# Fast Capitalism

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## 1NC – Shell

### **1NC Link – All-Purpose**

#### **The affirmative’s call for bolstering transportation infrastructure is anything but benign: the desire for intervention by the State into the transportation sector echoes a history that from the beginning has created an artificial industrial economy that is accelerating out of control.**

Carson 10

(Kevin A., Winner of the Beth A. Hoffman memorial prize for economic writing, “The Distorting Effects of Transportation Subsidies”, November 2010, Volume 60, Issue 9 of The Freeman, <http://www.thefreemanonline.org/features/the-distorting-effects-of-transportation-subsidies/>, [CL])

Although critics on the left are very astute in describing the evils of present-day society, they usually fail to understand either the root of those problems (government intervention) or their solution (the operation of a freed market). In Progressive commentary on energy, pollution, and so on—otherwise often quite insightful—calls for government intervention are quite common. [George Monbiot, for instance, has written](http://www.tinyurl.com/2c2emmz) that “[t]he only rational response to both the impending end of the Oil Age and the menace of global warming is to redesign our cities, our farming and our lives. But this cannot happen without massive political pressure.”

But this is precisely backward. Existing problems of excess energy consumption, pollution, big-box stores, the car culture, and suburban sprawl result from the “massive political pressure” that has already been applied, over the past several decades, to “redesign our cities, our farming, and our lives.” The root of all the problems Monbiot finds so objectionable is State intervention in the marketplace.

In particular, subsidies to transportation have probably done more than any other factor (with the possible exception of intellectual property law) to determine the present shape of the American corporate economy. Currently predominating firm sizes and market areas are the result of government subsidies to transportation.

Adam Smith argued over 200 years ago that the fairest way of funding transportation infrastructure was user fees rather than general revenues: “When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or their tonnage, they pay for the maintenance of those public works exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them.”

This is not, however, how things were actually done. Powerful business interests have used their political influence since the beginning of American history to secure government funding for “internal improvements.” The real turning point was the government’s role in creating the railroad system from the mid-nineteenth century on. The national railroad system as we know it was almost entirely a creature of the State.

The federal railroad land grants included not only the rights-of-way for the actual railroads, but extended 15-mile tracts on both sides. As the lines were completed, this adjoining land became prime real estate and skyrocketed in value. As new communities sprang up along the routes, every house and business in town was built on land acquired from the railroads. The tracts also frequently included valuable timberland. The railroads, according to Matthew Josephson (The Robber Barons), were “land companies” whose directors “did a rushing land business in farm lands and town sites at rising prices.” For example, under the terms of the Pacific Railroad bill, the Union Pacific (which built from the Mississippi westward) was granted 12 million acres of land and $27 million worth of 30-year government bonds. The Central Pacific (built from the West Coast eastward) received nine million acres and $24 million worth of bonds. The total land grants to the railroads amounted to about six times the area of France.

Theodore Judah, chief engineer for what became the Central Pacific, assured potential investors “that it could be done—if government aid were obtained. For the cost would be terrible.” Collis Huntington, the leading promoter for the project, engaged in a sordid combination of strategically placed bribes and appeals to communities’ fears of being bypassed in order to extort grants of “rights of way, terminal and harbor sites, and . . . stock or bond subscriptions ranging from $150,000 to $1,000,000” from a long string of local governments that included San Francisco, Stockton, and Sacramento.

Government also revised tort and contract law to ease the carriers’ way—for example, by exempting common carriers from liability for many kinds of physical damage caused by their operation.

Had railroad ventures been forced to bear their own initial capital outlays—securing rights of way, preparing roadbeds, and laying track, without land grants and government purchases of their bonds—the railroads would likely have developed instead along the initial lines on which Lewis Mumford speculated in The City in History: many local rail networks linking communities into local industrial economies. The regional and national interlinkages of local networks, when they did occur, would have been far fewer and far smaller in capacity. The comparative costs of local and national distribution, accordingly, would have been quite different. In a nation of hundreds of local industrial economies, with long-distance rail transport much more costly than at present, the natural pattern of industrialization would have been to integrate small-scale power machinery into flexible manufacturing for local markets.

Alfred Chandler, in The Visible Hand, argued that the creation of the national railroad system made possible, first, national wholesale and retail markets, and then large manufacturing firms serving the national market. The existence of unified national markets served by large-scale manufacturers depended on a reliable, high-volume distribution system operating on a national level. The railroad and telegraph, “so essential to high-volume production and distribution,” were in Chandler’s view what made possible this steady flow of goods through the distribution pipeline: “The revolution in the processes of distribution and production rested in large part on the new transportation and communications infrastructure. Modern mass production and mass distribution depend on the speed, volume, and regularity in the movement of goods and messages made possible by the coming of the railroad, telegraph and steamship.”

### 1NC Link – Planning

**This acceleration is part of a centralized use of planning language as a method of rendering transit into a technological unit of efficiency: the affirmative reduces transportation to a question of expertism.**

Wilson 1

(Richard Willson is a professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic University, Transportation 28: 1–31, 2001 – <http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson_article.pdf>, [KG])

Transportation planners use language as if it mirrors the world. If language is a mirror, then, it is a neutral tool in the service of communicating information. In most transportation planners’ minds, language describes objective conditions, explains methodologies and expresses values. Numbers, moreover, are a precise form of language that provides unambiguous representations of reality. Are not measures of vehicle flows, level of service or cost effectiveness robust representations of reality? Gridlock is gridlock, right? For planning, however, gridlock is not gridlock until we have defined it as a problem and decided to do something to address it. Transportation plans depend on what gridlock means, and establishing meaning is an inherently social and linguistically based process. The way that transportation planners use language – understanding certain ideas and values and excluding others, hearing some things and not hearing others, and defining roles for themselves, their organizations, decision makers and the public – shapes knowledge, public participation, problem definition, process design and negotiation, and the outcome of planning. The perspective offered in this paper is that language profoundly shapes our view of the world. The paper critically examines the formal scientific rationality that dominates the field and uses insights from planning practice, social theory and philosophy to explore the promise of communicative rationality as a new paradigm for transportation planning – one in which language and communicative processes form the basis for rational planning. Innovative forms of transportation planning based on theories of communicative rationality hold the promise of solving some of our most difficult transportation planning problems. The global aim of communicative rationality is to create a rational basis for constructing ends and means in a democratic society, by enriching public and political discourse. Communicative rationality focuses on interactive processes rather than the deliberative process of a single actor, emphasizing the design of planning processes, participation and learning, and a reconciliation of different ways of understanding planning opportunities. It reorients planning from a form of scientific, instrumental rationality to a form of reason based on consensual discussion. Alexander (2000) argues that there are many forms of rationality – communicative, instrumental, strategic, and so on – and that the real question is appropriately matching the form of rationality to the planning circumstance. This paper takes a different approach, anticipating a paradigm shift that will radically change the basis of knowing and the process for making transportation planning decisions. Kuhn (1970) explains that such shifts only occur when contradictions in the predominant paradigm become great and a new, more useful paradigm is compelling. The reader is invited to consider his or her own practice to conclude whether the preconditions for a paradigm shift in transportation planning are present and whether communicative rationality will be the new transportation planning paradigm. To properly explore these questions, the transportation field needs an intense dialogue about planning processes and a willingness to look at how transportation planning really works. This effort has been hampered by the fact that transportation planners and planning theorists generally ignore one another. Communicative rationality has not been reviewed in transportation journals; planning theory research seldom links to transportation planning. Furthermore, theory articles are often presented in language that is difficult to understand and disconnected from practice. In taking up these questions, therefore, I am seeking to foster a conversation between transportation planners and planning theorists, one that will improve the quality of transportation planning and add rigor to planning theory. There is tension between the formal process of planning based on scientific, instrumental rationality and the day-to-day reality of political bargaining and gamesmanship. One might argue, therefore, that a concern with transportation planning process is irrelevant, taking the view that real planning does not occur in formal planning processes, or in the preparation of plans, but through project entrepreneurship, bargaining and the exercise of political power. Transportation plans, then, either add sanction to what has already been decided or provide technical information that shifts the power among competing interests.

### 1NC Link/Impact – Accident

This expertism is exactly the kind of externalization of agency that ceded the building of the transportation sector as a creature of the State. From the mad drive of the State to construct an endless sprawl of accelerated living was born the Accident.

Block 9

(Walter, Department of Economics @ Rutgers University, pg. 1-3, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads”, [CL])

Were a government to demand the sacrifice of 46,700 citizens' each year, there is no doubt that an outraged public would revolt. If an organized religion were to plan the immolation of 523,335 of the faithful in a decade,' there is no question that it would be toppled. Were there a Manson-type cult that murdered 790 people to celebrate Memorial Day, 770 to usher in the Fourth of July, 915 to commemorate Labor Day, 960 at Thanksgiving, and solemnized Christmas with 355 more deaths,3 surely The New York Times would wax eloquent about the carnage, calling for the greatest manhunt this nation has ever seen. If Dr. Spock were to learn of a disease that killed 2,077 children4 under the age of five each year, or were New York City's Andrew Stein to uncover a nursing home that allowed 7,346 elderly people to die annually, there would be no stone unturned in their efforts to combat the enemy. To compound the horror, were private enterprise responsible for this butchery, a cataclysmic reaction would ensue: investigation panels would be appointed, the justice department would seek out antitrust violations, company executives would be jailed, and an outraged hue and cry for nationalization would follow. The reality, however, is that the government is responsible for such slaughter-the toll taken on our nation's roadways. Whether at the local, state, regional, or national level, it is government that builds, runs, manages, administers, repairs, and plans for the roadway network. There is no need for the government to take over; it is already fully in charge, and with a vengeance. I believe there is a better way: the market place. Explaining how a free market can serve to provide road and highway service, as it has furnished us with practically every other good and service at our disposal, is the objective of this article. Before dismissing the idea as impossible, consider the grisly tale of government road management. Every year since 1925 has seen the death of more than 20,000 people. Since 1929, the yearly toll has never dropped below 30,000 per year. In 1962, motor vehicle deaths first reached the 40,000 plateau and have not since receded below that level. To give just a hint of the callous disregard in which human life is held by the highway authorities, consider the following statement about the early days of government high- way design and planning:

The immediate need was to get the country out of the mud, to get a connected paved road system that would connect all county seats and population centers with mudless, dustless roads. These were the pioneering years. Safety, volume, and traffic operations were nor considered a problem. But by the middle thirties there was an awakening and a recognition that these elements were vital to efficient and safe operation of the highway system.

By the "middle thirties," indeed, nearly one-half million people had fallen victim to traffic fatalities.' Rather than invoking indignation on the part of the public, government management of the roads and highways is an accepted given. Apart from a Ralph Nader, who only inveighs against unsafe vehicles (only a limited part of the problem), there is scarcely a voice raised in opposition. The government seems to have escaped opprobrium because most people blame traffic accidents on a host of factors other than governmental mismanagement: drunkenness, speeding. lack of caution, mechanical failures, etc. Typical is the treatment undertaken by Sam Peltzman, who lists no less than thirteen possible causes of accident rates without even once mentioning the fact of government ownership and management. Vehicle speed . . . alcohol consumption . . . the number of young drivers . . . changes in drivers' incomes. . . the money costs of accidents. . . the average age of cars . . . the ratio of new cars to all cars (because it has been suggested that while drivers familiarize themselves with their new cars, accident risk may increase) . . . traffic density. . . expenditures on traffic-law enforcement bv state highway patrols . . . expenditures on roads . . . the ratio of imports to total cars (because there is evidence that small cars are more lethal than large cars if an accident occurs) . . . education of the population . . . and the availability of hospital care (which might reduce deaths if injury occurs).

Further, David M. Winch cites another reason for public apathy: the belief that "[many persons killed on the roads are partly to blame for their death . . ."9

True, many victims of road accidents are partly responsible. But this in no way explains public apathy toward their deaths. For people killed in New York City's Central Park during the late evening hours, are also at least partially to blame for their own deaths; **it takes a monumental indifference**, feeling of omnipotence, absentmindedness or ignorance to embark upon such a stroll. yet the victims are pitied, more police are demanded, and protests are commonly made. The explanation of apathy toward highway mismanagement that seems most reasonable is that people simply do not see any alternative to government ownership. Just as no one "opposes" or "protests" a volcano, which is believed to be beyond the control of man, there are very few who oppose governmental roadway control. Along with death and taxes, state highway management seems to have become an immutable, if unstated, fact. The institution of government has planned, built, managed and maintained our highway network for so long that few people can imagine any other work- able possibility. While Peltzman puts his finger on the proximate causes of highway accidents, such as excessive speed and alcohol, he has ignored the agency, government, which has set itself up as the manager of the roadway apparatus. This is akin to blaming a snafu in a restaurant on the fact that the oven went out, or that the waiter fell on a slippery floor with a loaded tray. Of course the proximate causes of customer dissatisfaction are uncooked meat or food in their laps. Yet how can these factors be blamed, while the part of restaurant management is ignored? It is the restaurant manager's job to insure that the ovens are performing satisfactorily, and that the floors are properly maintained. If he fails, the blame rests on his shoulders, not on the ovens or floors. We hold the trigger man responsible for murder, not the bullet. The same holds true with highways. It may well be that speed and alcohol are deleterious to safe driving; but it is the road manager's task to ascertain that the proper standards are maintained with regard to these aspects of safety. If unsafe conditions prevail in a private, multi-story parking lot, or in a shopping mall, or in the aisles of a department store, the entrepreneur in question is held accountable. It is he who loses revenue unless and until the situation is cleared up. It is logically fallacious to place the blame for accidents on unsafe conditions, while ignoring the manager whose responsibility it is to ameliorate these factors. It is my contention that all that is needed to virtually eliminate highway deaths is a non-utopian change, in the sense that it could take place now, even given our present state of knowledge, if only society would change what it can control: the institutional arrangements that govern the nation's highways.

### 1NC Impact – The Accident

**As modern market capitalism continues to accelerate the transportation sector into endless efficiency, the Accident becomes a pervasive part of everyday life – the Accident will expand until it becomes a ubiquitous ontic condition.**

**Virilio 7**

(Paul, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, “The original accident,” trans. by Julie Rose, Polity, available online DH)

'There is no science of the accident,' Aristotle cautioned a long tin1e ago. Despite the existence of risk studies which assess risks, there is no accidentology, but only a process of fortuitous discovery, archaeotechnological invention. To invent the sailing ship or steamer is to invent the shipwreck. To invent the train is to invent the mil accident of derailment. To invent the family automobile is to produce the pile-up on the highway.

To get what is heavier than air to take off in the form of an aeroplane or dirigible is to invent the crash, the air disaster. As for the space shuttle, Challenger, its blowing up in flight in the same year that the tragedy of Chernobyl occurred is the original accident of a new motor, the equivalent of the first shipwreck of the very first ship.

An indirect invention of the breakdown of computer (or other) systems, look at the economic upheaval in the financial markets when suddenly, with the stockmarket crash, the hidden face of the economic sciences and technologies of d b automate dealing in values rears up, like the iceberg before the Titanic, only on Wall Street, in Tokyo and in Lon:ion

And so, if, for Aristotle some little time ago and for us today, the accident reveals the substance, this is in fact because WHAT CROPS UP (accidens) is a sort of analysis, a technoanalysis of WHAT IS BENEATH (substare) any knowledge.

It follows that fighting against the damage done by Progress above all means uncovering the hidden truth of our successes in this accidental revelation - in no way apocalyptic - of the incriminated substances.

Whence the urgent need, at the threshold of the third n1illennium, for public recognition of this type of innovatwn that cmnes and feeds off every technology, as the twentieth centurv never ceased stunningly demonstrating.

On this score, too, political ecology cannot long go on sweeping under the carpet the eschatological dimension of the cal annties caused by the positivist ideology of Progress.

So the dromologue, or, if you like, the analyst of the phenomena of acceleration, is consistent in thinking that if speed is responsible for the exponential development of the artificial accidents of the twentieth century, it is also every bit as responsible for the increased impact of ecological accidents (the sundry instances of pollution of the environment) as, let's say, the eschatological calmnities that are loorning with the very recent discoveries of crenomics and biotechnologies. 1

Once upon a time the local accident was still precisely situatedas in the North Atlantic tor the Titanic. But the global accident no longer is and its fallout now extends to whole continents, anticipating the integral accident that is in danger of becoming, tomorrow or the day after, our sole habitat, the havoc wreaked by Progress then extending not only to the whole of geophysical space, but especially to. timespans of several centuries, to say nothing of the dimensions of a 'cellular Hiroshima'. Actually if the substance is absolute and essential (to science) and if the, accident is relative and contingent, we can now identify the 'substance' at the beginning of specific fields of knowledge and the 'accident' at the end of the philosophical intuition that Aristotle and a few others pioneered . Far from urging some 'millenarian catastrophism', there is no question here of making a tragedy out of an accident with the aim of scaring the hordes as the mass media so often do but only of finally taking accidents seriously.

### 1NC Impact – Ethics

#### Additionally, the State management of the transportation sector represents a centralized system of economic planning that robs the individual of their agency – the impact is ethics.

Romar 9

(Edward Romar, Lecturer in Management – U. Mass. Boston College of Management, Journal of Business Ethics, “Noble Markets: The Noble/Slave Ethic in Hayek’s Free Market Capitalism”, 85:57-66, 2009, Springer)

Like Nietzsche, Hayek, though acutely aware of the importance of ethics in a world based upon maximum freedom, did not develop a complete ethical theory to support the functioning of free market capitalism. Like Nietzsche, Hayek does not claim to know the meaning of morality or, in Nietzsche’s case, good and evil.3 Beyond support for the principles needed to anchor the functioning of free markets and the institutions needed to support them, Hayek left it to individual actors to develop their own moral principles, so long as these did not contradict those needed to support free markets. It was not his intention to prescribe a detailed ethical system to support free market capitalism because to do so would violate his principle of freedom and curtail the creativity of markets. Yet, the world described by Hayek is one where individuals have substantial power to control their destiny and seek their own level, a world where talent and risk dominate, a world governed by self interest, a world where individuals have few responsibilities to others, and a world driven by competition where reward goes to the successful. He described a world open to Nietzschean ethics. In The Road to Serfdom (1994) and The Fatal Conceit (1988) Hayek presents a powerful and eloquent attack on twentieth century totalitarianism. In The Road to Serfdom he argues that the socialist experiment must inevitably lead to totalitarianism and the complete elimination of individual liberty and freedom. In the name of principles of social justice, society installs a system of centralized social and economic planning, substitutes collective decisions for individual ones, and requires each person to adopt an identical and complete set of social values. Furthermore, to achieve its objectives, the socialist state must determine in great detail the allocation of resources and insure that each individual performs precisely his/her assigned role. Planned economies must substitute collectivist thought, values and behavior and eliminate any room for individualism. Hayek labels this weltanschauung the ‘‘fatal conceit.’’ It is fatal because it cannot achieve its objectives and it is conceit because it overestimates the role of human rationality and man’s ability to control social and economic processes. He sees constructivist continental European philosophic thought, primarily Cartesian rationalism, as the source of this error (Hayek, 1948, pp. 9–10; 1973, pp. 9–12). This philosophic tradition argues that man can understand the world completely and, therefore, social and economic processes can be understood completely and molded to fit human will. Hayek considers this a foolish, self-serving and arrogant position.4 Certainly, humans have a powerful intellect and reasoning skills. Human reason, though powerful, has its limitations and cannot completely understand with any certainty how human institutions and social processes evolved and how they operate. He views the evolution and development of human institutions, be they money, markets, or ethics as spontaneous, self-generating orders. Systems, if you will, evolving gradually, accidentally, on the basis of incremental change; not as a result of human design. He labels this ‘‘between instinct and reason.’’ Humans can understand to some extent how human society evolved from clan based societies into modern, complex ones based upon individualism and abstract rules, but we cannot know the processes or mechanisms of this evolution in sufficient detail to bend them to our will. We can tweak the social and moral systems but cannot engineer them. Man can modify social processes and their underlying ethical foundations; but, in the final analysis, we must accept them as is.5 Since social process and institutions obey their own set of evolutionary principles which man cannot know completely, it is best for these to evolve on their own, without much human interference. In The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law, Legislation and Liberty (3 vols., 1973, 1976, 1979) Hayek develops his ideas about the proper principles of economic and political organizations and their underlying ethical foundations. The fundamental principle of social organization must be based upon the principle of liberty, which may be defined as ‘‘that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in society’’6 (Hayek, 1960, p. 11). Hayek’s conception of the free, just and moral society is not one where there is a complete absence of coercion but where coercion is limited to those situations where it is required to prevent a reduction in the liberty of others. Society may use coercion to protect private property and to secure individual rights and conditions which allow each person the maximum amount of personal freedom to make choices of their own. This is accomplished through a limited set of abstract rules ‘‘that apply equally to all’’ which protect private or several property, enforce contracts, and prevent fraud and deception’’ (Hayek, 1960, pp. 140, 141, 143, 155). While Hayek is concerned with just and moral principles of economic, political and social organization, he views attempts to achieve ‘‘distributive justice’’ as the root cause of the immorality brought about by planned economies. In order to achieve the desired goals, human behavior must be planned in minute detail, thereby eliminating freedom of choice. Achieving collectivist goals mean that there can be no individual ones. Organizing to control every outcome means there cannot be individual choice. Social control means there will be little individual control and it is all doomed because humans cannot understand completely the mechanisms needed to reach their objectives. The only solution must be the free market and the minimal organizational principles required for it to operate efficiently. Since these are few and well known, it will be easier to succeed and create a just and moral society. Allow the market free reign and the just and moral society will follow according to its own principles.

