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AT: Middle East Adv (1/3)

No Iran prolif- intelligence is politicized and false

SCHOENFELD, Ph.D. from Harvard University's Department of Government, July 19, 2010 (GABRIEL, The Wall Street Journal, <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575342941580221462.html#>> DA: July 19, 2010, SL)

U.S. intelligence has already had two horrendously costly lapses this decade: the failure to interdict the plot of Sept. 11, 2001, and the erroneous assessment that Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass destruction. Both brought us into wars. A third failure may now be unfolding, with consequences that might dwarf the preceding two. To avoid this, we need an inquest. The status of Iran's nuclear program is the issue. In December 2007, our intelligence agencies put out a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which in its opening sentence baldly declared that "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." In a stroke, this authoritative pronouncement eliminated any possibility that President Bush, then entering his final year in office, would order a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Perhaps even more significantly, it undercut White House and international efforts to tighten sanctions on Iran. After all, if the Iranian nuclear program had been halted in 2003, what would be the point? But the NIE, or at least the unclassified summary around which public discussion revolved, was badly flawed. It relegated to a footnote the all-important fact that the most difficult part of a bomb project—"uranium conversion and enrichment"—was proceeding apace. The only thing that Tehran was said by the NIE to have stopped was "weaponization," the design of an actual warhead. This is the technically least complex facet of the enterprise. Behind the scenes, the intelligence services of Germany, Great Britain, France and Israel all took issue with the NIE. It became the subject of fierce criticism in Congress and the press. It is now clear that while the U.S. dithered, Tehran forged ahead. Evidence has surfaced that the flawed 2007 NIE was the result of political cookery. Paul Pillar, a former top analyst at the CIA, has frankly acknowledged that in downgrading the Iranian nuclear threat analysts may well have had policy implications foremost in mind. The intelligence community was severely burned for its erroneous conclusion about Iraq's WMD in 2002, which the Bush administration employed to justify going to war with Iraq. As a result, Mr. Pillar stated in a January 2008 NPR interview, "estimators might have shaped [the 2007 Iran] estimate in a way that would take this military option off the table." In his book published last year, "The Inheritance," David Sanger of the New York Times quotes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (a former CIA chief himself) declaring "that in his whole career in intelligence he had never seen 'an NIE that had such an impact on U.S. diplomacy.' He did not mean it as a compliment." Since late last year, U.S. intelligence has been preparing a new estimate of Iran's nuclear program. The critical question is whether the forces that led to politicization in 2007 have been eradicated. Will the drafters of the new Iran NIE call the shots as they are, or will they once again use intelligence as a political lever? Already some hints are emerging. In late June, CIA Director Leon Panetta flatly declared that the Iranians "clearly are developing their nuclear capability." Regarding "weaponization," he stated that "they continue to work on designs in that area." This explicit statement is an unequivocal reversal by our nation's premier spy agency. But could this stunning turnabout somehow be every bit as politicized as the 2007 NIE? This troubling possibility cannot be overlooked. Mr. Panetta, a former congressman and Bill Clinton's White House chief of staff, is a political creature to the marrow of his bones. The turnabout on Iran that he apparently has played a role in engineering may owe in part to a paradox: Intelligence that today emphasizes the Iranian nuclear danger is useful for precisely the same political purpose for which it was employed by intelligence analysts back in 2007, namely to take the military option off the table. Such intelligence bolsters the case for internationally agreed-upon sanctions, the Obama administration's favored policy toward Tehran and the only course that might obviate the use of force. In pressing ahead, the Obama administration has used the intelligence agencies to provide classified briefings to foreign officials. The stronger the evidence, the stronger the case for action short of war. And to be even more specific, there are various competing timelines now circulating in the intelligence world for when Iran will have passed the nuclear point of no return. The longer the time frame, the more room is left for sanctions to work their will. Israel, which may have its own reasons for coloring intelligence, contends that we might only have 12 months left. U.S. intelligence, as is clear from various public statements and congressional testimony by ranking officials, is pushing the timeline further out, to as few as two years and as many as five. What is the right number? If we and the rest of the world are not to be surprised by an Iranian detonation, it is the critical question. We need absolute confidence that the answer, even if indeterminate, is not once again based on cooked intelligence. That is why a neutral outside panel should be brought in to scrutinize the discredited 2007 NIE and the entire estimating process in this sensitive arena. Previous intelligence lapses, like those leading up to 9/11 or with Iraq's WMDs, have been thoroughly investigated by independent commissions, unleashing potential for corrective action. Who made mistakes and why? Are those same individuals in the process of introducing errors again? The national intelligence officer who oversaw the writing of the 2007 NIE was Vann Van Diepen. Today he is a senior official at the State Department, where he "spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation."

AT: Middle East Adv (2/3)

Alt causes to Middle Eastern instability- Kurdistan

**Vela,** quoting Henri Barkley, a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff**, July 18,** 2010 (Justin, Telegraph UK, “Turkey's tourist resorts threatened with terrorist campaign” <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/7897170/Turkeys-tourist-resorts-threatened-with-terrorist-campaign.html>> DA: July 19, 2010 SL)

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group, has said it plans a wave of violence following the breakdown of a year-long ceasefire. The PKK strategy will target major Turkish cities, rather than just army patrols and bases in the Kurdish heartlands. These are likely to include the metropolises of western Turkey, including those popular with tourists and businessmen, which have occasionally been hit by bombings in the last decade. A triple-bombing struck the resort of Marmaris in 2006, while a year later a suicide bomber struck a popular shopping street in the capital, Ankara. Around 2.5 million British tourists visit Turkey each year. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office last night said they advised "against all but essential travel" to the south east of Turkey due to the "high threat from terrorism". Murat Karayilan, the top commander of the PKK, said he had been left with no choice but to act following Turkish bombing raids on PKK bases in Iraq. He said the PKK would soon declare "democratic autonomy" in Kurdish regions of south-east Turkey. "If Turkey does not accept this, it is their problem," he said. The war between the Turkish government and the PKK, which has lasted 26 years and claimed 40,000 lives, has already moved into a new phase after the collapse of a ceasefire. The prime minister, Recip Erdogan, who was under attack for making too many concessions, has ordered bombing raids on PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The most prominent of these is the remote stronghold in the Qandil Mountains, where The Daily Telegraph was escorted for the interview along back roads hidden from the army drones circling overhead. Despite the raids and the weight of one of Nato's largest armies ranged against him, Mr Karayilan said his forces could keep up the struggle for decades more. "We are deeply rooted in the mountains and hearts of the people of Kurdistan," he said. "We are able to live another 50 years like this." Mr Erdogan's strategy is to improve strategic ties with its neighbours to the east and squeeze out opposition from the Kurds, who form a significant minority in several countries. He has built bridges with the leaders of the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which has provided a haven for the PKK for years. Business between Turkey and northern Iraq is now worth an estimated $7 billion. In return, Ankara is now demanding the Kurdish regional government hand over Mr Karayilan and 247 PKK commanders operating from their territory. Tens of thousands of Kurds have been arrested under Turkey's harsh anti-terror laws, including 1,600 Kurdish politicians and 4,000 children. Analysts say the PKK, which is considered as terrorist group by the EU and the US and is on Britain's list of proscribed groups, threats promise a major escalation of the conflict, at a time when Turkey is in the spotlight following its championing of the Palestinian cause in Gaza. "A PKK announcement of that sort really raises the ante. You will see that Kurds will respond with support. As a result there is going to be a counter wave of repression and it will increase the tension and violence," said Henri Barkey, of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington.

Non-Unique: Turkey already acts as a diplomat within the middle east region

Leverett and Leverett, Director of the New America Foundation's Iran Project, Professor of IR at Penn State AND CEO of Stratega, 9 (Flynn and Hillary, Serious Turkish Diplomacy, DA: July 19, 2010, October 29, 2009, <http://gei.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/what_serious_diplomacy_> looks\_like\_in\_turkey\_13765, LRD)

Turkey is, of course, a member of NATO and has long had a positive economic and strategic relationship with Israel. But, working from these four principles, the Erdogan government has in recent years effected major improvements in Turkey's relations with a much wider range of Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Iraq and Syria. This opening to the broader Middle East has been very strongly in Turkey's interest. Expanding trade and investment links to Iran, Iraq, Syria and other regional states has boosted the growth of Turkey's economy and reinforced its status as an "emerging market" of international significance. Moreover, closer ties to Middle Eastern countries, along with links to Hamas and Hezbollah, have made Ankara an increasingly important player across a wide spectrum of regional issues. Erdogan wants to position Turkey to act as a mediator between its Muslim neighbors and the West - including the United States, which needs to move beyond nice speeches by Obama and undertake concrete diplomatic initiatives to repair its standing in the Middle East. But if Washington is too shortsighted to see the necessity of realigning its relations with key Middle Eastern actors such as Iran, the Erdogan government's opening to the broader Middle East gives Ankara a wider array of strategic options for pursuing Turkish interests -- the essence of successful diplomacy.

AT: Middle East Adv (3/3)

Turkey can’t negotiate- bad relations with Israel

Al-Ahram Weekly 7/16 The writer is associate professor in Middle Eastern history and politics at Bilkent University. (7/16/10, " Obama's collapse ", <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1007/op23.htm>, gwy)

Turkey has told Israel that it either apologises and pays compensation, or it agrees to a proper international inquiry. The response from Netanyahu and Lieberman has been abusive. Turkey has done its best to play a bridging role in the Middle East in line with its policy of "zero problems" on its borders. With a state like Israel this is impossible unless Turkey is to follow the example of Arab governments and do nothing. Turkey is already downgrading relations with Israel. The end point of this process may be the suspension of relations or their calibrated reduction to a bare minimum. It is a sign of the madness gripping Israel that it should now have picked a fight with the only country in the Middle East with which it had amicable relations and indeed a strategic working relationship. Obama has backed down but the message coming out of Ankara is that Turkey will not.

