smart growth could, by itself, reduce total transportation-related CO[2] emissions from current trends by 7 to 10 percent as of 2050. This reduction is achievable with land-use changes alone." n57 Notably, these land use changes, controlled by local governments, provide permanent climate benefits that compound over time. "The second 50 years of smart growth would build on the base reduction from the first 50 years, and so on into the future. More immediate strategies, such as gas tax increases, do not have this degree of permanence." n58

**Warming is anthropogenic and risks extinction**

DEIBEL ‘7 (Terry L. Deibel, professor of IR at National War College, Foreign Affairs Strategy, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2”)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, **and what was once a mere possibility has passed** through probability **to near certainty.** Indeed **not one of more than 900 articles** **on climate change published in refereed scientific journals** from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually **impossible to find evidence of disagreement** over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to het the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. **Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically**. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to **shame**. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

### AT: Smart Growth Doesn’t Solve Transit

#### Smart Growth Solves Transit; Sweeden proves

Cervero 0 (Robert, Professor of City and Regional Planning in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California, ARTICLES AND PRESENTATIONS: GROWING SMART BY LINKING TRANSPORTATION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, LexisNexis)

There is no better example of the efficiency and sustainability gains that come from coordinated transportation and land-use planning than Stockholm, Sweden. The last half-century of strategic regional planning has given rise to a regional settlement and commutation pattern that has substantially lowered car-dependency in middle-income suburbs. Stockholm planners have created jobs-housing balance along rail-served axial corridors. This in turn has produced directional-flow balances. During peak hours, fifty-five percent of commuters are typically traveling in one direction on trains and forty-five percent are heading in the other direction. [n10](http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1342632947196&returnToKey=20_T15154447277&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.419518.84483910986" \l "n10) Such balanced directional splits stand in marked contrast to the United States where, because of the lack of any concerted effort to coordinate infrastructure and urban development, trains and buses are often filled in the morning inbound but back-haul three-quarters empty. Portland aims to follow in the footsteps of rail-shaped European cities like Stockholm. Notably, it has opted to build and expand light-rail transit in lieu of more freeways as a means to channel urbanization and avoid haphazard sprawl. Portland's colorful, vibrant downtown, arguably America's most walkable, has an eighteen-hour, European-like ambience. Ridership on the recently completed western extension to the city of Hillsborough is steadily climbing, growing more rapidly than any transit corridor in the United States. Still, Portland has its nay-sayers, with entire web sites devoted to Portland-bashing (i.e., [www.publicpurpose.com](http://www.publicpurpose.com/)). Critics contend that Portland's refrain from road expansion has led to traffic tie-ups that are worsening at a faster clip than in most American cities. In truth, it takes decades for the benefits of smart growth to reveal themselves. If any American city is poised to one day rid itself of sprawl and its ill effects, it is Portland. Successful integration of "green" transportation investments and sustainable growth patterns can also be found in the developing world, most notably in Curitiba, Brazil. Curitiba, a city of 2.5  [\*364] million inhabitants in southern Brazil, has taken on the mantle of Latin America's most sustainable metropolis. Through smart urban planning and strong political leadership, Curitiba has built exclusive busways while at the same time channeling urbanization along linear axes served by modern high-speed buses. Along some corridors, elephant-trains of double-articulated buses haul 16,000 passengers per hour, comparable to what much pricier metro-rail systems carry. [n11](http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1342632947196&returnToKey=20_T15154447277&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.419518.84483910986" \l "n11) On a per capita basis, Curitiba is Brazil's second wealthiest city, yet it averages considerably more transit trips than much-bigger Rio and S<tild a>o Paulo. It also boasts the cleanest air among any Brazilian city, despite being a provincial capital with a sizable industrial sector. The strong, workable nexus that exists between Curitiba's bus-based transit system and its linear settlement pattern deserves most of the credit.

#### **Smart Growth Solves Sprawl and lowers fuel emissions.**

Salkin and Levine 8 (Patricia and Amy, Spring, Patricia E. Salkin is Associate Dean and Director of the Government Law Center of Albany Law School. Amy Lavine is a Staff Attorney at the Government Law Center of Albany Law School, CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC POLICY: LAND USE LAW AND ACTIVE LIVING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATES TO ASSUME A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN PROMOTING AND INCENTIVIZING LOCAL OPTIONS, LexisNExis)

Transit-oriented development overlay districts are perhaps the most notable of this group. Transit-oriented development ("TOD") seeks to encourage the growth of mixed use, high density and pedestrian-friendly development near mass transit stations, with the goal of reducing motor vehicle reliance and curbing sprawl. n97 The primary goal of transit-oriented design is to decrease automobile use, and this is accomplished by encouraging the construction of mixed types of housing and commercial space near transit stations. Since many transit stops are located in already developed areas, TOD also has the effect of curbing sprawl by directing development to already urbanized areas. Although its name might suggest otherwise, transit-oriented development is also incredibly supportive of [\*345] pedestrian and bicycle use; it has aimed to make transit stations accessible and inviting to these users by creating transit-oriented developments that are compact, mixed use, and thoughtfully designed. TOD has been noted by the active living community not only for this quality, but also for the belief that people who use mass transportation are likely to incorporate more walking into their daily transportation routines than those who primarily use cars. Moreover, since transit-oriented development seeks to reduce automobile use and to slow sprawling development, it also helps to lower the vehicle emissions that exacerbate respiratory problems. Open space preservation and its ancillary benefits may also be a goal of TOD. n98 California has been a pioneer in this area, having enacted its Transit Village Development Planning Act in 1994. n99 The Act was used as the basis for the model TOD legislation included in the Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook, n100 and making transit-oriented developments appealing to pedestrians and bicyclists is a focus of both the California Act and the model legislation. While California's Act may be the most comprehensive in the country, other states have begun to address transit-oriented development as well. In North Carolina, cities are authorized to create TOD districts within a quarter mile radius of any mass transit stop, n101 and Pennsylvania has authorized public transportation agencies to work cooperatively with local governments to create "transit revitalization investment districts," n102 which are intended to [\*346] encourage transit oriented design. Connecticut has recently enacted legislation stating that one of its growth management principles is to promote the "concentration of development around transportation nodes and along major transportation corridors to support the viability of transportation options and land reuse[.]" n103 The new Connecticut legislation also requires regional planning agencies to identify areas where "compact, transit accessible, pedestrian-oriented mixed use development" is feasible. n104 Nevada has a similar requirement for regional planning bodies. n105 It bears mentioning that government assistance and incentives are especially important in encouraging local and regional governments to develop comprehensive transportation plans and TOD policies that support active living and smart growth. While the following discussion explores a sampling of the incentives and other programs that states have used in this area, there are a vast number of transportation programs not described here, including many administered by the federal government and private organizations. Perhaps most simply, states can encourage their municipalities to adopt smart transportation policies that encourage walking and bicycling by providing information about transit-oriented design and other innovative transportation strategies. Massachusetts' Smart Growth Toolbox includes a model TOD overlay ordinance and case studies demonstrating successful implementation of transit-oriented development principles. n106 The model ordinance includes such smart growth and active living provisions as limiting the number of parking spaces that may be built, minimizing building setbacks, and [\*347] requiring sidewalks and outdoor lighting. It also provides design standards relating to street trees, benches, public art and other pedestrian amenities. n107 Georgia n108 and the District of Columbia n109 also provide comprehensive materials intended to educate government bodies, developers and the public about the benefits of transit-oriented development. Oregon's Transportation and Growth Management Program does more than produce publications and guidance: it offers real-time and in person outreach and assistance in developing local comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances that " result[] in a balanced, multi-modal system that enhances opportunities for people to walk, bike, and use transit." n110 Funding and other financial incentives, of course, are especially useful in encouraging the creation of TOD districts and persuading local governments to integrate smart growth principles into their transportation policies. For example, TOD has been supported in New Jersey by the Department of Transportation's Transit Village Initiative, which gives priority funding and technical assistance to qualifying municipalities. n111 Similar frameworks exist in other states. The federal [\*348] government provides funds to states as part of the Safe Routes to Schools Program; the states are to distribute this money for infrastructure improvements and other projects (e.g. education and enforcement) that enable and encourage children to walk or bicycle to school. n112 Broader walking and bicycling grant programs exist in North Carolina n113 and Oregon, n114 where funding is available for the creation of bicycle and pedestrian plans and improvements, and grant programs in Washington, n115 Nevada n116 and Illinois n117 focus on improving pedestrian and bicycle safety. Oregon also provides grants through its Transportation and Growth Management (TGM) Program for [\*349] integrated land use and transportation planning. n118 It emphasizes that these "projects typically integrate land use and transportation planning so that land use patterns and transportation investments support each other. TGM supports planning but not construction projects." n119 All of these programs (and there are many more) have the positive effects of encouraging the creation of environments that foster active transportation and the use of mass transit.

