# Ethics File/Kritik Updates

# Kritik Slayers

## \*\*\*Utilitarianism Good\*\*\*

### Util Good-Solves Moral Tunnel Vision

Don’t evaluate their ethics in a vacuum-Their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize─

Isaac, 2002. (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### Extinction First

Never tolerate extinction for the sake of justice─

Bok, 1988(Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

### Always Value to Life

We should always assume value to life-survival comes first─

Cummisky, 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one-because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way-this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one. Consider Hill's example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statues only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.

Preserving existence is the primary obligation of a human and precedes value to life questions.

Wapner 03 [Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University. “Leftist Criticism of "Nature" Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age,” Dissent Winter 2003 <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm>]

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems.

### Calculation Good

Direct calculative considerations are the only way to address suffering-ontological theorizing is limiting and impractical

Jarvis ‘2K (Darryl, Director of the Center for International Relations, University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p 128-129)

Perhaps more alarming is the outright violence Ashley recommends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley’s torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, modernism, or realism emanate a “violence” that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self-professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, published, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theoretical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even revolutionary violence) is a necessary, let a lone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as “Down with positivism and rationality”? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocuous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. this is not sot say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

### Nuclear War Outweighs

Nuclear war outweighs ethics – potential for escalation means it must be averted

Shaper, 1982

[Donna, associate chaplain @ Yale University, October 13, “The Nuclear Reality: Beyond Niebuhr and the Just West”, http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=1344/]

The nuclear reality not only takes us beyond Niebuhr and real politics; it also takes us beyond the “just war” as a justification or rationalization for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear warfare is indicted, not vindicated, by the limiting categories of just-war criteria such as due proportion, just means, just intentions and reasonable possibility of success. The burden of proof is on those who would say otherwise. A limited nuclear “just” war can be theoretically conceived of in a textbook scenario, but is it possible in the real world? War is confusion, chaos and hell, not predictable sequences. Even if nuclear weapons were to be used as counterforce, and even assuming that noncombatants could be protected, the question of escalation would remain unanswered -- not to mention long-term environmental or genetic damage. How can we know that any use of nuclear weapons will not result in catastrophic escalation?

Nuclear war makes motives irrelevant – there’s no difference between doing and letting happen when it comes to nukes

Callahan, Sr. Fellow @ Harvard Medical School, 1973

[Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 59]

Motives and means are only two dimensions of moral reasoning. Consequences are the third, and many philosophers as well as practical politicians believe that the consequences are the most important criterion by which the morality of nuclear policies should be judged. When the potential consequences are so enormous, “otherwise honorable concerns with perfection, virtues, rights, and the doctrine of double effect simply give way. The difference between letting humanity or some large part of it be immolated and causing it to be immolated is a moral difference that pales into insignificance.”106

### AT-Ontology/Epistemology

Their prior questions are irrelevant in the context of our affirmative-empirical validity is enough─

Owen 2 (university of Southampton, David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But whilethe explanatory and/or interpretive power ofatheoreticalaccount is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certainkinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### AT-Discourse

Discursive focus trades off with focus on structural change—it becomes a psychological substitute for action.

Kidner 2k – psychology professor, David, Nature and Psyche, p 66-7

Noam Chomsky has noted that if "it's too hard to deal with real problems,' some academics tend to "go off on wild goose chases that don't matter ... [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is." An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or ideal, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a "world of wounds," the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of our time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external "real" world that is either absent or unsatisfying." Ian Craib's description of social constructionism as a "social psychosis" therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the "human" from the "natural" and abandons nature to industrialism.

Privileging discourse is an ineffective political strategy.

Taft-Kaufman ’95 - Jill (Professor of Speech at CMU); “Other Ways”; Southern Communication Journal; Spring; Vol. 60, No. 3

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

## \*\*\*Predictions Good\*\*\*

### Predictions/Scenario Planning Good

Our impacts aren’t constructed until they prove it-isolating a psychological bias doesn’t take out our impacts─

Yudkowsky 6 – Eliezer Yudkowsky, Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence that has published multiple peer-reviewed papers on risk assessment. Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic. August 31, 2006.

Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: “The world’s biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn’t make it dark out.” If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise – instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author’s naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that’s a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It’s harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the real- world facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer – someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: “What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It’s overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball.” Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

Even if predictions in the abstract are wrong, policy debates is productive, improves predictive accuracy, and solves cession of the debate to cloistered experts

Tetlock and Gardner 2011 (Philip Tetlock is a professor of organizational behavior at the Haas Business School at the University of California-Berkeley, AND Dan Gardner is a columnist and senior writer for the Ottawa Citizen and the author of The Science of Fear, received numerous awards for his writing, including the Michener Award, M.A. History from York, "OVERCOMING OUR AVERSION TO ACKNOWLEDGING OUR IGNORANCE" July 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/11/dan-gardner-and-philip-tetlock/overcoming-our-aversion-to-acknowledging-our-ignorance/)

