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International Relations 1NC (1/)

The affirmative is rooted in attempts at masculine action – their focus on troop withdrawal ultimately subverts the feminine tendencies in International Relations.

**Duncanson and Eschle 8** (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New Political Science 30(4), p. 560)IM

Nonetheless, the British state is, and must be, capable of decisive action. Such capability is central to Realist understandings of the state and shot through with masculine associations in contrast to feminised passivity and succumbing to constraint. Thus active verb constructions and descriptions of decisive action predominate throughout the text. The foreword and executive summary, for example, mention repeatedly that “we believe” and “we have decided.”90 Even when the state is doing nothing, or reducing its stockpile, it is actively choosing to do so: “we decided not to take an option . . . We will reduce . . . we have not conducted . . . we have increased our transparency . . . we have ceased production . . . We continue to make progress.”91 There is also an overt emphasis on avoiding inaction or constraint. “[O]ur capacity to act” must “not be constrained by nuclear blackmail by others,”92 “we must not allow such states to . . . deter us and the international community from taking the action required . . . or fundamentally constrain our policy options.”93 The possibility of a “dormant” nuclear weapons capability cannot be entertained, the capability must be “active” and also “credible.”94 The need for British nuclear weapons capacity to be “credible” is emphasised at several points so even if we do not act, it must be possible that we can, and others must believe that we can.

Our Kritik isn’t limited to military violence, but the security paradigm inherent with the masculine war machine

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

Anti-war feminists’ opposition to the practice of war is simultaneously pragmatic and moral. We have an abiding suspicion of the use of violence, even in the best of causes. The ability of violence to achieve its stated aims is routinely over-estimated, while the complexity of its costs are overlooked. Our opposition also stems from the perception that the practice of war entails far more than the killing and destroying of armed combat itself. It requires the creation of a “war system,” which entails: arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the resources these preparations require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as morally legitimate, even alluring; and shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities which undergird men’s and women’s acquiescence to war. Even when it appears to achieve its aims, war is a source of enormous individual suffering and loss. Modern warfare is also predictably destructive to societies, civil liberties and democratic processes, and the non-human world. State security may sometimes be served by war, but too often human security is not

International Relations 1NC (2/)

This masculine ideology is the root cause of all proliferation, environmental destruction, domestic violence, and war

Warren and Cady 94 (Karen J, Duane L, feminists and authors, Hypatia, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing connections,” pg 16-17)

Much of the current "unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors -- the symptoms of dysfunctionality -- that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is -- as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy. 11The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989 , 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "a militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" ( Spretnak 1989 , 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility ties in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

International Relations 1NC (3/)

Our alternative is to vote negative. Rejection of a framework that normalizes masculine warfare is critical to adopt epistemologies centered on a feminist ethic of peace

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

Both in philosophy and in “western” thought more generally, “objective” knowledge is produced by socially autonomous reasoners who have transcended institutional constraints, gender identifications, and emotion. Many feminists propose an “alternative epistemology” which stresses that all thinkers are “situated” within “epistemic communities” which ask some but not other questions, and legitimate some but not other ways of knowing. We are each of us also situated by social identities and personal histories. To take an example at hand: some of us address the volume’s questions as heirs of the “victims” of nuclear weapons, or associate ourselves with them.17 Others are heirs of the attackers. Some address the issue of “proliferation” of nuclear weapons from the situation of a possessor state, others from a situation in which they would find the term “proliferation” inappropriate. None of us speaks from nowhere; there is no phenomenon – including nuclear attack or proliferation – that can be seen independently of the situation of the seers.18 Three tenets of this “alternative epistemology” seem especially relevant to our work. Knowing is never wholly separated from feelings. Indeed, in many kinds of inquiry the capacity to feel and to account for one’s feelings is both a source and a test of knowledge. Secondly, as useful as hypothetical thought experiments and imagined scenarios may be, we begin with and return to concrete open-ended questions about actual people in actual situations. Finally, we measure arguments, and ideals of objectivity, partly in terms of the goods which they yield, the pleasures they make possible and the suffering they prevent. Grounded in this alternative epistemology, anti-war feminists criticize the dominant political/strategic paradigm for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, which we call “technostrategic discourse.”19 In contrast to just war theory, this discourse is explicitly not centered on the ethics of warfare, but on its material and political practicalities. As a tool for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, it essentially restricts the thinker to three issues: the actual use, i.e. the detonation, of these weapons in state warfare or by terrorists; the physical and geo-political effects of this use; the deployment of these weapons to deter attacks involving either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the concerns of the dominant strategic discourse are limited to the destructive effects of the weapons when, and only when, they are detonated, and to the possible deterrent effects of possessing these weapons. There is scant attention to the potential suffering of targeted societies, and no attempt to evaluate complicated effects on possessor societies of deploying and developing these weapons, nor to grapple with the moral significance of willingly risking such massive, total destruction. When anti-war feminists think about wars, they take into consideration the political, social, economic, psychological and moral consequences of accepting the practice of war. When assessing weapons, they do not single out or isolate weapons’ physical, military and strategic effects from their embeddedness in and impact upon social and political life as a whole, nor from the effects of the discourses which constitute “knowledge” about these weapons. Hence when asked to think about weapons of mass destruction, we strive to consider the totality of the web of social, economic, political, and environmental relationships within which weapons of mass destruction are developed, deployed, used and disposed of – all the while starting from the perspective of women’s lives. It is not possible to do so from within the bounds of “just war” and/or “technostrategic” frameworks – yet those are the very discourses which have shaped the questions we are asked to answer in this volume. Thus, as we respond to the editors’ questions, we find we need to both think inside their frame, and about the frame itself.

