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#### Transportation infrastructure planning only reflects elite concerns about the economy while also ignorning the everyday in favor of centralized political concerns

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

The newest – 2006 – census figures in Canada reveal that 70 percent of the population live in metropolitan areas.1 However, within those urban areas they increasingly live outside of urban cores in a new kind of urban landscape. Interestingly, more Canadians also work in the suburban parts of metropolitan areas. The number of people working in central municipalities increased by 5.9% from 2001 to 2006 whereas the number of people who worked in suburban municipalities increased by 12.2%. While there continues to be growth of the traditional suburban kind, and while inner cities experience densification of office and condominium developments, some of the most dynamic growth areas are literally in-between. But the picture in the old suburbs and the enclaves left by the last period of urban growth in Canadian cities is not as clear cut overall. There are areas of aggressive expansion, for example around suburban York University in Toronto, where a New Urbanist-styled “Village at York” has added 1000 units of residential space. Yet just one block away, the Jane-Finch district continues to lose both in economic standing and demographically. While these in-between areas in metropolitan regions experience fast paced socio-spatial change, the political and administrative realities that govern them are structured such that the concerns of these areas are literally marginalized. The Steeles Avenue corridor at the northern edge of the York University campus, for example, is a major east–west thoroughfare at the border of two municipalities – Toronto and Vaughan – that has enjoyed little attention among those cities’ investors and resident communities. Planners in the two municipalities have only recently begun to think about redevelopment possibilities in the corridor, but their policy-making is largely in isolation from each other. Just where the need for articulated urban infrastructure development is greatest, the capacity to act is least. The linear nature of public transit and other networked infrastructure – which favour either mass concentration of jobs or housing or wealthy enclaves of economically or politically influential users (industry, commerce, upper-middle class residences, etc.) – predestines the places located between designated destinations to lie in a fallow land of unsatisfactory access. This techno-material bias is corroborated by the political decision-making processes that underlie technical allocation. No politician, planner or bureaucrat will champion non-central or non-demarcated projects of public expenditure, particularly if inhabited or toiled in by socially less powerful groups. As a consequence, infrastructures that are built to connect centres actually disconnect those non-central spaces that lie in-between. The extended Toronto subway, for example, which is to connect the Vaughan Corporate Centre with York University and Downtown Toronto, bypasses the residential and commercial neighbourhoods on both sides of the designated line. In addition, we already know that while highways connect smart centres and movieplexes around the urban region, blue collar workers in the industrial malls of the sprawling Toronto productionscape rely on irregular buses to get them to and from work.

#### Ignorance of the practices of everyday life certifies as “natural” rhythms of life that are in fact reversible and contingent—only an interruption in everyday life slows capital by draining its labor power

Kipfer 2002 (Associate prof of polisci and French at York University, Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism: Lefebvre, Gramsci and the Problematic of Hegemony, *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 13:2)

Lefebvre described everyday life as c ~ n t r a d i c t o r y . ~ ~ On the one hand, everyday life is central to "the reproduction of social relations of - - production," by which he meant not just consumption and labor reproduction but all aspects which make capitalism survive. Daily life is key to hegemony and the reproduction of capitalism54 insofar as it is saturated by the routinized, repetitive, familiar daily practices that make up the everyday in all spheres of life: work, leisure, politics, language and so on.55 Everyday life is the best "guarantee of non-revolution because it is a crystallization of what we take for granted, of what seems self-evident and inevitable irrespective of whether we like it or note5' Made effective because of our "taste of solidity and durability" as defense against the uncertainties and illusions of modern life,58 the everyday becomes a "seat of power,"59 the "very soil on which the great architecture of politics and society rise up."60 While Lefebvre located the advent of the everyday in the origins of industrial capitalism in the 19th century and studied it empirically in the French Pyrenees region in the 1930s and 1940s, he insisted that it was not until the advent of "neo-capitalism" after the war than that "capitalism had seized the ground that had escaped it in large part until then: everyday life:"61 The reproduction of the relations of production entails the extension as well as the enlargement of the mode of production and its material base. On the one hand, capitalism spread across the entire world to subordinate preexisting productive forces and transform them for its purpose, as Marx understood it. On the other hand, capitalism formed new sectors of production, exploitation and domination. These sectors include leisure, everyday life, knowledge (connaissance) and art, and, finally, urbanization. What are the results of this double process? Capitalism has maintained itself by extending across space in its entirety. Starting from a small number of countries at the time of Marx.. ..it has conquered the globe by constituting the world market and celebrated colossal victories (notably with the creation of leisure, tourism, etc.), and this despite a number of serious defeats, revolutions and revolts.62 Capital centralization, aggressive state intervention, the opening of new sectors (leisure, mass media, consumer durables, advertising), bureaucratically administered consumption, and rapid urbanization caused French postwar capitalism to "extend into the slightest details of ordinary life."63 This deepening of capitalism in everyday life was the metropolitan dimension of a world-wide, neo-colonial expansion of capitalism. Lefebvre was often pessimistic about the "loss of autonomy of everyday life" and the latent "terrorism" of bureaucratic interventionism and administered consumption under n e o - ~ a p i t a l i s m . ~ ~ That was because, under neo-capitalism, power is not simply a "front" located in macro-institutional centers (schools, factories, parliament) but also in micro-worlds of space, discourse, "commonplace notions," visual representation, art consciousness.65 But in contrast to Marcuse's thesis about the one-dimensionality of the Fordist subject, Lefebvre insisted on the contradictions and promising potentials within postwar everyday life.66 Indeed, Lefebvre never tired of stressing the role of intellectuals to extricate the possible within the real rather than to reify the systemic coherence of capital.67 The dialectical methods that permeate his work - transduction, dialectical humanism, spectral analysis, differentialism, conjunctural analysis - all pointed to the limits of the reproduction of social relations of production. These limitations and contradictions of hegemonic formations, Lefebvre located as possibilities latent in commodified everyday life. Never completely engulfed by the dull constraints of the everyday, daily life - as symbolized in neo- capitalism by the car, the bungalow, the beach, popular magazines, TV ads - includes utopian promises for non-instrumentalized, playful, and non-alienated futures. Contradictions emerge because these promises are denied by the very regressive forces of commodification that spread them.68 Latent utopian promises within hegemonizing forms of everyday life can also be articulated in organized and explicit forms by social movements, as Lefebvre indicated in his conjunctural analysis of May 1968.69 Contradictions within hegemonic formations make revolutionary strategies possible. But like Gramsci, Lefebvre insisted that these strategies (for rights to the cityldifference, self-management and cultural revolution) adopt complex temporal and spatial horizons. Warning against spontaneist conceptions of revolutionary change, Lefebvre suggested that revolutionary ruptures be situated within a broader time frame of transforming everyday life.70 T o conceive revolution as a "'magic wand' that leads directly from despotism to freedom, capitalism to Communism" would overlook that everyday life tends to change at a different rate and in a different way than the state.71 Without accepting everyday life as the ultimate benchmark of revolutionary success, Lefebvre feared that old habits and practices - the tenacity of everydayness might quickly assert itself.72 In the absence of a qualitative horizon of transforming life "in its smallest, most everyday detail" (through self-management), revolution would risk repeating the quantitative state-socialist project of "intensifying production, cultivating new space, industrializing agriculture, building giant factorie~."~~

#### You have an ethical obligation to reject capitalism – it’s costs are beyond calculation

Glyn **Daly**, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northhampton, Conversations with Zizek p. 14-16 20**04**

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian- Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico- discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

#### Voting negative to interrupt the rhythms of capital and debate are key: rewrite the space of the everyday by denying the time as surplus labor that makes the system run—judge this debate from the perspective of the interrupter and critiquer of rhythms

Zayani 2009 (Mohamed, Professor of Critical Theory at Gtown Qatar, “Introduction to Rhythmanalysis” in *Rethinking Marxism* 11:1)

Although Henri Lefebvre wrote about a wide variety of issues, his most valuable contribution is arguably the formulation of a new Marxist sociology. At the center of this Marxiology is not homo economicus, as in classical Marxism, but homo quoti- dianus: not relations of production, but everyday life. For Lefebvre, the mundane, the recurrent, and the trivial are worthy of exploration because they bring to the fore “the great problem of repetition, one of the most difficult problems facing US” (1987, 10). The humdrum, repetitive movement that characterizes everyday life in the modem world is a contrived movement, one that defies the order of nature even as it emu- lates it. It took Lefebvre three volumes of The Critique of Everyday Life and over three decades to explore the extent to which “the bureaucratic society of directed consumption” (1976,32) has restructured everyday life and alerted its rhythms.’ Even at the end of his career, this problem did not cease to preoccupy him. In an essay coauthored with Catherine Rtgulier, entitled “The Rhythmanalytical Project,” Lefebvre probes the structures of temporality that characterize everyday life. The essay is a preamble to and even a condensed version of Lefebvre’s Elkments de rythmanalyse (1992), also written in collaboration with Rtgulier and originally en- visioned as the fourth volume of The Critique of Everyday Life. For Lefebvre and Rkgulier, everyday life conjures up two types of repetition that are deceptively similar: one is cyclical, the other linear. It is true that everyday life has always existed as the basis for every society, but in ways that are vastly different from the modern era. In preindustrial societies, everyday life revolves around the cycles of nature. The type of temporality associated with cycles is neither cumula- tive not circular (in the sense that no two seasons are ever the same), but instead regular and recurrent. Cyclical time unfolds within a sequence that refers to the order of existence (i.e., the movement of death or life). However, in a society that thrives on planning and measurability, the natural cycles that drive everyday life have been profoundly altered in accordance with the exigencies of the dominant mode of pro- duction. The time that defines the modem era is one that is subjected to the measur- ability of the clock and the routine of the working day. Behind the hours, days, weeks, months, seasons, and years stands an experience that is increasingly undermined by a modus vivendi that is marked by the division of labor and the automation of production. In an age of rationality, natural cycles and spontaneous movements are appropriated at the service of an intensely programmed everyday life. To put this somewhat differently, cyclical time has been progressively reconfigured into such functional categories as pledged time (time spent at work), free time (time devoted to leisure), and compulsive time (other demands that city life calls for such as run- ning errands, moving about, and the like).2 The study of the routinization of everyday life, then, is important because it puts into perspective a temporal modality that is structurally akin to the motion of capi- talism. With the hegemony of capitalism, cyclical time has gradually lost its depth, giving way to a more linear time or, what may be termed after Lefebvre and RCgulier, a time of indefinite progress. As a consequence of this change, everyday life still revolves around repetition, but the ensuing rhythm is specific to an age of mechani- cal production; it is impelled by the compulsion to repeat-and more specifically, the principle of production for the sake of production-that is at the core of capitalism. With the exigency of a sociosymbolic structured around the production of surplus- value, the noncumulative process upon which cyclical time has always thrived is folded into a cumulative process in which accumulation becomes the Ur-repetition. In a fluid society where the motion of capitalism has permeated cyclical alternations, the movement of life and death (the law of nature) is continuously undermined by the process of production and destruction (the law of value). Seen from this vantage point, everyday life is not just dominated by economic interest, but is itself a newly created sector called for by the increasing expansion of capitalism. According to Lefebvre, capitalism entered its latest phase when it managed to seize the ground that had escaped it in large part until then: everyday life. In today’s society, people are subjected to a programmed self-regulation; they are instructed in great detail how to live better, how to eat a healthier diet, how to dress fashionably, how to decorate their houses-in short, how to exist. What this means, in part, is that everyday life has become completely manipulated: “the everyday is not only a mode of production but also a mode of administering society. In both in- stances it refers to the predominance of the repetitive, of repetition in time. And this predominance of the repetitive is a way of life. It is a base of exploitation and of domination. But it is also a relation with the world of human beings” (Lefebvre 1988, 80). Such as it is, then, Lefebvre and RCgulier’s interest in everyday life is a rethink- ing of the concept of alienation in advanced capitalistic societies. Alienation is no longer confined to the work place; it takes place everywhere. In fact, capitalism as such is no longer limited to the economic principle of production for the sake of production. It is ensconced in all the spheres of vital activities; it is associated with the repetitive, the recurrent, the tautological, and the pleonastic. In this sense, to study the rhythms of everyday life is to study capitalism in its most insidious effect^.^ Implicit in this line of analysis is a commentary on the limits of Marx’s original formulations. For Lefebvre, Marx’s theories are useful but no longer sufficient. The evolution and detemtorialization of capitalism calls for both a revitalization and a rethinking of Marxism: “Marxism is an instrument of research and discovery, it is valid only if one makes use of it. Marx’s thinking cannot be conceived as a ‘pure’ object of knowledge . . . It becomes useful in understanding what has come to pass in the modem world if one is to orient and transform it. . . We must use it to discover what is new in the world. It is not a system or a dogma but a reference” (1988,77). In order to grasp postmodem or late capitalism in its full complexity, it becomes necessary to graft Marxism with fresh ideas and to infuse it with new concepts. The concept that Lefebvre claims to have added to the vocabulary of Marxism is “the everyday.” To better define this fundamental concept, Lefebvre makes a subtle but important distinction between daily life (la vie quotidienne), on the one hand, and the everyday (le quotidien) and its corollary, everydayness (la quotidiennetk)), on the other: “Let us simply say about daily life that it has always existed, but permeated with values, with myths. The word everyday as an object of programrping, whose unfolding is imposed by the market, by the system of equivalences, by marketing and advertising. As to the concept of ‘everydayness,’ it stresses the homogenous, the repetitive, the fragmentary in everyday life” (87 n. 1). For Lefebvre, as for Rkgulier, the everyday does not simply refer to the perfunctory functions that indi- viduals perform but instead designates the common denominator of these functions; it means by its sequence rather than its substance. Stated differently, the everyday is invested in a certain realism but cannot be con- founded with the real as such, nor can it be reduced to a mere enumeration of the mundane tasks and daily preoccupations that entangle the individual. Lefebvre and RCgulier have eloquently captured this nuance: The deployment of time is such that the day is fragmented into small units. A realist approach provides a detailed description of these units or segments of time (eating, dressing, cleaning, moving about, and so on); it mentions the things we use. Scientific as it may be, such a description is inadequate; it cannot capture the essence of the every- day, simply because the everyday does not consist in a series of time lapses but, in- stead, in their concatenation-i.e., their rhythm. (1985, 194)4 The everyday does not lie in the petty humdrum realities around which everyday life revolves or the mundane activities individuals perform; rather, it refers to repetition in daily life. What matters for the study of everydayness is not the prism of the ac- tivities one undertakes but their sequence, not their sum but their rhythm.

## Links

### Competitiveness Link

#### Expanding transportation infrastructure in the name of competitiveness dissolves lived life in favor of smooth unnoticed conduits for capital transfer

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

A recent globally sourced report states: “All cities need high-quality infrastructure to facilitate the movement of people and goods, and the delivery of basic services to their populations” (GlobeScan, 2007, p. 25). In complex city regions this poses a host of challenges of “funding, management, maintenance and efficient running of services, as well as the need to find infrastructure solutions that are environmentally sustainable” (Ibid.). A more popular publication, The Atlantic, published a stern warning that cities are losing the battle for eminence in infrastructure funding: “Transportation spending is spread around the United States like peanut butter, and while it is spread pretty thick – nearly $50 billion last year in federal dollars for surface transportation alone – the places that are most critical to the country’s economic competitiveness don’t get what they need” (Katz and Puentes, 2008, p. 38). These places are, of course, cities, and the Canadian situation is perhaps worse. A nationwide study by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities found in 2007 that the country’s urban infrastructures were “near collapse” and spoke of a municipal infrastructure deficit of $123 billion (Mirza, 2007). Infrastructure builds cities but it also dissolves cities as it creates centrifugal possibilities. The post-war suburbs are the most pervasive example of the explosion of settlement and the implosion of urban centres. A global “suburban solution” (Walker, 1981) drains the urban centres and leads to new forms of concentration where there are no traditional accumulations of infrastructure services. Historically concentrated forms of built and social environment – service hubs in ports, markets, civic centres, central business districts, etc. – give way to a more pervasively sprawled metropolitan landscape entirely dedicated to providing the most efficient conduit for global capital. Even in overall “healthy” metropolitan regions, the centrifugal dynamics continue. In Toronto, for example, the recent census figures suggest an unbroken, if not accelerated, trend towards suburbanization of housing and jobs. This has social and spatial implications: the traditional focus on collective consumption is partially replaced with a purely exchange value oriented set of criteria for infrastructure development which makes global economic competitiveness, rather than local social cohesion the marker of success ( [Erie, 2004] and [Keil and Young, 2008]). The spatial consequences of such a fundamental social reorientation are visible in the just-in-time landscapes of transportation and information infrastructures that have laced metropolitan regions since the 1980s. This is the walmartized, strip-malled landscape of automobile convenience, which values temporal availability (for producers and consumers) over quality; space (for warehousing, transportation and mass distribution on one hand and single family monster homes in the far reaches of the commutershed on the other) over other considerations (density, proximity, sustainability, etc.). The aforementioned study on “megacity challenges” concludes that while “transport overtakes all other infrastructure concerns … the environment matters but may be sacrificed for growth” (GlobeScan, 2007, p. 7). In this context, we also need to mention that urban regions are but part of larger urbanization clusters such as the regional Megalopolis of the Atlantic seaboard in the United States. A recent study of the area concludes: “Overall, the forces of urban decentralization have changed Megalopolis from a region of big city population to a more fully suburbanized agglomeration” (Vicino, Hanlon and Short, 2007, p. 348). In the Quebec-Windsor corridor in Canada, as well as in the Edmonton-Calgary corridor and the lower mainland of British Columbia, we see similar tendencies towards large scale suburbanized agglomeration. The governments of Ontario, Quebec, and Canada have addressed the specific transportation and infrastructure issues of the Quebec City-Windsor corridor with a planned Ontario-Quebec Continental Gateway and Trade Corridor (http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/speeches/2007/2007-11-27.htm). As is the case with the transportation networks in the regional Places to Grow planning efforts3, these transregional plans cut more transversals through the in-between city, treating these areas as terrain to be overcome rather than as places to stay, inhabit or produce. Perhaps the most visible outgrowth of this tendency is the globally financed, privatized Highway 407, which represents a giant concrete swath that crosses the entire Southern Ontario in-between belt north of Toronto (Torrance, 2008).

#### Zones that don’t “contribute” to the economy are viewed as objects rather than subjects: they serve self-interested planning rationales rather than anything external

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

What, then, are the infrastructural necessities specific to the in-between city? Tom Sieverts gives us some clues what to look for here. In the first place, the challenges of the in-between infrastructure are those of connectivity. From the point of view of the economy of urban regions, lack of connectivity is translated into lack of competitiveness. This is what most of the discourse on urban infrastructure is about. The in-between cities of the urban fringe participate in this policy discourse as silent partners, to be bypassed quickly, gotten by fast. The scale of connectivity for which infrastructures in the globalized metropolitan region is built makes links between airports, offices and ‘hip’ entertainment as well as between producers, suppliers, and mega-consumption spaces. The in-between is lost, although it is clear that those mega-infrastructures or super-structures are neglecting the capillaries of the urban region – those links that create spaces of the everyday where people live and work – at the peril of losing competitiveness along with livability (Keil and Young, 2008). Various spaces in the in-between city are theoretically connected mostly through car use but truncated public transportation filters into the automobilized landscape. As a hegemonic image, in-betweenness suggests freedom and mobility, “a life a la carte, provided [inhabitants] can afford it. By means of a rapid transport system, inhabitants can reach and connect with a large number of diversely specialized uses and places in a short time” (Sieverts, 2003, p. 71). But Sieverts is aware of the illusion that underlies this idealized view: “Read and used as a system, the Zwischenstadt is … problematic from several perspectives. It exerts stress on the environment, it does not serve those sectors of the population which do not have access to a car, and it fragments living space and living time” (Sieverts, 2003, p. 71). Some of the issue of invisibility of the in-between city in infrastructure questions has to do with the Zwischenstadt’s inherent character. Sieverts points out that memory has a hard time taking hold in this mesh of (sub)urban uses. “In the Zwischenstadt, we cannot speak any longer of one single form of aesthetic. At first sight, we have to separate at least three different aesthetics: the classical aesthetic of conventional beauty, e.g. of the old city, the aesthetics of the ‘prints of life’ e.g. in the form of ‘spontaneous appropriation’, and the aesthetic of flows, e.g. in the form of transportation networks” (Sieverts, 2007a, p. 204). While the in-between city is the playground of all kinds of state-sponsored strategies of planning and politics, it is no destination of such activities, but merely a container and recipient of higher order restructurings. The in-between city, in fact, is an “anaesthetic” environment, which has no memory and does not lend itself to be remembered as distinct. It is produced to be transgressed at high speed to reach other points in the urban region.

### Economy Link

#### Transport programs focused on benefiting the economy reduce human life to nothing

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

Compare this perspective with most of the key elements in high- modernist urban planning. Such plans all but require forms of sim- plification that strip human activity to a sharply defined single pur- pose. In orthodox planning, such simplifications underlie the strict functional segregation of work from domicile and both from com- merce. The matter of transportation becomes, for Le Corbusier and others, the single problem of how to transport people (usually in auto- mobiles) as quickly and economically as possible. The activity of shop- ping becomes a question of providing adequate floor space and access for a certain quantity of shoppers and goods. Even the category of en- tertainment was split up into specified activities and segregated into playgrounds, athletic fields, theaters, and so on.

