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# T:Beyond

Interpretation: Beyond means farther than, or outside of

Dictionary.com 2011 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/beyond

be·yond

–preposition

1. on, at, or to the farther side of: Beyond those trees you'll find his house.

2. farther on than; more distant than: beyond the horizon; beyond the sea.

2.Violation: The Affirmative does not call for any action whatsoever to be taken beyond the Earth’s mesosphere.

The Plan says ET life [from] beyond the mesosphere, not exploration and/or development beyond the Earth’s mesosphere. A correct way to word your plan is “The United States federal government should substantially increase the exploration beyond the earth’s mesosphere to explore the possibility of extraterrestrial life.”

3.Standards:

A. Predictable limits: The topic needs a strong line to draw to limit our infinitely smaller cases.

1. The aff has infinite time to prepare a topical case while the neg is confined to the totality of prep time to answer a non-topical case.

2. The negative cannot be expected to go outside of the literature base to research non-topical affirmatives

B. Ground:

1. The negative loses key ground including the vast majority of the DA’s if the aff doesn’t go beyond the Earth’s mesosphere (like Space Debris, Space Weaponization, etc.)

4.Topicality is a voter.

Debate is a game in which debaters gain the skills necessary to make good decisions, in politics and in life. A non-topical aff does not allow debaters to gain experience to make an educated policy decision about the resolution, and should therefore be rejected entirely. A non-topical aff also leads to the destruction of debate because Limits and ground are key to fairness, and no one wants to play a rigged game.

# CP

## 1NC

### Counterplan: The United States federal government should substantially increase the exploration, within and beneath the Earths mesosphere, of the possibility of Extra-Terrestrial life beyond the Earth’s mesosphere. The United States federal government should publicly affirm the possibility of the existence of Extra-Terrestrial life. The United States federal government should publicly disclose any evidence regarding the possibility of Extra-Terrestrial Life.

### Competitiveness: 1. We are non-topical- The negative does not claim to be exploring anything beyond the Earth’s mesosphere.

### 2. Their own Authors concede that exploration beyond the Earth’s mesosphere is not needed because there should be ample evidence on earth.

Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, ‘8 (“Sovereignty and the UFO”, Profs at OSU and U of Minnesota, Political Theory)

“ They can’t get here .” Even if intelligent life is common, skeptics argue it is too far away to get here. Relativity theory says nothing can travel faste rthan the speed of light (186,000 miles per second). Lower speeds impose a temporal constraint on ET visitation: at .001 percent of light speed, or66,960 miles per houralready far beyond current human capabilitiesit would take 4,500 Earth years for ETs to arrive from the nearest star. Higher speeds, in turn, impose a cost and energy constraint: to approximate light speed a spaceship would need to use more energy than is presently con-sumed in an entire year on Earth.Physical constraints on inter-stellar travel are often seen as the ultimate reason to reject the ETH, but are they decisive? Computer simulations sug-gest that even at speeds well below light the colonization wave-fronts of any expanding ET civilizations should have reached Earth long ago. 40 How long ago depends on what assumptions are made, but even pessimistic onesyield ET encounters with Earth within 100 million years, barely a blip in cosmic terms. In short, ETs should be here, which prompts the famous“Fermi Paradox,” “Where are They?”

### Net Benefit: Any Da that links to beyond-mesosphere exploration

## 2NC OV

**2NC Overview**: The CP is to affirm the potential existence of ET life and search for it underneath the mesosphere. The CP accesses all of the advantages of the aff by affirming the possible existence of ET while avoiding the links to the DA. At which point there is already no reason to evaluate the affirmative because the neg poses the optimal policy option.

# PIC: ET

## 1NC ET PIC 1/3

The United States Federal Government should substantially increase the exploration of the possibility of galactics beyond the earth’s mesosphere.

### **The word “extraterrestrial” is intrinsically linked to notions of otherness and leads to dehumanization**

Cunningham-Parmeter, expert in employment and immigration law, 4/8/11 (Keith, “ALIEN LANGUAGE: IMMIGRATION METAPHORS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF OTHERNESS,” Fordham Law Review 79, http://www.fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol\_79/9\_Article-Cunningham\_Mar.pdf.)

Thus, in certain instances, the Supreme Court employs dehumanizing metaphors to describe aliens as animals that are caught and released. In other Court opinions, dehumanization occurs by describing aliens as creatures from outer space. Extraterrestrials are the ultimate nonhumans. Recognizing the ability of “alien” to convey foreignness, science fiction writers co-opted the word in the mid-twentieth century. [T]he relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Born in a foreign galaxy, space creatures do not eat our food or breathe our air; they possess fewer human qualities than even animals on Earth. At times, the Court has described immigrants in this way: Empirical data discussed in detail below show that “alien” and “illegal alien” are by far the most common terms used to refer to immigrants in the law. Because metaphors connect listeners to deeply embedded cultural knowledge, the repeated use of “alien” in legal texts unavoidably triggers readers’ inclinations to associate aliens with extraterrestrials. For example, the Court frequently employs the metaphor ALIENS ARE INVADERS to discuss immigration. According to popular science fiction narratives, extraterrestrials seek to dominate the universe. As a method for creating multiple, overlapping correspondences, the invasion metaphor relates simultaneously to popular images of space creatures attempting to overtake the galaxy, as well as more conventional notions of warfare. By connecting readers to this cultural imagery, the Court’s alien metaphors present immigrants not only as invaders from foreign countries, but also as nonhuman aggressors from foreign worlds. Metaphors can dehumanize through direct comparisons to nonhumans, such as animals or space creatures, or by refusing to ascribe human qualities to immigrants. [T]he general purpose of the immigration statute’s employment prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a magnet pulls illegal immigrants toward the United States . . . . Such attribute-based metaphors dehumanize immigrants by presenting aliens as inanimate objects that are transported and pulled by outside forces: [M]any Mexicans being imported into this country . . . . [Respondent] and respondent[’s] wife paid a professional smuggler $450 to transport them into this country . . . . [S]he had attempted to smuggle aliens for gain. As nonhuman things, aliens can be pulled, smuggled, or transported, much like boxes of books or cases of wine. The law does not extend personal rights to such goods. According to these metaphors, aliens should be controlled and regulated in the same manner as other articles of commerce.

1NC ET PIC 2/3

### The word “galactic” should be used instead – has the same meaning without the negative connotations

Beckow, author, former Cultural Historian for the National Museum of Man, 2010 (Dave, “We Gaians,” http://the2012scenario.com/world-disclosure-day/who-are-the-extraterrestrials/we-gaians/.)

Each time I type “terrestrial,” my fingers become the hundred feet of a caterpillar who just became aware of walking. They trip all over themselves. The effort required to type that word slows me down to a crawl. I must find a better term. Moreover, if there are “terrestrials,” there must then be “extraterrestrials.” Otherwise who are terrestrials defined in juxtaposition to? There would only be terrestrials and hence no need to define the group as being apart from anyone else. But the word “extraterrestrial” carries a lot of negative baggage, too many War of the Worlds connotations. And, besides, it still has that caterpillar word in it: “terrestrials.” Can we not find a better set of words? By the power vested in me as a sovereign citizen of planet Earth, I hereby create a new word to replace “terrestrial” – “Gaian.” “Gaia” is Mother Earth. “Gaian” is an intelligent life form born and resident on Planet Earth. And since we tend to informalize words these days, it won’t be long before that word becomes “gaian” instead of “Gaian” and so I further propose that we move directly to that point and use the word, “gaian,” as the baseline term for what has till now been called terrestrial, earthling, Earthian, or terran. Now we need to find a replacement for “extaterrestrial.” By the same power vested in me, I recommend the word “galactic.” I’ve been criticized for that word because, it has been said, it refers to the galaxy rather than the cosmos or universe. But I’m not using it that way. I’m using it to mean an intelligent life form born and resident in a place within this universe (rather than within a parallel universe) and from this galaxy or another, but not from Earth.

### Competitiveness:

### Textual competition is real-world - SETI has purposefully removed the word “extraterrestrial” from their program in the past

Maccone, International Academy of Astronautics & INAF, 12/22/06 (Claudio, “SETI, extrasolar planets search and interstellar flight: When are they going to merge?” http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094576508003743.)

But enemies of SETI were lurking in the dark. They probably thought that NASA was going to contact ETs very soon, and that the world was hardly ready for any such a Contact. NASA was too aware of this mortal danger, as NASA itself avoided using the word SETI in the formal statement of the 1992 SETI Program: the Program was called HRMS (high resolution microwave survey), a way to avoid the word “Extraterrestrial” in SETI. And SETI scientists laughed at this HRMS “invention” and said that HRMS stood for “He Really Meant SETI”!

1NC ET PIC 3/3

### **Net benefit:**

### **The dichotomizing rhetoric of the affirmative, through the use of the word “extraterrestrial,” leads to anthropocentrism by drawing limits between the “superior” man and his primitive counterpart. Turns case.**

Yampell, lit Ph.D., Wayne University, 2008 (Cat, “When Science Blurs the Boundaries: The Commodification of the Animal in Young Adult Science Fiction,” Science Fiction Studies 35, http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/105/yampell105.htm.)

The history of homo sapiens is firmly rooted in the delineation of differences, often to the complete exclusion of samenesses—woman from man, child from adult, nature from culture, and nonhuman animal from human-animal.1 In contemporary Western culture, animals are so labeled to perpetuate anthropocentrism. By calling all that is not human-animal “other,” human-animals define other animals through the language of deficiency. They are not human-animal; thus, they are inferior and subject to the whims—and experiments—of the dominant species. In Of Grammatology (1974), Jacques Derrida writes, “Man calls himself man only by drawing limits excluding his other... : the purity of nature, of animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity” (244; emphasis in original). Entrenched in a position that maintains their subjugation and ensuing limitations, women, children, animals, and other subaltern groups are often discouraged or dismissed. In order to ensure dominion, human-animals (a category which does not necessarily include all homo sapiens) create and celebrate hierarchical boundaries and privilege that which separates over that which unifies.

## “ET” BAD

### Through distancing the “alien” as an inferior being, this binarization creates tension that prevents us from truly embracing the other and coming to terms with ourselves

Thomson, Professor of Women's Studies at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, 1996 (Rosemarie Garland, “Freakery: cultural spectacles of the extraordinary body.”)

This essay started with three quotations, each suggesting how freaks, aliens, or monsters function as categorical boundary breakers, entities that transgress cultural schemes of classification and violate hierarchical structures of binary opposition. The construction of the alien is always a complex play of disavowal and identification. The extraterrestrial alien, as a fictional creation, must function as a site of tension between self and other. As a projection of otherness generated from within the self, the figure of the alien articulates what a given culture perceives as different, aberrant, strange, freakish. Extraterrestrialism, the process of "othering" that essentializes alien difference as inferiority, acts to reify and reinforce the "human" as superior. Inasmuch as the freakish SF alien frequently draws from real-world racial stereotypes, the "human" frequently narrows to white, American, and male. Yet, the alien is a site of ambiguity, anxiety, and contestation. The vehemence with which the alien, the freak, and the other arc renounced, degraded, and disavowed by a culture, be it on the freak show stage or in the SF feature, suggests a commensurate level of anxiety in the collective distancing psyche. Constructed as a freak, a curiosity to be exhibited and gawked at, the alien calls the human into question. To live with the alien, the freak, and the monster is to come to terms with ourselves.