Link – Realism/Security

Realist assumptions are fundamentally skewed – they ignore the structural implications within nations and invoke epistemic violence

Ayotte and Husain 5 (Kevin J, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the California State University and Mary E, lecturer in the Department of Communication at the California State University, “Securing Afghan Women: Neocolonialism, Epistemic Violence, and the Rhetoric of the Veil, p. 112-113) PJ

The concept of “security” has not always been considered particularly problematic in the study of international relations. For much of the twentieth century, and to a signifi cant degree today, much of the theory and practice of international relations has been conducted from within the perspective of political realism, *realpolitik*, or its derivative, neorealism (Desch 1996, 361; Vasquez 1983, 160–72). Within the realist paradigm, security flows from power, specifi cally state power and military strength. Recent feminist scholarship has challenged this notion of security on the grounds that women have never been secure *r* within (or without) the nation state—they are always disproportionately affected by war, forced migration, famine, and other forms of social, political, and economic turmoil (Mohanty 2002, 514; Tickner 2001, 50–1). The statist theoretical framework of political realism is thus inadequate to explain the myriad conditions that make women insecure in the world today. In the wake of the “war on terrorism” and its mobilization of women’s bodies to justify U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, feminist analyses of international relations must broaden the concept of security, in J. Ann Tickner’s words, to “seek to understand how the security of individuals and groups is compromised by violence, both physical and structural” (2001, 48). To the types of violence examined by feminist international relations scholarship, we would add the concept of *epistemic violence* (see Spivak 1999, 266). While the physical and structural violence infl icted upon women must remain a central component of feminist theory and criticism, the war on terrorism in Afghanistan also demonstrates that the Western appropriation and homogenization of third-world women’s voices perform a kind of epistemic violence that must be addressed along with material oppressions.1 This essay argues that representations of the women of Afghanistan as gendered slaves in need of “saving” by the West constitute epistemic violence, the construction of a violent knowledge of the thirdworld Other that erases women as *subjects* in international relations. In claiming to secure Afghan women from the oppression of the Taliban, the United States has reinscribed an ostensibly benevolent paternalism of which we should remain wary. In particular, the image of the Afghan woman shrouded in the burqa has played a leading role in various public arguments seeking to justify U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. This rhetorical construction of Afghan women as objects of knowledge legitimized U.S. military intervention under the rubric of “liberation” at the same time that it masked the root causes of structural violence in Afghanistan. The pursuit of gender security must therefore account for the diverse ways in which the neocolonialism of some Western discourses about third-world women creates the epistemological conditions for material harm. Although the distinctions among epistemic, physical, and structural violence in this article allow for analytic precision in the sense that these forms of violence are indeed different in kind, we must recognize their complicitous relationship.

Link – Realism/Security

Realist assumptions and the security paradigm can’t solve structural problems and ignore constant structural violence.

Pandey in 2k6 (Anupam, thesis submitted to faculty of graduate studies and research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctorate of philosophy department of political science Carleton university, Forging bonds with women, nature and the third world: an ecofeminist critique of international relations, pg. 17-18)

Despite the fact that many significant critiques have made their presence felt, the discipline of IR continues to be dominated by the sub-field of military security. The chief reason for the same is the preponderance of the Realist paradigm which needs to be situated within the circumstances of the historical legacy and birth of IR, the Cold War, the emergence of a single hegemon post-Cold War, the renewed threat of terrorism, etc. Thus, concepts of balance of power, deterrence, sovereignty, etc. have come to occupy the central and vast majority of space in the subject matter of the discipline. Both theory and practice have served to reinforce each other and this partnership has served to marginalize all other issues which are regarded as “normative” concerns to the margins of the IR. Thus, issues such as Third World debt and poverty are relegated to the realm of “low politics” and hence put on the backburner, while matters pertaining to state security, wars, weaponisation and sovereignty are studied as an integral part of the “high politics” which deserve salience. However, the more recent innovation of human security studies is relevant to the Third World by sheer dint of its subject matter which explores human vulnerability across the globe that could be the result of natural or man-made disasters. Simon Dalby states that traditionally there have been two elements to human security — freedom from fear and freedom from want but over the years, the former element has overshadowed the latter (2002: 7). Further, he quotes the UNDP Human Development Report (1994) to define human security. Thus, issues of poverty, disease, hunger, famines, financial crises feature prominently here under the overarching topics of freedom from want and hunger (Thomas and Wilkins 2004). In the coming century, the six great threats to human security are unchecked rise in population, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and international terrorism (Dalby 2002: 8). It becomes clear that these threats are the result of actions of millions of people rather than deliberate actions of specific states. Therefore, the concept of security must change from the realist, statist and militarist preoccupations to include human welfare. Despite the fact that the approach is holistic in its understanding of world affairs and emancipatory in terms of its agenda, its drawback lies in that it largely espouses a liberal humanitarian framework rather than a radical departure from existing structural constraints

Link – Utilitarianism

**Utilitarianism re-perpetuates patriarchal hierarchies by establishing a rationale of who will and won’t survive.**

Plumwood 2 (Val,– Australian Research Council Fellow at University of Sydney, Environmental Culture: The ecological crisis of reason, p. 150-151) PJ

Singer's Minimalism is also a political position urging minimal depar­ture from prevailing liberal, humanistic and Enlightenment assumptions and from the present system of economic rationality."" But surely an ecological society will require more than minimal departures from these systems, none of which have been innocent bystanders in the development of the rational machinery which is bringing the stripping of the planet for the benefit of a small elite of humans to a high point of rational refinement. Singer's Utilitarianism reproduces many elements of rationalism, includ­ing the adoption of universal, abstract mathematically-expressible formulae for decision, in the best universalist/Impersonalist tradition. Also in the rationalist tradition is the content of the Utilitarian formula, with its maximisations (always damaging), illusory precision, its intellectualist reduction of ethics to a matter of rational calculation and quantification, and its corresponding reduction of the important dimensions of decision to aspects of life supposedly susceptible to these rational manipulations. And as we have seen, awareness, the chief ground of ethical consideration, is one, but only one, possible variation on reason or mind, although one that modernism can tie to preferences and hence to agency and property ownership. The most serious objection to my mind however is that any ecological or animal ethics based on Singer's Utilitarianism is committed to a massive program of ranking, quantification and comparison between beings and species - a program which, as I argue in the next chapter, is unworkable, ethically repugnant, and built on a problematic reading of equality. Theoretically, ranking comparisons and tradeoffs between beings are insisted upon by Utilitarianism at virtually every level. This emphasis on ranking does not encourage the kind of thinking that aims for mutual, negotiated outcomes, but rather ones that sanction a sacrificial order deter­mined on the basis of greater approximations to the human.