The optimists are right that there is much we can do at a cost that is quite modest relative to what is often at stake. For example, why not build on the IARPA tournament? Imagine a system for recording and judging forecasts. Imagine running tallies of forecasters’ accuracy rates. Imagine advocates on either side of a policy debate specifying in advance precisely what outcomes their desired approach is expected to produce, the evidence that will settle whether it has done so, and the conditions under which participants would agree to say “I was wrong.” Imagine pundits being held to account. Of course arbitration only works if the arbiter is universally respected and it would be an enormous challenge to create an analytical center whose judgments were not only fair, but perceived to be fair even by partisans dead sure they are right and the other guys are wrong. But think of the potential of such a system to improve the signal-to-noise ratio, to sharpen public debate, to shift attention from blowhards to experts worthy of an audience, and to improve public policy. At a minimum, it would highlight how often our forecasts and expectations fail, and if that were to deflate the bloated confidence of experts and leaders, and give pause to those preparing some “great leap forward,” it would be money well spent. But the pessimists are right, too, that fallibility, error, and tragedy are permanent conditions of our existence. Humility is in order, or, as Socrates said, the beginning of wisdom is the admission of ignorance. The Socratic message has always been a hard sell, and it still is—especially among practical people in business and politics, who expect every presentation to end with a single slide consisting of five bullet points labeled “The Solution.” We have no such slide, unfortunately. But in defense of Socrates, humility is the foundation of the fox style of thinking and much research suggests it is an essential component of good judgment in our uncertain world. It is practical. Over the long term, it yields better calibrated probability judgments, which should help you affix more realistic odds than your competitors on policy bets panning out.

### Predictions Good-Elites Disad

State domination only occurs when we resign from foresightedness – debate about catastrophe allows contestation of scare-tactics and takes power back

Kurasawa, 2004(Fuyuki. “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight.” Constellations, Vol. 11 No 4.)

If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 Much more common, however, is the opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.

Predictive ethics is the only way to change the oppressive conditions of the status quo

Kurasawa, 2004(Fuyuki. “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight.” Constellations, Vol. 11 No 4.)

Dystopias are thrust into public spaces to jolt citizens out of their complacency and awaken their concern for those who will follow them. Such tropes are intended to be controversial, their contested character fostering public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind, the means of addressing them, and the unintended and unexpected consequences flowing from present-day trends. In helping us to imagine the strengths and weaknesses of different positions towards the future, then, the dystopian imaginary crystallizes many of the great issues of the day. Amplifying and extrapolating what could be the long-term consequences of current tendencies, public discourse can thereby clarify the future’s seeming opaqueness. Likewise, fostering a dystopian moral imagination has a specifically critical function, for the disquiet it provokes about the prospects of later generations is designed to make us radically question the ‘self-evidentness’ of the existing social order.34 If we imagine ourselves in the place of our descendants, the taken for- granted shortsightedness of our institutionalized ways of thinking and acting becomes problematic. Indifference toward the future is neither necessary nor inevitable, but can be – and indeed ought to be – changed.

### Risk Assessment Good

Our risk assessment critical to transforming the public sphere—leads to democratic decision making

Borraz, 2007 [OLIVIER BORRAZ Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, “Risk and Public Problems,” Journal of Risk Research, 10, 7, Oct 2007, 941-957]

These studies seem to suggest that risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions. This politicization entails, in particular, a widening of the range of stakeholders, a reference to broader political issues and debates, the search for new decision- making processes (either in terms of democratization, or renewed scientific expertise), and the explicit mobilization of non-scientific arguments in these processes. But if this is the case, then it could also be true that risk is simply one way of framing public problems. Studies in the 1990s, in particular, showed that a whole range of social problems (e.g., poverty, housing, unemployment) had been reframed as health issues, with the result that their management was transferred from social workers to health professionals, and in the process was described in neutral, depoliticized terms (Fassin, 1998). Studies of risk, on the contrary, seem to suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized, i.e., taken up by new social movements, producing and using alternative scientific data, calling for more deliberative decision-making procedures, and clearly intended to promote change in the manner in which the state protects the population against various risks (health and environment, but also social and economic). In other words, framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order.

Risk framing puts pressure of policy makers to enact reforms and leads to deeper understanding of societal problems—we are a prerequisite for solving the systemic impacts they name

Borraz, ‘7 [OLIVIER BORRAZ Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, “Risk and Public Problems,” Journal of Risk Research, 10, 7, Oct 2007, 941-957]

First, risk is the result of a dynamic, haphazard, controversial and unstable process of construction. In a sense, risk is never entirely stabilized, it is associated with many uncertainties, its status like its boundaries change, following the dynamics of contention which contributed to its emergence. More than a frame, risk is thus closer to a state in the life of a public problem (Gilbert, 2003b), a state characterized by fluidity in its boundaries, struggles over the definition of the risk, debates as to who is accountable, etc. Labelling a problem as a risk exerts pressure on political authorities, in a way which tests their capacity to act. It is also an opportunity for rules and power relations to be redefined. Generally, the boundary between risk and crisis is unclear (Besanc ̧on et al., 2004). Second, risk is inseparable from wider political controversies and conflicting values, ideas and interests. Whatever the issue, be it limited in scale (sewage sludge or mobile phone masts) or on the contrary high profile (nuclear waste, global warming, asbestos, GMO), the move into the state of risk allows for links to be made with broader political, economic, social, moral, ethical or environmental issues. The risk of an activity is always more than just a health or environmental safety issue: it also questions the multiple dimensions surrounding that activity (its benefits, use, effects, etc.).