### Cities Link

#### Cities key claims rely on an implicit centrality of the city that also allows for political domination

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

The first of Le Corbusier's "principles of urbanism," before even "the death of the street." was the dictum "The Plan: Di~tator."~~ It would be difficult to exaggerate the emphasis that, like Descartes, Le Cor- busier placed on making the city the reflection of a single, rational plan. He greatly admired Roman camps and imperial cities for the overall logic of their layouts. He returned repeatedly to the contrast between the existing city, which is the product of historical chance, and the city of the future, which would be consciously designed from start to finish following scientific principles. The centralization required by Le Corbusier's doctrine of the Plan (always capitalized in his usage) is replicated by the centralization of the city itself. Functional segregation was joined to hierarchy. His city was a 'lmonocephalic" city, its centrally located core performing the "higher" functions of the metropolitan area. This is how he described the business center of his Plan Voisin for Paris: "From its offices come the commands that put the world in order. In fact, the skyscrapers are the brain of the city, the brain of the whole country. They embody the work of elaboration and command on which all activities depend. Everything is concentrated there: the tools that conquer time and space-telephones, telegraphs, radios, the banks, trading houses, the organs of decision for the factories: finance, technology, commerce."25 The business center issues commands; it does not suggest, much less consult. The program of high-modernist authoritarianism at work here stems in part from Le Corbusier's love of the order of the factory. In condemning the "rot" (la pourriture) of the contemporary city, its houses, and its streets, he singles out the factory as the sole exception. There, a single rational purpose structures both the physical layout and the coordinated movements of hundreds. The Van Nelle tobacco factory in Rotterdam is praised in particular. Le Corbusier admires its auster- ity, its floor-to-ceiling windows on each floor, the order in the work, and the apparent contentment of the workers. He finishes with a hymn to the authoritarian order of the production line. "There is a hierarchical scale, famously established and respected," he admiringly observes of the workers. "They accept it so as to manage themselves like a colony of worker-bees: order, regularity, punctuality, justice and paternali~m."~~ The scientific urban planner is to the design and construction of the city as the entrepreneur-engineer is to the design and construction of the factory. Just as a single brain plans the city and the factory, so a sin- gle brain directs its activity-from the factory's office and from the city's business center. The hierarchy doesn't stop there. The city is the brain of the whole society. "The great city commands everything: peace, war, work."27 Whether it is a matter of clothing, philosophy, technol- ogy, or taste, the great city dominates and colonizes the provinces: the lines of influence and command are exclusively from the center to the periphery.28

#### Urban is the key site to make a critique of capitalism

Kipfer 2002 (Associate prof of polisci and French at York University, Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism: Lefebvre, Gramsci and the Problematic of Hegemony, *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 13:2)

Conceptually, Lefebvre sees the urban as form and mediation. As socio-spatial f o r m - centrality, encounter, discontinuous simultaneityg5 - the urban mediates everyday life with the social order, links past, present, and future and articulates multiple scales. Rather than a transhistorical spatial determinant of ways of life (as in the Chicago School of urban s o ~ i o l o g y ) , ~ ~ the urban as form is both product and oeuvre and thus related dialectically to its content. As such, the urban is an intermediary instance that mediates the macro- dimensions and institutions of the social order (state and capital, patriarchy, institutional knowledge) (1 'ordre lointain) and the immediate, micro-reality of everyday life (1 'ordre p r o ~ h e ) . ~ ~ As a mediation and form, urban space includes material practices of reproduction (spatial practices, perceived space), state-bound interventions of policy, planning and dominant knowledge (spaces of representation, conceived space), and subtle dimensions of symbolism, affect and experience (representational space, lived space). As a product of industrialization, commodification, real estate capital, dominant "urbanist" strategies of planners and architects, and everyday symbols (such as phallic images), the urban is an objective "projection of society" onto space that eradicates citylcountryside with a landscape of the present. But the urban is also a "medium of action and creation" (oeuvre) by subjects.98 As such, the urban may be a result of creativity, spontaneity, and ludic festivity and thus include traces of a different, post-capitalist urban world.99 Squeezed between society and everyday life in a kind of half- existence (demi-existence), loo the urban is both site for the construction of hegemony and achilles heel of capital.lol As "a location for the reproduction of social relations of production,"lo2 urban space is clearly central to hegemony: Is it conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched? Could space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations, the milieu of in which their combination takes on body, or the aggregate of the procedures employed in their removal? The answer must be no. Later on I shall demonstrate and active - the operational or instrumental - role of space, as knowledge and action, in the existing mode of production. I shall show how space serves, and how hegemony makes use of it, in the establishment, on the basis of an underlying logic and with the help of knowledge and technical expertise, of a "system."103 Hegemonic social space is not "purged of contradictions" and has no "legitimate claim to immortality."lo4 But the production of urban space contributes to hegemony by fusing the immediate realm of lived space with the spatial practices and spaces of representations of the larger social order.lo5 The serialized abstract space and repetitive linear time of capital and state get inscribed in the everyday through moral principles, persuasion and the "self-evident" force of daily repetition. The urban mediates this process as it contains macro-structures and is incorporated in everyday life.lo6 In the postwar order, the fusion of all aspects of social space and the integration of the macro social order with everyday life through urbanization was particularly acute.lo7 While Lefebvre recognized (like Engels, Marx, and Gramsci) that urbanization creates objective revolutionary conditions by concentrating labor and capital, he emphasized (more emphatically than Engels and Gramsci and more like Benjamin) that urbanization, particularly in neo- capitalist form, is also a force of separation. Under neo-capitalism, industrialized agriculture and growing real estate sectors expand the productive forces and open new sources of profit while mass-produced suburbs, factory districts, and expressways presuppose the (organizational and spatial) centralization of capital. But neocapitalist urbanization survived by peripheralizing the working class and dissociating everyday life with new forms of segregation and individualization. Through postwar urbanization, everyday life is subsumed to bureaucratically administered consumption and enclosed in the homogenized and fragmented landscapes of bungalows (pavilions), high rise apartments (grands ensembles), freeways and leisure $paces (beaches and resort towns).Io8 Neo-capitalism takes root in everyday life by integrating utopian aspirations into these everyday spaces which become associated with desires for a different, erotic appropriation of body and nature, hopes for non-instrumental human relationships, or daydreams about freedom from repetitive drudgery. lo9 But contradictions within abstract space and linear time are signs of a possible, post-capitalist urban society shaped by differential space and cyclical time. Neo-capitalist urbanization gives rise to new forms of spatial contradiction. The openness produced by these contradictions explains the continued importance of violence in sustaining a social order without total cohesion.l1° The production of spacepromotes homogeneity and the repetitive - and thus helps reproduce social relations of production - but it also tends to undermine its own conditi0ns.l The fragmentation of urban space into property for sale and profit undermines the capacity to maintain and produce space - a collective productive force - for the purposes of the accumulation pro~css.ll~ Most importantly, the very urbanist practices of planners, architects, and developers that established the neo-capitalist "dreamscapes" negate the utopian aspirations associated with postwar everyday spaces by reducing them to regressive, patriarchal and industrialized utopias. As a result, "the explosion of the city," which may have dissociated everyday life and bound popular aspirations to neo-capitalism, cannot prevent unintended appropriations of space and radical attempts to reclaim urbanity and centrality. Lefebvre's "dialectical humanist" approach to the urban1 l 3 tried to detect everyday aspirations for a de-alienated, fully lived - creative, self-determined, sensual -future and link these aspirations to a critique of the general social order.' l4

#### Critique of the urban crucial

Kipfer 2002 (Associate prof of polisci and French at York University, Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism: Lefebvre, Gramsci and the Problematic of Hegemony, *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 13:2)

New critiques of capitalism may represent a break from the pessimism that has plagued much of the metropolitan left lately. But if it is essential to counter indifference and hopelessness, it may be premature to displace the problematic of hegemony with a problematic of hope and utopia, as some seem to suggest.138 Following Gramsci and Lefebvre, searching for the sources of a counter-hegemonic politics and explaining capitalist survival are not mutually exclusive but internally related projects. Today, the reactions to the bombings of the World Trade Centre underscore the centrality of the urban not only for the imagination and spatial strategies of oppositional forces but also the symbolic and material reorganization of capitalism and imperialism. Analyzing the urban dimensions of capitalist reconstruction is essential if street protest is not to become dissociated from everyday life.13"his analysis is already under way. "Neo-Gramscian" theorists have tried to fuse Harvey's neo-classical urban marxism with middle-range concepts from state and regulation theory to analyze urban hegemony after Fordism. 140 What the orientation excavated from Gramsci and Lefebvre suggests is that an analysis of urban hegemony must go beyond urban political economy and state theory and extend to matters of everyday life.141 Only such an extension makes it possible to grasp "the materiality of the urban" as a component of hegemonylcounter- hegemony in the integral terms suggested by Gramsci and L e f e b ~ r e . ' ~

### Planning Link

#### Legislative planning reproduces a bird’s eye view of urban life the creates the “secret legality” of state ordered capitalistic rhythms

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

“In addition to these doubts about the necessity of the TransApex plan, numerous critics have challenged its ecological and financial responsibility. The enthusiasm of Brisbane’s municipal authorities for a transport plan which further reinforces the centrality of private car usage deserves particular scrutiny at a time when the role of sustainable transport systems in the design and organisation of urban space is taking on a new urgency.26 Both the relatively recent explosion of international interest in means to reduce carbon emissions and the emergence of oil vulnerability as a threat to the long-term viability of Brisbane’s suburban landscape raise pertinent questions about the wisdom of TransApex.27 Dodson and Sipe point out that global oil insecurity in recent years has not been factored into the funding model for TransApex and a number of commentators have criticised the inadequacy of its public–private partnership model to adequately insure against risks associated with major transport infrastructure projects.28 Campaigns against the various elements of the TransApex plan have been run by a number of community organisations, including Communities Against The Tunnels (CATT), Community Action for Sustainable Transport (CAST) and the Stop the Hale Street Bridge Alliance. These groups have argued that the increased traffic that TransApex will inevitably promote will raise levels of air pollution and have a destructive impact on existing residential areas close to where the projects will be built. 29 One reason why these community activists have so far had very little success in resisting the push towards TransApex is that they are up against the structurally embedded dependence of Australian society on the motor car. This dependence has manifested itself functionally, through the postwar emergence of the deconcentrated suburban spatial form of Australian cities. In many parts of Brisbane, private forms of transport have been necessary to enable residents to traverse large areas between suburbs that are poorly serviced by rail and buses. The expansion of car ownership was also a necessary precondition for the growth of outer metropolitan development during the decades following World War II.30 Symbolically, the car has also played a central role in defining Australian national identity, both in terms of buttressing hegemonic forms of masculinity and (despite the reality of urban congestion) by promising freedom and unregulated mobility.31 However, both the functional and symbolic dimensions of car culture have relied upon the state’s promotion of the car through the subsidisation of public road infrastructure and the relative neglect of alternative modes of transportation. Even the regulation of private motor vehicle transport in Australia from the first decade of the twentieth century adopted a pro-motoring standpoint in the interests of not suppressing an emergent technology.32 As Davison describes, private motor vehicles are inextricably bound up with the project of modernity.33 Therefore, the development of freeway plans in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s, and their subsequent construction, appear as logical developments in the progress of a modern, technological society.34 Despite the obvious importance of the symbolic attachment to the car in Australia and its historically favoured position amongst planners and policymakers, these factors alone do not sufficiently explain the Brisbane City Council’s strident defence of TransApex. Indeed, its preparedness to engage in such a radical spatial assault on the city suggests a deeper logic at work — one which continues to exacerbate public anxieties over the imperative to reduce private commuting times, and has thwarted opposition to the TransApex model. One currently influential explanation of this logic is provided by Paul Virilio’s writings on the role of speed in the contemporary world. He argues that the single most important factor shaping social life and the institutions that govern it is the inexorable tendency towards ever-increasing speed — or, as he describes it, ‘dromology’. Generalised fears about the pace of everyday life, and consequential state interventions that moderate or enhance it are understood by Virilio as intrinsically ‘dromological’ elements of modernity.35 The concept of dromology provides a mechanism for investigating how the ‘relentless logic of speed has played a crucial part in the militarization of urban space, the organization of territory’ and current transformations of social, political and cultural life.36 Virilio has explored the impact of this logic on architecture, spatial planning, cinema and new forms of information technology.37 He most clearly depicts the degree to which dromological imperatives exercise control over the regulation of mobility in his book Speed and Politics, where he describes how the state confuses the governance of ‘social order with the control of traffic’. The State’s political power … is only secondarily ‘power organized by one class to oppress another’. More materially, it is the polis, the police, in other words highway surveillance, insofar as, since the dawn of the bourgeois revolution, the political discourse has been no more than a series of more or less conscious repetitions of the old communal poliorcetics, confusing social order with the control of traffic (of people, of goods), and revolution, revolt, with traffic jams, illegal parking, multiple crashes, collisions.38 The emergence of modernity is depicted by Virilio in terms of mobilisation and increasing speed in order to show that these developments have not resulted in the reality of freedom of movement. On the contrary, they have produced an ‘obligation to mobility’ or a ‘dictatorship of movement’ which places speed and the means to attain it at the centre of modern social and political life.39 Both personal desires for shorter travel times and state strategies for maximising the productivity of the working day coalesce in the spectral image of the clean, new road — an open space, free of obstructions. There is certainly much of value in Virilio’s account of how speed shapes social relations and forms of institutional governance. He draws attention to the ways in which movement through physical space is now measured in terms of the pace of increasingly rapid forms of technology and communication. The inner city itself is now identified not as the centre of urban life, but as an obstacle to the homogeneous flow of daily traffic. As Virilio describes it: The city is but a stopover, a point on the synoptic path of a trajectory, the ancient military glacis, ridge road, frontier or riverbank, where the spectator’s glance and the vehicle’s speed of displacement were instrumentally linked … (T)here is only habitable circulation.

### Public Transit

#### Public transit creates a captive audience that becomes targeted by advertising

Kolhonen 2005 (Paul, Finnish architecture professor, “Moving Pictures” <http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=351>)

City advertising is mainly for people on the move. Their mobility, combined with advertising, has a major role in forming the visual cityscape. The positioning advertising in the cities is directly related to the movement of people. Advertisements are always in places where they have the most viewers, where the most people pass by. Therefore, different transportation devices and transit spaces linked with traffic are the most sought after advertising spaces. The same applies to subway stations and bus stops, which seem to be the only places in the city where people stand with nothing to do but wait and look at the advertisements. These non-places have become an important setting for contemporary living[6] and such places are Usually thoroughly covered with advertisements. Sometimes they have no visual character apart from the one provided by advertisers, and that identity seems to be the same wherever you go in the world. Advertising is not just limited to the exterior. Advertising inside public transportation is very cost effective. It is easy to target an advertisement at a person who you know will be virtually motionless for a long time. A small correctly positioned message will reach a large audience, who sometimes have no chance to look away.

### Cars Link

#### Focusing on automobiles reinscribes a combination of state and capital into rewriting space

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

The Brisbane City Council has presented TransApex as one (albeit crucial) component of an ‘integrated and balanced transport strategy’ designed to free up congested inner-city roads for enhanced public transport and pedestrian access.5 However, many questions have already been raised about the economic, social and environmental costs of the discrete projects that constitute TransApex, and if the overall plan is completed, it will clearly have profound impacts on the spatial structure of Brisbane’s inner and middle-ring suburbs.6 This article is a contribution to this debate, but adopts a slightly different focus from much of the existing literature by exploring the philosophical framework underlying these projects. Engaging with the theoretical writings of Paul Virilio and Henri Lefebvre, it argues that behind council’s rhetorical attachment to ‘balance’ in transport modes lies an overwhelming bias towards entrenching the role of the private motor vehicle as the dominant mechanism of mobility in Brisbane. Virilio’s argument that the contemporary world is shaped by a logic of increasing speed provides part of the explanation for the obsessive desire of Brisbane’s public authorities to fund and build enormous infrastructure projects such as TransApex to resolve short periods of peak-hour traffic congestion. However, his account does not adequately connect this modernist paradigm for the governance of urban mobility to larger struggles over the political and legal ordering of space. By contrast, Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space provides us with a helpful lens through which we may observe how TransApex will reinforce a transport model that prioritises and subsidises the private motor car. These new freeway projects can be understood in Lefebvre’s terms as contributions to the reproduction of abstract space — the fragmented, homogeneous and hierarchical space engendered by the state and capital’s domination of urban life. Abstract space is buttressed by what Lefebvre describes as a ‘logic of visualisation’,7 which flattens the depth of social reality to a readable surface while paradoxically rendering taken-for-granted spatial structures (such as roads and motorways) as invisible and beyond critique. In turn, abstract space is associated with an abstract and quantified social time, dependent on the preeminence of linear repetition over other rhythms of the city. The construction of freeways through the inner and middle-ring zones of the city cements an unrelenting, repetitious flow of high-speed traffic as the dominant rhythmic mode. It will be argued in this article that TransApex’s reproduction of abstracted space and time will impose an invisible set of spatio-temporal laws, structuring the transport choices and behaviour of Brisbane commuters into the future.8 Consequently, political strategies aimed at resisting the logic of abstract space-time must not only be concerned with the reappropriation of physical space, but must promote a reassertion of alternative rhythms of movement through space to that of the freeway-bound motor car.

#### Cars work to reproduce a mindset that ravages the environment by reproducing industrial time

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

Providing for the movement of people and things is an inevitable and increasingly important element of urban governance. Urban life in most Australian cities is physically structured around the requirements of the private motor vehicle, whose dominance has been largely assumed and supported by most transport planners and political actors. Historically, urban transport policies have focused on the public funding of large-scale road infrastructure, which has closely enmeshed urban governance within what John Urry describes as the ‘system of automobility’.9 This ‘system’ has helped to subordinate decision-making about land use, the built environment and landscape design to a complex web of industrial, technical and social linkages surrounding the production and consumption of automobiles and their environmental resource use. 10 There is perhaps no better demonstration of this system in action in Australia than in Southeast Queensland. During the 1960s and 1970s, state government departments associated with development decisions, road infrastructure and local government operated a highly discretionary model of decision-making, circumventing formal mechanisms of administrative transparency. This helped to fragment those parts of the state public sector concerned with land use management into a collection of client-servicing agencies for particular industry sectors. One obvious example is the way the Queensland Department of Main Roads, which has held overall responsibilities for major road infrastructure since the first half of the twentieth century, has wielded enormous influence over land use decision-making and the urban planning of Brisbane. It has regularly proposed large-scale technological solutions such as freeway developments to accommodate the ever-present problem of peak-hour traffic congestion, demarcating such projects from other aspects of land use planning. Between the late 1960s and early 1980s, a fertile source for many of the Department of Main Roads’ proposals was the Brisbane Transportation Study, released in 1965 by the engineering consultants Wilbur Smith and Associates. In addition to this report, the firm also secured appointments to draw up transport plans for Melbourne, Sydney and Hobart, ultimately playing an incredibly influential role in shaping the philosophical approach of public sector transport planners in Australia over the past four decades. 11 Reiterating Smith’s own views that a ‘modern, well-planned system of express-highways’ was the most appropriate model of transport for the dispersed suburbanised city, the firm’s recommendations for Brisbane were dominated by new freeways and expressways to link all areas of the Central Business District (CBD) to the freeway system. 12 The Brisbane Transportation Study proposed the construction of 80 miles of freeways, four expressways, five cross-river bridges, the replacement of trams and trolley buses with diesel buses and the removal of several comparatively lightly patronised segments of the existing urban rail network. 13 The tram and trolley-bus systems were abolished, but less than half of the infrastructure projects originally proposed were constructed. Nevertheless, the Wilbur Smith study’s approach to future road development across the city had a central influence on two generations of transport planning practitioners, and a number of its recommendations lay dormant within transport bureaucracies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, there have been several political campaigns to resist plans by the Department of Mains Roads that had their origins in the Brisbane Transportation Study. 14 Over the past five years, the TransApex suite of projects has emerged as a contemporary restatement of this tradition of brutalist modernism in transport planning, which recognises the construction of major roads as the only real solution for peak-hour congestion and long cross-town journey times. This transport plan replicates the pathway of a number of the recommendations of the 1965 report, while incorporating the use of tunnels to circumvent existing surface roads and supposedly minimise aesthetic disruption to the existing urban landscape. 15 Although the traffic will eventually have to emerge into the open air, the use of tunnels in the plan has been used rhetorically to emphasise the ‘invisibility’ of its component parts.

### “Balance” Link

#### Rhetoric of transporatation “balance” masks the repdroduction of insidious urban planning philosophies

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

Council has presented TransApex in its planning documents as a complete ring road system that will form the backbone of a fully integrated orbital road network, while simultaneously contributing to a ‘balanced’ transport plan which integrates private motor vehicle usage with various modes of public transport, cycling and walking. 17 However, each project has been conceived as a discrete public–private partnership with individual timeframes and funding arrangements, so core elements of the overall plan are yet to be approved or financed. 18 This makes it difficult to assess the potential efficacy of the partial ring road that will be created through the currently approved components of TransApex. Equally questionable is council’s rhetorical commitment to ‘balance’ in transport planning, which has often been used in other Australian jurisdictions to mask a policy preference for road-building and public subsidisation of private car use. 19 Such a preference is apparent in the preliminary estimates of public sector expenditure in the Draft Transport Plan.20 16

### Homogenization/Econ Link

#### Making commerce easier participates in the old rational planning model that recreates a spatial orer emphasizing top down dynamics

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

The miniaturization imaginatively achieved by scale models of cities or landscapes was practically achieved with the airplane. The mapping tradition of the bird's-eye view, evident in the map of Chicago, was no longer a mere convention. By virtue of its great distance, an aerial view resolved what might have seemed ground-level confusion into an apparently vaster order and symmetry. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the airplane for modernist thought and planning. By offering a perspective that flattened the topography as if it were a can- vas, flight encouraged new aspirations to "synoptic vision, rational control, planning, and spatial order."14 A second point about an urban order easily legible from outside is that the grand plan of the ensemble has no necessary relationship to the order of life as it is experienced by its residents. Although certain state services may be more easily provided and distant addresses more easily located, these apparent advantages may be negated by such per- ceived disadvantages as the absence of a dense street life, the intrusion of hostile authorities, the loss of the spatial irregularities that foster co- ziness, gathering places for informal recreation, and neighborhood feeling. The formal order of a geometrically regular urban space is just that: formal order. Its visual regimentation has a ceremonial or ideo- logical quality, much like the order of a parade or a barracks. The fact that such order works for municipal and state authorities in adminis- tering the city is no guarantee that it works for citizens. Provisionally, then, we must remain agnostic about the relation between formal spa- tial order and social experience. The third notable aspect of homogeneous, geometrical, uniform property is its convenience as a standardized commodity for the mar- ket. Like Jefferson's scheme for surveying or the Torrens system for ti- tling open land, the grid creates regular lots and blocks that are ideal for buying and selling. Precisely because they are abstract units de- tached from any ecological or topographical reality, they resemble a kind of currency which is endlessly amenable to aggregation and frag- mentation. This feature of the grid plan suits equally the surveyor, the planner, and the real-estate speculator. Bureaucratic and commercial logic, in this instance, go hand in hand. As Mumford notes, "The beauty of this mechanical pattern, from the commercial standpoint, should be plain. This plan offers the engineer none of those special problems that irregular parcels and curved boundary lines present. An office boy could figure out the number of square feet involved in a street opening or in a sale of land: even a lawyer's clerk could write a description of the necessary deed of sale, merely by filling in with the proper dimensions the standard document. With a T-square and a triangle, finally, the mu- nicipal engineer could, without the slightest training as either an archi- tect or a sociologist, 'plan' a metropolis, with its standard lots, its stan- dard blocks, its standard width streets. . . . The very absence of more specific adaptation to landscape or to human purpose only increased, by its very indefiniteness, its general usefulness for e~change.

### Central Transport

#### Erodes local rhtyhms and marginalizes the local

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* p. 76)

This retrofitting of traffic patterns had enormous consequences, most of which were intended: linking provincial France and provincial French citizens to Paris and to the state and facilitating the deployment of troops from the capital to put down civil unrest in any department in the nation. It was aimed at achieving, for the military control of the na- tion, what Haussmann had achieved in the capital itself. It thus em- powered Paris and the state at the expense of the provinces, greatly af- fected the economics of location, expedited central fiscal and military control, and severed or weakened lateral cultural and economic ties by favoring hierarchical links. At a stroke, it marginalized outlying areas in the way that official French had marginalized local dialects.

### Roads Link

#### Road products reproduce a speed fetish that participates in not state but societal capture by the rhythms of capitalism

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

Despite the obvious importance of the symbolic attachment to the car in Australia and its historically favoured position amongst planners and policymakers, these factors alone do not sufficiently explain the Brisbane City Council’s strident defence of TransApex. Indeed, its preparedness to engage in such a radical spatial assault on the city suggests a deeper logic at work — one which continues to exacerbate public anxieties over the imperative to reduce private commuting times, and has thwarted opposition to the TransApex model. One currently influential explanation of this logic is provided by Paul Virilio’s writings on the role of speed in the contemporary world. He argues that the single most important factor shaping social life and the institutions that govern it is the inexorable tendency towards ever-increasing speed — or, as he describes it, ‘dromology’. Generalised fears about the pace of everyday life, and consequential state interventions that moderate or enhance it are understood by Virilio as intrinsically ‘dromological’ elements of modernity.35 The concept of dromology provides a mechanism for investigating how the ‘relentless logic of speed has played a crucial part in the militarization of urban space, the organization of territory’ and current transformations of social, political and cultural life.36 Virilio has explored the impact of this logic on architecture, spatial planning, cinema and new forms of information technology.37 He most clearly depicts the degree to which dromological imperatives exercise control over the regulation of mobility in his book Speed and Politics, where he describes how the state confuses the governance of ‘social order with the control of traffic’. The State’s political power … is only secondarily ‘power organized by one class to oppress another’. More materially, it is the polis, the police, in other words highway surveillance, insofar as, since the dawn of the bourgeois revolution, the political discourse has been no more than a series of more or less conscious repetitions of the old communal poliorcetics, confusing social order with the control of traffic (of people, of goods), and revolution, revolt, with traffic jams, illegal parking, multiple crashes, collisions.38 The emergence of modernity is depicted by Virilio in terms of mobilisation and increasing speed in order to show that these developments have not resulted in the reality of freedom of movement. On the contrary, they have produced an ‘obligation to mobility’ or a ‘dictatorship of movement’ which places speed and the means to attain it at the centre of modern social and political life.39 Both personal desires for shorter travel times and state strategies for maximising the productivity of the working day coalesce in the spectral image of the clean, new road — an open space, free of obstructions. There is certainly much of value in Virilio’s account of how speed shapes social relations and forms of institutional governance. He draws attention to the ways in which movement through physical space is now measured in terms of the pace of increasingly rapid forms of technology and communication. The inner city itself is now identified not as the centre of urban life, but as an obstacle to the homogeneous flow of daily traffic. As Virilio describes it: The city is but a stopover, a point on the synoptic path of a trajectory, the ancient military glacis, ridge road, frontier or riverbank, where the spectator’s glance and the vehicle’s speed of displacement were instrumentally linked … (T)here is only habitable circulation.40

#### Roads constitute a rank violence against the urbanity of the city: capitalism’s homogenizing tendencies are pursued at all costs as the rhythms of transport for labor overtake the lifeworld

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

A key element in Lefebvre’s analysis of the production of space is his depiction of the dominant spatial formation of contemporary capitalism as ‘abstract space’ — a space structured by tendencies towards fragmentation, homogenisation and hierarchy.44 The fragmentary character of abstract space can be understood on a number of different levels. Private land ownership breaks the city up and segments it into discrete parcels, which can be bought and sold as commodities, while land use controls divide social space into zones that can be categorised and policed according to designated uses.45 Public infrastructure, such as road and freeway developments that allow traffic to pass through existing residential areas, also contribute to the physical fragmentation and segmentation of urban space. Recognising the inherent violence in the deployment of technology in this way, Lefebvre describes how the ‘motorway brutalizes the countryside and the land, slicing through space like a great knife’.46 While at the local level abstract space appears to be fractured, it also tends towards homogeneity, through the subjection of space to the market criteria of pure exchange and through the state’s attempts to impose coherence and unity to the various subsystems that operate within the city. This allows us to observe how infrastructure projects such as roads and freeways impose a form of invisible legality on urban space. Freeway developments in particular contribute to spatial homogenisation by extending similar road forms and elevated flyovers throughout the city and extending the capacity of the motor car to travel at uniform speeds, unimpeded by the interruptions of other traffic or pedestrians. [P]eople (the ‘inhabitants’) move about in a space which tends towards a geometric isotopy, full of instructions and signals, where qualitative differences of places and moments no longer matter.47 The public provision of transport infrastructure is deeply entwined with the dependence of everyday life in Australia’s dispersed suburbanised cities on a range of collectively consumed resources and systems. Given the cultural and functional importance of the private car in Australian life, forms of modernist transport planning such as that pursued in TransApex are clearly linked to an increasing commodification of space. Writing presciently in 1968, Lefebvre described how the city has been strategically assaulted by ‘the car — the current pilot-object in the world of commodities’.48 This assault has only been able to succeed through the adherence of state decision-makers to an ideological representation of the city as ‘a network of circulation and communication’, thereby facilitating the permanent movement of vehicular traffic at almost any cost.49

