# NEG Korea 7-20-10

[NEG Korea 7-20-10 1](#_Toc267528095)

[AT ADV Miscalculation 2](#_Toc267528096)

[AT ADV Tripwire 4](#_Toc267528097)

[AT ADV Democracy 5](#_Toc267528098)

[AT ADV Six Party Talks 6](#_Toc267528099)

[AT ADV Reunification 8](#_Toc267528100)

[AT ADV US-South Korean (ROK) alliance good 1NC 9](#_Toc267528101)

[AT ADV US-South Korean (ROK) alliance good - Uniqueness 10](#_Toc267528102)

[AT ADV US-South Korean alliance good – turns 11](#_Toc267528103)

[AT ADV US-South Korean (ROK) alliance good – no internal link extensions 13](#_Toc267528104)

[AT ADV Anti Americanism 16](#_Toc267528105)

[AT ADV Trilateralism – US-ROK-China 17](#_Toc267528106)

[AT Solvency 18](#_Toc267528107)

[AT South Korea is prepared to take control of forces 20](#_Toc267528108)

[AT North Korean collapse inevitable 21](#_Toc267528109)

[DA Deterrence – Uniqueness 22](#_Toc267528110)

[DA Deterrence - Links 23](#_Toc267528111)

[DA Deterrence – Impacts 24](#_Toc267528112)

[DA Prolif - links 25](#_Toc267528113)

[DA Politics - links 27](#_Toc267528114)

[DA Troop Shift - links 28](#_Toc267528115)

[DA South Korean Politics – KFTA good – 1NC 29](#_Toc267528116)

[DA South Korean Politics – Uniqueness 32](#_Toc267528117)

[DA South Korean Politics – links – plan popular 33](#_Toc267528118)

[DA South Korean politics – links - plan controversial 37](#_Toc267528119)

[DA South Korean Politics – Impact scenario - economy 38](#_Toc267528120)

[DA South Korean Politics – Impact scenario uniqueness – KFTA won’t pass 39](#_Toc267528121)

[DA South Korean Politics – Impact scenario uniqueness – KFTA will pass 40](#_Toc267528122)

[DA ADMM - Uniqueness 41](#_Toc267528123)

[DA ADMM - Impacts 42](#_Toc267528124)

[CP Humanitarian propaganda 1NC 44](#_Toc267528125)

[CP Humanitarian Propaganda – Solvency extensions 45](#_Toc267528126)

[CP First Strike North Korea 46](#_Toc267528127)

[K Threat Construction - Links 47](#_Toc267528128)

[K generic links 49](#_Toc267528129)

AT ADV Miscalculation

**Despite tensions risk of war is low.**

**MacLeod 10** (Calum, June 1, USA Today, p. 1A, “World of troubles for U.S. // Obama returns to the White House facing crises on three fronts; A sunken ship, and talk of war”, lexis, twm)

Recent polls indicate people are thinking harder more about the North. A poll by Gallup Korea published in The Chosun Ilbo said 60% of respondents supported sanctions against the North. In Washington, analysts say that the current situation escalating into an all-out war is unlikely, but the situation remains tense and could become more dangerous. "The chances of it escalating into a full-scale war are still fairly low, though we're at a level of tension we haven't seen in decades," says Abraham Denmark, an Asia-Pacific expert at the Center for a New American Security.

South Korea fears North Korea and removal of troops increases fear

Kim **Asian Affairs writer 20**10 (Jinwung Kim 7/19/10 “Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States Forces Korea” JSTOR DA: 719/10) RY

**The most important factor to influence South Korean views of the USFK has been the presence of hostile North Korea beyond the DMZ.** North Korea constitutes a threat to South Korea's survival. Pyongyang's provocation of the Korean War and its continued threat to invade the south have justified the U.S. military presence and made the American withdrawal a taboo subject, a policy that existed even before the Korean War. On 13 October 1948, immediately after the ROK was established, a quarter of the members of the ROK National Assembly introduced a resolution calling on the United States to remove its troops from Korea. But the public mood in South Korea shifted after the outbreak of the Yosu-Sunch'on Rebellion. On 19 October 1948, two thousand troops of the Fourteenth Regiment of the South Korean Army, instigated by the Communists, rebelled at the port city of Yosu as they were about to embark for Cheju-do to suppress the uprising on the island. The troops seized control of the city and the nearby rail junction at Sunch'on. The rebellion finally ended on 26 October, but it unsettled the South Korean public, undermined confidence in their security forces, and increased the likelihood of an overt North Korean military assault across the 38th parallel. A tremendous wave of anxiety swept the country. Many of the same politicians who had sponsored the resolution demanding that American troops leave now clamored for temporary halting of the withdrawal.

**Risk of war is very low – it’s empirically proven for the past 57 years. There have been issues that were more provocative than the recent warship sinking and none of those escalated.**

**Pittsburgh Post 10** (WARREN P. STROBEL AND JONATHAN S. LANDAY, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, May 26, “KOREA WAR UNLIKELY, EXPERTS SAY; TENSIONS ARE LIKELY TO RISE, BUT CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED FOLLOWING PAST PROVOCATIONS”, lexis, twm)

North Korea's decision Tuesday to sever all ties with South Korea and threaten military action in disputed waters following the torpedoing of a South Korean warship confronts President Barack Obama with another international crisis that his administration doesn't want or need. Although the isolated, communist North's behavior is notoriously unpredictable and sometimes seems irrational, all-out war between it and the democratic, capitalist South still seems unlikely, analysts said, given the stakes. Nevertheless, tensions on the Korean peninsula, where some 28,500 U.S. troops provide a tripwire for U.S. military intervention if the North attacks, are likely to rise in coming days. North Korea would likely lose any conflict with the South, but not before inflicting massive damage on South Korea's capital, Seoul, a 30-minute drive south of the demilitarized zone that has divided the two Koreas since 1953. U.S. intelligence officials estimate that some 11,000 North Korean artillery pieces are in sheltered positions within range of Seoul and probably could destroy much of the city before they could be knocked out. "The tensions certainly have increased," but there is no sign that North Korea is mobilizing its 1.2 million-strong military, said a U.S. defense official, who requested anonymity to speak more freely. "They have masses [of troops] down on the DMZ [demilitarized zone], but they do a normal shift or rotation," he said. South Korean officials said they were bracing for fresh provocations from the North, especially at sea. On Monday, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak blamed North Korea for the March 26 sinking of the corvette Cheonan, which killed 46 of its crew, and said he was curbing trade with North Korea and banning its ships from transiting South Korean waters. "That could get sort of ugly if [North Korean vessels] don't stop, and chances are they won't," said Art Brown, formerly the top U.S. intelligence analyst for East Asia. "It's unlikely they will do nothing. I tend to think they're not going to try Korean War, version two." Still, Mr. Brown and other former top U.S. officials said serious clashes between the Koreas during the past 57 years haven't led to warfare -- and sometimes have provided opportunities for rapprochement. "It's not inevitable that it will escalate," said Mitchell Reiss, who negotiated with North Korea during the Clinton administration. Mr. Reiss said no war erupted after earlier North Korean acts that were more provocative than the Cheonan sinking was. Those included a 1983 bombing linked to North Korea that killed South Korean Cabinet members visiting Burma and a 1968 commando raid on the South Korean presidential residence, the Blue House.

Risk of North Korean attack is low.

NYT 08 (3-11-08, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/washington/11military.html>, da: July 18 2010, MLSF)

The commander of American forces in South Korea is urging the Pentagon to allow thousands of troops stationed there to have spouses and children live with them during tours of duty.

The proposal by the commander, Gen. B. B. Bell, is a recognition that the military must do more to improve the quality of life for troops and their families. It would reverse decades of policy for South Korea, recognizing that an attack from the North has become unlikely given the enduring American presence as a deterrent and the growth in size and sophistication of the South Korean armed forces. In any case, American troops have been shifted away from the front lines.

AT ADV Tripwire

US Troop reductions could destabilize the entire region.

Kelly 04 Jack Kelly is a Republican Councilman-at-Large on the City Council of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Jack July 18 2010 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040608-rok-troop-plans.htm> MLSF)

But retired Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, a former head of the National Security Agency, thinks the troop withdrawal "could set in motion the deterioration of the U.S. military position on the Korean peninsula, which could lead to destabilization of the entire region." The presence of U.S. troops not only keeps the North Koreans from attacking, it also permits the Japanese to keep their military small, which South Koreans -- who have bitter memories from World War II -- desire almost as much as to prevent a repeat of the Korean War, Odom said. "The U.S. troop presence not only deters the North, it keeps cordial relations between South Korea and Japan," said Odom, now director of national security studies for the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. "If there is anything that would cause Japan to increase its military capabilities, it would be no U.S. troops in Korea." John Pike, head of GlobalSecurity.Org, another Washington think tank, said he's puzzled by the Bush administration's Korea policy. The troop withdrawal "either suggests that there is a diminishing probability of war, or that they're just going to get American forces out of harm's way, to make it easier to blow up North Korea without getting a lot of Americans killed in the process,"he said. "In an ideal world, you wouldn't want to be [withdrawing troops]," said Frank Gaffney, director of the Center for Security Policy. "You'd want to move them around on the peninsula, but you wouldn't take them out. But the reality is, we don't live in an ideal world. We've gotten too small. What do you do when you've got too few forces in your force structure? The administration is betting that North Korea will stay calm. It's a bet I'd just as soon not take."

South Korea can’t afford to modernize their military.

Kyodo News International 10 (“SCOPE: U.S. troop cutback in S. Korea may change E. Asian security situation.” DA 7/19/10 <a href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SCOPE%3A+U.S.+troop+cutback+in+S.+Korea+may+change+E.+Asian+security...-a0118113726">SCOPE: U.S. troop cutback in S. Korea may change E. Asian security situation.</a>, AV)

At that time, the Roh administration was in trouble because of his supporters' minority in parliament. Its anti-U.S. stance was also under fire from the opposition camp,'' a government source said. The confidential U.S. proposal surfaced on May 17 this year when the United States told South Korea that it will transfer some troops to Iraq, giving rise to speculation that the anti-U.S. stance of Roh, who once proposed a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, led to the U.S. troop cut plan. Roh denied intentional concealment of the U.S. proposal, saying, ''Independent defense and the alliance (with Washington) are not contradictory but are to be mutually supplemented.'' But it is not clear how the government will secure financial resources for independent defense. There are many young members taking a firm stance against the United States in Roh's Uri Party, which swept to power in a general election in April, according to party sources. Meanwhile, a Japanese government official said, ''The U.S. troops stationed in South Korea are those mainly belonging to the Army, a type of military deployment during the Cold War, but those stationed in Japan are chiefly Navy and Air Force personnel, a type of deployment in the 'post-Cold War' era.'' ''There will be no major impact from the U.S. global military transformation,'' said the official. But a Foreign Ministry source said the troop cut in Germany and the stronger military presence in Turkey show the U.S. military's stance of giving priority to the Middle East and Central Asia.