Sanctions solve for Iran prolif—Coughlin doesn’t assume UN involvement

USA TODAY 6/17 (Aamer Madhani, 6/17/10, "U.S. announces more sanctions against Iran", lexis, MK)

WASHINGTON -- The Treasury Department said Wednesday that it would penalize an Iranian bank and several Iranian companies and individuals it says are deeply involved in developing Iran's nuclear program. The targets include five companies and 90 ships that Iran used to evade three previous rounds of sanctions, said Stuart Levey, Treasury's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. Levey said Iran even renamed and repainted some ships to try to evade recognition. "To be truly effective in ending Iran's proliferation activities and Iran's support for terrorism, we need to have in place a concerted, international approach," Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said. He said he expects other countries to announce their own sanctions against Iran soon. "This is not something the United States can do alone." The announcement came a week after the United Nations Security Council approved a fourth round of sanctions. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said his country will not make "one iota of concessions" and said that it will build four new reactors for medical research. Iran has repeatedly claimed its nuclear work is for peaceful purposes. Ahmadinejad said he will soon set new conditions for talks with the West, but first he wants to punish world powers for imposing sanctions. The U.S. has no trade with Iran, but the Treasury's move cuts off the newly designated businesses from the U.S. financial system and makes it difficult for them to do business with the rest of the world, said Gary Hufbauer, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics who is a former Treasury official. Hufbauer said the sanctions will be more potent if European nations also adopt them. "What the U.S. is doing is a slap on the wrist, but if we get other countries on board it would also be a slap on the face," he said. The list also targets two individuals and four organizations tied to Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, which the U.S. says plays a role in Iran's missile program and supports terrorism. The new sanctions were praised by Rep. Howard Berman, a California Democrat who is chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee. He said they would go a long way toward "persuading Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program."

AT: Russian TNWs Adv

Russia will keep TNWs

a. security interests besides the US

BBC 8/13/09 (“Russia should retain tactical nuclear arms - senior MP,”)

The United States keeps in Europe tactical nuclear warheads many in the US itself suspect are not expedient. "**Our own security is a totally different matter.** Tactical nuclear arms are unambiguously beneficial to us and necessary for maintaining it. I would prefer to retain them," Kokoshin said. "The availability of both strategic and tactical nuclear arms in combination with long-range smart conventional weapons will enable us to effectively manage crisis-like situations," he believes.Besides, future tactical nuclear arms reduction talks, should they ever begin, will require special control and verification measures, "far more complex that measures to control strategic offensive arms," Kokoshin said.

b. political function, expansion of NATO

Podvig 06 (Pavel, “TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TERRORISM,”

TNWs, however, do play another significant role for Russia, one that is similar to the role they play in the relationship between the United States and NATO. Although perhaps not apparent, Russia sees various aspects of its TNWs policy as an asset and even as a bargaining chip in the various arrangements and negotiations with Europe**. The current situation is such that Russia has incentives to retain this political function for its TNWs.** For instance, the expansion of NATO is of major concern to Russia. Russia feels increasingly excluded from the new European security arrangements, and although it wants to participate, it believes that it is being kept from doing so. Accordingly, Russia wrongly assumes that TNWs can be used to leverage its way into these security arrangements.

c. NATOs conventional forces, France and Britain

Arbman and Thornton 05 (Gunnar, Director of Research at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, and Charles, doctoral candidate in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland, Graduate Research Fellow in the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, focusing on arms control and nonproliferation issues, six years helping the US Department of Defense manage the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, MA from The George Washington University in security policy and his BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part II: Technical Issues and Policy recommendations, February 2005, Swedish Defence Research Agency,)

What, then, would it take for Russia to seriously engage in TNW reductions? One often-cited Russian requirement would be the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe**.** For example, as an official Russian statement affirmed: “On our part we believe that removal of the tactical nuclear weapons, for example, from Europe and elimination of respective infrastructure there would become an important practical step to ultimately overcome the remnants of the Cold War period.”156 However, **this step would seem to be insufficient**. First, the number of gravity bombs that the U.S. has stored in NATO countries is relatively small compared to the estimated Russian arsenal. Although the Russians consider the U.S. weapons in Europe to be strategic in nature, **this would be a highly asymmetrical equation.** At the very least, Russia would want to include French and British nuclear forces into such an equation. **But this would probably still be insufficient, given the relative superiority of NATO’s conventional forces.** Limiting the discussion to Europe’s current nuclear force posture would also seem to be insufficient. An adjustment to the CFE Treaty may result in a less threatening front toward Russia, but Russia would certainly want assurances that NATO would not place nuclear assets in former Warsaw Pact states and former Soviet republics. Moreover**, even with these added incentives such an equation would not address the threats along Russia’s southern and eastern borders.**

AT: TNWs Terrorism Impact (1/2)

Turn- TNWs deter terrorist use of WMD

Woolf 1/28/09(Amy, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Sevice, “Nonstrategic nuclear weapons”)

Specifically, the United States has maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that “the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full range of military capabilities will remain the **cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic missile and WMD proliferation threats.** The very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas deployed forces, or its allies.”28 These statements do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout th 1990s, that the United States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy.

Russia not key- multiple stockpiles risk terrorist acquisition

The Star 5/9/09 (“Global spread of 'loose nukes' reignites disarmament efforts,”)

The order to "duck and cover" sent nervous school kids cowering under their desks in the Cold War years, as all-too-real rehearsals for a nuclear blast were held across the United States.Today, with the era of backyard bomb shelters long buried, fears of Iran's nuclear ambitions, Pakistan's shadowy stockpile, and North Korea's atomic outbursts have taken centre stage.

TNWs are safe

a. Russia adequately protects its arsenal

Bleek 02 (“Report Evaluates Russian Nuclear Weapons Security,”)

A February 2002 annual report to Congress from the National Intelligence Council concludes that Russia maintains “adequate” control over its nuclear weapons but warns that although “nuclear [weapons complex] security has been slowly improving over the last several years, risks remain.”Russia maintains “adequate security and control of its nuclear weapons, but a decline in military funding has stressed the nuclear security system,” the report states. The document characterizes an unauthorized or accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon as “**highly unlikely**,” given **“current technical and procedural safeguards.”**

b. Reliable security

Meir 08 (Oliver, Arms Control Association,“NATO Mulls Nuke Modernization, Security”)

Reports about security problems at U.S. nuclear weapons bases in Europe have led to renewed calls from parliamentarians of European allies for an end to NATO's nuclear weapons-sharing arrangements. But a senior NATO official interviewed by Arms Control Today rejected the reports about security problems, predicted a continuation of NATO's nuclear weapons policies, and called for a modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe."**There is no question that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure**," Guy Roberts, NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for weapons of mass destruction policy and director for nuclear policy, told Arms Control Today Aug. 14.On June 19, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists released the classified findings of a February U.S. Air Force blue ribbon review (BRR), which he had obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. The "Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures" found that most European sites where U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed "require significant additional resources to meet [Department of Defense] security requirements." The review had been launched following an August 2007 incident in the United States, when a B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana wrongly and unknowingly armed with nuclear cruise missiles. (See [ACT, July/August 2008.](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/AirForce) )

AT: TNWs Terrorism Impact (2/2)

Terrorism risk exaggerated-

a. Russia’s TNWs are under control

Arbman and Thornton 05 (Gunnar, Director of Research at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, and Charles, doctoral candidate in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland, Graduate Research Fellow in the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, focusing on arms control and nonproliferation issues, six years helping the US Department of Defense manage the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, MA from The George Washington University in security policy and his BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part II: Technical Issues and Policy recommendations, February 2005, Swedish Defence Research Agency,)

Although Russia’s TNW footprint may be much smaller than it was at the end of the Cold War, the size and capabilities of the force remain significant. Therefore, despite constant assurances from the Russian government, foreign officials and experts continue to raise concerns about the safety, security, and control of Russia’s TNWs. We have concluded in his report that, although there remains substantial cause for concern, **Russia has implemented adequate procedural and technical measures to control its tactical warheads.**

-No smuggling

Baltimore Sun 10/7/08 (“Working with Russia to prevent nuclear terrorism,”)

U.S.-Russian cooperation also is vital for reducing nuclear terrorism risks in the rest of the world. More than 40 countries possess the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia lead the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an effort that brings together efforts from more than 70 countries, and are working together to ship highly enriched uranium at poorly defended research reactors worldwide to secure sites. But the scope and pace of the global effort still falls far short of the urgency of the threat, and Russia's help will be central to the accelerated needed action.Former [Sen. Sam Nunn](http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/arts-culture/sam-nunn-PEHST001475.topic), for example, has suggested that the United States and Russia establish joint teams of nuclear security experts to help countries beef up nuclear security and accounting systems, potentially achieving far more comprehensive nuclear security worldwide. Indeed, Mr. Nunn is the force behind a new organization, the World Institute for Nuclear Security, that seeks to bolster security at thousands of nuclear installations worldwide in an effort to prevent terrorists from getting access to atomic bomb materials.**The good news is that cooperation to secure nuclear stockpiles and stop nuclear smuggling is moving forward** despite the post-Georgia tailspin in U.S.-Russian relations. [Sen. John McCain](http://www.newsday.com/topic/politics/elections/u.s.-elections/john-mccain-PEPLT004278.topic) and Sen. Barack