### Fear of Nukes Good

Depicting scenarios for nuclear war creates a fear that drives people to action and arouses anger at injustices – the alternative creates irresponsibility and inaction

Grinspoon 1986 [Lester, Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, (The Long Darkness: Psychological and Moral Perspectives on Nuclear Winter) p. 3-4]

The late Archibald MacLeish wrote, "Knowledge without feelings is not knowledge, and can only lead to public irresponsibility and indifference, conceivably to ruin. . . . [When] the fact is dissociated from the feel of the fact . . . that people, that civilization is in danger" (Atlantic Monthly 203 [1959]:40-46). Many people repress their fear, anger, and rebelliousness in response to the nuclear threat; instead they anesthetize themselves. They avoid acquiring information that would make vague fears specific enough to require decisive action; they contrive to ignore the implications of the information they do allow to get through; they resign their responsibilities to leaders and experts; they treat the accelerating nuclear arms race as simply none of their business and convince themselves that there is nothing they can do about it. Just as some dangers are too slight to arouse concern, this one is, paradoxically, too vast to arouse concern. It is not an easy task to help people grasp affectively as well as cognitively the immensity of the danger. This is not just because we are all so psychologically well equipped to defend ourselves against anxiety that might threaten to overwhelm, but also because the horror itself is so abstract. Physicians, even though their work is often pressured and stressful, continue to be the professional group that smokes the least, and among physicians, thoracic surgeons have the lowest prevalence of smoking. Clearly, direct exposure to the consequences of smoking makes it difficult to deny them. Similarly, physicians have been in the vanguard of the movement to arouse the consciousness of the populace to the dangers of nuclear war. Working in the emergency room makes suffering from blast, fire, cold, radiation sickness, starvation, and infectious disease less of an abstraction. People who have or have had such experience are less likely to suffer from this failure of imagination. We have to confront the truth in this unprecedented situation. We must rouse ourselves from complacency and passivity and assume responsibility. We need the courage to be afraid and to make our friends, neighbors, and colleagues afraid-with a fear that is not neurotic and panicky but thoughtful, a fear not so much for ourselves as for our children, for civilization, and for this precious world. A problem for anyone who fully assimilates a consciousness of the nuclear threat is that it requires us to redirect our thoughts and change our lives in certain ways-a demand that many people understandably prefer to avoid. It means taking some time that we would like to devote to interesting, selffulfilling work with obvious rewards and devoting it instead to what seems a frustrating, unfulfilling struggle with few intrinsic rewards and an uncertain chance of success. It does not even bring the pleasure of correcting a visible injustice or relieving visible suffering. In fact, like some techniques of psychotherapy, it heightens suffering in the short run for everyone who is shaken out of numbness or self-delusion and into confrontation of the reality.

### AT-Uncertainty Inev

Predictions are good – even if we can’t predict the future with certainty, it means we must be even more wary of future crises

Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale, 2004

(Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales,” Constellations Volume 4 No. 11, December)

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

Uncertainty with the future doesn’t absolve us of responsibility – it makes predictions even more important

Kurasawa, 2004(Fuyuki. “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight.” Constellations, Vol. 11 No 4.)

Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight. Several bodies of literature have touched upon this sea-change toward a culture of prevention in world affairs, most notably just-war theory,14 international public policy research,15 and writings from the risk society paradigm.16 Regardless of how insightful these three approaches may be, they tend to skirt over much of what is revealing about the interplay of the ethical, political, and sociological dynamics that drive global civil society initiatives aimed at averting disaster. Consequently, the theory of practice proposed here reconstructs the dialogical, public, and transnational work of farsightedness, in order to articulate the sociopolitical processes underpinning it to the normative ideals that should steer and assist in substantively thickening it. As such, the establishment of a capacity for early warning is the first aspect of the question that we need to tackle. II. The Aptitude for Early Warning When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism Cautionary Tales: Fuyuki Kurasawa 459 © 2004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations.

## \*\*\*Kritik Impact Answers\*\*\*

### Democracy Checks

Their impacts are over-determined nonsense—democracy checks.

O’Kane 97 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsicallycapable of genocidalaction’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competitionwith state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is thesevery ordinary and common attributes of modernitywhich stand in the way of modern genocides.

### No Root Cause of War-Paralysis DA

Focus on strategic deterrence and democracy are key to adverting crisis escalation—reject the infinite number of root causes that debilitate action-They make war more likely

John Moore 4 chaired law prof, UVA. Frm first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State, Beyond the Democratic Peace, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis

[\*393] If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. n158 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come. [\*394] A useful framework for thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State and War, n159 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high-risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision to go to war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high-risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant - I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who are disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposed to high-risk behavior. We might also want to keep open the possibility that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence. Nondemocracies' leaders can have different perceptions of the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, the key to war avoidance is understanding that major international war is critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three - specifically an absence of [\*395] democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high-risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. n160

### No Root Cause of War-History

Empirical evidence is on our side─   
Kalevi Jaakko HOLSTI, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, 1991[“On The Study Of War,” Peace And War: Armed Conflicts And International Order, 1648-1989, Published by Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521399297, p. 3]

Investigators of conflict, crises, and war reached a consensus years ago that monocausal explanations are theoretically and empirically deficient. Kenneth Waltz’ (1957) classic typology of war explanations convincingly demonstrated various problems arising from diagnoses that locate war causation exclusively at the individual, state attribute, or systemic levels. He also illustrated how prescriptions based on faulty diagnoses offer no solution to the problem. Even Rousseau’s powerful exploration of the consequences of anarchy, updated by Waltz (1979), remains full of insights, but it only specifies why wars recur (there is nothing to prevent them) and offers few clues that help to predict when, where, and over what issues. Blainey (1973), in another telling attack on monocausal theories, continues where Waltz left off. He offers, on the basis of rich historical illustrations, both logical and anecdotal rebuttals of facile explanations of war that dot academic and philosophical thought on the subject. But rebuttals of the obvious are not sufficient. We presently have myriads of theories of war, emphasizing all sorts of factors that can help explain its etiology. As Carroll and Fink (1975) note, there are if anything too many theories, and even too many typologies of theories. approvingly, they point out that anything might lead to war, but nothing will certainly lead to war.

