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Explanation/Notes

In the words of Neil Cooper:

“…the contemporary merger of security and development has produced an architecture of intervention that aspires to the radical transformation of developing world societies. This project has been animated by the representation of the developing world, and particularly the failed state, as both a source of multiple threats to the developed world and to the human security of the poor. This represents a powerful legitimising discourse as it claims to synthesise both solidarism for the poor with security for the rich. Inside the developing world state it is characterised by projects of deregulation and re-regulation that aim to transform the behaviour of governments and societies but without fundamentally transforming their conditions either locally or in the context of the global economy. The effect has been to produce local and global regulatory frameworks that are ultimately incapable of transforming the structures and relationships that underpin state failure and conflict as well as the shadow trade that are a feature of both. At best, they operate to embed a mixture of limited global poor relief and extensive monitoring and policing geared to preventing the poor re-exporting disorder. At worst, they embed inequality and social stresses. In many respects however, this is at least part of the point of such regulatory interventions—the aim is not to transform structures but to merely provide a form of chimeric governance—a reassurance that something is being done to alter the conditions of the poor and to address the imagined insecurities of the rich.”

\*I = Iraq-specific

\*A = Afghanistan-specific

\*NK=North Korea-specific

You can probably change around the shell for an East Asia aff if they represent North Korea as a “rogue nation” and critique that. But the impact chain doesn’t line up without adjustment.

1NC Shell (1/3)

**A) Link: [Insert specific link card here] OR**

**“Failed states” are deemed as “conflict traps” that the liberal peace imposes economic control and regulation onto—prioritizing development and the market above all in a neoliberal ideology**

**Pugh ‘5**

(Michael, Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford **05** “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2))

The rationale for determining rules and frameworks for the development of societies that will release them from so-called **“conflict traps”** (Collier et al., 2003), attributes economic dysfunctionalism to societies, in their pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict stages, rather than to any dysfunctional economic precepts, structures and conditionalities generated by expressions of capitalist power and “global governance,”(1). A key aspect of the ‘liberal peace’ thus promotes a form of economic control and regulation to establish market correctives in societies that have been resistant to conventional **marketisation imperatives** (Paris, 1997; Duffield, 2001; Richmond, 2005). Although its modern version derives from the 1989 Washington consensus, to which Kofi Annan subsequently acceded on behalf of the United Nations, the project has not been revolutionary. Its antecedents can be traced to Cobdenite teachings concerning the peaceful benefits of free trade, though it was not so much ‘free’ as imposed by the hegemon, the UK and its powerful navy. Nevertheless, the ideology survived the First World War, and only in the Second did it give way to a system of international management on Keynesian lines. Even so, poverty reduction was conceived as serving the security interests of the most powerful. Robert McNamara’s “war on poverty” at the World Bank in 1972 was driven by the notion that the poor went communist (George, 1994: 48-57). Subsequent pressure on the US dollar in the Vietnam war and the collapse of trade proposals in the New International Economic Order, that would have assisted the poor countries, cemented the rise of **neoliberalism**. In historical terms, then, one can legitimately argue that the liberal peace has been a fluid response to the logic of industrial and post-industrial capitalism (Murphy, 2005: 142).

C) Like the gulag and the death camp, neoliberalism relies on the extermination of the Other, promoting the ideology that the only way to save the world is to destroy it. This amounts to sacrificial genocide and can only end in extinction.

Santos ‘3

(Boaventura de Sousa, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and Distinguished Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. "Collective Suicide?" March 28, 2003 online <http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php>; ₦)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it.

Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists.This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra‑ conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history.

1NC Shell (2/3)

During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to he incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years.

D) The alternative is to shift the focus from pathologies of deviancy to understanding the strategies of accumulation, redistribution, and political legitimacy that unfold in zones of conflict.

And the alt solves- A shift in focus would open analysis to the different processes of state formation and historical circumstances of developing states and permit the appreciation of alternative modes of social organization that stand in opposition to colonialism.

Bilgin and Morton ‘4

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4

(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

An alternative approach would therefore have to appreciate better the forces that shape the realms of political economy and security constraining and enabling developing states. Needless to say this is easier said than done. One way to do this, we argue, is to open analysis up to the different processes of state formation and the historical circumstances constitutive of various developing states. This might permit an appreciation of the differing historical and contemporary social circumstances and the alternative – but no less legitimate – modes of social organisation that prevail within states of the developing world. Linked to this is the need to **shift the focus** from pathologies of deviancy, or 'aberration and breakdown', to understanding the different strategies of **accumulation, redistribution and political legitimacy that unfold in zones of conflict**, thereby appreciating war as 'social transformation' (Duffield, 2001, pp. 136, 140; Duffield, 2002). To cite Mark Duffield directly (2001, p. 6): 'there is a distinction between seeing conflict in terms of having causes that lead mechanically to forms of breakdown, as opposed to sites of innovation and reordering resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority'. For example, factional struggles within and between states in sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia, Rwanda, Congo, Uganda), allied with the interests of IFIs can be interpreted as reducing war to a mode of production: a source of accumulation that enables the seizure of the resources of the economy alongside criminalisation and diplomatic, military or humanitarian aid to transform social institutions and political activity (Bayart, 1993, pp. xiii–xiv; see also Reno, 1998; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999). Hence a need to consider different forms and processes of state formation that have unfolded in diverse regions rather than obscuring the multiple historical and contemporary trajectories of state development. This means appreciating that bodies such as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), set up on 1 April 2002 to establish a fourth Somali government in Baidoa, joining the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland in rejecting the authority of the Transitional National Government in Mogadishu, are less an example of state failure than a contestation over social and political organisation. Similarly the conflagration in the Ivory Coast, since 19 September 2002, initially involving the launch of an attack by army rebels on Abidjan and two northern towns, Bouaké and Korhogo, in an attempt to seize power, is less a recent fallen 'domino' in the spread of failed states than an example of the predatory pursuit of wealth and power – a struggle over modes of governance – that has to be related to the specific historical experiences and the cultural and political conditions of sub-Saharan Africa through which political power is disseminated and wealth redistributed (Morton, 2004). This sort of approach might push one to reflect on suggestive historical precedents to struggles in developing countries over **political authority and mechanisms of social organisation**

1NC Shell (3/3)

**that may parallel** earlier periods of state formation elsewhere in the modern world. It might also lead to a more detailed examination of what historical and contemporary social circumstances give rise to state break-ups and alternative modes of social organisation related to periods of social transformation and changes in capitalism; the role played by the coexistence of Western economic penetration and colonial domination; how overlapping structures of kinship might be prone to challenges which weaken specific social relationships; and what the impact of the changing nature of internal and international conflict might be within developing states.

\*\*\*LINK\*\*\*

Security Studies Link

Security studies have shifted to a view of the underdeveloped world as “failed states” and as threats to the rich, global North

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

This article examines the contemporary form in which **security and development have been merged** and the way this has shaped reform initiatives aimed at eliminating those aspects of both local and global political economies deemed to promote violence and state collapse in the developing world. It will be argued that **the contemporary merger of security and development has been marked by a dual imagining of the relationship between underdevelopment and security**. First, **there has been a reorientation away from a Cold War understanding** in which the developing world was primarily understood as the object of security competition, **towards one in which it is represented as the source of multiple security threats to the developed world, with terrorism at the apex**. Second, **the broadening of the concept of security has contributed to a focus on the threats to human security that underdevelopment poses to the poor** in the developing world. Of course, the relative weight accorded to these two framings varies depending on the perspective of the observer—realists, for instance are likely to place more emphasis on the former. Nevertheless, one of the defining features of the mainstream academic and policy literature is the combination of these two framings in the notion of mutual vulnerability—the idea that the various depredations wrought on the poor in the developing world also produce negative security implications for the rich. Consequently, **it is deemed possible to envisage a harmonious synthesis between policies underpinned by the logic of security for the developed world and policies underpinned by solidarism with the poor.**

Security Rhetoric Link

Securitizing rhetoric reinscribes imperialist logic
Agathangelou ‘8

Agathangelou 2008, (Anna, Professor of Political Science @ York University, Radical History Review <http://www.makezine.enoughenough.org/intimateinvestments.pdf>, Waldman)

What bodies, desires, and longings must be criminalized and annihilated to produce the good queer subjects, politics, and desires that are being solidified with the emergence of homonormativity? As we have already suggested, it is a highly privatized, monogamous, and white(ned) docile subjectivity that has been decriminalized and ostensibly invited into the doors of U.S. national belonging through recent shifts in the gendered and sexual order. As we have also suggested, it is not only sexual and gendered arrangements that have been rendered flexible in the wake of neoliberalization but an entire retooling of the possibilities for life that is attempted through a neoliberal narrative of private rights, peace, and security. This move works hand in hand with a deeply racist and imperialist symbolic, affective, and material order that increasingly requires the soldiering, gatekeeping, and prison-guard labor of socalled formerly and currently marginalized subjects to this order.

“Failed State” Rhetoric Link

“Failed state” rhetoric is a covert attack on anti-colonialism movements
Morton ‘5

(Adam David**,** School of Politics @ Univ. of Nottingham, ‘5 [Sept, New Political Economy 10.3, “The ‘Failed State’ of International Relations,” muse])

This policy-making approach represents a pathological view of conditions in postcolonial states as characterised by deviancy, aberration and breakdown from the norms of Western statehood.10 It is a view perhaps most starkly supported in the scholarly community by Robert Kaplan’s vision of the ‘coming anarchy’ in West Africa as a predicament that will soon confront the rest of the world. In his words: The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering.11 Hence a presumed reversion ‘to the Africa of the Victorian atlas’, which ‘consists now of a series of coastal trading posts . . . and an interior that, owing to violence, and disease, is again becoming . . . “blank” and “unexplored”’.12 Similarly, Samuel Huntington has referred to ‘a global breakdown of law and order, failed states, and increasing anarchy in many parts of the world’, yielding a ‘global Dark Ages’ about to descend on humanity. The threat here is characterised as a resurgence of non-Western power generating conflictual civilisational faultlines. For Huntington’s supposition is that ‘the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc . . . from the bulge of Africa to central Asia . . . has bloody borders’ and ‘bloody innards’.13 In the similar opinion of Francis Fukuyama: Weak or failing states commit human rights abuses, provoke huma- nitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack their neighbours. Since September 11, it also has been clear that they shelter international terrorists who can do significant damage to the United States and other developed countries.14 Finally, the prevalence of warlords, disorder and anomic behaviour is regarded by Robert Rotberg as the primary causal factor behind the proliferation of ‘failed states’. The leadership faults of figures such as Siakka Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaı ̈re), Siad Barre (Somalia) or Charles Taylor (Liberia) are therefore condemned. Again, though, the analysis relies on an internalist account of the ‘process of decay’, of ‘shadowy insurgents’, of states that exist merely as ‘black holes’, of ‘dark energy’ and ‘forces of entropy’ that cast gloom over previous semblances of order.15 Overall, within these representations of deviancy, aberration and breakdown, there is a significant signalling function contained within the metaphors: of darkness, emptiness, blankness, decay, black holes and shadows. There is, then, a dominant view of postcolonial states that is imbued with the imperial representations of the past based on a discursive economy that renews a focus on the postcolonial world as a site of danger, anarchy and disorder. In response to such dangers, Robert Jackson has raised complex questions about the extent to which international society should intervene in ‘quasi-’ or ‘failed states’ to restore domestic conditions of security and freedom.16 Indeed, he has entertained the notion of some form of international trusteeship for former colonies that would control the ‘chaos and barbarism from within’ such ‘incorrigibly delinquent countries’ as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti and Sudan with a view to establishing a ‘reformation of decolonisation’.17 Andrew Linklater has similarly stated that ‘the plight of the quasi-state may require a bold experiment with forms of international government which assume temporary responsibility for the welfare of vulnerable populations’.18 In the opinion of some specialists, this is because ‘such weak states are not able to stand on their own feet in the international system’.19 Whilst the extreme scenario of sanctioning state failure has been contemplated, the common response is to rejuvenate forms of international imperium through global governance structures.20 Backers of a ‘new humanitarian empire’ have therefore emerged, proposing the recreation of semi-permanent colonial relationships and the furtherance of Western ‘universal’ values, and, in so doing, echoing the earlier mandatory system of imperial rule**.**21 In Robert Keohane’s view, ‘future military actions in failed states, or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing, may be more likely to be described both as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited’.22

“Failed states”/War-torn Link

**War torn societies and states are portrayed as “failed service providers run amok,” justifying imperialist intervention
Pugh ‘5**

Michael PUGH Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford **05** “The Polictical Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2)

Third, the discursive trope of imperial peacebuilding pathologises populations in war-torn societies [seem] as if [they] suffering from congenital incapacities that needs treatment through forms of therapeutic governance. In their critique of the psychosocial treatment of states as “**failed service providers run amok**,” Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac note that political processes divorced from the depiction of problems of conflict, oppression and poverty has opened the way for therapeutic approaches to intervention (Hughes and Pupavac, 2005: 2). Archived as congenitally incapable of governance and statehood, these societies require forms of trusteeship that inevitably reflect the priorities of the trustees.

Failed States Link

**The assumption that democracy prevents conflict is based on its universal applicability, same logic that labels some states as 'failed'.
Kartas ‘7**

Moncef Kartas, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva, 2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?"

Another important discursive thread strengthening the validity of the good governance discourse resonates in the academic and policy debate on ‘failed’ states. This debate, of course, falls into the broader ‘securitisation’ of underdevelopment identified by, for example, Duffield (2001: 38), as the merging of development and security that connects the threats of ‘new wars’ with underdevelopment into a mutually reinforcing imagery: “Underdevelopment is dangerous since it can lead to violence; at the same time, conflict entrenches that danger.” Duffield further notes: “Such commonly held sentiments have provided the rationale for the widespread commitment to conflict prevention and conflict resolution activities. This incorporation lies at the heart of the radicalisation of the politics of development. A commitment to conflict resolution denotes a major shift of official donor policy towards interventionism.” (Ibid.) When Helman and Ratner (cf. 1992/93: 7–8, 12) identified the threat posed by ‘failing’ and ‘failed’ states they endorse the *Agenda for Peace’s* peace-building concept advocating in favour of ‘conservatorships’ and trusteeships to create a new political, economic and social environment for states riven by war in order to prevent future conflict. In fact, the image of a governance ‘disease’ (Zartman 1995) that can spread from one country to another, or that breeds terrorism (e.g. Rotberg 2002; Crocker 2003) and requires international intervention has often been invoked.23 The penetration of the transition paradigm’s logic in the ‘failed’ state literature is obvious: for Zartman failure “means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state.” (1995: 5) Those functions include: 1) effective government and the rule of law; 2) state as symbol of identity; 3) territorial control; and 4) effective economic system. Zartman underlines the Hegelian duality between the state and society and argues for their interdependence and proportional strength – that is, state collapse, as the breakdown of good governance, goes hand in hand with societal collapse conceived in terms of deterioration of social coherence and cohesion (ibid.: 6). Hence, where modern state institutions have collapsed, we are confronted with a *tabula rasa*, an incoherent, debilitated and pathologic population, which must be protected from its own incapacity. Against this backdrop Helman and Ratner’s suggestion is not surprising: “Forms of guardianship or trusteeship are a common response to broken families, serious mental and physical illness, or economic destitution. The hapless individual is placed under the responsibility of a trustee or guardian, who is charged to look out for the best interests of that person.” (1993: 12) Like transitology this approach conceives of the state as a value-free organisation, as a set of universally valid procedures: “there is a set of functions that need to be performed for the coherence and the effectiveness of the polity – *anywhere*.” (Zartmann 1995: 10) State failure is a disease of governance and the reconstruction’s antidote consists in reversing the process back towards traditional modern state institutions under the rule of law (cf. ibid.). In this vein, Rotberg (2004: 2, 4–10) – differentiating strong, weak, failing, failed, and collapsed states according to their performance in effectively delivering the most crucial political goods – defined collapsed states as an extreme form of failure, where public authority has disappeared overshadowed by the private procurement of political goods. By taking the well-governed Western bureaucratic state as the standard against which the failure of the state can be explained, this discourse turns abstract symptoms into causes, thereby crowding out other forms of (informal) social regulations and political articulations from the equation. The only possibility to stop violence, to establish a society and create political order and stability is through state-centred governance. In fact, it is within this tautological argument that the strength of the good governance discourse resides. Hence, the notion that democratisation may spur violence and conflict, as for example suggested by Snyder (2000), is principally silenced by the logic that not the democratic and liberal market institutions *per se* are the cause, but badly implemented institutional reform. That is, the ‘theory’ is set beyond suspicion. In contrast, the discourse says: failure results from bad governance, and in fact underlines that the model is correct.

Failed States

**The difference between a successful and 'failed state' is based only on the west, justifies a paternalist ethic to stop terrorism and a new Cold War.**

**Bilgin and Morton ‘4**

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4 “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3)

Furthermore, as Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause (2002b, pp. 753–755) have argued, prevailing understandings of ‘state failure’ rest on assumptions about ‘“stateness” against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed’. The point being that presenting the experience of developing states as ‘deviations’ from the norm does not only reinforce commonly held assumptions about ‘ideal’ statehood but also inhibits reﬂection on the binary opposition of‘failed’ versus ‘successful’ states. This approach is symptomatic of the prevalence of Cold War discourses that revolve around such binary oppositions (e.g. Jackson, 1990). Although preventing state failure is presented as a primary concern in tackling the problem of insecurity in the developing world, this is still largely shaped by the persistence of Cold War discourses. As Jack Straw has admitted, in the ostensibly post-Cold War era, ‘the East and West no longer needed to maintain extensive spheres of inﬂuence through ﬁnancial and other forms of assistance to states whose support they wanted. So the bargain between the major powers and their client states unravelled’.15The result, in his view, is again the perfusion of warlords, crim- inals, drug barons or terrorists that ﬁll the vacuum within failed states and hence, despite the controversy it may court, there is ‘no doubt’ that the domino theory applies to the ‘chaos’ of failed states.16 Therefore, although the ‘formal Cold War’ has ceased – involving the stalemate between capitalism and communism – a ‘structural Cold War’ still prevails – involv- ing new justiﬁcations for the persistence of old institutions that perpetuate mental frameworks in search of alternative applications (Cox with Schecter, 2002, p. 160). The post-11 September 2001 interest in state failure does not therefore constitute a deviation from, but a persistence of, Cold War thinking and policies suitably adjusted to ‘new world order’ power relations (Bilgin and Morton, 2002). This is best exem- pliﬁed by avatars of global capitalism, such as Larry Diamond, extolling the need to win the ‘New Cold War on Terrorism’ through the extension of a global governance imperative linked to the promotion of liberal democracy (Diamond, 2002).

Generic Link

**Countries with economic dysfunctionalism are deemed as “conflict traps” that the liberal peace promotes economic control and regulation into**

**Pugh ‘5**

Michael **PUGH** Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford **05** “The Polictical Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2)

The rationale for determining rules and frameworks for the development of societies that will release them from so-called **“conflict traps”** (Collier et al., 2003), attributes economic dysfunctionalism to societies, in their pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict stages, rather than to any dysfunctional economic precepts, structures and conditionalities generated by expressions of capitalist power and “global governance,”(1). A key aspect of the ‘liberal peace’ thus promotes a form of economic control and regulation to establish market correctives in societies that have been resistant to conventional **marketisation imperatives** (Paris, 1997; Duffield, 2001; Richmond, 2005). Although its modern version derives from the 1989 Washington consensus, to which Kofi Annan subsequently acceded on behalf of the United Nations, the project has not been revolutionary. Its antecedents can be traced to Cobdenite teachings concerning the peaceful benefits of free trade, though it was not so much ‘free’ as imposed by the hegemon, the UK and its powerful navy. Nevertheless, the ideology survived the First World War, and only in the Second did it give way to a system of international management on Keynesian lines. Even so, poverty reduction was conceived as serving the security interests of the most powerful. Robert McNamara’s “war on poverty” at the World Bank in 1972 was driven by the notion that the poor went communist (George, 1994: 48-57). Subsequent pressure on the US dollar in the Vietnam war and the collapse of trade proposals in the New International Economic Order, that would have assisted the poor countries, cemented the rise of **neoliberalism**. In historical terms, then, one can legitimately argue that the liberal peace has been a fluid response to the logic of industrial and post-industrial capitalism (Murphy, 2005: 142).