### AT: State Smart Growth Not Successful

#### States Investing in Public Transit solves the sprawl caused by highways

Glendining 2 (Parris, the governor of Maryland since 1995, NEW URBANISM AND SMART GROWTH: MARYLAND'S SMART GROWTH INITIATIVE: THE NEXT STEPS, LexisNexis)

Long neglected older public schools in existing neighborhoods now receive eighty percent of new state school construction funds, up from thirty-eight percent a decade ago. n39 Contaminated and abandoned industrial sites, usually located in the heart of established communities, are now viewed as opportunities rather than liabilities and are being cleaned up and redeveloped. n40 The more we can reuse these long abandoned sites, the more we relieve the pressure for new "greenfield" development. The acreage returned to productive use within brownfield sites that have already been cleaned up is equivalent in size to the land that would be needed to build 800 houses on two-acre lots or 200 shopping centers, including the surface parking. n41 Highway projects that would likely encourage more sprawl development and which, in another era, would have been routinely approved, are now being reassessed, redesigned, and scaled to fit the character of their communities, or stopped altogether. n42 In 1998, five highway bypass projects that were inconsistent with the [\*1500] state's Smart Growth policy were taken off the Maryland Department of Transportation's long-range construction plan. n43 One was later restored, but only after a new design agreement was reached that attempts to discourage sprawl that might have otherwise resulted. n44 By investing heavily in transit, the state is developing a more balanced transportation system that focuses on moving people rather than just moving cars. This is essential if the state is to meet or exceed its goal of doubling transit ridership by 2020. The state recently announced, for example, plans to construct a new inside-the-beltway transit line that will connect the Maryland terminus of each of the radial lines of Washington, D.C.'s subway system. n45 The fourteen-mile long, $ 1.2 billion Purple Line connecting Bethesda and New Carrollton could become the first link in a circumferential transit line around Washington. n46 From the spring of 2000 to the end of 2001, Maryland invested $ 1.5 billion in new transit spending. n47 This money will permit the state to add new bus and neighborhood shuttle routes; to buy new buses and rail cars; to expand service hours for the Baltimore subway; to encourage more compact, mixed use development around transit stations; and to install "Smart Card" technology that will provide commuters with one card universally accepted by all state transit systems.

#### Smart Growth has been successful in states before; Maryland proves

Glendining 2 (Parris, the governor of Maryland since 1995, NEW URBANISM AND SMART GROWTH: MARYLAND'S SMART GROWTH INITIATIVE: THE NEXT STEPS, LexisNexis)

In 1997, the State of Maryland ignited a national movement to improve land use and development decisions throughout the United States. This modest effort started with the passage of a series of new laws called the Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Initiative. n1 These laws, which have been subsequently broadened and refined, n2 represent a new approach to managing growth while limiting its environmental, fiscal, and social impacts and channeling it towards improving the state's economy. In the four years since its enactment, Maryland's Smart Growth initiative has received national n3 and international n4 recognition as the nation's first statewide, incentive-based program to reduce the impact of urban sprawl. In the year 2000, it was named one of the ten most innovative new government programs in the nation in an annual competition sponsored by Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Ford Foundation, and the Council for Excellence in Government. n5 Maryland's Smart [\*1494] Growth effort has received numerous awards from various organizations. n6 The Maryland program has several objectives: support of the state's established communities; protection of the state's best remaining farms and natural areas; and saving taxpayers the high cost of building infrastructure to support increasingly dispersed development. n7 States as diverse as Maine and Utah are using Maryland's program as a model for their own growth management efforts. n8 Maryland's program has become a model for other states because the approach is incentive-based rather than regulatory. The program uses the state's budget, which in fiscal year 2002 totaled $ 21 billion, n9 as an incentive for growth within locally designated growth areas. n10 By withholding state funding elsewhere, the Maryland program hopes to discourage growth outside of these designated growth areas. Before the Smart Growth plan was implemented, the state had no geographic restrictions on providing financial support for growth. n11 Maryland has also rejected the losing proposition that all growth is bad. Maryland's Smart Growth plan is not a no-growth or even a [\*1495] slow-growth program. Instead, it recognizes the inevitability and value of growth to the Maryland economy. Indeed, the state has numerous programs designed to attract and encourage economic growth. The Smart Growth program, however, attempts to minimize the adverse effects of growth by channeling it to those areas of the state where existing or planned infrastructure and services are in place to support it. n12 The Maryland initiative rejects the longstanding notion that society must choose between the economy and the environment and that for one to get stronger, the other must get weaker. This is a false dichotomy based on the old premise that society must be prepared to accept some level of environmental destruction in the name of economic growth. In the long run, economic growth and environmental protection are inextricably intertwined. This fact is illustrated by the exceptionally strong state of Maryland's economy. Maryland has the highest family income n13 and the lowest poverty rate of any state in the nation. n14 Welfare cases are down sixty-eight percent with more than 155,000 people moving from dependency towards self-sufficiency. n15 Maryland can claim all these accomplishments while being recognized as the national leader in environmental protection. The Maryland effort is more than a fight against the unplanned or poorly planned development that we call sprawl. It is a fight for prosperity and a better quality of life, what we call Smart Growth. A major part of any state's economic development strategy is to assure a high quality of life for workers. Under the old model of economic development, states attracted businesses by providing them with tax benefits or financial incentives. In a knowledge-based economy, however, the most important factors for a business [\*1496] are a high-quality workforce, the availability of job training, and a commitment to education. In addition, quality of life has emerged as a major factor in the new economy. In support of this view, a Wall Street Journal article n16 highlighted ten factors that high-tech industry leaders consider when making location decisions. The most important factor cited was access to a skilled and educated workforce. n17 The second most important factor was proximity to world-class research institutions, including colleges and universities. n18 The third factor was access to a good quality of life. n19 In contrast, financial incentives - long the mainstay of state economic development strategies - came in last. n20 In a quest for a better access to a quality workforce, the high-tech, info-tech and bio-tech firms driving the new economy look to various locations around the world. n21 Firms are no longer limited by the boundaries of the United States; they no longer have to choose between Maryland or Virginia, Annapolis or Arlington. Companies are now looking at the relative merits of Illinois versus Ireland, Seattle versus Singapore, Maryland versus Milan. Clearly, times are changing. For the past fifty years, in Maryland, as in the rest of America, many people associated moving up with moving out. n22 In the process, we took our natural resources for granted as if they were unlimited. We took our communities for granted, too, wantonly tearing them down or simply abandoning them. n23 Our growth patterns were destroying the beauty of our state, leaving large parts of our cities boarded up and abandoned; worsening congestion; and forcing our citizens to pay higher and higher taxes to cover the infrastructure costs created by sprawl. At the beginning of the twentieth century, most development in Maryland, as well as in most other states, was in or near major [\*1497] cities such as Baltimore or Washington, D.C. n24 After World War II, this pattern began to change. n25 Prompted in part by public policies, such as G.I. Bill mortgage subsidies and construction of the Interstate Highway System, growth began to sprawl increasingly into suburban and rural areas. n26 This trend has, for the most part, gone unabated for the past fifty years. n27 Maryland's Department of Planning summed up the effect of this trend with this sobering prediction: If growth patterns do not change, development will consume as much land in central Maryland alone over the next twenty-five years as it has during the entire 368-year history of the State. n28 It is against that backdrop that Maryland felt the urgent need to develop the Smart Growth approach.