### 1NC Alternative – Deceleration

#### The alternative is to reject government involvement in the transportation sector – to do so is to open ourselves to the phenomenological limits of speed. We should embrace the deceleration of both thought and politics – abandon grand architecture as an approach to transit.

Featherstone 10

(Mark Featherstone is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University, UK. His areas of specialism are social and political thought and psychoanalysis. His current research focuses on notions of utopia and dystopia in social and political thought and he recently published a monograph on this topic entitled Tocqueville?s Virus (Routledge). He is currently working on the second volume of this study, entitled Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation, which will be published by Routledge in 2011. Apart from his focus on utopia in social and political theory, he is also interested in urbanisation, particularly in relation to processes of globalisation. “Virilio’s Apocalypticism” <http://www.sciy.org/2010/10/02/virilios-apocalypticism-by-mark-featherstone/>, Donnie)

Like Nietzsche [[35]](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=662" \l "_edn35), who was well aware of humanity’s tragic nature, Virilio knows that we will always try to touch the sky. In this respect I do not see him in any way as anti-modern, even though it is possible that his critique of the excessive nature of the empire of speed may express itself in a form of social and cultural conservatism that is not easily reconciled with his radical critique of technology. Instead I believe that his problematic resides in the hubristic forgetting of tragedy that has evolved through hyper-modernity and the need to rehabilitate the Ancient idea of humanity as a tragic creature of the limit that is made necessary and possible by the apocalyptic culture of post-modernism. This culture simultaneously and paradoxically marks the moment when we run into the limit of terrestrial time and space and forget about our earthbound limited nature. In this respect my focus is less on Virilio’s conservatism or his desire to restrict humanity; rather I am interested in what I perceive to be his concern to maintain the experience of the limit in a global age where we simultaneously inhabit a state of global fullness and completion and precisely for that reason have no sense of that truth. It is this paradox, this conflation of the destructive potential of completed modernity and the total inability of humanity to understand this condition as a sign of the limitation and potential end of its own existence, primarily because of its location or immersion in a vortex of information that screens out critical thought and knowledge, that forms the basis of Virilio’s apocalypse and necessitates the creation of institutions able to think through the end times in order to pull us back from the brink. Herein resides the meaning of Virilio’s [[36]](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=662" \l "_edn36) idea of a politics of the very worst and his notion of the accident as an inverted miracle able to radically re-orient our relation to the world and technology. For Virilio [[37]](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=662" \l "_edn37) modernity must be understood as a catastrophic epoch which has led to what he calls a ‘toposcopical disaster’ characterised by humanity’s inability to properly perceive the phenomenological reality of the environment that functions as its life support system. Against this catastrophic condition – which he tells us leads to the psychopathological condition of the planet man who falls into megalomania by virtue of his inability to understand his relation to the totally mediated virtual world that has been condensed to the infinite density of a singularity by the light speeds of new media technology – Virilio explains that we need to find a new form of art suitable for illustrating our condition and illuminating our apocalyptic situation. [[38]](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=662" \l "_edn38) From this insight I think we can make two points. First, it is methodologically significant that Virilio discusses the redemptive quality of art, rather than critical theory, because what this illustrates is his view that complex theoretical constructions are unlikely to impact upon a high speed society where knowledge and thought have been more or less destroyed by an excess of information and communication. The value of art is, therefore, that it makes an emotional, rather than cognitive, impression upon the audience and causes them to feel, rather than necessarily theoretically comprehend their situation in an epoch where theoretical comprehension has been, at best, marginalised, and at worst, foreclosed by the light speeds of new technology. We know that Virilio [[39]](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=662" \l "_edn39) foregrounds this methodological approach in his work because he has the tendency to explain the ways in which his own work leaps from idea to idea without necessarily working out the connections between theories and concepts. The effect of this procedure is, therefore, to give the reader first, an impression and second, an invitation to work backwards through the theoretical connections present in his work. We can, of course, find a precedent for this approach to critical writing, which is perfectly symmetrical with the trajectivity of the post-modern empire of speed, even if it does run the risk of collapsing into the vortex of information and communication that characterises our mediated world. We can compare Virilio’s thought to the German critical theorists’ notion of the thought-image, which was similarly meant to oppose the banality of the culture industry from the inside through the construction of media-friendly critical bombs. [[40]](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=662" \l "_edn40) In the case of both the German critical theorists, such as Adorno and Horkheimer (and to a lesser extent Benjamin), and Virilio, I think we can, therefore, pinpoint a notion of political activism, whereby critical writing is itself an artistic activity meant to oppose the banality of technology that simply works for the sake of working, and somehow to spark critical reflection in the minds of the disorientated and stupefied masses.

## Links

### Link – Expertism

#### **Infrastructure expertism by government organizations in urban settings**

Muscat 12

(John Muscat, Newgeography contributor, Newgeography, “The Use and Misuse of Glaser’s Triumph of the City,” 3/18/2012, http://www.newgeography.com/content/002730-the-use-and-misuse-glaesers-triumph-city, KG)

Appeals to authority are now the stock-in-trade of progressive pundits across a range of public controversies. In the face of popular discontent bubbling up from forums on the net and elsewhere, their fall-back posture is heavy-handed ‘expertism’. Policymaking is the prerogative of those with the right qualifications and credentials. Ordinary citizens should butt-out, no matter how self-interested the experts may seem. So too in the field of urban policy, encumbered as it is with a green-compact-city orthodoxy, do appeals to authority hold sway. Over the course of 2011 a book title kept cropping up in some of the media coverage of urban issues – [Triumph of the City](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/159420277X/ref%3Das_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=newgeogrcom-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=159420277X) by Harvard economist and New York Times blogger Edward Glaeser. Arguing that successful cities should be “urban theme parks” or “playgrounds” for the benefit of “smart inhabitants” – as progressives like to conceive themselves – while the energy-wasting populace must ;be brought to heel, Glaeser is, for the pundits, an authority figure from central casting.    The Sydney Morning Herald’s urban critic, [Elizabeth Farrelly](http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/be-happy-be-more-interesting-be-dense-20111019-1m809.html), claimed the book “instantly became flavour of the month amongst the cognoscenti”. Proceeding to deliver another full-throated hymn in praise of density, she abridged Glaeser’s argument in typically hyperbolic terms. If only we lived in “dense urban centres”, miracles would abound: cheaper housing, better transport, protected wildernesses, no climate change, decent coffee and “a choice of walk-to tapas”.  Her colleague [Ross Gittins](http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/sydney-too-must-go-up-to-go-green-20110920-1kjfi.html), the paper’s economics editor, was equally impressed. “Glaeser’s observations seem of obvious relevance to Sydney”, he wrote.  “Our sky-high house and unit prices are partly the product of … excessive government restrictions on development”, wrote Gittins, before adding, without a hint of irony, “there are limits to how far Sydney can be allowed to sprawl”. He resolves this contradiction with the phrase “Sydney needs to go up”, echoing a warning of Glaeser’s which serves as the new slogan of green urbanism: “If cities can’t build up, then they will build out”.   This is sweet music to the green-tinged intelligentsia, for whom there is no worse crime against the planet than a bulging ‘human footprint’. Before weighing-up the merits of Glaeser’s build-up-not-out pitch, though, it should be said that many of his Australian fans either misrepresent or misunderstand his position. Farrelly’s diatribes against developers and suburbs are commonplace. She is all in favour of rigid ‘urban growth boundaries’, prescriptive urban consolidation and other features of the anti-sprawl agenda adopted by state and local governments over recent decades. So apparently is Gittins. Glaeser’s views are more complex. “The government should not be in the business of enforcing lifestyles that we happen to find appealing”, writes Glaeser, “[t]he government’s job is to allow people to choose the life they want ...” He takes care to explain that this perspective accords with sound economic thinking: “[A]t the heart of economics is the belief that businesses work best by competing furiously in a market that the government oversees as impartial umpire. The same is true for cities. Competition among local governments for people and firms is healthy … The national government does no good by propping up particular places, just as it does no good by propping up particular firms or industries.” Identifying this principle as ‘spatial neutrality’, Glaeser is indifferent to the type of ‘growth boundaries’ so popular with Australian town planners and their green theorists, commenting at one point that “greenbelts may serve to check urban growth – which may or may not be desirable”. Indeed, it’s hard to see how any form of coercive zoning can be consistent with his position. Glaeser’s core argument is that the principle of neutrality has been systematically violated in the United States. “Cities [by which he means inner-cities] can compete on a level playing field”, he says, “but over the past sixty years, America’s policies have slanted the field steeply against them”. These policies include inner-city development controls, especially height restrictions, the home mortgage interest deduction, the Interstate Highway system, inferior inner-city schools administered by local school boards and inadequate gasoline (petrol) taxes. Remove such “artificial barriers” and “everybody, not just the privileged few, can enjoy the pleasures of Manhattan or Paris or Hong Kong”. Lurking behind Glaeser’s sedate prose, but never quite breaking out, is some kind of ultra-centripetal theory of human settlement. Human beings maximise their satisfaction by living in the centre of the world’s leading city, measured by size, wealth and amenity. It’s just that economic and legal barriers fix most of them in various grades of less desirable places. If the whole world could, in other words, they would pack up and move to Manhattan (“New York is still a paradigm of urbanity”, says Glaeser). In the years between 1880 and 1920, when millions of people from all over Europe swarmed into the crowded tenements of New York’s lower east side, such a theory might have had some plausibility. But the world changed. Since at least the middle of the twentieth century, the statistical and historical evidence points in the opposite direction. Countries like the US and Australia saw massive population shifts to the suburbs and attracted millions of immigrants hoping for their own suburban lot and house. However much Glaeser’s “artificial barriers” may have contributed to suburbanisation in the United States, the key issue is how important they were relative to one of the great transformations of the twentieth century: the unremitting growth of motor vehicle ownership and motorised commercial transportation. Even Glaeser concedes that “transportation technologies shape our communities, and modern sprawl is the child of the automobile”, though he insists the convenience of car ownership can be diminished.   The problem is that the trend towards urban dispersion started well before Glaeser’s so-called barriers came into existence. In his book  Downtown: Its Rise and Fall 1880-1950, Robert Fogelson writes that “by the mid and late 1920s, however, some Americans had come to the conclusion that the centrifugal forces were beginning to overpower the centripetal forces – or, in other words, that the dispersal of residences might well lead in time to the decentralization of business”. And the trend shows no sign of abating. Having analysed the 2010 US census, [Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox](http://www.city-journal.org/2011/eon0406jkwc.html) find that during the 2000s, just 8.6 per cent of the population growth in metropolitan areas with more than a million people took place in the core cities, the rest took place in the suburbs. “America continues to suburbanize”, they say. This is despite the financial crash, which would have blunted some of Glaeser’s pro-suburban incentives. Could it be that most people just prefer space over density? As for Australia, Glaeser’s core argument simply doesn’t hold. Most of his “artificial barriers” have no direct equivalents here. Our advanced motorways are intra-urban rather than interstate networks, and attract significant toll charges, our schools are subject to state rather than local board control and home mortgage interest is not tax deductible. No reasonable person would claim that our governments have “slanted the field” in favour of suburbs over recent decades. The very notion of spatial neutrality has been anathema. Urban consolidation is all the rage, suppressing land releases while driving up values to the point that Australian houses are consistently ranked ‘severely unaffordable’ in the annual Demographia survey, due in no small measure to a crushing mix of developer and infrastructure contributions and utility levies.   Still, [Australian Bureau of Statistics](http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/Products/3218.0~2008-09~Main%2BFeatures~New%2BSouth%2BWales?OpenDocument) figures show that four of the five strongest growing Sydney Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the year to 30 June 2009 were in the outer west: Blacktown, Parramatta, The Hills Shire and Liverpool, which offer home buyers the best prospect of owning a detached house and provide many industries with the cheap land, low rents, extensive space and proximity to major road junctions they need to thrive. According to the [Department of Finance](http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-first-ports-of-call-20110722-1htev.html), 90 per cent of the containers passing through Sydney’s Port Botany originate in or are destined for the city’s outer western region. In its [recent decision](http://smh.domain.com.au/real-estate-news/rezoning-blitz-in-push-for-housing-20120129-1qo29.html) to abandon some of the previous state government's residential zoning restrictions on Sydney’s fringe, the current government is just coming to terms with reality. Following Glaeser’s logic, if, in conditions of “a level playing field”, or even a “field slanted” against outer suburbs, residents and businesses still “choose” to locate on the periphery, government officials have no right to interfere, and will cause economic damage if they attempt to restrain these choices. Contrary to the impressions of his green-tinged admirers, Glaeser offers, in the Australian context, a powerful argument in favour of hands-off planning, decentralisation, suburbanisation and urban growth.

### Link – Accelerated Epistemology

**The acceleration of transit brings with it a deceptive necessity that scenario planning is the only correct mode of rationality.**

**Virilio ’98**

(Paul, “Dromoscopy, or The Ecstasy of Enormities”, *Wide Angle* 20.3 (1998), <http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/lerner/wide_angle/20_3/203virilio.htm>, EY)

From the driver's seat, immediate proximity means little. All that counts is what holds itself at a distance. In the pursuit of the voyage the vantage controls the advance. The speed of propulsion produces its own horizon: the *bigger* this is, the *farther* the horizon. The philosophy of the windshield necessitates foresight in addition to plain sight, because the latter is tricked by advancing. It's the future which decides the present of the route. In the accelerated wandering the past is overtaken. The landmarks are essentially those of the future. The dromovisual apparatus functions therefore above all like a means of exhumation. As a means of communication it only communicates that which is to come. In the unidirectionality of the trip, that which stands still has long since disappeared in the archeology of the departure. For the forward-looking driver of the trip, the driver's seat is a seat of foresight, a control tower of the future of the trajectory. On the contrary, that of the airport is for the air traffic controller the driver's seat of the airlines. Whatever be the apparent movement of the countryside in the screen of the windshield or the real movement of airplanes in the radar screen, that which counts for the controller of the trip is the anticipation, the advance knowledge.

### Link – Air/Highways

Government involvement made aviation and the highway system possible at a mass, accelerated scale.

Carson 10

(Kevin A., Winner of the Beth A. Hoffman memorial prize for economic writing, “The Distorting Effects of Transportation Subsidies”, November 2010, Volume 60, Issue 9 of The Freeman, <http://www.thefreemanonline.org/features/the-distorting-effects-of-transportation-subsidies/>, [CL])

Reprising the Role

As new forms of transportation emerged, the government reprised its role, subsidizing both the national highway and civil aviation systems.

From its beginning the American automotive industry formed a “complex” with the petroleum industry and government highway projects. The “most powerful pressure group in Washington” (as a PBS documentary called it) began in June 1932, when GM president Alfred P. Sloan created the National Highway Users Conference, inviting oil and rubber firms to help GM bankroll a propaganda and lobbying effort that continues to this day.

Whatever the political motivation behind it, the economic effect of the interstate system should hardly be controversial. Virtually 100 percent of roadbed damage to highways is caused by heavy trucks. After repeated liberalization of maximum weight restrictions, far beyond the heaviest conceivable weight the interstate roadbeds were originally designed to support, fuel taxes fail miserably at capturing from big-rig operators the cost of pavement damage caused by higher axle loads. And truckers have been successful at scrapping weight-distance user charges in all but a few western states, where the push for repeal continues. So only about half the revenue of the highway trust fund comes from fees or fuel taxes on the trucking industry, and the rest is externalized on private automobiles.

This doesn’t even count the 20 percent of highway funding that’s still subsidized by general revenues, or the role of eminent domain in lowering the transaction costs involved in building new highways or expanding existing ones.

As for the civil aviation system, from the beginning it was a creature of the State. Its original physical infrastructure was built entirely with federal grants and tax-free municipal bonds. Professor Stephen Paul Dempsey of the University of Denver in 1992 estimated the replacement value of this infrastructure at $1 trillion. The federal government didn’t even start collecting user fees from airline passengers and freight shippers until 1971. Even with such user fees paid into the Airport and Airways Trust Fund, the system still required taxpayer subsidies of $3 billion to maintain the Federal Aviation Administration’s network of control towers, air traffic control centers, and tens of thousands of air traffic controllers.

Eminent domain also remains central to the building of new airports and expansion of existing airports, as it does with highways.

Subsidies to airport and air traffic control infrastructure are only part of the picture. Equally important was the direct role of the State in creating the heavy aircraft industry, whose jumbo jets revolutionized civil aviation after World War II. In Harry Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky described the aircraft industry as spiraling into red ink after the end of the war and on the verge of bankruptcy when it was rescued by the Cold War (and more specifically Truman’s heavy bomber program). David Noble, in America by Design, made a convincing case that civilian jumbo jets were only profitable thanks to the government’s heavy bomber contracts; the production runs for the civilian market alone were too small to pay for the complex and expensive machinery. The 747 is essentially a spinoff of military production. The civil aviation system is, many times over, a creature of the State.

### Link – Acceleration

**Mass transportation is nothing but slow-motion implosion – mass transit renders the world into 2 dimensions in a blur of speed.**

Virilio 98

(Paul, “Dromoscopy, or The Ecstasy of Enormities”, *Wide Angle* 20.3 (1998), <http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/lerner/wide_angle/20_3/203virilio.htm>, EY)

Comparable to the vertical turnstile of a revolving door, the screen of the windshield functions a little like flaps at a tunnel's mouth, of which the horizontal axis would be the vehicle, the flaps the landscapes which successively pass by the car's exterior. In this obscene overturning, the country exposes its underside, and in turning over its landscapes, the territorial body excites the master of place to the violence of speed by inciting him to a rape of distance. But the transparent screen is also a sort of dial, a gauge which shows in its dromoscopic simulation the violence of the trip. There, where the viewers and the other dashboard indicators make known the state of the motor, the glass of the windshield indicates the status of the journey. The dromoscopic vision gives in plain language a double transparence, of the window and of the road, the evolution of the physical world and the simulated deformations of the visual field traversed. These are the precious indications of the state of places. With daily mobility's gallery of dashboards, the cultural revolution of transportation exposes itself publicly. In the screen of the car trip, the speeding-up of images is equivalent to an apparent seismic movement of which the epicenter would place itself at the blindspot of arrival. The vector of transportation is therefore nothing but an implosion, and the users of this ambulatory catastrophe are less the privileged contemplators of the route and more a thwarted landing party. With the speed of pursuit, it's the objective of the trip which destroys the path. It's the target of the projecting projectile (the automobile) which seems to provoke the ruin of distance. It's the passenger's desire to go to the end of the line as fast as possible which produces in the drawing-on of the voyage the brutal drawing and quartering of the landscape. The irresistible attraction of the route dissolves with the fixity of objects, the time of travel, the distance-time. The cognitive distance of space certainly subsists somewhere, but it tends to become a memory, the commemoration of ancient paths of faintly recalled journeys. The other end of the countryside is closer and closer but the consistency of places has disappeared in the aesthetic of rapidity, an optical phenomena. The goal of the voyage acts like a hardener. The instrument controls permit one to seize on the vivid--the suddenness of the tree, the instantaneity of houses, the hills which successively explode the route. The excessive attraction of the arrival changes the view of the passenger like the shutter of a camera--an instantaneous luminosity. The acceleration of the camera of dromographic shooting corresponds to the progressive closing of the windshield, the will to rejoin as fast as possible the goal of the voyage restraining the field of vision of the voyeurs-voyagers, their *depth of field.*

### Link – Fast Capitalism

Fast capitalism has created the disappearance of the local and the emergence of a globalized flow of identity that’s caught up in acceleration.

