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Inherency – COIN Now

U.S. is using COIN strategy to fight in Afghanistan

Brooks, columnist for the New York Times, 9 (David, December 3, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9726795199&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9726796808&cisb=22_T9726796807&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=161300&docNo=3>, “US Battle For New Afghan Solution,” lexis, DA: 7/12/10, JPL)

**This approach**, called **COIN**, **has reshaped military thinking**, starting with the junior officers who developed it and then spreading simultaneously up and down the chain of command. When United States President Barack **Obama** conducted his first Afghanistan strategic review, he too **gravitated toward** the **COIN**mentality, **appointing General** Stanley **McChrystal**, one of the **chief architect**s **of****COIN, to run the war** effort there. McChrystal came back with his own report earlier this year, with two key recommendations.

Obama is enacting COIN in Afghanistan

Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technical University, 7/4, (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4, 2010, “US Flawed Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)

Sustained efforts by the US and ISAF-NATO forces to reverse the gains made by the Afghan Taliban have failed to rein in the Taliban surge. The current US Administration led by President Obama ordered a review in 2009, which drew a counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy with former US General, Stanley McChrystal, as the main force to implement it on the ground. In order to wrest control of territory from the Taliban, a cornerstone of Obama Administration COIN strategy involved deployment of 30,000 fresh troops to the Afghan theatre, which would increase the total number of international troops to 142,000. There are numbers of challenges which the US and NATO currently faces in Afghanistan

Inherency – No CT

U.S. army general says we will continue to use COIN in Afghanistan

Riechmann, writer at the associated press, 6/26 (Deb, June 26, 2010, works have been published in Washington Times, the AP, Hamilton Journal, Washington Post, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=11019564>, “US To Karzai : New General Won’t Alter Afghanistan Plan

America's top military officer assured President Hamid Karzai on Saturday that newly chosen NATO commander Gen. David Petraeus would pursue the policies of his ousted predecessor, whom the Afghan leader warmly praised for reducing civilian casualties... Mullen, who spent just a half-day in Kabul, also met with U.S. Embassy officials and had a video teleconference with regional commanders in the field. To both sides, Mullen stressed the importance of a good "lash up" between often strained civilian and military efforts to beat back a resurgent Taliban and extend the Karzai government's control beyond Kabul. "He stressed to President Karzai that absolutely nothing will change about our commitment to the struggle there, to the strategy," said Capt. John Kirby, a spokesman for Mullen. Mullen then flew to neighboring Pakistan, where he repeated the message to President Asif Ali Zardari and Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

Inherency – COIN Fails

COIN can’t solve anything and inevitably fails because of costs and time constraints

Brooks, columnist for the New York Times, 9 (David, December 3, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9726795199&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9726796808&cisb=22_T9726796807&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=161300&docNo=3>, “US Battle For New Afghan Solution,” lexis, DA: 7/12/10, JPL)

But over the past few months, senior **members of the Obama Administration**

**have lost** some of their **enthusiasm for COIN**. It may be a good approach in the abstract, they say, but **there are problems with applying it** in this context. First, they say, **COIN is phenomenally expensive**. **It consists of doing a lot of things at once** from increasing troop levels to nation-building and doing them **over a long period of time**. **The US no longer has that** kind of **money**, **and Americans won't accept a new 10-year commitment** having already been there for eight. Second, **it may be possible to clear** and hold **territory**, **but it is looking less** likely that it will be **possible to transfer it to any legitimate Afghan authority**. Th**e Karzai Government is like an organised crime ring**. The governing talent is thin. **Plans to build a 400,000-man Afghan security force are unrealistic**. Third, **the population in Afghanistan is too dispersed for COIN to work properly**. **There would be** a few bubbles of security, where allied troops are massed, but then **vast sanctuaries for** the **insurgents**. Fourth, **COIN is too Afghan- centric and not** enough **Paki**stan- **centric**. The **real threats** to US interests **are along the** Afghan- Pakistani **border or involve the destabilisation of Pakistan's Government**. The **COIN** approach **does little to** directly **address that**.

COIN objectives cause it to inevitably fail – empirically proven

West, correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, 7/8, (Diana, July 8, 2010, <http://www.dailydemocrat.com/guestopinions/ci_15465351>, “ ‘COIN Costing Us Too Many Troops in Afghanistan,” Daily Democrat, DA: 7/15/10, JPL)

**Most Americans don't know what** the ascendance of **counterinsurgency** doctrine **in the US military means.** Judging by the failure of the senators to raise the topic with the most famous contemporary COIN author seated before them, neither do our elected representatives. Some senators were obviously distressed by restrictive battle rules, but they didn't seem to regard them as a crucial means to COIN's fantasy-end: winning so-called hearts and minds. **The** whole **nation-building endeavor**, too, **is just another COIN fantasy effort** designed to make them like us. "Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation-builders as well as warriors," Petraeus himself co-wrote in the foreword of the 2007 COIN manual (with Gen. F. James Amos, recently tapped to serve as the new Marine Commandant). "They must be prepared to help re-establish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long ..." You can say that again. Better, though, for our elected representatives to have read just that statement back to **Gen. Petraeus** and to have asked for a reaction, a reckoning, his defense of a **theory** that, I would argue (and frequently do), **has** for years **misused and abused the U.S. military through its** willful **ignorance of the Islam-West culture clash that** forever **dooms** all of **our do-gooding**. **The Great Society**, it's worth recalling, **didn't work here on our own people**. It's no more plausible, even at ROE-controlled gunpoint, on an alien society. **History confirms this**. **The U**nited **S**tates **engaged in** intensive **Afghan nation-building between** 19**46** **and** 19**79** -- specifically, in Helmand Province, **now**, ironically, **a Taliban stronghold**. **In other words, the program was not**, as Gen. Petraeus told the Senate this week, "hugely **successful**." For details, read Indiana University History professor Nick Cullather's 2002 paper, "From New Deal to New Frontier in Afghanistan," which is available online. It catalogues decades of failure apparent as far back as 1949. "If illusions doomed the project they also created and sustained it," Cullather wrote, summing up American denial on Afghanistan.

Inherency – COIN Fails

Attempting to use COIN in Afghanistan is what allowed extremist groups to gain power in the first place

Nagl, professor of National Security Studies at West Point Academy, 9, (John, November 2009, <http://www.fpri.org/telegram/20091130.nagl.winning-the-wars.html>, “Winning the Wars We’re In,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)

After the wake-up call of September 11, 2001, our lack of preparedness was exacerbated by our failure to adapt fully and rapidly to the demands of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. By early 2002, the Taliban appeared defeated and Afghanistan firmly under the control of America’s Afghan allies. The fall of Baghdad in April 2003 after a three-week campaign initially appeared as further confirmation of the superiority of U.S. military capabilities. In both instances, the enemy had other plans. Inadequate contingency planning by both civilian leaders and military commanders to secure the peace contributed to the chaotic conditions that enabled insurgent groups to establish themselves. With some notable lower- level exceptions, the military did not adapt to these conditions until it was perilously close to losing these wars. U.S. forces faced with insurgencies had no doctrinal or training background in irregular warfare and reacted in an uncoordinated and often counterproductive fashion to the challenges they faced. Many of these early ad-hoc approaches to counterinsurgency failed to protect the population from insurgent attacks and alienated the people through the excessive use of force.

COIN fails to accomplish objectives and only causes civilian casualties – empirically proven

Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technical University, 7/4, (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4, 2010, “US Flawed Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)

Secondly, the US COIN strategy enunciated under President Obama seems to be failing so far. The main issue behind the failure is a lack of public support, without which any COIN strategy, no matter how cleverly and carefully it is planned, would fail. This was evident in the military operation "Mushtarak" undertaken by US, NATO and Afghan forces in Helmand province in March 2010, which failed to clear the territory of Taliban presence and initiate economic development. To the contrary, the operation brought more miseries to the population in terms of loss of civilian lives and property.

Maintaining COIN strategy costs a hundred billion dollars annually

Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 7/26 (Richard, July 26, 2010, “We’re Not Winning. It’s Not Worth It. Here’s How to Drag Down in Afghanistan.” Newsweek, lexi,s, DA: 7/20/10, JPL)

This will be Obama's third chance to decide what kind of war he wants to fight in Afghanistan, and he will have several options to choose from, even if none is terribly promising. The first is to stay the course: to spend the next year attacking the Taliban and training the Afghan Army and police, and to begin reducing the number of U.S. troops in July 2011 only to the extent that conditions on the ground allow. Presumably, if conditions are not conducive, Petraeus will try to limit any reduction in the number of U.S. troops and their role to a minimum. This approach is hugely expensive, however, and is highly unlikely to succeed. The Afghan government shows little sign of being prepared to deliver either clean administration or effective security at the local level. While a small number of Taliban might choose to "reintegrate"--i.e., opt out of the fight--the vast majority will not. And why should they? The Taliban are resilient and enjoy sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, whose government tends to view the militants as an instrument for influencing Afghanistan's future (something Pakistan cares a great deal about, given its fear of Indian designs there). The economic costs to the United States of sticking to the current policy are on the order of $100 billion a year, a hefty price to pay when the pressure to cut federal spending is becoming acute. The military price is also great, not just in lives and materiel but also in distraction at a time when the United States could well face crises with Iran and North Korea. And the domestic political costs would be considerable if the president were seen as going back on the spirit if not the letter of his commitment to begin to bring troops home next year.

Inherency – Squo Too Slow

Current withdrawal plan is too slow to solve advantages

Heuvel, editor and publisher of the Nation, 5-26, (Katrina, 5/26/10, (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052502255.html?hpid=opinionsbox1>), “A Flawed Strategy and a Failed War in Afghanistan.” DA : 7/14/10, JPL.)

The House bill has 91 co-sponsors. A strong showing in the House -- where the amendment would probably receive more than 130 votes -- will demonstrate to the president that there is increasing concern in Congress and throughout the country about the danger of an open-ended commitment in Afghanistan. Even **though Obama said he will** begin **withdraw**ing **troops in July** 2011, **that is** a **tentative** date **at best** -- **and perhaps just the beginning of** the kind of **very slow withdrawal we** **see** now **in Iraq**. **Vietnam and Iraq** both **demonstrated how easy it is to get into war and how difficult it is to get out**. **We now see that** dilemma **in Afghanistan**. Withdrawal will demand a huge political lift and may well lead to the question, "What were the last eight years of lost blood and treasure about?"

Inherency – Can’t Do Both

COIN and CT can’t be implemented at the same time – it’s one or the other

Kaplan, Ph. D in political science from MIT, 9 (David, March 24, <http://www.slate.com/id/2214515>, “CT or COIN?”, Slate, DA: 7/13/10, JPL.)

A U.S. Marine in Afghanistan With just a week until President Barack **Obama** flies to Strasbourg, France, for his first NATO conference, his **top advisers are** still **divided** over what U.S. policy should be on the summit's No. 1 issue: **how to fight** the war **in Afghanistan**. It's a debate that the Bush administration never seriously had in the seven years following the post-9/11 invasion. Now, by contrast, in the wake of three major strategic reviews, Obama is extending and deepening the discussion of Afghanistan, because the outcome of this debate may set the course of American foreign policy for the remainder of his presidency. In the first days of his term, Obama placed strict limits on the war's objectives, shedding Bush's utopian rhetoric about turning Afghanistan into a Western-style democracy and focusing instead on merely keeping the place from reverting to a haven for global terrorists. But though he may initially have thought otherwise, this didn't settle questions of military strategy: how many troops should be deployed, what they should do when they get there, and how victory or defeat will be measured and appraised. This is what the debate inside the White House is about. According to close observers, **the** key **debate** in the White House **is whether the U**nited **S**tates and NATO **should wage a counterinsurgency campaign**—securing the Afghan population, helping to provide basic services, and thus strengthening support for the government—**or whether we should devote** most of **our resources to going after** al-Qaida **terrorists directly**. Obviously, any plan will wind up doing at least a bit of both; the debate is over priorities and emphasis.

COIN and CT are completely different operations and can’t be enacted together

**Exum, Fellow at the Center for New American Security, 9** (Andrew, March 26, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf>, “On CT Vs. COIN,” Small Wars Journal, DA: 7/14/10, JPL, served in U.S. Military 2000-2004)

**In advance of the Obama Administration’s forthcoming review of policies toward Afghanistan** and Pakistan, much of the **commentary has focused on whether** or not the **Obama** Administration **will adopt** a long-term, **hugely expensive** population-centric counter-insurgency (**COIN) campaign or** whether the administration will instead opt for **a lower-cost** counter-terror (**CT) strategy**.

Inherency – COIN =/= CT

COIN and CT are two completely different strategies

Hughes and Tripodi, Ph. Ds from Department of War Studies, at King’s College, 9 (Geraint and Christian, March, <http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/487106_918013288_910291733.pdf>, “Anatomy of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, DA: 7/16/10, JPL)

COIN is defined as the coordinated political and military response of a government and its external supporters to an organised campaign of subversion and paramilitary action waged against the former by an indigenous armed opposition. CT involves both the defensive measures a state undertakes to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and offensive measures taken to target and neutralise a terrorist group – these can range from penetration of the latter by intelligence and police services to more controversial measures such as assassination or ‘targeted killings’

Solvency – Replace COIN

Replacing COIN with CT solves al Qaeda, foreign presence, and Afghanistan insecurity

Fidler, Master of Philosophy in International Relations, 9. (David, October 15, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/15/from_coin_to_chaos>, “From COIN to Chaos”, Foreign Policy, DA : 7/12/10, JPL. Director of the Center on American and Global Security. Co-editor of “India and Counterinsurgency : Lessons Learned.” Graduated a Doctor of Jurisprudence from Harvard University, 1991. Graduated a Master of Philosophy in International Relations from Oxford, 1988.)