#### **The States can solve Smart Growth**

Hacker 11 (Carl, Ph.D. in Biology from Rice University, his J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center, and is currently an Associate Professor of Ecology and Health Law at the University of Texas School of Public Health, ARTICLE: EXPANDING WAISTLINES AND EXPANDING CITIES: URBAN SPRAWL AND ITS IMPACT ON OBESITY, HOW THE ADOPTION OF SMART GROWTH STATUTES CAN BUILD HEALTHIER AND MORE ACTIVE COMMUNITIES, LexisNexis)

As these public health challenges have emerged and grown, so too has our built environment - the manmade surroundings that provide the setting for human activity such as sidewalks, street patterns, and strip malls n13 - and the problems that are often associated with it. Urban sprawl, the uncontrolled, poorly planned, low-density and single-use development that has come to dominate U.S. land-use policy, n14 is now causing some health researchers concern. Recent studies have established a link between the patterns of development in American towns and cities, including urban sprawl and the negative impact those land-use policies have upon the public's health. n15 These studies have related the degree of urban sprawl in a particular community to the decreasing physical activity levels of its residents. n16 Because of the significant decrease in physical activity, these studies show that residents in sprawling communities regularly suffer from higher rates of obesity than their counterparts in non-sprawling communities. n17¶ This relationship between urban sprawl, physical activity levels, and public health creates the opportunity for public health officials [\*67] to take a new approach to controlling the obesity epidemic. n18 Legislatures have the opportunity to reform zoning codes and enact statutes that create guidelines and incentives for urban planning and community design that would encourage more active lifestyles by including physical activity such as walking and biking. n19 Since the early nineties, researchers, city officials, and urban planners have begun to recognize the problems created by urban sprawl and have proposed adopting Smart Growth statutes as a possible solution. n20 Yet most Smart Growth statutes do not incorporate a public health component and, for the most part, public health officials are seriously under-involved in the urban planning field. n21 It is certainly a step in the right direction for states and local governments to adopt traditional Smart Growth. However, by adding a clear public health component and by explicitly requiring public health involvement in the planning process, governments could potentially improve the statutes' overall impact on obesity rates by focusing on increasing levels of physical activity. n22

### AT: Perm Do Both

#### 1. The perm still links to the net benefit of politics.

#### 2. Perm fails – cost overruns are especially bad when multiple levels of government are involved

Edwards 11 – Director of tax policy studies at the Cato Institute and the editor of [www.downsizinggovernment.org](http://www.downsizinggovernment.org) [Chris, November 16, 2011, “Federal Infrastructure Investment,” http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/federal-infrastructure-investment]

Problems with Federal Infrastructure Investment There are calls today for more federal spending on infrastructure, but advocates seem to overlook the downsides of past federal efforts. Certainly, there have been federal infrastructure successes, but there has also been a history of pork barrel politics and bureaucratic bungling in federal investment spending. A substantial portion of federal infrastructure spending has gone to low-value and dubious activities. I've examined spending by the two oldest federal infrastructure agencies — the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation.7 While both of those agencies constructed some impressive projects, they have also been known for proceeding with uneconomic boondoggles, fudging the analyses of proposed projects, and spending on activities that serve private interests rather than the general public interest. (I am referring to the Civil Works part of the Corps here). Federal infrastructure projects have often suffered from large cost overruns.8 Highway projects, energy projects, airport projects, and air traffic control projects have ended up costing far more than originally promised. Cost overruns can happen on both public and private infrastructure projects, but the problem is exacerbated when multiple levels of government are involved in a project because there is less accountability. Boston's Big Dig — which exploded in cost to five times the original estimate — is a classic example of mismanagement in a federal-state project.9

### AT: China Alt Cause To Warming

#### China will make the transition to renewable energy lowering their CO2 footprint

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(Kevin Jianjun, Senior associate in the Carnegie Energy and Climate

Program, where he leads Carnegie’s work on China’s energy and climate policies, “Understanding China’s Rising Coal Imports,” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/china_coal.pdf> )

 Several key trends are likely to drive investment patterns in the Chinese power sector going forward. Given the Chinese government’s emphasis on energy conservation and air pollution control (e.g., SO2 emissions) during the 11th FYP period and the preference for domestically made equipment, capacity of large-scale supercritical and ultra-supercritical (USC) power plants has expanded rapidly in China. This trend is likely to continue. During the 12th FYP period, energy conservation and air pollution regulations have been continuously tightened, and a 17% GHG emissions intensity reduction target was also introduced. As a result, lower carbon fuels including renewables (especially wind), nuclear, and natural gas are planned to grow substantially in the coming decades, as shown in Table 3-3.

## Case

### No Solvency

#### **Aff Thesis is wrong – poor people/minorities live at the heart of cites – transportation infrastructure does nothing**

Harvey 2k (David, professor of geography and Johns Hopkins university, MEGACITIES LECTURE 4, <http://www.megacities.nl/lecture_4/possible.pdf>, JG)

In some of the advanced capitalist countries, that dystopian vision has been strongly associated with the long-cultivated habit on the part of those with power and privilege of running as far from the city centers as possible. Fuelled by a permissive car culture, the urge to get some money and get out has taken command. Liverpool’s population fell by 40 percent between 1961 and 1991, for example, and Baltimore City’s fell from close to a million to under 700,000 in the same three decades. But the upshot has been not only to create endless suburbanization, so-called “edge cities”, and sprawling megalopoli, but also to make every village and every rural retreat in the advanced capitalist world part of a complex web of urbanization that defies any simple categorization of populations into “urban” and “rural” in that sense which once upon a time could reasonably be accorded to those terms. The haemorrhaging of wealth, population and power from central cities has left many of them languishing in limbo. Needy populations have been left behind as the rich and influential have moved out. Add to this the devastating loss of jobs (particularly in manufacturing) in recent years and the parlous state of the older cities becomes all too clear. Nearly 250,000 manufacturing jobs lost in Manchester in two decades while 40,000 disappeared from Sheffield’s steel industry alone in just three short catastrophic years in the mid 1980s. Baltimore likewise lost nearly 200,000 manufacturing jobs from the late 1960s onwards and there is hardly a single city in the United States that has not been the scene of similar devastation through deindustrialization.

#### **Improving urban transportation won’t solve transportation gaps faced by poor**

Blumenberg and Manville 4 (Evelyn, associate professor of urban planning in the School of Public Policy and Social Research at the UCLA, Michael, Ph.D. student in the Department of Urban Planning at the UCLA, “Beyond the Spatial Mismatch: Welfare Recipients and Transportation Policy,” Journal of Planning Literature, Vol. 19, No. 2 (November 2004), pg. 33)

To be effective, therefore, transportation policies aimed at the poor must also look beyond the spatial mismatch literature. The research on transportation and employment has increasingly examined the impor- tant role of mode and, in particular, the pivotal role of cars in the economic fortunes of the poor. The evidence on the relationship between employment and public transit is much weaker. These findings are related to distance-based barriers and the land-use decisions that create them. The same policies that helped create the spatial mismatch have also challenged the utility of public transportation, making it less effective even as it became more necessary. It therefore is unrealistic and perhaps unfair to think that mass transit will fill the transportation gaps faced by the poor. As Wachs and Taylor (1998) note, transit and the urban poor suffer from the same affliction, which is a national urban pol- icy that for too many years has been harmful to urban areas. To saddle transit with the responsibility of bring- ing welfare recipients to work ignores this fact, con- structs a scenario for transit’s failure, and thus risks the further erosion of its credibility.

#### Transportation is not enough – won’t increase employment

Blumenberg and Manville 4 (Evelyn, associate professor of urban planning in the School of Public Policy and Social Research at the UCLA, Michael, Ph.D. student in the Department of Urban Planning at the UCLA, “Beyond the Spatial Mismatch: Welfare Recipients and Transportation Policy,” Journal of Planning Literature, Vol. 19, No. 2 (November 2004), pg. 33)

History has shown, however, that public transit’s record as an employment mechanism for the poor is somewhat lamentable. Public transportation has often stumbled in its attempts to connect the poor with jobs, even during times when funding was plentiful and the importance of transportation to the poor has been widely acknowledged. In the wake of the McCone Commission’s report, and subsequent assertions by John McCone himself that “the availability of public transportation directly affects, if it does not control, the employability of persons living in poverty areas,” the State of California funded the Transportation-Employ- ment Project, which ran a new bus line through under- served parts of Los Angeles (Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots 1967, 9). The Transportation- Employment Project was intended to gauge the effect of better transit on low-income workers, and its results were sadly ambivalent. Although ridership on the new bus line was consistently strong, and the new routes made some existing commutes far less circuitous, there was little evidence that the bus contributed meaning- fully to any decline in unemployment (California, Transportation-Employment Project 1970). Similar experiments run in St. Louis, Boston, and New York also yielded disappointing results (Falococchio and Cantelli 1974; Floyd 1968). “The overwhelming consen- sus,” O’Regan and Quigley (1999, 33) note, “is that these projects of the 1960s and early 1970s demonstrated only meager success.”