AT ADV Democracy

1. South Korea is a strong democracy now.

**The Washington Post 10** (Fred Hiatt, April 12, “Korea's hand, extended and waiting”, lexis, p. A17, twm)

In a world of dangerously failed states and willful challengers to American leadership, South Korea is an astoundingly successful democracy that wants to be friends. But will America say yes? That seemed to be the question perplexing President Lee Myung-bak when I interviewed him here last Wednesday, though he described relations at the moment as excellent. (Excerpts from our conversation are available here at http://washingtonpost.com/opinions.) The two nations have signed a free-trade agreement that Lee believes would -- in addition to bringing obvious economic benefit to both sides -- seal a crucial alliance and promote stability throughout Northeast Asia. But President Obama has yet to submit the agreement to Congress for ratification or say when he might do so. Given the neighborhood, you would think the United States would jump at the opportunity. To Korea's east, Japan's rookie ruling party is driving the Obama administration to distraction as Japan tries to figure out, so far without success, whether to distance itself from the United States. In North Korea, an isolated regime is "facing a transformative moment right now," Lee told me. Recently it "failed dismally in its effort to reform its currency; the state of the North Korean economy is worsening by the day." For the first time, he said, leaders have felt the need to explain themselves to their people. A reminder of the flashpoint the border remains came March 26, when a South Korean corvette sank while cruising near North Korean waters, with 46 sailors lost from its crew of 104. While the incident is being investigated, Lee refused to speculate on its cause, but he told me, "I'm very committed to responding in a firm manner if need be." And then there is what Lee called "the China factor." South Korea now trades more with China than with the United States and Japan combined, he said. Korea values its relationship with China highly, and it is "just a matter of time" before Korea and China open negotiations on a free-trade agreement (FTA) of their own. But, the president said, he is "concerned about the growing dependence of not only Korea but other countries in the region toward China." His desire for an American counterweight is shared by leaders throughout East and Southeast Asia, but few will say so as candidly. "For us, the FTA is not just simply a trade agreement or an economic agreement," he said. "It really is much more than that." Obama has expressed general support for increasing trade with South Korea but hasn't committed to the pact that he and Lee inherited from their predecessors. Every analysis shows it would benefit most American consumers and industries, but it faces opposition from Ford Motor, some union leaders and some Democrats in Congress. "When you look at the FTA from a bits-and-parts point of view, of course there will be opposition," Lee said. "We have certain members of our industry, certain members of our national parliament, who are vehemently opposed." "But you really have to look at the whole, entire FTA," he said, "and if it comes out as a plus, then it's the responsibility, I believe, of each country to really go ahead and try to push this through." He added that "it will all hinge upon" how committed the Obama administration is to winning ratification. "If they are, they are going to do all that they can to convince fellow Democrats to get on board," he said. Lee hoisted himself from an impoverished childhood to become a construction tycoon. (As a businessman two decades ago, he oversaw the renovation of the presidential mansion he moved into two years ago; he now regrets the imposing but energy-inefficient high ceilings, aides told me.) Along the way he earned the sobriquet "Bulldozer"; he is slender and soft-spoken but straightforward. If anything, though, Lee is too restrained, too polite, to point out how short-sighted the United States would be to slight Korea. With U.S. protection and support, South Korea has transformed itself from a Third World military dictatorship to a prosperous democracy that wants to cooperate with the United States in Haiti, Afghanistan and beyond. Would the United States really allow narrow-interest politics to limit such an opportunity? Lee told me he is confident that the United States, with its "entrepreneur spirit" and pioneering science, will bounce back from recession (as Korea, with 3.6 percent unemployment, already has). But he worries, he said, that in the process the United States may waver from its commitment to free trade. "And it must remain a beacon of free trade to be able to lead other countries around the world in other aspects as well," he said. "The benefits reaped from protectionism are very short-term, but the leadership role that you have, the status and prestige of the U.S., in that regard, are timeless."

2. Your internal link evidence is terrible – it’s from a North Korean government press release. Essentially, your evidence is from the totalitarian North Korean regime accusing South Korea of not being democratic.

**South Korea is a strong democracy.**

**Sydney Morning Herald** (Australia) **‘10** (HAMISH McDONALD, January 23, “Truth in danger in South Korea”, p. 11, lexis, twm)

One of the most impressive things to happen in Asia in the past 20 years has been the emergence of South Korea as a vigorous democracy with a competitive, high-tech economy and a sophisticated urban society. Considering what the Koreans endured last century, that's a miracle of human resilience. They were occupied by the Japanese and subjected to a brutal system of assimilation designed to erase their nationality, conscripted into Japan's wars as soldiers and comfort women, divided and occupied by the Allied powers, trampled over and massacred in one of history's most vicious wars, then ruled by harsh dictatorships, one of which survives in the North.

AT ADV Six Party Talks

No six party talks even after U.S. withdrawal – sunken South Korean ship prevents

BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 10 (“South Korea says nuclear talks not possible if North linked to ship sinking”, 4/20/10, Accessed through LexisNexis, DA: 7/19/10, ETC)

SEOUL, April 20 (Yonhap) - The resumption of multilateral denuclearization talks on North Korea will face a setback if the communist nation is found to have been involved in the recent sinking of a South Korean warship, South Korea's Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan [Yu Myo'ng-hwan] said Tuesday. "I believe the resumption of the six-party talks will not be possible for some time if we find evidence that clearly shows North Korea's involvement," the minister told a press briefing. The 1,200-ton warship Cheonan sank near the tense border with North Korea in the Yellow Sea on the night of March 26. Suspicions of Pyongyang's involvement grew after investigators said upon examining a part of the broken vessel that an external blast likely caused the sinking. The disaster, said to be one of the worst in South Korea's naval history, occurred as members of the six-party talks were trying to reopen negotiations on denuclearizing the North. "It is hard to say how exactly the two will be linked, but I believe it will be difficult to resume the six-party talks, at least until the Cheonan incident is resolved to a certain extent," the minister said. "If North Korea is found to have been involved, it will naturally be difficult to hold the six-party talks," he added. Thirty-eight sailors were confirmed dead from the sunken warship, with eight still missing. North Korea's military on Saturday denied involvement in the incident, accusing Seoul of laying false blame to evade its own responsibility. US officials, including Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, have noted an inevitable suspension of efforts to resume the nuclear talks until the countries find out exactly what or who caused the sinking of the Cheonan. Minister Yu said the resumption of the nuclear negotiations, last held in December 2008, will likely be further delayed until the North pays its due penalties should it be found guilty. "If North Korea is clearly found to have been involved, I think it will not be easy to hold the six-party talks for some time because we must make North Korea pay a price for its actions," he told the briefing.

North Korea enters six-party talks only to shift attention away from sunken South Korean ship – no real interest

Global Security Newswire ‘10 (“North Korea to Again Meet With U.N. Command”, 7/19/10, DA: 7/19/10, Online: <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100719_1830.php>, ETC)

Seoul's Unification Ministry wrote in a recent newsletter that Pyongyang seems prepared to "turn the critical mood around through active dialogue" following the Security Council's statement condemning the attack on the ship (Yonhap News Agency, July 17). South Korea's top diplomat, Yu Myung-hwan, yesterday voiced doubts over the Stalinist state's declaration that it was ready to return to negotiations aimed at ending its nuclear weapons program, Agence France-Presse reported. The North is simply attempting to shift pressure from the regime following international condemnation of the Cheonan attack, the foreign minister said. "It is very regrettable that (North Korea) is trying to abuse the six-party talks to make an excuse to shun the global attention to the Cheonan incident," he said in a television interview.

North Korea is developing nuclear weapons for its own sake – will never come to six-nation efforts

Greg Torode is the Chief Asia Correspondent at South China Morning Post 09 (“A policy adrift; Despite its might, the US Navy is no match for Pyongyang's rust-bucket cargo fleet”, 6/24/09, South China Morning Post, Accessed through LexisNexis, DA: 7/19/10, ETC)

Mainland ports are far more likely to find themselves in the spotlight - a move that will show the extent to which Beijing's anger at its ally is translating into hard action. Mainland academics and analysts - frequently a mirror of official thinking - are unusually talking up the need for a tougher approach to Pyongyang, despite the long-standing fraternal relationship. Underpinning the importance of the crackdown is the growing sense in Beijing and Washington that North Korea is not developing nuclear weapons as a mere bargaining chip, but for their own sake. If this harsh new reality is correct, it means the conventional diplomatic approach - the six-nation effort led by China - is dead. In Washington, an urgent internal review by the incoming Obama administration determined that North Korea had no intention of giving up its nuclear programme - shattering an assumption that has guided 16 years of often tortuous diplomacy and attempted engagement. This means that Washington is exploring a wider range of options in keeping the pressure on Pyongyang, as well as reconfiguring its list of possible negotiating positions. Obama administration officials have made clear that they would be willing to consider fresh regional and even one-to-one talks with Pyongyang - something Mr Kim is said to crave. "It's like we've been trapped in a warped kind of Groundhog Day when it comes to North Korea," said one Obama official. Richard Bush, a veteran State Department and intelligence official and now senior fellow at the independent Brookings Institution think-tank, warned the US Congress last week that it would take nothing short of the end of the Kim dynasty to raise fresh hopes. "The end of the Kim dynasty will create the possibility - and only the possibility - of a more favourable [North Korean] approach," Mr Bush said. "The international community should prepare for the possibility that North Korea may never be willing to give up its nuclear weapons."

AT ADV Reunification

Korean Reunification would force trillions in US spending and/or cause a war.

Beck 10, Researcher at Stanford University (Mr. Beck is the Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford University and teaches at American University and Ewha Womans University. “Contemplating Korean Reunification”DA: 7/19/10, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704340304574635180086832934.html>, AV)

North Korea's nuclear program has preoccupied foreign policy makers for years, but it's not the only problem on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Il's regime looks increasingly unstable and could collapse. That could lead to North Korea's reunification with the South and could present foreign leaders with the expensive task of modernizing the North's economy. There are three plausible scenarios for a Korean reunification. One would be sudden and bloodless like what Germany experienced. The worst would be a reunification marked by the kind of violence Vietnam suffered. The third is somewhere between the first two and akin to the chaotic post-Communist transitions of Romania and Albania. Any one of these outcomes would be expensive. The North's economy is in shambles. It collapsed in the 1990s amid a famine that likely killed hundreds of thousands of people. Fixing the economy will require new infrastructure, starting with the power grid, railway lines and ports. This alone will cost tens of billions of dollars. Few of the North's factories meet modern standards and it will take years to rehabilitate agricultural lands. The biggest expense of all will be equalizing North Koreans' incomes with their richer cousins in the South, whether through aid transfers or investments in education and health care. Even the best-case German model will cause South Koreans heartburn. Despite the $2 trillion West Germany has paid over two decades, Bonn had it relatively easy in the beginning. East Germany's population was only one-quarter of West Germany's, and in 1989 East German per capita income was one-third of the West's. The two Germanies also had extensive trade ties. North Korea's per capita income is less than 5% of the South's. Each year the dollar value of South Korea's GDP expansion equals the entire North Korean economy. The North's population is half the South's and rising thanks to a high birth rate. North and South also barely trade with each other. To catch up to the South, North Korea will need more resources than East Germany required if living standards on both sides of the peninsula are to be close to each other. More than a dozen reports by governments, academics and investment banks in recent years have attempted to estimate the cost of Korean unification. At the low end, the Rand Corporation estimates $50 billion. But that assumes only a doubling of Northern incomes from current levels, which would leave incomes in the North at less than 10% of the South. At the high end, Credit Suisse estimated last year that unification would cost $1.5 trillion, but with North Korean incomes rising to only 60% of those in the South. I estimate that raising Northern incomes to 80% of Southern levels—which would likely be a political necessity—would cost anywhere from $2 trillion to $5 trillion, spread out over 30 years. That would work out to at least $40,000 per capita if distributed solely among South Koreans. Who would foot such a bill? China is the greatest supporter of the current regime in Pyongyang, with trade, investment and economic assistance worth $3 billion a year. Even if that flow continues, it's only a fraction of the $67 billion a year needed to equal $2 trillion over 30 years. Japan is willing to pay $10 billion in reparations for having colonized the North in the 20th century, but that too would barely make a dent.

AT ADV US-South Korean (ROK) alliance good 1NC

Uniqueness - Strains in the relationship have been repaired – close consultation now.

**Dr. Shin, Director Korean Studies Program at Stanford, ’10** (Gi-Wook, June, “The Media and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case”, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShinGiWookMedia100628.pdf>, da: 7-22-10,ellipses in original, twm)

The general clash of identities within South Korea latently presents a most intractable and fundamental challenge to both US and South Korea as they seek to manage the strained alliance. With change of power to conservatives, strains in the alliance seem to have significantly been repaired. The Lee and Obama administrations currently enjoy close policy consultation and collaboration and there is much hope in both countries for the future of the alliance.

Turn – the plans lack of prior consultation will disrupt the unusually high level of military cooperation between the US and South Korea.

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

Compared with standard alliances in the past, the US-ROK alliance has been quite unusual. It has had a potent combined command in place, under US leadership, for any new war with North Korea and has generated elaborate additional military cooperation, including a good deal of joint military planning and training, regular extensive exercises in rapidly moving huge American forces to Korea, considerable compatibility in weapons systems, and elaborate political consultation about all the details involved and the maintenance of the overall alliance orientation.

**No internal link – it’s not about military issues it’s about other foreign policy priorities.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

This view would be more convincing if the US had not recently agreed to more engagement with the North, to the transfer of the Combined Forces Command responsibility to the South in any future war with the North, and to reductions in the profile of American forces in South Korea. For years the US has suggested, as it has with its other allies, that South Korea should carry more of the load in providing for its security. Polls show no massive decline in good feelings toward Americans, nor of a big drop in Americans’ attitudes toward the ROK.6 (Lee) This strongly suggests that the heart of the problem is a clash between the current governments and rejections by each of the other’s recent foreign policy priorities. This is not really surprising since the enormous political, economic, and social progress of South Korea has made the two societies much more like each other, which is normally the road to much better relations among democratic countries.