Luke 5

(Timothy W., University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, “Scanning Fast Capitalism: Quasipolitan Order and New Social Flowmations”, 1.1.5, <http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1_1/luke.html>, [CL])

Fast capitalism is a 24/7 reality. Its statics and dynamics require social theorists to delve into dromology, or disciplined discursive deliberations over the new modes of power and knowledge generated by speed itself. As one gains awareness of how speed shapes social practices, it is clear that social theory must consider the power of kinetics as a fundamental force in everyday life. Whether it is defined as "dromocracy" (Virilio 1986), "time-space compression" (Harvey 1989) or "fast capitalism" (Agger 1989), today's temporal terrains, as Virilio asserts, are embedded in "chrono-politics" through which "speed rules" over every aspect of life now being reformatted by "the dromocratic revolution" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983:43-51). These effects are both global and local in their scope and impact, although their impact on culture, economy, and society is not fully understood.

Consequently, this analysis develops an alternative critical approach to "kinematics," or the study of practice-carrying motions considered in themselves, for understanding the unusual fixities of form coevolving with the rushing ephemeralities of global flows. "Since movement creates the event," as Virilio argues, "the real is kinedramatic"(1995:23). A theoretical appreciation of the kinedramatic also indicates that the currents of global exchange are generating cohesive structures of movement on a worldwide scale, or "kineformations," which could be understood as "global flowmations" (Luke and Ó Tuathail 1998). These actually existing new social formations in the fast capitalist world are held together within the compressed time-space of flowmationalized discourses and practices. Whether it is Nike, FedEx, British Air or Exxon, transnational capital sells speed as either its key service or as a critical quality of its products. Flowmationalization, in turn, expresses the kinedramatic events of globalization as the dominant operating logic of the post-1989 New World Order.

Global flowmationalization develops gradually out of transnational discourses and practices as a world of sovereign governments from the seventeenth century and its Westphalian system of nation-states erupts with dromological trends as it comes under the sovereign reach of world governmentality. The "slow folks" get separated from the "fast class," "steady savers" are run over by "fast money," "slow growth" falls into disfavor with "fast pay-offs" as speed rules. Indeed, "fellow traveling" at common rates of speed eclipses common citizenship in place as a key nexus of many individuals' identity. The volatilization of once solid states by global trade, media, traffic, and data flows has compressed traditional permacultures into today's ephemeracultures (Luke 1992:72-76), embedding corporate engineered fast capitalist turnover into the reproduction of everyday life.

Still, such ruptures are costly. As Virilio observes about today's world, destroying "its stationary organization merely revealed that tendency to chaos, which, according to Schlegel, is hidden in all ordered creation" (1995:71-72). The purposive construction of chaos as capitalist opportunity clearly advances the interests of transnational enterprise inasmuch as new strange attractors of desire and goods spontaneously order chaotic flows of needs and satisfactions in global markets. Liberating these flows to go anywhere anytime anyway has extraordinary kinedramatic effects, because it means

...not only annihilating the duration of information—of the image and its path—but with these all that endures or persists. What the mass media attack in other institutions (democracy, justice, science, the arts, religion, morality, culture) are not the institutions themselves but the instinct of self-preservation that lies behind them. That is, what they still retain of bygone civilizations for which everything was a material and spiritual preparation directed against disappearance and death, and in which communicating meant to survive, to remain. (Virilio 1995:53)

Volatilizing old social formations, then, generates the turbulent chaos of today's New World Order in which these kineformations of global exchange emerge around the vortices of various strange attractors and shapeshifting wormholes in flowmations of commodities, currencies or concepts. On the one hand, one finds corporate entities celebrating the new freedoms of kineformation. Their plastic Visa cards carrying anyone anywhere anytime 24/7; and, on the other hand, one hears laments over the loss of what was once regarded as trusted and reliable sites of good incomes, stable employment, and moral consensus.

Foucault's genealogies of capitalism, statism, and managerialism in modern Europe focuses on the interventions of governmentality: how they are developed, what ends they served, which structures were implicated in applying them. This analysis must continue today in new social flowmations. Most importantly, kinematic power disembeds people from the enduring persistence of localistic traditions, and then reconfigures them as individual integers of abstract populations to bring the whole planet into a "governmentalization of the state" (Foucault 1991:103). Global flowmations no longer need to ground their sense of right disposition, convenient ends or even things as such in very narrow national terms. The flux of tastes and flows of people give capitalist kineformations the leverage needed for interventions into everyday life as the power/knowledge containments for their biopowers. The move to tailor marketplaces to products or buyers to goods as fast as tastes change, or can be changed, is one dromocracy of flowmationalization. Transnational businesses, media groups, banking syndicates, and national blocs all feed these tendencies toward world governmentality by advancing their own polyglot visions of convenience to engineer the right disposition of things for producers and consumers. This pluralization of global populations "as a datum, as a field of intervention, and as an object of governmental techniques" (Foucault 1991:102) is the basis of world governmentality. And, the kineformations of commodities emerge as part and parcel out of the major dromocratic shifts which no longer "isolate the economy as a specific sector of reality" (Foucault 1991:102), but rather transform economics into an identity that is the universalizing totality of the real.

## Impacts

### O/W Extinction

#### Totalitarianism destroys the parts of life that makes it beautiful – turns the aff

Caplan 5

(Bryan Caplan, Dept. Econ. And Center for Study of Public Choice – George Mason U., “The Totalitarian Threat”, October, 2005, http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/bcaplan/total4.doc)

Finally, it is tempting to minimize the harm of a social disaster like totalitarianism, because it would probably not lead to human extinction. Even in Cambodia, the totalitarian regime with the highest death rate per-capita, 75% of the population remained alive after three years of rule by the Khmer Rouge. (Margolin 1999b) But perhaps **an eternity of totalitarianism would be worse than extinction.** It is hard to read Orwell and not to wonder: Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our world will be progress towards more **pain**. The old civilizations claimed that they were founded on love or justice. Ours is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear, rage, triumph and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy – everything... There will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There will be no love, except the love of Big Brother. There will be no laughter, except for the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy. There will be no art, no literature, no science. When we are omnipotent we shall have no more need of science. There will be no distinction between beauty and ugliness. There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed. (1983: 220)

### Endless War

#### Capitalism is the only alternative to endless war – free market suppresses your impacts

Herbener 99

(Jeffrey Herbener, Prof. Econ. – Grove City College, Mises Daily, “Human Action on War”, 4-16-1999, HYPERLINK "https://mises.org/story/204" https://mises.org/story/204)

Failure to grasp the role of the market in creating, sustaining, and improving social life was the reason, according to Mises, that Western nations were so readily drawn into war in this century. The policy of total war in the modern age, which for Mises began with the French revolution, is a return of the relations between primitive tribes which had nothing to lose from wars of extermination since they had no inter-tribal division of labor and trade. Mises put it this way: "The struggles in which primitive hordes and tribes fought one another...were...pitiless wars of annihilation. They were total wars." (p. 168) Only when the victors came to perceive the possibility of future cooperation between themselves and the conquered did war become limited. Then, according to Mises, "Above the implacable hatred and the frenzy of destruction and annihilation a societal element began to prevail....War was no longer considered the normal state of interhuman relations...We may even say that as soon as people realized that it is more advantageous to enslave the defeated than to kill them, the warriors, while still fighting, gave thought to the aftermath, the peace. Enslavement was by and large a preliminary step toward cooperation." (pp. 168-169) The next step, Mises wrote was, "The ascendancy of the idea that even in war not every act is to be considered permissible, that there are legitimate and illicit acts of warfare, that there are laws, i.e., societal relationships which are above all nations, even above those momentarily fighting one another," and the spread of this idea, "has finally established the Great Society embracing all men and all nations." (p. 169) The authentic Great Society was achieved most fully, after a long struggle, in Western Europe in the three hundred years before the French revolution. The philosophy of conquest that animated the Roman empire also lived in the rulers of medieval Europe. But, under feudalism, their means of warfare were strictly limited. The aggressiveness of kings was checked by their vassals, which led to the normalcy of peaceful relations among sovereign states. When feudalism fell apart, kings organized their own armies of mercenaries; a system in which financial considerations limited war. The threat of coalitions among nations against an aggressor also constrained conquest. With peace the normal condition of life, laws of the Great Society began to be codified culminating in the works of Grotius in the seventeenth century. In this era, most people were not part of the war effort. War was fought among small armies of professional soldiers that afforded non-combatants the status of neutrals; their lives and property were sacrosanct. Limited war did not affect the daily activity of ordinary people save for the burdens of taxation, inflation, and debt which they loathed. Intellectuals, unfortunately, drew erroneous conclusions from the conduct of limited war. Since war was fought among aristocrats who gained from victory and lost in defeat while the people objected to war, they thought democracy would end war. A revolution supplanting the ruling class with the people will be the war to end all wars. Only the liberals of the nineteenth century grasped the truth that, as Mises put it, "what can safeguard durable peace is not simply government by the people, but government by the people under unlimited laissez faire. In their eyes free trade, both in domestic affairs and in international relations, was the necessary prerequisite of the preservation of peace." (p. 819) Historians, by ignoring this fact, erroneously concluded that the cause of modern total war was aggressive nationalism. Mises supplied the corrective: "aggressive nationalism is the necessary derivative of the policies of interventionism and national planning. While laissez faire eliminates the causes of international conflict, government interference with business and socialism create conflicts for which no peaceful solution can be found." (pp. 819-820) In a world of laissez faire, the movement of goods, capital, and people would bring about an equalization of prices, interest rates, and wage rates around the world. In such a world, "No individual is interested in the expansion of the size of his nation's territory," reasoned Mises, "as he cannot derive any gain from such an aggrandizement. Conquest does not pay and war becomes obsolete." (p. 681). But if foreign states prevent capitalists from investing abroad to gain access to cheaper raw materials and labor or consumers buying cheaper foreign products, then these benefits can only be obtained through conquest. "It is illusory to assume that the advanced nations will acquiesce in such a state of affairs," wrote Mises, "They will resort to the only method which gives them access to badly needed raw materials; they will resort to conquest. War is the alternative to freedom of foreign investment as realized by the international capital markets." (p. 499) But, investing and lending in foreign markets cannot be realized unless foreign governments are committed to laissez faire. Private property must be respected and plans to expropriate the capitalist must be surrendered. "It was such expropriations," Mises claimed, "that destroyed the international capital markets" and thereby paved the way for war. (p. 499) Nor can intergovernmental loans "substitute for the functioning of the international capital markets." Since "they are granted as virtual subsidies without any regard for payment of principal and interest," Mises wrote, "they impose restrictions upon the debtor nation's sovereignty. In fact such ‘loans' are for the most part the price paid for military assistance in the coming wars." (p. 499) While economic conflicts are often the proximate cause of war, these conflicts "do not spring from the operation of the unhampered market society." They arise instead from "the anti-capitalist policies designed to check the functioning of capitalism." (pp. 680-681) The attempt by nations to live in the halfway house between laissez faire and self-sufficient has had two monumental

consequences. First it has made war inevitable in a world of nationalism. The international division of labor has developed far enough that imported goods have become articles of mass consumption. "The most advanced European nations could do without these imports only at the price of a very considerable lowering of their standard of living," Mises wrote, and consequently "their vital interests are hurt by the protectionist trade policies of the countries producing these primary products." (p. 681) And, as mentioned already, protectionist policies also harm national interests by preventing the exploitation of international differences in prices, interest rates, and wage rates. With a partially developed division of labor, there is a real conflict of the have-nots against the haves. Modern war, Mises wrote, "is a war to abolish those institutions which prevent the emergence of a tendency toward an equalization of wages all over the world" by conquering territory instead of peacefully extending the division of labor. (p. 499) War cannot be avoided by having policy focus on domestic interventionism. Government control of domestic businesses cannot achieve its ends unless the state resorts to protectionism. If the government permits labor unions to use violence to exclude competing workers for the purpose of raising its member's wages, for example, the domestic prices of automobiles will rise and consumers will shift demand to cheaper imports. Only tariffs and quotas can prevent the consequent falling back of union wages. But the injury protectionism does to foreigners is engenders conflict. "It is an illusion," Mises wrote, "to assume that those injured will tolerate other nations' protectionism if they believe that they are strong enough to brush it away by the use of arms. The philosophy of protectionism is a philosophy of war. The wars of our age are not at variance with popular economic doctrine; they are, on the contrary, the inescapable result of a consistent application of these doctrines." (p. 683) Although the Great Society, and thus durable peace, requires international acceptance of laws defending private property and contract, it does not imply supra-national government. "It is not sovereignty of governments as such that makes for war," wrote Mises, "but sovereignty of governments not entirely committed to the principles of the market economy." "Liberalism," he continued, "did not and does not build its hopes upon abolition of the sovereignty of the various national governments." Such "a venture... would result in endless wars....What is needed to make peace durable is neither international treaties and covenants nor international tribunals and organizations like the defunct League of Nations or its successor, the United Nations. If the principle of the market economy is universally accepted, such makeshifts are unnecessary; if it is not accepted, they are futile. Durable peace can only be the outgrowth of a change in ideologies." (p. 682). The second effect of the partial development of the international division of labor is the disparate impact specialized production has on a nation's ability to conduct war. "It was in the [American] Civil War that, for the first time, problems of the interregional division of labor played the decisive role," wrote Mises, "the South was predominantly agricultural...[it] depended on the supply of manufactures from Europe. As the naval forces of the Union were strong enough to blockade their coast, they soon began to lack needed equipment." (p. 825) The Germans suffered the same problem in both World Wars. They were unable to run the British blockade for needed imports of food. "In both wars," Mises wrote, "the outcome was decided by the battles of the Atlantic." (p. 825) Critics of the market economy draw the wrong conclusions from these experiences with the partially developed international division of labor. They reason that until the happy day when the Great Society is fully established we must tolerate government control of business in preparation for the next war and when it comes, we must adopt war socialism as the price of victory and when it is over, we must maintain statism in preparation for the next war. To this cold-war mentality, Mises responded with an analysis of the American experience of the Second World War. "What America needed in order to win the war was a radical conversion of all its production activities" Mises wrote, "If the government had raised all the funds needed for the conduct of war by taxing the citizens and by borrowing from them, everybody would have been forced to cut down his consumption drastically....The government, now by virtue of the inflow of taxes and borrowed money the biggest buyer on the market, would have been in a position to obtain all it wanted." (pp. 822-823) To complete the transition, it is absolutely necessary not to interfere with the consequent changes in prices and profitability so as to give full reign to market incentives necessary to bring about the alterations in production. Instead, the Roosevelt administration resorted to price controls, quotas, and rationing to prevent the very shifts in demand and changes in prices and profits needed to attain the pattern of production that would meet war aims in the most efficient manner. But "the most important thing in war," Mises wrote, "is not to avoid the emergence of high profits, but to give the best equipment to one's own country's soldiers and sailors." (p. 823) Unlike economists from other traditions who assert that war is the health of the economy, Mises recognized that war supplants the satisfaction of consumer preferences, even if the government refrains from wartime controls. Reduced standards of living are suffered by the war generation whether government finances the war with taxes, debt, or inflation. "The popular justification of war loans is nonsensical," Mises wrote, "all of the materials needed for the conduct of a war must be provided by restriction of civilian consumption, by using up a part of the capital available and by working harder. The whole burden of warring falls upon the living generation." (p. 228) While Mises recognized that debt could be justified as a way to shift the burden of the necessary restrictions from one group to another, he deplored permanent government debt. "Long-term public and semipublic credit is a foreign and disturbing element in the structure of the market economy," he wrote, "it is obvious that sooner or later all these debts will be liquidated in some way or other, but certainly not by payment of interest and principle according to the terms of the contract." (p. 228) If a belligerent government chooses war socialism over financing the war effort, then the economy itself is not redirected but impaired, at best, and ruined at worst. Moreover, war socialism makes the post-war transition to normalcy problematic. If government financing has been used, then when peace comes the government simply reduces taxes, thereby restoring consumer incomes which allows entrepreneurs full scope to reconstruct the division of labor to satisfy consumer preferences once again. Wartime controls, however, supplant entrepreneurial management of business based on profit and loss with bureaucratic management based on rules and regulations. Dismantling such a structure so that normalcy can return is more difficult. "Capitalism is essentially a scheme for peaceful nations," Mises wrote, "But this does not mean that a nation which is forced to repel foreign aggressors must substitute government control for private enterprise. If it were to do this, it would deprive itself of the most efficient means of defense. There is no record of a socialist nation which defeated a capitalist nation. In spite of their much glorified war socialism, the Germans were defeated in both World Wars." (p. 684) Presumably the maxim of financing the war through the market, i.e., using the market to provide resources for war, applies to labor as well as materials. Efficiency would require that men and women be allocated into war production by entrepreneurial demand for their services according to profitability; thereby, permitting entrepreneurs to reconstruct the division of labor to satisfy war aims. Soldiers then, as well, could be most efficiently acquired by financing and not by conscription. Let me conclude with the words Mises used to close his chapter on war: "How far we are today from the rules of international law developed in the age of limited warfare! Modern war is merciless, it does not spare pregnant women or infants; it is indiscriminate killing and destroying. It does not respect the rights of neutrals. Millions are killed, enslaved, or expelled from the dwelling places in which their ancestors lived for centuries. Nobody can foretell what will happen in the next chapter of this endless struggle.... Modern civilization is a product of the philosophy of laissez faire. It cannot be preserved under the ideology of government omnipotence. Statolatry owes much to the doctrines of Hegel. However, one may pass over many of Hegel's inexcusable faults, for Hegel also coined the phrase ‘the futility of victory.' To defeat the aggressors is not enough to make peace durable. The main thing is to discard the ideology that generates war." (p. 828)

### The Accident

**Globalization feeds into a logic of technological totalitarianism that makes the accident an endless horizon that haunts the political - extinction**

Hutchings 8

(Kimberly Hutchings, Professor and Department Head of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008, “Apocalyptic times” in *Time and world politics: thinking the present*, Manchester University Press)

Virilio develops an extensive vocabulary to capture his vision of chronopolitics (2000: 109). But the most telling of the terms he uses is 'globalitarian', in which the concepts of 'globalisation' and 'totalitarianism' are fused (2000: 10-11). Here his arguments are strongly reminiscent of Arendt's account of totalitarianism (Arendt, 1986). Globalisation is totalitarian because it both homogenises and fragments the human condition. It homogenises it by destroying the spaces between individuals that condition the possibility of political judgement and action. There is no plurality of perspective in globalitarian time, and therefore no democratic engagement. Instead we have a politics (or non-politics) of collectivist emotion, of immediate gut reaction to simultaneously experienced events, in which there is no possibility of mediation (Virilio, 2005: 33). Globalisation fragments the human condition because it destroys the common location in which political community can be sustained, leaving individuals with nothing but the commitment to their own material, instant gratification, which feeds into a logic of instrumentality and technical control, and extends into all bodily as well as spiritual domains of existence (2000: 66). Like Arendt, Virilio is also clear that people are at least partly responsible for their own globalitarian plight. He argues that we are complicit with the projects of control and surveillance that have spilled over from war into all spheres of human existence. We should, he suggests, be thinking about how to control this new temporality, rather than letting it control us. But his arguments make it difficult to see how this could be possible. A crucial question arises at this precise instant in history: can one democratise ubiquity, instantaneity, omniscience and omnipresence, which are precisely the privileges of the divine, or in other words, of autocracy? (2002: 134) One strand of Virilio's thought can be traced back to Rousseau or, more generally, the romantic and conservative critiques of modernity that have deplored the effects on society and politics of mass society and materialism, from Burke to Arendt. However, there is another strand of his argument that is strongly technologically determinist. The first strand of argument permits the possibility of the invention or reinvention of alternative spatio-temporal conditions for politics that might allow politics (and thereby humanity) to take priority over war or technological innovation. It is this first strand that leads Virilio to deny that he is a purveyer of doom, and identify himself instead as a political actor (2005: 100). But the second strand of argument sees the fate of humanity as technologically determined, from the point at which politics becomes possible to the point at which it ceases to exist. If one defines politics in terms of particular kinds of spatio-temporal conditions that can no longer apply, then the answer to Virilio's 'crucial question' has to be in the negative. It is in this mode that Virilio writes of the earth as 'the colony, the camp of the great ordeal' (2000: 131) or our lives as a 'labyrinth for laboratory animals' (1997a: 73). However, there is another twist to Virilio's narrative. His grim vision of the earth as a global concentration camp is not the only possible ending, the end of chronos as such is also possible: if interactivity is to information what radioactivity is to energy, then we are confronted with the fearsome emergence of the 'Accident to end all accidents', an accident which is no longer local and precisely situated, but global and generalised. (2000: 134) Inherent in every form of chronos are different possibilities of accidental catastrophe, from the train wreck to nuclear holocaust. The accident undoes the power of control inherent in different technologies, but is also only possible because of them. For the first time, however, in the era of electro-magnetic proximity, this 'undoing' threatens to undo the human species altogether, if not immediately then certainly in the longer term (Armitage, 2000a: 44). In the contemporary era, the project of technical control is confronted for the first time in pure form with the potentially wholly catastrophic consequences of its own power on a number of fronts economically and biopolitically as well as militarily. The idea of 'accident' encompasses not just the possibility of another Chernobyl, but more broadly any of the unintended consequences of new technologies. For Virilio this includes the possibility of world economic collapse, which follows from the technologies that enable a single world market and the gradual replacement of humanity itself by its virtual counterparts. In this respect, the road to hell is most certainly paved with good intentions, since the technologies enabling the world market or cloning or cyber-sex were set up to serve rather than to destroy human interests. And so, we have seen the emergence of a third anthropological type over the twentieth century: the exterminator. Not so much the butcher of a terrorism that has turned suicidal, the looming shadow of the lost soldier of the wars of days gone by; more the kind of butcher who ingeniously offers the means of putting an end to the world and to its embedded humanity every possible means, including economic, technical and scientific all the while being intimately persuaded of bringing Progress, as superior civilization. (2005: 79) Virilio extends his argument about the accident to encompass more generally the implications of a world in which fear of the consequences of loss of control matches the scale of devastation that technologies of control have made possible. In this kind of world, he argues, there is a tendency for the declaration of a 'state of emergency' to become widespread, and for pre-emptive action to be seen as the appropriate response to unexpected events. He interprets the US response to the events of 9/11 in these terms (2005: 74).