The White House, Congress, the military, and the State Department are gripped with the question of what strategy to pursue in Afghanistan. The confusion emanating from the policy debates is pervasive. After committing to a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the spring, complete with a military surge and a "civilian uplift" to increase civilian capabilities, the Obama administration is showing signs of moving towards a strategy that is something less than a full COIN strategy and something more than a pure counterterrorism approach. What this strategy might entail is not yet clear, but what is clear is the danger for such an approach to collapse under the weight of political expedience piled on incoherent strategy and doctrine. **The fissure through which** the **confusion** **is** now **pouring is the** Obama administration's spring commitment to a **COIN strategy** **to reduce the threat posed by al Qaeda** in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In other words, **a COIN approach was selected to achieve a counterterrorism objective**. **The assumption** bridging this divide **was that defeating al Qaeda required defeating the Taliban**, which required a COIN effort. **That assumption** apparently **no longer holds**, **which exposes a dangerous moment for U.S. policy**. **Under COIN** doctrine, **counterinsurgents must include**, and coordinate application of, **all** elements of **national power**. **There are no "half measures" in COIN**, **which is why** President **Obama addressed** the "under-resourced" **mission in Afghanistan by sending more** military **forces** to improve security and an influx of civilian personnel to engage in stability operations, all coordinated under a new commander, Gen. McChrystal, known for his grasp of both COIN and counterterrorism. Gen. McChrystal's grim assessment of the campaign in Afghanistan and what is needed to turn it around are consistent with the principles of fighting COIN effectively. But **the torrent of bad news from Afghanistan**, from the **increasing insecurity**, **growing** American and allied **casualties**, **Taliban gains, and a legitimacy-wrecking election**, **have caused doubts about** the **COIN** strategy **to swell**, **and skeptics** are **urg**ing **adoption of a** something more like a **counterterrorism strategy**. Unlike COIN, the U.S. government does not have "doctrine" on counterterrorism. **Those favoring a counterterrorism-oriented strategy emphasize** that **it would require fewer combat forces**, more operations by special forces, and use of high-tech weapons, such as missiles fired from drones. But these ideas represent means and tactics and do not amount to strategy or doctrine.

COIN fails; counter-terrorism is necessary to solve problems in Afghanistan

BBC, world’s largest broadcasting association, 9 (October 26, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9727032004&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9727032007&cisb=22_T9727032006&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=4>, “Pakistan article says removal of US posts from Afghan side ‘strange’”, lexis, DA: 7/12/10, JPL.)

A **COIN**effort **is meant to deny control of territory as well as the chance to establish writ by** the **insurgents** in such territory. **The opposite seems to be happening in Afghanistan**. **There is**, practically, **no on-going** COIN **effort in****Afghanistan** - there hasn't been a discernable one in the last eight years. Does it give credence to the widely observed notion that **Afghanistan** in actuality **needs a****counter-terrorism effort, rather than a****counter-insurgency effort** - the new mantra in Washington? Is counter-terrorism the modified and revised mission a la Gulf War I? Will it need another effort like Gulf War II to

complete the mission in Afghanistan too?

Solvency – CT Solves

Switching to a counter-terror strategy solves every major objective in Afghanistan, including al Qaeda, Afghan militants in general, keeping Afghans from feeling abandoned, effective completion of missions, defense of US troops, and regional security and allows us to reduce our military presence there by nearly 90%

**Long, Assistant Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia School of Internation and Public Affairs, 9** (Austin, October 13, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/13/what_a_ct_mission_in_afghanistan_would_actually_look_like>, “What a CT Mission in Afghanistan Would Actually Look Like,” Foreign Policy, DA: 7/14/10, JPL. Previous associate political scientist for the RAND Corporation, served in Iraq as an analyst and advisor to the Multinational Force Iraq and the U.S. military. Previous consultant to MIT Lincoln Laboratory on studies of technology and urban operations in counterinsurgency. Author of Deterrence - From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research and On "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Co-founder of the Working Group on Insurgency and Irregular Warfare at the MIT Center for International Studies, member in the RAND Counterinsurgency Board of Experts. Previously taught international security at Clark University. PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).)

Both men have considerable stature and experience, with Riedel recently heading up a major review of policy in the region for the Obama administration. Yet **after numerous** personal **discussions and debates** over the past few weeks **with everyone from U.S. military officers to** some of **the most prominent scholars of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, I am firmly convinced** that **a shift to a "small footprint" counter-terrorism mission is not only possible but will best serve U.S. national security.** To use a military term of art, the bottom line up front is that **the U**nited **S**tates **could successfully transition to an effective small footprint counterterrorism mission** over the course of the next three years, **ending up with a force of** about **13,000 military personnel (or less) in Afghanistan.** But most of the discussion about what a counterterrorism posture would actually look like on the ground has been vague. Riedel and O'Hanlon sum it up as "a few U.S. special forces teams, modern intelligence fusion centers, cruise-missile-carrying ships and unmanned aerial vehicles." No one has attempted to put flesh on this skeleton in terms of numbers and locations of U.S. troops, so I'm proposing **the** following as a possible small footprint **counterterrorism posture**.First, this posture **would require maintaining bases and personnel in Afghanistan**. **Three airfields would be sufficient**: Bagram, north of Kabul, Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan, and ideally Kandahar, in the insurgency-ridden south of the country. **This would enable forces to collect intelligence and rapidly target al Qaeda in the Pashtun regions where its allies would hold sway**. Kandahar, in the heart of Taliban territory, might be untenable with a reduced U.S. presence, so an alternate airfield might be needed, potentially at Shindand, though this would not ideal. In terms of special operations forces, **this posture would rely on two squadrons of** so-called "**Tier 1" operators**, one at each forward operating base. These could be drawn from U.S. special mission units or Allied units such as the British Special Air Service or Canada's Joint Task Force 2. In addition, **it would require a battalion equivalent of U.S. Army Rangers**, U.S. Navy **SEALs**, U.S. **Marine** Special Operations **Companies**, British Parachute Regiment, **or some mix**, with basically a company with each Tier 1 squadron and one in reserve at Bagram. **These forces would work together as task forces** (let's **call them TF South and TF East**), with the Tier 1 operators being tasked with **executing direct action missions to kill or capture al Qaeda targets while** the **other units would serve as security and support for these missions**. In addition, two of the four battalions of the 160th Special Operations Regiment, basically one at each airfield, would be used to provide helicopter transport, reconnaissance, and fire support for the task forces. **One battalion might be enough but two certainly would**, thus **ensuring that no targets get away** for lack of lift. Note that according to Sean Naylor's reporting my direct action task forces are structured like the regional task forces in Iraq in 2006 that were tasked to hunt al Qaeda in Iraq. **Both task forces would be capable of acting against targets** elsewhere **in** the **Pashtun regions**, but al Qaeda operatives would likely only feel even relatively secure in a fairly limited geographic area. **TF East** in Jalalabad **would** likely need to **operate principally in** the heartland of the **Haqqani** militant network (Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces) **as this would be where al Qaeda's principal ally in the east could best protect its members**, who are not generally Pashtun. For similar reasons, **TF South would principally operate against al Qaeda targets in Kandahar**, **where the Quetta Shura Taliban is strongest**, and some of the surrounding provinces such as Helmand and Uruzgan. **In addition** to these two task forces, I would **retain** the **three Army Special Forces' battalions** and other elements that appear to be assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan. **While TFs South and East would focus** purely **on direct action**, **these** Special Forces **units would partner with local forces to collect intelligence and secure specific areas**. **These local forces would in many cases be** from **non-Pashtun** ethnic groups (Tajiks,

Solvency – CT Solves

(CONTINUED, NO TEXT REMOVED)

Uzbeks, Hazaras), which would limit their ability to be effective in the Pashtun area **but would** likely **include at least a few Pashtun tribes** that see more benefit working with the Afghan government and the United States than against them. Rather than serving an offensive purpose against al Qaeda like TF South and East, **Special Forces would** essentially **serve a defensive purpose to secure Afghan allies and reassure them** that **the** **U**nited **S**tates **is not going to abandon them**. **This reassurance and support** of local allies **is** a **crucial** and underappreciated part of a small footprint posture. The **non-Pashtun groups were** the United States' **critical allies** in 2001 **and remain** staunchly opposed to the Taliban and other militants. The Tajiks of the Panjshir Valley, for example, are probably more anti-Taliban than the United States is. **With U.S. support, these groups will be able to prevent** the **expansion of militants outside**

**Pashtun areas**. Local **allies in Pashtun areas will enable collection of intelligence to support the task force operations**. **Supporting local allies does not mean abandoning the Afghan government** any more than supporting local allies in the Awakening movement in Iraq's Anbar province meant abandoning the government of Iraq. Balancing the two will require some deftness and will be the focus of another post. Finally, a few more "enablers," to use another military term of art, would be required. First, this posture would need some additional special operations personnel focused on intelligence collection, along with a substantial complement of intelligence community personnel to collect both human and signals intelligence. Second, it would require a substantial complement of unmanned aerial vehicles including Predators, Reapers, and a few other specialized types along with their support personnel. Third, a few AC-130 gunships for air support would be needed, along with combat search and rescue teams from Air Force Special Operations Command. It should be clear that "small footprint" is a relative term. **This** special operations **posture** alone **would be roughly five battalions of ground forces**, **four aviation squadron**s, and a few odds and ends, probably **in the neighborhood of 5,000 U.S. and NATO troops**. In addition, **a conventional force** component **would be needed to serve as a quick reaction force, provide security** for the bases, **and protect convoys**. A conservative estimate for this force would be a brigade or regimental combat team, giving a battalion to each base, **another 4,000, roughly**. **For** additional **air support**, **two squadrons of fighter-bombers** (F-15E, A-10, etc.) **would** probably **be** **sufficient**, **adding** another **2,000 personnel**. **Finally**, my proposed posture **would require** additional **staff, logistics, and support personnel** (medical for instance), some but not all of which can be contractors, **adding another 2,000** military personnel. **This would be a total force of** about **13,000 military personnel** and some number of supporting intelligence community personnel and contractors. This is a high-end estimate, **and some military personnel** I have spoken to **think this mission could be done with half this number** of troops, **but the posture described above errs on the side of caution**. **This is small compared to the current posture in Afghanistan**, smaller still than the forces implied in Gen. McChrystal's report, and tiny compared to the peak number of forces in Iraq. On the other hand, it is vastly larger than any other purely counterterrorism deployment, and how we get there from here will be the subject of my next post.

Objectives in Afghanistan will be completed by CT, not COIN

Kaplan, Ph. D in political science from MIT, 9 (David, March 24, <http://www.slate.com/id/2214515>, “CT or COIN?”, Slate, DA: 7/13/10, JPL.)

**We're in Afghanistan only because of al-Qaida and** therefore we **should focus on that threat and leave the rest to the Afghans**. Yes, we should offer them aid and assistance, but **neither their economic development nor** **the survival of** Afghan President Hamid **Karzai's regime should be what our troops are** fighting and **dying for**.

Solvency – Terrorism

CT solves – local groups will provide us with intelligence

Bacevich Professor of International Relations at Boston University 9, (Andrew, November 9, 2009, http://harpers.org/archive/2009/11/0082687 “The War We Can’t Win,”, Harper Magazine, DA: 7/17/10, JPL)

What might this mean in practice? General Petraeus, now in charge of U.S. Central Command, recently commented that “the mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and other transnational extremists,” in effect “to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks.” The mission statement is a sound one. The current approach to accomplishing the mission is not sound and, indeed, qualifies as counterproductive. Note that denying Al Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan hasn’t required U.S. forces to occupy the frontier regions of that country. Similarly, denying transnational extremists safe havens in Afghanistan shouldn’t require military occupation by the United States and its allies. It would be much better to let local authorities do the heavy lifting. Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. As a backup, intensive surveillance complemented with precision punitive strikes (assuming we can manage to kill the right people) will suffice to disrupt Al Qaeda’s plans. Certainly, that approach offers a cheaper and more efficient alternative to the establishment of a large-scale and long-term U.S. ground presence—which, as the U.S. campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, has the unintended effect of handing jihadists a recruiting tool that they are quick to exploit.

Solvency – Al Qaeda / Pashtun

Adopting CT allows U.S. military to effectively target Al Qaeda and allied Pashtun regions

**Long, Assistant Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia School of Internation and Public Affairs, 9** (Austin, October 13, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/13/what_a_ct_mission_in_afghanistan_would_actually_look_like>, “What a CT Mission in Afghanistan Would Actually Look Like,” Foreign Policy, DA: 7/14/10, JPL. Previous associate political scientist for the RAND Corporation, served in Iraq as an analyst and advisor to the Multinational Force Iraq and the U.S. military. Previous consultant to MIT Lincoln Laboratory on studies of technology and urban operations in counterinsurgency. Author of Deterrence - From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research and On "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Co-founder of the Working Group on Insurgency and Irregular Warfare at the MIT Center for International Studies, member in the RAND Counterinsurgency Board of Experts. Previously taught international security at Clark University. PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).)