AT: Accidents Adv

TNWs are safe- no escalation or detonation

Arbman and Thornton 05 (“Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations,”)

Despite Russian claims, such as the following statement by two Russian military scholars, that its **operational planning is intended to minimize the collateral damage that may be caused by TNW detonations,** the discussion below will demonstrate that this objective is a low priority: “It should be noted that nuclear deterrence is realized by demonstrating real capabilities and the resolve to inflict sufficiently powerful strikes on the enemy leading to such damage where he cannot gain any advantages as a result of an attack on (or a continuation of aggression against) the Russian Federation and its allies. The scale of use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons must conform to the missions to be accomplished that stem above all from the degree of threat and the expected enemy reaction, **with minimization of collateral damage**.”38

No accidents

a. locks and expert is needed to operate

Arbman and Thornton 05 (“Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations,”)

Let us assume that a nuclear weapon has been illegally obtained one way or another. First, a necessary – though certainly not sufficient – condition to achieve a nuclear explosion with the acquired weapon, is to have access to an expert with sufficient knowledge about the particular type of weapon acquired. This would have to be a technically trained person, well acquainted with the physical, mechanical and electronic specifics of the warhead. Some acquaintance of the operational procedures involved in exploding it is yet another necessary requirement. Second, as elaborated in some detail in section II-3.1.4 of this report, **these weapons invariably have locks that must be unlocked, in principle presenting a formidable barrier against unauthorized use.** The question how easy or difficult it is to break or circumvent these locks **without access to the codes necessary to unlock a particular weapon is difficult to assess**.

b. storage is separated

Arbman and Thornton 05 (“Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations,”)

Fourth, and perhaps the most significant step Russia has taken, initiated during the Soviet period, is to separate a warhead’s triggering fuse from the warhead itself during storage. One retired senior military officer stated recently: “As far as storage facilities are concerned, the protection levels [for TNWs] are the same as it is for strategic nuclear weapons. The security systems, the control systems are all the same. Moreover, I will tell you a small secret. Marshall Sergeyev, when he was Minister of Defense, instituted certain technical measures for these small tactical nuclear weapons. These measures were implemented. The idea is that the hardware is kept separate from the actual nuclear weapon – they are separated in distance from each other.”87

AT: US-Russia Relations Adv

Relations low now- TNWs don’t solve

Lamond 09 (Claudine, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Russian Foreign Policy,” International Security report)

The fundamental problem with Russian‐America relations is a differing view of the ‘terms of engagement’; an open question remains as to whether the conflicts are **disagreements in values or interests**.6 **The ‘value gap’ between Russia and the US is often blamed for the poor relations**. Yet the disagreements between Russia and the US are not about different values, but different interests, both financial and geopolitical. What is more, the interests of America and Russia are increasingly colliding, as both seek to enhance their own power and influence, particularly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while diminishing the others. Despite repeated statements saying otherwise, Russia’s and America’s nuclear arsenals are still largely directed at each other. French and British nuclear arsenals are seen largely as an irrelevance in Russia, and relations with China have improved considerably over the past two decades, with mutual leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, joint military exercises and weapon technology exchanges. America often see tension with Russia as a conflict in values, the remains of an ideological conflict with a state whose democratic credentials still leave a lot to be desired.8 Russia did not evolve into the liberal democracy many had hoped for after the fall of the Soviet .

Arms control doesn’t spillover- separate agendas

ABC News 4/1/09 (“Breakthrough on U.S.-Russian Relations? "We’re Not Looking Into Anybody's Soul," Says U.S. Official, Previewing "Sober" Yet Optimistic Announcement,”)

Senior officials with the Obama administration tell ABC News that this morning, after a bilateral meeting between President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, [the governments of both countries will make a major announcement](http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Business/story?id=7214176&page=1) relating to U.S.-Russian relations, including arms control, a statement of the future U.S.-Russian agenda and a U.S.-Russian summit to take place perhaps as early as this summer. **"There are very real differences between the United States and Russia, and I have no interest in papering those over,"** President Obama said Wednesday morning at a press conference with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. "But there are also a set of common interests."The President listed those interests as ranging "from [Afghanistan](http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/03/president-ob-18.html) to [Iran](http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/03/potus-sends-spe.html)," including "reducing nuclear stockpiles … reducing the threat of terrorism ... stabilizing the world economy … and finding a sustainable path for energy and dealing with some of the threats of climate change. ... I think there's great potential for concerted action and that’s what I think we'll be pursuing." "A good place to start will be the issue of nuclear proliferation," the president said.The announcement will include a set of instructions to arms negotiators on how to conclude a new, "post-START" agreement by the end of 2009, a senior official tells ABC News.START -- or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty -- between the United States and then-USSR was signed in March 1991 and removed more than 75 percent of the strategic nuclear weapons in both countries' arsenals. But START is set to expire Dec. 5, 2009.Russian leaders have been making a lot of noise about rearming Russia; Russian Strategic Rocket Force Commander Nikolai Solovtsov, for example, said that Russia would start deploying next-generation RS-24 missiles after START expires at the end of the year. Wednesday's announcement could put the United States and Russia on a path to prevent that rearming. It will not be a treaty, the official cautioned ABC News. "This is just a set of instructions on how negotiators need to proceed."An Obama administration official says that the goal of the post-START negotiations would be to roughly reduce the joint u.S.-Russian nuclear arsenal to 3,000 missiles from the current allowable level of 4,400.The announcement will also include a joint statement on U.S.-Russian relations. The statement will include a section on arms control, Iran, Afghanistan, European security, the United States' proposed missile defense shield, the Russian war with Georgia, the World Trade Organization, democracy and human rights.

Relations resilient- empirics

DesMoines Register 8/26/09 (“Renew the focus on relations of U.S., Russia,”)

In recent years, U.S.-Russia relations have again taken a turn for the worse. Both nations have routinely portrayed the other in negative terms**. Mutual distrust and suspicions have grown over many political, defense and economic issues.** We have returned to describing each other in stereotypes.  The 50th anniversary of Khrushchev's visit is an excellent opportunity to focus again on the importance of better U.S.-Russia relations, honest dialogue and shared need to tackle nuclear and other global challenges. As President Barack Obama said in Moscow in early July, "But I believe that on the fundamental issues that will shape this century, **Americans and Russians share common interests that form a basis for cooperation."**

1NC NATO Cohesion T/

US unilateral removal of TNWs ends the NATO alliance- no security framework

Sally McNamara and Baker Spring**,** March 4, 2010.The Heritage Foundation Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs and F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy [http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/president-obama-must-not-remove-nuclear-weapons-from-europe. Accessed July 19, 2010J.T]

From a strategic standpoint, a proactive national defense relies on the ability to defend physical territory, as well as the ability to deter an enemy attack in the first place. In a highly dangerous world where hostile states—such as Iran and North Korea—possess both nuclear and conventional forces capable of striking the U.S. and its allies, a credible nuclear deterrence, not unilateral disarmament, is the best chance for peace. Therefore, the U.S., in consultation with its allies, should use nuclear weapons in Europe and in the U.S. to protect and defend the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. This position is consistent with a more defensive, broader strategic posture that would require the deployment of robust defensive systems, including ballistic missile defenses. This posture would also require modernizing the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, including their delivery systems, to make them better suited to destroying targets that are likely to be used to launch strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, as well as targets whose destruction requires the more powerful force of nuclear weapons. These targets could include missiles in hardened silos, deeply buried command and control facilities, and heavily protected nuclear weapons depots. A Threat to NATO Not since radical leftist sentiment gripped Western Europe in the 1980s has the transatlantic relationship faced such a serious ideological challenge to the mutual security of North America and Europe. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons from European and NATO bases would spell the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security.

NATOs essential to stop global super-power war

John **O'Sullivan**, editor of the National Review and founder of the New Atlantic, 6-19**98** [American Spectator]

Some of those ideas--notably, dissolution and "standing pat"--were never likely to be implemented. Quite apart from the sociological law that says organizations never go out of business even if their main aim has been achieved (the only exception being a slightly ominous one, the Committee for the Free World, which Midge Decter closed down after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), NATO's essential aim has not been permanently achieved. True, the Soviet threat is gone; but a **nuclear-armed and potentially unstable Russia** is still in the game; a major conflict has just been fought in the very Balkans which sparked the First World War; and there are a number of potential wars and civil wars lurking in such regions as the Tyrol, the Basque country, Northern Ireland (not yet finally settled), Corsica, Belgium, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe and the Balkans generally where, it is said, " every England has its Ireland, and every Ireland its Ulster." If none of these seems to threaten the European peace very urgently at present, that is in part because the existence of NATO makes any such threat **futile and even counter-productive**. No nation or would-be nation wants to take NATO on. And if not NATO, what? There are international bodies which could mediate some of the lesser conflicts: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe is explicitly given that responsibility, and the European Union is always itching to show it can play a Big Power role. But neither body has the military heft or the prestige to deter or repress serious strife. The OSCE is a collective security organization, and as Henry Kissinger said of a similar body: "When all participants agree, there is no need for it; when they split, it is useless." And the EU only made itself look ridiculous when it attempted to halt the Bosnian conflict in its relatively early stages when a decisive intervention might have succeeded. As for dealing with a revived Russian threat, there is no military alliance in sight other than NATO that could do the job. In a sense, NATO today is Europe's defense. Except for the American forces, Western armies can no longer play an independent military role. They are wedded to NATO structures and dependent on NATO, especially American, technology. (As a French general admitted in the Gulf War: "The Americans are our eyes and ears.") If NATO were to dissolve--even if it were to be replaced by some European collective defense organization such as a beefed-up Western European Union--it would **invite chaos as every irredentist faction sought to profit from the sudden absence of the main guarantor of European stability**.