### The Accident

**The Accident slowly creeps into politics and becomes a universal condition – the impact is slow-motion nuclear war.**

**Virilio 4**

(Director of the Ecole Speciale d' Architecture in Paris (Paul, Editor is Steve Redhead – Professor of Legal Studies in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology and PhD, “The Paul Virilio Reader”, Columbia University Press, ISBN: 0-231-13482-7, pg. 256-257)

Proof, if proof were needed, that far from promoting quietude, our industrialized societies throughout the twentieth century have essentially developed disquiet and the major risk, and this is so even if we leave out of account the recent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction… Hence the urgent need to reverse this trend which consists in exposing us to the most catastrophic accidents produced by the techno-scientific spirit, and to establish the opposite approach which would consist in exposing or exhibiting the accident as the major enigma of modern Progress. Although some car companies carry out more than 400 crash tests annually in the attempt to improve the safety of their vehicles, this still does not prevent television channels from continually inflicting road-death statistics on us (not to mention the tragedies which see the present repeatedly plunged into mourning). It is certainly high time (alongside the ecological approaches that relate to the various ways in which the biosphere is polluted) for the beginnings of an eschatological approach to technical progress to emerge – an approach to that finitude without which the much-vaunted globalisation is in danger of itself becoming a life-size catastrophe. Both a natural and a man-made catastrophe, a general catastrophe and not one specific to any particular technology or region of the world, which would far exceed the disasters currently covered by the insurance companies – a catastrophe of which the long-term drama of Chernobyl remains emblematic. So as to avoid in the near future experiencing an integral accident on a planetary scale, an accident capable of incorporating a whole host of incidents and disasters in a chain reaction, we should right now build, inhabit and plan a laboratory of cataclysms – the technical progress accident museum – so as to avoid the accident of substances, revealed by Aristotle, being succeeded by the knowledge accident – that major philosophical catastrophe which genetic engineering, coming on the heels of atomic power, bears within it. Whether we like it or not, globalization is today the fateful mark of a finitude. Paraphrasing Paul Valery, we might assert without fear of contradiction that ‘the time of the finite world is coming to an end’ and that there is an urgent need to assert that knowledge marks the finitude of man, just as ecology marks that of his geophysical environment.

### Beauty

**Speed reduces the beauty of the world into nothing but a blurred image of crosshatched field across the windshield of our cars and the windows of planes – the impact is everything.**

**Virilio 98**

(Paul, “Dromoscopy, or The Ecstasy of Enormities”, *Wide Angle* 20.3 (1998), <http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/lerner/wide_angle/20_3/203virilio.htm>, EY)

Today, the means of communication not only produces as yesterday the transfer from one point to another (no matter what the bridge), the means of rapid transportation also produces a fleeting figuration of flight. In simulating the transitoriness of immobile things, the means of communication shows the unbelievable reality of an end to space. The dromoscopic simulation makes believable the counter-truth of the world's contraction. The animation of dashboards deceives the voyagers with the cataclysmic movement of the end, the arrival of the end. Like a magic mirror, the windshield permits the future to be seen. In fact, the DROMOVISION (automobile media) simulated transitoriness well before the TELEVISION (audiovisual media) simulated proximity... all the way until the not-at-all-unimagineable moment when the instantaneity of omnipresence will abolish the distance of space, in the same blow making the dromovisual apparatus the perfect equivalent of the audivisual apparatus! The departure of the automobile should, however, be the occasion to examine the *prospects* of *projection*. Somewhat as one enters the laboratory, we should climb on board in order to decipher an enigma, that of the incoherence of the motorized wandering, trying to guess the logic of that desertion which impels travel. If in the history of architecture the window initially appeared in places of worship before proliferating in its usual habitat, this is because the window's opening permitted one to contemplate the sky without touching it: the environs of a temple. Yet more slowly, in pictorial history this time, the frame of easel painting permitted a renewal of this critical distance which geometric perspective confirmed scientifically. Today, it seems very much that the screen of the dashboard repeats this false proximity: with its rear-view mirror, its windowed doors, its frontal windshield, the automobile forms a quadriptych where the travel lover is the target of a permanent assault which renews the perspective of painting. The illusion is the same, but henceforth it extends itself at the surface of the world and no longer only on the surface of the canvas. The drive replaces the painting's varnish: the painter (driver) brings along behind him the viewer (passenger) in the transparent wake of his driving. If yesterday painting attracted the gaze of art lovers in the painted work's illusion of depth, currently the dromoscopic work attracts at the same time the driver and his passenger in the "work" of an entire country. Projected towards the light of the arrival, they occupy together the soul of a sort of translucent pit where the countrysides compose the measure of the journey.

### Violence of Speed

**With speed comes the violence of automobility that brings the war machine into the scope of cultural life.**

**Virilio 98**

(Paul, “Dromoscopy, or The Ecstasy of Enormities”, *Wide Angle* 20.3 (1998), <http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/lerner/wide_angle/20_3/203virilio.htm>, EY)

The technique of vectors henceforth replacing the tactics of bodies, this vision of a world lost as soon as it's perceived identifies itself well enough with a conqueror's vision, to the point that the control of the dashboard could appear a bit like a misunderstood form of war game. Let's remember: in the dialectic of war, that which unveils itself undoes itself; the visible is lost because it escapes the prescience which is the rule of the game of strategy. Likewise in the automobile's path the foresight of the movement of the adversary horizon is for the driver the twin of that movement of the adversary for the army commander. A sophisticated form of *kriegspiel*, the dromoscopy would be in some form a video game of speed, a *blitzkriegspeil* in which the military staff's exercises would ceaselessly perfect themselves, each rapid vehicle would be in sum a vector of command, a "command car." It is, moreover, instructive to consider the historical evolution of diverse "cockpits": if yesterday one still drove in the open air, in contact with the atmosphere while hearing the noise of the motor and the wind, feeling the machine vibrate, one can notice that the excess of speed has contributed to progressively enclosing the driver, first behind the screen of goggles, then behind the windshield, and finally in the interior driver's seat. The driving "by instinct" of the pioneers has given way to the "driving by instruments," then to the "auto-pilot," while awaiting the likely integral automation of automobility.... In fact, the driver's seat of machines offers a political image of the future. The instrument panel exposes to he who wants to observe it the foreseeable evolution of power. A veritable crystal ball, these screens and dials illuminate by their dim glow forthcoming political paths. The new "machine of war" brings with it the last "machine of surveillance." The two together become one. There is no more, as in the past, a dichotomy between the function of the weapon and that of the eye. The assault vehicle carries a scope machine, and the destruction of the looking illustrates that of living. Unfortunately, *the dromoscopic accidents* are less spectacular, it appears, in their immediate consequences than *the telescopic accidents*, not one wreck subsists and "visibly" nothing concerns itself with the security of looking. Nonetheless, in confronting this vertigo which attacks the passenger when he plunges in the depth of the countryside, we should question ourselves. This ecstasy of enormities which follows such vertigo and overtakes certain abatements of acceleration is formidable. The size of the world, its extension, is suddenly penetrated by the will to power of the driver: it's the assault which brings to light the regions of the journey. The territory no longer exists but by the violence of the advance. It's the advance which in the end provokes the dawning of places. The voyeur-voyager no longer has need like his sedentary brother to hold himself behind the keyhole of a center of panoptic convergence. His course is no more than a long look where the site and the sight etymologically intermix. [4](http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/lerner/wide_angle/20_3/203virilio.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT4) As Martin Heidegger declared in 1933 in associating himself with the philosophy of the Führer: "The beginning is also there. It is not behind us as that which was a long time ago, but it holds itself before us. The beginning has burst forth in our future. It stands apart like a distant disposition. Through us, its greatness demands we rejoin it." [5](http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/lerner/wide_angle/20_3/203virilio.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT5) Since, a number of "drivers of the people" and other "great ensigns" have succeeded one another behind the dromoscopic screen of absolute power, but it seems no less reassuring to consider the army of their offspring motorcyclists, automobile drivers, and family leaders who reproduce in their little daily evasions the dromocractic order of the great invasions. In this sharing of the power of speed's violence, what political fallout does this betoken? In the control of the engine, to what democratic illusion does this pertain? To what liturgy does it belong?

## Alts

### Flowmationization

The alternative is an intentional decentering – an unplanned planning that takes the language of modern capitalism and turns it in on itself.

Luke 5

(Timothy W., University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, “Scanning Fast Capitalism: Quasipolitan Order and New Social Flowmations”, 1.1.5, <http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1_1/luke.html>, [CL])

At this juncture, trends in kineformative governmentality, and their links to negative and positive freedom, gain significance because the capillaries of control where social science can matter are so pervasive. That is, questions of freedom in the quasipolis always, "lie across the distinction between theory and practice, across the borders of specialties and disciplines, across the specialized competencies and institutional responsibilities, across the distinction between value and fact (and thus between ethics and science), and across the realms of politics, the public sphere, science and the economy, which are seemingly divided by institutions" (Beck 1992:70). While their mechanisms are complex, the workings of kinematic governmentality unfold at these intersections between the technics of domination and cultivating the self. **Flowmationization is planned decentering, intentional unbounding, and purposive deterritorialization in quasipolitics**. Flowmational structures never rest anywhere—save in flight to and from their points of source and reception. Like the components of goods kept in permanent transit as fixed subunits of unfixed superunits, like the parts and pieces of Toyotas prior to their Toyotification at kanban assembly points flowing through disassembly lines, flowmations are shaped and steered by telemetries of regulation as well as the strange attractions of chaos. Flexible specializations spring into and out of rigid generalizations, riddling the latter's grounded authority with flows of power/knowledge seeking their transnational populations to command and control.

The rule of speed underlies most existing imaginaries of modernization and development as they come to us as post-Cold War globalism. Modernization has implicitly always suggested something like mobilization / acceleration / intensification as the biorhythms of ageless customs become infused with flowmational forces. Modernity's time-space compression is a xenotransplantation of energies and motions from fast zones to slow zones, anticipating in toto Marinetti's manifestations of Futurism: "with us begins the reign of uprooted man, of multiple man who gets tangled up in iron and feeds on electricity. Let's make way for the eminent and inevitable identification of man with the motor" (cited in Virilio 1995:129). Like the channels of any fluidized exchange, quasipolitical kineformations in core regions capture traffic with high-value, fast-rate, top-level qualities. Surrounding these flows with a strangely attracted peripheral band of flows in low-value, slow-rate, low-level exchanges, one finds immediate boundary layers of semi-peripheral/quasi-core flows that mix and match these leading and lagging currents. This flowmational interdependence crosscuts territorialized domains with deterritorialized kineformative currents. On these terrains, then, social theory can begin to explore the politics of fast capitalism as flowmationalization totally reworks our senses of place and experiences of space in cultural kineformations spun up from within the quasipolitical order.

### Collapse Good

Economic collapse is inevitable – further delay destroys the biosphere and ensures that the future collapse causes extinction

Barry 8

(Glen, Ph.D. in "Land Resources" from the U of Wisconsin-Madison, Jan 12, [earthmeanders.blogspot.com/2008/01/economic-collapse-and-global-ecology.html] AD: 6-22-11, jam)

Given widespread failure to pursue policies sufficient to reverse deterioration of the biosphere and avoid ecological collapse, the best we can hope for may be that the growth-based economic system crashes sooner rather than later Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of rapid economic growth. Yet this growth is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained, can only lead to human extinction and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it would be better for the economic collapse to come now rather than later. Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure. Humanity has proven itself unwilling and unable to address climate change and other environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products. Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological policies, are fundamentally incompatible. Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration. This critical transition to both economic and ecological sustainability is simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal consumption. We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies. It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil. Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon.

### Collapse Inevitable

It’s linear—the longer we wait, the worse it will be

Barry 10

(Glen, Ph.D. in "Land Resources" from the U of Wisconsin-Madison, Jan 7, [www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=308:resisting-global-ecological-change&catid=69:reports&Itemid=272] 6-23-11, jam)

The human family faces imminent and (Copenhagen would suggest) inevitable collapse of the biosphere – the thin layer of life upon an otherwise lifeless planet – that makes Earth habitable. Marshes and rivers and forests and fish are far more than resources – they and all natural ecosystems are a necessity for humanity’s existence upon Earth. A few centuries of historically unprecedented explosion in human numbers and surging, albeit inequitable, consumption and resultant resource use, ecosystem destruction and pollution; is needlessly destroying being for all living things. Revolutionary action such as ending coal use, reforming industrial agriculture and protecting and restoring old forests and other natural ecosystems, is a requirement for the continuation of shared human being. Earth is threatened by far more than a changing atmosphere causing climate change. Cumulative ecosystem destruction – not only in climate, but also water, forests, oceans, farmland, soils and toxics -- in the name of “progress” and “development” -- threatens each of us, our families and communities, as well as the Earth System in total and all her creatures. Any chance of achieving global ecological sustainability depends urgently upon shifting concerns regarding climate change to more sufficiently transform ourselves and society to more broadly resist global ecological change. Global ecological, social and economic collapse may be inevitable, but its severity, duration and likelihood of recovery are being determined by us now. It does not look good as the environmental movement has been lacking in its overall vision, ambition and implementation. The growing numbers of ecologically literate global citizens must come forward to together start considering ecologically sufficient emergency measures to protect and restore global ecosystems. We need a plan that allows humans and as many other species as possible to survive the coming great ecological collapse, even as we work to soften the collapse, and to restore to the extent practicable the Earth’s ecosystems. This mandates full protection for all remaining large natural ecosystems and working to reconnect and enlarge biologically rich smaller remnants that still exist. It is time for a hard radical turn back to a fully functioning and restored natural Earth which will require again regaining our bond with land (and air, water and oceans), powering down our energy profligacy, and taking whatever measures are necessary to once again bring society into balance with ecosystems. This may mean taking all measures necessary to stop those known to be destroying ecosystems for profit. As governments dither and the elite profit, it has become dreadfully apparent that the political, economic and social structures necessary to stop human ecocide of our and all life’s habitats does not yet exist. The three hundred year old hyper-capitalistic and nationalistic growth machine eating ecosystems is not going to willingly stop growing. But unless it does, human and most or all other life will suffer a slow and excruciating apocalyptic death. Actions can be taken now to soften ecological collapse while maximizing the likelihood that a humane and ecologically whole Earth remains to be renewed.

### Rejection

#### Individual challenges to collectivism are key to eroding the ideology of the State.

**Elbeling 92**

(Richard M. Elbeling, Ludwig von Mises Prof. Econ. – Hillsdale College, President of Foundation for Economic Education, “Fighting Statism in a Post-Communist World”, February, 1992, HYPERLINK "http://www.fff.org/freedom/0292b.asp" http://www.fff.org/freedom/0292b.asp)

This sentiment is the predominate one everywhere in the West. But it merely demonstrates just how far down an Orwellian memory-hole has gone any true knowledge of what capitalism means. A "corporate capitalism" is, in fact, a form of economic fascism. A "state-subsidized capitalism" is, in fact, a form of nationalist mercantilism. And a "welfare-state capitalism" is, in fact, a form of collectivist redistributivism. The tragedy we face is that the economies of the West are peculiar and perverse blends of all three, with varying amounts of real market activity only permitted to operate in narrow ranges and areas of the society. Nor are governments in the West constitutionally restrained, if by constitutional restraint we mean governments limited to the protection of individual rights. Group rights are the only rights increasingly recognized and enforced in the Western democracies. For example, in France and Germany, the fear of non-European immigration has resulted in debates over what defines a person as a Frenchman or a German and, therefore, having the rights of residence and citizenship (including the right to work and own property). The discussions revolve around the question: Are you a Frenchman or a German because accident of birth placed you there, or because of your "blood," i.e., were your ancestors, going back several generations, French or German? And in the United States, every conceivable social issue is immediately politicized into questions about minority rights (meaning ethnic rights), women's rights, sexual-preference rights, disabled-persons' rights, smokers' rights, or non-smokers' rights. In this mad rush to claim rights and demand that the state use its power to bestow various privileges on those belonging to various groups at the expense of others in society, it has been forgotten that the only relevant minority — and the only one truly possessing rights — is the individual. And the use of the word "forgotten" in the last sentence is unfortunately the heart of the dilemma that the world faces in this post-communist era. Communism may be politically dead at the present. But it is important to remember that communism is only one species of a wider genus. And that genus is statism. Statism is the philosophy that declares that the state is supreme — that in the state resides all ultimate power, authority and right. In this philosophy, the individual is considered to have no existence outside his role within the collective plan. He and everything he owns are the property of the state to which he belongs. Under statism, the concept of private property loses its meaning. Even if property has not been nationalized — even if individuals are not meticulously regulated at every moment in every detail of their economic and social activities — the logic of statism is that, at any moment for any purpose, the individual, his property and his productive energy are at the unreserved disposal of the state. While communism may have died, statism still rules the world, dominates all of our lives, and cats away at every aspect of our liberty. Stripped of our individual rights and denied our existence as independent individuals, we wait anxiously and with trepidation to be told by the state to which group we belong and what "rights" (that is, privileges) we shall have bestowed on us as members of various and sundry groups. And fearing that the groups to which we belong will receive fewer or less valuable "rights" than others in society, we enter into the arena of political combat to assure that "our" minority receives its "fair share" of the political largess. In the heat of the continuous and unending political battle over "rights" and "fair shares," the very idea that we exist as distinct and separate human beings possessing natural and inalienable rights as individuals slowly passes out of our very consciousness. Statism threatens to win its ultimate victory — over the minds of every individual in society — for each person finds it increasingly difficult to conceive of his existence other than in collectivist categories. If the statists have their way, we will cease to exist as individuals. As Yavgeny Zamyatin and Ayn Rand imagined in their futuristic novels, the "I" disappears, with only the "We" remaining. And it is in terms of this "We" that we start thinking of ourselves as free. Nevertheless, standing now at the threshold of the 21st century, we can took back at a hundred years during which the world has tried practically every form of statism imagined by man. And each of them has failed — failed politically, economically and culturally. Statism is a philosophy bankrupt of any justification or rationale — other than as a system to satisfy the lust for power and privilege. Its bankruptcy is shown by the fact that no one even tries any more to justify it as a moral principle. Statism has been reduced to a mere emotional wanting for the state to do certain things for certain people. Statism's moral bankruptcy opens the door for advocates of freedom to enter the field of battle with that most important of intellectual weapons: moral conviction. Brute force and power have never been able to maintain themselves without a moral justification to make people believe and accept their subservience. The advocates of freedom have the opportunity to rise up from under the rubble of statism and morally challenge the "We." And to argue and convince our fellow human beings that not only are there no fundamental differences between the various forms of statism, but also that each of us is — and morally has the right to be — an "I"

## AT’s

### AT: “Industry is Good”

There isn’t an impact to the degradation of industry – old-school laissez faire resolves all of the problems that centralization uses as blackmail to sustain itself.

