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Erdogan Bad Shell

Erdogan’s prestige is on the brink

Cook 4/2 [Steven A., Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/19018/turkeys\_local\_elections.html] KLS

The results of Turkey's local elections were a shock to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Although the party secured almost 39 percent of the vote-16 points better than its closest competitor-and 42 mayoralties, those numbers represent an eight percent decline in popular support and a loss of 15 mayoralties. For a politician of great skill such as Erdoğan, this miscalculation is compounded by the fact that he called the elections a referendum on his leadership and his party. Indeed, in the run-up to the polls Erdoğan indicated that if AKP secured anything less than 47 percent of the vote, the party would consider it a failure. As a result, despite Justice and Development's still commanding leads at both the local and national levels, there is a sense that Erdoğan and his party are greatly weakened and have begun an inevitable, irreversible slide in popularity. To move forward, Erdoğan and Justice and Development need to get back to basics on the economy, particularly as the unemployment rate nears 15 percent, and political reform.

Troop withdrawal is a win for Erdogan

Watson 9 (Ivan, staff writer @ CNN, 3/22/9, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/03/22/turkey.iraq.us/index.html) JPG

Turkey's prime minister said Saturday he would be receptive to the possibility of allowing American troops to withdraw from Iraq across Turkish territory, if the United States asks for permission. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says he's "positive" on the idea of U.S. troops crossing his country. "With regard to the exit of the American soldiers, we are positive on that issue," said Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking through an interpreter. In an exclusive interview with CNN at the headquarters of his Justice and Development Party, Erdogan indicated he had not yet received an official request from his American ally for permission to move troops across Turkish soil. "If weapons and ammunition are going to come out, it has to be clear where they are going to be heading," Erdogan said. "If we are informed about where this military equipment would be going precisely, then we can make a proper evaluation." In March 2003, the Turkish parliament voted against allowing a U.S. invasion force to cross Turkey's border to Iraq. At the time, Erdogan's political party commanded a majority of seats in parliament. The decision upset Pentagon plans to open a northern front in the push to overthrow Iraq's Saddam Hussein regime, forcing the U.S. military to rely on a single-pronged invasion force from Kuwait. It also struck a blow to the close U.S.-Turkish relationship, which grew increasingly tense during the U.S. [occupation of Iraq](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Iraq_War) -- widely unpopular in Turkey. American popularity dropped to single digits in Turkish opinion polls during the Bush administration. But Erdogan said President Obama has hit the right tone since his election to office. "His steps for Guantanamo Bay ... were very positively received in Turkey," Erdogan said, adding that he also welcomed Obama's recent message to Iran offering congratulations on the Persian New Year. Erdogan drew a comparison between himself and the American leader, saying they shared similar humble roots.

Erdogan Bad Shell

Erdogan causes multiple scenarios for regional instability

Aveniri 7-5 (Shlomo, PoliSci@Hebrew U., http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/avineri37/English)

Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva may have stepped on a hornets’ nest, owing to his unfamiliarity with regional policies and his general anti-Yanqui sentiments. Erdogan must have known that, by trying in this way to shield Iran, he is opening a wider chasm with the EU – and obviously with the United States. Opposing new sanctions against Iran in the Security Council further alienated Turkey from both the EU and the US. This does not sit well with a “zero conflict” policy. The same can be said about the shrill tone that Turkey, and Erdogan himself, has recently adopted vis-à-vis Israel. Walking off the stage at Davos during a round-table debate with Israel’s President Shimon Peres might have gained Erdogan points in the Arab world, which has historically viewed Turkey with the suspicion owed to the old imperial ruler. But the vehemence with which he lashed out at Israel during the Gaza flotilla crisis obviously went far beyond (justified) support for beleaguered Palestinians and (equally justified) criticism of the messy way in which Israel dealt with an obviously difficult situation. While gaining support on the so-called Arab street, and perhaps upstaging Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in the role of a modern Commander-of-the-Faithful, Erdogan’s policy and behavior have shocked not only Israelis, but also moderate Arab leaders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and some of the Gulf states. For many years, the AKP appeared to many in the region and elsewhere as a model for a democratic party with Islamic roots. But by supporting Hamas, Erdogan has allied Turkey with the most disruptive and extremist fundamentalist force in the Muslim Arab world – an organization that has its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, the arch-enemy of all Arab regimes in the region (including, of course, Syria). Since Erdogan is a critic of Israel, Arab rulers cannot say this openly. But Arab governments – and their security services – are beginning to ask themselves whether Turkey’s policies will undermine whatever internal stability their states possess. This is the exact opposite of a genuine “zero conflict” policy that aims to minimize tensions and enhance stability. Turkey now finds itself, through its alliance with Iran and support for Hamas, rushing headlong into a series of conflicts – with Europe, the US, Israel, and moderate Arab regimes that have survived Iranian Shia fundamentalism but may now feel threatened by a neo-Ottoman Sunni foreign policy. Turkey is thus emerging not as a regional mediator, equidistant from contending local players, but as an assertive, if not aggressive, regional power aiming for hegemony. Far from avoiding conflicts and mediating existing tensions, Turkey under the AKP appears intent on stoking new conflicts and creating new frontlines.

Middle East instability causes extinction

**Nassar 2** (Bahig, Arab Coordinating Centre of Non-Governmental Organizations, paper for Cordoba Dialogue on Peace and Human Rights in Europe and the Middle East) GAT

**Wars in the Middle East are of a new type**. Formerly, the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union had prevented them, under the balance of the nuclear terror, from launching war against each other. In the Middle East, **the possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction leads to military clashes and wars**. Instead of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Israel are using military force to prevent others from acquiring them, while they insist on maintaining their own weapons to pose deadly threats to other nations. But **the production, proliferation and threat or use of weapons of mass destruction** (nuclear chemical and biological) **are among the major global problems which could lead**, if left unchecked, **to the extinction of life on earth**. Different from the limited character of former wars, **the current wars in the Middle East manipulate global problems and escalate their dangers** instead of solving them.

\*\*\*UQ\*\*\*

UQ – Erdogan Brink

Erdogan’s prestige is on the brink

Cook 4/2 [Steven A., Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/19018/turkeys\_local\_elections.html] KLS

The results of Turkey's local elections were a shock to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Although the party secured almost 39 percent of the vote-16 points better than its closest competitor-and 42 mayoralties, those numbers represent an eight percent decline in popular support and a loss of 15 mayoralties. For a politician of great skill such as Erdoğan, this miscalculation is compounded by the fact that he called the elections a referendum on his leadership and his party. Indeed, in the run-up to the polls Erdoğan indicated that if AKP secured anything less than 47 percent of the vote, the party would consider it a failure. As a result, despite Justice and Development's still commanding leads at both the local and national levels, there is a sense that Erdoğan and his party are greatly weakened and have begun an inevitable, irreversible slide in popularity. To move forward, Erdoğan and Justice and Development need to get back to basics on the economy, particularly as the unemployment rate nears 15 percent, and political reform.

UQ – Erdogan Up – Public

Erdogan is popular – Election campaign

Salem 7-6 (Paul, Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41113)

Prime Minister Erdogan is a popular figure and he is somewhat of a populist himself. He enjoys stirring up public support and has at least two constituencies. One is the Turkish constituency itself—the country is in the run-up to elections and the themes that he has been raising, including tension with Israel, have been popular. He is certainly playing to a domestic audience.

UQ – Erdogan Up – Public

Turkish people rallying behind Erdogan- soft stance on Iran

BBC 6/15 [2010, Lexis] KLS

Increasingly confident and visibly nostalgic about the Ottoman role as a major world power,Turks certainly want and like for their government to have more say in the international arena. The Erdogan government's ambitious and dynamic foreign policy fits and represents those needs. They travelled all over the world, set the bar higher and higher, and finally secured temporary membership at the United Nations Security Council, declaring they would tackle injustices in the world. In this spirit, Ankara is playing the devil's advocate in the Iran nuclear crisis. In addition to the economic loss in the event of sanctions or a war, they complain that Tehran does not get fair treatment from the West. They point out the lack of concern about Israel's suspected nuclear programme, whereas there is a big fuss about Iran's highly scrutinized activities. Turkey's soft approach to Iran has further infuriated the Israelis because they consider the Tehran regime to be their most dangerous enemy in the region. Interestingly, some Sunni Arab regimes, who feel threatened by Shi'i Iran, privately join Israel in their criticism of Turkey. The problem for them is that Turkey has won the hearts of the Middle East man on the street. Erdogan may be more popular than many of the local rulers. And this public support alone will ensure Ankara stays in the game for a long time and plays it by its own rules rather than being a subordinate power. This will challenge and eventually change the Middle East equation. It is official that Turkey has a chair at the table now, at the expense of Israel if not the US.

Public support for Erdogan- emphasis on Middle East involvement

Harvey 6/17 [Benjamin, Staff Writer, BloomBerg newshttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-16/erdogan-rebuffs-u-s-while-protesting-propaganda-turkey-is-iranian-ally.html] KLS

There is no lack of public support at home for his move away from Israel. A poll by Ankara-based Metropoll found that 61 percent of those interviewed thought his reaction to the flotilla raid wasn’t strong enough. The June 3 poll questioned 1,000 people and had an error margin of 3 percent. Erdogan’s denial of a break with the West came at a regional business forum in Istanbul on June 10, the day after the UN Iran vote, at which he was given a standing ovation by Arab leaders. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, writing in Foreign Policy magazine last month, said NATO and the EU are still the “main fixtures” of Turkish diplomacy, and are “perfectly compatible” with growing involvement in the Middle East. Egemen Bagis, the minister for EU affairs, said in a June 12 interview that Turkey regularly consults U.S. leaders on Iran and other issues, even if the U.S. may feel “frustrated” with Turkish diplomacy on Iran.

Massive public support for Erdogan- Nationalistic wave with Israel strife

Tolan,6/8 [Sandy, Author of "The Lemon Tree: An Arab, a Jew, and the Heart of the Middle East.", Huffington Post, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sandy-tolan/israel-and-turkey-end-of\_b\_602615.html] KLS

At the time some observers declared this as merely stagecraft for a leader playing to his Turkish public. In part, of course, that was true. What these observers underestimated was Erdogan's genuine anger, backed by public protests against Israel and in support of the people of Gaza. Erdogan, who had been brokering back-channel discussions between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights, said those talks were essentially ended by the Gaza war. As Turkish public anger at Israel grew, in late 2009 the government [barred Israeli jets from participating in a Turkish military exercise.](http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0%2C%2C4832121%2C00.html)  "Turkish public opinion could not agree with the fact that Israeli aircraft would be training on Turkish territory, while at the same time there are gross human rights violations being committed in Gaza," Suat Kiniklioglu, a spokesman for the Turkish parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, told Deutsche Wella. Meanwhile, a Turkish television show depicting Israeli soldiers as murderous raised a fury in Tel Aviv. The result: a stunning and deliberate diplomatic gaffe committed by Bibi Netanyahu's foreign minister, Danny Ayalon, in a January 2010 meeting with Turkey's ambassador to Israel, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol. For the photo op, Ayalon arranged to be sitting above his Turkish counterpart, so that he could literally look down on him, and made sure the television shot omitted the Turkish flag, showing only Israel's Star of David. This orchestrated public humiliation only worsened the two nations' already fragile relationship. The situation was salvaged, somewhat, when Ayalon finally apologized just before Turkish president Gul's deadline to recall the ambassador to Ankara. Both Ayalon and Turkish leaders, of course, were playing to public opinion, which have each grown increasingly nationalistic as the conflict with the Palestinians hardens feelings.

UQ – Erdogan Up – Public

**Erdogan’s economic reform, human rights, political transparency draw bipartisan public support**

Kara 10 [Seyfeddin, Staff Writer, July, The Cresent Magazine http://www.crescenticit.com/background/1884-july-2010/2835-closer-look-at-akp-after-its-eight-year-rule-in-turkey.html] KLS

The AKP’s economic performance has also been a very important factor in its success. The AKP was born in the midst of a Turkish economic crisis which took the country to the brink of bankruptcy. In a notoriously corrupt economic system, the wealth of the country was being plundered by the secular elites and foreign enterprises. By undertaking bold economic reforms and a liberal market economy approach, the AKP gradually resuscitated the ailing economy and significantly reduced inflation and unemployment. The steadily growing Turkish economy has now become the 17th largest in the world and 6th in Europe, and is rising. 3. Fundamental human rights and freedoms have advanced greatly under AKP rule. Draconian laws that were enacted after the 1980 military coup had tightened the secular oligarchy’s grip on society. Upon forming the government, the AKP adeptly used the EU accession process to amend some of these laws. Civil liberties and freedom of expression have greatly improved; torture, ill-treatment, and unlawful killings have diminished significantly. The Kurdish minority has been embraced by the state; TRT, the state channel, has set up a 24-hour Kurdish channel, and a state university has opened a Kurdish language department. These developments have made the AKP even more popular in Kurdish dominated southeastern Turkey than the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). This was reflected in the AKP success in the Kurdish areas during the 2007 general elections.

Public has rallied behind Erdogan after Israel-Palestine conflict

Kara 10 [Seyfeddin, Staff Writer, July, The Cresent Magazine http://www.crescenticit.com/background/1884-july-2010/2835-closer-look-at-akp-after-its-eight-year-rule-in-turkey.html] KLS

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has worked in AKP’s favour at the domestic level as well. For instance, a harsh exchange between Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and Israeli President Peres at the World Economic Forum in January 2009 helped the AKP retain its majority of votes in the 2009 local elections. Prior to the incident, poll results had indicated a decline in AKP support. AKP popularity has reached its acme with the recent Palestinian-aid flotilla incident in which Israeli commandos attacked the boats killing nine Turkish aid workers. The Turkish public, whose national pride has been vexed by arrogant Israeli actions, has united behind the government. Some experts are now expecting a landslide victory for the AKP in the forthcoming elections.

UQ – Erdogan Up – Parties

Erdogan drawing support from CHP and MHP due to tension policy

Dogan 2/17 [Yalcin, Staff Writer, Daily News, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=8216coup-claims-and-tension-help-erdogan8217-2010-02-17] KLS

Kurtulmuş takes a tour in Anatolia for a few days a week. He takes the pulse of the public and says the following: “Erdoğan is following a tension-policy. And the CHP [Republican People’s Party], and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] knowingly or unknowingly, give support to this. But the tension-policy helps Erdoğan. One of the critical tools of this policy is the claims of a military coup. If he feels cornered, Erdoğan sticks to some certain statements like, ‘People, the coup is being made and we are here to stop it.’ He seeks public support. So, the coup claims and tension help the government.” But, the government is in favor of settling the scores with coups, Kurtulmuş asks: “You better settle the score with the Sept. 12 military coup. Why is the government not abolishing interim Article 15 in the Constitution, protecting the putscher?” Kurtulmuş has so many friends in the ruling party. We should underline his remarks about the tension and coup claims. Erdoğan suggested working together with Kurtulmuş a few times before, and offered deputyship in 2007. Kurtulmuş, however, goes his own way.

UQ – Erdogan Up – A2: Midterms

Erdogan will stay in power- 7 year ruling, mid term poll inaccuracy

Danieli 1/26 [Ariel, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3839650,00.html] KLS

 "Mid-term polls are no indication. I find it hard to believe that Deniz Baykal (leader of the secular opposition) will get 26% in the elections. If the elections were held next month this poll would be a sensation. It would point to the fact that Erdogan needs a coalition." Liel added that the Turkish voter has a reputation of being disloyal to its elected officials. "Erdogan has been ruling for seven years and that's rare in Turkish politics. The Turkish public takes down ruling parties fairly quickly," he noted.

UQ – Erdogan Down – Public

Erdogan’s credibility gone- International community, divided Turkish public

Rosenblum 6/20 [Irit, Staff Writer, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/tourism-minister-erdogan-is-the-enemy-not-turkey-1.297123] KLS

"The Turkish people aren't the enemy, but Erdogan is Israel's enemy," said Misezhnikov in response to Erdogan's comments that Turkey's problem is with the Israeli government, and not the Israeli people. Earlier yesterday, Erdogan said that his country did not have a problem with Israel's people but rather with its government's policies, the Turkish news agency Andolu reported. "This isn't a healthy situation, and unless he leaves office there is no room for optimism," Misezhnikov said during a cultural event in Bat Yam. He added that there are indications that Erdogan isn't speaking as a representative of the Turkish people, and that the country is divided in its support for him. The tourism minister also called on Israelis to heed the government's warnings and refrain from traveling to Turkey. The Tourism Ministry is due to meet today to discuss ways to draw travelers toward staying in Israel for their summer vacation. The Turkish PM stressed that his country would continue to investigate Israel's attack on the Turkish-flagged aid flotilla led by the Mavi Marmara on which nine activists were killed. "We have not remained silent against this piracy and injustice, and we will not do so, and we will seek solutions within the framework of international law," Erdogan told reporters in Ankara. Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Israel to agree to an international investigation of the commando raid on the Turkish ship trying to bring aid to Gaza and do "much more" to meet the needs of the Palestinians living there. Ban said Friday that Israel's investigation of the May 31 flotilla raid is important but won't have "international credibility," which is why he is continuing to urge the Israeli government to agree to an international panel with Israeli and Turkish participation. Last week Israel, under mounting international pressure, said it would set up an internal five-person panel, including two foreign observers, to investigate events surrounding the flotilla raid.

Turkish public- even leftist groups are concerned about Erdogan’s shift to the Islamic world

 Azadian 6/21 [Edmond Y, Staff Writer, Armenian Mirror Spectator, 2010, http://www.mirrorspectator.com/?p=3620] KLS

Brazil, like Turkey, is flexing its muscles inspired by its newly-found economic powerhouse, but unlike Turkey, it has not precipitated any open conflict with the US or the US’s allies in the region. Turkey has challenged the US at the United Nations and antagonized its most trusted ally, Israel, in the Middle East. Turkish leaders feel so secure in their position that after challenging the US and Israel they seem to have full control of the domestic agenda. In the past, every time the civilian government flexed its muscles, the military intervened. In the 1960s, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’ liberal government ended in disaster. A few years ago the Islamist coalition government of Necmettin Erbakan evaporated at blink of the eye of the military, which always has had strong ties to the US military establishment. This time around, the Erdogan government seems to have the military under leash through the Ergenekon investigations, which seem to have given the civilians a free hand in making policy decisions. Observers and politicians around the world — and even inside Turkey — have been wondering whether the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is shifting its political focus. Ironically, even some leftist groups in Turkey, which were very critical of their nation’s complete political surrender to the West, have expressed concern over these new policies.

Erdogan massive public support- rhetoric proves

Bugun 4/21 [Hmet Tasgetiren, Staff Writer, Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-207970-when-chp-leader-baykal-goes-erdogan.html] KLS

I used this term to make the heading a little provocative, but actually I’m not in favor of reducing Deniz Baykal’s Blessed Birth Week speech to this kind of framework. There was much in the speech that belonged to Baykal, but still, when you look at the speech it gives the impression of a “Baykal gone Erdoğan.” If you were to ask anyone in Turkey or in the world who they thought the speech belonged to, they would say Erdoğan. But that speech belonged to Baykal, and it is for this reason that it is very interesting. Baykal has attracted much attention because of his Erdoğan-like attitude. Erdoğan ranks at around 30 percent and Baykal ranks around 7 percent in public polls on credibility. If another public poll were to be held in the aftermath of this speech, the figures between Erdoğan and Baykal would probably be much closer. Why am I underlining all of this? Because I think it’s important to understand how a politician resonates with the public, or rather to properly evaluate why Baykal was congratulated by a hoca in Adıyaman, an imam in Erzurum and a state minister from a rival party.

UQ – Erodgan Down – Public

Erdogan’s credibility waning- Moderates opposed to his handling of the PKK

Head 6/3 [Jonathan, BBC News, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10492696.stm] KLS

In recent weeks Mr Erdogan's language has also become more hawkish, threatening to drown the insurgents in their own blood. But he still argues that his Democratic Opening is the only way forward. Other sectors of Turkish society are also weighing in. The country's most powerful business association, TUSIAD, made a rare intervention on the subject, criticising the government's handling but also calling for new thinking. A coalition of hundreds of non-governmental organisations and civil society groups in the south-east also came together in an appeal for both the PKK and the Turkish armed forces to stop fighting. But there is little else the government can do now, losing support and just a year away from an election.UQ – Erdogan

AKP is unpopular – Anti-Israel, pro-Islamic tilt

Inbar 6/9 [Efraim, Staff Writer, 2010, The Australian, Lexis] KLS

The nation could vote out the Islamists next year THE ``Gaza flotilla'' incident has revealed once again the change in foreign policy in Turkey, which is distancing itself from the West. It seems the Turkish government was behind the organisation of this provocation and it definitely endorses it. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, who occasionally makes anti-Semitic statements, seemed to be taking a leading role in this Israel-bashing. Even more troubling is that the Turkish government has co-operated with IHH (Turkish Relief Organisation), which has links to al-Qa'ida and other Islamist terrorists. The attitude towards Israel is just one facet of Turkey's reorientation in world affairs. Turkey, an important regional state and an important Western ally, stayed away from the Middle East for almost a century because the Turks perceived the region as backward, fanatical, corrupt and undemocratic. Yet, in the past few years, Turkey has returned to the region and is trying to carve a leadership role commensurate with its imperial past. Moreover, it has been in the throes of an identity crisis, in which Muslim tradition, still entrenched in Turkish society, aspires to greater expression than was hitherto permitted by the secular regime in Ankara. The attitude towards Israel is part of that debate. The ruling Islamist party (AKP) since November 2002 became emboldened only after its re-election in July 2007 to make significant changes to foreign policy. Ankara's relations towards Israel cooled, especially in the wake of the Gaza war in the winter of 2008. As of late, the fact Washington has a weak president who emphasises cordial relations with the Muslim world, at the expense of Israel, encourages Turkey to distance itself from the Jewish state. The hostile stance taken by Turkey towards Israel diverges from that of the West on Hamas, but also on other important issues. Ankara hosted Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, accused of war crimes, despite the protest of the European states. Turkey is the only member of NATO to have hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Turkey is also growing closer to Syria, which is anti-American and deep in the Iranian camp. Moreover, Turkey has stepped up its activity in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Undoubtedly, Erdogan feels more at home in Middle Eastern markets than in Western cities. Turkey also has tightened its relations with Russia, which aims to curb the role of the US in international affairs. Indeed, Turkey did not hesitate to deviate from American preferences. It announced it would not join sanctions against Iran and in the past month has strived, together with Brazil, to extricate Iran from its uncomfortable diplomatic position because of its ongoing nuclear program.

Erdogan losing public support- corruption, civil rights abuse

Ronen 6/6 [Gil, Staff Writer, 2010, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906]

Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. If current public opinion is held till the next elections, scheduled for July 2011, it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.”

UQ – Erdogan Down – Public

Erdogan losing public support- unemployment, trend of unpopularity

Danieli 1/26 [Ariel, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3839650,00.html] KLS

 Data recently released by the Sonar institute indicate that the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained only 28% in public support – the lowest rate since it entered parliament in 2002. Major-General Amos Yadlin tells Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Ankara has changed its policy, veering more towards radical direction; says easy for international community to attack Israel over its security measures as it hasn't faced terror recently The secular Republican People's Party (CHP), on the other hand, is slowly getting stronger according to the poll, with 26% of the public's support. Ranked third is the extreme-Right Nationalist Movement (MHP) with 19%. The ruling party has sustained an ongoing drop in support rates along the years. Whereas in the 2007's general elections it gained 46% of the votes, by 2009 it dropped to 39%. When asked about Turkey's problems 69.7% of the poll's participants answered that unemployment and the economic crisis were the most urgent issues. This probably explains the popularity decrease in Erdogan's party.

Erdogan’s support on the decline- unemployment

Danieli 1/26 [Ariel, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3839650,00.html] KLS

"The sense is that the ruling party is losing support, which is expected to continue," a senior official in the secular opposition party told Ynet. He noted that the AKP's loss of popularity indicates a return of the swing votes to the secular parties. "In 2002 they punished us over the government's failure, but now the same people are punishing Erdogan for the high unemployment."

UQ – Erdogan Down – Public

Erdogan on the decline with public- move from secularism, Iran

Inbar 6/9 [Efraim, Staff Writer, 2010, The Australian, Lexis] KLS

One should hope for change through democratic channels. Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world. Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is unease over the government's policy pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements such as Hamas and Iran. One should also recall that Shi'ite Iran was a historic rival of the Sunni Turks. Indeed, support in public opinion for the ruling Islamic party is in decline, despite Erdogan's remarkable political skills. This is mostly because of corruption and abuse of civil rights. Were elections held today, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. If present public opinion holds until theelections, scheduled for July next year, it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister. It is possible that, precisely because of his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel to gain public support. A big political drama is unfolding before our eyes in this important country. Only the Turks can determine their future. The strategic consequences of Turkey becoming part of an anti-American axis are far-reaching. For the sake of the free world, but mostly for their own sake, let us hope that the Turks will choose democracy and progress, not the ignorance and authoritarianism offered by Islamist regimes.

Erdogan’s credibility declining- shifting towards the East, secularism

Auslin 6/29 [Michael, AEI's director of Japan Studies, The Journal of American Enterprise Institute, http://blog.american.com/?p=16082] KLS

ISTANBUL — First-time visitors to Turkey are overwhelmed not only by the sheer mass and vitality of the country, but also by the fervid political atmosphere. Michael Rubin’s “The Islamic Republic of Turkey” is a must-read for those hoping to understand the current trends that have the country posed on the knife-edge of further Islamicization or a rebalancing of the country’s traditionally secular social and political systems. Several days of meetings in Ankara and Istanbul, while on a German Marshall Fund visit to Europe, resulted not only in confirmation of many of Michael’s insights, but also yielded surprising unanimity of views among opposition political leaders, foreign diplomats, academics, civil society leaders, and ordinary citizens. Most, though not all, feared the path their country is taking. They sense an inevitable withering of Turkey’s secular base, and an uncertain, though undoubtedly more Islamic-influenced future. Even more odd, to me at least, was the resigned belief in and acceptance of Prime Minister Erdogan’s increasingly intrusive state—many of those I met assumed they were being taped by the government, their conversations being recorded for future possible use. Few objected; rather they shook their shoulders and frankly admitted that they self-censor their conversations, even with family members, while on the phone or in email. For my part, all I can say is that my Verizon BlackBerry stopped working normally while I was in the country (repeatedly turning off and rebooting itself) and resumed perfect service once I left Turkey (maybe I was just the unlucky beneficiary of a non-compatible network). Far more worrisome is the well-executed undermining of Turkey’s long-established judiciary, media, and educational systems. However, there is evidence that Erdogan has overreached himself, and that public opposition to his regime is mounting. Nearly everyone I talked with felt that next year’s elections could result in the former ruling party, the secular CHP, retaking power. Should that fail, many of my interlocuters said, it would be up to the army to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to defend the secular state.

UQ – Erdogan Down – Parties

Israel attack has united opposition to the AKP

Today’s Zaman 6/9 [Middle Eastern Think Tank, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212572-chp-to-present-parliament-motion-on-govt-actions-over-israeli-raid.html] KLS

Kılıçdaroğlu said they support the establishment of an international commission to investigate Israel’s May 31 raid on the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish vessel in the flotilla. Around 600 of the flotilla’s 700 passengers were aboard the Mavi Marmara. Most were from Turkey and Arab countries, but the group also included dozens of Americans and Europeans, including lawmakers, and an Arab member of Israel’s own parliament. The Israelis ordered the flotilla to halt, but the ships pressed ahead and the resultant clash left nine people dead, including eight Turkish and one dual US-Turkish citizen. Around 30 people were wounded in the attack. “We said we have given our support to the prime minister, as he said the attacks would not be left without a response. We said the CHP would support solutions which are concordant with our national interests,” he said in his party’s group meeting on Tuesday. However, Kılıçdaroğlu also said Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not able to explain why Turkey sent civilians to Israel even though Israel had warned that it would intercept the flotilla. “Why did we send our citizens there? For what reason did the Turkish government not take the Israeli warnings into consideration? Who is responsible for sending civilians to their deaths? You put our citizens on a ship and send them to die. Then what is the reason for the existence of the Turkish Republic? To send its citizens to their deaths?” Kılıçdaroğlu asked. Meanwhile, two independent deputies joined the main opposition party on Tuesday. Independent deputies Harun Öztürk and Hüseyin Pazarcı became members of the CHP, increasing the number of CHP deputies to 101, while the number of independent deputies dropped to eight. On June 1 Emrehan Halıcı and Kamer Genç joined the CHP, after Kılıçdaroğlu was elected the new chairman on May 22. Currently, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has 336 seats in Parliament, while the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has 69 and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has 20 seats.

Unified opposition against Erdogan – Only a risk of a turn renewing support

Today’s Zaman 6/3 [Middle Eastern Think Tank, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214991-former-minister-basesgioglu-resigns-from-ak-party.html] KLS

With the resignation, all eyes turned to Adem Yavuz Arslan, the Ankara representative of the Bugün daily. Arslan warned in his column on Friday that resignations from the AK Party may arrive “in a few days.” According to the columnist, the new era in the Turkish politics, which kicked off with the resignation of Deniz Baykal from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), continues in full swing. “The new era made [Turkey Movement for Change (TDH) leader] Mustafa Sarıgül cancel his plans to transform his movement into a political party and forced [Democrat Party (DP) leader] Hüsamettin Cindoruk to stand aside for a while. … All internal and external powers joined in the common denominator to ‘overthrow Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.’ But there is still an obstacle to those who wish to re-design Turkish politics,” remarked Arslan, explaining that Prime Minister Erdoğan is still a strong leader and his AK Party is still a powerful political party. According to Arslan, the “powers behind plans to re-design politics in Turkey” persuaded nine AK Party deputies to resign from the party. “Starting today, personal resignations will occur within the AK Party. The ruling party will experience dissolution if it cannot manage to ‘win back the hearts’ of its members who were offended by their party,” the columnist cautioned.

UQ – Erodgan Down – Parties

Erdogan losing power- backlash from opposition parties for PKK killings

Today’s Zaman 6/21 [Middle Eastern Think Tank, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213718-opposition-blames-ruling-party-after-deadly-attacks.html] KLS

In the search for a scapegoat to heap blame on for the killings of 12 Turkish soldiers by the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) over the weekend, Turkey’s opposition parties have pointed to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its policies as the main factor responsible for the escalation of tension in the country. According to Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the ruling party’s policies have weakened Turkey’s fight against terror, implicitly putting the blame on the “Kurdish initiative,” through which the government hoped to end PKK terror.

On Saturday, nine soldiers were killed when terrorists attacked an army border unit in Hakkari’s Şemdinli district. Two soldiers were later killed by a land mine in the area. A separate terrorist assault on a military outpost in Elazığ left one soldier dead early Sunday. “Our soldiers’ battle, at the cost of their lives, shows Turkey’s commitment to its national unity. Political will, however, has weakened the fight. There is no doubt that our fight against the terrorist organization will prove successful. It is high time we say “stop” to these treacherous attacks against our unity, solidarity, peace and fraternity,” Kılıçdaroğlu remarked. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli was harsher in his criticism of the ruling party. “The architect of this dark picture is [Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan and his government. Erdoğan and the AK Party are a great weakness in the fight against terror,” he said.

Continued factions risk total Turkish isolationism and attack of Iraq

Today’s Zaman 6/21 [Middle Eastern Think Tank, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213718-opposition-blames-ruling-party-after-deadly-attacks.html] KLS

The MHP leader also called on the government to give up its plans for a Kurdish initiative and declare a state of emergency in Turkey’s East. “Turkey should impose a policy of deterrence against northern Iraq with the use of all political, economic and military means. And it should also launch a vast land operation in the region, which harbors [PKK] terrorists. … Turkey should also break all the terrorist head’s channels of communication with the outside world,” he remarked.