**Pugh ‘5**

Michael PUGH Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford 05 “The Polictical Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2)

Second, the revisionism still takes economics as largely independent of politics and social values. It results, as Robert Cox has suggested, in the de-politicisation of economic issues (Cox, 1992), as if a natural law or a primordial economic equivalent of the sex drive, rather than powerful interests, were guiding economic activity. Consequently, there is only one solution to all inadequately developed societies, whether East Timor or Haiti, and it is a solution based in the **economic rationalism of** (capitalistic) **entrepreneurship.** The project is completely transparent in its notion that public monies, whether from revenues raised in developing countries or from aid derived from the public purse in the donor countries should be used to provide profit-seeking business with a leg up. Unsurprisingly, the contradiction inherent in this so-called ‘rationalism’ is not addressed by the revisionists, though it is of acute concern to societies in the process of transformation from war to peace. Notoriously, aid often privileges the purchase of donor goods and expertise rather than local products and employment. Privatisation has been pursued at the expense of public goods and public space – where public goods are defined as accessible to all, non-exclusive and whose value for one consumer does not diminish their value for others (Kaul, 2005). Values other than those of economic rationalism are neglected, including the freedom to decide how markets are conducted, even though they figure in the UN “Millennium Declaration” and have been espoused by, among others, Armartya Sen (Sen, 1999). Inequalities and non-physiological needs are considered more significant than either absolute poverty or, beyond a survival point, physiological needs. This means that provided people are not destitute (which might be equated to the deep poverty scale of the UNDP), they may choose to live humbly in order to feel fulfilled. Such an approach recognises that the paths to modernisation may not be convergent at all, and the marginalised peoples of the world are entitled to choose the extent to which, and how, **they integrate in the global economy.**

Development Link

**Assumptions of failed states are based on western notions that ultimately destabilize the international order
Call 2008**

Charles T. "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'" Third World Quarterly 1491-1507, PhD from Stanford, Assistant Professor in International Studies and Conflict Resolution at American University

The most self-evident deficiency of the concept of state failure is the value- based notion of what a state is, and a patronising approach to scoring states based on those values. Naturally all categorisations rest on values. Indeed, I share many of the liberal values that lament the shortcomings of states that fail to provide basic, life-sustaining services to their populations. At the same time, the failed state concept repeats the same assumptions that modernisa- tion theory made in its heyday, assumptions that proved to be so problematic. Both approaches assume that there is some 'good' endpoint towards which states should move, and that this movement is somehow natural. Like the 'modern' standard of three decades ago, the 'successful state' standard of today is based on the features of the dominant Western states. Indeed, little discussion of the partial failures of Western states occurs in the literatiire on failed states. The schoolmarm tone of the concept is apparent: states are 'bad' because they have failed some externally defined test. Even where a state's population might be better served by the temporary or partial assumption of its sovereignty by some assemblage of international or regional actors,25 the multiple problems of such arrangements—ie alter- naties to the failed state—are not acknowledged or considered.

Stability Link \*A

Promotion of stability and security in failed states/Afghanistan is justification of neoliberal ideology and imposition of the market

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and
the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

An established feature of the contemporary aid discourse is the merging of development and security issues. Thus, for Collier ‘war retards development, but conversely, development retards war’.4 Whilst for Stewart, ‘**promoting security is instrumental for development** and . . . development is instrumental to the achievement of security’.5 **Much of**

Chimeric governance and the extension of resource regulation 317 **the same language has been mainstreamed** in the policy community **with military operations in post-invasion Afghanistan persistently described as being conducted with the goal of creating an environment which permits ‘development to follow** security’.6 Furthermore, **the discovery of a development-security nexus is often characterised as reflecting a new, progressive, enlightened step forward, a refinement and improvement of traditional development/security paradigms**. Thus, for Picciotto ‘the development consensus has evolved towards a concern with human security because of the disappointing record of the economic strategies of the 1980s and 1990s’.7 Similarly, for the UN’s high-level panel on threats8 not only are development and security ‘inextricably linked; (p. viii) and not only is development ‘the indispensable foundation for a collective security system’ (p. 3) but this insight is offered as part of a proposed shift towards a new security consensus.

Stability Link

Intervention and stabilization of “failed states” is the logic of indigenous exploitation and imperialism

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and
the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

In reality, **Western development policy has always had a security dimension**. Thus, as Duffield has noted, ‘**since the nineteenth century the recurrent task of development has been to reconcile the disruptive effects of progress on indigenous peoples, such as, commercial exploitation, impoverishment, and unchecked urbanisation, with the need for societal order’**.9 Indeed, **during the Cold War**, **the security functions of aid** (albeit traditional security functions) were clear, with development **serving as a tool to prevent newly independent states becoming security threats to the west**, either in their own right or as allies of the Soviet bloc. Thus, in setting out **the Truman doctrine** President Truman **noted** in 1947 **that the poverty experienced by half the world’s population was a handicap and threat to both them and the prosperous areas’**.10 Similarly, **Robert McNamara’s ‘war on poverty’ at the World Bank in 1972 was driven by the notion that the poor were more likely to go communist**.11 This is not to say that development was, in the language of Stewart, ‘instrumental to achieving security’. Rather, **the direction of development resources was a function of a security paradigm in which ‘the containment of communism was more important than the eradication of poverty’**.12

Civil Society/Rule of Law/Stability Link

Your paradigm of global governance imposes a neoliberal Western ideology on [country]

Cooper ‘5

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2005 “Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy” Security Dialogue 36:463; ₦)

The **political economy of contemporary conflicts has also been treated as the subject of an explicitly cosmopolitanist analysis that emphasizes the importance of solidarity with ‘islands of civility’ that persist in the midst of violent conflict** and can support PCPB. This has been particularly associated with the work of Mary Kaldor (1999). In addition, there have been a variety of edited publications (Berdal & Malone, 2000; Ballentine & Sherman, 2003), policyorientated works (particularly from the International Peace Academy and Fafo) and reports by campaigning NGOs such as Global Witness or Partnership Africa Canada that have explicitly addressed the political economy of civil conflicts. While these generally leave their theoretical underpinnings unstated, they can perhaps be loosely lumped together under the rubric of liberal internationalism. As such, **they essentially advocate a reformist agenda that takes the state and the capitalist system as given, but promotes the extension of regulation both at the local and at the global level as a vehicle for addressing the negative effects of war economies and shadow trade**. As in the cosmopolitanist analysis, **there is a certain overlap with the neoliberal emphasis on individualism, democracy and the provision of security through law and order reform**. However, such analyses are also underpinned by a clearer articulation of solidarity with the victims not only of local oppression but of the global economy and the IFIs. They also emphasize the transformatory potential inherent in enhanced representation for civil society at the local and the global level. Indeed, **this aspect of these analyses has become very influential, and the promotion of human rights, free speech, civil society representation (via more pluralist politics) and civil society protection (via the effective application of the rule of law) have become staples of peacebuilding discourse and policy. In reality, however, civil society has traditionally been more notable for its absence when it comes to economic decisionmaking or has been the object of tokenistic consultation exercises designed to provide a veneer of legitimacy for policies that have already been predetermined by donors** and the IFIs (see Béatrice Pouligny in this edition of *Security Dialogue*). Moreover, while much lip-service is paid to civil society, the experience of aid recipients is that accountability in terms of aid delivery is generally upwards to donors rather than downwards to locals – especially when it comes to evaluation of aid programmes.

[IFIs = International Finance Institutions, like the IMF]

Globalization Link \*9-11

“Failed states” serve as a reminder of the implications of the western-led globalization movement

Yannis 02

(Alexandros, Frmr Political Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Sec. Gen in Kosovo and  Research Associate in the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens ‘2 “State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction” Development and Change 33 (5) p.**)**

At the time of writing, **terms such as state collapse, failed states, state dis-integration, breakdown of law and order, anarchy and chaos are being regularly employed in the international relations vernacular to describe anew and worrying situation which seems to challenge, if not threaten, inter-national security**. These terms refer to the drastic deterioration of the political, social, and economic conditions of life in certain parts of the globe and to their implications for the local populations, for regional stability, and for international security. Understanding the phenomenon of state collapse requires an examination of the contextual circumstances from which it emerged. In the early post-Cold War period, state collapse usually implied an extreme disruption of the political order of a country due to protracted domestic conflicts and disintegration of public authorities, and the main issues raised were about its destabilizing impact on neighbouring countries and the humanitarian consequences for the local population. Its predominant features were thus regional and humanitarian; interest in addressing these issues was an integral part of the climate that dominated the early post-Cold War period and, particularly, the tendency of the western-led international community to provide assertive responses to such challenges. **The dramatic events of September 11 have elevated the relevance of collapsed states into a central question for international security**. **State collapse is now increasingly identified with the emergence within a dis-integrated state of non-state actors who are hostile to the fundamental values and interests of the international society** such as peace, stability, rule of law, freedom and democracy. **These actors** Ð **including terrorist groups, drugs cartels, money launderers and weapons dealers** Ð **are challenging the international status quo by exploiting the territorial vacuum of power and the technological and information opportunities of globalization**. This contribution first explains in greater detail the contextual factors that gave rise to the phenomenon of state collapse in the post-Cold War period. Second, in the light of this analysis, it provides some observations about the normative implications for peace-building and reconstruction which can address the underlying issues of the phenomenon of state collapse. In the early days of the post-Cold War period the majority of observers approached the phenomenon of state collapse mainly from an African/Third World perspective (Clapham, 1996; Herbst, 1996±7; Mazrui, 1995; Villalon and Huxtable, 1998; wa Mutua, 1995; Zartman, 1995; Zolberg, 1992). This is partly because a large number of disintegrating states could be found in these parts of the world, and partly because the majority of the poorest and weakest states in the world could be found in Africa. In the words of Abdulqawi Yusuf: `Thirty-four years after 1960, the symbolic year of ``Africa's inde- pendence'' many African countries continue to experience serious difficulty in the process of consolidation of their statehood . . . Some African nations have in the past few years reduced themselves to a state of ``suspended statehood'' in which there may still be recognised frontiers, but everything inside has become anarchy and lawlessness' (Yusuf, 1995: 3). Regional rather than global implications were the major concerns in this period. As Terence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar argued: `political disintegration generates instability and threatens neighboring states through refugee flows, the stimulation of illegal trade in weapons and other contraband, and because the communities imperilled by state collapse often cross borders and can appeal to neighbouring groups for involvement' (Lyons and Samatar, 1995: 3). Some observers, however, began pointing to the global implications of state collapse. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, for example, introduced state disintegration as a global phenomenon: `from Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, from Somalia, Sudan and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustain-ing itself as a member of the international community' (Helman and Ratner, 1992±3: 3). Robert Kaplan went a step further. He **attributed to the phe- nomenon of state collapse dimensions of a disease of biblical proportions, starting in Africa and other Third World countries, spreading and threaten- ing to infect the entire world**. Under the alarming title `The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet', **Robert Kaplan argued** that `crime and lawlessness of West Africa is a model of what future life could become everywhere as demographic, environmental, health and social problems increase' (Kaplan, 1994: 44). He concluded **that state collapse is manifested by `disease, overpopulation**, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, **the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of** private armies, security firms, and international **drug cartels**' (ibid.: 46). For these observers September 11 vindicated their doomsday theories. The conceptual contours of the phenomenon of state collapse can only be determined in the context of the conditions that generated international Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction 819 interest in disintegrating states and decomposing societies in the post-Cold War period. More specifically, state collapse should be understood as an aspect of the post-ColdWar international environment in which globalization and the decline of state authority have become the quintessential questions of our time, issues of domestic conflicts and their ramifications have emerged as major challenges for regional security, and human rights and humanitarian concerns have been assigned higher values in international politics. **September 11 added a new parameter: state collapse and its implications represent the sinister side of globalization and pose new threats to international security.**

Globalization Link

State collapse serves as a portent of the failure of neoliberal globalization

Yannis 02

(Alexandros, Frmr Political Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Sec. Gen in Kosovo and  Research Associate in the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens ‘2 “State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction” Development and Change 33 (5) p.**)**

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Terrorism Link \*9-11

The fear of terrorism has led to military interventions of “failed states”

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

In the aftermath of 9/11 however, **the securitisation of underdevelopment** highlighted by Duffield has intensified, both in the sense that this imagining **has become even more pervasive in both the policy and academic literature and in the sense that it is deemed to constitute an even more serious threat**. In particular, **the weak and failed state has been the subject of an acutely heightened discourse of threat and emergency creating both imperative and justification for a broad range of interventionary strategies**. This has a number of elements to it. First, mainstream **discourse often presents a re-imagining of the history of the development-security nexus, such that it is presented as something that has been discovered only in the aftermath of 9/11**. Thus, for Fukuyama ‘the September 11 attacks highlighted a different sort of problem... **security concerns demanded reaching inside of states and changing their regime to prevent future threats arising. The failed state problem that was seen previously as largely a humanitarian or human rights issue suddenly took on a major security dimension’**.17 Similarly, for Tony Blair in the quote given at the start of this piece, it is September 11 that has shattered illusions about the failed state and the developed world’s ability to remain immune from the various threats it poses. Picciotto makes much the same kind of point: **Suddenly, with the events of 9/11, the predicament of weak states emerged as a strategic risk . . . The lethal combination of terrorism, failed states and humanitarian crisis suddenly renewed the debate about the hoary principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states**.18 In much of this discourse then**, the shift to the securitisation of under-development that actually preceded 9/11 has been re-inscribed as a response to the actions of the developing world and to the terrorism, it is purported to breed**. The developing world, in effect, has become not only the object but also the instigator of the move to securitise underdevelopment.

Terrorism Link \*A

Fears surrounding “failing” states being able to house infrastructure for terrorism and enabling security risks shapes policy toward those states. These fears don’t get at the root of leadership failures that cause instability, and inevitably fail.
Bilgin and Morton ‘4

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4

(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

Although these two labels ('failed' and 'rogue') are often used interchangeably in the daily political lexicon, the difference between the two has often been clear to US policymakers. One major difference is that whereas the notion of a 'failed' state refers to internal characteristics, 'rogue' states are labelled as such because of their (anti-Western) foreign policy outlook. Another crucial difference is that whereas 'failed states' are considered a cause for concern when they come closer to the brink of collapse (such as Somalia), 'rogue' states are viewed as directly threatening international order and stability (as with Iraq and North Korea). Indeed, during the 1990s, labelling certain states as 'rogue' and 'failed' served to **enable different kinds of policy** aimed at two different kinds of states: 'friends' and 'foes'. When 'friends' (or client states during the Cold War) posed a threat to international stability because of their 'weakness', the recommended policy was usually one of building 'strong' states, as was the case with Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia and Sierra Leone. When the 'failed' state happened to be a 'foe' it was invariably represented as a 'rogue' state and containment became the recommended policy course, as with North Korea. Consequently, in the immediate post-Cold War era, the eyes of the policy establishment remained fixed on the 'rogue' phenomenon to the neglect of that of 'failed' states, although the latter became increasingly recognised as a threat to international stability from the mid-1990s onwards (see Zartman, 1995). Indeed, Brian Atwood, US Agency for International Development administrator, argued as early as 1994 that 'disintegrating societies and failed states with their civil conflicts and destabilising refugee flows have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability'.1 This pathology became more acute after 11 September 2001 when the world awoke to the prospect of 'failed states' becoming a cause of concern even before they moved towards the brink of collapse. Hence the need for a better definition of what constitutes state 'failure'. Since then, the example of Afghanistan, which served as a location for the al-Qa'eda network, has apparently shown that 'because failed states are hospitable to and harbour non-state actors – warlords and terrorists – understanding the dynamics of nation-state failure is central to the war against terrorism' (Rotberg, 2002, p. 85). Recent studies on 'failed states' have sought to inform this shift in policymaking interest from 'rogue' to 'failed' states by focusing on the problem of insecurity in the developing world and its repercussions for international stability (Chege, 2002; Cohen, 2002; McLean, 2002; Rotberg, 2002; Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002; Wanandi, 2002).2 This, in turn, serves to remind how the problems of the developing world customarily become **visible** to Western policymakers **only when they threaten international stability**. 'Failed' states are considered to be 'problems' only when the situation becomes acute enough to threaten the world beyond their boundaries. The 11 September 2001 attacks have resulted in not only a change in policy discourse but also a shift in the US policy establishment's approach to state failure in that the need for prevention (understood as acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed) is emphasised as a means of coping with international terrorism and maintaining international stability (see Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002; Zelikow, 2003, pp. 21–22). As Robert Keohane (2002, p. 282, original emphasis) has added, **'future military actions in failed states,** or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing**, may be more likely to be described both as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited'**. The emphasis put on 'failed' states in the latest US National Security Strategy document can be seen as indicative of a move away from 'crisis management and containment' to 'early diagnosis and prevention' in its approach to the failed state phenomenon. The document states that 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones', and that, 'the events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders'.3 Yet, such a shift from an almost exclusive concern with 'rogue' to that of 'failed' states requires a better appreciation of the processes through which some states come to 'fail' whilst others 'succeed'. As Robert Rotberg (2002, p. 93) has argued, 'state failure is man-made, not merely accidental nor – fundamentally – caused geographically, environmentally, or externally. **Leadership decisions and leadership failures** **have destroyed states and continue to weaken the fragile polities that operate on the cusp of failure'**. However, it would be misleading to represent **local leaderships** as solely responsible for state failure. After all, focusing on the domestic dynamics to the neglect of the socio-economic conjuncture, that allows some states to 'fail' and others to 'succeed', would not enable one to address the **long-term** consequences of state failure. Instead, an alternative approach that looks at the political economy of security relations between 'failed' states and their 'successful' counterparts is needed.

State Collapse Link

The disruption of governance securitizes policy and creates an urgency for intervention
Yannis 02

(Alexandros, Frmr Political Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Sec. Gen in Kosovo and  Research Associate in the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens ‘2 “State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction” Development and Change 33 (5) p.**)**

The post-Cold War upsurge in the phenomenon of state collapse Ð the disintegration of governmental authority and the extreme disruption of law and order in some parts of the world Ð is clearly associated with the debate about the future of the state. State collapse is often contemplated as the ultimate form of state decline: `the most dramatic examples of the decline in state authority can be found in countries where government and civil order have virtually disappeared' (Schachter, 1997: 8). Michael Reisman adds:`more than any other phenomenon, the disintegrating state has prompted doubts about the future of the state' (Reisman, 1997: 417). State disintegration is also associated with the theories of state decline because it is largely viewed as emanating from the destabilization of the world's domestic political systems in the aftermath of the Cold War and, especially, from the increasing marginalization of the state as a force capable of handling the impact of globalization and harnessing the growing strength of non-state and sub-state actors. While the forces of international capitalism and globalization are considered to be behind the financial instability and marginalization of certain parts of the world, and thus undermining the authority of the state from outside, the various forms of `uncivil society', several kinds of non-state and sub-state actors, are the major and most visible forces that erode state authority not only from outside but also from within. Richard Shultz put it as follows: From this perspective, the phenomenon of state collapse is another aspect of the cataclysmic impact on states and the international system of the global political, social and economic changes that are underway. It signifies the inability of states to absorb those changes peacefully, and particularly highlights the dynamic advent of forces inimical to the concept of public order as defined by the twentieth century social state (Hobsbawm, 1997: 263±5). While such developments may lie at the root of the phenomenon of state collapse, the emergence of state disintegration as a distinct issue in post- Cold War international politics is linked with separate specific developments.