More recently, studies have shown a weak statistical relationship between the availability and access to pub- lic transportation and low-income employment. In a study of low-income employment in Portland and Atlanta, Sanchez (Sanchez 1999) finds that proximity to transit might have a small positive effect on employ- ment, but he also cautioned that his results were far from conclusive. Likewise, Thompson (1997), in an investigation of Dade County, Florida, finds only a slen- der connection between transit and employment. Finally, Ong and Houston (2002) find that the level of transit service near welfare recipients’ homes has a small effect on increasing the probability of employ- ment and transit use among single women in Los Angeles without access to private vehicles.

#### **Poverty is the root of marginalization, not transportation**

Blumenberg and Manville 4 (Evelyn, associate professor of urban planning in the School of Public Policy and Social Research at the UCLA, Michael, Ph.D. student in the Department of Urban Planning at the UCLA, “Beyond the Spatial Mismatch: Welfare Recipients and Transportation Policy,” Journal of Planning Literature, Vol. 19, No. 2 (November 2004), pg. 33)

One of the reasons transit has difficulty overcoming spatial barriers to employment is that spatial barriers to employment are a mass transit problem almost as much as they are a poverty problem. The same forces that have dispersed employment—suburbanization and deindustrialization—have also created serious chal- lenges for transit agencies, which have had to contend with expanded service areas, decreasing ridership (Pucher and Renne 2003), and an emerging work/resi- dence pattern in which the dominant commute is now from suburb to suburb (Pisarski 1996). Mismatch also confounds transit because most public transportation systems have been designed for middle-class suburban riders heading inbound to downtown areas and not for those traveling within the suburbs or heading outbound from the central city.

#### Public Transit might have good intentions but is expensive, politically controversial, and often causes more inequity

**ICF 11** [ICF International, ICF International (NASDAQ:ICFI) partners with government and commercial clients to deliver industry expertise and innovative analytics in the energy, environment, and infrastructure; health, social programs, and consumer/financial; and public safety and defense markets. “Environmental Justice Emerging Trends and Best Practices Guidebook”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/environmental_justice/resources/guidebook/ejguidebook110111.pdf>, November 1, 2011] SV

Although transit can be expensive to build, operate, and maintain, it helps support low-cost walking and wheeling, and can help lower overall household costs. Providing access to affordable and quality public transportation continues to present a challenge. With limited rights-of-way available, large-scale transit projects can be controversial and expensive. Transportation practitioners may also be unfamiliar with strategies for preserving and expanding the supply of affordable housing in inner city and older suburban neighborhoods that have access to transit. Limited dollars in a competitive funding environment can be a substantial challenge for proponents interested in increasing transit service while increasing affordable housing around it. When major transit investments have spurred new development, in the absence of adequate consideration of measures in advance to preserve the existing community, minority and low-income residents sometimes have faced loss of community and cultural facilities, as well as eviction or pressure to sell their homes, in the face of escalating property values and taxes. Practitioners often confront issues of gentrification or unanticipated displacement from the project footprint and/or ensuing development.

#### Alt Causes—Litany of barriers that the aff doesn’t solve

**ICF 11** [ICF International, ICF International (NASDAQ:ICFI) partners with government and commercial clients to deliver industry expertise and innovative analytics in the energy, environment, and infrastructure; health, social programs, and consumer/financial; and public safety and defense markets. “Environmental Justice Emerging Trends and Best Practices Guidebook”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/environmental_justice/resources/guidebook/ejguidebook110111.pdf>, November 1, 2011] SV

Effective public participation requires an organized, strategic, and culturally sensitive effort, since members of underrepresented or marginalized communities experience a variety of barriers to participation. For example, based on prior negative experiences working and interacting with public agencies and officials, individuals and communities are sometimes suspicious of an agency's outreach motives. Low income and minority communities also frequently experience language and literacy barriers, as well as differences in cultural mores and preferences in communication. In addition to these cultural barriers, accessibility for persons with disabilities can also pose major challenges to full community participation. Other common barriers include a lack of knowledge about the overall transportation planning process, an incomplete sense of the role and relevance of participation in the planning process, and skepticism that public comments and feedback have an impact on the outcome of planning processes.

#### Transportation infrastructure historically creates greater distance between social classes

Squires 2 – Professor of Sociology and Public Policy and Public Administration at George Washington University (Gregory D., member of the Board of Directors of the Woodstock Institute, the Advisory Board of the John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Support Center in Chicago, Illinois and the Social Science Advisory Board of the Poverty & Race Research Action Council, former research analyst for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 4/1/02, *Urban Sprawl: Causes, Consequences, & Policy Responses*, p. 59, p. Google Books)

Suburbanization has been going on since cities were invented. At first, suburbanization was limited by the transportation capacities of the foot and the horse. Once the transportation infrastructure made longer commutes possible, suburbs began to appear along streetcar lines (Warner 1962). The automobile and the construction of modern, high-speed roads opened up the suburbs even further. Suburbanization has always been about two different things. In the first place, people move to the suburbs to translate their economic success into desirable neighborhood amenities, such as single-family homes, yards, and good schools (Gans 1967, 31–41). Second, as Park (1926) argued long ago, urban environments are shaped by the attempts of successful and mobile groups of persons to translate social distances between themselves and lower status groups into physical distances that protect them from the real and perceived threats posed by the lower status groups.

#### Tons of alt causes

Downs 99 – senior fellow in the Economic Studies program at the Brookings Institution (Anthony, August 1999, “SOME REALITIES ABOUT SPRAWL AND URBAN DECLINE,” Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/1999/8/cities%20downs/199908.pdf)

It is obvious how sprawl generates the first set of directly growth-related problems. But the American development process also inherently undermines the fiscal strengths of many large cities and inner-ring suburbs in what I believe is a socially unjust and undesirable manner.

Some form of peripheral growth around American metropolitan areas has been – and still is – inevitable because they have grown greatly in population, and will grow more. Purely vertical growth would have been inconsistent with the rising real incomes and transport innovations that have occurred since 1950. Both of those strong trends have caused households to want to live in lower densities with more land area and internal space per unit.

But the particular form which our peripheral growth has taken has resulted in intensive concentration of very poor households -- especially those in minority groups -- in the older, more central portions of our metropolitan areas. This concentration is not an inevitable result of outward expansion, but is caused by several specific policies adopted in America to produce this result, though they are not adopted in most of the rest of the world.

The first such policy has two parts. One is requiring all new housing to meet very high quality standards -- standards too costly for most poor households to occupy. Therefore, most poor households can only afford to live in new housing if their doing so is somehow subsidized. (Such subsidies need not involve public funds, as discussed later.) The second part is that the United States has chosen not to subsidize housing for many poor people in suburban areas. Since new housing naturally is concentrated on the outer edge of each metropolitan area at any moment, this means very poor people are concentrated in older areas closer to the historic center.

The second policy that generates core-area poverty areas combines fragmented control over landuses in many small outlying municipalities, and their adoption of exclusionary zoning and other policies designed to raise local housing costs so as to keep poor people out of their communities. So suburban behavior is partly responsible for the core-area concentration of the poor.

The third policy is tying the fiscal support of local governments to the wealth of their own residents as expressed in property values and sales taxes. When the residents move out, so do many of the resources the government can tap. This means many high-and-middle-income suburbs have much greater tax bases per household than low-income suburbs and most large cities; so the former can provide higher-quality public services such as education than the latter. This policy also creates strong incentives for many localities to minimize the amount of low-cost and multi-family housing within their boundaries. The local government spending generated by such housing is greater than the local tax revenues it produces; so most localities have a fiscal motivation for being exclusionary in addition to the social motivation.

The fourth cause of inner-core poverty concentrations is racial segregation in housing markets. Racial discrimination in housing markets by owners, Realtors, and lenders is still widespread. And the unwillingness of most whites to move into neighborhoods where more than about 25-33 percent blacks already live is a key factor. Reducing residential racial segregation is hard because even if both whites and blacks desire integrated living, the different ways they define it causes almost total segregation to emerge from free choices.iii

The poverty concentrations resulting from these policies contribute to adverse neighbor hood traits in many core areas. These include high rates of crime, drug abuse, broken families, unemployment, gang violence, and non-supportive attitudes towards education. Those negative conditions “push” many middle- and upper-income households of all races – mainly those with children -- and many businesses out of central cities into suburbs.iv When these middle-and- upper-income households and viable business firms leave core areas because of such conditions, they take their fiscal resources with them.