Ext. NATO Cohesion Link

TNWs key to NATO unity- shared decision-making

Woolf 1/28/09(Amy, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Sevice, “Nonstrategic nuclear weapons”)

Many analysts have questioned whether the United States needs to continue to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, more than 15 years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and demise of the Soviet Union. **NATO policy still views these weapons as a deterrent to any potential adversary**, **and they also serve as a link among the NATO nations, with bases in several nations and shared** responsibility for nuclear policy planning and decision-making. But, if the United States develops new nuclear warheads that can fulfill nonstrategic missions with delivery from a strategic platforms (such as a heavy bomber), the need for forward basing in Europe diminishes. Hence, some believe that the blurring of the distinction between nonstrategic and strategic delivery vehicles, along with the increasing concerns about threats outside of Europe, have reduced the utility of forward-deployed nuclear weapons.

TNWs are the vital internal link to NATO unity

Woolf 1/28/09(Amy, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Sevice, “Nonstrategic nuclear weapons”)

However, the authors of the Task Force study cited above hold a different view. They argue that **U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO remain “a pillar of NATO unity**.” They argue that these weapons “convey the will of multiple allied countries, creating real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage through the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the Alliance.”59 Removing these weapons from Europe would, therefore, do more to **undermine NATO’s political unity and military security** than it would to encourage Russia to reduce or contain its nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

TNWs act as Glue- key to NATO Cohesion

Horton 07 (Scott, Leuitenant, Colonel U.S. Army, USAWC Strategy Research Project, “NATO’s Nuclear Glue”)

NATO has already reduced its reliance on nuclear forces. Its strategy remains one of war prevention but it is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation.44 The collective security provided by NATO’s nuclear posture is shared among all members of the alliance. Moreover, the presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO **reinforces the political and military link between the European and North American members of the alliance.** At the same time, the participation of non-nuclear countries in the implementation of the alliance’s nuclear policies demonstrates alliance solidarity as well as the common commitment of member countries to maintaining their security and the widespread sharing among them of responsibilities and risks.45 It also removes an incentive for countries such as Germany to develop their own nuclear weapons. As former defense secretary James **Schlesinger has written, US nuclear weapons are the "glue" holding NATO together**.46 His comments date back to 1986, yet numerous staff officers on joint planning staffs and headquarters could have heard the same quote from current senior US defense officials.

TNWs key to NATO cohesion- shared risks and burdens of NATO missions

Millar 02 (Alistair, “The Pressing Need for Tactical Nuclear Weapons Control,”Arms Control Association)

NATO maintains that it depends heavily on widespread participation in nuclear roles by its European members. For example, the final communiqué of a NATO working group on nuclear weapons said that NATO will continue “widespread participation in nuclear roles and peacetime basing by Allies. Sub-strategic nuclear forces committed to NATO continue to provide the necessary political and military link to NATO’s strategic nuclear forces and a**n important demonstration of Alliance solidarity.”**[13](http://armscontrol.org/act/2002_05/millarmay02#notes) For the alliance**, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil ensures that allies on both sides of the Atlantic are sharing the risk** and the burden associated with NATO’s nuclear mission. Withdrawal of these forces would **weaken the value of the alliance substantially** because the European members want both a tactical and a strategic nuclear umbrella to be part of NATO’s defenses.

NATO Cohesion Good- Afghanistan

NATO cohesion is key to solve in Afghanistan

New York Times, 8/31/2009 (“Groundwork Is Laid for New Troops in Afghanistan”, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/world/asia/01military.html)

“The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort,” General McChrystal said in a statement after sending his report to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of all Middle East forces. A military official said General Petraeus immediately endorsed its findings and forwarded it on Monday to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who will review it before sending it to the White House.

Afghanistan Instability spills over and causes nuclear war

Starr, Chair of Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at John Hopkins University, 2001(S. Frederick, “The War Against Terrorism and U.S. Bilateral Relations with the Nations of Central Asia,” Testimony before Senate Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, Dec 13, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm>)

However, this does not mean that US actions are without risk to the Central Asian states. Quite the contrary. For a decade they have faced not only the dangers arising from Afghanistan but also the constant threat posed by certain groups in Russia, notably the military and security forces, who are not yet reconciled to the loss of empire. This “imperial hangover” is not unique to Russia. France exhibited the same tendencies in Algeria, the Spanish in Cuba and Chile, and the British when they burned the White House in 1812. This imperial hangover will eventually pass, but for the time being it remains a threat. It means that the Central Asians, after cooperating with the US, will inevitably face redoubled pressure from Russia if we leave abruptly and without attending to the long-term security needs of the region. That we have looked kindly into Mr. Putin’s soul does not change this reality. The Central Asians face a similar danger with respect to our efforts in Afghanistan. Some Americans hold that we should destroy Bin Laden, Al Queda, and the Taliban and then leave the post-war stabilization and reconstruction to others. Such a course runs the danger of condemning all Central Asia to further waves of instability from the South. But in the next round it will not only be Russia that is tempted to throw its weight around in the region but possibly China, or even Iran or India. All have as much right to claim Central Asia as their “backyard” as Russia has had until now. Central Asia may be a distant region but when these nuclear powers begin bumping heads there it will create terrifying threats to world peace that the U.S. cannot ignore.

1NC Turkish Prolif DA T/ (1/2)

Removing nukes from Turkey causes Turkish prolif

McNamara and Spring, March 4, 2010 (Sally and Baker, “President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe” The Heritage Foundation, << http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe>> DA: July 19, 2010, SL)

At this time, however, a withdrawal of America’s nuclear arsenal from Europe would send the message that transatlantic security is no longer indivisible. It would also give Moscow a blank check to pursue its long-sought-after sphere of privileged interest and, ironically, could pave the way for further nuclear proliferation. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability. The Need for Nuclear Weapons in Europe From a strategic standpoint, a proactive national defense relies on the ability to defend physical territory, as well as the ability to deter an enemy attack in the first place. In a highly dangerous world where hostile states—such as Iran and North Korea—possess both nuclear and conventional forces capable of striking the U.S. and its allies, a credible nuclear deterrence, not unilateral disarmament, is the best chance for peace. Therefore, the U.S., in consultation with its allies, should use nuclear weapons in Europe and in the U.S. to protect and defend the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. This position is consistent with a more defensive, broader strategic posture that would require the deployment of robust defensive systems, including ballistic missile defenses. This posture would also require modernizing the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, including their delivery systems, to make them better suited to destroying targets that are likely to be used to launch strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, as well as targets whose destruction requires the more powerful force of nuclear weapons. These targets could include missiles in hardened silos, deeply buried command and control facilities, and heavily protected nuclear weapons depots. A Threat to NATO Not since radical leftist sentiment gripped Western Europe in the 1980s has the transatlantic relationship faced such a serious ideological challenge to the mutual security of North America and Europe. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons from European and NATO bases would spell the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security. The Russian militarization of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad and Moscow’s recent simulation of a nuclear attack on Poland require a robust response from NATO, reinforced by America’s continued nuclear guarantee. Moscow’s simulation—in which Russian armed forces invaded Poland and its air force fired nuclear missiles against Warsaw and acted in conjunction with Belarus to suppress Polish minorities in Belarus—was codenamed “West” and labeled Poland as the aggressor country. Following this exercise, as well as President Obama’s ill-defined policy of “resetting” relations with Russia, Central and Eastern Europe has sought specific assurances as to the indivisibility of the alliance’s security. In addressing these concerns, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated: I want to reaffirm as strongly as I can the United States ’ commitment to honor Article 5 of the NATO treaty. No Ally—or adversary—should ever question our determination on this point. It is the bedrock of the Alliance and an obligation that time will not erode. Our nation faces threats elsewhere in the world, but we view peace and stability in Europe as a prerequisite for addressing all of the other challenges. A nuclear pullout from Europe does not comport with Secretary Clinton’s commitments outlined above. Rather than pulling back from the alliance’s commitments, the U.S. should honor Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and plan against Moscow’s threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of one of its members. This preparation should be underpinned by the sanctity of Article 5, America’s tactical and strategic nuclear insurance. Achieving the Exact Opposite The vast majority of America’s allies in Europe have not sought to join the club of nuclear weapons powers, largely because they enjoy the comfort of the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella. However, America’s unilateral nuclear disarmament may prompt some nations—particularly Poland in light of Moscow’s war gaming and Warsaw’s general sense of a transatlantic distancing—to seek alternate security insurance. Indeed, Turkey and countless other non-nuclear powers under the NATO umbrella could further be tempted to fill the security vacuum created by America’s unilateral disarmament by seeking their own weapons or forming alliances with other nuclear powers. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons could also encourage a hostile nation to seek similar weapons if it perceives America’s indifference to the transatlantic alliance. Russia and rogue states such as Iran and Syria could be emboldened by America’s retreat from its security commitments to Europe. Russia has already proved itself to be an authoritarian power, seeking to regain influence over its former satellites. In short, the ramifications of this measure are unpredictable and likely to be contrary to President Obama’s goal of nuclear disarmament. Critical Factors Ignored This week, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to reducing America’s nuclear stockpile, stating that he wants to see transformational change in the U.S. nuclear posture. However, his policy preferences should be only one part of the equation. The position of America’s friends and allies, the strategic concept of the NATO alliance, and transatlantic stability should also factor into his decision. Strategically, eliminating the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe cripples deterrence, stripping away an important pillar of transatlantic security and placing European force posture at a disadvantage