“Rogue States” Link \*I-NK

The discourse of rogue states and failed versus successful states is the persistence of Cold War logics and binaries. These discourses focus on the symptoms of state “failure” instead of the conditions that make it possible, making dealing with those conditions impossible and conflict with perceived “rogue” states inevitable
Bilgin and Morton ‘4

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4

(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks against New York and Washington, DC and the war in Afghanistan, 'failed states' have once again come to the fore of US policy planning. Previously, within a brief 'universal moment' (Holm, 2001, p. 361) in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the issue of 'state failure' was considered a responsibility of the international community. During this period, **intervention to establish** state structures was considered not only do-able but also morally responsible. Yet, beginning with the failure of US intervention in Somalia, this consensus disappeared and policymaking towards failed states became more ad hoc. Hence, as the significance of former anti-communist allies declined, a selective policy was adopted whereby those developing states that **retained their strategic significance** were still supported whilst the rest were **left** to their **own devices**. Additionally, states that refused to take cues from the US – such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq – became labelled as 'rogue' states and were engaged with accordingly. The stress was therefore put on the threat posed by 'rogue states' to the **neglect** of 'failed states', especially during the initial months of the George W. Bush administration (see Bleiker 2003; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003). This article seeks to address the recent shift in US policymaking interest from 'rogue states' back to 'failed' states. It is argued that the prevalence of notions of 'state failure' in US policy lexicon can be understood with reference to the **persistence of Cold War discourse** on statehood that revolves around the binary opposition of 'failed' versus 'successful' states. The purveyors of this discourse are within the academy as well as practitioners (governmental and non-governmental) who are all interested in issues that demand immediate attention, for example the implications of state collapse, building institutions in post-conflict societies or distributing aid. In addressing such issues, they focus on the supposed symptoms of 'state failure' (international terrorism) rather than the conditions that permit such 'failure' to occur. Instead, it is argued here that an understanding of 'state failure' should begin by moving away from the binary oppositions of Cold War discourse by focusing on the political economy of security relations. This is crucial in order to become aware of not only the different processes of state formation and modes of social organisation, but also the social and economic processes, through which some states come to 'fail' while others 'succeed'.

“Rogue” Prolif Link \*I-NK

The rhetoric of rogue states proliferating and the specter of nuclear annihilation creates policies of containment and imperialism toward those states. Means the case can never solve: this rhetoric serves as the prime driving force behind military expansion.
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Although similar assumptions prevailed as a result of anterior developments, the 'rogue' label emerged predominantly in US foreign policy discourse in the post-Cold War era. Whilst inclusion within the 'rogues gallery' is rather arbitrary, three criteria have been commonly invoked: the pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the use of international terrorism as an instrument of state policy and a foreign policy orientation threatening US interests in key regions of the world (Litwak, 2000, p. 49). These criteria became the cornerstone of the US post-Cold War containment doctrine to meet the perceived challenges of 'rogue states,' which often appeared in the annual US State Department's 'global terrorism' list.4 An early declaration of this containment doctrine was articulated by Anthony Lake, then assistant for national security during the administration of President Bill Clinton, in a piece on 'confronting backlash states'. Lake maintained that recalcitrant and outlaw states were those that assaulted the basic values of 'the family of nations' (the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the promotion of collective security) and consisted of regimes 'on the wrong side of history': Cuba, **North Korea, Iran, Iraq** and Libya (Lake, 1994, pp. 45–55). Similarly, the then secretary of state Madeleine Albright announced that 'dealing with the rogue states is one of the greatest challenges of our time ... because they are there with the sole purpose of destroying the system'.5 Reflecting upon such policy declarations, it was maintained that, as the certainty of Cold War threat perceptions eroded in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, US security practice underwent a process of rethinking, as a result of which 'rogue states' were represented as the emerging primary threats during the post-Cold War period. This can be viewed as an attempt on the part of US policy-makers and others to **replace** the threat of communist expansionism with another '**one size fits all' nemesis**.6 Although it is worth re-emphasising that 'rogue states' were not constructed ex nihilo, with such conceptions flourishing as a result of prior Cold War developments, the rogue state label was considered to reflect US policy preferences as the sole superpower of the post-Cold War era (Klare, 1995). The explicit 'rogue states' metaphor was notably dropped during the last year of office during the Clinton administration to become replaced by the more neutral 'states of concern' term.7 Reflecting on this at the time, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confessed that 'we are now calling these states "states of concern" because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, and their desire to disrupt the international system'.8 Since then, invoking the **spectre** of devastating nuclear, chemical or biological attack from 'rogue states' has served as the rationale justifying an **expansion of military forces**, including the deployment of the National Missile Defence (NMD) system. As the recent Proliferation: Threat and Response report by the US Department of Defence evidences, the countering of rogue 'states of concern' has become a central tenet of the security strategy of the George W. Bush administration.9 Indeed, 'rogue states' became the entire raison d'être of NMD and the **cornerstone of policy planning**. 'We believe', US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared in February 2001, 'that it is our responsibility to have a missile defence shield to protect the United States and our friends and allies from rogue states'.10'Unlike the Cold War', President George W. Bush told students at the US National Defence University, 'today's most urgent threat stems from ... a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life'.11 This stress is also best exemplified by the Bush administration's aim of stopping 'regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction' that 'constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world'.12

“Rogue” Prolif Link

**WMDs are only seen as a threat when held by irrational 'failed states', prolif discourse becomes pretext to invasion. Iraq Proves.**

**Bilgin and Morton ‘4**

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4 “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3)

The explicit ‘rogue states’ metaphor was notably dropped during the last year of ofﬁce during the Clinton administration to become replaced by the more neutral ‘states of concern’ term.7 Reﬂecting on this at the time, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confessed that ‘we are now calling these states “states of concern” because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, and their desire to disrupt the international system’.8 Since then, invoking the spectre of devastating nuclear, chemical or biological attack from ‘rogue states’ has served as the rationale justifying an expansion of military forces, including the deployment of the National Missile Defence (NMD) system. As the recent Proliferation: Threat and Response report by the US Department of Defence evidences, the countering of rogue ‘states of concern’ has become a central tenet of the security strategy of the George W. Bush administration.9Indeed, ‘rogue states’ became the entire raison d’être of NMD and the cornerstone of policy planning. ‘We believe’, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared in February 2001, ‘that it is our responsibility to have a missile defence shield to protect the United States and our friends and allies from rogue states’.10‘Unlike the Cold War’, President George W. Bush told students at the US National Defence University, ‘today’s most urgent threat stems from ... a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life’.11This stress is also best exempliﬁed by the Bush administration’s aim of stopping ‘regimes thatsponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction’ that ‘constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world’.12

Country Rearm Link

**The discourse of “failed states” justifies an imperial control of [country] instead of actual dynamics of cultural understanding, leading to militaristic backlash**

**Call ‘8**

(Charles T. "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'" Third World Quarterly 1491-1507, PhD from Stanford, Assistant Professor in International Studies and Conflict Resolution at American University

It is not clear how a stronger military or police capacity (or any of the five core functions) will ensure a rise in GNP, less corruption, more equity among ethnic groups, less subordination to ruling elites, or improved human rights performance. The specious connection between stronger state institutions in these areas and the various problems reflected in the diversity of problem- ridden states points to the need for more contextualisation, and perhaps categories, to capture these problems with more nuance. As noted earlier, deficiënt aspects of state performance and state institutions represent genuine problems that have been overlooked. The main challenge for addressing these problems is to go beyond the need to simply 'build states', with the implication that external actors should target their assistance first and foremost towards state strength. The one-size-fits-all 'state-building' answer to 'failed states' misses important tensions and trade- offs in pursuing state strength. Most salient, enhancing the capacity of military and police and judiciaries when these are instruments of repression, corruption, ethnic discrimination, and/or organised crime will only worsen these problems. The central challenge for state building—how to strengthen state legitimacy and effectiveness when the state is predatory, corrupt, authoritarian or otherwise 'bad'—is swept under the rug by the discourse of failed states and state building.

Diamond/Democracy Link

Diamond and Democracy are the new avatars of global capitalism. Democracy promotion is not a deviation from the norm, but the extension of cold war logics of global superpower governance

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(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

Therefore, although the 'formal Cold War' has ceased – involving the stalemate between capitalism and communism – a 'structural Cold War' still prevails – involving **new justifications** for the persistence of old institutions that perpetuate **mental** frameworks in search of alternative applications (Cox with Schecter, 2002, p. 160). The post-11 September 2001 interest in state failure does not therefore constitute a deviation from, but a persistence of, Cold War thinking and policies suitably adjusted to **'new world order'** power relations (Bilgin and Morton, 2002). This is best exemplified by avatars of global capitalism, such as Larry Diamond, extolling the need to win the 'New Cold War on Terrorism' through the extension of a global governance imperative linked to the promotion of liberal democracy (Diamond, 2002).

Democracy Link

**The assumption that democracy prevents conflict is based on its universal applicability, same logic that labels some states as 'failed'**

**Kartas ‘7**

Moncef Kartas, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva, 2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?"

Hence, peace-building constitutes an endeavour in transition towards and consolidation of democracy with the underlying rationale that the rule of law and transparency, i.e. good governance, provide the necessary means to transform violent conflict into political process. Interestingly, the phenomenon of peace-building as democratisation is not confined to UN peacekeeping missions. In fact, operations with a peace-building dimension followed or paralleled military interventions with different purposes as in Haiti, East Timor, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Iraq. However, all forms of peace-building interventions share the goal of resolving conflict through the building of democratic institutions and some also aim at (re-)building from scratch a modern state. Concomitantly to this standardised post-conflict peace-building strategy and methodology, a democratisation/good governance discourse prevails in the post-conflict peace-building literature, drawing on a set of implicit assumptions regarding the capacities of democratic institutions to create the conditions for lasting and sustainable peace, and mostly adopting a ‘lessons learnt’ approach.4 Although no study has yet produced substantial evidence or, failing that, a detailed theoretical explanation on the capacity of good governance reforms and/or democratisation to restore peace and stability, the assumption is widely shared and remains unquestioned.5 What might explain that good governance bias, which seems so deeply ingrained as to be not only shielded from scrutiny, but also compelling to the point of sustaining a consensus broad enough to organise the ‘international’ peace-building policies in terms of good governance. In his recent call for critical peace operations theory Bellamy (2004) argues basically that the reproduction of the ‘liberal peace’ discourse results from the problem-solving approach adopted by the majority of the literature on peace operations. The complementarities between peace-building policy and peacekeeping literature indicate that scholarly work is lagging behind practice, thereby uncritically reproducing a good governance bias. That is, as stated above, peace-building interventions adopted the approach ultimately seeking to install liberal electoral democracy as a means of restoring sustainable peace among conflicting domestic parties. The widely shared assumption behind this new approach to peace settlement draws on the global norm that ‘liberal’ democracy is the historically prescribed path towards peace, both on the international and on the national level. Roland Paris (1997; 2003: 44) has provided sound evidence on the emergence of this norm, and on how it has affected the strategy of peacekeeping missions. As critical approaches to peacekeeping highlighting the peace building consensus argue: “Peace is understood to lie in the establishment or reconstructive and transformative processes that culminate in states that mirror the liberal-democratic state.”(Richmond 2004: 87)

Intrinsic Characteristics Link

The affirmative reduces (topic country) to empirical observations, claiming intrinsic characteristics as the reason for the state “failure.” These representations of states as “failed” and as a deviation from the norm re-assert a justification for more interventions abroad. The only alternative seen by “failed states” is to become strong states, creating the conditions for war. Insistence on the need for America to establish stability is reminiscent of a Cold War approach by superpowers to contain threatening powers, leaving the affirmative hopelessly stuck in the status quo. Only an analysis of the processes by which states come to fail can hope to solve the case.

Bilgin and Morton ‘4

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4

(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

A better appreciation of state failure is not likely to materialise unless the socio-economic conjuncture within which such 'failure' emerges is analysed. However, little reference is commonly made to the **processes** through which these states have come to 'fail' whilst others 'succeeded'. In other words, the conditions that allow for state failure to occur are almost **never investigated** (Milliken and Krause, 2002a is a significant exception to this generalisation). Yet, this is an important avenue for research because existing approaches are **rooted in the assumption** that 'failures' are caused by the **intrinsic characteristics of certain states** without necessarily reflecting upon their colonial background and/or their peripheral position in global politico-economic structures. The broader point to make is that the ways in which deepening our **understanding of the factors** that have led some states to 'fail' may also help us to take alternative action. A second problem is that the contributors to present debates reduce state 'success' or 'failure' to an empirically observable capacity to manipulate (usually) coercive resources resulting in a not-so-democratic overtone of control and subordination (see Migdal, 1988 and 2001). Such insistence on the **need for strong states to establish stability and political control** is again not new but reminiscent of **Cold War approaches** to modernisation and development in the less-developed world when explanations were sought for the prevalence, particularly in Latin America, of authoritarian rule and 'strong' state corporatist regimes. Third, the stance of many contributors to state 'failure' analysis is reminiscent of the liberal peace 'two worlds' approach that has characterised post-Cold War debates on international security. The 'two worlds'– labelled as 'core' and 'periphery' by James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul (1992) – are represented as the zone of conflict (periphery) and zone of peace (core). The practical implication of the 'two worlds' approach is that **the structural and constitutive relationships between the two realms of security are obscured**. The only alternative left to the 'failed' states of the world is presented as that of **becoming 'strong' states** and joining the liberal peace. Yet what is left underemphasised is the centrality, for instance, of arms exports to many Western economies, which effectively underlines the contradictions at work in the making of the 'zone of peace' and 'zone of conflict'. What sustains such relations within the arms trade industry, despite the critical voices raised by non-governmental organisations, is **the representation of some states as 'failed'** within 'zones of conflict'. Therefore, the inherently unequal structural relationships between the two zones **are sustained**. Fourth, prevalent approaches to state failure and collapse, as 'deviance' from the norm, help to establish 'both **a justification and legitimacy for intervention'**, thereby **marginalising alternative approaches** (and practices) (see Duffield, 2002, p. 1050). After all, as Milliken and Krause (2002b, p. 762) remind us, 'what has collapsed is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive developmental state that sustained generations of academics, activists and policymakers, than any real existing state'. Hence the authors' call to analyse state failure (and collapse) as part of a 'broader and more prevalent crisis in the capacities and legitimacy of modern states' (Milliken and Krause, 2002b, p. 755). The fifth problem that is neglected is recognition of the role played by the sequencing of aid and structural adjustment programmes by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that have exacerbated the political and socio-economic landscape of states in the developing world. Further attention needs to be drawn to the institutional processes that have impacted on and constructed conditions of state failure (Ottaway, 2002), which are often embedded within wider institutional practices throughout the global political economy that **contribute to weakening state capacity**. Recognition of globally embedded state failure within IMF structures and policies that have insisted on cutting back the state itself, effectively dismantling modes of authority, mechanisms of social regulation and the maintenance of social bonds within developing states, is therefore essential.

Ethnic Conflict Link

**Strengthening states without resolving societal conflict means ethnic conflict will resurge**

**Call 2008**

Charles T. "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'" Third World Quarterly 1491-1507, PhD from Stanford, Assistant Professor in International Studies and Conflict Resolution at American University

In societies where state strength is not so much an issue as the degree to which the state serves all the territory equally, or where only certain social groups have access to effective state services, then issues of regime are likely to be more important than issues about the state.19 In countries like Croatia, Macedonia, Colombia and Indonesia, for instance, the strength of state institutions is far less weighty than how state institutions reflect and respond to popular aspirations, needs and identity. And in societies where ethnic groups exist in tension or hold disproportionate economie and political power, or where elites have long exploited the populace without any accountability, strengthening state institutions without attention to how society will relate to the state is perilous. In such states (eg Liberia, Afghanistan, Burundi), state building inevitably must reckon not solely with the nature of the state (federal, autonomous, etc) but also with the regime's rules of governance. Although recent scholarship has brought needed attention to the state, current concepts of state failure and state building threaten to throw the baby out with the bathwater. State building has marginalised questions like what sort of democratie regime is appropriate for a given country, how oppressed groups will receive representation, how social groups' interests will be mediated, what forms of accountability over state authorities should be adopted, and to what extent liberal rights will be enshrined and enforced, and by what sort of judicial system.20 These issues of governance, electoral rules, justice and group rights (among many others) will not resolve themselves solely through effective state strengthening. They require deliberate and thoughtful attention.

Of Omission, Link

**Powerful police or military force in a country might solve western security interests but it destroys the human security of populations**

**Call 2008**

Charles T. "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'" Third World Quarterly 1491-1507, PhD from Stanford, Assistant Professor in International Studies and Conflict Resolution at American University

Related to the paternalistic character of the failed state label is the obfuscation of the West's role in the contemporary condition of these states. This ahistoric scoring of a state as failing or fragile omits the long history of colonialism and exploitation in the impoverishment and poor governance of many societies presently considered fragile or failing.27 European states (and later North American countries) created the system of nation-states, often drawing the borders of states themselves, as well as extracting resources, fostering colonial institutions with powerful legacies, propping up post- colonial leaders, providing them with arms, and undermining the emergence of plural and civil societies that might have diminished poverty, warfare and weak institutions.28 Certainly elites and social groups in many poor and war-torn societies bear important responsibility for choices they have made. However, it is egregious to ignore the role of Western colonial powers, international financial institutions, development agencies and the systems these actors have created in the historical evolution of so-called failed states.

Urban Warfare Link

**Representations of urban warfare are derivative of the failed state construct.**

**Graham ‘5**

S. D. N. (2005) ’Remember Fallujah : demonising place, constructing atrocity.’, Environment and planning D : society and space., 23 (1). pp.1-10. Professor of Human Geography at the University of Durham, PhD in Scientific and Technology Policy

All this furthers the deep discursive equivalence that is constructed between Islamic urban places and ‘terrorist nest’ war zones to be assaulted and ‘cleansed’. Military commanders often compare the various facilities as though comparing cities as holiday destinations. "The advantage of [the training complex at] George Air Force Base", reflected Colonel James Cashwell in March 2003, "is that it is ugly, torn up, all the windows are broken and trees have fallen down in the street. It’s perfect for the replication of a war-torn city." (cited in Wilson, 2004). Finally, the US Military’s demonisation of Islamic (and other majority world) cities per se is accomplished through the combined vitriol of a whole legion of US military ‘commentators’ who enjoy huge coverage, exposure and influence in the US media. Taking advantage on the traditional reticence of US forces to engage in urban warfare, these commentators endlessly discuss what is known in the jargon as "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain" (or ‘MOUT’). Once again, they serve to construct Islamic urbanism as little more than a combat site, a killing zone which challenges the US to harness its techno-scientific might to sustain hegemony and empire by killing ‘terrorists’ as rapidly and efficiently as possible with as few (US) casualties as possible. Crucially, here, the purportedly irrational, structureless and impenetrable spaces of Casbahs and Medinas are cast as little more than the results of deliberate strategies to interrupt the high-tech killing power of US forces: the only remaining shelters from the verticalised, orbital targeting that sustains US global military pre-eminence. One of the most influential sources of these discursive appeals to the Islamic city- as-target is Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. military urban warfare specialist and an influential columnist on Rupert Murdoch’s neo-conservative *New York Post.* Peters’s starting point is that the majority world’s burgeoning megacities and urbanising corridors are spaces where "human waste goes undisposed, the air is appalling, and mankind is rotting" (Peters, 2002, 6). Here, cities and urbanisation represent little but decay, anarchy, disorder and the post Cold War collapse of ‘failed’ nation states. "Boom cities pay for failed states", he writes, "post-modern dispersed cities pay for failed states, and failed cities turn into killing grounds and reservoirs for humanity’s surplus and discards (guess where we [i.e. the United States military] will fight)" (Peters, 1996, 2). And yet even the savagery of the first US assault on what Ralph Peters calls the "terror-city" of Fallujah did little to satisfy Peters’s bloodlust for violent mastery of Islamic cities (Peters, 2004a). Praising the US Marines "for hammering the terrorists into the dirt" during this first assault, Peters nevertheless castigated the cease fire negotiations after the battle that, he argued, allowed those ‘terrorists’ left alive to melt back into the civilian population (Peters, 2004b). Again, the symbolic importance of Fallujah was strong in his mind : "make no mistake: There can be no compromise in Fallujah. It we stop one inch short of knocking down the last door in the last house in the city, our enemies will be able to present the Battle of Fallujah to their sympathisers as a great victory" (Peters, 2004b).