Link – Women’s Empowerment

Attempting to assist Afghan women is a façade created to sustain masculine hegemony in Afghanistan – the alternative is the only way to give women agency.

Ayotte and Husain 5 (Kevin J, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the California State University and Mary E, lecturer in the Department of Communication at the California State University, “Securing Afghan Women: Neocolonialism, Epistemic Violence, and the Rhetoric of the Veil, p. 113-114) PJ

The insecurity of Afghan women, discursive and material, also refl ects and infl ects some rather long-running theoretical debates within feminism. Disputes about the representation of race and class (or lack thereof) in feminist politics, for example, fragmented numerous organizations and movements over the past several decades, just as theoretical debates about difference and essentialism have splintered feminist intellectuals. The case of the U.S. appropriation of Afghan women and the burqa demonstrates the unsustainability of these theoretical divides. The material oppression of women in Afghanistan cannot be reduced to an array of floating signifiers; equally clear, however, is the danger of reducing representations of material conditions to the purported essence of Afghan women. Through rhetorical criticism of U.S. representations of Afghan women, this essay argues for a theoretical synthesis that will provide a more complex understanding of the nature of gender insecurity in the post-cold war world. The first section of this article briefly reviews relevant theoretical debates within feminism and feminist international relations in order to demonstrate both the value and the limits of discrete critical approaches and to lay the foundation for the middle ground adopted later. The second section examines specific U.S. representations of Afghan women and the burqa and considers the ways in which these discourses inflict and entrench certain forms of epistemic, physical, and structural violence against women. The conclusion explores alternative representations of Afghan women that offer the prospect of greater security through both critical reflexivity and the promotion of women’s agency via indigenous social activism.

Benign rhetoric and women’s empowerment is used to justify imperialist measures.

Ayotte and Husain 5 (Kevin J, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the California State University and Mary E, lecturer in the Department of Communication at the California State University, “Securing Afghan Women: Neocolonialism, Epistemic Violence, and the Rhetoric of the Veil, p. 115-116) PJ

There seems to be considerable agreement that the burqa, the heavy garment that covers the entirety of a woman’s body with only a narrow mesh screen for vision, has become the universal symbol of women’s oppression in Afghanistan (Kensinger 2003, 2; Abu-Lughod 2002, 785). In the context of the Taliban’s harsh imposition of the mandatory burqa for all Afghan women, where the smallest deviation in dress was often met with public violence, such symbolism is easy to understand. It has been well documented that women in Afghanistan have been beaten simply for accidentally letting an inch of skin show (United Nations 2000, 7; Amnesty International 1999; Physicians for Human Rights 1998, 52). Of course, the Taliban’s overwhelming misogyny neither began nor ended with the imposition of the burqa, and the wide range of oppressive policies that the Taliban inflicted upon women has certainly been discussed in the U.S. news media. Yet in many cases, representations of the burqa have come to stand in for all of the other violence done to Afghan women by an either visual or linguistic synecdoche. It is not only the rhetoric of “the veil” that is significant in U.S. discourses about Afghan women but also the position of the speaking subject.3 Especially problematic is the ventriloquism of Afghan women by discourses speaking for (both “on behalf of” and “in place of”) them. For example, Vicki Mabrey reported on CBS’s *60 Minutes II* that, “for the women of Afghanistan, the veil, the burqa, has become the symbol of the Taliban’s power” (“Unveiled” 2001). Of course, in one sense this may very well be perfectly accurate, and the point of identifying this moment is not to suggest that U.S. women (or men) should not speak of other peoples’ oppression. The key is to maintain a constantly reflexive skepticism toward the adequacy of our own (U.S.) representations of the “plight” of third-world women. Although Mabrey does interview women from Afghanistan, we must recall that “Huma,” “Sonia,” and the others interviewed in the news program are always already ventriloquized by the media narrative. Even if their accounts could be unproblematically interpreted as immediate and generalizable reflections of reality, that discourse has already been edited, prompted by certain lines of questioning, i.e., mediated. This is not to suggest that the women’s stories are false, but rather that even their indigenous narratives are inflected by their representation in an inevitably Western discourse (Spivak 1999, 49).

Link – Women’s Empowerment

Don’t buy into the ruse – historically women’s empowerment has been used as justification to go to war and perpetuate violence all while denying women agency and value.

Sjoberg 7 (Laura, PhD and visting professor at Duke University, 2/13, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Laura%20Sjoberg%20-%202\_13\_07.pdf)

Another symbolic employment of gender to motivate war-fighting came from images of American women living in the American dream. To the United States, the First Gulf War was where [in part] about preserving Western women’s way of life. President Bush and a number of other Western leaders talked about free access to Iraqi and Kuwait oil as a question of defense of the way of life that citizens had become accustomed to. Discussion of oil as key to mothers’ driving their children to soccer practice, or heating their homes, or performing other household functions reliant on access to oil dominated the part of the Gulf War justification rhetoric which talked about Western interests. Lack of access to oil would hinder women from effectively serving as mothers and wives, and this was a part of the justification for going to war. A common image for the ‘way of life’ argument justifying United States involvement in the Gulf War was that of a woman unloading her children out of a car in front of a house with a yellow ribbon. She feeds her children, waters her flowers, and conveys the message that he husband is in Iraq, fighting so that they can keep this way of life. Here, a woman’s role as a mother is highlighted. Motherhood in war serves a number of functions: physical creation of soldiers, social creation of these soldiers, support of the soldiers from back home, a woman for each soldier to protect, and a comfort for who soldiers are wounded in battle. In the Gulf War, in turn, soldiers were cast as fighting for their ‘wives and mothers’. They defended ‘freedom for their children’ and a ‘new world order’ where ‘all fathers, mothers and children’ would be able to live without fear for their lives. The pageantry of the war included videotaped messages from soldiers in Iraq ‘back home,’ saying hello to their mothers, and to the mothers of their children. This created the double image that mothers were being fought for, and that the soldiers fighting were tough, but focused on what they were protecting, Beautiful Souls at home. Beautiful Souls at home were not the only protective purpose of the Western soldiers who spent 1991 in Iraq. One of the arguments made for the defense of Kuwait was the protection of Kuwaiti women and children from the horrors inflicted by Iraqi soldiers. Much abuse of Kuwaiti ‘womenandchildren’ is documented during the Iraqi occupation. At the time it was argued that the abuse of women in Kuwait by the Iraqi military was a part of the reason why Kuwait must be liberated from Iraqi control. Many Americans advocated continuing the Gulf War to overthrow the government of Iraq because of Saddam Hussein’s abuse of women. Saddam Hussein was accused of sponsoring rape, severe psychological trauma, politicized sexual violence, and torture of mothers for their children’s political activities. The Saddam Hussein government’s abuse of women played an important part in the argument that it was an illegitimate government; legitimate governments would not abuse women, who are by gender defenseless. This discourse fails to mention the (often horrible) effects of war on women. The claim, instead, is that the violation of women is an international security issue. Women must be fought *for*; that the fighting might hurt them does not enter political conversation. In this situation, American men and women must protect Iraqi women from Iraqi men (specifically, from an Iraqi man, Saddam Hussein) by force, lest the security of the international community break down. The women who are being protected are omitted on a number of levels: their agency, their preferences, their choices, and their ultimate fate. Also, women who fight are generally neglected.

