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1NC Reverse Spending D.A. Shell (1/4)

A. The Future Combat System and F-22 are at the mercy of funding shortages – new costs have put the programs on their last legs

Eaglen and Allison 6/7/2k10(Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Julia Bertelsmann, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Allison Center, assisted with the preparation of this report, “U.S. Defense Spending: The Mismatch Between Plans And Resources,” *States News Service*, pg nexis)

In turn, increasing costs have reduced acquisition plans even further, perpetuating the dysfunctional cycle at enormous cost and with significant consequences for the force. While purchasing more advanced equipment can offset Pentagon decisions not to replace systems on a one-for-one basis, there are limits to this approach. At some point, sheer numbers outweigh the advantages of advanced capabilities because each ship, plane, and vehicle can be in only one place at one time. If the U.S. intends to continue fulfilling its commitments around the globe, increasing capability alone is not enough. It must be backed by a sufficient quantity of next-generation systems. After more than a decade and millions of dollars in funding, only three DDG-1000s are being built. Recent defense procurement is replete with similar examples of programs that have been terminated short of originally planned numbers or that have entered the dreaded defense "death spiral." The Army's Future Combat Systems program, the program to replace OH-58D Kiowa helicopters, the Marine Corps' Osprey program, and the F-22 tactical fighter program have been truncated or eliminated, largely as a result of unbudgeted cost growth. Ultimately, all of these programs have suffered from disconnects between the Defense Department's proposed plans and annual budgets. Acquisition Reform Without Significant Procurement Account Growth. For more than a century, think tanks and congressional oversight bodies have produced numerous studies on acquisition problems. Regrettably, many of the changes implemented to streamline the defense acquisition system have instead added layers of regulations and complex requirements that have made the process less competitive, more costly, and more cumbersome. For the most part, these efforts have failed to rein in costs or alleviate schedule delays. Instead, additional layers of red tape, combined with a growing number of personnel to oversee a declining number of new programs, have only exacerbated cost increases and schedule delays[32] without adding accountability to the process. Delays and cost overruns that were often the result of government changes, not contractor inabilities, have the added consequence of making weapons systems easy political targets. Meanwhile, the underlying causes of cost growth-such as barriers to entry in the defense market and excessively demanding regulations and standards-are often poorly understood. The favored solution of many policymakers, including those in the Obama Administration, is often simply to slash "underperforming" programs.

B. Troop Withdrawal Saves MASSIVE amounts of Money that will be Re-directed to Weapons Programs

Military Times 2k9

(“Faster troop withdrawal may save $1 trillion,” 9/5, pg online @ <http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2009/09/military_troopwithdrawals_cost_090309w/> //da7/15)

A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says. That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion. The budget forecast, issued as Congress is about to return from a summer break and confront questions about budget priorities and deficit spending, says defense costs are uncertain because budget analysts cannot predict the number of deployed troops and the pace of operations. The $7.4 trillion price tag is based on the number of deployed troops remaining at about 210,000, but looks at two scenarios for reductions: • A sharp reduction in troops over three years, resulting in $1.1 trillion in savings. Under this projection, the number of deployed troops falls to 160,000 in 2010; to 100,000 in 2011; to 35,000 in 2012 and to 30,000 from 2013 to 2019. • A more gradual decline that shaves $700 billion off the $7.4 trillion defense spending estimate. It assumes 210,000 deployed troops in 2010; 190,000 in 2011; 150,000 in 2012; 100,000 in 2013 and 75,000 in 2014 and beyond. The report does not suggest what the money saved from the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan should be used for, but the Defense Department surely would make a bid to keep at least some of it to pay for unfunded weapons modernization programs.

1NC Reverse Spending D.A. Shell (2/4)

C. They’ll be Directed at FCS – Congress Views FCS as Zero-Sum with Military Deployments

Center for Security Policy 2k5

(“An army of none? Congress should build, not impede, the transformational 'future combat systems',” pg online @ <http://web.archive.org/web/20061130021953/www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_35> //da: 7/16)

Unfortunately, some on Capitol Hill are opposing the funding required to develop and field the Future Combat Systems. Seemingly, this opposition stems from a failure to appreciate the truly transformational nature of the FCS and the critical role it can - and must - play in providing for America's defense in the decades to come. It appears as well to rely heavily on criticisms contained in a now-dated Government Accountability Office (GAO) report issued in April 2004. Such efforts could, if unchecked, lead to the reduction of funding by a half billion dollars during FY06 that the Army itself describes as critical for the development of FCS to test it at Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2006. Even worse, the efforts could lead to a breaking up of the very heart of FCS' network, in favor of a return to conventional approaches. The GAO report reinforced several commonly held misconceptions about the Future Combat Systems initiative. They fail to take into account the impressive progress that has been made to date in the FCS program. # One such fallacy is the notion that the current development of FCS technology is insufficiently advanced for designers to meet future goals and costs. If true, decision-makers would be obliged to approve funding for a program that is untested and unproven. This criticism appears to arise from the fact that the GAO uses a different benchmark for evaluating program maturity than does the Department of Defense. Instead of the lagging program the GAO indicates, FCS is currently on track to conform to DOD's stringent requirements, with all technologies scheduled to meet their Program Need Dates. # Some staff critics in the House of Representatives have suggested, erroneously, that progress in FCS development to date has been lackluster and unanticipated design problems could be expected to only worsen the situation down the road. In reality, the FCS program is far better equipped to identify and address any future problems than its critics appreciate. The use of synchronized maturity periods known as "Integration Phases," has allowed FCS developers an unprecedented ability to anticipate and rectify problems before they appear. # The perception that the FCS program is behind schedule is also inaccurate. In fact, it is on schedule at nearly 15% of funding already expended by June 2005 - a performance milestone that, when reached by other defense programs in the past, has almost always proven an indicator of future success. 'Penny Foolish, Pound Stupid' Some in Congress contend that it is not possible to fully fund the Future Combat Systems while spending for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such a trade-off mentality is a recipe for disaster. In the interest of alleviating a present budget crunch, it would compound the spending bow-wave problem already afflicting the Pentagon's planned modernization programs. The result would be to deny the Army the ability to bring to bear critical technologies needed to maintain America's preeminence on the battlefield, and, therefore, possibly its success there. In light of the fact that the defense budget is still at a relatively low percentage of the Nation's GDP when compared to past allocations, it would be undesirable - if not actually recklessly irresponsible - to run such risks, especially in light of recently announced increases in federal revenues. Particularly troubling is the proposal being advanced by some in Congress that the various Future Combat Systems components be split up into separate development tracks. Doing so would only serve to damage the strategic underpinnings of the entire program - i.e., its emphasis on integrated command and control. Without this critical central feature, the Pentagon could be left with a class of vehicles and weapons that would be disconnected from each other and unable decisively and successfully to confront heavier enemy forces. Were such a recommendation to be followed, it may

well lead to a FCS program unable to fulfill its main objective of a more lethal yet lighter and more readily deployable ground force. The Bottom Line The FCS is one of the ambitious transformational programs ever embarked upon by the U.S. Department of Defense. It will fundamentally alter the way the military thinks and operates. Such a revolutionary family of systems undeniably carries with it some technological risk, but it also promises a host of tangible benefits. If the U.S. military, especially the Army, is to survive in the rapidly changing battlespace of the 21st Century, it must embrace the sort of futuristic approach inherent in the Future Combat Systems. Talk about the desirability of and need for "force transformation" is cheap. Unfortunately, realizing it is not. The FCS represents one of the most important steps taken to date to achieve this goal. Were funding for this program to be substantially cut now, the effect would be as predictable as it would be undesirable: to imperil and possibly to preclude the realization of a critical family of capabilities made possible by swift technical development.

1NC Reverse Spending D.A. Shell (3/4)

D. That Causes Directed Energy Weapons

National Defense Magazine 2k1

(“Directed-Energy Weapons Promise 'Low Cost Per Kill',” pg online @ <http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/national-security-international/809833-1.html> //da: 7/16)

Laser weapons for ground combat--ranging from air-defense chemical lasers that destroy incoming rockets to smaller devices that could zap enemy antennas--are the focus of several Defense Department projects currently under way. If the technology pans out, the U.S. Army, for example, would be able to equip its future combat vehicles with all-electric laser guns. Government and industry experts agreed that, even though there are still technological and doctrinal hurdles to overcome, the use of lasers in tactical weapon systems could bring about new types of armaments that would be more accurate than explosive-based munitions and much less costly. The word laser is an acronym for "laser amplification by stimulated emission of radiation." Lasers are possible, because of the way light interacts with electrons, which exist at different energy levels. The first laser was invented more than 40 years ago. Interest in directed-energy weapons has been growing within the U.S. military services. The Air Force is developing a megawatt airborne laser that would destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles. The service, additionally, is in the early stages of developing a space-based laser, also as an anti-ICBM weapon. For ground combat, the U.S. Army is working on smaller lasers that could defend against rockets, artillery, mortars, cruise missiles, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles. The Army and the Israeli government have spent about $200 million on a tactical high-energy laser, a program that began about five years ago. The THEL is a ground-based air-defense chemical laser designed to destroy Katyusha and other short- range rockets. The beam's heat destroys the rocket by causing it to detonate. THEL is a promising start, but it's not what the U.S. Army needs, because it's not mobile, said Richard J. Bradshaw Jr., the service's program manager for directed energy technology. "Israel would be happy with a tractor-trailer size THEL," he said. But the United States wants a system that can fit on a C-130 medium-lift aircraft. The current THEL weighs about 400,000 pounds, about 10 times the payload capacity of the C-130. The Army is expected to complete a study next month on the development of a mobile THEL. Funding could be a problem, given that all $200 million spent on THEL so far have been congressional add-ons. For fiscal 2002, Congress is expected to allocate $30 million for THEL. "We always come up to the wire," said Bradshaw, during an interview in Huntsville, Ala. Rather than rely on lastminute add-ons, Bradshaw would like for the Army to provide a long-term budget for the program. "We need to get it to the troops and start testing the laser," he said. A lot of testing will be required before the Army could even consider deploying laser weapons, Bradshaw explained. Commanders need to be convinced that lasers are safe and that the operators are proficient, he said. "The air commanders worry about the safety of a laser pointing up into the sky," Bradshaw said. Just like with any other weapon, one problem in a combined arms environment is identifying friend and foe. "With THEL, if there is a [friendly] aircraft in its flight path, it creates a zone around it in the computer. The beam cuts off and cuts on, on the other side." Bradshaw said the next step for THEL, in addition to making it mobile, is to make it work with other systems, such as Patriot. "We want to plug and play with operational Patriot systems," he said. One advantage of killing enemy missiles with a laser is the relatively low cost compared to kinetic-energy missiles. The Patriot's newest missile, the PAC-3, currently costs $3.8 million a piece. A THEL shot is estimated to cost about $8,000. The Holy Grail for the Army's laser program, however, is a 100-kilowatt solid-state laser. Solid-state are all-electric lasers. Unlike chemical lasers, which require a chemical reaction , the solid-state devices use electric power to convert the energy of the crystal into laser power. In the future, if the Army can develop a large solid-state laser, the cost per kill would be measured in cents, not dollars, Bradshaw said. A solid-state laser gun mounted on a hybrid-electric Humvee truck would make the cost of operating that weapon essentially whatever it costs to put diesel fuel in the truck engine. The advantages of solid-state lasers for the Army would be significant, because these systems would cost less and would be easier to maintain than chemical lasers, he said. But the solid-state technology is not mature, and there are technical problems to be solved, such as the cooling of the laser materials, which tend to overheat. "These things have a lot of complex piping," said Bradshaw. A solid-state laser that can be used as a tactical weapon may not be available until 2015. The Army has developed a 10-kilowatt solid-state laser, which is the largest of that kind ever built, said Bradshaw. The Army's solid-state laser program will receive about $90 million during the next five years, he said. For the future combat system, the Army's next-generation tank, the goal is to have a 100-kilowatt, un-cooled, solid-state laser, Bradshaw said. Until the FCS is developed, the preferred vehicle to test a laser is a hybrid-electric Humvee, because it provides on-board power generation. In the commercial sector, TRW Inc. has built 4-5 kilowatt solid-state lasers, for industrial machining applications. The company is a prime contractor for military chemical-laser programs, including THEL, the airborne laser and the space-based laser projects. The Army contracted much of the development work on the 100-kilowatt solid-state laser to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and to the Raytheon Company's directed energy weapons division. The company has produced more than 30,000 solid-state lasers for weapon rangefinders and target designators, said Brad Sowers, head of directed-energy weapons programs at Raytheon. "We are looking at whether you can demonstrate a mobile directed-energy weapon on a Humvee," he said in an interview. Achieving that goal, he said, could take several years. "We have to demonstrate that we can scale the power to weapon-class level and provide the thermal management--the cooling," he explained. It's not as simple as cooling your car's engine, he said. "A lot of engineering needs to be done to perfect the heat-exchange process and package it, so that it can fit on a mobile vehicle." When it comes to introducing laser weapons into the battlefield, the technology is only part of the equation, Bowers said. The safety factor is no different than with other weapons, he said. "It's like a gun. If you point and shoot, it'll damage. It has to be handled like any other weapon that has destructive properties. "As we produce these things, there is a lot to be learned about how to handle the radiation coming out of the laser, how to control the beam, how to protect the operators" from potentially being blinded by a laser beam, he said.

1NC Reverse Spending D.A. Shell (4/4)

E) Extinction

Marshal 95

(Professor and internationally recognized expert on laser and light bio-effects in the field of ophthalmology (John l “A Horrifying New Laser Weapon That the World Should Ban Now” APRIL 12, 1995. <http://www.iht.com/articles/1995/04/12/edmar.php> //da: 7/15)

GENEVA— In the next few years a new and horrifying weapon could begin appearing on the world's battlefields: blinding laser weapons. In the United States, more than 1,100 small laser rifles are said to have been field tested. The Pentagon reportedly considered, but fortunately ruled out, the deployment of anti-personnel lasers among the new "nonlethal" weapons it recently sent to Somalia to cover the withdrawal of United Nations forces. Once these small laser weapons are produced on a large scale, they will probably cost less than an ordinary rifle, and their proliferation among terrorists and other criminals is to be expected. Until now most applications of laser technology have served humanity. Lasers are used in communication, civil engineering, home entertainment and commerce. Their use in medical diagnosis and surgery have enabled treatments that would previously have been unthinkable. It could be argued that even in the military arena their introduction has had a beneficial effect by making some weapons, such as "smart bombs," more discriminatory. However, the very properties that make lasers so useful in eye surgery are exploitable as offensive anti-personnel weapons. Because it concentrates light falling on its surface, the human eye is extremely vulnerable to damage from high intensity lights. It is sad and repugnant that some would consider turning the scientific advances created by lasers into a device to be used to blind human beings. Portable laser rifles, or even small lasers clipped onto normal rifles, could emit invisible and silent beams of pulsed optical radiation.L Victims would not realize they were under attack until it was too late; they could be permanently blinded in less than two-millionths of a second. Potential victims would not have to look directly into such laser beams; blindness could be caused by hemorrhages created by a beam entering the eye obliquely. Although there are goggles that protect against any laser emitting a single wavelength, it is relatively simple to design an anti-personnel laser that can fire a variety of wavelengths. Goggles that protect against several wavelengths would be extremely dense and those that protect against all wavelengths would be opaque.L Goggles that protect against all laser wavelengths have proved impossible to design. Some claim that the laser rifles can be used to inflict only temporary blindness. But it is impossible to design a laser that can only temporarily blind or dazzle. A laser that could dazzle toward the end of its range would inevitably cause permanent blindness nearer the source. Aiming for temporary blindness under battlefield conditions appears impossible. Such blindness, particularly at a young age, is not just another injury. There is no prosthesis for a destroyed retina. The instantaneous blinding of young people inevitably results in severe depression and frequently in suicidal tendencies. Rehabilitation for the blind is always a slow, demanding and extremely costly process. Based on extensive consultations with military, medical and technical experts, the International Committee of the Red Cross has concluded that blinding in warfare should be outlawed under international humanitarian law, and it is heading a campaign to achieve this. Its appeal has been supported by 25 countries that favor the adoption of a prohibition on the use of lasers intentionally to blind when governments meet in Vienna in September to review the 1980 UN Conference on Excessively Injurious Conventional Weapons. The assembly of the World Health Organization, which convenes in Geneva in May, should also call for a ban on blinding weapons on the basis that they abuse medical knowledge for an inhumane purpose and, if used, will divert scarce health resources. For once, the international community has the opportunity to outlaw the use and prevent the proliferation of an abhorrent form of warfare before the genie is out of the bottle. If, on the other hand, governments are unwilling or unable to deal with the threat of blinding weapons now, the chances of humanity surviving the challenges of the next century are slim.

\*\*\*Uniqueness\*\*\*

2NC Uniq Wall

Cuts Coming Now – Lack of Funds Mean Trade-offs are INEVITABLE

Congress Daily 6/21/2k10

(“Tough choices confront defense budget cutters,” pg online @ <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/062110cdam2.htm> da 7/14)

But the discussion inside the Beltway has shifted within the past year from shielding the military's accounts from the type of fiscal belt-tightening that is now a reality for most other federal agencies to making the Pentagon an active participant in cost-cutting exercises. For its part, the Pentagon recently announced a five-year effort to find more than $100 billion in savings within the Defense Department's budget and reinvest that money into higher-priority force structure and modernization accounts. Two-thirds of the savings are expected to come from unnecessary overhead costs, which make up roughly 40 percent of the Pentagon's budget. The rest will come from cuts to weapons systems and other investment accounts that the military deems it no longer needs -- a painful prospect for the armed services and lawmakers on Capitol Hill, who are reluctant to cut programs they've championed for years. The cost-cutting effort is designed to make the Pentagon able to live within a base budget that is expected to have only 1 percent real growth annually -- a relatively modest raise for a department whose base budget has nearly doubled in size since 2001. At the same time, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., has announced that his panel will launch a review to find cost savings, presumably starting with the fscal 2012 budget. "It's not just a matter of dollars; it's how you spend them," Skelton said recently. "You spend [it] all on bows and arrows in a bigger budget, you don't have much." Some budget hawks argue that the Pentagon is not going far enough and should actually reduce the size of its accounts -- not continue to grow its overall budget each year. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank, D-Mass., who was joined by Reps. Ron Paul, R-Texas, and Walter Jones, R-N.C., has released a study that proposes defense cuts that total nearly $1 trillion over the next 10 years. And Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., has proposed freezing the size of the defense budget until the Pentagon can produce an audit of its accounts. "Change is in the wind," said Winslow Wheeler, a former Senate budget analyst now at the Center for Defense Information. "[Defense Secretary Robert] Gates and people like Skelton are fighting a rearguard action where they're trying to express the view where we know the party's over but we sure would like to keep the spending at its ultra high level like it's at now." But even Wheeler -- who says Gates is "missing the boat" and does not grasp the sense of urgency in the need to cut the size of the defense budget -- credits the Defense secretary with taking a stab at reform. "I like Gates - I just wish he'd do more of what he's doing," Wheeler said. Others, however, see Gates' five-year plan as a significant challenge, one that could prompt a cultural change within a Pentagon that has grown accustomed to spending freely. Jacques Gansler, the Pentagon's acquisition chief during the Clinton administration, said Gates is "calling attention to the fact" that the Pentagon needs to worry about affordability, change the way it does business, and do more with less money. Meanwhile, David Berteau, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said it would be impossible to cut tens of billions of dollars from overhead in the defense budget without making significant changes. "There's a popular view that there's so much fluff or waste or mismanagement that there's billions and billions of dollars to be picked up," Berteau said. "The reality is, to get that kind of savings, you actually have to stop doing something. You actually have to find actions you have to stop spending time on." Finding the level of savings that Gates wants from the Pentagon's budget is "harder than it looks," Berteau said.