Relations Link

**Relations are just neoliberal colonialism, when we restructure we exploit local populations and resources.**

**Bilgin and Morton 2002**

Pinar and Adam David, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?" Third World Quarterly Vol. 23 No. 1 pp.55-80, Professor of IR @ Bilkint University, Professor of IR @ University of Wales

The centrality of arms exports to many Western economies effectively high- lights the contradictions at work in the making of the ‘zone of peace’ and ‘zone of conflict ’. What sustains such relations within the arms trade industr y, despit e the critical voices raised by non-governmental organisations, is the representatio n of some sta tes as ‘f aile d st ate s ’ within ‘z one s of c onf lict ’ . As a r e sult, the inherently unequal structural relationships between the two zones are sustained . What therefore prevails in much analysis, despite attempts to focus on ‘politica l e c on omy ’ int e ra c ti on s, i s a v ie w of se c u ri t y tha t is c ons tit u te d by d isti nc t institutional realms of ‘politics ’ and ‘economics ’ that separately interact with one another. For example, Robert Gilpin’s standard definition of political economy refers to ‘the interaction of the state and the market as the embodiment of politic s and economics in the modern world’. In addition he claims that state and market have independent logics and existences of their own, influencing the distributio n of power and wealth.89 More recently he has also declared that ‘international politics significantly a ff e c ts t h e n a t u r e a n d d y n a mi c s o f th e in t e r n a t io n a l economy’, leading to the conclusion that ‘the supportive policies of powerful states and cooperative relationships among these states constitute the necessar y political foundations for a stable and unified world economy’.9 0 One consequenc e of these assumptions is that state and market, politics and economics, become reified (thing-like) abstractions that are separated from specific social relation s and ma te ria l inte rests that constitute a socia l ( or wor ld) order. 9 1 By dividin g politics and economics, attention is therefore diverted from security problems , which are inextricably embedded within capitalism. Hence, for Justin Rosenberg, ‘the structural specificity of state sovereignty lies in its “abstraction ” from civil society —an abstraction which is constitutive of the private sphere of the market, and hence inseparable from capitalist relations of production ’.9292

\*\*\*IMPACT\*\*\*

“Failed States” Discourse spills over

**The discourse of “failed states” spills over to other fields and justifications**

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

It should also be noted that the **metaphors** of contagion, **of export of chaos, of spread**, of threat and infection **that now dominate the discourse on the problems of failed states** even **work their way into what are otherwise quite radical analyses**. To be sure, these retain their emphasis on the need for solidarity with the poor and the oppressed and contain both a greater sense that the developing world is also the victim of threats and that these are located in the workings of capitalism and the international system. However, **the metaphors of threat spill over and contagion are still deployed uncritically**. Thus, for the authors of the recent Barcelona Report on a Human Security Doctrine for Europe, regional conflicts and failed states are:

“the source of new global threats including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and organised crime . . . contemporary conflicts are fertile ground for a combination of human rights violations, criminal networks and terrorism, which spill over and cause insecurity beyond the area itself. While these developments may initially have appeared to apply primarily to developing and conflict states, the 11 September and 11 March attacks have made it clear once and for all that no citizens of the world are any longer safely ensconced behind their national border.20”

Neoliberalism Impact - Giroux

Neoliberal disparages nations it touches, creating a system that emulates indentured servitude in which natives are forced to work under the impression that their economic standpoint will improve, whereas in reality, they are just filling the pockets of US corporations
Giroux ‘5
Henry A. Giroux holds the Global TV Network Chair in Communications, “The Terror of Neoliberalism:

Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics” [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/college\_literature/v032/32.1giroux.html 2005](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/college_literature/v032/32.1giroux.html%202005)

Just as the world has seen a more virulent and brutal form of market capitalism, generally referred to as neoliberalism, develop over the last thirty years, it has also seen “a new wave of political activism [which] has coalesced around the simple idea that capitalism has gone too far”(Harding 2001, para.28).Wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalismwages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, and non-commodified values. Under neoliberalism everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit. Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the public’s airwaves over to powerful broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding and then bills the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools more closely resemble either malls or jails, and teachers, forced to get revenue for their school by adopting market values, increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties—that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to take standardized tests. As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday life, big government is disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to individual freedom, suggesting that power should reside in markets and corporations rather than in governments (except for their support for corporate interests and national security) and citizens. Citizenship has increasingly become a function of consumerism and politics has been restructured as “corporations have been increasingly freed from social control through deregulation, privatization, and other neoliberal measures”

Neoliberalism Impact – Santos \*I

Like the gulag and the death camp, neoliberalism relies on the extermination of the Other, promoting the ideology that the only way to save the world is to destroy it. This amounts to sacrificial genocide and can only end in extinction.

Santos ‘3

(Boaventura de Sousa, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and Distinguished Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. "Collective Suicide?" March 28, 2003 online <http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php>; ₦)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it.

Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists.This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra‑ conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history.

During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to he incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years.

Neoliberalism Impact -- Environment

Neoliberalism leads to the commodification of nature – everything becomes an object of trade and commercialization, which causes massive environmental destruction

Von-Werlhof 8

Claudia, Professor of women’s studies and political science @ University of Innsbruck, 2/1/8, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7973>

Social, cultural, traditional and ecological considerations are abandoned and give way to a mentality of plundering. All global resources that we still have – natural resources, forests, water, genetic pools – have turned into objects of “utilization”. Rapid ecological destruction through depletion is the consequence. If one makes more profit by cutting down trees than by planting them, then there is no reason not to cut them (Lietaer 2006). Neither the public nor the state interferes, despite global warming and the obvious fact that the clearing of the few remaining rain forests will irreversibly destroy the earth’s climate – not to even speak of the many other negative effects of such action (Raggam 2004). Climate, animal, plants, human and general ecological rights are worth nothing compared to the interests of the corporations – no matter that the rain forest is no renewable resource and that the entire earth’s ecosystem depends on it. If greed – and the rationalism with which it is economically enforced – really was an inherent anthropological trait, we would have never even reached this day. The commander of the Space Shuttle that circled the earth in 2005 remarked that “the center of Africa was burning”. She meant the Congo, in which the last great rain forest of the continent is located. Without it there will be no more rain clouds above the sources of the Nile. However, it needs to disappear in order for corporations to gain free access to the Congo’s natural resources that are the reason for the wars that plague the region today. After all, one needs petrol, diamonds, and coltan for mobile phones. The forests of Asia have been burning for many years too, and in late 2005 the Brazilian parliament has approved the clearing of 50% of the remaining Amazon. Meanwhile, rumors abound that Brazil and Venezuela have already sold their rights to the earth’s biggest remaining rain forest – not to the US-Americans, but to the supposedly “left” Chinese who suffer from chronic wood shortage and cannot sustain their enormous economic growth and economic superpower ambitions without securing global resources. Given today’s race for the earth’s last resources, one wonders what the representatives of the World Trade Organization (WTO) thought when they accepted China as a new member in 2001. They probably had the giant Chinese market in mind but not the giant Chinese competition. After all, a quarter of the world’s population lives in China. Of course it has long been established that a further expansion of the Western lifestyle will lead to global ecological collapse – the faster, the sooner (Sarkar 2001). Today, everything on earth is turned into commodities, i.e. everything becomes an object of “trade” and commercialization (which truly means “liquidation”: the transformation of all into liquid money). In its neoliberal stage it is not enough for capitalism to globally pursue less cost-intensive and preferably “wageless” commodity production. The objective is to transform everyone and everything into commodities (Wallerstein 1979), including life itself. We are racing blindly towards the violent and absolute conclusion of this “mode of production”, namely total capitalization/liquidation by “monetarization” (Genth 2006).

Extinction

Imperialism causes extinction

**Schell 2003**

**(**Jonathan "The Logic of Peace" Visiting Fellow at Yale, Director of the US China Relations Program at the Asia Center)

What is true for proliferation of nuclear weapons is also likely to be true for their  use. Force, history teaches, summons counterforce. What goes around comes  around. The United States is the only nation on earth that has used these weapons of  mass destruction. An American attempt to dominate world affairs is a recipe for  provoking their use again, very possibly on American soil.  It’s unlikely that the passion for self-determination will be any easier to suppress  than the spread of destructive technology. Empire, the supreme embodiment of  force, is the antithesis of self-determination. It violates equity on a global scale. No  lover of freedom can give it support. It is especially contrary to the founding prin-  ciples of the United States, whose domestic institutions are incompatible with the  maintenance of empire. Historically, imperial rule has rested on three kinds of su-  premacy — military, economic, and political. The United States enjoys unequivocal  superiority in only one of these domains — the military, and here only in the con-  ventional sphere. (Any attempt at regime change in a country equipped with even a  modest deliverable nuclear arsenal is out of the question even for the United States.)  American economic power is impressive, yet in this domain it has several equals or  near equals, including the European Union and Japan, who are not likely to bend  easily to American will. In the political arena the United States is weak. “Covenants,  without the sword, are but words,” Hobbes said in the late seventeenth century.  Since then, the world has learned that swords without covenants are but empty  bloodshed. In the political arena, the lesson of the world revolt — that winning military victories may sometimes be easy but building political institutions in for-  eign lands is hard, often impossible — still obtains. The nation so keenly interested  in regime change has small interest in nation-building and less capacity to carry it  out. The United States, indeed, is especially mistrusted, often hated, around the  world. If it embarks on a plan of imperial supremacy, it will be hated still more.  Can cruise missiles build nations? Does power still flow from the barrel of a gun —  or from a Predator Drone? Can the world in the twenty-first century really be ruled  from thirty-five thousand feet? Modern peoples have the will to resist and the means to do so. Imperialism without politics is a naive imperialism. In our time, force can  win a battle or two, but politics is destiny.  Can a nation that began its life in rebellion against the most powerful empire of  its time end by trying to become a still more powerful empire? It perhaps can, but  not if it wishes to remain a republic. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams defined  the choice with precision in 1821. After giving his country the wellknown advice  that the United States should not go abroad “in search of monsters to destroy” but be  “the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all ... the champion and vindi-  cator only of her own,” he added that if the United States embarked on the path of  dominating others, the “fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change  from liberty to force . . . . She might become the dictatress of the world. She would  no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.”2  A country’s violence, Hannah Arendt said, can destroy its power. The United  States is moving quickly down this path. Do American leaders imagine that the  people of the world, having overthrown the territorial empires of the nineteenth and  twentieth centuries, are ready to bend the knee to an American overlord in the  twenty-first? Do they imagine that allies are willing to become subordinates? Have  they forgotten that people hate to be dominated by force? History is packed with  surprises. The leaders of the totalitarian Soviet empire miraculously had the good  sense to yield up their power without unleashing the tremendous violence that was at their fingertips. Could it be the destiny of the American republic, unable to resist the  allure of an imperial delusion, to flare out in a blaze of pointless mass destruction  The Cooperative Path  In sum, the days when humanity can hope to save itself from force with force are  over. None of the structures of violence — not the balance of power, not the balance  of terror, not empire — can any longer rescue the world from the use of violence,  now grown apocalyptic. Force can lead only to more force, not to peace. Only a  turn to structures of cooperative power can offer hope. To choose that path, the  United States would, as a first order of business, have to choose the American  republic over the American empire, and then, on the basis of the principles that  underlie the republic, join with other nations to build cooperative structures as a  basis for peace.

Solvency Takeout

The 1AC reps means no solvency – intervention becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of re-intervention until the state is completely neoliberal and western
Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

However**, the attempt to extend external regulation and monitoring inside the developing world state is a project whose effectiveness is limited** by a number of factors. **First, locals engage in innovative adaptation to the dictates of externals—whether through obstruction, evasion or** their **co-option** of externally imposed initiatives into existing mechanisms of power and patronage. Thus, both the oil diagnostic in Angola and the World Bank initiative in Chad have come under criticism for their failure to reign in corruption and misuse of local resources. **One response to such failures of course is a call for even more intervention** and a re-awakening of interest in the benefits of Empire,47 neotrusteeships or ‘shared sovereignty’.48 **Second, the push for oversight and regulation occurs in a context characterised by the absence of local ownership and in transitions to ‘market democracy’** characterised by reductions in state subsidies, downward pressure on salaries and welfare safety nets, privatisation processes that are easily captured by elites and formal elections that increase the pressure for patronage and vote-buying. Aid supplicants then, do not get to choose regulation a` la carte. **Democracy and neoliberalism come as a package and there is little freedom for societies to opt for anything other than a particular set of market mechanisms underpinned by integration into an unequal global trading system**. This is the case even when the rhetoric is of local empowerment and agency—the poor in effect must be forced to be free (traders), a contradiction neatly illustrated by the European Commission in discussing the Doha development round: Ownership of the trade reform agenda [by LDCs] is key. The Integrated Framework is a good example of this approach as it . . . *insists that the LDCs demonstrate their commitment* to the trade policy reform agenda through the creation of national co-ordination structures.49 (Emphasis added.) The continued dominance of neoliberalism is reflected in the fact that between 1979 and 2002 there have been 2,500 privatisations in 48 African countries.50 Similarly, in Iraq **military intervention was immediately followed by a project** (albeit one that proved difficult to implement) **aiming at extensive regulatory intervention**—the lowering of corporate tax rates, the passing of regulations permitting foreign companies to own 100% of Iraqi assets outside of the natural resource sector; allowing investors to take 100% of their profits out of Iraq; and regulations permitting companies to sign leases and contracts that could last for 40 years.51 In Afghanistan, the World Bank mandated an increased role for the private sector in telecommunications, oil, gas, and mining and directed the government to leave electricity to foreign investors.52

Solvency Takeout

**The aff’s perception of [country] as a “failed state” means no solvency because of anti-imperialist backlash**

**Kartas ‘7**

(Moncef, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva, 2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?")

This becomes particularly problematic when it comes to the assessment of the conflict. The methodology takes the good governance as the reference, i.e. as the ideal type, against which the conflict is assessed in terms of deviation from the ideal-type of the Western legal-rational state. Society can, thus, be conceived of as the separated sphere of the private and thus apolitical and the state as autonomous and regulating the public (see Cynthia Weber 1995; Walker 1993). The state’s autonomy from society is a crucial image, because crises of the polity do not result from a failure of the state, but are caused by societal and/or institutional deviation from the idea. Hence, the idea provides a powerful justification for its own existence. Those two effects become visible in the way the ‘good governance’ perspective stigmatises societies and institutions in failing states as ‘ill’, as evidenced by the failed states literature mentioned above. Thus, the society can be ‘pathologised’ in terms of culture of violence, corruption, etc. As X and X have aptly argued in a recent paper heavily criticising the conflict assessment tools used by donor agencies and international organisations, even security is a highly context specific and culturally constitutedconcept. Therefore, we cannot apply our categories of good governance and security in non-western conflict situations inferring symptoms of the conflict as its roots and causes. In contrast, post-colonial studies usually retrace the process of state formation, whereby they emphasise that the mechanisms of the historical process in Europe described, for example, by Tilly, as a by-product of war making, which required ever increasing bureaucracy and tax collection capacity, cannot account for the colonial and post- colonial process of state formation (see Leander 2002; Tilly 1985). Further the process underlines that the state rests on a legal fiction that has undergone substantive changes in history. While the Weberian state, if it ever existed, was a very recent phenomenon of the twentieth century, it is still transforming for example against the backdrop of globalisation. In fact, for most of the time the world entailed areas with different forms of socio-political organisation. The idea of universal statehood emerged only recently, because states are the indispensable units for the international legal system. Because of this necessity, as Jackson (1990) has argued for post-colonial states, which did not fulfil the legal definition of a state, the system accommodated to grant them the legal appearance of statehood holding them artificially together. With the case of Africa, Clapham shows that only in some regions around the Great Lakes, in parts of West and South Africa and in Ethiopia did some form of political organisation exist prior to colonialisation. For the main parts of Africa social cohesion was mainly based on extended family relationship and spiritual authority (see Clapham 2004: 84). The idea of ‘state’ was experienced for the first time with the imposition of colonial structures. Hence, the post-colonial states were built on shaky grounds, at least where no, little or very different forms of political organisation existed. As Clapham notes: “A familiar weakness of African state formation was the very uneven fit between such indigenous bases of statehood as the continent possessed and the imposed structures of colonial rule.” (Clapham 2004: 85) Yet, another aspect of the idea of the state plays an important role. Virginia Tilley, explaining sources of ethnic conflict, emphasised that the state incorporates values and norms challenging the validity of the norms and values of indigenous groups (e.g. by imposing adherence to a unique national identity), who in turn reject the very concept of statehood (see Tilley 2002).

Solvency Takeout

**They can't solve-failure is a normative concept that entails empirically unsuccessful means to rescue states.**

**Boas and Jennings 2005**

Morten and Kathleen M., Researchers at the Fafo Institute for International Studies "Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of 'Failed States'" The European Journal of Development Research Vol.17 No. 3 pp.385-395

Few would disagree with general statements such as ‘the Liberian state is a failure’ or ‘Afghanistan is a failed state’. The question, however, is what these pronouncements really tell us about security and development in these states.In actual fact, the answer is very little. The way in which the terms ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states is currently being used in reports coming out of Washington, Brussels or other Western capitals reﬂect this limitation: the concepts are used in a way that is less analytical than descriptive and categorical, lending itself to a narrow, checklist approach to policy that may result in extremely misguided planning and interventions. Reading various policy and strategy documents, furthermore, it is quickly evident that they are essentially self-referential: failed states only matter insofar as they affect ‘our’ security [see e.g. White House, 2002; EU, 2003; USAID, 2005 ]. This instrumentalist approach to the affected states is seriously problematic. When all problems and solutions are seen through the dominant lens of Western security interests, the singularity of each crisis – and the dissimilarities between one and the others – gets lost; after all, everyone and everything looks the same when you see only yourself in the mirror. Policy interventions thus assume a standardised form on the basis of what has worked in other places before. Yet this obfuscation of vital differences cripples policy effectiveness from the outset, by reducing the complex nexus of actors, incentives, power structures and networks into a homogenised, easily digestible form that bears little resemblance to the situation on the ground. This is unsurprising, because the concept of ‘state failure’, predicated as it is on the existence of the prototypical state, is built on a faulty assumption of uniformity in state organisation, structure and behaviour. To say that something ‘fails’ or ‘is failing’ is a normative judgement that is only meaningful in comparison to something else; in this case, that something else is the existence of a Westernised, ‘healthy’ state that, unfortunately, has little relevance to most of the states in question because it has simply never existed there. Comparing a ‘failing’ state to mature states thus entails a neglect of history, demography, culture and economics, and their relationship to regional dynamics and patterns. It is the analytical equivalent of comparing apples and oranges, which also elides the critical role played by agency and incentives in determining why a state looks and functions as it does. Thus, categorising regimes and enacting policy decisions and interventions on the basis of a simpliﬁed, analytically questionable notion of failed states will result in the continued failure of attempts to improve outcomes in the states and regions in question.

Turns Case

**States fail because of US intervention, not acknowledging that traps us in a vicious cycle.**

**Call 2008**

Charles T. "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'" Third World Quarterly 1491-1507, PhD from Stanford, Assistant Professor in International Studies and Conflict Resolution at American University

The concept of state failure reflects new ways of thinking about order, peace and development. States and state institutions have been 'rediscovered' by aid agencies, financial institutions, diplomats and militaries in Western countries and in intergovernmental bodies. We have not yet fully comprehended the degree to which this renewed concern with states is likely to reshape foreign policy programmes and the manner in which national elites in Asia, Latin America and Africa deploy these concepts in their interactions with international actors or with their own populations. However, state failure must be seen in the context of the post-9/11 period. The rediscovery of the state has occurred in the context of the 'war on terror', as failing states are deemed dangerous for Western security interests. lts prominence derives mainly not from concern for the inability of some states to provide for their own population's security, welfare and rights, but to deter and control threats to the populations and institutions of rich countries.The important need to combat terrorism has led to a privileging of the order- providing capacities of states. As shown above, the failed state concept has fuelled a tendency towards single, technocratie formulas for strengthening states, which emphasise coercive capabilities. Although security is a *sine qua* *non* for sustained legitimacy and development, external efforts that privilege coercive capabilities everywhere and anywhere, without regard for context, are likely to bolster abusive, predatory and illegitimate states. Past historie periods where Western powers privileged enhancing the coercive capacities of peripheral countries led to a cycle of serious problems: oppressive governments, serious human rights violations, and instability that came back to haunt those who had originally adopted an expeditious but unsound approach to building state institutions for stabilisation. In the Caribbean in the early part of the 20th century, the USA pursued a strategy of state building that centred on constabulary forces, without sufficient attention to issues of regime, to other state institutions, or to accountability. The result was the rise of constabulary officer Somoza to lead an authoritarian Nicaragua for decades, as well as repressive dictatorships by the Duvaliers in Haiti and by Fulgencio Batista in Cuba.40 A security-centred state-building template is one of the more serious dangers of the failed state concept. The failed state concept has helped identify and emphasise genuine problems. The concept has drawn overdue attention to the importance of state institutions in peace processes, in development effbrts, and in considering sources of transnational insecurity. Humanitarian NGOs, the UN, regional organisations, bilateral donors and Western militaries should all take the state and its institutions more seriously in their endeavours. Yet imprecise concepts make for poor scholarship and bad policy. I have provided a critique of the fallacy of the failed state. The concept's harm is not limited to extreme or isolated examples. The term is inadequate, even misleading, for virtually every country it purports to describe. Just as the State Failure Task Force has done, scholars should abandon the concept of state failure, and put renewed effbrt into devising categories of analysis that will be denotatively and connotatively clear, useful and discriminating.