## Efficiency

#### Attempts to engineer efficiency are really attempts to “fix” class struggle by destroying class consciousness

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

This productivism had at least two distinct lineages, one of them North American and the other European. An American contribution came from the influential work of Frederick Taylor, whose minute de- composition of factory labor into isolable, precise, repetitive motions had begun to revolutionize the organization of factory work.39 For the factory manager or engineer, the newly invented assembly lines per- mitted the use of unskilled labor and control over not only the pace of production but the whole labor process. The European tradition of "energetics," which focused on questions of motion, fatigue, measured rest, rational hygiene, and nutrition, also treated the worker notionally as a machine, albeit a machine that must be well fed and kept in good working order. In place of workers, there was an abstract, standard- ized worker with uniform physical capacities and needs. Seen initially as a way of increasing wartime efficiency at the front and in industry, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut fur Arbeitsphysiologie, like Taylorism, was based on a scheme to rationalize the body.40 What is most remarkable about both traditions is, once again, how widely they were believed by educated elites who were otherwise poles apart politically. "Taylorism and technocracy were the watchwords of a three-pronged idealism: the elimination of economic and social cri- sis, the expansion of productivity through science, and the reenchant- ment of technology. The vision of society in which social conflict was eliminated in favor of technological and scientific imperatives could embrace liberal, socialist, authoritarian, and even communist and fas- cist solutions. Productivism, in short, was politically promisc~ous."~~ The appeal of one or another form of productivism across much of the right and center of the political spectrum was largely due to its promise as a technological "fix" for class struggle. If, as its advocates claimed, it could vastly increase worker output, then the politics of re- distribution could be replaced by class collaboration, in which both profits and wages could grow at once. For much of the left, produc- tivism promised the replacement of the capitalist by the engineer or by the state expert or official. It also proposed a single optimum solution, or "best practice," for any problem in the organization of work. The logical outcome was some form of slide-rule authoritarianism in the interest, presumably, of all.42

### Workforce Modernization

#### Dragging the workforce forward links to vicious utopian social planning

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

In this reading, high modernism ought to appeal greatly to the classes and strata who have most to gain-in status, power, and wealth-from its worldview. And indeed it is the ideology par excel- lence of the bureaucratic intelligentsia, technicians, planners, and en- g i n e e r ~ . ~ ~ The position accorded to them is not just one of rule and privilege but also one of responsibility for the great works of nation building and social transformation. Where this intelligentsia conceives of its mission as the dragging of a technically backward, unschooled, subsistence-oriented population into the twentieth century, its self- assigned cultural role as educator of its people becomes doubly gran- diose. Having a historic mission of such breadth may provide a ruling intelligentsia with high morale, solidarity, and the willingness to make (and impose) sacrifices. This vision of a great future is often in sharp contrast to the disorder, misery, and unseemly scramble for petty ad- vantage that the elites very likely see in their daily foreground. One might in fact speculate that the more intractable and resistant the real world faced by the planner, the greater the need for utopian plans to fill, as it were, the void that would otherwise invite despair. The elites who elaborate such plans implicitly represent themselves as exemplars of the learning and progressive views to which their compatriots might aspire. Given the ideological advantages of high modernism as a dis- course, it is hardly surprising that so many postcolonial elites have marched under its banner.30

## Internal Links

### Rhythms/Capitalism

#### Transportations infrastructure creates a way of life the manifests itself everyday to produce capitalism as a natural structure: refusing to endorse these modes of conveyance provides low scale resistance that interrupts capitalist time

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

The logic of visualisation does not remain the province of experts within the spatial sciences, but also infiltrates popular consciousness as a justification for abstract space as a natural state: Abstract space … simultaneously embraces the hypertrophied analytic intellect; the state and bureaucratic raison d’etat; ‘pure’ knowledge and the discourse of power. Implying a ‘logic’ which misrepresents it and masks its own contradictions, this space, which is that of bureaucracy, embodies a successful integration of spectacle and violence …58 For the commuter, orienting oneself around abstract space is dependent on the ability to comprehend plans, interpret codes and obey signals. The driver of a motor vehicle passing through the fragmented zones of the deconcentrated suburban city requires, above all else, ‘the capacity to read the symbols of the highway code, and with a sole organ — the eye — placed in the service of his (sic) movement within the visual field’.59 The freeway and the expressway exacerbate this effect, by reducing the space of the road to a homogeneous plane to be read according to well-understood norms and repetitious signals. Maintaining this homogeneity is inevitably linked to the elimination of blockages and delays to the circulation of traffic, and this returns us to the importance of time in the governance of mobility. However, rather than accepting Virilio’s assertion of a uniform and totalising dromological tendency of modern life as the last word, it is necessary to recognise the ways in which the city is an assemblage of rhythms — some generated by relations of domination and others cycling to an alternative tempo. This is the thrust of Lefebvre’s late writings on rhythmanalysis, in which he attempts a theorisation of how the interconnections between space and time unfold in everyday life. For Lefebvre, time in contemporary urban societies is measured in two ways: ‘fundamental, cyclical rhythms’ and ‘repetitions imposed by quantified time (ie the type of temporality dictated by clocks and watches)’.60 The repetitions associated with linear time mirror the fractured and homogeneous nature of abstract space: [Q]uantified time subjects itself to a very general law of this society: it becomes both uniform and monotonous while also breaking apart and becoming fragmented. Like space, it divides itself into lots and parcels: transport networks, themselves fragmented, various forms of work, entertainment and leisure.61 Abstract space generates an abstract social time, which is imposed on the users of space.62 The rhythms of the living body are subordinated to those repetitive gestures that contribute instrumentally to productive labour. An example is the manner in which transformations of the built environment, such as high-speed freeway developments, provide a platform for the repetitive stream of daily commuting traffic traversing the city. Sheller and Urry’s description of the temporal effects of the system of automobility in general are directly relevant to the experience of the freeway: Automobility … coerces people into an intense flexibility. It forces people to juggle tiny fragments of time so as to deal with the temporal and spatial constraints that it itself generates … [It] structur[es] and constrain[s] the ‘users’ of cars to live their lives in particular spatially stretched and time-compressed ways. By actively supporting the role of the private car in the overall system of urban mobility, the freeway invisibly but effectively marginalises other transport options. Historically in Brisbane, this has had the effect of making it very difficult for most households to avoid daily motor vehicle usage, unless situated very close to poorly serviced railway or busway stations. TransApex further entrenches this privatised model of mobility by subsuming transport and land use planning decisions to the objective of reducing isolated pockets of peak-hour congestion. It will effectively legislate for the extension of a spatiotemporal order, which reproduces the dominance of linear and quantified social rhythms. Virilio correctly identifies the dromological pressures to which these rhythms fall prey, but the city is also the site of a plurality of other rhythms, not all of which are dominated by increasing levels of speed.63 As Lefebvre states: [E]veryday life remains shot through and traversed by great cosmic and vital rhythms: day and night, the months and the seasons, and still more precisely biological rhythms … [T]his results in the perpetual interaction of these rhythms with repetitive processes linked to homogeneous time.64 Occasionally, the repetitive gestures generated by abstract space find themselves in direct conflict with lived time and the spaces produced by the body’s rhythms. Abstract, commodified space may provide the ‘envelope’ of time, but lived time resists its reductive power. ‘[R]eal social time is forever reemerging complete with its own characteristics and determinants: repetitions, rhythms, cycles, activities.’65 Accordingly, resistance to the laws of abstract space requires not just the reappropriation of physical space, but a reassertion of alternative rhythmic modes. This leads us to the prospect of a ‘differential space-time’, capable of supplanting the dominance of abstract space and its quantified, linear time.66 Marginalised means of travel, such as walking, cycling and the various mixes of public transport, may well be subject to the demands of linear time if simply integrated into the daily routine of commuting. But they have the advantage of removing the mobile body from the obligation to keep to the freeway speed limit in order to remain merged with the general flow of traffic. As such, these activities can be the basis for moments of ‘appropriated time’, resisting forceful social urges towards speed, repetition and quantification.67 Similarly, the act of aimlessly driving around town can approximate the leisurely stroll, while roadways may themselves be appropriated by those wishing to use them for purposes that evade the homogeneous intent of their original design.68 Fostering these alternative rhythms of mobility and securing a space for the practices that generate them form an essential part of any strategy seeking to confront the fragmentary, homogeneous and hierarchical tendencies of abstract space and producing a space-time open to social difference.

### Panopticism

#### State transportation initiatives promote legibility of populations to enhance monitoring and colonize everyday life

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

To this point, I have been making a rather straightforward, even banal point about the simplification, abstraction, and standardization that are necessary for state officials' observations of the circumstances of some or all of the population. But I want to make a further claim, one analogous to that made for scientific forestry: the modern state, through its officials, attempts with varying success to create a terrain and a population with precisely those standardized characteristics that will be easiest to monitor, count, assess, and manage. The utopian, im- manent, and continually frustrated goal of the modern state is to re- duce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality beneath it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observations. Much of the statecraft of the late eighteenth and nine- teenth centuries was devoted to this project. "In the period of move- ment from tribute to tax, from indirect rule to direct rule, from subor- dination to assimilation," Tilly remarks, "states generally worked to homogenize their populations and break down their segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, and legal systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transportation, and comm~nication."~~ As the scientific forester may dream of a perfectly legible forest planted with same-aged, single-species, uniform trees growing in straight lines in a rectangular flat space cleared of all underbrush and poachers,85 so the exacting state official may aspire to a perfectly legi- ble population with registered, unique names and addresses keyed to grid settlements; who pursue single, identifiable occupations; and all of whose transactions are documented according to the designated formula and in the official language. This caricature of society as a mil- itary parade ground is overdrawn, but the grain of truth that it em- bodies may help us understand the grandiose plans we will examine later.86 The aspiration to such uniformity and order alerts us to the fact that modern statecraft is largely a project of internal colonization, often glossed, as it is in imperial rhetoric, as a "civilizing mission." The builders of the modern nation-state do not merely describe, observe, and map; they strive to shape a people and landscape that will fit their techniques of observati~n.~~ This tendency is perhaps one shared by many large hierarchical or- ganizations. As Donald Chisholm, in reviewing the literature on ad- ministrative coordination, concludes, "central coordinating schemes do work effectively under conditions where the task environment is known and unchanging, where it can be treated as a closed system."88 The more static, standardized, and uniform a population or social space is, the more legible it is, and the more amenable it is to the techniques of state officials. I am suggesting that many state activities aim at transforming the population, space, and nature under their jurisdiction into the closed systems that offer no surprises and that can best be observed and controlled. State officials can often make their categories stick and impose their simplifications, because the state, of all institutions, is best equipped to insist on treating people according to its schemata. Thus categories that may have begun as the artificial inventions of cadastral surveyors, census takers, judges, or police officers can end by becoming cate- gories that organize people's daily experience precisely because they are embedded in state-created institutions that structure that exper- i e n ~ e . ~ ~ The economic plan, survey map, record of ownership, forest management plan, classification of ethnicity, passbook, arrest record, and map of political boundaries acquire their force from the fact that these synoptic data are the points of departure for reality as state officials apprehend and shape it. In dictatorial settings where there is no effective way to assert another reality, fictitious facts-on-paper can often be made eventually to prevail on the ground, because it is on be- half of such pieces of paper that police and army are deployed

### Calculability

#### Central planned transportation infrastructure calculates and reduces all human activities to after effects of capital

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

Believing that his revolutionary urban planning expressed univer- sal scientific truths, Le Corbusier naturally assumed that the public, once they understood this logic, would embrace his plan. The original manifesto of CIAM called for primary school students to be taught the elementary principles of scientific housing: the importance of sunlight and fresh air to health; the rudiments of electricity, heat, lighting, and sound; the right principles of furniture design; and so on. These were matters of science, not of taste; instruction would create, in time, a cli- entele worthy of the scientific architect. Whereas the scientific forester could, as it were, go right to work on the forest and shape it to his plan, the scientific architect was obliged to first train a new clientele that would "freely" choose the urban life that Le Corbusier had planned for them. Any architect, I imagine, supposes that the dwellings she designs will contribute to her clients' happiness - - rather than to their misery. The difference lies in how the architect understands happiness. For Le Corbusier, "human happiness already exists expressed in terms of num- bers, of mathematics, of properly calculated designs, plans in which the cities can already be seen."40 He was certain, at least rhetorically, that since his city was the rational expression of a machine-age con- sciousness, modern man would embrace it ~holeheartedly.~~ The kinds of satisfactions that the citizen-subject of Le Corbusier's city would experience, however, were not the pleasures of personal freedom and autonomy. They were the pleasures of fitting logically into a rational plan: "Authority must now step in, patriarchal authority, the authority of a father concerned for his children. . . . We must build places where mankind will be reborn. When the collective (unctions of the urban community have been organized, then there will be individ- ual liberty for all. Each man will live in an ordered relation to the whole."42 In the Plan Voisin for Paris, the place of each individual in the great urban hierarchy is spatially coded. The business elite (indus- trials) will live in high-rise apartments at the core, while the subaltern classes will have small garden apartments at the periphery. One's sta- tus can be directly read from one's distance from the center. But, like everyone in a well-run factory, everyone in the city will have the "col- lective pride" of a team of workers producing a perfect product. "The worker who does only a part of the job understands the role of his labor; the machines that cover the floor of the factory are examples to him of power and clarity, and make h i m part o f a work ofperfection to which his simple spirit never dared to aspire."^ Just as Le Corbusier was perhaps most famous for asserting that "the home is a machine for living," so he thought of the planned city as a large, efficient machine with many closely calibrated parts. He assumed, therefore, that the cit- izens of his city would accept, with pride, their own modest role in a noble, scientifically planned urban machine. By his own lights Le Corbusier was planning for the basic needs of his fellow men-needs that were ignored or traduced in the existing city. Essentially, he established them by stipulating an abstract, simpli- fied human subject with certain material and physical requirements. This schematic subject needed so many square meters of living space, so much fresh air, so much sunlight, so much open space, so many es- sential services. At this level, he designed a city that was indeed far more healthful and functional than the crowded, dark slums against which he railed. Thus he spoke of "punctual and exact respiration," of various formulas for determining optimal sizes for apartments; he in- sisted on apartment skyscrapers to allow for park space and, above all, for efficient traffic circulation. The Le Corbusian city was designed, first and foremost, as a work- shop for production. Human needs, in this context, were scientifically stipulated by the planner. Nowhere did he admit that the subjects for whom he was planning might have something valuable to say on this matter or that their needs might be plural rather than singular. Such was his concern with efficiency that he treated shopping and meal 1 preparation as nuisances that would be discharged by central services I like those offered by well-run hotels.44 Although floor space was pro- vided for social activities, he said almost nothing about the actual so- cial and cultural needs of the citizenry.

## Alt

### Interruptions/Resistance

#### Alternative denaturalizes central highway planning: key mode and mechanism of resistance; this evidence also answers their sq inevitability args

Butler 2008 (Chris, Lecturer at Griffin Law School, “Slicing Through Space…” *17* Griffth L. Rev.)

The TransApex plan is radical in its scope, but philosophically represents the return with a vengeance of a well-worn version of modernist transport planning. Despite the various criticisms of the plan’s contribution to entrenching private motor vehicle usage and the financial model on which it is based, it appears that the decisive conservative victory in recent local authority elections signals ‘full steam ahead’ for the planning and construction of its currently approved components.70 This article has employed Lefebvre’s account of abstract space and its attendant social rhythms to critique the forms of thinking underpinning TransApex. It has been argued that this set of projects can be conceptualised in Lefebvrean terms as contributing to the reproduction of abstract space. In turn, this space is associated with an abstract and quantified social time that effectively dominates and marginalises other rhythms of the city. Despite the physical visibility of this set of infrastructure projects, they will also reinforce an invisible set of spatio-temporal laws, structuring the transport choices and behaviour of future generations of travellers. Virilio accurately pinpoints how the endlessly increasing levels of speed in contemporary life play an important part in naturalising this abstracted space-time. But it must also be remembered that the forms and structures of urban space are constantly open to contestation by those wishing to use space in ways which run counter to currently dominant uses. Accordingly, the spatio-temporal order prescribed by transport projects such as TransApex are inevitably subject to political challenge by alternative conceptualisations of the movement of people and things within contemporary cities. Any challenge to this set of spatio-temporal laws that coerces travellers into the system of automobility will require the concretisation of new social norms relating to mobility. Such a legal, political and cultural shift will involve vastly increased levels of public transport and safer opportunities for cyclists and pedestrians to ‘reclaim the streets’ and generate different social rhythms to those imposed by the speeding ‘steel and petroleum car’. In the short term, this will necessitate frequent, regular and coordinated feeder connections to busway and railway stations from neighbouring suburbs. Incredibly, Brisbane residents are still waiting for adequate services of this type almost four decades after they were recommended by the Wilbur Smith Public Transport Study. 71 It will also be imperative that public transport authorities remove time restrictions on carrying bicycles on trains, provide bicycle racks on all buses and fund major end-of-trip facilities for cyclists and pedestrians in all major workplaces. Taken in isolation, these proposals appear to be simply a moderate plea for plural forms of mobility. However challenging it may be, the hegemony of the system of automobility will also require profound social changes incorporating reconfigurations of both the built environment and currently dominant forms of social time. A crucial step in this direction is to denaturalise freeway development as an inevitable consequence of progress in a modern, technological society. Linked to this is the need to render visible the hidden but coercive spatio-temporal order that modernist transport plans such as TransApex impose on the city. As the source of an alternative legality of urban movement, Lefebvre’s social theory holds out the tantalising hope for the emergence of a differential space-time, undermining the dominance of abstract space and its quantified social time, and replacing the logic of visualisation with a more balanced relationship between the travelling body and its rhythms in space. This is obviously an immense political project in Brisbane’s current transport planning context. It will demand much more than isolated local resistance against particular components of the TransApex plan. As Lefebvre’s work makes clear, all successful strategies of political transformation require activists to produce new spaces and assert alternative social rhythms. 72 Unless those engaged in struggles against the blinkered vision and negative consequences of modernist transport planning take such strategic questions seriously, the prospects for a different model of urban mobility will recede even further down the road.

#### Alt interrupts and solves time

Kipfer Siederi and Wieditz 2012 (Associate prof of polisci at York University, “Henri Lefebvre: Debates and Controversies” in *Progress in Human Geography*

Given the place of the urban in Lefebvre’s philosophy and politics, it is no surprise that his understanding of the urban and space is infused with time and history. His work does in fact justify arguments for a spatial turn of social theory (Soja, 1989), but this turn should not be conceived in ontological terms. As Lefebvre (1991b: 96) has it, ‘time may have been promoted to the level of ontology of the philosopher, but it has been murdered by society’. Since the production of abstract space is itself implicated in this death of time (its reduction to a linear succession of instants), it is imperative that ‘space’ be de-reified in the same way Marx proposed to do for the commodity: by treating spatial form not only as a powerful social force but also as a product of – necessarily temporal – processes, strategies, and projects. In turn, Lefebvre suggests that contradictions of space in the late 20th century – those between abstract and differential space – are simultaneously tensions between the linear and cyclical temporalities which inhere in everyday life. As students of Lefebvre’s (2004) rhythmanalytic approach to everyday life have pointed out (Edensor, 2010; Gardiner, 2000; Highmore, 2005; Loftus, 2012), the insight about the intimate relationship between time and space is crucial to grasp his relevance for research on the body (less as effect and more as producer of time/space) and the contradictory rhythms that shape political ecologies in our urbanizing world. In this view, socialism appears as a fundamental transformation of neocolonial capitalism’s time-space, not as a redistributive and socially more just reorientation of otherwise unchanged forces and relations of production.

## Impacts

### Genocide

#### State-based infrastructure planning terminates in substantial violence and ethnic destruction

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

These state simplifications, the basic givens of modern statecraft, were, I began to realize, rather like abridged maps. They did not suc- cessfully represent the actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only that slice of it that inter- ested the official observer. They were, moreover, not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade. Thus a state cadastral map created to designate taxable property-holders does not merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its ability to I give its categories the force of law. Much of the first chapter is in- I tended to convey how thoroughly society and the environment have I been refashioned by state maps of legibility. This view of early modern statecraft is not particularly original. Suitably modified, however, it can provide a distinctive optic through which a number of huge development fiascoes in poorer Third World nations and Eastern Europe can be usefully viewed. But "fiasco" is too lighthearted a word for the disasters I have in mind. The Great Leap Forward in China, collectivization in Russia, and compulsory villagization in Tanzania, Mozambique, and Ethiopia are among the great human tragedies of the twentieth century, in terms of both lives lost and lives irretrievably disrupted. At a less dra- matic but far more common level, the history of Third World develop- ment is littered with the debris of huge agricultural schemes and new cities (think of Brasilia or Chandigarh) that have failed their residents. It is not so difficult, alas, to understand why so many human lives have been destroyed by mobilized violence between ethnic groups, religious sects, or linguistic communities. But it is harder to grasp why so many well-intended schemes to improve the human condition have gone so tragically awry. I aim, in what follows, to provide a convincing account of the logic behind the failure of some of the great utopian social engi- neering schemes of the twentieth century.

### Life Legibility

#### Central state interventions drive a process of state ownership of life: and ignorance of local rhythms guts solvency and turns the case

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* p. 76-79)

Officials of the modern state are, of necessity, at least one step-and often several steps-removed from the society they are charged with governing. They assess the life of their society by a series of typifi- cations that are always some distance from the full reality these ab- stractions are meant to capture. Thus the foresters' charts and tables, despite their synoptic power to distill many individual facts into a larger pattern, do not quite capture (nor are they meant to) the real forest in its full diversity. Thus the cadastral survey and the title deed are a rough, often misleading representation of actual, existing rights to land use and disposal. The functionary of any large organization "sees" the human activity that is of interest to him largely through the sim- plified approximations of documents and statistics: tax proceeds, lists of taxpayers, land records, average incomes, unemployment numbers, mortality rates, trade and productivity figures, the total number of cases of cholera in a certain district. These typifications are indispensable to statecraft. State simplifi- cations such as maps, censuses, cadastral lists, and standard units of measurement represent techniques for grasping a large and complex reality; in order for officials to be able to comprehend aspects of the ensemble, that complex reality must be reduced to schematic categor- ies. The only way to accomplish this is to reduce an infinite array of detail to a set of categories that will facilitate summary descriptions, comparisons, and aggregation. The invention, elaboration, and deploy- ment of these abstractions represent, as Charles Tilly has shown, an enormous leap in state capacity-a move from tribute and indirect rule to taxation and direct rule. Indirect rule required only a minimal state apparatus but rested on local elites and communities who had an interest in withholding resources and knowledge from the center. Direct rule sparked widespread resistance and necessitated negotia- tions that often limited the center's power, but for the first time, it al- lowed state officials direct knowledge of and access to a previously opaque society. Such is the power of the most advanced techniques of direct rule, that it discovers new social truths as well as merely summarizing known facts. The Center for Disease Control in Atlanta is a striking case in point. Its network of sample hospitals allowed it to first "discover"-in the epidemiological sense-such hitherto unknown diseases as toxic shock syndrome, Legionnaires' disease, and AIDS. Stylized facts of this kind are a powerful form of state knowledge, making it possible for officials to intervene early in epidemics, to understand economic trends that greatly affect public welfare, to gauge whether their poli- cies are having the desired effect, and to make policy with many of the crucial facts at hand.75 These facts permit discriminating interven- tions, some of which are literally lifesaving. The techniques devised to enhance the legibility of a society to its rulers have become vastly more sophisticated, but the political motives driving them have changed little. Appropriation, control, and manip- ulation (in the nonpejorative sense) remain the most prominent. If we imagine a state that has no reliable means of enumerating and locating its population, gauging its wealth, and mapping its land, resources, and settlements, we are imagining a state whose interventions in that society are necessarily crude. A society that is relatively opaque to the state is thereby insulated from some forms of finely tuned state inter- ventions, both welcomed (universal vaccinations) and resented (per- sonal income taxes). The interventions it does experience will typically be mediated by local trackers who know the society from inside and who are likely to interpose their own particular interests. Without this mediation-and often with it-state action is likely to be inept, greatly overshooting or undershooting its objective. An illegible society, then, is a hindrance to any effective interven- tion by the state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare. As long as the state's interest is largely confined to grab- bing a few tons of grain and rounding up a few conscripts, the state's ignorance may not be fatal. When, however, the state's objective re- quires changing the daily habits (hygiene or health practices) or work performance (quality labor or machine maintenance) of its citizens, such ignorance can well be disabling. A thoroughly legible society elim- inates local monopolies of information and creates a kind of national transparency through the uniformity of codes, identities, statistics, reg- ulations, and measures. At the same time it is likely to create new po- sitional advantages for those at the apex who have the knowledge and access to easily decipher the new state-created format. The discriminating interventions that a legible society makes pos- sible can, of course, be deadly as well. A sobering instance is word- lessly recalled by a map produced by the City Office of Statistics of Am- sterdam, then under Nazi occupation, in May 1941 (figure 1 3).76 Along with lists of residents, the map was the synoptic representation that guided the rounding up of the city's Jewish population, sixty-five thou- sand of whom were eventually deported. The map is titled "The Distribution of Jews in the Municipality." Each dot represents ten Jews, a scheme that makes the heavily Jewish dis- tricts readily apparent. The map was compiled from information ob- tained not only through the order for people of Jewish extraction to register themselves but also through the population registry ("excep- tionally comprehensive in the nether land^")^^ and the business reg- istry. If one reflects briefly on the kind of detailed information on names, addresses, and ethnic backgrounds (determined perhaps by names in the population registry or by declaration) and the cartographic exacti- tude required to produce this statistical representation, the contribu- tion of legibility to state capacity is evident. The Nazi authorities, of course, supplied the murderous purpose behind the exercise, but the legibility provided by the Dutch authorities supplied the means to its efficient implementation.78 That legibility, I should emphasize, merely amplifies the capacity of the state for discriminating interventions-a capacity that in principle could as easily have been deployed to feed the Jews as to deport them Legibility implies a viewer whose place is central and whose vi- I sion is synoptic. State simplifications of the kind we have examined are designed to provide authorities with a schematic view of their society, a ' view not afforded to those without authority. Rather like U.S. highway I patrolmen wearing mirrored sunglasses, the authorities enjoy a quasi- monopolistic picture of selected aspects of the whole society. This privileged vantage point is typical of all institutional settings where command and control of complex human activities is paramount. The monastery, the barracks, the factory floor, and the administrative bu- reaucracy (private or public) exercise many statelike functions and often mimic its information structure as well.