### The phrase “extraterrestrial” is too vague, evokes sci-fi imagery, and harmfully assumes human qualities

Heidmann, radio-astronomer at Paris University, 1995 (Jean, “Extraterrestrial Intelligence,” http://books.google.com/books?id=7G2p3vWjNeQC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false.)

Our study of the origin of life, our exploration of space, and astronomy itself all prompt us to give serious consideration nowadays to the idea of extraterrestrial life, which until now has been the preserve of science fiction. Straightaway, we need to be more precise: the word 'extraterrestrial' naturally evokes images such as those in The War of the Worlds, Alien, ET, or Close Encounters of the Third Kind. We tend to think either of gentle beings or of horrible monsters endowed with amazing powers. Above all, we tend to confer on them a degree of intelligence at least equal to our own. In contemporary literature or films, extraterrestrials are generally either an idealization of what humanity would like to be, or else a caricature of what we fear it might become. In particular, when we envisage forms of extraterrestrial life, we tend to ignore the fact that they might not have attained the level of intelligence and civilization that we have reached. Yet, on a cosmic scale, the evolutionary path that life may follow is highly complex. To understand it, we need to forget the little green men that otherwise haunt our imaginations.

# CASE

## Bio-Politics Defense 1/2

### It won’t cause extinction-elites know that destruction is counter-productive.

**Bauman ‘1,** Zygmunt, Emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of Leeds and Warsaw, Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World, Polity, 2001

The era of great transformation was, to put it in a nutshell, an era of engagement. The ruled were dependent on the rulers, but the rulers no less depended on the ruled. For better or worse, the two sides were tied to each other and neither could easily opt out of the wedlock – however cumbersome and repulsive it might feel. Divorce was not a realistic option for either side. When in a flash of inspiration Henry Ford made his historic decision to double his workers’ wages, what he was after was a double bind which would tie them to his factories more strongly and more securely than the mere need of livelihood, which could be met by other employers as well. Ford’s power and wealth were no more extensive and no more solid than his immense factories, heavy machines and massive labour force; he could not afford to lose either. It took some time before both sides, by many trials and more errors still, learned that truth. But once the truth had been learned, the inconvenience and the high and rising cost of panoptical power (and, more generally, of domination-through-engagement) became apparent. A marriage where both sides know that it has been tied together for a long time to come, and neither of the partners is free to take it apart, is by necessity a site of perpetual conflict. The chances that the partners will be of the same mind on all on all matters that may arise in the unforeseeable future are as small as the probability that one of the partners will in all matters give way to the will of the other, making no attempt to win a better deal. And so there will be numerous confrontations, head-on battles and guerrilla sallies. Only in extreme cases, though, are the war actions likely to lead to the ultimate attrition of one or both partners: an awareness that such attrition can happen and **the wish that preferably should not will in all probably be enough to cut the “schismogenetic chain” just before the ultimate happens** (‘since we are bound to stay together whatever happens, let’s rather try to make our togetherness liveable’). So alongside the internecine war there will also be long periods of truce, and between them bouts of bargaining and negotiation. And there will be renewed attempts to compromise on a shared set of rules acceptable to all

### The affirmative’s impacts will be prevented by localized resistance.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the current literature, it seems that biopolitics is almost always acting on (or attempting to act on) people; it is almost never something they do. This kind of model is not very realistic. This is not how societies work. The example of the attempt to create a eugenic counseling system in Prussia should be instructive in this respect. Here public health and eugenics experts— technocrats— tried to impart their sense of eugenic crisis and their optimism about the possibility of creating a better “race” to the public; and they successfully mobilized the resources of the state in support of their vision. And yet, what emerged quite quickly from this effort was in fact a system of public contraceptive advice — or family planning. It is not so easy to impose technocratic ambitions on the public, particularly in a democratic state; and “on the ground,” at the level of interactions with actual persons and social groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the fantasies of technocrats. This is of course a point that Foucault makes with particular clarity. The power of discourse is not the power of manipulative elites, which control it and impose it from above. Manipulative elites always face resistance, often effective, resistance. More important, the power of discourse lies precisely in its ability to set the terms for such struggles, to define what they are about, as much as what their outcomes are. As Foucault put it, power— including the power to manage life —“comes from everywhere.”105 Biomedical knowledge was not the property only of technocrats, and it could be used to achieve ends that had little to do with their social-engineering schemes.106 Modern biopolitics is a multifaceted world of discourse and practice elaborated and put into practice at multiple levels throughout

Bio-Politics Defense 2/2

### All policies are not the same—biopower within a democratic context are radically different than their fascism examples. Power is driven by the people, thus biopolitical concentrations are distributed, avoiding their impacts.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the Weimar model, then, the rights of the individual, guaranteed formally by the constitution and substantively by the welfare system, were the central element of the dominant program for the management of social problems. Almost no one in this period advocated expanding social provision out of the goodness of their hearts. This was a strategy of social management, of social engineering. The mainstream of social reform in Germany believed that guaranteeing basic social rights— the substantive or positive freedom of all citizens — was the best way to turn people into power, prosperity, and profit. In that sense, the democratic welfare state was— and is — democratic not despite of its pursuit of biopower, but because of it. The contrast with the Nazi state is clear. National Socialism aimed to construct a system of social and population policy founded on the concept of individual duties, on the ubiquitous and total power of the state, and on the systematic absorption of every citizen by organizations that could implant that power at every level of their lives — in political and associational life, in the family, in the workplace, and in leisure activities. In the welfarist vision of Weimar progressives, the task of the state was to create an institutional framework that would give individuals the wherewithal to integrate themselves successfully into the national society, economy, and polity. The Nazis aimed, instead, to give the state the wherewithal to do with every citizen what it willed. And where Weimar welfare advocates understood themselves to be constructing a system of knowledge and institutions that would manage social problems, the Nazis fundamentally sought to abolish just that system by eradicating — by finding a “final solution” to — social problems. Again, as Peukert pointed out, many advocates of a rights-based welfare structure were open to the idea that “stubborn” cases might be legitimate targets for sterilization; the right to health could easily be redefined as primarily a duty to be healthy, for example. But the difference between a strategy of social management built on the rights of the citizen and a system of racial policy built on the total power of the state is not merely a semantic one; such differences had very profound political implications, and established quite different constraints. The rights-based strategy was actually not very compatible with exclusionary and coercive policies; it relied too heavily on the cooperation of its targets and of armies of volunteers, it was too embedded in a democratic institutional structure and civil society, it lacked powerful legal and institutional instruments of coercion, and its rhetorical structure was too heavily slanted toward inclusion and tolerance.

## AT Bare Life

### Bio-politics does not result in bare-life – increase in biopower increases the potentialities of life

**Ojakangas ‘5**

(Mika, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in Finland “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power,” Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 5-28, May)

<Moreover, life as the object and the subject of bio‐power – given that life is everywhere, it becomes everywhere – is in no way bare, but is as the synthetic notion of life implies, the multiplicity of the forms of life, from the nutritive life to the intellectual life, from the biological levels of life to the political existence of man.43 Instead of bare life, the life of bio‐power is a **plenitude of life**, as Foucault puts it.44 Agamben is certainly right in saying that the production of bare life is, and has been since Aristotle, a main strategy of the sovereign power to establish itself – to the same degree that sovereignty has been the main fiction of juridico‐institutional thinking from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt. The sovereign power is, indeed, based on bare life because it is capable of confronting life merely when stripped off and isolated from all forms of life, when the entire existence of a man is reduced to a bare life and exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Life is undoubtedly sacred for the sovereign power in the sense that Agamben defines it. It can be taken away without a homicide being committed. In the case of bio‐power, however, this does not hold true. In order to function properly, bio‐power cannot reduce life to the level of bare life, because bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist – which also makes understandable the vast critique of sovereignty in the era of bio‐power. Bio‐power **needs a notion of life** that corresponds to its aims. What then is the aim of bio‐power? Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as Foucault emphasizes, to “**multiply life**”,45 to produce “**extra‐life**.”46 Bio‐power needs, in other words, a notion of life which enables it to accomplish this task. The modern synthetic notion of life endows it with such a notion. It enables bio‐power to “invest life through and through”, to “optimize forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern.” 47 It could be argued, of course, that instead of bare life (*zoe*) the form of life (*bios*) functions as the foundation of bio‐power. However, there is no room either for a *bios* in the modern bio‐political order because every *bios* has always been, as Agamben emphasizes, the result of the exclusion of *zoe* from the political realm. The modern bio‐political order does not exclude anything – not even in the form of “inclusive exclusion”. As a matter of fact, in the era of bio*‐*politics, life is already a bios that is only its own zoe. It has already moved into the site that Agamben suggests as the remedy of the political pathologies of modernity, that is to say, into the site where politics is freed from every ban and “a form of life is wholly exhausted in bare life.”48 At the end of *Homo Sacer*, Agamben gives this life the name “form‐of‐life”, signifying “always and above all *possibilities* of life, always and above all power”, understood as potentiality (*potenza*).49 According to Agamben, there would be no power that could have any hold over men’s existence if life were understood as a “form‐of‐life”. However, it is precisely this life, life as untamed power and potentiality, that bio‐power invests and optimizes. If bio‐power multiplies and optimizes life, it does so, above all, by **multiplying and optimizing potentialities of life, by fostering and generating “forms*‐*of*‐*life**”.