Link – War/Security

The aff treats war as an account of society instead of a practice, which excludes it from true criticism

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 3, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)IM

Of course, the fact that two logically distinct lines of query—the failure to recognize similarities and the exaltation of a subject matter—are bound together anticipates one compelling response. The discipline that claimed the study of war as its own in the aftermath of World War I, that is, international relations, eclipsed critiques that were inclined to locate war within a broader explanatory matrix. Specifically, the feminist and Marxist critiques of war were excluded in the initial flurry of intellectual "homesteading" that quickly came to define the incipient field.3 Feminist critiques that addressed World War I in terms of patriarchal culture and society were circulated throughout the war.4 Similarly, arguments about the origins of World War I that focussed upon the nature and dynamics of globalizing capitalism were present from the beginning.5 It is curious that a field with the raison d'etre of explaining war would cast two sobering lines of inquiry aside at its point of inception. When viewed in this manner, the inaugural phase of intellectual activity in international relations, a phase that has been described recently as neo-Kantian in view of its penchant for democratic republicanism and its focus upon the cooperative prospects of sovereign states, appears as a discursive practice aimed at foreclosing radical critiques of war.6 From the outset, in other words, the theoretical understanding of international relations was profoundly political in terms of its consonance with the reproduction of patri-capitalism. The theory-that-became-praxis crystallized within an early 20th century discursive matrix that marginalized feminist and Marxist critique, and with it any possibility of addressing war as a historically embedded social practice. The tendency to reify war, that is, to fail to examine it as part of a broader set of cultural understandings and practices, was intensified during the positivist pall of international relations. The immediate task at hand became the application of a naturalist model of science in the quest for nomological theories of war. Scholars could apply this theoretical knowledge to the world "out there" in order to promote and foster a more peaceful world. "The cause of the disease once known," presciently mused Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the Abstract of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace in a manner that anticipated the spirit of researchers throughout much of the 20th century, "suffices to indicate the remedy, if indeed there is one to be found." The view that war might be related to patriarchy, indeed, that it might be rooted in patriarchal culture, or the possibility that war might be understood better as one manifestation of violence characteristic of a gendered society, was absent from almost all research. Nor was the developing feminist critique deemed to be all that relevant or helpful in understanding war.7 War was treated as a thing in need of an account rather than a practice fundamentally linked to other sociocultural practices.

Link – Omission

The affirmative’s failure to address the inherent masculinities and security paradigms in contemporary nuclear states make their impacts inevitable – the alternative is the best option.

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

Question Three asks whether it is ethical to develop and deploy WMD as deterrents only. That is, it asks the classic question of whether it is ethical to have weapons and threaten to use then, even if it is not ethical to use those weapons militarily. As the question is framed, then, “development” and “deployment” appear not as phenomena subject to ethical scrutiny unto themselves, but merely as way-stations, as adjuncts subsumed under what is taken to be the core ethical issue, which is seen as deterrence. This formulation does not work for us. We need to pause and recognize that there are really several questions enfolded in that one. We must not only ask about the ethical status of deterrence, but also whether its entailments – development and deployment – are themselves ethical.27 One of the constitutive positions of anti-war feminism is that in thinking about weapons and wars, we must accord full weight to their daily effects on the lives of women. We then find that the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, even when they are not used in warfare, exacts immense economic costs that particularly affect women. In the words of a recent Indian feminist essay: “The social costs of nuclear weaponisation in a country where the basic needs of shelter, food and water, electricity, health and education have not been met are obvious.... [S]ince patriarchal family norms place the task of looking after the daily needs of the family mainly upon women, scarcity of resources always hits women the hardest. Less food for the family inevitably means an even smaller share for women and female children just as water shortages mean an increase in women’s labour who have to spend more time and energy in fetching water from distant places at odd hours of the day.”28 While the US is not as poor a nation as India, Pakistan, or Russia, it has remained, throughout the nuclear age, a country in which poverty and hunger are rife, health care still unaffordable to many, low-cost housing unavailable, with crumbling public schools and infrastructure, all while the American nuclear weapons program has come at the cost of 4.5 trillion dollars.29 In addition to being economically costly, nuclear weapons development has medical and political costs. In the US program, many people have been exposed to high levels of radiation, including uranium miners; workers at reactors and processing facilities; the quarter of a million military personnel who took place in “atomic battlefield” exercises; “downwinders” from test sites; and Marshallese Islanders.30 Politically, nuclear regimes require a level of secrecy and security measures that exclude the majority of citizens, and in most countries, all women, from defense policy and decision-making.”31 From the perspective of women’s lives, we see not only the costs of the development of nuclear weapons, but also the spiritual, social and psychological costs of deployment*.* One cost, according to some feminists, is that “Nuclearisation produces social consent for increasing levels of violence.32 Another cost, for many, is that nuclear weapons create high levels of tension, insecurity and fear. As Arundhati Roy puts it, nuclear weapons “[i]nform our dreams. They bury themselves like meat hooks deep in the base of our brains.”33 Further, feminists are concerned about the effect of nuclear policy on moral thought, on ideas about gender, and how the two intersect. Nuclear development may legitimize male aggression, and breed the idea that nuclear explosions give a ‘virility’ to the nation which men as individuals can somehow also share. [T]he strange character of nuclear policy- making not only sidelines moral and ethical questions, but genders them. This elite gets to be represented as rational, scientific, modern, and of course masculine, while ethical questions, questions about the social and environmental costs are made to seem emotional, effeminate, regressive and not modern. This rather dangerous way of thinking, which suggests that questions about human life and welfare are somehow neither modern nor properly masculine questions, or that men have no capacity and concern for peace and morality, can have disastrous consequences for both men and women.34