Erdogan’s power fading- AKP will not stay in power

Today’s Zaman 6/18 [Middle Eastern Think Tank, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213441-ak-party-signals-snap-elections-under-worst-case-scenario.html] KLS

He said Erdoğan had actually made a mistake by publicly announcing that they did not plan to hold early elections. He said recent polls suggested that the AK Party's votes are at around 37-38 percent, whereas the CHP's votes are at 30 percent. “The AK Party will not go to early elections at a time when the CHP's votes are at their highest unless there is an extraordinary development. But if the Constitutional Court rules to annul the package, this would be an extraordinary development. In that case the prime minister would study the ruling's effect on the people and say that although he had promised no early elections this year, conditions are now forcing him to hold elections ahead of time. Any sort of annulment from the Constitutional Court would increase the AK Party’s votes by a few points. If the prime minister is convinced that this increase would secure the AK Party coming to power as a single-party government, he will not refrain from holding early elections.”

UQ – Erdogan Down – Parties

Republican People’s Party mounting opposition to Erdogan- flotilla, inconsistent policies

Today’s Zaman 6/8 [Middle Eastern Think Tank, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212535-main-opposition-in-turkey-accuses-govt-of-hypocrisy-over-israeli-raid.html] KLS

Leader of Turkey's main opposition accused government of carrying out hypocritical policies after the Israeli raid on Gaza-bound aid flotilla. "Mr. Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] lashes out at Israel and he uses the matter as an instrument in domestic politics," Republican People's Party Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu told a party meeting on Tuesday. "But why did Turkey say 'yes' to Israel's OECD membership bid in spite of Palestine's objections. You gave the green light on May 20, 2010," Kılıçdaroğlu said. On May 10, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development invited Israel to join the organization and it became a member on May 27. "You say 'one minute' in front of cameras, but 'yes please' behind closed doors," Kılıçdaroğlu said referring to Erdoğan's angry exchange with Israeli president during a panel discussion in Davos where he criticized Israel over its military campaign on Gaza and stormed off the stage. Turkish-Israeli ties have gone worse after last week's Israeli raid on Gaza aid convoy which killed eight Turks and an American of Turkish origin. Kılıçdaroğlu said his party supported Turkish government's efforts for a UN Security Council resolution to condemn Israeli government, adding that CHP would support government in its all moves regarding Turkey's national interests. "However, Mr. Prime Minister, who roared and almost declared war, saw that you will hit the wall some day if you use foreign politic as a tool in domestic politics," he said. "You have to stand behind your words," he added. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=215143 The biggest story in yesterday’s Turkish newspapers seemed to be the “format” of the visit Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) new leader, paid to army trenches in the southeastern corner of the country. Did he stand up tall, or kneel down? Did he look determined to finish off the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or not? How was he treated by the commanders and soldiers?

Erdogan losing power- his own party doesn’t acknowledge him

Şafak 7/2 [2010, Today’s Zaman Yasin Dogan Yeni http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214814-pms-invitation-was-ok.html]

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently calling on political party leaders to share their views about the rise of acts of terrorism in Turkey with the government has started a new political polemic. Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s responded to Erdoğan’s invitation saying: “Does Erdoğan think he is the president? There is no such tradition in Turkish politics,” which is similar to the uncompromising attitude of Deniz Baykal of the CHP. It is inevitable for a political understanding that is against dialogue and reconciliation to turn every issue into a crisis. Kılıçdaroğlu’s statement, saying, “Prime ministers do not invite other leaders but they visit other leaders” is inconsistent. Is it reasonable to invite the prime minister to visit his party by saying that he is not the president? In this case, does Kılıçdaroğlu think he is the president? The government has no right to invite others, but the opposition has to do so. What could be more reasonable and natural than the prime minister of a country making such a call to the opposition leaders?

\*\*\*Issue Spec UQ\*\*\*

Issue Spec UQ – Shift to East Up

Shift to East coming – Erdogan key

Ben-Ami 6-28 (Shlomo, Toledo Ctr for Intl Peace, http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-s-rise-and-the-decline-of-pan-arabism-analysis-495692)

The deadly fiasco of the Turkish-led 'peace flotilla' to Gaza highlighted the deepening strain in the Israeli-Turkish alliance. But it mainly helped expose the deeper, underlying reasons for Turkey's shift from its Western orientation toward becoming a major player in the Middle East - in alliance with the region's rogue regimes and radical non-state actors. Foreign policy cannot be separated from its domestic foundations. The identity of nations, their ethos, has always been a defining motive in their strategic priorities. Israel's blunders did, of course, play a role in the erosion of its alliance with Turkey. But the collapse of its old 'alliance of the periphery,' including Turkey, the Shah's Iran and Ethiopia, had more to do with revolutionary changes in those countries – the Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power, the end of Emperor Haile Selassie's regime, and now Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamic shift – than with Israeli policies. The current crisis reveals the depth of Turkey's identity complex, its oscillation between its Western-oriented Kemalist heritage and its Eastern Ottoman legacy. Snubbed by the European Union, Erdogan is tilting the balance towards the latter.

Issue Spec UQ – Israel Alliance Down

Erdogan de-emphasizing Israeli relations- Iran and Hamas ties on the rise

Bsaikri 6/23 [Senussi, Researcher, Middle East Monitor2010 http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/articles/europe/1197-turkish-israeli-relations-frozen-can-the-arabs-turn-this-to-their-favour] KLS

Turkey has been pursuing a new foreign policy since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in November 2002. Although Turkey maintained its special ties with Israel during the early years of the AKP administration, there was growing concern among Israeli leadership regarding Turkey’s increasing activism in the Middle East, particularly its relations with Iran and its support for Hamas. Evidently, Turkish policy towards Israel has changed in the last three years. Erdogan’s government has become much more pro-Palestinian and much more critical of Israel’s policies in the West Bank and Gaza.

Issue Spec UQ – Iran Alliance Up

Erdogan pushing for Iran alliance after flotilla

Harvey 6/17 [Benjamin, Staff Writer, 2010,Business Week, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-17/erdogan-rebuffs-u-s-insists-turkey-isn-t-iran-ally-update2-.html] KLS

Even so, the U.S. should anticipate increasing “friction” as Turkey seeks to raise its global profile, said Henri Barkey, a member of the State Department’s Middle East policy planning staff from 1998 to 2000. “We are going to see many more clashes between Turkey and the U.S.,” said Barkey, now a professor at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. “They are opening embassies everywhere, using trade as a major source of influence, trying to play a role in a whole series of international organizations and alliances.” That will be a change for a country that has been a formal ally of the U.S. since 1952, when it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and had established diplomatic relations with Israel three years earlier. Throughout the Cold War and its aftermath, Turkey was a reliable supporter of the U.S. and its allies and in recent years Israel’s strongest partner in the Muslim world. The most recent sign of Turkey’s drift away from that posture came last week when it voted in the United Nations Security Council against imposing new nuclear sanctions on Iran. That followed Turkey’s recall of its ambassador to Israel after what Erdogan called an Israeli “massacre” of nine Turkish citizens on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla.

Iran alliance coming- public support, anti-Israel sentiment

Harvey 6/17 [Benjamin, Staff Writer, 2010,Business Week, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-17/erdogan-rebuffs-u-s-insists-turkey-isn-t-iran-ally-update2-.html] KLS

Erdogan says the evolution of Turkish policy marks a return to natural ties with Arab neighbors, strained for decades by the legacy of Ottoman imperialism and Turkey’s close security links with the U.S. and Israel. There is no lack of public support at home for his move away from Israel. A poll by Ankara-based Metropoll found that 61 percent of those interviewed thought his reaction to the flotilla raid wasn’t strong enough. The June 3 poll questioned 1,000 people and had an error margin of 3 percent. Erdogan’s denial of a break with the West came at a regional business forum in Istanbul on June 10, the day after the UN Iran vote, at which he was given a standing ovation by Arab leaders. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, writing in Foreign Policy magazine last month, said NATO and the EU are still the “main fixtures” of Turkish diplomacy, and are “perfectly compatible” with growing involvement in the Middle East.

Issue Spec UQ – Iran Alliance Up

Iran alliance will pass- Erdogan ideologically drawn to Islamic roots

Poyrazlar 6/17 [Elcin, Washington correspondent, Cumhuriyet, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elcin-poyrazlar/turkey-uncovered-the-iran\_b\_600562.html] KLS

Turkey's 'No' vote on UN sanctions on Iran is yet another clue about the ruling AKP party's real agenda. Some people like to portray Turkey as a more independent actor on the world stage and an emerging regional power. Yet the truth is that the AKP government is simply unveiling its long suppressed desires and finally showing its Islamist face. Yes, Turkey is becoming more independent but by breaking away from the west. Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister and the AKP's leader, has roots in political Islam and loves to play to the Arab street, but this is much more than a question of boosting his ego.

Iran alliance will pass- Gaza outrage against Israel

Poyrazlar 6/17 [Elcin, Washington correspondent, Cumhuriyet, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elcin-poyrazlar/turkey-uncovered-the-iran\_b\_600562.html] KLS

The AKP's Islamist rhetoric has reached its peak with its latest statements about Israel. Israel's bloody attack on a Turkish aid ship on its way to Gaza gave the AKP formidable political leverage in the region. Frustrated by the US's rejection of a fuel exchange deal with Iran brokered by Brazil and Turkey, the AKP saw a new opportunity to demonize Israel and depict it as the major problem in the region. Israel's unjustifiable killings of nine Turks on the ship, which Erdogan labeled 'state terrorism', came as a lifeline for the Turkish government. The AKP is gradually losing support from its Islamist base and used the crisis to serve its own domestic agenda. Erdogan's comments became borderline hysterical following the Israeli raid, and that fueled domestic anger in Turkey and irritated the country's allies. If Erdogan was indeed so upset about the loss of Turkish lives, why did not he make half the fuss about an attack the very same day by the PKK, the Kurdish terrorist group, in which six Turkish soldiers died?

Issue Spec UQ – Iran Alliance Down

Iran Alliance won’t pass- Turkey will remain a mediator between the EU and Middle East

Arab Times 7/7 [2010 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/155224/t/Turkey-is-currently-trying-to-play-a-significant-role-in-the-Middle-East-and-this-was-evident-through-its-mediation-role-between-Iran-and-the-West/Default.aspx]

“Meanwhile, the government of Tayyep Recip Erdogan has tried to adopt some policies that could enable it to meet the satisfaction of the European Union and persuade the latter to accept Turkey’s membership in the Union, but the EU members in general and Germany and France in particular still oppose Turkey’s entry into the EU. “Such being the case, we have observed that Turkey is currently trying to play a significant role in the Middle East and this was evident through its mediation role between Iran and the West. Not just that, Turkey at the moment looks biased towards the Arab attitudes in terms of the Arab-Israeli struggle and this has resulted in tense relations with Israel and the West.

Issue Spec UQ – PKK Compromise Down

PKK compromise won’t pass- opposition parties and PKK terror stunt

Today’s Zaman 6/29 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214504-105-erdogan-reforms-must-not-mar-flow-of-funds-to-emerging-markets.html] KLS

Mr Erdogan invited the two nationalist opposition parties to join him in formulating what he was now calling his "Democratic Opening". But they refused, accusing him of "selling out to terrorists". "This should have been above party politics," says Professor Arakon. "But the opposition thought only of appealing to their own supporters, of saying no to whatever the government proposed." The opposition was given a perfect opportunity to attack the plan when the PKK announced in October that it was sending back 30 people from Iraq, including eight fighters from its armed wing, as a test of the government's sincerity. Its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, had already threatened to launch a "roadmap" of his own. Loss of nerve The PKK was staking out a part for itself in the Democratic Opening, although the government's main objective had been to isolate the insurgents. Under normal circumstances, the fighters would have been arrested once they crossed the border, but they were released. However, when they arrived in the main Kurdish city of Diyarbakir they were given a heroes' welcome by tens of thousands of supporters. This prompted a furious response from nationalists and veterans' groups in the rest of Turkey, who accused the PKK of trampling on the memories of the soldiers killed in the war. The government lost its nerve. For years Turks have been conditioned to view the PKK as barbaric "terrorists". The group is listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU and the US.

PKK compromise won’t pass- increased violence trading off with reconciliation prospects

Arrott 6/22 [Elizabeth, Staff Writer, Voice of America, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/news-analysis/Kurdish-Militants-Undermine-Turkish-Initiative-96891889.html] KLS

 Turkey has launched a new military operation against Kurdish rebels along the Iraqi border, prompted by a series of insurgent attacks against security forces. The campaign is the latest in the long struggle against the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, by the Turkish government, which is trying to balance integration of Kurdish citizens with appeasing outrage over the attacks. The latest strikes have been a blow to Turkey's self-image as a new regional leader, a reminder of a problem that has festered since 1984, when the PKK launched its insurgency in the southeast. A top Turkish diplomat is among those trying to downplay the incidents. Huseyin Avni Botsali, the country's ambassador to Egypt, says the government is not underestimating the attacks, but cautions they must be put in a broader context. "They definitely have a destabilizing effect, but they are tactical developments, some of the negative attitudes are influencing it," he said. "Some people try to use violence in order to push for a political agenda. And history has proven time and again that violence is not going to deliver anything." While the PKK may not be able to beat the government militarily, the government, despite decades of battle, has yet to defeat the rebels.

No risk of PKK reform- ideologically opposed to reconciliation

Head 6/3 [Jonathan, BBC News, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10492696.stm] KLS

Exactly a year ago Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that he was working on a new plan to end the war with insurgents from the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, which has cost more than 40,000 lives. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan (centre) visits troops near the border with Iraq, 20 June 2010 After talking of peace, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is now more hawkish Today that plan has stalled, and new attacks by the PKK this year have reignited the conflict, killing more than 50 soldiers and prompting retaliatory raids by Turkish troops and aircraft into northern Iraq. "Our nation wants unity," Mr Erdogan declared after meeting the main Kurdish party, the DTP, last August, to discuss his plans to end the conflict in the Kurdish south-east. "It wants no more crying mothers, no more blood and killing". It was the first time a Turkish government had promised to seek a solution through democratic, peaceful means. There was talk of an end to restrictions on using the Kurdish language, new human rights bodies in the region, a new era between the Turkish state and its largest minority. But by November the government had still not presented its plans to parliament, as promised.

Issue Spec UQ – PKK Compromise Down

PKK compromise wont pass- PKK attacks escalate resentment

Today’s Zamaan 7/6 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215242-103-kilicdaroglu-waits-for-pm-as-bahceli-sets-conditions-for-meeting.html] KLS

Tension and violence have escalated in Turkey recently, after Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorists attacked dozens of military personnel and civilians, bringing terrorism to the top of the country’s agenda. Erdoğan last week called on all political party leaders to share their views on the rising terrorism with the government, but the opposition did not welcome Erdoğan’s invitation. “I will convey my invitation as soon as possible. We will see who will come. I would like to discuss these issues [related to terrorism] with those who accept the invitation. I would like to hear what kind of contribution they would make,” Erdoğan said last Tuesday during his party’s parliamentary group gathering.

PKK compromise won’t pass- empirically opposed opposition

Today’s Zamaan 7/6 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215242-103-kilicdaroglu-waits-for-pm-as-bahceli-sets-conditions-for-meeting.html] KLS

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government last summer launched an initiative to address Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish issue. However, the government was unable to find support from the opposition parties for its move. Neither the CHP nor the MHP have agreed to meet with the government to discuss the democratic initiative thus far.

PKK compromise won’t pass- US opposition

Hürriyet Daily News 6/25 [2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=erdogan-to-meet-obama-at-g-20-summit-2010-06-25] KLS

 “The issue of Turkey’s struggle with the PKK can be raised during the talks within the scope of northern Iraq, where the terrorist organization has bases,” sources said. Recognizing the PKK as a “common enemy,” Washington signaled they are ready for new requests from the Turkish government. The Turkish military bombed targets in northern Iraq in response to escalating PKK attacks in June. Since then, Ankara has requested more cooperation from Regional Kurdish Administration in northern Iraq.

PKK compromise won’t pass, conflict has only increased in the past year

BBC 7/3 [2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10492696.stm] KLS

Exactly a year ago Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that he was working on a new plan to end the war with insurgents from the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, which has cost more than 40,000 lives.Today that plan has stalled, and new attacks by the PKK this year have reignited the conflict, killing more than 50 soldiers and prompting retaliatory raids by Turkish troops and aircraft into northern Iraq.

PKK compromise won’t pass- heightened Kurdish violence and Erdogan’s threats

BBC 7/3 [2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10492696.stm] KLS

So when Mr Erdogan finally presented the plan to parliament in November, it contained little detail. Over the following month, the Constitutional Court banned the DTP over its alleged links to the PKK, and hundreds of local Kurdish officials were arrested by the authorities. Rebel 'hawks' For many Kurds, it seemed like business as usual again. "The opening is finished", declared DTP member of parliament Emine Ayna. The PKK had declared a ceasefire in April 2009. But this year it began attacks on military targets as the winter snow retreated from its mountain strongholds. On 31 May, Abdullah Ocalan announced from his prison cell that the ceasefire was over, that he had give up hope of a dialogue with the government."The PKK is being led by hawks at the moment", says Kurdish intellectual Umit Firat. "The movement is led by men whose only skills are fighting, so they feel threatened by the Democratic Opening. They don't want to lose support to the governing party, they want their presence to be felt." In recent weeks Mr Erdogan's language has also become more hawkish, threatening to drown the insurgents in their own blood. But he still argues that his Democratic Opening is the only way forward. Other sectors of Turkish society are also weighing in.

Issue Spec UQ – PKK Compromise Up

PKK compromise will pass- Iraq withdrawal necessitates Turkish stability

BBC 7/3 [2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10492696.stm] KLS

"Our nation wants unity," Mr Erdogan declared after meeting the main Kurdish party, the DTP, last August, to discuss his plans to end the conflict in the Kurdish south-east. "It wants no more crying mothers, no more blood and killing". It was the first time a Turkish government had promised to seek a solution through democratic, peaceful means. There was talk of an end to restrictions on using the Kurdish language, new human rights bodies in the region, a new era between the Turkish state and its largest minority. But by November the government had still not presented its plans to parliament, as promised. 'Democratic Opening' "It was never a very precise project," says Professor Maya Arakon, from Yeditepe University in Istanbul. "It came out of nowhere after the prime minister had returned from Washington, where he had been told by President [Barack] Obama of the US plan to pull out of Iraq by 2011." Mr Obama asked Turkey to prepare to maintain stability in the region after the US left, which added pressure on Turkey to resolve tensions in the region. PKK attacks in south-eastern Turkey are often carried out by rebels based in northern Iraq who cross the border to stage raids.

PKK compromise will pass- business coalitions and society pushing for it

BBC 7/3 [2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10492696.stm] KLS

The country's most powerful business association, TUSIAD, made a rare intervention on the subject, criticising the government's handling but also calling for new thinking. A coalition of hundreds of non-governmental organisations and civil society groups in the south-east also came together in an appeal for both the PKK and the Turkish armed forces to stop fighting. But there is little else the government can do now, losing support and just a year away from an election. However, some things have changed. Kurdish language and culture classes are being taught for the first time in universities in the south-east. And Kurdish politicians are constantly challenging the restrictions on the use of Kurdish during campaigns. "This government's greatest achievement is that they have left the era of denial in the past," says Umit Firat, "They have declared that there is a Kurdish people and a Kurdish language."

PKK compromise will pass- opposition behind Erdogan’s proposals

Today’s Zamaan 7/6 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215242-103-kilicdaroglu-waits-for-pm-as-bahceli-sets-conditions-for-meeting.html] KLS

A series of exchanges between party leaders in Ankara over a possible meeting with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss the recent spike in terrorist attacks in the country has gained momentum with new moves by opposition leaders.

Issue Spec UQ – PKK Compromise Up

PKK peace initiative will pass- diverse parties support it

İdiz 7/1 [Semith, Staff Writer, Huriyett Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=if-not-now-then-when-are-they-going-to-talk-2010-07-01] KLS

Turkey continues to face a serious problem with Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, terrorism. It is evident that unless this problem is solved, further advances in terms of the “Kurdish initiative” will be difficult for the government. This will become increasingly apparent as the country enters an election climate, given that general elections are due in 2011. The chances are that the various political parties will vie with each other in terms of a nationalist discourse in this environment, especially as the number of Turkish soldiers and civilians killed by the PKK continues to rise. As matters stand, the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party, or MHP, has started to up the ante in this respect by calling for martial law to be re-established in the predominantly Kurdish Southeast, and for the death penalty to be reinstated for terrorists. Fortunately even the military sees that there is no logic to this at this stage, given that years of martial law in the region brought no results, and may have even made the situation worse according to many observers. As for bringing back the death penalty, that is highly unlikely. The maximalist approach of the MHP aside, it is clear that a much more imaginative approach will be required if this problem is to be solved. Whether this will involve some form of direct or indirect contact with the PKK is something that is heatedly being debated at the moment. One side to this debate is vehemently opposed to this proposition, while the other side sees it as the only way to go. Whatever the merits of these arguments may be, it is becoming increasingly clear that if any bold steps are to be taken to try and solve this problem, then some form of national unanimity will have to be established.

PKK compromise will pass- PKK losing support with continued violence, need stability

Turkone 6/19 [Mumtazer Staff Writer, Today’s Zaman, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-213530-is-terrorism-on-the-rise.html] KLS

The soundest method is always trial and error. The PKK made its first move in İskenderun on May 31. As the proclaimed “moderate war” goes on, the PKK leaders revise their tactics based on the reactions they receive. And the first reaction: Kurds do not want violence. By resorting to violence, the PKK is losing its public support. The “moderate war” which was launched with the PKK’s İskenderun attack has no strategic target. A war without a clear strategy will bring only bloodshed, even for a terrorist organization. What will the PKK gain by killing people? Even the PKK leaders in Kandil cannot answer this question. The PKK is trying to protect its organizational structure and interests. But once the evil forces are released from Pandora’s box, they acquire a somewhat autonomous personality and won’t go back in the box. The PKK now has a structure that is independent of the circumstances which once made it viable. With this independent structure, it seeks to adapt to the changing conditions in Turkey as well as on a global scale. Thus, the conclusion we can arrive at today: Even if Turkey can settle its Kurdish issue, this may not necessarily solve the PKK issue. On the other hand, without solving the Kurdish issue, Turkey cannot solve any problem. The Kurdish issue can be settled only via a legal accord to which everyone would readily accede while the terrorism issue can be terminated only through a common political wisdom that will not flicker even in the face of extremely violent attacks.

Issue Spec UQ – Economic Reform Up

Economic reform will pass- Erdogan at the G20 proves

Today’s Zaman 6/29 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214504-105-erdogan-reforms-must-not-mar-flow-of-funds-to-emerging-markets.html] KLS

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said the world economy should be careful when taking precautionary measures so as not to stop the flow of capital to developing countries and has called for the restructuring of credit rating agencies. Erdoğan was speaking on Monday at a meeting of the Group of 20 economic powers gathering in Toronto. He said the global economic crisis had revealed deficiencies within the financial sector. In order to reduce the vulnerability of the sector and prevent a new crisis from happening, the G-20 has serious financial sector reform on the agenda, he said. However, the prime minister asserted that some points should be considered seriously regarding the financial reform. He said precautionary measures which increase the cost of funds should be avoided.

Issue Spec UQ – No Con Reform

No constitutional reform – secular resistance and no votes

Champion 6/23 (Marc, writer @ Wall Street Journal, 6/23/10, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704117304575137511475485200.html) JPG

Other changes include increased labor-union rights for public servants, and guarantees for certain preferential treatments for women, children, the elderly and the disabled. That clause, however, drew suspicion from pro-secular media and politicians, who saw its wording as an attempt to promote the right to wear Islamic head scarves. Politicians and analysts say the AKP is unlikely to get the 367 votes it needs in the 550-seat parliament to adopt the amendments. The government already has said that if that happens, it will call a referendum on the changes, a vote analysts say it is likely to win.

No constitutional reform – domestic and international opposition

Katcher 10 (Benjamin, analyst @ American Strategy Program, Washington Note, 5/10/10, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/05/searching\_for\_e/) JPG

The constitutional reform debate is the latest manifestation of the defining divide in Turkish politics between the conservative, Islamic-oriented AKP government and the staunchly secular, Kemalist state led by the military, judiciary and bureaucracy. The reforms would enhance the power of the government at the expense of the state by giving the government greater power to appoint justices to Turkey's high court and requiring that military officers accused of civilian crimes be tried in civilian courts. A third controversial proposal that would have made it more difficult for the judiciary to close political parties fell just short of passing. [As I predicted in March](http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/03/der_spiegels_in/), the constitutional reforms place the European Union in a bind. The EU has called for Turkey to adopt a new constitution for years, but the reform proposal is neither as comprehensive nor as liberal Europe would like. The process itself is problematic as well because all three opposition parties opposed the reforms, which they perceive to be a power grab in disguise.

Reform wont pass – strong base of opposition

Alpay 10 (Sahin, columnist @ Todays Zaman, 2/8/10,

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-200887-stumbling-blocks-of-constitutional-reform-in-turkey.html) JPG

The proponents of the status quo include also the main opposition parties, that is, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which aspire to rule in a coalition following the next election. The “class” base of the status quo may be said to be the İstanbul bourgeoisie that rose to prominence mainly due to the state subsidies enjoyed during the years until the 1980s when Turkey pursued an import substitution industrialization strategy. The social base of the status quo is composed mainly of urban educated strata committed to Kemalism.

Issue Spec UQ – No Con Reform

**No constitutional reform – court blockage and decreased voting base**

Alpay 10 (Sahin, columnist @ Todays Zaman, 2/8/10,

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-200887-stumbling-blocks-of-constitutional-reform-in-turkey.html) JPG

Worse surely are the difficulties of the AKP that arise from its opponents. The AKP government took advantage of the EU accession process to amend the 1982 constitution to a considerable extent during its first three years in power. Under military and judicial coup threats, encouraged by the negative signals coming from the EU, it was soon forced to shelve the initiative for an entirely new constitution it put forward prior to the 2007 elections. Considering there is no other way of winning the coming elections and putting in force its agenda, the AKP leadership is currently attempting at partial constitutional reform, to basically avert the threat of a second closure case before the constitutional court, and to affect some improvements in political rights even for the Kurds. It is possible, however, that the Constitutional Court, which has increasingly assumed juristocratic powers, will not allow for even a partial reform.

The proponents of economic reform are disunified and weak

Alpay 10 (Sahin, columnist @ Todays Zaman, 2/8/10,

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-200887-stumbling-blocks-of-constitutional-reform-in-turkey.html) JPG

Proponents of democratic change, on the other hand, are composed of social segments that are weary of the status quo. These include mainly the devoutly religious Sunni Muslims, the Alevis, the Kurds, and the non-Muslims. None of these groups, however, speaks with one voice, and none is much concerned with the others’ grievances. The Sunni religious complain of restrictions on their religious rights, but do not object to those on others’ rights. Alevis demand official recognition of their religion, but otherwise strongly support hard-line state secularism. Kurds demand recognition of their identity, but are divided between those who regard the PKK as their representative, and those who do not. The demands of the tiny minority of non-Muslims hardly matter for the larger society. The leading “class” base of the proponents of change may be said to be the business and professional elites of Anatolia who have risen to prominence thanks to the liberalization and globalization of the Turkish economy since the 1980s. And the toughest critics of the status quo are surely the liberal-minded intelligentsia who display considerable differences among themselves.

Issue Spec UQ – No Con Reform

Constitutional reform won’t pass, even if it does it will be a watered down version

Hürriyet Daily News 3/19 [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=pm-erdogan-outlines-timetable-for-constitutional-reform-2010-03-19] KLS

The AKP has asked for appointments with the other parties represented in the Parliament – the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, and the Peace and Democracy Party, or BDP – to discuss the package Monday. As soon as it is finalized, the proposed reforms are also scheduled to be announced to members of the media and relevant nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs. “Turkey has an urgent need for constitutional reform,” Erdoğan told members of his Justice and Development Party, or AKP. “Politics are getting hot while the weather is getting hot in the spring,” he added. “We wish to make a comprehensive amendment [to the Constitution] but unfortunately other political parties are too far away from such reform. Some of them even suggest reducing this amendment to only one article.” The constitutional amendment will not personally benefit Erdoğan or the AKP, but instead answer national expectations and requirements as the country moves toward European Union membership, the prime minister said. “Turkey has significantly progressed in the fields of economy and foreign and domestic politics, as well as social life,” he added. “Turkey now has to achieve these reforms without losing any more time.” Erdoğan said he was planning to meet with his “friends” from the opposition to discuss the proposed changes. The prime minister said he and his colleagues would meet with the opposition to “hear about which parts they prefer to exclude or what kind of amendments they would suggest,” urging all parties to collaborate. “I want to believe in common sense,” Erdoğan added. “Anyone who disagrees, please express yourself frankly and avoid making up excuses. You can achieve nothing by misleading the public.”

1. [Turkey’s last offer to Israel: Three options on table](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey8217s-last-offer-to-israel-three-options-on-table-2010-07-04)
2. [Israel rebuffs Turkey's demanded apology](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=israel-tells-turkey-we-wont-apologise-for-defending-self-2010-07-05)
3. [Top Israelis urge 'reset' of ties between Israel, Turkey](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=israeli-minister-ex-spy-chief-urge-recovery-of-ties-2010-07-05)
4. [As reparation process with Israel begins….](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=as-reparation-process-with-israel-begins8230.-2010-07-02)
5. [From a proactive to a reactive foreign policy](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=from-a-proactive-to-a-reactive-foreign-policy-2010-07-05)
6. [Turkey's rhetorical guns trained on northern Iraq](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=8216we-are-at-where-words-end8217-says-basbug-2010-07-06)
7. [British, German, UAE airports 'refuse fuel to Iran jets'](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=britain-germany-uae-airports-refuse-fuel-to-iran-jets-2010-07-05)
8. [Turkish, Greek artists collaborate to create film on Cyprus](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=first-film-by-turkish-cypriots-and-greek-artists-2010-07-02)
9. [A secret meeting is a ‘secret’ meeting](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=a-secret-meeting-is-a-8216secret8217-meeting-2010-07-05)
10. [Immigrants in Holland unfazed by rise of anti-Islamic party](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=immigrants-in-holland-unconcerned-about-rise-of-anti-islamic-party-2010-07-04)

Constitutional reform won’t pass- PKK terror tactics

Today’s Zaman 6/16 [http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213262-100-pm-erdogan-highlights-timing-of-terrorist-attacks-in-speech.html]

“Human rights and freedoms continue to expand despite terror. The terrorist organization is disturbed to see that people are freer now. They are disturbed by the compassionate hand of the state. Recent attacks have revealed the real objective of the terrorist group. My nation sees everything. My people see what purpose the terrorist group serves. They see that terrorists are working to curb the democratization movement in Turkey,” he remarked on Tuesday during his Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) parliamentary group meeting. Turkey has recently been rocked by a rise in the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the terrorist PKK. The terrorist group recently lifted its unilateral cease-fire against Turkish security forces. Most observers believe the real aim of the bloody attacks is to psychologically force people to vote against the government’s constitutional reform package in the referendum scheduled for Sept. 12 of this year.

Constitutional Reform won’t pass- multi-party opposition

Today’s Zaman 3/2 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-203061-constitutional-reform-package-in-parliament-this-month-pm-says.html] KLS

After the prime minister’s announcement, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) immediately expressed its opposition to the package, as expected. However, there seems to be controversy over the grounds of opposition within the party. CHP leader Deniz Baykal on Sunday said that “a fresh government and a renewed government” was necessary for constitutional amendments. CHP Secretary-General Önder Sav said yesterday that his party will not lend its support to the package on the grounds that the planned amendments would harm judicial independence. CHP parliamentary group deputy chairman Hakkı Süha Okay, on the other hand, said they cannot be a party to the constitutional amendments of a party that has been designated as a focal point of anti-secular activities. Okay was referencing a 2008 Constitutional Court decision on a closure case filed against the AK Party. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which on various occasions has proposed changes to the Constitution, also plans to reject the AK Party’s reform package. MHP parliamentary group deputy chairman Mehmet Şandır said yesterday, “The MHP will not cooperate with the prime minister’s proposal.”