## Bio-Politics Good—Totalitarianism

### Bio-politics solves totalitarian power by prioritizing the best interests of the populace.

**Selby, 07** - Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth – (Jan, Sept. 2007, International Relations, “Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance, and the Limits of Foucauldian IR”, Vol. 21, No. 3, pg 335-336)

Now these assertions from Hardt and Negri about international peace and the Gulf War are for the most part synonymous with straightforwardly liberal internationalist ones. Consider how differently realist (or indeed most Marxist) analysts would tend to characterise the 1990–1 intervention: as motivated by a desire to secure vital oil reserves for the world market; as prompted by an interest in maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East; as enabling the US state to consolidate its permanent military presence in the Gulf; or as allowing it to demonstrate its new military technologies, prowess and sole-superpower status (whilst getting others to pay for the whole exercise). In offering an account of the contemporary world order and the place of the US within it, Hardt and Negri inevitably enter an orthodox IR terrain that has long been dominated by two rival perspectives – one, liberal internationalist, which lays stress on the (actual or hoped-for) international diffusion of power, and on the significance of law, values and rights; the other, a realist tradition, which instead perceives enduring concentrations of power in the hands of states, and the primacy of state power and interests over law, value and right. Not only do Hardt and Negri enter into this terrain, but in their emphasis on ‘values’, ‘law’ and the waning of inter-state ‘imperialism’, they take clear sides within it. However misleading the stylised distinction between liberal and realist ‘traditions’ can sometimes be (I return to this issue below), the affinities between Hardt and Negri’s and liberal internationalists’ models of world order and international politics are striking.74 Nor does this apply to Hardt and Negri alone. Dillon and Reid are undoubtedly more cautious in their liberalism, insisting that global liberal governance has a distinctly ‘martial face’, but they too ‘do not dispute the importance of the powerful desire among liberal states and societies to establish global norms of intervention . . . on the grounds of humanitarian liberal values’.75 What is more, Dillon is clearly of the view that, under global liberal governance, the search for profit and security is subordinate to the operations of bio-power: ‘global liberal governance’, he says, ‘is a Foucauldian system of power/knowledge that . . . operate[s] through the strategic manipulation of different generative principles of formation: profit, scarcity, security and so on’.76 Just as bio-power is the overarching mode of power within this world order, so the primary ‘object of power’ within this order is the ordering of life and the welfare of populations.77 Implicitly, but never directly stated, the central feature and determinant of the current world order is not the maximisation of state power and security, or US primacy (as realists would tend to emphasise), or even class conflict and the accumulation of capital (as would Marxists), but instead the general welfare. Dillon and Reid, like Hardt and Negri, are of course far from liberal in many of their assumptions about politics and society. But in relation to international politics, where the most abiding opposition is between broadly liberal and realist perspectives, the globalisation of a Foucauldian model of power ends up inspiring a quintessentially liberal, rather than realist, reading of international politics.

## Bio-Politics Good—Deterrence 1/2

### Bio-politics key to nuclear deterrence

**Bogard ’91,** William Bogard, professor at Whitman College, 1991 [Social Science Journal, Vol. 28 Issue 3 p. 325]

Although there are many places in the History of Sexuality that might indicate what Foucault had in mind was indeed what we commonly mean by “deterrence,” the general context remains one of discipline, expanded to encompass the issues of bio-power and the control over life. But there are a number of reasons to believe that such developments raise problems for the economy of power relations that, while related to those of discipline, are nonetheless conceptually distinct. The following appear to me to be the most relevant of those distinctions. With discipline, the problem of power is that of producing and finalizing functions within a human multiplicity, to maximize utility through the strategic ordering of spatial and temporal relations, ultimately to foster or disallow life itself. With deterrence, on the other hand, we might say that the problem is one of reintroducing an asymmetry between opposing forces which have evolved too close to a point of equivalence or parity, or to a saturation point where it is no longer possible to increase their respective utilities. Where discipline sets forces in motion, deterrence indefinitely postpones the equivalence of forces. Here again, **the case of nuclear deterrence serves as a paradigm,** but this is only because it is the most concentrated and extreme form of a whole multiplicity of tactical maneuvers—of postponement, disinclination, destabilization, etc.—that, like the disciplines in the 1 8th century, have evolved into a general mechanism of domination, and which today pervades the most diverse institutional settings.

Bio-Politics Good—Deterrence 2/2

### Attempts to move away from nuclear deterrence ensures global nuclear war.

**Schneider ‘9** [Mark. Fellow @ National Institute for Public Policy. “Prevention Through Strength: Is Nuclear Superiority Enough” Comparative Strategy]

Western nuclear powers—the United States, Britain, and France—vastly outgun the rogue states in every measurable respect. However, this alone may not be enough to ensure deterrence. The problem, as Dr. Keith B. Payne has observed, is that, “Effective deterrence threats must be credible to the opponents. Unfortunately, leaders of terrorist states and tyrants who recognize the appropriate priority we place on avoiding civilian casualties may not believe U.S. deterrent threats that would produce the high yields and moderate accuracies of the remaining Cold War arsenal.”36 The problem is complicated by the ceaseless efforts of the political left to delegitimize nuclear deterrence. In the pre–World War II era, or even during the late Cold War, the use of chemical and biological agents by a minor nation against a great power would have been suicidal. Today, however, we have to take the threat of WMD attacks, even by a much weaker nation, very seriously in significant part because of the delegitimization of nuclear deterrence in the Western world. In my view, the delegitimization of nuclear deterrence by the political left is one of the most serious problems we face in dealing with WMD proliferation. The left-wing view of nuclear weapons in the United States has moved, to some degree, into the mainstream. Distinguished former American leaders such a George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, despite the manifest failure of arms control to constrain the WMD threat, call for “A world free of Nuclear Weapons” because “ . . . the United States can address almost all of its military objectives by non-nuclear means.”37 This view ignores the complete lack of plausibility of creating a verification regime involving the abolition of nuclear weapons with acceptable risk, the consequences of cheating and the lack of any credible response option if it is actually discovered that an authoritarian regime had retained a sizable nuclear stockpile, and the military implication of the other types of weapons of mass destruction—chemical and biological (CBW) attack, including the advanced agents now available to potential enemies of the United States and our allies. A credible U.S. nuclear deterrent is necessary to deal with existing threats to the very **survival of the U.S., its allies, and its armed forces** if they are subject to an attack using WMD. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch wrote in The Wall Street Journal, “However, the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive. It will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.”38 If WMD attacks were actually made against Western cities, the reaction to them by civilian populations would likely be extreme but it would be too late to impact deterrence. There would likely be overwhelming demand by the affected populations to make the attacks stop. The U.S. National Strategy for Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction recognized that we must respond to WMD attack rapidly and that, “The primary objective of a response is to disrupt an imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat of future attacks.”39 In the words of Dr. William Graham, Chairman of the Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission: Failure to provide a credible deterrent will result in a wave of nuclear proliferation with serious national security implications. When dealing with the rogue states the issue is not the size of the U.S. nuclear deterrent but the credibility of its use in response to chemical or biological weapons use and its ability to conduct low collateral damage nuclear attacks against WMD capabilities and delivery systems including very hard underground facilities for purposes of damage limitation. We must also have the capability to respond promptly. The United States nuclear guarantee is a major deterrent to proliferation. If we do not honor that guarantee, or devalue it, many more nations will obtain nuclear weapons.40 **There are only two ways to achieve a rapid end to a conflict: surrender or**, alternatively, prompt and effective **counterforce strikes** designed to limit damage by destroying the adversary’s offensive capability. In such a charged atmosphere there likely would be demands in many states for massive retaliation against the attacker. Prewar debates about nuclear strategy, proportionality, and international law may vanish once the scope of the tragedy was fully appreciated.

## Bio-Politics Good—Terror

### State surveillance is key to solve terrorism and bioweapon attacks

**Kerr 2k** (Donald, Assistant Director of the FBI, Laboratory Division, testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6 http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress00/kerr090600.htm)

Terrorist groups are increasingly using new information technology (IT) and the Internet to formulate plans, raise funds, spread propaganda, and communicate securely. In his statement on the worldwide threat in the year 2000, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified that terrorist groups, "including Hezbollah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and Bin Laden's al Qa'ida organization are using computerized files, E-mail, and encryption to support their operations." As one example, convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, stored detailed plans to destroy United States airliners on encrypted files on his laptop computer. Other terrorist groups, such as the Internet Black Tigers (who are reportedly affiliated with the Tamil Tigers), engage in attacks on foreign government websites and E-mail servers. "Cyber terrorism" -- the use of Cyber tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, or government operations) for the purpose of coercing or intimidating a government or civilian population -- is emerging as a very real threat. Recently, the FBI uncovered a plot to break into National Guard armories and to steal the armaments and explosives necessary to simultaneously destroy multiple power transmission facilities in the Southern United States. After introducing a cooperating witness into the inner circle of this domestic terrorist group, it became clear that many of the communications of the group were occurring via E-mail. As the investigation closed, computer evidence disclosed that the group was downloading information about Ricin, the third most deadly toxin in the world. Without the fortunate ability to place a person in this group, the need and technological capability to intercept their E-mail communications' content and addressing information would have been imperative, if the FBI were to be able to detect and prevent these acts and successfully prosecute.

**Terrorism Causes Extinction**

**Sid-Ahmed** ‘**4** (Mohamed, political analyst, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

## Secrecy Good-Humanitarian

### Governmental secrecy is not for preservation of the state, but rather benefits to the people.

**Stancil ’10,** John Stancil, Stancil is a writer for The Nation, On Wikileaks and Governmental Secrecy, http://www.thenation.com/article/156835/wikileaks-and-government-secrecy

Then there is the danger that dissidents or other activists might be unwilling to talk to American officials for fear of retaliation. This danger is real, but easy to exaggerate. Much information on human rights abuses is collected efficaciously by NGOs, which manage to do their work and protect sources where necessary without a secrecy apparatus like that of the US government. The government itself relies extensively on their reports. However, it is still true that only a government can collect information and intervene fast enough to make a difference to those who are threatened. I participated in several examples of this in Jerusalem, where our ability to get very detailed information (sometimes working with NGO contacts who wanted their association with us kept secret) and then make timely protests to the Israeli government led to tangible benefits for Palestinians threatened with home demolitions or other abuses. (More numerous during my service were the abuses we did not stop.) It was clear in these cases that NGOs, on their own, never could have achieved the outcomes we did because they never could duplicate what embassies already have: an information-gathering network that works seamlessly with state power, has direct access to leaders of other states and doesn't have to rely on the slow mechanisms of public pressure. Secrecy is one of the state's tools that can help in some human rights cases, so to the extent that WikiLeaks succeeds in taking that tool away, it will reduce the likelihood of helpful intervention.

## Anthropocentricism Defense

### Human-centered ethics doesn’t exclude responsibility to nonhumans—moral duties can still be applied to nature.

Kyung-sig **Hwang**, **2003**. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

The third view, which will be defended here, is that there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties **can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory**.[4] In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A **human-centered theory of environmental ethics** holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all **ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings**. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and its non-human habitants.[5]

## Anthropocentricism Solves Environment

### The public will never accept exclusively ecologically driven ethics-only anthropocentricism can justify environmental preservation through advocating benefits to humans—turns the reasons anthro is bad.

David **Watson**, **2007**. Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa. "Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic," http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis\_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm.