Link – Omission

The affirmative’s scenarios subscribe to the traditional values of International Relations in that they omit the individual sufferings and experiences of affected women.

Sjoberg 7 (Laura, PhD and visting professor at Duke University, 2/13, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Laura%20Sjoberg%20-%202\_13\_07.pdf)

The search for feminist knowledge can be seen as a journey to understand and change the world through “gendered lenses.” In feminist research, I am looking to understand international politics, to find its injustices, and to challenge those injustices, while recognizing a pluralism concerning the definition and appraisal of injustice. As Ann Tickner points out, this makes feminist method not an event, but a journey – a journey that I take through observation, critique, revealing, reformulation, reflexivity, and action, guided by gendered lenses. We will start with individual gender. Feminists in IR frequently go out of their way to *look for* *women* in global politics. Women are necessarily a part of global politics: they make up more than half the world’s population and are located everywhere that men are. Yet, the stories of global politics often do not mention the women whose lives affect and are affected by international relations. The histories or Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Israel are contentious. Political convictions influence the stories that people tell of Middle East relations since the end of the First World War. Some speak of Israel’s fight to survive in a region that threatens to replicate the Holocaust. Others recount the oppression of the Arab Middle East by rich and powerful outsiders, in Israel and abroad. These stories from diverse political perspectives perhaps share nothing but their tendency to omit women. Women are largely omitted from the histories of the First Gulf War. Where women are mentioned, it is normally in the context of either their need for protection or a human interest story on the oddity of women in participatory roles. The stories of women that were told in the First Gulf War (when they were told at all) were of innocent women in need of protection or feminine emulation of masculine military values. Telling the stories that remain untold in traditional histories is one of feminisms’ strongest tools. Feminisms look to politics at the margins to find women - to see realities about their lives, their actions, and their suffering. Speaking about women’s lives makes it more difficult to ignore them.

Link – Proliferation

Rhetoric of proliferation is part of the security paradigm that justifies masculine violence on those perceived as threats.

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

“Proliferation” is not a mere description or mirror of a phenomenon that is “out there,” but rather a very specific way of identifying and constructing a problem. “Proliferation, ” as used in Western political discourse, does not simply refer to the “multiplication” of weapons of mass destruction on the planet. Rather, it constructs some WMD as a problem, and others as unproblematic. It does so by assuming pre-existing, legitimate possessors of the weapons, implicitly not only entitled to those weapons, but to “modernize” and develop new “generations” of them as well. The “problematic” WMD are only those that “spread” into the arsenals of other, formerly non-possessor states. This is presumably the basis for the “licit/illicit” distinction in the question; it does not refer to the nature of the weapons themselves, nor even to the purposes for which they are intended – only, in the case of nuclear weapons, to who the possessor is, where “licitness” is based on the treaty-enshrined “we got there first.” Thus, use of the term “proliferation” tends to locate the person who uses it within a possessor state, and aligns him or her with the political stance favoring the hierarchy of state power enshrined in the current distribution of WMD. The framing of Question Four. “... is it proper to deny [WMD] possession to others for the same purposes?”, seems similarly based in a possessor state perspective, as it is presumably the possessor states who must decide whether it is proper to deny possession to others. As we have already stated, we find WMD themselves intrinsically morally indefensible, no matter who possesses them, and we are concerned about the wide array of costs to any state of development and deployment. We therefore reject the discourse’s implicit division of “good” and “bad,” “safe” and “unsafe” WMD, (defined as good or bad depending on who possesses them). Our concern is to understand how some WMD are rendered invisible (“o urs”) and some visible (“theirs”); some rendered malignant and others benign. Here, we join others in noting that the language in which the case against “proliferation” is made is ethno-racist and contemptuous. Generally, in Western proliferation discourse as a whole, a distinction is drawn between “the ‘Self’(seen as responsible) vs the non-Western Unruly Other.”36 The US represents itself as a rational actor, while representing the Unruly Other as emotional, unpredictable, irrational, immature, misbehaving. Not only does this draw on and reconstruct an Orientalist portrayal of third world actors37; it does so through the medium of gendered terminology. By drawing the relations between possessors and non-possessors in gendered terms – the prudential, rational, advanced, mature, restrained, technologically- and bureaucratically- competent (and thus “masculine”) Self, versus the emotional, irrational, unpredictable, uncontrolled, immature, primitive, undisciplined, technologically-incompetent (and thus “feminine”) Unruly Other – the discourse naturalizes and legitimates the Self/possessor states having weapons which the Other does not. By drawing on and evoking gendered imagery and resonances, the discourse naturalizes the idea that “We” / the US / the responsible father must protect, must control and limit “her,” the emotional, out-of-control state, for her own good, as well as for ours. This Western proliferation discourse has had a function in the wider context of US national security politics. With the end of the “Evil Empire” in the late 1980s, until the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the US appeared to be without an enemy of grand enough proportions to justify maintaining its sprawling military- industrial establishment. This difficulty was forestalled by the construction of the category of “rogue states” – states seen as uncontrollable, irresponsible, irrational, malevolent, and antagonistic to the West.38 Their unruliness and antagonism was represented as intrinsic to their irrational nature; if it were not in their “nature, the US would have needed to ask more seriously if actions on the part of the West had had any role in producing that hostility and disorder. The discourse of WMD proliferation has been one of the principal means of producing these states as major threats. To say this is neither to back away from our position opposing weapons of mass destruction, nor to assess the degree to which WMD in the hands of “Other” states actually do threaten the US, the “Other” states’ regional opponents, or their own population. But it is an assessment of the role of WMD proliferation discourse in naturalizing and legitimating otherwise-difficult-to-make-appear-rational programs and expenditures such as National Missile Defense.39

Link – Hegemony/Militarism/Humanitarianism

The military puts on a facade of possible liberation from sexism while waging war on the women, the environment, and culture.