Cuts Now – Iraq and Afghanistan

Defense Procurement News 10

(“Secretary Of Defense’s War On Spending Ramps Up,” 6/1, pg online @ <http://www.defenseprocurementnews.com/topics/process/> da: 7/12)

Since early this month the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other officials have been making speeches about the need to reign in defense spending. This is especially true for money not supporting current fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. This “war on spending” is either an attempt to redirect funding to what Gates’ believes are higher priorities or laying the ground work for major cuts to the defense budget in the next few years. Gates’ in a speech to the Navy League stressed that the United States can no longer afford to invest in multi-billion dollar aircraft carriers and their supporting ships. This questions the whole organization and focus of the U.S. Navy. He stressed development and procurement of cheaper solutions to the Navy’s potential missions which included a new emphasis on submarines Ashton Carter, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition at one of his presentations mad clear that the current Administration did not believe it could afford the second engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). In fact he said that the whole program must become affordable to be successful. The second engine has been promoted as risk reduction by Congress in case the main engine made by Pratt & Whitney, a part of United Technologies Corporation (UT) is not ready in time or cannot be made in enough quantities. There are criticisms that the project amounts to pork for General Electric (GE) and Rolls-Royce (RR:LSE) and Gates has tried not to fund it in his 2010 and 2011 budgets. At the very least the budget will stay flat and if it is reduced these proposals will set up a battle between the Administration, Congress, industry and their supporters as they struggle to find the right mix of investment, weapon systems and deficit spending reductions. These reasons include: \* Continuing budget pressure from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the Navy and Air Force especially are seeing their budgets reduced. The Army and Marine Corps does the lions share of the work in South West Asia and they need more money. Reducing large ship building and aircraft modernization programs is one easy way to get it.

Uniq: FCS Cuts (Must Read)

And, FCS is in the cross-hairs it will be the first system completely gutted

Kaplan 2k9

(Fred, “Obama plans to spend as much on defense as Bush did,” pg online @ <http://www.slate.com/id/2212323/pagenum/all/#p2> //da: 7/15)

And so, to meet the White House budget target, something else will have to give—and that's where some big-ticket weapons can be expected to face the ax. Or, as Gates put it at his press conference, there will be some "rebalanced investment between current and future capabilities." President Obama made the point plainer still at his congressional address Tuesday night, promising, as he put it, to "reform our defense budget, so that we're not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use." The cognoscenti knew that the president was talking about one weapon system above all others—the F-22 Raptor fighting plane, which Gates has also decried several times in the past as a weapon that was built to fight aerial duels with the Soviet Union and that is so ill-suited to today's wars that no Air Force commander has ordered a single one of them into harm's way in any of the wars we've waged in recent years. The Air Force wants to buy 200 more of these planes—20 per year over the next decade at a cost of $4 billion annually. That's one battle to watch closely. But there are more weapons in the same situation. If President Obama is scrutinizing every line in every budget for programs that don't work or aren't critically needed, he could find several in the DoD budget that could be slashed or slowed down without doing any damage to the nation's security. Again, we don't yet know the breakdown of programs and costs in the FY10 budget, but it's likely to be—or the service chiefs would like it to be—a continuation of past years' trends. The current FY09 budget includes $4.2 billion for a new aircraft carrier, $3.2 billion for a new DDG-1000 destroyer, $3.6 billion for a new Virginia-class nuclear submarine, $12 billion for various components of a missile-defense system (which Obama is reportedly inclined to cut by 20 percent), and $3.6 billion for the Army's Future Combat System—a complicated high-tech network of systems that has run into huge problems: Its deployment date has slipped from 2011 to 2015, its cost has exploded (an estimated $160 billion and rising), and its reliability is in question This last program is still in the early stages of development—just $20 billion has been spent to date—and so it might be particularly vulnerable. The White House budget released today states in its introduction that weapons programs will not be allowed "to proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the risk of cost growth and schedule slippage." That sounds like a reference to the Future Combat System. And if Obama and Gates want to take away big items from the Air Force and Navy, they would be wise—politically as well as on the merits—to take a big slice out of the Army's baroque mess, too.

Uniq: Cuts Coming Now

And, Cuts are Coming Now – Economic Downturn

Modesto Bee 5/13 (“Pentagon Rethinking Value Of Major Military Pushes; Large-Scale Counterinsurgency Efforts Too Costly, Last Too Long,” pg nexis)

Nearly a decade after the United States began to focus its military training and equipment purchases almost exclusively on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military strategists are quietly shifting gears, saying that large-scale counterinsurgency efforts cost too much and last too long. The domestic economic crisis and the Obama administration's commitment to withdraw from Iraq and begin drawing down in Afghanistan next year are factors in the change. The biggest spur, however, is a growing recognition that large-scale counterinsurgency battles have high casualty rates for troops and civilians, eat up equipment that must be replaced and rarely end in clear victory or defeat. In addition, military thinkers say such wars have put the United States' technologically advanced ground forces on the defensive while less sophisticated insurgent forces are able to remain on the offensive. Counterinsurgency "is a good way to get out of a situation gone bad," but it's not the best way to use combat forces, said Andrew Exum, a fellow with the Washington-based Center for a New American Security. "I think everyone realizes counterinsurgency is a losing proposition for U.S. combat troops. I can't imagine anyone would opt for this option." Many Pentagon strategists think that future counterinsurgencies should involve fewer American ground troops and more military trainers, special forces and airstrikes. Instead of "fighting them there so we don't have to fight them here," as former President George W. Bush once defined the Afghan and Iraq wars, the Pentagon thinks it must train local populations to fight insurgents. The military calls it "foreign internal defense," although some have a pithier name: counterinsurgency light. The new kind of counterinsurgency is "for the indigenous people and a handful of Americans," said Joseph Collins, a professor at the National Defense University, a Pentagon-funded institution that trains officers and civilians. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognized the changed thinking in an article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. "The United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan and Iraq anytime soon -- that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire," he wrote. More likely, he said, are "scenarios requiring a familiar tool kit of capabilities, albeit on a smaller scale." ECONOMY A DRIVING FORCE The economic downturn is driving much of the change within the Pentagon. Military spending has risen steadily since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Pentagon planners say budget cuts are inevitable, and that the change in strategy will help make them. "We now have to figure out what works. We used to have a practically unlimited budget. Not anymore," said a senior military officer, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity. "There is no more room to experiment." After most major conflicts in U.S. history, defense spending has dropped to prewar levels within two years, accounting for inflation, said James Quinlivan, a military analyst at the Rand Corp.

Uniq: Cuts Now

Cuts Coming Now – Budget Pressure

The Hill 2k9(11/19, “Pentagon budget drop anticipated,” pg nexis)

Congressional budget experts predict defense spending will decline steadily as a share of the U.S. gross domestic product, dipping below 3 percent by 2028. The projection comes as senior defense authorizers from both parties raise concerns about budget constraints shaping Pentagon spending in fiscal 2011 and several years beyond. "The picture is not a pretty one," Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in his opening statement Wednesday at a hearing on future defense budgets. Ranking member Buck McKeon (R-Calif.) raised alarm over a "dramatic decline" in funding for weapons systems - from 35 percent of the overall defense budget in fiscal 2010 to 24 percent in 2020. "I'm increasingly concerned that efforts to balance the Pentagon will result in a department in decline," he said. "The victim of a lower defense budget, as we will hear from our witnesses, will be procurement and R&D [research and development] accounts." By 2015, defense spending is projected to amount to 3.5 percent of the GDP and decline to 2.6 percent by 2028 based on the Pentagon's current plans, according to Matthew Goldberg, the acting assistant director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Defense spending amounted to 5.6 percent of the GDP in the 1980s, then dropped to 3.8 percent in the 1990s and rose to 4 percent in 2008. That 4 percent includes emergency supplemental funding, said Goldberg. Even if unbudgeted costs are included, defense spending would still drop to 3.8 percent in 2015 and would not surpass 3.1 percent by 2028. CBO also projects that carrying out the Pentagon's plans in its 2010 budget request - excluding overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere - would require defense resources averaging $567 billion annually (in constant 2010 dollars) from 2011 to 2028. That amount is about 6 percent more than the $534 billion the Obama administration requested for the 2010 budget, excluding overseas contingency funds, according to Goldberg. Reasons why more resources would be required in the long run include the likelihood of growing military pay and benefits; a projected increase in the cost of operating and maintaining aging equipment as well as newer and more complex systems; plans to develop advanced weapons systems to replace aging ones; and investments in advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems to meet emerging security threats. Goldberg stressed that CBO projections could change, particularly if unbudgeted costs are taken into consideration. "The inclusion of total unbudgeted costs increases the projection to an annual average of $624 billion through 2028, or 17 percent more than the regular funding requested for 2010," he said. "Some 38 percent of the total unbudgeted costs between 2013 and 2028 are associated with overseas contingency operations." Stephen Daggett, a Congressional Research Service specialist in defense policy and budget, indicated the Pentagon may need to discuss budget trade-offs over the next decade in the Quadrennial Defense Review, a sweeping analysis of military strategy and capabilities. The results of the QDR are expected to coincide with the 2011 budget request in February. Daggett suggested pressures brought about by the unprecedented U.S. budget deficit will affect military spending. "Budget projections over the next 10 years show potential budget deficits as a percentage of GDP that have, in the past, been followed by long-term limits on defense spending," Daggett said in his testimony to the committee. The deficit for fiscal 2009 was a record $1.4 trillion, and Congress is expected to raise the country's legal debt limit to $13 trillion. "The alternatives to a steep reduction in acquisition accounts are a resumption of at least modest real growth in the overall defense budget; cuts in the size of the force or measures to reduce operating costs," he added. Each 2 percent increase in the defense budget above inflation would add about $10 billion in funds available for acquisition accounts, while a cut of 100,000 active-duty troops would save $12 billion to $15 billion per year in military personnel and in directly related operational and maintenance costs, according to Daggett. "A smaller force would entail limits on U.S. military capabilities - one choice might be to reduce requirements for ground forces for long-term stability operations," he explained. Daggett also said changes in major weapons programs announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in April could "provide an impetus" to improve efficiency in weapons production. For example, the Defense Department has narrowed production of tactical fighter aircraft to two jets - various versions of the Boeing F/A-18 Navy-Marine fighter and of the multiservice, multinational Lockheed F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In shipbuilding, the effect of recent decisions may be to allow fairly long and relatively large production runs of DDG-51 destroyers, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); of new ships based on the LPD-17 amphibious ship; and of Virginia-class submarines, according to Daggett. The termination of the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) program will spur reliance on improved designs of existing technologies. "To the extent the changes result in regular, predictable and robust annual production runs of technologically mature systems with stable designs, both acquisition officials in the government and production teams in industry might focus on efficiency measures," Daggett said.

Uniq: Cuts Now (F-22)

And, Budget Cuts Now – Will be battle over cutting the F-22

MSNBC 2k9

(4/6, “Gates outlines military spending overhaul,” pg online @ <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30071664/> //)

WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday recommended halting production of the F-22 fighter jet and scrapping a new helicopter for the president as he outlined deep cuts to many of the U.S. military's biggest weapons programs. Gates said his $534 billion budget proposal represents a "fundamental overhaul" in defense acquisition and reflects a shift in priorities from fighting conventional wars to the newer threats U.S. forces face from insurgents in places such as Afghanistan. The department must ensure it has the right programs and money to "fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years to come, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks," Gates said as he revealed details of his budget for the next fiscal year. The promised emphasis on budget paring is a reversal from the Bush years, which included a doubling of the Pentagon's spending since 2001. Spending on tanks, fighter planes, ships, missiles and other weapons accounted for about a third of all defense spending last year. But Gates noted more money will be needed in areas such as personnel as the Army and Marines expand the size of their forces. Lawmaker opposition Gates will likely face stiff resistance in Congress, where lawmakers are wary of losing defense contractor jobs with an economy in crisis. Some defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin Corp. have warned of huge layoffs if programs are cut. Production of the F-22 fighter jet, which cost $140 million apiece, would be halted at 187. Plans to build a new helicopter for the president and a helicopter to rescue downed pilots would be canceled. A new communications satellite would be scrapped and the program for a new Air Force transport plane would be ended.

Uniq: Costs = No FCS

And, costs gutted FCS

Defense Daily 7/11/2k10

(“DoD Official Foresees 'Gradual Drawdown' In Weapons Purchasing,” pg nexis)

Pentagon spending on research, development and production of new weapons will likely see a gradual drawdown rather than a steep drop in the coming years, a top official said yesterday. "We're going to see possibly some gradual drawdown in the investment accounts," said Frank Kendall, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics. "For the near term, I do not see a dramatic change." The Defense Department is working hard to reduce waste to live within its now slowly growing budget, Kendall said during a conference in Arlington, Va., hosted by Swiss bank Credit Suisse and defense consultant Jim McAleese. Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled eight major programs--including the DDG-1000 destroyer, the Air Force's Transformational Satellite and the vehicle portion of the Army's Future Combat Systems modernization effort--as part of the department's Fiscal 2010 budget request. Kendall explained that, when officials looked at their portfolio of expensive development programs prior to those terminations, there was "just too much stuff in the pipeline" that the Pentagon could not afford to keep on the books in the long run. In the future, Kendall said, the department will need stricter criteria and clearer requirements for programs before investing substantially in their development.

Uniq: Cuts at-risk

Obama has tackled defense programs and cut major weapons systems – question is can he keep the cuts through this year

International Herald Tribune 2k9

(10/30, “Obama sticks to pledge on defense costs;In a rare retreat, lobbyists see favored programs pared in military budget,” pg nexis )

When the Obama administration proposed canceling a host of expensive weapons systems last spring, some of the military industry's allies in Congress assumed, as they had in the past, that they would have the final say. But as President Barack Obama signed a $680 billion military policy bill on Wednesday, it was clear that he had succeeded in paring back nearly all of the programs and setting a tone of greater restraint than the Pentagon had seen in many years. Now the question is whether Mr. Obama can sustain that push next year, when the midterm elections are likely to make Congress more resistant to further cuts and job losses. White House officials say Mr. Obama took advantage of a rare political moment to break through one of Washington's most powerful lobbies and trim more weapons systems than any president had in decades. Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff, said Wednesday that the plan was to threaten a veto over a prominent program - in this case, the F-22 fighter jet - ''to show we were willing to expend political capital and could win on something that people thought we could not.'' Once the Senate voted in July to stop buying F-22s, Mr. Emanuel said in an interview, that success ''reverberated down'' to help sustain billions of dollars of cuts in Army modernization, missile defense and other programs. Mr. Emanuel said the strategy emerged when the defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, told Mr. Obama they needed to ''shake up sacred cows and be seen as taking on fights.'' Military analysts said Mr. Gates, a holdover from the Bush administration, also aimed at the most bloated programs. Senator John McCain, the former Republican presidential candidate, who has criticized the Pentagon's cost overruns, provided Mr. Obama with political cover to make the cuts without being seen as soft on the military. ''They probably get an 'A' from the standpoint of their success on their major initiatives,'' said Fred Downey, a former Senate aide who is now vice president for national security at the Aerospace Industries Association. ''They probably got all of them but one or maybe two, and that's an extraordinarily high score.'' Still, Mr. Obama said at the signing ceremony on Wednesday that there was ''more waste we need to cut.'' The act authorizes $550 billion for the Pentagon's base budget in fiscal 2010 and $130 billion more for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. That compares with a total of $654 billion for both accounts in fiscal 2009. The measure also includes a ban on hate crimes that Democratic leaders attached to the bill. Mr. Obama has said that he does not intend to reduce military spending while the United States is engaged in two wars. But Mr. Gates also wants to cut more futuristic programs to free money for simpler systems like helicopters and unmanned spy planes that can help the troops now. Winslow T. Wheeler, an analyst at the Center for Defense Information, a Washington analytical organization, said another key to Mr. Gates's success was regaining control of the budget from the armed services. But the administration has had to make some compromises, and some issues remain to be decided in a separate spending bill. Mr. Obama had wanted to cancel an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a new plane that is expected to be a mainstay for the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marines. He had also threatened to veto the military bills if they took money from plane purchases to keep developing that engine.

\*\*\*Internals\*\*\*

2NC FCS Internal

And, Changes to FCS have made the program sellable, but funds MUST be freed-up from military costs to save the program

Cordesman 2k9

(Anthony, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy CSIS, “The Future Combat System What Future Can the Army Afford?,” pg online @ <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090205_fcsarmy.pdf> //da: 7/15)

These costs pose a problem because the Army faces major challenges in funding its overall budget. These cost burdens go far beyond the FCS. They interact with other procurement programs, current warfighting needs, the cost of ―reset‖ to compensate for past wartime wear and losses, and the expansion of its manpower strength. There are technology risks because some subsystems will not be tested on prototypes before important production decisions are made. There are also operational, organizational and cost hurdles that must be cleared to fully field the system. If any of these problems create major new cost, schedule, and performance problems, it is uncertain whether such a complex program can sustain the Congressional confidence needed to fund the program, accelerate development and field needed capabilities. The Army has to make a strong case to convince lawmakers and appropriators of the benefits of its largest modernization in 50 years in a climate of economic recession, growing mandatory spending, and two ongoing wars. Although there is speculation about new Government stimulus packages to fight the economic crisis, it is uncertain that this will benefit expensive weapon system programs such as the Future Combat System. Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan may draw funding away from procurement programs.9 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly advocated a stronger focus on fighting and winning these ongoing operations. This could lead the Army to focus on repairing and replacing war-torn equipment to maintain the Army‘s readiness, and growing the force in troop numbers. Warfighting costs and increases in end strength compound these pressures. The new administration plans to deploy additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan by the summer of 2009. The Army‘s grow the force plan is right on track and will increase active-duty troop levels to 547,000, up 65,000 from before the wars. However, this increase may not be enough to sustain the current and planned operations. Army officials have called for an additional 30,000 troops to cope with the manpower-intense tasks of stability operations in Afghanistan. ―We have five to 10 new missions, and we are already stretched now. … You can't do what we've been tasked to do with the number of people we have,‖ Undersecretary of the Army Nelson Ford said.10 The Army already adopted a $70 billion plan to increase its end strength from 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active and reserve soldiers by FY2013.11 A further increase in end strength may be necessary to sustain the current operations and maintain readiness. At an average salary of $120,000 annually – the highest level in the Army‘s history – personnel accounts may squeeze funds out of procurement programs.12 Maintaining the Army‘s readiness also means repairing and replacing damaged or lost equipment from ongoing operations. Finally, the transformation of the strategic reserve into an active reserve requires increased spending on upgrading Army Reserve and National Guard equipment and replacing outdated materiel. Among these most urgent needs, expensive weapon systems procurement programs might be pushed to the end of the waiting line. All services will be affected. With the switch to a spin out fielding plan for FCS equipment, the Army has succeeded in changing many appropriators‘ minds about the need to fund the FCS budget. The complex system of systems appears to be modular enough to provide the flexibility and responsiveness to cater to the needs of current wars. This flexibility may lead it through the looming budgetary storm. Nevertheless, all services will face increasing budgetary pressure. Many Government officials have been quoted recently that tough choices will have to be made in defense procurement plans. ―We‘ve got to fund the wars we are in‖ and that ―puts an awful lot of pressure‖ on decreasing spending on weapon modernization and the repair of war-torn equipment, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was quoted while Secretary Gates warned that ―the spigot of defense spending that opened on 9/11 is closing‖.13 The FCS program is no exception. It already receives close attention because of its size and cost and faces the risk of serious cutbacks and delays.

2NC Internal (Must Read)

And, Reducing Presence Frees-up Resources Needed to Save Weapons Systems

Defense News 11/10/2k8

(“Shortlist Sketched for DoD Team; Sources Expect Obama To Focus First on Wars,” pg nexis)

Even as U.S. defense insiders and observers speculated about possible picks for the next administration's top Pentagon jobs, they noted that the team's first-year focus will be pretty clear: fulfilling Barack Obama's campaign pledges to draw down in Iraq and devote more resources to Afghanistan. But they said DoD appointees also must be ready to tackle a slew of unresolved budgetary and weapon-purchasing issues, including: \* What is the proper use -- and size and scope -- of wartime supplemental spending bills? \* Will other federal priorities squeeze DoD budgets? \* How can DoD rein in skyrocketing weapon program costs? \* Does the military need more F-22 Raptor fighters than the 203 the Air Force now has funded or partially funded? \* Shutter the C-17 Globemaster cargo plane or shutter the production line? \* Are major cuts needed to high-profile and costly programs such as the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) and the Air Force-run Transformational Satellite (TSAT)? "They're also going to be under intense pressure to take action on F-22 and KC-X" tanker, said Christopher Bolkcom, a defense and aerospace analyst at the Washington-based Congressional Research Service. "C-17 will be right there, as well, but it's not as time-sensitive." Most of the other immediate decisions the Obama Pentagon team will face are "of operational import, not acquisitions," yet those choices will shape future budgets, Bolkcom said. For example, money freed up by curtailing efforts in Iraq could be used to spare programs from the chopping block.