Turns Case – Generic

**Liberal Internationalism – the Western idea model of peace building – reignites fighting between agencies and states**

**Paris 08**

(Roland 9/10, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 54-89)

My argument is straightforward. A single paradigm – liberal internationalism – appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic policy and a market-oriented economy. Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering-an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization. This paradigm, however has not been a particularly effective model for establishing stable peace. Paradoxically, the very process of political and economic liberalization has generated destabilizing side effects in war-shattered states, hindering the consolidation of peace and in some cases even sparking renewed fighting. In Rwanda and Angola, for example, political liberalization contributed to the resurgence of violence; in Bosnia, elections reinforced the separation of the parties rather than facilitating their reconciliation; and in Mozambique, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the effects of economic liberalization have threatened to reignite conflict. At best, the liberal internationalist approach to peacebuilding has generated unforeseen problems. At worst, peace-building missions have had the “perverse effect” of undermining the very peace they were meant to buttress.

**Peacebuilding operations with the goals of creating long term peace have a bad record of actually creating peace**

**Paris 08**

(Roland 9/10, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 54-89)

This is not to say that peacebuilding operations have done more harm than good. On the contrary, many of the countries that have hosted such operations might still be at war if not for the help they received from international actors in negotiating and implementing peace accords. If, however, the goal of peace building is not simply to stop the fighting, but to create conditions that will allow peace to **endure long after the departure of the** peacebuilders themselves – in other words, a self-sustaining peace – then the record of peacebuilding has been mixed at best. All but one of the eight peacebuilding operations I examine in this article have failed to meet this larger goal. Excluding Namibia, which I argue is a a special case, every peacebuilding host state has experienced continuing of renewed instability. Although some of these countries (such as Rwanda) have been more unstable than others (such as El Salvador), the broader question is whether peacebuilding operations have placed these states on a path toward lasting peace. I argue that they have not.

Turns Case – PMCs \*I

The neoliberal ideology of the USFG allowed PMCs to operate in the first place – we solve your case impacts

Sheehy and Maogoto 08

Benedict and Jackson,Benedict Sheehy: B.Th., M.A., LL.B., M.A., LL.M. Senior Lecturer in Law, RMIT University (Australia); Jackson N. Maogoto: LL.B, LL.M., PhD, LLM, GCertPPT, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Manchester, “THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC”, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Lexis

One of the most significant challenges to the privatization agenda is maintaining control and accountability. The basic challenge of control and accountability of violent public services is exacerbated when a State privatizes the delivery of those services. Given the nature of defense services and the consequent need for vast sums of money, secrecy, and power, the importance of control and accountability as well as the risks associated with privatization are exponentially greater. In the context of the privatization of defense, as will be shown, the situation is different, making the accountability of PMCs a matter of urgent concern particularly in relation to regulation. When public militaries and governments interact, the interactions have not always been peaceful. Drawing from the history of such interactions, one should certainly conclude that a public military does not always act in the public interest. History is replete with instances in which a military has seized control and been unwilling to give up power. [n112](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n112) Nevertheless, public militaries often can and do surrender to public will, particularly when the basis for their legitimacy rests on some notion of public accountability and maintenance of the Rule of Law. The privatized defense industry, however, has no such constraints, and indeed, history is replete with examples of PMCs running amok, uninhibited by any allegiance or claim to public legitimacy and constitutionalism. No surprise then that in the case of controlling privatized defense capabilities and ensuring accountability, the record is appalling. There have been a shocking number of serious abuses by PMCs of their de facto powers. These include fraud, corruption, and deceit, including failing to warn a government it has been hired to protect, but in fact, participating in the overthrow of that government in favor of a preferred government. [n113](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n113) Other incidents are related to exploitative compensation demands including mineral rights put to cash-strapped governments. [n114](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n114) As the Iraq experience demonstrates, there have been few, if any, lessons learned when dealing with  [\*171]  PMCs. Companies that have murdered civilians have escaped legal sanction, and far from being penalized, have either been awarded additional contracts or continued to enjoy benefits of existing contacts. [n115](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n115) Perhaps the greatest challenge of accountability has to do with violent actions undertaken by a PMC extraterritorially in the name of a nation without corollary accountability to the people of that nation. Unlike other privatized services, which may be provided extraterritorially, PMC services may well include intentional death, injury, and challenge to the sovereignty of citizenry. Services of this nature and potential consequences require a distinctly higher level of accountability to a nation's people than to the provision of privatized transport services. Indeed, Rachel Weber, in her detailed study of the defense industry, argues for a thorough revision of governments' approach to defense industry contractors; in essence, removing industry participants from the strictly private sphere based on the nature of their work, subsidies received, and the level of importance to the nation. [n116](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n116) In South America, consider the early 1980s example of United States sponsored PMCs supporting the Contras' attacks on the democratically elected government of El Salvador. [n117](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n117) That debacle, which was finally brought to an end by public scrutiny and disclosure of what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair, left El Salvador in shambles with gangs and paramilitaries running rampant. [n118](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n118) No corporate actors were held accountable. [n119](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n119) In a sign that this was not a one-off incident, in the early 1990s, the crumbling of Yugoslavia not only turned the Balkans into a war zone dripping with blood, but another opportunity for PMCs to "assist" in restoring order through provision of logistical and training support. [n120](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n120) However, in the process, employees of one of the leading PMCs in this theatre, DynCorp, were implicated in serious human rights violations; the trafficking of women and running a prostitution ring. [n121](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n121) Lesser known are events such as those of Spearhead Ltd.'s training of Colombian drug enforcers whose "non-holds" barred approach had its list of victims including mayors, provincial governors, judges, presidential candidates, and civilians massacred. [n122](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n122) The activities of  [\*172]  some PMCs, which have left whole regions in ruins, have touched all corners of the earth--the latest and most publicized being in the Middle East. The PMC's record in Iraq includes torture, random killings, and massacres, again without accountability. One thing that has been a constant in all noted human rights and humanitarian norm breaches (the raison de etre this Article) has been the impunity enjoyed by implicated PMCs--neither their employees, directors or other allied actors have been called to account. These events form the impetus and drive the necessity to evaluate the issue of accountability of PMCs. Accountability requires identification, analysis, and evaluation as to whether: 1) the defense services offered by the PMC are legal and the objectives appropriate whether cast as contract specifications or broader policy objectives;2) the services are performed within the bounds of the law; 3) the activities undertaken are fully and truthfully reported; and4) all breaches of obligations create appropriate avenues of liability and compensation. [n123](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n123) Singer sets out the nub of the problem thus: "With PMCs, clear tensions always exist between the security goals of clients and the firms' desire for profit maximization. For governments, the public good and the good of the private companies are not identical." [n124](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n124) Singer identifies the three main obstacles to effective control of PMCs,which are set out in the next three paragraphs.

First, among the obstacles to accountability, Singer identifies the problem of monitoring. [n125](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n125) From the contract drafting and tendering process, to the implementation, evaluation, and renewal process, contracting is complex and hence, difficult to monitor. [n126](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n126) Complexity may be part of any contract monitoring, and transparency poses a particular quagmire for governmental contracting with the PMC. [n127](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n127) PMC contracts may be pre-determined or in a highly specialized niche market that precludes actual competition; therefore, avoiding market scrutiny and monitoring of its terms or in award. [n128](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n128) Contracts with PMCs often take place in highly secret contexts, such as in the course of war. [n129](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n129) In any case, PMCs as private actors dealing with private contracts and having access to military secrets, are well shielded from public scrutiny. [n130](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n130) The public  [\*173]  is, thus, not privy to either private commercial transactions or to military secrets. Such being the case, it is obvious thatPMC contracts may well go unobserved by public authorities. [n131](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n131) Monitoring is further challenged in the field when the chain of command is not clear--a complaint made by military officials--leaving it unclear to where the PMC is accountable and for what. [n132](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n132) The question of accountability becomes even more difficult when parties' accountabilities are in conflict. The conflict of profit and security is not a minor matter as was illustrated in a recent incident when the airport in Baghdad was shut down by the firm engaged to guard it over a pay dispute. [n133](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n133) A second concern Singer identifies is the profit motive. Whereas one of the government's neo-liberal objectives of the use of privatized defense service is the reduced expenditure, the PMCs objective is the opposite. Although the government seeks to control costs of violent action, the PMC seeks to increase profits and correlative costs. What particularly distinguishes the PMC-government relationship from a business-to-business relationship, however, is that the nature of the services provided puts the government in a vulnerable position in two senses. First, where a government has privatized its defense services, it is no longer in position to substitute its own resources in the event of PMC failure. Accordingly, it is in a very weak bargaining position, particularly vis-a-vis an entrenched PMC providing service in a niche market. Second, services as opposed to goods, are harder to measure and monitor, and indeed, are easier to supply at less than agreed levels than goods, and again, particularly so in the supply of military services. [n134](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198" \l "n134) Unsurprisingly, PMCs have encouraged outrageous and notorious cost overruns, including over-charging, billing for ghost employees, encouraging unwitting military officers whose focus is on strategy rather than expenditures to take more expensive alternatives, and even outright fraud. [n135](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n135) The outrages have occurred to such an extent in Iraq that a Senate Hearing, "Combating War Profiteering: Are We Doing Enough to Investigate and Prosecute Contracting Fraud and Abuse in Iraq?" was organized. Senator Leahy reported "untold billions [were] unaccounted for" [n136](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n136) and the Office of the Inspector General was only able to report that $ 9.8 million had been repaid in  [\*174]  restitution. [n137](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n137) Thus, on a cost-benefit calculus, the profit motive far outweighs any penalties, real or potential, encouraging PMCs to avoid controlling and accounting for costs (financial) and activities (domestic and international humanitarian violations). Singer identifies the third issue for the PMC as "Why fight hard?" [n138](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n138) He notes the incentives to prolong contracts, protect one's weapons, and employees. [n139](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n139) Other concerns include the firm's potential reluctance to fight on the basis of protecting its own commercial interests in certain areas, preferring to protect its land-based assets over the government's strategic needs and objectives, or divided loyalties where its employees wish to avoid engaging in combat against former comrades working for PMCs on the other side of a conflict, as appears to have happened in Ethiopia. [n140](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n140) While Singer notes these negative examples, PMCs have engaged in firefights, apparently, beyond contractual obligations in certain instances in Iraq. [n141](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n141) The ability to control and call PMCs to account by legal means such as court-martial is non-existent. [n142](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n142) It means that accountability and control in the military chain of command arising from legal sanction is gone. The issues above have a bearing on the efficiency claim supporting the neo-liberal privatization policy agenda. A study by U.S. scholar, Markusen indicates that the predicted efficiencies have not been realized. [n143](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n143) She wrote: "No one has been able to evaluate fully the long-term costs and consequences of extensive privatization of national defense, and the sheer inability to do so should give pause to advocates of outsourcing anything other than the most routine functions." [n144](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n144) Indeed, while standing armies are expensive, the less accountable and corporately shielded PMCs will almost certainly prove to be more so, [n145](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277503916421&returnToKey=20_T9629660493&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.222096.3447024198#n145) even without counting the costs to democracy and its institutions. This serves only to add impetus to achieving PMC accountability to the Nation-State and may well require some radical re-thinking of traditional approaches  [\*175]  to control PMCs, as well as reform to corporate and contract law and regulation. The foregoing discussion of the complexities of accountability and control associated with the privatization of defense sets the stage for a fresh analysis of the Nation-State--the corporate PMC relationship and potential for the de facto and de jure control of the PMC to which we turn next. It should be noted that in terms of the accountability for violence inflicted extraterritorially, one cannot be but pessimistic. Laws and courts have been remarkably otiose in constraining governments in their foreign adventures. Given such, control of PMCs in that context by legal means is not likely to produce much result.

\*\*\*ALTERNATIVE\*\*\*

Shift the Focus

The alternative is to shift the focus from pathologies of deviancy to understanding the strategies of accumulation, redistribution, and political legitimacy that unfold in zones of conflict.

And alt solves- A shift in focus would open analysis to the different processes of state formation and historical circumstances of developing states and permit the appreciation of alternative modes of social organization that stand in opposition to colonialism.

Bilgin and Morton ‘4

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4

(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

An alternative approach would therefore have to appreciate better the forces that shape the realms of political economy and security constraining and enabling developing states. Needless to say this is easier said than done. One way to do this, we argue, is to open analysis up to the different processes of state formation and the historical circumstances constitutive of various developing states. This might permit an appreciation of the differing historical and contemporary social circumstances and the alternative – but no less legitimate – modes of social organisation that prevail within states of the developing world. Linked to this is the need to **shift the focus** from pathologies of deviancy, or 'aberration and breakdown', to understanding the different strategies of **accumulation, redistribution and political legitimacy that unfold in zones of conflict**, thereby appreciating war as 'social transformation' (Duffield, 2001, pp. 136, 140; Duffield, 2002). To cite Mark Duffield directly (2001, p. 6): 'there is a distinction between seeing conflict in terms of having causes that lead mechanically to forms of breakdown, as opposed to sites of innovation and reordering resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority'. For example, factional struggles within and between states in sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia, Rwanda, Congo, Uganda), allied with the interests of IFIs can be interpreted as reducing war to a mode of production: a source of accumulation that enables the seizure of the resources of the economy alongside criminalisation and diplomatic, military or humanitarian aid to transform social institutions and political activity (Bayart, 1993, pp. xiii–xiv; see also Reno, 1998; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999). Hence a need to consider different forms and processes of state formation that have unfolded in diverse regions rather than obscuring the multiple historical and contemporary trajectories of state development. This means appreciating that bodies such as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), set up on 1 April 2002 to establish a fourth Somali government in Baidoa, joining the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland in rejecting the authority of the Transitional National Government in Mogadishu, are less an example of state failure than a contestation over social and political organisation. Similarly the conflagration in the Ivory Coast, since 19 September 2002, initially involving the launch of an attack by army rebels on Abidjan and two northern towns, Bouaké and Korhogo, in an attempt to seize power, is less a recent fallen 'domino' in the spread of failed states than an example of the predatory pursuit of wealth and power – a struggle over modes of governance – that has to be related to the specific historical experiences and the cultural and political conditions of sub-Saharan Africa through which political power is disseminated and wealth redistributed (Morton, 2004). This sort of approach might push one to reflect on suggestive historical precedents to struggles in developing countries over **political authority and mechanisms of social organisation that may parallel** earlier periods of state formation elsewhere in the modern world. It might also lead to a more detailed examination of what historical and contemporary social circumstances give rise to state break-ups and alternative modes of social organisation related to periods of social transformation and changes in capitalism; the role played by the coexistence of Western economic penetration and colonial domination; how overlapping structures of kinship might be prone to challenges which weaken specific social relationships; and what the impact of the changing nature of internal and international conflict might be within developing states.

Alt Solvency

**The failed state construct is a starting point for tackling broader notions of capitalism and security, refocus to human security is better**

**Bilgin and Morton ‘2**

Pinar and Adam David, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?" Third World Quarterly Vol. 23 No. 1 pp.55-80, Professor of IR @ Bilkint University, Professor of IR @ University of Wales

One of the ‘sillier academic developments of the Cold War ’, as Barry Buzan has argued , was the construction of security studies and international political economy as ‘separate and even opposed pursuits ’ . 1 3 7 Notwithstanding recent attempts to correct this ‘wrong turn’ in the development of the social scientific division of labour, moving beyond and challenging the historical construction and cold-war annexation of the social sciences has turned out to be a seriously difficult task . 1 3 8 Not least, the re is the problem of overcoming the artificial separation of politics and economics that informs much conventional analysis related to questions of ‘political economy ’ and security underpinning those representations of the post-colonial state criticised above. In contrast, a more historicised consideration of the post- colonial state re casts conceptions o f state –civil society antagonisms in terms of an appreciation of the political economy of security. Our aim has not so much been to generate an alternative conception of ‘failed states ’, but with presenting an alternative to the construction of ‘failed states ’ as political practice. It therefore behoves us to highlight how the ‘state ’ element within the notion of ‘failed states ’ is neglected, sanitised and presented within a benign form of political order. Perhaps, therefore, rather than focus on ‘f ailed state s ’, increased attention should be granted to the ‘ failed universalisation ’ of the ‘imported state ’ within the post-colonial world.1 3 9 By historicising various representations of ‘failed states ’ it might then also be possible to move beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences and to begin to open up critical ways of thinking about politics and security. Primarily the latter involves c o n s i d e r i n g t h e pr o s p e c t s f o r a l t e r n a t iv e d e v e lo p me n t strategies and sociopolitical scenarios linked to wider issues of human security in o r de r to c o n si d e r a l te r n a t iv e f u tu r e s i n wo r l d or d e r. Su c h f ut u r e s r e f e r t o ‘programmes presented for discussion, scenarios developed for clarification and se tt in g d ir e ct i on s f o r c ons tr u c ti ve p oli tic a l ima gi na ti on an d ac t ion ’ . 1 4 0 Th e alternative critical perspective brought to bear on the representation of ‘faile d states ’ in this argument provokes questions about futures by highlighting the serious social science limitations and constraints of cold-war thought and action. An awareness of such structures, still persisting in the present and permeating through alternative institutions and mentalities, is therefore the starting point for thinking about possible futures.

Alt Solvency

**Understanding the contexts of state failure and human security are infinitely preferable to the securitization logic of the 1AC.**

**Bilgin and Morton 2002**

Pinar and Adam David, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?" Third World Quarterly Vol. 23 No. 1 pp.55-80, Professor of IR @ Bilkint University, Professor of IR @ University of Wales

The difference between a Critical Security Studies approach and others that also favour the adoption of a broad security agenda is an insistence that broadenin g se c urity will not suff ice so long a s ou r c onc epti o n of se cur ity c ontinue s to privilege the state, regarding it as the sole legitimate focus for decision making and loyalt y. This is in clear contrast to the uncritical adherents of aforementione d (neo)statist approaches in Security Studies . Signif ic ant ly, a focus on the politica l economy of sec urity within Critica l Security Studies encompasses an appreciation of structures within the globa l political economy that mediate world orde r.95 An understanding and appreciation of actors’ practices of security within civil society is also incorporated which goes beyond conventional tendencies to focus solely on the state ’s capacity to provide securit y.96 Such an alternative approach, therefore, can potentially better appreciate the forces that shape the realms of political economy and securit y constraining and enabling post-colonial states. For merely bringing together the study of political economy and security while remaining firmly committed to statist norms to maintain economic and political stability in the liberal inter - national political economy is not sufficient. Hence the importance of openin g analysis up to the different processes of state formation and historical circum- stances constitutive of various post-colonial states, thereby considering different forms of stat e rather than obscuring diverse trajectories of state formation . The concept of hegemony—ra ther tha n tre ating politic s and economics as somehow external realms in mutual interaction —offers the potential to gras p these different historical social processes and contradictions intrinsic to stat e formation. More specifically, the rich conception of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci opens up questions about how the economic realm sets certain limits conditioning possibilitie s in the first instanc e within processes of stat e formation, while retaining a sense of openness and contingency about subsequen t political developments .9 7 Clearly, one has to be careful in developing this con- ception of hegemony in relation to different cultural conditions to avoid simpl y applying concepts to quite different contexts and social phenomena. After all, ‘ the historic is t appr oac h to socia l scie nce does not envisage a ny gene ra l or universally valid laws which can be explained by the development of appropriat e g ene ra ll y a pplic ab le the or ies ’ .9 8 T he end ea vou r is no t to a ppr oac h diff er e nt historical trajectories of state development through the application of Eurocentri c generalisations but, instead, to insert oneself within alternative historical and contemporary contexts in order to adopt and adapt concepts to changing circum- stances and new conditions, thereby focusing on the historically specific logic of capitalist societies, while tracing similar processes of state formation. This is the pur pose behind a critical theor y that, ‘ is conscious of its own re la tivity but through this consciousness can achieve a broader time perspective and become less relative ’.99 Hence, at least, the possibility emerges to develop an alternativ e representation and understanding of the post-colonial state by drawing on thi s conception of hegemony to rethink issues of human securit y.