I'm proposing **the** following as a possible small footprint **counterterrorism posture**. First, this posture **would require maintaining bases and personnel in Afghanistan**. **Three airfields would be sufficient**: Bagram, north of Kabul, Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan, and ideally Kandahar, in the insurgency-ridden south of the country. **This would enable forces to collect intelligence and rapidly target al Qaeda in the Pashtun regions where its allies would hold sway**… In terms of special operations forces, **this posture would rely on two squadrons of** so-called "**Tier 1" operators**, one at each forward operating base. These could be drawn from U.S. special mission units or Allied units such as the British Special Air Service or Canada's Joint Task Force 2. **In addition, it would require a battalion equivalent of U.S. Army Rangers**, U.S. Navy **SEALs**, U.S. **Marine** Special Operations **Companies**, British Parachute Regiment, **or some mix**, with basically a company with each Tier 1 squadron and one in reserve at Bagram. **These forces would** work together as task forces (let's call them TF South and TF East), with the Tier 1 operators being tasked with executing direct action missions to **kill or capture al Qaeda targets while the other units would serve as security and support for these missions**. **Both task forces would be capable of acting against targets elsewhere in the Pashtun regions,** but al Qaeda operatives would likely only feel even relatively secure in a fairly limited geographic area. **TF East** in Jalalabad **would** likely need to **operate principally in the heartland of** the **Haqqani** militant network (Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces) as **this would be where al Qaeda's principal ally in the east could best protect its members**, who are not generally Pashtun. For similar reasons, TF **South would principally operate against al Qaeda targets in Kandahar, where the Quetta Shura Taliban is strongest**, and some of the surrounding provinces such as Helmand and Uruzgan.

Solvency – Terror / Pak Stability

CT policy is key to checking Middle East terrorism and Pakistan stability

Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 7/26 (Richard, July 26, 2010, “We’re Not Winning. It’s Not Worth It. Here’s How to Drag Down in Afghanistan.” Newsweek, lexi,s, DA: 7/20/10, JPL)

So what should the president decide? The best way to answer this question is to return to what the United States seeks to accomplish in Afghanistan and why. The two main American goals are to prevent Al Qaeda from reestablishing a safe haven and to make sure that Afghanistan does not undermine the stability of Pakistan. We are closer to accomplishing both goals than most people realize. CIA Director Leon Panetta recently estimated the number of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to be "60 to 100, maybe less." It makes no sense to maintain 100,000 troops to go after so small an adversary, especially when Al Qaeda operates on this scale in a number of countries. Such situations call for more modest and focused policies of counterterrorism along the lines of those being applied in Yemen and Somalia, rather than a full-fledged counterinsurgency effort. Pakistan is much more important than Afghanistan given its nuclear arsenal, its much larger population, the many terrorists on its soil, and its history of wars with India. But Pakistan's future will be determined far more by events within its borders than those to its west. The good news is that the Army shows some signs of understanding that Pakistan's own Taliban are a danger to the country's future, and has begun to take them on.

CT Checks War

U.S. government must quickly create a new strategy for Afghanistan to avoid war

BBC, world’s largest broadcasting association, 9 (October 26, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9727032004&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9727032007&cisb=22_T9727032006&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=4>, “Pakistan article says removal of US posts from Afghan side ‘strange’”, lexis, DA: 7/12/10, JPL.)

**The consequence for Pakistan of this American dither is calamitous**. **What should have been** a synchronous application of **force on both sides of the Durand** line **ends up being a piston applied from one end into a** perforated second end of a **tube**; **a loss of effect and diffusion** of the entire effort. Perhaps there will need to be another effort in due course to achieve objectives fully. That shall be a shame. The **political leadership in the US must make up their minds fast, outline their objectives in****Afghanistan**, provision the necessary resources to the man on the ground who will then need to pump some resolve into his force **and** help **create** the strategic **advantage for the US to seek an** honourable **exit**. Else **the only other possibility will be a repeat of** the **Vietnam** nightmare.

COIN 🡪 Terrorism

COIN strategy increases the capability of terrorists

Sheridan, foreign editor of The Australian, 10, (Greg, June 24, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9727077065&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9727077068&cisb=22_T9727077067&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=244777&docNo=5>, “Ties That Bind and Confound,” lexis, DA: 7/12/10, JPL)

**According to** a new report by **Matt** **Waldman**, published by the London School of Economics, **the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of the Pakistani military is** intimately involved in **supporting the** Afghan **Taliban**. Waldman asserts t**he ISI is even represented on the Taliban's central leadership council**, the so-called Quetta Shura. This is in great distinction to the fight the Pakistanis are having with the Pakistan Taliban. Despite the connections of the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban, the ISI makes an easy distinction between them. Waldman goes further than other analysts in his estimate of ISI intimacy with the Afghan Taliban, but the basic point, of some continuing **ISI complicity with the Taliban, is not contested by any serious analyst**. Indeed, **Australian governments and** senior **military figures have** often **raised it with the Pakistanis**. Thus, **we are providing military training to an institution that**, in part, **contributes to the killing of** Australian **soldiers**. **This is just a part of the infinite and unavoidable** moral **complexity** **of** the long war against terror, and modern **counter-insurgency**.

- Matt Waldman is a Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights and professor at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard.

CT = Less Troops

A counter-terrorism strategy requires less military presence than COIN

Signoriello, recipient of a Master degree in IT equipment, 9 (John, June 28, <http://www.examiner.com/x-36506-Richmond-County-Elections-2010-Examiner?showbio>, “Critical Debate Brewing : Counter-Insurgency Vs Counter-Terrorism”, Examiner, DA: 7/12/10, JPL)

**Counter-terrorism**, Vice President **Biden's preferred strategy**, **is a simpler approach**, **requiring fewer troops, and less risk to those troops**, **relying, instead, on good ground** intelligence **and** the willingness

AT: Afghanistan Perceives Abandonment

They say the plan causes troops in Afghanistan to feel abandoned. Not true, Extend our Long in ’09 evidence. CT stratedgy leaves three Army Special Forces battalions in Afghanistan; these groups are specifically responsible for teaming up with Middle Eastern forces to complete objectives; this would keep Afghanistan and surrounding areas and allies from feeling abandoned.

COIN Unpopular

COIN unpopular among policy makers – ineffective and incredibly expensive

**Exum, Fellow at the Center for New American Security, 9** (Andrew, March 26, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf>, “On CT Vs. COIN,” Small Wars Journal, DA: 7/14/10, JPL, served in U.S. Military 2000-2004)

One thing most **policy-makers** seem to **understand**, though, is that a population-centric **COIN** campaign **in Afghanistan would be long, messy, and expensive**. Our **NATO** allies would no doubt **tire of the inevitable rise in casualties** before we do, **and with the global economy in dire straits**, **it is worth noting** that – largely due to issues of re-supply – **an infantry brigade costs twice as much** to operate **in Afghanistan as** it does to operate **in Iraq**. For this and many other reasons, **there exists far less enthusiasm in the community of COIN theorists and practitioners about** a possible **COIN** campaign **in Afghanistan** than there was for a COIN campaign in Iraq.

COIN extremely unpopular – no public support because of casualties and failures

Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technical University, 7/4, (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4, 2010, “US Flawed Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)

Secondly, the US COIN strategy enunciated under President Obama seems to be failing so far. The main issue behind the failure is a lack of public support, without which any COIN strategy, no matter how cleverly and carefully it is planned, would fail. This was evident in the military operation "Mushtarak" undertaken by US, NATO and Afghan forces in Helmand province in March 2010, which failed to clear the territory of Taliban presence and initiate economic development. To the contrary, the operation brought more miseries to the population in terms of loss of civilian lives and property.

COIN Costs

Maintaining COIN strategy costs a hundred billion dollars annually

Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 7/26 (Richard, July 26, 2010, “We’re Not Winning. It’s Not Worth It. Here’s How to Drag Down in Afghanistan.” Newsweek, lexi,s, DA: 7/20/10, JPL)

This will be Obama's third chance to decide what kind of war he wants to fight in Afghanistan, and he will have several options to choose from, even if none is terribly promising. The first is to stay the course: to spend the next year attacking the Taliban and training the Afghan Army and police, and to begin reducing the number of U.S. troops in July 2011 only to the extent that conditions on the ground allow. Presumably, if conditions are not conducive, Petraeus will try to limit any reduction in the number of U.S. troops and their role to a minimum. This approach is hugely expensive, however, and is highly unlikely to succeed. The Afghan government shows little sign of being prepared to deliver either clean administration or effective security at the local level. While a small number of Taliban might choose to "reintegrate"--i.e., opt out of the fight--the vast majority will not. And why should they? The Taliban are resilient and enjoy sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, whose government tends to view the militants as an instrument for influencing Afghanistan's future (something Pakistan cares a great deal about, given its fear of Indian designs there). The economic costs to the United States of sticking to the current policy are on the order of $100 billion a year, a hefty price to pay when the pressure to cut federal spending is becoming acute. The military price is also great, not just in lives and materiel but also in distraction at a time when the United States could well face crises with Iran and North Korea. And the domestic political costs would be considerable if the president were seen as going back on the spirit if not the letter of his commitment to begin to bring troops home next year.

Afghanistan K WOT

Afghanistan is a test to the WOT – success there key to combating global terrorism

Bukhari, researcher at Raja Ratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technical University, 7/4, (Syed Adnan Ali Shah, July 4, 2010, “US Flawed Coin Strategy,” The Statesman, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)

Afghanistan is increasingly becoming a litmus test for the international community in its pursuit of the global war on terror. Since 2005, the Taliban have recuperated and regrouped, and present an existential threat to the current Karzai-led Afghan Administration with every passing year. According to a recent report of International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), the Taliban which maintained permanent presence over 54 percent of the Afghan territory in 2007, not only increased it to 72 percent and 80 percent respectively in 2008 and 2009, but also spread its tentacles to hither to peaceful parts of northern and western Afghanistan.

AT: CT Hurts Human Rights

CT does no tharm human rights; UN policies check

Foot, Professor of International Relations and the John Swire Senior research Fellow in International Relations, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 7, (Rosemary, November, 2007, “The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation and Embedded Ideas,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, DA: 7/20/10, JPL)

Annan's 2002 remarks were an early attempt to ensure that human rights concerns would begin to be reflected in the procedures of these two influential Committees. The Secretary General's credibility in the area of human rights promotion was high. His close association with a period in the UN history when it had been more attentive to human rights and when he himself had argued that priority should be given to individual over state sovereignty ensured that.44 In October 2001, he had set up a "Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism" which had a sub-group devoted to human rights consequences. Partly as a result of this, the final report of the Group, issued in August 2002, attempted to place human rights firmly at the centre of the UN role in countering terrorism. As it stated: [T]he United Nations must ensure that the protection of human rights is conceived as an essential concern. Terrorism often thrives where human rights are violated, which adds to the need to strengthen action to combat violations of human rights. Terrorism itself should also be understood as an assault on basic rights. In all cases, the fight against terrorism must be respectful of international human rights obligations.

AT: Counter-Terrorism PICs

Your word PICS are based on old rhetoric which not only empirically denies your impacts but proves their isn’t a link – the Obama administration recognizes that we can identify the real threats without losing perspective and reason.

Riedel, a CIA veteran, chaired the president's Afghanistan-Pakistan review, ‘10(Bruce, he is also a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, May 27, <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0527_halls_clinton.aspx#riedel>, “ National Security Strategy and Counter Terrorism”, da: 7-19-10, twm)

 The Obama administrations’ rollout of its new national security strategy began with the President’s speech last week in West Point. In his speech to the graduating class of cadets, President Obama rightly sought to put the current threat to the United States from al Qaeda and its allies in the global Islamic jihad movement in perspective. The President said al Qaeda is led by “small men on the wrong side of history.” He is right, Usama bin Laden and his gang has no real plan for the future. They do have an elaborate narrative that tries to justify murder but the only role model for a future caliphate they offer is the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Few Afghans and very few Muslims want to emulate Mullah Omar’s medieval hell that banned everything from kites to women’s education. The President reminded Americans that while the threat of terror today is real and serious, al Qaeda is not an enemy on the scale of Nazi Germany or Stalin’s USSR. And while the war in Afghanistan is a grim and deadly battle, he noted it pales in comparison to the battlefields that Ulysses S. Grant faced in the civil war or Eisenhower in World War II. The international coalition in Afghanistan has lost 1,700 killed in eight years. At Cold Harbor in 1864 Grant lost 1,800 dead in one battle, most on one day. Perspective is important because it means we should not succumb to the temptations to engage in Islam phobia in response to the very real dangers posed by al Qaeda. We do not need to ban burqas or harass American citizens of Pakistani or Somali descent. We need to reassure our fellow Muslim Americans that we know they are loyal citizens. The President’s top counter terrorist advisor John Brennan in another speech was clear: “we are at war against al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates” not with terrorism or Islam. The National Security Strategy states this explicitly when it says “we are at war with a specific network, al Qaeda.” In fighting terror we do not need to panic and sacrifice our values. This message is important today. Brennan referred to a “new phase” in al Qaeda’s tactics, smaller plots than 911 using American citizens recruited to al Qaeda and its allies. In the last year we have faced a rash of such terror plots conducted by a few disgruntled Muslim Americans from Fort Hood to Times Square. Not surprisingly Muslim American communities are fearful of a backlash. A Pakistani American community organization has urged its members to consult a lawyer immediately if questioned by the FBI. The President and his team rightly are telling us to keep our heads. Good counter terrorism practices are not inconsistent with our civil liberties. We may well see a mass casualty attack in the USA this year, al Qaeda’s goal, but we need to respond with perspective and reason, not fear and torture.

AT: Complete Withdrawal Links

Neg arguments assume *immediate* US departure – arguments don’t link

Dr. Bernard I. Finel, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the American Security Project. “An Alternative Strategy for Afghanistan” – New Atlanticist” Policy and Analysis Blog – August 20, 2009 – http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/alternative-strategy-afghanistan.