Internals: FCS $ Will Be Back

And, Influential Members of Congress will Fight to Bring Back FCS funding

Committee on Armed Services 2k8

(“Armed Services Committee Unanimously Approves Defense Authorization Bill,” pg online @ <http://republicans.armedservices.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=502> //da: 7/15)

Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Armed Services Committee Ranking Republican: “This bill provides increased capability and protection for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, increases the quality of life for military families and shapes our future defense posture by providing valuable investments in warfighting technology and benefits. I commend Chairman Ike Skelton and my colleagues on HASC for putting together an excellent bipartisan bill. While I did not agree with several provisions, such as cuts in missile defense and the Army’s future combat system, overall, the bill is excellent.” Rep. Jim Saxton (R-NJ), Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Ranking Republican: “While the legislation passed last night provides the Department of Defense much needed resources, it was clear that the budget top line is inadequate to provide the proper resources for the growing missions and responsibilities the Nation has levied on our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. For example, the Future Combat System is the foundation of our Army of tomorrow, but four years of back-to-back cuts are going to have a negative impact on the program. To protect the nation from tomorrow’s threats around the world, Congress must have the foresight to adequately fund anti-missile defense, and modernization for the Army, Navy and Air Force and Marines.” Rep. John McHugh (R-NY), Military Personnel Subcommittee Ranking Republican: “This defense authorization bill includes a number of provisions that from a military personnel standpoint will benefit our troops, which is my area of focus as the Military Personnel Subcommittee’s Ranking Member. From increasing the end strength of our Army and Marine Corps to authorizing a 3.9 percent pay raise, this bill will help to provide our troops with the support they need to defend the United States. I am glad that we did this without raising TRICARE pharmacy fees and by assisting school districts across the country impacted by BRAC with $65 million in impact aid. “However, although we prohibited increases in TRICARE pharmacy fees, the majority chose to finance the cost of that prohibition on the backs of military retirees – stripping them of one percent of their retired pay for a month. This was taking the easy way out instead of finding a real solution. I hope we can correct this on the floor so we don’t penalize military retirees.” Rep. Terry Everett (R-AL), Strategic Forces Subcommittee Ranking Republican: “This is my last defense authorization bill and I am pleased with its overall focus on meeting the needs of our nation’s security requirements through increased funding for the war on terror, equipment upgrades to better protect our military in Iraq and Afghanistan and a substantial pay raise for uniformed personnel. I would have preferred to have seen full funding for European missile defense and committee approval of a study of options for future active space defenses, causes for which I personally fought. But in the end I believe this is a strong defense bill that will maintain and build upon our ability to protect the homeland while looking after the men and women of our Armed Forces.” Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD), Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee Ranking Republican: "No bill is perfect, but this is a good bill. The men and women in the Armed Forces whose mission success and safety are our highest priority should know that the Members of the Armed Services Committee and our staffs worked hard cooperatively and collaboratively with the Administration and the Armed Services to provide them improvements for now and the future in equipment, compensation, policies and operations. "Energy is the biggest national security and economic challenge in the 21st century --for our military as the biggest consumer -- and our country. We're the world's number 3 producer with 8 percent of production. However, we consume 25 percent and import more than 60 percent of what we use. 96 percent of world reserves are owned and 78 percent of oil produced by governments of foreign countries. Many of these countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia, Iran and Nigeria, are unstable and ambivalent or outright hostile to America and our allies. At over 120 dollars per barrel, the $600 billion the US now pays for imported oil is nearly equal to the entire defense budget. "I want to thank Chairman Skelton, Ranking member Hunter, Readiness Subcommittee Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes and other colleagues for working with me to include in the House bill several key recommendations of the 2008 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Energy Strategy: ‘More Fight, Less Fuel.’ Among these are calculating the fully-burdened cost of fuel and requiring its consideration as a factor in the development of new equipment, weapons and tactics. It also creates within DoD a military director of operational energy plans and programs to develop and oversee a strategy for managing the military's energy requirements. "That adds to reasons why nuclear propulsion for large naval combatants is the right choice. It offers greater power and unparalleled safety and operational endurance without the vulnerabilities of fossil fuel refueling. Life-cycle costs of nuclear power are also declining with rising fuel costs. I have worked closely for years with Seapower Chairman Gene Taylor on this and other issues. The House bill advances last year's requirement for the Navy to include integrated nuclear propulsion for the next generation cruiser. It also recommends that future classes of amphibious assault vessels be nuclear. "I am pleased by the strong bipartisan support of the Republican amendment to accelerate procurement of two each Virginia Class attack submarines in 2010, 2011 and 2012. This will help reduce a critical gap in future decades. "Chairman Taylor and I have also taken steps to ensure that cost-overruns of the DDG-1000 destroyer will not endanger the Navy's 30-year 313-ship plan. It is imperative to ensure that America’s blue-water Navy is superior with a balance of fleet size and capabilities to meet future challenges, such as those posed by a rising China and a re-emergent Russia. Only a blue water navy can protect the shipping lanes and choke points through which most of the world's oil and commerce flow." "America must be prepared for asymmetrical attacks and the potential that a future foe may engage in more effective attacks against us than on 9/11. The House bill includes an amendment I offered to continue the work of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. With the proliferation of both nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, a high atmosphere EMP nuclear attack launched on a rogue SCUD is the ultimate terrorist weapon that could destroy our society." Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-CA): “I’m pleased that the Committee has passed a bipartisan National Defense Authorization Act. While it’s not a perfect bill, it does make important provisions for the men and women who serve in our Armed Services. To that end, I have maintained that we must ensure our troops have appropriate funds to make sure they never go to combat against a technological equal. “As this bill moves through the legislative process, Republicans will be working to see that critical funding is restored for missile defense, including the Airborne Laser. I’m disappointed that Committee Democrats didn’t provide full funding for the missile defense programs requested by this administration, because the emerging threat posed by Iran is very real, and shouldn’t be ignored. The programs we have been developing over the past ten years are working and should be fully funded.” Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX), Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Ranking Republican: “The mark-up produced by the House Armed Services Committee demonstrates that we can achieve a bipartisan consensus on important national defense issues. Unfortunately, what we have done today will come to naught if we do not address other important national defense issues outside the jurisdiction of this Committee. In particular the House Democratic Leadership must allow a vote on much needed foreign intelligence surveillance legislation, stop putting global warming ahead of real intelligence gathering hindering our assessment of legitimate threats, and stifling innovative approaches to foreign aid, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation.” Rep. Todd Akin (R-MO), Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Ranking Republican: “HR 5658 is a good bill that I intend to support. Unfortunately, it does contain a number of provisions that I am very concerned about including serious cuts to missile defense and Army modernization as well as being below what I believe our nation needs to defend itself properly. “Unfortunately, the Democrats continue to cut funding for Future Combat Systems, which is the Army’s central modernization effort. Knowledge is power, particularly on the battlefield, and FCS will revolutionize the way our soldiers gain and share knowledge in the heat of battle. FCS will also provide next generation armored vehicles that will be smarter, safer and more fuel-efficient. In the last few decades we have seen technology bring amazing new capabilities to our military and we must push these technologies down to our soldiers on the frontline.” Rep. J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), Readiness Subcommittee Ranking Republican: “The final mark contains many sound measures that provide key capabilities to strengthen our military readiness and to ensure our troops have the resources they need, both in the field and at home. I am particularly pleased with the passage of a number of bipartisan amendments including the acceleration of funding for school districts impacted by BRAC, $120 million for Navy ship repair to eliminate the unfunded backlog of ship maintenance, and additional funding to make necessary improvements to Army and Marine Corps barracks to improve standards of living for our troops. A key component to ensuring readiness for our warfighting missions is maintaining the quality of our equipment and the living standards for our troops and their families. While the bill isn't perfect, it makes great steps to equip and provide for our troops, and I hope that it will continue to be strengthened as it moves to the House floor.” Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC): “Our troops need 21st Century technology and resources to help them do their job. I am grateful that this NDAA provides for a number of programs that will benefit our armed services. However, there are concerns I and many of my colleagues have regarding specific components of the legislation that I hope will be addressed as this process proceeds. In particular, the funds necessary to reset our National Guard and Reserve forces to match the responsibilities in the Global War on Terrorism are vital; but we must not be undermining other important programs by shifting funding that could have a negative strategic impact. By increasing our overall funding for defense to reflect the needs of the global conflict we face, we will ensure our military can fight, reset, grow, and modernize.” Rep. John Kline (R-MN): “Overall, the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act is good legislation that supports our brave men and women in uniform. “I am disappointed, however, that the committee missed an opportunity to further increase veteran benefits. The committee refused to utilize the House budget resolution that specifically authorized increased spending for disability pay, retired pay, and Survivor Benefit Plan annuities. It also rejected an amendment that would have set the DoD budget at 4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Spending 4 percent of our nation’s GDP on Defense is fiscally responsible and would encourage the military to use its resources prudently without limiting the U.S. economy’s capacity to grow and prosper.” Rep. Phil Gingrey, M.D. (R-GA): “I am proud to join my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee in support of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. Like most legislation, this bill we passed out of committee is not perfect, but it represents months of hard work and bipartisan debate and compromise. Further, I am extremely pleased this bill will ensure America's continued air superiority by providing advance procurement funds for an additional lot of F-22A Raptors. The Committee also unanimously approved my amendment which reaffirms the Congress’s support of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. While this bill could be improved by fully funding America's missile defense priorities and the Army Future Combat Systems, it is essentially a good bill that provides for the immediate needs of the warfighter and addresses readiness concerns.” Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ): “Last night’s NDAA mark-up highlighted some key differences between Republicans and Democrats on defense. The majority was opposed to fully funding the Army’s modernization program despite Republican attempts to fully fund it; they were opposed to robustly investing in missile defense to ensure that the US and her allies stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat; they were opposed to taking a serious look at space defense, despite Republican attempts to prepare for threats in space; and lastly the majority refused to set a floor of 4% of GDP for our defense. In today’s world, an under-funded national defense could ultimately be more costly to the American people than anything else government does.” Rep. Bill Shuster (R-PA): “Without question, Congress’ first responsibility is to provide for our national defense and support the men and women who defend our freedoms. The committee’s report is a reflection of how solemn the House takes this responsibility. The National Defense Authorization Act lays the ground work for the programs and funding necessary to keep our military trained, equipped, and ready to meet any challenge and defeat any enemy. This legislation meets those goals and I look forward to working with my colleagues on the committee to see that it is passed by the House.” Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-CO): “Following the mark up of the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act, I am happy to see necessary funding for our national defense and military authorized, but am disappointed by the lack of funds allocated to some of the essential aspects of our military budget. Specifically, seeing funds slashed from the European-based missile defense system and the Army’s Future Combat System is especially disheartening considering 2009 is a critical year for military funding. “Staying ahead of the threats made by Iran and moving forward with the European missile defense site construction is essential. By locating our defenses in optimal locations we have the ability to fully utilize our highly capable missile defense system. I am fully aware of the mounting threats in the 21st century by missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Even if we delay, Iran will not. Additionally, Europe is in favor of the missile defense site being erected on their soil. We need to stay ahead of the threat. This is not a partisan issue as illustrated by the Senate Armed Services Committee’s recent bipartisan approval for full funding of the European site. “The Army’s Future Combat System will play a key role for our next generation of soldiers. With the FCS funds being cut yet again, the Army’s funding crisis will only continue to worsen. This program is literally of the Army and should be funded accordingly.

Uniq/Internals: Wpns Systems at-risk

And, programs are getting cut now – weapons systems are at the top – withdrawal will save programs or allow shifting of funds

Politico.com 6/17/2k10 (“Gates gears up for cuts fight” pg nexis)

Defense Secretary Robert Gates may hold enormous sway on matters of national security, but when it comes to budget issues, he'll have to arm-wrestle with two institutional powerhouses: the Office of Management and Budget and Congress. Gates has directed the military to find billions of dollars in overhead savings for the Pentagon's fiscal year 2012 budget as part of a grand bargain - one that promises DoD leaders that if they save money, they will be able to reinvest those dollars without sacrificing the size of their forces. So far, there are signs that Gates's plan is working. The Pentagon, along with other agencies dealing with national security, has escaped OMB's mandate to all other agencies to cut 5 percent from their budgets. But with mounting pressure on the administration to cut the ballooning deficit, defense industry officials said the Pentagon will very likely be a target for budget reduction as early as 2011. OMB may roll back the perceived agreement between the military and the administration on the size of the Pentagon's budget. And Congress may also step in, scaling back the size of the Pentagon's budget request - or top-line, as it's called in military parlance - starting this year, officials said. In a landmark speech last month in Abilene, Kan., Gates outlined his plan for saving the Pentagon from the kind of crippling cuts it experienced in the 1990s. Given that the Pentagon anticipates 1.8 percent real growth in its budget for 2011 and a 1 percent increase in real growth over the next five years, Gates wants the military to find $100 billion in savings over those five years, starting in fiscal year 2012. He reiterated that message to the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Wednesday. "The initiative is not designed to reduce the defense top line," Gates said. "I believe the current top line is the minimum needed to sustain a military at war and to protect our interests in the years to come in an even more unstable and dangerous world." He added that all of the savings will be applied to pay for personnel, force structure and future capabilities. "As a matter of principle and political reality, the Department of Defense cannot go to America's elected representatives and ask for budget increases each year unless we have done everything possible to make every dollar count," Gates said. The secretary has an agreement with President Barack Obama and Peter Orszag, the OMB director, to keep the savings the Pentagon finds, said spokesman Geoff Morrell. "The bottom line is [that] for us to be able to continue to do all of the things that are going to be asked of us, we need to be as big and as well-equipped as we have been. And you can't do that on 1 percent real growth," Morrell said. Morrell added that military members are backing what will be a "painful" process because the Pentagon recognizes the global financial situation and because they have the added incentive that cuts to overhead can be transferred to other areas of their budgets. But officially, OMB isn't nearly as reassuring about an agreement with the military. "Because we are in the early stages of developing the 2012 budget request and new Future Years Defense Program, we can't comment on that internal process at this time," said OMB spokeswoman Meg Reilly. "Nothing's official until the actual budget is made," Reilly said, though she added that OMB supports Gates's goal of finding savings in its overhead budget. Pressed again to confirm whether Gates and Orszag have an agreement, Reilly later confirmed with Orszag "that the Pentagon can keep the savings they create as long as they meet outyear targets," in an e-mail. Last week, Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, spoke at a "Showcase for Commerce" event in Johnstown, Pa., the home district of his predecessor, the late Rep. John Murtha. Dicks said Congress has its own responsibility to delve into deficit reduction and warned relief might come from the defense budget. "With the austerity that colors the rest of our appropriations work this year, and with a serious commitment to reduce the deficit, I cannot believe defense will be held harmless," Dicks said. "In the allocation our subcommittee receives, we could see a substantial reduction from the president's budget request - which obviously complicates our task but which is nevertheless a necessary exercise. Ultimately, if we are unable to constrain spending at some point, that itself will be a threat to our national security." Gates may have found a way to motivate his generals to cut their budgets, but OMB and Congress have a different outlook, said one senior defense industry official. "While Gates can make his best effort," the official said, "he's going to face a real challenge getting support from OMB or on Capitol Hill that he's the best arbiter of the budget across all of the government's priorities." That said, budget shifts this year may not be too painful for the defense industry, the official said. Congress is likely to target operation and maintenance accounts and spare big-ticket weapons systems, with the possibility of adding back funding next spring through a war supplemental. In the future, the official said, Congress may look to work with the military services on a quiet way of cutting the size of the force as troops continue to withdraw from Iraq and begin to withdraw from Afghanistan. Within the industry, Gates has hammered home a key message since taking control of the Pentagon under Obama: Troubled weapons systems are a target, and performing programs will stay afloat, the official said. But others will be seeking still deeper cuts. If the administration is serious about cutting the deficit, looking to defense is inevitable, said Larry Korb, a defense expert at the left-leaning Center for American Progress.

Internals: Funds Shift

Current Cuts Prove – Presence and Weapons Systems are Zero-Sum

Washington Post 6/29/2k10

(“Pentagon aims to cut $100 billion;Savings to be sought on weapons systems, contractor services,” pg nexis)

Pentagon officials said Monday that they plan to try to cut as much as $100 billion over the next five years out of the billions of dollars spent annually in buying weapons systems and other services from outside contractors. The Pentagon spends about $700 billion a year on defense -- $300 billion of which goes toward salaries and benefits for military and civilian employees. The rest is for weapons, including airplanes and ships, and for service contracts to keep computers running and facilities maintained. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he wants contracts scrutinized more closely for inefficiencies and unneeded overhead. He said the savings could be shifted to support U.S. troops around the globe. Pentagon officials said they're looking for annual savings in the $400 billion spent on goods and services. Gates said the effort is part of his plans in "reforming the way the Pentagon does business." He said he has asked Pentagon officials over the past month to "take a hard, unsparing look at how the department is staffed, organized and operated. . . . As a matter of principle and political reality we must do everything possible to make every taxpayer dollar count," he said. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer, met with major defense contracting executives Monday to discuss the new proposals. Many of the executives saw their sales rise with the Pentagon's increased spending in the past few years with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But defense budgets are expected to grow more slowly in coming years. Over the past few decades, the number of government employees overseeing contracting has shrunk as defense budgets have rapidly grown. That led to little oversight on the costs of weapons systems, industry experts say. The Obama administration has pushed for hiring more contracting experts to help improve the acquisition process.

And, items in the DOD budget compete for funding – it’s a zero-sum game

Roll Call 5/11/2k10 (“Gates to Pentagon: Prepare for Budget Pain,” pg nexis)

But as a budget guy, for me the real story was that the fiscal 2012 federal budget debate, that is, the plan that technically will start to be debated next January, actually began last week when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was widely quoted as saying his department's health care costs were out of control, pay raises for the troops had been too generous and Pentagon overhead had to be reduced. Gates was delivering four budget messages. First, Gates clearly was saying that he has been told that the deficit will be a big issue for the White House next year. Second, he was telling the military community that, because of the deficit, the Pentagon will not be immune from budget pressures. To the contrary, Gates was saying in no uncertain terms that the deficit will have an effect on the DOD's spending plans and that the department is very likely to be required to come up with savings in 2012. Third, he was telling the White House and everyone in the budgeting community that large immediate spending reductions from the Pentagon budget will be very hard to achieve. Published reports indicate that Gates thinks he can come up with $10 billion to $15 billion in savings for 2012. By any outside-the-Beltway standard, that is a great deal of money. But it is also a less than 3 percent cut from the current level, would come close to freezing but not actually reducing the DOD budget, and would have little immediate effect on a baseline budget deficit that could be close to $1 trillion. Fourth, Gates was telling both those inside the Pentagon and those who do business with it that the military budget pie is not going to be getting bigger and, therefore, that the fiscal 2012 military spending debate will be more of a zero-sum game than it has been at any time over at least the past decade. Not finding the $10 billion to $15 billion in administrative savings will mean that the other parts of the department's budget will have to take the hit: He specifically cited weapons procurement and personnel benefits as two areas that will likely be the alternative place to look. In effect, Gates was telling everyone that they should either help him find the savings through efficiencies or it will be every man, woman, service and contractor for themselves.

And, Budgets will be shifted to keep spending level

Kaplan 2k9

(Fred, “Obama plans to spend as much on defense as Bush did,” pg online @ <http://www.slate.com/id/2212323/pagenum/all/#p2> //da: 7/15)

Much remains unknown about the shape of President Barack Obama's debut defense budget. Details won't be announced—several key decisions won't be made—until April. But from the broad numbers released this morning, two things seem clear: First, it is larger than it appears to be at first glance. Second, not counting the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are projected to decline significantly—in other words, looking just at the Defense Department's base-line budget for weapons production, research and development, uniformed personnel, and so forth—Obama's estimates for military spending over the next few years are roughly the same as George W. Bush's. If huge change is in the works at the Pentagon, it will come in the form of budgets reshuffled, not reduced. And yet, there are signs—they can be gleaned from the numbers—that serious changes are in the offing, that some lumbering weapons programs will be slashed, perhaps canceled, though it's probably also the case that other programs will be boosted or accelerated to compensate. The basic outlines are these. The Obama administration is requesting $533.7 billion for the Defense Department in fiscal year 2010—a $20.4 billion, or 4 percent, increase over its budget this year, the last budget passed by the Bush administration. In addition, Obama is requesting $130 billion as a "best guess" of what continued operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will cost next year. This constitutes a breakthrough in honesty; Bush stuffed all war costs into midyear "supplemental" requests, toted and considered apart from the budget, subject to no scrutiny at all. So, with these war costs added to the total, we're up to $663.7 billion.