### No Root Cause of War Extenstions

There’s no one root cause of war—so many alternate explanations.

Sharp 8 – senior associate deputy general counsel for intelligence at the US Department of Defense, Dr. Walter, “Democracy and Deterrence”, Air Force University Press, May, http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Books/sharp/Sharp.pdf

While classical liberals focused on political structures, socialists analyzed the socioeconomic system of states as the primary factor in determining the propensity of states to engage in war. Socialists such as Karl Marx attributed war to the class structure of society; Marx believed that war resulted from a clash of social forces created by a capitalist mode of production that develops two antagonistic classes, rather than being an instrument of state policy. Thus capitalist states would engage in war because of their growing needs for raw materials, markets, and cheap labor. Socialists believed replacing capitalism with socialism could prevent war, but world events have proven socialists wrong as well.32 These two schools of thought—war is caused by innate biological drives or social institutions—do not demonstrate any meaningful correlation with the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war. There are many variables not considered by these two schools: for example, the influence of national special interest groups such as the military or defense contractors that may seek glory through victory, greater resources, greater domestic political power, or justification for their existence. Legal scholar Quincy Wright has conducted one of the “most thorough studies of the nature of war”33 and concludes that there “is no single cause of war.”34 In A Study of War, he concludes that peace is an equilibrium of four complex factors: military and industrial technology, international law governing the resort to war, social and political organization at the domestic and international level, and the distribution of attitudes and opinions concerning basic values. War is likely when controls on any one level are disturbed or changed.35 Similarly, the 1997 US National Military Strategy identifies the root causes of conflict as political, economic, social, and legal conditions.36 Moore has compiled the following list of conventional explanations for war: specific disputes; absence of dispute settlement mechanisms; ideological disputes; ethnic and religious differences; communication failures; proliferation of weapons and arms races; social and economic injustice; imbalance of power; competition for resources; incidents, accidents, and miscalculation; violence in the nature of man; aggressive national leaders; and economic determination. He has concluded, however, that these causes or motives for war explain specific conflicts but fail to serve as a central paradigm for explaining the cause of war.37

Violence is proximately caused—root cause isn’t offense, and modernity isn’t violent.

Curtler 97 – PhD Philosophy, Hugh, “rediscovering values: coming to terms with postnmodernism” 164-5

At the same time, we must beware the temptation to reject out of hand everything that stinks of modernism and the Enlightenment. We must resist the postmodern urge to reject and reduce in the conviction that everything Western humans thought prior to 1930 leads inevitably to the Holocaust and its aftermath and that every exemplary work of art and literature diminishes the human soul. In particular, we must maintain a firm hold on our intellectual center and, while acknowledging the need for greater compassion and heightened imaginative power, also acknowledge our need for reasonable solutions to complex issues. Indeed, the rejection of reason and "techno-science" as it is voiced by such thinkers as Jean-François Lyotard seems at times little more than resentment born of a sense of betrayal: "it is no longer possible to call development progress" (Lyotard 1992, 78). Instead, modernism has given us Auschwitz. Therefore, we will blame reason and science as the vehicles that have brought us to this crisis. Reason has yielded technology, which has produced nuclear weapons, mindless diversions, and choking pollution in our cities while enslaving the human spirit. Therefore, we reject reason. This is odd logic. Reason becomes hypostatized and is somehow guilty of having made false promises. The fault may not lie with our tools or methods, however, but with the manner in which we adapted them and the tasks we demanded they perform. That is to say, the problem may lie not with our methods but with ourselves. At times, one wonders whether thinkers such as Lyotard read Dostoyevsky, Freud, or Jung, whether they know anything about human depravity. Science is not at fault; foolish men and women (mostly men) who have expected the impossible of methods that were designed primarily to solve problems are at fault. We cannot blame science because we have made of it an idol. Lyotard was correct when he said that "scientific or technical discovery was never subordinate to demands arising from human needs. It was always driven by a dynamic independent of the things people might judge desirable, profitable, or comfortable" (Lyotard 1992, 83). But instead of focusing attention on the "dynamic," he chooses to reject the entire techno-scientific edifice. This is reactionary. We face serious problems, and the rejection of science and technology will lead us back to barbarism, not to nirvana. What is required is a lesson in how to control our methods and make them serve our needs. Thus, although one can sympathize with the postmodern attack on scientific myopia, one must urge caution in the face of hysteria. There are additional problems with postmodernism, however.

## \*\*\*Cede The Political\*\*\*

### Engaging Insitutions K

Engaging institutions is key to solve – they don’t have a chance at solving otherwise

Grossberg, 92 (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 388-389)

The demand for moral and ideological purity often results in the rejection of any hierarchy or organization. The question-can the master's tools be used to tear down the master's house?-ignores both the contingency of the relation between such tools and the master's power and, even more importantly, the fact that there may be no other tools available. Institutionalization is seen as a repressive impurity within the body politic rather than as a strategic and tactical, even empowering, necessity. It sometimes seems as if every progressive organization is condemned to recapitulate the same arguments and crisis, often leading to their collapse. 54 For example, Minkowitz has described a crisis in Act Up over the need for efficiency and organization, professionalization and even hierarchy,55 as if these inherently contradicted its commitment to democracy. This is particularly unfortunate since Act Up, whatever its limitations, has proven itself an effective and imaginative political strategist. The problems are obviously magnified with success, as membership, finances and activities grow. This refusal of efficient operation and the moment of organization is intimately connected with the Left's appropriation and privileging of the local (as the site of democracy and resistance). This is yet another reason why structures of alliance are inadequate, since they often assume that an effective movement can be organized and sustained without such structuring. The Left needs to recognize the necessity of institutionalization and of systems of hierarchy, without falling back into its own authoritarianism. It needs to find reasonably democratic structures of institutionalization, even if they are impure and compromised.