Insubordination

**The alternative is to vote negative, repeated acts of insubordination is what topples false constructs like the 'failed state'.
Kartas ‘7**

Moncef Kartas, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva, 2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?"

Interestingly, good governance resembles very much Foucault’s concept of governmentality; this is so, because both concepts reflect the idea of the rationalisation of authority. Governmentality as the management of problems relies heavily on disciplinary techniques. Hence, peace-building practices, which seek to replicate modern legal rational government technologies, can by their own logic of intervention only replicate them by applying them to the national elites and administration or even directly onto local traditional (pre-modern) institutions. Zanotti adapting the concept of disciplinarity to peacekeeping notes: “Institutional disciplinarity concerns reform of the institutions of potentially disorderly state. International organizations, and UN peacekeeping in particular, actively engage in bringing about reforms aimed at transforming pre-modern modalities of government into orderly, predictable, disciplinary and disciplined administrations.” (Zanotti 2006: 152) Yet, her analysis neglects the fact that first, the same government technologies shape the policies and practices of the international organisations and second, the capacity of disciplinary techniques to ‘successfully’ produce docile bodies rests on deeper social power-relations. Foucault has in fact differentiated between three modes and dimensions of power. First, the micro- physics of power, which produces hierarchies through the organisation of sundry social relationships, such as family and work relationships. Those local power relations, which are quite volatile, constitute with their specific rules the condition of possibility of political power and authority (see Foucault 1980: 118– 122). This corresponds to Knight’s (1992) idea that the capacities of formal political institutions rests on the various informal social institutions. And as McHoul and Grace underline “Hegemonic or global forms of power rely in the first instance on those ‘infinitesimal’ practices, composed of their own particular techniques and tactics, which exist in those institutions on the fringes or at the micro-level of society…” (1993: 90) Second, power as domination alludes to highly institutionalised power relations, which are quite stable over time, but not immutable. This comes close to what is understood as power in the most common definition. The third mode of power consists of government technologies “aiming to affect the actions of individuals by working on their conduct – that is, on the ways in which they regulate their own behavior.” (Hindess 1996: 97) It is where the ‘mismatch’ between disciplinary technologies and the micro power-relations constitutive of the local social world occur that the good governance discourse produces its most problematic effects. The following quote from Carothers on the promotion of the rule of law makes the problem of ‘mismatch’ more tangible: “Aid providers know what endpoint they would like to help countries achieve – the Western-style, rule-oriented systems they know from their own countries. Yet, they do not really know how countries that do not have such systems attain them. That is to say they do not know what the process of change consists of and how it might be brought about.” (Carothers 2004 [2003]: 136–7) Third, this imposition of legal-rational structures through legal-rational means not only fails to produce change, but also more critically yields considerable resistance. While resistance can turn into armed violence it can also adopt the kind of everyday resistance famously analysed by Scott. Scott’s analysis of everyday resistance of the poor in Malaysia suggests that effective resistance does not materialise in onstage political declaration or as organised movement. In fact, everyday resistance consists of a quiet and piecemeal process of insubordination, because it aims at self-help and withdrawal rather than institutional confrontation (see Scott 1985: 32). The particularity of everyday resistance resides in its implicit disavowal of public and symbolic goals (see ibid: 33).

Reject Failed States Reps

**Reject their failed state discourse-it's inseparable from its methodological fallacies.**

**Jones ‘8**

Branwen Gruffydd(2008) 'The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of the 'failed state' ideology', Review of International Political Economy, 15: 2, 180 — 205 Lecturer in International Political Economy at the University of London, PhD

The descriptive, ahistorical and atheoretical nature of the category of ‘failed state’ helps in the easy acceptance of this account of the nature and causes of social and political crisis in Somalia. The untheorized no- tion of the state assumed by the ‘failed state’ discourse is abstracted from the historical development of particular forms of state, and isolated from the economy and the social relations which constitute society. This rei- ﬁes the surface appearances of formal political institutions and functions, and falsely assumes the universality of distinct political forms speciﬁc to capitalist society; it also obliterates the historically speciﬁc character of imperial, colonial and neocolonial states. In confronting the challenge of explanatory critique, the very category of ‘failed state’ must be rejected. It is inseparable from underlying method- ological ﬂaws which assume that which has to be explained – the histori- cally speciﬁc form of state–society relations. This is not to contest the exis- tence of profound social, political and economic crises in Africa and other regions, to which the term is so readily applied, but to challenge their char- acterization and, above all, their explanation, in terms of ‘state failure’. This point is illustrated clearly in the case of Somalia’s condition. The general account reproduced via the discourse of ‘state failure’ focuses on questions of individual leadership and pathology, and the inherent tendency towards clan-based division and conﬂict as a deﬁning feature of Somali culture. Be- cause what a state is meant to look like is assumed, the characterization of Somalia’s condition as ‘state failure’ does not actually address the historical speciﬁcity of Somalia’s state–society relations, but focuses instead on the behavior of abhorrent individuals, and aspects of Somali culture which are assumed to be inherent. In order to produce a more adequate understand- ing and explanation of the Somali crisis of the 1990s it is necessary to exam- ine the historical legacy of colonial rule on Somalia’s modern social forma- tion; the speciﬁc character of Somalia’s postcolonial political economy and its structured insertion into the regional and global capitalist system; and the overwhelming signiﬁcance of international intervention in Somalia and the region of the Horn of Africa over the four decades since independence.

A New Term

**The term “state failure” leads to bad scholarship and bad policy, we should abandon the concept in search of a new way to divide categories of analysis to research state failure
Call 8**

Call(Assistant Professor in the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace) **08** (Charles T., The Fallacy of the 'Failed State', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 8, 2008, pp 1491-1507)

The important need to combat terrorism has led to a privileging of the orderproviding capacities of states. As shown above, the failed state concept has fuelled a tendency towards single, technocratie formulas for strengthening states, which emphasise coercive capabilities. Although security is a sine qua non for sustained legitimacy and development, external efforts that privilege coercive capabilities everywhere and anywhere, without regard for context, are likely to bolster abusive, predatory and illegitimate states. Past historie periods where Western powers privileged enhancing the coercive capacities of peripheral countries led to a cycle of serious problems: oppressive governments, serious human rights violations, and instability that came back to haunt those who had originally adopted an expeditious but unsound approach to building state institutions for stabilisation. In the Caribbean in the early part of the 20th century, the USA pursued a strategy of state building that centred on constabulary forces, without sufficient attention to issues of regime, to other state institutions, or to accountability. The result was the rise of constabulary officer Somoza to lead an authoritarian Nicaragua for decades, as well as repressive dictatorships by the Duvaliers in Haiti and by Fulgencio Batista in Cuba.40 A security-centred state-building template is one of the more serious dangers of the failed state concept. The failed state concept has helped identify and emphasise genuine problems. The concept has drawn overdue attention to the importance of state institutions in peace processes, in development effbrts, and in considering sources of transnational insecurity. Humanitarian NGOs, the UN, regional organisations, bilateral donors and Western militaries should all take the state and its institutions more seriously in their endeavours. Yet imprecise concepts make for poor scholarship and bad policy. I have provided a critique of the fallacy of the failed state. The concept's harm is not limited to extreme or isolated examples. The term is inadequate, even misleading, for virtually every country it purports to describe. Just as the State Failure Task Force has done, scholars should abandon the concept of state failure, and put renewed effbrt into devising categories of analysis that will be denotatively and connotatively clear, useful and discriminating.

\*\*\*ANSWERS\*\*\*

AT: Pullout Link Turn \*I-A

Trying to stabilize “failed states” is justification for imposition of Western order on new governments like Iraq and Afghanistan

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

However, this article argues that **there are a number of problems with this imagining of the relationship** between security and development. First, **it overestimates the extent to which the developing world really does export a multitude of threats** to the developed world. Thus, policies underpinned by the logic of security are implicitly legitimised at the expense of solidarism, even in ostensibly radical and solidarist texts. Second, in policy terms **the synthesis of security and solidarism has legitimised a project that aims to significantly extend the sites of both military and regulatory intervention in developing world societies**, at least when compared with Cold War practice. The former is **exemplified by the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan**; the latter in the way aid criteria have gradually expanded from a concern with superpower allegiance, first to incorporate the economic conditionalities of structural adjustment **and now** a range of formal and informal governance conditionalities. For example, **a range of initiatives aimed at introducing better resource governance inside weak and failed states**. Moreover, the solidarist element in this project is constrained by the perceived economic and security interests of the more powerful states and by the unwillingness of externals to abandon the key tenets of neoliberalism both at the local and the global level. At the same time, the extension of external regulation and monitoring has been undermined both by the ability of local actors to obstruct or adapt such projects to their own ends and by the selective application of regulation—not least between the developed and developing worlds. Consequently, whilst **the contemporary merger of security and development seems to promise radical transformation of the conditions of the poor, it is, at best, a vehicle for limited global poor relief combined with regulation and monitoring aimed at preventing the export of disorder. At worst, it is a form of chimeric governance that purports to offers the rich protection from their imagined threats whilst doing little to transform the real threats to the lives and livelihoods of the poor.**

AT: Pullout Link Turn/Neolib Good

The neoliberal state makes concessions to protect its system of structural violence seducing us to make us advocates for it
Agathangelou, Pol Sci at York, ‘8

Agathangelou 2008, (Anna, Professor of Political Science @ York University, Radical History Review <http://www.makezine.enoughenough.org/intimateinvestments.pdf> Waldman)

As the killing of those at the margins of liberal and neoliberal sovereignty continues to be glamorized and fetishized in the name of ‘democracy,’ we are confronted with urgent questions about the ways in which life, death, and desire are being (re)constituted in the current political moment. The intensification of carnage wrought by empire has brought with it a renewed thrust to draw in precisely those who are the most killable into performing the work of murder. As we are seduced into empire’s fold by participating, often with glee and pleasure, in the deaths of those in our own communities as well as those banished to the ‘outsides’ of citizenship and subjectivity, we must ask: How are these seductions produced and naturalized?1 What forms of (non)spectacular violence must be authorized to heed the promises being offered by empire? These are the central problematics this paper engages.2 In 2003, a host of U.S. LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) organizations lauded the Supreme Court’s six to three majority in *Lawrence and Garner v. State of Texas*, a ruling that rendered sodomy laws unconstitutional, calling it “a legal victory so decisive that it would change the entire landscape for the LGBT community.”3 One major LGBT legal advocacy organization stated, “the good feeling we get from watching *Will & Grace* has been transformed into social legitimacy and legal protection that LGBT people can take to the bank.”4 Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the court majority, expressed the unconstitutionality of the 1986 *Bowers v. Hardwick* case by stating, “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the state, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”5 Pregnant with the promise of democratic freedoms and futures severed from histories of colonization and other forms of violence and degradation, much of the mainstream LGBT movement rejoiced at the “decriminalization of gay sexuality” with no mention of the continued forms of conduct that are made criminal, and thus remain subject to statesponsored and state-sanctioned violence in both the public and private spheres. The expansive effort to repeal sodomy laws coincided with, and was bolstered by, a national push on the part of a variety of LGBT organizations to legalize same-sex marriage. Both campaigns were launched under the banner of privacy rights — the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force’s (NGLTF) campaign to repeal sodomy laws was aptly dubbed the Privacy Project. Not coincidentally, such efforts were spearheaded by a class of queer subjects in the leading strata of the neoliberal world order, those who “benefited” most from the increasing dominance of free market capitalism, structural adjustment policies, and the privatization of public space and welfare apparatuses.6 Both campaigns, fought in the name of equality, proved instrumental in consolidating precisely the political and material conditions they purportedly sought to contest. In the case of sodomy laws, mainstream LGBT organizations consisting largely of media strategists, lobbyists, and attorneys — a far cry from earlier incarnations of queer social movements — heralded the “decriminalization of gay sexuality,” all the while leaving unnoted and undisturbed the ongoing criminalization and pathologization of “other sexualities.” Meanwhile, such desires continued to be rendered deviant by the U.S. state. We see this contradiction embodied in a statement from the executive director of NGLTF following the *Lawrence* decision: “In 2003, it’s appalling that states would still argue that there’s nothing wrong with the police kicking down the bedroom doors of a gay or lesbian couple and arresting them for having intimate relations with the person they love.”7 The statement makes clear which doors will and should continue to be kicked down, and which forms of intimate relations remain outside the bounds of state-sanctioned love. This newly accorded privacy (part and parcel of constituting neoliberal “individual liberty”) annexes state repression to a perverse past by embracing a more tolerant future. In the case of gay marriage, the push for state-sanctioned kinship reconsolidates the exclusionary practices of the institution of marriage. This move recodes “good” forms of national kinship (monogamous, consumptive, privatized) while punishing those that fall outside of them, particularly those forms of racialized and classed kinship that continue to be the target of state violence and pathology. Thus both campaigns actively court a limited and precarious equality in exchange for leaving the foundational antagonisms of capitalist liberal democracy unscathed.8 If it is no longer the bedroom of a “gay and lesbian couple” arrested for having “intimate relations with the person they love,” whose doors, then, will continue to get kicked down? And, precisely, which “gay and lesbian couple” is even conceivable in this statement? Eluding the grasp of the looming prison – police apparatus, the newly christened “love” of this imagined “gay and lesbian couple” can only come into relief in contradistinction to those forms of desire and intimacy whose deviance renders them commonsensical property of the state. It is no coincidence, then, that the police are being called up to legislate good and bad love during this political moment. To be sure, the ruling coincides with two decades of the rapid proliferation of an increasingly privatized and corporatized prison apparatus, police state, and militarized regime of repression. During the past three decades of neoliberal (re) consolidation, the number of mostly brown, black, and poor people locked away in the U.S. system alone has increased nearly three hundred – fold.9 As we will argue, it is against this backdrop of, borrowing the phrase from Julia Sudbury, “global lockdown” that the “love” mentioned above becomes imaginable and attainable.10 In this essay, we wish to follow Sudbury in expanding analyses of “global lockdown” to “other spaces of confinement” to account for the affective economies of the diffuse networks of punishment, mass warehousing, and criminalization that come to constitute overlapping carceral landscapes.11 By “affective economies,” we refer to the circulation and mobilization of feelings of desire, pleasure, fear, and repulsion utilized to seduce all of us into the fold of the state — the various ways in which we become invested emotionally, libidinally, and erotically in global capitalism’s mirages of safety and inclusion. We refer to this as a process of seduction to violence that proceeds through false promises of an end to oppression and pain. It is precisely these affective economies that are playing out as gay and lesbian leaders celebrate their own newfound equality only through the naturalization of those who truly belong in the grasp of state captivity, those whose civic redemption from the category of the sodomite or the criminal has not been promised/offered (which one, it might not matter . . .) by the Supreme Court. It is precisely the aforementioned “good feeling” strategically deployed through homonormativization — mobilizations that barely mask the bloody, violent consequences of neoliberal privatization, the mass warehousing and liquidation of mostly brown and black bodies, and of imperial(ist) war — that we wish to locate alongside the pleasure and glee that we were all compelled to perform in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s execution. It is this circulation of desire and relief continually shored up in support of the relentless lockdown and torture of prisoners in both declared and nondeclared sites of global war.

AT: Perm

Can’t do both -- interests and ideals matter, co-option, and the neoliberal ideology of the 1AC

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

Such an agenda certainly contains the promise of radical transformation and a move to sustainable security. However, **the radical promise inherent in this solidarist agenda has been undermined because of three factors**. **First,** **the failure to deliver on promised reforms as solidarism has conflicted with economic interest**—as exemplified in the failure (despite much rhetoric to the contrary) to prioritise developing world needs in the Doha development round.35 **Second, is the co-option or usurpation of solidarism by security**. For example, spending from an enlarged US aid budget has been substantially influenced by the priorities of the war on terror;36 whilst in the Sahel US concern at the way porous borders and informal economies may have been exploited by terror networks has led to the development of a Pan-Sahel Initiative focused on reinforcing borders, and enhancing surveillance. In other words, cutting of networks that have ‘become the economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples’37 has been prioritised rather than dealing with the underlying dynamics driving such networks. **Third, and most crucially, the fact that, in the dominant conception, the neoliberal model remains the pre-eminent vehicle to promote development** (at both the global and local level). The Millennium Project report to the UN Secretary-General for example, incorporates a ‘consumerist teleology’, which frames development in terms of convergence and integration into the world system and which conceives public investment as a vehicle to promote market economics.38 Thus, as Grasyon has noted, to the extent that freedom from want has been incorporated into **the human security agenda it has been ‘configured around neoliberal models of growth, integration and governance** . . . Stressing deregulation, privatisation, free trade and economic growth at the macro-level’.39 As Michael Pugh notes in this issue then, **the post-Washington consensus is less about embedding a global political economy of peace than it is about retaining the essentials of a neoliberal status quo that exacerbates the insecurities of the poor.**

AT: Perm

Politics in peace building removes the right of self assertion by the poor masses

Pugh ‘5

Michael **PUGH** Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford **05** “The Polictical Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2)

But we are still entitled to ask the critical question: who is peacebuilding for, and what purposes does it serve? The means for achieving the good life are constructions that emerge from the discourse and policy frameworks dominated by specific capitalist interests – represented as shared, inevitable, commonsensical or the only available option – when they correspond to the prevailing mode of ownership. Economic wisdom resides with the powerful. As Murphy notes, political inequality leaves many with no control over the major decisions that affect their lives (Murphy, 2005: 18). For Cox, too, “whereas the right of self-assertion is celebrated, in a social and economic context the individual’s capacity to exert control over the systemic factors that determine its implementation is removed. Consequently, just as in one-party, authoritarian regimes, **politics is about depoliticizing people,** by removing the economic determinants of everyday conditions from political control” (Cox, 1992). The millennial revisionism represents a significant shift. But ultimately it may perpetuate asymmetries that maintain the liberal peace, albeit in less orthodox forms. Indeed, the revisionism may intensify the grip of capitalist-dominated financial and trade institutions. The recommendations of the 2004 UN High Level Panel’s report on boosting the UN’s attention to peacebuilding activities includes provision for international financial institutions to be more actively involved in peace processes. However, without transformation of the IFIs, and the liberal agenda itself, subjugation rather than emancipation will continue to be injected into the political economy of peacebuilding.

AT: Perm

**The 'failed state' model applies logic of the west to the rest, it's inapplicable and crushes policy success.**

**Kartas ‘7**

Moncef Kartas, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva, 2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?"