### Imperialism

#### Central planning results in serious imperialism

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

Designed or planned social order is necessarily schematic; it al- /' ways ignores essential features of any real, functioning social order. This truth is best illustrated in a work-to-rule strike, which turns on the fact that any production process depends on a host of informal prac- tices and improvisations that could never be codified. By merely fol- lowing the rules meticulously, the workforce can virtually halt produc- tion. In the same fashion, the simplified rules animating plans for, say, a city, a village, or a collective farm were inadequate as a set of in- structions for creating a functioning social order. The formal scheme was parasitic on informal processes that, alone, it could not create or maintain. To the degree that the formal scheme made no allowance for these processes or actually suppressed them, it failed both its intended beneficiaries and ultimately its designers as well. Much of this book can be read as a case against the imperialism of high-modernist, planned social order. I stress the word "imperialism" here because I am emphatically not making a blanket case against ei- ther bureaucratic planning or high-modernist ideology. I am, however, making a case against an imperial or hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role of local knowledge and know-how.

#### Mass imperialism and environmental destruction results

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

What has proved to be truly dangerous to us and to our environ- ment, I think, is the combination of the universalist pretensions of epis- temic knowledge and authoritarian social engineering. Such a combina- tion has been at work in city planning, in Lenin's view of revolution (but not his practice), in collectivization in the Soviet Union, and in vil- lagization in Tanzania. The combination is implicit in the logic of sci- entific agriculture and explicit in its colonial practice. When schemes like these come close to achieving their impossible dreams of ignoring or suppressing metis and local variation, they all but guarantee their own practical failure. Universalist claims seem inherent in the way in which rationalist knowledge is pursued. Although I am no philosopher of knowledge, there seems to be no door in this epistemic edifice through which metis or practical knowledge could enter on its own terms. It is this imperi- alism that is troubling. As Pascal wrote, the great failure of rationalism is "not its recognition of technical knowledge, but its failure to recog- nize any other."88 By contrast, metis does not put all its eggs in one bas- ket; it makes no claim to universality and in this sense is pluralistic. Of course, certain structural conditions can thwart this imperialism of epi- stemic claims. Democratic and commercial pressures sometimes oblige agricultural scientists to premise their work on practical problems as defined by farmers. During the Meiji Restoration, three-person techni- cal teams began by investigating farmers' innovations and then taking them back to the laboratory to perfect them. The construction workers who refused to leave Brasilia as planned or the disillusioned ujamaa villagers who fled from their settlements to some degree undid the plans made for them. Such resistance, however, comes from outside the paradigm of epistemic knowledge itself. When someone like Albert Howard, himself a meticulous scientist, recognizes the "art" of farm- ing and the nonquantifiable ways of knowing, he steps outside the realm of codified, scientific knowledge. Authoritarian high-modernist states in the grip of a self-evident (and usually half-baked) social theory have done irreparable damage to human communities and individual livelihoods. The danger was compounded when leaders came to believe, as Mao said, that the peo- ple were a "blank piece of paper" on which the new regime could write. The utopian industrialist Robert Owen had the same vision for the fac- tory town New Lanark, although on a civic rather than national level: "Each generation, indeed each administration, shall see unrolled before it the blank sheet of infinite possibility, and if by chance this tabula rasa had been defaced by the irrational scribblings of tradition-ridden ancestors, then the first task of the rationalist must be to scrub it clean."89 What conservatives like Oakeshott miss, I think, is that high mod- ernism has a natural appeal for an intelligentsia and a people who may have ample reason to hold the past in contempt.90 Late colonial mod- ernizers sometimes wielded their power ruthlessly in transforming a population that they took to be backward and greatly in need of in- struction. Revolutionaries have had every reason to despise the feudal, poverty-stricken, inegalitarian past that they hoped to banish forever, and sometimes they have also had a reason to suspect that immediate democracy would simply bring back the old order. Postindependence leaders in the nonindustrial world (occasionally revolutionary leaders themselves) could not be faulted for hating their past of colonial dom- ination and economic stagnation, nor could they be faulted for wasting no time or democratic sentimentality on creating a people that they could be proud of. Understanding the history and logic of their com- mitment to high-modernist goals, however, does not permit us to over- look the enormous damage that their convictions entailed when com- bined with authoritarian state power.

#### Imperialism causes extinction and an unending cycle of global war

William Eckhardt, Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, February 1990, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, jstor, p. 15-16

Wright looked at the relation between modern civilization and war in somewhat more detail, based on his own list of 278 modern wars from 1480 to 1941, plus 30 more ‘hostilities’ from 1945 to 1964. Modern war was not especially different from other civilized wars in its drives or motives of dominance, independence, and rivalry, but it was quite different in its geographical scope (the world) and in its technologies (from the hand gun to the atom bomb, from the printing press to the mass media). Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: ‘[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars’ (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this process of benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence: ‘World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence’ (pp. 965, 969). ‘The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all’ (p. 1190). This ‘disparity between states’, not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of ‘disparity between states’ created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that ‘Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase’ (pp. 246, 247). So far as structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright’s estimate was very conservative indeed. Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused ‘only’ 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one’s benefit, but of putting an end to life itself! This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It’s too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice**.**

### Capitalism

#### Architecture and transport in the service of commerce reduces life to an artless repetition of capitalism calculation

Tarfuri No Date Given (Manfredo, “TOWARDS A CRİTİQUE OF ARCHİTECTURAL İDEOLOGY” <http://www.hulyayurekli.net/pdf/ArchitectureinContext/Archincont-Tafuri-ozet.pdf>)

The restructuring of the entire urban space and surrounding landscape thus corresponds to the need to rationalize the total organization of the urban machine:on this scale, technological structures and transportation systems must constitute a unitary image. Le Corbusier to uses the technique of schock: the “objects a reaction politique, however are now connected with one another within a dialectical, organic whole. Corbusier used the secondary effect the indirect stimulus. In his lowest level the cell the goal was to gain maximum flexibility, interchangeability, and possibility of rapid use. Freedom was important in his designs also in the production Le Corbusier worked like an intellectual in the strict sense he did not become associated with local government powers. And he also worked just the opposite way of the Weimer intellectuals, from the specific and particular to the general and universal. His models have all the characteristics of laboratory experiments, and in no case a laboratory model can be translated wholly into reality. But the failure of Algiers and Corbusier in general cannot be understood when seen in the context of the international crisis of modern architecture. Capitalist Development Confronts Ideology: Modern historians put the blame of the crisis of modernism on Fascism and Stalinism. Although, the initial hypothesis of Tafuri is that ideology of the plan is swept away by the reality of the plan the moment the plan came down from the utopian level and became an operant mechanism. Art was called to give the city a superstructural face by trying to dissimulate the contradictions of the contemporary city, resolving them in polyvalent images, figuratively glorifying the formal complexity. Art that refuses to place itself in the vanguard of the cycles of production, demonstrates well beyond all verbal challenges, that the consumption process extends to infinity, and that even rubbish, when sublimated into useless or nihilistic objects can assume a new use value, thus reentering, if only by the back door , the cycle of production and consumption. Yet this rear guard is also the indication of the capitalist plan’s refusal­perhaps only temporary­to fully resolve the contradictions of the city and transform the city into totally organized machine without archaic forms of waste or generalized dysfunctions. In such a phase as this, one must act to convince the public that the contradictions, imbalances, and chaos typical of the contemporary city are inevitable­that such chaos in itself, in fact, contains unexplored riches, unlimited possibilities o be turned to account, bright and shining values to be presented as new social fetishes. critique of art and architecture" Marcusian mythology is used to demonstrate that it is possible to achieve a vaguely defined collective freedom within the current relations of production, and not through their subversion. With the reassertion of art’s role as a mediator one may again assign in the naturalistic attributes that enlightment culture had given it. The destiny of the capitalist society with its order and disorder is not at all extraneous to the project. The ideology of the project is essential to the integration of modern capitalism, with all its structures and super structures, into human existence, as is the illusion of being able to oppose that project with the tools of a different project or with those with a radical anti­ project. It may even be that many marginal and rearguard roles exist for architecture and planning. Of primary interest to us, however, is the question of why, until now Marxist oriented culture has denied or concealed the simple truth that, just as there can be no such thing as a political economics of class, but only a class critique of political economics, likewise there can never be an aesthetics, art or architecture of class, but only a class critique of aesthetic, art, architecture and the city

### Growth

#### Capitalism guarantees economic collapse—mature capitalism doesn’t guarantee adequate private investement guaranteeing increasing recessions and sub-par growth

Beitel, currently conducting research for Service Employees International Union, May 2008

[Karl, *The Subprime Debacle*, Monthly Review Vol 60 Iss 1, Proquest]

A financial crisis in a capitalist system is often seen as serving to bring an ultimately unsustainable credit expansion to a halt when it has run too far in advance of the rate of accumulation. By forcing lenders to write off the value of these nonredeemable loans from their balance sheets, crisis places a periodic "check" on the inherent propensity toward the excessive creation of credit. Once nonperforming loans have been charged off and cleared from the bank's portfolio and losses written off, the stage is set for a renewed cycle of credit-fueled reflation, provided, of course, that the distress does not erupt into a full-scale financial meltdown. The role of the central bank is to balance the need to contain euphoric bouts of speculative excess once the credit expansion threatens to push asset prices to unsustainable levels (typically by raising the interbank loan rate), while standing ready to provide liquidity and fulfill its function as the lender of last resort in the event that a looming repayment crisis threatens to cut off the supply of credit if banks panic and start hoarding funds. If the Fed can balance these two functions, the result is an oscillating pattern of (semi)-controlled deflations and reflations of the credit structure over the course of the business cycle. While debt deflations are always full of unwelcome and nasty surprises, several factors are currently at work that will in all likelihood prevent the subprime debacle from turning into a full-scale financial meltdown. Most notably, balance sheets of nonfinancial corporations are in a generally strong condition. Because firms have used strong internal cash flows to lower their debt-equity ratios as opposed to increasing investments in physical capital, they are presently less directly exposed to shifting conditions in the financial markets. Given the generally strong profit position in the nonfinancial corporate sector the U.S. monetary authorities will probably find a way to muddle through the present crisis. Despite this fact, economic activity will slow, and a recession, followed by a protracted period of subpar growth, looks likely.21 As has been noted many times in these pages, in a capitalist system characterized by industrial maturity and markets dominated by large oligopolistic corporations, there are no endogenous mechanisms that insure that capitalists will collectively invest at a level required to keep the system humming along at anywhere near full capacity. This points to one of the system's most fundamental, and ultimately irreconcilable, contradictions: mature capitalism has no endogenous means to guarantee an adequate level of private investment, yet by the same token it cannot tolerate any rise in wages that would erode the profits of the owning class. This has left the system dependent upon debt-fueled consumption. The internal contradiction shows up in the form of subpar growth and economic stagnation, or credit-driven booms and bubbles followed by crisis once the expansion of financial claims on earnings collides with the realities of wage stagnation for the majority of the U.S. working class. While debt-fueled bubbles provide a temporary solution to problems of overaccumulation, they cannot be assumed to do so forever. The ability of households to continue to increase their debt loads at anywhere near the rate observed over the last two decades appears tapped out at present. This implies limits are being reached in the ability of debt-financed household spending to serve as a panacea for stagnation. Restoring a higher rate of accumulation will thus require the emergence of a new dynamic technology or growth sector able to absorb massive sums of capital investment and reignite the engines of long-term growth and accumulation. Absent this, the system looks poised to enter into a period of protracted stagnation. The wild card in the current conjuncture is the fact that the subprime debacle is unfolding in an international context characterized by a deepening crisis of confidence in the dollar. Recent booms in U.S. consumer spending have driven a steady increase in the U.S. trade deficit, currently at just under 5 percent of GDP. The United States has been able to sustain recent debt-fueled consumer spending booms despite this burgeoning trade deficit in large part because of foreigners' willingness to use their surplus dollar reserves to purchase dollar-denominated financial assets, particularly U.S. government debt that still serves as the "gold standard" of international finance. Capital inflows from abroad have similarly provided the means through which the United States has financed its massive and growing fiscal deficits. While the dollar's position as the world's preeminent international reserve currency appears secure at present, the Federal Reserve's ability to reflate the U.S. economy through periodic injections of cheap credit could at some point encounter an external financing constraint should foreigners become less willing to buy and hold U.S. government debt. Concerns are emerging in many foreign quarters over the ongoing loss of the value of their dollar-denominated financial holdings. Any longer-term move away from the dollar through a sell-off of U.S. Treasury debt would put pressure on U.S. interest rates and limit the policy options available to the Fed. How these events will ultimately play out is impossible to predict. What is certain, however, is that other crises await, and the ability of the central bank indefinitely to defer the underlying problem of overaccumulation is far from guaranteed.

### Environment

#### Capitalism causes environmental collapse – causes extinction

Foster 10 [John Bellamy, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon in Eugene, Last updated and edited February 3, 2010, “Why Ecological Revolution”, <http://monthlyreview.org/100101foster.php>] //khirn