One of my great frustrations in becoming more involved in the debate over Afghanistan policy and the utility of population-centric counter-insurgency (COIN) theory is how ruthlessly the pro-escalation side of the debate has sought to caricature the position of the skeptics. The choice has been portrayed as being between a full commitment to COIN or an immediate withdrawal and subsequent abandonment of Afghanistan. These are not the only choices.

AT: Complete Withdrawal

Complete U.S. withdrawal causes Afghan government collapse and regional war

Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 7/26 (Richard, July 26, 2010, “We’re Not Winning. It’s Not Worth It. Here’s How to Drag Down in Afghanistan.” Newsweek, lexi,s, DA: 7/20/10, JPL)

At the other end of the policy spectrum would be a decision to walk away from Afghanistan--to complete as quickly as possible a full U.S. military withdrawal. Doing so would almost certainly result in the collapse of the Karzai government and a Taliban takeover of much of the country. Afghanistan could become another Lebanon, where the civil war blends into a regional war involving multiple neighboring states. Such an outcome triggered by U.S. military withdrawal would be seen as a major strategic setback to the United States in its global struggle with terrorists. It would also be a disaster for NATO in what in many ways is its first attempt at being a global security organization.

Plan Text Options

Thus the plan : The United States federal government should remove the COIN strategy from Afghanistan and instead implement a counter-terrorism strategy while reducing the number of US troops in Afghanistan to 13,000.

Thus the plan : The United States federal government should remove the COIN strategy from Afghanistan and reduce the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to those necessary to pursue a counter-terrorism strategy.

Thus the plan : The United States Federal Government should reduce (its?) United States military presence in afghanistan to those forces necessary for a small footprint counterterrorism posture.

\*\*\*Taliban Advantage\*\*\*

1AC Taliban Advantage (1/3)

The huge U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is the main cause of increasing Taliban violence

O’Donnel, Kabul Bureau chief of AFP, 7/10, (Lynne, July 10, 2010, <http://www.canada.com/news/Five+soldiers+fighting+Taliban+Afghanistan+NATO/3261573/story.html>, “Five U.S. Soldiers Die Fighting Taliban in Afghanistan : NATO,” PostMedia Network Inc., DA : 7/14/10, JPL)

Five **U.S. soldiers were killed** Saturday **in separate incidents while battling the Taliban**-led insurgency in Afghanistan, as NATO said its troops had accidentally killed six Afghan civilians. Three of the soldiers died in eastern Afghanistan and two were killed in the south, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said. A sixth US serviceman also died Saturday, in an accidental explosion, an ISAF official told AFP on condition of anonymity. **The** six **deaths bring to 352 the toll of international soldiers in the Afghan war this year**, according to a tally kept by AFP based on the icasualties.org website. **It was the highest one-day toll** **since** the deaths of ten foreign soldiers on **June 21**, which equalled **the worst day of the year** for international forces. An ISAF statement said the causes of death in the east were small-arms fire, a home-made bomb attack and an unspecified "insurgent attack". The two soldiers who died in the south were involved in separate attacks with homemade bombs, known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). US soldiers are known to be involved in a major operation in Kunar province, on Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan, though ISAF would not confirm that the deaths in the east were related to the offensive. While it is ISAF policy not to reveal the nationalities of the soldiers, an official who asked not to be identified said all were Americans. ISAF earlier said its troops had killed six civilians accidentally, a day after reporting that six Afghan soldiers had died in a "friendly fire" incident. Civilian casualties are an incendiary topic with **Afghans**, who **increasingly regard the presence of international troops in their country as the main cause of violence** that has wracked Afghanistan for almost nine years. ISAF said "artillery fire from an ISAF unit killed six civilians and wounded several others in Jani Khel on Thursday", referring to a district of Paktia province, south of Kabul. The dead had been removed before ISAF units had arrived on the scene, the force said, and so it was not immediately clear that people had been killed by what it said were "errant rounds". That statement came after ISAF said a helicopter patrol in southern Ghazni province had opened fire on a group of Afghan soldiers on Tuesday, mistaking them for militants planting bombs by a roadside. While reports of friendly fire incidents are not common in Afghanistan, they add to a perception that foreign forces do not take enough care to avoid killing Afghans, military or civilian. Command of the 140,000 troops in Afghanistan has just been taken over by US General David Petraeus who is under some pressure to change the rules of engagement, as some soldiers believe they restrict defensive action. Petraeus has not publicly ruled out making changes, though observers in Kabul said he is unlikely to alter rules he was instrumental in formulating and which are credited with cutting civilian casualties. The United Nations said in a recent report that **most civilian casualties in Afghanistan are caused by the Taliban**, using IEDs or in suicide attacks. **The U**nited **S**tates, **with** almost **100,000 of the 140,000** international **troops in Afghanistan, is bearing the greatest burden** **of a rising death toll**, with 224 soldiers dead this year so far, and 1,171 since the war began in 2001.

Failure to control Taliban leads to Paki instability and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into terrorist hands

Desta, Pakistan & Afghanistan Bureau Chief, 9 (Samson, April 24, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/24/pakistan.taliban.control.gilani/index.html>, “U.S. ‘Extremely Concerned’ About Taliban Movements in Pakistan,” CNN, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

The **U**nited **S**tates is **keeping a close eye on Pakistan** after this week's **Taliban surge** into the Buner district brought them just **60 miles from the capital**, Islamabad. A Taliban fighter in the district of Buner, which is only 96 kilometers from Islamabad. 1 of 2 A Pakistani government official said Friday that the insurgents had completely withdrawn from the district by the end of the week, but a human rights group said people in Buner were reporting that **local Taliban remained in the district**. And senior U.S. officials cautioned that any withdrawal by the Taliban was likely meaningless and that **the fundamentalist group** now **holds large areas of the country with the government** seemingly **unable to stop them**. "**We're** certainly **moving closer to the tipping point**," Adm. Mike Mullen, **chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said** on NBC's "Today" show Friday. In the interview from Afghanistan, Mullen said he was "extremely concerned" about indications **the Taliban is moving closer to Pakistan's capital** of Islamabad. Syed Mohammed Javed, commissioner of the Malakand Division that includes Buner, said the Taliban withdrew on Friday without any conditions. Earlier in the day, Taliban spokesman Muslim Khan told CNN that the militants would pull back from the district. Pakistani Express TV showed live footage of armed and masked Taliban militants in Buner, loading pickup trucks and driving away. Sufi Muhammed, an Islamist fundamentalist leader who has been negotiating on behalf of the Taliban, was on scene overseeing the withdrawal, police said. U.S. military commander Gen. David Petraeus credited about 300 Pakistan's Frontier Corps with driving Taliban militants out of Buner. The U.S. Central Command chief spoke to CNN on Friday after testifying before a Congressional panel about the need for the United States to boost its support for Pakistani counterinsurgency troops such as the Frontier Corps. But Amnesty International's regional chief said people in Buner are reporting a different situation. "What we're hearing from people in

1AC Taliban Advantage (2/3)

(CONTINUED, NO TEXT REMOVED)

Buner ... is that the Taliban that have moved out are the non-local ones," Sam Zarifi, Amnesty's Asia Pacific director, told CNN. "So the local branch of **the Taliban** are still in place in Buner." Amnesty International is concerned that those local Taliban **will continue to enforce** the Taliban's "**abusive and repressive" control of Buner**. Girls over the age of 7 are forced to wear a burka, a head-to-toe covering that the Taliban say is required of Muslims under its radical interpretation of Islamic law, or sharia. "I think we're going to see those harsh edicts stay," Zarifi said. The Taliban installed strict Islamic law when it took over Afghanistan after a two-year fight with warlords, many of whom surrendered without a fight. They fought with a coalition of some of those warlords known as the Northern Alliance from 1996 until U.S. forces, seeking the leadership of al Qaeda after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, added bombing raids to Northern Alliance ground operations and successfully drove the Taliban out of most of Afghanistan. But the Taliban regrouped in 2004, launching a guerrilla war against the Afghan government while operating from the tribal areas of that country and Pakistan. Meanwhile, senior U.S. officials said that the "retreat" was likely meaningless. Control was the impetus behind the Taliban move into Buner, and the fundamentalist group now controls large areas of Pakistan, they said. The officials said, however, that they did not believe **the Taliban's goal was** to take over the government of Pakistan but rather **to create instability by taking advantage of** Pakistan President Asif Ali **Zardari's** apparent **inability to cope with the situation**. Zardari, they said, does not understand the gravity of the situation, remains distracted by domestic politics and appears unable to make critical decisions to deploy the army to stabilize the country. State Department envoy Richard Holbrooke has been on the phone "nonstop" with officials in Islamabad and Washington, the officials said, providing frequent information to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama. Holbrooke's read on the situation, officials familiar with the conversation said, is that **the Pakistani government does not know how to handle the situation and is looking to the U**nited **S**tates **for direction**. **A senior military official [said]**, however, presented a more dire case. **Pakistan is "rapidly deteriorating**," he said. He said that

**he could not rule out** the possibility of a **military takeover in Islamabad**, although he added that such a prospect was not in the immediate future. As for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, he said the weapons "are safe for now" but that the United States is monitoring the safety systems in place. Administration officials said that the Pakistani military had assured the United States it would not act without an express order from the civilian leadership. Earlier this week, **Clinton warned that nuclear-armed Pakistan was in danger of falling into terrorist hands**. Before the Taliban's apparent withdrawal Friday, a local Pakistani official expressed doubt about whether the militants would leave, as they pledged to local elders on Thursday. "Nobody can trust them," Sardar Hussain Babik, the provincial education minister, said by phone from Buner. The Taliban have broken promises before and probably would do so again, he said. Militants who swarmed into Buner subsequently locked up courthouses, seized court documents and battled Pakistani troops who were sent to protect residents. The militants said they took control of the district to ensure that Islamic law was properly imposed. The Pakistani government called the land grab a breach of a recent peace agreement.

This presents 2 scenarios for extinction.

First is Paki nuclear terrorism.

Boyle, professor of international law at Illinois University of Law, 9 (Francis, August 20, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/08/20_boyle_criminality_deterrence.php>, “The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

**The human race stands on the verge of nuclear self-extinction** as a species, **and with it will die** most, if not **all**, forms of intelligent **life on** the planet **earth**. Any attempt to dispel the ideology of nuclearism and its attendant myth propounding the legality of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence must directly come to grips with the fact that the nuclear age was conceived in the original sins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki constituted crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined by the Nuremberg Charter of August 8, 1945, and violated several basic provisions of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. 4 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), the rules of customary international law set forth in the Draft Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923), and the United States War Department Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (1940). According to this Field Manual and the Nuremberg Principles, all civilian government officials and military officers who ordered or knowingly participated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could have been lawfully punished as war criminals. The start of any progress toward resolving humankind's nuclear predicament must come from the realization that **nuclear weapons have never been** legitimate **instruments of state policy**, **but** rather have always **constitute**d **illegitimate instrumentalities of internationally lawless and criminal behavior**. To the contrary, **the** entire **human race has been victimized by** an international conspiracy of ongoing **criminal activity carried out by** the nuclear weapons states under the doctrine known as "nuclear deterrence," which is really a euphemism for "**nuclear terrorism**." This international criminal conspiracy of nuclear deterrence/terrorism currently practiced by the nuclear weapons states is no different from any other conspiracy by a criminal gang or band. They are the outlaws. So it is up to the rest of the international community to repress and dissolve this international criminal conspiracy as soon as possible.

1AC Taliban Advantage (3/3)

Second is Kashmir. Paki instability and failure to contain Taliban causes terrorism in Kashmir

Afridi, member of Council on Foreign Relations, 9 (Jamal, July 9, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9135/kashmir_militant_extremists.html#p4>, “Kashmir Militant Extremists,” Council on Foreign Relations, DA: 7/14/10, JPL. B.A. of political science from Notre Dame, member of The Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs)

India has long accused Pakistan's premier intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of arming, training, and providing logistical support to militants in Kashmir. Pakistan denies any ongoing collaboration between the ISI and militants, stressing a change of course after September 11, 2001. After the December 2001 attack on India's parliament, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf promised to crack down on terrorist groups active in Kashmir and purge ISI officials with ties to these groups. However, the Indian government implied the ISI's involvement in a July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, and again in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai. But as this Backgrounder points out, some experts believe **the relationship between the Paki**stani **military and** some **Kashmiri groups has turned with the rise of militancy** **within Pakistan**. Shuja Nawaz, author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within, says **the ISI "has certainly lost control" of Kashmiri militant groups**. According to Nawaz, some of the groups trained by the ISI to fuel insurgency in Kashmir have been implicated in bombings and attacks within Pakistan, therefore making them army targets. **Many terrorists** active **in Kashmir** **received training** in the same madrasas, or Muslim seminaries, **where Taliban** and al-Qaeda **fighters studied**, **and** some **received** military **training at camps in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan**. Leaders of some of these terror groups also have al-Qaeda connections. The long-time leader of the Harakat ul-Mujahideen group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, signed al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of holy war, which called on Muslims to attack all Americans and their allies. Maulana Masood Azhar, who founded the Jaish-e-Mohammed organization, traveled to Afghanistan several times to meet Osama bin Laden. Azhar's group is suspected of receiving funding from al-Qaeda, U.S. and Indian officials say. In 2006, al-Qaeda claimed to have established a wing in Kashmir.