 AT ADV US-South Korean (ROK) alliance good - Uniqueness

Visit by both Clinton and Gates proves commitment to the US-ROK alliance.

**Cloud ‘10** (July 20, July 20, Los Angeles Times, “Gates arrives in S. Korea; Clinton to join talks”, lexis, p. A5, twm)

This week's talks come 60 years after the start of the Korean War and at a time when the Cheonan incident has raised tensions on the Korean peninsula and forced closer examination of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance. About 40,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the South. Having Gates and Clinton together permits "higher-level strategic discussions about the relationship between our two countries cutting across military, diplomatic and political trade issues -- the whole range," the U.S. Defense official said. The upcoming military exercises, which officials said would begin soon and involve air and naval units, have been in the works since the March 26 sinking, but an official announcement was delayed until after United Nations Security Council deliberations on the incident concluded this month. The council's response -- a statement that condemned the sinking but stopped short of blaming North Korea -- has elevated the importance of the Gates-Clinton visit and of the coming exercises. U.S. officials said they were unable to recall a previous instance in which the secretaries of State and Defense had traveled to Seoul at the same time for meetings with South Korean counterparts. Gates and Clinton also are scheduled to meet with South Korea's president, Lee Myung-bak.

**US proving commitment to the alliance now.**

**Cloud ‘10** (July 20, David, Los Angeles Times, “Gates arrives in S. Korea; Clinton to join talks”, lexis, p. A5, twm)

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates arrived in Seoul on Monday for a high-level show of unity expected to include the announcement of major military exercises by the U.S. and South Korea four months after the sinking of a South Korean warship.

AT ADV US-South Korean alliance good – turns

US-South Korean alliance strong now – it’s such an important alliance changes there will also undermine the perception of our commitment to Japan.

Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Bark, Seoul National University, ‘09 (Marcus and Taeho, July 18 2010 <http://works.bepress.com/marcus_noland/13/> MLSF)

Due to the still critical nature of the United States-Republic of Korea (U.S.-ROK) alliance, diplomatic and economic relations between the two nations assume larger than usual importance. This fourth NBR Special Report examines whether economic ties could diffuse conflict in other aspects of the bilateral relationship, or whether economic irritants might be a source of further bilateral tensions. In the Foreword, Stephen W. Bosworth, former Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and current Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, places the importance of United States-Republic of Korea relations in the broader context of ongoing changes in Northeast Asia. He notes the tremendous growth of “non-military components” in the relationship—trade, of course, but also South Korea’s democracy, its role as a partner of the United States on issues “far from the Korean Peninsula,” and the cultural link based in the Korean-American community. Ambassador Bosworth concludes that the bilateral relationship has vastly increased in complexity for these reasons, due to the rise of China, and a host of other developments. He argues, consequently, that the alliance is sure to change in the future. In the subsequent essays, Dr. Marcus Noland of the Institute of International Economics and Dr. Taeho Bark of Seoul National University offer trenchant analyses on the state of economic relations and the potential repercussions for the strategic relationship. Marcus Noland feels that the economic relationship between the United States and South Korea—characterized by increasing intra-industry trade, rising services trade, expanding inter-corporate penetration, and growing foreign direct investment (FDI)—appears to be evolving towards something more like the relationships that the United States maintains with most other OECD countries. This expansion of bilateral interdependence, however, is not without its irritants. The motor vehicle and steel sectors remain perennial problems. Antidumping practices in the United States and capital channeling in South Korea are also sources of ongoing disputes. Additionally, Noland describes the declining relative importance of the two countries in each other’s global trade relationships. The net result may well be a relative decoupling of interests that could reinforce the widening strategic differences between the two historic allies, especially if South Koreans come to regard China and Japan as acting more constructively than the United States with regard to North Korea. In his essay, Taeho Bark points out that the United States is still South Korea’s most important trading partner. But various irritants remain in the economic relationship. Among these are the contentious bilateral trade issues in automotives, steel safeguarding, semiconductors, and IPR. If any of the bilateral trade conflicts become political, anti-American sentiment in South Korea will quickly rise, which will negatively affect the U.S. position on the North Korean nuclear issue and on other security issues. Given the fluid international situation in Northeast Asia, South Korea has become in some ways a fulcrum of the U.S. military presence in the region. Without a presence in Korea, the U.S. presence in Japan could be put into question. Persistent trade friction threatens to poison this strategically vital bilateral partnership. Therefore, a thorough assessment of U.S.- South Korean economic relations can help U.S. policymakers and leaders in South Korea gain a clear understanding of the issues that can and will affect not only the economic well-being of both nations, but also the strategic situation in Northeast Asia.

**Turn – the U.S. has to avoid unilateral moves to preserve the alliance.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

Just as in the North Atlantic regional system, success for the hegemon requires that it uses its leadership position to gain an earned influence rather than operate on an assumed or structural influence. American influence should continue to be gained in the well developed ways employed during the Cold War in the transatlantic region – putting an emphasis on constant consultation, showing a determination to build consensus whenever possible, often displaying a willingness to defer to other members’ concerns and a readiness to take advice. Leadership in those days involved offering important ideas and normally setting the agenda, then coming up with the working proposals for discussion, but consistently ensuring that all parties had their say and being open to adapting proposals to gain a consensus. The United States needs to bring this sort of leadership to bear in Northeast and East Asia, abandoning the more clearly unilateral posture which the Bush administration unsuccessfully pursued. There are certainly many frustrations in using this form of leadership, and the US is not a patient nation. But it learned to operate this way during the Cold War to its everlasting credit, and it needs to return to it now.

AT ADV US-South Korean (ROK) alliance good – no internal link extensions

**No internal link – it’s a political issue not a military one.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

The disagreements can plausibly be traced, in part, to political ineptness on the part of both governments in recent years. Generally speaking, the military leaders and other military personnel of the two nations seem to find their level of cooperation and compatibility quite high. They do not feel that the ability of the two armed forces to work together for Korea’s defense has diminished.7 Hence the title of this article. The political and military dimensions of the alliance have become misaligned and this needs fixing to make the alliance healthy again.

**Multiple issues will disrupt the US-ROK alliance.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

While not so directly pertinent, the ROK and US also developed disagreements on other matters. The invasion of Iraq was not popular in South Korea. American ambivalence about China clashed with blossoming Sino-ROK relations, as China became steadily more important to the ROK as a way to influence the North and promote unification. American deepening of cooperation with Japan and advocacy of improved ROK-Japan security cooperation collided with ROK frictions with Japan over territorial and other matters, more indications of trouble in the alliance.

**US-ROK relations will inevitably decrease – ROK thinks it’s in their best interest not to be seen as tied too closely to the U.S.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

If events ever begin to slide toward unification, China’s reaction would be very important. Seoul would want both China’s support on unification and China’s decision not to inject its forces into the North, for any reason. China is also a major destination of South Korean foreign investments and the South’s largest trading partner. Two decades ago Seoul reached out to Beijing, and vice versa, when it became increasingly clear that each had much to offer the other, and it is hardly surprising that the relationship has continued to blossom. With a healthy alliance, this should not have contributed to any breach in US-ROK relations. After all, Washington and Beijing have been pursuing expanded relations too, economically and even militarily. But with the alliance in trouble, this step by Seoul looks more suspicious to Washington. Also relevant on threat perceptions is the fact that the US is suspicious of China’s rise, but the ROK thus far is not.5 Another element often cited is the rise of regional identity in East Asia, a development to which South Korea has made important contributions. This is being driven by rising economic interdependence in the area. The extensive bilateral economic ties between the US and many countries in the region are now mediated by the rise of China as more and more investment money (American included) has poured into China to make the cheap goods that flow to the US. Countries all over the region are depending very heaving on selling raw materials, machinery and semi-finished goods to China. South Korea aspires to an important role in the region, and, since many others have reservations about the dominance of the US, a relaxation in USROK relations is useful to the ROK.

Multiple alternate causalities to a decline in the US-ROK alliance – North Korean prolif, US global security management, and Japan.

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

In this sense, the ROK position on North Korea is inadequate. North Korea has been a declining threat in conventional military terms and no match for the South politically and economically. The one thing it excels in is making trouble. The real threat it now poses pertains to proliferation, a threat with serious regional and global dimensions. South Korea wants nothing done about the North’s proliferation that would damage its real priorities - bringing unification closer without risking a North Korean collapse. Thus it asks very little reciprocity from the North for engagement, downplays DPRK human rights violations, and will not participate fully in the Proliferation Security Initiative.9 It won’t support doing whatever may be necessary to prevent North Korean nuclear proliferation – no serious sanctions, no use of force.10 The limitations of Seoul’s concept of the alliance are apparent. It is continue providing a deterrence guarantee by the US, so that the ROK won’t have to use its rapidly improving military capabilities in fighting a war with the North. Thus, the ROK’s becoming self-sufficient militarily mainly means not having to defer to the US as much on dealing with North Korea. Meanwhile, Seoul insists USFK elements should be used outside Korea only when this does not clash with South Korean interests. The United States is now very wary of arrangements in which it needs the consent of its partners to act, even as it bears most of the costs of global security management. This includes arrangements for using force in a multilateral fashion in which the other participants specifically tailor the use of their forces to fit their narrow national concerns (as with NATO forces in Afghanistan now). Why not go with coalitions of the (militarily) willing instead? Clearly the ROK is an awkward fit with US leadership of global security management via a Western coalition. It not only puts relations with North Korea ahead of global security issues, it is also uncomfortable with Japan, something which does not fit with the pluralistic security community the US expects the coalition to be. There is a more fundamental problem as well. The United States wants the dominant role in the coalition.

AT ADV Anti Americanism

No Anti-Americanism in Korea

Boot **senior fellow at the council for foreign relations, NYT/LA Times writer 20**10 (Max Boot 5/31/10 “America is still the best guarantor of freedom and prosperity” [http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot-20100531,0,1391318.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot-20100531%2C0%2C1391318.story) DA: 7/19/10) RY

The latter incident naturally has focused attention in Seoul and served to accelerate the reaffirmation of close American-Korean ties that had already begun with the election of the more conservative President Lee Myung-bak in 2008. The anti-Americanism that had been prevalent in South Korea only a few years ago has all but disappeared, and it is not only (or even mainly) because of President Obama's vaunted charm. It is largely because South Korea has tried detente and found that it did nothing to moderate the aggressive behavior of the North Korean regime.

AT ADV Trilateralism – US-ROK-China

Relations between US-ROK-China aren’t zero sum.

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

Also relevant on threat perceptions is the fact that the US is suspicious of China’s rise, but the ROK thus far is not.5 Another element often cited is the rise of regional identity in East Asia, a development to which South Korea has made important contributions. This is being driven by rising economic interdependence in the area. The extensive bilateral economic ties between the US and many countries in the region are now mediated by the rise of China as more and more investment money (American included) has poured into China to make the cheap goods that flow to the US. Countries all over the region are depending very heaving on selling raw materials, machinery and semi-finished goods to China. South Korea aspires to an important role in the region, and, since many others have reservations about the dominance of the US, a relaxation in USROK relations is useful to the ROK. On the other hand, there is no evidence that a better relationship with other East Asian governments could only have been obtained by letting the alliance erode. No other country except North Korea has made that a prerequisite to expanded ties. Perhaps the most popular explanation is the generational shift in Korean society and politics, reflected in the election of President Roh Tae-woo. Many emphasize that the younger generations in South Korea have no personal recollection of the US role in the creation of the ROK and its survival in the face of the North Korean invasion in 1950. For them, frictions with the US loom larger as the shadow of history ebbs, including the inevitable difficulties that come with hosting American forces. Others point to the left-wing, anti-American political orientation of teachers in the ROK as having shaped younger generations accordingly. It is said that this helped revive contentions that the US was responsible for the initial division of the peninsula, complaints about US military atrocities during the Korean War, and nationalist reactions to American complaints about ROK trade practices.