Consequently, many core areas are left with dispro portionate burdens of providing costly services to poor households, because of the poverty concentrations within them. This creates a self-aggravating downward fiscal spiral that weakens the ability of core area governments to provide quality public services. That results in grossly unequal environments in which children are reared across our metropolitan areas.

In theory, sprawl’s specific traits help produce core-area concentrations of poverty. For example, unlimited extension of new development into space removes new jobs from accessibil ity by inner-core residents, and fragmented controls over land uses permit exclusionary policies.

#### Land use controls mean the plan doesn’t solve anything

Brueckner 1 – Professor of Economics at the University of California, Irvine (Jan K., Ph.D. from Stanford University, former visiting professor at UC Santa Barbara and UC San Diego, Brookings Institution, “Urban Sprawl: Lessons from Urban Economics [with Comments],” *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs*, pp. 65-97, p. JSTOR)

The government action that most promotes excessive suburbanization is local government land use controls. Both central city and suburban governments impose draconian limits on business and residential density—prohibition of multifamily dwellings, minimum lot size requirements, height limitations, floor-area ration limits, and a panoply of other controls. Such controls patently force excessive decentralization of metropolitan areas. They are imposed pursuant to parochial desires of residents to exclude low-income and minority people, whose interests are not represented at the local level since they are not there. As long as local governments can impose land use controls in the interest of their residents, no actions at any government level, such as growth boundaries, can have effects that will not increase distortions. Although motivations are less clear, local governments also impose density and other controls on commercial real estate.

#### Public transportation is too slow anyway – the poor would never use it far away from cities

Glaeser et al. 8 – professor of economics at Harvard University (Edward L., research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research; Matthew E. Kahn, Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago, Professor at the UCLA Institute of the Environment, the Department of Economics, and the Department of Public Policy, research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, former Visiting Professor at Harvard University and Stanford University, former professor at Columbia and the Fletcher School at Tufts University; and Jordan Rappaport, senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City; January 2008, “Why do the poor live in cities? The role of public transportation,” *Journal of Urban Economics*, Volume 63, Issue 1, pp. 1-24, p. Elsevier)

The core result from this calibration is that given reasonable parameter estimates, people earning $10 an hour would be expected to take public transportation and people earning $20 an hour would be expected to drive. But given the fact that public transportation is almost twice as slow as driving, we should still expect the poorer people who take public transportation to live closer to the city center. Natural parameter estimates for the US readily predict that the poor will both take public transportation when it is available and then locate close to the city center.

### AT Traffic

**No solvency---traffic increases proportionately**

Robert **Cervero 1** Cervero Department of City and Regional Planning Institute of Urban and Regional Development University of California, Berkeley “Road Expansion, Urban Growth, and Induced Travel: A Path Analysis” http://escholarship.org/uc/item/05x370hr#page-3

The preponderance of empirical evidence to date suggests that induced effects are substantial. A widely cited study by Hansen and Huang (1997), based on 18 years of data from 14 California metropolitan areas, found every 10 percent increase in lane miles was associated with a 9 percent increase in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) four years after road expansion, controlling for other factors. Another study of 70 U.S. metropolitan areas over a 15-year time period concluded that areas investing heavily in road capacity fared no better in easing traffic congestion than areas that did not (Surface Transportation Policy Project, 1998). Based on a meta-analysis of more than 100 road expansion projects in the United Kingdom, Goodwin (1996) **found that proportional savings in travel time were matched by proportional increases in traffic on almost a one to one basis**, a finding that prompted the U.K. government to jettison its longstanding policy, “predict and provide”, of responding to traffic-growth forecasts by building more motorways.

### Econ DA Turns Case

**Our econ DA turns case**

Randal **O’Toole 10** is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit The Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf

Further, dependence on tax dollars makes transit agencies especially vulnerable to economic downturns because the sources of most of their operating funds—generally sales or income taxes, but in some cases annual appropriations from state legislatures—are highly sensitive to the state of the economy. Sales and income taxes are particularly volatile, while property taxes are less so. 9 Yet property taxes provide only about 2 percent of transit operating funds, while sales and income taxes provide more than a quarter of operating funds. 10

### AT Environment---1NC

**No environment internal link**

Randal **O’Toole 10** is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit The Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf

Far from being an environmental panacea, **transit energy efficiencies have also dramatically declined**. Between 1970 and 2008, the amount of energy used to move a passenger one mile by automobile declined by nearly 30 percent, but **the amount used by transit buses increased by 76 percent** and the amount by light- and heavy-rail transit increased by 17 percent. 18 In 2008, transit used an average of 3,360 British thermal units (BTUs) per passenger mile, while passenger cars used an average of 3,440. 19 This is hardly a big enough difference to justify huge subsidies to transit on the basis of energy savings, especially since auto energy efficiencies are rapidly improving.

#### Turn – Transportation infrastructure has a disproportionate environmental impact on vulnerable populations

-displaces residents and damage community structure

-construction impairs walkability and livability

-roadways and rail facilities generates several types of pollution

-auto transport have generated a transit-dependent subclass

-transportation systems facilitate ethnic- and class-based segregation

**Jacobs et al 10** [EPA, David E. Jacobs 1 , Rajiv Bhatia 2 , and James VanDerslice 3 1 National Center for Healthy Housing, Washington, DC; 2 San Francisco Department of Public Health, San Francisco, CA; 3 University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, <http://www.epa.gov/ncer/events/calendar/2010/mar17/abstracts/Infrastructure_formatted_.pdf>, 3/17/2010] SV

For transportation infrastructure, this paper presents available evidence for five pathways through which transportation system infrastructure may cause disproportionate environmental or health impacts on vulnerable populations. Most directly, infrastructure can displace residents and permanently damage community structure and integrity. Second, both the construction and operation of infrastructure can impair (or benefit) walkability and livability. Third, use of motor vehicles on roadways and rail facilities generates air pollution, noise, and pedestrian hazards, disproportionately affecting residents living adjacent to these facilities. Fourth, preferential investments in auto-centered transport have generated a transit-dependent subclass that has substantial barriers to access. Finally, transportation systems facilitate ethnic- and class-based segregation, contributing to the reproduction of environmental injustice.

### AT EJ

#### Claims of “Environmental Racism” are based on nominally peer reviewed studies with critical errors

**Friedman 98** [David Friedman Ph.D, economist, physicist, legal scholar, Harvard University, B.A., 1965 (Chemistry and Physics) University of Chicago, M.S., 1967 (Physics), PhD., 1971 (Physics) Employment Santa Clara University Professor of Law University of Chicago Law School John M. Olin Faculty Fellow Cornell Law School Visiting Professor Olin Scholar Tulane University , A. B. Freeman School of Business Associate Professor UCLA, Dept of Economics Assistant Professor UC Irvine Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics Virginia Polytechnic Institute Assistant Professor of Economics University of Pennsylvania School of Public and Urban Policy Post Doctoral fellow and Lecturer Columbia University Research Associate, Physics, “The "environmental racism" hoax”, <http://yyy.rsmas.miami.edu/groups/ambient/teacher/env_justice/module%20segments/ib%20The%20environmental%20racism%20hoax.pdf>, 1998] SV

When the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) unveiled its heavily criticized environmental justice "guidance" earlier this year, it crowned years of maneuvering to redress an "outrage" that doesn't exist. The agency claims that state and local policies deliberately cluster hazardous economic activities in politically powerless "communities of color." The reality is that the EPA, by exploiting every possible legal ambiguity, skillfully limiting debate, and ignoring even its own science, has enshrined some of the worst excesses of racialist rhetoric and environmental advocacy into federal law. "Environmental justice" entered the activist playbook after a failed 1982 effort to block a hazardous waste landfill in a predominantly black North Carolina county. One of the protesters was the District of Columbia's congressional representative, who returned to Washington and prodded the General Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate whether noxious environmental risks were disproportionately sited in minority communities. A year later, the GAO said that they were. Superfund and similar toxic dumps, it appeared, were disproportionately located in non-white neighborhoods. The well-heeled, overwhelmingly white environmentalist lobby christened this alleged phenomenon "environmental racism," and ethnic advocates like Ben Chavis and Robert Bullard built a grievance over the next decade. Few of the relevant studies were peer-reviewed; all made critical errors. Properly analyzed, the data revealed that waste sites are just as likely to be located in white neighborhoods, or in areas where minorities moved only after permits were granted. Despite sensational charges of racial "genocide" in industrial districts and ghastly "cancer alleys," health data don't show minorities being poisoned by toxic sites. "Though activists have a hard time accepting it," notes Brookings fellow Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., a self-described black liberal Democrat, "racism simply doesn't appear to be a significant factor in our national environmental decision-making."