Choudry 8 (Aziz, professor at McGill University, http://www.google.com/search?q=Aziz+Choudry&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a) PJ

The burden of war, conflict, violence and militarized capitalism falls disproportionately on women. The impacts of women can be seen not only in conflict zones but through the proliferation of small arms and creeping militarization of communities and society at large, leading to more violence against women in domestic and community contexts, rapes, sexual violence, displacement and the exaltation of warrior masculinities. Women are more likely to become war refugees. Unsurprisingly then, it has also been women who have led resistance against militarization, war and violence, US military bases and the accompanying masculinization of broader society and social behaviour. It is usually women who pick up the pieces in communities ripped apart by war, violence and state repression. Cynthia Enloe notes that social workers who address issues of domestic violence “agree that military service is probably more conducive to violence at home than at any other occupation”.43 Meanwhile, we are subjected to constant claims that a primary goal of the US-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is to liberate Afghani women. Commenting on this, Sunera Thobani notes, “one battle in the ideological war was to be waged on the terrain of gender relations, … rallying western populations around fantasies of saving Muslim women would be more effective than rallying them around the overtly imperialist policies of securing US control over oil and natural gas supplies.”44 Just as purported humanitarian concerns are wheeled out as justifications for thinly-veiled imperialist wars over resources45, military contractors and war profiteering corporations portray themselves as inclusive, socially progressive and gender-sensitive. On their corporate websites, these corporations’ core business is painted over with a cosmetic veneer that could cause us to forget that it is for war and killing people. For example, Pentagon contractors like Northrop Grumman boast of their “workforce diversity”46 and showcase their women executives. The Canadian and US defence industries have set up organizations like Women in Defence and Security (WiDS)47, signed memorandums of understanding with Canada’s Department of National Defence, and are affiliated with the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI)48, an industry-led association of more than 550 member firms in the defence and security industries in Canada to “promote the advancement of women leaders in defence and security professions across Canada”. Raytheon, the maker of “Bunker Buster” bombs, Tomahawk and Patriot missiles, lobbed at Afghanistan and Iraq49, causing many deaths proclaims: “Diversity at Raytheon is about inclusiveness — providing an atmosphere where everyone feels valued and empowered to perform at a peak level, regardless of the many ways people are different”50. Virginia-based Booz Allen Hamilton51, one of the biggest suppliers of technology and personnel to US government spy agencies like the CIA, NSA, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), as well as the US Department of Defence and Department of Homeland Security (former CIA director R. James Woolsey is now a senior vice president of Booz Allen), also boasts how it is committed to diversity in the workforce “because we believe that diversity of backgrounds contributes to different ideas, which in turn drives better results for clients. To us, diversity means all the ways individuals differ from one another—race, gender, ethnicity, physical abilities, educational background, country of origin, age, sexual orientation, skills, income, marital status, parental status, religion, work experience, and military service”. Then there is Aegis Defence Services52 whose employees were caught on video randomly shooting automatic weapons at civilian cars in Baghdad’s airport road53, which claims “Our equal-opportunity policy emphasizes our aim to create a work environment that is inclusive and non-discriminatory, where all employees are empowered by their individuality and encouraged to use it in order to achieve success”. Greenwashing environmentally destructive corporations is despicable enough. Yet there is something particularly obscene about the ways in which these corporations hide behind such mission and values statements and commitments to “diversity”, complementing the claims of the militaries in Afghanistan to be liberating Afghani women.

Link – Democracy

Status quo democracy masks structures of patriarchy.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 105-106) JM

Analyses of democratization are built on traditional definitions of democracy that are based on the legacy of Western liberal democracy, a legacy that has been problematic for women. Feminist political theorists have reexamined the meaning of democracy and its gendered implications by going back to the origins of Western democratic institutions. In her reevaluation of social contract theory, Carole Pateman has outlined how the story of the social contract as articulated by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European political theorists has been treated as an account of the creation of a public sphere of civil freedom in which only men were endowed with the necessary attributes for entering into contracts. Liberal definitions of citizens as nonsexed autonomous individuals outside any social context abstract from a Western male model. Evolving notions of citizenship in the West were based on male, property-owning heads of households: thus, democratic theory and practice have been built on the male-as-norm engaged in narrowly defined political activities.31 Women, Pateman claims, were not party to the original contract; rather, they were incorporated into the private sphere through the marriage contract as wives subservient to their husbands, rather than as individuals. The private sphere, a site of subjection, is part of civil society, but separate from the “civil” sphere; each gains meaning from the other and each is mutually dependent on the other.32 This separation of the public and private spheres has had important ramifications for the construction and evolution of political and economic institutions at all levels; feminists see them as intimately related, however. What goes on in the public sphere of politics and the economy cannot be understood as separate from the private. Historically, therefore, terms such as citizen and head of household were not neutral but associated with men. Even in states where women have achieved formal or near-formal equality, feminists have claimed that this historical legacy still inhibits their political and economic participation on an equal basis with men. As feminists from the South have pointed out, what is “public” in one society may be “private” in another; it is true, however, that women’s activities, such as reproduction and child rearing, tend to be devalued in all societies. Nevertheless, the evolution of democratic practices and institutions and their attendant notions of individual rights have certainly had benefits for women; the concept of rights and equality were important rationales for the suffrage movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the West as well as for movements for women’s liberation and human rights in various parts of the world today. But, as Pateman’s analysis suggests, the liberal tradition continues to present particular problems for women; as she points out, aspiring to equality assumes that individuals can be separated from sexually differentiated bodies.33 Deep structures, upheld by the public/ private divide, have continued to keep women in positions of subordination, even after the acquisition of the vote or other legal gains; despite the fact that women have always participated in the public sphere as workers, they do not have the same civil standing as men in most societies. For example, in twentieth-century welfare laws in the West, men have generally been defined as breadwinners and women as dependents; likewise, immigration laws and rules governing refugees define women as dependents with negative implications for their legal status. In the United States, the concept of firstclass citizen has frequently been tied to military service, a disadvantage for women running for political office.34 Studies of democratic transitions in Russia, East Europe, and Latin America demonstrate some of the problems associated with the legacy of the Western liberal tradition.35