It is now universally recognized within science that humanity is confronting the prospect — if we do not soon change course — of a planetary ecological collapse. Not only is the global ecological crisis becoming more and more severe, with the time in which to address it fast running out, but the dominant environmental strategies are also forms of denial, demonstrably doomed to fail, judging by their own limited objectives. This tragic failure, I will argue, can be attributed to the refusal of the powers that be to address the roots of the ecological problem in capitalist production and the resulting necessity of ecological and social revolution. The term “crisis,” attached to the global ecological problem, although unavoidable, is somewhat misleading, given its dominant economic associations. Since 2008, we have been living through a world economic crisis — the worst economic downturn since the 1930s. This has been a source of untold suffering for hundreds of millions, indeed billions, of people. But insofar as it is related to the business cycle and not to long-term factors, expectations are that it is temporary and will end, to be followed by a period of economic recovery and growth — until the advent of the next crisis. Capitalism is, in this sense, a crisis-ridden, cyclical economic system. Even if we were to go further, to conclude that the present crisis of accumulation is part of a long-term economic stagnation of the system — that is, a slowdown of the trend-rate of growth beyond the mere business cycle — we would still see this as a partial, historically limited calamity, raising, at most, the question of the future of the present system of production.1 When we speak today of the world ecological crisis, however, we are referring to something that could turn out to be final, i.e., there is a high probability, if we do not quickly change course, of a terminal crisis — a death of the whole anthropocene, the period of human dominance of the planet. Human actions are generating environmental changes that threaten the extermination of most species on the planet, along with civilization, and conceivably our own species as well. What makes the current ecological situation so serious is that climate change, arising from human-generated increases in greenhouse gas emissions, is not occurring gradually and in a linear process, but is undergoing a dangerous acceleration, pointing to sudden shifts in the state of the earth system. We can therefore speak, to quote James Hansen, director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and the world’s most famous climate scientist, of “tipping points…fed by amplifying feedbacks.”2 Four amplifying feedbacks are significant at present: (1) rapid melting of arctic sea ice, with the resulting reduction of the earth’s albedo (reflection of solar radiation) due to the replacement of bright, reflective ice with darker blue sea water, leading to greater absorption of solar energy and increasing global average temperatures; (2) melting of the frozen tundra in northern regions, releasing methane (a much more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide) trapped beneath the surface, causing accelerated warming; (3) recent indications that there has been a drop in the efficiency of the carbon absorption of the world’s oceans since the 1980s, and particularly since 2000, due to growing ocean acidification (from past carbon absorption), resulting in faster carbon build-up in the atmosphere and enhanced warming; (4) extinction of species due to changing climate zones, leading to the collapse of ecosystems dependent on these species, and the death of still more species.3 Due to this acceleration of climate change, the time line in which to act before calamities hit, and before climate change increasingly escapes our control, is extremely short. In October 2009, Luc Gnacadja, executive secretary of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, reported that, based on current trends, close to 70 percent of the land surface of the earth could be drought-affected by 2025, compared to nearly 40 percent today.4 The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that glaciers are melting throughout the world and could recede substantially this century. Rivers fed by the Himalyan glaciers currently supply water to countries with around 3 billion people. Their melting will give rise to enormous floods, followed by acute water shortages.5 Many of the planetary dangers associated with current global warming trends are by now well-known: rising sea levels engulfing islands and low-lying coastal regions throughout the globe; loss of tropical forests; destruction of coral reefs; a “sixth extinction” rivaling the great die-downs in the history of the planet; massive crop losses; extreme weather events; spreading hunger and disease. But these dangers are heightened by the fact that climate change is not the entirety of the world ecological crisis. For example, independently of climate change, tropical forests are being cleared as a direct result of the search for profits. Soil destruction is occurring, due to current agribusiness practices. Toxic wastes are being diffused throughout the environment. Nitrogen run-off from the overuse of fertilizer is affecting lakes, rivers, and ocean regions, contributing to oxygen-poor “dead zones.” Since the whole earth is affected by the vast scale of human impact on the environment in complex and unpredictable ways, even more serious catastrophes could conceivably be set in motion. One growing area of concern is ocean acidification due to rising carbon dioxide emissions. As carbon dioxide dissolves, it turns into carbonic acid, making the oceans more acidic. Because carbon dioxide dissolves more readily in cold than in warm water, the cold waters of the arctic are becoming acidic at an unprecedented rate. Within a decade, the waters near the North Pole could become so corrosive as to dissolve the living shells of shellfish, affecting the entire ocean food chain. At the same time, ocean acidification appears to be reducing the carbon uptake of the oceans, speeding up global warming.6 There are endless predictive uncertainties in all of this. Nevertheless, evidence is mounting that the continuation of current trends is unsustainable, even in the short-term. The only rational answer, then, is a radical change of course. Moreover, given certain imminent tipping points, there is no time to be lost. Catastrophic changes in the earth system could be set irreversibly in motion within a few decades, at most. The IPCC, in its 2007 report, indicated that an atmospheric carbon dioxide level of 450 parts per million (ppm) should not be exceeded, and implied that this was the fail-safe point for carbon stabilization. But these findings are already out of date. “What science has revealed in the past few years,” Hansen states, “is that the safe level of carbon dioxide in the long run is no more than 350 ppm,” as compared with 390 ppm today. That means that carbon emissions have to be reduced faster and more drastically than originally thought, to bring the overall carbon concentration in the atmosphere down. The reality is that, “if we burn all the fossil fuels, or even half of remaining reserves, we will send the planet toward the ice-free state with sea level about 250 feet higher than today. It would take time for complete ice sheet disintegration to occur, but a chaotic situation would be created with changes occurring out of control of future generations.” More than eighty of the world’s poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries have now declared that carbon dioxide atmospheric concentration levels must be reduced below 350 ppm, and that the rise in global average temperature by century’s end must not exceed 1.5°C.7 Strategies of Denial The central issue that we have to confront, therefore, is devising social strategies to address the world ecological crisis. Not only do the solutions have to be large enough to deal with the problem, but also all of this must take place on a world scale in a generation or so. The speed and scale of change necessary means that what is required is an ecological revolution that would also need to be a social revolution. However, rather than addressing the real roots of the crisis and drawing the appropriate conclusions, the dominant response is to avoid all questions about the nature of our society, and to turn to technological fixes or market mechanisms of one sort or another. In this respect, there is a certain continuity of thought between those who deny the climate change problem altogether, and those who, while acknowledging the severity of the problem at one level, nevertheless deny that it requires a revolution in our social system. We are increasingly led to believe that the answers to climate change are primarily to be found in new energy technology, specifically increased energy and carbon efficiencies in both production and consumption. Technology in this sense, however, is often viewed abstractly as a deus ex machina, separated from both the laws of physics (i.e., entropy or the second law of thermodynamics) and from the way technology is embedded in historically specific conditions. With respect to the latter, it is worth noting that, under the present economic system, increases in energy efficiency normally lead to increases in the scale of economic output, effectively negating any gains from the standpoint of resource use or carbon efficiency — a problem known as the “Jevons Paradox.” As William Stanley Jevons observed in the nineteenth century, every new steam engine was more efficient in the use of coal than the one before, which did not prevent coal burning from increasing overall, since the efficiency gains only led to the expansion of the number of steam engines and of growth in general. This relation between efficiency and scale has proven true for capitalist economies up to the present day.8 Technological fetishism with regard to environmental issues is usually coupled with a form of market fetishism. So widespread has this become that even a militant ecologist like Bill McKibben, author of The End of Nature, recently stated: “There is only one lever even possibly big enough to make our system move as fast as it needs to, and that’s the force of markets.”9 Green-market fetishism is most evident in what is called “cap and trade” — a catch phrase for the creation, via governments, of artificial markets in carbon trading and so-called “offsets.” The important thing to know about cap and trade is that it is a proven failure. Although enacted in Europe as part of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, it has failed where it was supposed to count: in reducing emissions. Carbon-trading schemes have been shown to be full of holes. Offsets allow all sorts of dubious forms of trading that have no effect on emissions. Indeed, the only area in which carbon trading schemes have actually been effective is in promoting profits for speculators and corporations, which are therefore frequently supportive of them. Recently, Friends of the Earth released a report entitled Subprime Carbon? which pointed to the emergence, under cap and trade agreements, of what could turn out to be the world’s largest financial derivatives market in the form of carbon trading. All of this has caused Hansen to refer to cap and trade as “the temple of doom,” locking in “disasters for our children and grandchildren.”10 The masquerade associated with the dominant response to global warming is illustrated in the climate bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in late June 2009. The bill, if enacted, would supposedly reduce greenhouse gas emissions 17 percent relative to 2005 levels by 2020, which translates into 4-5 percent less U.S. global warming pollution than in 1990. This then would still not reach the target level of a 6-8 percent cut (relative to 1990) for wealthy countries that the Kyoto accord set for 2012, and that was supposed to have been only a minor, first step in dealing with global warming — at a time when the problem was seen as much less severe. The goal presented in the House bill, even if reached, would therefore prove vastly inadequate. But the small print in the bill makes achieving even this meager target unrealistic. The coal industry is given until 2025 to comply with the bill’s pollution reduction mandates, with possible extensions afterward. As Hansen observes, the bill “builds in approval of new coal-fired power plants!” Agribusiness, which accounts for a quarter of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, is entirely exempt from the mandated reductions. The cap and trade provisions of the House bill would give annual carbon dioxide emission allowances to some 7,400 facilities across the United States, most of them handed out for free. These pollution allowances would increase up through 2016, and companies would be permitted to “bank” them indefinitely for future use. Corporations would be able to fulfill their entire set of obligations by buying offsets associated with pollution control projects until 2027. To make matters worse, the Senate counterpart to the House bill, now under deliberation, would undoubtedly be more conservative, giving further concessions and offsets to corporations. The final bill, if it comes out of Congress, will thus be, in Hansen’s words, “worse than nothing.” Similar developments can be seen in the preparation for the December 2009 world climate negotiations in Copenhagen, in which Washington has played the role of a spoiler, blocking all but the most limited, voluntary agreements, and insisting on only market-based approaches, such as cap and trade.11 Recognizing that world powers are playing the role of Nero as Rome burns, James Lovelock, the earth system scientist famous for his Gaia hypothesis, argues that massive climate change and the destruction of human civilization as we know it may now be irreversible. Nevertheless, he proposes as “solutions” either a massive building of nuclear power plants all over the world (closing his eyes to the enormous dangers accompanying such a course) — or geoengineering our way out of the problem, by using the world’s fleet of aircraft to inject huge quantities of sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere to block a portion of the incoming sunlight, reducing the solar energy reaching the earth. Another common geoengineering proposal includes dumping iron filings throughout the ocean to increase its carbon-absorbing properties. Rational scientists recognize that interventions in the earth system on the scale envisioned by geoengineering schemes (for example, blocking sunlight) have their own massive, unforeseen consequences. Nor could such schemes solve the crisis. The dumping of massive quantities of sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere would, even if effective, have to be done again and again, on an increasing scale, if the underlying problem of cutting greenhouse gas emissions were not dealt with. Moreover, it could not possibly solve other problems associated with massive carbon dioxide emissions, such as the acidification of the oceans.12 The dominant approach to the world ecological crisis, focusing on technological fixes and market mechanisms, is thus a kind of denial; one that serves the vested interests of those who have the most to lose from a change in economic arrangements. Al Gore exemplifies the dominant form of denial in his new book, Our Choice: A Plan to Solve the Climate Crisis. For Gore, the answer is the creation of a “sustainable capitalism.” He is not, however, altogether blind to the faults of the present system. He describes climate change as the “greatest market failure in history” and decries the “short-term” perspective of present-day capitalism, its “market triumphalism,” and the “fundamental flaws” in its relation to the environment. Yet, in defiance of all this, he assures his readers that the “strengths of capitalism” can be harnessed to a new system of “sustainable development.”13 The System of Unsustainable Development In reality, capitalism can be defined as a system of unsustainable development. In order to understand why this is so, it is useful to turn to Karl Marx, the core of whose entire intellectual corpus might be interpreted as a critique of the political economy of unsustainable development and its human and natural consequences. Capitalism, Marx explains, is a system of generalized commodity production. There were other societies prior to capitalism in which commodity markets played important roles, but it is only in capitalism that a system emerges that is centered entirely on the production of commodities. A “commodity” is a good produced to be sold and exchanged for profit in the market. We call it a “good” because it is has a use value, i.e., it normally satisfies some use, otherwise there would be no need for it. But it is the exchange value, i.e., the money income and the profit that it generates, that is the exclusive concern of the capitalist. What Marx called “simple commodity production” is an idealized economic formation — often assumed to describe the society wherein we live — in which the structure of exchange is such that a commodity embodying a certain use value is exchanged for money (acting as a mere means of exchange), which is, in turn, exchanged for another commodity (use value) at the end. Here, the whole exchange process from beginning to end can be designated by the shorthand C-M-C. In such a process, exchange is simply a modified form of barter, with money merely facilitating exchange. The goal of exchange is concrete use values, embodying qualitative properties. Such use values are normally consumed — thereby bringing a given exchange process to an end. Marx, however, insisted that a capitalist economy, in reality, works altogether differently, with exchange taking the form of M-C-M′. Here money capital (M) is used to purchase commodities (labor power and means of production) to produce a commodity that can be sold for more money, M′ (i.e., M + Δm or surplus value) at the end. This process, once set in motion, never stops of its own accord, since it has no natural end. Rather, the surplus value (profit) is reinvested in the next round, with the object of generating M′′; and, in the following round, the returns are again reinvested with the goal of obtaining M′′′, and so on, ad infinitum.14 For Marx, therefore, capital is self-expanding value, driven incessantly to ever larger levels of accumulation, knowing no bounds. “Capital,” he wrote, “is the endless and limitless drive to go beyond its limiting barrier. Every boundary is and has to be a [mere] barrier for it [and thus capable of being surmounted]. Else it would cease to be capital — money as self-reproductive.” It thus converts all of nature and nature’s laws as well as all that is distinctly human into a mere means of its own self-expansion. The result is a system, fixated on the exponential growth of profits and accumulation. “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!”15 Any attempt to explain where surplus value (or profits) comes from must penetrate beneath the exchange process and enter the realm of labor and production. Here, Marx argues that value added in the working day can be divided into two parts: (1) the part that reproduces the value of labor power (i.e., the wages of the workers) and thus constitutes necessary labor; and (2) the labor expended in the remaining part of the working day, which can be regarded as surplus labor, and which generates surplus value (or gross profits) for the capitalist. Profits are thus to be regarded as residual, consisting of what is left over after wages are paid out — something that every businessperson instinctively understands. The ratio of surplus (i.e., unpaid) labor to necessary (paid) labor in the working day is, for Marx, the rate of exploitation. The logic of this process is that the increase in surplus value appropriated depends on the effective exploitation of human labor power. This can be achieved in two ways: (1) either workers are compelled to work longer hours for the same pay, thereby increasing the surplus portion of the working day simply by adding to the total working time (Marx calls this “absolute surplus value”); or (2) the value of labor power, i.e., the value equivalent of workers’ wages, is generated in less time (as a result of increased productivity, etc.), thereby augmenting the surplus portion of the working day to that extent (Marx calls this “relative surplus value”). In its unrelenting search for greater (relative) surplus value, capitalism is thus dependent on the revolutionization of the means of production with the aim of increasing productivity and reducing the paid portion of the working day. This leads inexorably to additional revolutions in production, additional increases in productivity, in what constitutes an endless treadmill of production/accumulation. The logic of accumulation concentrates more and more of the wealth and power of society in fewer and fewer hands, and generates an enormous industrial reserve army of the unemployed. This is all accompanied by the further alienation of labor, robbing human beings of their creative potential, and often of the environmental conditions essential for their physical reproduction. “The factory system,” Marx wrote, “is turned into systematic robbery of what is necessary for the life of the worker while he is at work, i.e., space, light, air and protection against the dangerous or the unhealthy contaminants of the production process.”16 For classical political economists, beginning with the physiocrats and Adam Smith, nature was explicitly designated as a “free gift” to capital. It thus did not directly enter into the determination of exchange value (value), which constituted the basis of the accumulation of private capital. Nevertheless, classical political economists did see nature as constituting public wealth, since this was identified with use values, and included not only what was scarce, as in the case of exchange values, but also what was naturally abundant, e.g., air, water, etc. Out of these distinctions arose what came to be known as the Lauderdale Paradox, associated with the ideas of James Maitland, the eighth Earl of Lauderdale, who observed in 1804 that private riches (exchange values) could be expanded by destroying public wealth (use values) — that is, by generating scarcity in what was formerly abundant. This meant that individual riches could be augmented by landowners monopolizing the water of wells and charging a price for what had previously been free — or by burning crops (the produce of the earth) to generate scarcity and thus exchange value. Even the air itself, if it became scarce enough, could expand private riches, once it was possible to put a price on it. Lauderdale saw such artificial creation of scarcity as a way in which those with private monopolies of land and resources robbed society of its real wealth.17 Marx (following Ricardo) strongly embraced the Lauderdale Paradox, and its criticism of the inverse relation between private riches and public wealth. Nature, under the system of generalized commodity production, was, Marx insisted, reduced to being merely a free gift to capital and was thus robbed. Indeed, the fact that part of the working day was unpaid and went to the surplus of the capitalist meant that an analogous situation pertained to human labor power, itself a “natural force.” The worker was allowed to “work for his own life, i.e. to live, only in so far as he works for a certain time gratis for the capitalist…[so that] the whole capitalist system of production turns on the prolongation of this gratis labour by extending the working day or by developing the productivity, i.e., the greater intensity of labour power, etc.” Both nature and the unpaid labor of the worker were then to be conceived in analogous ways as free gifts to capital.18 Given the nature of this classical critique, developed to its furthest extent by Marx, it is hardly surprising that later neoclassical economists, exercising their primary role as apologists for the system, were to reject both the classical theory of value and the Lauderdale Paradox. The new marginalist economic orthodoxy that emerged in the late nineteenth century erased all formal distinctions within economics between use value and exchange value, between wealth and value. Nature’s contribution to wealth was simply defined out of existence within the prevailing economic view. However, a minority of heterodox economists, including such figures as Henry George, Thorstein Veblen, and Frederick Soddy, were to insist that this rejection of nature’s contribution to wealth only served to encourage the squandering of common resources characteristic of the system. “In a sort of parody of an accountant’s nightmare,” John Maynard Keynes was to write of the financially driven capitalist system, “we are capable of shutting off the sun and the stars because they do not pay a dividend.”19 For Marx, capitalism’s robbing of nature could be seen concretely in its creation of a rift in the human-earth metabolism, whereby the reproduction of natural conditions was undermined. He defined the labor process in ecological terms as the “metabolic interaction” between human beings and nature. With the development of industrial agriculture under capitalism, a rift was generated in the nature-given metabolism between human beings and the earth. The shipment of food and fiber hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of miles to the cities meant the removal of soil nutrients, such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, which ended up contributing to the pollution of the cities, while the soil itself was robbed of its “constituent elements.” This created a rupture in “the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil,” requiring the “systematic restoration” of this metabolism. Yet, even though this had been demonstrated with the full force of natural science (for example, in Justus von Liebig’s chemistry), the rational application of scientific principles in this area was impossible for capitalism. Consequently, capitalist production simultaneously undermined “the original sources of all wealth — the soil and the worker.”20 Marx’s critique of capitalism as an unsustainable system of production was ultimately rooted in its “preconditions,” i.e., the historical bases under which capitalism as a mode of production became possible. These were to be found in “primitive accumulation,” or the expropriation of the commons (of all customary rights to the land), and hence the expropriation of the workers themselves — of their means of subsistence. It was this expropriation that was to help lay the grounds for industrial capitalism in particular. The turning of the land into private property, a mere means of accumulation, was at the same time the basis for the destruction of the metabolism between human beings and the earth.21 This was carried out on an even greater and more devastating scale in relation to the pillage of the third world. Here, trade in human slavery went hand-in-hand with the seizure of the land and resources of the entire globe as mere plunder to feed the industrial mills of England and elsewhere. Whole continents (or at least those portions that European colonialism was able to penetrate) were devastated. Nor is this process yet complete, with depeasantization of the periphery by expanding agribusiness, constituting one of the chief forms of social and ecological destruction in the present day.22 Marx’s whole critique thus pointed to the reality of capitalism as a system of unsustainable development, rooted in the unceasing exploitation and pillage of human and natural agents. As he put it: “Après moi le déluge! is the watchword of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Capital therefore takes no account of the health and the length of life of the worker [or the human-nature metabolism], unless society forces it to do so.”23 He wryly observed in Capital that, when the Germans improved the windmill (in the form to be taken over by the Dutch), one of the first concerns, vainly fought over by the emperor Frederick I, the nobility, and the clergy, was who was “the ‘owner’ of the wind.” Nowadays, this observation on early attempts to commodify the air takes on even greater irony — at a time when markets, in what Gore himself refers to as “subprime carbon assets,” are helping to generate a speculative bubble with respect to earth’s atmosphere.24 Toward Ecological Revolution If the foregoing argument is correct, humanity is facing an unprecedented challenge. On the one hand, we are confronting the question of a terminal crisis, threatening most life on the planet, civilization, and the very existence of future generations. On the other hand, attempts to solve this through technological fixes, market magic, and the idea of a “sustainable capitalism” are mere forms of ecological denial: since they ignore the inherent destructiveness of the current system of unsustainable development — capitalism. This suggests that the only rational answer lies in an ecological revolution, which would also have to be a social revolution, aimed at the creation of a just and sustainable society. In addressing the question of an ecological revolution in the present dire situation, both short-term and long-term strategies are necessary, and should complement each other. One short-term strategy, directed mainly at the industrialized world, has been presented by Hansen. He starts with what he calls a “geophysical fact”: most of the remaining fossil fuel, particularly coal, must stay in the ground, and carbon emissions have to be reduced as quickly as possible to near zero. He proposes three measures: (1) coal burning (except where carbon is sequestered — right now not technologically feasible) must cease; (2) the price of fossil fuel consumption should be steadily increased by imposing a progressively rising tax at the point of production: well head, mine shaft, or point of entry — redistributing 100 percent of the revenue, on a monthly basis, directly to the population as dividends; (3) a massive, global campaign to end deforestation and initiate large-scale reforestation needs to be introduced. A carbon tax, he argues, if it were to benefit the people directly — the majority of whom have below average per-capita carbon footprints, and would experience net gains from the carbon dividends once their added energy costs were subtracted — would create massive support for change. It would help to mobilize the population, particularly those at the bottom of society, in favor of a climate revolution. Hansen’s “fee and dividend” proposal is explicitly designed not to feed the profits of vested interests. Any revenue from the carbon tax, in this plan, has to be democratically structured so as to redistribute income and wealth to those with smaller carbon footprints (the poor), and away from those with the larger carbon footprints (the rich).25 Hansen has emerged as a leading figure in the climate struggle, not only as a result of his scientific contributions, but also due to his recognition that at the root of the problem is a system of economic power, and his increasingly radical defiance of the powers that be. Thus, he declares: “the trains carrying coal to power plants are death trains. Coal-fired plants are factories of death.” He criticizes those such as Gore, who have given in to cap and trade, locking in failure. Arguing that the unwillingness and inability of the authorities to act means that desperate measures are necessary, he is calling for mass “civil resistance.” In June 2009, he was arrested, along with thirty-one others, in the exercise of civil resistance against mountain top removal coal mining.26 In strategizing an immediate response to the climate problem, it is crucial to recognize that the state, through government regulation and spending programs, could intervene directly in the climate crisis. Carbon dioxide could be considered an air pollutant to be regulated by law. Electrical utilities could be mandated to obtain their energy increasingly from renewable sources. Solar panels could be included as a mandatory part of the building code. The state could put its resources behind major investments in public environmental infrastructure and planning, including reducing dependence on the automobile through massive funding of public transportation, e.g., intercity trains and light rail, and the necessary accompanying changes in urban development and infrastructure. Globally, the struggle, of course, has to take into account the reality of economic and ecological imperialism. The allowable carbon-concentration limits of the atmosphere have already been taken up as a result of the accumulation of the rich states at the center of the world system. The economic and social development of poor countries is, therefore, now being further limited by the pressing need to impose restrictions on carbon emissions for the sake of the planet as a whole — despite the fact that underdeveloped economies had no role in the creation of the problem. The global South is likely to experience the effects of climate change much earlier and more severely than the North, and has fewer economic resources with which to adapt. All of this means that a non-imperialistic, and more sustainable, world solution depends initially on what is called “contraction and convergence” — a drastic contraction in greenhouse gas emissions overall (especially in the rich countries), coupled with the convergence of per-capita emissions in all countries at levels that are sustainable for the planet.27 Since, however, science suggests that even low greenhouse gas emissions may be unsustainable over the long run, strategies have to be developed to make it economically feasible for countries in the periphery to introduce solar and renewable technologies — reinforcing those necessary radical changes in social relations that will allow them to stabilize and reduce their emissions. For the anti-imperialist movement, a major task should be creating stepped-up opposition to military spending (amounting to a trillion dollars in the United States in 2007) and ending government subsidies to global agribusiness — with the goal of shifting those monies into environmental defense and the meeting of the social needs of the poorest countries, as suggested by the Bamako Appeal.28 It must be firmly established as a principle of world justice that the wealthy countries owe an enormous ecological debt to poorer countries, due to the robbing by the imperial powers of the global commons and the pillage of the periphery at every stage of world capitalist development. Already, the main force for ecological revolution stems from movements in the global South, marked by the growth of the Vía Campesina movement, socialist organizations like Brazil’s MST, and ongoing revolutions in Latin America (the ALBA countries) and Asia (Nepal). Cuba has been applying permaculture design techniques that mimic energy-maximizing natural systems to its agriculture since the 1990s, generating a revolution in food production. Venezuela, although, for historic reasons, an oil power economically dependent on the sale of petroleum, has made extraordinary achievements in recent years by moving toward a society directed at collective needs, including dramatic achievements in food sovereignty.29 Reaching back into history, it is worth recalling that the proletariat in Marxian theory was the revolutionary agent because it had nothing to lose, and thus came to represent the universal interest in abolishing, not only its own oppression, but oppression itself. As Marx put it, “the living conditions of the proletariat represent the focal point of all inhuman conditions in contemporary society….However, it [the proletariat] cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the conditions which give it life, and it cannot abolish these conditions without abolishing all those inhuman conditions of social life which are summed up in its own situation.”30 Later Marxist theorists were to argue that, with the growth of monopoly capitalism and imperialism, the “focal point of inhuman conditions” had shifted from the center to the periphery of the world system. Paul Sweezy contended that, although the objective conditions that Marx associated with the proletariat did not match those of better-off workers in the United States and Europe in the 1960s, they did correspond to the harsh, inhuman conditions imposed on “the masses of the much more numerous and populous underdeveloped dependencies of the global capitalist system.” This helped explain the pattern of socialist revolutions following the Second World War, as exemplified by Vietnam, China, and Cuba.31 Looking at this today, I think it is conceivable that the main historic agent and initiator of a new epoch of ecological revolution is to be found in the third world masses most directly in line to be hit first by the impending disasters. Today the ecological frontline is arguably to be found in the inhabitants of the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta and of the low-lying fertile coast area of the Indian Ocean and China Seas — the state of Kerala in India, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia. They, too, as in the case of Marx’s proletariat, have nothing to lose from the radical changes necessary to avert (or adapt to) disaster. In fact, with the universal spread of capitalist social relations and the commodity form, the world proletariat and the masses most exposed to sea level rise — for example, the low-lying delta of the Pearl River and the Guangdong industrial region from Shenzhen to Guangzhou — sometimes overlap. This, then, potentially constitutes the global epicenter of a new environmental proletariat.32 The truly planetary crisis we are now caught up in, however, requires a world uprising transcending all geographical boundaries. This means that ecological and social revolutions in the third world have to be accompanied by, or inspire, universal revolts against imperialism, the destruction of the planet, and the treadmill of accumulation. The recognition that the weight of environmental disaster is such that it would cross all class lines and all nations and positions, abolishing time itself by breaking what Marx called “the chain of successive generations,” could lead to a radical rejection of the engine of destruction in which we live, and put into motion a new conception of global humanity and earth metabolism. As always, however, real change will have to come from those most alienated from the existing systems of power and wealth. The most hopeful development within the advanced capitalist world at present is the meteoric rise of the youth-based climate justice movement, which is emerging as a considerable force in direct action mobilization and in challenging the current climate negotiations.33 What is clear is that the long-term strategy for ecological revolution throughout the globe involves the building of a society of substantive equality, i.e., the struggle for socialism. Not only are the two inseparable, but they also provide essential content for each other. There can be no true ecological revolution that is not socialist; no true socialist revolution that is not ecological. This means recapturing Marx’s own vision of socialism/communism, which he defined as a society where “the associated producers govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control…accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature.”34 One way to understand this interdependent relation between ecology and socialism is in terms of what Hugo Chávez has called “the elementary triangle of socialism” (derived from Marx) consisting of: (1) social ownership; (2) social production organized by workers; and (3) satisfaction of communal needs. All three components of the elementary triangle of socialism are necessary if socialism is to be sustained. Complementing and deepening this is what could be called “the elementary triangle of ecology” (derived even more directly from Marx): (1) social use, not ownership, of nature; (2) rational regulation by the associated producers of the metabolic relation between humanity and nature; and (3) satisfaction of communal needs — not only of present but also future generations (and life itself).35 As Lewis Mumford explained in 1944, in his Condition of Man, the needed ecological transformation required the promotion of “basic communism,” applying “to the whole community the standards of the household,” distributing benefits “according to need, not ability or productive contribution.” This meant focusing first and foremost on “education, recreation, hospital services, public hygiene, art,” food production, the rural and urban environments, and, in general, “collective needs.” The idea of “basic communism” drew on Marx’s principle of substantive equality in the Critique of the Gotha Programme: “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” But Mumford also associated this idea with John Stuart Mill’s vision, in his most socialist phase, of a “stationary state” — viewed, in this case, as a system of economic production no longer geared to the accumulation of capital, in which the emphasis of society would be on collective development and the quality of life.36 For Mumford, this demanded a new “organic person” — to emerge from the struggle itself. An essential element of such an ecological and socialist revolution for the twenty-first century is a truly radical conception of sustainability, as articulated by Marx: From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private property of one man in other men [i.e., slavery]. Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the earth. They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations as boni patres familias [good heads of the household].37 Such a vision of a sustainable, egalitarian society must define the present social struggle; not only because it is ecologically necessary for human survival, but also because it is historically necessary for the development of human freedom. Today we face the challenge of forging a new organic revolution in which the struggles for human equality and for the earth are becoming one. There is only one future: that of sustainable human development.38

### War

#### Capitalism is the root cause of war

Dr. David Adams, 2002, former UNESCO Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace, former Professor of Psychology (for 23 years) at Wesleyan University, specialist on the brain mechanisms of aggressive behavior and the evolution of war, “Chapter 8: The Root Causes of War,” The American Peace Movements, p. 22-28, <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter8-22.html>

To take a scientific attitude about war and peace, we must carry the causal analysis a step further. If peace movements are caused by wars and war threats, then we must ask, what are the causes of these wars, both in the short term and in the long term? Before analyzing the causes of wars, it is necessary to dismiss a false analysis that has been popularized in recent years, the myth that war is caused by a "war instinct." The best biological and anthropological data indicate that there is no such thing as a war instinct despite the attempt of the mass media and educational systems to perpetuate this myth. Instead, "the same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace" (note 15). Since there are several kinds of war, it is likely that there are several different kinds of causes for war. There are two kinds of war in which the United States has not been engaged for over two centuries. The first are wars of national liberation such as the American Revolution or today's revolutions in Nicaragua and South Africa being waged by the Sandinistas and the African National Congress. The second are wars of revolution in which the previous ruling class is thrown out and replaced by another. In the British and French Revolutions of earlier eras the feudal land-owners were overthrown by the newly rising capitalist class. In the revolutions of this century in Russia, China, Cuba, etc. the capitalists, in turn, were overthrown by forces representing the working class and landless farmers. The six wars and threats of war that have caused American peace movements in this century have been wars of imperial conquest, inter-imperialist rivalry, and capitalist-socialist rivalry. What are the root causes of these wars in the short term? For the following analysis, I will rely upon some of America's best economic historians (note 16). The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars of 1898, according to historian Walter LaFeber, were inevitable military results of a new foreign policy devoted to obtaining markets overseas for American products. The new foreign policy was the response to a profound depression that began in 1893 with unemployment soaring to almost 20 percent. Farm and industrial output piled up without a market because American workers, being unemployed, had no money to buy them. Secretary of State Gresham "concluded that foreign markets would provide in large measure the cure for the depression." To obtain such markets, the U.S. went into competition with the other imperialist empires such as Britain and Spain. The U.S. intervened with a naval force to help overthrow the government of Hawaii in 1893, intervened diplomatically in Nicaragua in 1894, threatened war with England over Venezuela in 1895, and eventually went to war with Spain in 1898 and invaded the Philippines in 1898. To quote from the title of LaFeber's book, the U.S. established a "new empire." American intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression. In 1914 and 1915, as war between the European imperialist powers broke out, American unemployment was rising towards ten percent and industrial goods were piling up without a market. One industrial market was expanding, however, the market for weapons in Europe. The historian Charles Tansill concludes that "it was the rapid growth of the munitions trade which rescued America from this serious economic situation." And since the sales went to Britain and France, it committed the U.S. to their side in the war. Finance capital was equally involved: "the large banking interests were deeply interested in the World War because of wide opportunities for large profits." When bank loans to Britain and France of half a billion dollars went through in 1915, "the business depression, that had so worried the Administration in the spring of 1915, suddenly vanished, and 'boom times' prevailed." Of course, German imperialism did not stand idly by while the U.S. profited from arms shipments and loans to their enemies in the war. German submarine warfare against these shipments finally provoked American involvement in the War. The rise of fascism in Europe was the direct result of still another cyclical depression, the Great Depression that gripped the entire capitalist world in the Thirties. In his recent book on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism, David Abraham has documented how major capitalists turned to Hitler to fill the vacuum of political leadership when the economy collapsed. In part, the absence of political leadership "with the collapse of the export economy at the end of 1931...drove German industry to foster or accept a Bonapartist solution to the political crisis and an imperialist solution to the economic crisis. The "Bonapartist solution", as Abraham calls it, was found in Hitler's Nazi Party. As he says, "By mid-1932, the vast majority of industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation in the government." For these industrialists, "an anti-Marxist, imperialist program was the least common denominator on which they could all agree, and the Nazis seemed capable of providing the mass base for such a program." The appeasement of Hitler's promise to smash the communists and socialists at home and to destroy the Soviet Union abroad expressed a new cause of capitalist war. Up until that time, inter-imperialist wars were simply the response to economic contradictions at home and capitalist competition abroad. In part, World War II was yet another inter-imperialist war. But now a new cause of war was emerging alongside of the old. The rise of socialism was a direct threat to the entire capitalist world. In addition to glutted domestic markets and competition for foreign markets, the capitalists now had to face the additional problem that the overall foreign market itself was shrinking. Thus, they tended to support each other in the face of a common enemy. After World War II, there was a particularly sharp shrinkage in the "free world" for capitalist exploitation as socialism and national liberation triumphed through much of the world. The U.S. and its allies responded by demanding that the socialist countries open their doors to investment by capitalism. According to historian William Appleman Williams, "It was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war." As Williams explains, "the policy of the open door, like all imperial policies, created and spurred onward a dynamic opposition." Diplomatic and military confrontation between the U.S. and USSR were used to justify the Cold War and establishment of NATO, but the underlying issues were economic. As pointed out by historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "The question of foreign economic policy was not the containment of Communism, but rather more directly the extension and expansion of American capitalism according to its new economic power and needs." In addition to the new problem of shrinking world markets, there remained the problem of cyclical depressions. Although unemployment was not bad in 1946 because industry was producing to meet the accumulated needs of the war-deprived American people, the specter of another depression was very much a factor in the Cold War. As the Kolkos point out, "The deeply etched memory of the decade-long depression of 1929 hung over all American plans for the postwar era....In extending its power throughout the globe the United States hoped to save itself as well from a return of the misery of prewar experience." The Vietnam War was a continuation of the Cold War, as the United States tried to prevent further shrinkage of the world capitalist economic system. The U.S. had already fought a similar war in Korea. In his chapter, "The U.S. in Vietnam, 1944-66: Origins and Objectives," Gabriel Kolko calls the intervention of the United States in Vietnam, "the most important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy since the Second World War." Elsewhere in his book, Kolko goes into detail about the economic basis of American imperialism: access to raw materials, access to markets for American products, and investment opportunities for American capital. The Vietnam War, he explains, was not a conspiracy or simply a military decision. It was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world." Finally we come to the question of what has caused the massive escalation of the arms buildup under Presidents Carter and Reagan (and more recently under Bush, father and son). To some extent, it is a response to the old problem of cyclical depressions. Since World War II, each recession has been deeper than the last, until by 1981 unemployment reached double digits for the first time since