#### Environmental Justice framing of the social inequity means it fails and alienates other populations

**Litman & Brenman 12** [Todd Litman, Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Marc Brenman, Social Justice Consultancy and Senior Policy Advisor to The City Project, “A New Social Equity Agenda For Sustainable Transportation”, <http://www.vtpi.org/equityagenda.pdf>, 8 March 2012] SV

In practice, transportation social equity issues are often addressed using an environmental justice lens, which tends to focus on illegal and measurable harms to certain vulnerable minority groups, as defined in the following box. Political debates, transport agencies, professional organizations (such as TRB), advocacy groups and courts all tend to use this perspective when evaluating social equity issues (Bullard and Johnson 1997; Forkenbrock and Sheeley 2004). This approach is understandable. It addresses what can be considered the worst categories of social inequities (measurable discrimination against vulnerable minorities), and it helps define a reasonable scope of issues that planning organizations can address. For example, to satisfy social equity requirements a planning agency should identify any vulnerable minorities and any impacts that a project will impose on them, and then work with that group to mitigate these impacts. Similarly, social equity advocacy organizations have a reasonably definable constituency with definable concerns and intervention methods, including legal action. However, this approach also has significant limitations:  It is ineffective at representing the interests of unorganized and geographically dispersed groups. For example, transit riders and bicyclists are often more politically organized and influential than the much larger group of people who walk. Minority and low-income people tend to be more influential they live close together than if they are dispersed Mobility for teenagers and young adults is generally overlooked as a social equity issue. It relies on often ambiguous classifications, such as race and age, as surrogates for functional status such as poverty and physical disability. Although African Americans tend to have high poverty rates, it is wrong to assume that all African Americans are poor, and unfair to overlook white population poverty. Similarly, although seniors tend to have high disability rates, it is wrong to assume that all seniors are disabled, and unfair to overlook the needs of younger disabled people. This can alienate people who feel that their interests are undervalued, such as low-income people who lack minority status.  It tends to consider social equity issues in isolation, and so favors special mitigation actions rather than more integrated solutions that may help achieve more total benefits. For example, it is more likely to support special subsidies or transit services intended to help specific groups than to support broader policy and planning reforms that create more diverse transport systems and more accessible land use, which provide economic, environmental and social equity benefits.  It tends to overlook issues important to physically, economically and socially disadvantaged groups not specifically defined as discrimination, such as planning decision impacts on health, affordability, and community livability (Bell and Cohen 2009; CNT 2008; Litman 2007) Environmental justice, as it is currently applied, can therefore be considered a subset of total social equity issues. Environmental justice might be considered to reflect the most extreme and therefore most important issues, but this approach often excludes other impacts and groups.

### AT Cheaper---1NC

**Plan saves no money**

Randal **O’Toole 10** is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit The Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf

The Case for Subsidies Supporters of transit subsidies justify those subsidies by inventing and exaggerating the social benefits of transit. They imagine, for example, that transit is environmentally superior to driving, when in fact, the environmental impacts of transit are approximately equal to driving. 77 In 2008, for example, operating the average car used about 3,400 British thermal units (BTUs) per passenger mile, while the average transit bus used 4,300. 78 While rail transit operations use an average just 2,500 BTUs per passenger mile, the energy cost of building rail lines is high. 79 A complete lifecycle analysis has found that “total lifecycle energy inputs and greenhouse gas emissions contribute an additional 63% for onroad, 155% for rail, and 31% for air systems over vehicle tailpipe operation.” 80 In other words, the total energy cost of driving is about 5,500 BTUs per passenger mile, while rail transit is about 6,400 BTUs per passenger mile.

### AT Cheaper---2NC

**Doesn’t save money**

Randal **O’Toole 10** is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It “Fixing Transit The Case for Privatization” Policy Analysis #670 Nov 10 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA670.pdf

Subsidy advocates claim that transit saves people money. 81 In making this claim they both exaggerate the cost of driving and ignore the subsidies that support more than threefourths of the cost of transit operations and improvements. Their calculations assume that people only buy new cars, pay full finance charges for the cars, and then buy a new car as soon as the old one is paid off, resulting in an average expenditure of 56 cents per mile. In fact, the average car on the road is 9.2 years old, meaning Americans keep driving cars for an average of more than 18 years. (The average light truck is 7.1 years old.) 82 Since older cars are fully amortized, their average cost is far lower than 56 cents per mile. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Americans spent slightly less than $950 billion in 2008 buying, operating, and maintaining autos, including all related taxes and insurance. 83 For that expense, Americans drove cars and light trucks about 2.7 trillion passenger miles, for an average cost of about 35 cents a vehicle mile. 84 Since the average car carries about 1.6 people, the average cost of auto travel is about 22 cents per passenger mile. By comparison, transit riders paid $11.4 billion in fares in 2008 to travel 53.7 billion passenger miles, for an average fare of 21 cents per passenger mile. On top of the fare revenue, transit systems received $25.0 billion in operating subsidies and $16.1 billion in capital subsidies. With the subsidies taken into account, the total cost of transit was 98 cents per passenger mile—more than four times greater than the cost of driving (Table 4). 85

### AT P3's Mech

#### PPPs plays into the benefits-received model and shifts burdens which causes generational inequity

**TRB 11** [Transportation Research Board Of The National Academies, Committee on Equity Implications of Evolving Transportation Finance Mechanisms “Equity of Evolving Transportation Finance Mechanisms”, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr303.pdf>, 2011] SV

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are contractual agreements formed between a public agency and a private-sector entity that allow for greater private-sector participation in the delivery and ﬁnancing of transportation projects(FHWA Ofﬁce ofInnovative ProgramDelivery n.d.). PPPs are not a revenue source perse;rather,they are a form of project delivery that relies on one of the funding sources described above to retire project debt and cover operating and maintenance costs and proﬁts. Tolls are often, but not always, the revenue source. In many cases, PPPs are a way of using private sector borrowing capacity to raise revenue up front, to be paid back later by a stream of dedicated funds from gas taxes, tolls, transit fares, or parking fees. Thus, some PPPs have come in the form of a long-term lease of existing publicly ﬁnanced facilities to private ﬁrms, as happened in 2005 for the Chicago Skyway and in 2006 for the Indiana Toll Road (FHWA 2008). In such cases, the upfront concession fee paid by the private partner may be substantial; for example, the fee for the 99-yearlease of the Chicago Skyway was $1.8 billion. For private investors, the primary motivation for pursuing leasing opportunities is the potential to gain an attractive rate of return on their investment. Economic (and equity) issues associated with PPPs are considered by Small (2010). As discussed in Chapter 3, PPPs raise important questions about generational equity, notably, the shifting of cost burdens to future generations who may or may not benefit from the transportation facilities and services for which the funds are used.

## Misc. CP's

### Generic States Solvency

### **States Generic**

#### **States Can Solve Urban Sprawls**

Bollens 97 (Scott A., Professor of Planning, Policy and Design; Warmington Chair in Peace and International Cooperation Ph.D. University of North Carolina, AICP , Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies, Summer 1997)