Carson 10

(Kevin A., Winner of the Beth A. Hoffman memorial prize for economic writing, “The Distorting Effects of Transportation Subsidies”, November 2010, Volume 60, Issue 9 of The Freeman, <http://www.thefreemanonline.org/features/the-distorting-effects-of-transportation-subsidies/>, [CL])

The State and the Corporation

It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the dominant business model in the American economy, and the size of the prevailing corporate business unit, are direct results of such policies. A subsidy to any factor of production amounts to a subsidy of those firms whose business models rely most heavily on that factor, at the expense of those who depend on it the least. Subsidies to transportation, by keeping the cost of distribution artificially low, tend to lengthen supply and distribution chains. They make large corporations operating over wide market areas artificially competitive against smaller firms producing for local markets—not to mention big-box retailers with their warehouses-on-wheels distribution model.

Some consequentialists treat this as a justification for transportation subsidies: Subsidies are good because they make possible mass-production industry and large-scale distribution, which are (it is claimed) inherently more efficient (because of those magically unlimited “economies of scale,” of course).

[Tibor Machan argued just the opposite](http://www.tinyurl.com/n8jxxp) in the February 1999 Freeman:

Some people will say that stringent protection of rights [against eminent domain] would lead to small airports, at best, and many constraints on construction. Of course—but what’s so wrong with that?

Perhaps the worst thing about modern industrial life has been the power of political authorities to grant special privileges to some enterprises to violate the rights of third parties whose permission would be too expensive to obtain. The need to obtain that permission would indeed seriously impede what most environmentalists see as rampant—indeed reckless—industrialization.

The system of private property rights . . . is the greatest moderator of human aspirations. . . . In short, people may reach goals they aren’t able to reach with their own resources only by convincing others, through arguments and fair exchanges, to cooperate.

In any case, the “efficiencies” resulting from subsidized centralization are entirely spurious. If the efficiencies of large-scale production were sufficient to compensate for increased distribution costs, it would not be necessary to shift a major portion of the latter to taxpayers to make the former profitable. If an economic activity is only profitable when a portion of the cost side of the ledger is concealed, and will not be undertaken when all costs are fully internalized by an economic actor, then it’s not really efficient. And when total distribution costs (including those currently shifted to the taxpayer) exceed mass-production industry’s ostensible savings in unit cost of production, the “efficiencies” of large-scale production are illusory.

### AT: Cap Bad

**Capitalism died in 1887 with the Interstate Commerce Commission – your arguments don’t link. We think modern capitalism is bad too.**

Vance 9

(Laurence Vance, Adjunct Instructor in Accounting – Pensacola Junior College, “Does Capitalism Need Adjustment?” 1-13-2009, http://mises.org/story/3287)

One of the worst things that has happened during this economic crisis is that capitalism itself has been attacked without mercy — even by some who generally support the free market. Calls for more regulations, more bailouts, more Fed action, more stimulus packages, more recovery programs, and more government intervention in general can be heard from every quarter. Not that capitalism hasn't always had its share of critics — even among those who usually espouse some degree of it, like evangelicals. In his recent book, How to Be Evangelical without Being Conservative (Zondervan, 2008), Roger Olson advocates "a highly graduated income tax combined with redistribution of wealth to the poor through education, job training, direct aid to children, subsidized day care for children of poor working mothers and fathers, and other forms of welfare." He rejects Robert Nozick's belief in "small government that interferes as little as possible in the economy" for John Rawls's "limited but active government."[1] Olson recognizes that "one might argue that Rawls's principles would also require guaranteed work with a living wage for everyone and universal entitlement to health care." But it should not scare us that "these social policies are often labeled 'socialism' by conservatives." Socialism, according to Olson, is "just a word." In fact, these policies are not socialistic at all; they are "simply adjustments to capitalism to ameliorate its tendency to widen the gap between the rich and the poor."[2] But rather than an adjustment, what capitalism needs is a vigorous defense. This is true now more than at any other time since the Great Depression because all the Depression-era economic fallacies are being resurrected to try to combat the current crisis. Fortunately, I do not need to write a defense of capitalism: that has already been done — twice —and by men more qualified than I. These defenses of capitalism are not only vigorous; they are uncompromising, up to date, understandable, and eminently readable. And neither one is a textbook on economics. The first book is The Politically Incorrect Guide to Capitalism by Robert P. Murphy, an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute and frequent contributor to this website. Murphy wastes no time in his introductory chapter. Not only does government intervention in the market trample on "freedom and individual rights," it "often hurts the very people it presumes to help." It is "precisely backward" that capitalism exploits the poor for the benefit of the rich. The problem with most modern critics of capitalism is that they "fear freedom — they fear the results of allowing people to decide their own economic affairs and letting the unregulated market run its course." Capitalism's critics "think regulators and bureaucrats know better than private citizens making their own voluntary arrangements." In his defense of capitalism, Murphy discusses every conceivable topic: supply and demand, price controls, profits, taxes, labor laws, antidiscrimination laws, environmental issues, workplace safety, money, banking, monopolies, trade, trade deficits, outsourcing, depressions, business cycles, and interest. Along the way he defends robber barons, middlemen, speculators, CEOs, Big Oil, and other "capitalist pigs," while skewering unions, environmentalists, and government bureaucrats, programs, businesses, deficits, and market interventions. After the introduction, each myth-exploding chapter can be read independently. An added bonus is the procapitalist books we are "not supposed to read" that are mentioned throughout each chapter. No anticapitalist myth is too sacrosanct for his sharp and witty pen. For a more detailed look at The Politically Incorrect Guide to Capitalism, see David Gordon's review in the Mises Review. Murphy's own introduction to his book can be read here. The second book is How Capitalism Saved America: The Untold History of Our Country, from the Pilgrims to the Present by Thomas J. DiLorenzo, one of the senior faculty of the Mises Institute and also a frequent contributor to this website. DiLorenzo takes a historical approach but begins with two crucial introductory chapters on the nature of capitalism and the perpetrators of anticapitalism. DiLorenzo takes us through American history — from the Pilgrims to the 2001–2002 California energy crisis — and shows "how, from the very beginning, capitalism has been vital to America's growth, and how excessive government interference in the economy has only exacerbated economic problems and stifled growth." Although the book is written chronologically, the chapters of How Capitalism Saved America (after the introductory chapters) can, like Robert Murphy's book, be read independently. DiLorenzo dismisses as Marxist propaganda the idea that capitalism is "a zero-sum game in which 'somebody wins, somebody loses.'" Instead, "Capitalism succeeds precisely because free exchange is mutually advantageous." And not only does it succeed, it is "the source of civilizations and human progress." Capitalism has "brought to the masses products and services that were once considered luxuries available only to the rich." Capitalism is not only "the best-known source of upward economic mobility," it "actually reduces income inequalities within a nation." In short, capitalism alleviates poverty, raises living standards, expands economic opportunity, and enables scores of millions to live longer, healthier, and more peaceful lives. Why then is capitalism blamed for causing monopolies, harming consumers, endangering workers, damaging the environment, causing instability, exploiting the Third World, breeding discrimination, and causing war? DiLorenzo believes that because there is "a widespread misunderstanding of what capitalism is, our leaders — and also much of the general public — incorrectly blame capitalism for any economic problems we face." This anticapitalism bias is so pervasive — in the entertainment industry, universities, private foundations, the media, and among government regulators and agencies, environmentalists, ministers — that "most businesspeople are not even capitalists." DiLorenzo indicts large corporations, not because they are large or because they are corporations but because "many corporations support interventionist or anticapitalist policies like trade protectionism or corporate welfare because they hope to benefit from the policies at everyone else's expense."[3] For a more detailed look at How Capitalism Saved America see David Gordon's review in the Mises Review and my own review from the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. Together, these two books on capitalism are a double-barreled shotgun pointed in the face of socialism, mercantilism, protectionism, interventionism, anticapitalist myths, and every bogus idea that has passed for capitalism since Karl Marx invented the term. Both books are sorely needed to counteract the numerous myths, distortions, and falsehoods about capitalism that appear daily in newspapers and magazines and come out of the mouths of government officials, political commentators, preachers in pulpits, and teachers in classrooms. Although there are other important books on this subject — see the works of Mises and Rothbard, and George Reisman's massive Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics — these two books by Murphy and DiLorenzo are the most accessible for the general reader. They should be distributed far and wide — whatever direction the economy takes in the future. The recent attacks on capitalism are not only wrong, they are misdirected. One of the greatest myths about capitalism is that the US economy is a capitalistic one. As George Reisman has well said, "Laissez-faire capitalism is a politico-economic system based on private ownership of the means of production and in which the powers of the state are limited to the protection of the individual's rights against the initiation of physical force." The US economy (now a "mixed economy") began its permanent decline from real capitalism with the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887.The Progressive Era reforms, the Square Deal, the New Deal, and a myriad of government restrictions and regulations have further severed the US economy from real capitalism. Capitalism needs no adjustment. It needs to be understood and put into practice. Not only is capitalism never the cause of a financial crisis, it is always the cure. Government intervention is never ever under any circumstances the solution to any problem, large or small, economic or otherwise. When will men ever learn that more government is not only never the solution, it is usually part of the problem? Real capitalism — that is, capitalism based on secure private-property rights, sound money, the division of labor, social cooperation, freedom of contract, freedom of association, voluntary exchange, and the absence of government control, oversight, and regulation — is the answer to the current economic crisis. Not state capitalism, not crony capitalism, not mixed-market capitalism, not fascism and interventionism under the guise of capitalism, but unfettered, laissez-faire, free-market capitalism.

### AT: Cap Destroys Enviro

Free market resolves warming and environmental destruction – State policy is the catalyst for modern capitalism’s destruction of nature.

Callahan 7

(Gene, adjunct scholar with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Oct, [www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/how-a-free-society-could-solve-global-warming/] AD: 6-22-11, jm)

For these reasons, I believe it is crucial to accept provisionally, for the sake of argument, the scientific claims behind the case for manmade global warming. In the present article I will demonstrate that it still would not follow that the taxes and other regulations typically proposed by greens are the best way to address the problem. Just as the free market is still the optimal economic arrangement, regardless of how many citizens are angels or devils, so too does the free market outperform government intervention, regardless of the fragility of Earth’s ecosystems. When trying to determine if the free market is to blame for possibly dangerous carbon emissions, a logical starting point is to list the numerous ways that government policies encourage the very activities that Al Gore and his friends want us to curtail. The U.S. government has subsidized many activities that burn carbon: it has seized land through eminent domain to build highways, funded rural electrification projects, and fought wars to ensure Americans’ access to oil. After World War II it played a key role in the mass exodus of the middle class from urban centers to the suburbs, chiefly through encouraging mortgage lending. Every American schoolchild has heard of the bold transcontinental railroad (finished with great ceremony at Promontory Summit, Utah) promoted by the federal government. Historian Burt Folsom explains that due to the construction contracts, the incentive was to lay as much track as possible between points A and B—hardly an approach to economize on carbon emissions from the wood- and coal-burning locomotives. For a more recent example, consider John F. Kennedy’s visionary moon shot. I’m no engineer, but I’ve seen the takeoffs of the Apollo spacecraft and think it’s quite likely that the free market’s use of those resources would have involved far lower CO2 emissions. While myriad government policies have thus encouraged carbon emissions, at the same time the government has restricted activities that would have reduced them. For example, there would probably be far more reliance on nuclear power were it not for the overblown regulations of this energy source. For a different example, imagine the reduction in emissions if the government would merely allow market-clearing pricing for the nation’s major roads, thereby eliminating traffic jams! The pollution from vehicles in major urban areas could be drastically cut overnight if the government set tolls to whatever the market could bear—or better yet, sold bridges and highways to private owners. Of course, there is no way to determine just what the energy landscape in America would look like if these interventions had not occurred. Yet it is entirely possible that on net, with a freer market economy, in the past we would have burned less fossil fuel and today we would be more energy efficient. Even if it were true that reliance on the free-enterprise system makes it difficult to curtail activities that contribute to global warming, still the undeniable advantages of unfettered markets would allow humans to deal with climate change more easily. For example, the financial industry, by creating new securities and derivative markets, could crystallize the “dispersed knowledge” that many different experts held in order to coordinate and mobilize mankind’s total response to global warming. For instance, weather futures can serve to spread the risk of bad weather beyond the local area affected. Perhaps there could arise a market betting on the areas most likely to be permanently flooded. That may seem ghoulish, but by betting on their own area, inhabitants could offset the cost of relocating should the flooding occur. Creative entrepreneurs, left free to innovate, will generate a wealth of alternative energy sources. (State intervention, of course, tends to stifle innovations that threaten the continued dominance of currently powerful special interests, such as oil companies—for example, the state of North Carolina recently fined Bob Teixeira for running his car on soybean oil.) Private insurers have a strong incentive to assess the potential effects of global warming without bias in order to price their policies optimally—if they overestimate the risk, they will lose business to lower-priced rivals; if they are too sanguine about the dangers, they will lose money once the claims start rolling in. Individuals finding their homes or businesses threatened by rising sea levels will find it easier to relocate to the extent that unfettered markets have made them wealthier. Industrial manufacturers, as long as they are held liable for the negative environmental effects of their production processes—a traditional common-law liability from which state policies intended to “promote industry” have often sought to shield manufacturers—will strive to develop technologies that minimize the environmental impact of their activities without sacrificing efficiency. Government interventions and “five-year plans,” even when they are sincere attempts to protect the environment rather than disguised schemes to benefit some powerful lobby, lack the profit incentive and are protected from the competitive pressures that drive private actors to seek an optimal cost-benefit tradeoff. If the situation truly becomes dire, it will be free-market capitalism that allows humans to develop techniques for sucking massive amounts of carbon out of the atmosphere, and to colonize the oceans and outer space. Beyond these futuristic possibilities, the obvious responses to global warming—such as more houses with AC, sturdier sea walls, and better equipment to evacuate flooded regions—are again only feasible when the free market is unleashed. It is the poorest people and nations that stand to suffer the most if the worst-case scenario for global warming is realized, and the only reliable way to alleviate their poverty, and thus help protect them from those effects, is the free market.

### AT: Cap Sustainable

**Globalized capitalism makes the systemic exploitation of resources and the environment inevitable – this contradiction of accelerating consumption creates a race between industrial economies to consume faster – this makes the collapse of global capitalism an accident of its own design – impact is extinction.**

Foster 7

(John Bellamy, Professor of Sociology at University of Oregon, The Ecology of Destruction, Feb 2007, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0207jbf.htm>)

In the almost five years that have elapsed since the second earth summit it has become increasingly difficult to separate the class and imperial war inherent to capitalism from war on the planet itself. At a time when the United States is battling for imperial control of the richest oil region on earth, the ecology of the planet is experiencing rapid deterioration, marked most dramatically by global warming. Meanwhile, neoliberal economic restructuring emanating from the new regime of monopoly-finance capital is not only undermining the economic welfare of much of humanity, but in some regions is removing such basic ecological conditions of human existence as access to clean air, drinkable water, and adequate food. Ecologists who once warned of the possibility of future apocalypse now insist that global disaster is on our doorstep. Bill McKibben, author of The End of Nature, declared in his article “The Debate is Over” in the November 17, 2005, issue of Rolling Stone magazine that we are now entering the “Oh Shit” era of global warming. At first, he wrote, there was the “I wonder what will happen?” era. Then there was the “Can this really be true?” era. Now we are in the Oh Shit era. We now know that it is too late to avert global disaster entirely. All we can do is limit its scope and intensity. Much of the uncertainty has to do with the fact that “the world...has some trapdoors—mechanisms that don’t work in straightforward fashion, but instead trigger a nasty chain reaction.”6 In his book, The Revenge of Gaia, influential scientist James Lovelock, best known as the originator of the Gaia hypothesis, has issued a grim assessment of the earth’s prospects based on such sudden chain reactions.7 Voicing the concerns of numerous scientists, Lovelock highlights a number of positive feedback mechanisms that could—and in his view almost certainly will—amplify the earth warming tendency. The destructive effect of increasing global temperatures on ocean algae and tropical forests (on top of the direct removal of these forests) will, it is feared, reduce the capacity of the oceans and forests to absorb carbon dioxide, raising the global temperature still further. The freeing up and release into the atmosphere of enormous quantities of methane (a greenhouse gas twenty-four times as potent as carbon dioxide) as the permafrost of the arctic tundra thaws due to global warming, constitutes another such vicious spiral. Just as ominous, the reduction of the earth’s reflectivity as melting white ice at the poles is replaced with blue seawater is threatening to ratchet-up global temperatures.8 In Lovelock’s cataclysmic view, the earth has probably already passed the point of no return and temperatures are destined to rise eventually as much as 8° C (14° F) in temperate regions. The human species will survive in some form, he assures us. Nevertheless he points to “an imminent shift in our climate towards one that could easily be described as Hell: so hot, so deadly that only a handful of the teeming billions now alive will survive.”9 He offers as the sole means of partial salvation a massive technical fix: a global program to expand nuclear power facilities throughout the earth as a limited substitute to the carbon-dioxide emitting fossil fuel economy. The thought that such a Faustian bargain would pave its own path to hell seems scarcely to have crossed his mind. Lovelock’s fears are not easily dismissed. James Hansen, who did so much to bring the issue of global warming to world attention, has recently issued his own warning. In an article entitled “The Threat to the Planet” (New York Review of Books, July 13, 2006), Hansen points out that animal and plant species are migrating throughout the earth in response to global warming—though not fast enough in relation to changes in their environments—and that alpine species are being “pushed off the planet.” We are facing, he contends, the possibility of mass extinctions associated with increasing global temperature comparable to earlier periods in the earth’s history in which 50 to 90 percent of living species were lost. The greatest immediate threat to humanity from climate change, Hansen argues, is associated with the destabilization of the ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica. A little more than 1° C (1.8° F) separates the climate of today from the warmest interglacial periods in the last half million years when the sea level was as much as sixteen feet higher. Further, increases in temperature this century by around 2.8° C (5° F) under business as usual could lead to a long term rise in sea level by as much as eighty feet, judging by what happened the last time the earth’s temperature rose this high—three million years ago. “We have,” Hansen says, “at most ten years—not ten years to decide upon action but ten years to alter fundamentally the trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions”—if we are to prevent such disastrous outcomes from becoming inevitable. One crucial decade, in other words, separates us from irreversible changes that could produce a very different world. The contradictions of the entire Holocene—the geological epoch in which human civilization has developed—are suddenly being revealed in our time.10 In the Oh shit era, the debate, McKibben says, is over. There is no longer any doubt that global warming represents a crisis of earth-shaking proportions. Yet, it is absolutely essential to understand that this is only one part of what we call the environmental crisis. The global ecological threat as a whole is made up of a large number of interrelated crises and problems that are confronting us simultaneously. In my 1994 book, The Vulnerable Planet, I started out with a brief litany of some of these, to which others might now be added: Overpopulation, destruction of the ozone layer, global warming, extinction of species, loss of genetic diversity, acid rain, nuclear contamination, tropical deforestation, the elimination of climax forests, wetland destruction, soil erosion, desertification, floods, famine, the despoliation of lakes, streams, and rivers, the drawing down and contamination of ground water, the pollution of coastal waters and estuaries, the destruction of coral reefs, oil spills, overfishing, expanding landfills, toxic wastes, the poisonous effects of insecticides and herbicides, exposure to hazards on the job, urban congestion, and the depletion of nonrenewable resources.11 The point is that not just global warming but many of these other problems as well can each be seen as constituting a global ecological crisis. Today every major ecosystem on the earth is in decline. Issues of environmental justice are becoming more prominent and pressing everywhere we turn. Underlying this is the fact that the class/imperial war that defines capitalism as a world system, and that governs its system of accumulation, is a juggernaut that knows no limits. In this deadly conflict the natural world is seen as a mere instrument of world social domination. Hence, capital by its very logic imposes what is in effect a scorched earth strategy. The planetary ecological crisis is increasingly all-encompassing, a product of the destructive uncontrollability of a rapidly globalizing capitalist economy, which knows no law other than its own drive to exponential expansion.