Internals: Systems Compete

And, weapons systems compete for funding – limited amount means trade-offs occur

Conetta 2k10 (Carl Conetta is co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, *Foreign Policy In Focus* 3/3, “The Pentagon's Runaway Budget,” pg nexis)

The Pentagon has failed to adequately integrate these trends or prioritize among them. Instead, they have all gone forward in parallel, competing for funds. This situation puts unrelenting upward pressure on the budget. Legacy programs, which tend to be backward-looking, have predominated. Thus, despite the Pentagon's spending $2.5 trillion on modernization between 1989 and 2003, there was a lack of preparedness for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tasks after 2001. Notably, the decisions to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan by military means entailed a new wave of equipment purchases.

War Spending Causes Trade-offs in other areas of the DOD Budget

Daggett 2k9

(Statement Of Stephen Daggett Specialist In Defense Policy And Budgets Congressional Research Service “Before The House Committee On Armed Services Hearing On Resourcing The National Defense Strategy: Implications Of Long-Term Defense Budget Trends” 11/18 pg online @ <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC111809/Daggett_Testimony111809.pdf> )

First, although the defense budget appears by historical standards to be quite robust, senior leaders of the military services have expressed concern about shortfalls in funding for major programs and the Defense Department has felt a need to make some difficult trade-offs between programs needed to fight the wars we are in, as Secretary Gates has put it, and preparations for future conflicts. The first question in understanding budget issues, therefore, is why funding seems so tight when the budget is so high. The answer appears to be that the cost of much of what the Defense Department does has climbed in recent years at a rate that outpaces the growth in funding. This statement identifies six very broad trends that have driven up the cost of military capabilities, in some cases quite dramatically, over the past ten to twenty years

And, Presence Consumes Resources

Eaglen and Allison 6/7/2k10 (Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Julia Bertelsmann, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Allison Center, assisted with the preparation of this report, “U.S. Defense Spending: The Mismatch Between Plans And Resources,” pg nexis)

High Wartime Operations Tempo. Constant wartime deployments of manpower and materiel for missions in Afghanistan and Iraq are another internal strain on defense budgets. An increasingly large portion (60 percent, according to the DOD Comptroller) of the account for overseas contingency operations (OCO) is paying for maintenance, replacements, repairs, and other costs associated with a higher-than-usual pace of operations.[23]

And, Personnel Trades-off with Weapons systems

Congressional Quarterly Weekly 3/15/2k9 (“Military Readiness in Rough Times,” pg nexis)

Far-Term Outlook Whatever cuts are made for fiscal 2010, more tough choices will occur in fiscal 2011 and beyond. The soaring federal deficit will need to be addressed even as internal Pentagon budget problems worsen. The cost of people competes against the price of hardware, as the average price per year of a soldier, in pay and benefits, now totals $120,000. What's more, rampant cost hikes in weapons severely limit additional investments. The Defense Business Board report found that the cost of major weapons has doubled in the past seven years, from $783 billion to more than $1.7 trillion, with 44 percent of the increase due not to expanding capabilities but merely to higher than expected costs. These real costs outpace planned budgets by billions of dollars a year, according to the Congressional Budget Office. "It is as much a cultural issue as a management issue," the Defense Business Board said, "and in times of budget stress, could threaten the core of the institution." The defense review will assess not only the big-ticket weapons but also the military's fundamental units of organization -- the number of aircraft carrier battle groups, submarines, aviation squadrons or brigades -- to see whether both the kind and number of systems and organizations are suited to tomorrow's likeliest military scenarios. If some of the top-dollar programs are delayed or killed, then the winners in the budget battles could turn out to be the existing brands. The result is that weapons systems such as the F/A-18 strike fighter, the Abrams tank and the Navy's Arleigh Burke-class of destroyers could be around far longer than anyone figured.

Internals: Systems Compete

And, weapons systems and military presence are zero-sum -

Congressional Quarterly Weekly 5/8/2k10

(“Gates Fires Warning Shot at Navy's Warship Plans,” pg nexis)

The bottom line, Gates said, is that defense spending won't continue to rise as it has since 2001, or even as much as is needed to sustain all the Pentagon's current plans. "The gusher has been turned off and will stay off for a good period of time," he said. The Pentagon chief didn't announce any specific terminations of major weapons programs last week. But in the pair of high-profile speeches, Gates -- in his waning tenure as Defense secretary -- made clear that he is gearing up for some difficult budget decisions. And pricey Navy vessels are now squarely in his cross hairs. It will take congressional assent, however, to kill off planned multibillion-dollar purchases of aircraft carriers, submarines, amphibious ships and destroyers. Despite a degree of sympathy for Gates' objectives on the defense committees, his critics -- particularly among U.S. shipbuilding companies and their congressional allies -- are politically well-armed and girding for battle. "I think there would be major push-back if that indeed were proposed," said Mississippi Sen. Roger Wicker, ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee's Seapower panel. Cuts Big and Small Gates has taken aim at weapons spending before, particularly in the aerospace arena. He mounted a victorious campaign last year to end production of the F-22 fighter jet and other weapons -- and he's still fighting to stop building C-17 transports and a second set of engines for F-35 fighters. Such spending diverts resources from pressing battlefield needs in Iraq and Afghanistan today, and preparations for potential conflicts tomorrow, he has argued. But in the face of tighter budgets, Gates is now throwing down a new challenge to his own department. The Pentagon, he said, will have to eliminate duplicative levels of bureaucracy and transfer that money -- equivalent to at least 2 percent of the annual budget -- to modernize armaments, sustain military operations and pay personnel. If that goal isn't achieved, he clearly implied, programs will have to be cut.

Overseas troop presence competes for defense spending with procurement and R&D

Sharp 2k10

(Travis Sharp, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February 2, 2010, “How to read the QDR,” online: <http://www.cnas.org/node/4075> //da: 7/15)

In the years ahead, fierce competition for federal budgetary resources may prevent the Pentagon from receiving enough money to do all of the things it has already committed to doing, let alone the things required to cope with emerging nontraditional security threats. When combined with byzantine congressional and interagency budget processes, which are not conducive to "whole-of-government" approaches to national security, the structural constraints described above are a significant drag on responsive, forward-oriented strategies for overcoming the wide range of irregu¬lar, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges to the United States laid out in the 2010 QDR. In the wake of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, political leaders may be reticent to increase defense spending and to keep it elevated for most of the next two decades, as would be required to execute existing initiatives. Excluding costs for Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon's base budget must average $567 billion per year between 2011 and 2028 in order to carry out current plans. Defense policymakers should not delude themselves into thinking that it will be easy to secure this high level of funding over such a long period. The Pentagon will struggle to obtain resources as it competes against ballooning interest on the national debt, non-defense domestic priori¬ties, and a generation of baby boomers driving mandatory spending higher than ever. Further, public opinion polls show that more than 70 percent of Americans think current defense spending levels are either "about right" or "too much." Even if the required funding were to be appropriated, the high costs for personnel, operations and maintenance, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq threaten to crowd out investments in procurement and research and development, which together provide new solutions for today, such as mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles, and alternative options for tomorrow, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the next generation bomber.

\*\*\*Links\*\*\*

1NC Iraq Link

B. Withdrawing Troops Quickly from Iraq Saves Billions in troop development and equipment costs – Prevents Cuts to the F-22 And Future Combat Systems

Armed Forces Journal 2k8

(11/14, “A Glass Half Full, pg online @ <http://www.afji.com/2008/11/3758514> da: 7/12)

So the logical place to look if budget cuts have to be made will be the defense budget — that’s where so much of the money is. “The pressure to do this will be very strong in Congress and the incoming administration. Regardless of who is elected, there will be pressure to push down defense spending,” said James Carafano, a national security expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation. “I think they will cut the top line and force the services to decide whether to cut programs or stretch them out,” he said. Carafano’s gloomy forecast: Programs will be scaled back. **“[The Army’s Future Combat Systems program] will get whittled down. There will be fewer F-22s.** There might not be some new starts.” A prolonged economic downturn could prompt even more profound changes in the military, said P.J. Crowley, a retired Air Force colonel and former national security assistant to President Clinton. “It might involve relooking at which services do what,” with an eye toward eliminating overlapping missions, Crowley said. “Do we really need three services doing close-air support? Do we need two services doing long-range strike? Why do we still have a Cold War triad? These kinds of decisions have been deferred,” said Crowley, who now is a senior fellow at the liberal Center for American Progress. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made a similar point in a speech Sept. 29 at the National Defense University. Gates criticized the defense establishment for focusing too much on well-established, costly weapons programs for notional conflicts of the future, while failing to meet needs — military and nonmilitary — for real wars today. But Gates knows that change won’t be easy: “Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress.” Indeed, bad economic times could increase support for costly weapons programs, said James Quinlivan, a researcher and defense expert at Rand Corp. “Defense spending is a stimulus package,” he said. “Do you want to unemploy people who are highly specialized and are important to defense” in the midst of an economic downturn by cutting or scaling back weapons programs? “There are a lot of reasons not to cut defense.” The problem for those who would cut defense spending is that “buying things has constituencies,” said Nathan Freier, a defense scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Members of Congress, governors and mayors are all pushing for these things.” The jobs on aircraft assembly lines, shipyards and defense plants keep local economies afloat even as they strain the federal budget. Guns vs. butter The last time the U.S. faced a similar economic crisis was 1968, Quinlivan said. Then, the Vietnam War was increasingly costly, inflation was high and rising, the federal deficit was climbing and President Lyndon Johnson wanted to keep money flowing into the social reform programs of his Great Society initiative. Tension between war spending and domestic improvement erupted into the “guns vs. butter” debate over national spending priorities. But rather than cut defense or domestic spending, Johnson successfully pressured Congress to pass a 10 percent surtax on corporate and income taxes, Quinlivan said. With both presidential candidates promising tax cuts, a similar surtax during the current economic crisis seems unlikely. Quinlivan and fellow Rand researcher Bruce Held contend in a paper written this summer that defense spending is due for a “significant” decrease, and the economic slump is only one factor. Following a pattern that has prevailed for 70 years, defense rises and falls every 18 to 20 years, they wrote. If the cycle holds, defense spending has reached its zenith and is about to decline. Quinlivan said a decrease could be on the order of $30 billion a year. Military spending began to grow again in the late 1990s and accelerated after the 2001 terrorist attacks, they said. “But the days of high defense budgets are numbered. The pressures that have historically led to cuts in defense budgets have re-emerged,” they said. “Voter fatigue with ongoing conflicts will pressure Congress and the White House to reduce military spending, just as a sputtering economy will spread thinning tax revenues over a growing number of claimants.” Among those competing for defense dollars are the nation’s neglected infrastructure and retiring baby boomers who want more from the Social Security and Medicare programs, they said. Freier offers a similar forecast for smaller defense budgets. He says lower military budgets would be “renormalization.” He suggests that spending reductions will show up first in operations and maintenance accounts as “nonessential” operations, maintenance and “nonessential training” are cut. They could also appear in resetting, such that 10 pieces of war-worn equipment might be replaced with seven new or refurbished ones, he said. “This clearly puts a stake in the heart of doubling the buy of F-22s,” Freier said of the controversial stealth fighter. The Air Force wants 380 planes; Gates wanted to end the program at 183. Neither side won. The F-22’s fate has been left to the next administration and Congress. “Every item in the budget will get a fresh look,” said Williams, the MIT research scientist. But the whether programs actually are eliminated may depend on the depth of current economic troubles. If the economic outlook is less than dire, weapons buys may be delayed or trimmed rather than canceled, she said. For the near term, deep defense spending cuts are unlikely, said Kosiak, the CSBA budget expert. “When you’re at war, it’s difficult to cut costs.” But continued improvement in the conditions in Iraq could make a big budgetary difference. For instance, if the military is able to begin drawing down forces in Iraq, it can also re-evaluate plans to add 92,000 troops to the Army and Marine Corps, Crowley said. Each additional 10,000 troops costs about $1.2 billion a year, so adding 92,000 would add $110 billion to the annual defense budget. Adding fewer troops saves personnel costs, “and if you don’t add troops, you need less hardware to equip them with,” Crowley said. And as troops come home, the cost of fighting in Iraq should also decline. Gates may have his eye on that calculus, as well. “In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units in country will decline over time,” he said at the National Defense University. “About the only argument you hear now is about the pacing of the drawdown.

1NC COIN Link: F-22, FCS

And, COIN operations in Afghanistan are expensive –they trade-off with F-22 and Weapons Systems

Agence France Press ‘9

(“Obama to help troops, rethink defence spend,” 2/25, pg online @ <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jQmlNuequei36TCBuV0mAgUP7dAw> da: 7/12)

WASHINGTON (AFP) — President Barack Obama said his upcoming budget would increase the number of US soldiers, state the true cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cut "Cold War-era" weapons programs. Setting out his priorities for military spending, Obama said late Tuesday in his first address to a joint session of Congress that he wanted to provide relief to men and women in uniform with higher pay and a larger ground force. The statements come amid news reports that Obama is set to order the bulk of US military forces to withdraw from Iraq by August 2010. "To relieve the strain on our forces, my budget increases the number of our soldiers and Marines," Obama said in the speech. "And to keep our sacred trust with those who serve, we will raise their pay, and give our veterans the expanded health care and benefits that they have earned." More than seven years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq have put unprecedented pressure on the all-volunteer military and their families, with top officers blaming a recent spike in suicides in the army on the relentless pace of deployments. Obama's promise to raise the number of soldiers and Marines appears in line with the military's plans to expand its ground forces by nearly 100,000 troops. Vowing to restore "honesty and accountability" to government spending, Obama said his budget "for the first time includes the full cost of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. "For seven years, we have been a nation at war. No longer will we hide its price," he said to applause. Obama's jab at former president George W. Bush referred to his predecessor's controversial method of accounting for the cost of the two wars through "supplemental" funding requests outside of the main defense budget. He said his administration would scrap wasteful contract work in Iraq and impose tough scrutiny on mammoth weapons systems that grew out of the Cold War, though he offered no specifics. "We'll eliminate the no-bid contracts that have wasted billions in Iraq, and reform our defense budget so that we're not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use," Obama said. The 612 billion dollar defense authorization bill signed by Bush in September represented the largest in real terms since World War II, and probably the peak of a seven-year buildup dating to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. With a grave economic crisis and an expected 1.3 trillion dollar deficit, big cuts are expected in the vast US defense budget -- which represents more than 40 percent of the world's total military spending. Administration officials hope some of the savings will come from a withdrawal of troops from Iraq, where 142,000 troops are stationed. Obama is close to issuing an order to withdraw the bulk of US military forces from Iraq by August 2010, the New York Times reported Wednesday, citing senior administration officials. The order would give the US military 19 months to pull out, three months more than the promise Obama made while campaigning for president in 2008. However tens of thousands of US troops -- it is unclear exactly how many -- would remain "to continue training Iraqi security forces, hunt down foreign terrorist cells and guard American institutions," the Times reported. The president has not made a final decision, administration officials told the Times, but could complete the review and announce the plan later this week. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has already warned of major budget cutbacks, citing expensive weapons programs such as the F-22 fighter aircraft as possible targets. "It's obviously one of the programs that, along with a number of others -- many others -- that we will be looking at," Gates said earlier this month. The United States cannot "eliminate national-security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything," Gates wrote in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. The military has struggled to strike a balance between the demands of counter-insurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to prepare for conventional warfare as a hedge against rising powers like China. Gates has made clear that counter-insurgency is the immediate priority, and that new ships, sophisticated aircraft and a network of hi-tech army vehicles may be of little use in Iraq and Afghanistan. Candidates for possible cuts include the F-22 Raptor fighters, which cost about 350 million dollars each; the F-35 and F-18E/F aircraft; the Navy's new generation destroyer; and computer-linked Army vehicles known as Future Combat Systems.

1NC Afghanistan

Withdrawing from Afghanistan frees-up Billions

Bandow 2k10

(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan, 1/4/10, The National Interest, “A War We Can’t Afford,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22716)

 The U.S. government is broke. Nevertheless, Washington is currently fighting two wars: one is ebbing while the other is expanding. How to pay for the Afghan build up? Democrats say raise taxes. Republicans say no worries. The best policy would be to scale back America’s international commitments. The United States will spend more than $700 billion on the military in 2010. The administration’s initial defense-budget proposal, minus the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, was $534 billion, almost as much as total military spending by the rest of the world. Even though the Iraq war is winding down, its costs will persist for years as the government cares for thousands of seriously injured veterans. Afghanistan cost about $51 billion in 2009 and had been expected to run $65 billion in 2010. However, the president’s build up is estimated to add another $30 billion annually. And if this “surge” doesn’t work—U.S. troop levels still lag well behind the minimum number indicated by Pentagon anti-insurgency doctrine—the administration will feel pressure to further increase force levels. Every extra thousand personnel deployed to Afghanistan costs about $1 billion. Although the president reportedly plans to emphasize deficit reduction in his upcoming budget, he continues to propose new programs even with $10 trillion in red ink predicted over the next decade. The cost of the Afghan war will be yet another debit added to the national debt.

2NC Link Wall

And, the Link is Comparatively bigger than any link turn

Sustainable Defense Task Force 2k10 (“Debt, Deficits, and Defense A Way Forward ,” pg online @ <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1006SDTFreport.pdf> //da” 7/15)

Progress along most of these avenues was modest at best, as was the momentum. The Government Accountability Office points to military base reductions and competitive sourcing as the initiatives that probably saved the most money, although the extent of savings from the latter are now contested.4 At any rate, the recurring savings from both do not exceed a few percent of today’s base budget. And, it is despite these savings that we find ourselves in our current predicament, with the base DoD budget having rocketed 50% in real terms since 1998. Fiscal pressures now argue for renewing DoD reform efforts across a broad front. But the needed complements to new efforts at reform are quantifiable benchmarks and budget limits enforced from outside the Pentagon. Otherwise, “savings” may never materialize or will be absorbed by other Pentagon accounts if they do.

And, withdrawal frees-up resources

New York Times 2/25/2k9 (“Obama Favoring Mid-2010 Pullout In Iraq, Aides Say,” pg nexis)

Mr. Obama, who met with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Tuesday, has not made a final decision but could complete his review and announce his plan this week, administration officials said. In his speech to Congress on Tuesday night, Mr. Obama said only that he would ''soon announce a way forward in Iraq that leaves Iraq to its people and responsibly ends this war.'' It was not clear on Tuesday exactly how many of the 140,000 troops would remain in Iraq after August 2010 or whether any of the 14 combat brigades now there would stay under a new mission. The 19-month time frame for the withdrawal of combat troops was first reported Tuesday by The Associated Press. The approach split the difference with military commanders who proposed a range of options, including the 16-month withdrawal Mr. Obama promised last year and a longer timetable that would have spread the withdrawal over 23 months. Mr. Obama 's advisers said they believed they had reached an accommodation that would satisfy both the military and a public eager to get out of Iraq, while relieving the strain on the armed forces and freeing up resources for Afghanistan. ''The president has been struck by the fact that there has been a meeting of the minds in a lot of ways among his military advisers about what would be a safe and responsible way to redeploy our troops while protecting our interests in Iraq,'' said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because no decision had been announced. Another top official said the White House was confident that those who supported Mr. Obama 's election would accept a somewhat longer time frame. ''He's always said that he would consult with his military commanders on this and would reach a responsible, appropriate decision,'' the official said. ''This is not a very large deviation.'' The troop withdrawal could also help to ease the budget pressure the White House is facing as Mr. Obama seeks to make good on a promise to cut the federal deficit in half by 2013, when his current term will end. In recent weeks, Mr. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed the three withdrawal options -- 16, 19 and 23 months -- with the president. Pentagon officials characterized the talks as extensive and said that each option was presented with what Mr. Gates and Admiral Mullen saw as the accompanying risks.