Issue Spec UQ – No Con Reform – Judicial Block

No constitutional reform – judicial blockage

PressTV 10 (Staff, 3/22/10, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=121454&sectionid=351020204) JPG

Turkey's chief of the Supreme Court of Appeals has attacked Ankara's bid to amend the constitution, mounting official resistance against the proposals. Judge Hasan Gerceker denounced the constitutional reform package as "unconstitutional," Reuters reported on Monday. The opposition has already claimed that the package is driven by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)'s quest for more power. The AKP, which enjoys a large parliamentary majority, says the package is needed to control the power of judges and prosecutors and to pave the way for Turkey's EU membership.

Issue Spec UQ – No Con Reform: A2 – Courts Block

Overriding court blockage will be the death of the AKP

Euractiv.com 10 (Staff, int’l news site, 3/30,

http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-constitutional-reform-under-fire-opposition-business-news-393050) JPG

Deniz Baykal, leader of n opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), warned the AKP against a possible overturning of the package by the Constitutional Court and the threat of a second closure case against the ruling party. "If the AKP initiated such a constitutional amendments package, which is against the Constitution, and the top court agreed in this way, then they would be caught red-handed," Baykal said in an interview published in the Hürriyet daily on Monday. "This situation doesn't remain at the innocent level of solely acting against the Constitution. It is very dangerous and wrong to persistently initiate such a move despite such a stiff warning and reaction," Baykal said, implying that the AKP may face a second closure case if it proceeds with its amendments.

Issue Spec UQ – Yes Con Reform

Reform will pass – business support and dwindling opposition

Yilmaz 7/4 (Baris, journalist @ Southeastern Europe Times, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en\_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/04/07/feature-02) JPG

Some signs of a compromise are emerging, with the main opposition Republican People's Party extending a conditional olive branch. Speaking on Tuesday, CHP leader Deniz Baykal said his party would support the package if President Abdullah Gül puts three of the more controversial articles -- related to the top judiciary -- to a referendum in which voters will decide on them separately. "We will demonstrate our goodwill and conciliatory approach to the end" if Gul agrees, Baykal said. Turkey's largest business association, TUSAID, has been calling on the Erdogan administration to work for a broad consensus. "A constitutional package that does not result from a political consensus will complicate the process of making a new constitution in the future," the organisation said in a press statement. "We expect the governing party to be open to new ideas, while the opposition ought to offer concrete proposals that will enrich the debate."

Reform has the votes necessary – amendments are still being debate

Bozkurt 10 (Goksel, journalist @ Hurriyet Daily News, 4/21/10, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=akp-alarmed-with-330-vote-threshold-2010-04-21) JPG

As the General Assembly becomes the scene of mounting tension on the reform package, the ruling party has exerted its utmost effort to receive as many votes as possible to push the most critical articles over the 330-vote threshold. The discussions on the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP’s, constitutional amendments package began on Monday with high tension, as the government’s reform package narrowly passed, receiving 333 of the minimum 330 votes from deputies. The package passed the vote on the first day of discussions, allowing Parliament to move forward and discuss its individual articles in more detail. The constitutional amendment proposals are being voted on in two rounds in the General Assembly, and the articles do not need to garner the minimum 330 votes in the first round of the General Assembly. However, the AKP has been exerting a great effort to push the package’s most critical articles, which concern the restructuring of Turkey’s judges and prosecutor’s board and Constitutional Court, over the 330-vote threshold in the first round.

Turkish business and industry supports the plan

Euractiv.com 10 (Staff, int’l news site, 3/30,

http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-constitutional-reform-under-fire-opposition-business-news-393050) JPG

TÜSİAD, the Turkish Industry & Business Association, issued a press release stating that Turkey needs a brand new Constitution. The proposed package of amendments has fundamental flaws and falls short of addressing democratic deficits, it said. Unfortunately, the proposed constitutional reform package is not the outcome of a parliamentary consensus, the association added. "A constitutional package that does not result from a political consensus will complicate the process of making a new constitution in the future. We expect the governing party to be open to new ideas, while the opposition ought to offer concrete proposals that will enrich the debate," TÜSİAD further stated.

Issue Spec UQ – Yes Con Reform

Constitutional reform will pass- EU, APK backing

Clemons 5/10 [Steve, Director @ the American Strategy Program, 2010, The Washington Note, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/05/searching\_for\_e/] KLS

In this context, it is interesting that the European Union is set to announce today that it supports the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party's controversial constitutional reform amendments, which were passed by Turkey's Parliament last week and are set to go to a referendum. The constitutional reform debate is the latest manifestation of the defining divide in Turkish politics between the conservative, Islamic-oriented AKP government and the staunchly secular, Kemalist State led by the military, judiciary and bureaucracy.

Constitutional reform will pass- key to EU accession

Hardy 7/7 [Liam, is a freelance writer and independent researcher based in Istanbul, Turkey, 2010, http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/viewarticles.php?editorialid=1082] KLS

Most agree the country’s military-imposed constitution is flawed, containing restrictions on basic freedoms of speech, religious expression and association. The European Union has repeatedly called for its reform as part of Turkey’s accession bid, and Chief Negotiator for EU Affairs Egemen Baðýþ as well as many other high-ranking Turkish officials have voiced this need. In fact, a constitutional reform package has been proposed and will be voted on by public referendum on 12 September, though it faces possible annulment by the country’s Constitutional Court due to a case opened by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

Constitutional Reform will pass- civil coalitions

Today’s Zaman 7/3 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215001-101-civilian-coalition-yes-to-constitutional-reform-package.html] KLS

A variety of people from a number of civil society organizations as well as independent activists have come together for a campaign to say “yes” to the constitutional reform package that is currently in the hands of the judges of the Constitutional Court to be reviewed.The 70 Million Steps Against Coups coalition spokesman Şenol Karakaş said they will start to tell the public about the importance of the reforms on Saturday. “The Constitution, which is the product of a military coup, should be left behind,” he said.

\*\*\*Links\*\*\*

Link – US Unpopular – General

Military presence creates mistrust and skepticism tanking public opinion

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Stephen and Samuel, Stephen – Senior VP and Director of Intl Security Program @ Center for Strategic & International Studies, and Samuel – fellow @ CSIS Intl Security Prog – specialist in Middle East, CSIS June 2008, csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606\_turkeyshiftingdyn.pdf) JPG

U.S.-Turkey relations have had their ups and downs over the past 15 years, and Europe’s de facto exclusion of Turkey has not necessarily pushed Ankara closer to the United States. Turkey- U.S. military cooperation, including within NATO, remained robust through the 1990s in Bosnia, Kosovo, and northern Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan following 9/11. The relationship also expanded during this period to incorporate nonsecurity issues such as energy cooperation an reached its high-water mark with President Bill Clinton’s visit to Turkey in 1999 following the Izmit earthquake.4 These positive outward signs, however, disguised a general unease beneath the surface. Many Turkish leaders felt betrayed by Washington’s failure to deliver assistance they were promised for their robust support of the Gulf War and subsequent support to stabilization efforts such as Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Northern Watch. Indeed, the economic and political costs of Turkish support for the Gulf War and the subsequent sanctions and isolation of Ba’athist Iraq led a 2002 Turkish General Staff report to conclude that Turkey had come out behind and that in the future, “the activities of the United States should be followed with skepticism.”5 Today the relationship is plagued by mutual suspicion.

The US is unpopular with Turkey – the relationship is on the brink

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Stephen and Samuel, Stephen – Senior VP and Director of Intl Security Program @ Center for Strategic & International Studies, and Samuel – fellow @ CSIS Intl Security Prog – specialist in Middle East, CSIS June 2008, csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606\_turkeyshiftingdyn.pdf) JPG

Domestic politics in both Turkey and the United States have also complicated the relationship. It has become increasingly popular across the Turkish political spectrum to voice anti-American sentiment, and anti-Turkish sentiment also has increased in the United States in recent years. On June 14, 2007, four members of the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution.8 The introduction of the bill triggered yet another crisis in the U.S.-Turkey relationship, with frantic action by the Turkish government to stop passage. By October, with high-casualty PKK terrorist attacks unfolding in Turkey’s southeast and opinion of the United States at an all-time low, the House leadership, pressured by the President and Secretary of Defense, withdrew support for the bill and convinced other members to stand aside in the interest of U.S. national security. Having recalled the Turkish ambassador to the United States, there had been strong hints in September that appropriate reaction to the bill’s passage would be to curtail U.S. access to İncirlik Airbase—a critical supply hub for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was not the first time the Armenian genocide issue threatened relations, and it will rise again.9 More troublesome, leaders and the public in both the United States and Turkey are questioning the very fundamentals of their relationship. As Ian Lesser has noted, “Today, the strategic quality of the relationship can no longer be taken for granted.”10 A strategic relationship means that both parties find ways to manage lesser differences in order to maintain effective cooperation in the advancement of their long-term national interests. Instead, today’s relationship is tactical and transactional, with neither side able to look beyond recent betrayals or clearly articulate what they want and can contribute strategically to the partnership.

Link – US Unpopular – General

US presence is unpopular – support for Kurd nation-state

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Stephen and Samuel, Stephen – Senior VP and Director of Intl Security Program @ Center for Strategic & International Studies, and Samuel – fellow @ CSIS Intl Security Prog – specialist in Middle East, CSIS June 2008, csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606\_turkeyshiftingdyn.pdf) JPG

No event since the U.S. congressional reaction and arms embargo following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus has so tested the U.S.-Turkey relationship as the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Divergence on Iraq left a bitter taste for both countries, and Turkish disillusionment with the United States has grown in the aftermath of the war. The rise of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq and resurgence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a Maoist terrorist group that has existed since the 1970s—has complicated matters significantly. Many Turks fear that the rise of an autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq will fuel secessionist tendencies among the estimated 14 million Kurds concentrated in Turkey’s southeast border regions. Turks also see the U.S. failure to halt PKK activities in northern Iraq as evidence of a double standard with respect to terrorism and Turkey’s security more broadly. Despite the recent highpoint of an intelligence-sharing agreement signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Erdoğan in November 2007 and a resulting series of targeted cross-border operations by Turkey against the PKK, many Turks continue to believe that the United States unduly restricts their options in Iraq, prioritizing relations with Iraqi Kurds over Turkey’s core security interests. With its five-year presence in Iraq, the United States has ingrained itself into the Middle East as never before. Turkey, like many of its neighbors to the south, was stunned when the United States chose to pursue, against all regional advice save Israel, a military intervention in Iraq. Turkey, in particular, believed it had an opportunity to stop or delay the invasion of Iraq after its parliament voted “no” to allowing a U.S. invasion from its soil in March 2003. Washington was deeply disappointed with the lack of a northern front for the operations and, more importantly, with Turkey’s lack of solidarity in liberating fellow Muslims from Saddam’s oppression. As the occupation of Iraq went sour, many of the Iraq War’s architects and advocates blamed the lack of access from Turkey (despite significant flexibility allowed by Turkey in the use of İncirlik Airbase and air corridors in and out of the country). Many U.S. policymakers have continually failed to recognize that for Turkey the question of regime change in Iraq centered on Turkey’s own Kurdish question.40 The Turkish fear of national dismemberment, given the historical memory of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, is palpable in Turkish political discourse today.41 At stake in Iraq are not just immediate Turkish interests such as stability in a neighboring oil-rich state, but the vision of the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, of the country as an ethnically homogeneous, “Turkish” whole, with no accommodation for other national identities.42 The Turkish “no” vote was spurred by concerns in the country that the promises U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had made more than 80 years previous would finally come true: an independent Kurdish homeland under self-rule (not to mention the specter of the Armenia that Wilson had promised, which would have taken territory from what is now eastern Turkey). The outcome of the Iraq War has confirmed many Turks’ worst suspicions. During the five years of U.S. presence in Iraq, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has regrouped, and an autonomous Kurdish state has begun to take shape under President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). With an early role on the 25-member Interim Governing Council of Iraq, Talabani, Barzani, and other Kurds deftly maneuvered to, in the words of the International Crisis Group, “design a constitutional framework that will not only reverse decades of Arabisation but also facilitate these areas’ incorporation into Kurdistan.” 43 Recognized as the administrative power of the federated region of northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)44 is in a strong position to annex the city of Kirkuk and surrounding oil-rich region through a constitutionally mandated referendum (slated for last year, but still not held).45 The KRG has continued on a path to independence, also signing a number of oil agreements outside the authority of the Iraqi government (though committed to sharing revenue with the rest of Iraq).46 Iraqi Kurds make clear that while they may exercise some patience, they will have their own nation with either de jure or de facto independence from Baghdad.47

Link – US Unpopular – General

US unpopular – Iraq, lack of cooperation, new generation and US pressuring – reversal of policy is necessary to forge relations

Sherwood-Randall 7 (Elizabeth, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Alliance Relations @ Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), CFR Fall 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14251/tend\_to\_turkey.html) JPG

In the wake of the Iraq debacle, the United States will occupy a position of greatly diminished stature and leverage among the many allies that stepped forward to offer unqualified support immediately after September 11, 2001. No relationship has been more badly damaged in this relatively short period of time, or is in greater need of repair, than the alliance between the United States and Turkey. Although America's standing has declined precipitously across Europe, Turkey is the one NATO country at risk of becoming strategically unmoored. The war has had a profound and disorienting effect on Turkey—the only Muslim nation anchored in the West through bilateral ties with the United States and membership in NATO. In some polls, Turks are reported to have the least favorable public opinion of the United States among countries surveyed. The Bush Administration’s actions have ominously alienated a generation of young people unfamiliar with the positive legacy of American global leadership. Across the population, a slow process of disenchantment and disengagement has taken place. If this negative trajectory is not reversed,Turkey could seek alternative affiliations—most likely with its Islamic neighbors or with Russia—at the expense of its connections to the United States and Europe. How could such a dramatic rupture with Turkey have occurred? In short, American policymakers ignored or misread Turkish politics, disregarded legitimate Turkish concerns, and launched an invasion of nearby Iraq with substantial negative consequences for Turkish interests. In preparing to go to war, the United States aggressively sought Turkish permission for the Fourth Infantry Division to cross Turkey in order to enter Iraq from the north. The pressure Washington put on Ankara—and the perception in some Turkish circles that the United States sought to bribe the country to secure its agreement—rebounded negatively in the domestic debate, resulting in the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s failure on March 1, 2003 to approve a resolution permitting U.S. troop transit into Iraq. In reaction, the Pentagon severely curtailed contacts with the Turkish military, essentially freezing it out of the action precisely at the moment that its leaders felt Turkey’s vital interests were being imperiled. On the policy side, high-level visits were postponed or canceled, and regular consultations between the Department of Defense and the Turkish military’s General Staff were suspended. Further, Turkish offers to send troops to Iraq were repeatedly rebuffed, reinforcing the impression that Turkeywas being excluded from shaping events that would have serious implications for its security. At the time of the invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Americans rejected a proposed Turkish deployment of 20,000 troops in the north on the grounds that it could lead to conflict between Turks and Kurds; later in 2003, when the U.S. sought support for peacekeeping and reconstruction, Turkey’s proposal to send 10,000 soldiers was rejected by Iraq’s Governing Council.

Turkish politics and the public unilaterally opposes the US

Menon and Winbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Rajan – Prof of IR @ Lehigh U & Fellow @ New America Foundation, and S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies @ Hudson Inst., Hudson Inst. 3/25/7, www.middleeasttransparent.com/IMG/pdf/**turkey**\_pdf.pdf) JPG

What is striking is that this divergence between Turkish and American perspectives resonates among all political constituencies within Turkey, where, particularly in the aftermath of the Iraq war, American popularity is at all-time low and the notion that the United States seek to weaken, even dismember, Turkey is commonplace, no matter how far-fetched this may seem to Americans. The Bush administration for its part believed that it could reasonably expect cooperation from a NATO ally in the run-up to the war against Iraq and regarded the Turkish parliament’s vote disallowing US forces to use southeastern Turkey to open a second (northern) front against Saddam Hussein’s armed forces as tantamount to betrayal. Turkey, on the other hand, is now convinced that Washington seeks to punish it for a decision that was based not on animus toward the United States, but on vital national interests, specifically the fear that the end result of allowing US forces to open an additional front would be to implicate Turkey in a war that was unpopular in most parts of the world—especially in its Muslim regions—and to create upheaval on its sensitive southern flank, thereby exacerbating the problems in its Kurdish-populated southeast. It is this breakdown in goodwill and trust that has led seasoned observers of US-Turkish relations to wonder whether a divorce between the two longstanding allies is in the offing.

Link – US Unpopular – General

The US-Turkey “strategic partnership” is unpopular in Turkey with the public and parliament

Parris 3 (Mark, Ret. US Ambassador to Turkey & Visiting Fellow @ Brookings Inst., The Washington Inst. For Near East Policy, 3/28/3, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/878248/posts) JPG

The Bush Administration's decision to go to war with Iraq accelerated the shift in perceptions of "strategic partnership," and dramatically raised the stakes involved. Even before the Turkish Parliament's March 1 "no" vote on a resolution authorizing U.S. forces to stage in Turkey, strong and mounting opposition to war there suggested the U.S. was testing the outer limits of "strategic cooperation." Those limits were breached when Parliament on March 1 failed to approve a government-backed "motion" to permit deployment. While the significance of the vote and the factors responsible for it will be debated for decades, the facts at the end of the day were as stark as they were clear: On an issue of paramount importance to the President of the United States, Turkey had said, "no." On a set of issues affecting Turkey's paramount national interests, the Turkish Parliament had not trusted the intentions or assurances of its "strategic partner." This is not the place to analyze whether such a result was avoidable, nor to assign blame. Mistakes were made, and opportunities lost, on both sides. What is indisputable is that U.S. - Turkish "strategic partnership," to the extent it still meant anything at all, meant something quite different on the evening of March 1 than it had that morning. Parliament's decision had a profound impact on a number of levels: At the personal level, an American administration which, from the President down, had been unusually pro-Turkish in its instincts and orientation, suffered a bitter defeat. Washington reacted with public restraint, but media accounts suggested deep personal anger and resentment over the reverse. On the Turkish side, statements by Prime Minister Gul and other leaders betrayed frustration that U.S. officials had not understood the difficulties AK faced in seeking Parliament's approval. At the diplomatic level, coming just as the American-British-Spanish diplomatic end-game was getting underway at the UN Security Council, the "no" vote gave encouragement to Council members lobbying against a new authorizing resolution and made more difficult the Bush Administration's task of winning over undecided members. This reinforced perceptions in America that Turkey had left its strategic partner in the lurch. Delays in scheduling a second vote deepened those perceptions. At the operational level, the need to plan alternatives to a northern front in Turkey forced U.S. military planners to go back to the drawing board at a time when they had hoped to be putting finishing touches on war planning. Experts speculated the result could be additional U.S. and civilian casualties. Parliament's "no" meanwhile left Turkey's armed forces without an agreed framework for dealing with developments in northern Iraq (no doubt an important factor in Gen. Hilmi Ozkok's subsequent public call for a review of the March 1 decision). At the economic level, the March 1 decision left Turkey with no safety net for coping with the economic consequences of war, and hardened Congressional attitudes toward doing anything positive for Turkey. This, in turn, reinforced Turkish concerns that Congress would not come through on Administration aid promises, even if Parliament turned its decision around. Finally, at the popular level, the "no," and subsequent reports of efforts to "sweeten" the deal, reinforced negative media images of Turks and Turkish diplomacy that had been fueled in preceding weeks by leaked suggestions that Turkey was holding out for unreasonable levels of aid in return for its support. In Turkey, meanwhile, resentment over perceived American strong-arm tactics and arrogance revived anti-U.S. stereotypes and images last seen during the Cold War. These factors will be significant burdens to overcome as the U.S. and Turkey now turn to the question of building a relationship that will serve their separate and common interests in the months and years ahead.

Link – US Unpopular – General

The US strategy in the Midde East fuels resentment from the Turkish elite and public

Menon and Winbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Rajan – Prof of IR @ Lehigh U & Fellow @ New America Foundation, and S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies @ Hudson Inst., Hudson Inst. 3/25/7, www.middleeasttransparent.com/IMG/pdf/**turkey**\_pdf.pdf) JPG

The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies. If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism. The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks. The widespread belief among Turks that the United States undertook the Iraq war without regard to the consequences for Turkey’s security and that Washington now seeks to punish it for the Turkish parliament’s vote has created enormous resentment toward the United States. This sentiment is reflected across the political spectrum. It is evident among elites, including the leadership of the Turkish military, arguably the country’s most influential institution, but also pervades society more generally. Opinion polls show that Turks, who once viewed the United States as an ally and friend, increasingly see it as not just unfriendly, but as a direct threat to their national security. As a result, influential Turks, government officials and foreign policy experts alike, are discussing a strategic reassessment. This reorientation would involve building deep ties with new partners, among them Russia, China, Iran, and Syria and would, moreover, abandon the longstanding premise that the United States remains the indispensable ally.

Link – US Unpopular – General

The US is unilaterally unpopular in Turkey – paternalism, war in Iraq, and divergent interests

Menon and Winbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Rajan – Prof of IR @ Lehigh U & Fellow @ New America Foundation, and S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies @ Hudson Inst., Hudson Inst. 3/25/7, www.middleeasttransparent.com/IMG/pdf/**turkey**\_pdf.pdf) JPG

The United States does not, of course, “own” Turkey and must never manage its relationship with Ankara in ways that even suggest that it thinks it does, for the Turks are a proud people with a long and illustrious history, and their country is a key regional power, whose influence extends to the United States, Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia. Turkish nationalism has become both combative and embittered during the past several years; it could turn against the United States and indeed be shaped strongly by anti-Americanism. This is not a hypothetical danger: there is abundant and unmistakable evidence that America’s relationship with Turkey is under severe, indeed unprecedented, strain, which is why minor missteps could have a disproportionate effect, fraying the alliance further. For example, while we may value Turkey as country with a tradition of moderate Islam and a secular polity, statements that praise it a “model” for Muslims strikes Turks as paternalistic, not complimentary. So low has confidence in the United States become among Turks and so high is the level of resentment that Seyfi Tashan, a leading Turkish political commentator and long-time proponent of Turkey’s integration into the West, observed that whereas the United States and Turkey had stood together during the Cold War, now the United States (together with Europe) appeared to be waging “an undeclared Cold War” against Turkey. 2 Let us give a heavy discount for hyperbole; nevertheless, that a prominent member of the foreign policy establishment could characterize the US-Turkish relationship thus is telling, not least because Tashan’s sentiments are not only representative of public sentiment, they are milder by comparison. For instance, a potboiler imagining a war between the US and Turkey in northern Iraq proved wildly popular among Turks, more than 80 percent of whom also opined in a 2005 survey that American policies in their region endangered Turkey’s security. 3 The cold reality, then, is that Turkey and the United States are drifting apart—and rapidly. Senior officials and respected academic experts in Turkey and the United States now concur that there is something fundamentally wrong with the state of US-Turkish relations and that if both sides do not recognize this reality and attend to it with seriousness and vigor, a strategic partnership that has served both Americans and Turks well for more than half a century could suffer serious damage. This assessment is not overblown. It is grounded in considerable, compelling, and consistent evidence derived from opinion polls in Turkey, discussions in the Turkish media, and the analyses and pronouncements of those who conduct Turkish foreign policy, or influence it. Nor does this conclusion rest on a romanticized assumption that there was once an idyllic, perfect friendship that is now dissolving and that must and can be reconstituted in its pristine form. The past was never halcyon, and veteran observers of Turkey well understand that the United States and Turkey have disagreed on important issues in the past, that their relationship has encountered rough terrain on numerous occasions, and that such differences will surface in the future. Nevertheless, the current situation is different in their minds because the two countries are increasingly defining their place in the world, their assessments of major security threats, and their national interests in radically divergent ways. There will be two consequences if this trend is not revered: First, future crises that test the strongly strength of the bilateral bond will have greater destructive potential than before; second, even far less consequential instances of discord will prove harder to handle than ever before and the cumulative effect will take a steep toll on the alliance. This loss of cushioning is particularly important because, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey and the United States face a new, unfamiliar, and complex environment and will be hard put to adapt their alliance creatively to new conditions without trust and goodwill, both of which are being depleted.

Link – US Unpopular – Iraq

US is unpopular with Turks – PKK and US unilateral decisions in Iraq

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Stephen and Samuel, Stephen – Senior VP and Director of Intl Security Program @ Center for Strategic & International Studies, and Samuel – fellow @ CSIS Intl Security Prog – specialist in Middle East, CSIS June 2008, csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606\_turkeyshiftingdyn.pdf) JPG

It was further disconcerting for many Turks that their prime minister had to travel to Washington as a supplicant before Turkey could exercise its sovereign right in defense against cross-border terrorist raids. Under the terms of that agreement, the United States has provided its NATO ally with real-time targeting intelligence on the PKK inside Iraq from the newly established Ankara Coordination Center.54 High-level military channels of communication also were activated between the Turkish General Staff and their U.S. counterparts, including Commander of Multinational Force- Iraq General David Petraeus and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright. Despite the increased satisfaction of the Turkish government, military, and public with newfound U.S. attention, troubles in the relationship flared again amidst an offensive by Turkish Armed Forces into northern Iraq during the last week of February 2008. Following at least four other concerted air operations and brief ground incursions in previous months, this operation involved elite Turkish commando units working in tandem with fixed-wing and rotary aircraft in northern Iraq. Initial news delivered to the Turkish public from the frontlines of the operation resulted in eruptions of patriotic support from across the political spectrum. Political fallout from previous U.S.-authorized Turkish operations had been relatively minor, but this time the international media zoomed in on the situation, quickly eliciting condemnation from Russia, Iran, and the EU, as well as an escalation of rhetoric in Iraq. Leaders from the Iraqi central government, prominent Kurdish politicians, and even the likes of Moqtada al-Sadr decried the violation of Iraq’s territorial sovereignty at U.S. behest. High-level calls placed from Baghdad to Washington resulted in President Bush outlining a clear exit strategy for the Turks.55 Bush’s statement was interpreted in Turkey again as undue U.S. pressure and elicited strong rebuff from the Turkish military and civilians as to their right to pursue military actions as they see fit.

US presence in Iraq shifted public opinion against the US – 90 percent disapproval

CNN 3 (Staff, 3/1/3, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/01/sprj.irq.main/) JPG

The parliament adjourned after an initial vote showed 264 lawmakers favoring the measure -- three fewer than needed for passage -- 250 opposing and 19 abstaining. After the proposal failed to gain a majority vote, Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul declared it had been "rejected." The 267 votes sought represents half of the 533 lawmakers who voted, plus one. The parliament is to reconvene Tuesday, but the fate of the contentious measure is uncertain. The proposal has little popular support in Turkey. Hundreds of thousands of protesters rallied Saturday in downtown Ankara. Public opinion polls show more than 90 percent of Turks against Iraq. The United States has offered $6 billion in economic aid to offset fears that war could devastate Turkey's economy. Refusal to participate could have severely limited Turkey's role during a war and in a post-war Iraq. U.S. troop ships are waiting offshore and out of sight of the Turkish port of Iskenderun. U.S. officials have said they were confident Turkey would be the point of origin for a northern front in a war with Iraq. Meanwhile, Iraq destroyed four of its Al Samoud 2 missiles Saturday, a top U.N. weapons official said, meeting a U.N.-imposed deadline to begin dismantling the weapons. The Iraqis had to bring in heavy equipment to crush the missiles, said Demetrius Perricos, deputy to chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix. He told reporters destroying all of the estimated 100 to 120 missiles could take several weeks.

Link – US Unpopular – Iraq

Turks hate the war in Iraq

Seibert 9 (Thomas, Foreign Correspondent @ The National, 4/2/9,

http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090402/FOREIGN/265753634/1013/ART) JPG

But Mr Obama’s visit, which will see an unprecedented security operation with several thousand policemen on duty, may not be just about harmony and friendship. America’s war in Iraq and what is perceived as Washington’s one-sided position favouring Israel have been deeply unpopular in Turkey. Critics doubt that Mr Obama will usher in a fundamentally new US foreign policy in the region. “The policy of a big power does not change just because there is a cuter president,” said Koray Caliskan, a political scientist at Istanbul’s Bosphorus University. A poll released this year showed 44 per cent of Turks regard the US as the biggest threat to their country and that only four per cent see America as Turkey’s most important friend. Personal approval ratings for Mr Obama were much higher, at 39.2 per cent, compared to the 9.2 per cent approval for his predecessor, George W Bush, in a similar poll four years ago. Like many people around the world, Turks welcomed Mr Obama’s election victory last year. Still, Turkish-American relations have not yet fully recovered from the shock they received in 2003, when Ankara turned down a request by Washington for the deployment of US ground forces on Turkish soil to be used in the attack on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Today, the expected demand by Washington to use Turkish territory for the planned troop withdrawal from Iraq could open some old wounds between the two countries. The US military would like to use the Incirlik air base near Adana in southern Turkey to bring troops and weaponry out of Iraq in the coming year. Mr Caliskan said the US wanted to turn Turkey into a “police station” full of weapons to keep an eye on developments in nearby Iraq even after the troop withdrawal. Leftist groups have said they are going to hold protest rallies against Mr Obama in Ankara. Turkey is also concerned that Mr Obama may recognise the Ottoman genocide against the Armenians in 1915, as he promised he would do during his elections campaign last year. And just days before Mr Obama’s arrival in the Turkish capital, Mr Erdogan, who raised eyebrows this year by storming out of a panel debate with the president of US ally Israel, said he did not like the American choice for the post of Nato general secretary.

Link – US Unpopular – War on Terror

The war on terror has created US resentment in Turkey

Menon and Winbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Rajan – Prof of IR @ Lehigh U & Fellow @ New America Foundation, and S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies @ Hudson Inst., Hudson Inst. 3/25/7, www.middleeasttransparent.com/IMG/pdf/**turkey**\_pdf.pdf) JPG

Yet recent tectonic shifts in global politics have made for more divergence than convergence in Turkish and American worldviews. Since 9/11, the overriding priority in American foreign policy has been the “war on terror,” but even though both partners are plagued by the scourge of terrorism, some of the particulars of the Bush administration’s anti-terrorism campaign have complicated the US-Turkey alliance rather than providing it a new logic and purpose. In particular, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has created discord between Ankara and Washington and, in the minds of Turks, brought strife and upheaval right to their southern border, not least by threatening to create an independent Kurdish state in Iraq that could, by its sheer existence, stoke the dogged separatist movement in southeastern Turkey. The Bush administration’s claim that the war was essential to root out terrorist cells and weapons of mass destructions from Saddam’s Iraq, the more so after 9/11, did not persuade Turks any more than it did most of the rest of the world.

Link – US Unpopular – Rhetoric

The US labeling Turkey as a model is unpopular with the secularists

Larrabee 10 (Stephen F., PhD in Poli Sci @ Columbia, writer @ RAND Corp., January 2010, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG899.sum.pdf) JPG

U.S. policymakers should avoid portraying Turkey as a model for the Middle East. The notion of Turkey as a model makes many Turks, especially the secularists and the military, uncomfortable because they feel it pushes Turkey politically closer to the Middle East and weakens Turkey’s Western identity. In addition, they fear that it will strengthen political Islam in Turkey and erode the principle of secularism over the long run. The latter concerns are particularly strong within the Turkish armed forces. (See p. 121.)