1NC Turkish Prolif DA T/ (2/2)

Turkish prolif leads to global proliferation and water wars

Romero 99 (Jane's Intelligence Review March 1, 1999; Pg. 32 HEADLINE: Charting reactions to the Islamic bomb)

Turkey, like Israel, has expressed concern about the Indo-Pakistani nuclear race, as this will inevitably lead to an Iranian atomic bomb, which would be highly alarming to Ankara and force it to join the race. Turkey will be able to do this as soon as construction of several nuclear power plants on the Turkish coast is completed. The Turkish government has announced plans to build 10 nuclear reactors by 2020, the first of which is to be built at Akkuyu Bay. On 4 June, al-Sharq alAwsat reported that, seen with Arab eyes, the Turkish decision to build a nuclear reactor at Akkuyu Bay constitutes a new threat, aside from the military co-operation with Israel, to its Arab neighbors. This is particularly so as the reactor reportedly will come under the jurisdiction of the Turkish National Security Council. Turkey’s division to build a nuclear reactor is being justified by the nuclear tests last May on the Indian subcontinent and the Iranian nuclear programme, which is claimed bty Tehran to be aimed at acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purpose. Negotiations have commenced with German, US and Canadian companies for construction of the reactor, which may begin next year. Some Arab analysts do not seem to place too much trust in the guarantee that the reactor will be used for peaceful purposes only, and the distrust has been fanned by statements tmade by prominent retired Turkish military figures who have stressed the necessity of establishing Turlkish military supremacy in the region and of acquiring non conventional weapons, among other nuclear weapons. Iraq and Syria are particularly wary of a possible future emergence of Turkey as a nuclear power, as both countries oppose Ankara’s diversion of water from the Euphrates. This prospect wil naturally also alarm Tehran, which might face two nuclear adversaries in the future instead of one. Whichever way you see it, it appears as **if these fears of adversaries gaining possible advantages will trigger off a very dangerous arms race, with most countries in the region trying to develop WMD.**

Every new nuclear state increases the risk of nuclear war

ICNND 2009 (International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, chaired by Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, *Eliminating Nuclear Threats,* *http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND\_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf)*

3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear armed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non‑state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.

Ext. Turkish Prolif Link

TNWs are key to prevent Turkish proliferation

Devey 10 (Anna Tomaskovic, 3/23, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Masters in Public Policy and Administration, cosmopolitan review, gwy)

NATO will likely look to the U.S. for leadership on this issue.  Although there have been rumors that the Obama Administration is interested in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s mission, conservative domestic politics will continue to stress the importance of nuclear deterrence and indivisible security guarantees within NATO. Conservatives in the U.S. are also concerned about security issues for the Baltic States and some Eastern European states that have expressed their desire for continued NATO TNW deployment to strategically balance Russia’s increased revanchism. Additionally, neither Italy nor Turkey have expressed their desire to have the nukes removed from their bases; some suspect that the presence of TNW in Turkey is what has prevented them from developing their own nuclear weapons technology to counterbalance the growing threat of neighboring Iran. Advocates for removing TNW from Europe should be careful not to push their agenda too quickly; if European leadership requests immediate removal of TNW at the same time that an increasing threat of a nuclear Iran creates more conservative domestic pressure in the U.S., Europeans may find themselves with TNW being moved from Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium to the Incirlik base in Turkey, a situation which could be more dangerous and less helpful to the overall goals of disarmament than a maintenance of the status quo would have been. In Western Europe, TNW are militarily fairly useless, but in Turkey’s relative proximity to Iran, TNW may begin to be included in strategic planning once again. As NATO deliberates, caution and tact is advised, less disarmament advocates are left to shake their heads and repeat the old adage, “Be careful what you wish for

Tukey would proliferate absent NATO security guarantee

Larrabee and Lesser 03 (Analysts at RAND, “Tukish foreign policy in an age of uncertainity-chapter 6”)

Nonetheless, Iran arguably posses the most serious long- term proliferation risk for Turkey. A nuclear Iran in possession of missiles capable of reaching all major Turkish cities, while holding the terrority of Ankara’s NATO allies a risk would fundamentally alter the geopolitical lanscape facing Turkey. The need to monitor and counter this threat is almost certain an important part of the current Turkish Israeli intelligence and defense relationship. It is a key motivator for Turkish participation in U.S., NATO and Israeli missile defense relationship. Indeed, Turkish strategists are already beginning to discuss the utility of a Turkish deterrent in the form of a national missile capability. Much more remote, but not beyond the bounds of credibility, would be the development of a Turkish nuclear capability- unthinkable under current circumstances, but not inconceivable over the coming decades **if NATO nuclear gurantee is uncertain.**

Turkey is not proliferating now- depends on US/NATO security guarantees

NTI 09 (Turkey Profile, Updated in August 2009, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies)

Turkey is not known to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is a member in good standing of [all of the major treaties governing their acquisition and use](http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/turkey.pdf). Turkey is also active in proliferation prevention efforts such as the U.S.-led [Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).](http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b4_6.html)[1] While Turkey is situated in a notoriously "dangerous neighborhood"[2] and is often mentioned as a possible proliferation domino should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, it **has relied for its security on the nuclear and conventional deterrence provided by U.S./NATO security guarantees** for more than half a century.

Unilateral TNW removal causes Turkish Proliferation

Thranert 12/10/08 (Dr. Oliver Thränert, Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, “U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet,” PROLIFERATION ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 10, 2008, PUBLISHED: DECEMBER 10, 2008)

The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to **prevent nuclear proliferation** within the Alliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided by U.S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik, Turkey could have further doubts about the reliability of NATO's commitment to its security. Turkey already feels let down by NATO's ambivalent response to its calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance, facing a nuclear-weapon-capable Iran, and possibly feeling that NATO’s nuclear security guarantee would not actually be extended to it in a crisis, **Turkey could seek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities of its own.**

Ext. Turkish Prolif🡪Global Prolif

Turkish proliferation is destabilizing- causes global prolif

Sezer 95 (Duygu Bazogly, Prof of International relations in Ankara, Compatative strategy, vol 14)

The Turkish political elite’s image of Turkey as a law-abiding, stable, and reliable member of the international society and an ally of the West seems, by definition, to exclude serious consideration by Turkey of risky and adventurous choices and objectives such as the nuclear weapons option. Moreover, they are keenly aware of the technological constraints that would have to be overcome and the economic sacrifices that would have to be endured if such a choice were made. The task of preventing proliferation therefore falls on the shoulders of major powers and the nonproliferation regime they have erected. Turkey does entertain serious and legitimate views that the risk of proliferation is real and that the risk would transform into a clear danger unless the custodians of international security and the nonproliferation regime were extremely serious about it.

\*\*DA Links\*\*\*

Deterrence Links

TNWs key to extend US deterrence guarantees

Politics Daily 7/8/09 (“Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the Menace No One Is Talking About,”)

A more immediate problem looms, however. As Russia and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, the relative clout of tactical nukes rises. The existing imbalance in tactical nukes "will become more apparent" and **U.S. allies will be "less assured,''** the commission said.As Kristensen described it to me, the concern is that "as you cut down the deployed strategic forces, you end up with more tactical than strategic weapons deployed and that begins to create some problems. In the U.S., we don't have very many non-strategic [tactical] nuclear weapons compared to the Russians. If we agree to go down to very low levels of strategic weapons, that begins to matter to strategists.''Especially to strategists concerned about maintaining a strong "nuclear umbrella'' over its friends and allies in Europe. Let's say, however improbable, that Moscow and Washington agree to throw tactical nuclear weapons into the arms reduction negotiations that Obama and Medvedev agreed to this week. How likely is a deal? Not very, experts suggest.For one thing, tactical nukes are small and easily hidden. And their "delivery vehicles'' -- arms-control jargon for the aircraft or missiles that carry them -- are also used for other purposes. Reliably counting these weapons and verifying reductions is devilishly difficult, the experts say. Another reason is that the numbers are too important to each side to think seriously about reductions. Russia's conventional military forces are smaller and vastly inferior to those of the United States, and Russian analysts see their nuclear weapons as a critical counterbalance. Russia also needs its tactical nukes to deter problems along its long border with China.On the U.S. side, a key goal is keeping Europeans reassured that Russia can't muscle them around. It's not that Washington would fire off its tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis, but that simply withdrawing the weapons would make some vulnerable European nations -- Lithuania comes to mind -- uneasy. And "uneasy'' is something to be avoided in a crisis. The blue-ribbon commission, in laying out a proposed U.S. approach to the issue, succinctly demonstrated the problem: The United States should go after deep cuts in Russian tactical nukes, but go easy in cutting its own."All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella,'' it said in a statement that probably mirrors the Kremlin's own thinking, "should be assured that any changes in its forces do not imply a **weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.''**

Obama Good Link- Political Capital (1/2)