### AT: Govt k/2 Highway System

#### Government ownership has failed the highway industry and only privatization through a classic market economy can fix it

Block 9

(Walter, Department of Economics @ Rutgers University, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads”, [CL])

What reasons are there for advocating the free market approach for the highway industry? First and foremost is the fact that the present government ownership and management has failed. The death toll, the suffocation during urban rush hours, and the poor state of repair of the highway stock, are all eloquent testimony to the lack of success which has marked the reign of government control. Second, and perhaps even more important, is a reason for this state of affairs. It is by no means an accident that government operation has proven to be a debacle, and that private enterprise can succeed where government has failed. It is not only that government has been staffed with incompetents. The roads authorities are staffed, sometimes, with able management. Nor can it be denied that at least some who have achieved high rank in the world of private business have been incompetent. The advantage enjoyed by the market is the automatic reward and penalty system imposed by profits and losses. When customers are pleased, they continue patronizing those merchants who have served them well. These businesses are thus allowed to earn a profit. They can prosper and expand. Entrepreneurs who fail to satisfy, on the other hand, are soon driven to bankruptcy. This is a continual process repeated day in, day out. There is always a tendency in the market for the reward of the able, and the deterrence of those who are not efficient. Nothing like perfection is ever reached, but the continual grinding down of the ineffective, and rewarding of the competent, brings about a level of managerial skill unmatched by any other system. Whatever may be said of the political arena, it is one which completely lacks this market process. Although there are cases where capability rises to the fore, there is no continual process which promotes this. Because this is well known, even elementary, we have entrusted the market to produce the bulk of our consumer goods and capital equipment. What is difficult to see is that this analysis applies to the provision of roads no less than to fountain pens, frisbees, or fishsticks.

### AT: Govt k/2 Highway System

#### The road industry would then operate as any other business once privatized and would assume responsibility

Block 9

(Walter, Department of Economics @ Rutgers University, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads”, [CL])

Let us now turn to a consideration of how a free market in roads might operate.'' Along the way, we will note and counter the intellectual objections to such a system. All transport thoroughfares would be privately owned: not only the vehicles, buses, trains, automobiles, trolleys, etc., that travel upon them, but the very roads, highways, byways, streets, sidewalks, bridges, tunnels, crosswalks themselves upon which journeys take place. The transit corridors would be as privately owned as is our fast food industry. As such, all the usual benefits and responsibilities that are incumbent upon private enterprise would affect roads. The reason a company or individual would want to build or buy an already existing road would be the same as in any other business-to earn a profit. The necessary funds would be raised in a similar manner-by floating an issue of stock, by borrowing, or from past savings of the owner. The risks would be the same-attracting customers and prospering, or failing to do so and going bankrupt. Likewise for the pricing policy; just as private enterprise rarely gives burgers away for free, use of road space would require payment. A road enterprise would face virtually all of the problems shared by other businesses: attracting a labor force, subcontracting, keeping customers satisfied, meeting the price of competitors, innovating, borrowing money, expanding, etc. Thus, a highway or street owner would he a businessman as any other, with much the same problems, opportunities, and risks. In addition, just as in other businesses, there would be facets peculiar to this particular industry. The road entrepreneur would have to try to contain congestion, reduce traffic accidents, plan and design new facilities in coordination with already existing highways, as well as with the plans of others for new expansion. He would have to set up the "rules of the road" so as best to accomplish these and other goals. The road industry would be expected to carry on each and every one of the tasks now undertaken by public roads authorities: fill potholes, install road signs, guard rails, maintain lane mark-ings, repair traffic signals, and so on for the myriad of "road furniture" that keeps traffic moving. Applying the concepts of profit and loss to the road industry, we can see why privatization would almost certainly mean a gain compared to the present nationalized system of road management.

### AT: Constant Tolls

#### Market forces would keep the road systems efficient and would not let them become a constant system of tolls

Block 9

(Walter, Department of Economics @ Rutgers University, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads”, [CL])

Another common objection to private roads is the spectre of having to

halt every few feet and toss a coin into a tollbox. This simply would not occur on the market. To see why not, imagine a commercial golf course operating on a similar procedure: forcing the golfers to wait in line at every hole, or demanding payment every time they took a swipe at the ball. It is easy to see what would happen to the cretinous management of such an enterprise: it would very rapidly lose customers and go broke. If roads were privately owned, the same process would occur. Any road with say, 500 toll booths per mile, would be avoided like the plague by customers, who would happily patronize a road with fewer obstructions, even at a higher money cost per mile. This would be a classical case of economies of scale, where it would pay entrepreneurs to buy the toll collection rights from the millions of holders, in order to rationalize the system into one in which fewer toll gates blocked the roads. Streets that could be so organized would prosper as thoroughfares; others would not. So even if the system somehow began in this patchwork manner, market forces would come to bear, mitigating the extreme inefficiency.

### AT: Eminent Domain k/2 Roads

#### Roads can still be constructed without eminent domain effectively by the private sector

Block 9

(Walter, Department of Economics @ Rutgers University, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads”, [CL])

Then there is the eminent domain challenge: the allegation that roads could not be efficiently constructed without the intermediation of government-imposed eminent domain laws which are not at the disposal of private enterprise. The argument is without merit. We must first realize that even with eminent domain, and under the system of government road construction, there are still limits as to where a new road may be placed. Not even a government could last long if it decided to tear down all the skyscrapers in Chicago's Loop in order to make way for yet another highway. The logic of this limitation is obvious: it would cost billions of dollars to replace these magnificent structures; a new highway near these buildings, but one which did not necessitate their destruction, might well be equally valuable, but at an infinitesimal fraction of the cost. With or without eminent domain, then, such a road could not be built. Private enterprise could not afford to do so, because the gains in siting the road over carcasses of valuable buildings would not be worthwhile; nor could the government accomplish this task, while there was still some modicum of common sense prohibiting it from operating completely outside of any economic bounds. It is true that owners of land generally thought worthless by other people would be able to ask otherwise exorbitant prices from a developer intent upon building a straight road. Some of these landowners would demand high prices because of psychic attachment (e.g.. the treasured old homestead); others solely because they knew that building plans called for their particular parcels, and they were determined to obtain the maximum income possible. But the private road developer is not without defenses, all of which will tend to lower the price he must pay. First, there is no necessity for an absolutely straight road, nor even for one that follows the natural contours of the land. Although one may prefer, on technical grounds, path A, it is usually possible to utilize path B. . . . .Z, all at variously higher costs. If so, then the cheapest of these alternatives provides an upper limit to what the owners along path A may charge for their properties. For example, it may be cheaper to blast through an uninhabited mountain rather than pay the exorbitant price of the farmer in the valley; this fact tends to put a limit upon the asking price of the valley farmer. Secondly, the road developer, knowing that he will be satisfied with any of five trajectories, can purchase options to buy the land along each site. If a recalcitrant holdout materializes on any one route, he can shift to his second, third, fourth or fifth choice. The competition between owners along each of these passageways will tend to keep the price down. Thirdly, in the rare case of a holdout who possesses an absolutely essential plot, it is always possible to build a bridge over this land or to tunnel underneath. Ownership of land does not consist of property rights' up to the sky or down to the core of the earth; the owner cannot forbid planes from passing overhead, nor can he prohibit a bridge over his land, as long as it does not interfere with the use of his land. Although vastly more expensive than a surface road, these options again put an upper bound on the price the holdout can insist upon.

### AT: Posthumanism

**The idea that we can use technology to manipulate the human body only ensures that individual people experience the same destruction we are seeing on the earth as a whole.**

**Virilio 5**

(Paul, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, “The Information Bomb,” Verso edition published in 2005, available online DH)

The international press, less changeable than it seemed, registered the painful completion of the geographical conquest and anticipated, in alarmist despatches, the new major event which might be said to be its direct consequence. That was the coming, five years later, of a first world war which, by its very universalism, would become the first total war of humanity against man thanks to the deployment of a military-industrial arsenal of mass destruction, which was soon to encompass a scientific complex ranging from physics to biology and psychology.11

It was merely a question of time, then, for the transfer of the West's expansionist drives from the exhausted geography of the terrestrial to the human body - that last, still-unexplored corner of the planet, relatively protected by the last cultural, social and moral prohibitions ...

And for the solemn celebrations, such as those which attended the end of slavery and the defence of human rights, to become merely sinister masquerades - only poorly concealing the drift, from the 1940s onwards, of a colonial savoir-faire towards a world-scale project of an endocolonial nature. One has only to look to see this: with the rise of unemployment and cultural integration, the abandonment of the nourishing countryside for the over-populated and unproductive ghettos, and galloping pauperization, our post-industrial world is already the spitting image of the old colonial world, examples of which we find in Africa, Latin America or the Far East.

And we can rest assured that, after the unrestrained exploitation of the living Earth and its geography, the exploitation of the cartography of the human genome is already well advanced. This is a project which tells us a great deal about a booming industrial techno-biology, whose ambition is to reduce to the state of specimen every member of a humanity which has had its day, every human being who, like young Minik's father, might be said no longer precisely to be an individual, no longer individuum-indivisible.

### AT: Posthumanism

**The cybernetic transformation alienates us from our own bodies and destroys our humanity.**

**Adams 3**

(Jason, Masters Political Science, Popular Defense in the Empire of Speed: Paul Virilio and the Phenomenology of the Political Body,” November 2003)

For Virilio, the cybernetic society consists of the enveloping of the animal body within an infrastructure of individualizing and totalizing technologies to such a great extent that anxiety, once an emotion that occurred only at certain moments, becomes a generalized condition of everyday life, an unprecedented form of life that is lived constantly 'on stage', under the watch of satellites, surveillance cameras, electronic tethers, cell phones, email listservs and other' such prostheses; as he sees it then, "the more the speed of movement increases, the more control becomes absolute, omnipresent. The more speed grows, the more control tends to supplant the environment itself, so that the real time of interactivity finally replaces the real space of bodily movement".87 This netting of the territorial body under the circuitry of cybernetics is of necessity also a netting of the animal body as well, with the result that in the near future, the human person "will no longer throw himself into any means of physical travel, but only into another body, an optical body; and he will go forward without moving, see with other eyes, touch with hands other than his own, to be over there without really being over there, a stranger to himself, a deserter from his own body, an exile for evermore.

### AT: Posthumanism

**The advent of the non-human destroys humanity and ends the process of life.**

**Featherstone 1**

(PhD in Social Theory at Staffordshire University, teaches social theory and anthropology at Keele University (Fall 2000/Winter 2001, Mark, “Speed and Violence: Sacrifice in Virilio, Derrida, and Girard”, Anthropoetics – the Journal of Generative Anthropology 6, no. 2, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.127.4057&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=53) MGM

Virilio’s example of the Philip Nitschke / Bob Dent case acts as a critique of the dangers of an unquestioning acceptance of the technological / textual colonization of the human body by allowing us to understand how the human / non-human relation reaches critical mass and feeds into the technology / accident machine. For Virilio, the Nitschke / Dent episode (Bob Dent, a terminal cancer patient, consented to computer-aided euthanasia by taking advantage of a remote-suicide machine developed by his doctor Philip Nitschke) shows how technology collapses the man / machine bind and achieves total mastery over humanity through the sacrificial accident. Writing on the conclusion to this zero-sum game, Virilio claims that the Nitschke / Dent episode suggests comparisons with "Kasparov, the world chess champion, playing a game against a computer specially designed to defeat him" (2000a: 5); both events illuminate the onset of techno-domination, the condition that allows the objective machine to progress at the expense of subjective humanity. Following Oughourlian’s (1991) theory of mimetic desire, masters and slaves, and the construction of the monadic self, one can see how at this terminal point the machine possesses man. Here the accident, the collision between self and other, renders humanity expendable and seals the fate of the victim. According to Virilio this condition is caused by the over-reliance on technology, a situation which is itself predicated on the ostensibly democratic nature of machine culture. As the Nitschke / Dent case illustrates, the empty form of the technology leads one to assume its neutrality. As we have seen with Derrida and the advocates of deconstruction (such as Beardsworth and Davies), to whom we may add the critics of the dominant ideology thesis (such as Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner), this position ignores the most powerful form of bias: the ideological prejudice hidden deep within the complex structure of the technological / textual form (Zizek, 1994). To extend this equation of technology / textual form and ideology, just as Virilio’s theory of progressive technology illuminates a mechanism that advances the ideological program of late capitalism through the accident and its subsequent consumption of victims, Derrida’s concept of différance mimes in the textual realm the post-industrial system’s program of techno-scientific frontierism / exploration. Foregrounding this relation between Virilio’s theory of technology and Derrida’s deconstruction makes clear that the ideological prejudice that is hidden within technology is also present within the form of progressive textuality. The effect of the ideological misrecognition present at the formal level of technological / textual fundamentalism is two-fold. First, the ideology of the monadic self is inflated as humanity attempts to assert its own position in the face of the increasing dominance of technology / text. However, because this self-augmentation is sought through technology / text itself, the ideological process simply compounds the original problem of over-reliance on non-human forms. In other words, because the components of the ideology of the monadic self are embedded in the structures of technology / text, the attempt to raise the value of humanity in relation to machines through non-human forms of articulation is denied by the circular reasoning employed. Second, the dominance of technology / text as a machine for the extension of the monadic self leads to both a loss of historical memory and the end of political morality. With regard to the loss of memory, Virilio refers to the concept of motion sickness or "kinetosis" to show how the mimetic bind between humanity and technology leads to dizzying speeds that cause the self to become disoriented and decentered. The disregard for political morality, which Virilio identifies as another category of the crisis of technological high modernity, is an effect of this radical disorientation of the monadic self. For Virilio this condition, caused by the excessive speed of technology, leads to further investment in non-human augmentation and consequently the increased popularity of the political ideologies of the monadic self and the possessive individual. To illustrate this process at work, Virilio considers how technology is able to both cripple and augment the body: Those disabled in war or injured in serious road or work accidents, victims of terrorism and people who have lost arms, legs, their mobility, sight, speech or virility are all afflicted at the same time by a forgetting, a paramnesia. On the one hand, they more or less consciously repress the unbearable images of the accident which violently deprived them of their able-bodied state; on the other hand, new visions force themselves upon their minds, in sleep or in half-sleep, as a compensation for the motor and sensory privations that now afflict them (2000a: 39-40). Here we can see how the technological accident leads to the destruction of the body and its subsequent re-formation through non-human augmentation. Virilio shows how, when we are crippled in the world, the technological form re-presents an image of our former mobility. It becomes a symbolic form which at once sustains a deterministic world system and structures humanity’s relationship with progressive technology. This theory of cybernetic tranquilization is similarly relevant at the level of textuality. Bandera’s critique of deconstruction shows how, in much the same way that Girard’s notion of the scapegoat explains how the anesthetization of the social system is secured by the death of the sacrificial victim, Derrida’s space of difference and indeterminacy is achieved at the expense of dissenting voices, which are dismissed as totalitarian others.

### AT: Virilio = Crazy

**Even if he seems paranoid, he’s right about a lot of stuff.**

**Adams 3**

(Jason, Masters Political Science, Popular Defense in the Empire of Speed: Paul Virilio and the Phenomenology of the Political Body,” November 2003)

Indeed, the global spy satellite system that the Pentagon spent the last quarter of the 20th century putting into place made a contribution of its own, since it has over time made it impossible for national armies to function without being detected immediately; a mass mediatization of political bodies reflected also in the tendency of many Americans during the events of September 11, to feel as though they were 'watching a movie' even amongst those who saw it occur directly in front of them. Thus he argues, "on September 11, 2001 the Manhattan skyline became the front of the new war. The anonymity of those who initiated the attack merely signals, for everyone, the rise of a global covert state - of the unknown quantity of a private criminality - that 'beyond-good-and-evil' which has for centuries been the dream of the high priests of an iconoclastic progress".'74 Just as was the case with the bombing of the World Trade Center, such developments as the Department of Defense and CIA sponsoring of the recent film The Sum of All Fears and the sudden appearance of the propaganda-oriented 'Office of Strategic Influence' each have the common effect of "casting doubt on the truth of the truth of the facts and in that way creating concern about diffuse threats, where disturbance of the perception of events always works to heighten popular anxiety"'75since the question of whether an event was an attack or an accident, or whether a news item was information or disinformation is left wide open. This is only amplified by such unsettling Pentagon projects as the High-Frequency Active Aural Research Program which is said to be already capable of artificially producing "floods, droughts, hurricanes and earthquakes""6 which could be deployed as 'natural disasters', not to mention the even more disturbing Partnership for a New American Century's (PNAC) research into the development of a 'genetic bomb' which Thom Hartmann has described as such; "imagine a bomb that only kills Caucasians with red hair. Or short people. Or Arabs. Or Chinese. Now imagine that this new bomb could be set off anywhere in the world, and that within a matter of days, weeks or months it would kill every person on the planet who fits the bomb's profile, although the rest of us would be left standing. And the bomb could go silently, without anybody realizing it had been released".177 When one considers that PNAC was once headed by Rumsfeld, Virilio's sometimes 'paranoid' sounding arguments thus seem to have considerable weight behind them, just as many of his other predictions have been borne out over time; what he concludes from all of this is that in an era in which "one man = total war"178 the world must take seriously the threat of terrorism of all kinds, while also maintaining one's guard against the instrumental use of these same emotions in order to inspire popular anxieties, softening people up for manipulations of all sorts; as he puts it, to succumb to or to unleash this sort of rhetoric in this way "is to forget, rather quickly, that fear is a poor counselor, as all dictatorships have proven since antiquity".I7'

### AT: Progress

**Progress is always symmetrical – for every development there is one accident and for every person saved, someone dies.**

**Virilio 5**

(Paul, “L'Accident original,” Jan. 29, 2005, http://frenchphilo.tribe.net/thread/f09709c8-1c47-4c83-a9d8-67c6f77fc168)

LD: You keep saying that the greater the speed, the greater the effect of the accident. Do you mean that the more phenomena the more catastrophes? PV: What is new is the serial type of the catastrophe. In the past, there were two types of accidents: the natural cataclysm and the artificial accidents, like a fatal fall from a horse. However, in the last century, this became continual. On top of the natural and artificial accidents, including the worst like Chernobyl, Minamata or Seveso, we have the voluntary accident like the massive attack of the World Trade Center. We bypass the big battle of the past for big attacks that cause more harm than an entire battalion does. Pearl Harbor killed 2500 soldiers but 3000 died in the Twin Towers, because of twenty suicidal men. LD: Do we have to fight more against fear? PV: We have to fight more and more against panic. The Cold War period, which was the equilibrium of terror, gave way to the Cold Panic period, which is the disequilibria of terror happening from natural accident or one inflicted by humans. Panic is the big question of the politic of tomorrow. Every body knows that fear is a poor adviser. We could pass from a substantial politic based on a common interest to an accidental politic based on emotional community. In this regard, the 21st century and the recent tsunami catastrophe have started a new public, globally synchronized and ephemeral emotion. We cannot trust it. Public and global emotion is already a form of tyranny. The manipulator, especially the political one, will not forget the tsunami effect neither will the terrorists forget about the Twin Towers effect. LD: What do you recommend? PV: Face it. In history, humans had to confront the hostility of the natural world, the great invasions, the tyrants and different type of terrors. Today, we have to face the terror of our own progress. The other day, I was very sorry to see the expressionist spectacle at the launch of the new Airbus A380. We celebrated that airplane, a marvel as a cult object. However, nobody said that inventing an 800 seats airplane would create 800 dead, when it crashes. I will call upon a political intelligence about the end, a philosophy of the industrial eschatology. Eschatology is the science of the end, of the world end, which is actually not at all the end of the world. The problem is that nobody dare face that finitude. LD: How did you, as a specialist of human catastrophe, take the horrendous Asian tidal wave? PV: This tsunami will have the same importance to ecology than the WTC attacks had on the politic. Those two events frame, in my mind, the beginning of our 21st century: On one hand, the terrorist accident, on the other, the horrifying ecological drama. Each of them is in fact a revelation. We are passing from the revolution to the revelation era. The revolution era was of ideology. It lasted two or three centuries. However, it is over. We are entering now in the catastrophic revelation, which should encourage us to a better knowledge of accidents, natural or artificial. Without this effort, we will not understand the complexity of the accidental phenomena that are happening more and more under our eyes.