Opponents of a conservative anthropocentric environmental ethic will object to the priority of human survival in an environmental ethic. Those who oppose any anthropocentric ethic would look to the concept of value to support their argument. They would claim that other members of the biosphere possess intrinsic value and that their value cannot be considered less than that of a human. Thus, other members of the biosphere cannot be sacrificed for the betterment of humanity. According to such arguments, the intrinsic value of these other members prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Emotionally the arguments of the non-anthropocentrists have great appeal. Philosophically justified, moral and ethical theorists often gravitate to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. However, there are several problems with the concepts they assert. Non-anthropocentrists claim that other members of the biosphere have intrinsic value, and this prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Compelling examples along these lines are often cited to justify non-anthropocentrism. The ‘slaughtering’ of animals such as cows, deer, or chickens for human use is wrong because the chickens and cows possess as much value as humans. However, whether or not these arguments are valid and justified is not the only consideration necessary. The discussions of philosophers and intellectuals are not the end of environmental ethics. **The people of Western societies**, as consumers of vast amounts of resources, **must realize the importance of the other members of the biosphere if this issue is to be addressed**. Humans are part of nature, or the biosphere, as are all other living and non-living entities on the earth. Though humanity often seems separate and distinct from nature, humans emerged from the already thriving biosphere. This earth has been the only home to humanity. Without the earth and its parts, the necessary conditions for the existence and survival of humanity are lacking. **Environmental anthropocentrism does not necessitate an adversarial relationship between humans and the rest of nature**, contrary to popular opinion. In fact, humanity has a great interest in the welfare of the biosphere: There is very good reason for thinking ecologically, and for encouraging human beings to act in such a way as to preserve a rich and balanced planetary ecology: human survival depends on it. (Massanari 45) Environmental ethics need to embrace anthropocentrism and the insights of conservation ethics. Human self-interest, regardless of its moral status, is present in human nature and culturally around the world. However, this self-interest and the direct relation it should have with the welfare of the biotic community is often overlooked. Instead of continuing the debate of whether to champion all members of the biosphere or to promote the advancement of humanity, we need to embrace all members of the biosphere in order to promote the advancement of humanity. There are many different factors that allow for life on earth, particularly human life. The ‘resources,’ as they are often called, necessary for the survival of humanity are limited. If the finite resources necessary for human life are gone, then the existence of humanity will no longer be viable on Earth. The recent trend of human attitude toward and interaction with the environment is frighteningly shortsighted. Only a sector of the scientific community attempts to address the potential environmental problems facing humanity in the near and distant future. Those that do, however, often express what seems like helpless concern: A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it, is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated. (“Warning to Humanity” 783) Looking only as far as twenty-five to fifty years into the future of the environment is commonly considered long-term thinking. More than likely, this will only be an intermediate point in the environmental change humans have caused. The future viability of life on the planet is necessary for human survival, and humanity can yet have a say in this future. Humans came about among a preexisting world of living and non-living agents. We are just one of many species that have inhabited, or do inhabit the earth. These various species serve different functions in the biosphere and are interdependent upon one another for the survival of themselves and the biosphere.

### Western Science is key to improve our quality of life. Our lives depend on the developments that science has created.

**Locke ‘97** (Edwin A.; Professor of Management – University of Maryland-College Park and Senior Writer – Ayn Rand Institute) “The Greatness of Western Civilization” [www.aynrand.org/site/News2?JServSessionIdr001=7xcem0b1i1.app7a&page=NewsArticle&id=6164&news\_iv\_ctrl=1077](http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?JServSessionIdr001=7xcem0b1i1.app7a&page=NewsArticle&id=6164&news_iv_ctrl=1077)

The triumph of reason and rights made possible the full development and application of science and technology and ultimately modern industrial society. Reason and rights freed man's mind from the tyranny of religious dogma and freed man's productive capacity from the tyranny of state control. Scientific and technological progress followed in several interdependent steps. Men began to understand the laws of nature. They invented an endless succession of new products. And they engaged in large-scale production, that is, the creation of wealth, which in turn financed and motivated further invention and production. As a result, horse-and-buggies were replaced by automobiles, wagon tracks by steel rails, candles by electricity. At last, after millennia of struggle, man became the master of his environment. The result of the core achievements of Western civilization has been an increase in freedom, wealth, health, comfort, and life expectancy unprecedented in the history of the world. The achievements were greatest in the country where the principles of reason and rights were implemented most consistently--the United States of America. In contrast, it was precisely in those Eastern and African countries which did not embrace reason, rights, and technology where people suffered (and still suffer) most from both natural and man-made disasters (famine, poverty, illness, dictatorship) and where life-expectancy was (and is) lowest. It is said that primitives live "in harmony with nature," but in reality they are simply victims of the vicissitudes of nature--if some dictator does not kill them first. The greatness of the West is not an "ethnocentric" prejudice; it is an objective fact. This assessment is based on the only proper standard for judging a government or a society: the degree to which its core values are pro- or anti-life. Pro-life cultures acknowledge and respect man's nature as a rational being who must discover and create the conditions which his survival and happiness require--which means that they advocate reason, rights, freedom, and technological progress. Despite its undeniable triumphs, Western civilization is by no means secure. Its core principles are under attack from every direction--by religious fanatics, by dictators and, most disgracefully, by Western intellectuals, who are denouncing reason in the name of skepticism, rights in the name of special entitlements, and progress in the name of environmentalism. We are heading rapidly toward the dead end of nihilism. The core values and achievements of the West and America must be asserted proudly and defended to the death. Our lives depend on them.

## Biocentricism—Extinction

### Radical biocentrism causes extinction.

Kyung-sig **Hwang**, **2003**. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

While our ability to affect the future is immense, our ability to foresee the results of our environmental interventions is not. I think that our moral responsibility grows with foresight. And yet, paradoxically in some cases grave moral responsibility is entailed by the fact of one's ignorance. If the planetary life-support system appears to be complex and mysterious, humble ignorance should indicate respect and restraint. However, as many life scientists have complained, these virtues have not been apparent in these generations. Instead they point out, we have boldly marched ahead, shredding delicate ecosystems and obliterating countless species, and with them the unique genetic codes that evolved through millions of years; we have altered the climate and even the chemistry of the atmosphere, and as a result of all this-what?[18] A few results are immediately to our benefit; more energy, more mineral resources, more cropland, convenient waste disposal. Indeed, these short-term payoffs motivated us to alter our natural environment. But by far the larger and more significant results, the permanent results, are unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nature, says poet, Nancy Newhall, "holds answers to more questions than we know how to ask." And we have scarcely bothered to ask.[19] Year and year, the natural habitants diminish and the species disappear, and thus our planetary ecosystem (our household) is forever impoverished. It is awareness of ecological crisis that has led to the now common claim that we need transvaluation of value, new values, a new ethic, and an ethic that is essentially and not simply contingently new and ecological. Closer inspection usually reveals that the writer who states this does not really mean to advance such a radical thesis, that all he is arguing for is the application of old, recognized, ethical values of the kind noted under the characterization of respect for persons, justice, honesty, promotion of good, where pleasure and happiness are seen as goods. Thus, although W. T. Blackstone writes; "we do not need the kind of transvaluation that Nietzsche wanted, but we do need that for which ecologists are calling, that is, basic changes in man's attitude toward nature and man's place in nature, toward population growth, toward the use of technology, and toward the production and distribution of goods and services." We need to develop what I call the ecological attitude. The transvaluation of values, which is needed, will require fundamental changes in the social, legal, political and economic institutions that embody our values. He concludes his article by explicitly noting that he does not really demand a new ethic, or a transvaluation of values. A human being is a hierarchical system and a component of super-individual, hierarchical system of sets. What is needed is **not the denial of anthropocentrism**, the placing of the highest value on humans and their ends and the conceiving of the rest of the nature as an instrument for those ends. Rather what is needed is the explicit recognition of these hierarchical systems and an ecological approach to science and the accumulation of scientific knowledge in which the myriad casual relationships between different hierarchical systems are recognized and put to the use of humanity. The freedom to use the environment must be restricted to rational and human use. If there is irrational use - pollution, overpopulation, crowding, a growth in poverty, and so on - people may wipe out hierarchies of life related to their own survival and to the quality of their own lives. This sort of **anthropocentrism is essential even to human survival and a radical biotic egalitarianism would undermine conditions for that survival**.[20] Rational anthropocentrism, one that recognizes the value of human life "transcends our individual life" and one in which we form a collective bond of identity with the future generations is essential is the process of human evolution.

## Anthropocentrism turn

### Secrecy of the Government is not a cause but a symptom of existing Anthropocentrism AND the Affirmatives presupposition that federal secrecy is responsible turns the case because conspiracy theories are anthropocentric- Affs own authors concede

Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, ‘8 (“Sovereignty and the UFO”, Profs at OSU and U of Minnesota, Political Theory)

Physical evidence . Usually the first objection to the ETH is the lack of direct physical evidence of alien presence. Some ET believers contest this, claiming that the U.S. government is hiding wreckage from a 1947 crash at Roswell, New Mexico, but such claims are based on conspiracy theories that we shall set aside here. Not because they are necessarily wrong(although they cannot be falsified in the present context of UFO secrecy),but because like UFO skepticism they are anthropocentric, only now We know that UFOs are ETs but “They” (the government) aren’t telling. Such an assumption leads critique toward issues of official secrecy and away from the absence of systematic study, which is the real puzzle. In our view secrecy is a symptom of the UFO taboo, not its heart. While there is no direct physical evidence for the ETH, however, there is considerable in direct physical evidence for it, in the form of UFO anom-alies that lack apparent conventional explanationsand for which ETs are therefore one possibility. 34 These anomalies take four forms: ground traces, electro-magnetic interference with aircraft and motor vehicles, photographs and videos, and radar sightings like the Belgian F-16 case. Such anomalies cannot be dismissed simply because they are only indirect evidence for ETs, since science relies heavily on such evidence, as in the recent discovery of over 300 extra-solar planets (and counting). 35 For if UFO anomalies are not potentially ETs, what else are they?

### The very notion that we would be able to recognize ET intelligence is, at its core, anthropocentric

LEE F. WERTH No. 1, 1998 Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 15, “The Anthropocentric Predicament and the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (The Universe as Seen Through Our Eyes Darkly)” Lee F Werth: Associate Professor, Philosophy Cleveland State University

Speculation based upon biology arises within the perspective of biology, a perspective which reveals its limitations. We have little reason to hope to recognise E.T.I., even when we create 'them' in our image, that is, the images allowed by biological evolutionary theory. But such a theory is hopelessly Earthbound. Even within the constraints of our conventional notions for what constitutes an organism and an environment, we have seen how changes in temporal perspective and/or alternative ways of organising sensory input, can completely alter what would constitute an object or an event. And if 'their' sense organs are also different, as would be the case if radiowaves could be 'seen,' an empty room to us could be awash in an opaque sea of electromagnetic radiation from 'their' perspective. Our respective worlds could easily be incommensurable even assuming that they too have concepts of space, time, causation, object, event, quality, quantity, etc., and use a subject-predicate means of communication. Yet, unless 'their' biological evolution closely mirrors ours, there is little reason to believe 'their' world will be conceptualised analogously to ours. 'They' need not only not use our concepts of space, time, etc., E.T.I, might not employ concepts at all, or at least nothing we could identify as a concept. From our Earthbound perspective, we simply lack the capacity to imagine their 'perspective.' How could we possibly conceive the inconceivable.

## Anthro Good

### Anthropocentrism is good

**Strand** 20**08** ((A Buddhist philosophical magazine writer) <http://www.tricycle.com/interview/interview-the-movement-with-no-name>) JA

The movement should be anthropocentric. We're human. We see through the eyes given to us. The problem is that we are not anthropocentric enough, because when we truly see ourselves we see that we are connected to all else, that we are inseparable from every molecule, thought, child, twig, and creature on earth. When we know that to take care of one life we have to take care of all life, and that life includes what we say, how we act, what we do, and what we honor, that is the beginning of the sacred embodiment that leads to true civilization.