Kashmiri terrorism is most likely cause of Indo-Pak conflict – causes nuclear war

Mir, reporter for DNAIndia, 9 (Amir, January 2, <http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_pak-terrorism-could-spiral-into-nuclear-war-pentagon-study_1218172-all>, DNAIndia, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

**As early as** 19**98**, **US Defence department forecast an Indi**a-**Pak**istan **conflict over** Jammu and **Kashmir which can turn into** the first-ever **nuclear war** in South Asia, eventually leading to deployment of multinational troops in both the countries. **The Pentagon study** titled "Sources of Conflict in 21st Century: Regional Futures and the American Strategy", was conducted after India and Pakistan

decided to go nuclear in 1998. The study, done by the Rand Corporation, a well-regarded semi-official US think-tank, **said: "The cause of** the **Indo-Pak conflict is** again l**ikely to be** the Pakistan-aided **insurgency in** Jammu **Kashmir** and east Punjab."

Cross-apply Boyle 9 nuclear strike causes extinction.

Even supporters of COIN admit, CT would contain the Taliban and prevent Pakistan instability

Kaplan, Ph. D in political science from MIT, 9 (David, March 24, <http://www.slate.com/id/2214515>,“CT or COIN?”, Slate, DA: 7/13/10, JPL.)

**A "targeted" CT campaign**, its advocates say, **would** at least **demonstrate the West's resolve in the war on terrorism and keep al-Qaida** **jihadists contained**. **It's** a type of **fighting** that **we know how to do, and its effects are measurable**. One might also argue (I don't know if anyone on the inside is doing so) that **it could serve as a holding action**—a way of **keeping Afghanistan from plunging deeper into chaos**—**while we focus more intently on diplomatic measures to stabilize** neighboring **Pakistan**. **If Pakistan blows up, curing Afghanistan of its problems will be irrelevant and**, in any case, **impossible**. **Some in** the **COIN** camp **have sympathy for this argument**—**especially** for **the part about** the **high cost and** the **uncertainty of success**

Solvency – Taliban

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The Taliban are terrorists that increase global terrorism – we need to strike Pakistan sanctuaries to stop them and check Afghan stability

Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi , 10- (Brahma, February 16, “Surge, bribe and run; Washington has learned nothing from past policies,” Washington Times, lexis, DA: 7/17/10, JPL)

To justify the planned Faustian bargain with the Taliban, the Obama team is drawing a specious distinction between al Qaeda and the Taliban and illusorily seeking to differentiate between "moderate" Taliban (the good terrorists) and those who rebuff deal-making (the bad terrorists). The scourge of transnational terrorism cannot be stemmed if such specious distinctions are drawn. India, which is on the front line of the global fight against international terrorism, is likely to bear the brunt of the blowback of Mr. Obama's AfPak strategy, just as it came under terrorist siege as a consequence of the Reagan-era U.S. policies in that belt. **The Taliban**, al Qaeda and groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are a difficult-to-separate mix of soul mates who together **constitute the global jihad syndicate**. The only difference is that al Qaeda operates out of mountain caves in Pakistan while the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba operate openly across Pakistan's western and eastern borders. To cut a deal with any constituent of this syndicate will only bring more international terrorism. A stable Afghanistan cannot emerge without dismantling the Pakistani military's sanctuaries and sustenance infrastructure for the Afghan Taliban and militarily decapitating the latter's command center in Baluchistan. As U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry put it in his leaked November cables to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, "[M]ore troops won't end the insurgency as long as Pakistan sanctuaries remain." Instead of seeking to cut off the Taliban's support, the U.S. is actually partnering with the Pakistani military to win over the Taliban. And, as an inducement, it has upped the annual aid for Pakistan for next fiscal year to $3.2 billion - a historic high.

Taliban => Global Nuclear War

Failure to deal with the Taliban leads to global nuclear war

Neoavatara, branch of WordPress, 9 (April 24, 2009, <http://neoavatara.com/blog/?p=4090>, “Pakistan, Time for Contingency Planning,” Neoavatara, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

The **Paki**stani **leadership** must be forced to realize the extremely bad situation they are in. So far, they **have been** delusional, still **feeling** that **India is a bigger threat than the Taliban**. **That is** simply **not the case**. Pakistan will not exist in five years **if the Taliban is not taken care of** today. The situation is that dire. Hopefully, for Pakistan, Indian, and the rest of the world, they come to their senses… **The Paki**stani **government falls**. **The Paki**stani **military is in disarray**. The ISI, the **Paki**stani **intelligence services, side with the Taliban**. And the **U**nited **S**tates **and India do not have a**n active **plan** in place **to deal with the failed state**. **This is not** an **unreasonable** set of **circumstances**. **This would lead the subcontinent to** ultimately be **destabilize**d, **and nuclearize**d. **The Chinese would have difficulty staying out of the conflict**, because let us face facts: **a nuclear** **war on the subcontinent would dramatically effect the entire** Asian **continent**. **This is the apocalypse scenario**; unlikely, but **frighteningly possible**.

Kashmir Terror => Nuke War

Kashmiri terrorism is most likely cause of Indo-Pak conflict – causes nuclear war

Mir, reporter for DNAIndia, 9 (Amir, January 2, <http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_pak-terrorism-could-spiral-into-nuclear-war-pentagon-study_1218172-all>, DNAIndia, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

**As early as** 19**98**, **US Defence department forecast an Indi**a-**Pak**istan **conflict over** Jammu and **Kashmir which can turn into** the first-ever **nuclear war** in South Asia, eventually leading to deployment of multinational troops in both the countries. **The Pentagon study** titled "Sources of Conflict in 21st Century: Regional Futures and the American Strategy", was conducted after India and Pakistan decided to go nuclear in 1998. The study, done by the Rand Corporation, a well-regarded semi-official US think-tank, **said: "The cause of** the **Indo-Pak conflict is** again l**ikely to be** the Pakistan-aided **insurgency in** Jammu **Kashmir** and east Punjab."

Kashmiri terrorism leads to nuclear war

Kumar, Ph. D and member of prestigious India Administrative Service, 99 (Susmit, July 14, 1999, <http://www.proutworld.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=48:analysis-a-synthesis&id=202:an-impending-nuclear-war-over-kashmir&Itemid=128>, Proud World, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

After the Kargil crisis, **there is a dramatic rise in terrorism in** the **Kashmir** Valley. There have been several incidents of daring raids by terrorists on Indian army and paramilitary camps. There are several cases of rocket attacks on these camps. In the early years of separatist movements in the Valley, almost all militants were from the Valley and they were fighting for an independent Kashmir. But now almost all **militants are** non-Kashmiris. They are **fighting in the name of Islamic holy war** and also for money. **ISI** lures unemployed Muslims from Islamic countries, mostly from Arab countries, to Afghan terrorist universities. It **gives $3,000 to every terrorist for** his one month **work in J&K**. Almost one-third of Indian army’s regular troops is tied down in J&K in fighting couple of thousands of terrorists. Quoting US intelligence sources, US newspapers have reported that about 8,000 to **10,000 mujahideens are ready to enter J&K for the holy war**. **India has been bleeding for last ten years because of the terrorism unleashed by Pakistan**. Now **ISI is spreading its activities in** the Northeast and elsewhere in **India** too… Hence **it is just question of time when India’s patience**  **will run out**… **India’s** next central **government will have to** find a solution, which is to **eliminate the terrorist camps in Pakistan and in Afghanistan**. I**ndia will have to bomb these camps** and will go for hot pursuit across the LOC. **This will** certainly **lead to a full-scale war** as predicted by several of the world famous think tanks. Also if tens of thousands of Talibans enter IKV, then **the only solution for India will be a war**… The **Pakistanis**, driven backward and **fearful of losing their** nuclear **arsenal**, **launch a nuclear strike against** the **India**n force. The **escalation to nuclear weapons happens within the first 12 days of** the **war**. The Wall Street Journal published a full-page article on this war game on June 24, 1998. According to a report of the prestigious Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also, published in May 1998, Pakistan might be prepared to use nuclear weapons even if such an action seemed irrational.

Nuke Terror => Nuke War

An act of nuclear terror would trigger global nuclear war

**Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 10, (**Robert, July 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 33, Issue 7)

And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important.

Yes Paki Takeover

Taliban is trying to overtake nuclear-armed Pakistan

Kumar, Ph. D and member of India Research Laboratory, 9 (Arun, October 14, <http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/taliban-takeover-of-pakistan-would-be-catastrophe-for-us-india-washington-post_100260736.html>, Thaindian, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

A resurgent **Taliban is aiming to gain control over** a **nuclear-armed Pakistan**, a development that would be a “catastrophe for the interests of the US and major allies such as India”, an influential US daily has warned. “During the past 10 days, **Pakistan’s conflict with the Taliban** movement **has escalated toward full-scale war**-and the extreme Islamist movement has mostly held the initiative,” the Washington Post said in an editorial Wednesday. **Noting that an attack against** **Pakistan’s army headquarters was staged with the help of a terrorist organisation from the country’s** ethnic **Punjabi heartland**, the daily suggested that “**the Taliban no longer aims** merely **at controlling** the ethnic **Pashtun areas** of Pakistan and Afghanistan **but at gaining control over a nuclear-armed state**”. “All of this is bad news for the United States, which has a vital national interest in preventing an extremist takeover in Pakistan and the destabilization of the region stretching from Afghanistan to India,” it said. “It’s curious that spokesmen for the Obama administration continue to talk down the Taliban threat and to describe it as unequal to that posed by Al Qaeda,” the Post said describing it as a “badly out of date” analysis. “Al Qaeda, though still dangerous, has suffered serious reverses in the past several years, while **the Taliban has gone from struggling for survival to aiming for control over both Afghanistan and Pakistan**,” it said. “Though it is not known to be planning attacks against the continental United States, success by the movement in toppling the government of either country would be a catastrophe for the interests of the United States and major allies such as India,” the Post warned. Cautioning against a “strategy that would give up the US attempt to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan”, the Post said it would not only “condemn American soldiers to fighting and dying without the chance of winning, but it would also cripple Pakistan’s fight against the jihadists”.

AT: No Paki Takeover

Taliban will try to take Pakistan government; they do not uphold their word or treaties

Desta, Pakistan & Afghanistan Bureau Chief, 9 (Samson, April 24, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/24/pakistan.taliban.control.gilani/index.html>, “U.S. ‘Extremely Concerned’ About Taliban Movements in Pakistan,” CNN, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

Before the Taliban's apparent withdrawal Friday, a local Pakistani official expressed doubt about whether the militants would leave, as they pledged to local elders on Thursday. "**Nobody can trust them**," Sardar Hussain Babik, **the** provincial **education minister, said** by phone from Buner. **The Taliban have broken promises** before **and** probably **would do so again**, he said. **Militants who swarmed** into **Buner** subsequently **locked** up **courthouses**, **seized court documents and battled Pakistani troops** who were sent to protect residents. The militants said they took control of the district to ensure that Islamic law was properly imposed. **The Paki**stani government **called the land grab a breach of a** recent **peace agreement**.

AT: Paki Gov’t Checks Taliban

Paki government incapable of keeping Taliban under control; says it needs help from U.S.

Desta, Pakistan & Afghanistan Bureau Chief, 9 (Samson, April 24, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/24/pakistan.taliban.control.gilani/index.html>, “U.S. ‘Extremely Concerned’ About Taliban Movements in Pakistan,” CNN, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

The officials said, however, that they did not believe **the Taliban's goal** **was to** take over the government of Pakistan but rather to **create instability by taking advantage of** Pakistan President Asif Ali **Zardari's** apparent **inability to cope with the situation**. **Zardari**, they said, **does not understand the gravity of the situation, remains distracted by domestic politics and appears unable to make** critical **decisions to deploy the army to stabilize the country**. **State Department envoy** Richard **Holbrooke** has been on the phone "nonstop" with officials in Islamabad and Washington, the officials said, providing frequent information to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama. Holbrooke's read on the situation, officials familiar with the conversation **said**, is that **the Pakistani government does not know how to handle the situation and is looking to the U**nited **S**tates **for direction**. A senior military official [said], however, presented a more dire case.

AT: No Nuke War

Nuclear war is a real threat

**Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 10, (**Robert, July 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 33, Issue 7)

And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves.

\*\*\*Yemen Advantage\*\*\*

1AC Yemen Advantage (1/3)

Contention 2 is Yemen.

Yemen currently can’t fight back against Al Qaeda – needs better U.S. assistance

RNW, 9 (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, December 30, <http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/yemen-wants-more-help-counter-terrorism>, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

The **Yemeni government** has **said it needs** more **support from the West to tackle al-Qaeda**, as details emerge of the links between the Nigerian would-be bomber of a US-bound plane and the south western Asian country. **Several hundred al-Qaeda militants are** possibly **operating in Yemen and** could be **planning attacks** like the attempt on Christmas Day to blow up a US jet, **a Yemeni minister** has **said**. **According to US intelligence agencies**, **al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has transformed** itself from a regional threat **into the network's most active affiliate** **outside** **Pakistan and Afghanistan**. The group has claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing of a Delta Airlines plane as it approached Detroit on a flight from Amsterdam with almost 300 people on board. US media have reported that some of the leaders behind the planned attack are former detainees of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. **Appealing for** more **help from the US** and Europe, **Yemen's Foreign Minister** Abu Bakr al-Qirbi **described** the **current** level of **assistance** **as "inadequate**" **and said his country needed more training for counter-terrorism** units and more military equipment. The growing al-Qaeda threat from Yemen had already prompted US President Barack Obama to expand assistance to the Yemeni government to launch raids against militant hide-outs earlier this month.