### Policy Debates Good

Policy debates are critical to education about government action – refusal to debate specific policy alternatives cedes the whole discussion to elites

Walt 1991 (Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, International Studies Quarterly 35)

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning-game theory is an obvious example-we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On thc whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self interested parties.

### AT-Not Policy Makers

Turn: the fact that we may not become policy makers makes this education more important, not less

Keller, Whittaker, and Burke, 2001. [Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost]

Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key element in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in political or policy oriented practica. In a survey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practica in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/development (BSW=lS%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the largest representation at a single school being 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learning in the classroom: \* Students are involved in more than listening. \* Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students’ skills \* Students are involved in higher-order thinking (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). \* Students are engaged in activities. \* Greater emphasis is placed on students’ exploration of their own attitudes and values. (p. 2) Experiential learning in the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage students to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situations, and to consider new ways of thinking in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer (Meyers & Jones, 1993).

# Kritik Supplements

### Util Bad-Justifies Any Atrocity

Utilitarianism can be manipulated to justify any atrocity – their framework condones mass slaughter and results in nuclear conflict

Jim Holt, commentator for the BBC, writes frequently about politics and philosophy, August 5, 1995, New York Times, “Morality, Reduced To Arithmetic,” p. Lexis

Can the deliberate massacre of innocent people ever be condoned? The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945, resulted in the deaths of 120,000 to 250,000 Japanese by incineration and radiation poisoning. Although a small fraction of the victims were soldiers, the great majority were noncombatants -- women, children, the aged. Among the justifications that have been put forward for President Harry Truman’s decision to use the bomb, only one is worth taking seriously -- that it saved lives. The alternative, the reasoning goes, was to launch an invasion. Truman claimed in his memoirs that this would have cost another half a million American lives. Winston Churchill put the figure at a million. Revisionist historians have cast doubt on such numbers. Wartime documents suggest that military planners expected around 50,000 American combat deaths in an invasion. Still, when Japanese casualties, military and civilian, are taken into account, the overall invasion death toll on both sides would surely have ended up surpassing that from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scholars will continue to argue over whether there were other, less catastrophic ways to force Tokyo to surrender. But given the fierce obstinacy of the Japanese militarists, Truman and his advisers had some grounds for believing that nothing short of a full-scale invasion or the annihilation of a big city with an apocalyptic new weapon would have succeeded. Suppose they were right. Would this prospect have justified the intentional mass killing of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In the debate over the question, participants on both sides have been playing the numbers game. Estimate the hypothetical number of lives saved by the bombings, then add up the actual lives lost. If the first number exceeds the second, then Truman did the right thing; if the reverse, it was wrong to have dropped the bombs. That is one approach to the matter -- the utilitarian approach. According to utilitarianism, a form of moral reasoning that arose in the 19th century, the goodness or evil of an action is determined solely by its consequences. If somehow you can save 10 lives by boiling a baby, go ahead and boil that baby. There is, however, an older ethical tradition, one rooted in Judeo-Christian theology, that takes a quite different view. The gist of it is expressed by St. Paul’s condemnation of those who say, “Let us do evil, that good may come.” Some actions, this tradition holds, can never be justified by their consequences; they are absolutely forbidden. It is always wrong to boil a baby even if lives are saved thereby. Applying this absolutist morality to war can be tricky. When enemy soldiers are trying to enslave or kill us, the principle of self-defense permits us to kill them (though not to slaughter them once they are taken prisoner). But what of those who back them? During World War II, propagandists made much of the “indivisibility” of modern warfare: the idea was that since the enemy nation’s entire economic and social strength was deployed behind its military forces, the whole population was a legitimate target for obliteration. “There are no civilians in Japan,” declared an intelligence officer of the Fifth Air Force shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, a time when the Japanese were popularly depicted as vermin worthy of extermination. The boundary between combatant and noncombatant can be fuzzy, but the distinction is not meaningless, as the case of small children makes clear. Yet is wartime killing of those who are not trying to harm us always tantamount to murder? When naval dockyards, munitions factories and supply lines are bombed, civilian carnage is inevitable. The absolutist moral tradition acknowledges this by a principle known as double effect: although it is always wrong to kill innocents deliberately, it is sometimes permissible to attack a military target knowing some noncombatants will die as a side effect. The doctrine of double effect might even justify bombing a hospital where Hitler is lying ill. It does not, however, apply to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Transformed into hostages by the technology of aerial bombardment, the people of those cities were intentionally executed en masse to send a message of terror to the rulers of Japan. The practice of ordering the massacre of civilians to bring the enemy to heel scarcely began with Truman. Nor did the bomb result in casualties of a new order of magnitude. The earlier bombing of Tokyo by incendiary weapons killed some 100,000 people. What Hiroshima and Nagasaki did mark, by the unprecedented need for rationalization they presented, was the triumph of utilitarian thinking in the conduct of war. The conventional code of noncombatant immunity -- a product of several centuries of ethical progress among nations, which had been formalized by an international commission in the 1920’s in the Hague -- was swept away. A simpler axiom took its place: since war is hell, any means necessary may be used to end, in Churchill’s words, “the vast indefinite butchery.” It is a moral calculus that, for all its logical consistency, offends our deep-seated intuitions about the sanctity of life -- our conviction that a person is always to be treated as an end, never as a means. Left up to the warmakers, moreover, utilitarian calculations are susceptible to bad-faith reasoning: tinker with the numbers enough and virtually any atrocity can be excused in the national interest. In January, the world commemorated the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, where mass slaughter was committed as an end in itself -- the ultimate evil. The moral nature of Hiroshima is ambiguous by contrast. Yet in the postwar era, when governments do not hesitate to treat the massacre of civilians as just another strategic option, the bomb’s sinister legacy is plain: it has inured us to the idea of reducing innocents to instruments and morality to arithmetic.