Tacticals initiatives require expenditure of political capital

Jon Brook Wolfsthal Deputy Director Non-Proliferation Project, FDCH, 9/14/03

Russia's commitment to accept dismantlement of many weapon systems and to secure and even eliminate some of the nuclear weapons released by those agreements has been linked to the legal implementation of the START I and other arms control agreements. We should be concerned that with the Treaty of Moscow, the legal basis for Russia's implementation of some CTR programs is undermined, and at the very least promising areas for cooperation are left un-addressed. I offer the example of concerns over tactical nuclear weapons in Russia, which have been cited by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directly. The United States previously sought to establish a non-strategic nuclear weapon transparency regime, which would include details on how many such weapons existed. Such an effort was envisioned under the 1997 Helsinki statement but was never implemented. But whether under one name or another, a legal basis for transparency and control over sub-strategic weapons would be helpful is addressing this gaping security issue. This issue has been raised by the Bush administration in its efforts with Russia, to the detriment of progress in this important area.[5] If progress is to be made in this field, it will require direct presidential leadership. Cont…Political support for threat reduction activities is not sufficiently deep in the United States, Russia, and Europe. High- level and consistent political support added to the expenditure of political capital are essential for real progress to be maintained on the threat reduction agenda. Threat reduction lacks a coordinated and understandable strategy. Many pressing future threat reduction programs will focus on activities with more intangible results than those of the past decade. Financing for some key threat reduction activities is inadequate. Financing is not the only impediment to progress. Access to facilities and transparency of information are essential. Economics and threat reduction are inextricably linked but not well integrated, and the connection is not well understood. Re-employment programs for scientists generally are not working well in any of the WMD complexes. The relationship between arms control agreements and threat reduction needs to be better defined. There is a need to expand threat reduction to include new activities. Threat reduction already covers a wide range of activities, but there are additional areas where it could be expanded: attack submarine dismantlement; warhead dismantlement; export and border control; cooperation on early warning; missile de-targeting and de- alerting; and ways to induce the United States and Russia to begin discussions of their sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Our past efforts show that the United States can make significant and even quick progress in reducing the proliferation risk from the former Soviet Union's weapons complex when we make a high level and sustained commitment in terms of prestige and financing. This effort must be communicated and followed up from the very highest levels, including between the presidents. Moreover, to be successful, the efforts must be clearly communicated to, understood and supported by the Congress to ensure funding, oversight and to avoid political hurdles which have routinely hampered the implementation of some security efforts.

No domestic support for removing tacticals – political support for keeping weapons in Europe outweighs concern over Russian weapons

Cirincionne and Podvig, ’01 (Joseph and Pavel, Foreign Policy In Focus, 11/27, http://www.fpif.org/presentations/wmd01/pconf.html)

Of course they serve no military purpose whatsoever. It is difficult to conceive of any scenario under which the United States would use a tactical nuclear weapon stationed in Europe for any reason. So those also should be withdrawn. I don't believe Europe is any longer so insecure that it will feel the withdrawal of those nuclear weapons would somehow present a decrease in U.S. commitment to Europe. There were supposed to be talks between the United States and Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. This was part of the 1997 agreement between Clinton and Yeltsin. START III, which was going to reduce the levels of strategic weapons, was also supposed to start, for the first time, actual negotiation on tactical nuclear weapons, in which the U.S. would talk about the thousands of Russian tactical weapons, and Russia would get to talk about the sea-launched, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. They are of concern to Russia. Unfortunately, this vital issue has been dropped from the agenda. No one in the United States, or Russia for that matter, is raising this issue of tactical nuclear weapons. It is precisely these weapons that pose some of the most serious security concerns. Primary I'm thinking of the Russian arsenal, but as your colleagues in Moscow says, there also are some concerns with the European-based weapons the United States has. Other comments here? Bill Hartung: Yes, Pavel Podvig. Pavel Podvig: Let me add just a few words. I think Joe is absolutely right. The tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serve no military purpose or any purpose whatsoever, and I'm speaking about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as well as Russian ones. But these serve as a very good illustration of what's wrong with the current situation. Because if we look at the politics of these tactical weapons, then we see that in fact in the United States and in Europe, there are concerns about the safety and security of Russian tactical nukes. People would argue that they are not very well-secured. But at the same time, we see that for some reason, the United States and its European allies value having the U.S. weapons in Europe much higher than their concern about Russian nuclear weapons. So basically, my point is that this is the choice the U.S. and its European allies must make themselves. Whether it is more important to keep tactical weapons in Europe--as a means of holding together a NATO alliance, or for whatever other conceivable purpose. Or to try to open negotiations with Russia on how to eliminate and control and secure all tactical nuclear weapons, including Russian ones, if there are concerns about their security.

Obama Good Link- Political Capital (1/2)

Plan drains capital- nuclear weapons cuts face bureaucracy

Ritchie, ’08 (Nick, Oxford Research Group, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War”)

Incentives to change nuclear weapons policy have been significantly reduced by the absence of broad bipartisan post Cold War consensus on the future of nuclear weapons policy and the long term role and requirements of nuclear weapons. This is reflected in the three competing idea sets examined in the previous chapter. This absence of consensus has affected and been affected by the sense that no major procurement decisions were needed, the secondary importance of nuclear weapons policy to senior political and military leaders, and a conservative inertia within the nuclear policy bureaucracy. There have consequently been few incentives to entice sustained investment of scarce political capital by senior political leaders in government and Congress to overcome either the reality of the nuclear weapons policy presented by the nuclear policy community or the divergent views within and between Congress and the executive. When decisions have been required the management of these domestic divisions was, according to Nolan, ‘an increasingly important determinant of policy choices.’ Overcoming these divisions would require a compelling strategic vision for American nuclear forces to be articulated at the highest levels of government. There have been incentives for incremental change to adapt nuclear weapons policy to the post-Cold War environment. These have ranged from reducing the perceived risk of nuclear conflict, reducing spending, reinforcing the non-proliferation regime through American restraint, reorienting military force and posture to new strategic realities and redressing the impact of ageing complex facilities, warheads, delivery platforms and expertise. Occasional senior – level executive, congressional and military engagement has therefore been forthcoming, but there has been little sustained desire to take policy in a different direction following the end of the Cold War.

Costs capital- *unilateral* nuclear cuts ensure congressional backlash

Krepon, ’01 (Michael, President Emeritus @ Stimson Center, International Institute Strategic Studies, Survival, Summer)

The alternative would be to rely on unilateral, or so called ‘reciprocal’ nuclear force reductions. Such measures would be easier to implement than treaties, but they would also be easier to reverse. Intrusive monitoring arrangements for treaties are spelled out; they would be voluntary or non – existent for unilaterally or reciprocal initiatives. If unilateral steps are pursued entirely as a substitute for treaties many new problems could result. Even dramatically ambitious reassurance initiatives could be undermined or completely nullified by other initiates, such as moves to deploy space – based weapons or to expand NATO to the Russian border. The abrupt replacement of treaties with unilateral initiatives will not be reassuring and could generate a strong backlash at home and abroad. The demise of bilateral treaties would spill over and undermine multilateral accords, such as the Non – Proliferation Treaty. The net effect of jettisoning treaties could be profoundly unsettling, including the sharp curtailment of cooperative threat reduction initiatives now underway in Russia. Heavy reliance on unilateral measures could have another negative consequence: making the intended recipients of reassurance measures the central arbiters of their utility. National leaders could stress an absence of reassurance in order to prompt further initiatives to alleviate their expressed concerns. The informal nature of reassurance arrangements – and the ability of states to reverse course relatively quickly – could retard the desired transition to CTR. Congressional prerogatives would also need to be taken into account for a strategy that seeks to replace treaties with reassurance measures. If initiatives are not reciprocated fully, the US Congress could become disenchanted with the process.

Obama Good Link- Military Lobby

Pentagon lobbies for NATO tactical nuclear weapons

Gertz, 9/3/09 (bill, national security reporter for Washington times, www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/InsidetheRing.html)

The administration requested the money for a study about upgrading the B61, an aircraft-delivered tactical nuclear bomb that both the Pentagon and the Energy Department say is needed to defend Europe as part of what the military calls "extended deterrence." The matter is urgent for the Pentagon because the study is needed now to meet a 2017 deadline for outfitting the bomb on the new F-35 jet. Current F-16 jets that carry B61s will be phased out of service in eight years. The B61 is dropped by bombers and has a parachute in the tail to slow its descent and allow detonation above the ground. The B61 money was cut by the House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water development. Subcommittee Vice Chairman Ed Pastor, Arizona Democrat, said in a June 23 statement that the B61 money was zeroed out because the administration "has yet to meet the requirement for nuclear strategy, stockpile and complex plans that we first directed in fiscal year 2008." The Senate version of the energy bill contains the B61 money, and differences between the two versions will be worked out in a House-Senate conference in the coming weeks. The White House issued a policy statement July 14 on the cut, stating that the funding elimination would cancel the B61 upgrade for needed "end-of-life components." "Without refurbishment of these components, the sustainment of the B61 bomb family, a key component of our deterrence strategy, will be in jeopardy," the statement said. The administration is set to lobby House subcommittee members to restore the funds. A letter is planned from Thomas P. D'Agostino, head of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, and U.S. Strategic Command commander Gen. Kevin P. Chilton. The two leaders are expected to tell House members that fixing the B61, the oldest weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, is urgently needed. A recent blue-ribbon commission of experts found major problems with the entire U.S. nuclear stockpile, specifically the triggering packages and electronics of older nuclear weapons, including some, like the B61, that were built in the 1960s. According to a Senate aide, the B61 funding cut was pressed by staff members on the subcommittee without close supervision by the chairman, Rep. Peter J. Visclosky, Indiana Democrat, who is under investigation by federal authorities investigating lobbying by the PMA Group. Because of the investigation, Mr. Visclosky is not working on the fiscal 2010 bill and turned over subcommittee leadership on that issue to the vice chairman, Mr. Pastor. House Appropriations Committee spokesman Ellis Brachman said Mr. Visclosky recused himself because "he did not want [the investigation] to get in the way of this year's business." Mr. Pastor was fully versed on the issues in the bill, including the B61 money, Mr. Brachman said. "This is a long-standing position of the subcommittee that we would like to see the administration finalize its plans for the nation's nuclear strategy and stockpile," Mr. Brachman said. Strategic Command spokeswoman Maj. Regina Winchester said Gen. Chilton is prepared to go to Capitol Hill this month to lobby for the B61 money, along with Mr. D'Agostino. "The B61 is the oldest weapon in the nuclear weapons stockpile and requires urgent upgrades to remain in service, incorporate modern safety and security features, and increase long-term confidence in weapon reliability," she said, The bomb's life extension "is essential to provide our NATO allies with a visible sign of our extended deterrent commitment and to maintain a credible strategic air-delivered nuclear deterrent capability," she noted.