AT Solvency

**U.S. actions are irrelevant – only China can leverage North Korea to change.**

**Lee, ambassador for international security affairs and global issues and dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, ’10** (Chung Min, May 26, p. 10, “ONLY BEIJING CAN REIN IN NORTH KOREA”, The Australian, lexis, twm)

THE verdict is in: On March 26, a North Korean submarine fired a torpedo that sunk a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, and killed 46 sailors. This finding was announced formally last week by a joint investigation team consisting not only of Korean civilian and military experts, but specialists from the US, Britain, Sweden and Australia. The smoking gun appeared in the form of a North Korean torpedo's propeller shaft. Make no mistake: this is South Korea's 9/11, and it deserves a strong response. Thankfully, that's just what South Korea and its democratic allies are planning. On Monday, the Lee Myung-bak administration announced a range of unilateral and multilateral measures, including South Korea's official warning that additional armed provocations will be met with matching military responses. North Korean vessels will no longer transit South Korean waters and psychological warfare against the North will be restarted. These steps are designed to help shut off the Kim Jong-il regime's hard-currency pipelines; enhance military vigilance and pressures on the North; and reconstitute the South's national security infrastructure, including early-warning capabilities and rules of engagement. This is the single strongest South Korean response to a provocation from the North in decades. Seoul's announcements are fully consistent with Lee's resolute and consistent response to Pyongyang's provocations. Since taking office in 2008, the President has discontinued cash transfers to the North in the absence of any assurance that the money wasn't being used for military purposes, insisted that human rights be a part of the inter-Korean agenda, and called on Pyongyang to abide by its nuclear dismantlement promises. The Cheonan investigation and its conclusive findings should also help the President bat back rumours that he was using the Cheonan to gain political standing before next week's local elections. On the US side, the Obama administration has strongly condemned North Korea. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travels to Seoul this week to iron out joint responses with South Korean officials, including the strengthening of bilateral military exercises, a potentially enhanced South Korean role as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative, co-ordinated responses in the UN Security Council, and much stronger measures to cut off hard-currency transfers to the Pyongyang regime. Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has also reaffirmed Tokyo's unstinting support for Seoul and Washington, and by extension, realising the critical importance of maintaining a robust US-Japan alliance as the linchpin of Japanese security. But perhaps the most important development will be decided deep within the halls of power in Beijing. China's communist leadership has publicly maintained rigid neutrality over the Cheonan incident but that may soon change. Clearly, it will take time before we see any marked adjustments in Chinese policy towards North Korea. But the Cheonan incident means that China can no longer straddle the fence. Even Beijing cannot afford to ignore the overwhelmingly clear evidence. Meanwhile, whatever dividends China gained from a North Korea that served as a buffer against South Korea, Japan and even the US, have been superseded by direct, mutually beneficial and increasingly profitable and, crucially, irreversible economic and politically viable linkages with its former adversaries. If Beijing really wants to be a great power, it's time for Chinese leaders to re-evaluate fundamentally why they continue to support North Korea. The Cheonan sinking isn't a single event. It is only the latest tragic chapter in the world's longest-running terrorist war. North Korea launched a commando raid on South Korea's presidential residence (1969), axed to death US servicemen in the demilitarised zone (1976), assassinated 17 members of the South Korean cabinet in Burma (1983), bombed a civilian airliner (1987), infiltrated assassins to kill North Korean defectors (1990s and 2010), instigated deadly naval skirmishes (1999, 2002, 2009), and killed a South Korean tourist at the Mount Kumgang resort (2008). Kim most likely ordered the Cheonan attack for a number of reasons, including diverting attention from the disastrous December currency revaluation and beefing up the military's support for his family's rule as he prepares to hand over power to his third son, Kim Jong-un. After all, the world carried on even after Pyongyang crossed the nuclear threshold and most important, the Chinese continue to provide 70 per cent of North Korea's food supplies and oil. That's the dynamic that South Korea and its allies have to encourage China to change. For without Beijing's support, US, South Korean and Japanese efforts to compel North Korea into submission through sanctions and other measures may not alter Kim's behaviour.

**China has the most leverage with North Korea.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

Most explanations for these developments do not seem to get to the heart of the matter. They are, however, worth repeating here, since they have been important in the domestic and intraalliance dialogs in recent years. Perhaps the most valid one is the suggestion that the rise of China has been an important factor. As China is North Korea’s foremost, almost its only friend, it is now the best source of advice to the South on intraKorean issues, the best communications channel outside of Seoul’s limited direct contacts to the North, and the government with the greatest leverage on the North.

AT South Korea is prepared to take control of forces

South Korean Military Unable to Assume Command and Take Control

Stars and Stripes 10, (By ASHLEY ROWLAND AND HWANG HAE-RYM. “Will South Korea be ready to assume wartime command?” DA:7/19/10, <http://www.stripes.com/news/will-south-korea-be-ready-to-assume-wartime-command-1.101057>, AV)

SEOUL, South Korea — In two years, South Korea and the United States will make one of the biggest changes in the history of their decades-old military alliance — one that some experts say could put the country and the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there at greater risk of attack by the North. Beginning April 17, 2012, South Korean troops in any future wartime situation will no longer be under the command of a U.S. general. The two countries agreed to the change several years ago in recognition of South Korea’s status as a modern, wealthy nation with a competent military. But a growing number of critics question whether South Korea will have the advanced military capabilities — from command-and-control systems to missile defenses — needed to lead a war against an attacking North Korea. They contend that fundamental changes in command structure will complicate a military relationship between the U.S. and South Korea that could already be strained under battle conditions. “That leaves ROK (Republic of Korea) and U.S. forces more vulnerable, not less vulnerable,” said Bruce Bechtol, a international relations professor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and author of “Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea.” If a war broke out in South Korea today, the top U.S. general on the peninsula would command some 600,000 active-duty troops from both countries — a number that could swell with the arrival of U.S. troops from outside the peninsula and the activation of up to 3.5 million South Korean reservists, according to U.S. Forces Korea. After the transfer of operational control, called OPCON, the U.S. and South Korean militaries will be run by two separate commands linked by liaison officers and coordination centers and cells. The U.S. will support the South Korean command during wartime, but its troops would remain under the control of a U.S. general.

South Korean control won’t work because it’s based on the flawed premise that they will work from a unified war plan.

Stars and Stripes 10, (By ASHLEY ROWLAND AND HWANG HAE-RYM. “Will South Korea be ready to assume wartime command?” DA:7/19/10, <http://www.stripes.com/news/will-south-korea-be-ready-to-assume-wartime-command-1.101057>, TWM)

He said the transfer won’t affect the U.S. and South Korean unity of command because the allies will be operating from a single, agreed-upon war plan. But that’s a flawed premise, said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow and director of research in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. “The old adage is that no war plan survives contact with the enemy,” he said in an e-mail. “So that’s not good enough, with respect to [Gen. Sharp].” After the leadership transfer, South Korea will lead ground forces, with the U.S. in a supporting role. The U.S. will lead air operations to achieve “maximum effect” from air power outside the peninsula, including U.S. assets from Guam, mainland Japan and Okinawa, according to USFK spokesman David Oten. The U.S. also will control other assets and operations, such as amphibious landings and some that can’t be disclosed for security reasons, Oten said. Sharp said the biggest difficulty in planning for the transfer is ensuring military leaders from both countries have seamless command-and-control systems and will see the same picture unfolding minute by minute on their computer screens during a war. Both countries continue to make major progress on that, he added. So far, both U.S. and South Korea officials say there are no plans to delay the 2012 transfer date.

AT North Korean collapse inevitable

North Korean collapse not coming anytime soon

Lee Byong-Chul is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation in Seoul, 10 (“Too many South Korean analysts are predicting the collapse of the North”, 7/19/10, Asia Sentinel, DA: 7/20/10, online: <http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2598&Itemid=246>, ETC)

But that was then. Today, no one can credibly say that the North, led by the "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-il, will be gone any time soon. Instead, the pundits who insisted on the end of the Kims are moving toward consensus on the continued existence of a tyrannical regime where freedom of information, assembly, and expression are banned. There is expected to be another Kim "Leader" of some sort.

DA Deterrence – Uniqueness

Moving an aircraft carrier to the region proves US commitment to deterrence.

**Cloud ‘10** (David, July 20, Los Angeles Times, “Gates arrives in S. Korea; Clinton to join talks”, lexis, p. A5, twm)

The military drills are likely to involve a large number of naval vessels and aircraft and will take place in both the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said. They will continue over a period of months. In addition to sending a message to the North, U.S. officials said the drills were aimed at improving South Korea's capabilities in anti-submarine warfare, which appear to have come up short in the Cheonan incident. On Sunday, the U.S. military announced that the aircraft carrier George Washington, based in Japan, would make a port call in the South Korean port of Busan while Gates and Clinton are in Seoul. "It is there as an additional manifestation of our steadfast commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea," Morrell said, adding that the George Washington would go from Busan "to begin participating in the first of the exercises."

US engaged and flexing its power in Korea now.

**Daily Telegraph ’10** (The, July 21 1, SECTION: WORLD; Pg. 27, twm)

The US will send the aircraft carrier USS George Washington to South Korea this week to bolster America's presence in the region. The deployment was considered a show of force to North Korea in the wake of the ambush sinking of a South Korean warship last March that resulted in the deaths of 46 sailors. South Korea and an international team of investigators blamed North Korea for the attack. The aircraft carrier was expected to be in South Korea's port of Busan by tomorrow. It could also participate in an upcoming military exercise off the coast of South Korea.

US enhancing deterrence now.

**Cloud ‘10** (David, July 20, Los Angeles Times, “Gates arrives in S. Korea; Clinton to join talks”, lexis, p. A5, twm)

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates arrived in Seoul on Monday for a high-level show of unity expected to include the announcement of major military exercises by the U.S. and South Korea four months after the sinking of a South Korean warship. Gates will be joined in Seoul by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in talks with South Korean counterparts, meetings that U.S. officials say are aimed at sending a signal to North Korea in response to the sinking of the Cheonan, allegedly by Northern forces. "We're trying to send a clear message of deterrence," said a senior U.S. Defense official, who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. He added that the message was that officials in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, should "reconsider this sort of behavior that they've been engaged in."

DA Deterrence - Links

US key to deter North Korea

Boot **senior fellow at the council for foreign relations, NYT/LA Times writer 20**10 (Max Boot 5/31/10 “America is still the best guarantor of freedom and prosperity” [http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot-20100531,0,1391318.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot-20100531%2C0%2C1391318.story) DA: 7/19/10) RY

 South Korea knows that only the U.S. offers the deterrence needed to keep a nuclear-armed North Korea in check. That is why the South Koreans, who have one of the world's largest militaries (655,000 activity-duty personnel), are eager to host 28,000 American troops in perpetuity and even to hand over their military forces in wartime to the command of an American four-star general. Under an agreement negotiated during the Bush administration, operational control is due to revert to the South Koreans in 2012, but senior members of the government and military told us they want to push that date back by a number of years. South Korea's eagerness to continue subordinating its armed forces to American control is the ultimate vote of confidence in American leadership. What other country would the South Koreans possibly entrust with the very core of their national existence? Not China, that's for sure.

DA Deterrence – Impacts

**Risk of North Korean attack high now.**

**The Australian 10** (July 22, “Nominated spy chief tips Korea as conflict hot spot”, lexis, twm)

James Clapper, the man nominated to head the US spy community, told senators yesterday he feared a period of ``direct attacks'' by North Korea on its southern neighbour. Mr Clapper was testifying before senators,who must confirm his nomination as director of national intelligence. South Korea, the US and other nations accuse the North of torpedoing the Cheonan corvette near the tense Yellow Sea border in March. The North denies involvement in the sinking, which claimed 46 lives, and says any retaliation could spark war. ``The most important lesson for all of us in the intelligence community from this year's provocations by Pyongyang is to realise that we may be entering a dangerous new period when North Korea will once again attempt to advance its internal and external political goals through direct attacks on our allies in the Republic of Korea,'' Mr Clapper wrote in response to questions. ``North Korea's military forces pose a threat that cannot be taken lightly.'' Mr Clapper, Defence Secretary Robert Gates's top intelligence adviser, was posted in South Korea in the 1980s. Mr Gates -- currently in South Korea -- and the South's Defence Minister Kim Tae-Young announced a joint military exercise on Sunday in the Sea of Japan as a warning to North Korea. Barack Obama tapped Mr Clapper, a retired air force general and veteran of US spy efforts, to replace retired US navy Admiral Dennis Blair.

**DA Prolif - links**

Unique link - the US-South Korean alliance is strong now. Troops are key to maintaining that. Even with coming troop cuts the commitment is strong because the DOD is moving families in and extending tour of duties.