These ten strategies could form the foundation for a more democratic and socially conscious regionalism. The multijurisdictional governments that initiate these strategies counter the distorting effects of contemporary single-mandate regionalism by integrating environmental, social, and economic policies on a metropolitan-wide scale. Some of these strategies are currently being used by a limited number of regional agencies. Others are currently outside the domain of regional governance, but could be part of more responsible theaters of collective action in the future. Some strategies were enacted pursuant to state legislative action, creating important operational and functional roles for metropolitan governments. Moreover, a few of the strategies are driven by goals other than social equity, yet they can have profound influences on concentrated poverty and racial **segregation**. Regional strategies aimed at improving the lives of poor and minority households commonly have been associated with adherence to deconcentration and desegregation objectives. Yet, they could complement and reinforce in-place community development efforts. Equating regionalism with mobility or deconcentration [\*19] efforts is simplistic and erroneous. The dichotomy presented between community development and regional strategy is incorrect and dangerous. If regional governance matures to include human development and social equity as policy concerns, regional governance and local community development can be compatible. Broad metropolitan demographic and economic changes affect the evolution of individual neighborhoods within regions, and these dynamics can most effectively be governed by a multi-jurisdictional body. Regional governance could reinforce and strengthen in-place community development efforts by channeling metropolitan spending (such as transportation and locally unwanted land uses) toward outcomes that provide benefits or eliminate burdens to neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. Regional governments are involved in the implementation of progressive and multi-objective federal transportation and air quality initiatives, creating opportunities for planners to incorporate social equity concerns within larger spending programs. In addition, regional strategies play an important role in the management and control of regional growth processes (metropolitan sprawl) and political organization (suburban incorporation) that affect segregation and inter-jurisdictional inequalities. The problem of suburban sprawl is exposed as an issue of social justice compelling regional governments to manage metropolitan growth processes in ways that assist in-place strategies targeted at poor neighborhoods. n80 In other cases, regional strategies could be associated with either in-place enhancement of neighborhoods or deconcentration of poverty households. For example, metropolitan tax sharing both redirects resources to poverty neighborhoods and facilitates deconcentration through the elimination of fiscally-driven land use regulations. n81 Regional strategists posit that in-place community development is necessary but insufficient to counter the growing poverty of central city neighborhoods. Deconcentration efforts are an essential supplement to place-based community revitalization. Regional organizations must play a critical role in allocating government subsidies to reduce racial concentration, in mounting metropolitan campaigns against residential segregation and in developing guidelines for municipal programs seeking residential diversity and integration. Regional bodies could require development of "fair share" suburban low-income housing while discouraging local regulatory barriers. They could encourage greater density and diversity in suburban areas through compact growth standards, while encouraging a more balanced distribution of jobs and housing across the metropolitan landscape. The choice between in-place and mobility strategies presents a false dichotomy which is unnecessarily splintering anti-poverty advocates and preventing the development of a comprehensive, multi-tier attack on the nation's areas of concentrated poverty. Equity strategies advanced by regional policy-makers could improve inner-city communities of concentrated poverty and increase the diversity of metropolitan opportunities open to poor and minority households.

**States solve**

**Raya & Rubin 6** “Safety, Growth, and Equity: Transportation” Richard Raya and Victor Rubin, policylink transportation series, http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%7B97C6D565-BB43-406D-A6D5-ECA3BBF35AF0%7D/SGE-Transportation.pdf

 The modern “transportation equity” movement has grown out of a merging of civil rights and environmental justice efforts. Still in its infancy, the transportation equity (or transportation justice) movement gained national recognition and momentum in the 1990s. The objective of this movement is to ensure equal access for all people to social and economic opportunities by providing equitable services and equitable levels of access to all places. 17 Clearly, different groups in society have different constraints on their ability to travel, so a onesize-ﬁ ts-all solution for transportation is not the goal. An equitable transportation system will be ﬂ exible and responsive to the needs of different communities and groups. In California, activists have worked, **mainly on the regional and local levels**, for equity both in decision making and in transportation outcomes. In terms of decision-making, activists have pursued more meaningful opportunities for public involvement in the development of Regional Transportation Plans (RTPs). These plans are approved by Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and outline how the majority of federal, state, and local transportation money will be spent in each region. In terms of transportation outcomes, activists have advocated on behalf of disadvantaged communities, largely one project at a time, by ﬁ ghting for additional bus lines, or for trafﬁ ccalming measures on dangerous streets. The challenge for California’s grassroots activists is to translate their local and regional transportation work into successful **statewide campaigns to advance transportation equity at the state level**. The passage of the Safe Routes to School Act in 1999 was a clear victory for transportation equity in California, providing more than $25 million a year for bicycle and pedestrian amenities around schools; but this is only a sliver of the $15 billion that the state spends on transportation each year.

#### The Aff’s focus on technology rather than other issues guarantees the same failure they criticize—a local approach that does \_\_\_\_\_\_(list of actions) solves best

**ICF 11** [ICF International, ICF International (NASDAQ:ICFI) partners with government and commercial clients to deliver industry expertise and innovative analytics in the energy, environment, and infrastructure; health, social programs, and consumer/financial; and public safety and defense markets. “Environmental Justice Emerging Trends and Best Practices Guidebook”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/environmental_justice/resources/guidebook/ejguidebook110111.pdf>, November 1, 2011] SV

Community concerns are highly context specific and cannot be assumed or generalized across traditionally underrepresented communities. Transportation agencies may encounter multiple underrepresented communities within the same project area. Variations in the modes of transportation used may result in differing access to facilities and services and thus divergent needs. The populations may also have distinct cultural mores and preferences for communication that will require sensitively tailored public participation plans. As such, agencies need to explore a broad range of strategies to engage with and validate community concerns. Community outreach should proactively engage underrepresented communities in their preferred settings, instead of expecting the community to come to the agency with feedback. Direct community outreach can enhance participation by visiting impacted community members, meeting one-on-one to solicit their feedback, holding special events, and convening meetings at non-traditional places. Innovations in technology can advance and extend agencies' outreach by offering community members who cannot participate in public meetings alternative options for obtaining information and providing feedback. However, technologically advanced outreach methods should not be used to the exclusion of other methods. Transportation planners should address suspicion and skepticism directly by incorporating community concerns into planning and programming efforts. Transportation agencies must demonstrate how the concerns articulated by community members are explicitly addressed by project plans. Outreach materials should highlight community concerns as they have been articulated in the public participation process, and provide details about the agency's efforts to address community concerns and incorporate them into project plans and construction designs. These materials can be disseminated in a number of ways. As discussed in this chapter, agencies with an online presence use email newsletters, status updates on their Web sites, and videos. The Buford Highway case study created display boards of the revised plans featuring the measures adopted to address pedestrian concerns and exhibited them at open house information meetings. The BREJTP project team presented findings during community meetings at locations proposed by community members. They also included community members in the development and dissemination of the final report community members helped to develop. In addition to incorporating mitigation and improvement suggestions, agencies can also involve community members in analyzing the concerns that they raise. As demonstrated, community members can be involved in selecting appropriate metrics for validating their concerns, as well as in gathering data.

#### States can solve transit

Sanchez 8 (Thomas, Fall,  chair of the City and Metropolitan Planning Program at the University of Utah and Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution. An Equity Analysis of Transportation Funding, http://urbanhabitat.org/node/2812)

It is difficult to gauge the level of commitment of MPOs to transportation equity principles simply by describing the types of planning activities that they undertake. Moreover, the racial and ethnic composition of voting members is only an indirect measure of adequate public participation and representation, although it may serve as an indicator of the degree to which minorities have a stake in regional policy making. Planning analyses directed at equity concerns and adequate representation are two visible factors affecting MPO planning outcomes, which have both practical and symbolic importance. Data collection, analysis, and system evaluation regarding fairness at least signal an awareness of potential weaknesses and corrections. Follow through and implementation, however, are the ultimate sign of organizational commitment. In addition, a diverse set of representative policy-makers would ideally reflect the range of constituent preferences. An interesting question is whether planning analysis and representative boards are substitutes for or complements within the MPO structure. Is it sufficient to have thorough data collection, analysis, and monitoring of equity outcomes at the metropolitan scale despite unrepresentative board members, or do representative boards (and their consequent voting) more directly influence policy and decision-making that affect distributional equity? Finally, does the combination of planning analyses and representative boards have synergistic effects that provide a greater potential for addressing the needs of traditionally underserved populations? Specific challenges remain in regard to greater public participation and involvement in transportation decision-making by state departments of transportation and MPOs.[5] Community-based groups that assist transportation agencies should be encouraged to improve outreach processes and strategies to identify culturally diverse groups and facilitate their involvement. Such efforts are greatly needed to support information dissemination about transportation and related land-use impacts. Mechanisms are needed that allow formal recognition of coalitions of community representatives on MPO advisory committees and decision-making boards. In addition, MPOs, local governments, researchers, and community-based organizations need resources for more data collection and analysis about transportation access to basic needs, such as healthcare, jobs, affordable housing, and public education.[6]

States solve; The public want the states to do transit
Raya & Rubin 6 “Safety, Growth, and Equity: Transportation” Richard
Raya and Victor Rubin, policylink transportation series,
<http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%7B97C6D565-BB43-406D-A6D5-ECA3BBF35AF0%7D/SGE-Transportation.pdf>