Migdal’s approach to the analysis of state/society relations offers an interesting perspective. By rejecting Weber’s ideal type definition of the state, he seeks to avoid two analytical caveats linked to the good governance discourse. First, the definition’s inherent state/society duality leads to a conception ofauthority as having a specific location, as being in the hands of an agent, an institution, or emanating from a source (see Migdal 2001: 7). This authority in turn allows those in power to mould the society at their will. Therefore, such theories accord no role to those “acted upon, the objects of control,” being the ones who are changed, the passive recipients of others’ rule.”(Migdal 2001: 9) Second, as the authority of the state is uncontested, analysis focuses on the competition for office, for the occupation of the locus of power, or on the decisions-making process in terms of policy outcomes. This is however not singular of comparative politics, but as Bartelson (2001) has noted, the concept of the modern state is foundational to political science itself. The dichotomy between an international and national realm mirrors the fundamental assumption about the state: its uncontested autonomy expressed in the differentiation between the state and society, the public and private, the political and apolitical. As further noted by Bartelson (2001:31, 66), the scientific authority of the field came to be identified with the authority conferred on the idea of the state. This circularity accounts for one of the major heuristic weaknesses of the nation-state, i.e. conceptually political authority is located or emanates from the state. However, while comparative politics may try to explain under what conditions the authority and democratisation process of a particular government is undermined, there is little doubt that the modern state remains the only political organisation to solve problems of political order. This is intrinsic to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s definition of democratisation: “Democratisation, thus, refers to the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control, social tradition, expert judgment, or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g., nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g., state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.).” (1986: 8) Yet, the implementation of policies drops out of the investigation, as well as the struggle surrounding that implementation, and how the struggle in turn affects a) the authority of the state and b) the social order. It follows that failure of the state is not a problem of the state but a disease of those who govern or who are governed, i.e. a pathology of the society that needs treatment, and, thereby, de-legitimises local politics (Hughes and Pupuvac 2005). As Kalyvas has pointed out the complexity and fluidity of civil wars might appear to the superficial observer puzzling and irrational, because under the apparent national fault lines (supra level) there are local (micro level: community, villages, families) conflict dynamics eventually converging with the supra level but, nevertheless, of a particular nature (see Kalyvas2003).

AT: Neoliberalism Good

Neoliberal economics is unsustainable

**Ikerd 6**

John, Professor of Agricultural Economics, The Economics of Hunger: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Food Systems, http://web.missouri.edu/~ikerdj/papers/Eastern%20Oregon-%20Econ%20Hunger.htm

But what does entropy have to do with hunger? Capitalism not only uses up physical energy, it also uses up human energy. The law of entropy applies to social energy as well as physical energy. All human resources – labor, management, innovation, creativity – are products of social relationships. No person can be born or reach healthy maturity without the help of other people who care about them *personally*, including their families, friends, neighbors, and communities. People must be educated, trained, civilized, and socialized before they can become productive members of complex societies. All organizations – including businesses organizations and economies – also depend upon the ability of people to work together for a common purpose, which in turn depend upon the sociability and civility of the society in which they were raised. Capitalism inevitably dissipates, disperses, and disorganizes social energy because it weakens personal relationships. Social capital is the value embodied in the willingness and ability of people to form and maintain positive personal relationships. However, maximum economic efficiency requires that people relate to each other impartially, which means impersonally. People must compete rather than cooperate, if market economies are to work efficiently. When people spend more time and energy working – being “productive” – they have less time and energy to spend on personal relationships within families and communities, and social capital is depleted. When people buy things based on price rather than from people they know and trust, personal relationships within communities suffer from neglect, and social capital is dissipated. Neoclassical capitalism devalues personal relationships and disconnects people and thus dissipates, disperses, and disorganizes social energy. Capitalistic economies are so efficient because they use people to do work but do nothing to restore the social capital needed to sustain positive personal relationships within society. It makes no economic sense for corporations to invest in building relationships within families, communities, or society for the benefit of future generations. It’s always more economically efficient to find new people and new communities to exploit. Capitalistic economies don’t waste energy by investing in society, and they resist all attempts of people, through government, to tax private enterprises to promote societal well-being. That’s why capitalism is so efficient. But, neoclassical capitalism inevitably tends toward social entropy; **that’s why it is not sustainable**.

AT: Short-term Solutions Good/Pragmatism (2NC Must Read)

Short-termism is the enemy of strategic thinking. Policymakers constantly have to face the instability they themselves have caused by short-term solutions to long-term problems. Short-term solutions introduce distorted information and epistemological flaws. Only with a focus shift to the long term ramifications of policy on “failed” states can we solve the root cause of instability.
Bilgin and Morton ‘4

Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4

(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas 'something' needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the **fallacy of 'short-termism'** in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, **short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking**. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating. The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to **face the instability they have caused**. Hence the need for a **comprehensive understanding** of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'. Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). **The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision**. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also **distorts** information. Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental **epistemological** concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very **structural conditions** **shaping the problems of 'failure'** raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

AT: “Our Paradigm is Sound”

Your paradigm is inherently flawed – the world is no longer “underdeveloped” and “developed” and terror can’t be contained to “failed states”
Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

However, **it is not simply that the relationship between underdevelopment and conflict could be, and were, conceived differently in the Cold War**. Indeed, if that were the only objection to the current framing of poverty, the obvious riposte would be to highlight those analyses that understand the ‘new wars’23 as reflective of new material conditions in the contemporary world. For instance, **shifts in the financing of civil conflict in the periphery and/or in the intensity of global interconnectedness that both make it impossible to maintain hermetic (and indeed hermitic) immunity from the chaos of the peripheries**. **However, this very notion of the interconnectedness of threat, of mutual vulnerabilities shared by the zones of peace and the zones of war—indeed, the very difficulty in making the distinction between such zones is itself profoundly difficult to sustain.**

AT: Terror Impacts/“They are threats”

The real threat is our imperialist justifications – terror is not a real threat compared to hunger. Even if they win it’s a bad threat, most terror is domestic anyway

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

Second, to **the extent that instability is transmitted at all, it is in a significantly diluted form. Thus, the majority of terrorist events, the majority of AIDS victims and the majority of global environmental catastrophes happen in the developing world.** This is not to deny that events such as **9/11 and its counterpart** in Spain were horrific—but they **did not represent a threat to the sustainability of economy and society** in either Spain or the US, they did not represent a threat, in any meaningful sense to a way of life. Moreover, on the scale of global threats**, the 3,000 who died in the attack on the World Trade Center are dwarfed by the 10 million who die of hunger** and hunger-related causes each year.26 Horrific as it was, 9/11 did not impact on the fact that average life expectancy in the US (77 years) remains over double that of a citizen of Sierra Leone (34.3 years) (see http://hdr. undp.org/statistics/data/). **The developed and the developing world do not so much inhabit a global world of interconnected threats and vulnerabilities as a world of profoundly asymmetric threats and vulnerabilities**, one in which the poor in the developing world experiences severe threats and one in which the developed world is more secure, more wealthy and more healthy than ever. Indeed, **to the extent that developed world citizens experience threats, these are overwhelmingly domestic and the products of modernity and consumerism not fundamentalism and nihilism**. Thus, over five times as many US citizens (15,980) were murdered by their fellow citizens in 2001 as died at the hands of terrorists on 9/11,27 whilst some 43,000 Americans die in car accidents every year28 and 128,000 people die from cancer in England each year.29 Third, **terrorism and extremism is by no means a unique export of the developing world**—Fascism and Communism were both modernist projects; the Baader-Meinhoff, the Red Brigade, the IRA, ETA and the Una bomber have all been creations of the developed world. Moreover, **to the extent that Islamic terror does represent a threat, it is not one that is uniquely located in the weak and failed states**. Indeed, **if there is such a thing as a typical terrorist, then the evidence suggests they are more likely to be drawn from the middle classes of middle-income countries**.30 However, the reality is that terrorism can be just as much a problem of development and state capacity as one of underdevelopment— the ability to utilise flight training schools, to launder money electronically, to play the global stock market and to communicate via mobile and internet.

AT: “We help them”

1. That’s new link – global solidarism is armed by neoliberal intervention

Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

This article examines the contemporary form in which **security and development have been merged** and the way this has shaped reform initiatives aimed at eliminating those aspects of both local and global political economies deemed to promote violence and state collapse in the developing world. It will be argued that **the contemporary merger of security and development has been marked by a dual imagining of the relationship between underdevelopment and security**. First, **there has been a reorientation away from a Cold War understanding** in which the developing world was primarily understood as the object of security competition, **towards one in which it is represented as the source of multiple security threats to the developed world, with terrorism at the apex**. Second, **the broadening of the concept of security has contributed to a focus on the threats to human security that underdevelopment poses to the poor** in the developing world. Of course, the relative weight accorded to these two framings varies depending on the perspective of the observer—realists, for instance are likely to place more emphasis on the former. Nevertheless, one of the defining features of the mainstream academic and policy literature is the combination of these two framings in the notion of mutual vulnerability—the idea that the various depredations wrought on the poor in the developing world also produce negative security implications for the rich. Consequently, **it is deemed possible to envisage a harmonious synthesis between policies underpinned by the logic of security for the developed world and policies underpinned by solidarism with the poor.**

2. Your authors rely on false assumptions – neoliberalism exacerbates poverty and divisions
Cooper ‘6

(Neil, IR and Peace Studies @ Univ of Bradford, 2006 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3; ₦)

Not only is this problematic in principle but, as Amy Chua has demonstrated, **the combination of democracy and free markets is often a virulent one that can serve to embed the wealth and power of minority groups and exacerbate economic division**.53 Similarly, **the evidence that deregulating/re-regulating to formally integrate local economies into global markets produces benefits** for growth and for the poor **is dubious**. Growth may be a function of more specific factors and growth under the **neoliberal model risks exacerbating conditions for the poor** who benefit less from any growth gains that may occur.54 Indeed, it is more convincing, to suggest that integration follows growth, which follows protection.55

AT: “We don’t say ‘failed/rogue states’”

The affirmative still deals in assumptions about “stateness” that define states by their deviations from norms. These Cold War assumptions reinforce assumptions, inhibit reflections, and construct coercive ideologies

Bilgin and Morton ‘4

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(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience//DN)

Yet, the phenomenon of state 'failure' **defies generalisation**. One brash rendering of the 'failed states' approach gauges degrees of 'stateness' along a continuum starting with those states that meet classical Weberian criteria of statehood and ending with those that meet none of these criteria of 'successful' statehood (Gros, 1996). In common with attempts elsewhere (Carment, 2003), the goal is to assess states in order to assist in 'calibrating' the conditions for successful intervention. As a result, **a taxonomy** of 'failed states' has been developed by Gros (1996) ranging from so-called 'anarchic states' (Somalia, Liberia), to 'phantom' or 'mirage states' (Zaïre/Democratic Republic of Congo), to 'anaemic states' (Haiti), to 'captured states' (Rwanda) or 'aborted states' (Angola, Mozambique). Paraphrasing Mark Duffield (2001, p. 13), this view of conflict zones is akin to Victorian butterfly collectors constructing lists and typologies of the different species identified. The problem is that the **arbitrary and discriminatory nature** of such taxonomy is barely recognised. Yet precisely such arbitrariness **characterises the diagnoses of state failure within Western foreign policymaking**. This, in turn, has implications for practices of intervention (Duffield, 2002; Ottaway, 2002). Furthermore, as Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause (2002b, pp. 753–755) have argued, prevailing understandings of 'state failure' rest on assumptions about ' "stateness" against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed'. The point being that presenting the experience of developing states as **'deviations' from the norm** does not only **reinforce** commonly held **assumptions** about 'ideal' statehood but also **inhibits reflection** on the binary opposition of 'failed' versus 'successful' states. This approach is symptomatic of the prevalence of Cold War discourses that revolve around such binary oppositions (e.g. Jackson, 1990). Although preventing state failure is presented as a primary concern in tackling the problem of insecurity in the developing world, this is still largely shaped by the persistence of Cold War discourses. As Jack Straw has admitted, in the ostensibly post-Cold War era, 'the East and West no longer needed to maintain extensive spheres of influence through financial and other forms of assistance to states whose support they wanted. So the bargain between the major powers and their client states unravelled'.15 The result, in his view, is again the perfusion of warlords, criminals, drug barons or terrorists that fill the vacuum within failed states and hence, despite the controversy it may court, there is 'no doubt' that the domino theory applies to the 'chaos' of failed states.16

AT: Framework

**Policy framing divorces us from our responsibility for the devastation of nations, the state centricity of their framework ignores human elements.**

**Wilde 2003**

Ralph, "The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the 'Failed States' Concept" ILSA Journal of Comparative & International Law, Lecturer in Law University College London

The skewed notion of responsibility arguably suggested by the failed state idea is not only misconceived; it also leads to policy prescriptions that, by  [\*427]  themselves, may ignore the structural causes of the problems they seek to address. The use of international territorial administration to respond to situations of infrastructural collapse is a case in point. Necessarily, international territorial administration is concerned exclusively with the local causes of this situation, seeking, for example, to improve local capacities for governance. Clearly, it has no remit with respect to, for example, the foreign states, international financial institutions and multinational corporations that will play as important a role in shaping the future of the territory's economy as local people and their leaders. I am not suggesting that international territorial administration should somehow be able to perform that second role. My point is that as a policy device, it is necessarily limited to addressing the local causes of whatever problem it is concerned with. Considering the remarkably intrusive nature of this policy device, there is no comparable device that intervenes within other states and international institutions, to try to prevent, as international territorial administration does on the national level, these states and institutions from making decisions that contribute to the factors that hamper a recovery from governmental collapse, or precipitate such a collapse in the first place. So when Helman and Ratner discuss the "saving" of failed states, their prescription - foreign administration - is necessarily limited to the indigenous governmental structure. [9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=e065419ac49ba991083c12ab866ce44c&searchType=&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=4b2fcb5e54cf4b76dd92f8e6548d6df4&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all#n9) They do not concern themselves with proposing other, similarly intrusive mechanisms with respect to, say, rich countries and multinational corporations. Necessarily, the proscription is reactive, in that it is concerned with responding to state collapse when it has happened, thereby focusing exclusively on indigenous factors, rather than seeking to prevent it in the first place, which would require a focus on both indigenous and exogenous factors.The result is a somewhat na ve and simplistic proposal that fits well with the narrow notion of responsibility of the "failed state" paradigm. So when Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst state that the key question for the international community is what are the responsibilities of states, the United Nations (or regional IGOs), and other actors when states fail, the responsibilities in question concern remedial measures of intervention "post-failure" in the territory concerned, not prophylactic measures concerning the behavior of these actors that might lead to state collapse in the first place. [10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=e065419ac49ba991083c12ab866ce44c&searchType=&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=4b2fcb5e54cf4b76dd92f8e6548d6df4&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all#n10) Moreover, the "responsibilities" are conceived in terms suggestive of the charity of innocent bystanders, not the liability of those who are partially complicit. The sub-title to Karns and Mingst's question about the international community's  [\*428]  responsibilities when states fail is: [h]ow should choices be made as to where to direct scarce resources? [11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=e065419ac49ba991083c12ab866ce44c&searchType=&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=4b2fcb5e54cf4b76dd92f8e6548d6df4&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all#n11)The asymmetrical conception of responsibility of the failed state concept, then, is reflected in and supported by the regime of international policy institutions. One might venture that this asymmetry is, of course, no accident. One might ask who uses the language of "failed states" and what their interests are in doing so. The "failed states" concept originated in Western scholarship, and has been utilized in Western policy discourse. Examining this language may be helpful, therefore, in understanding Western ideas of a "failed" other and a "successful" self. Just as Edward Said studied "Orientalism" inter alia as a way of understanding how Western culture conceives itself through an alienated, oriental "other," the failed state concept may be illuminating insofar as our understandings of those who use it are concerned. [12](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=e065419ac49ba991083c12ab866ce44c&searchType=&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=4b2fcb5e54cf4b76dd92f8e6548d6df4&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all#n12) As a basis for policy, however, it may be limited, precisely because it reflects the interests of those who use it, and these interests may conflict with the interests of those in relation to whom it is used. Indeed, exclusively locally-based connotations of responsibility exculpate Western states and multinationals, and the international financial institutions they control, in terms of whatever actions these actors may have conducted that contributed to the so-called "failure" by the state concerned. Similarly, these actors do not face the prospect of intrusive policy institutions, like international territorial administration, that seek to prevent whatever policies they may prosecute that lead to state collapse.We have, therefore, a suggestion of responsibility, and an institution for addressing this responsibility, that only takes in part of the picture. Can this not be supported, however, as the best that can be hoped for in an unequal world? Was Helman and Ratner's limited focus an attempt to address legitimate concerns about state collapse, while staying within the bounds of what was realistic in terms of the proscription put forward? In the first place, on pragmatic grounds it may have little effect. The work done on the ground with local people may be undermined by the absence of comparative processes operating in those other arenas that are equally determinative of the policies concerned. Even if this were not the case, however, there is a further problem.The failed states concept is not only about emphasizing a certain area of responsibility. It can also be seen as repudiating the notion that responsibility can reside elsewhere as well. The notion of the failed state, then, and its associated policy institutions like international territorial administration, may reflect and constitute not good first steps, but rather the impediments that exist to broader notions of responsibility and mechanisms for implementing that  [\*429]  responsibility. The failed state concept not only reflects our unequal world, but buttresses that inequality. When international territorial administration is used in circumstances of state collapse, it may be serving merely to distract attention away from the structural, exogenous factors that both contributed to the collapse and will mediate the future economic development of the territory.

Discourse Shapes Reality/Perm Answer/No Solvency

**State failure is the new communism, a pretext for intervention. As a discursive construct it cannot be used for decolonization because of its imperialist roots.**

**Jones ‘8**

Branwen Gruffydd(2008) 'The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of the 'failed state' ideology', Review of International Political Economy, 15: 2, 180 — 205 Lecturer in International Political Economy at the University of London, PhD

While the superﬁcial facts of Somalia’s current crisis are captured by the term ‘failed state’, the accompanying discourse lacks explanatory power. The forces which led to the disintegration of Somali society into intractable violent conﬂict during the 1990s, after the ﬁnal overthrow of Barre’s regime, are rooted in the colonial and postcolonial contradictions of the local and regional political economy, which were heavily militarized by international intervention governed by geo-strategic logics. However, the signiﬁcance of the ‘failed state’ discourse lies not simply in its lack of explanatory power. This discourse, in persistently mis-characterizing social conditions and mis-identifying their causes, serves to legitimize and reproduce the very imperial qualities of international order which lie at the heart of so- called ‘state failure’. It remains to highlight this ideological character of the ‘failed states’ discourse and its relationship to imperialism. A recur- ring feature of imperialism in the global development of capitalism has been intervention in non-European societies, with the objective of secur- ing or establishing social orders, conditions and institutional arrangements beneﬁcial for imperial commerce and economic expansion (Anghie, 2005). Forms and techniques of imperial intervention have varied through time and in different regions. Two particular aspects of these general impera- tives of imperial intervention are especially signiﬁcant with regard to the *discourse* of ‘failed states’ and the *production* of social and political crises. First, all forms of imperial intervention have to be legitimized. A persis- tent element in the ideological legitimation of imperial intervention is the identiﬁcation of some lack or inferiority on the basis of which different so- cieties and states can be distinguished, both from the imperial powers and among each other. In the nineteenth century formal colonial occupation was legitimized by distinguishing between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ states (Anghie, 1999). This discourse was further reﬁned in order to distin- guish varying capacities for self-rule under the trusteeship system of the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations (Grovogui, 1996). During the Cold War the ‘evil’ of communism became the prism through which to categorize friends and enemies. In the post-Cold War era of ‘War on Terror- ism’ the discourse of ‘state failure’ with its hierarchy of categories – ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’ – legitimizes intervention by identifying lack, inferiority and incapacity. Because of the ideological function of these changing discursive regimes, there is necessarily only a warped or wholly false relationship between the logics of the discourse and the realities to which they refer. The social ten- sions and conﬂicts within societies of the Third World during the twentieth century, which gave rise to attempts to bring about changes to the prevail- ing social conditions and orders, in most cases had little to do with ‘Soviet expansionism’. While the Soviet Union did provide support to a number of left-wing governments and movements under threat, the movements were largely the product of ‘internal’ contradictions. The terms of discursive dis- tinction reﬂect the imperatives of imperial power rather than actual social conditions. This is perhaps clearer in the case of nineteenth century colonial ideology: few today would endorse the reality of a hierarchy between more or less civilized peoples. A critical understanding of the discourse about ‘uncivilized’ peoples cannot be based, therefore, on comparative inquiry into the actual characteristics of different societies, but must focus on the logics of imperial power. Similarly, an understanding of the discourse of ‘state failure’ cannot proceed on the basis of trying to distinguish different modalities of state failure. Just as with the ideology of ‘civilized’ states, the entire basis of the discourse must be seen for what it is – an imperial ide- ology – and therefore rejected as a useful component of social inquiry. The ‘failed state’ discourse can only be the object of critical inquiry; it cannot offer tools for inquiry.