And, troops compete DIRECTLY with weapons systems

Congressional Quarterly Weekly 3/15/2k9 (“Military Readiness in Rough Times,” pg nexis)

The cost of people competes against the price of hardware, as the average price per year of a soldier, in pay and benefits, now totals $120,000. What's more, rampant cost hikes in weapons severely limit additional investments. The Defense Business Board report found that the cost of major weapons has doubled in the past seven years, from $783 billion to more than $1.7 trillion, with 44 percent of the increase due not to expanding capabilities but merely to higher than expected costs. These real costs outpace planned budgets by billions of dollars a year, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

2NC Links: Equipment

We’ll win a new link here – the plan eliminates the reason for cutting the program – it gets us out of the theatre forcing FCS Cuts – Contractors will fight to bring the program back

Politico 2k9(“Pentagon shells out for work undone,” pg online @ <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22932.html> //da: 7/15)

But breakups are never easy; contractors and their supporters pull out all the stops to fight back. In 2005, Lockheed Martin and the Air Force successfully fought off an attempt by then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to cancel the C-130J cargo plane. Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) and the Air Force argued that the termination costs would reach $1.78 billion, making it a better deal to simply buy the rest of the planes under contract. Based on those figures, Rumsfeld reversed his decision. But a year later, the Pentagon’s inspector general looked into the estimate and found that the Air Force couldn’t substantiate the $1.78 billion figure. The government’s decision might have been different had a more accurate estimate been used, the report said. Here’s a look at some of the potential termination-cost battles before the Pentagon today: Missile defense In the case of the Pentagon’s flagship missile defense program, a multibillion-dollar effort to install missile interceptors in Alaska and California run by Boeing Co., military officials say they’re shifting investments because times have changed. Earlier this year, Gen. James Cartwright said: “Ballistic missiles are about as passé as e-mail: Nobody does it anymore.” As part of the program, the government planned to build and install 44 missile interceptors. The administration’s budget proposed installing just 30. Missile Defense Agency spokesman Rick Lehner said no termination costs will be required, since the 44 interceptors are either purchased or delivered. But contractors may press for additional payment, taking the position, as Chambliss did, that finishing the program as originally conceived won’t be that much more expensive than putting the brakes on now, said a congressional aide. Pressed on that point, Lehner said, “That’s a legal issue that we would need to discuss directly with Boeing, not to Boeing through the news media.” FCS Boeing faces another sticky set of negotiations with the Army’s Future Combat System. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) pointed out last week that the program’s cost has grown from $90 billion to $120 billion. But don’t expect the government to kill the program because of the cost escalation or any of its troubles in development. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said he wants different ground vehicles, ones that better account for the threats seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is moving forward with plans for a new vehicle program, but the main difficulty in ending FCS will be figuring out how to divide up such a complicated fleet. The Future Combat System comprises 14 different platforms connected by a computer network. Eight of those platforms, the program’s manned ground vehicles, are on the chopping block. The program is managed by a lead systems integrator and two subcontractors — General Dynamics and BAE Systems — that are making the vehicles. The trick will be extricating the vehicles from the rest of the program and negotiating the difference — while coming up with a new plan for Army vehicles.

More Evidence – FCS is getting cut because of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

Gates 2k9

(Robert, Sec of Defense, “Remarks By Secretary Of Defense Robert Gates At The Naval War College,” Federal News Service 4/17, pg nexis)

Furthermore, where different modernization programs within services existed to counter roughly the same threat or accomplish roughly the same mission, we should look more to capabilities available across the services. While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the past two decades, procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. This was a major factor in the decision to cancel the Air Force's combat search and rescue helicopter, apart from its cost and development problems. Another important thing I looked at was whether modernization programs -- in particular, ground modernization programs -- had incorporated the operational and combat experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem with the Army's Future Combat Systems was that a vehicle program designed nine years ago did not adequately reflect the lessons of close-quarter combat and improvised explosive devices that have taken a fearsome toll on our troops and their vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99 percent exquisite, service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build and only then are deployed in very limited quantities.

Links: Afghanistan

And, Afghanistan war is expensive

US News 6/11/2k10

(“Will Cost of Afghanistan War Become a 2010 Campaign Issue?” pg nexis//ef)

As troops surge, of course, so too does the cost of the war. The price tag for Afghanistan alone is more than $300 billion to date, with another $100 billion expected to be spent in 2010, according to the Obama administration's supplemental budget request. The president has promised to begin withdrawing U.S. troops by July 2011, conditions permitting. But U.S. military officials currently engaged in a brutal war against a committed network of Taliban insurgents warn that, indeed, conditions may not permit.

Afghanistan funding Trades off – Budget Shortfalls Ensure Cuts but programs can be brought back

DOD Buzz 2k9

(Online Defense and Acquisition Journal, 5/7, “‘Reform’ Budget Marks Afghan Shift,” pg online @ <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/05/07/dod-money-shifts-to-afghanistan/> //da: 7/15)

The first defense budget of the Obama administration clearly demonstrates its shift in priorities from Iraq to Afghanistan and from conventional forces to irregular warfare. It also, in the words of the Defense Department’s comptroller, marks the start of the closing of the spigot of defense spending. An early reading of the administration’s budget documents, released Thursday reveals that the biggest policy shift is the movement of money from Iraq operations to those supporting Afghanistan, combined with the decision to move war funding into the base budget. All this has even given birth to a new acronym: OCO, for Overseas Contingency Operations. This is the money for what we used to call the Global War on Terror and was included in the many enormous supplemental spending bills submitted by the Bush administration. In 2009, funding was pretty evenly split ($700 million each) between Iraq and Afghanistan, said Vice Adm. Steve Stanley, Joint Staff director of force structure, resources and assessment. that has shifted this year, with Afghanistan to get $1.2 billion of the funding. Of course, most of the OCO money goes to pay for the cost of US troops and their operations. One other thing that has changed this year. The administration will not declare the war an emergency, barring it from requesting money in a supplemental. The OCO justification document puts the reasons in a nutshell: “In Iraq, the United States will see through the responsible drawdown of forces, building on Iraq’s improved yet fragile security gains. In Afghanistan, new efforts will bring to bear the coordinated efforts of the U.S. and its allies, and will support Pakistan in denying safe haven to the extremists that threaten the democratic government in Islamabad, our regional partners, and the U.S. homeland [For those who want to follow along, here are links to the comptroller’s briefing, a justification booklet that provides a detailed overview, and for the hard core budgeteers among us — the RDT and E and the procurement (P-1) numbers.] The budget’s growth is smaller than last year, even though it now includes most of the funding for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. OSD Comptroller Robert Hale said at the Thursday briefing that recent Pentagon budgets had grown by 4 percent while this one grows by roughly 2 percent, after adjustment for inflation. Although much of the focus on this budget has focused on the unprecedented number of major program cancellations announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates it actually requests more for procurement, which would rise some 5.6 percent over last year. Hale pushed the idea that this is a “reform budget,” one that was “crafted to reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment.” In addtion to folding war funding into the base budget and boosting money to care for those who have served, it proposes more program terminations than have been offered at least since the end of the Cold War. As already outlined by Gates on April 6, it would: end production of the C-17 cargo plane; end production of the F-22; design and development of the $19 billion Transformational Satellite program; eliminate the $87 billion Manned Ground Vehicle portion of the Future Combat System; end the program of record known as CSAR-X; kill the presidential helicopter. Hale also said at the briefing that the Kinetic Energy Interceptor was cancelled, part of $1.2 billion in funding cut to the missile defense program. But as has been reported before, while some programs were killed, much money is given back. The F-35 fighter, Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite, the Littoral Combat Ship are all major winners in this budget.

Links: Asia

And, Asian Withdrawal Saves Billions

Sustainable Defense Task Force 2k10 (“Debt, Deficits, and Defense A Way Forward ,” pg online @ <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1006SDTFreport.pdf> //da” 7/15)

Reduce US military presence in Europe and Asia by one-third and cut military end strength accordingly. Save $80 billion from 2011–2020. This option would cap routine US military presence in Europe and Asia at 100,000 personnel, which is 26% below the current level and 33% below the level planned for the future. All told, 50,000 personnel would be withdrawn. End strength would be reduced accordingly as would associated assets and units. Savings would include reduced personnel costs, military housing expenses, incremental costs of stationing troops abroad, steady-state acquisition costs for reduced force structure, and operations and maintenance costs associated with reduced units and personnel. Today there are more than 317,000 active-duty US military personnel stationed or deployed overseas. In the Central Command area, encompassing Iraq and Afghanistan, there are approximately 180,000 activecomponent personnel as well as over 45,000 reservists. Approximately 150,000 active-component US military personnel are officially assigned to Europe and Asia. However, about 15,000 of these have been re-deployed to the wars. The remaining 135,000 in Europe and Asia represent the current minimum US presence in these regions. Not even the extreme demands imposed by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have compelled a reduction in this minimum. America’s commitments in Asia and Europe also tie down some troops at home. Although most of the troops who forward deploy to these areas do not rotate on a short time cycle, some do – and these require a rotation base. Moreover, those who are stationed overseas for longer periods – one to three years – are normally not available for immediate redeployment when they return home. There is some “down time.” Finally, all duty assignments in the services add to the need for trainees and students. A modest assumption is that the 135,000 personnel who constitute our minimum presence in Europe and Asia tie down as many as an additional 50,000 personnel. Thus, measured in terms of personnel, our total “irreducible” investment in these regions runs as high as 185,000. This is the number of personnel who have been rooted to those regions and, so far, unavailable for use elsewhere.

Links: Iraq

\*\*\*Complete Iraq Withdrawal Saves $316 Billion

Korb et al ‘98

(Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Defense Information. he was a Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh Peter M. Juul, Laura Conley, Major Myles B. Caggins III, Sean E. Duggan December 2008, “Building a Military for the 21st Century New Realities, New Priorities” pg online @ <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/military_priorities.html> da: 7/12)

At the present time, the United States is spending about $10 billion a month to maintain over 140,000 troops a year in Iraq and $2 billion a month to support 34,000 American troops in Afghanistan. If President-elect Obama withdraws all combat brigades from Iraq over the January 2009 to April 2010 period, this would decrease the U.S. presence by about 50,000, or about 36 percent, and reduce the cost to about $7 billion a month by mid-2010. If the withdrawal of combat troops is accompanied by a withdrawal of an equal number of support troops, this would mean that the costs would drop to about $4 billion a month. If all American troops are withdrawn by the end of calendar year 2011, as the Status of Forces Agreement mandates, the costs would drop to zero by the second quarter of FY 2012. Adding another 20,000 troops to Afghanistan, as requested by General McKiernan, would increase the costs in that theatre by at least $1.5 billion a month. Thus, the savings from a drawdown from Iraq accompanied by an increase in Afghanistan would result in a net savings of about $2.5 billion a month until the complete withdrawal from Iraq. At that time, the monthly costs for Afghanistan would be $3.5 billion. Thus, as indicated in the table below, the net savings from a complete withdrawal from Iraq over the next four years would be $316 billion (After $54 billion is offset by the increase of our forces in Afghanistan). If $76 billion is allocated to reset, the net savings would be approximately about $240 billion.

Iraq Costs Billions and Eats DOD Budget

Bandow 2k7

(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan “The Great Defense Budget Black Hole,” pg online @ <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/02/16/the-great-defense-budget-black-hole/> )

The Iraq war continues to consume lives, both American and Iraqi. The conflict also is burning mountains of cash. No wonder U.S. military outlays are spiraling out of control. Earlier this month, the Bush administration proposed a complex $715 billion defense spending package. There is $481 billion for standard Pentagon operations in 2008. There is $142 billion for the war next year. There is an extra $93 billion for the war this year – on top of the $70 billion already approved. Even these figures are almost certainly too low. The Pentagon’s budget director, Tina Jonas, explained that next year’s war estimates treat the ongoing escalation as “a near-term initiative.” Thus, “I think we know that it will be wrong.” As a result, “things will change and we’ll have to adjust at that point.” Outside analysts expect the planned combat escalation to hike equipment repair bills beyond current budget estimates. Which means yet another supplemental, probably next year. Iraq’s most obvious impact on the budget is for more ammunition, equipment, buildings, and health care, as well as day-to-day logistical support. The FY2008 budget even includes $318 million for base construction, as if the Iraqis will allow the U.S. a permanent military presence. Moreover, by so straining the Army, in particular, the Iraq war has caused the administration to seek an additional 92,000 soldiers and Marines. This expansion will run $5.3 billion in 2007, $18.6 billion next year, and some $117.6 billion through 2013. So far, Iraq and Afghanistan have cost an estimated $661 billion. By the time U.S. forces finally go home, Americans will be out $1 trillion or more as a result of George Bush’s foreign joyride.

Withdrawal Frees-up cash

Patriot News 4/25 (“Obama faces hard paths to popular goal; The president wants a commission to give him a plan for cutting the deficit. Everyone agrees something must be done, but the options are unpalatable for many,” pg nexis)

Cut spending Obama already has proposed freezing "nonsecurity" discretionary spending for three years. That covers all federal programs except defense, homeland security, veterans and entitlements. The commission could propose extending that freeze or even reducing spending on those programs. Sen. Kent Conrad, D-N.D., the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, last week proposed cuts including the Pell Grant program, which Obama likes. Reducing spending is politically hard, however. When Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., demanded an offset to pay for $9.2 billion in unemployment benefits, Democrats and the media slammed him, and he lost. Another option is to freeze or cut the rest of the discretionary budget, including defense and homeland security. Money could be saved by the withdrawal of U. S. troops from Iraq, if the rising costs of sending more troops to Afghanistan don't consume those savings.

Links: Phased W/D

And, a phased withdrawal saves $12 billion

Sustainable Defense Task Force 2k10 (“Debt, Deficits, and Defense A Way Forward ,” pg online @ <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1006SDTFreport.pdf> //da” 7/15)

Because some of the US personnel officially stationed in Europe and Asia are now routinely sent to Iraq and Afghanistan, the proposed reduction would occur in phases. In the near-term, 30,000 troops might be withdrawn and reduced, producing savings of more than $6.5 billion per year. The remainder would have to wait until the total number of active-duty troops committed to the wars has fallen below 100,000. With this, the proposed reductions could be completed and annual savings would rise to $12 billion.

Links: Bases Expensive

And, Base Maintenance and Operation is Expensive

Government Accountability Office 2k7 (“Trends in Operation and Maintenance Costs and Support Services Contracting,” pg online @ <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07631.pdf> //da:7/15)

The Department of Defense (DOD) spent about $210 billion, or 40 percent of the total defense budget, to operate and maintain the nation’s military forces in fiscal year 2005.1 As a major component of DOD’s funding for readiness, operation and maintenance (O&M) appropriations fund the training, supply, and equipment maintenance of military units as well as the administrative and facilities infrastructure of military bases. Over the past several years, DOD has increasingly used private sector contractors, rather than uniformed or DOD civilian personnel, to provide O&M-related services in areas such as logistics, weapon systems, and base operations support; information technology services; and administrative support

Links: Base w/d saves

And, Cutting Bases Frees Up BILLIONS from the Defense Budget

Prof. Gusterson, 2k9

(Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, 3/10, “Empire of bases,” pg online @ <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/hugh-gusterson/empire-of-bases> da: 7/12/10)

These bases do not come cheap. Excluding U.S. bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States spends about $102 billion a year to run its overseas bases, according to Miriam Pemberton of the Institute for Policy Studies. And in many cases you have to ask what purpose they serve. For example, the United States has 227 bases in Germany. Maybe this made sense during the Cold War, when Germany was split in two by the iron curtain and U.S. policy makers sought to persuade the Soviets that the American people would see an attack on Europe as an attack on itself. But in a new era when Germany is reunited and the United States is concerned about flashpoints of conflict in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, it makes as much sense for the Pentagon to hold onto 227 military bases in Germany as it would for the post office to maintain a fleet of horses and buggies. Drowning in red ink, the White House is desperate to cut unnecessary costs in the federal budget, and Massachusetts Cong. Barney Frank, a Democrat, has suggested that the Pentagon budget could be cut by 25 percent. Whether or not one thinks Frank's number is politically realistic, foreign bases are surely a lucrative target for the budget cutter's axe. In 2004 Donald Rumsfeld estimated that the United States could save $12 billion by closing 200 or so foreign bases. This would also be relatively cost-free politically since the locals who may have become economically dependent upon the bases are foreigners and cannot vote retribution in U.S. elections. Yet those foreign bases seem invisible as budget cutters squint at the Pentagon's $664 billion proposed budget. Take the March 1st editorial in the New York Times, "The Pentagon Meets the Real World." The Times's editorialists called for "political courage" from the White House in cutting the defense budget. Their suggestions? Cut the air force's F-22 fighter and the navy's DDG-1000 destroyer and scale back missile defense and the army's Future Combat System to save $10 billion plus a year. All good suggestions, but what about those foreign bases?

More Evidence –

Washington Post 2k9(“Closing Military Bases,” pg online @ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/20/AR2009032001758.html> da: 7/12)

Looking to cut billions from the federal budget? Consider closing some of the 1,000 military bases the United States maintains abroad. That's what Hugh Gusterson, a professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University, suggests in an online column for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Closing some of the bases would save billions, Gusterson argues, citing none other than former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who in 2004 estimated a savings of $12 billion if the U.S. shut 200 foreign bases. Gusterson says that most foreign bases were built during the Cold War and serve an outdated strategy. Why, for example, does the United States maintain more than 200 bases in Germany? It made sense during the decades-long face-off with the Soviets. But now? Bases can also become a rallying point for anti-American sentiment. The presence of U.S. military outposts in Saudi Arabia was a potent recruiting tool for al-Qaeda in the 1990s, Gusterson says. The U.S. Navy's base in Vieques, Puerto Rico, closed in 2003, touched off a protest movement that endures to this day.

Links: COIN

COIN Frees up Billions in resources

Congressional Quaterly Weekly 2k9

(“Military Readiness in Rough Times,” 3/15, pg nexis)

Probably not this year, but at least by the next one, the Defense Department will have to start making do with less. Eight years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and six years of ever-larger emergency war budgets, will begin to give way to more modest defense budgets as the nation climbs out of a credit crisis and a deep and worldwide recession, only to face the prospect of inflation. "One thing we have known for many months," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 27, "is that the spigot of defense funding that opened on 9/11 is closing." "With two major campaigns ongoing," Gates said, "the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department." A month later, Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the committee's ranking Republican, told his colleagues bluntly, "A train wreck is coming. "Look at the president's 10-year budget," McCain said on March 3, "and you'll see a decrease, overall decrease, in defense spending." At the same time, the armed forces are under pressure to repair the damage, in materiel and manpower, wrought by the fighting in Iraq and what will probably be more combat in Afghanistan, while continuing to modernize and reorganize to meet other possible threats elsewhere in the world. The process will play out over several defense budgets and fiscal years. The Army and Marine Corps, for instance, have only begun an expansion of personnel called for by the Bush administration and backed by President Obama. At the same time, the continued threat of terrorism and the dislocation and discontent inherent to the world economic situation might put more demands on the military, not fewer. "For the foreseeable future," said Sen. Ben Nelson, a Nebraska Democrat and chairman of the Armed Services subcommittee on personnel, "we are going to be faced with a larger military than a lot of people would like. If we are going to have a military able to deal with current challenges, as well as any future threats, then we have to have adequate forces to do that." What follows is a look at the current debate over the defense budget in light of the Pentagon's current commitments and future challenges, its personnel makeup -- both caring for veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan and training new forces -- and the choices it must make in weapons and equipment. MILITARY COMMITMENTS The debate over the shape and size of the fiscal 2010 defense budget -- and over projected defense spending in the years ahead -- centers on whether the U.S. military will have the personnel and weapons to meet both current commitments and future challenges. Some experts, such as Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington, argue for more spending in the Pentagon's base budget for weapons procurement and a larger force to protect U.S. interests. Kagan and others who believe in more aggressive defense spending and policies say that the procurement holiday in the late 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and NATO's success in the Balkans, left the United States unprepared for the combat that followed the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. As one Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Thune of South Dakota, put it, the defense budget should not become "the ATM for deficit reduction." Among Pentagon officials and independent military analysts, though, there is broad agreement that U.S. forces will have the funds they require to carry out their continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- the military's principal commitments -- through the end of fiscal 2010, Sept. 30 of that year. They note that for the remainder of fiscal 2009, Obama will ask for $75.5 billion in supplemental war funding, bringing the total for this fiscal year to about $141 billion. Congress approved $65.9 billion in fiscal 2009 war funding in the most recent supplemental spending law. For fiscal 2010, Obama will request $130 billion in war funding, with details to follow in April, when he presents the full version of his $533.7 billion request for the Pentagon's base budget. Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and an authority on defense and foreign policy, says Obama's war funding requests break down to about $1 million per soldier deployed in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. With Obama planning to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq to between 35,000 and 50,000 troops by the end of August 2010 -- and to increase troop strength in Afghanistan by 17,000 over the next few months -- defense analysts say his war funding request will adequately meet the military's needs. "All in all," said Gordon Adams, the senior White House defense budget official in the Clinton administration and now a professor at American University's School of International Service, "as the military goes forward with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's pretty well funded." There are currently about 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, a level that Obama is expected to generally maintain until Iraq holds presidential elections in December, said Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then, starting at the beginning of 2010, U.S. troops will begin a rapid withdrawal until all combat troops are out by the Aug. 31 deadline. A U.S. force of as many as 50,000 will remain in Iraq with the new mission of training Iraqi security forces and protecting U.S. civilians working in the country on reconstruction projects. Though Obama has pledged to consult with his commanders if conditions in Iraq require any changes, Gates has said the chance of missing Obama's withdrawal targets is "remote." One situation that could slow the pace is the growing tension between Sunni Muslims and Kurds over the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk. The city lies just outside the autonomous Kurdish region and is claimed by both groups. Shifting Focus to Afghanistan For the foreseeable future, though, the biggest challenge for the United States will be in Afghanistan, where reconstituted Taliban forces have erased many of the gains achieved by the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 that toppled the Taliban regime and drove al Qaeda terrorists into sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan. There are now 36,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan, alongside some 24,000 other NATO troops. U.S. commanders there have requested an additional 30,000 soldiers, which would nearly double the U.S. military presence. Obama has called on NATO members, especially Germany, to contribute more troops and to lift restrictions that prevent some contingents from operating in combat zones. So far, however, his efforts have failed. Meanwhile, Obama has ordered another 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan while officials from across the administration work to come up with a new strategy for the area. So far, there is no consensus on what the United States is trying to achieve in Afghanistan -- making it difficult to plan military requirements. Among the numerous strategy proposals that have been produced, two are being seriously considered, informed U.S. officials said. One is a major nation-building plan that would require as many as 100,000 U.S. soldiers, along with many civilian reconstruction teams, and cost roughly $2 billion a month for at least a decade, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the draft proposals. Under this plan, U.S. soldiers would adopt a classic counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban: establish a protective presence among civilians in important areas and improve their living conditions with various reconstruction projects to win their allegiance. Sufficient U.S. forces would be on hand to repel any Taliban attacks, but U.S. firepower would be carefully calibrated to avoid civilian casualties. Obama has not approved the plan, and Defense Secretary Gates is said to oppose it as far too ambitious. Testifying in January, Gates cautioned strategic planners to lower their expectations when it comes to democracy-building in Afghanistan. "If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose," he said. The other plan would use far fewer U.S. troops and focus on bribing Afghanistan's tribes to kill members of al Qaeda and other hostile militants. Adherents of this plan include former national security advisers Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who have advised the Obama administration to emulate the 19th century British, who paid Afghan tribes to do their bidding. Under such a plan, the United States would offer handsome rewards not only to tribes who killed al Qaeda members but also to those who provided U.S. forces with the intelligence that helped Special Forces to kill them. It also would seek to peel away Taliban moderates from the group's hard core. And the plan would simply buy up Afghanistan's opium crop to prevent the Taliban from using it to fund the insurgency. Such a plan would cost far less than any nation-building effort and have a greater chance of securing U.S. objectives without a major commitment of U.S. forces, Scowcroft and Brzezinski said.