## Interspecies violence turn

### It’s better not to contact aliens- human assault is inevitable and the ET will wipe us out in retaliation, Humans will force their hand.

PETER AUSTIN April 2010 CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE “MAN, THE STATE, AND ALIENS AN INVESTIGATION OF UNIFYING THREATS IN STRUCTURAL REALISM” SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR JENNIFER TAW AND DEAN GREGORY HESS Pg.66

Now that we have chosen a framework, it is helpful to take a moment to justify and expand upon the assumption that the aliens will be a threatening and power seeking force. With realism as our paradigm, our initial thoughts about the extraterrestrials fall nicely into place. It is simply a fact that the alien power will be a force interested in its own security and operating in an anarchic system. They will likely be suspicious of the intentions of earth powers and fear that their own security may be threatened, if not now then at some point in the foreseeable future.

This is not an outlandish supposition. One need only look at any part of humanity's stay on earth to find numerous stones of a violent, aggressive, and power hungry species. Our existence is littered with war and conflict, fear of the unknown and destruction of those who are different. Any observer looking at such a species would be right to treat it with apprehension and caution at bare minimum, and it is this very history that is in part responsible for the enduring power and accuracy of realism. Humans have been responsible for sending millions of their own to gas chambers and butchering themwith machetes, and this does not take into account the toll from numerous "civilized" wars, just one of which encompassed firebombing and mechanized warfare on three continents and was ended by the complete destruction of two large cities. Even if the extra terrestrials were unconcerned with any moral issues brought up by this bloodshed, they would have every right to be reasonably concerned that earth's warlike nature might target species beyond Homo Sapiens, and protect themselves accordingly.

## Inherency 1/3

### NASA is actively looking for ET life now- the Government isn’t opposing the search. Search on Mars Proves

Lori Keesey 07.27.05 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center “NASA Develops a Nugget to Search for Life in Space” http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/technologies/nuggets.html

Astrobiologists, who search for evidence of life on other planets, may find a proposed Neutron/Gamma ray Geologic Tomography (NUGGET) instrument to be one of the most useful tools in their toolbelt. Image right: Principal Investigator Sam Floyd holds the device that will be used this summer when he and his team test the NUGGET concept at the National Institute of Standards and Technology in Gaithersburg, Md. Click on image to enlarge. Credit: NASA As conceived by scientists at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt, Md., NUGGET would be able to generate three-dimensional images of fossils embedded in an outcrop of rock or beneath the soil of Mars or another planet. Tomography uses radiation or sound waves to look inside objects. NUGGET could help determine if primitive forms of life took root on Mars when the planet was awash in water eons ago. Similar to seismic tomography used by the oil industry to locate oil reserves beneath Earth’s surface, NUGGET would look instead for evidence of primitive algae and bacteria that fossilized along the edges of extinct rivers or oceans. As on Earth, these remains could lie just a few centimeters beneath the surface, compressed between layers of silt. If a mechanical rover that explores planet surfaces were equipped with an instrument like NUGGET — capable of peering beneath the surface — then it might be able to reveal evidence of life beyond Earth. “This is a brand new idea,” said Sam Floyd, the principal investigator on the project, funded this year by Goddard’s Director’s Discretionary Fund. If developed, NUGGET would be able to investigate important biological indicators of life, and quickly and precisely identify areas where scientists might want to take samples of soil or conduct more intensive studies. “It would allow us to do a much faster survey of an area,” Floyd said. The proposed instrument, which could be carried on a rover or a robot lander, is made up of three fundamentally distinct technologies — a neutron generator, a neutron lens, and a gamma-ray detector.

### NASA’s Cassini spacecraft is actively searching for life- and disclosing the results.

International Business Times June 28, 2011 “ Saturn’s Moon may hold signs of life”

http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/170416/20110628/saturn-moon-enceladus-cassini-mission-life-extraterrestrial.htm

NASA's Cassini spacecraft has found evidence that one of Saturn's moons could actually support life. Enceladus, one of the ringed planets 62 moons may prove to hold the answer to one of astronomy's biggest question: is there life out there? Enceladus named after the mythological Greek giant is a small and brilliantly white moon orbiting Saturn. Its white reflective surface is frozen frequently by geysers of ice regularly emitted by the moon. These eruptions are so powerful that the moon gives off a stream of crystals as it circles Saturn. The icy exhaust also adds to Saturn's iconic ring system. At first glance this tiny moon seems nothing more than a pretty addition to one of the solar system's intriguing planetary systems but according to a paper published in the scientific journal Nature; this moon holds a vast ocean of saltwater beneath its icy surface. According to Dr. Carolyn Porco leader of the Cassini Imaging Team Enceladus' ocean could support life similar to the organisms found in Earth. The team reached this conclusion after studying data transmitted by the Cassini spacecraft which has been observing Saturn since 2004. Cassini took measurements of the icy plume shooting out of the moon and found it contained salt. Salt isn't unique in space as it can form when vapors nucleate down from the gas phase to the crystalline phase but this particular salt sample from Enceladus had a heavy concentration of complex salts- salts that are found in oceans.

Inherency 2/3

### SQ disproves the warrants by actively searching for life.

**NASA** 5/17/20**11** ((National Aeronautics and Space Administration)

Now that NASA’s Kepler space telescope has identified 1,235 possible planets around stars in our galaxy, astronomers at the University of California, Berkeley, are aiming a radio telescope at the most Earth-like of these worlds to see if they can detect signals from an advanced civilization. The search began on Saturday, May 8, when the Robert C. Byrd Green Bank Telescope -- the largest steerable radio telescope in the world -- dedicated an hour to eight stars with possible planets. Once UC Berkeley astronomers acquire 24 hours of data on a total of 86 Earth-like planets, they’ll initiate a coarse analysis and then, in about two months, ask an estimated 1 million SETI@home users to conduct a more detailed analysis on their home computers. “It’s not absolutely certain that all of these stars have habitable planetary systems, but they’re very good places to look for ET,” said UC Berkeley graduate student Andrew Siemion. The Green Bank telescope will stare for about five minutes at stars in the Kepler survey that have a candidate planet in the star’s habitable zone -- that is, the planet has a surface temperature at which liquid water could be maintained. “We’ve picked out the planets with nice temperatures -- between zero and 100 degrees Celsius -- because they are a lot more likely to harbor life,” said physicist Dan Werthimer, chief scientist for SETI@home and a veteran SETI researcher.

### We have reached out to potential life in space in the past

**NASA JPL** 19**99** ((National Aeronautics and Space Administration Jet Propulsion Laboratory) <http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/spacecraft/goldenrec.html>) JA

Pioneers 10 and 11, which preceded Voyager, both carried small metal plaques identifying their time and place of origin for the benefit of any other spacefarers that might find them in the distant future. With this example before them, NASA placed a more ambitious message aboard Voyager 1 and 2-a kind of time capsule, intended to communicate a story of our world to extraterrestrials. The Voyager message is carried by a phonograph record-a 12-inch gold-plated copper disk containing sounds and images selected to portray the diversity of life and culture on Earth. se dialect. Following the section on the sounds of Earth, there is an eclectic 90-minute selection of music, including both Eastern and Western classics and a variety of ethnic music. Once the Voyager spacecraft leave the solar system (by 1990, both will be beyond the orbit of Pluto), they will find themselves in empty space. It will be forty thousand years before they make a close approach to any other planetary system. As Carl Sagan has noted, "The spacecraft will be encountered and the record played only if there are advanced spacefaring civilizations in interstellar space. But the launching of this bottle into the cosmic ocean says something very hopeful about life on this planet."

Inherency 3/3

### NASA is actively funding the search for life in space

**AP** 5/12/20**11**((associated press article title: IU team gets NASA grant to study methane) <http://www.wishtv.com/dpp/news/education/university/iu-team-gets-nasa-grant-to-study-methane>) JA

BLOOMINGTON, Ind. (AP) - A team led by an Indiana University scientist has won a $2.4 million NASA grant for research that could help the space agency search for life elsewhere in the solar system. The three-year project will be led by IU biogeochemist Lisa Pratt. She and 11 colleagues from IU, Princeton University and four other institutions will travel to Greenland to study cold-weather microbes that are releasing methane along the edges of receding Arctic ice sheets. Methane is a greenhouse gas that can be produced by microbes and also geologic processes. NASA wants to know more about how methane is created by hardy microbes like those in Greenland to help future unmanned space probes search for microbial life on Mars and icy moons obiting Jupiter and Saturn.

# Pragmatic Ecocentrism K

## 1NC 1/6

### 1.Our drive to reach the stars, to colonize, and to explore is a symptom of an extra-terrestrial mind set- we are trying to separate ourselves from the earth

Catrin **Gersdorf**, and Sylvia **Mayer** 20**06** “Nature in Literary and Cultural Studies: Transatlantic Conversations on Ecocriticism” Gersdorf previously held professorships at the Universities of Leipzig and Munich. She was Maria-Goeppert-Mayer Professor at the University of Hannover, Germany and is currently Guest Professor of American Studies at the Warsaw School of Scoial Psycholoy. She also was a Visiting Scholar at the Critical Theory Institute, University of California, Irvine, and at the Southwest Institute for Research on Women, University of Arizona, Tuscson. Prof. Dr. Sylvia Mayer American Studies and Intercultural Anglophone Studies UNIVERSITAT BAYREUTH

Ecocriticism entails an implicit critique of the notion that humans are in some way separate from the natural world. Ecocritical readings of texts can function to remind us that we are, in fact, animals of this particular planet. Certain literary texts make this point explicitly. In two short stories, "Newton's Sleep" and "Paradises Lost," Ursula K. Le Guin uses the metaphor of extended life in outer space, where humans are disconnected from terrestrial life and become literally extra-terrestrial, to explore the problem of separating ourselves, psychologically, from the source of our lives. Many of Le Guin's science fiction works explore the issues of "extra-terrestrialism" as an issue of aliens, Terran humans and humans (to use the term loosely) from different planets encountering each other. Here, however, she focuses on the disconnection space travel requires from any planet -and the problems inherent in such a disconnection. In both stories, the Terran humans have chosen to create a new reality for themselves as space inhabitants. In doing so, they separate themselves from the realities of terrestrial life, though their reasons for doing so differ in the stories. In addition to the physical separation from Earth, the characters in both stories attempt a psychic separation from our planet - or planetary life of any sort - and the methods through which they create that psychic separation also differ In "Newton's Sleep," the attempt is to separate from the reality of terrestrial life through the application of pure reason; in "Paradises Lost," the attempt is through religious faith. Both responses are seen as worthy attempts to adjust to the reality of extended life in space; both are fully understandable adaptations to the circumscribed world of the space colonies the characters inhabit. Le Guin is not primarily concerned with criticising reason or religion. But in her view, both reason and religion are problematic in that they attempt to reduce "reality" (an admittedly problematic term) to something that can be fully contained in and thus in a sense controlled by the human mind. In this sense, both stories relate to what David Ehrenfeld calls "the arrogance of humanism" (in his book of the same name). The underlying assumption — indeed presumption - of humanism, Ehrenfeld argues, is precisely the idea that humans have the power to control whatever we chose, from our own minds and bodies to everything that surrounds us. The fundamental basis of Western societies at this point in time relies on a firm belief that "all problems are soluble by people" and furthermore that "many problems are soluble by technology" (Ehrenfeld 1981: 16-17). This is precisely the assumption that Le Guin's stories confront and question. As both stories illustrate, any entity as intricate in its systems and the totality of its existence as a planet - or a human being - is far too complex to be contained and controlled by the application of human intellect, whether that application is framed as the use of reason or reliance on religious faith.