Link – Democracy

Historical examples prove that democracy is bad for teh womenz.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 106-108) JM

That democratic transitions may actually be negative for women was most evident in the former Soviet Union and some states in East Europe: gender relations associated with the public/private divide there became more pronounced. Because of the elimination of quota systems in legislatures in this region, the number of women in institutional politics was sharply reduced after transitions to democracy, with the proportion of women elected to representative bodies declining from an average of 33 percent to 10 percent. 36 This decline was especially significant given that legislative bodies began to play a real role in policymaking. It is important to note, however, that women’s representation under Communist regimes was largely window dressing: women were equally marginalized from real centers of power before and after democratic transitions.37 In East Europe and Russia, the drop in political participation of women during the transition was accompanied by a loss of economic status. Applauded by liberals, the transition to market economies and structural adjustment associated with the opening to the global economy took disproportionate numbers of women out of the labor force because of the need to shed labor to adjust to market competition; as in other cases of structural adjustment, the state sector, where women are often employed, shrank dramatically. In the early 1990s, in all of eastern Central Europe except Hungary, women constituted 50 to 70 percent of total unemployed; in post-Soviet Russia, in 1992 they constituted 70 percent.38 Where women were working, they tended to be confined to traditional, low-paying “female” occupations. Given the diminishing demand for labor and the erosion of state-provided social services such as day care and health care, women were reconstructed as dependent wives, mothers, consumers, and caregivers; with child-care and maternity leave being dismantled, women were cast as “unreliable” workers. Under socialism, the family played the role of an embryonic civil society representing antistate freedom; following democratization, the family was reconstructed, along lines consistent with the liberal tradition, as maledominated, female-dependent. At the same time as women were reassigned to the private sphere, the public sphere was being revalued, thus accentuating the public/private divide. Barbara Einhorn has claimed that these developments were a return to the nineteenth-century liberal version of citizenship based on property owning males (outlined by Pateman), which reinforced a patriarchal concept of roles. Einhorn suggests that these roles are profoundly undemocratic.39 In short, women’s rights in East Europe and post-Communist Russia eroded; women began to be constructed as passive beings rather than mature political subjects. In the 1990s, as is often true in times of major political change, there was also a sense that women’s rights were peripheral and that working to improve them was a luxury, given the economic difficulties of transition. In a critique of feminist literature of socialist transitions, Jaqui True has questioned its emphasis on women’s victimization; she claims that this literature runs the risk of creating a victimized identity for the women of East Europe that is not unlike the category Third World women—one that postcolonial feminists object to strongly. True’s study of women in the Czech Republic suggests that they were both winners and losers in the transition. Nevertheless, she points to the masculinization of a growing high-paid private sector, with women being disproportionately located in lower-waged public-sector occupations; she concludes that women have generally been more disadvantaged than men by structural changes.40

Link – Democracy

Democracy presents an inherent gender bias.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 110) JM

When proponents of liberal democracy and marketization speak of the spread of human rights based onWestern notions of individualism, feminists have cautioned that both definitions of human rights and the kinds of violations that get attention from Western states and their human-rights communities may be gender biased. Since basic needs and welfare provision so often fall to women, and since women are disproportionately economically disadvantaged, the preference by Western liberal states for political rights over economic rights may also present particular problems for women. In addition, since human-rights violations are usually defined as violations by officials of the state, domestic violence has not been a priority on the international human-rights agenda. In order to understand the role of gender—the effects of democratic transitions on women and their activities in these transitions—we need a redefinition of democracy that starts at the bottom. Generally women are better represented in local politics; often they are working outside regular political channels. GeorginaWaylen has claimed that any analysis of democratization that fails to incorporate a gendered perspective—ignoring the actions of certain groups—will be flawed.45 Therefore, the liberal democratic state must be reexamined for its gender biases, as well as its class and racial biases; definitions of representation and citizenship in the spaces in which political life occur need to be rethought. Arguing that patriarchal structures are deeply embedded in most types of political regimes, democratic and otherwise, certain internationalist feminists have looked beyond the state to build institutions and networks that are more likely than the state to diminish gender and other social hierarchies. Given the barriers to formal political office that exist for women in most states, including democracies, women activists frequently bypass the state by working either at the grassroots level or by joining forces transnationally to work for women’s rights at the global level.

Democracy masks male privilege.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 121-122) JM

While liberalization may allow space for women’s organizing, the issue then becomes: What kind of state will best serve not only women’s interests but peace and security, broadly defined? The liberal state, which is characterized by market democracy rather than social democracy, is clearly not the kind of state that feminists have in mind. Liberal democracy has not inspired feminists who work outside the liberal tradition because of deep structures of gender inequality; these deep structures, they claim, have kept women unequal even after they received the vote and other formal rights. An important issue for feminist theorists, therefore, is whether inequality can be addressed within a liberal-democratic framework or whether the model is fundamentally flawed, given the structural problems of the public/private divide.83 As suggested by Pateman’s analysis, certain feminist political theorists see a deep gender bias in democratic theory. For them, seeking equality in a man’s world is problematic because it assumes a standard of normality that is male; in the West, this standard is that of white, privileged males.84 The model of the abstract individual, behind which this gendered representation is hidden, is a powerful impediment to the recognition of gender as a salient political factor. The association of citizenship with masculine characteristics such as rationality and autonomy is problematic for women’s citizenship; women cannot be included in categories associated with publicsphere activities that are themselves defined by the exclusion of female traits and identities.85 For women to be equal political actors, this must be recognized.