AT: Link Turn

And, No Ground Force Cuts Coming – their link turns aren’t true

Congressional Quarterly Weekly 3/15/2k9 (“Military Readiness in Rough Times,” pg nexis)

Cost Savings for New Recruits While the government eyes ways to scale back the defense budget, military recruiting is getting easier, in large part due to the struggling economy. In these tough times, the armed forces are finding they can be more selective and can reduce enlistment and retention bonuses that have ballooned in recent years. The Defense Department released figures in February showing that all branches of the active-duty military met or exceeded their recruiting goals for January. Furthermore, they all met or exceeded their goals for re-enlistments. Both the active-duty Army and the Army Reserve -- both hard-hit by the extended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan -- exceeded recruiting goals from October through January, which hasn't been done since before the Iraq War began. Over the past several years, as the Army struggled to fill its barracks, it was forced to lower standards for new recruits. In many cases, the Army took in recruits without high school diplomas, with the lowest scores on the armed forces qualification test, or with criminal histories. But with the struggling economy, the Defense Department is getting better troops for less money. More Nation-Builders Skill levels required by the military are going up, though, as the Defense Department shifts its focus from pure combat to a combination of fighting and nation-building, which is called soft power. By all accounts the State Department will play a larger role in this new kind of warfare, but soft power is also bringing structural changes to the Defense Department. Gates says he wants to focus on building a greater counterinsurgency capacity, and that means the Pentagon will be in the market for more Special Forces personnel, foreign military trainers, linguists and even anthropologists familiar with different cultures. Curtis Gilroy, who directs the Defense Department's policy on recruiting, says that not only do such needs exist but that the department is already organizing to hire some of the right people. A defense language office was established several years ago to go after "not only native speakers, but also people who have language proficiency and aptitude and cultural awareness," Gilroy said. "That is critical." However, Gilroy and others in the Defense Department are looking to the Quadrennial Defense Review due a year from now for more direction on how to recruit and deploy military trainers in combat zones. Roger D. Carstens, a former Army Green Beret, is now a non-resident fellow at the Center for New American Security, a national-security think tank in Washington. He said the military has problems increasing its Special Forces because the recruiting pool is very limited and because the Special Operations Command doesn't have the capacity to give them all jobs when they graduate from their prospective schools. "So what do we do?" Carstens asked rhetorically. "We make the guys we do have more capable, and we do that by increasing their enablers." Enablers, such as specially equipped helicopters and capacity, intelligence officers and unmanned aerial vehicles, make each Special Forces soldier capable of doing more -- like the fancy weapons of James Bond. At the same time, the Defense Department is struggling to figure out how it will organize itself to bring more personnel into the field who can train friendly foreign soldiers. In terms of the general-purpose forces, Lawrence J. Korb, an assistant Defense secretary under President Ronald Reagan and now a defense budget expert at the Center for American Progress, said ground forces are not likely to decrease, despite the growth of soft power. Most members of the Senate Armed Services Committee don't expect that, either. "That is a decision the president can make, and whether or not down the road it proves to be too many, or the right number, or too few, will depend on the circumstances in the world," said Chairman Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat. "But the hard choices will be made on the acquisition side." Legacy Costs Rising With the United States boasting the largest all-volunteer military in its history, the cost of caring for veterans will be substantial in the coming decades. "The bonuses will go down, but the health care costs are going to go up," said James Jay Carafano, a defense expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation. "The legacy costs are spiraling out of control." This has not been lost in the White House. Obama in his first budget proposal has asked Congress to appropriate $55.9 billion in discretionary spending for the Veterans Affairs Department in fiscal 2010, roughly 10.9 percent more than was appropriated in fiscal 2009, according to a White House summary published Feb. 26. The summary also indicates that Obama will seek a $25 billion increase for the VA over the next five fiscal years. No matter the cost, said Thune of South Dakota, "it seems to me that it is just something that the American public is going to be willing to accept. We have got be prepared to provide the highest quality of care for them, and so that is something that I think we just have to bite the bullet on." According to Rep. Chet Edwards, the Texas Democrat who chairs the House Appropriations subcommittee that deals with the VA, "We must have a larger force and we have to support quality of life for our troops and veterans. We have to have an adequately sized and an adequately trained force and one that is supported with quality health care, housing and education. Deficit reduction or not." Some of the most difficult choices facing the administration and Congress involve modernizing military hardware. PURCHASING POWER The administration is likely to scale back or end some weapons programs when it sends the details of its fiscal 2010 budget proposal to Congress next month, but will probably put off the biggest cuts for another year at least -- because it doesn't want to lay off a lot of defense workers in the middle of a recession and because the Quadrennial Defense Review won't be finished until next year. Down the road, though, fiscal and political pressures are expected to lead to major cuts in weapons programs. The Defense Department accounts for about half the government's discretionary spending, which will make it a big target for lawmakers trying to close the budget deficit after the economy recovers. Meanwhile, the weapons budget is being squeezed by rising personnel costs, overhead expenses, the price of waging two wars and the ever-expanding prices of the weapons themselves. In January, a Pentagon advisory panel called the Defense Business Board published a frank assessment of key issues facing the new administration. "All indications are the Department is entering a prolonged period of fiscal constraint in a tough economy with deficits increasing and competitive spending pressures," concluded one of the board's sub-groups. "Actions related to the Wall Street crisis will exacerbate the pressure. Business as usual is no longer an option." Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments said, "In the near term, it looks like defense spending, and spending in general, are going to be protected." "But as you look further out, things really do become grim," Krepinevich said. "There is no way around the knife this time, barring some cataclysmic event in the international environment." Near-Term Outlook Obama and Defense chief Gates will probably scale back several programs this year. In his Jan. 27 Senate testimony, Gates said the fiscal 2010 budget "must make hard choices." "Any necessary changes should avoid across-the-board adjustments, which inefficiently extend all programs," he said. "We must have the courage to make hard choices." In his speech to Congress two days before, Obama promised to "reform our defense budget so that we're not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use." During the presidential campaign, Obama had singled out as deserving of scrutiny the Army's Future Combat Systems -- a collection of new vehicles, aircraft, robots and communications gear. The program, which Pentagon experts say will cost about $200 billion, has been plagued by technical setbacks. The Army reportedly has seen the handwriting on the wall and offered to decrease the program's cost by reducing from eight to four the number of classes of manned vehicles that would be developed and built. A likely target of budget planners as early as this year is the array of missile defense programs under development. Whereas President George W. Bush's last budget would have allocated $9.4 billion for anti-missile programs in fiscal 2010, the Obama administration prefers to spend $7.5 billion, according to Loren B. Thompson, a national-security expert with the Lexington Institute, who advises some defense contractors. An anti-missile system carried aloft by a modified Boeing 747 airliner may be canceled, experts say. Another program that the White House has already said it would put on hold is the new "Marine One" presidential helicopter, the VH-71. The helicopter is being developed in two models -- an immediate upgrade under construction now and a more advanced version. The cost of developing and building 28 of the helicopters has doubled, from $6.5 billion to $13 billion. The Defense Department has asked so much from one aircraft, though, loading it with communications gear, defensive countermeasures and larger fuel tanks, that it has grown heavier and more expensive. Thompson and other experts predict that only the upgraded model will go into service.

\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

Impacts: Direct NRG --> Arms Race

And, Direct Energy Weapons Development causes an arms race

Rogers 2k2

(“Directed energy: a new kind of weapon,” pg online @ <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_153.jsp> //da:7/16)

The impact of directed energy weapons over the next quarter of a century could be huge, and some analysts argue that they are as potentially revolutionary as was the development of nuclear weapons sixty years ago. For now, directed energy weapons are being seen as an answer to ballistic missile defence but, in the longer term, military planners are already viewing them as serving many other functions. The United States has a pronounced lead over all other countries, but its potential success may encourage others to follow suit, setting up a new kind of arms race; it may also lead to opponents developing new ways of retaliating. In the light of the attacks of 11 September 2001, this is not to be discounted.

FCS --> Directed Energy

And, FCS Results in Directed Energy, Laser, and Microwave Weapons

Goure 2k3

(Dr. Goure holds Masters and Ph.D. degrees in international relations and Russian Studies from Johns Hopkins University and a B.A. in Government and History from Pomona College, “The U.S. Army Meets Star Wars,” pg online @ <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/the-us-army-meets-star-wars> //da: 7/15)

In the future, directed energy will become a critical element of the U.S. Army's Objective Force. Central to the creation of the Objective Force is the Future Combat System (FCS). The FCS could employ laser weapons to perform a number of missions including counter-surveillance, air defense and mine clearance. In addition to laser weapons, high-power microwave (HPM) weapons are also likely to be part of the Army's future. Deployed on ground vehicles, helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicles, or even fired from artillery and missile tubes, HPM weapons will provide the Army with new ways of engaging hostile forces, particularly in complex and urban terrain. One HPM device, the Active Denial System, now in development, holds forth the promise of being the first effective, long-range (1,000 ft or more) nonlethal weapon in the U.S. arsenal. The Army's plan for future ground forces involves a complete transformation of platforms, force structure and doctrine. A critical element of that transformation will be the deployment of a wide range of directed energy weapons and sensor systems.

Uniq: Cuts Now (Personnel)

And, Weapons Systems Will be Cut Now – Personnel Costs

Congressional Quarterly Weekly 3/15/2k9 (“Military Readiness in Rough Times,” pg nexis)

PERSONNEL COSTS The heaviest strain on U.S. forces has been the prolonged and multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, which have exhausted military personnel, their families and, in the case of National Guard troops and reservists, their employers. The Obama administration is currently recruiting 65,000 new Army soldiers and 27,000 more Marines in an effort to relieve tired units, safely withdraw from Iraq and bulk up forces in Afghanistan. **But future budget pressure and economic woes will probably force a look at personnel costs.** In fact, Rep. Susan A. Davis, the California Democrat who chairs the House Armed Services subcommittee on military personnel, has already asked active and reserve components of the military how they plan to hold current troop levels constant with less spending on personnel. "Budget managers will now begin to stalk these programs for savings, and rightly so, because, as recruiting and retention become easier, one must assume it can be done more cost-effectively," Davis told Defense Department personnel officers at a March 3 hearing. "The question before us today is how all the goals, growth and reshaping will be achieved with far less funding than what has been available up to this point." According to Andrew F. Krepinevich, president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a defense think tank, and an authority on defense spending, military personnel costs have risen by nearly 50 percent, in real terms, over the past dozen years. In fiscal 2009, Congress appropriated $132.5 billion to pay for military personnel and their expenses. The additional 92,000 troops cost the government an extra $108 billion, with a recurring cost of $14 billion a year, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Though scaling back personnel is a traditional method for relieving stress on the defense budget, the economic recession might make the military an employer of last resort. The question is whether Obama and Congress will be willing to pay the hefty tab for that. David Axelrod, a chief strategist in the Obama administration, said the size of the force is likely to hold steady in the near term, and sacrifices will be made on other budget items to do so. "Obviously, the security of the United States of America is paramount, and that is something that we are not going to compromise," Axelrod said. "But we are going to be very disciplined about how we budget for that so that we can sustain such a force. Obviously, there are reforms to be had."

Impacts: Heg/Irregular Warfare (1/2)

FCS Guts Irregular Warfighting and Makes Cyber Attacks Inevitable – we must gut the program

Krepinevich 2k9

(President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the author of Seven Deadly Scenarios “The Pentagon's Wasting Assets Subtitle: The Eroding Foundations of American Power,” Foreign Affiars, July/August, pg nexis)

The cyberwarfare competition is so shrouded in secrecy that it is difficult to determine the United States' level of vulnerability, let alone options for addressing it. It may be that a defensive strategy cannot be successfully pursued and that the United States will be forced to develop its own cyberweapons and rely on deterring the worst sorts of cyberattacks. In short, the potential for a surprise of the worst sort in this realm remains a real possibility. Significant resources may be liberated by reducing the military's emphasis on capabilities whose value will likely diminish greatly in the future. Defense Secretary Gates has recently taken some initial positive steps in this direction. For example, the navy's new Zumwalt-class destroyers are too expensive to address the challenges posed by irregular warfare and too vulnerable to operate in East Asia or the Persian Gulf; Gates is moving forward with plans to terminate their production. The army has proposed spending over $150 billion on its constellation of Future Combat Systems. Yet the FCS are optimized for traditional conventional warfare rather than the persistent irregular warfare the army now confronts. The defense secretary's decision to terminate the eight FCS combat vehicles is on the mark, as is his cancellation of the tactical satellite program. Large satellites that are highly effective so long as space is a sanctuary must be reconsidered in recognition of the fact that this condition no longer obtains. Much more needs to be done to free up defense resources.

Irregular warfighting’s key to prevent escalation from inevitable conflicts---accesses every major impact

Bennett 2k8

(John T. Bennett, Defense News, December 4, 2008, “JFCOM Releases Study on Future Threats,” online: <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3850158> //da:7/15)

The study predicts future U.S. forces' missions will range "from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons." Some of these missions will be spawned by "rational political calculation," others by "uncontrolled passion." And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways. "Our enemy's capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks," the study said. "The threat of mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks." The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in "an era of persistent conflict." During the next 25 years, it says, "There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy." The study gives substantial ink to what could happen in places of strategic import to Washington, like Russia, China, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Extremists and Militias But it calls the Middle East and Central Asia "the center of instability" where U.S. troops will be engaged for some time against radical Islamic groups. The study does not rule out a fight against a peer nation's military, but stresses preparation for irregular foes like those that complicated the Iraq war for years. Its release comes three days after Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed a new Pentagon directive that elevates irregular warfare to equal footing - for budgeting and planning - as traditional warfare. The directive defines irregular warfare as encompassing counterterrorism operations, guerrilla warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations. Leaders must avoid "the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s," the study said. "The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War." Irregular wars are likely to be carried out by terrorist groups, "modern-day militias," and other non-state actors, the study said. It noted the 2006 tussle between Israel and Hezbollah, a militia that "combines state-like technological and war-fighting capabilities with a 'sub-state' political and social structure inside the formal state of Lebanon." One retired Army colonel called the study "the latest in a serious of glaring examples of massive overreaction to a truly modest threat" - Islamist terrorism. "It is causing the United States to essentially undermine itself without terrorists or anyone else for that matter having to do much more than exploit the weaknesses in American military power the overreaction creates," said Douglas Macgregor, who writes about Defense Department reform at the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. "Unfortunately, the document echoes the neocons, who insist the United States will face the greatest threats from insurgents and extremist groups operating in weak or failing states in the Middle East and Africa." Macgregor called that "delusional thinking," adding that he hopes "Georgia's quick and decisive defeat at the hands of Russian combat forces earlier this year [is] a very stark reminder why terrorism and fighting a war against it using large numbers of military forces should never have been made an organizing principle of U.S. defense policy." Failing States The study also warns about weak and failing states, including Mexico and Pakistan. "Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons," said the study. "That 'perfect storm' of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used."

Impacts: Heg/Irregular Warfare (2/2)

And, Failure to Combat Irregular Warfighting Trade-offs Gut U.S. Heg

Krepinevich 2k9

(President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the author of Seven Deadly Scenarios “The Pentagon's Wasting Assets Subtitle: The Eroding Foundations of American Power,” Foreign Affiars, July/August, pg nexis)

The military foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. For the past several decades, an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U.S. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. This has allowed it to guarantee U.S. access to the global commons, assure the safety of the homeland, and underwrite security commitments around the globe. U.S. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. In fact, they are already starting to disappear. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete -- becoming "wasting assets," in the language of defense strategists. The diffusion of advanced military technologies, combined with the continued rise of new powers, such as China, and hostile states, such as Iran, will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure -- perhaps prohibitively expensive -- for U.S. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest, including East Asia and the Persian Gulf. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect. Meanwhile, the U.S. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons -- including space and cyberspace -- is being increasingly challenged. Recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U.S. military, one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, he also cautioned, "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future." Despite this admonition, U.S. policymakers are discounting real future threats, thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world -- one similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War.

Nuclear war

Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, and founded of the National Institute for Public Policy, 4 (Colin, *The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order*)

The United States could pick up its military ball and go home. It could choose to rely for world order on the hidden hand of universal commercial self-interest somewhat guided by such regional and local balances and imbalances of power as may be extant or might emerge. In effect, frequently this would translate as a green light for regional bullies to mark out their territories (and sea space and air space). Thus far, the contemporary United States is showing no persuasive evidence of an inclination to bring itself home as a political military influence. The issue is not whether America’s skills in statescraft are fully adequate for the sheriff role (whose would be?). Rather, it is whether there is to be a sheriff at all. If the United States declines the honor, or takes early retirement, there is no deputy sheriff, waiting, trained and ready for promotion. Furthermore, there is no world-ordering mechanism worthy of the name which could substitute for the authority and strength of the American Superpower. At present there is no central axis of a balance of power to keep order, while the regional balances in the Middle East and South and East Asia are as likely to provoke as to cool conflict – and conflict with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at that.