Irish Sun 09 (July 18 2010 <http://story.irishsun.com/index.php/ct/9/cid/45d771c7290844e9/id/557900/cs/1/> MLSF)

**As South Korea’s military transitions to full operational control, it’s important to remember the past 60 years of U.S. commitment to the country and to not waver in that support**, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen talked Friday with servicemembers and defense civilians at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan in Seoul, Korea. He spoke about his earlier meetings with his South Korean counterpart, citing “tremendous change” on the horizon. The Korean military is expected to assume a larger defense responsibility there in April 2012. The alliance will only get stronger, the chairman said, with continued commitment from the United States. The U.S.-South Korea alliance dates to the Korean War in 1950. An armistice was signed in July 1953 with North Korea, unofficially ending the war. The United Nations and U.S. military have maintained a presence in South Korea since then. “Sometimes you don’t think about this, but you are here as a part of that, and sometimes we don’t think about how significant that alliance is in terms of preserving the freedom, preserving the democracy that is here in the Republic of Korea,” Mullen said. “We are very much supportive of executing and sustain that alliance.” Mullen spent the previous two days with his Korean counterparts reviewing the changes and specifics of their alliance. For the U.S. military stationed there, that means a smaller U.S. footprint. Within the next 10 years, the 28,000 servicemembers that make up U.S. Forces Korea will be cut roughly by 14,000. However, there will be more command-sponsored families and new infrastructure to accommodate them, he said. **In December, about 1,700 U.S. troops with families were there. The number has since grown to 3,100. The chairman said that by the end of 2010 there would be about 4,500 families, noting that the Defense Department is planning to normalize three-year tour lengths there.**

Link - Perception of strong security is key to prevent South Korea and Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Bakanic et al. Woodrow Wilson School of Public International Affairs, 08

(Elizabeth Bakanic, Mark Christopher, Sandya Das, Laurie Freeman, George Hodgson, Mike Hunzeker, R. Scott Kemp,Sung Hwan Lee, Florentina Mulaj, Ryan Phillips, January. “Preventing nuclear proliferation chain reactions: Japan, South Korea, Egypt . <http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591f.pdf>) RY

Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that U.S. alliances with and assurances to them remain robust. Perceptions that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are strong contribute to the credibility of U.S. security assurances, including extended deterrence. Conversely, a lack of confidence in these alliances raises the risk that Japan and South Korea might pursue nuclear weapons. To allay Japanese concerns about neglect, the United States should look for both substantive and symbolic opportunities to demonstrate that Japan remains a key U.S. partner. It should also commit to resolving the abductee issue in the context of the Six Party Talks. To allay South Korean fears of U.S. disengagement, the United States should be prepared to revisit discussion of the timetable for transferring wartime operational control of South Korean forces, should the new South Korean administration so request.

**DA Politics - links**

Decreasing war efforts costs political capital.

Stanley, Assistant Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University, 09 (Elizabeth A., Summer, “Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 pg. 55-6)RY

Internally, entrapment may be the result of having to answer to hawkish constituencies or, more benignly, from having “spun up” the population to mobilize for war. 50 Unless the war ends quickly, leaders must expend political capital to enact policies—such as demonizing the enemy and mobilizing the armed forces—to ease the process of waging war. The more political capital leaders expend, the more they convince their constituents that ªfighting the war is the right thing to do. But while manipulating perceptions helps to sustain the war effort, it hampers peacemaking. The leader is likely to pay a domestic political price—a domestic audience cost—if he backs down. 51 Even if the governing coalition wants to de-escalate, other political challengers can capitalize on enemy stereotypes and accuse the coalition of “being soft” on the adversary.

DA Troop Shift - links

Troops shifting from ROK to Afghanistan

The Korea Times 09 (July 18 2010 <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/07/205_55867.html>, ellipses in original, MLSF)

U.S. President Barack Obama hinted that American troops stationed in South Korea could be deployed to Afghanistan. The remark was made Thursday when he spoke to thousands of U.S. troops here on the final day of his weeklong Asia tour. It came on the heels of the Oct. 22 comment by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Pentagon could temporarily deploy U.S. service members in Korea to the Middle East in coming years. Mullen referred to the soon-to-be-implemented longer, family-accompanied tours by U.S. troops in South Korea as a base for the idea. ``Many of you served in Iraq … others among you served in Afghanistan,'' Obama told 1,500 U.S. forces at Osan Airbase in Gyeonggi Province. ``Others among you will be deployed yet again.'' Pundits say the comment by Obama can be construed as emphasizing ``strategic flexibility'' for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) since the U.S. government is struggling to handle Afghan issues amid surging death tolls and withdrawals of non-U.S. troops from the terrorism-stricken Central Asian nation. Strategic flexibility is aimed at changing the mission of American forces abroad from stationary ones focused on defending host nations to rapid deployment troops that can be swiftly dispatched to other parts of the world where the United States is in need. Seoul and Washington already agreed on the scheme in 2006, but the plan has not been fully implemented amid concerns that it could weaken the Korea-U.S. combined forces against North Korea. A high-ranking official at the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command confirmed the U.S. move. ``When the plan of longer, accompanied tours by U.S. troops here was initiated, the U.S. military was already considering the troop rotation scheme at the same time,'' the official told The Korea Times on condition of anonymity. ``Such a rotation is normal in other countries where U.S. troops are stationed, so South Korea should not be an exception as long as the tour normalization plan is settled in the coming years.'' Following approval from the Pentagon, the USFK, which has 28,500 troops in Korea, is going ahead with lengthening the tours of its service members here to up to three years and having them live with their family members. USFK Commander General Walter Sharp said his command would have half of its 28,500 members serve three-year accompanied tours, similar to those served by soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in Japan and Europe for decades.

Empirically troops from South Korea are redeployed to Afghanistan.

NYT 08 (3-11-08, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/washington/11military.html>, da: July 18 2010, MLSF)

“As we move into these sanctuary bases — and they are sanctuaries — they are not up under the guns,” General Bell said. The general acknowledged that the change in policy that he was advocating could be costly, because additional housing, schools and medical facilities would have to be built. But he said some of those expenses might be borne by the South Korean government. The American military presence in South Korea has dropped by about 9,000 troops over the past five years, as two brigades previously based there have joined the rotation schedule for Iraq and Afghanistan.

DA South Korean Politics – KFTA good – 1NC

**Lee can avoid becoming a lame duck but it will be difficult – he has to avoid controversy.**

**Gale ’10** (July 21, Bruce, “Future looks bleak for S. Korean leader”, The Straits Times (Singapore), lexis, twm)

What can President Lee do? Some observers have suggested that he appoint Ms Park Geun Hye - a long-time rival within the GNP and proponent of the original Sejong City plan - as prime minister. This would help heal the rift in the ruling party that became obvious when about 50 party members joined the opposition in the legislature to vote down the President's proposal. But such a bold measure seems unlikely. It is certainly out of keeping with the current state of South Korean politics, which is increasingly mired in personality clashes. The Korean economy grew more than 7 per cent in the first half of this year on the back of strong export growth. But the effects of that growth have yet to spread to the public, and external uncertainties are prompting many economists to forecast difficult conditions in the second half of the year. Organisations such as the IMF have also been urging Asian policymakers to brace themselves for the possibility of further economic shocks. It is natural for a president's influence to wane as the end of his term approaches. But in the current circumstances, it hardly makes sense for South Korea to continue a tradition in which the last 21/2 years of a president's term of office are effectively wasted. A skilful leader should be able to delay this process. But with opposition parties notorious for sensationalising any hint of scandal, it will not be easy.

The plans reduction in military presence would spark massive controversy between progressives and conservatives.

**Dr. Shin, Director Korean Studies Program at Stanford, ’10** (Gi-Wook, June, “The Media and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case”, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShinGiWookMedia100628.pdf>, da: 7-22-10, twm)

Alliance issues composed nearly half (48.62%) of the conservative daily’s coverage of the bilateral relationship over the study period, and for Hankyoreh, alliance issues composed more than two-thirds (68.27%) of U.S.-ROK relations coverage. My previous study indicated that economic and trade issues were much more prominently featured in U.S. newspapers’ coverage of the ROK. This is an interesting disparity in perception, given that for the duration of the study period, the United States was the ROK’s largest trading partner. Thereby it is feasible to conclude that security issues remain the defining characteristic of the U.S.-ROK relationship in the minds of the Korean people. These statistics provide useful insight into how the Korean media—and by extension, the Korean people—perceive the role of the alliance within the larger realm of U.S.-ROK relations. The alliance seems to dominate the media’s conception of the bilateral relationship. In addition, it is noteworthy that the progressive newspaper devoted a higher percentage of its coverage to security issues, within both U.S.-ROK and U.S. coverage, than the conservative newspaper did. This finding indicates that in leading the challenge to the conventional wisdom about the alliance, progressive forces, including Hankyoreh, had an agenda-setting effect. They provoked a debate that increased both progressive and conservative newspapers’ coverage of alliance issues, as ideologically opposed media outlets sought to refute each other and advance their own positions. In terms of specific issue coverage in Chosun and Hankyoreh editorials and columns (see Table 3), it is apparent that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea was the leading topic, again demonstrating that in terms of Korean interest and perception, the military alliance is the core of the U.S.-ROK relationship. (The topic of U.S.-ROK trade was a distant second at 13.95%). Table 3 reveals that Hankyoreh devoted half of its coverage of the bi-lateral relationship to the subject of troops, while Chosun devoted less than one-quarter of its coverage to this subject—a noteworthy disparity. Korean progressives led the questioning of the U.S. military presence on ROK soil by focusing on and consistently expressing outrage over negative aspects such as crimes committed by American GIs. Together, these findings clearly show that the U.S.-ROK relationship yields significant coverage in the Korean media (more so than in the U.S. media). Moreover, security—and to a large extent, the U.S. troop presence—is what defines the bilateral relationship, despite the importance of economic ties. 2) Media’s Role in Debates over Alliance The extensive press coverage shown above suggests that the media has been an important place for discussion and debate on alliance issues among Koreans. In particular, in an attempt to challenge the conventional view and to promote a new perspective on U.S.ROK relations, the progressive media framed the alliance debate, setting the terms to which the conservative side had to respond—namely, South Korea’s interests to wholeheartedly pursue a new relationship with North Korea while making changes to its unequal alliance with the United States. Hankyoreh, for instance, accused conservative forces of being “trapped in the Cold War-era concept,” arguing that conservative notions of South Korea’s security interests vis-à-vis the North and the United States are outdated and that when it comes to brethren in the North, Chosun can be “cold-hearted.”21 Figure 1 illustrates intensified debate over the alliance between progressive and conservative forces in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Prior to 1999, Hankyoreh’s interest in the bilateral relationship appeared rather flat, and the progressive newspaper accorded roughly a similar level of coverage as its conservative counterpart. Yet after 1999, attention levels substantially increased and inter-newspaper disparities became apparent, indicating a very different environment—one in which the U.S.-ROK relationship was a topic of heated debate. It appears that Hankyoreh led this debate, challenging conventional wisdom on the relationship through a significant increase in critical editorials and columns. Chosun followed suit, increasing the number of editorials and columns on the relationship, refuting progressive criticism, defending its positions, and criticizing the attitudes and actions of the progressive administrations that had come to power.

Myung-bak will get KFTA – that’s key to economic recovery.

**Chan and Calmes ’10** (Sewell and Jackie, June 27, New York Times, lexis, twm)

The Obama administration announced Saturday that it would ask Congress to ratify a long-stalled free-trade agreement with South Korea after the midterm elections in November. The decision, which risks angering labor unions and their Congressional supporters, was announced as the Group of 20 economies began a two-day summit meeting here, following a smaller meeting by the Group of 8 powers. After the meeting with the South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, Mr. Obama's aides said they would try to resolve lingering issues by the time of the next G-20 leaders' talks, to be held in Seoul, South Korea, in November, and present the deal to Congress shortly after the November elections. ''We very much welcome and thank President Obama for proposing a date for us to look forward to, and we will work towards that date and objectives,'' Mr. Lee said here in Toronto. A top White House official said the administration was committed to removing two significant obstacles -- Korean restrictions on auto and beef imports -- to ratification of the agreement. The United States trade representative, Ron Kirk, said he planned to promptly initiate talks with his Korean counterpart, Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, but also pledged to consult with Congress in carrying out the negotiations. President George W. Bush's administration concluded the agreement in June 2007, but the Democratic leadership in Congress has not acted on it, nor has the Obama administration pressed the issue until now. ''President Obama's leadership in breaking down barriers to commerce couldn't come at a better time,'' said Vikram S. Pandit, the chief executive of Citigroup, who leads a coalition of businesses that have urged ratification of the agreement. He said that the agreement ''should lead to increased trade and investments, driving growth and job creation to fuel our economic recovery.''