Link – US Unpopular – AKP

The AKP opposes US foreign policy – that influences the public

Cagaptay 9 (Soner, senior fellow & director of Turkish Research Program @ The Washington Inst., 12/3/9, Center for Strategic Research and Analysis,

http://www.cesran.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=656%3Amr-erdogan-visits-washington-the-akps-foreign-policy-and-united-states-interests&catid=58%3Amakale-ve-raporlar&Itemid=99&lang=en) JPG

Previously, Turkish leaders successfully made the case to the public that the country's interests lay with its Western allies, to the point that popular attitudes were swayed in the direction of supporting the United States. One example of such persuasion by officials involved former Turkish prime minister and President Turgut Ozal, who made an initially unpopular yet ultimately powerful argument in favor of Turkish support for the United States in the 1991 Gulf War. As a result, the Turkish public backed the U.S. effort. Such a tendency, however, has not continued under the AKP, which has often taken an anti-Western stance before the Turkish public. This is, in part, because the party does not seem to consider Turkey part of the West. When Prime Minister Erdogan, who is also the AKP leader, addressed the summit of the Arab League in Khartoum, Sudan, in 2006, he told the attending heads of state that the "developed nations use terror to sell us weapons." Through the AKP's efforts to align with nations such as Iran and Sudan, rather than with its former Western allies, the Turks are helping nourish domestic sympathy for such regimes. This transition by AKP officials -- in both policy and rhetoric -- gives significant impetus to the growing feeling among Turks that their interests lie with a foreign policy that is both anti-Western and increasingly Islamist.

Link – US Unpopular – AKP

Opposing US interests is a win for the AKP

Cagaptay 9 (Soner, senior fellow & director of Turkish Research Program @ The Washington Inst., 12/3/9, Center for Strategic Research and Analysis,

http://www.cesran.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=656%3Amr-erdogan-visits-washington-the-akps-foreign-policy-and-united-states-interests&catid=58%3Amakale-ve-raporlar&Itemid=99&lang=en) JPG

Domestic aspirations seem to be melding the AKP's foreign policy with its anti-Western pedigree, rooted in its Islamist past. In 1997, the AKP's predecessor, the Refah (Welfare) Party, was forced to step down from government when popular discontent was voiced thanks to Western backing. From this experience, the AKP has drawn the lesson that it must maintain strong popular support. To do so, the party seems to be relying on a populist tactic of enhancing its domestic standing through criticizing the West -- a tactic that seemingly has succeeded. In line with driving down Turkish attitudes toward the United States and the West, the AKP now stokes feelings of anti-Western nationalism in drawing broad support for its foreign policy.

Link – Iraq Withdrawal – Erdogan Win

Ending of the War in Iraq is a win for Erdogan

Menon and Winbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Rajan – Prof of IR @ Lehigh U & Fellow @ New America Foundation, and S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies @ Hudson Inst., Hudson Inst. 3/25/7, www.middleeasttransparent.com/IMG/pdf/**turkey**\_pdf.pdf) JPG

The assessment that the American war in Iraq has created a dire threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity is particularly pronounced among Turks now—and for several reasons. First, although the February 1999 capture of the long-time PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan (he was apprehended in Kenya, one of many stops while on the run) took the winds out of the organization’s sails for several years. From his jail cell, where he is serving a life sentence, Öcalan has renounced his political ideas, abandoned his dreams for an independent Kurdish state, and called on the PKK to lay down its arms and to embrace a solution based on autonomy. But the party faithful nevertheless continue to revere him and to tout his leadership. Whatever hopes Turks may have had Öcalan’s capture would destroy the PKK were dashed by the upsurge in violence in southeastern Turkey in 2006 and the revival of the organization, which canceled its 2004 ceasefire declaration and resumed its attacks, with Murat Karayilan as its principal field commander, despite the arcane splits that followed Öcalan’s arrest, producing changes in ideology and nomenclature. 7 Second, the Erdogan government’s reforms relating to the Kurds notwithstanding, the Turkish armed forces’ leaders remain convinced that the PKK presents first and foremost a military problem that must be dealt with by force and that Western proposals to address Kurdish separatism by expanding Kurds’ political rights and cultural autonomy are naïve, and perhaps even intended to weaken, even fragment Turkey. In this assessment, making concessions to the Kurds, prompted by the lure of EU membership, amounts to starting down a slippery slope and is particularly perilous because of the uncertainties created by the possible crumbling of Iraq. For the overwhelming majority of Turks, preventing the rise of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq’s north trumps the aspiration to join the EU, a point that has been put starkly by Prime Minister Erdogan. Third, the rise of a Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq that appears (certainly to Turks) independent in all but name—the Iraqi flag is conspicuous by its absence, independence remains the public’s dream and is openly spoken of, and an independent military force, the peshmerga, stands ready to defend the homeland—has added to the already substantial fear that the American war to topple Saddam could culminate in Iraq disintegration and the rise of a Kurdish state that energizes, or even assists, Kurdish separatists in Turkey. That Öcalan is feted as a hero in Iraqi Kurdistan merely fans Turkish animus an encourages conspiracy theories and dire analyses. 8

Link – TNWs – Erdogan Win

Removal of nukes is a win for Erdogan

Today’s Zaman 10 (Turkish news website, 4/15/10, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/mobile.do?load=wapDetay&link=207467) JPG

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's policy on Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions has long been irking the international community and in particular its close ally the US as it has been perceived as a move encouraging Tehran rather than discouraging it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Erdoğan urged, once again, during a speech in Washington on Monday that a nuclear-free zone be established in Turkey's region, i.e., the Middle East, which in particular will include Israel. Erdoğan also said that Turkey does not want Iran or any other nation to have nuclear weapons. But Erdoğan defends Iran's right to acquire nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while opposing the imposition of strong sanctions on this country. Ankara also opposes any military option to be put on the table as a last resort as a means of deterring Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. There is no problem with Turkey's stance that Iran, like other nations, has the right to acquire nuclear energy. But NATO ally Turkey's position raises concerns that this has been playing into the hands of Iran, which has created deep suspicion within the international community over its alleged work toward creating nuclear weapons. While the issue of Iran has continued to be a matter of serious disagreement between Turkey and the US in particular, Erdoğan will soon face a dilemma over nuclear arms the US deployed during the Cold War years at İncirlik Air Base in southern Turkey. This displays an inconsistency between Erdoğan's call for a nuclear-free zone in the region while hosting US nuclear weapons on its soil. Will Erdoğan be ready to agree on the withdrawal of those weapons at İncirlik? The US is also expected to knock on Turkey's door following the signing of a renewed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on April 8 under which the US may possibly scrap its nuclear arms deployed at four European countries, including Turkey. There are some 220 aerial atomic bombs held on military bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey. According to experts, Italy and Turkey host about 90 of these nuclear warheads each. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the US has withdrawn artillery-delivered tactical nuclear weapons based mainly in the Thracian region, İstanbul and Erzurum in the east. The strategic nuclear weapons delivered by airplane are kept at the İncirlik base. While there has been a debate over whether those nuclear weapons are enough of a deterrent to meet today's threats, the US is believed to keep the nukes at İncirlik as a means of deterring Iran from any possible nuclear strike. According to one opinion, it may be good to keep the guns on the table because in taking the guns off the table, one can lose tremendous leverage over the other.

Link – A2: Diplomacy Solves Popularity

US diplomacy doesn’t solve the issue

Cagaptay 9 (Soner, senior fellow & director of Turkish Research Program @ The Washington Inst., 12/3/9, Center for Strategic Research and Analysis,

http://www.cesran.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=656%3Amr-erdogan-visits-washington-the-akps-foreign-policy-and-united-states-interests&catid=58%3Amakale-ve-raporlar&Itemid=99&lang=en) JPG

Though the AKP has maintained cooperation with the United States in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, the party's foreign policy appears corrosive for U.S. interests in the long term. As noted, the AKP encourages anti-Western rhetoric and views ever more in line with Islamism, thereby helping stir similar anti-Westernism among the populace. Meanwhile, anti-Americanism is fast becoming internalized within Turkish society. The U.S. administration's reshuffle in foreign policy -- placing Turkey higher up on the agenda and jump-starting efforts to improve strained bilateral ties -- has not produced its intended effect of shifting Turkish public opinion back toward the United States and the West. Even if Washington continues to take the right steps regarding Turkey policy, only a pro-Western foreign policy in Ankara coupled with pro-Western rhetoric by the AKP will likely dispose Turks more favorably toward the United States.

\*\*\*Link Turns and Answers\*\*\*

**Link Turn – US Popular – PKK**

Turkey still supports the US – unified response to the PKK

eKantipur 6/21 (Staff, online news site, 6/21/10, http://www.ekantipur.com/2010/06/21/world/us-ready-to-help-turkey-against-kurd-rebels-ambassador/316922/) JPG

The United States supports Turkey's struggle against separatist Kurdish rebels and is ready to "urgently" consider any new request for help from Ankara, the US ambassador to Turkey said Monday. "We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK," Ambassador James Jeffrey said in a written statement. He was referring to the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), listed as a terrorist group by both Ankara and Washington, which has dramatically stepped up violence in Turkey's southeast. "The PKK is a common enemy of both Turkey and the US and we actively support the efforts of our Turkish allies to defeat this terrorist threat," Jeffrey said. He stressed "there has been no change in the level of US-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq." The United States has been supplying Turkey, a NATO ally, with intelligence on rebel movements in northern Iraq, used particularly in Turkish air raids on PKK hideouts in the region. Turkey's "no" vote on fresh UN sanctions against Iran and a simmering crisis with Israel has sparked concern in Turkey that the United States may withhold support in Ankara's struggle against the PKK.

Turkey supports US – recognized PKK as terrorists

Daloglu 9 (Tulin, Chiefg Washington Correspondant @ Haberturk – Turkish news channel, Turkey Analyst Vol. 2 No. 11, 6/5/9, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2009/090605B.html) JPG

The relationship between the United States and Turkey has traditionally relied heavily on military cooperation. However, President Barack Obama’s April trip to Turkey created an impetus to build a stronger economic connection – provided that businesses find a profitable incentive to work together. But the most significant step toward “normalizing” relations between the countries came when the U.S. recognized that the separatist Kurdish organization PKK poses a threat not only to Turkey but also to America, and Iraq, as well. It was a step destined to ease the tension that has characterized, even poisoned the U.S.-Turkish relationship since the invasion of Iraq.

Link Turn – US Popular – Flotilla

The US and its foreign policy is still popular – flotilla proves

Quinn 6/1 (Andrew, staff writer @ Reuters, 6/1/10, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N01115314.htm) JPG

Turkey on Tuesday pressed for stronger U.S. support after Israel's raid on a Turkish-backed aid flotilla, saying the crisis could hit U.S. hopes for Middle East peace amid worsening tensions over Iran's nuclear program. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, in Washington for talks with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, said Ankara wanted a clear U.S. condemnation of Monday's raid after Israeli forces killed nine people, including four Turks, while trying to stop a convoy of vessels delivering aid to the Gaza Strip. "Some of our allies are not ready to condemn the Israeli actions," Davutoglu said. He said he was disappointed with Washington's cautious response to an incident he likened to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. "Psychologically this attack is like 9-11 for Turkey because Turkish citizens were attacked by a state, not by terrorists, with an intention, a clear decision of political leaders of that state," he said. "We expect full solidarity with us. It should not be a choice between Turkey and Israel. It should be a choice between right and wrong." International fury over the flotilla attack has created a tough balancing act for the Obama administration, particularly with Turkey, a key NATO ally seen by Washington as a secular Muslim power that can counter Islamic militancy in the region. Both Turkey and Israel, the United States' closest Middle East ally, are pivotal players on peace in the region and the impasse over Iran's nuclear program. A rupture in relations between the two could badly complicate U.S. foreign policy.

Link Turn – US Popular – Military

Erdogan is seeking US support with the PKK from the US military

Asbarez News 6/28 (Staff, 6/28/10,

http://asbarez.com/82666/turkey-wants-more-than-intelligence-from-us-in-war-against-pkk/) JPG

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called on the U.S. to help Turkey in its war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) by providing the Turkish military with than just “intelligence sharing,” the Turkish Hurriyet Daily News reported on Monday. Erdogan made his remarks early Monday during a press conference in Toronto, where he attended the G-20 summit over the weekend and met separately with US President Barack Obama. According to the Turkish leader, an anti-terror mechanism set up between Turkey, Iraq and the United States should include functions other than “intelligence sharing.” Erdogan said he discussed this issue in talks with Obama. “This is being negotiated within the trilateral mechanism. I think that the steps to be taken in this regard will be implemented,” Erdogan said before his departure from Toronto. Erdogan said he and Obama focused on Turkey’s war against the PKK, disagreements over Iran sanctions and the ongoing row between Turkey and Israel. Erdogan said he asked Obama to enlarge American cooperation with Turkey against the PKK in light of what Erdogan called a recently launched “terror campaign” by the Kurdish freedom movement. The U.S. has been providing Turkey with intelligence since late 2007 and initiated the establishment of what they call the trilateral mechanism – a broad cooperative measure between Turkey, Iraq and the U.S. intended to restrict the movement of the PKK in Northern Iraq. Erdogan, however, said Turkey is unsatisfied with its function. He said Turkey has long been expecting a more operational form of cooperation against the PKK, but neither side has been willing to respond. “It seems that the region is ruled by the separatist terrorist organization [the PKK]. On the one hand we’ll talk about the territorial integrity of this country [Iraq], but on the other hand we’ll talk about a part of this country captured by the terror organization,” Erdogan said.

The AKP and US have strong ties despite military backlash

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Stephen and Samuel, Stephen – Senior VP and Director of Intl Security Program @ Center for Strategic & International Studies, and Samuel – fellow @ CSIS Intl Security Prog – specialist in Middle East, CSIS June 2008, csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606\_turkeyshiftingdyn.pdf) JPG

Turkish politics are also in a state of flux. Leaders of the traditional secularist parties in Turkey have lost influence at home over the past decade and also feel betrayed by the United States as a result of its perceived embrace of the AKP.11 On the other hand, a confident Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other members of the AKP won the election in late 2002 as the first majority government in power since 1987. And while they are seen by supporters of traditional Kemalist parties as having a thinly veiled “Islamist” agenda, AKP leaders have maintained generally cooperative relations with the United States and Europe.12 Still, this has opened the door to the possibility of building new political coalitions in both countries that are broader and more vibrant than ones of the past, which tended to be dominated only by security concerns. Against this background, 2007 was a pivotal year in Turkish politics, and 2008 is ripe for further historical twists. Parliament was scheduled to elect a successor to President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in May 2007 at the end of his seven-year term. Secular Turks feared that Erdoğan, who had been involved in earlier Islamist movements, or another outwardly devout AKP politician, would be nominated for President. The prospect of the AKP taking over the presidency, a bastion of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s legacy of strict secularism with veto power over legislation, provoked strong protests and warnings from the military. To stave off a crisis, the AKP leadership chose Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, who is seen as more of a centrist, as its Presidential candidate. This did little to allay critics. Detractors highlighted Gül’s candidacy as yet another failure for the AKP to offer compromise to traditional Kemalist elements of society. Gül’s selection failed to prevent the military from suggesting that it remains ready to act in defense of Kemalist secularism, in this case through its April 27 “e-coup.”13 Preceding the posting of that strongly worded statement on the Turkish General Staff ’s Web site, upwards of a million people, the largest political rally in Turkish history, marched in Istanbul in support of preserving the Kemalist legacy, opposing Gül’s candidacy. Opposition parties subsequently boycotted two rounds of parliamentary voting on a new President, and the election was later cancelled by the Constitutional Court, which upheld the opposition position that two-thirds of the deputies needed to be in attendance during the voting. Gül withdrew his candidacy and Erdoğan sought to break the deadlock by calling for early general elections, proposing also to amend the constitution to allow for direct popular election of the President and reducing the quorum requirement to one-third.

Link Turn – Afghanistan

Erdogan and the military support operations in Afghanistan

Uslu 9 (Emrullah, PhD candidate at @ the Center for Middle Eastern Studies @ U of Utah, Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 131 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=35238) JPG

Since Barack Obama declared that the U.S. government will prioritize restoring the international basis for its fight against al-Qaeda within Afghanistan, Turkey has emerged as a key source of support for this new approach. In March, before his appointment as foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu signaled that the Obama administration will enjoy improved bilateral relations with Turkey in contrast to the tension that has marred the relationship in recent years. Davutoglu said, "Our priorities mostly match those of the Obama administration. Obama appreciates Turkey's foreign policy activities in the Middle East, South Caucasus, and Afghanistan" (Anadolu Ajansi, March 20). It appears that in April, Washington requested additional Turkish troops in support of ISAF in Afghanistan. Davutoglu visited Washington in late March in his role as the chief advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and claimed that the U.S. had expressed no interest in additional military support from Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, March 20). However, the Turkish press later reported that during his visit to Turkey in early April, Obama formally requested additional troops in support of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and that Ankara had provisionally agreed to send 1,000 extra troops (Zaman, April 11). The head of the Washington-based American-Turkish Council (ATC), James Holmes, reaffirmed this U.S. request for support in Afghanistan (Hurriyet, April 9). It was unknown whether these Turkish forces might engage in combat operations or conduct peace support activities. On April 15, the influential daily Hurriyet reported that Ankara planned to send 10-15 Turkish officers as part of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) to assist in training the Afghan National Army (Hurriyet, April 15). In late April the Turkish Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug stated that Turkey will take over the ISAF command in November. Italian and French brigades in Kabul, where Turkish troops are currently deployed, will be redeployed to regions in the east and south of the country. This gap will be filled by Turkish forces. Turkey will also seek additional troops from NATO, however, if the void cannot be filled by forces from other countries, Ankara will increase the size of its current deployment of around 800 troops in Afghanistan - with the caveat that they will not participate in any counter-terrorist operations (Zaman, April 29; EDM, June 16). Reliable sources close to the Turkish military told Jamestown that Ankara is now finalizing preparations to send additional troops to Afghanistan. According to that plan around 70 troops will go to Afghanistan within ten to fourteen days in order to monitor and assist in the election process in August.

No Link – Anti-Americanism

The US and Turkey are aligning their goals – eliminates mistrust

Daloglu 9 (Tulin, Chiefg Washington Correspondant @ Haberturk – Turkish news channel, Turkey Analyst Vol. 2 No. 11, 6/5/9, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2009/090605B.html) JPG

In an effort to further strengthen the relationship, President Barack Obama became the first American president to travel to Turkey during his first 100 days in office, during his first tour to Europe. “I’m trying to make a statement about the importance of Turkey, not just to the United States but to the world,” he said, standing side by side with Turkish President Abdullah Gül. While the Obama administration continues to share intelligence with Turkey in its fight against the PKK, the U.S. seems to have no interest in stoking Turkey’s distrust – not necessarily because Turkey is a lynchpin in the Muslim Arab Middle East, but surely because it has begun to reach out to countries in the region like never before. Because of these efforts, Washington cannot keep its distance from Turkey. That said, nothing concrete may come of Obama’s visit to Turkey right away. But the U.S. commitment to strengthen its relationship with Ankara is significant enough. It should be noted that Turkey found its safe place in NATO unexpectedly challenged by the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Several NATO members opposed to the invasion initially refused to extend a security umbrella to Turkey to protect its citizens from possible chemical or biological attack. That naturally shook Turkey’s trust in NATO. And the perception that the U.S. is at war with Islam has added to many Turks’ aggravation. Partially in response to this, the Turkish government moved to broaden its regional relations, building stronger ties with the Muslim Middle East, especially Syria and Iran, and also boosting ties with Russia. Obama’s unprecedented diplomatic endeavor offers some clarity as to where Turkey stands in this order.

No Link – Summer Session

Parliament out of session- no chance the plan can affect his credibility

Kanli 7/5 [Yusuf, Staff Writer, 2010, Hurriyet Daily News http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=eyes-on-high-court-2010-07-05] KLS

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spent the last few days on holiday but unlike the tradition he did not allow Parliament go on summer recess on July 1. Instead, he ordered the AKP deputies to stay in Ankara. Why? Was it that the prime minister wanted to give the impression that he is prepared for the worst and if the high court makes a “not so welcome decision” he would retaliate with snap general elections?

**\*\*\*Internal Links\*\*\***

**Internal Link – Public Key**

AKP popular but continued success depends on rallying the public behind them

Kara 10 [Seyfeddin, Staff Writer, July, The Cresent Magazine http://www.crescenticit.com/background/1884-july-2010/2835-closer-look-at-akp-after-its-eight-year-rule-in-turkey.html] KLS

The AKP, with its many achievements, has certainly enjoyed sustained and continuous popularity, seeing it even to its attractive position in the approach to the forthcoming general election. However, the party’s long term success depends on tackling the issues important to its many disenchanted Muslim supporters. If it fails to find tangible solutions to these issues, it is very likely that in the long run, it may be overtaken by a re-emerging “Islamic” Saadet Party. Under the new leadership of Numan Kurtulmus, the Saadet Party has skillfully exploited AKP mistakes, thereby attracting some of its supporters. And it is clear that in the present political climate, this constructive opposition combined with robust leadership poses a far greater challenge to AKP rule than the crumbling secular oligarchy in Turkey.

Public popularity key Erdogan’s domestic agenda

Koogler 7 [Jeb, Associate at the Watson Institute for International Studies, June 20, http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2007\_07\_01\_archive.html ]

What's notable about both of these articles -- and the common thread between the two -- is that they both show that the AKP has appealed to a very broad constituency. By pursuing a relatively moderate domestic agenda since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has found support from both liberals and women. (Both of these groups, I should note, have traditionally supported secular parties.) The number of Turks who are either supporting the AKP -- or at least supporting their right to continue to be a part of the political process -- appears to be on the rise.

Internal Link – Base Key

Appeasing the base is key to AKP success

Kara 10 [Seyfeddin, Staff Writer, July, The Cresent Magazine http://www.crescenticit.com/background/1884-july-2010/2835-closer-look-at-akp-after-its-eight-year-rule-in-turkey.html] KLS

Further, the religious background of leading AKP members has strengthened the significance of these references and the overall Islamic identity of the party.  As such, many practicing Muslims, that form the bulk of AKP support base, have certain expectations of the party. They are also aware that there is still great pressure exerted on the AKP by remnants of the secular oligarchy. A clear example of this was the manner in which the Constitutional Court prosecutor nearly ended the political life of the AKP in 2008 when the party attempted to alter the constitution to lift the headscarf ban. It was viewed as an indication of the party’s “hidden Islamic agenda”.

**Internal Link –** AKP Key

The AKP controls the public and the military

Nouraee 10 (Andishesh, freelance journalist, 3/1/10, CreativeLofting.com, http://clatl.com/atlanta/is-turkeys-military-plotting-to-overthrow-its-government/Content?oid=1430269) JPG

Sensing public opinion was decisively in its favor, the AKP called the military's bluff and called for new elections that were essentially an army vs. Islamist referendum. The AKP sensed correctly and [won big](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_general_election%2C_2007#Results). The recent arrests of once-untouchable military muckety-mucks suggests Turkey's government is increasingly confident it can take on the military without risking a coup. In fact, critics of the government say the arrests are as power-grabby as the military's supposed coup plot. Maybe so, but the country is better off resolving its army vs. government clash with trials and elections rather than tanks and guns.

Internal Link – Military Key

Military has heavy influence over Turkish politics

Nouraee 10 (Andishesh, freelance journalist, 3/1/10, CreativeLofting.com, http://clatl.com/atlanta/is-turkeys-military-plotting-to-overthrow-its-government/Content?oid=1430269) JPG

As of me typing this, 31 current and former Turkish military officers have been charged in connection with an [alleged plot to overthrow](http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15505946) the Turkish government. Among those charged is the former head of Turkey's First Army region, General Cetin Dogan. To put that in perspective, imagine how odd and frightening it would be to democracy-loving Americans of all political stripes if Gulf War hero Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf or Surgin' General David Petraeus was arrested for plotting the violent overthrow of the Obama administration. Details about the alleged plot are just now reaching the public thanks to the Turkish newspaper Taraf, which somehow got a hold of 5,000 or so pages of secret Turkish military documents. The plot itself appears to be at least seven years old. It was apparently hatched in 2003, just after the 2002 election of the Islamic Justice and Development Party, or AKP. The plan, known as [Sledgehammer](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8538484.stm%E2%80%9Dhttp%3A//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8538484.stm), was Listerine-like in its diabolical cleverness. Students of marketing may recall that back in 1921, Listerine invented a fictional disease, halitosis, for the express purpose of selling its cure – the company's namesake mouthwash. Well, back in 2003, elements of Turkey's military allegedly planned to trigger a national security crisis for the express purpose of stepping in to solve said crisis. The plot apparently involved plans to detonate bombs in Turkish mosques, as well as hatching ways to trigger a military confrontation with rival Greece by shooting down an airliner over the Aegean Sea. The plotters' hope was to so weaken the nation's confidence in the country's newly elected Islamist government that people wouldn't object to the military shoving aside that government. The rise of Islamist political parties in Turkey is not welcome by Turkey's military or by many regular Turks. Many Turks view the strict separation of religion and government as the core characteristic of the modern Turkish state. The Turkish Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, believed the comingling of Islam and the government led to the Ottoman Turkish Empire's weakening during the 18th and 19th centuries – and ultimately its downfall after World War I. Prior to Ataturk, Turkey was ruled by monarchs who considered themselves not only the leader of Turkey, but also the leader of Muslims all over the world. Modern Turkey's military views itself as the guardian of the wall Ataturk built to divide mosque and state. Sledgehammer wasn't the first or last time the country's military has clashed with democratically elected Islamist leaders in Turkey. In 1997, Turkey's military forced an Islamist government's collapse with a threatening memo. In 2007, the military tried the same thing – posting a threatening note on the [military's website](http://atlanta.creativeloafing.com/gyrobase/why_is_turkey_on_the_brink_of_a_military_coup_/Content?oid=244827) in response to the nomination of Islamist Abdullah Gul to Turkey's presidency.

Internal Link – A2 – Military Key

Erdogan is checking western and secular influence

Borchgrave 6/23 [Arnaud de, Staff Writer, Washington Times 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/23/talking-turkey-43683123/] KLS

Mr. Erdogan declines to call Hamas a terrorist organization, and he no longer sees Turkey's role in NATO as a priority. And to make sure there was no possibility of the country's military staging what might have been a fifth coup since 1960 to oust a civilian government, Mr. Erdogan ordered the arrest of 52 military commanders in February. Code-named Operation Sledgehammer, the purported plan was to blow up mosques and museums as a signal for the military to overthrow the Islamic-oriented government.

Military power low

Middle East Monitor 6-27 (http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/articles/arab-media/1215-turkey-is-paying-the-price-on-our-behalf)

Politics aside, the influence of the army in Turkey cannot be overlooked entirely. Traditionally the generals have played a key role in Turkey’s government, and at the moment the consensus is that Mr. Erdogan and the General Staff are in agreement on this issue. However, the military’s influence has waned and is not as strong as in the past, in part because of what was seen as unacceptable interference in the democratic process

**\*\*\*Impacts Links\*\*\***

**Erdogan Good – ME Peace**

**Erdogan is critical to ME peace**

Salem 7-6 (Paul, Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41113)

Third, on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is useful and helpful that Prime Minister Erdogan staked out this rather hard line position because it enables him to appeal to the Arab and Muslim public. Turkey has been pushing for peace talks and stability for years and Erdogan now has strong credibility. So, the fact that there is somebody like Prime Minister Erdogan front and center and able to speak for an Arab and Muslim public is an opportunity. It is much better having Erdogan rather than President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran or Sheik Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah. Unfortunately, the Arab leaders who are engaged in these talks—like President Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah II of Jordan, or King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia—don’t have the pull or credibility in public opinion to actually make progress towards peace. Concessions and difficult decisions need to be made and Arab leaders are too weak at this point to be helpful—and Iran doesn’t want to help at all. Turkey’s position presents an opportunity. President Obama said from day one that the Arab-Israeli conflict is his number one priority. While Turkey’s recent involvement may have raised tensions a little bit, they were already high and no progress was being made. Perhaps the increased tensions will provide the momentum needed to move forward and Turkey can be an able partner in building peace in the region.

AKP key to Middle East and global stability

The National 5/11 [http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100522/WEEKENDER/705219882/1041/MULTIMEDIA] KLS

The troubles before the AKP came to power “created a major political vacuum in Turkey. Those were really horrible years and Turkey lost big time,” says a senior foreign policy adviser. “The AKP came to power and proved to the world that it could run this country much better than all the other governments before. The more successful AKP became, the more new possibilities in foreign policy emerged. It’s no longer a narrow nation-state agenda. It’s a regional agenda. It’s a global agenda.”

Erdogan Good – Low Israel Relations – Wag the Dog

Low popularity causes Erdogan to wag the dog by cutting ties w Israel

CSM 7-5 (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0705/Turkey-ups-the-ante-on-Israel-over-Gaza-flotilla-incident/(page)/2)

In a recent commentary in Haaretz, the International Crisis Group's Hugh Pope cited "misconceptions" and "myth-making" on both sides of the Turkey-Israel dispute, but said the main driver of deteriorating ties was Turkish public opinion that Israel is treating the Palestinians unjustly. "Crises with Israel have always followed any Turkish perception that injustice is being done to the Palestinians: whether during the Six-Day War in 1967, the formal declaration of a unified Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 1980 or the occupation of West Bank towns in 2002," Pope wrote. "The golden era in Turkish-Israeli relations in the 1990s was exceptional and coincided exactly with the years of the Oslo peace process. When Israel is again perceived as seeking peace, it will most likely find Turkey rapidly ready to do business once more." Ties between Turkey and Israel were already strained, before the May 31 bloodshed in which Israeli special forces raided a flotilla carrying aid for Palestinians and attempting to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza.

More ev…

Today’s Zaman 7-4 (http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215033-109-centerthe-new-turkey-reality-bribyi-bravni-dogrucenter.html)

One thing that has changed in Turkey in the last decade is that the Turkish public is increasingly aware of what is happening around them in the region and it is not just the AKP’s base that supports Turkey’s new assertive foreign policy. The fact that no other nation has ever killed civilian Turkish nationals in the history of the Turkish Republic turned the flotilla incident into a national issue. There is clearly a deep national need for the Turkish public to receive an apology for the killings on the Mavi Marmara. Now that Israel has made it personal to Turks, it’s no longer the AKP that is driving the ship of public opinion. Accordingly, it will not be surprising to see this public outrage setting the threshold for future government policies in the region even after the AKP’s leadership ends. Therefore, if Israel wants to keep an old friend and reverse its isolation in the region, it needs to acknowledge its responsibility in the deadly flotilla attack and work to normalize its relations with Turkey again before it is too late.

More ev…

Middle East Monitor 6-27 (http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/articles/arab-media/1215-turkey-is-paying-the-price-on-our-behalf)

Internally, the one constant is the increase in popularity of the ruling party and its leader, which a poll puts at 40%, rising from 33% just a few weeks ago. This has prompted criticism from opposition parties and interest groups associated with Israel and the USA. The motives for the latter two are obvious, while the opposition parties are suggesting that there could be serious consequences arising from moves away from American and Israeli spheres of influence. Some commentators claim that Erdogan is keen to escalate the rift with Israel to enhance his party’s position in time for parliamentary elections next year.

Erdogan Good – Shift to the East – Wag the Dog

Erdogan will be increasingly belligerent toward the West if his popularity continues to decline

NYT 7-5 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/business/global/06lira.html?\_r=1&pagewanted=2&src=busln)

No one here disputes that these trends give Mr. Erdogan the legitimacy — both at home and abroad — to lash out at Israel and to cut deals with Iran over its nuclear energy, moves that have strained ties with its chief ally and longtime supporter, the United States. (Turkey has exported $1.6 billion worth of goods to Iran and Syria this year, $200 million more than to the United States.) But some worry that the muscle flexing may have gone too far — perhaps the result of tightening election polls at home — and that the aggressive tone with Israel may jeopardize the defining tenet of Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: peace at home, peace in the world. “The foreign policy of Turkey is good if it brings self-pride,” said Ferda Yildiz, the chairman of Basari Holding, a conglomerate that itself is in negotiations with the Syrian government to set up a factory in Syria that would make electricity meters. Even so, he warns that it would be a mistake to become too caught up in an eastward expansion if it comes at the expense of the country’s longstanding inclination to look to the West for innovation and inspiration. “It takes centuries to make relations and minutes to destroy them,” he said.