the Thirties. Government spending was needed to put people back to work. Would the government spend the money for military weapons or for civilian needs? A long line of Presidential candidates, standing for the military solution, have been supported in their campaigns by the military-industrial complex against other candidates who were unable to wage a serious campaign for civilian spending instead of military spending. The growing power of the military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition to the economic causes of war. It reflects an economic crisis that goes even deeper than those of the past. In addition to the cyclical depressions and the shrinkage of foreign markets, there is a new imbalance in the entire structure of capitalism. There is an enormous increase in financial speculation and short-term profit schemes. The military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector of the American economy because through the aid of state subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits. Never mind if the U.S. government goes into debt to banks and other financial institutions in order to pay for military spending. The world of financial speculation does not worry about tomorrow. Not only does this "military spending solution" endanger the security of the planet, but it also increases the risk of a major financial collapse and subsequent depression. To summarize, we may point to the following causes of American wars over the past century: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. In the 1985 edition of this book the argument was made that the socialist countries were escaping from the economic causation of war. In comparison to the capitalist countries, they did not have the same dynamic of over-production and cyclical depression, with periods of enhanced structural unemployment. As for exploitation and imperialism, despite the frequent reference in the American media to "Soviet imperialism," the direction of the flow of wealth was the opposite of what holds true under capitalist imperialism. Instead of the rich nations extracting wealth from the poor ones, which is the case, for example between the U.S. and Latin America, the net flow of wealth proceeded from the Soviet Union towards the other socialist countries in order to bring them towards an eventually even level of development. According to an authoritative source associated with the U.S. military-industrial complex, the net outflow from the Soviet Union amounted to over forty billion dollars a year in the mid-1980's. In one crucial respect, however, the 1985 analysis was incorrect. It failed to take account of the military-industrial complex that had grown to be the most powerful force of the Soviet economy, a mirror image of its equivalent in the West. The importance of this was brought home to those of us who attended a briefing on economic conversion from military to civilian production that was held at the United Nations on November 1, 1990, a critical time for Gorbachev's program of Perestroika in the Soviet Union. The speaker, Ednan Ageev, was the head of the Division of International Security Issues at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked by the Gorbachev administration to find out the extent to which the Soviet economy was being used for military production. Naturally, he went to the Minister of Defense, where he was told that this information was secret. Secret even to Gorbachev. In conversation, Ageev estimated that 85-90% of Soviet scientific researchers were in the military sector. That seems high until you realize that the Soviet's were matching U.S. military research, development and production on the basis of a Gross National Product only half as large. Since about 40% of U.S. research and development was tied to the military at that time, it would make sense that the Soviets would have had to double the U.S. percentage in order to keep pace. How could the Gorbachev administration convert their economy from military to civilian production if they could not even get a list of defense industries? Keeping this in mind, along with the enormous militarization of the Soviet economy, it is not so surprising that the Soviet economy collapsed, and with it the entire political superstructure. The origins of the Soviet military-industrial complex can be traced back to the Russian revolution which instituted what Lenin, at one point, called "war communism". He warned that war communism could not succeed in the long run and that instead of a top-down militarized economy, a socialist economy needed to be structured as a "cooperative of cooperatives." But war communism was entrenched during the Stalin years, carried out of necessity to an extreme during the Second World War, and then perpetuated by the Cold War. The economic causation of the war system is not new. It originated long before capitalism and socialism. From its beginnings in ancient Mesopotamia, the state was always associated with war, both to capture slaves abroad and to keep them under control at home. As states grew more powerful, war became the means to build empires and to acquire and rule colonies. In fact, the economic causation of war probably extends back even further into ancient prehistory. From the best analysis I know, that of Mel and Carol Ember, using the methods of cross-cultural anthropology, it would seem that war functioned as a means to survive periodic but unpredictable food shortages caused by natural disasters. Apparently, tribes that could make war most effectively could survive natural disasters better than others by successfully raiding the food supplies of their neighbors. While particular wars can be analyzed, as we have done above, in terms of immediate, short-term causes, there is a need to understand the war system itself, which is as old as human history. Particular wars are the tip of a much deeper iceberg. Beneath war, there has developed a culture of war that is entwined with it in a complex web of causation. On the one hand, the culture of war is produced and reinforced by each war, and, on the other hand, the culture of war provides the basis on which succeeding wars are prepared and carried out. The culture of war is a set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that consists of enemy images, authoritarian social structure, training and arming for violence, exploitation of man and nature, secrecy and male domination. Without an enemy, without a social structure where people will follow orders, without the preparation of soldiers and weapons, without the control of information, both propaganda and secrecy, no war can be carried out. The culture of war has been so prevalent in history that we take it for granted, as if it were human nature. However, anthropologists point to cultures that are nowhere near as immersed in the culture of war, and it is the opinion of the best scientists that a culture of peace is possible. Peace movements have not given enough attention to the internal use of the culture of war. The culture of war has two faces, one facing outward and the other inward. Foreign wars are accompanied by authoritarian rule inside the warring countries. Even when there is no war threat, armies (or national guards) are kept ready not just for use against foreign enemies, but also against those defined as the enemy within: striking workers, movements of the unemployed, prisoners, indigenous peoples, just as in an earlier time they were used against slave rebellions. As documented in my 1995 article in the Journal of Peace Research (Internal Military Interventions in the United States) the U.S. Army and National Guard have been used an average of 18 times a year, involving an average of 12,000 troops for the past 120 years, mostly against actions and revolts by workers and the unemployed. During periods of external war, the internal wars are usually intensified and accompanied by large scale spying, deportations and witch hunts. It would appear that we have once again entered such a period in the U.S. We are hardly alone in this matter. Needless to say, the culture of war was highly developed to stifle dissent in the Soviet Union by Stalin and his successors of "war communism." The internal culture of war needs to be analyzed and resisted everywhere. For example, readers living in France should question the role of the CRS. The internal use of the culture of war is no less economically motivated than external wars. The socialists at the beginning of the 20th Century recognized it as "class war," carried out in order to maintain the domination of the rich and powerful over the poor and exploited. Not by accident, it has often been socialists and communists who are the first to be targeted by the internal culture of war in capitalist countries. And they, in turn, have often made the most powerful critique of the culture of war and have played a leading role in peace movements for that reason. Their historical role for peace was considerably compromised, however, by the "war communism" of the Soviet Union. With its demise, however, there is now an opportunity for socialists and communists to return to their earlier leadership against war, both internal and external, and to insist that a true socialism can only flourish on the basis of a culture of peace. In considering future prospects for the American Peace Movements, I shall begin with trends from the past and then consider different factors for the future? First, let us look back over the economic factors and movements of the previous century to see if the trends are likely to continue. 1. Wars are likely to continue because, for the most part, their economic causes remain as strong as ever: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. The fourth factor is not as prominent since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but there is still evidence of this factor at work: for example, the attempted overthrow of the government of Venezuela in spring, 2002, was apparently linked to its developing ties with socialist Cuba, especially in terms of its oil resources. Although the coup d'etat failed, there was a risk of plunging Venezuela into warfare, especially considering the increasingly internationalized war next door in Colombia. Although the "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan, Philippines, etc. and the associated military buildup is usually justified as revenge for the attacks of September 11, there seems little doubt that there are economic motives involved as well, including the control of oil resources from Central Asia as a supplement to those of the Middle East. At the same time, the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. appears at some level to be intended as an increase in government spending to hedge against declining non-military production, unemployment and financial crises in the stock markets. 2. The American peace movements have been reactive in the past, developing in response to specific wars or threats of war, and then disappearing when the war is over or the threat is perceived to have decreased. In fact, this observation at the macro level is mirrored by an observation that I have made previously at a micro level: participants in peace movements have been motivated to an important degree by anger against the injustice of war. This dynamic seems likely to continue. Governments, worried about the reactive potential of peace movements may attempt to engage in very brief wars, just as the U.S. government cut short the 1991 Gulf War after several weeks to avoid an escalating peace movement. In the future, peace movements need to be broadened by linkages to other issues and by international solidarity and unity; otherwise they risk being only temporary influences on the course of history, growing in response to particular wars and then disappearing again afterwards. The world needs a sustained opposition to the entire culture of war, not just to particular wars. To be fully successful, the future peace movement needs to be positive as well as negative. It needs to be for a culture of peace at the same time as it is against the culture of war. This requires that activists in the future peace movement develop a shared vision of the future towards which the movement can aspire. I have found evidence, presented in the recent revision of my book Psychology for Peace Activists (note 17), that such a shared, positive vision is now becoming possible, and, as a result, human consciousness can take on a new and powerful dimension in this particular moment of history.

### Poverty

#### Neoliberalism results in mass poverty

Giroux, Prof of Comm @ McMaster, 2004 p. 44-45

(Henry, The Terror of Neoliberalism)

It is virtually impossible to understand the rise of such multifaceted authoritarianism in American society without analyzing the importance of neoliberalism as the defining ideology of the current historical moment.’72 While fascism does not need neoliberalism to develop, neoliberalism creates the ideological and economic conditions that can promote a uniquely American version of fascism.’73 Neoliberalism not only undermines the vital economic and political institutions and public spaces central to a democracy, it also has no vocabulary for recognizing anti-democratic forms of power. Even worse, it accentuates a structural relationship between the state and the economy that produces hierarchies, concentrates power in relatively few hands, unleashes the most brutal elements of a rabid individualism, destroys the welfare state, incarcerates large numbers of its disposable populations, economically disenfranchises large segments of the lower and middle classes, and reduces entire countries to pauperization.’74

#### And, fighting poverty is a moral obligation-must reject complicity

James Gilligan, Department of Psychiatry Harvard Medical School, Violence: Reflections on Our Deadliest Epidemic, 2000, p 195-196.   
  
  The 14 to 18 million deaths a year cause by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide--or about eight million per year, 1935-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-1966 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year.     In other word, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

## Framework

### A2: Framework

#### Every life angle for rhythms is key—vote negative

Lefebvre and Regulier, founder of the theory of everyday life, 1999 (“The Rhythmanalytical Project” in Rethinking Marxism *11:1*)  
From this vantage point, the living body can and has to be conceived as an inter- action of internal organs, each having its own rhythm, yet subjected to a spatiotem- poral globality. Furthermore, this human body is the locus and center of interaction between the biological, the physiological (nature), and the social (or what is often called the “cultural”), with each of these levels or dimensions having its own speci- ficity and therefore its own time and space or, if you will, its own rhythm. This in- evitably leads to stress, problems, and perturbations in this ensemble where stability is no guarantee. Whence the importance of scales, proportions, and rhythms. In dealing with physi- cal reality and its relation to the physiological and the tangible reality of human be- ings, modern philosophy offers two schemes. On the one hand, there is the Kantian and neo-Kantian scheme and, on the other hand, there is the empirical or positivist scheme. According to the former, phenomena (or the flux of sensations) are classi- fied and organized according to a priori categories-that is, prior to the subject and to knowledge, including that of time and space. The in-itself (the noumenal) escapes the “subject.” From the perspective of empiricism and positivism, sensible facts come together in relations of simultaneity, involvement, and concatenation. To put this in a slightly different way, if A includes B, and B includes C, then it follows that A in- cludes C. This type of reasoning implies that there is no need for categories other than logic, which are not categories per se but experimental evidences transcribed into a formal language. From Newton to Einstein and contemporary physics, Knowledge has followed another course that is also marked by certain philosophies such as Feuerbach’s. We often perceive only our relationship with natural objects or with commodities (i.e., with realities), which means that we must distinguish between appearances-which themselves have a reality-and what these things really are. For example, a wooden table or a pencil seems inert, yet it moves and changes (even if only the planet is moving); it is full of motion and energy. What takes place in physical reality can also be seen at work in the context of social relations. The inert object one sees desig- nates not just a material reality but also a social relationship. The whole process of production is dissimulated so that the product of one’s work appears as a mere ob- ject. Such being the case, it becomes necessary to go beyond facts, phenomena, and the flux of immediate sensations, which is different from saying that what is over and above the phenomenon and the sensible fact is determined in an interior and purely a priori way as the Kantian tradition leads one to believe. Our scale determines our setting and our place in the time-space of the universe: what we perceive and what can be used as a starting point for praxis as well as for theoretical knowledge. Both the micro and the macro elude us, although we can at- tain them progressively through knowledge and through their relationship to the known. Our rhythms immerse us in a vast and infinitely complex world that imposes on us an experience as well as the elements of this experience. Take light, for in- stance. We do not perceive it as an undulation that is charged with corpuscles but as a wonder that metamorphoses things, as an illumination of objects, and as a game at the surface of everything that exists. However, this subjective aspect should not ob- scure a certain objectivity. Centuries of research and measurement have made it possible to identify (though not fully to define) a physical reality in the phenomena that are associated with light. The specter of undulatory movements (with or without trajectories) extends in- definitely, even infinitely, from the macro to the micro, from corpuscular movements to the movements of metagalaxies. Relativist thought rejects all fixed and definitive references. A point of reference can only be provisional and conjunctural, which means that today, we can fault Einstein for having refuted the Newtonian concept of absolute time and space while retaining an absolute or a constant of the universe- the speed of light. In the immense specter, we understand and perceive only what is consonant with our own rhythms-that is, the rhythms of our organs, including two spheres that vary in accordance with individuals. One is over our normal perceptions and is geared toward the micro; the other is above our perceptions and is oriented toward the macro (sound waves, ultrasound, infrared and ultraviolet, and the like). We may even imagine beings with a more extended field of perception. We may certainly invent the tech- nology that can effectively extend this field. It continues to exist with its limits, markers. and borders According to Protagoras’s old formula, everything in the world is measured against the human being as a species,that is, as a physical and physiological being. It is not just that knowledge is relative to our constitution; it is also that the world that pre- sents itself to us (whether it be nature, the earth, and what we call the sky or the body and its integration in social relations) is relative or proportional to this constitution. Our knowledge is relative not so much to a priori categories, but to the senses and instruments with which we are endowed. To put it more philosophically, another scale would determine another world. Would it be the same? Undoubtedly, but it would be understood differently. Without knowing it (and the reference here is not to the “unconscious”), human beings appropriate at the center of the universe movements that are consonant with their own movements. The ear, the eyes, the gaze, the hands-these are far from being passive organs that do little besides record or execute. What is shaped, formed, and produced is part of this scale which, it must be emphasized, has nothing accidental or arbitrary about it. It is the scale of the planet, of accidents, of the surface of the earth, and of the cycles that recur. This is of course different from saying that pro- duction is confined to the production of things and objects that are nature’s givens. What is created is not part of this scale; it either transcends it or transforms it.

### Agora Alt

#### Voting negative interrupts neoliberal communicative practice and place building

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

But the in-between city does not just carry the baggage of the classical suburb, it also shares some of the problems of not-yet-developed areas (where all new development creates unplanned demand) and magnetically draws upon itself the “urban” problems of congestion, poverty, racism, etc. For his part, Tom Sieverts expresses the core of the problems facing the landscape of the Zwischenstadt as having to reconcile the “agora” into the “system:” Thus, the system of the global economy must be opposed by the agora of local economic cycles, the system of abstract communication must be set against the agora of lively debate, and the system of the bureaucratic power over society as a whole must be confronted with the agora of local community and neighbourhood responsibility (2003:73). Let us pause, however, to consider the kind of human subject for whom all these benefits were being provided. This subject was singu- larly abstract. Figures as diverse as Le Corbusier, Walther Rathenau, the collectivizers of the Soviet Union, and even Julius Nyerere (for all his rhetorical attention to African traditions) were planning for ge- neric subjects who needed so many square feet of housing space, acres of farmland, liters of clean water, and units of transportation and so much food, fresh air, and recreational space. Standardized citizens were uniform in their needs and even interchangeable. What is strik- ing, of course, is that such subjects-like the "unmarked citizens" of liberal theory-have, for the purposes of the planning exercise, no gender, no tastes, no history, no values, no opinions or original ideas, no traditions, and no distinctive personalities to contribute to the en- terprise. They have none of the particular, situated, and contextual at- tributes that one would expect of any population and that we, as a mat- ter of course, always attribute to elites. The lack of context and particularity is not an oversight; it is the necessary first premise of any large-scale planning exercise. To the de- gree that the subjects can be treated as standardized units, the power of resolution in the planning exercise is enhanced. Questions posed within these strict confines can have definitive, quantitative answers. The same logic applies to the transformation of the natural world. Ques- tions about the volume of commercial wood or the yield of wheat in bushels permit more precise calculations than questions about, say, the quality of the soil, the versatility and taste of the grain, or the well- being of the community.' The discipline of economics achieves its for- midable resolving power by transforming what might otherwise be considered qualitative matters into quantitative issues with a single metric and, as it were, a bottom line: profit or 1 0 ~ s . ~ Providing one un- derstands the heroic assumptions required to achieve this precision and the questions that it cannot answer, the single metric is an invalu- able tool. Problems arise only when it becomes hegemonic. What is perhaps most striking about high-modernist schemes, de- spite their quite genuine egalitarian and often socialist impulses, is how little confidence they repose in the skills, intelligence, and experi- ence of ordinary people. This is clear enough in the Taylorist factory, where the logic of work organization is to reduce the factory hands' contribution to a series of repetitive, if practiced, movements-oper- ations as machinelike as possible. But it is also clear in collectivized farms, ujamaa villages, and planned cities, where the movements of the populace have been to a large degree inscribed in the designs of these communities. If Nyerere's aspirations for cooperative state farm- ing were frustrated, it was not because the plans had failed to integrate a scheme of cooperative labor. The more ambitious and meticulous the plan, the less is left, theoretically, to chance and to local initiative and experience.

### Politicize Infrastructure

#### Politicize infrastructure: use your ballot to signal a refusal in the participatory regime of new neoliberalism: all deficit spending for infrastructure is not created equal—it does not have to be articulated to economic interest

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

How can renewal come to the politics of infrastructure in the in-between city? The ideology of neo-liberal governance seemed so deeply ingrained that, in spite of ever-increasing tallies of infrastructure maintenance shortfalls and the reality of bridges and light standards collapsing onto freeways, the likelihood of governments in Canada (or Ontario or Greater Toronto) generating and freeing up the billions of dollars necessary for basic infrastructure maintenance appeared remote. The possibility of a radically altered way of conceiving the region from the perspective of infrastructure connectivity in which the in-between cities are not bypassed may have been even more so. The question that now opens up is: will the new emphasis on deficit spending in response to global economic recession reinforce the ways in which the in-between infrastructures and their dependent populations have been marginalized or will they participate in the renewal? The new topologies in urban regions do indeed call for a new relational politics. Suburban areas in Canada no longer function as stable refuges somewhere outside of ‘the city’ and the rhythms of suburban daily life cannot be assumed to be either harmonious or uncomplicated. This will be exacerbated by the current economic and financial crisis as mortgages become less fictitious and more of a real burden to suburban families as happened before in the 1990s (Dale, 1999). At the same time, the suburbs of Canada’s largest urban regions are the most culturally diverse communities in the country, their traffic congestion is among the country’s worst, and their workplaces are growing the fastest. Looking at new suburban areas and forgotten in-between cities, we see evidence of heightened forms of global connectivity (embodied in the millions who have immigrated to Canada’s suburbs) interfacing with local processes and politics of planning and development on the terrain of largely pre-structured suburban environments. But will these new relational dynamics generate a new relational politics particularly related to infrastructure? As we have taken up the call in this paper for a “politicization of infrastructure” in the in-between city, we have recognized that the terrain on which hardware and user patterns are laid in the mixed periphery of the Toronto area has begun to shift economically, demographically and eco-socially. Revisiting the question of “how power’s different modalities are variously exercised, how it puts people into place”, we can now conclude that while the invisibility of these spaces used to make for a rather ineffective politics and for a relegation of connectivity concerns there to the backburner of the urban agenda, their hybrid and hermaphroditic character may be a starting point for the reinvention not just of urban connectivity in spaces that have often been overlooked, but also for the recognition of those spaces themselves. Transit justice, i.e. overcoming the class–gender–ethnicity–age biases of the system, will certainly have to play a part in the politicization of infrastructure. Yet, one of the inherent dangers of a politics of metropolitan infrastructure is exactly the racialized subtext of the transformations we are experiencing. Often taking cues from the way segregated American cities have been portrayed, popular and scientific discourse has noted the increasing significance of ethno-cultural and class divisions. A Toronto daily newspaper headlined an article on the topic last year with “Everything’s white when you’re downtown” and commented: “White picket fences and manicured lawns cared for by mostly white, upper-middle class families come to mind when the word ‘suburban’ is mentioned. But in recent years, the Cunninghams and the Cleavers are moving into the downtown core, while multicultural and poorer populations take up residence behind those picket fences” (Liu, 2008:5; A more scholarly discussion of the relationship of class and ‘race’ in the Canadian metropolis can be found in Walks and Bourne, 2006). In order to understand the complexity of the in-between city’s infrastructure politics better, we need to overcome such rigid throwbacks to the dichotomies of the old city-suburban scheme. In fact, the “politicization of infrastructure” will need to explode such hierarchical notions of urban space as well as the more linear models of social inclusion that rest on these notions. It cannot be sufficient anymore to link the periphery to the centre by better supply of hard and soft infrastructures. While important, such conventional politics of infrastructure is ultimately flawed because it overlooks the complex networked mobility needs and realities present in those communities that are traditionally marginalized by the dichotomous centre-periphery model. Considering “the relation between social exclusion, mobility and access to be a dynamic one, and one that plays out at the level of society as a whole” (Cass, 2005, p. 553), we believe that bringing better connectivity to the in-between city is not a matter of closing the modernization gap. While we firmly believe that building light-rail and flexibilizing the bus routes for example are minimum requirements of a new politics of infrastructure “out there”, we also concur that “initiatives in transport, planning and communications should promote networking and meetingness (and minimize missingness) amongst those living, working and visiting particular places” (Cass, 2005, p. 553). This includes at a minimum to acknowledge these communities’ existence beyond neo-colonial gestures from the political high ground of the central city. The politicization of infrastructures therefore includes the politicization of the people in the in-between city around issues of transportation, infrastructure, and connectivity on the basis of their own experienced needs of mobility and access.

### Power Relations Key

#### Must account for particulars in order to solve and accounts for power and violence

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

The edge cities (Garreau, 1991) and exopolis (Soja, 1996) of the post-Fordist period re-centred and re-regionalized – globalized – capitalist production. New modes of aggressive re-territorialization have occurred as regions have politically or economically found new reasons for, and institutions of, regionalism ( [Brenner, 2004], [Boudreau et al., 2007] and [Collin and Robertson, 2007]). At the same time, territorialization was not the only dynamic at work. Amin (2004), among others, has concisely noted the usefulness of “a relational reading of place that works with the ontology of flow, connectivity and multiple geographical expression, to imagine the geography of cities and regions through their plural spatial connections” (Amin, 2004, p. 34). While Amin describes the new forms of economic, administrative and governance regionalism – as well as a politics of territorial management – he argues “against the assumption that there is a defined geographical territory out there over which local actors can have effective control and can manage as a social and political space. In a relationally constituted modern world in which it has become normal to conduct business – economic, cultural, political – through everyday trans-territorial organization and flow, local advocacy, it seems to me, must be increasingly about exercising nodal power and aligning networks at large in one’s own interest, rather than about exercising territorial power” (2004, p. 36). He instead opts for a “relational politics of place … that is consistent with a spatial ontology of cities and regions seen as sites of heterogeneity juxtaposed within close spatial proximity, and as sites of multiple geographies of affiliation, linkage and flow” (2004, p. 38). We will return to these politics below.