The modern “transportation equity” movement has grown out of a merging of civil rights and environmental justice efforts. Still in its infancy, the transportation equity (or transportation justice) movement gained national recognition and momentum in the 1990s. The objective of this movement is to ensure equal access for all people to social and economic opportunities by providing equitable services and equitable levels of access to all places. 17 Clearly, different groups in society have different constraints on their ability to travel, so a onesize-ﬁts-all solution for transportation is not the goal. An equitable transportation system will be ﬂ exible and responsive to the needs of different communities and groups. In California, activists have worked, mainly on the regional and local levels, for equity both in decision making and in transportation outcomes. In terms of decision-making, activists have pursued more meaningful opportunities for public involvement in the development of Regional Transportation Plans (RTPs). These plans are approved by Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and outline how the majority of federal, state, and local transportation money will be spent in each region. In terms of transportation outcomes, activists have advocated on behalf of disadvantaged communities, largely one project at a time, by ﬁghting for additional bus lines, or for trafﬁc calming measures on dangerous streets. The challenge for California’s grassroots activists is to translate their local and regional transportation work into successful statewide campaigns to advance transportation equity at the state level. The passage of the Safe Routes to School Act in 1999 was a clear victory for transportation equity in California, providing more than $25 million a year for bicycle and pedestrian amenities around schools; but this is only a sliver of the $15 billion that the state spends on transportation each year.

### UGB CP

#### Text: The fifty states and all relevant sectors should implement urban growth management by mandating urban growth boundaries.

#### UGB’s solve Segregation; Portland Proves

Orfield 6 ( Myron, March 2006, Associate Professor of Law and Fesler-Lampert Chair in Urban and Regional Affairs, University of Minnesota., ARTICLE: LAND USE AND HOUSING POLICIES TO REDUCE CONCENTRATED POVERTY AND RACIAL SEGREGATION,)

Black-White racial segregation has decreased in the Portland region. The region is one of the nation's least class-segregated metropolitan areas, and it became even more economically integrated [\*901] during the 1990s. n162 These pro-opportunity trends may flow in part from the region's growth management policies. Limiting sprawl can help in-crease access to opportunity by reducing residential racial segregation. While sprawl may depress real housing prices, making home purchases more accessible to Black residents, the same process that lead to this outcome can also lead to greater racial segregation. Moreover, studies have shown that Black homeowners, more than any others, are steered toward real estate that actually loses equity value. n163 These prop-erties generally are located in highly stressed inner-ring suburbs. n164 Matthew Kahn investigated the relationship between sprawl and Black home ownership. n165 He found that sprawl reduces the Black/White housing consumption gap by increasing the supply of land for development, which in turn in-creases affordability. n166 Using regression analysis, he found that Black households in highly sprawled metropolitan areas occupied larger housing units and were more likely to own their homes than were Black households in regions without as much sprawl. n167 Kahn's analysis contains its own counter-argument, however. He posits two explanations for his findings. First, greater land supply in sprawled areas lowers housing prices. n168 Second, "as jobs move to the fringe in sprawling metro areas, inner-city housing stock that is far from employment opportunities becomes cheaper." n169 Kahn thus concedes, "while housing opportunities for Blacks may improve with sprawl, the quality of life for minorities [\*902] could de-cline in sprawling areas if suburban growth leads to less access to jobs and increases income segregation." n170 If sprawl leads to increased racial segregation, then urban growth boundaries could stem further segregation and perhaps promote racial integration. Indeed, a recent study found that urban containment policies decrease racial segre-gation. n171 Arthur Nelson, Casey Dawkins, and Thomas Sanchez compared the 1990-2000 changes in the index of dis-similarity - a common measure of segregation - for the Black population relative to the White population among select-ed metropolitan areas, both those with and those without urban containment policies. n172 They found that, although Black-White segregation declined in nearly all metropolitan areas in the United States, segregation declined faster, on average, among regions with growth containment policies. n173 More specific to the Portland region, Nelson and Wachter found that Black-White residential segregation declined in Portland at twice the average national rate between 1990 and 2000. n174 The region's Black-White dissimilarity value fell fifteen points - from sixty-four in 1990 to forty-eight in 2000. n175 Across all metropolitan areas, Black-White dissim-ilarity decreased nearly as much during the 1990s - twelve percentage points, to fifty-two. n176 (Dissimilarity values of sixty or above are very high, while values of forty to fifty reflect moderate residential segregation. n177 Changes in dis-similarity values exceeding ten points during a decade are considered very significant.) n178 [\*903] Black-White segregation, however, declined fastest in metropolitan areas where the Black population shares were under five percent. n179 Nevertheless, although the Portland metropolitan area had a small Black population share in 2000 - roughly three percent n180 - it is desegregating even faster than other areas with small Black population shares. The region's twenty-one point decline in its Black-White dissimilarity value not only is more than twice the pace of the national average decline between 1980 and 2000 (nine points), n181 but it also exceeds the twelve-point average decline for metro areas with Black population shares of less than five percent. n182 In the Portland region, Hispanics comprised approximately seven percent of the population in 2000 n183 and were far less segregated from Whites than Blacks. n184 Even so, Hispanic-White segregation is increasing in Portland. n185 The Hispanic-White dissimilarity index for the Portland region increased from twenty-two in 1980 to thirty-five in 2000. n186 Yet, Portland's Hispanic-White dissimilarity index remains well below the average value of forty-nine (a four-point increase across twenty years) for regions with Hispanic population shares of five to ten percent. n187 In addition to having relatively less racial segregation, for decades Portland has been "one of the most class-integrated metropolitan areas in the country." n188 The Oregonian, Portland's major newspaper, reported that "Portland and its suburbs became more economically integrated during the 1990s," unlike most metropolitan areas. n189 As of 2000, households earning less than the region's median income constituted at least one-third of the population in all but one Portland suburb. n190 David Bell, a partner at Portland- [\*904] based GSL Properties, attributes this economic integra-tion in the Portland region to the metropolitan housing rule's requirement n191 that cities within the Portland UGB zone enable construction of a substantial number of multiple-family units. n192

### Condition CP

**TEXT: The United States federal government should condition \_\_\_\_ upon urban areas having a regional integrated water, wastewater, and stormwater plan that takes into account carbon emissions, energy, and water needs.**

**That solves**

**Knight et. al 10** Bruce A. Knight is a member of the American Planning Association, National Infrastructure Investment Initiative, “REBUILDING AMERICA: APA NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT TASK FORCE REPORT” October 2010 http://www.planning.org/policy/infrastructure/pdf/finalreport.pdf

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS In the early '90s the water and wastewater industries began promoting the concept of integrated resource planning (IRP) which encourages an evaluation of the land use and environmental impacts of centralized versus distributed systems. The concept of the IRP is still relatively new to most wastewater utilities that may still rely on a more traditional master planning process for specific facilities with little community involvement. Specific ways that planners can start to implement the IRP concept are noted in this section. Require regional water/wastewater/stormwater plans The federal government should condition any federal funds to urban areas for infrastructure upon having a regional water/wastewater/stormwater plan that is integrated with local land use plans, and that take into account carbon emissions and the energy needs of water/wastewater treatment as well as the water needs for energy production. This could be similar to how federal transportation funds are now conditioned combined with the new requirements that California - SB 375 etc - has to connect transportation/ carbon emissions/energy use.

**And, that’s key to preventing the collapse of water infrastructure**

**Knight et. al 10** Bruce A. Knight is a member of the American Planning Association, National Infrastructure Investment Initiative, “REBUILDING AMERICA: APA NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT TASK FORCE REPORT” October 2010 http://www.planning.org/policy/infrastructure/pdf/finalreport.pdf

As part of rebuilding America’s infrastructure, we are challenged to develop a new paradigm for water/wastewater that integrates water resources with energy, land use, transportation and the ecosystem. Aging infrastructure, climate change, and population **growth are stretching the limits of our existing water supply**, **sewage systems, and drainage and flood control infrastructure**. **These forces are depleting and degrading our natural resources**. More is needed than simply replacing or upgrading the performance and efficiency of the individual parts of this infrastructure - **change is needed in the fundamental way water and wastewater are integrated with the rest of the urban systems**. It's almost impossible to talk about these utilities today without taking a more integrated approach that encompasses stormwater management and flood control, low-impact development, recycling and reuse of wastewater effluent, and the health of urban watersheds and associated ecosystems. The condition of the gray assets is important, but insufficient in characterizing the challenges and needs associated with managing urban water resources.