Erdogan Good – Shift to the East – Wag the Dog

**Erdogan popularity is on the brink – High popularity allows a shift toward the East that threatens relations and global stability**

Mauro 7/6 (Ryan, analyst @ Asymmetrical Warfare and Intelligence Center, Europe News, http://europenews.dk/en/node/33496) JPG

Turkey is lost under Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). They are firmly in the camp of Iran despite their competition over the title of reigning anti-Israel champion. Israel has [labeled](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=israel-brands-turkish-charity-terrorist-organisation-2010-06-17) the IHH — the group that tried to break the Gaza blockade with the Marvi Marmara — a terrorist group, which indirectly labels Turkey a state sponsor of terrorism because of the AKP and Erdogan’s [close ties](http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=177960) to the IHH. Luckily, this may only last for a year. The AKP and Erdogan are still popular in Turkey, but the main opposition group, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has chosen a new leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who is being well-received. Assisted by Erdogan’s overreaching domestically and internationally, the CHP may ride a backlash that leads to defeat or clipped wings for AKP during the next general election scheduled for July 2011. A new [poll](http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/35662/chp_grows_virtually_ties_akp_in_turkey/K%C4%B1l%C4%B1%C3%A7daro%C4%9Flu) shows the CHP with a one percent lead over the AKP at a time when support for Erdogan is supposed to be high because of the confrontation with Israel. The opposition is already taking aim at Erdogan’s foreign policy. This means that they feel he is more vulnerable on this issue than the current wisdom suggests. (The current wisdom holds that his provocations are good political investments.) "There is a crisis in trust with the West because of their [the AKP] politics and the AKP needs to repair it immediately. If they don’t, then we will see worse results in the next few months,” Kilicdaroglu [said](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=pm-slams-international-and-national-media-2010-06-13). He has clearly called for Turkey to reverse course, decrying "the shift in our axis.” At the same time, a group of Turkish diplomats is [going after](http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-3907460%2C00.html) Erdogan for having an "adventurous” foreign policy. They are accusing him of neo-Ottomanism. It is very encouraging that there has been such a quick reaction against Turkey’s latest moves against the West and against Israel. The Turkish public is still opposed to Western policy and the CHP has condemned Israel for the flotilla raid, but there is definite angst over the overall Islamist trend and aligning against the West. The Turkish population is vehemently against terrorism. A [poll](http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/53865) in September found that only four percent support suicide bombings and only two percent expressed confidence in Osama bin Laden to "do the right thing regarding world affairs.”  Another [poll](http://pewglobal.org/2010/02/04/mixed-views-of-hamas-and-hezbollah-in-largely-muslim-nations/) from February found that Hezbollah is only looked favorably upon by three percent of the population and Hamas by five percent. Erdogan may well have overreached in his movement of Turkey’s foreign policy into the Islamist camp. The AKP was originally careful with how it went about turning Turkey away from pro-Western secularism, because they understood that they won because their opponents were splintered. One of the keys to the AKP’s original 2002 electoral victory was the rule that parties failing to win 10 percent of the vote are not given a seat in parliament. If you look at the results, this excluded many anti-Islamist parties because their support was divided among voters, creating competition that ultimately doomed them all. Daniel Pipes [observes](http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NWJlYTUyMzA5OTMxNTA2ZGZlNTMzOTJmYjFhZjU0ZDU) that the AKP won the 2002 election with 34.28 percent of the vote. The CHP won 19.4 percent. If you take the five anti-Islamist parties that failed to receive 10 percent and assumed they allied with the CHP, they’d have a majority of 55.7 percent of the seats. That means a defeat for the AKP and possible exclusion from the ruling bloc.

The AKP did not originally ride in on a tidal wave of pro-Islamist sentiment. The party did, however, expand their gains in July 2007, and that’s when they felt it was politically tenable to pursue a more Islamist course. The belief that this contributed to the AKP’s success is partially what’s motivating Erdogan to act so aggressively now as he faces domestic political troubles one year away from the next election. One top Israeli expert, Professor Efraim Inbar, [said](http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906) that the AKP’s popularity is declining and if the current dissatisfaction with them is preserved, “it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister.” The West should have two main goals now: contain Erdogan’s aggression and vindicate the opposition in the process. It is true that Erdogan is seeking confrontation for political gain, but it is this straining of ties that is being used by the CHP to hammer him. Standing firm so the problems he causes are apparent will add weight to the opposition’s condemnations of his foreign policy. The West must also be on watch for potential aggression against Turkey’s pillars of democracy. The AKP is already [trying](http://www.investingdaily.com/id/17448/turkey-great-economic-potential-but-severe-political-risks.html) to roll back freedom by attempting to outlaw adultery, taking over a huge portion of the media, arresting military officers on what may be trumped up charges, and [moving](http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=361123&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21) to place the judiciary under the control of the AKP-dominated parliament. If the opposition is having trouble putting the AKP on the defensive for these actions, the West should release reports, and officials should make statements that will grab headlines by pointing out the dangers to Turkey’s democracy. The population may not be pro-American, but they are not anti-democracy. In democracies, politics is usually cyclical. Once a party has been in power for an extended period of time, its opponents have a natural advantage. The AKP could still win the most votes, but even a significant loss of seats will be a major setback that will pressure them into moderating their actions. The AKP is in trouble but the secular opposition must unite. The CHP is talking about reforming the law keeping parties that win less than 10 percent out of parliament. If they can succeed, it will make it easier to contain the AKP and strengthen Turkey’s democracy. Things are very bad with Turkey right now — but democracy, the process used by the AKP to come to power, may very well be its undoing next July.

Erdogan Good – PKK Reconciliation

Political deadlock between parties means Erdogan needs political capital to push PKK compromise

Jackson 9 [Alexander, Senior Editor, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, CU Issue 43, August 17, http://cria-online.org/CU\_-\_file\_-\_article\_-\_sid\_-\_59.html] KLS

The question for now is whether the Turkish government has the political will for peace with the PKK, and how many of Mr Ocalan’s ‘fundamentals’ it is prepared to accept (a general amnesty is, apparently, not likely to happen). The thaw with Armenia has already cost AKP some political capital, and pushing too hard on a settlement with the Kurds may be a step too far for nationalist parties and the military. Serious ceasefire violations by the PKK – the group killed one Turkish soldier on August 7 (Washington Post, August 7) - would almost certainly derail efforts at reconciliation. So would any inflammatory moves by the pro-Kurdish Democratic Social Party (DTP). This seems remote, for the time being: Interior Minister Besir Atalay met with the party’s leader on August 13, where he was apparently reassured that the DTP would assist the government’s efforts (Todays Zaman, August 15). However, splits between moderates and hardliners – in the DTP, the PKK, and the nationalist opposition – are likely, and will create further conflict and political deadlock.

Opposition party sentiment means the AKP needs political capital to push PKK compromise

Taspinar 2/6 [Omer, Staff Writer, Today’s Zaman, http://turkishcampus.com/cafe/trar.htm] KLS

It doesn't help that elections are in the air.. The AKP has already spent precious political capital on its initiative on the Kurdish issue, which is also at an impasse after the Constitutional Court decided to close down the pro-Kurdish and pro-terrorist PKK Democratic Society Party (DTP). The AKP's nationalist credentials are under fire from the MHP. This poses a major dilemma for Erdogan because the AKP and the MHP often fight for the same political constituency, particularly in the conservative Anatolian heartland. Add to these internal political considerations a crucial external dimension

PKK compromise needs political capital to pass- opposition must be swayed

Sanamyan 9 [Emil, Washington Editor of the Armenian Reporter, September 1, http://yandunts.blogspot.com/2009\_12\_01\_archive.html] KLS

The measure's critics claim it amounts to an amnesty for members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been fighting a 30-year guerilla campaign against the Turkish government. The Turkish political opposition in turn sees the effort as the ruling party's grab for Kurdish votes. "It is a tough time for the Turkish government to make an unexpectedly forthcoming step on [Armenia relations] now, given the amount of political capital the Kurdish initiative is using up," Ms. Goksel told the Armenian Reporter. As part of political bargaining in parliament, it would not be unreasonable to expect Turkish leaders to use the Armenia protocols as a way to deflect opposition from the Kurdish initiative. Even if the protocols are submitted for ratification, "ultimately there is no guarantee that the protocols will pass parliament," Ms. Goksel said, suggesting a scenario similar to the 2003 parliamentary vote that barred U.S. land forces from transiting Turkish territory in the war against Iraq. As in the past, the opponents of ratification will likely cite the lack of progress in the Karabakh talks as justifying their opposition, she said. And the government will have other reasons for stalling on the vote.

Erdogan Good – PKK Reconciliation

Erdogan is being flanked on the PKK – Capital is key to resisting crackdowns that escalate violence

Al-Jazeera 6-23 (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2010/06/2010623181513943582.html)

The attacks have taken on a political dimension for Erdogan, whose ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) faces difficult elections next year. Erdogan's overtures have helped the AKP win some Kurdish support, but they have also exposed the party to criticism from the rightist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the MHP, recently called Erdogan’s opening "a project of treason". Turkish and Kurdish politicians talk to Al Jazeera about the escalating violence The People's Republican Party (CHP), the main opposition party, also blamed Erdogan's policies for the renewed violence, though his criticism was more measured. "I expressed my concerns over the policies followed [on terrorism] to the President. I explained my concerns over intelligence gathering and economic policies which lead to terrorism," Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the CHP, said after a meeting with Abdullah Gul, the Turkish president. Erdogan has promised not to abandon his overtures to the Kurds. But with violence quickly rising, he will face mounting pressure to crack down - hard - on Kurdish fighters.

Erdogan Good – Constitutional Reform

Public support for constitutional reform but opposition means political capital is necessary for it to pass

IRI 7 [October 18, International Republican Institute, http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/economist-cites-iri-armenia-poll] .KLS

Turning a deaf ear to such criticism, the government has wasted precious political capital on writing a new constitution. The current document, written by the generals after their last coup in 1980, undoubtedly needs to be replaced. Yet by insisting on provisions that would enable veiled women to attend university, the government has been accused of promoting a covert Islamist agenda.

Wooing opposition parties is key to constitutional reform

Euractiv.com 3/30/10 (Staff, int’l news site,

http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-constitutional-reform-under-fire-opposition-business-news-393050) JPG

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said that his ruling AK Party will send its constitutional reform package to parliament today (30 March). But the proposed reforms were met with hostility from the opposition and the business community. In March 2008 the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) narrowly escaped being outlawed for violating the secular system (see EurActiv [LinksDossier](http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678) on EU-Turkey relations). Turkey’s chief prosecutor said in January that he was examining whether the government was exerting pressure on the judiciary, a move that may in theory result in a fresh closure case against the AKP. The AKP dominates parliament, but its majority falls short of the 367 votes required for adopting constitutional changes. The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) refused to back the changes (see 'Positions'). The second largest opposition party, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), signalled that it was also not on board, accusing the ruling party of imposing its own will on others. If the government fails to draw opposition support and pushes the amendments through parliament with less than 367 votes in favour, it will be forced to put the changes to a referendum. Erdogan's government says the reforms, which change the structure of the Constitutional Court and make it harder to ban political parties, are designed to boost democracy in line with European Union criteria. Critics of the AKP, who accuse it of harbouring a secret Islamist agenda, say the package is designed to consolidate the party's power before parliamentary elections scheduled for mid-2011. "I hope that they will present it to the speaker of parliament tomorrow, God willing," Erdogan said in a speech to an AK Party meeting in the capital Ankara.

Erdogan popularity and AKP power is critical to con reform

Global Comment 6-25 (http://globalcomment.com/2010/israel-and-turkey-tracing-the-decline/)

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been leader of Turkey since 2002 as head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The Islamic-leaning party differs from the dogma of Kemalism – the secular based belief system enshrined by and after Mustafa Kemal, a.k.a. Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey – in two major ways: the nation has become increasingly religious and has fostered increased minority rights. Both steps have fractured the Turkish identity of the past 80 years. The AKP behaved cautiously at first, until Erdogan won a specially called for election to validate his nomination of fellow AKP member Abdullah Gul to the presidency, solidifying the party’s control of the government. Since then, the AKP has pushed for more religious rights – students’ right to wear headscarves on university campuses most notably – and constitutional reform that would put Turkey in line for EU admission while also, conveniently, limiting the secular military’s power. In a visit to Turkey three months ago, I noticed that constitutional reform and the tensions between the AKP and the old secular establishment were the hot topics of Turkish politics, and not any foreign policy matters.

Erdogan Good – Economic Reform – Wag the Dog

If Erdogan’s popularity continues to decline, he’ll explode the budget deficit

Bloomberg Business 7-6 (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-06/turkey-s-politics-may-encourage-looser-fiscal-stand-lubin-says.html)

Turkey’s government may loosen fiscal policy to help counter rising support for its main challenger, swelling an already-expanding current account deficit, said David Lubin, Citigroup Inc.’s chief emerging markets economist. With the opposition “revitalized by a change in leadership, and where opinion polls suggest that the AKP’s popularity has been waning a little bit, it’s possible to imagine that there might be incentives for a fiscal stimulus,” Lubin said in an interview in London yesterday. With record-low interest rates, that could lead to “much worse trends in the current account deficit” in the second half of this year. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government has pledged to rein in a budget deficit that widened to 5.5 percent of economic output last year. Erdogan’s government said in March that it no longer needs International Monetary Fund assistance to manage its public finances, and parliament is debating legislation to impose a cap on the deficit. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party or AKP, which must call elections within a year, was backed by 39 percent of voters according to a May poll by research company Genar, down from the 47 percent in 2007 elections. The main opposition Republican People’s Party, which elected Kemal Kilicdaroglu as its new leader in May, was on 26 percent. Turkey’s budget surplus before interest payments in the first five months of 2010 was more than double the target for the whole year, leaving the government room to relax fiscal policy without jeopardizing budget goals. Lubin said he expects Turkey’s economy to expand more than 6 percent this year, “which is a really impressive rate.” He said measures to strengthen Turkish banks, taken after a series of collapses a decade ago, helped the country rebound from the global crisis of the past two years.

Erdogan = Economic Reform

Erdogan’s political capital is key to reforms

Phillips 4 (David L., Sen. Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, 12/22/4, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64230/david-l-phillips/a-crescent-among-stars) JPG

Through effective and charismatic personal diplomacy, Erdogan, in seeking Turkey's accession, burnished his credentials at home and in Europe. He never begged for admission; instead, Erdogan conducted a strong and positive campaign, all the while insisting on equal treatment. He resolutely rejected European proposals for a "privileged partnership" instead of full membership for Turkey, and resisted efforts to force him to recognize Cyprus as a condition for entry. Despite grumblings from hard-line nationalists, the vast majority of Turks have enthusiastically welcomed the EU decision. Erdogan's public approval rating, already sky-high, has climbed even higher. He should now use this political capital to push through important political, economic, and security reforms, further consolidating Atatürk's vision of a secular European state on the Bosphorus. Indeed, Turkey needs political reform to break its pattern of erratic governance. To accomplish this, Erdogan should call for early parliamentary elections and, once he has secured a bigger parliamentary majority, initiate constitutional reforms to replace the country's parliamentary system with a presidential one. Doing so would allow him to run for president in 2007, and govern with a stronger hand.

Erdogan shapes the publics opinion – overwhelms secular opposition

Tait 9 (Robert, reporter @ The Gaurdian, 10/26/9, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/26/turkey-iran1/print) JPG

Friendly towards a religious theocratic Iran, covetous and increasingly resentful of a secular but maddeningly dismissive Europe: it seems the perfect summary of Turkey's east-west dichotomy. Erdogan's partiality towards Ahmadinejad may surprise some in the west who see Turkey as a western-oriented democracy firmly grounded inside Nato. It has been a member of the alliance since 1952. It will be less surprising to Erdogan's secular domestic critics, who believe the prime minister's heart lies in the east and have long suspected his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development party (AKP) government of plotting to transform Turkey into a religious state resembling Iran. Erdogan vigorously denies the latter charge, but to his critics he and Ahmadinejad are birds of a feather: devout religious conservatives from humble backgrounds who court popular support by talking the language of the street. After Ahmadinejad's disputed presidential election in June, Erdogan and his ally, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gul, were among the first foreign leaders to make congratulatory phone calls, ignoring the mass demonstrations and concerns of western leaders over the result's legitimacy. Talking to the Guardian, Erdogan called the move a "necessity of bilateral relations". "Mr Ahmadinejad was declared to be the winner, not officially, but with a large vote difference, and since he is someone we have met before, we called to congratulate him," he said. "Later it was officially declared that he was elected, he got a vote of confidence and we pay special attention to something like this. It is a basic principle of our foreign policy. The gesture will be remembered when Erdogan arrives in Tehran this week for talks with Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, that will focus on commercial ties, including Turkey's need for Iranian natural gas. Ahmadinejad has voiced his admiration for Erdogan, praising Turkey's recent decision to ban Israel from a planned Nato manoeuvre in protest at last winter's bombardment of Gaza. Since the election, Iran has witnessed a fierce crackdown on opposition figures that has resulted in activists, students and journalists being imprisoned and publicly tried. Detainees have died in prison, and there have been allegations of torture and rape. Some of those alleging mistreatment have sought refuge in Turkey. But Erdogan said he would not raise the post-election crackdown with his hosts, saying it would represent "interference" in Iranian domestic affairs.

Erdogan = Economic Reform

**Erdogan push is key to the AKPs agenda – US backing and Turkey military support prove**

Mathhews and Kohen 8 (Owen and Sami, journalists @ Newsweek, 2/9/8, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/02/09/the-true-turkish-believer.html) JPG

Whether Erdogan will follow through with his plans is still an open question. Almost no ruler in modern Turkish history has been better placed to push reform as he is, here and now. Last year, using a canny mix of brinkmanship and diplomacy, he got the United States to back limited Turkish airstrikes and commando raids against PKK bases inside northern Iraq. That won him huge support not just from voters—including ultranationalist voters—but also from Turkey's politically powerful generals. "The government stands side by side with our soldiers," Erdogan told parliamentarians when asking them to authorize the use of force outside Turkey's borders last year. That message went some way toward defusing the military's longstanding enmity toward Erdogan and the AKP.

Erdogan is persistent and has empirically overseen reforms

Mathhews and Kohen 8 (Owen and Sami, journalists @ Newsweek, 2/9/8, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/02/09/the-true-turkish-believer.html) JPG

Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan just won't take no for an answer. In 2002 he and his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power promising to get Turkey into the European Union. Under the banner of the EU's "Copenhagen criteria" for new members, the AKP made an impressive start: it abolished the death penalty, curbed the backroom political power of the military and eased restrictions on Kurdish language and culture. But instead of recognizing just how far Turkey had come, European leaders recoiled, rebuffing Erdogan and his country at virtually every turn. French President Nicolas Sarkozy says he opposes Turkish membership in the EU because it's "an Asian country," suggesting instead that maybe one day it could be part of a proposed Mediterranean Union. German Chancellor Angela Merkel warns that "Turkey's membership is going to constrain the EU." She offers "privileged partnership" instead of full membership. Erdogan is undeterred. Instead of slowing down the pace of change, the AKP has announced its biggest and boldest reform package yet. Emboldened by a resounding victory in snap elections last summer, the party has embarked on a wholesale overhaul of the hard-wiring of the country's political system. Central to the new order is a redrawing of Turkey's 1981 Constitution designed to give more power to the people—including direct presidential elections—as well as introducing more freedom of speech and religion. In doing so, the AKP hopes to create a society that Europe simply cannot refuse—one that is moving ahead with a long-term strategy that looks calmly past the current crop of anti-Turkish European leaders. "Whatever they say, we will continue on our path," promises Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. "For us the important thing is that the negotiation process with Europe remains on track."

Erdogan = Economic Stability (Generally)

Erdogan power is critical to economic stability – Midterms key

Reuters 6-22 (http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49536320100622)

Political fallout could complicate the election prospects of the AK Party, favoured by investors for its pro-market policies. Opposition parties have accused Erdogan of making political decisions that have weakened the fight against the PKK and have increased calls for early elections. Failure by the AK Party to win another parliamentary majority could bring a return of the fractious coalitions of the past. Some opinion polls have suggested the AK Party will struggle to win a clear-cut majority.

Erdogan Bad – Shift to the East

Erdogan’s AKP is shifting Turkey to the East away from the U.S. – Kills relations

Al Jazeera 7-6 (http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/07/201075124551502442.html)

At the same time, the AKP's role was boosted by its sponsorship of indirect talks between Syria and Israel. But Turkey was changing. Firstly, the government began placing a greater emphasis on Turkey's Islamic identity and affinity with the causes of the Muslim world. Secondly, in its effort to implement the reforms demanded by the European Union, the Turkish government managed to marginalise the country's military council, stripping it of its power to shape policies. Thirdly, the AKP no longer saw itself as a junior partner in its alliances and sought to assert Turkey's role as a strong regional power rather than a follower in a pro-Western axis. Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's foreign minister, put forward a new paradigm in international relations where Turkey's political weight is derived from expanding and developing its ties with its neighbours to the East - including the Arab world, the former Soviet Republics and Iran. When Obama became US president, Turkey was the first Muslim country he visited in his bid to open a new page with the Muslim world away from the hostile terminology of the 'war on terror'. His visit was viewed as a triumph for Turkey's new strategy and a boost to its perceived role as a power broker between East and West. But the new developments in Turkey alarmed its traditional allies in Washington, particularly neo-conservatives and the pro-Israel lobby - who claimed that Ankara was distancing itself from the West. The Israeli war on Gaza galvanised the AKP's opponents in Washington, while Turkey saw it as a blow to its efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria at a time when it was expecting a breakthrough.

Erdogan Bad – Iran Alliance

Erdogan will use political capital to push Iranian alliance and ensure his office

BBC 6/2 [2010, Lexis]

Ankara can now use grassroots anger to make easy political capital for electoral purposes at a critical moment for the party in government, and to consolidate its domestic power against the Army (the only entity in Turkey capable of countering Erdogan's Islamist rise) which remains the sole power in the Turkish state still favourable to cordial relations with Israel. But there is another factor lurking behind all of this: Iran, and its search for regional hegemony. It is no mere coincidence that the tragedy took place on the very same day as the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] published two extremely tough reports on Iran and on Syria. Lebanon's stint as duty president of the UN Security Council (an obstacle in the way of a new round of UN sanctions against Iran) came to an end on 31 May and people presumed that the United Nations would deliberate against Iran either this week or next, on the eve of the anniversary of last year's fraudulent elections.

Erdogan’s influence is key to Iranian relations

Tait 9 (Robert, reporter @ The Gaurdian, 10/26/9, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/26/turkey-iran1/print) JPG

Erdogan has overseen a dramatic improvement in the previously frigid relations between Turkey and Iran, which was viewed with suspicion by the pro-secularist high command of the powerful Turkish military. Trade between the two countries last year was worth an estimated £5.5bn as Iran has developed into a major market for Turkish exports. Erdogan's views will interest US foreign policy makers, who have long seen his AKP government as a model of a pro-western "moderate Islam" that could be adopted in other Muslim countries. They will also find an audience with President Barack Obama, who signalled Turkey's strategic importance in a visit last April and has invited the prime minister to visit Washington. They are unlikely to impress Israel, which has warned that Erdogan's criticisms risk harming Turkey's relations with the US.

Erdogan Bad – Low Israel Relations

Erdogan is the source of low relations with Israel – He takes the issue personally

Philadelphia Inquirer 7-4 (http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/20100704\_Worldview\_\_Inkling\_of\_hope\_in\_crisis\_between\_Israel\_\_Turkey.html)

On the Turkish side, Erdogan has stoked the flames, with his fire-breathing rhetoric about Israel. No question his public is deeply aggrieved by the deaths of eight Turks and a Turkish American on the aid ship Mavi Marmara. However, Erdogan - famous in Turkey for his emotional outbursts - appears to have taken this episode very personally, the culmination, in his mind, of a series of slights by Israelis. When I interviewed him in late 2009, he exploded in rage in recalling a visit to his office earlier that year by then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The two men had discussed Turkish efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria and to free Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from Hamas captivity in Gaza. But Olmert never revealed that Israel planned to invade Gaza in three days to stop Hamas rocket fire, leaving Erdogan to face political accusations that he had known in advance. Erdogan also fumed, in the interview, that Turkey had not been permitted to send relief supplies to Gaza after the invasion. The flotilla episode fits right into this narrative of betrayal.

Midterms are key – AK Party will continue pressure until then

Ennahar Online 6-29 (http://www.ennaharonline.com/en/international/4312.html)

The United States and several Western countries, including Italy, have expressed concern recently over the evolution of diplomacy in Turkey, a candidate for the European Union but they are moving eastward, to Iran, Syria or Sudan. They fear losing a valuable Muslim ally, strategically located between Europe, Middle East and Central Asia. "Obama has telephoned Erdogan just before the vote" in the Security Council, where Turkey is a non-permanent, and he took the "No" of Turkey as a "personal attack", says Mr. Birand. "Turkey will maintain pressure on Israel until the legislative elections" of spring 2011, he predicts, saying that these repeated attacks serve the electoral interests of the conservative Islamic regime in Ankara.

Impact Link T/O – A2: Wag the Dog

Turkish radicalism will kill Erdogans credibility in the long run and hurts Turkish credibility

Bengio 6/11 (Ofra, Sen. Fellow @ Center for Middle Eastern & African Studies, 6/11/10,

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/ofra-bengio-turkey-s-strategic-u-turn-israel-s-tactical-mistakes-1.295578) JPG

Because of the inherently asymmetrical nature of Turkish-Israeli relations, Israel appears to be the main loser from their deterioration. Still, Turkey too stands to lose from the new situation. As it increasingly assumes a more Iranian-like radical stance, Ankara's credibility as a stability-promoting power in the region is likely to be damaged. Second it has diminished its chances for playing the role of a mediator between Syria and Israel, a task that is strongly coveted by the architects of its newly activist foreign policy. Lastly, the surge in popularity of the AKP government, exemplified by the huge anti-Israeli demonstrations that Erdogan’s inflammatory speeches helped unleash, may boomerang against him in the long run. Even now, concurrently with the anti-Israeli demonstrations, similarly large ones have been taking place against the AKP, organized by Kurds. Ultimately, Israel will not be able to serve indefinitely as a diversion from the Turkish government’s domestic and external problems.

Erdogan has public support and is not to blame for anti-Israeli sentiment

Horovitz 6/18 [David, The Jerusalem Post, 2010, Lexis] KLS

One commentator all but snorted in my face at the notion that Erdogan is an Islamist who is ideologically committed to destroying relations with the Jewish state. He ridiculed the idea that the prime minister was directly involved in the flotilla affair. He flatly rejected claims that the Mavi Marmara had been made available cheaply to the pro-Hamas, reportedly terror-linked IHH (Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms). He asserted that the Taksim Square protests were primarily the work of other Islamic players, notably the rival Saadet party. And he said that had Erdogan wanted the masses out on the streets, there would have been tens if not hundreds of thousands of protesters rather than a few thousand.

Impact Link T/O – ME Peace

Turkey can not negotiate ME peace – Terrible Israeli relations

Daily News & Economic Review 7-5 (Ankara newspaper, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=from-a-proactive-to-a-reactive-foreign-policy-2010-07-05)

Turkey’s increasingly messy entanglement with Israel is forcing Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to change tack on his overall foreign policy vision vis-à-vis the Middle East. He continues to garner much respect and support on Arab streets and among radical groups or countries in the region with his increasingly angry remarks toward Israel. It is unlikely, however, that there is a role left for Turkey to play in terms of the seminal issue concerning the region, namely the Arab-Israeli dispute. There is no way Israel will consent to a Turkish role in any discussions concerning this issue in the near future. As for Davutoğlu, he continues to up the ante, having received the cue from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in this respect. Talking to reporters in his plane on his way back from Kyrgyzstan over the weekend, Davutoğlu more or less laid down the law. He was quoted as saying if Israel refuses to apologize for its deadly attack on the Mavi Marmara ship, which left nine Turks dead, relations between the two countries will never improve. “They have three possible roads ahead of them. They either apologize or they accept an international commission of inquiry and its findings or relations will be severed. We have not determined a deadline here, but we will not wait indefinitely,” Davutoğlu said, according to Monday’s daily Hürriyet. These are categorical remarks and leave no room for compromise, and the way things are going it appears ties will be severed if Davutoğlu sticks to his word, because Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already discounted the possibility of an apology.

Turkey is not an honest broker – No peace talks

Xinhua News 7-6 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-07/06/c\_13386796\_2.htm)

However, for the time being, Israel remains skeptical regarding Ankara's real intentions and numerous Israeli government officials have said they will not use Ankara as a negotiator on another peace track with Syria for as long as it is felt in Israel that Turkey cannot be an honest broker. Turkey had been chairing indirect negotiations between Israel and Damascus with Netanyahu's predecessor Ehud Olmert. Even in recent weeks, Turkey has offered to resurrect that track but for the time being Israel is saying "thanks, but no thanks."

More ev…

Global Comment 6-25 (http://globalcomment.com/2010/israel-and-turkey-tracing-the-decline/)

Yet Turkey’s policies have at times contradicted that depth. Erdogan’s criticisms before the past few weeks came twinned with the call, often sounding like a demand, for Israel to resume indirect talks with Syria through Turkish mediation. An effective mediator need not be impartial, but they certainly need the trust of both sides, and insulting one of the sides is no way to win this trust.

Impact Link T/O – ME Peace

Erdogan makes ME peace impossible – Sidelines Syria & Egypt & overstates the Palestinian case

Khaleej Times 7-8 (http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2010/July/opinion\_July46.xml&section=opinion&col=)

The Turkish-Israeli rift and Erdogan’s attempt to broker a deal with Brazil to transfer enriched Iranian uranium has immediate, seismic political significance for Syria. The Mavi Marmara flotilla tragedy makes any additional Turkish mediation in secret talks between Syria and Israel, or a negotiated settlement on the Golan Heights, impossible. His olive branch gone, Syrian President Assad has publicly warned that the risk of war in the Middle East is rising. Moreover, if Turkey emerges as a visceral, powerful champion of the Palestinian cause, Syrian influence and strategic options in Gaza will narrow. Syria, threatened with an invasion by Turkish generals a decade ago, consciously courted Erdogan’s AKP in an attempt to end its international isolation in Arab politics due to its Iran alliance. An assertive Turkish role in the Arab-Israeli conflict could, however, relegate Syria to a subordinate role in the emerging Iran-Turkish axis. The flotilla incident has boosted the international image of Hamas and exposed the cruelty and futility of the Israeli naval blockade. Since Fatah-Hamas politics has been in zero sum modes since the fratricidal slaughter three years ago in Gaza, this event weakens Abu Mazen’s government in the West Bank. Palestinian politics will never be the same again because Abu Mazen’s trust in American peace making, Israeli concessions and a two state solution has proven to be an illusion. Without Saudi petrodollars, an Egyptian military deterrent, Syrian acquiescence, a unified Palestinian leadership and Iraqi sovereignty, an Arab Israeli peace settlement is a chimera.

Impact Link T/O – Israeli Relations

Turkey won’t cut relations w Israel – They’re resilient and Turkey is backing down

National Post 7-6 (http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/Israel+Turkey+Need+Each+Other/3239191/story.html)

However, Turkey's threats to sever relations with Israel are unlikely to materialize as both countries need each other and Ankara cannot afford new tensions with the West, analysts said. The analysts said Mr. Davutoglu was compelled to issue the warning mostly because Israel's vocal refusal to apologize for the raid threatened to make the Turkish government lose face at home. "If Israel had made a little effort, the Turkish government would have responded with even greater willingness," said Bahadir Dincer from the International Strategic Research Organisation in Ankara. "Turkey and Israel need each other on the diplomatic chessboard of the Middle East." Serdar Erdurmaz, an expert at the Strategic Analysis Centre, described Mr. Davutoglu's remarks as an attempt to win political capital at home but added that Ankara had actually relaxed its conditions for reconciliation.