### Util Bad-Policy Paralysis Turn

All actions risk catastrophe meaning they link to paralysis more than we do.

Sven Ove Hansson, Professor- Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden. 2005. “The Epistemology of Technological Risk” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, Volume 9, Winter 2005.

Available online @ <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v9n2/hansson.html> MG

However, it would not be feasible to take such possibilities into account in all decisions that we make. In a sense, any decision may have catastrophic unforeseen consequences. If far-reaching indirect effects are taken into account, then – given the unpredictable nature of actual causation – almost any decision may lead to a disaster. In order to be able to decide and act, we therefore have to disregard many of the more remote possibilities. Cases can also easily be found in which it was an advantage that far-fetched dangers were not taken seriously. One case in point is the false alarm on so-called polywater, an alleged polymeric form of water. In 1969, the prestigious scientific journal Nature printed a letter that warned against producing polywater. The substance might "grow at the expense of normal water under any conditions found in the environment," thus replacing all natural water on earth and destroying all life on this planet. (Donahoe 1969 ) Soon afterwards, it was shown that polywater is a non-existent entity. If the warning had been heeded, then no attempts would had been made to replicate the polywater experiments, and we might still not have known that polywater does not exist. In cases like this, appeals to the possibility of unknown dangers may stop investigations and thus prevent scientific and technological progress.

### Util Bad-Policy Paralysis Turn

Consequentialim causes paralysis-All actions risk catastrophe. Thus no action can be justfied.

Charles Fried, professor of law at Harvard, 1994 “Absolutism and its Critics”, Pg. 170

This line of analysis is enough to show that some quite plausible interpretations of absolute norms lead to impossibly stringent conclusions, lead in fact to total paralysis. But the case is in fact even worse. For it the absoluteness of the nor is interpreted to mean that the consequences – such as the death of an innocent person – is overwhelmingly bad, then not only are we forbidden to do anything, for anything carries with it a risk of death, we are indeed required to do nothing but to seek out ways to minimize the deaths of innocent persons. For if such a death is so bad that no good can outweigh it, we are surely not justified in pursuing some good, even if that good does not present this risk when we might instead be preventing this most undesirable of all consequences. So this interpretation is to actually a prescription for paralysis, it is more like an obsession. This norm, by virtue of this view of its absoluteness, takes over the whole of our moral life. Finally, since every action will endanger the life of some innocent, even action intended to rescue some other innocent, we cannot escape the further corollary of this interpretation that we must choose that course and only that course of action expected to produce the greatest net saving of life – including, if need be, the deliberate, cold-blooded killing of an innocent person. This situation is worse still, for this interpretation is not only obsessive, it also opens the possibility of insoluable contradictions within any system containing more than one absolute norm. The judgement that it is categorically wrong to lie would be interpreted in an analogous way to mean that a false belief is absolutely bad – that is, so bad that nothing can justifiy producing or even not eradicating it. But obviously, telling the truth will very often increase to some small extent the chances that an innocent person will die, and in any event the time spent in eradicating false belief will not be spent in warding off the danger of death from innocent persons. Now, deontological systems avoid the paralysis, obsession, and contradiction of this interpretation. They are at once less and more stringent. They would not allow killing an innocent even to save several innocents from death; but the consequentialist interpretation would require the killing.

### Survival Ethics Destroys V2L

Obsession with survival results in the destruction of all other ethics and degredation of human life.

Callahan, Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics, 1973 (Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, Pages 91-93)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades, fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese Americans were herded, without due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in a general consensus that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimizations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposed a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has been one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival, the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evokes as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B.F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jaques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost all known religious, ethical, and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and beating children. Some have suggested we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life and thus procreate more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to starving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies For all these reasons, it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life - then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be make to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

### Default to Systemic Impacts

Their scenarios aren’t probable – default to our impacts because they are systemic and thus have a 100% probability.

Nicholas Rescher, Professor of Philosophy @ Pitt University. 1983. “Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management.” Pg. 50.

The "worst possible case fixation" is one of the most damaging modes of unrealism in deliberations about risk in real-life situations. Preoccupation about what might happen "if worst comes to worst" is counterproductive whenever we proceed without recognizing that, often as not, these worst possible outcomes are wildly improbable (and sometimes do not deserve to be viewed as real possibilities at all). The crux in risk deliberations is not the issue of loss "if worst comes to worst" but the potential acceptability of this prospect within the wider framework of the risk situation, where we may well be prepared "to. take our chances," considering the possible advantages that beckon along this route. The worst threat is certainly something to be borne in mind and taken into account, but it is emphatically not a satisfactory index of the overall seriousness or gravity of a situation of hazard.

### Dignity Comes First

The utility of a society only has value when its individuals are treated with dignity. A free society that sacrifices some of its own individuals to prevent human extinction is morally corrupt.