Al Qaeda remaining in power in Yemen causes 2 scenarios.

First is Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda operations in Yemen kills Saudi Stability

Al-Watan, Saudi national newspaper, 10, (March 26, 2010, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9748500170&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9748500173&cisb=22_T9748500172&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=2>, “Saudi editorial says biggest security threat to kingdom comes from Yemen”, lexis, DA: 7/15/10, JPL)

The detailed statement which the Interior Ministry released yesterday has shed light on important facts that were previously a matter of surmise and conjecture. These have now become established fact in the eyes of the competent Saudi authorities, which have constantly demonstrated high security competence and relied on accurate intelligence information. **The Interior Ministry** statement **emphasized** the **foreign dimension of Al-Qa'idah** organization, **which is barricaded in Yemen**… **Leniency in** fortifying **the border with Yemen enables terrorists to easily move between the two countries**. This is not to say that there is anything wrong in the relationship between the two fraternal countries or the two peoples, who are linked by bonds of kinship and religion, as much as it relates to terrorists' exploitation of the extensively long and open border and their infiltration from Yemen into Saudi Arabia and vice versa. Criminals commit crimes in Saudi Arabia and flee to Yemen while African nationals and deviants from other countries infiltrate into our country to carry out acts of terror. There are two important points relating to this situation, the first of which pertains to the concurrence of the incident at the Al-Hamra checkpoint in Jazan on 24 Shawwal [Hegira corresponding to 13 October 2009] and the war that the Huthist rebels waged across the southern border on 15 Dhi al-Qi'dah, as only 20 days separate the two events. The second point is the large number of **Yemeni nationals [are] involved in** the **Al-Qa'idah** organization **and** their **joining it to target Saudi Arabia's security and stability**. In fact, this points to a causal relationship between Al-Qa'idah and the Huthist rebellion. This reality places on our brothers in the Yemeni government and on all the Yemeni people a great responsibility to fight against terror and violent organizations as well as armed groups which are beyond the umbrella of the rule of law. After all, what negatively affects Saudi Arabia would also negatively affect Yemen, and vice versa. It is worthy of all the Yemeni people to renounce militant manifestations, arms, and dissociation from the Yemeni authorities and their constitutional institutions. It is now quite clear that **the greatest security threat to Saudi Arabia comes from Yemen and across the Yemeni border involving** participation by Yemeni citizens and African Janissaries recruited in Yemen in **acts of terror** in Saudi Arabia. Therefore it is first Yemen's responsibility to safeguard the border and to combat militant manifestations and terror organizations and, second, to seriously seek to extend the state's authority throughout Yemeni territories and apply the law to all shades of the speculum of Yemeni society. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has the right to take all necessary measures on its international border because infiltration across the border has become a lucrative trade for anyone without an occupation, and the threat to the security of Saudi Arabia has become a trade in the market of African mercenaries and Janissary groups stationed in Yemen's mountains.

1AC Yemen Advantage (2/3)

Failure to control Al Qaeda in Yemen kills Middle Eastern oil production and causes both Yemeni war and regional instability

Al-Arabi, Arabic newspaper, 9 (May 14, 2009, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9748748199&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9748755202&cisb=22_T9748755201&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=7>, “Yemeni president "has the right to be concerned" about Al-Qa'idah - Arabic paper”, lexis, DA: 7/15/10, JPL)

In other words, these **disturbances**, **which spread in** most of the southern cities in **recent weeks**, **might develop into** acts of violence and **armed confrontations**, **because Yemen is a jungle of weapons** and its territories are open to many seas, **while the** central **government's control over these borders is weak, if non-existent** in many areas. The **dangers of this situation will not be limited to Yemen** and its borders. Rather, **they might extend very fast to neighbouring states, namely Saudi Arabia**, **as** the **Al-Qa'idah** Organization **seeks to** use Yemen as a staging area to **reach** places **deep inside Saudi Arabia and oil industries in particular**... **There are social and political grievances and rampant corruption** in the south, in addition to the state's documented negligence of the situation there. **If these grievances remain without** measures and **radical solutions**, **they will** increase in a way that will **turn Yemen into a failed state that will create a favourable environment for** the hard-line groups, led by the **Al-Qa'idah** Organization, **to flourish**. **Turning Yemen into a failed state** or splitting it again into north and south **will** **undermine stability in the Gulf region and** the **Arab Peninsula**, **and this** situation **will expose oil supplies, production, and industries to a great danger**.

Saudi oil production is the biggest internal link to the global economy

Hinds, project manager of RBS Global Banking & Markets, 10 (Matthew, March 12, 2010, <http://lse-ideas.blogspot.com/2010/03/saudi-arabia-what-are-effects-of-global.html>, “Saudi Arabia : What are the Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Saudi Arabia’s Economic Prospects?”, LSE Ideas, DA: 7/15/10, Project Manager of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Senior Project Manager at WestLB European commercial bank, Regional Project Manager at CitiGroup, JPL)

Overall, the **lack of urgency shown by Saudi Arabia in** response to **the financial crisis is understandable**. In those dark autumn days of 2008, **when the U**nited **S**tates’ mortgage system was unraveling, when Lehman Brothers was collapsing, **when global capitalism itself was teetering on the brink, Saudi Arabia’s oil wells ignored the chaos and kept pumping**. Certainly, Saudi Arabia was adversely affected by the extreme fluctuation in oil prices during the economic downturn, from $147 a barrel on July 2008 to $38 in December 2008. But it should not be overlooked that **the Kingdom** still holds **over 20% of the world’s “proven” oil supplies**, **and** it is rumoured that **those with market knowledge estimate** that **the** likely **figure is closer to 40%,** due to oilfields that have been undeclared. **Furthermore**, with Saudi Arabia’s current oil capacity so well known, it is easy to overlook that south of Riyadh promising **new oilfields are being discovered**. These new fields have minimal lifting costs and contain “sweet crude,” high quality oil with even lower refinement costs. In the aftermath of the world financial crisis, as the hopeful promise of the Copenhagen Climate Conference fades away, **Saudi Arabian oil will become even more of a necessary entity in the** “new normal” **global economy**. **Oil will remain** one of **the bedrock**s **of** **this** earthier kind of **21st century capitalism**, **providing material for many industries**, including plastics, metals, paints and fertilizers. **Companies** like Sabic **have not even begun to scratch the surface when it comes to Saudi Arabia’s unrealized potential** in petrochemicals, **but in the future expect them to dominate**.

1AC Yemen Advantage (3/3)

Economic collapse causes extinction

Bearden, director of Association of Distinguished American Scientists, 2k, (T.E., June 12, 2000, <http://www.cheniere.org/techpapers/>, “Unnecessary Engery Crisis : How to Solve it Quickly,” The Tom Bearden Website, DA: 7/15/10, JPL)

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. **Prior to** the final **economic collapse**, the **stress** on nations **increases** the intensity and number of their **conflicts**, **to** the point **where** the arsenals of **weapons of mass destruction** (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, **are** almost **certain to be released**. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea { } launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China — whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States — attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual **treaties involved** in such scenarios **will** quickly **draw other nations into the conflict**, escalating it significantly. As the studies showed, **rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs**, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed. **The resulting** great **Armageddon will destroy civilization** as we know it, **and** perhaps most of **the biosphere**, at least for many decades.

Second is Iran.

Al Qaeda violence in Yemen will draw US into war with Iran

TENS of thousands of **refugees are fleeing a** vicious **civil war that threatens to turn** the Arab peninsula state of **Yemen into a terrorist stronghold and** to **suck the U**nited **S**tates **into another** sensitive **conflict** zone. The Yemeni government has tried to subdue a rebel Shia army in the north of the country, but its assault has met fierce resistance. The Yemeni air force has mounted a series of raids to pound the rebels into submission. **Yemen** has **accused Iran**, which is ruled by a Shia theocracy, **of backing the rebels with money and arms**, though it has produced no hard evidence. **International observers fear** that even if America, a long-term ally of Yemen, refrains from intervening in the conflict, the **violence could spill over the borders and develop into a regional war with Iran** by proxy. Saudi Arabia has given financial support to Yemen, partly out of fear of its own Shia minority and terrorist elements. A full-scale assault on the rebel stronghold in Saada province was launched last month. Since then, 25,000 refugees have registered with the United Nations refugee agency, but diplomats said as many as 100,000 people may have been displaced by the fighting. Whole villages were on the move, according to the World Food Programme (WFP), and thousands of people were caught in a pocket between the fighting and the Saudi border. About 35,000 have fled to Saada city, only to take refuge in houses that later came under constant shell fire. "**The situation is getting worse** and worse,'' said Gian Carlo Cirri, country director for the WFP. "We're not confronted with a humanitarian crisis, **it's becoming a humanitarian tragedy**.'' One analyst said that the US might be forced to intervene to prevent Yemen becoming a "failed state''. **The country has been used as an al-Qaeda base** before, and its location between the oil supply routes of the Gulf and Somalia, a haven for pirates, means the West regards its stability as vital. Joost Hiltermann, of the International Crisis Group, said: "You might well see American advisers, maybe even some special troops, go in for special operations.'' President Barack Obama sent a letter this week to President Ali Abdullah Saleh pledging to "stand beside Yemen, its unity, security and stability''. "The **security of Yemen is vital for the security of the U**nited **S**tates,'' he said.

That goes nuclear

Burleigh, Research Professor in Modern History, 7. (Michael, Jan 5, 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3635933/The-Iranian-who-wants-an-apocalypse.html>, “The Iranian Who Wants an Apocalypse,” Telegraph, DA: 7/15/10, Awarded a first class honours degree in Medieval and Modern History from University College London, winning the Pollard, Dolley and Sir William Mayer prizes. Ph.D in medieval history, was a professor at New College, Oxford, the London School of Economics, and University of Cardiff. JPL)

According to today's Spectator, **Ahmadinejad may** actually **welcome** such **an attack, since this will "justify" a retaliatory strike against** Israel **with nuclear weapons** acquired from the former Soviet Union. Certainly, Iran's dark role in **arming Hizbollah, and** even **darker machinations in Iraq, suggest a**n almost wilful **disregard for consequences**. **Ahmadinejad is unique, not because of his pronouncements about Israel, which he wishes wiped off the face of the earth, but because he actively seeks to bring about an apocalyptic struggle between the righteous and the wicked** to accelerate the return of the mahdi or Hidden Imam. ... How the West responds to these threats is an unavoidable question. It is likely that, within 12 months, Iran's technicians will complete the nuclear cycle needed to produce weapons grade uranium.

Al Qaeda Kills Saudi Stability

First is Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda operations in Yemen kills Saudi Stability

Al-Watan, Saudi national newspaper, 10, (March 26, 2010, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9748500170&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9748500173&cisb=22_T9748500172&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=2>, “Saudi editorial says biggest security threat to kingdom comes from Yemen”, lexis, DA: 7/15/10, JPL)

The detailed statement which the Interior Ministry released yesterday has shed light on important facts that were previously a matter of surmise and conjecture. These have now become established fact in the eyes of the competent Saudi authorities, which have constantly demonstrated high security competence and relied on accurate intelligence information. **The Interior Ministry** statement **emphasized** the **foreign dimension of Al-Qa'idah** organization, **which is barricaded in Yemen**… **Leniency in** fortifying **the border with Yemen enables terrorists to easily move between the two countries**. This is not to say that there is anything wrong in the relationship between the two fraternal countries or the two peoples, who are linked by bonds of kinship and religion, as much as it relates to terrorists' exploitation of the extensively long and open border and their infiltration from Yemen into Saudi Arabia and vice versa. Criminals commit crimes in Saudi Arabia and flee to Yemen while African nationals and deviants from other countries infiltrate into our country to carry out acts of terror. There are two important points relating to this situation, the first of which pertains to the concurrence of the incident at the Al-Hamra checkpoint in Jazan on 24 Shawwal [Hegira corresponding to 13 October 2009] and the war that the Huthist rebels waged across the southern border on 15 Dhi al-Qi'dah, as only 20 days separate the two events. The second point is the large number of **Yemeni nationals [are] involved in** the **Al-Qa'idah** organization **and** their **joining it to target Saudi Arabia's security and stability**. In fact, this points to a causal relationship between Al-Qa'idah and the Huthist rebellion. This reality places on our brothers in the Yemeni government and on all the Yemeni people a great responsibility to fight against terror and violent organizations as well as armed groups which are beyond the umbrella of the rule of law. After all, what negatively affects Saudi Arabia would also negatively affect Yemen, and vice versa. It is worthy of all the Yemeni people to renounce militant manifestations, arms, and dissociation from the Yemeni authorities and their constitutional institutions. It is now quite clear that **the greatest security threat to Saudi Arabia comes from Yemen and across the Yemeni border involving** participation by Yemeni citizens and African Janissaries recruited in Yemen in **acts of terror** in Saudi Arabia. Therefore it is first Yemen's responsibility to safeguard the border and to combat militant manifestations and terror organizations and, second, to seriously seek to extend the state's authority throughout Yemeni territories and apply the law to all shades of the speculum of Yemeni society. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has the right to take all necessary measures on its international border because infiltration across the border has become a lucrative trade for anyone without an occupation, and the threat to the security of Saudi Arabia has become a trade in the market of African mercenaries and Janissary groups stationed in Yemen's mountains.