No cut off of Israeli ties – US Pressure and inevitable cooling

National Post 7-6 (http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/Israel+Turkey+Need+Each+Other/3239191/story.html)

"Severing relations with Israel does not seem possible to me. There is serious U.S. pressure" on Turkey and Israel to mend fences, Oytun Orhan from the Middle East Studies Centre said. "Ties with Israel are not separate from Turkey's pro-Western orientation, which remains its main foreign policy peg...Turkey cannot position itself as a country in full confrontation with Israel like Iran or Syria," he said. Mr. Netanyahu meets the U.S. President in Washington today and Barack Obama is expected to voice his dismay over the commando raids on a flotilla of ships approaching Gaza. But Turkey, the analyst stressed, may opt to "gradually increase pressure" on Israel -- by extending an overflight ban on Israeli military aircraft to civilian planes for instance -- while keeping dialogue channels open. "A close relationship like the one in the 1990s is no longer possible," Mr. Orhan said. "But I expect that the parties will stop fanning the tensions and that the ties will remain in a state of cold peace in the near future, at least until the governments in both countries change."

Their evidence is media bluster for domestic audiences – No cut off of ties

Xinhua News 7-6 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-07/06/c\_13386796\_2.htm)

Two experts on the Israeli-Turkish relationship expressed doubts about the chances that Ankara will really cut off ties with Israel. In conversations with Xinhua, both emphasized that they had not seen the latest reports but said in general terms they cannot envisage Turkey taking such a step. "I really can't see a break in diplomatic ties but if it were to happen it would be a terrible thing for Israel. However, as I said, I cannot see this happening," said Alon Liel, a former Israeli ambassador to Turkey, who later became the director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry. Likewise, senior Turkish newspaper columnist Yusuf Kanli pours cold water on the suggestion that Davutoglu is prepared to go as far as the newspapers suggest. "I don't think that Turkey will take such a drastic step," Kanli said on Tuesday. In his opinion, this is part of a negotiation between the countries being carried out via the media. Each nation is offering a position from which it can retreat down the line -- "the Turks demanding an apology, the Israelis refusing." "Turkey needs Israel and Israel needs Turkey," Kanli explained.

Impact Link T/O – Israeli Relations

Relations are resilient

Miami Herald 6-30 (http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/30/1707724/turkey-vital-ally-for-israel.html)

However, Turkey's efforts to become a regional power broker require that it maintain credibility in the West and retain and improve its diplomatic relations with Israel. These positions have support in the Turkish military and with a significant portion of the population, thus decreasing the probability that Turkey will risk a full scale cold war by sustained anti-Israeli and anti-Western policies and rhetoric.

Turkey-Israeli relations are resilient – even if they collapse there wont be a war

Trend News 7/3 (Staff, http://en.trend.az/news/politics/foreign/1714698.html) JPG

Despite a meeting between officials of [Turkey](http://en.trend.az/search/?str=Turkey&m=a) and [Israel](http://en.trend.az/search/?str=Israel&m=a), relations between these countries can improve only if the Israeli government fulfills Ankara's demands, former Turkish Foreign Minister and now MP from the Turkish ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) [Yasar Yakis](http://en.trend.az/search/?str=Yasar%2BYakis&m=a) believes.

"There are definite requirements on the Israeli government, the relations can enter a better stage if they are fulfilled, although the wound will not be cured fully," Yakis told [Trend](http://www.trend.az) over the telephone. On Thursday it became known that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Israeli Trade Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer held a secret meeting in Brussels on the restoration of bilateral relations, which were on the verge of breakdown because of the Israeli military's attack on the Turkish humanitarian ship Mavi Marmara routing to Gaza that lead to murder of nine Turks. The Turkish leadership demanded from Israel to offer a formal apology for the attack on an international convoy in the international waters and pay compensation to the families of the victims, as well as to ease the blockade of the Gaza Strip and accept an international investigation into the incident in the Mediterranean Sea. Davutoglu said Turkey agreed upon the meeting, which was initiated by Israel, to state directly and clearly its demands to be fulfilled by the Israeli authorities within the international law. Yakis believes the former military and strategic partnership between the two countries is possible only if Israel fulfills the requirements of Ankara, although the relations between the two nations should not suffer from this. "Two people - the Turkish and Israeli, who historically have provided tremendous support to each other, should not suffer from the errors that the government makes sometimes," Yakis said. "Turkey demanded respect for itself because of some erroneous actions of the Israeli government." Meanwhile, Israeli government's official Mark Regev believes goods relations meet both countries' interests, given that Israel had excellent relations with Ankara in the past. "We hope Ankara also holds this opinion," Regev told [Trend](http://www.trend.az). Turkey closed down partially the air transportation for Israeli aircrafts and recalled its ambassador from Tel-Aviv, though there is still military cooperation between the countries. "Indeed, Turkey is not going to break out war with Israel, but it will use other leverages depending on direction of relations," Yakis said. For instance, if to speak about trade and economic relations that have been developed in rapid pace until recent crisis, even the Turkish government does not put embargo, although it will not restrain the Turkish businessmen to

cease cooperation with Israel, Yakis said.

Impact Link T/O – Israeli Relations

Turkey-Israeli relations are resilient – both sides want to sustain

Bila 7/1 (Sibel1 Utku, journalist @ Agence France-Press, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Israeli+Turkish+ministers+held+secret+meeting+Reports/3222700/story.html) JPG

ANKARA — Turkey and Israel held secret talks to seek a way out of a deep crisis in bilateral ties since a deadly raid on Gaza-bound aid ships, officials said Thursday. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Israeli Trade Minister Benjamin Ben Eliezer met Wednesday in Brussels, where Davutoglu was on a visit to discuss his country’s EU membership bid. The talks were agreed "upon a request by Israel," Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Burak Ozugergin told AFP. The United States, alarmed over the rift between its two main allies in the Middle East, was also involved in organising the meeting, media reports said. It was the first meeting at a ministerial level since relations between the once-close allies plunged into deep crisis on May 31 when Israeli commandos raided a Turkish ship leading an aid flotilla to the Gaza Strip, killing nine. "The point our ties have reached is not one that we are happy with... The meeting provided an opportunity to convey in person the steps we expect so that relations can be repaired," Ozugergin said. Davutoglu told Ben Eliezer that Turkey expected Israel to apologise over the bloodshed, pay compensation to the victims’ families, agree to an international inquiry into the raid and end the blockade of Gaza, he said. An official at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office confirmed that Ben Eliezer held talks Wednesday with "a Turkish official." The talks sparked tensions in Israel as it emerged that Netanyahu gave the go-ahead for the meeting without informing hawkish Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Turkey’s Hurriyet daily said "the ground for the secret talks was laid" last week when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with US President Barack Obama in Toronto. Ozugergin declined to comment on the report. US assistant secretary of state Philip Gordon had said earlier that Washington was working to heal the Turkish-Israeli rift amid fears that Turkey, NATO’s sole mainly Muslim member, was sliding away from the West.

Impact Link T/O – Shift to the East

**Erdogan is pragmatic – No radical agenda**

Mathhews and Kohen 8 (Owen and Sami, journalists @ Newsweek, 2/9/8, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/02/09/the-true-turkish-believer.html) JPG

That, too, could be considered a liberal move—more akin to much of the West's freedom of religion than Ataturk's ideal of laïcité, or freedom from religion. Now Erdogan faces an enormous balancing act. The test of his commitment to European ideals will come as he chooses in the months ahead which reforms to pursue next—EU reforms, or those advocated by his grass-roots supporters. Poll numbers suggest waning support among Turks for entry to the EU, largely because of European rebuffs and the perception that Europe has failed to keep its promises on Turkish-dominated Northern Cyprus. Yet it seems increasingly unlikely that Erdogan and the AKP would ever hop off that old European streetcar. Since his firebrand days, Erdogan has realized that straight political Islam has a limited appeal to all but a tiny minority of Turkish voters. The same goes for isolationist nationalism. So he is likely to take a more pragmatic path, if for no other reason than that Turkey's continued economic growth is tightly linked to its embrace of Western business standards. Indeed Turkey is going to keep driving that streetcar west—no matter what the EU or Erdogan's opponents have to say about it.

No radical Islamic shift

Jerusalem Post 7-2 (http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=180101)

The evidence is still equivocal, but it looks increasingly as if Erdogan plans to take his country down the path of Islam, picking up the political, social and economic baggage it needs as he ploddingly moves along. If he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) aren’t leading a Khomeini-style revolution, that’s because Turkey’s strategic location between Europe and the Middle East, its NATO membership and the distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of Turks for religious extremism require him to proceed cautiously.

No shift to the East

Today’s Zaman 7-4 (http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215051-102-analysts-say-tepid-response-from-the-west-pushed-turkey-away.html)

Assessing the bluster in the West over “who lost Turkey,” Tocci said she is diametrically opposed to such views. “Turkey’s policy in the Middle East is largely the product of Turkey’s own domestic transformation, which has in turn been inspired and triggered to a significant extent by the EU,” she stated. In many respects, the argument goes, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East can be characterized as being “Europeanized”; it is far more Europeanized than in the 1990s, when Turkey’s relations with the Middle East were marked by a strategic relationship with Israel and tensions and conflicts with all its southern neighbors. Noting that it remains essential that Turkey realize that the value of its foreign policy in the Middle East continues to hinge on its democratic consolidation, Tocci said this in turn remains inextricably tied with its own EU accession process. Dennis Sammut, from London-based LINKS, dismissed claims that Turkey is drifting away from the West. “Turkey remains a candidate country of the European Union,” Sammut noted, “whilst the accession process is going slower than some had hoped, it continues.”

Impact Link T/O – Shift to the East

No shift toward the East – It was natural and inevitable and is harmless

Reuters 7-6 (http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49926020100706)

NATO member Turkey's concerted efforts to forge relations with its eastern neighbours, the Middle East, the Islamic World, as well as Russia and the former Soviet bloc countries, has led to some critics saying it is turning away from the West. Some go further, saying the choice of new friends, like Iran and Syria, is a mark of the ruling AK party's Islamist pedigree. Gul dismisses such notions as misconceived. For Turkey, gaining admission to the EU is the top priority of state policy, he said.

The AK Party he belonged to before becoming president in 2007 has been the driving force, and while critics still talk of its Islamist roots, the party likens itself to a Muslim version of Europe's christian democrats. Turkey, Gul said, was committed to the ideals of democracy, human rights, free markets, gender equality, and transparency and accountability and was intent on promoting those values. The youth, intellectuals, and politicians in many Muslim countries, according to Gul, have been inspired by watching Turkey change. “Turkey has become a sort of central attraction," Gul said. "Everybody is questioning themselves and saying; If Turkey can realise this, we can realise this too." Improving relations with Eastern neighbours, and seeking to grow markets in the Middle East, Africa and the wider Islamic World as well as former Soviet bloc countries didn't compromise Turkey's EU goal, Gul said. It was natural for a country to engage with former dominions of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, Gul said, in the same way that Britain cherished its ties with the Commonwealth and Spain retains its links with Latin America, including some radical states. "Turkey's orientation is being confused with its contacts and relations -- these are separate things." Having good relations with neighbours, was part of a vision to spread stability and security needed to bring prosperity to a a region whose governments have neglected their people by squandering resources on war, conflict and confrontation.

No shift to the East – The shift is outward, in general

Financial Times 6-28 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/357b1e10-7fe8-11df-91b4-00144feabdc0.html)

This is not just a fit of pique at the EU’s reluctance to advance Turkey’s accession. Nor is it a strategic turn east, or an ideological tilt by the neo-Islamist AKP towards Muslim countries.

Mr Erdogan does want to demonstrate that a confident, economically dynamic and politically reformed Turkey has options, and that it is an asset to the EU and the west, proficient in the “soft power” Europe seems to have forgotten how to use. Securing the neighbourhood, moreover, and fostering economic interdependence – quintessential EU principles – have also led to improved relations with Russia, Greece and Armenia, not just with Muslim countries. While the alliance with Israel has fractured over Gaza and last month’s Israeli assault on the Turkish-flagged aid flotilla, Turkey last month also cast its vote for Israel’s entry into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. That is the behaviour of a regional power with a long-term view of its strategic interests, not of a country veering towards Islamist activism.

Impact Link T/O – Shift to the East

No eastern shift – They’re still pragmatically checking Iran

Financial Times 6-28 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/357b1e10-7fe8-11df-91b4-00144feabdc0.html)

More interesting, therefore, than the breakdown in Turkish-Israeli relations is the re-emergence of Turkey as a regional power, alongside the revival of its strong and confident Sunni leadership to offset the, historically atypical, Shia assertiveness of Iran and its allies. The rebound in Shia fortunes was triggered by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. That overturned the Sunni order, in an Arab heartland country, placing the Shia in the saddle for the first time since the Fatimid dynasty collapsed in 1171. Iran alone had been unable to spread its 1979 Islamic Revolution into Arab lands. That required the agency of George W Bush, just as the advent of Hizbollah, Iran’s most powerful proxy, was a reactive consequence of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. A recent spate of commentary describing the foreign policy of Mr Erdogan and his peripatetic foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, as anti-western, anti-Israeli, neo-Ottoman – even a challenge to rival the threat from Iran – misses the point. By emerging as a popular champion of Palestinian rights, Turkey has ended Iran’s ability to make all the running in the region.

Erdogan is not key & a shift to the East is not exclusive w relations w the West and will not be radical

Daily News & Economic Review 6-28 (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=what-drives-arab-interest-in-turkey-2010-06-28)

First, the interest in Turkey among Arabs is not contingent on either on Mr. Erdoğan or his Justice and Development Party, or AKP. In other words, should Mr. Erdoğan and the AKP go, the interest would not diminish in any way. In fact, according to my Palestinian friend, “Erdoğan will be forgotten overnight.” Second, Arab interest in Turkey would decline if Ankara were to lose its “Western orientation” in general, and sever its ties with the EU in particular. In other words what is liked about Turkey is the Western image it projects, an image which is lacking in the Middle East.

Third, a Turkey that has severed ties with Israel and turned this country into a demonized adversary will diminish Ankara’s role in the Middle East, where there is the need for new players who have contacts with both Israel and the other countries in the region.

No shift to the East

Turkish Press 6-28 (http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=353369)

Those who really believe that Turkey is creating a new axis of power in the Middle East against the West are getting neither Turkey nor the region right. Turkey is a major regional power and acts in its own interests and the interests of the region. Turkey's efforts to establish regional stability and minimize conflict to the extent possible are also in the interest of all parties. The artificial divisions that have been imposed upon the region since Sept. 11 have not worked and are failing everywhere, from Iraq and Lebanon to Palestine and Afghanistan. By pushing aside key players and befriending ineffectual actors in the region, the US and partly the EU have contributed to the ongoing stalemate. Instead, they should pay more heed to Turkey's experience in the region. It has been proven right so many times in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. It is likely to be proven right again in Iran, Palestine and Afghanistan.

Impact Link T/O – Shift to the East

No aggressive imperial Turkish shift to the East

Khaleej Times 7-8 (http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2010/July/opinion\_July46.xml&section=opinion&col=)

Erdogan is no Gemal Abdel Nasser. He is not willing to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba, subvert pro-West Arab regimes or commit combat troops against the IDF for the sake of Palestinians. Erdogan does not run a military regime, does not intend to nationalise all private businesses in Turkey, and does not intend to buy arms from Russia to boost his deterrent power. Erdogan’s government is about business with the Arab world, it seeks to attract Arab tourists and Arab investors, not project neo-Ottoman imperial power in the Levant. The Nasser analogy does not stand the test of political logic.

Impact Link T/O – Iran Alliance

No Iran alliance

Today’s Zaman 7-4 (http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215033-109-centerthe-new-turkey-reality-bribyi-bravni-dogrucenter.html)

Turkish and US national interests are more aligned now than ever before in history. However, their tactics to pursue these interests are different. Let’s start with the Iran issue. The last thing Turkey wants to see in its region is a nuclear Iran, as it wants to ensure stability in its own backyard. Having the largest economy in the area between the EU and India, south of Russia and including Africa, Turkey is aware of the fact that nobody will benefit more from the preservation of stability within in that zone than itself. However, having seen the results of the Iraq war and the futility of past sanctions on Iran, Turkey does not want another war, especially one that has the risk of spreading throughout the whole of the Middle East. Therefore, the Turkish government wants to push for a diplomatic solution and avoid any military confrontation at all costs. Having said that, and contrary to what many pundits on the American right have warned, Turkey does not intend to form any kind of “axis” with Iran against the West. Anybody who claims that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, run by devout Muslims, wants to form a religious alliance with Iran either does not know a thing about the difference between the Iranian version of Shiite Islam and Turkish Islam or simply has ill will. No such alliance was formed even during the Ottoman Empire, when the empire was ruled by Islamic law.

More ev…

Today’s Zaman 7-4 (http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215033-109-centerthe-new-turkey-reality-bribyi-bravni-dogrucenter.html)

Iran and Turkey are unofficial rivals in the region. When Turkey’s power increases, Iran’s influence is necessarily reduced. A self-confident Turkey, with its democratic institutions, is filling the power vacuum in the Middle East that would otherwise be filled by Iran. Hence, when the American right and the Jewish lobby unconditionally support the Netanyahu-led government’s aggressive actions in the region and attack Turkey reflexively in an effort to protect Israel, they are playing straight into the hands of Iran. In fact, these interest groups would be protecting Israel’s long-term interests more by pressuring the Netanyahu administration to abide by international laws than by encouraging it to repeatedly and publicly defy them. The pundits’ blind support of Israeli policies at any cost, rather than acting as a pragmatic, balancing force, also jeopardizes US national interests by further isolating the US and Israel. By way of analogy, a loving parent who does everything his child asks without question to show his love is not acting in a way that will ultimately benefit the child in the long run.

No Iran alliance

Turkish Press 6-28 (http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=353369)

Turkish officials have said over and over again that Turkey will be the last country to allow Iran or any other country in its region to acquire nuclear weapons. This principled position seems to have fallen on deaf ears in Washington. Instead, some circles, driven by ideology and domestic politics more than anything else, are accusing Turkey of turning its back on the US, falling into the trap of Iranian machinations and forming a new alliance with Iran and Syria.

Impact Link Turn – Iran Alliance

Erdogan strength reins in Iranian heg

Financial Times 6-28 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/357b1e10-7fe8-11df-91b4-00144feabdc0.html)

More interesting, therefore, than the breakdown in Turkish-Israeli relations is the re-emergence of Turkey as a regional power, alongside the revival of its strong and confident Sunni leadership to offset the, historically atypical, Shia assertiveness of Iran and its allies. The rebound in Shia fortunes was triggered by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. That overturned the Sunni order, in an Arab heartland country, placing the Shia in the saddle for the first time since the Fatimid dynasty collapsed in 1171. Iran alone had been unable to spread its 1979 Islamic Revolution into Arab lands. That required the agency of George W Bush, just as the advent of Hizbollah, Iran’s most powerful proxy, was a reactive consequence of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. A recent spate of commentary describing the foreign policy of Mr Erdogan and his peripatetic foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, as anti-western, anti-Israeli, neo-Ottoman – even a challenge to rival the threat from Iran – misses the point. By emerging as a popular champion of Palestinian rights, Turkey has ended Iran’s ability to make all the running in the region.

\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

Impacts – Iran Alliance Bad – NW

Turkey Iran alliance causes proliferation and exponentially increases the risk of a nuclear war which draws in the worlds superpowers

Peters 5/21 (Ralph, columnist @ NY Post, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/nukes\_gone\_wild\_e1DsERRbLf9qsRnyDadpwK) JPG

The world changed this week and we yawned. Our government and media utterly failed to grasp the meaning of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey nuke deal. Undercutting the sanctions-lite bargain Secretary of State [Hillary Clinton](http://www.nypost.com/t/Hillary_Rodham_Clinton) thinks she has with Russia and China was the least of it. We're so obsessed with the single (albeit important) issue of terrorism that we're missing profound global realignments and the rise of grave new threats. Iran's "agreement" to ship a slice of its enriched-uranium pie to Turkey for reprocessing is pure gamesmanship. We expect that from Iran. The alarming part is that, this time, Turkey and Brazil are in on the game. The ludicrous terms of this con-job have long since been overtaken by events. Brazil's President Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip Erdogan](http://www.nypost.com/t/Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan) aren't trying to stop Iran's nuke program. They're eager to facilitate it. What Brazil and Turkey just did wasn't intended to impede Tehran, but to make it harder for Western powers to impose sanctions. Both countries want Iran to run interference for them. Once Iran gets the bomb and takes the (slight) heat, Brazil and Turkey both intend to go nuclear. Brazil wants vanity nukes to cement its position as South America's hegemon, a regional alternative to the US. Turkey's slow-roll Islamist government dreams of a new Ottoman age -- as it turns from the West to embrace the Muslim states it ruled a century ago. After easing Tehran's path to the bomb, Ankara will claim that it needs its own nuclear capability to maintain regional stability. But the coming widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons will be profoundly destabilizing. Each Middle Eastern country, especially, that goes nuclear increases the probability of a nuke exchange exponentially. As Western states fantasize about a "nuclear-weapons-free world," their developing-world darlings are scrambling like mad to develop nuclear arsenals. And we don't get it. Which leads to the second problem with our asleep-at-the-wheel foreign policy (content to equate Arizona's human-rights record with China's): New alliances are developing that are already destabilizing our strategic architecture -- even without nukes. Let's connect a few of the Iran-Turkey-Brazil dots: \* Iran and Brazil share close ties to Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and support other left-wing movements in Latin America. \* Russia sells arms to Iran and Venezuela. Iran supplies weaponry to [Hezbollah](http://www.nypost.com/t/Hezbollah) and Hamas. Venezuela equips Latin narco-terrorists and guerrillas -- to which Brazil turns a blind eye -- and backs Islamist terror. \* While artfully dismantling Turkey's once-secular constitution, Ankara increasingly supports radical-Muslim causes abroad. Turkey's new embrace of Iran is paralleled by a growing intimacy with Russia, as well. \* After flirting with Israel, Turkey chose Syria (whose regime also seeks nukes) as its neighborhood partner. Syria cooperates with Iran in support of Hezbollah and [Hamas](http://www.nypost.com/t/Hamas) -- and has deep ties to Russia. \* China's working hard to strengthen its strategic ties with Brazil and Venezuela, and Beijing's already Iran's staunchest defender on the international stage. \* What do Iran, China, Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, Syria and even our "NATO ally" Turkey have in common? They're all resentful of American power and want to see Washington taken down several notches. In the depths of the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement was a sorry joke in which rhetorical grandstanding and leftist economics stopped development in its tracks for decades. Member countries hurt themselves far more than they annoyed us. The emerging constellation of alliances will mean a lot more trouble. Not least, because so many countries will have nukes. Several years ago, I wrote that, despite the end of yesteryear's superpower confrontation, our military's going to find itself on a nuclear battlefield, after all -- either smack in a war, or running a gruesome cleanup operation. The odds of that happening will soar as proliferation worsens.

Impacts – Iran Alliance Bad – Iran Strikes

**Turkey alliance with Iran causes Israeli Strikes**

Kawther Salam 5/31 (Palestine news site, staff,

http://www.kawther.info/wpr/2010/05/31/flotilla-massacre-is-a-reply-to-the-turkish-iranian-relations) JPG

The leaders of the Israeli gang of War criminals, the so-called “Israeli government” is currently engaged in inciting and planning to launch a nuclear war against Iran, was not able to do anything in response to the Turkish- Iranian-Brazilian agreement of last May 17 2010 to transfer 1.200 Kg of low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for nuclear fuel. In retaliation, they perpetrated the massacre on the Freedom Flotilla of humanitarian aid-carrying ships aiming to break the Israel genocide of siege on Gaza imposed since 2006. The Turkish-Iranian-Brazilian agreement stood as an obstacle against the Israeli ambitions to force the world to enter into a spiral of bloody nuclear war. It is wrong to believe that the Turkish government was not expecting the massacre against the Freedom Flotilla which carried 10.000 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Gaza. The military maritime piracy and massacre operation carried out by Shayetet 13, a naval commando unit, in which at least 20 peace activists were murdered and over 50 were wounded, was a decision of the inner circles of power in israel and approved by the Israeli Cabinet headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak and other war criminals. This Israeli massacre was a message addressed to Turkey and its new Iranian and Syrian allies. Anyone who knows to read between the lines and the history of Israel’s military leaders can understand that Israel has never distinguished between civilians and militants of the groups which are considered as enemies according to the non-logical standards of the zionists.

Impacts – Iran Alliance Bad – Iranian Nuclearization (1/2)

A. Iranian alliance enables Iranian nuclearization

BBC 9 [BBC Asian Monitoring, October 31, Lexis]

Besides, Iran started both its nuclear programme and posing a threat to Iraq in the early 1980s. Iraq even bombed Iran's nuclear reactor in Bushehr. Regardless of how secretly Tehran had been running its nuclear programme until 2002 it has always maintained that it is for peaceful and civilian purposes citing economic realities. Iran has not given up on its nuclear programme so far and it is doubtful that it is going to as long as the geopolitical situation in the region stays as it is. This is not a political choice but a strategic policy. That is how to regard the prime minister's latest statements regarding Iran. For one thing, the "global nuclear injustice" that Erdogan draws attention to when necessary and which he recently referred to in his interview with the Guardian, is a fact. You have to admit that this picture of injustice gives no incentive at all for ridding the world of nuclear weapons. In fact, the opposite is true. Furthermore, there is much more to Turkish-Iranian relations than just being neighbours and Muslims. Relations, overshadowed by the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and ideological competition, are doing very well indeed in terms of security, economy and trade, and politics. Clearly, Erdogan does not want to jeopardize relations with Iran over "rumours" of nuclear weapons, especially at this time when Turkey is gaining more and more clout in the region. Furthermore, regardless of what Iran does it cannot convince the world that it is not running its nuclear programme for military purposes, to be more precise it is not intent on producing nuclear weapons. Iran's rhetoric and actions under Ahmedinejad have only increased these suspicions. There is widespread feeling in Iran that the West is applying double standards while in the West the opinion is that Iran is being very cloak and dagger. These opinions only exacerbate the mutual lack of confidence. The way things are going, they could evolve into a process that envelops Turkey and the entire region. Again, from Erdogan's comments it is clear that Turkey is playing the role of Western ally and Iran's friend. This is not mediation. Neither the United States nor Iran has any need of mediation. Furthermore, the situation vis-a-vis the EU, which has never gotten any result from its years of mediation despite all the "soft power" at its disposal, is self-evident. That brings us to Turkey. Turkey can very well play the role it never could in US-Iraqi tensions now in US-Iranian tensions taking advantage of its very good relations with the West and Iran in general and the USA in particular. Clearly, in order to play this role Erdogan is attaching just as much importance to his friendship with Iran as he does to the alliance with the West.

Impacts – Iran Alliance Bad – Iranian Nuclearization (2/2)

B. Iranian nuclearization ignites Middle Eastern war- 28 million dead in 21 days, 33 million to follow, global economy destroyed- extinction

Walker 7 [Martin Senior Director of the Global Business Policy Council November 22 Middle East Times http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2007/11/22/analysis\_a\_mideast\_nuclear\_war/4411/ ] KLS

He has now turned his laser-like research and forensic intelligence skills to studying the real implication of the endless diplomatic minuet at the United Nations over Iran's nuclear ambitions. In the real world, this matters mainly because an Iranian nuclear capability would transform the power balance in the wider Middle East, and leave the region and the rest of us living under the constant prospect of a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. This would mean, Cordesman suggests, some 16 million to 28 million Iranians dead within 21 days, and between 200,000 and 800,000 Israelis dead within the same time frame. The total of deaths beyond 21 days could rise very much higher, depending on civil defense and public health facilities, where Israel has a major advantage. It is theoretically possible that the Israeli state, economy and organized society might just survive such an almost-mortal blow. Iran would not survive as an organized society. "Iranian recovery is not possible in the normal sense of the term," Cordesman notes. The difference in the death tolls is largely because Israel is believed to have more nuclear weapons of very much higher yield (some of 1 megaton), and Israel is deploying the Arrow advanced anti-missile system in addition to its Patriot batteries. Fewer Iranian weapons would get through. The difference in yield matters. The biggest bomb that Iran is expected to have is 100 kilotons, which can inflict third-degree burns on exposed flesh at 8 miles; Israel's 1-megaton bombs can inflict third-degree burns at 24 miles. Moreover, the radiation fallout from an airburst of such a 1-megaton bomb can kill unsheltered people at up to 80 miles within 18 hours as the radiation plume drifts. (Jordan, by the way, would suffer severe radiation damage from an Iranian strike on Tel Aviv.) Cordesman assumes that Iran, with less than 30 nuclear warheads in the period after 2010, would aim for the main population centers of Tel Aviv and Haifa, while Israel would have more than 200 warheads and far better delivery systems, including cruise missiles launched from its 3 Dolphin-class submarines. The assumption is that Israel would be going for Iran's nuclear development centers in Tehran, Natanz, Ardekan, Saghand, Gashin, Bushehr, Aral, Isfahan and Lashkar A'bad. Israel would also likely target the main population centers of Tehran, Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, Ahwaz and Kermanshah. Cordesman points out that the city of Tehran, with a population of 15 million in its metropolitan area, is "a topographic basin with mountain reflector. Nearly ideal nuclear killing ground." But it does not end there. Cordesman points out that Israel would need to keep a "reserve strike capability to ensure no other power can capitalize on Iranian strike." This means Israel would have to target "key Arab neighbors" - in particular Syria and Egypt. Cordesman notes that Israel would have various options, including a limited nuclear strike on the region mainly inhabited by the Alawite minority from which come the ruling Assad dynasty. A full-scale Israeli attack on Syria would kill up to 18 million people within 21 days; Syrian recovery would not be possible. A Syrian attack with all its reputed chemical and biological warfare assets could kill up to 800,000 Israelis, but Israeli society would recover. An Israeli attack on Egypt would likely strike at the main population centers of Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Suez, Luxor and Aswan. Cordesman does not give a death toll here, but it would certainly be in the tens of millions. It would also destroy the Suez Canal and almost certainly destroy the Aswan Dam, sending monstrous floods down the Nile to sweep away the glowing rubble. It would mean the end of Egypt as a functioning society. Cordesman also lists the oilwells, refineries and ports along the Gulf that could also be targets in the event of a mass nuclear response by an Israel convinced that it was being dealt a potentially mortal blow. Being contained within the region, such a nuclear exchange might not be Armageddon for the human race; it would certainly be Armageddon for the global economy. So in clear, concise and chillingly forensic style, Cordesman spells out that the real stakes in the crisis that is building over Iran's nuclear ambitions would certainly include the end of Persian civilization, quite probably the end of Egyptian civilization, and the end of the Oil Age. This would also mean the end of globalization and the extraordinary accretions in world trade and growth and prosperity that are hauling hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians and others out of poverty.

Impacts – Iran Alliance Bad – Hamas

A. Turkish- Iranian alliance promotes nuclearization and Hamas influence

Harvey 6/17 [Benjamin, Staff Writer, 2010,Business Week, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-17/erdogan-rebuffs-u-s-insists-turkey-isn-t-iran-ally-update2-.html] KLS

Before those latest moves, Turkey invited leaders of Hamas, a group branded as terrorist by the U.S., European Union and Israel, for talks in Ankara; proposed joint energy projects with Iran; and brokered with Brazil a nuclear fuel deal with the Iranians that the U.S. dismissed as a “transparent ploy” to avoid sanctions. In so doing, Turkey runs the risk of losing influence with its Western allies, said Cengiz Aktar, a professor of international relations at Galatasaray University in Istanbul. This is true even though the policies reflect more a misunderstanding of the Middle East than an ideological shift, he said. “There have been so many mistakes made in the way Turkey deals with the region,” he said in a phone interview. “It ends up an ally of Hamas and Iran, which is not the ideal position if you want to be a peacemaker.” New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman agreed, writing yesterday that while he once hailed Turkey as “the antidote to ‘Bin Ladenism’” it is now focused under Erdogan “on joining the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel.”