Shue 89 – Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University (Henry, “Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, pp. 141-2)

Given the philosophical obstacles to resolving moral disputes, there are at least two approaches one can take in dealing with the issue of the morality of nuclear strategy. One approach is to stick doggedly with one of the established moral theories constructed by philosophers to “rationalize” or “make sense of” everyday moral intuitions, and to accept the verdict of the theory, whatever it might be, on the morality of nuclear weapons use. A more pragmatic alternative approach assumes that trade-offs in moral values and principles are inevitable in response to constantly changing threats, and that the emergence of novel, unforeseen challenges may impel citizens of Western societies to adjust the way they rank their values and principles to ensure that the moral order survives. Nuclear weapons are putting just such a strain on our moral beliefs. Before the emergence of a nuclear-armed communist state capable of threatening the existence of Western civilization, the slaughter of millions of innocent human beings to preserve Western values may have appeared wholly unjustifiable under any possible circumstances. Today, however, it may be that Western democracies, if they are to survive as guardians of individual freedom, can no longer afford to provide innocent life the full protection demanded by Just War morality. It might be objected that the freedoms of Western society have value only on the assumption that human beings are treated with the full dignity and respect assumed by Just War theory. Innocent human life is not just another value to be balanced side by side with others in moral calculations. It is the raison d’etre of Western political, economic, and social institutions. A free society based on individual rights that sanctioned mass slaughter of innocent human beings to save itself from extinction would be “morally corrupt,” no better than soviet society, and not worth defending. The only morally right and respectable policy for such a society would be to accept destruction at the hands of tyranny, if need be. This objection is partly right in that a society based on individual rights that casually sacrifices innocent human lives for the sake of common social goods is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, even Just War doctrine allows for the unintentional sacrifice of some innocent human life under certain hard-pressing circumstances. It is essentially a consequentialist moral doctrine that ascribes extremely high – but not absolute – value to innocent human life. The problem for any nonabsolute moral theory, of course, is where to draw the line.

### Predictions Fail-Scholarship Key

Probability determinations that they call for are doomed to failure—rationality and intuitive responses to their improbable internal link chains are vital in the context of a debate round.

Hansson ‘5 (Sven Ove; Professor- Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden; “The Epistemology of Technological Risk” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, Volume 9, Winter 2005) http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v9n2/hansson.html MG

We therefore need criteria to determine when the possibility of unknown dangers should be taken seriously and when it can be neglected. This problem cannot be solved with probability calculus or other exact mathematical methods. The best that we can hope for is a set of informal criteria that can be used to support intuitive judgement. The following list of four criteria has been proposed for this purpose. (Hansson 1996) 1. Asymmetry of uncertainty: Possibly, a decision to build a second bridge between Sweden and Denmark will lead through some unforeseeable causal chain to a nuclear war. Possibly, it is the other way around so that a decision not to build such a bridge will lead to a nuclear war. We have no reason why one or the other of these two causal chains should be more probable, or otherwise more worthy of our attention, than the other. On the other hand, the introduction of a new species of earthworm is connected with much more uncertainty than the option not to introduce the new species. Such asymmetry is a necessary but insufficient condition for taking the issue of unknown dangers into serious consideration. 2. Novelty: Unknown dangers come mainly from new and untested phenomena. The emission of a new substance into the stratosphere constitutes a qualitative novelty, whereas the construction of a new bridge does not. An interesting example of the novelty factor can be found in particle physics. Before new and more powerful particle accelerators have been built, physicists have sometimes feared that the new levels of energy might generate a new phase of matter that accretes every atom of the earth. The decision to regard these and similar fears as groundless has been based on observations showing that the earth is already under constant bombardment from outer space of particles with the same or higher energies. (Ruthen 1993) 3. Spatial and temporal limitations: If the effects of a proposed measure are known to be limited in space or time, then these limitations reduce the urgency of the possible unknown effects associated with the measure. The absence of such limitations contributes to the severity of many ecological problems, such as global emissions and the spread of chemically stable pesticides. 4. Interference with complex systems in balance: Complex systems such as ecosystems and the atmospheric system are known to have reached some type of balance, which may be impossible to restore after a major disturbance. Due to this irreversibility, uncontrolled interference with such systems is connected with a high degree of uncertainty. (Arguably, the same can be said of uncontrolled interference with economic systems; this is an argument for piecemeal rather than drastic economic reforms.) It might be argued that we do not know that these systems can resist even minor perturbations. If causation is chaotic, then for all that we know, a minor modification of the liturgy of the Church of England may trigger a major ecological disaster in Africa. If we assume that all cause-effect relationships are chaotic, then the very idea of planning and taking precautions seems to lose its meaning. However, such a world-view would leave us entirely without guidance, even in situations when we consider ourselves well-informed. Fortunately, experience does not bear out this pessimistic worldview. Accumulated experience and theoretical reflection strongly indicate that certain types of influences on ecological systems can be withstood, whereas others cannot. The same applies to technological, economic, social, and political systems, although our knowledge about their resilience towards various disturbances has not been sufficiently systematized.

### Predictions Kritik- Conjunctive Fallacy

The fantasy of extinction has warped humanity’s understanding of existential risks as one judged by its descriptions and not necessary evaluation of the possibility event itself. Subjectivity inevitably colors their interpretation of the so-called “inevitable” future.