Impacts: Cyber War

Cyber warfare will lead to extinction

Heinbockel 2k

(John, Professor Emeritus Department of Mathematics and Statistics Old Dominion University, 2000

Press ‘Enter’ to Win World War III, http://www.rit.edu/~wjh3710/pub/senior\_paper.pdf)

As the future of warfare becomes more sophisticated, what will be the military technology of tomorrow? The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, believes that there are three possible answers to that question: nuclear warfare, biological/chemical warfare, or cyber warfare. While nuclear and biological warfare is conducted on a battlefield, cyber warfare operates via the Internet and computers. All of these weapons have the same destructive potential, but the circumstances surrounding their uses and aftereffects are very different. With what new technology will a commander in World War III fight? Military commanders of the future will make greater use of state-of-the-art computer technology to fight wars, making the usage of conventional weapons obsolete. Since the beginning of military history, the commander who made the best use of technology always won. No matter if it was the arrows and tomahawks of the Native Americans against the guns and cannons of the European settlers, or the order given by President Harry Truman to drop two nuclear bombs on Japan, the army with the preeminent technology always came out on top. “A short time ago, an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima and destroyed its usefulness to the enemy. That bomb has more power than 20,000 tons of TNT (qtd. in Hiroshima).” This quote by Harry Truman describes the power of the first option, nuclear warfare. German and Austrian scientists, working for Adolf Hitler, created plans for a nuclear weapon. These scientists soon fled to the United States and became the foundation of the Manhattan Project. This developed into a race to see which nation could build the first nuclear weapon. The weapon that the United States manufactured was first used on the Japanese at Hiroshima, and then two days later at Nagasaki. The potential of this weapon was frightening. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, the Atomic bomb was banned from use by all countries except the United States, Russia, China, France, and United Kingdom because of the global aftereffects of this terrifying weapon. Nuclear warfare produced the most heinous aftereffects of any previous type of warfare (Walker). The blast of a nuclear weapon is powerful. It may cause third degree thermal burns, produces enough pressure to bend heavy steel girders to a 90-degree angle, and turns the entire blast radius into a firestorm. The people who have survived the blast will still experience a lifetime of side effects. Some of these might be genetically linked to future generations. The intensity and brightness of the blast may cause symptoms like keloid formation and retinal blastoma in humans. The sediment, or fallout, from the mushroom-like cloud, produced by the explosion, will be highly radioactive. The nuclear blast and its consequential fallout will affect the whole world. Heat produced from the explosion will increase the Greenhouse effect on the earth’s atmosphere. The explosion will also disrupt global weather patterns. Fallout from the explosion and ashes from the burning cities will be deposited in the air and block the sunlight from reaching the earth’s surface. The lack of sunlight will disrupt the climate, and the world will experience a yearlong winter, known as a nuclear winter. Nuclear weapons affect all nations, even those not involved in the war (Sublette). These side affects are not the only drawbacks that accompany nuclear warfare. The United States wasted two billion dollars in the development of nuclear warfare. Individual Heinbockel 3 weapons are equally expensive to manufacture. Technological equipment must be available to successfully create a weapon with nuclear capabilities that uses Uranium-235, a rare isotope. This resource is very limited and in high demand. Therefore, nuclear warfare is the most expensive, hardest to create, and has the widest reaching aftereffects among all the potential types of warfare. The second option is “the poor man’s atomic bomb” described by Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian Parliament. While a nuclear bomb requires rare materials and a capable factory, biological weapons can be easily manufactured with conventional materials. Biological warfare is defined as the “employment in war of microorganisms to injure or destroy people, animals, or crops” (Columbia Encyclopedia). The most popular forms of biological warfare include anthrax, bubonic plague, and smallpox. The most notorious chemical agents are chlorine, sarin, and dichlorodiethyl sulphide, mustard gas. During the French and Indian War, military leaders launched the smallpox virus into the Native American camps. More recently, in May 1995, terrorists released the chemical agent sarin into the Tokyo subway. Even though Chemical and biological warfare (CBW) was banned during the Geneva Convention in 1925, terrorists continue to ignore it and still wish to harness this deadly form of warfare (NATO). The main problem with biological and chemical weapons is that these highly lethal weapons are uncontrollable after being released. The effectiveness of these weapons also depends upon the weather conditions. Deaths from chemical and biological agents will be higher on a clear calm day than on a more windy day. For example, 100kg of anthrax, on an overcast day with a slight breeze, would cause approximately the same number of deaths as a hydrogen bomb. To combat the potential of chemical weapons, NATO instituted the Chemical Weapons Heinbockel 4 Commission (CWC), which banned the use of all chemical weapons as of January 13, 1993 (NATO). “It’s not a matter of if America has an electronic Pearl Harbor – it’s a matter of when,” said Curtis Weldon, a Republic Representative from Pennsylvania, when asked to comment upon the third option, cyber warfare (qtd. in Miklaszwski). Imagine power outages in Chicago, New York City, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles. In Washington, the 911 service was made inoperable; the Department of Defense had email and phone problems; and the Navy lost control of one of its submarine’s computer systems. This is what happened in 1997 when the U.S. hired 35 hackers to test the security of federal computers. A cyberwar is no longer fiction. The digital “Pearl Harbor” is upon us (Christensen). The U.S. launched its first cyber attack in 1999 against Yugoslav Serb computers. The U.S. identified the controls that the Serbs used to target NATO airplanes with missiles, and they cut the telephone systems and forced Serbian forces to communicate through highly interceptable cell phones. Experts said that the U.S. only used 10% of its capabilities. Now that the U.S. can successfully initiate cyber attacks, can they defend against them? Apparently, they cannot. China proved this in 1999, when she retaliated against the U.S. computer systems, which had bombed a Chinese embassy in Belgrade. They discovered 3,000 to 4,000 “backdoors” into the U.S. computer systems. Jay Valentine, the head of a company that investigates U.S. security breaches, estimates that only five percent of the existing “backdoors” were discovered. On January 5, 2000, President Bill Clinton introduced a 200-page document that outlined the National Plan for Information Systems Protection. Then, on January 7, President Clinton introduced a bill giving $2.03 billion toward computer security in 2001. The U.S. government Heinbockel 5 and military are just beginning to realize the power and capabilities that cyber warfare possesses (Hoffman). In cyber warfare, the rules change. There is no longer a definitive battlefield. Cyber warfare is fought over the infinite expanse of the Internet. Large armies are reduced to a few computer specialists; crackers and hackers become the cyber warriors. In a cyberwar, unlike any other war, winning does not constitute destruction instead it causes disruption. This can be 2NC CIBER WARFARE MODULE disruption of power, of communications, and even the transfer of money. These disruptions usually cause no casualties or even collateral damage. The defense is cryptology and digital weapons. Cryptology has kept people from gaining access to critical information since the reign of Mary, Queen of the Scots. During World War II, the U.S. encrypted its messages into the oral Cherokee language. This procedure was limited by proximity and expertise in the language. Now, it is possible to electronically encrypt data and computer systems, which have no boundaries. The current government standard digital encryption takes an average of 100 years to crack because each code is unique. By using this type of encryption, the U.S. should not worry about other countries stealing information from its computer systems. Information is not the only thing that has to be protected; the computer needs protection also. In addition to decrypting expertise, a cyber warrior has many other potential weapons. These weapons include logic bombs, sniffers, HERF guns, computer worms, and viruses. Logic bombs are programs that destroy or rewrite data at a specific time or when a specific set of instructions are performed. Sniffers allow third parties to eavesdrop on a computer to monitor communications or other information. A HERF gun is a high-energy radio frequency gun that can disable any electronic device it targets. Computer worms multiply themselves taking mass hard disk space with useless files. These are hard to recognize and will Heinbockel 6 crash a computer system once the hard drive is full. Viruses are maliciously created programs that are produced for the purpose of destroying computers. Viruses come in all shapes and sizes. Some, called macros, add or delete information from specific documents, while others, such as the Black Widow, will infect the master boot record of the computer and render it useless. These are the crackers weapons, their only offense in the WWW, worldwide war. Their primary target is information, whose only protection is through encryption (Lohr). Cyber warfare will become the military technology of the future and will ultimately become the blitzkrieg of the 21st century. This is because cyberwars are fast and cheap and require fewer participants. Cyber warfare is more controlled than nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare. Cyber weapons will begin a war where the winner will truly be the commander that makes the best use of state-of-the-art technology to disrupt an enemy’s economy. Even though technology has become more deadly, future war will have fewer human casualties than any other major war in the history of the world. The countries of NATO should start looking toward the deactivation and disuse of all biological and nuclear capacities during warfare. Cyber warfare has rendered these capacities to be too powerful for use by any nation or organization for any reason. Nuclear and biological warfare have been a technology of the past, and cyberwar will be the technology of the future. Albert Einstein predicted that, “I do not know with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones (Sublette).” Nuclear warfare and biological warfare were yesterday’s weapons, but cyber warfare is the weapon of tomorrow’s armies. Will the new technologies of tomorrow ultimately lead to the self-destruction of humans? Man has developed the technology that leads to world destruction. Vince Incardona, a networking specialist at Rochester Institute of Technology says that, “[Humans] have already perfected the art of eliminating each other so well that continuing to perfect these technologies only leads in one direction: extinction (\*Incardona).”

Impacts: Readiness

FCS is divided into Combat Brigade Units –

Krepinevich 2k9

(Andrew F. Krepinevich PresidentCenter for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “The Future of U.S. Ground Forces,” pg online @ <http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20090326.The_Future_of_US_G/T.20090326.The_Future_of_US_G.pdf> //da7/16)

The Service has for decades fielded forces specialized for airborne operations and air assault operations. Of course, the Army also has its Special Forces, expert in a range of irregular warfare operations. It has forces specially designed for high-end warfare, and plans to continue in this vein with the Future Combat Systems Brigade Combat Teams (FCS BCTs), which the Army properly recognized are “optimized” for conventional warfare. These kinds of forces are designed to surge on short notice to address conventional contingencies. While it was once argued that such “general-purpose” forces could readily shift gears to handle contingencies at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the evidence of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq suggests the contrary. Moreover, the Army’s new doctrine confirms the triumph of real-world experience over wishful thinking. Thus what the Army lacks are forces designed to surge in the event of a major contingency at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, as well as forces designed to prevent such a contingency from arising in the first place.

That Guts Readiness

Sinnreich 2k6, 1-29-2006

(Richard Hart, writes regularly for The Lawton (Okla.) Sunday Constitution., “Disarming The Army’s Manning Problem Won’t Solve It,” http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KHYL-6MXSYZ)

Meanwhile, still another recent Pentagon-directed study has fared no better. Commissioned by Rumsfeld’s Program Analysis and Evaluation directorate and performed by his own Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the study contends that the Army’s current approach to reorganizing its combat forces into self-contained brigade-size formations threatens to diminish rather than enhance the Army’s actual fighting capability. In order to expand the number of deployable brigades without increasing the Army’s end strength, each brigade is being organized with only two infantry or armor battalions rather than the three commonly considered necessary for successful combat operations. According to the IDA study, that decision implies the effective elimination of 40 maneuver battalions. “The essence of land power is resident in the maneuver battalions that occupy terrain, control populations and fight battles, not in headquarters and enablers,” the study comments. “Yet the Army plan reduces the number of maneuver battalions by 20 percent below the number available in 2003, while increasing [brigade] headquarters by 11.5 percent.” In rebuttal, Army spokesmen note that each reorganized brigade also has a combat-capable reconnaissance squadron, and argue that improved information technology and effective integration of joint capabilities will more than compensate for the brigades’ reduced manpower. Reportedly, however, few of the Army’s own war games and experiments have confirmed that assessment. At the heart of both debates is the same problem: reluctance to acknowledge the need for larger ground forces and its political and budgetary implications. For Army leaders, the budget costs of a permanent increase in manpower would seriously endanger current procurement programs, especially the Army’s troubled Future Combat System. For the administration, it would tend retroactively to validate widespread criticism that the United States invaded Iraq with a ground force too small for the job.

Collapse of readiness undermines hegemony and causes global war

Spencer ‘2K

(Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9-15,

http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1394.cfm )

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." 4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. 6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

AT: FCS Good

And, FCS Doesn’t Solve Combat Operations and Readiness – Ground Troops are essential

Kagan 2k6

(Frederick W., Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2K6 “The U.S. Military's Manpower Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Issue 4, July/August)

GROUND FORCES perform a wide variety of tasks. It is the ability to control territory and populations, however, that is land power's unique contribution to war in this high-tech age. Only soldiers are discriminating enough, in terms of both judgment and the capabilities of their weapons, to mix with an enemy's population, identify the combatants intermingled with that population, and accomplish the critical tasks of governance and reorganization that are so essential in persuading an enemy government to surrender. These are not functions that can be usurped by airpower, by computerization, or by mechanization in any way--at least not until robots with real cognitive abilities can be fielded. In the meantime, military occupation and population control will remain human endeavors and will be less amenable to technological enhancement than any other aspect of war. It has long been true that one soldier with a radio (and access to artillery or air support) can kill a large crowd. If the aim is to control that crowd without killing it, however, hundreds of soldiers are required, no matter how good their technology. The size of the ground force needed to control conquered territory is determined by the size of that territory, the density of its population, and the nature and size of the resistance, not by the nature of the soldiers' weapons. When it comes to reorganizing or building political, economic, and social institutions, there is no substitute for human beings in large numbers. The idea that technological improvements in the U.S. ground forces, such as the army's Future Combat Systems, will be able to reduce dramatically the number of soldiers necessary for missions similar to those in Iraq or Afghanistan is therefore illusory and unrealistic. As long as war remains a process of human beings interacting with one another--as all irregular warfare is--the land-power "market" will require a heavy investment in people. This need has been clearly borne out in the struggle in Iraq, where coalition success has rested entirely on the interaction between coalition troops and Iraqis. Airpower and long-range land-based firepower have been helpful in killing insurgents quickly and with minimal collateral damage, but they have played an entirely supporting role. The speed with which Iraqi soldiers can be trained; the number of villages in which the coalition can conduct its strategy of "clear, hold, build"; and the ability of coalition troops to restore and defend Iraqi infrastructure, polling places, and borders have been directly proportional to the number of coalition soldiers in Iraq, not to the quality of their equipment. And there is no reason to imagine that this situation will change in any future counterinsurgency or stability operation. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review insisted that the U.S. military should remain able to conduct such operations in the future on a large scale and for prolonged periods. Making that possible, however--not to mention ensuring U.S. preeminence in conventional warfare--means maintaining large ground forces. Indeed, Washington will need a large pool of trained and ready soldiers for all sorts of conflicts at every point along the spectrum for decades to come.

\*\*\*Aff\*\*\*

Link Turns

Turn: the plan saves money – withdrawing troops means there is LESS justification for weapons systems – the plan STOPS those from being funded

Christian Science Monitor 3/29/2k10 (“Defense budget: After Afghanistan and Iraq withdrawal, a peace dividend?,” pg online @ <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend> da: 7/11 )

If and when these wars wind down, the US may receive an even bigger peace dividend in the form of overall defense cuts. Huge federal budget deficits will force them. Right now, neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress are inclined to make serious cuts for fear of being called weak on defense. Without a war, however, members of Congress, particularly Democrats, may begin asking hard questions about weapons programs. There's much to cut, says Christopher Hellman of the National Priorities Project in Northampton, Mass. He calls the defense budget "bloated." The Obama budget set 2011 defense spending at $739 billion. This amounts to 19 percent of total federal outlays. Carl Conetta, director of the Project on Defense Alternatives in Cambridge, Mass., suspects defense spending could be cut as low as $650 billion without seriously damaging American security needs. To trim the deficit, Mr. Obama called for a freeze in discretionary spending but exempted defense. The US defense budget adds up, at the very least, to 47 percent of total worldwide defense spending. That reflects the US role as the sole superpower, the various US interests abroad, and the relatively high costs of the US military. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson raised defense spending almost 50 percent in constant dollars. President Reagan, with his ambition to financially clobber the Soviet Union, raised defense outlays by more than 50 percent.

Turn – Withdrawal undercuts Defense Funding

Congressional Quarterly Weekly 3/20/2k10 (“Defense's New Defender,” pg nexis)

Now Dicks, who has made a career largely of saying yes, will increasingly have to say no. He may come under increasing pressure to rein in Pentagon spending. Congress is weighing an Obama administration plan to freeze most domestic discretionary spending for three years. Although it would be exempt, the Pentagon is receiving just over half of U.S. discretionary appropriations this fiscal year, which could make its budget more of a target than usual for critics. Significant cuts are unlikely this year, but as U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan wanes, the record increases in defense spending since Sept. 11 will almost certainly become a thing of the past. Pressures inside the Pentagon are squeezing the defense budget, too. The cost of pay and benefits for a larger all-volunteer military force will conflict more sharply with weapons spending. These fiscal forces will lead to hard choices for Dicks, and he will have to cut programs that are not performing. "Dicks is a tough guy, even when he's on your side," said Thompson.

Turn: withdrawal undercuts support for defense spending – guts weapons programs

Congress Daily 6/21/2k10

(“Tough choices confront defense budget cutters,” pg online @ http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/062110cdam2.htm)

"A double tsunami is about to hit defense," said Adams, now a professor at American University. The first wave is a growing appetite for deficit reduction and spending control. The second wave, Adams said, is an anticipated reduction in troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, making it both easier and more politically feasible to cut the defense budget. With tens of thousands of troops still deployed in both countries, most lawmakers -- particularly key members of the Armed Services committees from both parties -- would not tolerate cuts to the defense budget. In fact, many Republicans complain that the Obama administration isn't spending enough to acquire fighter aircraft and ships. But a peacetime environment would pave the way for significant defense cuts, as it has after most major military operations.

No Link: No Increases

And, there is no link – withdrawal wont increase funds available for FCS

MarketWatch 2k7

(“Defense stocks felled over Iraq withdrawal,” August 17, 2007, pg online@ http://www.marketwatch.com/story/talk-of-iraq-withdrawal-hits-defense-stocks-but-spending-goes-on-200781717450)

Some sort of withdrawal from Iraq is likely, Jane's Intelligence Review analyst Matthew Smith said, and the reduction of Iraqi combat operations will mean a greater focus on overall military preparedness. It will also mean a reduction in supplemental spending, which has been supporting Iraq operations and has allowed rapid new procurement growth with little Congressional oversight.

For 2008 the supplemental budget includes funding for additional C-17 cargo aircraft and Blackhawk Medevac helicopters, mine resistant ambush protected, or MRAP vehicles, as well as soldiers' health and housing allowances.

Legislators on the House Appropriations Committee have said 2008 would be the last for large supplemental requests, sometimes referred to as emergency spending, citing the fiscal "flabbiness" of the process.

So while large suppliers with diverse portfolios and a history of service contracts with the Defense Department will likely benefit or be unaffected by a reset, smaller companies that only make one kind of product could be left out, said Morningstar analyst Marisa Thompson.

That could be a blow to a company like Force Protection Inc. (FRPT 4.15, -0.08, -1.89%) , which exclusively builds MRAP vehicles, and has benefited from a political push for more emergency funding to protect troops from roadside bombs. If the troops are taken out of Iraq, demand for the armored trucks could shrink.

Laurence Korb, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration and now a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, said he expects a procurement crunch after 2008.

"There will no longer be supplementals, but there will be the reset, and money for big ticket items will have to compete" for funding, Korb said. MRAP spending will be impacted, there will be a decline in spending for "future combat systems" such as missile defense, and funding for programs like the Joint Strike Fighter -- being built by Lockheed, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems -- will likely be stretched out over more years, he said.

No Link: Closing Bases Costs Money

Closing bases costs more money than it saves in the short term---and long-term savings are small

Peters2k 9

(Katherine McIntire Peters, writer for Government Executive, August 12, 2009, “Defense budget portends difficult trade-offs,” online: <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0809/081209kp1.htm> //da: 7/14)

Harrison's analysis also shows that predicted savings from program changes don't always materialize. He noted that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process, which resulted in the decision to shut down 22 major bases -- about 7 percent of the military's network of installations -- was supposed to yield $40.1 billion in savings between 2005 and 2025. The Defense Department now estimates the savings will be $15.3 billion, but in the near term the department is spending more to close the bases than it is saving.