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### Searching for Extra-Terrestrials is a symptom of, and step towards disassociation with Earth

Debbora Battaglia, Anthropology—Mounty Holyoke, 2005

E.T. Culture: Anthropology in Outerspaces, ed. Debbora Battaglia, p. 23-8

The theme of hope as an experiential and analytic category, both situated and contingent, is theorized in a reflexive anthropological thought piece by Vincent Crapanzano (2003: 3-32) that could have been a postscript to Carucci's ethnography. While optimism and faith in the creativity of action are currently less evident in popular culture e.t. imagery and texts than are horror stories (even while characters such as Agent Mulder of The x-Files claim a place for them in televisual history), we have ample evidence that alongside a "healthy paranoia" hope has a value for human sociality that the discourse of extraterrestriality locates—and may even activate. Overall, the articulation of anxiety and optimism in the social discourse of technoscience spirituality puts a restraining order both on scenarios of technology-produced alienation and of transcendental humanism. Sven Birkets writes that "One day soon we will conduct our public and private lives within networks so dense, among so many channels of instantaneous information, that it will make almost no sense to speak of the differentiated self" (quoted in Melley 2000: 31). What Birkets imagines is a process of connecting across contexts so intense and time warped that it covers for the work of relationality. The cart of connection becomes the horse of social relating; singular acts of connection are taken for social exchange. This is "endgame" insofar as subjectivity becomes so absorbed in technoscience that its difference from information is a matter of indifference to subjects. The danger from this perspective is of ceding human agency to nonvisible forces as the body's heterogeneous material enmeshments are given over to commodifying forces, for the greater benefit of the few. (Clonaid's Internet enterprise fulfills the promise of network in these terms.) In contrast, technoscience spirituality can be reduced neither to commerce nor to negative applications, since in a larger sense it embraces both "life as we know it" and "life as it could he" (Christopher Langton, cited in Helmreich 2001: 612). If, as Sun Ra's reviewer stated it, "future talk is ordering talk," then we can expect more artistic genre fusions and hybrid cult religions, "not without a note of optimism." In his illuminating ethnography of artificial life scientists in New Mexico (2001), Stefan Helmreich notes that just as scientists have come to appreciate the "third culture" of public culture that crosscuts science and humanities discourses, new bridges can be imagined from here to realms of the spiritual, and from these bridges leaps of faith across all these chasms. Such leaps are risky, of course. But they also enliven a situated futurology and humanistic hypothesis making in a "secular modernity" that is showing itself to be less secular by the moment (see especially de Vries 2001). In all of the scenarios just considered, failure of critical models to "mind the gap" (Baudrillard 1988) between what we can imagine doing and making and being and what we do, make, or are in the material world can lead to underappreciation of human capacities for constructive and destructive action. This is precisely what the messages of benevolent aliens since the dawn of the nuclear age have been credited with calling to our attention. As David Samuels's and my own essay on Raelians note in this volume, it is no historical accident that in The Day the Earth Stood Still Klaatu, the first alien undercover agent/ethnographer in popular cinematic history, sets about saving humans from themselves by "passing" among them and observing with growing alarm their irrational, belligerent tendencies. It is not until he sheds his human guise to emerge as an alien prophet from his gleaming flying saucer—dressed in the same formal white suit that the contemporary prophet Rael dons for publicity photos against the backdrop of an exact replica of Klaatu's flying saucer, which is also an exact replica of the saucer that transported Rael to higher consciousness and other planets—that Klaatu's warning is taken seriously by a select audience of "the greatest scientists on Earth." The nuclear nightmare Klaatu envisions has a corollary in the horror of The Matrix. In the wake of apocalypse, sentient human bodies imagine themselves to be free agents, while in physical reality they exist as living food for an alien intelligence that controls the apparatuses of their delusional contentment within a corporate, "cubicled" habitus. Humans, as any cult site on the Internet will tell you with or without reference to Baudrillard. have become "simulacra" of themselves. But The Matrix's heroic Neo is guided in "hacking into" this condition. And the fact that he can arrive at consciousness of his alienated situation of false security offers hope that he will be able to recognize the possibility of experiencing the real thing: meaningful relationships with others similarly awakened to the consequences of their desubjectification and what Heidegger terms the "enframement" of Earth's resources as consumables. In this scenario of recovering self-authorship through the agency of relations with others similarly disabled and struggling toward social engagement, acts of liberation are their own reward, recognition aside. But the reward is not sufficient as such until it is supplemented by a sense of mission and the salvation that comes from freeing others similarly trapped in postmodernity's imaginary of fulfillment (cf. Biagioli 2003).

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### Humanity is caught up in trying to keep the self separate from the natural

Catrin Gersdorf, and Sylvia Mayer 2006 “Nature in Literary and Cultural Studies: Transatlantic Conversations on Ecocriticism” Gersdorf previously held professorships at the Universities of Leipzig and Munich. She was Maria-Goeppert-Mayer Professor at the University of Hannover, Germany and is currently Guest Professor of American Studies at the Warsaw School of Scoial Psycholoy. She also was a Visiting Scholar at the Critical Theory Institute, University of California, Irvine, and at the Southwest Institute for Research on Women, University of Arizona, Tuscson. Prof. Dr. Sylvia Mayer American Studies and Intercultural Anglophone Studies UNIVERSITAT BAYREUTH

In the midst of the very real dangers of a long-term space voyage, a religious sense of the perfection of the vehicle itself as well as its task is thus nearly inevitable. Further, Ehrenfeld points out that humanism's assumptions lead us to the sense that our approximation of angelic status requires a separation from nature, for "angels are not supposed to mix with mortal Nature" (Ehrenfeld 1981: 21). Thus, in the terms of the religious system that develops on the Discovery, the only way to find value in the reality of their lives is to transcend their planetary roots, to deny them, all the more so since those roots cannot be directly experienced. The travelers do not "mix with mortal Nature" beyond what is required for their own survival and contained in a self-sustaining system of their own devising. Thus, they can legitimately consider themselves as Angelic. Further, it is not surprising that the human-made environment in which they live is seen as the only value: anything else, everything outside that constructed space, is dangerous (literally true in a space voyage). It is therefore a small metaphoric step to seeing anything outside as sinful, not merely physically but morally and spiritually deadly.Hsing and Luis are among those who **question the Angels\* thinking**: both of them feel a desire for there to be something more than simply the human-made environment, something outside, something else. They do not understand planetary realities, but they are drawn to the idea of other colours, textures, experiences than those entirely mediated by humans. Through them - and through the fact that we do not question their interest as normal, natural, laudable - Le Guin suggests we consider what we need apart from human experiences, and why and how our own lives are augmented by the nonhuman Others who surround us. The crisis in the story occurs when it is revealed that the voyage is going to be drastically shorter than expected: that they will, in fact, reach their destination - an actual, real planet - within a matter of four years instead of forty. The Angels and the non-Angels have to decide whether they wish to explore the planet and leave, simply leave, or stay on the planet as colonists. A number choose to leave - and their fate is left to the outer reaches of space: we have no eye on board that ship once Hsing and Luis depart That as readers we are left on the destination planet with Hsing and Luis indicates Le Gum's valourising of that choice as the correct one, though it is an enormously difficult one for the colonists. They enter a world that is filled with Others: "Creatures. There were creatures everywhere. This world was made of creatures. The only things not alive were the rocks. Everything else was alive with creatures" (Le Guin 2002: 354). This is not a bad description of our own planet, and although the colonists are at first dismayed and overwhelmed by the multiplicity of creatures, they come to find a place for themselves in this world. In describing the process by which the colonists adjust themselves to the intricacies of a terrestrial existence, Le Guin plays with language, presenting the colonists' use of - indeed their discovery of the true meanings of - words that we understand without question to lead readers to a questioning of our underlying cultural assumptions. Some of this use of language occurs even when the colonists are still aboard the ship: Hsing, for instance, reads in a history volume about people on Earth throwing things away and wonders where "away" is (Le Guin 2002: 267), an idea which brings the contemporary reader up short. Where is "away," if we stop to consider the question?

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### AND, A pragmatic ecocentrist viewpoint is key to advert environmental impacts, like warming, resource depletion, pollution, and species extinction

Wendy Lynne Lee Spring 2009 “Restoring Human-Centerednes to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist's Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism” Ethics & the Environment, Volume 14, Number 1, , pp. 29-51 (Article) Published by Indiana University Press

Whatever other issues may distinguish ecocentrists from environmental pragmatists from ecofeminists, few quibble with the claim that human chauvinism has taken its toll on Earth’s environmental integrity. We need look no further than recent evidence of global climate change, resource depletion, species extinctions, deforestation, or water and air pollution to see that the future of human and nonhuman life may depend upon whatever collective will we can muster to address these looming crises.1 Unsurprisingly, critiques of this chauvinism vary widely according to perspective and commitments. Ecocentrists, for example, equate chauvinism with human-centeredness, arguing that only the disavowal of the latter and the adoption of an ecocentric perspective will be adequate to the formulation of an effective course of action. Environmental pragmatists, however, reject this identity and argue that it isn’t human-centeredness per se that is at fault for environmental deterioration but rather a lack of foresight necessary to the envisioning of a sustainable future. Pragmatist Bryan Norton, for example, argues for adopting a “weak anthropocentrism” that explicitly recognizes the interdependence of human and nonhuman nature in the formulation of values appropriate to a “future for human consciousness” (2003, 163– 174). Ecofeminists adopt (and reject) aspects of these and many other approaches, but are nonetheless distinguished by arguments that reveal the intimate and mutually reinforcing relationships between human chauvinism, androcentrism, ethnocentrism, and heterosexism. Karen Warren, Carol Adams, Greta Gaard, and Chris Cuomo, among others, show how specific institutions and industries benefit from treating women, nonwhite human beings, and nonhuman animals as if each were valuable primarily as a reflection of that paradigmatic resource, nature “her” self.

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### Independently, warming is the only existential risk.

**Deibel ’07—Prof IR @ National War College (Terry, “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft,” Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today)**

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers from terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet

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### The alternative is to reject the affirmative, to stop looking at the stars for answers, and to refocus on fixing ourselves and re-relating to our planet.