DA South Korean Politics – Uniqueness

**Presidet Myung-Bak is on the brink.**

**Gale ’10** (July 21, Bruce, “Future looks bleak for S. Korean leader”, The Straits Times (Singapore), lexis, twm)

IS PRESIDENT Lee Myung Bak of South Korea about to become a lame duck leader? Recent developments certainly suggest that that is the case. On June 2, Mr Lee's conservative Grand National Party (GNP) received a surprise setback in city and provincial elections. Then, on June 29, the National Assembly rejected a controversial plan to modify an earlier proposal designed to ease congestion in Seoul by developing an alternative city 150km south of the capital. This was followed on July 11 by the resignation of a key presidential aide who was named in an alleged abuse of power scandal involving President Lee's acquaintances. Adding insult to injury are the opinion polls, which last month showed the President's approval rating falling to below 40 per cent for the first time this year. Mid-term blues are common among South Korean presidents. Unfortunately, they also tend to become permanent. These once-popular leaders end their terms in ignominy, usually with approval ratings below 10 per cent. Former president Roh Moo Hyun's suicide in May last year after being implicated in a corruption scandal underlines the point. Mr Roh won the 2002 elections, only to be impeached in March 2004 over charges of electoral law violations, economic mismanagement and illegal campaign donations. He was reinstated two months later after the Constitutional Court overturned the impeachment. However, he later lost control of the legislature and engaged in personal feuds with the media until the end of his term in February 2008. The previous Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2003) had a similarly rough ride. Taking office soon after the Asian financial crisis, Mr Kim vigorously pushed the economic reform and restructuring recommended by the International Monetary Fund, successfully engineering an economic recovery. However, a series of scandals ravaged Mr Kim's presidency during the second half of his term, severely damaging his popularity. They included bribery scandals involving the president's sons, and another involving large transfers of cash to North Korea.

DA South Korean Politics – links – plan popular

US troop presence is unpopular with the new generation of South Korean’s.

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

Perhaps the most popular explanation is the generational shift in Korean society and politics, reflected in the election of President Roh Tae-woo. Many emphasize that the younger generations in South Korea have no personal recollection of the US role in the creation of the ROK and its survival in the face of the North Korean invasion in 1950. For them, frictions with the US loom larger as the shadow of history ebbs, including the inevitable difficulties that come with hosting American forces. Others point to the left-wing, anti-American political orientation of teachers in the ROK as having shaped younger generations accordingly. It is said that this helped revive contentions that the US was responsible for the initial division of the peninsula, complaints about US military atrocities during the Korean War, and nationalist reactions to American complaints about ROK trade practices.

Korean media have mobilized substantial anti-americanism.

**Dr. Shin, Director Korean Studies Program at Stanford, ’10** (Gi-Wook, June, “The Media and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case”, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShinGiWookMedia100628.pdf>, da: 7-22-10, twm)

In November 2002, five months after U.S. military vehicles accidentally killed two Korean school girls in a Seoul suburb, Ambassador Thomas Hubbard issued an official apology on behalf of President Bush: “Just this morning, the president sent me a message asking me to convey his apologies to the families of the girls, to the government of the Republic of Korea and to the people of Korea.'' In the past, such accidents would have gone largely unnoticed but this time the U.S. was compelled to issue a presidential apology. A half dozen years later, pressured by massive public protests against importation of US beef, the four-month old Lee government, despite a former agreement with President Bush, demanded the prohibition of U.S. beef more than 30 months old to be exported to Korea. In both instances, the Bush administration was concerned with the potential adverse impact on the alliance as the Korean media were able to mobilize thousands of angry protesters, sparking an influx of anti-American sentiment across the country. Reluctantly, the U.S. accepted the Korean demands. These two cases clearly show that the U.S.-ROK alliance can no longer be deduced down to simple measures of power. Rather relational dynamics have shifted; enabling a former client to make demands on its patron and see such demands materialize. Observers of Korean affairs note that the Korean media have contributed to the rise of the South Korean public’s adversarial attitude toward the U.S. and its changing perceptions of the alliance with the United States as illustrated by the aforementioned cases.2

Strong media biased ensures South Korean public opposes US troop presence.

**Dr. Shin, Director Korean Studies Program at Stanford, ’10** (Gi-Wook, June, “The Media and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case”, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShinGiWookMedia100628.pdf>, da: 7-22-10,ellipses in original, twm)

The extraordinary increase in Hankyoreh’s coverage from 1999 to 2000 likely reflected an environment in which progress in inter-Korean relations, including the landmark inter-Korean summit, spurred a broader reexamination of the alliance, especially in the wake of unfortunate incidents involving U.S. soldiers. In these years, nationwide outrage was incited by the Nogun-ri controversy, the Maehyang-ri bombing range accident, the discharging of formaldehyde into the Han River, and the negotiations of the Status of Forces Agreement—events that the progressive media focused on heavily (and much less so by the conservative mainstream). According to a senior U.S. diplomat in Seoul at that time, the standard story line in the media was that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) was on a rampage, showing no respect for the lives of Koreans. 22 Additionally, former Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo asserted that, “[The] perception of a thaw between North and South Korea in the wake of the June summit . . . provided a convenient platform for those who have always opposed the U.S. troop presence to promote their cause among the broader spectrum of the South Korean public.”23 An ardent progressive crusade on this issue and a new spirit of inter-Korean cooperation persuaded additional elements of the political spectrum that it was no longer necessary to endure the inconveniences associated with U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. This mindset evolved despite President Kim Dae Jung’s strong argument that the alliance remained relevant in the Sunshine era, if only for regional security.

Empirically, the South Korean media can force US concessions and create anti-Americanism.

**Dr. Shin, Director Korean Studies Program at Stanford, ’10** (Gi-Wook, June, “The Media and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case”, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShinGiWookMedia100628.pdf>, da: 7-22-10,ellipses in original, twm)

The significance of disproportionate attention to the alliance was clearly displayed in instances such as the 2002 schoolgirl deaths and the 2008 beef protests wherein an impassioned Korean media played a key role in compelling some type of U.S. concession. Right after the schoolgirl deaths, the South Korean media paid only minimal attention to the accident as the major news stories were Korean soccer team’s stellar performance at the 2002 World Cup and an accidental clash with the North Korean Navy. However, in the weeks following the situation turned into a media frenzy. The progressive online newspaper OhMyNews mounted the charge that mobilized tens of thousands when they published a wide array of stories on the topic, demanding an official apology for the deaths and subsequent “fraudulent verdicts.”28 Progressive reports instituted an angry call for mobilization to demand a legitimate American repentance: “If we put our people’s strength together, the day will come when the arrogant and ignorant Bush will apologize, kneeling down in front of our people.”29 South Korean coverage of the issue trumped the attention in U.S. press who concentrated on the military accident and the resulting demonstrations as part of the larger increasing anti-American sentiment on the peninsula.

**South Korean’s perceive the United States as trying to dominate them.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

It has so imbued the modern American approach to international economic affairs, that the American involvement in those matters from Bretton Woods to globalization makes no sense without using that as the starting point. Realists from Morgenthau to Mearsheimer have lamented that the United States is not fundamentally realist in its orientation to the world. This is one reason realist-inclined administrations have repeatedly ended up pursing détente, engagement, the application of democratic peace theory, and the pursuit of international welfare policies, something that became increasingly evident over time with the Bush administration.

Many Koreans do not believe this. Koreans have a limited inclination to depict another society and government as not mainly motivated by narrow national interests. One of the best recent Korean discussions of the contemporary problems in the alliance proposes that the US would have a better image in Korea if there was A candid U.S. acknowledgement that international politics are driven primarily by national interests, including military security, economic opportunities, and political values, and that the alliance is one way of promoting such national interests.11 This is despite the additional contradictory assertion that “the United States tends to regard North Korean as evil, tyrannical, and a hellish nightmare; the ROK seems to view it as dangerous, though frightened and fragile, and requiring a cautions and reassuring approach. This divergence may derive from the fact that the South Korean approach is based on a historical experience with the North and the U.S. attitude is based on a universalist and moralist philosophy.”12 If this is true, and indeed it is, the US will not approach its alliances in a typically realist fashion, and does not have a typically realist national strategy. From the Korean realist perspective the alliance exists because it serves American interests to have bases in Korea for projecting its power so as to maintain its dominance and conduct its rivalry with China (just as was the case during the Cold War vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union). It defended Korea in 1950 because that interest and its credibility for other alliance commitments were on the line. It opposes North Korean nuclear weapons to preserve its privileges as a nuclear “have.” It supported military dictatorships in the ROK because they suited American interests. Any number of Koreans believe the US deliberately divided Korea in 1950, has treated the South as a satellite, and is covertly opposed to unification because it would diminish American influence on the peninsula. Therefore, a stronger Korea must give priority to its specific national interests. It can stop deferring to the US. Just as with DeGaulle’s France (that bastion of realism), the essence of national dignity and the ultimate in national interests is selfsufficiency in national defense. Thus, the alliance has never really represented Koreans’ true needs and interests. Many Americans, of course, talk in terms that reinforce this view. Just like Koreans, they cite American trade and investments in Korea, the strategic value of Korea for US forces, the strategic importance of Korea for Japan – the preeminent American ally in Asia, etc. to explain the alliance. Some of them are realists – this view of the alliance comes naturally to them. Some are catering to Koreans’ view of how the world works. Some are simply repeating what is used to sell the alliance to various communities in the US and Korea.

Withdrawal of US ground forces would be popular with South Koreans.

**Cummings U.S. Army 04(**Colonel John P. Cummings United States Army, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” DA; 7/19/10. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, AV)

Furthermore, the removal of U.S. ground forces would halt the progress of anti-American sentiment among the South Korean population.

South Korea wants the US out

Reid ‘05 (Angus, Global Scan, 9-25-05, <http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/south_koreans_want_us_troops_to_leave/>, da: July 18 2010, MLSF)

Many adults in South Korea believe their country should not accommodate United States military bases, according to a poll by JoongAng Ilbo. 54 per cent of respondents want all U.S. forces currently stationed in their country to be withdrawn. Diplomatic relations between the North and South have been strained since the end of the Korean War. A one-mile demilitarized zone has separated the two countries since 1953. The U.S. currently has 32,500 soldiers in South Korea. The U.S. has close to 230,000 troops stationed all over the world, not including U.S.-based forces currently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In August 2004, U.S. president George W. Bush announced plans to close some overseas military bases, which would reduce the number of soldiers in South Korea to 25,000 by 2008. U.S. defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld is scheduled to meet with South Korean counterpart Yoon Kwang-ung on Oct. 21 in Seoul. The South Korean government said the talks will focus on “bilateral ties and cooperation on the global war of terrorism.”

DA South Korean politics – links - plan controversial

Media sets the agenda – ensures plan will get coverage pitting conservatives against progressives.

**Dr. Shin, Director Korean Studies Program at Stanford, ’10** (Gi-Wook, June, “The Media and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case”, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShinGiWookMedia100628.pdf>, da: 7-22-10, twm)

In particular, the progressive administrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun have promoted ‘nationalist’ views challenging Korea’s dependence on the United States for their national security. Although previous works have documented changes in Korean public “attitudes” or “sentiments” toward the U.S. and the alliance, there is a need to better understand the media’s role in shaping such attitude changes and influencing alliance politics. Public opinion research has indicated an agenda-setting role within the news media for public discussion of key policy issues; exposure to news can significantly influence public opinion and its perceptions of other nations.3 Also, by shaping public opinion, the mass media can indirectly influence foreign policy making processes.4 The media can even provide an important medium in forging a nation’s identity, which would, as constructivists of international relations argue, provide “the foundation of state power and foreign policy.”5 Building on this media research, this paper examines how the South Korean media have covered the alliance issue and assesses how that has contributed to the increasingly contentious alliance politics in the South. It concludes with policy implications that can be useful to both Korean and American policy makers.

Media ensures coverage of the plan would be intense and controversial.