\*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

Perm Idea

Springboard perm: Use the plan as a means of starting the alt. Withdrawing to get out and rethinking intervention solves best.

Perm NB

Perm: Do both -- recognizing that our representations are imperfect opens us the possibility of an ethical relationship to the Other

Colebrook 2k ( Professor in the Department of English Literature at the University of Edinburgh, "Questioning Representation")

As I've already suggested, a strain of nostalgia and utopianism runs through both forms of anti-representationalism: both the desire to return to a world that is lived as present, rather than subjectively re-presented, and the desire to overcome all commitments to presence in the celebration of a [End Page 59] differential, non-autonomous and post-human writing. If the concept of representation generates the consistent incoherence of a real that is *then* represented and a subject who *then* represents, we have to ask ourselves whether we *can* cleanse thought of the risky vocabulary of representation, whether we can return to the lived immediacy of pre-modern pre-subjective mutual recognition, or whether we can paste over our Cartesian separation and think a world that is not written by us but that writes itself. Is the representational antinomy or paradox an accident and is it curable? We might consider post-Kantian anti-representationalism as an increasing anti-subjectivism. Talk of schemes, representations, constructions, and paradigms does generate notions of what these schemes are schemes *of.* To talk of representation as a construction, schematization or structuration also implies that there is one *who* constructs, or that there is (to use Nietzsche's phrase) a doer behind the deed (Nietzsche 1967, 45). Representation presents us with what Michael Dummett refers to as the danger of falling back into psychologism (1993, 129). How possible is it to overcome these illusions and to remain within representation without appealing to *what is,* or, more important, without demanding autonomy? Perhaps representation in both its epistemological and ethical/political senses is valuable precisely for the contradictions and tensions it presents for thought. Consider, to begin with, knowledge as representation and the possibility that we might no longer trouble ourselves with an ultimate foundation for our representations, and this because any attempt to do so would bring us up against our own representational limit. In *Realism with a Human Face,* Hilary Putnam distinguishes between two broad readings of Wittgenstein's notion that the limits of my language are the limits of my world. The first response to such a predicament would be to rule out as nonsensical any attempt to think outside my world. The second response, favored by Putnam, would be that this recognition brings us up against the very notion that my world is *my world* (Putnam 1990, 28)*.* While we have no appeal or foundation that lies outside representation, we sustain a philosophical question in the face of this inability. We might say, then, that rather than be ruled out of court as a nonsensical illusion, representation functions as a useful antinomy. The idea that our world is always a represented world renders us both responsible for that world, at the same time as we recognize our separation or non-coincidence with the world. And this might be how we can retrieve a notion of autonomy through representation in the second, ethical, sense. As I have already suggested, autonomy need not be defined as the feature of pre-social or pre-linguistic [End Page 60] moral individuals. Rather, to take an act of speech as autonomous is to see it as not grounded in a pre-given, law, nature or being. Thus the "subject" on this account would not be a substantive entity that authors its own meaning fully, but would be effected through acts of representation. Why save a notion of subjective autonomy? Think of the converse situation: a world of writing effects, disowned speech acts, performances without performers or moves in a game without players. Such a world imagines that it is possible to have a form of speech that does not carve out a point of view, that is not located in a way of being, that presents no resistance to perpetual coming and self-invention. It is a world in which the representational illusion is disavowed, a world in which speech takes place without the reifying error that I imagine myself as one *who speaks.* The idea that there *is* a writing, speaking or language that represents and that can't be owned by subjects does, quite sensibly, challenge the idea that what we say is a straightforward representation of some pre-linguistic meaning or ownness. But what such an idea of a radically anonymous writing in general precludes is the autonomy effects generated through processes of representation. Just as cultural studies--we are told--dreams of a world in which truth claims, foundations and representational claims are no longer made, and just as Richard Rorty imagines a world of ironists who accept their language games as nothing more than games and themselves as nothing more than players (Rorty 1989, 80), so the attempt to think beyond autonomy imagines a world in which what I say is not taken as issuing from the intention of some reified, congealed and illusory notion of man. But we might think of autonomy alongside the antinomy of representation. To take demands as autonomous is to recognize them as both ungrounded, as well as being demands for a certain grounding. If what I say makes a claim for autonomy, then it is both owned as what *I say* (and thereby institutes me as a subject), at the same time as the claim for *autonomy* separates this saying from any pre-given subject. To be autonomous, a claim would have to be more than a determined expression *of a subject*; it would have to have its own positive, singular and effective force. As Kant argued, true autonomy could not be thought of as issuing from a natural ground; but once we think an autonomous law this generates the regulative idea (but not knowledge) of a subject from whom this law has issued.

Consider this antinomy in terms of some of the typical approaches to representation in popular culture--in particular, in popular feminism. It is widely asserted that women are subordinated to alien domains of representation. Eating disorders are explained by

DA to alt: War Inevitable

Threats must be confronted—refusal to engage emboldens aggression, resulting in conflict

Thayer 6

(Bradley, Professor of Security Studies at Missouri State, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy,” Nov/Dec, 32-7)

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, **history shows that threats must be confronted**. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.

Rorty/Pragmatism DA to the alt

The Kritik’s attempts at philosophy over politics and “Theorizing” our actions create a hallucinogenic and spectatorial left.

Richard Rorty, Professor of Philosophy @Stanford, ’98, *Achieving our Country*

I said earlier that we now have, among many American students and teachers, a spectatorial, disgusted, mocking Left rather than a left which dreams of achieving our country. This is not the only left we have, but it is the most prominent and vocal one. Members of this left find America unforgiveable,, as Baldwin did, and also unachievable, as he did not. This leads them to step back from their country and, as they say, “theorize” it. It leads them to do what Henry Adams did: to give culture politics preference over real politics, and to again be made to serve social justice. It leads them to prefer knowledge to hope. I see this preference as a turn away from secularism and pragmatism – as an attempt to do precisely what Dewey and Whitman thought should not be done: namely, to see the American adventure within a fixed frame of reference, a frame supplied by theory. Paradoxically, the leftists who are most concerned not to “totalize”, and who insist that everything be seen as the play of discursive differences rather than in the old metaphysics-of-presence way, are the most eager to theorize, to become spectators rather than agents, but that is helping yourself with one hand to do what you push away with the other. The further you get from Greek metaphysics, Dewey urged, the less anxious you should be to find a frame within which to fit an ongoing historical process.

That leads to the rise of a totalitarian new right.

Richard **Rorty**, Professor of Philosophy @ Stanford, **’98**, *Achieving our Country*

At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for – someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid blond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel “It Can’t Happen Here” may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped our, Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words “nigger” and “kike” will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unacceptable to its students will come flooding back. All the resentment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super-rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to prvoke military adventures which will generate short term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twentieth century, no longer have a left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved.

Alt Fails/Turn \*\*

**Alt Fails and Turn – The alt is an impossible chimera –multiple layers of interference in the economies and the political life makes change impossible, maybe helping the tyrants and warlords continue to govern successfully
Call 10**

**Call** (Assistant Professor in the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace) **10** (Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives, European Journal of

International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

Nevertheless, the implication that the US, the West, or its affiliated international organizations may stop their **multiple layers of interference** in the economies and political life of less powerful countries is a chimera. Self-sacrifice will not trump self-interest in motivating interstate relations. No social movement to pack up norms of human rights and humanitarianism and return them quietly to the box of sovereignty will prevail under present-day globalization. Moreover, it is not clear that the peoples of poor, peripheral countries want to be left alone. The citizen-subjects of repressive, abusive, exclusionary, racist governments today are aware of the possibility of external support for their causes. They strategize and organize to gain that support to defeat tyranny, physical insecurity, misery, and human rights abuses. Of course tyrants, warlords, and abusers also work to gain that support, often **more effectively**. The prescription to step away and withdraw from international engagement is just as likely to benefit these **victimizers rather than their victims or their political opponents.** Rather than abandon international engagement with states whose peoples are suffering from bad governance or externally inspired warfare, external actors require smarter approaches through more refined analytic frameworks and more contextualized responses. Here I argue that less universal concepts are necessary to adequately approach the panorama of societies and states in the contemporary world. After discussing recent trends toward universalized concepts and analytic frameworks, I discuss alternative concepts based on familiar ‘gaps’ of capacity, security, and legitimacy. I then analyze the state-building endeavor using this framework, arguing that analysis should focus on the strategic balancing of efforts to address divergent problems of weak, war-torn, and illegitimate states.

Alt Fails

**Failure to involve causes one party rule and dictatorship**

**Call 10**

**Call** (Assistant Professor in the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace) **10** (Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives, European Journal of

International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

After electoral processes, international actors tend to boost capacity-building initiatives and celebrate the legitimacy of the new regime. Yet precisely because of their newfound internal and external support, new governments often develop a legitimacy gap by governing without regard for (and often against the interests of) groups that opposed them. Post-conflict elected governments ranging from Hun Sen’s Cambodia to Charles Taylor’s Liberia to Alkatiri’s East Timor governed in ways that undermined their legitimacy. In the case of East Timor, this claim had little to do with the social divides of the prior war. Unfortunately, once a ‘founding election’ has occurred, the norms of sovereignty and of democracy themselves mitigate against excessive interference by foreign powers or donors (O’Donnell et al., 1986). Once elected, new presidents can claim the mantle of legitimacy and resist external leverage toward deeper democratic practice. A number of post-conflict regimes — Haiti, Uganda, Cambodia, Rwanda, South Africa — have moved toward de facto one-party rule.

Because international actors must show due deference to the outcome of internationally ratified elections, the tools for shaping the legitimacy gap generally involve diplomacy and leverage through aid and other incentives. The logic, however, remains primarily one of supporting countervailing weights to exclusionary and authoritarian tendencies. Many countervailing forces lie outside the state. ‘Democracy promotion’ programs include aid to civil society organizations, support for free media, support for opposition parties seeking greater contestation and openness, and support for stronger checks on the executive branch (reallocated powers to legislatures or judiciaries, for instance). At the extreme, legitimation initiatives extend to economic sanctions, embargoes, and armed intervention.

Alt Fails

**Failure to involve international troops causes warlords to be recruited into the government**

**Call 10**

**Call** (Assistant Professor in the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace) **10** (Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives, European Journal of

International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

More recent examples of tensions between the security and legitimacy gaps abound. In Afghanistan, for instance, the US-led Coalition forces chose not to deploy international troops to provide security outside of Kabul immediately after the Taliban government fell in late 2001. The resultant security gap constrained the international ability to help fill a legitimacy gap. Afghan elites and international officials negotiating a victors’ accord in Bonn had little choice but to incorporate the country’s **most influential warlords into senior posts** in a transitional government. Without including these warlords in important state positions, their armies would have turned on the transitional government much like the factional warfare that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1980 (Rubin, 2002). That decision to preserve security undermined the legitimacy of the internationally supported participatory councils (the emergency loya jirga and the constitutional loya jirga) and ultimately of the Karzai administration (International Crisis Group, 2003).

Perm

**Plan is a middle ground, breaking from the one-dimensional analytic framework that you kritik, listening to conditions on the ground instead of Western Leaders**

**Call** (Assistant Professor in the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace) **10** (Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives, European Journal of

International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

Rather than recognizing state fragility and reacting in a formulaic manner, the key challenge for analysis and action is how to best balance competing interests with the conditions on the ground to fill the right gaps. Of course, national populations and their representatives should be the protagonists in deliberations about the most sustainable institutions and strategies to address security, legitimacy, and capacity gaps. Yet too often international actors are in unique positions of determining **which actors will be at the table,** and whose voices will prevail. Furthermore, powerful Western states tend to see ‘failing’ or ‘fragile’ states through the lens of their interests. They treat strategically important ‘fragile states’ different from those that neither possess important natural resources nor pose a serious threat like mass destruction. Thus when dealing with opponents like North Korea or Iran, powerful Western states will tend to privilege their legitimacy gaps over their capacity or security gaps. Conversely, when addressing allied countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia, the West will tend to privilege assisting a state with its capacity gap over acknowledging any need to mediate with internal enemies (the security gap) or to confront internal legitimacy shortfalls. Recognizing these tendencies can help identify flawed policies and anticipate their consequences. Sound judgment in approaching weak, war-torn, or autocratic states is essential. Good policy requires knowing how and when to balance the need to reassure former enemies against the need for improved capacity, the need to foster legitimate rule with short-term security concerns or long-term capacity requirements. At a minimum, I hope to dislodge policy from a **one-dimensional and overaggregated analytic framework**. At a maximum, balancing the imperatives of responding to these three gaps may be the crux of formulating policies that can meet short-term and long-term objectives.

Capacity Gap = Not giving enough resources for the population

Legitimacy Gap = Not spreading power equally (poor are pwned)

Security Gap = Not giving enough security

(Combine with Call)

Perm

The function of the plan is more important than our representations-actions speak louder than words. We can edit our discourse.

Walt ‘9

Walt 2009 Stephen M. "Actions Speak Louder than Words" IR Prof @ Harvard

The key point to bear in mind is that there are real limits to America's ability to improve its global image simply by improved "messaging," "spin," or even by electing a black President. And there's an important lesson there for Obama, whose rise to power was elevated in good part by his remarkable communications skills. The lesson is that an eloquent, learned, and well-delivered speech-like the one he gave in Cairo--is just a first step, and the effects wear off quickly. To bring about genuine change, lofty rhetoric needs to be accompanied by policies that will actually address the legitimate concerns and grievances of his listeners.  You know the old line: talk is cheap. And here's another old saw: actions speak louder than words.

In the end, what will matter to people around the world is what the United States actually does with its vast power at its disposal. If it is seen as both competent and committed to morally defensible aims and broadly benevolent purposes, it is likely to be viewed as a positive force by most people (though the sheer magnitude of U.S. power will still make many nervous, and there will always be some who cannot be won over). If it is seen as bumbling, venal, cruel, or deeply hypocritical, however, then no amount of clever packaging is going to fool the world for long.

Turn: Failed State Discourse Good

Turn: Failed state rhetoric imposes a limiting function on the military-vilifies interventionism.

Kaufmann Greg, former USAF Colonel, 2008 "Stability Operations and State Building: Continuities and Contingencies" http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=879

 Malinowski argued that there were six minimal requirements for an institution: charters, personnel, norms, material apparatus, activities and function(s) (see Figure 1.). Charters provide the socio-cultural and moral legitimacy for an institution (i.e., the social and cultural warrants). The personnel and norms of a chartered institution define what is now referred to as the organizational culture of the institution.76 The material apparatus (artifacts) and the activities (observed actions), the informal culture of organizations, contain the lived and living reality of their operation.77 Finally, we have the function of the chartered institution which is, to use Malinowski’s words, .” . . the integral result of organized activities.”78 In the 21st century, we rarely speak in the terms used between World Wars I and II (e.g., of direct and indirect rule). Rather, we tend to speak of failing or failed states, and use a political rhetoric, at the general policy level, that is more often couched in terms of human rights, self-determination, and humanitarian concerns.79 National interest concerns, such as access to and control over natural resources, basing rights, trade access, etc., are often used in the current rhetoric with highly negative connotations, and even self-defense arguments are questioned.80 This rhetorical shift has had a major impact on mission warrants (see Section II) which are no longer in terms of direct or indirect rule but, frequently, in terms of temporary “co-rule” or “crisis intervention”; the analogy is no longer to “parents” but to “midwives” and “social workers.”81 This shift, in turn, has produced significant limitations in both time and potential actions on what social and cultural engineering can take place.

Turn: West is Best

Turn: Democratic institution building gives the greatest freedom.
Warraq ‘8

Warraq 2008 Ibn "Why the West is Best" Author of "Defending the West: Critiquing Edward Said's Orientalism"

Moreover, other parts of the world recognize Western superiority. When other societies such as South Korea and Japan have adopted Western political principles, their citizens have flourished. It is to the West, not to Saudi Arabia or Iran, that millions of refugees from theocratic or other totalitarian regimes flee, seeking tolerance and political freedom. Nor would any Western politician be able to get away with the anti-Semitic remarks that former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad made in 2003. Our excusing Mahathir’s diatribe indicates not only a double standard but also a tacit acknowledgment that we apply higher ethical standards to Western leaders.

A culture that gave the world the novel; the music of Mozart, Beethoven, and Schubert; and the paintings of Michelangelo, da Vinci, and Rembrandt does not need lessons from societies whose idea of heaven, peopled with female virgins, resembles a cosmic brothel. Nor does the West need lectures on the superior virtue of societies in which women are kept in subjection under sharia, endure genital mutilation, are stoned to death for alleged adultery, and are married off against their will at the age of nine; societies that deny the rights of supposedly lower castes; societies that execute homosexuals and apostates. The West has no use for sanctimonious homilies from societies that cannot provide clean drinking water or sewage systems, that make no provisions for the handicapped, and that leave 40 to 50 percent of their citizens illiterate.

As Ayatollah Khomeini once famously said, there are no jokes in Islam. The West is able to look at its foibles and laugh, to make fun of its fundamental principles: but there is no equivalent as yet to Monty Python’s *Life of Brian* in Islam. Can we look forward, someday, to a *Life of Mo*? Probably not—one more small sign that Western values remain the best, and perhaps the only, means for all people, no matter of what race or creed, to reach their full potential and live in freedom.

Turn: Democracy (1/2)

Turn: US needs to shore up democracy in failed states
Diamond ‘8

Diamond 2008 Larry "Doing Democracy Promotion Right" Newsweek http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/how-to-save-democracy.html

Thanks to bad governance and popular disaffection, democracy has lost ground. Since the start of the democratic wave, 24 states have reverted to authoritarian rule. Two thirds of these reversals have occurred in the past nine years—and included some big and important states such as Russia, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Thailand and (if one takes seriously the definition of democracy) Nigeria and the Philippines as well. Pakistan and Thailand have recently returned to rule by elected civilians, and Bangladesh is about to do so, but ongoing crises keep public confidence low. Democracy is also threatened in Bolivia and Ecuador, which confront rising levels of political polarization. And other strategically important democracies once thought to be doing well—Turkey, South Africa and Ukraine—face serious strains.

This isn't to say there haven't been a few heartening successes in recent years. Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has become a robust democracy nearly a decade after its turbulent transition from authoritarian rule. Brazil, under the left-leaning Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has also strengthened its democratic institutions while maintaining fiscal discipline and a market orientation and reducing poverty. In Africa, Ghana has maintained a quite liberal democracy while generating significant economic growth, and several smaller African countries have moved in this direction.

But the combination of tough economic times, diminished U.S. power and the renewed energy of major authoritarian states will pose a stiff challenge to some 60 insecure democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet bloc. If they don't strengthen their political institutions, reduce corruption and figure out how to govern more effectively, many of these democracies could fail in the coming years. Part of the tragedy is that Washington has made things worse, not better. The Bush administration was right that spreading democracy would advance the U.S. national interest—that truly democratic states would be more responsible, peaceful and law-abiding and so become better contributors to international security. But the administration's unilateral and self-righteous approach led it to overestimate U.S. power and rush the dynamics of change, while exposing itself to charges of hypocrisy with its use of torture and the abuse of due process in the war on terror. Instead of advancing freedom and democracy in the Middle East, 2005 and 2006 witnessed a series of embarrassing shocks: Hamas winning in the Palestinian territories and Islamist parties winning in Iraq; Hizbullah surging in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood surging in Egypt. After a brief moment of optimism, the United States backed away and Middle Eastern democrats grew embittered.

The new American administration will have to fashion a fresh approach—and fast. That will mean setting clear priorities and bringing objectives into alignment with means. The United States does not have the power, resources or moral standing to quickly transform the world's entrenched dictatorships. Besides, isolating and confronting them never seems to work: in Cuba, for example, this policy has been a total failure. This does not mean that the United States should not support democratic change in places like Cuba, Burma, Iran and Syria. But it needs a more subtle and sophisticated approach.

Turn: Democracy (2/2)

Democratic governance is key to avert extinction – prevents terrorism, genocide, and environmental destruction

Diamond, 95

[Larry Diamond, a professor, lecturer, adviser, and author on foreign policy, foreign aid, and democracy.

 “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, issues and imperatives : a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict”, December 1995, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/di.htm]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.