### Social Justice/Sustainability

#### Concern for undervalued populations key precondition to solving for social justice and inequality

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

Empirically, our 85 sq km study area – partly in the City of Toronto and partly in the City of Vaughan – is home to about 150,000 people and a place that is rich in social and physical complexities and contradictions (see Fig. 2). Methodologically, we explore the relative/relational (Harvey, 2006) connectedness of people, places and urban processes through the lens of infrastructure, with the help of photographic documentation, textual analysis, census data analysis, and interviews. In an era characterized by “splintering urbanism” (Graham and Marvin, 2001) in which urban regions come to resemble “archipelagos of enclaves” (Hajer and Reijndorp, 2001), uneven access to different infrastructures is particularly visible in the poorly understood and under-recognized “in-between city”. Yet, dramatic inequalities in infrastructure provision and service delivery in these areas render many urban residents vulnerable to unpredictable events – environmental, economic, and social. We argue that casting light on the infrastructure problems of the “in-between city” is a necessary precondition for creating more sustainable and socially just urban regions, and for designing a system of social and cultural infrastructures that has everything a community needs and meets global needs as well. This work is relevant to a broad spectrum of urban decision-making processes in the area of infrastructure and beyond. It involves partners in government, the private sector and the community.

### Everyday Life

#### Prefer everyday life first: priotizing the quotidian is key to resist

De Certeau 1984 (Michel, Professor in France and founder more or less of “everydayness” studies as a field,. *The Practice of Everyday Life* p. xiii-xiv)

The "making" in question is a production, a Poiesis[2] -but a hidden one, because it is scattered over areas defined and occupied by systems of "production" (television, urban development, commerce, etc.), and because the steadily increasing expansion of these systems no longer leaves "consumers" any place in which they can indicate what they make or do with the products of these systems. To a rationalized, expansionist and at the same time centralized, clamorous, and spectacular production corresponds another production, called "consumption." The latter is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates itself everywhere, silently and almost invisibly, because it does not manifest itself through its own products, but rather through its ways of using the products imposed by a dominant economic order. For instance, the ambiguity that subverted from within the Spanish colonizers' "success" in imposing their own culture on the indigenous Indians is well known. Submissive, and even consenting to their subjection, the Indians nevertheless often made of the rituals, representations, and laws imposed on them something quite different from what their conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but by using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system they had no choice but to accept. They were other within the very colonization that outwardly assimilated them; their use of the dominant social order deflected its power, which they lacked the means to challenge; they escaped it without leaving it. The strength of their difference lay in procedures of "consumption." To a lesser degree, a similar ambiguity creeps into our societies through the use made by the "common people" of the culture disseminated and imposed by the elites" producing the language. The presence and circulation of a representation (taught by preachers, educators, and popularizers as the key to socioeconomic advancement) tells us nothing about what it is for its users. We must first analyze its manipulation by users who are not its makers. Only then can we gauge the difference or similarity between the production of the image and the secondary production hidden in the process of its utilization. Our investigation is concerned with this difference. It can use as its theoretical model the construction of individual sentences with an established vocabulary and syntax. In linguistics, "performance" and "competence" are different: the act of speaking (with all the enunciative strategies that implies) is not reducible to a knowledge of the language. By adopting the point of view of enunciation-which is the subject of our study-we privilege the act of speaking; according to that point of view, speaking operates within the field of a linguistic system; it effects an appropriation, or reappropriation, of language by its speakers; it establishes a present relative to a time and place; and it posits a contract with the other (the interlocutor) in a network of places and relations. These four characteristics of the speech act[3] can be found in many other practices (walking, cooking, etc.). An objective is at least adumbrated by this parallel, which is, as we shall see, only partly valid. Such an objective assumes that (like the Indians mentioned above) users make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules. We must determine the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of this collective activity.

### Anti-Discipline

#### Our alternative is to examine everyday life as a counteracted version of key practices

De Certeau 1984 (Michel, Professor in France and founder more or less of “everydayness” studies as a field,. *The Practice of Everyday Life*)

As unrecognized producers, poets of their own acts, silent discoverers of their own paths in the jungle of functionalist rationality, consumers produce through their signifying practices something that might be considered similar to the "wandering lines" ("lignes derre") drawn by the autistic children studied by F. Deligny[17]: "indirect" or "errant" trajectories obeying their own logic. In the technocratically constructed, written, and functionalized space in which the consumers move about, their trajectories form unforeseeable sentences, partly unreadable paths across a space. Although they are composed with the vocabularies of established languages (those of television, newspapers, supermarkets, or museum sequences) and although they remain subordinated to the prescribed syntactical forms (temporal modes of schedules, paradigmatic orders of spaces, etc.), the trajectories trace out the ruses of other interests and desires that are neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop.[18] Even statistical investigation remains virtually ignorant of these trajectories, since it is satisfied with classifying, calculating, and putting into tables the "lexical" units which compose them but to which they cannot be reduced, and with doing this in reference to its own categories and taxonomies. Statistical investigation grasps the material of these practices, but not their form; it determines the elements used, but not the "phrasing" produced by the bricolage (the artisan-like inventiveness) and the discursiveness that combine these elements, which are all in general circulation and rather drab Statistical inquiry, in breaking down these "efficacious meanderings" into units that it defines itself, in reorganizing the results of its analyses according to its own codes, "finds" only the homogenous. The power of its calculations ties in its ability to divide, but it is precisely through this analytic fragmentation that it loses sight of what it claims to seek and to represent.[19] "Trajectory" suggests a movement, but it also involves a plane projection, a flattening out. It is a transcription. A graph (which the eye can master) is substituted for an operation; a line which can be reversed (i.e., read in both directions) does duty for an irreversible temporal series, a tracing for acts. To avoid this reduction, I resort to a distinction between tactics and strategies.

### Embrace Inefficiency

#### Stage a walkout—refuse to let this debate efficiency add to the aggregtation of capital

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

This homely insight has long been of great tactical value to genera- tions of trade unionists who have used it as the basis of the work-to- rule strike. In a work-to rule action (the French call it grove du zele), employees begin doing their jobs by meticulously observing every one of the rules and regulations and performing only the duties stated in their job descriptions. The result, fully intended in this case, is that the work grinds to a halt, or at least to a snail's pace. The workers achieve the practical effect of a walkout while remaining on the job and follow- ing their instructions to the letter. Their action also illustrates pointedly how actual work processes depend more heavily on informal under- standings and improvisations than upon formal work rules. In the long work-to-rule action against Caterpillar, the large equipment manufac- turer, for example, workers reverted to following the inefficient proce- dures specified by the engineers, knowing they would cost the company valuable time and quality, rather than continuing the more expeditious practices they had long ago devised on the job.2 They were relying on the tested assumption that working strictly by the book is necessarily less productive than working with initiative.

### Metis

#### Practicing metis is key—the debate is in the gap between the ideal and the routine—it's a place where we can start to remake different rhythms

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, Seeing Like a State )

The necessarily implicit, experiential nature of metis seems central. A simple experiment in implicit learning conducted by the philosopher Charles Peirce may help to convey something of the process. Peirce had people lift two weights and judge which of the two was heavier. At first, their discrimination was rather crude. But as they practiced for long periods, they became able to distinguish accurately quite minute differ- ences in weight. They could not pinpoint what it was that they sensed or felt, but their actual capacity to discriminate grew enormously. Peirce took the results as evidence for a kind of subliminal communication via "faint sensations" between people. For our purposes, however, it il- lustrates a rudimentary kind of knowledge that can be acquired only by practice and that all but defies being communicated in written or oral form apart from actual practice." Surveying the range of examples that we have touched on, we can venture some preliminary generalizations about the nature of metis and about where it is relevant. Metis is most applicable to broadly sim ilar but never precisely identical situations requiring a quick and prac- ticed adaptation that becomes almost second nature to the practitioner. The skills of metis may well involve rules of thumb, but such rules are largely acquired through practice (often in formal apprenticeship) and a developed feel or knack for strategy. Metis resists simplification into deductive principles which can successfully be transmitted through book learning, because the environments in which it is exercised are so complex and nonrepeatable that formal procedures of rational deci- sion making are impossible to apply. In a sense, metis lies in that large space between the realm of genius, to which no formula can apply, and the realm of codified knowledge, which can be learned by rote.

#### This debate is a site for everyday metis—the judge can begin their practice of rewriting practices not only in policy but also in debate—make this debate about producing a new metis

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, Seeing Like a State )

One last analogy may help to clarify the relationship between gen- era1 rules of thumb and metis. Metis is not merely the specification of local values (such as the local mean temperature and rainfall) made in order to successfully apply a generic formula to a local case. Taking lan- guage as a parallel, I believe that the rule of thumb is akin to formal grammar, whereas metis is more like actual speech. Metis is no more de- rivative of general rules than speech is derivative of grammar. Speech develops from the cradle by imitation, use, trial and error. Learning a mother tongue is a stochastic process-a process of successive, self- correcting approximations. We do not begin by learning the alphabet, individual words, parts of speech, and rules of grammar and then try- ing to use them all in order to produce a grammatically correct sen- tence. Moreover, as Oakeshott indicates, a knowledge of the rules of speech by themselves is compatible with a complete inability to speak intelligible sentences. The assertion that the rules of grammar are de- rivative of the practice of actual speech is nearer to the truth. Modern language training that aims at competence in speaking recognizes this and begins with simple speech and rote repetition in order to imprint pattern and accent while leaving the rules of grammar implicit, or else introducing them later as a way of codifying and summarizing practi- cal mastery. Like language, the metis or local knowledge necessary to the suc- cessful practice of farming or pastoralism is probably best learned by daily practice and experience. Like serving a long apprenticeship, growing up in a household where that craft is continually practiced often represents the most satisfactory preparation for its exercise. This kind of socialization to a trade may favor the conservation of skills rather than daring innovation. But any formula that excludes or sup- presses the experience, knowledge, and adaptability of metis risks inco- herence and failure; learning to speak coherent sentences involves far more than merely learning the rules of grammar.

### Activate Quotidian Judge Space

#### “Any Risk” calculations attempt to push out the quotidian by virtue of its immeasurability—it is the immeasurable impact of the quotidian that demands it be elevated above quanitifiable techne—restore the “art” of judging

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, Seeing Like a State )

Where metis is contextual and particular, techne is universal. In the logic of mathematics, ten multiplied by ten equals one hundred every- where and forever; in Euclidean geometry, a right angle represents ninety degrees of a circle; in the conventions of physics, the freezing point of water is always zero degrees centigrade.18 Techne is settled knowledge; Aristotle wrote that techne "came into being when from many notions gained from experience, a universal judgement about a group of similar things arises."19 The universality of techne arises from the fact that it is organized analytically into small, explicit, logical steps and is both decomposable and verifiable. This universality means that knowledge in the form of techne can be taught more or less completely as a formal discipline. The rules of techne provide for theoretical knowl- edge that may or may not have practical applications. Finally, techne is characterized by impersonal, often quantitative precision and a concern with explanation and verification, whereas metis is concerned with per- sonal skill, or "touch," and practical results. If the description of techne as an ideal or typical system of knowl- edge resembles the self-image of modern science, that is no accident. The actual practice of science, however, is something else again.20 The rules of techne are the specification of how knowledge is to be codi- fied, expressed, and verified, once it has been discovered. No rules of techne or episteme can explain scientific invention and insight. Dis- covering a mathematical theorem requires genius and perhaps metis; the proof of the theorem, however, must follow the tenets of t e ~ h n e . ~ ~ Thus the systematic and impersonal rules of techne facilitate the pro- duction of knowledge that can be readily assembled, comprehensively documented, and formally taught, but they cannot by themselves add to that knowledge or explain how it came into beingz2 Techne is characteristic, above all, of self-contained systems of rea- soning in which the findings may be logically derived from the initial assumptions. To the degree that the form of knowledge satisfies these conditions, to that degree is it impersonal, universal, and completely im- pervious to context. But the context of metis, as Detienne and Vernant emphasize, is characteristically "situations which are transient, shift- ing, disconcerting and ambiguous, situations which do not lend them- selves to precise measurement, exact calculation, or rigorous logic."23 Nussbaum shows convincingly how Plato attempted, especially in the Republic, to transform the realm of love-a realm that almost by defi- nition is one of contingency, desire, and impulse-into a realm of techne or epi~terne.~~ Plato regarded mundane love as subject to the lower appetites, and he hoped to purge it of these base instincts so that it could more closely resemble the philosopher's pure search for truth. The superiority of pure reasoning, especially scientific and mathe- matical logic, lay in the fact that it was "pure of pain, maximally sta- ble, and directed at the truth." The objects of such reasoning "are eter- nally what they are regardless of what human beings do and say."25 What one loved, or should love, Plato claimed, was not the beloved him- self but rather the pure forms of unalloyed beauty reflected in the bel0ved.~6 Only in this way could love remain straight and rational, free of the appetites. The spheres of human endeavor that are freest of contingency, guesswork, context, desire, and personal experience-and thus free of metis-hence came to be perceived as man's highest pursuits. They are the philosopher's work. One can see why, on the strength of such cri- teria, Euclidean geometry, mathematics, some self-contained forms of analytical philosophy, and perhaps music are considered to be among the purest of pursuit^.^' Unlike the natural sciences and concrete ex- periments, these disciplines exist as realms of pure thought, untouched by the contingencies of the material world. They begin in the mind or on a blank sheet of paper. The Pythagorean theorem, a2 + b2 = c2, is true for all right triangles everywhere and forever. A recurrent theme of Western philosophy and science, including so- cial science, has been the attempt to reformulate systems of knowledge in order to bracket uncertainty and thereby permit the kind of logical deductive rigor possessed by Euclidean geometry.28 In the natural sci- ences, the results have been revolutionary. Where philosophy and the human sciences are concerned, the efforts have been just as persistent but the results far more ambiguous. Descartes's famous episteme "I think, therefore I am" mimicked the first step in a mathematical proof and was an "answer to the disorder that threatened to undo society."29 The aim of Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarians was, through their calculus of pleasure and pain (hedonism), to reduce the study of ethics to a pure natural science, to an examination of "every circumstance by which an individual can be influenced, being remarked and invento- ried, nothing. . . left to chance, caprice, or unguided discretion, every- thing being surveyed and set down in dimension, number, weight, and measure."3o Even chance (ruche) itself, which techne was designed to master, was eventually, thanks to statistics and probability theory, transformed into a singular fact that might enter the formulas of techne. Risk, pro- viding it could be assigned a known probability, became a fact like any other, whereas uncertainty (where the underlying probabilities are not known) still lay outside techne's reach.31 The intellectual "career" of risk and uncertainty is indicative of many fields of inquiry in which the realm of analysis was reformulated and narrowed to exclude elements that could not be quantified and measured but could only be judged. Better put, techniques were devised to isolate and domesticate those aspects of key variables that might be expressed in numbers (a nation's wealth by gross national product, public opinion by poll numbers, val- ues by psychological inventories). Neoclassical economics, for exam- ple, has undergone a transformation along these lines. Consumer pref- erences are first taken as a given and then counted, in order to bracket taste as a major source of uncertainty. Invention and entrepreneurial ac- tivity are treated as exogenous and cast outside the perimeter of the discipline as too intractable to submit to measurement and prediction.32 The discipline has incorporated calculable risk while exiling those top- ics where genuine uncertainty prevails (ecological dangers, shifts in taste).33 As Stephen Marglin shows, "the emphasis on self-interest, calcu- lation, and maximization in economics" are classical examples of "self- evident postulates" and reflect "more an ideological commitment to the superiority of episteme than a serious attempt to unravel the complex- ities and mysteries of human motivation and behavior."34

### Standpointof Everyday

#### Adopting standpoint of the everyday is key—puts the real stakes on the table

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, Seeing Like a State )

The power of practical knowledge depends on an exceptionally close and astute observation of the environment. It should by now be rather obvious why traditional cultivators like Squanto are such con- summate observers of their environment, but the reasons bear repeat- ing in the context of a comparison with scientific knowledge. First, these cultivators have a vital, direct stake in the results of close observation. Unlike the research scientist or extension agent who does not have to take her own advice, the peasant is the immediate consumer of his own conclusions. Unlike the typical modern-day farmer, the peasant has no outside experts to rely on beyond his experienced neighbors; he must make decisions based on what he knows. Second, the poverty or marginal economic status of many of these cultivators is itself, I would argue, a powerful impetus to careful obser- vation and experimentation. Consider the hypothetical case of two fishermen, both of whom must make their living from a river. One fisherman lives by a river where the catch is stable and abundant. The other lives by a river where the catch is variable and sparse, affording only a bare and precarious subsistence. The poorer of the two will clearly have an immediate, life-and-death interest in devising new fishing techniques, in observing closely the habits of fish, in the careful siting of traps and weirs, in the timing and signs of seasonal runs of different species, and so forth

### Predictions Implication

#### Better to observe the structural impacts of the here and now than worry about future predictions

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, Seeing Like a State )

The mistake of our ancestors was to think that they were "the last number," but since numbers are infinite, they could not be the last number. -Eugene Zamiatin, We The maxim that serves as the heading for this section is not simply suitable for bumper stickers mimicking the insider slogan of Bill Clin- ton's 1992 presidential campaign, "It's the economy, stupid!" It is meant to call attention to how routinely planners ignore the radical con- tingency of the future. How rare it is to encounter advice about the fu- ture which begins from a premise of incomplete knowledge. One small exception-a circular on nutrition published by the health clinic at Yale University, where I teach-will underscore its rarity. Normally, such circulars explain the major food groups, vitamins, and minerals known to be essential for balanced nutrition and advise a diet based on these categories. This circular, however, noted that many new, essen- tial elements of proper nutrition had been discovered in the past two decades and that many more elements will presumably be identified by researchers in the decades ahead. Therefore, on the basis of what they did not know, the writers of this piece recommended that one's diet be as varied as possible, on the prudent assumption that it would contain many of these yet unidentified essentials. Social and historical analyses have, almost inevitably, the effect of diminishing the contingency of human affairs. A historical event or state of affairs simply is the way it is, often appearing determined and necessary when in fact it might easily have turned out to be otherwise. Even a probabilistic social science, however careful it may be about es- tablishing ranges of outcomes, is apt to treat these probabilities, for the sake of analysis, as solid facts. When it comes to betting on the future, the contingency is obvious, but so is the capacity of human actors to influence this contingency and help to shape the future. And in those cases where the bettors thought that they knew the shape of the future by virtue of their grasp of historical laws of progress or scientific truth, whatever awareness they retained of the contingency seemed to dis- solve before their faith. And yet each of these schemes, as might also have been predicted, was largely undone by a host of contingencies beyond the planners' grasp. The scope and comprehensiveness of their plans were such that they would have had indeterminate outcomes even if their historical laws and the attendant specification of variables and calculations had been correct. Their temporal ambitions meant that although they might, with some confidence, guess the immediate consequences of their moves, no one could specify, let alone calculate, the second- or third- order consequences or their interaction effects. The wild cards in their deck, however, were the human and natural events outside their models-droughts, wars, revolts, epidemics, interest rates, world con- sumer prices, oil embargoes. They could and did, of course, attempt to adjust and improvise in the face of these contingencies. But the mag- nitude of their initial intervention was so great that many of their mis- steps could not be righted. Stephen Marglin has put their problem suc- cinctly: If "the only certainty about the future is that the future is uncertain, if the only sure thing is that we are in for surprises, then no amount of planning, no amount of prescription, can deal with the con- tingencies that the future will reveal."l There is a curiously resounding unanimity on this point, and on no others, between such right-wing critics of the command economy as Friedrich Hayek and such left-wing critics of Communist authoritari- anism as Prince Peter Kropotkin, who declared, "It is impossible to legislate for the future." Both had a great deal of respect for the diver- sity of human actions and the insurmountable difficulties in success- fully coordinating millions of transactions. In a blistering critique of failed development paradigms, Albert Hirschman made a comparable case, calling for "a little more 'reverence for life,' a little less strait- jacketing of the future, a little more allowance for the unexpected- and a little less wishful thinking.'I2 One might, on the basis of experience, derive a few rules of thumb that, if observed, could make development planning less prone to dis- aster. While my main goal is hardly a point-by-point reform of devel- opment practice, such rules would surely include something along the following lines. Take small steps. In an experimental approach to social change, pre- sume that we cannot know the consequences of our interventions in ad- vance. Given this postulate of ignorance, prefer wherever possible to take a small step, stand back, observe, and then plan the next small move. As the biologist J. B. S. Haldane metaphorically described the advantages of smallness: "You can drop a mouse down a thousand- yard mineshaft; and on arriving at the bottom, it gets a slight shock and walks away. A rat is killed, a man broken, a horse ~plashes."~ Favor reversibility. Prefer interventions that can easily be undone if they turn out to be mistake^.^ Irreversible interventions have irrever- sible consequence^.^ Interventions into ecosystems require particular care in this respect, given our great ignorance about how they interact. Aldo Leopold captured the spirit of caution required: "The first rule of intelligent tinkering is to keep all the part^."^

## A2: Answers

### A2: Perm

#### Voting negative is the permutation—critiquing the aff for overlooking certain populations creates a mix of state exceptions and the existence of people—this solves your perm evidence better

Young and Keil 2009 (Douglas and Roger, Professors at York University, *Cities* 27.2 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275109001085>)

Based on the recent spatial developments in Europe, German planner Tom Sieverts has proposed the term Zwischenstadt or “in-between city” (Sieverts, 2003). This concept is meant to grasp the novel urban form that has emerged beyond the traditional, more compact, uni-centred European city. Sieverts notes that this new urban form is now pervasive and home as well as workplace to a growing percentage of Europeans. Similarly, Dutch scholars Hajer and Reijndorp have pointed to the fact that we now all live in an urbanized field, which appears as an “archipelago of enclaves” (Hajer and Reijndorp, 2001; see also the notion of post-suburbia, Wu and Phelps, 2008). Much of the more recent attention to metropolitanism, regionalism and regionalization has had to do with the changing scales of post-Fordist, globalized and neoliberalizing economies. Regions to some degree re-defined the space of political economies and shattered the methodological nationalism of scholars and practitioners alike. These new regions led to largely two spatial effects: (1) the centrifugal sprawl away from city centres or new sprawl where there was no previous agglomeration and (2) the re-centralization of economies in downtowns as well as airports, edge cities, business parks, etc. We argue now that the current period seems at yet another crossroads: between the ‘glamour zones’ of the “creative” inner (global) city economies on one end and the sprawling new regional economies on the other, we now have a new set of socio-spatial arrangements which characterize the current period of urban expansion more than others. We are talking here about the in-between cities as the currently most dynamic and problematic forms of suburbanization. In North America, these in-between cities comprise the old post-WW2 suburbs in particular, but also the transitional zones between those suburbs and the exurban fringe that has leapfrogged some agricultural developments, utility corridors, conservation areas, and the like. These remnant spaces of Fordist urbanization include large urban landscape forms such as oil tank farms, military sites, municipal airports, industrial facilities, large scale housing estates, often public, marginal agricultural lands as well as ravines, woodlots and retention ponds, new strip malls, university or other educational institutions, infrastructures such as rail switching yards or freight terminals, landfills (sometimes expired), entertainment facilities such as theme parks and movieplexes; big box retail outlets, religiously-centred developments, etc. They also contain small pockets of hugely surprising and diversified urban uses such as ethnic mini-malls, mini-ghettos of students or poverty populations, rich enclaves, semi-legal uses such as strip clubs and saunas, as well as niche market entertainment locales such as climbing walls or go-cart tracks. While – and perhaps because – these in-between spaces assemble a wild and often unexplainable mix of uses untypical for either the inner city or the classical suburb, they present landscapes of extreme spatial and social segregation. In-betweenness is a metaphor that has strong resonance in a poststructural understanding of societies where no fixed boundaries may exist that separate collective and individual identities in “essential” or “natural” ways. This is expressed in Sieverts’ own admission that “cultural plurality is a positive characteristic of the Zwischenstadt” (2003, p. 52). Hybridity and creolization are important concepts through which to understand the postcolonial world in which many communities find themselves today ( [Bhabha, 1994] and [Goonewardena and Kipfer, 2004]). Bhabha, for example, takes “the cultural and historical hybridity of the postcolonial world … as the paradigmatic place of departure” for looking at our world today (1994, p. 21). While it is not possible here to take this thought too far given the different focus of this particular article, it may be useful to remind ourselves that it is in these less than determined spaces “in-between” where urbanizing societies also develop the social spaces in which hybridity is cultivated through a mix of (exclusionary) state practices and (liberating) popular activities. In fact, where Wacquant (2008), for example, sees a fundamental difference between the ghetto in the United States, which is a space vacated by the state, and the French banlieue, a space entirely occupied and produced by state action, we would point to the in-between city we study as a mixed product of both, state presence and state retreat (see Young and Keil (2009) for a further development of these ideas). On a global scale, hybridity is now written firmly into the spaces we call in-between cities. Gregory Guldin observes about urbanization trends in China which he says find themselves in a hermaphroditic state: As areas become more prosperous, townization and citization proceed apace. Villages become more like market and xiang towns, and country towns and small cities become more like large cities. This in turn dampens the ardor of people in villages and xiang towns to move to county towns, and so on up the line, even when people continue to recognize a higher “cultural level” in cities. The urbanization process unfolding is thus caused not only by a stream of rural-to-urban migrants but also by urbanization in place; that is, entire districts becoming more urbanized at all levels of the rural–urban continuum. At the lower, townization level, some Chinese have conceptualized this town-village blending as chengxiang yitihua (urban–rural integration [Zhang, 1989]) […] a form neither urban nor rural but a blending of the two wherein a dense web of transactions ties large urban cores to their surrounding regions (Guldin, 2001, p. 17). During the onset of the current economic crisis, millions of Chinese migrant workers were entangled in a web of work-housing relationships in this in-between world2 and became living witnesses to the dissolution of clear town-country relationships into a web of hybrid in-between spaces that can be holding tank for the reserve army of the global workbench, launching pad for personal life trajectories or site of socio-spatial conflict ( [Branigan, 2009a] and [Branigan, 2009b]). In a related argument, Yiftachel speaks of “gray cities”, places “positioned between the ‘whiteness’ of legality/approval/safety, and the ‘blackness’ of eviction/destruction/death” (Yiftachel, 2009, p. 89). While conditions in Toronto’s in-between city are not as drastic as in Palestine, which serves as Yiftachel’s area of study, the principle here is interesting and relates well to our theme of hybridity. What is remarkable is the notion that hybridity of this kind is potentially deadly, not a safe space, a space of vulnerability, invisibility and powerlessness. Yiftachel notes that “[g]ray spaces contain a multitude of groups, bodies, housing, lands, economies and discourses, lying literally ‘in the shadow’ of the formal, planned city, polity and economy” (2009, p. 89). We can also evoke here the complex of issues that Ananya Roy has recently summarized under the title “exurbanity and extraterritoriality” which point towards some form of hybridity between urban and national spaces where identities are formed in complex layered interactions (Roy, 2007, p. 9–10).