**Dr. Shin, Director Korean Studies Program at Stanford, ’10** (Gi-Wook, June, “The Media and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: The South Korean Case”, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShinGiWookMedia100628.pdf>, da: 7-22-10, twm)

Most people in the United States and South Korea learn about issues of foreign affairs through the mass media, rather than by direct association or involvement. In the case of South Korea, it is entirely possible that the news media have contributed to the public’s changing perceptions of the United States and the bilateral alliance. In the United States, as well, the news media likely have some influence on Americans’ views of Korea, although probably to a lesser degree (for reasons that will be specified later). Given the media’s influence in the realm of foreign affairs as well as domestic politics, the role it plays in shaping issues related to the U.S.-ROK alliance merits a careful examination. Media Environments in South Korea and the United States In understanding media’s role in alliance politics, it is crucial to note the different media environments in the United States and South Korea. In the nineteenth-century United States, most newspapers had an informal party affiliation and openly advocated for their parties’ candidates.12 The U.S. media environment has evolved significantly since that time, however, and objectivity, nonpartisanship, and high standards of journalistic ethics are now the aims of mainstream media organizations. In contrast, the media environment in South Korea today is not much different from that of the nineteenth-century United States. The South Korean news media are sharply divided on key policy issues—both domestic and foreign—in accordance with their ideological leanings. As many observers of Korean affairs have noted, a particular Korean media outlet often reflects only one side of a given issue, espousing almost entirely conservative or progressive views, depending on its leadership, orientation, and/or audience.13 This sharp division includes views of the North Korea issue and South Korea’s relationship with the United States. Most progressive newspapers characterize themselves as nationalist and seek to expedite the inter-Korean reconciliation process while questioning the rationale for the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula.

DA South Korean Politics – Impact scenario - economy

KFTA key to competitiveness.

**Edmonson ’10** (June 29, R.G., Journal of Commerce Online, “White House Seeks Free Trade with Korea;”, lexis, twm)

The Bush administration completed a free trade pact with South Korea in 2007, and export advocates have questioned why the Obama administration has not moved forward with it, particularly since the announcement of an initiative to double exports in five years. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said his office is now ready to move forward after discussions of the earlier agreement with the industry and members of Congress. He noted that beef and automobile exports had been sticking points. Now, at President Obama s direction, we look forward to finalizing ways to address these concerns, level the playing field for U.S. workers and producers and deliver to Americans the jobs and economic opportunity this agreement can bring, Kirk said. The United States hopes to complete the agreement in time for the president s visit to South Korea in November for the next G20 meeting. Saturday s announcement won wide approval from the industry. Frank Vargo, vice president for international economic affairs at the National Association of Manufacturers, called it Great news! Korea is a more than $300 billion import market, and we are on the verge of being shut out as the European Union implements its trade agreement with Korea. Scott Davis, chairman and chief executive of UPS, said the agreement means more jobs and more global competitiveness for the two countries. He said the agreement contains vital provisions for the express delivery industry, including better market access and customs clearance.

DA South Korean Politics – Impact scenario uniqueness – KFTA won’t pass

Congress won’t approve KFTA – beef tariffs.

**Chan and Calmes ’10** (Sewell and Jackie, June 27, New York Times, lexis, twm)

Response from Congress was mixed. Representative Sander M. Levin, the powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, said that the agreement as negotiated by the Bush administration ''does not effectively address the regulatory and tax barriers that have led to one-way trade and hurt our industrial sector as well as kept out our beef.''

Congress won’t approve KFTA – no consultation.

**Chan and Calmes ’10** (Sewell and Jackie, June 27, New York Times, lexis, twm)

Mr. Levin, Democrat of Michigan, added: ''Congress expects to be consulted actively in these negotiations, and the date targeted by the president can be met only if the outstanding issues are fully addressed with enforceable commitments.''

Congress won’t approve KFTA – beef tariffs.

**Chan and Calmes ’10** (Sewell and Jackie, June 27, New York Times, lexis, twm)

Senator Max Baucus, the Montana Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, said he would support ratification as long as ''the unscientific barriers Korea has erected against American beef'' were removed.

KFTA won’t pass – labor groups.

**Chan and Calmes ’10** (Sewell and Jackie, June 27, New York Times, lexis, twm)

The South Korea free-trade agreement is one of three -- the others are Colombia and Panama -- that were completed under the Bush administration. Neither the Obama administration nor Congressional Democrats have moved to complete the accords. In the case of the Latin American countries, labor groups have cited a variety of objections concerning the treatment of union workers. In the case of South Korea, the United Automobile Workers union and Ford have asserted that South Korea has not provided the United States with sufficient market access for American auto exports. General Motors and Chrysler, which have made headway in the Korean market, have supported ratification. ''The U.S. has been notably absent on trade and investment liberalization efforts while the European Union and Canada have moved vigorously to conclude trade deals,'' said Daniel M. Price, who worked on trade and international economics during both Bush presidencies. ''Three pending free-trade agreements have languished in the absence of administration and Congressional support for their approval.''

DA South Korean Politics – Impact scenario uniqueness – KFTA will pass

KFTA by November.

**Edmonson ’10** (June 29, R.G., Journal of Commerce Online, “White House Seeks Free Trade with Korea;”, lexis, twm)

President Obama and South Korea President Lee Myung-bak intend to complete a free trade agreement by November, the two announced during a meeting at the G20 summit in Toronto on Saturday. The Bush administration completed a free trade pact with South Korea in 2007, and export advocates have questioned why the Obama administration has not moved forward with it, particularly since the announcement of an initiative to double exports in five years. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said his office is now ready to move forward after discussions of the earlier agreement with the industry and members of Congress. He noted that beef and automobile exports had been sticking points. Now, at President Obama s direction, we look forward to finalizing ways to address these concerns, level the playing field for U.S. workers and producers and deliver to Americans the jobs and economic opportunity this agreement can bring, Kirk said. The United States hopes to complete the agreement in time for the president s visit to South Korea in November for the next G20 meeting.

Obama pushing KFTA now – it’s key to economic recovery.

**Chan and Calmes ’10** (Sewell and Jackie, June 27, New York Times, lexis, twm)

''The U.S. has been notably absent on trade and investment liberalization efforts while the European Union and Canada have moved vigorously to conclude trade deals,'' said Daniel M. Price, who worked on trade and international economics during both Bush presidencies. ''Three pending free-trade agreements have languished in the absence of administration and Congressional support for their approval.'' Mr. Price added, ''The announcement to reinvigorate efforts on the Korea agreement is a welcome break with past administration silence.'' The European Union recently completed a free-trade accord with South Korea, and Canada is close to a similar deal. At the G-8 summit talks this weekend, the Canadian prime minister, Stephen Harper, highlighted the link between economic recovery and trade expansion.

DA ADMM - Uniqueness

ADMM will solve where ASEAN didn’t because it includes Russia and the United States – ADMM has momentum now.

**Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ’10** (K., The Straits Times, June 15, “Towards a better security framework”, lexis, twm)

And when Mr Teo mentioned 'key players', he meant the United States and Russia too. Asean already has a forum involving its six dialogue partners - the East Asia Summit, which encompasses the 10 member-states of Asean plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. By creating a new security platform to include the US and Russia, Asean has completed its long-held aspiration of inviting the superpowers to partake in the regional framework. This is based on the assumption that confidence-building within the region will not be successful without the world's key players guaranteeing the peace and security of the region. For Asean, it is also part of bringing the US closer to the region after long years of a rather inactive relationship. The ADMM+8 forum will thus help strengthen the Asean-US relationship and justify President Barack Obama's renewed engagement with this region.

DA ADMM - Impacts

Comprehensive support for ADMM ensures ability to solve terrorism, piracy, disaster relief and will stop conflicts from escalating.

**The Straits Times** (Singapore) **‘10** (Lee Seok Hwai & Jermyn Chow, June 7, “Strong backing for Asean plus eight security forum”, lexis, twm)

MOST, if not all countries, at the Shangri-La Dialogue back an Asean-led body that will be launched later this year to tackle security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. This includes China, South Korea, Russia and the United States, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean told his defence counterparts, top military brass and analysts from 28 countries at the close of the annual regional defence conference yesterday. Japan and Australia - countries that had previously mooted their own alternatives of strengthening regional cooperation - also support Asean to be the centre of the security grouping, said Mr Teo. Dubbed the Asean Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus Eight (ADMM+8), it will be a gathering of Asean defence ministers and their counterparts beyond the region - Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the US. The group will tackle security issues such as terrorism, piracy, disaster relief and transnational crime. It will be launched in Hanoi in October, and meet every three years subsequently. 'Various, in fact, all countries I spoke to, support such a regional structure,' said Mr Teo. 'The ADMM+8 provides an inclusive yet focused configuration, bringing together, for the first time, the defence establishments of all the key players in the region.' DPM Teo said Asean is the 'fulcrum' of such a regional security set-up and is best placed to strengthen security cooperation because the 10-member grouping is 'neutral, consultative and open to engagement'. 'Through this process, Asean helps to ensure that mistrust or disagreements do not lead to tensions, and tensions do not spiral into confrontation and conflict.' Beyond just becoming a talk shop, the new security set-up will also allow countries to cooperate in practical ways such as multilateral military exercises. DPM Teo said: 'Only through working together can one truly understand each other's viewpoints and constraints, reducing suspicions while increasing comfort levels to work better together.' Vietnamese Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh said the new structure will develop stronger links with counterparts from outside the region. Asean first proposed in 2004 setting up a formal dialogue for Asean defence ministers to exchange views and build mutual trust. They started meeting two years later. Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said the ADMM has done well, not only in concept, but in practice. For example, Asean militaries will, for the first time, train together to respond to natural disasters next year.

**ADMM can solve armed conflicts, proliferation, terrorism, piracy, and infectious diseases.**

**Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ’10** (K., The Straits Times, June 15, “Towards a better security framework”, lexis, twm)

Moreover, the ADMM+8 can be considered an 'additional ingredient' to the security-centric regional forum, the Asean Regional Forum (ARF). But whereas the ARF has remained a foreign ministry-dominated structure, the ADMM+8 will involve defence ministers among the participating countries and their concerns over the threats to the region, both traditional and non-traditional security issues. Armed conflicts, territorial disputes and nuclear proliferation are not the only serious threats to the region. In the past few years, this region has been beset by non-traditional security issues including terrorism, piracy, natural disasters, transnational crimes and infectious diseases. The ADMM+8 will be assigned to handle this new set of issues. Expertise from the eight dialogue partners will allow the region to become better equipped to handle unforeseen circumstances.

ADMM solves multiple hot spots in Asia.

**Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ’10** (K., The Straits Times, June 15, “Towards a better security framework”, lexis, twm)

THE Asean Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus Eight has finally got the leaders' nod for its first gathering to be held in Hanoi, Vietnam, in October this year. The nod could not have come at a better time. Peace and security in the East Asia region have in recent weeks been disturbed by the possibility of renewed conflict between North and South Korea. In South-east Asia, periodic military clashes between Thailand and Cambodia over the ownership of the Preah Vihear temple has put Asean's conflict resolution mechanism to the test. Competing territorial claims over the South China Sea among a number of Asean member-states and China have continued to challenge established ties between the grouping and Beijing. All these have without doubt placed the state of the region's security under the world's spotlight. Known now as the ADMM+8, the framework will centre on Asean, making it a driving force in leading security-related dialogue and discussion in East and South-east Asia. Singapore Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean declared at the end of the Shangri-La Dialogue: 'The ADMM+8 provides an inclusive yet focused configuration, bringing together, for the first time, the defence establishments of all the key players in the region.'

**ADMM leads to peace in the region and the ability to solve climate change and energy security.**

**Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ’10** (K., The Straits Times, June 15, “Towards a better security framework”, lexis, twm)

The forum will offer Asean another opportunity to ensure that existing ties between the region and its dialogue partners will be more deeply consolidated. Combined efforts to tackle security issues will make the region a safer place. In time, ADMM+8 may also serve as a model for a new regional architecture to discuss issues such as energy security and climate change.

ADMM addition of Russian will further peace in the region.

**Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ’10** (K., The Straits Times, June 15, “Towards a better security framework”, lexis, twm)

As for Russia, an enthusiastic dialogue partner of Asean, the ADMM+8 forum will further require commitment on the part of Moscow to contribute to peace-building in the region, especially in East Asia, to which Russia belongs geographically.

Empirically proven that ASEAN can solve conflicts.

**Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ’10** (K., The Straits Times, June 15, “Towards a better security framework”, lexis, twm)

Asean has been known for playing its role as a neutral and consultative grouping. Its primary role as an honest broker in the past - from the Cambodian conflict to humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which hit Myanmar in 2008 - will be further highlighted in the upcoming ADMM+8.

CP Humanitarian propaganda 1NC

**CP text: Lee Myung-bak in a joint operation with the United States of America should announce baseline preparation for the collapse of the North Korean government.**

The Counterplan attacks Kim Jung-Il politically, preventing further provocations.

**Bennet holds a Ph.D. in policy analysis from RAND Graduate Institute, ’10** (Bruce, online: <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2010/06/30/GA.html>, da: 7-20-10, ec)

Lee should announce that the baseline preparation for a collapse of the North Korean government involves humanitarian aid (including food, feeder grain and medicine), which is already desperately needed. Because the roads that lead across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) are inadequate to carry all of the food aid that would be needed, Lee could task South Korean and U.S. Marines to prepare to deliver food and other humanitarian aid along the coasts of North Korea by practicing aid delivery along South Korea's east and west coasts, filming these exercises, and broadcasting/sending pictures and film into North Korea. The message would be clear: South Korea and the U.S. are not your enemies and are not causing your problems. They are instead preparing to help you when your government no longer interferes. There will be those who say that such an approach is hardly an adequate punishment of North Korea for the outrageous act of sinking the Cheonan. Yet this action would directly attack Kim's strategy, and he would, presumably, be furious. If the U.S. and South Korea wish to deter future North Korean provocations, they need to convince Kim that he will suffer further personal costs from such actions. There will also be those who oppose this approach as too extreme. They feel that North Korea is more likely to respond to carrots than sticks. But realism suggests otherwise. With its currency revaluation last December, the North Korean regime rejected the markets that the international community offers and China has recommended. Even as North Korea had begun to experience the importance of markets, it rejected the economic strength they provide in favor of political control. And who can believe that North Korea will give up all of its nuclear weapons, given the huge leverage they afford the regime both internally and externally? The conclusion seems clear: It is time to take action that imposes political costs on Kim, putting him on notice that further provocations will only increase the price he has to pay. Because the North Korean government is so opaque, we can only speculate as to Kim Jong-il's objectives and strategies.

CP Humanitarian Propaganda – Solvency extensions

CP solves the incentive for North Korea to escalate tensions which takes us off the brink of any war scenarios in the region.

**Bennet holds a Ph.D. in policy analysis from RAND Graduate Institute, ’10** (Bruce, online: <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2010/06/30/GA.html>, da: 7-20-10, ec)

Provocations appear to be how Kim deals with his personal weaknesses, and those of his regime. He has used them to demonstrate his power with nuclear weapons tests and this naval "victory." He has sought to divert the attention of the North Korean elites, blaming external enemies for his regime's failings, and recently trying to support the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un. He has tried to secure U.S. and international attention to the plight of North Korea, aiming to increase aid to his country and have it recognized as a nuclear power. And with the Cheonan sinking, it would appear he hoped to dishearten the South Korean military and the government of President Lee Myung-bak for failing to protect the ship. Kim has sought a Cold War-like condition with South Korea and the U.S. as a form of "diversionary conflict." But the Cheonan sinking suggests that he may be experimenting with a more serious escalation to a limited war footing, perhaps to rally military support for his son's succession. If so, Kim may already be planning an escalated military attack, just as he used nuclear tests after the initial provocations of missile tests in 2006 and 2009. To keep the escalation limited, he would likely pursue another plausibly deniable attack, perhaps using submarines again or special forces. Attacking Kim's strategy requires some creativity. For example, economic sanctions hurt the North Korean people and especially the elites, demonstrating that the U.S. and South Korea are their enemies, which is exactly what Kim wants. Alternatively, retaliation by military attack on North Korean forces would likely do limited damage to the North Korean military, but would support Kim's strategy by rallying his military behind the regime. Such an attack could also lead to serious, unintended escalation. A different approach is needed. South Korean President Lee has already taken the first step and promised defensive actions to prevent repetition of this kind of provocation. He should now promptly invest in: 1) the sensors that could detect submarine penetrations of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) that is the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas; 2) the ability to make a response to such penetrations; and 3) enhanced defenses against other possible North Korean provocations. The absence of easy provocations may deter some North Korean actions. Lee could attack the North Korean strategy by announcing that North Korea sank the Cheonan because Kim is trying to manage his weaknesses and North Korean instability. In response to Kim's desire for greater attention, the U.S. and South Korea could give him attention he does not want by declaring that North Korean instability is forcing both governments to prepare for a collapse of its regime, without trying to cause a collapse. This policy is like buying fire insurance: I don't expect my house to burn down this year or even in the next five years, but I have insurance to recover from such a catastrophe should it occur. Similarly, more preparations are needed for a North Korean government collapse, and for subsequent South Korean-led unification of the peninsula.

CP First Strike North Korea

Text: The United States should strike suspected North Korean nuclear weapons facilities using conventionally armed precision weapons.

CP solves North Korean nuclearization.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 03(“Alternatives to Letting North Korea Go Nuclear” 7/19/10, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3267/alternatives_to_letting_north_korea_go_nuclear.html>, AV)

A second alternative is to use military force to arrest North Korea’s race to nuclear weapons**.** I described previously the attack plan on Yongbyon we devised in 1994, the last time North Korea was moving towards reprocessing at Yongbyon. A strike with conventionally-armed precision weapons at Yongbyon’s fuel rods and reprocessing facility would not eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program, but it would set it back for years. If we were to strike Yongbyon, North Korea would have a choice. It could respond by lashing out at South Korea through an invasion over the DMZ, but that would precipitate a war that would surely mean the end of the North Korean regime. There is no guaranteeing that the North would not make such a foolish choice. But that is the risk we must run in this option; it is the risk worth taking to avoid the disaster associated with the first alternative of letting North Korea go nuclear. As a practical matter, we are in a much better position to threaten or conduct such a strike if we have previously made an effort to talk North Korea out of its nuclear programs. Even if you are a pessimist about the success of talks, therefore, they are a prerequisite for exercising this alternative.

K Threat Construction - Links

North Korea isn’t a real threat, but treating it as one incentivizes other countries to develop nuclear weapons

Scott Thompson was a professor at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts University, ‘09 (“Baiting a trap for the mouse that roared”, 6/3/09, New Straight Times, Accessed through LexisNexis, DA: 7/19/10, ETC)

The real threat from North Korea's nuclear weapons is not that it would or could use them in the region; by the point a crisis had ratcheted up to that point, China would have closed down Pyongyang's oil supplies, Japan would have thrown its post-war "defence-limited" constitutional constraints away, and South Korea would have mobilised. More pertinently, the Seventh Fleet would have moved in for the kill. It's rather that North Korea, in "getting away with it", sends a signal to Iran and other would-be nuclear states that club membership is available and brings international respect, not to mention regional fear. It scares Israel, with its 200 nuclear weapons, into heightened military preparations and sets back the ever-receding normalisation of ties in that region. But there's a third question. Stephen Bosworth, the present American negotiator for this crisis (and he's my dean, as well as a former ambassador in Seoul), is often quoted as saying that what Pyongyang wants is respect, not military position as such. But if the state is a failed one, and its leadership a joke, why not treat it as such? Nothing diminishes as much as ridicule. What finally destroyed Kwame Nkrumah was a speech by the revered Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere, who from an African unity platform scoffed and laughed at Nkrumah's pretensions given Ghana's diminishing economic reality. It was soon all over for "the Osagyefo" - the "Redeemer", his title around the country. It reminds one of "Dear Leader", doesn't it? Now, I'm not proposing that concerned parties confine their response to the North Korean leadership to laughing at its porn habits, costly Cognac and expansive golf courses. It's too frightening: Seoul is so close to the demilitarised zone and there are still millions of South Koreans who remember the horrors of the Korean War. But look at where the weaponry comes from. North Korea's Gross National Product, though difficult to measure, is around $30US billion (RM104 billion), probably about a 40th of the South's. It's about equivalent to a middling American city, less than a third of that of a major metropolis like Chicago. It can generate short-term fear but not long-term fright. True, that doesn't affect the present nuclear conundrum. But it helps to put matters in perspective. I would encourage leaders to laugh a bit at North Korea. Prostrating themselves hasn't worked very well, after all. Treating Kim Jong-Il with respect has just upped his demands. Deal with him as vulgar; Oscar Wilde observed that as long as war "is regarded as wicked, it will always have its fascination ... when it is looked upon as vulgar, it will cease to be popular". Well, the ridiculous and vulgar mouse has roared but, alas, it's a rat. Rats can be caught too. The real option for all of us is to treat North Korea as a house of cards, with a tiny economy and ill-proportioned military, that can and will collapse, sooner rather than later.

K generic links

**K – pick your favorite and here is a link.**

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

In terms of grand strategy, Washington is seeking an overarching association of the West and its friends for purposes of global security management, much like the one that handles global economic management. An initial point is that it is now customary to extend the concept of security well beyond physical safety from attack by a state. Thus, global security management is about much more than in the past in terms of actors of concern, and the many possible components of what is now often termed “human security.” The West has had a great deal to do with stretching this basic concept in international politics, being responsible, for instance, for getting some potential or actual efforts at genocide inside societies declared threats to “international peace and security.” Along these lines, the main Western strategy for peace and security now involves promoting democracy, capitalism, human rights, and globalization. There is nothing puny about the goals of the prospective association! Those goals are not really controversial among the potential members. It is American insistence on treating resistance to, or behavior contrary to, these goals as a threat that often deserves a coercive, particularly military, approach that is seriously contested. This is hardly surprising given the ambitious sweep of the American perspective. It envisions a massive collective management of the international system under US leadership, and not with a status quo orientation. The aim is a forthright effort at radical change. In this sense the United States is a revolutionary state in the international system, seeking partners in a transformative reign. No other democracy is thinking in quite this way, with the possible exception of Britain under Tony Blair. Instead, when it comes to making substantial efforts up to and including the use of force, those governments think primarily in terms of a) regional security improvements and b) gradual change in the international system under Western encouragement. They favor giving history more of a nudge than a rude shove. Hence the pattern that has emerged. Cooperation on the overall goals along these lines now exists, enough to make rulers uncomfortable from Moscow and Beijing to the Middle East and many other places. But the Americans are regularly frustrated with their allies for being insufficiently ambitious about the cause and too leery of possible costs and difficulties, complications and casualties. They aren’t helping enough and, all too often, are critical of American leadership. That stimulates American feelings, dating to a much earlier Cold War era that the allies are ultimately free-riding and status-quo orientated. From this have emerged familiar assertions associated particularly with the “neocons”: the allies are more trouble than they’re worth, too unreliable and under-equipped in military situations, not going to pull their weight. Washington is better off acting unilaterally or with coalitions of the willing. Multilateralizing the American response on major security issues is now likely to lead only to half-hearted efforts and disastrous results. It is frequently claimed that this attitude is no longer fashionable, given the disaster the Iraq war has become. After all, the US has painfully discovered how much it needs its friends and international legitimation for its efforts. However, American alienation from its allies arose long before the Bush administration. Disparagement of having to act with allies was common in the Cold War and was quite evident in the Clinton years. It will readily return. As for American allies, they are equally frustrated about the United States. It wants to lead but, in their view, in a rather authoritarian way, quite unsuited to a clutch of democracies. It is also too unilaterally inclined. It doesn’t “consult” enough, a word which they usually use as if it meant “take our advice.” It doesn’t limit its actions to those legitimized in some larger collective decision process. These irritating behavior patterns are made more disturbing by the fact that the United States regularly takes security issues too seriously. It sees threats as greater and more urgent than they are and therefore overreacts, becoming too ready to take extreme steps including the use of coercion. This frustration has been clearly evident in recent years in NATO and other US alliances. However, in the US-ROK alliance, it has posed particularly troublesome difficulties. The broad ROK position is that the US has failed to adjust to today’s stronger Korean national feelings and to the enormous progress of South Korea that has helped inspire those feelings. The alliance has not been adjusted to the ways South Korea is now a much more significant country. It needs to become more

K link – US presence is about capitalism and democracy promotion.

**Morgan, professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, ‘07** (Patrick, Ph.D. from Yale, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions Of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities”, ciao, twm)

In fact, while the United States set about protecting South Korea years ago for classic realist reasons in the Cold War, its relationship with South Korea always also turned on US promotion of economic development, democracy, and social liberalization for the ROK.