# Aff Answers

### Turn – Growth k/2 Heg

#### **You can’t just collapse the economy and expect it all to work out fine – the alternative results in isolationism. The impact is nuclear conflict.**

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8

(Friedberg + Schoenfeld, Friedberg is an IR prof at Princeton and Schoenfeld is a scholar at the Witherspoon Institute, 2008

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html)

One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

### Turn – Russian Civil War

#### Economic collapse causes Russian war – that leads to nuclear extinction

David 99

(Steven David, Jan/Feb 1999. Prof. of political science at Johns Hopkins. Foreign Affairs, lexis.)

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, *krais,* and *oblasts* grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war

### Turn – Interdependence/War

Growth is key to interdependence which greatly reduces the risk of war – five reasons

Yee 99

(Tan Tan, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Jan-Mar, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25\_1/7.htm)

Like the Democratic Peace Proposition, the notion that increased interdependence reduces the probability of war among nations is not new. For one, economists have long demonstrated that economic interdependence benefits both parties through the process of international trade. The underlying rationale is worth explaining. In a simple model of a two-state-two-product international economy, even if a particular state is more efficient at producing both goods, it would still make more economic sense for each state to specialise in producing one of the goods and thereafter obtain the other through barter exchange. This is because the issue is one of relative rather than absolute efficiency; the more efficient state should optimise its limited resources to focus entirely on producing the goods where it has a relatively greater efficiency. From an economic viewpoint, therefore, international trade represents one of the rare occasions in international affairs that present a win-win situation to both parties.15 Traditionally, theories on the effect of interdependence between states on the risk of war can be divided into two main camps. On the one extreme, liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression; in other words, states would rather trade than fight.16 To put it simply, trade is mutually beneficial, while war is at best a zero-sum game. At the same time, the increasing lethality of modern weapons has greatly increased the costs and risks of war, thus making the trading option seem even more rational. Four other subsidiary propositions supporting the liberal view are worth mentioning here.17 Firstly, the increased economic activity that accompanies higher trade levels tends to promote domestic prosperity, and in doing so lessens the internal problems that push leaders to war. Secondly, trade may alter the domestic structure of a particular state, giving more influence to groups with a vested interest in the continuation of peaceful trade. Thirdly, a higher level of interdependence inevitably leads to increased interaction between governments and peoples. This enhances understanding and an appreciation of each other's views and perspectives, reducing the misunderstandings and miscalculations that sometimes lead to war. The final argument asserts that trade has the spillover effect of enhancing political ties between trading partners, thus improving the prospects for long-term co-operation. Going by the liberal arguments, there is cause for optimism as long as a high level of interdependence can be maintained among all states. Rosecrance sums up the view rather neatly that high interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading.18 Some liberals explain the continuing occurrence of war as a result of the misconception of political leaders caught up in the outmoded belief that war still pays.19 Yet others saw it as the misguided attempts by political leaders to gamble for an outright victory in war, in which case the benefits would be even greater. The contention is that inspite of the pacifist tendencies that interdependence brings about, it may sometimes not be enough to prevent war from happening.

### Turn – Resource Wars

Economic collapse ensures nuclear resource wars

Broward 9

((Member of Triond) http://newsflavor.com/opinions/will-an-economic-collapse-kill-you)

Now its time to look at the consequences of a failing world economy. With five official nations having nuclear weapons, and four more likely to have them there could be major consequences of another world war. The first thing that will happen after an economic collapse will be war over resources.The United States currency will become useless and will have no way of securing reserves. The United States has little to no capacity to produce oil, it is totally dependent on foreign oil.If the United States stopped getting foreign oil, the government would go to no ends to secure more, if there were a war with any other major power over oil, like Russia or China, these wars would most likely involve nuclear weapons. Once one nation launches a nuclear weapon, there would of course be retaliation, and with five or more countries with nuclear weapons there would most likely be a world nuclear war. The risk is so high that acting to save the economy is the most important issue facing us in the 21st century.

### Turn – V2L

**No value to life in capitalism.**

Sancho, ’11 – chair of the Annual World Conferences on the Science of Duality

[Louis Sancho; “Fukyshima: Dying for Japan Inc.;” published 3/29/2011; <http://www.cerntruth.com/?p=257> ] Jay

I know you don’t believe me. I know you think and believe the ‘experts’ of the system. This is what you have learned. Those are your memes to keep you happy. And that is right. It is what it is expected of you. Especially if you are a Japanese living close to the death zone. Because the world you live in is NOT a world in which life has an infinite value. You live in the Financial-Military-Industrial Complex (called in newspeak the Free market, the FMI system in [complexity](http://www.cerntruth.com/?page_id=269)), a perfectly organized system that we [complexity](http://www.cerntruth.com/?page_id=269) theorists study scientifically as an evolving organic system, whose functions, equations, evolution and purpose is crystal clear to us – though all this might be hidden to you. So if you want to keep happy, don’t worry and don’t read. Probably mankind is beyond salvation. And yet there is a certain beauty in knowing the truth, in being free at least in your mind, even if you are prisoner on the iron jail the [FMI complex](http://www.cerntruth.com/?page_id=280) has built for all of us. Before II world war, the [FMI complex](http://www.cerntruth.com/?page_id=280) was more obvious. The Matrix of fictions and marketing built today to appease the sheeple was not yet in place. Men had not been devolved into a short attention-span, visual neopaleolithic and ego-centric, anthropomorphic belief on our self-centered position in the [Universe](http://www.cerntruth.com/?page_id=275). But now the FMI system controls our information, so we believe what it tells us. There is no confabulation theory here, but ‘emergence’, a concept of systems sciences that discharges full responsibility in the individuals and yet creates the same effect. We humans have become completely dependent on machines – organic systems of metal, more complex than we are, to which we transfer our form and evolve to reach higher degrees of energy and information – to exist and what is far worse, our beliefs have adapted to them subconsciously since the Bronze age in which we discovered the power of weapons. There was an age that has resurfaced from time to time in religions of love and social, ecological movements in which people were aware that metal, weapons that kill our body, gold that hypnotize our mind and today machines that make us increasingly obsolete were ‘dual fruits of the tree of science’, some good some bad, and by not distinguishing and pruning the bad fruits, such as the nuclear industry, in a ‘free market’ where all goes, in an economic ecosystem in which weapons could predate on man, we would become extinct. All this wisdom was lost and soon selfish egocentric tribes that relied on weapons to impose their power (Indo-Europeans) or money to hypnotize and slave people (cananeans), came on top of all societies. And for 5000 years they built a matrix of ideological, self-centered fictions which now are ‘common-sense’, the ultimate beliefs. Those are the ideologies that sustain the Financial-Military-Industrial complex in which we live. They justify all the wrong paths with the same self-centered, myopic, short-span, individualist egotism that corporations, nations, nuclear scientists, bankers – you name it – show in everyday behavior. Yet behind those ‘selfish memes of metal’ imprinted in our mind, there is still a natural genetic, biological program of love for nature, natural food, clean air, social love – the genetic program of human evolution. And so a great deal of ‘newspeak’ takes place within the Financial-Military-Industrial Complex and the die-hard ‘believers’ that worship with messianic zeal the evolution of weapons, machines and money as the future of mankind, to appease and convince people that the FMI system cares for us, that corporations serve us, that nations are the supreme meaning of our existence. And this [*duality*](http://www.cerntruth.com/?p=224) between a brain-washed mankind who adores the wrong memes and a newspeak of caring is specially present in Japan; a nation founded by iron-horse warriors coming from Korea, who became samurais and emperors (but this cannot be said, Japanese are kept in a state of ‘neoteny’, with infantile myths and self-restrain, and worship their ‘traditions’, the jail of their mind; displaying an extreme aggressive-passive behavior to people who might ‘offend’ their sensibilities) and imprinted the happy peasants of the sun-god with an absolute slavery to the master. This samurai today rules japan and its corporations that manufacture machines with a submissive population that likes more their robots than the foreigners, because it has become lobotomized to a point in which so much restrain of otherwise natural feelings and inner emotions, makes them in external behavior closer to their robots than to human beings. How this is possible is obvious: today the imprinting of our mind with the ideologies that make us love the [FMI complex](http://www.cerntruth.com/?page_id=280) that is killing gaia starts at 3, when you are put in front of a TV. From then on, the ‘nervous system’ of simultaneous indoctrination will imprint your brain with mass-media propaganda and the 3 ‘ideologies’ that make of its 3 networks, the idols of mankind. The financial system has an ideology called capitalism that tells us money is NOT just a system of metal-information (evolved from gold, the most informative atom of the [Universe](http://www.cerntruth.com/?page_id=275) into e-money, data in a computer), but the invisible hand of go(l)d, the meaning of it all, and its values must be respected. To explain you really the meaning of economics [I would need an entire web-blog on complex economics which I have](http://www.economicstruth.com), so I will not insist on it. But the FMI complex is an evolving system independent of man, which merely constructs it. So it has its own organization and goals. It has a global, digital brain called the world stock-market and a type of citizen called the corporation; but in system sciences I prefer to call it by its biological function – so we shall call corporations [company-mothers](http://www.economicstruth.com/84) of machines. 90% of the stock-market is dedicated to re=produce those machines, feed them with energy, provide them with information and within that scheme, we humans have only 2 functions: to work=reproduce those machines and to test=consume them. Every time we work, we reproduce a machine or a part of it, every time we consume it we test it and vitalize it. Because the FMI system is an evolving ecosystem of machines that is terraforming the Earth and substituting us, the super-organism of history as we substituted our fathers, the organism of life. That simple chain is the world you live in, evolving unrelentlessly: Gaia->History->The Metal-Earth (FMI complex). And only if you are aware of that arrow of evolution we have set in motion, and we back with the 3 ideologies of mechanism (machines are the future of man, not organic systems of metal that substitute and make obsolete human beings), capitalism (money is the language of god, not a language whose values are different from those of words and give zero value to life and maximal value to machines and weapons) and nationalism (the idea that we are different races according to a piece of cloth, called a flag, so we must not love each other and evolve together as members of the same species, but use weapons to come up on top), we can interpret the world as it is, including Fukushima.

### Cap Sustainable

Global capitalism and its acceleration is progressive, self-correcting, and wealth-generating – ensures sustainability

Goklany 7

(Julian Simon Fellow at the Political Economy Research Center

Indur, Now For the Good News, http://www.reason.com/news/show/119252.html)

Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression.

### Cap Sustainable

#### Mixed economy sustainable

Noble 3

(Chair of the department of Political Science and director of the international studies program at the California State University

Charles, Why Capitalism Needs the Left, http://www.logosjournal.com/noble.htm)

In combination, free market and capitalism have also helped usher in and sustain fundamental political changes, widening the scope both of personal freedom and political democracy. Because of this system, more people get to choose where to work, what to consume, and what to make than ever before, while ancient inequalities of rank and status are overturned. The spread of market capitalism has also laid the foundation for the expansion of democratic decision-making. With the establishment of private property and free exchange, political movements demanding other freedoms, including wider access to government, have proliferated. To be sure, capitalism cannot guarantee personal liberty or political democracy. It has produced it share of dictatorships too. But, to date, no society has been able to establish and maintain political democracy without first establishing and securing a market capitalist system. The large corporations that stand at the heart of contemporary capitalism have proven indispensable in this transformation. They are the essential intermediaries in the modern economy, linking financial capital, expertise, technology, managerial skill, labor and leadership. They are spreading everywhere in the world not only because they are powerful, but also because they work. But market capitalism is not a machine that can run on its own. It needs rules, limits, and above all else stewardship. Partly because the system feeds off of people's darker instincts, partly because it is a machine, and therefore indifferent to human values, and partly because there is no central planner to assure that everything works out in the end, there must be some conscious effort to bring order to this chaos, however creative it might be. Left to its own devices, unfettered capitalism produces great inequities, great suffering, and great instability. In fact, these in-built tendencies are enough to destroy the system itself. Karl Marx figured this out in the mid-19th century and built his revolutionary system on the expectation that these dark forces would prevail. But Marx underestimated our ability to use politics to impose limits on the economic system itself. At one time, and still in other places, even conservatives knew this to be true, and offered themselves up as responsible social stewards. Whether out of a sense of noblesse oblige or enlightened self interest, they volunteered to lead a collective effort to reform the system so that capitalism could survive and continue to serve human interests. From the 1930s through the 1970s, American corporate leaders and a fair number of Republicans seemed to understand this too. They made their piece with "big" government, seeing in the New Deal and even the Great Society a way to forge both social peace and political stability through the creation of a "mixed" economy.

### AT: Transition Wars

**Economic collapse forces countries to focus inward – solves risk of conflict**

Bennett and Nordstrom 2k

(D. Scott, Ph.D., The U of Michigan, Distinguished prof of Political Science, and Timothy, Associate prof. Director of Graduate Studies @ U of Mississippi, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No.1, Feb, pp. 33-61, jam)

INTERNAL CONDITIONS AND EXTERNAL BEHAVIOR: IMPROVEMENTS By coming at externalization from the substitutability perspective, we hope to deal with some of the theoretical problems raised by critics of diversionary conflict theory. Substitutability can be seen as a particular problem of model specification where the dependent variable has not been fully developed. We believe that one of the theoretical problems with studies of externalization has been a lack of attention to alternative choices; Bueno de Mesquita actually hints toward this (and the importance of foreign policy substitution) when he argues that it is shortsighted to conclude that a leader will uniformly externalize in response to domestic problems at the expense of other possi- ble policy choices (1985, 130). We hope to improve on the study of externalization and behavior within rivalries by considering multiple outcomes in response to domestic conditions.5 In particular, we will focus on the alternative option that instead of exter- nalizing, leaders may internalize when faced with domestic economic troubles. Rather than diverting the attention of the public or relevant elites through military action, leaders may actually work to solve their internal problems internally. Tying internal solutions to the external environment, we focus on the possibility that leaders may work to disengage their country from hostile relationships in the international arena to deal with domestic issues. Domestic problems often emerge from the challenges of spreading finite resources across many different issue areas in a manner that satisfies the public and solves real problems. Turning inward for some time may free up resources required to jump-start the domestic economy or may simply provide leaders the time to solve internal distributional issues. In our study, we will focus on the condition of the domestic economy (gross domes- tic product [GDP] per capita growth) as a source of pressure on leaders to externalize. We do this for a number of reasons. First, when studying rivalries, we need an indicator of potential domestic trouble that is applicable beyond just the United States or just advanced industrialized democracies. In many non-Western states, variables such as election cycles and presidential popularity are irrelevant. Economics are important to all countries at all times. At a purely practical level, GDP data is also more widely available (cross-nationally and historically) than is data on inflation or unemploy- ment.6 Second, we believe that fundamental economic conditions are a source of potential political problems to which leaders must pay attention. Slowing growth or worsening economic conditions may lead to mass dissatisfaction and protests down the road; economic problems may best be dealt with at an early stage before they turn into outward, potentially violent, conflict. This leads us to a third argument, which is that we in fact believe that it may be more appropriate in general to use indicators of latent conflict rather than manifest conflict as indicators of the potential to divert. Once the citizens of a country are so distressed that they resort to manifest conflict (rioting or engaging in open protest), it may be too late for a leader to satisfy them by engaging in distracting foreign policy actions. If indeed leaders do attempt to distract people's attention, then if protest reaches a high level, that attempt has actually failed and we are looking for correlations between failed externalization attempts and further diversion.

### AT: Transition Wars

Even if conflicts occur they won’t escalate

Bennett and Nordstrom 2k

(D. Scott, Ph.D., The U of Michigan, Distinguished prof of Political Science, and Timothy, Associate prof. Director of Graduate Studies @ U of Mississippi, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No.1, Feb, pp. 33-61, jam)

When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect with- out suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversion- ary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. \* Following Blainey (1973), a state facing poor economic conditions may in factbe the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivals. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. \* Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states' desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

### Virlio = Insane

**Virilio is crazy – his theories don’t make sense and he literally makes up words**

**Sokal and Bricmont 98**

(\*Professor of Physics at NYU AND \*\*Belgian theoretical physicist, philosopher of science and a professor at the Université catholique de Louvain (December 1998, Alan and Jean, “Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science”, Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, pg. 169-170) MGM

The writings of Paul Virilio revolve principally around the themes of technology, communication, and speed. They contain a plethora of references to physics, particularly the theory of relativity. Though Virilio's sentences are slightly more meaningful than those of Deleuze-Guattari, what is presented as "science" is a mixture of monumental confusions and wild fantasies. Furthermore, his analogies between physics and social questions are the most arbitrary imaginable, when he does not simply become intoxicated with his own words. We confess our sympathy with many of Virilio's political and social views; but the cause is not, alas, helped by his pseudo-physics.

Let us start with a minor example of the astonishing erudition vaunted by Le Monde:

Recent MEGALOPOLITAN hyperconcentration (Mexico City, Tokyo ... ) being itself the result of the increased speed of economic exchanges, it seems necessary to reconsider the importance of the notions of ACCELERATION and DECELERATION (what physicists call positive and negative velocities [vitesses positive et negative selon les physiciens]) ... (Virilio 1995, p. 24, capitals in the original 220)

Here Virilio mixes up velocity (vitesse) and acceleration, the two basic concepts of kinematics (the description of motion), which are introduced and carefully distinguished at the beginning of every introductory physics course. 221 Perhaps this confusion isn't worth stressing; but for a purported specialist in the philosophy of speed, it is nonetheless a bit surprising.

### Virilio = Insane (Proof)

**Here is Virilio, comparing women to space exploration…**

**Wilbur 94**

(Professor, Vancouver Island University, 94 (Shawn, “Dromologies: Paul Virilio: Speed, Cinema, and the End of the Political State,” http://records.viu.ca/~soules/media301/dromologies.htm)

Virilio explains portions of his dromological narrative in terms of the development of "vehicles," although he uses this term in rather novel ways. At various times, Virilio speculates on the "first vehicle," which he most often identifies with "woman." Both in sexual intercourse, when "mounted" by man, or in the relation of support characteristic, he believes, of the human heterosexual couple, the woman in some sense "carries" the man. The couple constitues the simplest "war machine." Of course, since every mode of carriage brings along its own accident, we should note here then "little death" of orgasm as the fatal accident of this particular vehicular relationship. Beyond this are more conventional forms of vehicles, beginning with the riding animal and beast of burden and extending through various wheeled, tracked and winged forms, then becoming strange again as various telecommunications forms begin to "carry" us afar in a variety of ways. That many of these earlier forms of communication techniques were in fact vehicular technologies only becomes more obvious in an era where we take certain forms of tele-presence for granted. The obvious differences in these modes of transportation point to essential changes in the world, as it is organized by vectors of time-space-speed. We can fairly easily trace the "conquest of space" that involves an acceleration form the nearly static travelling of sexual intercourse to the escape velocity of spacecraft. It is harder to comprehend the subsequent "conquest of time" which telepresence, "live" satellite braodcast, and other "technologies of ubiquity" have nearly accomplished. When the time of transportation or transmission is relative, depending not on distance but on where you want to go, distant points become both nearer and sooner than those closer in strictly spatial terms. Virilio argues that what we are left with is finally only speed, the ability to manipulate the space-time matrix. This certainly seems to be the case in the virtual spaces of the internet, where speed of transmission--and the consequent ability to process greater "bandwidth"--has become the guiding criteria for nearly all hardware and software development decisions.