FCS Good: Heg

Forcing budget trade-offs with the FCS cripples our ability to create new technologies and deploy our forces in order to project power

Center for Security Policy 7/18/2K5

(“An army of none? Congress should build, not impede, the transformational 'future combat systems'” Decision Brief No. 05-D 35 2005-07-18, [www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D\_35](http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_35) //da: 7/16)

The first major step in this move to the future force is the Future Combat Systems (FCS), a program initiated by the U.S. Army in 2003. FCS will pioneer the next generation of war-fighting capabilities, including the construction of a whole new class of air and land vehicles connected by a battle-management network. The project is currently in developmental phases and is projected to be fully operational by the year 2014. Fortunately, long before then, the FCS will be distributing - or "spinning-out" - matured technologies to soldiers already in the field, strengthening the current force while laying the groundwork for the force of the future. The conventional war-making wisdom of the past brought with it the notion that the survivability and lethality of a combat vehicle was strictly a function of heavy armor and main cannon size. Characteristic of such traditional thinking is the Army's prized M1 Abrams Tank - composed of nearly 70 tons of steel and a main gun capable of penetrating the armor of the most modern enemy main battle tanks. Such legacy force platforms are extremely powerful and have served the Army well in the past. However, they are both difficult to transport and to keep supplied, limiting the Army's operational reach and particularly its ability to react to quickly developing hotspots such as the one faced by the United States in Afghanistan in 2001. A New Way of Achieving Battlefield Dominance These age-old choices between maneuverability, lethality, flexibility and survivability will be fundamentally changed, however, by the emergence of FCS, which will optimize total combat-effectiveness using the power of a tightly integrated network. Rather than rely on armor to withstand an enemy attack and conventional munitions to destroy it, FCS will use superior unit integration and coordination to engage the enemy. Employing sophisticated sensors linked between 18 different vehicle platforms - including 8 manned ground vehicles, 6 unmanned ground vehicles, and 4 unmanned air vehicles - the FCS network can rapidly disperse tactical intelligence in order to preempt enemy attacks and mount offensive assaults unbeknownst to the enemy. All 18 platforms are designed to be relatively lightweight, mobile and, when deployed as a synchronized battle force, collectively superior in terms of lethality compared to a similar unit of M1 Abrams tanks or other conventional vehicles. In essence, the FCS network serves as a force-multiplier, allowing a lighter force that utilizes integration to fight and win decisively against any foe. The Army calls FCS the "greatest technology and integration challenge ever taken," and sees it as an indispensable ingredient in its bid to transform the Army into a force centered on small, agile and responsive combat units. Initial production of FCS platforms is to begin in November of 2008. Once accomplished, it will represent nothing less than a total revolution in American military affairs. Unfortunately, some on Capitol Hill are opposing the funding required to develop and field the Future Combat Systems. Seemingly, this opposition stems from a failure to appreciate the truly transformational nature of the FCS and the critical role it can - and must - play in providing for America's defense in the decades to come. It appears as well to rely heavily on criticisms contained in a now-dated Government Accountability Office (GAO) report issued in April 2004. Such efforts could, if unchecked, lead to the reduction of funding by a half billion dollars during FY06 that the Army itself describes as critical for the development of FCS to test it at Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2006. Even worse, the efforts could lead to a breaking up of the very heart of FCS' network, in favor of a return to conventional approaches. The GAO report reinforced several commonly held misconceptions about the Future Combat Systems initiative. They fail to take into account the impressive progress that has been made to date in the FCS program. One such fallacy is the notion that the current development of FCS technology is insufficiently advanced for designers to meet future goals and costs. If true, decision-makers would be obliged to approve funding for a program that is untested and unproven. This criticism appears to arise from the fact that the GAO uses a different benchmark for evaluating program maturity than does the Department of Defense. Instead of the lagging program the GAO indicates, FCS is currently on track to conform to DOD's stringent requirements, with all technologies scheduled to meet their Program Need Dates. Some staff critics in the House of Representatives have suggested, erroneously, that progress in FCS development to date has been lackluster and unanticipated design problems could be expected to only worsen the situation down the road. In reality, the FCS program is far better equipped to identify and address any future problems than its critics appreciate. The use of synchronized maturity periods known as "Integration Phases," has allowed FCS developers an unprecedented ability to anticipate and rectify problems before they appear. The perception that the FCS program is behind schedule is also inaccurate. In fact, it is on schedule at nearly 15% of funding already expended by June 2005 - a performance milestone that, when reached by other defense programs in the past, has almost always proven an indicator of future success. Some in Congress contend that it is not possible to fully fund the Future Combat Systems while spending for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such a trade-off mentality is a recipe for disaster. In the interest of alleviating a present budget crunch, it would compound the spending bow-wave problem already afflicting the Pentagon's planned modernization programs. The result would be to deny the Army the ability to bring to bear critical technologies needed to maintain America's preeminence on the battlefield, and, therefore, possibly its success there. In light of the fact that the defense budget is still at a relatively low percentage of the Nation's GDP when compared to past allocations, it would be undesirable - if not actually recklessly irresponsible - to run such risks, especially in light of recently announced increases in federal revenues. Particularly troubling is the proposal being advanced by some in Congress that the various Future Combat Systems components be split up into separate development tracks. Doing so would only serve to damage the strategic underpinnings of the entire program - i.e., its emphasis on integrated command and control. Without this critical central feature, the Pentagon could be left with a class of vehicles and weapons that would be disconnected from each other and unable decisively and successfully to confront heavier enemy forces. Were such a recommendation to be followed, it may well lead to a FCS program unable to fulfill its main objective of a more lethal yet lighter and more readily deployable ground force. The FCS is one of the ambitious transformational programs ever embarked upon by the U.S. Department of Defense. It will fundamentally alter the way the military thinks and operates. Such a revolutionary family of systems undeniably carries with it some technological risk, but it also promises a host of tangible benefits. If the U.S. military, especially the Army, is to survive in the rapidly changing battlespace of the 21st Century, it must embrace the sort of futuristic approach inherent in the Future Combat Systems. Talk about the desirability of and need for "force transformation" is cheap. Unfortunately, realizing it is not. The FCS represents one of the most important steps taken to date to achieve this goal. Were funding for this program to be substantially cut now, the effect would be as predictable as it would be undesirable: to imperil and possibly to preclude the realization of a critical family of capabilities made possible by swift technical development.

FCS Good Terrorism

FCS key to winning WOT – current tanks are too heavy

Isenberg 2k2

(Senior analyst at Intellibridge, Editor of the Homeland Security Monitor, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2002 (David and Ivan, June 11th, “Empty Promises”, Policy Analysis #442, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa442.pdf )

Although Gen. Eric Shinseki is developing new medium-weight brigades with lighter wheeled vehicles, the meager force that he is creating (six brigades) will be converted from both light and heavy forces. Thus, there is doubt about whether the Army is actually becoming lighter. The Army’s essence is a heavy armored force, and each succeeding generation of Army vehicles has become heavier and heavier (e.g., the Crusader). In less-developed countries, the 70-ton M-1 tank—built to travel on the excellent German freeways— is too heavy to travel on unreinforced roads and too wide to fit through train tunnels and narrow city streets. The Army’s self-image must change; most of the active Army should become lighter to fight the brushfire wars against terrorism. As a hedge against the unlikely rise of another superpower, heavy forces could be retained in the Army National Guard.

Terrorist attacks destroy civilization

Alexander 2k3

(Professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States, 2003, (Yonah, August 27th, “Terrorism Myths and Realities,” Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20030827-084256-8999r.htm )

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

F-22 Good

F-22 cuts immediately cause extinction

Goon and Kopp 4/14/09

(Carlo Copp, member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics , a member of the Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, and of the Association of Old Crows , Has Consulted to Private Industry and Government Organizations, He Has Written for Amberley based Defence Today based in Australian Aviation, Has produced extensive contributions to the Defence White Paper Debate, Work has been Published by the United States Air Force, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-140409-1.html)

“F-22 Termination: America’s Self-Induced Strategic Death Spiral” The F-22 is the only US fighter capable of defeating modern “anti-access” weapons. Without a sufficient number of F-22s a US President will be denied credible conventional weapons options in a nation state conflict (US DoD). When Defence Secretary Robert Gates announced on Monday last week his intended recommendation to Cabinet that the US ceasefurther production of the F-22 Raptor fighter, it came as no surprise to many observers of the Pentagon bureaucracy. This recommendation is unprecedented as it amounts to a unilateral choice by the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense to opt out ofthe business ofdefending American forces, allies and interestsagainst industrialised nation states. In an era of rising industrialised regional powers across Asia, this choice amounts to a self-induced strategic death spiral***.***  The ground truth of current times is that “anti-access” technologies capable of denying access to all US combat aircraft other than the F-22A Raptor and B-2A Spirit have been the hottest selling items in the globalised arms market**.** These technologies include advanced digital technology fighter aircraft and long range Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), and a range of supporting systems such as radars, passive sensors, computer networks, data fusion systems, radar decoys, radar / communications / GPS jamming equipment and point defence weapons designed to shoot down US smart munitions in flight. Advanced Surface to Air Missiles are a particular concern since they are relatively cheap, often highly effective, and unchallengingin personnel training demands. Russia has exported large numbers of the S-300PMU / SA-10C, S-300PMU1 and PMU2 Favorit / SA-20, and is set to export the new S-400 Triumf / SA-21, which includes a 200 nautical mile range missile built to kill AWACS, JSTARS and jamming aircraft like the EA-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler. These missile systems are often described as “Patriot class” and are similar to the US Patriot in basic design, but employ more refined radar designs, longer ranging missiles, and are much more mobile than the Patriot, making them vastly more difficult to kill compared to legacy Soviet era or Patriot SAM batteries. An opponent operating SA-10C/12/20/21/23 SAM systems can play the same “shoot and scoot” game even better than Saddam did with Scud launchers in 1991, or Serbia did with SA-6 SAM batteries in 1999, and evade US fighters most if not all of the time. Cold War era tactics of inundating enemy SAM batteries with HARM anti-radar missiles are effectively bankrupt. Not only are missile battery and search radars protected by smart decoys and other countermeasures, but they are also defended by advanced short range missiles and radar directed gun systems, the latter similar in concept to the US Navy Phalanx CIWS, designed to shoot down incoming US missiles or smart bombs. The Cold War era tactic of high power jamming against missile battery radars is also approaching bankruptcy, because the new generation of more powerful digital frequency hopping phased array radars are very difficult to jam, but also because SAM batteries are now equipped with missiles of sufficiently long range to kill a standoff jamming aircraft. The ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System in both the US Navy Prowler and Growler lacks the power to permit jamming from outside the range of the newer SAMs, and both aircraft are too slow to outrun SAM shots. In the air, US forces will have to confront a new generation of high performance fighters, such as thefully digital supercruising Su-35-1/Su-35BMFlanker, andover the coming decade the stealthyPAK-FA. The only Western combat aircraft with the combination of performance and stealth sufficient to decisively defeat these new aircraft is the F-22A Raptor. While Russia remains the global leaderin producing and exporting sophisticated “anti-access” weapons, China is now entering this marketwith a range of indigenous products, and derivatives of Russian products. This year China announced the export of the HQ-9/LD-2000, an improved Chinese derivative of the Russian S-300PMU/SA-10C SAM system, which includes the option of the FT-2000 passive anti-radar missile, designed to home on the radar emissions from an AWACS, JSTARS, U-2 or Global Hawk surveillance aircraft, or on emissions from jamming aircraft like the EA-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler. To defeat US smart munitions in flight, the LD-2000 is on offer, a clone of the European Goalkeeper radar directed Gatling gun, carried on a high mobility truck. Other Chinese built anti-access products include Missile Approach Warning Systems for SAM batteries, and jammers, as well as a wide range of modern digital radars including low band designs with some counter-stealth capability, and phased arrays derived from the Russian S-300P series. The existence, performance and capabilities of these weapons are well documented in a plethora of unclassified Russian language and Chinese language literature, ranging from professional journals, academic journals, manufacturer’s literature and marketing documents, and also numerous public interviews and statements by the research scientists and engineers who developed these systems. Any nation which deploysa sufficient density ofthese modern high technology “anti-access” weapons will be able to put up a defensive umbrella which is impenetrable to legacy US combat aircraft like the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 series. Moreover, these weapons can be used to effect an “ISR lockout”, driving US surveillance systems like the JSTARS, AWACS, Rivet Joint, U-2 and Global Hawk away and blinding US commanders in the field**.** Of no less concern is that the design specification for the F-35Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter was written around the generation of potential threat radars, SAM systems and fighter aircraft which preceded the current generation of productsnow in the global market. The result is that the F-35’sstealthdesign**,** defensive systemsand performance are completely inadequate to deal with modern “anti-access” systems. The F-35 would be shot down in combat almost as frequently as the legacy jets. The F-35’s poor aft hemisphere stealth and lack of supercruise capability make it highly vulnerable to long range SAM shots during escape manoeuvres and egress after weapons release. Whether the troubled F-35 meets its stated design specifications is now irrelevant, as that specification itself has been overtaken by opposing systems. The inadequacy of the F-35’s basic design specification against current threat systems continues to be ignoredby senior US decision-makers despite the overwhelming volume of hard technical evidenceproving thisis so. One recently retired US Air Force strategist, upon receiving a technical briefing on the new generation of “anti-access” systems, observed that this painted a “scary picture”. It is a scary picture. Twenty years of clever scientific and operational thinking, motivated by profit rather than Soviet ideology, and access to sophisticated Western computer and software technology in a globalised market, has produced a deep generational change in Russian built weapons technology. The Chinese in turn have licensed or “acquired” this technology to build their own derivatives. The US has never confronted 1980s generation Soviet SAMs and radars in combat, nor has it ever confronted the 1980s generation Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter. The derivatives of these weapons now in the market have two more decades of maturity and refinement in their designs, and digital weapon systems which are mostly of the same generation of technology seen in operational US weapons. The current generation of “anti-access” weapons are in techno-strategic terms a “check mate” play against USCold Warlegacy weapons, anddue to its poor design definition, also a “check mate” play against the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Where does this leave the United States in operational terms? The planned force of 187 F-22A Raptors is numerically insufficient to deliver the required number of sorties to effect an air campaign on the scale of Desert Storm, and would be challenged to cover the demands of a campaign on the scale of the bombing of Serbia in 1999. This can be easily proven by a simple throw weight calculation based on precision guided weapon capable fighters deployed in the 1991 and 1999 air campaigns. Between 500 and 700 F-22s are needed to preserve America’s historical advantage in air power. The notion that F-22s can quickly kill off opposing SAMs and carve corridors through an enemy’s SAM belts was predicated on the poor mobility ofa preceding generation ofSAM systems. This model is now also bankrupt. Linked by radio networks and using satellite navigation, modern high mobility SAM batteries and radars may take weeks to kill off in a sustained air campaign. Legacy fighters and the F-35Joint Strike Fightercannot be flown into such airspace, due to the very high risk of ambush SAM shots killing the aircraft**.** The result of having only 187 F-22s will be air campaigns limited in size and the rate at which critical targets can be attacked and reattacked, resulting in opportunities for opponents to play shell games with assets, evading attacks. Iflegacy aircraft or insufficiently stealthy F-35s are employed, combat losses are apt to mount quickly, and the few surviving aircrew becomepolitically exploitablehostages for propaganda and political extortion purposes. Even at combat loss rates of only several percent, the “half life” of a fighter fleet would be measured in weeks even at modest sortie rates. Overuse of the small F-22 fleet will burn out airframe life much faster than planned for, seeing the fleet run out of life possibly in less than two decades, leaving the US without any credible tactical air capability. Where does this leave the United States in strategic terms? The inability to project power on an effective scale against even a regional nation state opponent in the class of Saddam’s former Iraq, equipped with modern “anti-access” weapons, without unsustainable losses in aircrew and aircraft, severely limits strategic optionsavailable to the United States. Confronted with a regional crisis in which force must be used to prevent a US ally or US forces on the ground from being overrun, a US President will be left with two wholly unacceptable choice**s**. The first choice is to accept high losses in expensive to replace combat aircraft and even more expensive to replace aircrew, with the enormous political costs that entails with US voters and Congress, and the strategic, political and fiscal costs of replacement. The second choice is to threaten the use of, or to use, tactical nuclear weapons, which carries enormous costs politically, on the domestic and global stages, and which carries very real risks ofescalation**,** especially if the opponent or its ally has a credible nuclear weapons capability. The political costs the US incurred by invading Iraq in 2003 would pale into insignificance if the US were to employ, unilaterally, tactical nuclear weapons to deal with a regional conflict. The cost of procuring a sufficient number of F-22 Raptors is trivial compared to the costs incurred by the alternatives. It is worth observing that one half of the current ‘on-record’ procurement budget for the F-35 would buy well in excess of 1,000 F-22A Raptors, making a complete mockery of any fiscal justifications for the F-35 over the F-22. This begs the question of why SecDef Gates opted to make his recommendation on F-22 Raptor termination. Basic strategic logic shows that this recommendation produces real and tangible strategic risks over the coming decade that the US will be unable to effectively intervene using conventional forces in regional conflicts involving nation state opponents, driving available military options into politically unacceptable choices such as tacticalnuclear weapons. The recommendation is all the more remarkable given the President’s stated policy aims to “...preserve our unparalleled airpower capabilities to deter and defeat any conventional competitors, swiftly respond to crises across the globe, and support our ground forces”; and “America seeks a world with no nuclear weapons”. Unilaterally abandoning the capability to use conventional air power against industrialised nation states is simply not coherent with the stated philosophical and practical strategic aims of the Obama Administration. In the words of one senior US strategist, “**the recommendation to terminate the F-22 is insane”.**  The unilateral grand strategic policy decision inherent in SecDef Gates’ F-22 recommendation is also not coherent with the thinking of key US allies in the West Pacific, such as Australia and Japan. Australia’s soon to be released White Paper, equivalent to a US QDR, is expected to strongly prioritise regional nation state conflicts over counter-insurgency campaigns. Japan’s 2007 Defence White Paper does much the same, also focussing on China’s enormous military growth, that being well detailed in the March OSD report to Congress on China’s military capabilities. As the Rumsfeld/Gates OSD actively discouraged both Japan and Australia from procuring the F-22, and marketed the F-35 instead, both nations are left to rely on the strategic deterrent effect of the US F-22 fleet, and its combat effect if hostilities were to break out. In grand strategy terms, SecDef Gates’ recommendation leaves both Japan and Australia “up the creek without a paddle” as a US fleet of only 187 F-22 aircraft is too small for viable deterrent or actual combat effect against China. The long term political impact is yet to be seen, but we should not be surprised if the Japanese start thinking seriously about developing and deploying nuclear armed ballistic missiles. Other Asian allies may change their alignment away from the US, throwing their lot in with China. The Gates recommendation will not be welcomed by Australia’s strategic analysts. The most likely explanation for SecDef Gates’ recommendation is bureaucratic advice based on a combination of very poor technical intelligence onnew generation “anti-access weapons”; grossly optimistic assessments of the F-35’s procurement costs, survivability, capability, and Initial Operational Capability dates; anda complete absence of deeper strategic thought and operational analysis on the available force structure alternatives. There is ample evidence to argue that all three of these toxic ingredients are present in the current, largely Bush Administration staffed, senior Pentagon bureaucracy. It is known from numerous public statements that performance models for Russian and Chinese built weapons used in operational analysis are often ten or more years out of date, and the technical sophistication of these weapons has not been part of any recent Pentagon public statements or documents. There is also abundant public evidence of the F-35’s limited capabilities and performance being misrepresented inside and outside the Pentagon. Finally, the detailed force structure modelling required to validate force structure choices will likely not be performed until the Quadrennial Defence Review later this year, if at all given that robust analysis would not validate the current OSD strategic position. The weakness of the strategic argument supporting the OSD position is very clear. The idea of “complex hybrid warfare” is simply a renaming of the 1930s Nazi and Soviet practice of using insurgent proxies, which they often armed with state of the art light weapons, and employed to disrupt and destabilise nation state opponents in support of conventional military forces. The post Cold War growth in irregular forms of combat has been a reaction to the overwhelming effect of US conventional air power since the Cold War. Cripple that air power as the OSD intends to do, and opponents will return to the use of conventional forms of combat. A Sukhoi fighter-bomber armed with KAB-1500 satellite, laser or television guided thermobaric bombs can kill American troops far more effectively than any insurgent with a suicide vest could. The focus of the 2010 budget proposal, and repeated comments about “next-war-itis”, display a clear indifference to the strategic realities of Asia’s high technology arms race, which has produced many conventional military capabilities far more potent than those deployed by the Warsaw Pact during the 1980s. Gates is a highly experienced intelligence professional, with a doctorate in Russian/Soviet history, robust performance in a range of senior intelligence postings, and a well regarded track record in analytical intelligence. It is therefore surprising that he was prepared to make a decision on the basis of advice which is not only contestable, but has been contested, and repeatedly proven wrong in public. What is clear is that if the President and Congress agree to the Gates recommendation on F-22 termination, for the next two to three decades the US will be opting out of the business of deterrence and protecting American interests and allies against nation state threats, with all of the enormous strategic and political costs that introduces.