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In the end, readers are left with a sense that in fact, the umbilicus cannot be cut, or perhaps that it is not an umbilicus but a literal life line. Susan sums it up: "Who do we think we are?" she asks. In the standard Western Cartesian way of thinking, we are something separate from, indeed better than, the rest of the lives that surround us, the ball of water and earth we stand on, the sea of air we swim through without thinking about it, and all the myriad Others who share the planet with "us." But in fact, Le Guin suggests, we are inextricably a part of all the things we separate ourselves from. We are creatures of reason, yes, but that is not all we are, and if we attempt to live our lives using only reason or logic as our yardsticks for value and significance, we miss seeing the reality that our lives are implicit in everything around us and cannot be extracted from that wholeness. In the end, the issue of vision and what is real becomes almost dreamlike in its complexity. Esther has had the operation on her eyes but it has failed: the new eyes were not successful. However, through the same process that brings the trumpet vines and horses to Spes, Esther turns out to be able to see, and it is Dee who stumbles, blind, literally and metaphorically, in the world he does not comprehend. He calls out to Esther for help and, in the final benediction of the story, through his admission of bewilderment (a literal being lost in the wild), he regains his ability to see. The reality he can now see includes Esther's little black friend, his own mother, and all the rest of his emotional, human life. When Dee accepts the irrationality of existence, he regains his world.

## Link: Development

### The development of space is only another way to try to tame nature and make ourselves separate from it

Catrin Gersdorf, and Sylvia Mayer 2006 “Nature in Literary and Cultural Studies: Transatlantic Conversations on Ecocriticism” Gersdorf previously held professorships at the Universities of Leipzig and Munich. She was Maria-Goeppert-Mayer Professor at the University of Hannover, Germany and is currently Guest Professor of American Studies at the Warsaw School of Scoial Psycholoy. She also was a Visiting Scholar at the Critical Theory Institute, University of California, Irvine, and at the Southwest Institute for Research on Women, University of Arizona, Tuscson. Prof. Dr. Sylvia Mayer American Studies and Intercultural Anglophone Studies UNIVERSITAT BAYREUTH

Since Le Guin's works evidence her deep and abiding interest in Taoist thought, this definition is particularly apt. In what follows, however, I shy away from the word "system," as in "planetary system," because it harks too much of the kind of scientific ordering that is being reevaluated and critiqued in the stories under discussion. Nevertheless, in both stories, the humans in question are attempting to tame the systems in which they exist, and indeed to tame their responses to those systems. They live in the only possible fully tamed system: one that is entirely the product of human construction. The metaphoric aspects of this are crucial, as here and now we appear to be in the process of attempting to tame our entire planet, despite its essential wildness and despite the ways in which the planet is clearly beyond our capacity to tame.

## A2: TRY OR DIE

### Try or die scenarios make earth abandonment inevitable- Logic makes our relationship to the earth artificially calculable

Catrin Gersdorf, and Sylvia Mayer 2006 “Nature in Literary and Cultural Studies: Transatlantic Conversations on Ecocriticism” Gersdorf previously held professorships at the Universities of Leipzig and Munich. She was Maria-Goeppert-Mayer Professor at the University of Hannover, Germany and is currently Guest Professor of American Studies at the Warsaw School of Scoial Psycholoy. She also was a Visiting Scholar at the Critical Theory Institute, University of California, Irvine, and at the Southwest Institute for Research on Women, University of Arizona, Tuscson. Prof. Dr. Sylvia Mayer American Studies and Intercultural Anglophone Studies UNIVERSITAT BAYREUTH

In the story "Newton's Sleep," the characters have created what they feel is a "techno-utopia," and the protagonist, Ike, is a devotee of pure reason as the only necessary guiding principle. His character evidences our contemporary separation from the Romantic approach to nature, which at very least acknowledged the value of artistic production as a nonrational but necessary aspect of apprehending reality. As Karl Kroeber says, contemporary devaluing of the non-scientific, nonrational - embodied in characters such as Dee - "reveals the degree to which we have internalized a masculinized ideal of selfhood founded on separation from nature, rational objectivity, and a need to dominate: individuality as a will to power" (Kroeber 1994: 17). Indeed, the title of the story - taken from a Blake poem that is a critique of reason as the valourised method for apprehending reality -gives us immediate warning that the story will question the primacy of intellect and the rational as the basis of our approach to our lives. Ike, his family, and a number of like-minded survivors have abandoned Earth in order to live in the Special Earth Satellite, or Spes (an acronym that is also, not coincidentally, the name for the goddess of hope). Dee believes the inevitable logic of that decision was manifest at the first signs of "resource exhaustion, population explosion, the breakdown of government" (Le Guin 1991: 25), which he savs had been in full evidence for one hundred years prior to thetime when the story takes place. With those givens, the rational, reasonable conclusion was obvious. Earth could not be saved, so reason dictated that people must find the money and means to leave Earth behind. Of course, the statement "Earth could not be saved" begs the question "why not?" Dee never questions whether different choices could have been made during that preceding one hundred years that might have led to a different reasonable conclusion. And readers are being led to question the choices being made right now, as presumably we are living sometime during that hundred-year span.

## Ecocriticism 1st

### Pragmatic Ecocritism must be evaluated before all others- it questions the assumptions that other Kritiks are based upon

WILLIAM HOWART H 1996 “Some Principles of Ecocriticism” The Ecocritism Reader . Professor Emeritus, Princeton University: American Noir The Literature of Place and Travel Walden in Our Time Moby-Dick Unbound Transatlantic Romanticism Darwin in Our Time American Places • American Renaissance Early American Literature • Literature and Environment Race & Region • Race & Place.

Those problems seem to lie far afield from literary study, yet in fact texts do reflect how a civilization regards its natural heritage. We know nature through images and words, a process that makes the question of truth in science or literature inescapable, and whether we find validity through data or metaphor, the two modes of analysis are parallel. Ecocriticism observes in nature and culture the ubiquity of signs, indicators of value that shape form and meaning. Ecology leads us to recognize that life speaks, communing through encoded streams of information that have direction and purpose, if we learn to translate the messages with fidelity. To see how far these values dwell from current humanism, we may turn to a Modern Language Association guide. Redrawing the Boundaries: The Transformation of Literary Studies (1992.)- As its title implies, this survey proposes a sweeping act of land reform in all literary fields, medieval to postcolonial, by using bold spatial imagery: ideas intersect at odd angles, disciplinary maps raise questions of boundaries (national, racial, sexual, political), frontiers project beliefs that shape imagined spaces. Yet this geography is only rhetorical, according to its mappers, because literature dwells Nowhere: "The odd thing, in fact, about literature as an imagined territory is that there are apparently no natural limits—and hence, it would seem, there are apparently no natural limits to the field of literary criticism" (Greenblatt and Gunn 6). The dogma that culture will always master nature has long directed Western progress, inspiring the wars, invasions, and other forms of conquest that have crowded the earth and strained its carrying capacity. Humanists still bristle with tribal aggression, warring for dominion even though they spurn all forms of hegemony. The boldest new scholars have focused on 1500-1900, four centuries of global dominion, with such revisionist ferocity as to sustain what Leah S. Marcus astutely calls "a set of geographic metaphors . . . that suggest our continuing engagement on one level with a cast of mind we have rejected on another" (Greenblatt and Gunn 61). Many recent works of critical theory chart borders, boundaries, frontiers, horizons, margins, but these tropes also have no natural or geographical reference (Marshall). Yet if current literary maps are devoid of content, postmodern geographers are not: several have used contemporary theory to re-examine the spatial, perceptual, and textual conventions of maps and land (Entrilcin, Monmonier, Wood). Ecocriticism seeks to redirect humanistic ideology, not spurning the natural sciences but using their ideas to sustain viable readings. Literature and science trace their roots to the hermeneutics of religion and law, the sources for early ideas of time and space, or history and property. Concepts of property and authority are central directives in science; hence its long service to Western expansion (Bowler). Today science is evolving beyond Cartesian dualism toward quantum mechanics and chaos theory, where volatile, ceaseless exchange is the norm. While some forms of postmodern criticism are following this lead, many humanists still cling to a rationalist bias that ignores recent science. Postmodern critics now describe science as a culture, one with social and political impact, and as a language that possesses rare powers of definition (Beer, Hayles, Jordanova, Levine, Williams). Others have traced literary borrowings of science, as in Thoreau's use of botany or Twain's studies of evolution (Boudreau, Cummings); and readers of science fiction-fantasy recognize how literature raids science for utopic or dystopic imagery (Erlich). Science fiction views technology as either alien or brethren; it blazes trails into the frontier of outer space; it forecasts ecological collapse (Barter, Mogen, Rabkin). These narratives emulate the theories and experi-merits of science yet challenge its inherent faith in progress. Such an ironic, relativistic mode is comic and corrective, providing a rhetorical proxy for the ethics of ecology (Elgin, Wendlen). Despite these interests, many humanists distort the nature of scientific inquiry. One literary historian describes changing canons in the mid-1980s as "competing verbal worlds" that evolve toward greater complexity and diversity (Elliott). That view misstates the Darwinian theory of natural selection, which holds that variance results not from competition but adaptation to crisis. Darwin's phrase, "survival of the fittest," means not strongest but most fit, best suited to change. Such misreadings suggest why today's cultural and biological ideas of diversity are at odds: minorities demand a right to their survival, while science fears a coming extinction. Ironically, that late phase in evolution generates the greatest cooperation among species (Wilson, Diversity of Life). The humanistic critique of science advances on many fronts, attacking its narrow cultural superiority (Gehlen) or its wide reach and willful obscurity (Medawar). A source of both hope and fear, science presents solutions that only generate new problems, as in the bioethical riddles spawned by genetic engineering: should we destroy all "defective" genes? To some critics, such questions suggest that scientists too often ignore the policy implications of their discoveries (Weissmann). Science also remains stubbornly male-dominant, excluding women from its "hard" disciplines and justifying the practice with specious logic (Hubbard). These discriminatory conditions offend humanistic values of distribution and integration, which ecocritics assume in principle. Throughout the twentieth century, literary theory has often challenged the scale and verity of science. The "human sciences" of Dilthey asserted differences between scientific knowledge and human understanding, laying emphasis on consciousness and sympathetic insight as traits cultivated by-civilization. War and genocide dimmed this optimism, yet among humanists the conviction endures that experience is mind-centered and free of reference to actualities of space and time. Literary critics still place an expansive trust in poetry and dreams, states they see as providing alternative relations to material substance. Hence the persistence of psychoanalytic criticism, despite recent advances in medicine that provide chemical aids for mental disease. As philosophers of mood and ego, humanists are inclined to trust "the talking cure" above pharmacology, finding lithium or Prozac less reliable than Freud and Kristeva. Cultural critics share an attachment to ideology and a distrust of physical experience. Marxist theory has influenced environmental history, often by ignoring natural science. In Marxist readings, economics determines social history; hence capitalism becomes the source for all conflict, oppression, and environmental abuse (Crosby). Such views ignore many inconvenient facts: that disturbance is commonplace in nature; that aborigines and socialists often commit ecocide. Revolutionary theories tend to ignore natural constraints on production: as farmers have long known, floods and locusts can destroy years of rational planning. A more consistent approach examines how social systems change as rural agrarian life evolves toward urban industry (Benjamin, Williams). This emphasis on the interaction of place and work agrees with ecology, which charts how physical conditions may affect beliefs. Historians who accept such a teleology are anticipating ecocriticism, which shares the hope that flawed social conditions may be improved. In the poststructuralist wave of discourse analysis, references to the natu-ral sciences are almost entirely missing. Phenomena instead become cultural constructs, void of physical content and subject to cryptic readings. One cultural theorist describes climate and landscape as little more than political conspiracies (Ross, Strange Weather), a bias echoed in New Historical readings of culture as shaped entirely by race, gender, class, money, and other factors of material social life. While their political emphasis is welcome, these approaches foreground social conditions and minimize the natural forces that affect history (Thomas, New Historicism). For decon-struction, on the other hand, all notions of order and structure become anathema, since language is assumed to have no stable meaning. This view is seen as mainly hostile to authoritarian rule, not as a new idea about nature or culture (Argyros). Ecocriticism, instead of taxing science for its use of language to represent (mimesis), examines its ability to point (deixis). More developed in Asian than European languages (Liu), deixis locates entities in space, time, and social context. Through deixis, meaning develops from what is said or signed relative to physical space: I-you, here-there, this-that. Common as air or water, deixis expresses relative direction and orientation, the cognitive basis for description (Jarvella). In learning to read land, one can't just name objects but point to what they do: pines live in sandy soil, oaks in clay, and thus their rates of water absorption differ. As one scholar of place notes, the landscape contains many names and stories, so that learning and writing them becomes a way of mapping cultural terrain (Rydcn). A bio-geographer works in similar ways, reading regional life and land forms, then using ecology to map their interactions (Brown). In their autobiographical writings, biologists often assert that language helps them develop powers of assimilation and expression. For Lewis Thomas, the core of life is language, which he sees as both mechanical and organic, "and the principal way we transform energy" (Thomas, Lives of a Cell). Edward O. Wilson, firmly committed to science writing, also holds that poetry makes science "convergent in what they might eventually disclose about human nature" (Wilson, Biophilia). These are not nostalgic concessions to metaphor, but revelations drawn from lives of fieldwork, reading natural signs and finding ways to write them for readers. The earth sciences are "descriptive" because they explain natural forms through verbal composition. In the view of one scholar, Darwin achieved his synthesis of evolutionary theory through the act of composing, by writing out narrative and exposition that spurred larger inferences (Tallmadge). Geologists often describe tectonic processes as "writing in stone" for that analogy recounts their task of learning natural history (Raymo). The habit of description has made earth scientists conscious of how words shape their disciplines. An example is Keywords in Evolutionary Biology {1992), in which scholars of science, philosophy, and history explicate influential terms that have changed their meaning across time. The keywords, a noun coined by cultural historian Raymond Williams (1976), range from adaptation to teleology, and their evolving significance has shaped theory and politics in many fields. As the editors note, keywords reflect not just semantic debates but "a rough map of some of the territory of dispute and change" (Keller 6). That terrain is rugged, for scientific terms are affected by social and lexical change. Such instability opens science at least partially to metaphor, which enlarges meaning, just as ecocriricism seeks to examine how metaphors of nature and land are used and abused. Ecocritics may detect more parity between literary and scientific writing than other postmodernists, but that view is not eccentric or unprecedented. The early formalists present systematic studies of language, so regular in Jakobson as to resemble genetic code. New Critics used close readings to explore the intricate diversity of words, insisting that they share an organic coherence (Krieger). Structuralism and semiotics focused on descriptive language, offering precise descriptions of the signs and signifying that form culture (Blanchard). Reader-response theory stressed the social, transactive nature of reading in "interpretive communities" (Fish). Studies of orality and literacy examined the evolution of language from internal to external forms, as writing objectified ideas but also conquered pre-Hterate cultures (Burns, Goody). Also anticipating ecocriticism were structuralist critics of myth and anthropology who examined symbols, often from agricultural fertility rites, that explain natural conditions or try to prevent disasters, such as famine and flood (Blumenberg). Ethnic and postcolonial studies have a strong regional emphasis, but they dwell on political or cultural spaces rather than their physical environs. In time, ecocriticism may provide critics of race and ethnicity with a view of how those social constructions relate to larger histories of land use and abuse. As land is traded, people are degraded, moved to and from regions as mere chattel in an invidious property system (Dixon). Ecocriticism finds its strongest advocates today in feminist and gender critics, who focus on the idea of place as defining social status. Of par-ticular interest is "a woman's place," often described as an attic or closet, that contains yet sustains individuals until they locate a congenial environs (Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic; Sedgwick). Some feminists equate anatomy with geography, envisioning the female body/text as a "no man's land" aligned against a hostile masculine world, the patriarchal settlement (Gilbert and Gubar, No Man's Land; Pagano, Kolodny). But in this work most ideas of sexual difference still derive from Freudian theory, rather than recent biogenetics. Ecocriticism urges the study of gender to examine evolutionary biology, where communities are not just cultural spaces.