Yemen Stability = Saudi Stability

If Yemen is unstable, so is Saudi Arabia, and vice versa

Al-Arabi, Arabic newspaper, 9 (May 14, 2009, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9748748199&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9748755202&cisb=22_T9748755201&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=7>, “Yemeni president "has the right to be concerned" about Al-Qa'idah - Arabic paper”, lexis, DA: 7/15/10, JPL)

**This realization was evident** in a statement made by the **Saudi foreign minister**, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, at a news conference that he held two days ago. He **said**: "**Saudi Arabia is with Yemen all the way. Stability in** the Kingdom of **Saudi Arabia complements stability in Yemen and stability in Yemen complements stability in the kingdom**."

\*\*\*Smart Power Advantage\*\*\*

1AC Smart Power Advantage (1/6)

Obama’s failure to integrate smart power is exemplified by his policy choices in Afghanistan – Counterinsurgency guts Effective use of Smart Power

Fernholz 10

(Tim writing fellow at the Prospect. His work has been published by The New Republic, The Nation, The Guardian, American Lawyer, and the Washington City Paper. He is also a Research Fellow at the New America Foundation. “The Ultimate Test Case,” *The American Prospect*, March, 2010, pg nexis//ef)

EVEN AS OBAMA PROMISED A DIFFERENT kind of foreign policy, his embrace of the "good war" laid the groundwork for Afghanistan to overtake his broader vision. During the campaign, he pledged to send 7,000 more troops to the conflict, to push for more development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ultimately to finish "the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban" with new tactics developed in Iraq to combat insurgencies. At the time, approximately 30,000 American soldiers were deployed to bases in Afghanistan, where they focused mainly on hunting terrorists and insurgents. Even though 2008 saw the largest troop deployment since the conflict began, the Taliban had regained its strength in Pakistan and began an increasingly successful campaign against the new Afghan government; development efforts existed but were constrained. On his first day in office, Obama emphasized his focus on Afghanistan by appointing veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke the first special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating a civilian counterpart for Petraeus, who was now overseeing both Iraq and Afghanistan from his post at the U.S. Central Command. After a hurried review of the situation in Afghanistan informed by Bush-era analysis, the administration quickly confirmed that it would follow through on Obama's campaign promises and also send an additional 13,000 troops. Brian Katulis, a security-policy analyst at the Center for American Progress, later derided this initial assessment as "pre-cooked" because it didn't address the fundamental question of whether the United States' investment in Afghanistan was out of proportion with its interests there. Over the next several months, insurgents in Afghanistan continued to gain ground despite the additional troops, and casualties increased (last year saw the most American casualties since the war began). In August, criticism of Afghanistan's fraud-ridden presidential election wounded the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai's corrupt and ineffective regime and raised questions about the viability of his government as a partner for the United States while political unrest continued to increase in nearby Pakistan. Also in August, the commander Obama had installed in Afghanistan that previous spring, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, finished his assessment of the war. It called for a more ambitious counterinsurgency strategy, a doctrine popularized by Petraeus in Iraq, which emphasizes protecting the population and addressing the roots of conflict--everything from material needs to political disputes. McChrystal's assessment was accompanied by a classified request for 80,000 more troops and a warning that without a new approach, defeat would be inevitable. The request was written largely by U.S.-based policy experts flown into Afghanistan for short visits, and when it was leaked to the press, those experts were ready to defend it, creating intense pressure on Obama to acquiesce. All this forced the administration to reassess every aspect of its Afghanistan strategy, giving Obama another chance to fundamentally alter the centerpiece of his foreign-policy agenda. "If the administration really wants to demonstrate that their global vision, which emphasizes all components of American power, including diplomacy and development assistance, they're going to have to make that actually achieve results in both Afghanistan and Pakistan," Katulis says. "Afghanistan and Pakistan are the ultimate test case of everything the president has been talking about when he discusses his national-security strategy as smart power." The Obama administration is finding all of its challenges in one country. Afghanistan combines the task of developing a corrupt, failed state; the scourge of extreme political Islam; the dangers of terrorism and insurgency; the threat of nuclear proliferation and destabilization in nearby Pakistan; and a delicate diplomatic portfolio as the U.S. seeks to balance power between everyone from local militias and a corrupt government to a belligerent, nuclear-weapon-seeking Iran, a shaky frenemy in Pakistan, and its rival, the emerging economic superpower of India. Seven years of neglect under the Bush administration created a problem of such complexity that immediately imposing a clear vision for Afghanistan was nearly impossible. The situation was complicated by the domestic political debate in the U.S., which quickly settled into a familiar groove: How many troops would be sent to Afghanistan or taken away? Conservatives hammered Obama for not immediately acquiescing to McChrystal's troop request, and many on the left argued it was time for the U.S. to leave this expensive distraction behind altogether. Other experts, like Gilles Dorronsoro, who were echoed by Vice President Joe Biden, advocated for a reorientation of American forces in Afghanistan without an increase in troop levels, which would buy time to demonstrate a new approach. While the military pressured Obama for a larger commitment, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry (himself the former coalition commander in Afghanistan) sent cables imploring Obama not to commit to troop increases in order to provide additional leverage over Karzai. Obama's final decision in December offered something for everyone, or tried to: The U.S. would deploy an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, fewer than McChrystal requested but still a tripling of the troop commitment to the conflict since Obama's inauguration. The strategy was virtually unchanged from what Obama had offered in the spring. The goal also remained the same: "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future." Obama's plan echoed the surge he opposed in Iraq: An escalation to protect civilians in population centers and train Afghan security forces that will, in theory, reverse the momentum of the insurgents and even co-opt those who are willing to lay down their arms. Along with aid from a "civilian surge" of U.S. officials and contractors with expertise in engineering, agriculture, justice, and local politics, the hope is that this will give the Afghan government time to recover from corruption and incompetence (the euphemism is "capacity building"). The one new development was a timeline: In July of 2011, the U.S. will start handing over responsibilities to the Afghans so that coalition forces can begin to withdraw. The president insisted on this timeline, and it remains the single most

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progressive aspect of the plan--a recognition that, in the greater scheme of things, the U.S. has better things to do for its national security than muck about in Afghanistan. "Any American president has to think about the political sustainability of his policies, and an American president that launches into policies that he can't sustain politically isn't doing his job," Hurlburt says. "That's true of Obama, that's true of Bush, it's true of everybody. You look at some of the things that Bush started and couldn't sustain--that's the worst of all possible worlds." OBAMA'S TINKERING AROUND THE EDGES--the timeline, the counterinsurgency strategy, the emphasis on development, the whole-of-government approach--marks a real departure from the previous administration's efforts. His rhetoric still holds the promise of the overhaul he campaigned on. But the president's failure to fundamentally reorient the Afghan conflict has broad ramifications for his promised foreign-policy reforms. Perhaps the most significant loss is the big picture. Nearly 100,000 troops are committed to pursuing Obama's "narrow goal" of defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But is this extensive involvement in an Afghan civil war the best way to fight al-Qaeda and like-minded groups? After all, one of al-Qaeda leaders' stated goals is drawing the United States into expensive and intractable long-term conflicts. Even as we're leaving Iraq, doubling-down on Afghanistan plays into their hands. "We did not ask for this fight," the president said in a major speech on Afghanistan in December. "On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people." It was an explanation straight out of the Bush era. Much of the 9-11 operation was carried out not in Afghanistan or Pakistan (or Iraq, for that matter) but in places like Germany and Florida. And terrorism experts warn that officials should not take for granted that al-Qaeda could re-establish a safe haven in Afghanistan, or that such safe havens are threats to the United States. The administration admits that fewer than 100 al-Qaeda terrorists remain in Afghanistan--and that many insurgents aren't ideological opponents of the United States. Some are petty criminals, some are simply armed local groups tired of being pushed around by the central government, and others fight merely for pay. (The U.S. was embarrassed to find out in December that the Taliban paid its fighters more than the Afghan National Army paid its soldiers.) Many of these insurgents are angry at the U.S. simply because we're there. "The importance of a people not wanting to be occupied cannot be underestimated," says Matthew Hoh, a former Foreign Service officer who was the first person to resign a government post in protest of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. "National will or ethnic will cannot be downplayed or misunderstood or denied." Meanwhile, the transnational terrorists we're supposedly fighting don't need bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan to attack us. Officials concede that safe havens in other failed or failing states must be pressed as well. Just weeks after Obama announced his strategy, a Nigerian man obtained explosives from an al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen--which, along with places like Pakistan, Algeria, and Somalia, provides a "safe haven" for the group--and attempted to destroy an international flight as it landed in Detroit. U.S. intelligence agencies, despite having some relevant information, didn't act in time to prevent the bomber from getting on the flight. Perhaps the billions of dollars dedicated to the new troops in Afghanistan would be better served fixing structural failures in intelligence-gathering. Instead, we're seeing the considerable militarization of intelligence-gathering. After a suicide bomber killed seven Central Intelligence Agency employees in Afghanistan, CIA Director Leon Panetta wrote that "like our military, CIA officers are on the front lines against al-Qaeda and its violent allies." The officers were stationed there to manage a drone program that hunts terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. While fighting terrorists requires both intelligence-gathering and the kind of targeted strikes the CIA performs, there is a clear imbalance when a camp in Afghanistan has dozens of CIA employees but the National Counterterrorism Center has only eight or nine Middle East analysts. The focus on troops has also hampered Obama's goal of placing equal emphasis on civilian and military aspects of our foreign policy. The military, which has increasingly become America's primary presence abroad, is resisting the attempt to narrow the focus of the war. Despite the White House's goal of training just over 200,000 Afghan soldiers and police, Pentagon officials plan to train 400,000. And Holbrooke, intended to be the civilian counterpart to Petraeus, has seen his influence diminish commensurate with his lack of resources. Though his office is still an important center of coordination, he plays a smaller-than-expected role in the White House-driven decision-making process. Obama's foreign-policy vision professed a need to address the root causes of conflict by building up local infrastructure and actively fostering better lives for people in places like Afghanistan. Despite a consensus--which even includes Defense Secretary Robert Gates--that civilian development, medical access, and agricultural expertise are critical to counterinsurgency, the administration's budget request in March reflected a heavy emphasis on defense over development. Ambassador Eikenberry protested in a cable to Washington, asking for an additional $2.5 billion--60 percent more than he had been given. The military was receiving $68 billion. Even if civilian efforts were given more resources, overhauling the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to make them more effective remains a challenge--despite the fact that the State Department created a position to do just that. Although the administration expects to have 974 civilians on the ground by early 2010, beating a goal it set in March, this is a drop in the bucket: Afghanistan has a population of 28 million. Reports show a deep frustration from U.S. officials working on development projects, because they are almost entirely dependent on the military. Indeed, despite the growing acceptance of the need for civilian expertise, the military often finds itself trying to do the work of civilian agencies that aren't set up to operate in a war zone. "We're in a 'build the airplane while you're flying it' kind of situation," Hurlburt says. "If the effort to produce a better, much more energetic and smartly focused civilian effort in Afghanistan succeeds, it will become the template for broader reform of the institutions." That template could be useful, Hurlburt adds, or it could be detrimental, since the lessons U.S. development officers learn in Afghanistan may not apply so well to countries that need U.S. help but aren't in the middle of a war. This narrow focus on the military conflict also distracts from Pakistan, Afghanistan's nuclear neighbor, where an unstable government and the proliferation of extreme Islamist groups are of much more interest to the United States. "I am not sure what 40,000 additional

1AC Smart Power Advantage (3/6)

troops in Afghanistan can do about the greater global security threat, instability in Pakistan," Katulis told me last fall. "You have nearly daily--and sometimes twice-a-day--attacks targeted inside of Pakistan, which is five times more populous and has nuclear weapons." Just consider the numbers: Obama is spending $1.5 billion a year on aid to Pakistan and over $68 billion fighting a war in Afghanistan. With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visiting Pakistan, the administration has had some success in navigating the nation's complex politics. Clinton is trying to broaden the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from working with the government on national-security issues toward a holistic engagement with the entire country. It's exactly the kind of approach that Obama promised, but it is undermined by the use of drone strikes on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which have increased anti-American sentiment. The Obama team has set aside the Bush administration's end goal of installing a democracy and instead made a limited version of that aim the means to their central end: Everything comes down to eliminating the terrorist presence in Afghanistan. Vikram Singh, Holbrooke's defense adviser, says the region is the "epicenter" of al-Qaeda's action, which is why the administration has made preventing the group's re-establishment there a more pressing goal than dealing with al-Qaeda globally. With even John Kerry, now the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, using the distinctly Bush-administration phrase "global counterinsurgency" in his speeches on Afghanistan, progressive attempts to change the way we think about terrorism threats have taken a step back.