Obama Bad Link- Bipart

New Bipartisan movement against TNWs

Krieger 07 (president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, David Krieger, January 5, 2007, A Bipartisan Plea For Nuclear Weapons Abolition, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/01/05\_krieger\_plea.htm)

A number of steps need to be taken to lay the groundwork for a world free of nuclear threat, including de-alerting nuclear arsenals; reducing the size of nuclear arsenals; eliminating tactical nuclear weapons; achieving Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encouraging other key states to also do so; securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials everywhere in the world; and halting production of fissile materials for weapons, ceasing to use enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research reactors. For many of us committed to the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons, there is nothing new in their arguments. They are arguments that many civil society groups have been making since the end of the Cold War. Other former officials, such as Robert McNamara and General George Lee Butler, former head of the US Strategic Command, have also made such arguments. What is new is that these former Cold Warriors have joined together in a bipartisan spirit to publicly make these arguments to the American people. This means that the perspectives of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Global Security Institute, the Nuclear Policy Research Institute and other dedicated civil society groups are finally being embraced by key former officials who once presided over Cold War nuclear strategy.

Bipartisan support for TNW cuts

Estabrooks 04 (Sarah Estabrooks, Winter 2004, The Ploughshares Monitor, *Funding for new nuclear programs eliminated*, http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mond04f.htm)

The 2004 Energy budget request included two high-profile projects that were interpreted as demonstrating interest in developing new nuclear technologies and enhancing available capacity. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program sought to develop high-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons commonly referred to as bunker busters, modifying available penetrating technologies. A parallel initiative, the Advanced Concepts Initiator, called for research into new low-yield, or tactical, nuclear weapons. Funding for these ‘bunker busters’ and ‘mini-nukes’ programs was heavily criticized as running counter to multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts and agreed commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the 2005 budget appropriation, both of these projects were zeroed out completely. A significant turnaround, this cut had bipartisan support. In House committee negotiations, Republican Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman, Rep. David Hobson, led the move to eliminate funding for the programs. Despite Senate approval of the funding, the House version of the bill garnered support from Democrat Senators and the cut was included in the final spending bill. Democrat Representative Edward Markey, a critic of the programs and supporter of the House cut, has gone so far as to call this move “the biggest victory that arms control advocates in Congress have had since 1992, when we were able to place limits on nuclear testing. If we are to convince other countries to forego nuclear weapons, we cannot be preparing to build an entire new generation of nuclear weapons here in the U.S. ” (Ruppe 2004).

Obama Bad Link- Public

Public and pentagon support of TNW removal

Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram – BASIC- British American Security Information Council, 1-15-2009 “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” d.a. 7-19-2010 http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm

There has been for some time a growing inclination within the Pentagon to scale back or end the stationing of US TNWs in Europe, and rationalizing, as a mid-term move, warheads to one or two bases. Despite its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 that appeared to expand the roles for nuclear weapons, the Bush Administration has actually been looking to replace roles by more flexible conventional weapons. However, the United States does not want to be seen as acting unilaterally and reneging on its commitments to NATO.[29] The Obama Administration is as committed as any NATO member to moving on this issue with a unified Alliance and will look to test opinion across the Alliance beyond only the host states before making any significant changes. Nevertheless, the new Administration is also committed to producing a new Nuclear Posture Review in late 2009 or early 2010, and will be looking at revisions to its own nuclear strategy and arsenals. This is likely to include a reduced role for nuclear weapons, possibly restricting the doctrine only to deterring the use of nuclear weapons by hostile states against the United States and its allies. This would be an ideal time for NATO to conduct its review alongside the United States. Recent polls suggest 87% of the US population believe the government should negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons.[30] Over half also believe that the government's practice of sharing its TNWs with NATO members could be a violation of the NPT and should cease.[31]

Public supports Tactical withdrawal

Avery 1/23/09 (John, “The Way Is Open for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Northern Europe,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation)

From the standpoint of an NWFZ in Northern Europe, the recommendation that all short-range nuclear weapons be destroyed is particularly interesting. The US nuclear weapons currently stationed in Holland, Belgium and Germany prevent these countries from being (at present) part of a de-facto Northern European NWFZ; but with an Obama Administration in the United States, and with John Holdren advising President Obama, this situation might be quickly altered. Both **public opinion and official declarations support the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe** [12]. Indeed the only argument for their retention comes from NATO, which stubbornly maintains that although the weapons have no plausible function, they nevertheless serve as a “nuclear glue”, cementing the alliance.

\*\*\*CP\*\*\*

Turkey CP 1NC

Text: Turkey should end its commitment to nuclear sharing agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by ending Turkey’s technical capability to employ tactical nuclear weapons in times of war.

CP solves proliferation, deterrence and NATO cohesion

Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)

This policy note does not pretend to solve that dilemma by suggesting a possible European conceptual approach. It discusses a single measure that could become part of such an approach: Should Europe’s non-nuclear NATO members that are participating in NATO nuclear sharing give up the technical capability to employ sub-strategic nuclear weapons in times of war? This questions runs counter to those questions likely to be raised during NATO’s nuclear review. However, it represents one option for working on a European approach. [2. The proposal](http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#top) The simple answer is: Yes. Those European nations having a capability to use U.S. nuclear weapons in times of war, should and could revoke that capability.  They can do so. If they would do so, for the first time non-nuclear nations – beyond rejecting to become nuclear powers - would make a substantial contribution to support the declared common goals  of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Those non-nuclear NATO members that have the technical capacity to use nuclear weapons in times of war can renounce it without losing security or political influence – and ought to do so in accordance with the Alliance’s 2000 Summit Communiqué as well as the results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nevertheless, they could continue to play their role in NATO nuclear planning. All six nations concerned can jointly take that decision. If a joint decision is not reached, important NATO members like Germany should pioneer the idea. According to this policy note, such a step would constitute a central new impulse for nuclear disarmament. It would facilitate the process towards additional steps of nuclear disarmament which could for the first time open the **way for dismantling thousands of sub-strategic nuclear weapons** that are no longer needed or useful; would be an important contribution to **strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime** since it removes the cause for doubts whether nuclear sharing is in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Art I and II); would contribute to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. The Alliance's nuclear policy could be better brought in line with the 1996 ru-ling of the International Court of Justice. This policy note presents additional findings important for European governments having to consider such a move: Nuclear consultation rights remain in effect if non-nuclear NATO members renounce the technical capability to use nuclear weapons in case of war. Nuclear deterrence remains effective, as does intra-Alliance solidarity which finds its expression in sharing the risks, roles, and responsibilities resulting from NATO’s nuclear strategy. The internal cohesion of the alliance will benefit since the repeated debates about zones of different security will become irrelevant once all non-nuclear NATO members are participating in the Alliance’s nuclear policy in a homogeneous way. Finally, the divergent national nuclear interests within NATO to some extent will be harmonized; this can be used constructively to reinforce the non-proliferation and disarmament policies of the Alliance.

Solves Prolif

CP solves prolif better than the aff

Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)

NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements have been a burden on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is true especially for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the core part of the regime. For many years the non-aligned states have considered nuclear sharing as a violation of the NPT. During war times nuclear sharing would permit the use of nuclear weapons by states that have joined the NPT as non-nuclear states. This directly contradicts the obligations described in article II of the NPT, while the U.S. as nuclear state would violate Article I of the NPT. Aside from criticizing the lack of interest in speedy nuclear disarmament on the part of nuclear states, this argument about the possible violation of the NPT in times of war has recently become a continuously raised point of contention. [5] The last review conference on the NPT was held in New York City in April 2000. More than one hundred states again criticized the nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO. NATO’s member states were called upon to abandon nuclear sharing [6], in order to fully comply with their obligation under Articles I and II of the NPT. Nuclear sharing was criticized as a loophole to circumvent the restrictions of the NPT. The non-aligned states consider the transfer of control over nuclear weapons in case of war as a special case of proliferation, becoming visible for instance if U.S. nuclear weapons were flown to their targets by German Tornado pilots. They remind NATO that Articles I and II of the NPT permit no exceptions, and that the NPT is equally binding for all parties to the treaty in times of peace and war.[7] Both the U.S. and its NATO partners reject that interpretation and emphasize that nuclear sharing is legal under the NPT. They contend that during peacetime, the nuclear warheads remain strictly under U.S. control. According to their view, in case of war the NPT is no longer binding. There has never been a serious attempt to overcome these conflicting views. NATO nuclear sharing undermines the credibility of the NPT. The doubts of the non-aligned states can only be put aside if one were to share the conviction of NATO that the cryptic formulations in additional interpretations which some NATO partners produced when signing the treaty, and which the U.S. stated in the national ratification process, can justify the lawfulness of nuclear sharing. In that case the NPT would be even more seriously weakened: The legality of the NPT ratification process could be called into question by many parties to the treaty, since they were unaware of these interpretations, their relevance, and their true meaning when they signed and ratified the NPT. It would mean a considerable strengthening of the NPT if the non-nuclear members of NATO were to take the initiative to remove these obstacles to the credibility of the NPT by renouncing their capability to use nuclear weapons in times of war. They could remove any doubts about their willingness to comply with NPT regulations. The need to forge agreement among the NPT members about whether nuclear sharing constitutes breach of the treaty or not would disappear. Even more importantly, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime would be seriously strengthened at a time when many fear that the results of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review will – in the mid to longer term – seriously weaken world-wide non-proliferation efforts by enhancing the likelihood of proliferation. As a case in point, members of the Bush administration have publicly discussed whether the U.S. should stick to its politically binding obligations under the Negative Security Assurances, which were both crucial and instrumental to obtaining the unconditional and unlimited extension of the NPT in 1995.A non-proliferation regime with different rights and obligations cannot be stable in the longer term. Therefore a renunciation of the technical aspect of nuclear sharing presents an unequivocal signal that NATO member states recognize the universal validity of the NPT. Their voluntary renunciation would be a strong indication to all parties to the NPT that the role of nuclear weapons within NATO strategy is being reduced, not expanded.