## A2: Anthropocentrism

### Limited Anthropocentrism is good- it’s the best way to access true pragmatic ecocriticism and turns case

Wendy Lynne Lee Spring 2009 “Restoring Human-Centerednes to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist's Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism” Ethics & the Environment, Volume 14, Number 1, , pp. 29-51 (Article) Published by Indiana University Press

However plastic and evolving the somatic, perceptual, cognitive, psychological, epistemic and affective capacities native to Homo sapiens, they are still specific to human—and not Chimpanzee or dolphin—being. Human consciousness is, in other words, informed by the unique articulation and interaction of capacities that characterize human embodiment, capacities whose exercise creates the conditions for human experience. To be clear, I am not suggesting that what defines human-centeredness is that human beings have capacities that other species of creatures do not—this may or may not be true given any particular comparison. What I am suggesting is that the unique configuration of capacities that describes Homo sapiens informs an experience unique to this species and thereby define this consciousness in terms of this configuration. A human-centered consciousness cannot then be displaced, disavowed, or disowned—the notion that we could get “outside” of human centeredness makes as little sense as the notion that there’s an “outside” for human consciousness (other than permanent coma or death). Hence, I can care profoundly about the welfare of chimpanzees—I can try to imagine what it might be like to be a chimpanzee, and I might make excellent guesses given all of the perceptual, somatic, and psychological similarities we do appear to share in light of the behavioral, anatomical, and other evidence. But I cannot experience the world like a chimpanzee because there is no “outside” to my experience as a member of Homo sapiens.2

## A2: We have real impacts!

### We are not separate from our environment. We are permeable with nature and an understanding of human-centeredness in necessary to interact with (but not dominate) nature. Furthermore, We do not advocate “going down with the ship” but the lens that the Aff embodies creates a disassociation with all of the natural world.

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If Acampora is correct, “[h]uman beings…can be envisioned materially as epidermal encapsulates of corporeality. The convivial challenge is to interpret the skin-boundary not as an impermeable barrier but as a surface of contact” (1999, 123), that is, as something we not only share with other life forms—namely, penetrable physicality located on the very surface of our skin—but can experience transpecifically, or as a “flesh of the world” irrespective of our particularity. Of course Acampora is right that skin is permeable. From this fact, however, nothing necessarily follows for my experience of myself as encapsulated—as “I”—other than that I am indeed as physically vulnerable as is the surface of my skin porous,and that this is true of other species of creature as well. That’s it. Certainly nothing follows that implies the metaphysical weight of “transpecific incarnality.” That Acampora assumes that being able to conceive of physicality as penetrable implies being able to, say, experience the world as transpecific commits him to Bender’s fatal error—it is one thing to envision (conceive) oneself as an “encapsulate of corporeality,” but it is quite another to experience oneself as such. I can perfectly well conceive of myself as this spatially located—residenced—“encapsulate,” but in order to experience myself through this concept I need to be able to “step outside” or objectify the very “skin-boundary” that informs my experience per se. In other words, I must effectively disavow my self via the adoption of a concept of my “self” as “encapsulate” or “contact surface”—I must knowingly dissociate my self from “my” “self.” Contrary to Acampora, then, the “convivial challenge” is not “to interpret the skin-boundary as a surface of contact.” To accomplish this I must already have objectified my self via the concept of “encapsulate.” The convivial challenge is whether I can objectify my self qua encapsulate, and this, I suggest, cannot be accomplished without importing the very dualist baggage Acampora rejects, which is to say it cannot be accomplished at all.While Acampora doesn’t argue for it directly, like Bender he appears to assume that the adoption of more environmentally responsible practices hinges on our being able to comprehend the experience of others as expanded versions of ourselves as we come to be able to identify with them via “contact surfaces.” Hence it seems likely that he equates centeredness with chauvinism—why else risk the methodological dualism?5 Acampora insists that we embrace the fact of our physical dependence, our corporeality as residence or home, and he seems to assume that only an environmental sensibility borne of the right experience will yield adequate resolve for environmental activism. But this is clearly mistaken—I can embrace the fact of my corporeality, surmise it’s connectedness to that of others, take this seriously as a foundation for environmental responsibility, and never have the experiences either he or Bender lean on so heavily to ground that responsibility. In fact, such experience could be impossible for me even if it were possible for others due to, say, congenital quadriplegias. But this does not imply that I can’t think my way through to environmental activism, and, if I’m right about human-centeredness, this avenue just might be more promising—and more inclusive—anyways.

# Util good

## 1NC Util Good 1/2

### Morality is good, and must be considered in some cases, but utilitarianism is a necessary part of all calculations. A reasonable combination of both solves back all their offense and allows us to weight our impacts against their aff.

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Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

### Deontology is subjective and can never be a unified theory; only consequences are objective and measurable, therefore look to utilitarianism as the most objective paradigm.

Jeffrey **Lipshaw in 05** (adjunct prof. @ Indiana University School of Law, 36 Cumberland Law Review 321, “DUTY AND CONSEQUENCE: A NON-CONFLATING THEORY OF PROMISE AND CONTRACT”, ln)

Academic law, particularly in its explanatory and normative role for commercial relationships, aspires to science and, as such, abhors deontology. Two primary reasons for this exist. First, consequences are measurable, at least in theory. There is no "methodological purchase" in deontology. 10 Second, deontology is fraught with paradox. For every duty, there is a seemingly polar opposite consideration. Consideration of duty entails bright lines and gray areas, law and equity, fixed rules and intuitive application. Recognition of the paradox of deontology is as old as our thinking about right and wrong. The theology of the prophet Micah was based on the inability of human reason to reconcile justice and mercy. But Micah's resolution was bereft of philosophy or science, and left the untying of the knot to God. 11 The paradoxes of deontology (much less the paradox posed by our apparent inability to reconcile deontology and consequentialism) are particularly frustrating to anyone who wants to set forth a unified theory. 12

1NC Util Good 2/2

### Any risk of a nuclear use must be treated as absolute because it will result in extinction.

**Schell 82**,**[Fate of the Earth pg. 82, God of Policy debate,**[**debate.uvm.edu/NFL/rostrumlib/CheshierJan'01.pdf**](http://debate.uvm.edu/NFL/rostrumlib/CheshierJan'01.pdf)**]**

\...it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of **nuclear** explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone ofuncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of hu- man history. To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. (95)