And, Afghanistan is the litmus test for a smart power strategy – failure there collapses the rest of Obama’s Foreign Policy Agenda

Fernholz 10

(Tim writing fellow at the Prospect. His work has been published by The New Republic, The Nation, The Guardian, American Lawyer, and the Washington City Paper. He is also a Research Fellow at the New America Foundation. “The Ultimate Test Case,” *The American Prospect*, March, 2010, pg nexis//ef)

THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE settled into the Washington consensus that he criticized as an up-and-coming senator. His Afghanistan strategy buys into the idea that American troops can defeat tenacious insurgencies, that our officials have the ability to build even the most basic state from the ground up, and that terrorists represent a monolithic enemy around the world. The cocky senator of last spring has been replaced by a cautious and tightly controlled president. There was a time when Obama could flout conventional wisdom, but now he must accommodate it. It's true that Obama did not start this war, did not under-resource it for eight years, and did not fail to pursue Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora. The credit for those dubious achievements goes to George W. Bush. But the new president has missed opportunities to shift how our government approaches these problems. Many of the campaign aides who helped craft Obama's forward-thinking foreign-policy vision remain in his inner circle, but are superseded by a group of veteran officials (Clinton, Gates, Petraeus, Holbrooke, National Security Adviser James Jones) whose commitment to new ideas varies. It remains to be seen how much they--and the responsibilities of being president--have shifted Obama's personal foreign-policy vision. The stakes are high in Afghanistan not only on the merits but because success buys him the credibility to advance other foreign-policy initiatives that don't tend to go over well with domestic audiences: closing Guantanamo Bay, engaging Iran, pressuring Israel toward peace, reaching out to the Muslim community, and reducing nuclear weapons in America and the world. Even given the daunting odds, it is still possible that a new mode of foreign policy--one that is executed by civilians and soldiers equally--could spring from the crucible of Afghanistan. The other scenario, though, is that using the military in Afghanistan as the central means of fighting terrorism leaves reform of law enforcement and intelligence out in the cold, hinders the transformation of the civilian agencies, and prevents Obama from spending resources on other projects. A failure in Afghanistan is a failure to change the way this country approaches foreign policy. Worse, if the next two years don't show an Afghan government that can handle basic governing and security, then all of Obama's ideas will be wrapped in that failure, hindering his ability to execute any of his other initiatives. "We're not getting at the root issues," says Hoh, the former Foreign Service officer. "We don't like to admit that, in the case of Afghanistan, maybe our *presence* is making the situation worse. That maybe these people are fighting because they don't want to be occupied.... Remember the film Red Dawn? All of us, we talked about it a lot, all of us always thought we'd be on the other side of Red Dawn--we didn't think we'd be the ones with the attack helicopters.... So it's a very humbling experience to realize, you know, we're the occupying power."

1AC Smart Power Advantage (4/6)

And, Integrating a Smart Power Strategy is Essential To U.S.-China Relations and Cooperation – that Solves EVERY Scenario for Extinction

Cohen and Greenberg 2k9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” pg online @ <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf> //ef)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holder—by far—of U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge

1AC Smart Power Advantage (5/6)

from global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-China cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly dilferent histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trust and respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both\_\_\_\_It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .°5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

1AC Smart Power Advantage (6/6)

Integrating Smart Power into our Strategy is Necessary to Solve U.S.-China Relations and Prevent Multiple Scenarios for Our Destruction

Cohen and Greenberg 2k9(William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” pg online @ <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf> //ef)

U.S.-Chinese ties could have a greater impact on international affairs than any other relationship. Solving the world's most serious issues—including global financial instability, proliferation and terrorism, climate change, and energy insecurity—is difficult to envision without joint action by Beijing and Washington. In today's globalized world, transnational challenges require transnational solutions, especially by the most important states. U.S.-China partnership is| indispensable for addressing many of the main challenges of the twenty-first century. One barrier to closer ties between China and the United States is "strategic mistrust" between their leaders. Neither government at the present time aims to harm the other, but tensions invariably arise when any powerful states—especially these two with their vastly different histories, cultures, and political systems—pursue policies that seek primarily to enhance their own security ^\_ To reduce mutual tensions, Chinese and U.S. leaders must adopt a broader conception of their nation's interests, one that includes advancing the global good as a joint means to realizing their country's own national aims. China and the United States can almost always achieve their diverse economic, security, and other objectives more effectively through cooperative use of their smart-power resources—including diplomatic, economic, military, political, and cultural tools—rather than through unilateral action. \_ To foster a more cooperative relationship, Chinese and U.S. leaders must treat the other country with respect. Disagreements between China and the United States are unavoidable, but these should be handled diplomatically and privately. Public diplomacy should aim to enlighten the citizens of both countries about the importance of their mutual ties. The Commission offers illustrative recommendations based on the premise that the two countries can best realize their mutual interest through promotion of the global good. The proposals seek to help construct a new strategic framework for a cooperative U.S.-China relationship, anchored in the concept of smart power and employing clear, measurable, and enforceable goals.

U.S.-China Relations – Brink

More than half of China's citizens questioned in a poll believe that the US and China are headed for a new Cold War. Relations between the nations have soured so much over the last few months that some are wondering whether we are already seeing one. In January, China announced plans to financially punish US firms involved in arms sales to Taiwan, claiming that the trade damaged its national security. A subsequent meeting between the president and the Dalai Llama did nothing to ease matters, and this after a much-publicised disagremeent between the two nations over climate change – with the US declaring itself unwilling to subsidise cuts in Chinese emissions and the Chinese declaring themselves unwilling to cut emissions at all. Despite Barack Obama's attempts to improve co-operation between the two countries, it looks like relations between the East and West are headed in precisely the opposite direction.

\*\*\*Heg Advantage\*\*\*

1AC Heg Advantage (1/)

COIN strategy kills U.S. heg

Kretkowski, member of BEA, Industry of International Affairs, 10, (Paul, January 7, 2010, <http://softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com/2010/01/against-coin-for-ct-in-afghanistan-and.html>, “Against COIN, For CT in Afghanistan,” Soft Power Beacon, DA: 7/16/10, JPL)

What I've taken from that reading is that the U.S. must pull back from its current efforts to remake Iraq and Afghanistan in the image of a Western democracy, or risk long-term political and economic exhaustion. What follows is not an argument about morality, and readers may find much of it amoral. It is about making cold-blooded political and economic calculations about where U.S. national interests will lie in the next decade. They do not lie in an open-ended COIN mission. The history of the Peloponnesian War is particularly relevant here. Athens began fighting Sparta with the resources of an empire and thousands of talents of silver in the bank—enough to fight expensive, far-flung naval and land campaigns for three years without lasting financial consequences. Athens was rich, and if peace with Sparta had come by the end of the third year, Athens would have continued to prosper and rule over much of the Mediterranean. (Athens had a "hard"—conquered or cowed—empire as opposed to the "soft" empire of alliances and treaties the U.S. currently has.) But the war with Sparta dragged on for decades, despite occasional peace overtures by both sides. By war's end—despite the spoils of battle and increased taxes and tribute extracted from its shrinking dominion—Athens was broke, depopulated by fighting and plague, bereft of its empire, and could no longer project power into the Mediterranean. Where its former interests ranged from Black Sea Turkey to southern Italy, it spent decades as a small-bore power and never regained its former strength or influence. I worry that the U.S. is similarly locked into an open-ended commitment to democratize a nation that is of regional rather than global importance—a parallel to Athens convincing itself that it had to conquer distant, militarily insignificant Sicily.

\*\*\*Democracy Advantage\*\*\*

1AC Democracy Advantage (1/)

Success in Afghanistan is essential to future democracy promotion – inhumanity caused by lack of democracy presents a moral obligation to solve

Whitty, Master of International Law from Columbia University, and Nixon, professor of International Relations at Oxford University, 9, (Brendan and Hamish, October 5, 2009, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/10/the-impact-of-counterterrorism-objectives-on-democratization-and-statebuilding.html>, “The Impact Of Counter-Terrorism Objectives On Democratization And Statebuilding In Afghanistan,” Human Security Report Project, DA: 7/19/10, JPL)

Afghanistan since 2001 has experienced neither a transition from war to peace, nor from destruction to development, nor yet from authoritarianism to an Islamic democracy. The human costs of this failure, perhaps partly unavoidable given the challenges facing the country and its partners eight years ago, present a continued moral and political challenge to the international community. Democratic development is only one of several dimensions of this challenge. In assessing the influence of external factors on the political development of the country, as in many post-conflict or conflict environments, it is crucial to remember that the promotion of democracy is one of a range of other objectives. In particular, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Afghanistan took place against the backdrop of the “Global War on Terror,” launched in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. It therefore represents either a pivotal moment in the history of post-conflict democracy promotion or an experiment shaped by unique international factors which can be distinguished from earlier examples and which should be avoided **in the future**.

AT: Afghanistan is Democracy

Afghanistan elections did not follow guidelines of an actual democracy, and there is extreme doubt that the country will continue to hold elections

Whitty, Master of International Law from Columbia University, and Nixon, professor of International Relations at Oxford University, 9, (Brendan and Hamish, October 5, 2009, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/10/the-impact-of-counterterrorism-objectives-on-democratization-and-statebuilding.html>, “The Impact Of Counter-Terrorism Objectives On Democratization And Statebuilding In Afghanistan,” Human Security Report Project, DA: 7/19/10, RP)

In sum, while the 2004 and 2005 elections represented an achievement, the legal order and practical realities under which they were conducted limited the scope for democratic competition to become institutionalized. Not only were there limitations on the ability of party groupings to articulate platforms in the face of the stronger preexisting organizations and ethnic networks, but also the legal responsibilities of the bodies to be elected were still unclear and poorly understood. Furthermore, there are serious and enduring doubts about the preparations in terms of registration, administrative capacity, and the security environment for the next elections scheduled in 2009 and 2010, and concerning the sustainability of the system as a whole.

\*\*\*Add-Ons\*\*\*

Terrorism Add-On

COIN strategy increases the capability of terrorists

Sheridan, foreign editor of The Australian, 10, (Greg, June 24, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9727077065&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9727077068&cisb=22_T9727077067&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=244777&docNo=5>, “Ties That Bind and Confound,” lexis, DA: 7/12/10, JPL)

**According to** a new report by **Matt** **Waldman**, published by the London School of Economics, **the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of the Pakistani military is** intimately involved in **supporting the** Afghan **Taliban**. Waldman asserts **the ISI is even represented on the Taliban's central leadership council**, the so-called Quetta Shura. This is in great distinction to the fight the Pakistanis are having with the Pakistan Taliban. Despite the connections of the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban, the ISI makes an easy distinction between them. Waldman goes further than other analysts in his estimate of ISI intimacy with the Afghan Taliban, but the basic point, of some continuing **ISI complicity with the Taliban, is not contested by any serious analyst**. Indeed, **Australian governments and** senior **military figures have** often **raised it with the Pakistanis**. Thus, **we are providing military training to an institution that**, in part, **contributes to the killing of** Australian **soldiers**. **This is just a part of the infinite and unavoidable** moral **complexity** **of** the long war against terror, and modern **counter-insurgency**.

- Matt Waldman is a Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights and professor at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard.

Terrorism causes extinction

Boyle, professor of international law at Illinois University of Law, 9 (Francis, August 20, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/08/20_boyle_criminality_deterrence.php>, “The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

**The human race stands on the verge of nuclear self-extinction** as a species, **and with it will die** most, if not **all**, forms of intelligent **life on** the planet **earth**. Any attempt to dispel the ideology of nuclearism and its attendant myth propounding the legality of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence must directly come to grips with the fact that the nuclear age was conceived in the original sins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki constituted crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined by the Nuremberg Charter of August 8, 1945, and violated several basic provisions of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. 4 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), the rules of customary international law set forth in the Draft Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923), and the United States War Department Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (1940). According to this Field Manual and the Nuremberg Principles, all civilian government officials and military officers who ordered or knowingly participated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could have been lawfully punished as war criminals. The start of any progress toward resolving humankind's nuclear predicament must come from the realization that **nuclear weapons have never been** legitimate **instruments of state policy**, **but** rather have always **constitute**d **illegitimate instrumentalities of internationally lawless and criminal behavior**. To the contrary, **the** entire **human race has been victimized by** an international conspiracy of ongoing **criminal activity carried out by** the nuclear weapons states under the doctrine known as "nuclear deterrence," which is really a euphemism for "**nuclear terrorism**." This international criminal conspiracy of nuclear deterrence/terrorism currently practiced by the nuclear weapons states is no different from any other conspiracy by a criminal gang or band. They are the outlaws. So it is up to the rest of the international community to repress and dissolve this international criminal conspiracy as soon as possible.

Terrorists Can Get Nukes

Terrorists can easily obtain nuclear weapons

National Terror Alert, 4/18 (April 18, 2010, <http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2010/04/18/threat-of-terrorists-obtaining-nuclear-weapons-a-reality/>, “Threat of Terrorists Obtaining Nuclear Materials is a Reality,” National Terror Alert, DA: 7/14/10, JPL)

The United States again reasserted itself as the world’s police last week, leading the way to secure thousands of pounds of fissile materials that could be used to build nuclear weapons such as dirty bombs. Countries around the world have agreed to identify, secure and covert this material before it falls into the hands of criminal gangs that would gladly sell to the highest bidder. Point #1 – **Do not underestimate** the sophistication of **a terrorist group**. **We’ve** routinely **done that as a nation**, **and** the **consequences were** **deadly** on 9/11. **Al Qaeda could** certainly **have the right people** on the “payroll” – **scientists, engineers, technical experts** – infused with the radical Islamist ideology and **ready to help the cause**. Point #2 – **Do not underestimate** the **finances of terrorist groups**. **Many are engaged narcotrafficking, where millions of dollars trade hands daily**. Point #3 - Despite the best detection efforts at airports and in major cities, **highly enriched uranium could easily be transported and smuggled**. **Expert Graham Allison** (author of “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe) **says it takes only** about **35 pounds** (roughly **the size of a grapefruit**) **of** highly enriched **uranium to make a nuclear bomb**. **This** amount of material **is easily transportable and could be smuggled along** established **trafficking routes** by highly paid “mules”. Point #4 - **On** the subject of **dirty bombs** – **the materials needed**, like medical isotopes **might be** pretty **easily obtained**, and it is true they alone would not yield much radiation. The main issue with a dirty bomb would be the blast itself…unless the some relatively high-grade uranium was employed. Then **a dirty bomb would not only have immediate**, **but long lasting radiation effects** at the point of detonation.