### AT: Speed Bad

Virilio overexaggerates the negative effects of technology – the benefits of tech outweigh the Accident

Kellner 98

[Douglas Kellner, George F. Keller Philosophy of Education Chair, UCLA, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections,” Illuminations, 11/7/98, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell29.htm, ACC. 12-20-09, JT]

Paul Virilio is one of the most prolific and penetrating critics of the drama of technology in the contemporary era, especially military technology, technologies of representation, and new computer and information technologies. For Virilio, the question of technology is the question of our time and his life-work constitutes a sustained reflection on the origins, nature, and effects of the key technologies that have constituted the modern/postmodern world. In particular, **Virilio carries out a radical critique of the ways that technology is transforming the contemporary world and even the human species.**

**Yet** I want to argue in this study that **Virilio has a flawed conception of technology that is excessively one-sided and that misses the emancipatory and democratizing aspects of new computer and media technologies.** My argument is that **his vision of technology is overdetermined by his intense focus on war and military technology and that this optic drives him to predominantly negative and technophobic perspectives on technology per se.** However, precisely the one-sidedness and extremely critical discourse on war and military technology, as well as his reflections on war, cinema, technologies of representation and vision machines, constitute some of the most valuable aspects of his work.

Consequently, in the following pages I will follow Virilio in pursuing what he calls the "riddle of technology" and interrogate his attempts to elucidate this conundrum. Nowhere, however, does Virilio directly theorize technology in any systematic or sustained way, although reflections on it permeate his analyses. Thus, I want to probe Virilio's perspectives on technology to determine the extent of his insight and use-value, and to indicate what I see as the limitations of his perspectives. In this reading, **Virilio emerges as one of the major critics of war, technology, and vision machines in our time, albeit with excessively negative and even technophobic proclivities.**

### No Alternative

There isn’t a viable political alternative to the relations between capital and the State – no method of deceleration.

Kellner 98

[Douglas Kellner, George F. Keller Philosophy of Education Chair, UCLA, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections,” Illuminations, 11/7/98, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell29.htm, ACC. 12-20-09, JT]

**By eschewing critical social theory, Virilio does not have the resources to theorize the complex relations between capital, technology, the state, and military in the present age, substituting a highly elusive and evocative method for systematic theoretical analysis and critique. Virilio himself acknowledges his elusive** and suggestive **approach** to writing, **noting: "I don't believe in explanations. I believe in suggestions,** in the obvious quality of the implicit. Being an urbanist and architect, I am too used to constructing clear systems, machines that work well. I don't believe it's writing's job to do the same thing. I don't like two-and-two-is-four-type writing. That's why, finally, I respect Foucault more than I like him" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 38-39). Indeed, Virilio's style is extremely telescopic, leaping from topic to topic with alacrity, juxtaposing defuse elements and themes, proliferating images, quotes, and ideas which rapidly follow each other, often overwhelming the reader and making it difficult to grasp the thrust of Virilio's argument.

### No Alternative

**Virilio misunderstands the nature of new technology as purely negative – instead, it is a contested terrain of struggle against institutional and corporate domination. There is no space for agency in the alternative – turns the K**

Kellner 98

[Douglas Kellner, George F. Keller Philosophy of Education Chair, UCLA, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections,” Illuminations, 11/7/98, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell29.htm, ACC. 12-20-09, JT]

**Virilio misses a key component of the drama of technology in the present age and that is the titanic struggle between national and international governments and corporations to control the structure, flows, and content of the new technologies in contrast to the struggle of individuals and social groups to use the new technologies for their own purposes and projects. This optic posits technology as a contested terrain, as a field of struggle between competing social groups and individuals trying to use the new technologies for their own projects.** Despite his humanism, **there is little agency or politics in Virilio's conceptual universe** and he does not delineate the struggles between various social groups for the control of the new technologies and the new politics that they will produce. **Simply by damning, demonizing and condemning new technologies, Virilio substitutes moralistic critique for social analysis and political action, reducing his analysis to a lament and jeremiad rather than an ethical and political critique** Œ la Ellul and his tradition of Catholic critique of contemporary civilization, or critical social theory. **Virilio has no theory of justice, no politics to counter, reconstruct, reappropriate, or transform technology, no counterforces that can oppose technology. Thus, the increasing shrillness of his lament, the rising hysteria, and sense of futile impotence.**

### Speed Good

**Speed is good—we must accelerate warfare to win the war on terrorism and reduce casualties on both sides**

Peters 6

(Ralph, fmr US intelligence officer and best-selling author, Never Quit the Fight, 154-156)

Real atrocities aren’t required. Everything American soldiers do is portrayed as an atrocity. World opinion is outraged, no matter how judiciously we fight. With each passing day—sometimes with each hour—the pressure builds on our government to halt combat operations, to offer the enemy a pause, to negotiate…in essence, to give up. We saw it in Fallujah, where slow-paced tactical success led only to cease-fires that comforted the enemy and gave the global media time to pound us even harder. Those cease-fires were worrisomely reminiscent of the bombing halts during the Vietnam War—except that everything happens faster now. Even in Operation Desert Strom, the effect of images trumped reality and purpose. The exaggerated carnage of the “highway of death” north from Kuwait City led us to stop the war before we had sufficiently punished the truly guilty—Saddam’s Republican Guard and the regime’s leadership. We’re still paying for that mistake. In Fallujah, we allowed a bonanza of hundreds of terrorists and insurgents to escape us—despite promising that we would bring them to justice. We stopped because we were worried about what already hostile populations might think of us. The global media disrupted the U.S. and Coalition chains of command. Foreign media reporting even sparked bureaucratic infighting within our own government. The result was a disintegration of our will—first from decisive commitment to worsening hesitation, then to a “compromise” that returned Sunni-Arab Ba’athist officers to power. That deal not only horrified Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’a Arabs, it inspired expanded attacks by Muqtada al Sadr’s Shi’a thugs hoping to rival the success of the Sunni-Arab murderers at Fallujah. We could have won militarily. Instead, we surrendered politically and called it a success. Our enemies won the information war. We literally didn’t know what hit us. The implication for tactical combat—war at the bayonet level—is clear: We must direct our doctrine, training, equipment, organization, and plans toward winning low-level fights much faster—before the global media can do what enemy forces cannot do and stop us short. We can still win the big campaigns. But we’re apt to lose thereafter, in the dirty end-game fights. We have to speed the kill. For two decades, our military has concentrated on deploying forces swiftly around the world, as well as on fighting fast-paced conventional wars—with the positive results we saw during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But at the infantry level, we’ve lagged behind—despite the unrivaled quality of our troops. We’ve concentrated on critical soldier skills but ignored the emerging requirements of battle. We’ve worked on almost everything except accelerating urban combat—because increasing the pace is dangerous and very hard to do. Now we have no choice. We must learn to strike much faster at the ground-truth level, to accomplish the tough tactical missions at speeds an order of magnitude faster than in past conflicts. If we can’t **win** the Fallujahs of the future **swiftly**, we will **lose them**. Our military must rise to its responsibility to reduce the pressure on the National Command Authority—in essence, the president—by rapidly and effectively executing orders to root out enemy resistance or nests of terrorists. To do so, we must develop the capabilities to fight within the “media cycle,” before journalists sympathetic to terrorists and murderers can twist the facts and portray us as the villains. Before the combat encounter is politicized globally. Before allied leaders panic. And before such reporting exacerbates bureaucratic rivalries within our own system. Fighting faster at the dirty-boots level is going to be tough. As we develop new techniques, we’ll initially see higher casualties in the short term, perhaps on both sides. But we should have learned long ago, if we are not willing to face up to casualties sooner, the cumulative tally will be much, much higher later. We’re bleeding in Iraq now because a year ago we were unwilling even to shed the blood of our enemies. The Global War on Terror is going to be a decades-long struggle. The military will not always be the appropriate tool to apply. But when a situation demands a military response, our forces must bring to bear such **focused, hyperfast power** that our enemies are **overwhelmed and destroyed** before hostile cameras can defeat us. **If we do not learn to kill very, very swiftly, we will continue to lose slowly.**

### Luddites DA

**Critiquing the social forces around technology encourages Luddism and rejection of progress—they throw out the good with the bad**

**Hughes 6**

(James, Ph.D., Public Policy Studies at Trinity College, “Democratic Transhumanism 2.0,” Last Mod Jan 26, <http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm>)

First, left Luddism inappropriately equates technologies with the power relations around those technologies. Technologies do not determine power relations, they merely create new terrains for organizing and struggle. Most new technologies open up new possibilities for both expanded liberty and equality, just as they open new opportunities for oppression and exploitation. Since the technologies will most likely not be stopped, democrats need to engage with them, articulate policies that maximize social benefits from the technologies, and find liberatory uses for the technologies. If biotechnology is to be rejected simply because it is a product of capitalism, adopted in class society, then every technology must be rejected. The mission of the Left is to assert democratic control and priorities over the development and implementation of technology. But establishing democratic control over technological innovation is not the same as Luddism. In fact, to the extent that advocates for the democratic control of technology do not guarantee benefits from technology, and attempt to suppress technology altogether, they will lose public support.

**Technological advancement solves its own impact—accelerated progress will make us more likely to prevent accidents**

**Bostrom 3**

(Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, “Transhumanism FAQ,” October,

<http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/68/>)

Superintelligence is an example of a technology that seems especially worth promoting because it can help reduce a broad range of threats. Superintelligent systems could advise us on policy and make the progress curve for nanotechnology steeper, thus shortening the period of vulnerability between the development of dangerous nanoreplicators and the deployment of effective defenses. If we have a choice, it seems preferable that superintelligence be developed before advanced nanotechnology, as superintelligence could help reduce the risks of nanotechnology but not vice versa. Other technologies that have wide risk-reducing uses include intelligence augmentation, information technology, and surveillance. These can make us smarter individually and collectively or make enforcement of necessary regulation more feasible. A strong prima facie case therefore exists for pursuing these technologies as vigorously as possible. Needless to say, we should also promote non-technological developments that are beneficial in almost all scenarios, such as peace and international cooperation.

### Luddites DA – Impact (Extinction)

Criticisms of technology like the 1NC only produce apathy toward things like environmental catastrophe – new technology is key to solve – impact is extinction.

Zimmerman & AtKisson, ’89

[Alan AtKisson & Michael E. Zimmerman is Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, Summer, Global Climate Change (IC#22), ‘An Interview with Michael Zimmerman]

Alan: A critique I hear often is that deep ecologists want to return to a way of life that's totally tied to the rhythms of the Earth, but at this point we have so disturbed those rhythms that we can't even consider going back. **To retreat to a pre-technological state would in fact be dooming the Earth to destruction, whereas what we need now is to be more engaged in trying to repair the damage.** How would a deep ecologist respond?

Michael: I think deep ecologists have mixed emotions about that, but I would agree with that critique. For example, **if we stopped our development at the current level, it would be a catastrophe, because our production methods are so dirty and inefficient and destructive that if we keep this up, we're really in trouble.** Some deep ecologists say that it would be all for the best if the industrial world were just to collapse, despite all the human suffering that would entail. If such a thing ever occurs, some people have suggested, we could never revive industrialization again because the raw materials are no longer easily accessible. I hope that doesn't happen, and yet it may happen. Now, social ecologists say that deep ecologists flirt with fascism when they talk about returning to an "organic" social system that is "attuned to nature." They note that reactionary thinkers often contrast the supposedly "natural" way of life - which to them means social Darwinism and authoritarian social systems - with "modernity," which in political terms means progressive social movements like liberalism and Marxism. But deep ecologists recognize this danger. They call not for a regression to collective authoritarianism, but for the evolution of a mode of awareness that doesn't lend itself to authoritarianism of any kind. So I think the only thing we can do is to move forward**. We need to develop our efficiency and production methods so that we'll be able to take some of the pressure off the environment.** We also need to develop increasing wealth for the highly populated countries so their populations will go down. [Ed. Note: See Lappé and Schurman, "The Population Puzzle," in IC #21.] **There's a necessity for new technology**. The question is, can it be made consistent with our growing awareness that the planet is really hurting?

### Climate Skepticism DA

#### Their skepticism of technology and knowledge that can predict complex future events spills over into climate skepticism—denies policy action**Demeritt 1** [David Demeritt, Department of Geography King’s College London, 6/1/2001, Blackwell Publishers, InformaWorld “The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91(2), 2001, p. 309]

Unfortunately, public representations of science seldom acknowledge the irreducibly social dimension of scientific knowledge and practice. As a result, disclosure of the social relations through which scientific knowledge is constructed and conceived has become grounds for discrediting both that knowledge and any public policy decisions based upon it. This political strategy of social construction as refutation has been pursued by the so-called climate skeptics and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol. It is premised upon an idealized vision of scientific truth as the God’s-eye view from nowhere. Rather than accepting this premise and being forced to deny that scientific knowledge is socially situated and contingent, the proper response to it is to develop a more reflexive understanding of science as a situated and ongoing social practice, as the basis for a more balanced assessment of its knowledge. **A richer appreciation for the social processes of scientific knowledge construction is as important for scientists themselves as it is for wider public credibility of their knowledge. In the particular case of climate change, heavy reliance upon diverse, highly specialized, and multidisciplinary bodies of scientific knowledge highlights the problem of trust in knowledge and the expert systems that produce it. As phenomena, the global climate and anthropogenic changes to it would be difficult even to conceive of without sophisticated computer simulations of the global climate system.** Although satellite monitoring systems as well as instrumental records and paleoclimatic evidence have also been important, particularly in the identification of historic changes in the climate to date, **it is these powerful computer models that have been decisive in identifying the problem of future anthropogenic climate change and making it real for policy makers and the public**. Ordinary senses struggle in the face of phenomena so extensive in space and time and incalculable in their potential impacts. For the social theorist Ulrich Beck (1992), this **dependence upon science to make tangible otherwise invisible environmental risks is characteristic of what he calls the modern risk society.**

### Climate Skepticism DA

**Earth becomes Mars – all life dies**

Brandenburg and Paxon 99

(John E. Brandenburg and Monica Rix Paxon, physicist rocket scientist, Mars expert, investigator on MET project, NASA technical advisor, former member of space transport subcommittee ; writer and scientific editor, Dead Mars, Dying Earth, 1999, p.232 – 233)

The world goes on its merry way and fossil fuels continue to power it. **Rather than** making painful or politically difficult choices, such as **investing in fusion research or enacting a rigorous plan of conserving, the industrial world chooses to muddle through the temperature climb**. Let’s imagine that America and Europe are too worried about economic dislocation to change course. **The ozone hole expands**, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations’ heartlands. **The seas rise, the tropics roast** but the media networks no longer cover it**. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall,** but profits rise for those who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs—a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a nuclear war that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia.. . Suddenly the gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. **Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide**. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. **As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases**, which further warms the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, **plants die and burn in enormous fires which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate**, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, “See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!” **Earth, as we know it, dies.** After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost—as is its water—because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but **the ultraviolet sears any life that tries to make a comeback**. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. **Earth becomes the second Mars**—red, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving.

### AT: Accident Impact

**We have already developed maximum capacity for destruction—further progress can only be good**

**Walker 9**

(Mark, assistant professor at New Mexico State University and holds the Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of Civilization ,” The Global Spiral, Feb 5, <http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx>)

This line of thinking is further reinforced when we consider that there is a limit to the downside of creating posthumans, at least relatively speaking. That is, one of the traditional concerns about increasing knowledge is that it seems to always imply an associated risk for greater destructive capacity. One way this point is made is in terms of ‘killing capacity’: muskets are a more powerful technology than a bow and arrow, and tanks more powerful than muskets, and atomic bombs even more destructive than tanks. The knowledge that made possible these technical advancements brought a concomitant increase in capacity for evil. Interestingly, we have almost hit the wall in our capacity for evil: once you have civilization destroying weapons there is not much worse you can do. There is a point in which the one-upmanship for evil comes to an end—when everyone is dead. If you will forgive the somewhat graphic analogy, it hardly matters to Kennedy if his head is blown off with a rifle or a cannon. Likewise, if A has a weapon that can kill every last person there is little difference between that and B’s weapon which is twice as powerful. Posthumans probably won’t have much more capacity for evil than we have, or are likely to have shortly. So, at least in terms of how many persons can be killed, posthumans will not outstrip us in this capacity. This is not to say that there are no new worries with the creation of posthumans, but the greatest evil, the destruction of civilization, is something which we now, or will soon, have. In other words, the most significant aspect that we should focus on with contemplating the creation of posthumans is their upside. They are not likely to distinguish themselves in their capacity for evil, since we have already pretty much hit the wall on that, but for their capacity for good.

### Posthumanism DA

**Speed is good—every minute of technological delay kills a million people**

**Bostrom 3**

(Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, “Transhumanism FAQ,” October, <http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/72/>)

From this perspective, an improvement to the human condition is a change that gives increased opportunity for individuals to shape themselves and their lives according to their informed wishes. Notice the word “informed”. It is important that people be aware of what they choose between. Education, discussion, public debate, critical thinking, artistic exploration, and, potentially, cognitive enhancers are means that can help people make more informed choices. Transhumanists hold that people are not disposable. Saving lives (of those who want to live) is ethically important. It would be wrong to unnecessarily let existing people die in order to replace them with some new “better” people. Healthspan-extension and cryonics are therefore high on the transhumanist list of priorities. The transhumanist goal is not to replace existing humans with a new breed of super-beings, but rather to give human beings (those existing today and those who will be born in the future) the option of developing into posthuman persons. The non-disposability of persons partially accounts for a certain sense of urgency that is common among transhumanists. On average, 150,000 men, women, and children die every day, often in miserable conditions. In order to give as many people as possible the chance of a posthuman existence – or even just a decent human existence – it is paramount that technological development, in at least some fields, is pursued with maximal speed. When it comes to life-extension and its various enabling technologies, a **delay** of a **single week** equals **one million avoidable premature deaths** – a weighty fact which those who argue for bans or moratoria would do well to consider carefully. (The further fact that universal access will likely lag initial availability only adds to the reason for trying to hurry things along.)

**Speed is good—every day of technological progress we lose denies perfection to 150,000 people**

**Bostrom 5**

(Nick, Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy, “Transhumanist Values,” Last Mod Sept 17, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/values.html>)

Wide access. It is not enough that the posthuman realm be explored by someone. The full realization of the core transhumanist value requires that, ideally, everybody should have the opportunity to become posthuman. It would be sub-optimal if the opportunity to become posthuman were restricted to a tiny elite. There are many reasons for supporting wide access: to reduce inequality; because it would be a fairer arrangement; to express solidarity and respect for fellow humans; to help gain support for the transhumanist project; to increase the chances that you will get the opportunity to become posthuman; to increase the chances that those you care about can become posthuman; because it might increase the range of the posthuman realm that gets explored; and to alleviate human suffering on as wide a scale as possible. The wide access requirement underlies the moral urgency of the transhumanist vision. Wide access does not argue for holding back. On the contrary, other things being equal, it is an argument for **moving forward** **as quickly as possible**. 150,000 human beings on our planet die every day, without having had any access to the anticipated enhancement technologies that will make it possible to become posthuman. The sooner this technology develops, the fewer people will have died without access. Consider a hypothetical case in which there is a choice between (a) allowing the current human population to continue to exist, and (b) having it instantaneously and painlessly killed and replaced by six billion new human beings who are very similar but non-identical to the people that exist today. Such a replacement ought to be strongly resisted on moral grounds, for it would entail the involuntary death of six billion people. The fact that they would be replaced by six billion newly created similar people does not make the substitution acceptable. Human beings are not disposable. For analogous reasons, it is important that the opportunity be become posthuman is made available to as many humans as possible, rather than having the existing population merely supplemented (or worse, replaced) by a new set of posthuman people. The transhumanist ideal will be maximally realized only if the benefits of technologies are widely shared and if they are made available as soon as possible, preferably within our lifetime.