B. Turkish-Iranian support of Hamas enables proliferation of the Middle East and Israeli extinction

Keyes 6/1 [Alan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 2010, http://www.aipnews.com/talk/forums/thread-view.asp?tid=14599&posts=2] KLS

Hamas exists to make war on Israel. War making never proceeds by exclusively violent means. But by the same token it never departs from an essentially violent purpose, which is to *force* the enemy to do your will. Hamas wills the obliteration of Israel. It makes sense, therefore, to consider how the supposedly humanitarian challenge to Israel’s blockade serves this war aim. To do that, we must ask a simple question: What if the challenge achieves its purpose. Convicted by international opinion and its own conscience, Israel gives up the blockade (or turns it over to some international force under the notoriously unreliable auspices of the UN.) Then, free from Israeli inspection and interference, ships will carry supplies to Gaza. Free from Israeli inspection and interference, those supplies could include anything from food and bandages to weapons of mass destruction. Iranian President Ahmadinejad “vowed Friday to keep supporting the Palestinian militant group Hamas until the “collapse of Israel.” Given the close ties between Iran and Hamas, it would be irrational simply to dismiss the possibility that Iran (once it has a nuclear weapons capability) would contribute to that collapse by supplying Hamas with a suitable tactical nuclear device. Israel’s blockade is an indispensable component of its lawful and necessary efforts to defend itself against obliteration.  Do the Turks and others deny its right to do so?  Of course, not all the rhetoric they use to justify their aid to Hamas is consciously intended to provide cover for a logistical arrangement that supports Hamas’s war of extinction against Israel. But that means that some of it is. In like manner, not everything about the Obama faction’s attitude of barely concealed hostility to Israel is intended to thwart actions essential to Israel’s survival. In light of ongoing events, however,  that statement  begs to be considered in a separate piece, which is forthcoming.

Impacts – Iran Alliance Good- Economy

A. Iranian alliance key to sustaining Turkish economy

Azadi 6/16 [Azar, Staff Writer, 2010, Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=178650] KLS

So, why would Erdogan and his government risk the country’s status by getting into bed with Iran and a questionable NGO, especially one that is by some accounts funded by questionable practices and sources? Why risk membership in the EU and NATO? Why risk its friendship with Israel? Why would partnership with Ahmadinejad against Israel be more attractive to Erdogan than facing the Turkish nationalists accusing him of treason and sellout? Is this simply because he wants to be reelected? Or has Turkey been swayed by statistics that seem to say that this is simply how the Middle East and southern Asia are shaping up. Erdogan could simply be responding to the increasingly popular and populated Islamic movement? BUT IT is never that simple. There are two distinct factors that may be contributing to shift Turkey further into the Islamist camp. First, to sustain the economy and keep the population happy, Erdogan needs more “green money” (Islamic green, not environmental green) from various Islamic markets, businesses and economies. It is thought that this money brought his party to power and is still critical to keeping it there. As a result, Erdogan’s policy toward Israel requires significant adjustment. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have made their foreign aid to the AKP (Erdogan’s Justice and Reconciliation Party) dependent on Turkey’s continued adjustments to domestic and international policies, including the country’s position toward Israel. The combination of foreign aid to the Islamist party and expectations by Islamic markets present in Turkey has pressured Erdogan to alter the country’s foreign policy. The events orchestrated around the flotilla are an ideological dividend to the green money market that has been propping up Erdogan’s government and Turkey since 2003. Second, it is interesting that Erdogan’s increased interest in foreign policy coincided with Iranian uranium enrichment. Turkey enjoys a close relationship with the Saudis, who are very concerned about the rise of Shi’ites in global Islamic power. Iran is a particular concern since it is on the verge of acquiring an atomic capability that would overshadow the entire Sunni Arab dominated Gulf.

B. Turkey key to the world

Paul 6/9 (Amanda, Economic Analyst,Turkish Press, http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352709) KLS

As neighbor Greece continues to suffer from its economic meltdown, Turkey has weathered the financial crisis far better than many other countries, including a significant number of European Union member states. As a result Turkey has become a more integrated and bigger player in the global economy, with a strong emerging economy making it one of only a few countries with post-crisis potential. Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey is boasting about this achievement at every opportunity, including last week when Turkey's dynamic and super-smart finance minister, Mehmet Simsek, was in Brussels. Indeed, after a number of meetings at the European Commission, he has come away 'feeling sorry' for the EU.

No Impact – Iranian Nuclearization

Turkish- Iranian alliance deters Iranian nuclearization- Erdogan carries out US sentiment

Larison 6/16 [Daniel, Ph.D. graduate from the University of Chicago, 2010, http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/06/16/turkish-gaullism-and-turkeys-balancing-role/] KLS

A useful counterpoint to Friedman is a recent column by Ömer Taspinar, who provides what seems to me to be one of the more persuasive explanations for why the Turkish government has been acting as it has over the last several years. Taspinar starts by questioning the handy, potentially misleading Islamic/secular distinction that practically every Western observer, including myself, has used at one time or another: I believe one of the major mistakes in analyzing Turkish foreign policy is done when analysts speak of a “secular” versus “Islamic” divide in Ankara’s strategic choices. While the growing importance of religion in Turkey should not be dismissed, the real threat to Turkey’s Western orientation today is not so much Islamization but growing nationalism and frustration with the United States, Europe and Israel. Of course, for many analysts referring to this divide is not so much intended to describe what is going on as it is aimed at demonizing the direction Turkish foreign policy has taken. The so-called “Islamic” turn is mostly cited by those who want to minimize or deny the role that Western governments have had in sabotaging the Western orientation of Turkey they claim to find so valuable. Most American observers are only too happy to blame the EU for alienating the Turks, as Secretary Gates did just this month, and Friedman is even willing to acknowledge some Israeli responsibility, but most Americans refuse to acknowledge that Washington had any role in weakening ties. Writing shortly after Erdogan’s Davos blow-up, I said: The episode summed up the growing frustration in Turkey’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) government with Israeli policy and showed the strain that the conflict in Gaza had put on Israel’s only alliance with a Muslim country. More than that, though, it reflected growing Turkish disillusionment with all of its Western allies over the last decade. The greatest danger to Turkey and the West now comes from failing to recognize how Western policies have alienated the Turks and misinterpreting their disillusionment as simple rejection [bold mine-DL]. There is something else that Taspinar said that is very important for Westerners to understand: Until a couple of years ago, I used to argue that Western-oriented Kemalist elites had traded places with the once eastward-leaning Islamists on the grounds that it was the AK Party that seemed more interested in maintaining close ties with Europe and the United States. The AK Party, in my eyes, needed the West more than Turkey’s Kemalist establishment for a simple reason: It needed to prove to the Turkish military, to secularist segment of society at home and to Western partners in the international community that it was not an Islamist party. Now, however, I increasingly believe that the AK Party, too, has decided to jump on the bandwagon of nationalist frustration with the West. After all, this is the most powerful societal undercurrent in Turkey, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an needs to win elections. As the events of the last couple of weeks have shown, America and Europe should pay attention to Turkey’s Gaullist inclinations. In the past, Americans and Europeans would often ask whether Turkey had any realistic geopolitical alternatives and complacently reassure themselves that it did not. But today such alternatives are starting to look more realistic to many Turks. The rise of Turkish Gaullism need not come fully at the expense of America and Europe [bold mine-DL]. But Turks are already looking for economic and strategic opportunities in Russia, India, China and, of course, the Middle East and Africa. It is high time for American analysts to stop overplaying the Islamic-secular divide in Turkish foreign policy and pay more attention to what unites both camps: Turkish nationalism. Taspinar’s concept of Turkish Gaullism is quite helpful in making sense of Turkish foreign policy and the unreasonable hostility it has generated here in the U.S. Turkey today is acting very much as France did in the early 2000s, and it is provoking the same irrational backlash that characterized the response to French opposition to invading Iraq. The U.S. is fortunate to have allies that are not satisfied to serve as nothing more than lackeys, and we are also fortunate to have allies that try to create obstacles when we are heading down a self-destructive or foolish path. In 2002-03, the French government was a better ally to the United States in resisting the Iraq war than the British government was in facilitating it. Today Turkey is a better and more useful ally when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program than any of the governments that voted with the U.S. for the new round of sanctions. In protecting their own national interests, the Turkish government is providing the U.S. with opportunities to avoid a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program. So far the administration seems to have learned nothing from the previous experience with difficult, independent-minded allies.

No Impact – Iranian Nuclearization

**Turkey wont protect Iran if it nuclearizes – relations are already collapsing**

Javedanfar 7/5 (Meir, journalist @ Real Clear World, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/07/05/an\_emerging\_rupture\_in\_iran-turkey\_relations\_\_99049.html) JPG

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has suddenly found himself reassessing his government's burgeoning ties with the Islamic Republic of [Iran](http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/iran/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink) - and sooner than expected.

One of the reasons [Turkey](http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/turkey/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink) agreed to Iran's demands and voted against new UN Sanctions was because the Iranian government promised that it would continue to negotiate with the West. However, it did not take long for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to break his promise. Soon after the UN resolution was passed, the Iranian leader declared, through Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that all negotiations will be suspended for two months. This has clearly angered the Turks, who may not be able to stand by Tehran for very much longer. And why should they? The U.S. government is already breathing down Erdogan's neck, and word is that the meeting between the two sides at last month's G20 summit in Canada was tense. Obama arrived late to the meeting, and there were no joint press statements or photographs taken together. This, in addition to other reports that the U.S. canceled its participation at a recent regional security conference in Turkey a mere 12 hours before it started. The Turkish government knew well in advance that its decision to back Iran in the UN would raise the ire of the Americans. However, they hoped that the merits of their relationship with Tehran would compensate for that and make such a policy worthwhile. Reality is proving otherwise. The Brazilians soon realized after sanctions passed that it wasn't worth their while to defend Iran's nuclear cause. The Turks, based on Washington's reaction and the fact that Tehran broke its promise of negotiations, could very well reach the same conclusion - and sooner than many expected. This does not mean that Turkey is going to break relations with Tehran, nor does it mean that it will distance itself from Iran altogether. What it does mean is that Erdogan and his AKP party will reduce their support for Iran's cause in the UN. They will stop acting like Ali Khamenei's lawyer and defender in the West, because that's what Khamenei wanted from them all along, and he was prepared to pay handsomely for it with a cheap gas deal and lucrative contracts for Turkish companies. Now that new sanctions are going to be imposed by the United Nations, as well as the U.S. and the EU, the Iranian government is going to find it harder to buy political support at the UN.One major reason will be the decline in value of Iranian incentives. There are few countries in the world who would now prefer to side with Iran against the west. This means it will be more difficult for Khamenei to find heavy weight countries from the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) to back its stance. Even Hugo Chavez is not as vociferous as he once was; snubbed by Iran's ties with [Brazil](http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/brazil/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink), he did not attend the recent nuclear summit in Tehran.This is just one impact of sanctions. There are also domestic implications. Some countries, including [Israel](http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/israel/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink), have dismissed the latest round of sanctions against Iran. The Iranian government has not. Ahmadinejad has already started a domestic PR campaign to calm nerves. In a recent interview he tried to downplay the impact of sanctions by saying that the U.S. and Iran do not have any economic relations, therefore the latest round of sanctions won't have any impact on Iran's economy. This is of course wrong. Although direct economic trade between both countries is not very much, the new round of sanctions are nevertheless going to hit the economy hard. First and foremost, it is going to become more difficult for American companies who were using the United Arab Emirates to resell their products to Iran. This is partly due to the UAE's commitment to abide by the new sanctions.

No Impact – Hamas

Turkey is negotiating with Hamas – wont support terrorism

Bilici 9 (Abdulhamit, columnist @ Today’s Zaman, 1/17/9, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-164310-turkey-hamas-relations.html) JPG

Moreover, Turkey's contact with Hamas now receives much praise from the region and the world. It is frequently stated that Turkey's relations with Iran, Syria and Hamas represent an opportunity for a solution. A former top US diplomat of Jewish origin recently described Turkey's relations with Iran and Hamas as "an opportunity that must not be wasted." The US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, too, played a role in this change of perception. Indeed, the US administration is now advocating that the US should establish contact with the Taliban in Afghanistan and with insurgent groups in Iraq, which were previously declared enemies. Davuto?lu, who had been criticized for masterminding the initiative to invite Hamas to Turkey, underlined this change in a recent interview with Le Monde. Noting that the US could not beat al-Qaeda in Iraq but that its relations with Sunni groups were instrumental in creating today's relative peace in the country, Davuto?lu cautioned that the alienation of Iran and Hamas would increase tension. As a matter of fact, there are even people in Israel who argue that Israel should negotiate with Hamas. For instance, Dr. Ran HaCohen, a harsh critic of Israeli policies, maintains that the Israeli people, with the exception of politicians, favor having direct contact with Hamas. He notes that it is silly and childish not to talk to Hamas under the pretext that it does not recognize Israel. "Palestinian President [Mahmoud] Abbas is not a Hamas member: He recognizes Israel's right to exist, he deplores terrorism and he isn't even accused of corruption. Still, Israel refuses to negotiate with him. If we don't talk with Abbas, why should we talk to Hamas, now that we believe we can impose our colonialist visions unilaterally?" he asks. Turkey's priority is Palestine, putting an end to the division among Palestinians and bringing peace to the region. Contact with Hamas is critical for a solution. Yet we must not forget that Turkey should guide Hamas with its historical and democratic experience, rather than supporting it or siding with it.

Impacts – Con Reform Bad – Authoritarianism

A. Constitutional reform would promote authoritarianism

Brookings Institute 4/30 [Center on the United States and Europe, 2010, http://www.docuticker.com/?p=35126] KLS

Today, Turkey is once again in the midst of a major constitutional debate. As usual, the political and electoral stakes are high. The AKP and proponents of constitutional changes argue that the newly proposed reforms would promote democracy and bolster Ankara’s bid for membership in the European Union. Not surprisingly, the secularist opposition maintains quite a different view. They see these reforms as steps that would seriously undermine the independence of the judiciary while further reducing the autonomy of the military. Their position is quite predictable since they are primarily concerned about Islamization and the authoritarian tendencies of the government. This position is particularly embraced by the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), the main opposition force in the Turkish Parliament. The CHP considers the Ergenekon case a pro-AKP judicial plot to silence all the secularist critics of the government in order to establish an Islamist and authoritarian state. As a result, the main opposition appears more interested in scoring political points against the AKP than supporting the proposed reforms.

**B. Decline of the public sphere necessitates authoritarianism, threatening global survival**

Boggs 97 [Carl, Professor of Social Sciences at National University in Los Angeles, Theory and Society, December, Volume 26, Number 6, p. 773-4, Google Books]

**The decline of the public sphere** in late twentieth-century America **poses a series of great** dilemmas and **challenges**. Many ideological currents scrutinized here -- localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology -- intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. **The false sense of empowerment** that comes with such mesmerizing impulses **is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved** -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And **such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases**, technological displacement of workers) **cannot be understood** outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, **the widespread retreat from politics**, often inspired by localist sentiment, **comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence**. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. **By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions**. In the meantime, **the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies**. This last point demands further elaboration. **The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate** at many levels, **can** in fact **be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites** -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser developed countries. **The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity** and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.

Impacts – Con Reform Bad – Authoritarianism

**Constitutional reform is anti-democratic – no public consensus, and unilateral decision making**

Onur 10 (Murat, contributor to Int’l Affairs, 3/28, int’l affairs review, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/156) JPG

“Our Party shall prepare a completely new constitutional bill to allow freedoms, responding to the needs of the entire society, conforming to the principle of the State of law and standards of democratic countries, aiming at establishing a new "social contract" between society and the State. This bill shall not be an exercise of "constitutional engineering" but document reflecting the will and demands of the people to the State structure on a democratic basis” Most Turks agree with Prime Minister Erdoğan that Turkey needs “substantial reforms in the judiciary”. They probably would go even farther and say the country is in need of a new constitution. However, it is hard to agree that the current developments in Turkey represent the “footsteps of a modern democracy”. The excerpt at the introduction is taken from the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) charter of the party. Besides its pro-democracy content, perhaps the single most important part of the passage is in the last sentence. Unfortunately, the AKP is doing exactly the opposite of what it declares. So far, AKP’s reform policy includes a unilaterally-drafted constitutional change package, a public affairs campaign by pro-government NGOs exclusively for pro-AKP audiences, and daily complaints by the party leadership on how the judiciary opposes the “nation’s will”. Recent statements by the AKP leadership could draw a better picture. Last month, Prime Minister Erdoğan said “the judiciary is intervening in the executive branch’s business,” and argued for stronger executive powers so the government would be able to resist. The Justice Minister at a press conference also argued that “an independent judiciary which is proactive in influencing the political administration and sees its power as unlimited – instead of just being an objective [institution] – is much more dangerous than a dependent judiciary”. Ironically, the conference was entitled “The Rule of Law and the Judiciary in the Democratization Process”. To critics, the AKP’s rhetoric of reform represents more of an attempt to solidify the party’s increasing control in the judiciary, rather than a move for improving Turkish democracy. A quick look at the AKP’s reform plan could explain why. Proposed changes to Article 15 simply reconstruct the country’s top judicial institution, the Constitutional Court. Under new rules, the court will increase from 11 to 19 members, 16 of whom would be directly appointed by the president. Another important institution, the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK) would also undergo significant changes. Under the amendments, the number of board members will grow to 21 from the current 7, while the Justice Minister retains his position as president of the Board. Also controversial are amendments to the country’s party closure procedures. The AKP proposal transfers the right to decide on party closure cases from the Constitutional Court to separate commissions that would be set up by the parties. This proposal not only fundamentally contradicts the separation of powers principle, but also lays way for unpleasant political bargaining on party closures. Membership in the top court and the HSYK requires extensive experience in law and the judiciary. AKP’s proposal allows the President to appoint ordinary citizens to 16 of the 19 positions on the Constitutional Court. The HSYK, which regulates judiciary matters, would allow the inclusion of people without background in the judiciary. Experts argue that the proposed changes could create a weak judiciary where the appointed members of the institutions lack merit and legal proficiency. AKP’s strategy ignores the integral parts of a democratic constitutional reform process: consensus and participation. True, the AKP has the parliamentary majority; but moving unilaterally on matters that concern the entire society is not democratic by any standard. Studies show that constitutional changes undertaken without public participation failed to produce political stability and were often rejected by the people. Imposed constitutions, whether by a military junta or a majority party, tend to create dissent and political tensions. Opposition parties have already declared they will not support any of the proposed amendments to the judiciary. The acting head of the HSYK, president of the Council of State, and the president of the Supreme Court of Appeals have also criticized the proposals. Yet the AKP is planning to go to a referendum days after announcing the reform package. In other words, the party is not giving the public sufficient time to understand and discuss the proposals, much less permit them to participate in the process. The referendum, which will only allow voting on the package as a whole rather than voting on each article separately, also contradicts democratic norms. Turkey’s current constitution was imposed by the military and received over 90 percent approval rating in the referendum in 1982. It created a dysfunctional government and failed to address citizens’ needs. Unilaterally pushing for reforms will most likely retain a constitution that is as dysfunctional as the old one. Consensus on a healthy social contract does not seem possible in a divided parliament that represents a highly polarized public. Perhaps it is time to think about a fresh way to achieve constitutional reform in Turkey through participation of all factions in the society.

Impacts – Con Reform Bad – Authoritarianism

**Constitutional reform erodes democracy**

Cutler 10 (Robert M, Sen. Fellow @ Carleton U, 4/13/10,

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=114934) JPG

Of the many possible approaches to Turkish constitutional reform, the particulars introduced by the AKP rather blatantly give it partisan, perhaps permanent, institutionalized advantage. The [Istanbul-based expert Gareth Jenkins concludes](http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100329A.html) in Turkey Analyst that while “the higher courts in Turkey have hardly been impartial,” nevertheless “numerous examples of the politically motivated abuse of power by AKP officials and party sympathizers in the lower echelons of the judiciary and the law enforcement system[…] taken together with the self-serving selectivity of the content of the AKP’s proposed constitutional amendments[…] raise concerns that the package will not serve the goal of moving Turkey closer to a pluralistic fully-functioning democracy.” Jenkins specifically explains that although the provisions for restructuring the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK, which nominates judges) are “broadly in line with the recommendations of the EU report of April 2009,” nevertheless “the AKP [preserves its] current influence on the council while […] diluting any opposition to the government” by “retaining the Justice Minister as chair of the HSYK.” [The EU report](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/conclusions_on_turkey_en.pdf), on the other hand, specifically “described the presence on the HSYK of the Justice Minister as chair of the council as being incompatible with the separation of powers.” At the same time, the AKP reform package illogically invokes the separation of powers to make it actually more difficult for the Constitutional Court to conduct judicial review of the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation.

No Impact – Con Reform – A2: EU Accession

**No EU accession from constitutional reform – EU opposition and political infighting**

Mathhews and Kohen 9 (Owen and Sami, journalists @ Newsweek, 3/28/9, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/27/putting-ghosts-to-rest.html) JPG

But those obstacles are past, and Erdogan is running out of excuses. Opposition to Turkish accession to the EU is stiffening in several countries, and at home Erdogan's long run of political success is unlikely to continue indefinitely. This year could mark his last chance to prove to Brussels, and to skeptics inside Turkey, that he's serious about joining Europe and transforming Turkey into a functional democracy. Egemen Bagis, Turkey's minister for European Union affairs, insists that "relations with the EU will be a major priority" in coming months, noting that Erdogan is "determined to go ahead" with constitutional changes that would guarantee individuals' rights to appeal to the Constitutional Court, introduce an ombudsman to squash politically motivated prosecutions and create new laws to protect nonviolent political parties from getting shut down by the courts. The problem is that if done properly, attempts to introduce those laws would put Erdogan on a collision course with the courts, as well as the Army and bureaucracy—unelected institutions that see themselves as the guardians of Turkey's secular state and see the Islamist-rooted AK Party as a threat. Last summer's attempt by the Constitutional Court to ban the party ended in a delicate draw, with the court unwilling to throw the country into turmoil by banning Turkey's ruling party, its president and prime minister from politics. But Erdogan emerged chastened and apparently unwilling to risk another debilitating battle with the judges and the generals. This standoff has tied Turkey up in knots. After all, constitutional reform is about more than pleasing Brussels—it's about making the country's democracy functional and putting to rest the specter of constant attacks on democratically elected governments and parties from the unelected judiciary. Yet it's still not clear if Erdogan has the political will to move forward with the reforms. If AK keeps its healthy nationwide majority in municipal elections in March, the temptation for Erdogan to do nothing could grow—which may be fatal to the EU project. Cengiz Aktar, a professor at Istanbul's Galatasaray University, says if Erdogan emerges stronger from the elections he could "be more arrogant and less willing" to introduce reforms In March, Gül headed to Brussels for a state visit, bearing the message that Turkey is ready to renew its commitment to Europe. But the real question is whether Erdogan has the political courage to make common cause with the opposition and introduce the radical constitutional changes needed to lay to rest the ghosts of the 1980 military coup and the deeply undemocratic Constitution it spawned. So far, Erdogan's political survival has been a remarkable feat of political tactics. This is his chance to prove that he's in the business of making history, too.

No Impact – Con Reform – A2: EU Accession

No UQ and No MPX- Constitutional reforms won’t pass and fail to garner Turkish EU succession

Clemons 5/10 [Steve, Director @ the American Strategy Program, 2010, The Washington Note, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/05/searching\_for\_e/] KLS

The reforms would enhance the power of the government at the expense of the state by giving the government greater power to appoint justices to Turkey's high court and requiring that military officers accused of civilian crimes be tried in civilian courts. A third controversial proposal that would have made it more difficult for the judiciary to close political parties fell just short of passing. As I predicted in March, the constitutional reforms place the European Union in a bind. The EU has called for Turkey to adopt a new constitution for years, but the reform proposal is neither as comprehensive nor as liberal Europe would like. The process itself is problematic as well because all three opposition parties opposed the reforms, which they perceive to be a power grab in disguise.

Constitutional reform doesn’t lead to EU accession – democracy already perceived

Cutler 10 (Robert M, Sen. Fellow @ Carleton U, 4/13/10,

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=114934) JPG

Von Lingen observes that, despite [Erdogan’s recent threat to deport up to 100,000 Armenians living in Turkey without citizenship](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=unveiling-erdogan8217s-real-face-2010-03-19), so far in Brussels “neither the human rights situation [in Turkey] nor the newly introduced constitutional amendments [are] major issues of concern in the EU” and that “up until now, there has been no worry about Erdogan not being a democrat.” The statement by Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle in March observes that “the proposed reforms go in the right direction” and [rhetorically insists](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2010/03/20100329_2_en.htm) on “the crucial importance […] that the broadest possible consultation takes place, involving all political parties and civil society, in a spirit of dialogue and compromise.” Based upon closer inspection of the current constitutional package, the Istanbul-based observer Jenkins tends rather toward the view that, as regards to the EU’s recommendations, the AKP simply “has either advocated changes or retained clauses which restrict the room for maneuver of its opponents and increase its own influence, while refusing to contemplate any reforms which would curb its own power.” This manner of proceeding is in line with Erdogan’s oft-cited statement, made as mayor of Istanbul and never disclaimed, that “democracy is simply a bus we ride until our destination, and then get off.” The origin of Christian democracy in Europe, as noted, has nothing historically in common with that of the AKP in Turkey. But also there is little in the way that the AKP has developed its ruling power that distinguishes it from the uncompromisingly anti-secular Islamic norm excluding any obligation to “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.” Europe in the 20th century also experienced totalizing social movements that conquered national political hegemony, and they were not Islamic; therefore, there is no question here of any opposition between Islam and “Christian Europe.” That being so, the EU in its view of Turkey today should not blind itself to the appearance of specific threats against particular democratic norms.

Impacts – Con Reform Good – Econ/Nuclear Security

A. Constitutional reform key to nuclear security and Turkish economic strength

Melen 4/14 [Mithat, Staff Writer, Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-last-chance-2010-04-15] KLS

The constitutional amendment process has become a big issue in the country. The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government is bent on making the changes it insists are essential and wants to have the amendments ratified as quickly as possible in the Parliament. But there is an important question we have to pose to the government: “Is it so imperative to make an amendment to the Constitution? If so, why this hurry?” When the most important issue in the international arena is nuclear-energy security, about which Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held meetings during his U.S. visit, we are kept busy with other subjects completely irrelevant to vital world issues. As technological changes come rapidly, and as world economies grow bigger each day, the existing legislations and constitutions become irrelevant regarding international realities. From time to time, we try to make the necessary changes, but they either fall short of our needs or exceed them. Certain rights should be obtained through hard struggles. Sometimes, politically motivated rights or legislations copied from other countries do not fit your system. Consequently, they become reasons for extremist reactions. I have forgotten how many constitutional amendments we have made in the recent past. All constitutions are drawn according to a country’s political atmosphere at the time and become affected by the politicians of that particular period. Almost always, the needs of the population and world conditions are being ignored. Today, the world debates about the ways and means to confine nuclear energy for the use of peaceful and humanitarian purposes, while we in Turkey are arguing about completely different subjects irrelevant to vital international issues. For two years, the world has been trying to find ways to get out of the global economic crisis. Economic conditions are changing and the role of the state in countries’ economies is becoming minimized. Today, instead of virtual economies, a more realistic economic structure that will not give way for government intervention is starting to emerge. Economic growth and increasing production is shifting from West to East in the world. Today, the perception that if Western economies’ growth drops, then the world economy will get stuck has become irrelevant. Economic systems get intermingled, world population is increasing, the influence and power of ethnic and religious groups are on the rise. Even emigration from rural parts to urban areas will stop if cities are unable to feed their citizens. The model of industrialization is unable to meet the present needs of the people. International organizations that try to solve the world’s problems are trying to derive lessons from their 50-year histories. The next 50 years will have nothing to do with past ones. It is certain that world politics, economies and even systems will change. But the million-dollar question is: “How will international institutions and theories change?” Is it possible to go on with the old theories when all world conditions are changing in the 21st century? We need new theories, new structures and new institutions. On top of it all, the concept of democracy and all economic, social and political theories that have fed it for so long are not meeting the necessary requirements anymore. The world is changing and Turkey tries to adapt herself to these radical changes, but to what extent can the following scenario be acceptable under the circumstances? You may need to amend the Constitution. But you pick only a few articles that don’t suit your policies and you try to amend them to win another four-year term for your government. Of course constitutions are amended and the AKP government can have these amendments passed with its parliamentary majority. But if we cannot find a solution for our need for a nuclear energy plant, if we cannot find a solution for our need for a economic jurisdiction, if we cannot draw the necessary regulations for our capital markets, then the debate on the Constitution will drag on forever. We are again losing our chance. There will be constitutional change, but nothing will change for the better. Maybe in a short time, this government will have to go. Its successor will criticize everything the former government has done. This debate will go on forever and Turkey will continue to lose time.

Impacts – Con Reform Good – Democracy

A. Constitutional reform bolsters democracy, rule of law and human rights

Today’s Zaman 3/2 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-203061-constitutional-reform-package-in-parliament-this-month-pm-says.html] KLS

“A partial constitutional amendment package will be presented to Parliament soon, and a comprehensive constitutional reform package will be presented to Parliament by the end of March,” Erdoğan said following a meeting of the Reform Watch Group, established to oversee Turkey's European Union accession process, on Sunday. The meeting was chaired by Erdoğan and was hosted by chief EU negotiator Egemen Bağış. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay and Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin attended the meeting at the prime minister's office in Dolmabahçe Palace. The prime minister underlined in his speech that Turkey has to swiftly adopt constitutional amendments in order to continue taking steps forward in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Erdoğan also touched upon a recent debate regarding judicial independence and impartiality, which was kicked off by a Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) decision to strip four prosecutors of their authorization last month.

B. Rule of law key to freedom and prevents nuclear extinction.

Rhyne 58 [Charles S. Washington Lawyer, Rhyne, May 1, 1958 http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/2008/history/rhyne58.shtml]

Law and courts exist to protect every citizen of the United States in his person and property and in his individual rights and privileges under the Constitution. The ultimate power to change or expand the law in our system remains with its source, the people. They can elect as lawmakers those who will vote for wise laws and vote out of office those who do not. They can also amend the Constitution as experience dictates the necessity of change. In these days of soul-searching and re-evaluation and inventorying of basic concepts and principles brought on by the expansion of man’s vision to the new frontiers and horizons of outer space, we want the people of the world to know that we in America have an unshakable belief in the most essential ingredient of our way of life—the rule of law. The law we honor is the basis and foundation of our nation’s freedom and the freedom for the individual which exists here. And to Americans our freedom is more important than our very lives. The rule of law has been the bulwark of our democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the minorities, the unpopular; it has made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the will of people. It stands as the very antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about “justice” under our rule of law, the absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When we talk about “freedom” for the individual, Hungary is recalled to the minds of all men. And when we talk about peace under law—peace without the bloodbath of war—we are appealing to the foremost desire of all peoples everywhere. The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that mankind’s best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man’s relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the rule of law has enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between nations. The lawyer is the technician in man’s relationship to man. There exists a worldwide challenge to our profession to develop law to replace weapons before the dreadful holocaust of nuclear war overtake our people.

Impacts – Con Reform Good – Democracy

Constitutional reforms don’t erode democracy

Thumann 10 (Michael, ME bureau Chief @ Zeit, 3/29/10, http://www.ip-global.org/archiv/exclusive/view/1269872135.html) JPG

Some Kemalists and center elite representatives argue that the AKP is pursuing a hidden Islamic agenda. The evidence for such claims is hard to detect, however there are strong indications that the old system of governance is gradually co-opting the AKP. The rise of the periphery elite to power is the result of long-term sociological change combined with a serious malfunction of the Turkish political system. Consequently, the republic of the 1980 coup is terribly out of date, and is unable to cope with the transformation of Turkey. It cannot balance the interest groups competing for power at the center. Turkey has seen four coup d’etats in forty years, each to restore a rough political equilibrium. But popular support for a coup has sharply diminished. Instead permanent obstruction of reforms and possibly destabilization through unending confrontation look more likely. The fear of the classical elites and the adoption of periphery politicians to old habits do not bode well for Turkey’s democracy. Today, the country needs a comprehensive constitutional reform that would aim at democratizing and decentralizing Turkey at the same time. A new division of power both at the center and in the provinces is long overdue. The AKP, the Turkish parliament, and the European Union in membership negotiations with Turkey should push for these fundamental reforms.