Solves Russia reciprocation

We solve NATO- Russia relations and Russian reciprocation

Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)

The renunciation of the technical capability to employ nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear sharing could also prove a major contribution to nuclear disarmament. While the Bush administration is deeply skeptical about or even against entering new legally binding arms-control agreements limiting U.S. flexibility to do whatever the administration decides to be favorable, the European NATO members have an ongoing interest in continued nuclear disarmament. European and U.S. interests meet, when it comes to eliminating thousands of tactical or sub-strategic nuclear warheads representing remnants of the Cold War. The majority of these weapons rests (and rusts) in Russia’s arsenal. Western proliferation concerns often concentrate on these weapons. NATO’s non-nuclear members can facilitate the necessary bilateral U.S.-Russian process of discussing reductions to these arsenals. In 1997 in Helsinki, Russia and the United States for the first time announced their intention to talk about further measures to reduce tactical nuclear systems, as well as verifiable nuclear warhead dismantling. Yet concrete and visible steps are still to be announced. While the Bush administration’s proposal for a new strategic framework for cooperation with a no longer hostile Russia should ease a solution, U.S. reluctance to enter legally binding agreements makes such an endeavor more complicated at the same time.

If the non-nuclear NATO states declare their willingness to give up their capability to use nuclear weapons, the process of including tactical nuclear weapons into disarmament could be eased. Their move could open the option to withdraw most if not all remaining U.S. sub-strategic nuclear warheads from Europe and thus send a positive signal to Russia: Russia’s long-standing demand to eliminate sub-strategic nuclear weapons that can reach Russian territory could be granted and thus, in turn, could entice Moscow to begin discussions about increased transparency on and mutual reductions of tactical nuclear weapons.Despite their relatively small number, the tactical nuclear warheads still deployed in Europe do have a high symbolic value in this context. This would also apply to their withdrawal. To facilitate it will be a signal that European security after the end of the East-West conflict does no longer depend on the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe**. This would be an important confidence-building measure and might open the perspective to de-nuclearize NATO-Russia relations.**

In the past, the fact that important non-nuclear states in Europe have retained the ability to use American nuclear weapons in case of war, be it for political or status reasons, has been one of the principle political obstacles standing in the way of U.S.-Russian negotiations about reducing or eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. These non-nuclear states have thus made their peculiar contribution to prevent negotiations about a reduction or elimination of these weapons from occurring. Today they can similarly contribute, but in a positive fashion, to make possible such negotiations and facilitate a successful outcome. The precondition would be that these states, in recognizing the changed situation after the end of the Cold War, declare their political will to give up the technical aspects of nuclear sharing.

Counterplan solves Russia reduction and verification measures

Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)

Indirectly this step would have even greater significance. It could be decisive for the final outcome of the next round of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions. Will it contain only some further modest limits to strategic launch systems? In this case it would further reduce the number of operational nuclear weapons by a few thousand, yet it would not determine what happens with the nuclear warheads themselves. This is the character of the unilateral moves suggested by the Bush administration in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review. Or will future new agreements be more comprehensive and far-reaching? The possibility to include tactical nuclear weapons and verifiable warhead dismantling is not yet entirely foreclosed. It is up to the European non-nuclear NATO members to push this door open. In addition, progress has been made on developing warhead dismantling verification technologies. It should be technically possible to conduct non-intrusive verification based on surveying the warhead containers entering a dismantling facility and the pit-containers leaving that facility.Such a move could comprise thousands of additional nuclear warheads and include them in the process of dismantling. Since the economic situation is making it difficult for Russia to put a priority on financing expensive arms reduction measures, an offer of technical and financial support to accompany such a move would be appropriate. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar has made this suggestion for years. This could increase Russia's willingness to make its tactical arsenal transparent and to promote its reduction with Western support. It is exactly here that the non-nuclear states of NATO would act in their own best interest if they would contribute to such an offer.Abandoning the technical aspects of nuclear sharing would not only have a positive impact on the nuclear arms reduction process, it would also strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Solves International law

Counterplan solves international law and ICJ credibility

Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)

According to the legal opinion published by the International Court of Justice, the present operational plans for nuclear sharing violate international law. This 1996 decision not only categorizes any use of nuclear weapons as a grave violation of international law, it includes already the threat of nuclear strikes. [[9]](http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#_edn9) This ruling by the ICJ delegitimizes the nuclear policy of the past 50 years. A renunciation of nuclear capability by the non-nuclear NATO states would contribute to making NATO regulations more congruent with international law. However, complete congruence would not yet be achieved. The ICJ opinion is not a binding legal ruling regarding norms of international law. Rather the ICJ, according to the UN-Charter, is carefully evaluating on the basis of constitutional criteria what is compatible with international law and what is not. As an international organization, NATO cannot afford to dismiss these norms. With regard to the political legitimacy, which is tied to legal norms, it is equally essential that nuclear sharing with non-nuclear NATO members is restricted to nuclear planning and consultations. This would make it easier for NATO to return to a policy of using nuclear weapons as a "means of last resort", as stated in London in 1990, in case the existence of one or more NATO members was threatened with physical annihilation. This is the only situation in which the judges of the ICJ have not unanimously ruled the threat of using nuclear weapons to be illegal. To conclude that it would be legal, however, would contradict both the letter and the spirit of the ICJ ruling.

Solves NATO Cohesion

CP solves NATO cohesion- member states continue to participate in nuclear planning without nuclear weapons

Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)

Consequently, the non-nuclear allies in NATO could abandon their nuclear weapons employment capability and continue to participate in nuclear planning and consultation of the alliance without being afraid to lose influence over NATO nuclear policy or be held responsible for an insufficient assumption of roles, risks and responsibilities[[4]](http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#_edn4) or inevitably provoke a discussion about the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. Such a step would lead to a harmonization of the European non-nuclear states' participation in NATO’s nuclear strategy. At the same time it would signal that these non-nuclear states continue to bear political responsibility for the concept of nuclear deterrence and to represent their nuclear weapons-related interests in the Nuclear Planning Group. They thereby would increase the internal coherence of the Alliance and its political capacity to act. In the longer term the non-nuclear members might become aware of their common interests with respect to NATO’s nuclear policy and thus could prepare joint positions on the future role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance. Concerns by new member states about being sufficiently involved in NATO's nuclear policy would prove to be superfluous, as would any endeavors on their part to increase their status through the purchase of nuclear-capable aircraft. There will be no inner circle of non-nuclear members left, that are more involved than others in the Alliance's nuclear policy. A crucial and burdensome factor in NATO-Russia relations will lose its relevance for the decisions about the future of NATO enlargement expected for the Alliance’s Prague Summit in November 2002.

AT: US Decides

Greece proves that it’s within Turkish jurisdiction

Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram – BASIC- British American Security Information Council, 1-15-2009 “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” d.a. 7-19-2010 http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm

There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.[21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Turkey's location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkey's close proximity to states deemed potentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for TNWs. The risk, of course, is that stationing TNWs in Turkey might provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of explaining the continued presence of US TNWs on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab neighbors. There is a fear that they undermine Turkey's clear diplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey's legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support.[22]

Allies decide if US can continue forward deployment- US only controls *capability for the future*

Chris Lindborg, BASIC Analyst 7 April 2010 “Considering NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons after the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review” d.a. 7-19-2010

The new NPR5 essentially leaves open for allies to decide whether to continue the forward deployment of the nuclear bombs in Europe, but makes clear that the United States will maintain all capabilities necessary for their deployment for the future whatever the decision by allies: “The United States will consult with our allies regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in Europe, and is committed to making consensus decisions through NATO processes. In cooperation with allies and partners, the NPR has determined that the following steps will be taken. … The Air Force will retain a dual-capable fighter (the capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons) as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. … the United States will also conduct a full scope B-61 (nuclear bomb) Life Extension Program to ensure its functionality with the F-35 and to include making surety – safety, security, and use control – enhancements to maintain confidence in the B-61. These decisions ensure that the United States will retain the capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance commitments. These decisions do not presume the results of future decisions within NATO about the requirements of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing, but keep open all options.” (pp. 27-28)