#### View from the state incommensurable with view from the street

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

What is remarkable and telling about Jacobs's critique is its unique perspective. She begins at street level, with an ethnography of micro- order in neighborhoods, sidewalks, and intersections. Where Le Cor- busier "sees" his city initially from the air, Jacobs sees her city as a pedestrian on her daily rounds would. Jacobs was also a political acti- vist involved in many campaigns against proposals for zoning changes, road building, and housing development that she thought ill-advised.77 It was all but inconceivable that a radical critique, grounded in this fashion, could ever have originated from within the intellectual circle of urban planner~.~g Her novel brand of everyday urban sociology ap- plied to the design of cities was simply too far removed from the or- thodox educational routines of urban planning schools at the time.79 An examination of her critique from the margins serves to underline many of the failings of high modernism.

#### Cannot combine the plan and Metis

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

One purpose of this illustration is to alert us to the social conditions necessary for the reproduction of comparable practical knowledge. These social conditions, at a minimum, would seem to require a com- munity of interest, accumulated information, and ongoing experimen- tation. Occasionally there are formal institutions that seem almost per- fectly tailored to the collection and exchange of practical information, such as the veillLes of nineteenth-century France. The veillee, as its name implies, was a traditional pattern of gathering practiced by farm families during winter evenings, often in barns to take advantage of the warmth generated by the livestock and thus save on fuel. With no agenda save sociability and economy, the gatherings amounted to lo- cal assemblies where opinions, stories, agricultural news, advice, gos- sip, and religious or folk tales were exchanged while the participants shelled nuts or embroidered. Given the fact that each member there possessed a lifetime of interested observation and practice in which every family paid for the consequences of its agricultural decisions, the veillee was an unheralded daily seminar on practical knowledge. This brings us squarely to two of the great ironies of metis. The first is that metis is not democratically distributed. Not only does it depend on a touch or a knack that may not be common, but access to the ex- perience and practice necessary for its acquisition may be restricted. Artisan guilds, gifted craftsmen, certain classes, religious fraternities, entire communities, and men in general often treat some forms of knowledge as a monopoly they are reluctant to share. Better stated, the availability of such knowledge to others depends greatly on the social structure of the society and the advantages that a monopoly in some forms of knowledge can ~onfer.~' In this respect metis is not unitary, and we should perhaps speak of metises, recognizing its nonhomo- geneity. The second irony is that, however plastic and receptive metis is, some forms of it seem to depend on key elements of preindustrial life for their elaboration and transmission. Communities that are mar- ginal to markets and to the state are likely to retain a high degree of metis; they have no choice, as they have to rely disproportionately on the knowledge and materials at hand. If, while shopping at the local store or visiting at the farmers' association, Mat Isa had found a cheap pesticide that would have finished off the red ants, I don't doubt that he would have used it. Some forms of metis are disappearing every day.72 As physical mo- bility, commodity markets, formal education, professional specializa- tion, and mass media spread to even the most remote communities, the social conditions for the elaboration of metis are undermined. One could; with great justice, welcome a great many of these extinctions of local knowledge. Once matches become widely available, why would anyone want to know, except as a matter of idle curiosity, how to make fire with flint and tinder? Knowing how to scrub clothes on a wash- board or on a stone in the river is undoubtedly an art, but one gladly abandoned by those who can afford a washing machine. Darning skills were similarly lost, without much nostalgia, when cheap, machine- made stockings came on the market. As the older Bugis seamen say, "These days, with charts and compasses, anyone can steer."73 And why not? The production of standardized knowledge has made certain skills more broadly-more democratically-available, as they are no longer the preserve of a guild that may refuse admission or insist on a long apprentices hi^.^^ Much of the world of metis that we have lost is the all but inevitable result of industrialization and the division of labor. And much of this loss was experienced as a liberation from toil and drudgery. But it would be a serious error to believe that the destruction of metis was merely the inadvertent and necessary by-product of eco- nomic progress. The destruction of metis and its replacement by stan- dardized formulas legible only from the center is virtually inscribed in the activities of both the state and large-scale bureaucratic capitalism. As a "project," it is the object of constant initiatives which are never en- tirely successful, for no forms of production or social life can be made to work by formulas alone-that is, without metis. The logic animating the project, however, is one of control and appropriation. Local knowl- edge, because it is dispersed and relatively autonomous, is all but un- appropriable. The reduction or, more utopian still, the elimination of metis and the local control it entails are preconditions, in the case of the state, of administrative order and fiscal appropriation and, in the case of the large capitalist firm, of worker discipline and profit. The subordination of metis is fairly obvious in the development of mass production in the factory. A comparable de-skilling process is, I be- lieve, more compelling and, given the intractable obstacles to complete standardization, ultimately less successful in agricultural production. As Stephen Marglin's early work has convincingly shown, capitalist profit requires not only efficiency but the combination of efficiency and control.75 The crucial innovations of the division of labor at the sub- product level and the concentration of production in the factory repre- sent the key steps in bringing the labor process under unitary control. Efficiency and control might coincide, as in the case of the mechanized spinning and weaving of cotton. At times, however, they might be un- related or even contradictory. "Efficiency at best creates a potential profit," notes Marglin. "Without control the capitalist cannot realize that profit. Thus organizational forms which enhance capitalist control may increase profits and find favor with capitalists even if they affect productivity and efficiency adversely. Conversely, more efficient ways of organizing production which reduce capitalist control may end up reducing profits and being rejected by capitalist^."^^ The typical struc- ture of artisanal production was often an impediment to efficiency. But it was nearly always an obstacle to capitalist profits. In the "putting- out" system in textiles that prevailed before factory organization, cot- tage workers had control over the raw material, could set the pace of the work, and could increase their return by various stratagems that were difficult to monitor. The crucial advantage of the factory, from the boss's point of view, was that he could more directly fix the hours and the intensity of the work and control the raw materials.77 To the degree that efficient production could still be organized on an artisanal basis (such as early woolen manufacturing and silk ribbon weaving, accord- ing to Marglin), to that degree was it difficult for the capitalist to ap- propriate the profits of a dispersed craft population.

### A2: Collapses Structures

#### Practical knowledge that results fills in best

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

Those who do not have access to scientific methods and laboratory verification have often relied on metis to develop rich knowledge sys- tems that are remarkably accurate. Traditional navigation skills before the eras of sextants, magnetic compasses, charts, and sonar are a case in point. I refer again to the Bugis in this context, because their skills have been so brilliantly documented by Gene Ammarell.61 In the ab- sence of formal tide tables, the Bugis have elaborated a thoroughly re- liable scheme for forecasting rising and falling tides, the direction of currents, and the relative strength of tides-all of which are vitally important to their sailing plans and safety.62 Calculating on the basis of time of day, the number of days into the lunar cycle, and the mon- soon season, the Bugis captain holds in his head a system that provides all the accurate information he needs about tides. From an astrono- mer's perspective, it seems odd that the scheme makes no reference to the angle of declination of the moon. But since the monsoon is directly related to the declination of the moon, it serves effectively as a proxy. The cognitive map of the Bugis captain can be reconstructed in writ- ten form, as Ammarell has done, for illustrative purposes, but it was learned orally and by informal apprenticeship among the Bugis. Given the complexity of the phenomena it is meant to address, the sys- tem for evaluating and predicting tides is elegantly simple and emi- nently effective

### A2: Not Authoritarian Nation

#### Neoliberalism is the new authoritarianism

Giroux, Prof of Comm @ McMaster, 2004 p. xxiv

(Henry, The Terror of Neoliberalism)

Neoliberal ideology, on the one hand, pushes for the privatization of all noncommodified public spheres and the upward distribution of wealth. On the other hand, it supports policies that increasingly militarize facets of public space in order to secure tile privileges and benefits of the corporate elite and ultra-rich. Neoliberalism does not merely produce economic inequality, iniquitous rower relations, and a corrupt political system; it also promotes rigid exclusions from national citizenship and civic participation. As Lisa Duggan points omit, “Neoliberalisin cannot be abstracted from race and gender relations, or other cultural aspects of the body politic. Its legitimating discourse, social relations, and ideology are saturated with race, with gender, with sex, with religion, with ethnicity, and nationaliIy.”2 Neoliberalism comfortably aligns itself with various strands of neoconservative and religious fundamentalisms, waging imperial wars abroad as well as at home against those groups and movements that threaten its authoritarian misreading of the meaning of freedom, security, and productiveness.

#### Neoliberalism will usher in a new authoritarianism

Giroux, Prof of Comm @ McMaster, 2004 p. xxv-xxvi

(Henry, The Terror of Neoliberalism)

The main argument of this book is that neoliberalism has to be understood and challenged as both an economic theory and a powerful public pedagogy and cultural politics. That is, it has to be named and critically understood before it can be critiqued. The common-sense assumptions that legitimate neoliberalismn ‘5 alleged historical inevitability have to be unsettled and then engaged for tile social damage they cause at all levels of human existence., I attempt to identify and critically examine the most salient and powerful ideologies that inform and frame neoliberalism. I am also arguing for making cultural politics and time notion of public pedagogy’ central to the struggle against neoliberalism, particularly since education anti culture now play such a prominent political and economic role in both securing consent and producing capital. In fact, my position is similar to Susan Buek-Monss’s argument that “the recognition of cultural domination as just as important as, and perhaps even as the condition of possibility of, political anti economic domination is a true advance in our thinking. 2 Of course, this position is meant not to disavow economic and institutional struggles but to supplement them with a cultural politics that connects symbolic power and its pedagogical practices with material relations of power. What I am calling for in this case is a new language for addressing “social and cultural learning and reproduction in time context of globalization and the way in which globalization itself constitutes a problem of and for pedagogy. In addition, I analyze how neoliberal policies work at the level of everyday life through the language of privatization and the lived cultural forms of class, race, gender, youth, and ethnicity. Finally, I attempt in every chapter to employ a language of critique and possibility, engagement and hope, as part of a broader project of viewing democracy as a site of intense struggle over matters of representation, participation, and shared power.. Central to this is the belief, as Alain Touraine argues, that neoliberal globalization has not “dissolved our capacity for political action. “° Such action depends on the ability of various groups—the peace movement, the anti—corporate globalization movement, the human rights movement, the environmental justice movement—within and across national boundaries to form alliances in which matters of global justice, community, and solidarity provide a common symbolic space and multiple public spheres where norms are created, debated, and engaged as part of an attempt to develop a new political language, culture, amid set of relations. Such efforts must be understood as part of a broader attempt not only to collectively struggle against domination but also to defend all those social advances that strengthen democratic public spheres and services, demand new rights, establish modes of power sharing, andl create notions of social justice adequate to imagining and sustaining democracy on a global level. Consider, for example, the anti-corporate globalization movement’s slogan “Another World Is Possible!” which demands, as Alex Callinicos insightfully points out, a different kind of social logic, a powerful sense of unity and solidarity. Another world—that is, a world based on a different social logic, run according to different priorities from those that prevail today. It is easy enough to specify what the desiderata of such an alternative social logic would he—social justice, economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and democracy—but much harder to specify how a reproducible social system embodying these requirements could be built. And then there is the question of how to achieve it. Both these questions—Vhat is the alternative to capitalism? What strategy can get us there?—can be answered in different ways. One thing the anti-capitalist movement is going to have to learn is how to argue through the differences that exist and will probably develop around such issues without undermining the very powerful sense of unit that has been one of the movement’s most attractive qualities.’ Callinicos’s insight suggests that any viable struggle against neoliberal capitalism will have to rethink “the entire project of politics within the changed conditions of a global public sphere, and to this democratically, as people who speak different political languages, but whose goals are nonetheless the same: global peace, economic justice, legal equality, democratic participation, individual freedom, mutual respect.”° One of the central tasks facing intellectuals, activists, educators, and others who believe in au inclusive and substantive democracy is the need to use theory to rethink the language and possibilities of politics as a way to imagine a future outside time powerful grip of neoliberalisin and the impending authoritarianism that has a different story to tell about the future, one that reinvents the past in the image of the crude exercise of power and the unleashing of unimaginable human suffering. Critical reflection and social action in this discourse must acknowledge how time category of the global public sphere extends the space of politics beyond the boundaries of local resistance. Global problems need global institutions, global modes of dissent, global intellectual work, and global social movements.

### A2: Strategic Essentialism/Coalitions Turn

#### Lefebvrian everyday methodology solves

Kipfer 2002 (Associate prof of polisci and French at York University, Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism: Lefebvre, Gramsci and the Problematic of Hegemony, *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 13:2)

Meta-theoretical (and political) difficulties do emerge, however, when it comes to actualizing a "Gramscian" Lefebvre for the purpose of analyzing urban hegemony. After all, the marxist problematic of hegemony has been dismissed as a "master-narrative" for neglecting considerations of difference.143 Yet the open and integral marxism that follows from Gramsci and Lefebvre accepts the everyday and difference as central, not derivative problems without following the poststructuralist move to disconnect hegemony from the problematic of the survival of c a p i t a 1 i ~ m . l ~ ~ In particular Lefebvre's dialectical humanism, which differs from Derrida's approach to differance, 145 places the interplay between minimal and maximal difference at the center of capitalist hegemony and the search for a future beyond alienation. Critics are correct that Lefebvre theorized the role of ecology, racism, patriarchy and imperialism in the production of space and differentialist practice neither sufficiently nor adequately. 146 But the fact that Lefebvre insisted that the production of abstract spacellinear time extends to modernist linguistic reifications, "phallocentric" masculinity, Euro-centrism and neo-colonialism~47 and the "destruction of nature"148 allowed others t o use Lefebvre for feminist,149 ecological,150 or anti-racist15' intellectual projects. It is thus possible to link Lefebvre's urban marxism to theorists who share a similar dialectical humanist sensibility to difference (as alienation, possibility, and iiberation) but focus their analyses more squarely on racism, empire, patriarchy, and s e ~ u a 1 i t y . l ~ ~ Establishing such links is essential not only to develop an urban analysis of hegemony but also to understand more fully the role difference in counter-hegemonic projects.

# Aff

## Link Defense

### A2: Advertising

#### Inevitable—must work within

Kolhonen 2005 (Paul, Finnish architecture professor, “Moving Pictures” <http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=351>)

Economist's aesthetics also places architects, city planners and designers in a new position. They are no longer just resolving the given problem in a merely functional and eye-pleasing way. In addition to all this they have also become image-builders for their clients. The present situation, where the marks of the economist's aesthetics can be seen in every city, demands a new sensibility towards advertising and commercial culture. It seems that advertising is something we are not about to escape. In reality, nowadays we have to accept at least some advertising in our living environment. The best we can do is to try to understand its mechanics and its visual and social effects and to make informed decisions when we are developing our cities.

### A2: Planning Links

#### Your claims about planning are polemical: elide history

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

Aided by hindsight as it is, this unsympathetic account of high- modernist audacity is, in one important respect, grossly unfair. If we put the development of high-modernist beliefs in their historical con- text, if we ask who the enemies of high modernism actually were, a far more sympathetic picture emerges. Doctors and public-health engi- neers who did possess new knowledge that could save millions of lives were often thwarted by popular prejudices and entrenched political in- terests. Urban planners who could in fact redesign urban housing to be cheaper, more healthful, and more convenient were blocked by real- estate interests and existing tastes. Inventors and engineers who had devised revolutionary new modes of power and transportation faced opposition from industrialists and laborers whose profits and jobs the new technology would almost certainly displace

#### No impact—lack of authoritarian government checks violence

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

It is possible, I believe, to say something more generally about the "elective affinity" between authoritarian high modernism and certain institutional arrangement^.^^ What follows is rather crude and provi- sional, but it will serve as a point of departure. High-modernist ideolo- gies embody a doctrinal preference for certain social arrangements. Authoritarian high-modernist states, on the other hand, take the next step. They attempt, and often succeed, in imposing those preferences on their population. Most of the preferences can be deduced from the criteria of legibility, appropriation, and centralization of control. To the degree that the institutional arrangements can be readily moni- tored and directed from the center and can be easily taxed (in the broadest sense of taxation), then they are likely to be promoted. The im- plicit goals behind these comparisons are not unlike the goals of pre- modern ~tatecraft.~~ Legibility, after all, is a prerequisite of appropria- tion as well as of authoritarian transformation. The difference, and it is a crucial one, lies in the wholly new scale of ambition and intervention entertained by high modernism.

### A2: Impact

#### Interventions don’t actually change lives—resistance exists even post plan

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

It is far easier for would-be reformers to change the formal struc- ture of an institution than to change its practices. Redesigning the lines and boxes in an organizational chart is simpler than changing how that organization in fact operates. Changing the rules and regula- tions is simpler than eliciting behavior that conforms to them.I1O Re- designing the physical layout of a village is simpler than transforming its social and productive life. For obvious reasons, political elites- particularly authoritarian high-modernist elites-typically begin with changes in the formal structure and rules. Such legal and statutory changes are the most accessible and the easiest to rearrange.

#### U.S. setting disables bigger impacts

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

If such schemes have typically taken their most destructive human and natural toll in the states of the former socialist bloc and in revo- lutionary Third World settings, that is surely because there authori- tarian state power, unimpeded by representative institutions, could nullify resistance and push ahead. The ideas behind them, however, on which their legitimacy and appeal depended, were thoroughly West- ern. Order and harmony that once seemed the function of a unitary God had been replaced by a similar faith in the idea of progress vouch- safed by scientists, engineers, and planners. Their power, it is worth re- membering, was least contested at those moments when other forms of coordination had failed or seemed utterly inadequate to the great tasks at hand: in times of war, revolution, economic collapse, or newly won independence. The plans that they hatched bore a family resem- blance to the schemes of legibility and standardization devised by the absolutist kings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What was wholly new, however, was the magnitude of both the plans for the wholesale transformation of society and the instruments of statecraft -censuses, cadastral maps, identity cards, statistical bureaus, schools, mass media, internal security apparatuses-that could take them far- ther along this road than any seventeenth-century monarch would have dreamed. Thus it has happened that so many of the twentieth cen- tury's political tragedies have flown the banner of progress, emancipa- tion, and reform.

#### Subjective resistance prevents worst impacts

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

Human resistance to the more severe forms of social straitjacketing prevents monotonic schemes of centralized rationality from ever being realized. Had they been realized in their austere forms, they would have represented a very bleak human prospect. One of Le Corbusier's plans, for example, called for the segregation of factory workers and their families in barracks along the major transportation arteries. It was a theoretically efficient solution to transportation and production problems. If it had been imposed, the result would have been a dispir- iting environment of regimented work and residence without any of the animation of town life. This plan had all the charm of a Taylorist scheme where, using a comparable logic, the efficient organization of work was achieved by confining the workers' movements to a few repetitive gestures. The cookie-cutter design principles behind the lay- out of the Soviet collective farm, the ujamaa village, or the Ethiopian resettlement betray the same narrowness of vision. They were de- signed, above all, to facilitate the central administration of production and the control of public life.

#### Impacts overblown

Scott 1998 (Professor of Political Science at Yale, *Seeing Like a State* )

The invention of scientific forestry, freehold tenure, planned cities, col- lective farms, ujamaa villages, and industrial agriculture, for all their ingeniousness, represented fairly simple interventions into enormously complex natural and social systems. After being abstracted from sys- tems whose interactions defied a total accounting, a few elements were then made the basis for an imposed order. At best, the new order was fragile and vulnerable, sustained by improvisations not foreseen by its originators. At worst, it wreaked untold damage in shattered lives, a damaged ecosystem, and fractured or impoverished societies. This rather blanket condemnation must be tempered, especially in the case of social systems, by at least four considerations. First, and most important, the social orders they were designed to supplant were typically so manifestly unjust and oppressive that almost any new order might seem preferable. Second, high-modernist social engineering usu- ally came cloaked in egalitarian, emancipatory ideas: equality before the law, citizenship for all, and rights to subsistence, health, education, and shelter. The premise and great appeal of the high-modernist credo was that the state would make the benefits of technological progress available to all its citizens. The two remaining reasons for tempering our condemnation of such schemes have less to do with their potentially destructive conse- quences than with the capacity of ordinary human actors to modify them or, in the end, to bring them down. Where functioning represen- tative institutions were at hand, some accommodation was inevitable. In their absence, it is still remarkable how the dogged, day-to-day re- sistance of thousands of citizens forced the abandonment or restruc- turing of projects. Given sufficient time and leeway, of course, any high-modernist plan will be utterly remade by popular practice. Soviet collective farms, the most draconian case, were finally brought down as much by the dispirited work and resistance of the kolkhozniki as by the political shifts in Moscow.

### Alt Fails

#### Alternative can’t overcome individualism

Kipfer 2002 (Associate prof of polisci and French at York University, Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism: Lefebvre, Gramsci and the Problematic of Hegemony, *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 13:2)

The defeat of the new left in the aftermath of 1968 demonstrated the difficulty of sustaining quasi-revolutionary conjunctures with long-term urban strategies aimed at transforming everyday life, promoting self- management, and transforming "minimal difference" (a component of hegemony) into "maximal" difference (an element of counter- hegemony). Abstractly universalist, centralist and "phallocentric" Jacobin tendencies among the French left, which ignored difference altogether, did not help in this regard.124 For Lefebvre, minimal, or "induced" difference exists as an alienated, isolated fragment - an unmediated form of individualist or pluralist particularity - that is easily serialized, reproduced, trivialized and naturalized within the parameters of phallocentric abstract space and the reified "world of signs" of modernism. Maximal, "produced" forms of differential space and cyclical time, however, are festive, affective, unalienated, fully lived forms of plurality that can only flourish in a post-capitalist world defined by use-value and self-management.125 Asserting the right to difference can be a moment of counter-hegemonic politics if it liberates the "parodies" of minimal difference from the totalizing forces of commodification, uneven development, linguistic abstraction, phallocentrism and bourgeois power.126

#### U.S. urbanism irrelevant—global south key—alt can’t address that

Kipfer Siederi and Wieditz 2012 (Associate prof of polisci at York University, “Henri Lefebvre: Debates and Controversies” in *Progress in Human Geography*

Today, the anti-productivist leanings that inhere in Lefebvre’s conception of time, space, and everyday life appear at first sight to be of obvious importance given the socio-ecological state of the planet. But this – the planetary importance of Lefebvre’s work – is one of the thorniest questions in Lefebvre scholarship, one that should be approached with a great deal of caution (Kipfer et al., 2008). While Lefebvre’s work in the 1970s and 1980s strove towards a genuinely multipolar conception of knowledge production and political struggle, the European focus of his intellectual endeavours and lived experiences prevented him from realizing his own ambitions. Today, of course, the planetary pertinence of Lefebvre is not contingent only on his work but also on ongoing social processes and political struggles. Accelerated urbanization in the global South, the disintegration of state socialism, and the contradictions of Euro-American imperialism have contributed to a situation where Lefebvrean insights are taken in fresh directions in such places as Brazil and Hong Kong (on the latter, see Ng et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2012). Our own paper, itself squarely situated in Euro-American debates, will only be able to point to the fact that Lefebvre’s ultimate fate for truly global analyses will be determined by developments beyond the North Atlantic.