Impacts – Con Reform Good – EU Accession (1/2)

A. Constitutional Reform promotes EU accession and human rights

Today’s Zaman 3/2 [2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-203061-constitutional-reform-package-in-parliament-this-month-pm-says.html] KLS

Erdoğan also said an ombudsman law, of crucial importance in the EU harmonization process, will also be included in the package. The law, which was previously vetoed by former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the grounds that the “ombudsman” institution was not defined in the Constitution, is necessary since Turkey currently has no separate institution to inspect public services. Some other topics likely to be covered in the constitutional package include the establishment of a committee on political ethics, the right of civil servants to engage in collective bargaining and go on strike and the protection of personal information. Another article to be included in the package will be on measures against child abuse.

B. Accession solves democracy and human rights violations

Canan 7 [Fuat, Staff Writer, April 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7057/is\_2\_9/ai\_n28498815/pg\_3/?tag=content;col1]

Main argument put forward by pro-EU groups on this issue is that: Turkey's EU bid for membership ensures the democratization of the country and fully safeguards human rights for Turkish citizens. Therefore, a key goal should be to keep Turkey firmly on track for EU membership. Advocates of this view mostly claim that none of the recent political and economic reforms in Turkey would have been possible without the EU incentive. (14) (15) It is therefore crucial to keep this incentive and Turkey's European vocation alive. According to this discourse Turkey has inherited an authoritarian legacy from the military rulers that cannot easily be eliminated. Thus, urgent question facing Turkey is the establishment of a consolidated, sustainable democracy, underpinned by both liberalization and democratization. (16) They often argue that the overall aim should be to reform the country, with the EU providing the requisite formal leverage. (17) These groups often assert the idea that efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria and accession process itself will contribute to Turkey becoming a more democratic and prosperous country. Ogutco, for example, finds the accession process itself a catalyst that will act as a spur to improvement, not only in terms of democracy and human rights, but also in respect to economy. (18) It is undeniable that the new period starting from 1999 in the mutual relations has produced greater and deeper changes in Turkey than did the preceding 40 years. Turkey's EU candidacy since 1999 has stimulated the Turkish political and legal reforms and intensified the Europeanization process in Turkey. Muftuler-Bac identifies the process in Turkey as Europeanization which accelerated since 1999 and which was mostly described as democratization. (19)

Impacts – Con Reform Good – EU Accession (2/2)

C. Democracy stops extinction.

Diamond 95 [Larry, Scholar, Democracy Studies http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Impacts – Con Reform Good – EU Accession – Xt Link

Constitutional reform is key to EU accession

Katcher 10 (Benjamin, analyst @ American Strategy Program, Washington Note, 3/3/10, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/03/der\_spiegels\_in/) JPG

This is not terribly surprising given Turkey's centrality to Europe's foreign policy challenges in the Middle East, but the unfolding constitutional controversy is likely to become a key issue between Brussels and Ankara in the coming months with implications for Turkey's EU membership bid. Reforming Turkey's anachronistic 1982 constitution - which was written in the aftermath of a military coup - is a key prerequisite for Turkey's admission to the European Union. Europe is concerned that Turkey's powerful judiciary and military be brought under civilian control, and with extending certain liberal freedoms to Turkish citizens. As [Gareth Jenkins explains](http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/991/re93.htm), the problem is that the AKP proposal contains only some of the EU requirements, and includes several items that have not been demanded by Europe, but are meant to consolidate the party's power. Thus far, key European Union officials have [supported the proposal](http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-205709-europe-backs-reform-package-urges-civilian-constitution.html), with the caveat that they would like to see negotiation and input from Turkey's opposition parties, which are closely aligned with the military and the judiciary and are steadfastly opposed to the proposal.

Constitutional reforms are key to EU accession

EU Business 10 (4/13/10, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/turkey-politics.446/) JPG

(MADRID) - The European Union said Tuesday it welcomes plans by the Turkish government to reform the country's constitution, saying they are essential to bring Ankara closer to the bloc. "The European Union welcomes the Turkish government's intention to present a package of constitutional reform proposals to be debated soon in the national assembly," Spain's foreign ministry, whose country holds the rotating EU presidency, said in a statement. "Reforms have played an essential role in the process of bringing Turkey closer to the EU and they continue to be essential today. "The reading of the constitutional reform package proposed by the Turkish government reveals that they are in tune with the general principles contained in the progress reports that the European Commission has regularly issued about Turkey," it added. Last month Turkey's Islamic-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP) government proposed a package of constitutional reforms which it argues are needed to curb the powers of an entrenched judiciary and to bring Turkey closer to EU democratic standards.

No Impact – Con Reform – A2: Democracy

Democracies don’t prevent war- empirically denied

Ostrowski 02 [James, Writer for Rockwell, Spring, http://www.lewrockwell.com/ostrowski/ostrowski72.html] KLS

Spencer R. Weart alleges that democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other. Even if this is true, it distorts reality and makes people far too sanguine about democracy’s ability to deliver the world’s greatest need today – peace. In reality, the main threat to world peace today is not war between two nation-states, but (1) nuclear arms proliferation; (2) terrorism; and (3) ethnic and religious conflict within states. As this paper was being written, India, the world’s largest democracy, appeared to be itching to start a war with Pakistan, bringing the world closer to nuclear war than it has been for many years. The United States, the world’s leading democracy, is waging war in Afghanistan, which war relates to the second and third threats noted above – terrorism and ethnic/religious conflict. If the terrorists are to be believed – and why would they lie?─they struck at the United States on September 11th because of its democratically-induced interventions into ethnic/religious disputes in their parts of the world.

Democratization doesn’t prevent war- statistics

Gowa 95 [Joanne, Cambridge University Press, Jun 22,://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-194275\_ITM] KLS

Students of this issue have been very careful to make clear that whether or not a state is democratic does not affect its overall propensity to wage war. As they observe, democracies are just as likely as are other states to engage in war.(9) In addition, no strong evidence that democracies are any less likely than are other polities to initiate war exists. Thus, the incidence of war between democracies is not an indicator of the war-proneness of democracies in general. Instead, the distinctive effect of democracy on war is limited to cases in which both members of a pair of states are democratic. Another finding that emerges from this literature relates to the outbreak of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Several studies find that a statistically significant difference in the incidence of MIDs exists between members of pairs of democratic states and members of other dyads. Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz categorize a dispute as an MID if (1) it involves "threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of force"; and (2) the threat or deployment of military forces is "explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned."(10) Examples of MIDs include the 1898 Fashoda crisis, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis. The finding about MIDs echoes that about wars, namely, that militarized disputes are much less likely to occur between democracies than between members of other pairs of states.

Impacts – PKK Compromise Good – Civil War

Only compromise will prevent thousands of deaths and a civil war

Kurdish Aspect 7-5 (http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc070510MA.html)

The situation at present is hindering the Turkish state’s ability to deliver progress and in providing the integral developments that the people of Kurdistan crave. Part of the problem is that this project of solution is being conducted almost entirely in military terms because the Turkish state has failed to be candid about this issue. As columnist Ayse Karabat stated last week on Sundayzaman.com, “In doing all of these things there first needs to be the strengthening of democracy and the expansion of freedom, because the lack of these essential aspects of society is the reason we have now reached the situation we are facing now. “ Furthermore we can find a similar argument by another Turkish columnist, Dogu Ergil, who stated on SundayZaman.com that, “No one mentions the killing of many innocent children from the “other side” or 17,000 murders, by unidentified official agents, committed in an attempt to suppress the Kurdish insurgency, or the forced evacuation of thousands of villages and the banishment of its inhabitants at will. This is the source of the problem; we all think, like the state, that the Turkish Constitution is the master of the country and the nation.

Operational success in the north of Kurdistan requires improvements in the development of commerce, education and health, in an attempt to win the hearts of the people of the south of Turkey towards their government. The Turkish state should take a lesson from the extensive history of insurgencies from the IRA in Northern Ireland and the ANC in South Africa. The PKK is not waging a futile war and as Patrick Cockburn from Independent on this PKK issue states, “it reveals a weakness in the region's growing powerhouse”. The PKK should be taken seriously immediately by the Turkish state. The Turkish army is planting the seeds of hatred between the Turks and the Kurdish nation which can only result in civil war. This can be related to the similar history of Kazakhstan in the former Soviet Union in which this Stalinist state has spread the seeds between Tagics and others, and as a result we have been witnessing the civil war taking place there over the last month. The Turkish issue in the north of Kurdistan needs a solution rather than a widespread deepening depression. The Turkish state needs to realise that time has changed and that is essential they talk to the PKK because they cannot be defeated by force. The Turkish state has tried for the last thirty years to dismantle the PKK without success and it is now time to rethink and be prepared to take a different approach.

Impacts – PKK Compromise Good – Terrorism Brink

Large-scale PKK attacks on the brink

The Australian 7-6 (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/kurdish-rebels-gird-for-battle/story-e6frg6so-1225888661627)

KURDISH rebels are preparing for a sustained military confrontation with the Turkish government following the end of a year-long ceasefire. The lull had raised hopes of ending the 26-year insurgency. Speaking from their mountain-top refuge in northern Iraq, the leaders of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) warned of large-scale attacks across Turkey in response to aerial bombardments of its bases in the past few days. "It's going to be very hot," said Sozdar Avesta, one of the top five commanders of the PKK, describing the military situation in the months ahead. "Guerilla units across Turkey have been activated. We have started a period where we are going to actively defend ourselves."

Impacts – **PKK Compromise Good – Solves Terrorism**

Erdogan key to deterring PKK terrorism

TRT 6/28 [2010, http://www.trtdari.com/trtinternational/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=248994a5-c13c-4419-9b7d-35a9d551815d&title=Erdo%C4%9Fan%20evaluates%20agenda] KLS

The G-20 summit that gathered the world leaders has ended. Following the summit, Prime Minister Erdoğan met members of the press and evaluated his critical meeting with US President Barrack Obama and G-20 summit. **Critical meeting with Obama** Bilateral meetings put their stamps on the G-20 summit which gathered world leaders. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met many leaders at the summit. The most attention-grabbing meeting for Turkey was the one between Prime Minister Erdoğan and the US President Barack Obama. **New phase in fight against terrorism** Erdoğan said the meeting was quite positive and sincere and that both of them expressed their expectations in a clear way. Rising terror attacks in recent days and going into a new phase in the fight against terrorism topped the agenda of Obama-Erdoğan meeting. Erdoğan said there is no problem in intelligence sharing, but that the tripartite mechanism should have other functions than sole intelligence sharing. The two leaders also discussed Iran's nuclear energy program. Erdoğan said "negotiations will continue." **Terrorist Organization PKK**  Erdoğan said, “As you already know that there is a three-way mechanism among us regarding the PKK issue. The process which started with intelligence sharing is going on. We have no problem on that point. The three-way mechanism should also have some other functions beyond intelligence sharing. And, now we are talking on whether to utilize that function, I think that the steps to be taken by the three-way mechanism on the matter will find different field of application”.

Breaking the compromise would escalate violence and drive the PKK further underground

Reuters 6-22 (http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49536320100622)

Erdogan is under pressure to take tough action against the PKK. Security analysts say NATO member Turkey is likely to increase air strikes against PKK positions in northern Iraq and may launch limited commando raids into northern Iraq rather than a large cross-border operation, which would take months in terms of building troops and logistics due to mountainous terrain. Ankara will have to weigh political repercussions in the event it launches a cross-border operation, which could hurt its blossoming ties with Iraq's Kurdish autonomous government. A large-scale operation would not be welcomed by ally Washington, which provides the Turkish military with intelligence on PKK. In any case, security analysts say any operation is unlikely to eradicate the PKK, but could disrupt its supply lines and push rebels deeper into the mountains for a short-term period.

Compromise solves PKK attacks

De Bellaigue 7 (Christopher, freelance journalist, 10/25/7, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/oct/25/turkey-at-the-turning-point/?page=1) JPG

The AKP has used its power cannily in the Kurdish provinces, extending free health care and giving out schoolbooks as part of a campaign to persuade people in the partly illiterate region to send their children to school. The AKP’s reputation for piety has not harmed it since many Kurds, despite the PKK’s disapproving attitude toward religion, are pious as well. The Kurds appreciate the government’s resistance to pressure from the armed forces to authorize an attack across the border into northern Iraq on PKK camps there.[5](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/oct/25/turkey-at-the-turning-point/?page=3#fn5-823607097) But the main explanation for the AKP’s popularity among the Kurds is that Erdogan, unlike his predecessors, recognizes that the Kurdish problem turns on respect for Kurdish ethnic identity, not economic and social backwardness. The government has modestly increased the Kurds’ linguistic and cultural autonomy and much reduced torture in police stations, a major change. The fighting, although it continues, is less intense than it was. The new constitution will allow, so some have said, the teaching of Kurdish as a second language in Turkish schools. It will also redefine Turkish citizenship without any reference to ethnicity. Such reforms would be popular among the Kurds, who resent the current constitution’s emphasis on Turkish culture. The PKK, which has stopped demanding a separate Kurdish state, could hardly complain.

Impacts – **PKK Compromise Good – PKK Terrorism Impact**

**PKK conflict escalates to global war**

Uysal 7/2 (Ahmet, assoc. prof. at Eskişehir Osmangazi University, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214854-109-centerkurdish-separatism-is-a-threat-to-the-future-of-the-middle-east-bribyi-brahmet-uysalcenter.html) GAT

 Not distancing themselves from violence also limits the BDP’s popularity even among Kurds as it won about 15 percent of the Kurdish vote since most Kurds still vote for the AK Party. In other words, the Kurdish region is the main battleground for the separatist PKK and the pro-integration AK Party. While the former wants a further division in the already divided Middle East, the latter seeks integration within the country and with its neighbors, including Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Iraq and its Kurdish region are considered for such regional integration. The separatist Kurds, not all of them of course, want to dismantle the current Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi territories and establish a communist Kurdish state in their place. The foundation of a Kurdish state is an impossible project, but it is sufficient to create problems in the region. Such a state has no chance of survival, as Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq (e.g., Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani) have realized, but they continue to play the PKK card for an increased role in Iraq. In recent months their relations with Turkey have improved significantly, but they have to put more pressure on the PKK that is stationed in northern Iraq. Frequent terrorist attacks help hard-liners and make a peaceful solution impossible in addition to poisoning relations with neighbors. Because of the escalation of terrorism in Turkey, Erdoğan’s AK Party may lose its majority in the upcoming elections next year. The sole alternative would be a coalition between the conservative nationalist MHP and the secular nationalist CHP. Their nationalist policies may alienate the moderate Kurds and even escalate ethnic tension, spreading to Iraq and destabilizing the whole region. Because the PKK is positioned in the mountainous north, the rise of terrorist attacks can force Turkey to turn to Iraq. The escalation of terrorism and ethnic conflict in Turkey would create a big mess in the conflict-torn Middle East. The West must put more pressure on radical Kurdish activists operating in European cities by cutting the financial and human support they provide to the PKK. Similarly, the US must put more pressure on Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani not to allow the PKK unhindered operation in northern Iraq. Like the Egyptian president who convinced al-Assad not to host the PKK leader in 1999, Arab governments can help Turkey overcome this terrorism by standing by the people of Turkey. Otherwise, the peaceful and rational Turkish experience led by the AK Party in the region will leave the ground for a nationalist government that might destabilize Iraq and damage relations with Kurds, Arabs and the West. Conflicts all around the greater Middle East can hurt and damage even the most stable countries in the globalized world.

Impacts – PKK Compromise Good – Democracy

A. PKK compromise promotes democracy and ends Kurdish exclusion

Toronto Star 9 [December 3, Pg A22, Lexis]

A violent Kurdish insurgency in Turkey has abated in recent years. But scars linger from the fierce 25-year struggle waged by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), in which some 45,000 people were killed. While Kurds form 20 per cent of Turkey's population of 76 million, they have long been restricted even in using their own language. But now Turkish Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip Erdogan](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9690011304&returnToId=20_T9690011391&csi=8286&A=0.7827606024195358&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A592%23&searchTerm=Recep%20Tayyip%20Erdogan%20&indexType=P)  is wisely reaching out to heal old wounds, nudged by the European Union, which Turkey seeks to join as a modern, secular Muslim democracy. Villages are being allowed to revert to their Kurdish names. Mardin Artuklu University has a green light to integrate Kurdish language studies in its curriculum. Soon Kurds will be allowed to use their language in political affairs. There's now a Kurdish public TV channel. Restrictions on private broadcasts in Kurdish have been eased. And bilingual road signs are popping up.

Impacts – PKK Compromise Good – Iraq Stability

PKK attacks cause instability in Iraq

AFP 7-6 (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hdTyjLBqNJWEB0CWMpMQ2t7fBjvA)

The PKK could pose security threats also for Iraq after US troops withdraw from the country, Anatolia quoted him as saying in a television programme. "The PKK presence in the north of Iraq could have a negative impact on Turkish-Iraqi ties. In a sense, it could have a negative impact also on Turkish-US ties," he said.

Impacts – PKK Compromise Good – **MidEast Instability**

The PKK is a threat to stability in the Middle East

**Cihan 6** (Cihan News Agency, http://www.middleeastinfo.org/forum/index.php?s=365ac380b8efee18000238c5c0f5a39c&showtopic=11289&mode=threaded) GAT

The American **Washington Post** daily **cited the** Kurdistan Workers Party (**PKK**) terrorist organization **as one of the severe threats to stability in the Middle East**. An editorial written by Lenore G. Martin said that the **PKK**, which is operating from havens in northern Iraq, **was a threat to Turkey and to stability in the Middle East**. The daily said that Turkey was determined to prevent a repetition of the 1984-1999 terrorist activities with the separatist PKK, in which it suffered more than 30,000 deaths. Martin underlined that the U.S. should take much firmer action to stop the PKK's terrorist activities from undermining its Middle East policy. The U.S. administration recently appointed a special envoy to coordinate the war against PKK terrorism. Retired General Joseph Ralston recently paid a visit to Turkey to discuss the measures to battle against PKK terrorism. The Washington Post claimed that **a Turkish cross-border operation into northern Iraq would create chaos in that part of Iraq and potentially destabilize the region.** The daily added that **the U.S. would face a more chaotic situation in Iraq and the loss of a long-term relationship with the Iraqi Kurds**, who are Washington's best hope for obtaining rights for U.S. bases in the future. "If Washington opposes the invasion, it risks further estrangement from Turkey, a state positioned to play a critical strategic role in a region where Iran increasingly challenges the United States for dominance." The daily advised the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to deny the PKK havens in northern Iraq and prevent PKK leadership from traveling freely throughout the country. The editorial recommended Turkey to grant more cultural and social rights to the Kurdish citizens of Turkey to allow their integration into the Turkish republic. "The U.S. must throw its full weight behind efforts to eject the PKK from northern Iraq. Furthermore the United States needs to pressure Europe more energetically to block the transfer of funds to the PKK, which it has classified as a terrorist organization. It cannot rely on a tripartite commission to stop the next guerrilla war in the Middle East," the Washington Post added.

No Impact – PKK Compromise Bad – Terrorism

PKK compromise won’t solve terrorism – Overtures ignored

VOA News 6-22 (http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/news-analysis/Kurdish-Militants-Undermine-Turkish-Initiative-96891889.html)

The government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which faces elections next year, is caught between stepping up action against the rebels, and concerns that not only has the initiative stalled, but may not have gone far enough to begin with. "The problem is that although the prime minister has shown a lot of respect for Kurdishness, which is a great breakthrough in Turkey, a lot of the details of what was called the democratic opening have not managed to capture the imagination of Kurdish nationalists," Hugh Pope, project director for Turkey at the International Crisis Group in Istanbul, stated.

Impacts – Israeli Relations – War

Collapse of Israeli relations causes war by collapsing the peace process

Jerusalem Post 7-5 (http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=180514)

Syrian President Bashar Assad warned that the current rift in Israel-Turkey relations threatens the stability of the Middle East, and said "the chances of peace grow slim, and the prospect of war grows." Speaking at a press conference in Madrid Monday, Assad said that if "relations between Israel and Turkey are not renewed, it will be very difficult for Turkey to continue its role in the [peace] negotiations." Relations between the two countries deteriorated in the wake of Israel's raid on the ship Mavi Marmara, which resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens. Assad called Turkey a crucial part of the peace process, saying "Turkey knows the ins and outs of the Middle East," and "there was never such a significant factor as Turkey for peace talks, and the stability of the region."

Low Israeli relations make regional stability impossible

AFP 7-5 (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3915494,00.html)

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad warned Monday that the Israel-Turkey crisis could affect stability in the Middle East and undermine Ankara's role in the region's peace negotiations. "If the relationship between Turkey and Israel is not renewed it will be very difficult for Turkey to play a role in negotiations" to revive the Middle East peace process, Assad said on an official visit to Spain. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says 'relations will be broken' unless Jewish state apologizes or accepts conclusions of international inquiry into deadly raid on Gaza-bound flotilla

This would "without doubt affect the stability in the region," the Syrian leader said, speaking alongside Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.

Turkey-Israeli relations are critical to avoid regional war

Miami Herald 6-30 (http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/30/1707724/turkey-vital-ally-for-israel.html)

Turkey has become a vocal critic of Israeli policies and recently withdrew its ambassador to Israel indefinitely. As the United States pushes for regional peace, a Turkish-Israeli reconciliation is a key step toward this goal. Turkey is a nation at the crossroads of East and West. It is a NATO ally but has more recently increased its ties with the Muslim world. In seeking to assert its power in the region, Turkey has mediated some of the region's most hot-button issues. In 2008, Turkey mediated indirect talks between Syria and Israel and more recently worked with Brazil and Iran to forge an agreement on Iran's nuclear enrichment program.

Reversing the slide in relations is a model for regional relations

Miami Herald 6-30 (http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/30/1707724/turkey-vital-ally-for-israel.html)

Repair of the strained Turkish-Israeli relationship presents an opportunity to improve Israel's relationship with the Muslim world. Israel's diplomatic relations with Turkey contrast with its lack of diplomatic relations with most of its Arab and Muslim neighbors. Unfortunately, these relationships are characterized by mistrust, accusations and violence, doing nothing to improve the economic or humanitarian conditions in Gaza while heightening Israeli security concerns.

Negotiations between Turkey and Israel to resolve current tensions, however, can demonstrate to other Arab and Muslim nations that diplomacy yields better results than provocative speech or violence.

Impacts – Israeli Relations – War

Restoring Israeli relations solves Middle East peace

Miami Herald 6-30 (http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/30/1707724/turkey-vital-ally-for-israel.html)

If Israel and Turkey can reestablish their relationship of trust, Turkey is poised to serve a major role in addressing the larger Palestinian issue and in fostering dialogue between the West and Iran and Syria. The outlook for Middle East peace is extremely pessimistic, and it has been a struggle to bring the parties involved in the region's problems to the negotiating table.

By strengthening its credentials with the Arab world, Turkey may become its de facto leader in the region. Such a position can conflict with a mediator role, particularly if the Turkish government uses its new-found power to pander to anti-West and anti-Israeli sentiment.

However, if it chooses to maintain its traditional relationships with the West and Israel, it can truly promote dialogue and mediate the conflicts in the Middle East. Working toward a deal with Iran and easing the blockade on Gaza and were good first steps.

Although many outstanding issues remain, these efforts show that dialogue with friends and enemies alike has the potential to bring comprehensive solutions to this troubled region.

Impacts – Israeli Relations – Relations w the U.S.

Relations w Israel are key to relations w the U.S.

Daily News & Economic Review 7-5 (Ankara newspaper, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=from-a-proactive-to-a-reactive-foreign-policy-2010-07-05)

The AKP administration is also discovering now, no doubt much to its chagrin, that its stance on Israel is also becoming a precondition for better ties with the US – a fact that is clearly going to make itself felt more and more in the coming weeks and month if the angry feedback from Washington is anything to go by. We fail to see the success story for Turkey in all of this.

Impacts – Israeli Relations – A2: It’s Ok Now

It’s not over – No Israeli apology and radicalized public opinion

Gulf News 7-7 (http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/turkey-s-patience-being-pushed-to-the-limit-1.650534)

The fact that Israel's ambassador to Turkey has not been recalled and that a meeting took place between an Israeli and Turkish officials in Brussels last week, are by no means adequate indicators that the storm is starting to pass. Erdogan is still very angry with what happened. His Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu is still seemingly unconvinced of the need to bend in order to shelter his country from Turkish wrath. Between an angry Turkish Prime Minister and a stubborn Israeli one, relations seem far — very far — from a real rapprochement.

Impacts – Israeli Relations – A2: Resilience

The Flotilla has made complete collapse of relations a possibility, but recovery is possible too

Gulf News 7-7 (http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/turkey-s-patience-being-pushed-to-the-limit-1.650534)

Despite all of the above, Middle East analysts in the West are still busy debating how damaging the flotilla event was on Turkish-Israeli relations.

Realists claim that they already have hit rock bottom — especially after Turkey withdrew its ambassador on May 31 — and have reached the point of no return. Others claim that from where things stand today, the only way left for bilateral relations to go is up, arguing that war — as some wishful Arab journalists predicted — was simply, on nobody's agenda.

Some in Israel, like Alon Liel, who for many years served as his country's ambassador to Turkey, are nevertheless very worried. Liel spoke shortly after the incident saying: "They have already called the Turkish ambassador back to Ankara. I hope very much that this incident will not lead to breaking the diplomatic link."

As far as the Turks are concerned, there is a basket of solutions that can come out of talks, the most important being:

1) Israel can lift the siege over Gaza, as Turkey has been loudly calling for since the war of 2008.

2) The Israeli government can shoulder full responsibility for its mistake, apologise, compensate victims and accept international investigation into the flotilla affair.

3) It can show goodwill towards Turkey through accepting Turkey's role in the Middle East peace process, especially on the Syrian track which was called off by the Syrians in 2008 because of the war on Gaza.

It is up to the wise men in Israel — if there are any left — to realise the folly of being on the bad side of Turkey and pressure Netanyahu and his foreign minister into a change of policy; before it is too late.

Those who realise how important trade, for example, has been between both countries are pushing in this direction from within the Israeli business community. Bilateral trade between the countries reached $2.5 billion (Dh9.19 billion) in 2009. Additionally, sources in Turkey are now saying that their government is no longer interested in extending the Russian Blue Stream pipeline, a major trans-Black Sea pipeline that carries natural gas from Russia to Turkey.

Simply put, trust has completely collapsed between Turkey and Israel. The Turks walked that extra mile by agreeing to the Brussels meeting—which so far has clearly amounted to nothing—but there are limits to Turkey's patience.

Experts agree

Trend News 7-5 (http://en.trend.az/news/politics/foreign/1715936.html)

The probability of rupture in diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel is high at this stage, said Oded Eran, head of the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies. "I think it is quite possible, we have already witnessed a serious decline in the volume of the relations," Eran, former Israeli ambassador to the EU and NATO, told Trend by telephone.

No Impact – Israeli Relations – Turkey-Israel War

Turkey-Israel nuclear war impossible- economic disincentive

Hallinan 6/24 [Conn, Staff Writer, World Bulletin, http://www.worldbulletin.net/news\_detail.php?id=60432] KLS

Ankara’s falling out with Israel is attributed to the growth of Islam, but while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party does have a streak of Islamicism, Turkey’s anger at Israel is over policy not religion. The current Israeli government has no interest in resolving its dispute with the Palestinians, and leading members of the Netanyahu coalition have threatened war with Iran, Syria and Lebanon. A war with any of those countries might go regional, and could even turn nuclear if the Israelis find their conventional weapons are not up to the job of knocking out their opponents. Ankara has much to lose from war and everything to gain from nurturing regional trade agreements and building political stability. Turkey has the 16th largest economy in the world and seventh largest in Europe.

Impacts – Econ Reform Good – Relations w the West

Only economic reform ensures good relations w the West

Daily News & Economic Review 7-5 (Ankara newspaper, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=it8217s-time-to-shift-the-axis-to-the-eu-2010-07-05)

It is very difficult for the prime minister to convince the West without taking concrete steps. With only making statements about Turkey’s need to be a part of the Western world, nothing changes.

Allegations and decisions have been made. What’s left is convincing attitudes. Showing the Western world Turkey’s real position can happen only through taking more steps toward the European Union. What does that mean? Making all changes required by negotiations and applying them without any delay. Shifting gears and accelerating EU progress and more importantly starting efforts to open up ports where southern Cyprus ships are kept under lock. It’s not the one-way opening of ports but stating its intent to take serious steps.

Imapcts – Shift to the East Bad – Conflict

Shift to the East causes hostile rivalry w the West especially in the context of the aff – Only pullout makes our impacts inevitable

Ben-Ami 6-28 (Shlomo, Toledo Ctr for Intl Peace, http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-s-rise-and-the-decline-of-pan-arabism-analysis-495692)

Kemalism always saw the Ottoman legacy as a burden, an obstacle to modernisation. In Erdogan's vision, modernisation does not preclude a return to Turkey's Islamic roots, nor does it require it to abandon its destiny as a Middle East power, even if this means flouting United States-led policies in the region. To both Israel and the West, the regional context of Turkey's rise is especially disturbing. Erdogan's neo-Ottomanism is not a return to an idyllic Ottoman Commonwealth; it is more a clash between a rising radical axis, led by two major non-Arab powers (Turkey and Iran), and the declining Arab conservative regimes. Indeed, Turkey's growing regional relevance is the measure of the Arabs' failure. They failed to advance their peace initiative with Israel, and are complicit in the blockade of Gaza in the hope that Hamas will collapse, thereby humbling their own Islamist oppositions. Yet, despite Erdogan's creeping Islamic revolution, Turkey is not a second Iran. The AKP remains a progressive, heterogeneous party that sees no contradiction between Islam and democracy. Nor has it entirely given up on Turkey's European dream. Moreover, an increasingly robust secular opposition, the Republican People's Party (CHP) under the vigorous leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is bound to help stem the Islamist tide. With Israel's return to a sober peace strategy, and with an honest dialogue between Turkey and its NATO allies, the Turkish bridge between East and West can still be salvaged."

No Impact – Econ Reform ≠ Accession

Political infighting makes compromise on reforms inevitable – kills EU accession

Alpay 10 (Sahin, columnist @ Todays Zaman, 2/8/10,

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-200887-stumbling-blocks-of-constitutional-reform-in-turkey.html) JPG

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in power has not only been responsible for most of the constitutional and legal amendments required for accession to the European Union, but has even assigned, in the days prior to the last general election in 2007, a group of liberal-minded lawyers to draft a constitution in line with EU norms. It had, however, to shelve the idea soon after the election, despite garnering nearly half of the votes. It is currently flirting with the idea of partial constitutional reform towards broader democratic rights, but is uncertain whether it can achieve that.Why then has the AK Party government had to shelve the idea of a new constitution, is currently talking about only partial constitutional reform, and may even fail to pass it? The answer to these questions lies in the current balance of political forces. The country is divided between those forces which want to preserve the status quo as defined by the existing Constitution, and those which demand democratic change. The former prevail among the state elites while the latter are in the government.

No Impact – Econ Reform – Growth

Economic reform doesn’t solve long term market pitfalls

Rubin 6/29 [Michael, Resident Scholar. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2010, <http://gayandright.blogspot.com/2010/06/islamists-have-bought-turkey.html>] KLS

But there was far less here than met the eye. Rather than base economic reform on sound, long-term policies, Erdogan instead relied on sleight of hand. He incurred crippling debt and, in effect, mortgaged long-term financial security of the republic for his own short-term political gain. Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, has said that the state debt accrued during Erdogan’s first three years in power surpassed Turkey’s total accumulated debt in the three decades prior. And that was only official debt. Outside of public view, Erdogan and Gul, now his foreign minister, presided over an influx of so-called Green Money—capital from Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich Persian Gulf emirates, much of which ended up in party coffers rather than in the public treasury.