Yudkowsky ‘6 (Eliezer; Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic 8/31/06) MG

In addition to standard biases, I have personally observed what look like harmful modes of thinking specific to existential risks. The Spanish flu of 1918 killed 25-50 million people. World War II killed 60 million people. 107 is the order of the largest catastrophes in humanity's written history. Substantially larger numbers, such as 500 million deaths, and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction of the entire human species, seem to trigger a different mode of thinking - enter into a "separate magisterium". People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of an existential risk, and say, "Well, maybe the human species doesn't really deserve to survive."There is a saying in heuristics and biases that people do not evaluate events, but descriptions of events - what is called non-extensional reasoning. The extension of humanity's extinction includes the death of yourself, of your friends, of your family, of your loved ones, of your city, of your country, of your political fellows. Yet people who would take great offense at a proposal to wipe the country of Britain from the map, to kill every member of the Democratic Party in the U.S., to turn the city of Paris to glass - who would feel still greater horror on hearing the doctor say that their child had cancer - these people will discuss the extinction of humanity with perfect calm. "Extinction of humanity", as words on paper, appears in fictional novels, or is discussed in philosophy books - it belongs to a different context than the Spanish flu. We evaluate descriptions of events, not extensions of events. The cliché phrase end of the world invokes the magisterium of myth and dream, of prophecy and apocalypse, of novels and movies. The challenge of existential risks to rationality is that, the catastrophes being so huge, people snap into a different mode of thinking. Human deaths are suddenly no longer bad, and detailed predictions suddenly no longer require any expertise, and whether the story is told with a happy ending or a sad ending is a matter of personal taste in stories.

### Predictions Kritik-Conjuntive Fallacy

Portrayal of existential risks requires the burden of skills in the study and the studies themselves. Lack of probability discussion is a reason for you to be skeptical of their internal link chains.

Yudkowsky ‘6 (Eliezer; Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic 8/31/06) MG

Any existential risk evokes problems that it shares with all other existential risks, in addition to the domain-specific expertise required for the specific existential risk. Someone on the physics-disaster committee should know what the term "existential risk" means; should possess whatever skills the field of existential risk management has accumulated or borrowed. For maximum safety, that person should also be a physicist. The domain-specific expertise and the expertise pertaining to existential risks should combine in one person. I am skeptical that a scholar of heuristics and biases, unable to read physics equations, could check the work of physicists who knew nothing of heuristics and biases. Once upon a time I made up overly detailed scenarios, without realizing that every additional detail was an extra burden. Once upon a time I really did think that I could say there was a ninety percent chance of Artificial Intelligence being developed between 2005 and 2025, with the peak in 2018. This statement now seems to me like complete gibberish. Why did I ever think I could generate a tight probability distribution over a problem like that? Where did I even get those numbers in the first place? Skilled practitioners of, say, molecular nanotechnology or Artificial Intelligence, will not automatically know the additional skills needed to address the existential risks of their profession. No one told me, when I addressed myself to the challenge of Artificial Intelligence, that it was needful for such a person as myself to study heuristics and biases. I don't remember why I first ran across an account of heuristics and biases, but I remember that it was a description of an overconfidence result - a casual description, online, with no references. I was so incredulous that I contacted the author to ask if this was a real experimental result. (He referred me to the edited volume Judgment Under Uncertainty.) I should not have had to stumble across that reference by accident. Someone should have warned me, as I am warning you, that this is knowledge needful to a student of existential risk. There should be a curriculum for people like ourselves; a list of skills we need in addition to our domain-specific knowledge. I am not a physicist, but I know a little - probably not enough - about the history of errors in physics, and a biologist thinking about superviruses should know it too. I once met a lawyer who had made up his own theory of physics. I said to the lawyer: You cannot invent your own physics theories without knowing math and studying for years; physics is hard. He replied: But if you really understand physics you can explain it to your grandmother, Richard Feynman told me so. And I said to him: "Would you advise a friend to argue his own court case?" At this he fell silent. He knew abstractly that physics was difficult, but I think it had honestly never occurred to him that physics might be as difficult as lawyering.

### Predictions Kritik-Alarmism Turn

Apocalyptic impact rhetoric exists only to force people into action—impacts divorced from statistical reality are dangerous

Sunstein '7 (Cass R. Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Clerked for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court; "Worst-Case Scenarios" Harvard University Press 2007 Pg 278-9) //MG

We have seen that if a bad incident has occurred in the recent past, people are especially likely to focus on the worst-case scenario. If intense emotions are associated with a bad outcome, people might well neglect the question of probability altogether, focusing on that outcome instead. If people are outraged above all because the incident is associated with an identifiable perpetrator (the Goldstein Effect), they will demand an especially strong response. When a terrible incident has occurred recently, and when it is highly salient, people's intuitions will often lead them to exaggerate the probability of another such incident. Whatever the statistical reality, people's reactions to a worst-case scenario will be dampened if they have no experience with its occurrence; if it is too abstract, image-free, or statistical to call up intense emotions; and if it is not associated with any particular face or any identifiable actor. Dampening will also occur if the bad outcome is not expected to occur for a long time-and if its victims are distant in either time or space. Of course, well-organized groups, the media, and political leaders have power to influence the underlying dynamics. Worst-case scenarios can be made more or less vivid through words or pictures, and sometimes they come into view quite suddenly. The different American reactions to terrorism and climate change are at opposite ends of a continuum; many other risks can be placed toward one or another end. Depletion of the ozone layer, for example, is probably more vivid than climate change, because of the fear of skin cancer and the image of a "hole" in the "protective shield" around the earth. But for the ozone layer, the reaction of the world and of the United States was driven in part by a statistical analysis showing that the risks were very high and that they could be reduced or even eliminated at an acceptable cost.