Link – Democracy

Democracy is part of an exceptionalist mentality that perpetuates dominative logics and shatter equality.

Plumwood 2 (Val,– Australian Research Council Fellow at University of Sydney, Environmental Culture: The ecological crisis of reason, p.81-82) PJ

Inequality, whether inside the nation or out of it, is a major sponsor of ecological irrationality and remoteness, especially where it creates systematic opportunities and motivations to shift ecological ills onto others rather than to prevent their generation in the first place. Inequality combines with geographical remoteness to generate excellent conditions for epistemic remoteness, creating major barriers to knowledge and offering massive opportunities for redistributing ecoharms onto others in ways that elude the knowledge and responsibility of consumers and producers Hog with concern for ecological consequences. Under conditions which allow both remoteness and rational egoism to flourish, such actions even emerge as mandatory for the rational self-maximiser, since the logic of the global market treats the least privileged as the most expendable, defining them as as having `the least to lose' in terms of the low value of their health, Iand and assets, and, by implication, of their lives.' This logic helps ensure that the least privileged are likely to feel the first and worst impacts of environmental degradation, as in the case of much global deforestation, pollution, waste dumping in poor and coloured communities (such as Warren County), and environmentally hazardous working and living conditions for the poor. As it comes increasingly to dominate over other spheres, the global market systematically violates complex equality, enabling `one good or one set of goods [to be] dominant and determi­native of value in all the spheres of distribution'`', facilitating the positive feedback patterns adding ecological ills to social ills which are the mark of ecojustice violations. Theoretically, it seems, a democracy where all have input into decisions should have a low level of remoteness and a maximum of ecological rationality. It should have a high level of correctiveness because it should maxi­mise the informational base relevant to environmental degradation. It should enable all affected citizens to be heard and to have their issues addressed by responsive decision-makers. j But in actually-existing liberal democracy, it doesn't seem to work quite like that, and it is commonly observed that liberal democracies are not performing well either in reme­dying ecological crises or in listening to disadvantaged citizens.`' Shallow forms of democratic politics provide only weak forms of ecological ration­ality, not well correlated with correctiveness on ecological or social matters, and their inequalities allow privileged groups many opportunities for remoteness. But from this observation we can draw few conclusions adverse to the ecological rationality of the deeper forms of democracy that are better placed to enable systematic reductions in remoteness. Identifying the structural features that account for these rationality fail­ures of liberal democracy is more difficult than noting the failures. Dryzek (1992) argues persuasively that the political and administrative spheres of liberal capitalism are unable to respond adequately to the complexity of the ecological problems generated by its imprisoning capitalist production systems. The interest group interpretation of liberal democracy is another feature which is highly problematic from the perspective of ecological rationality. It is increasingly apparent that the form of `interest group' politics that flourishes in liberal democracy is unable to create stable measures for the protection of nature, or to recognise basic ecological priority that ecological well-being is not just another interest group concern but ultimately a condition for most other interests. This failure is an aspect of its denial and neglect of collective life. The conception of democracy and decision-making in terms of a central state mediating a multiplicity of competing (private) interest groups takes egoism, inequality and domination for granted, provides poorly for collective goods, and allows systematic redistribution of ecological ills to weaker groups. It places many key environmental values in a disempowered private realm beyond the reach of politics.

Link – International Institutions

International norms are masculine.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 124) JM

World-order and normative IR theorists have challenged us to think about the meaning of democracy beyond its narrow statist form. They have argued that a true “democratic peace” cannot be built on exclusive forms of national democracy but must be conceptualized in global terms. Drawing on feminist literatures in democratic theory and empirical examinations of the experiences of states that have recently undergone democratic transitions, IR feminists have reanalyzed democratization and exposed its gender biases. They have also pointed out that the norms and rules upon which Western democracy has been built and that have been carried up into international organizations are gendered. Universalist claims embodied in such international norms as human rights are based on male definitions of rights. Although not normally included in conventional IR agendas, democratization at all levels, from the local to the global, has been central to IR feminist analyses. In calling for a form of democracy that dismantles oppressive social hierarchies, feminists have begun to build models of democracy that rethink the state and its international security policies.

International institutions perpetuate patriarchy.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 111-112) JM

Women’s low rate of participation in the United Nations, particularly in states’ diplomatic missions—a pattern that has been replicated in many other IGOs—suggests that women’s attempts to gain leverage at this level has, in many cases, been less successful than at the national level. As Anne Runyan 112 democratization warns, there is a danger of trading gendered nationalism for gendered internationalism. 49 Since intergovernmental organizations represent the views of governments of their member states rather than their populations, this lack of transparency compounds the underrepresentation of women’s voices, as well as those of men from excluded or marginalized groups. As the United Nations has begun to pledge to “mainstream a gender perspective,” the question becomes: Whose perspective will be represented, when groups with the most resources are the most likely to gain access?50 International organizations such as the United Nations have played an important role in promulgating universal norms and standards of conduct that, as discussed earlier, have been seen by certain world-order scholars as indicating the beginnings of a global society or an extension of the boundaries of political community beyond the nation-state.51 While feminists also assume the possibility of community beyond statist boundaries, they question the extent to which these universalizing norms are based on male experiences. Both feminist theorists and women organizing through social movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have worked hard to bring these gender biases to light and to try to reframe norms and rules in ways that get beyond them. One such example has been the reformulation of the meaning of human rights.

Link – State

Notions of sovereignty and the state are inherently masculine.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 54) JM

While critical-security studies has emphasized the importance of identity for understanding state behavior, feminist theorizing is distinctive insofar as it reveals how these identities often depend on the manipulations of gender. An examination of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men. Early states in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe were identified with the person of the sovereign king. Hobbes’s depiction of the Leviathan, a man in armor wearing a crown and carrying a sword, serves as a visual representation of this early-modern form of sovereign authority. With the advent of republican forms of government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the identity of the “people” remained limited; women were incorporated slowly into the political process and it is still questionable whether they have achieved a legitimate voice in the construction of foreign policy.60 We must conclude, therefore, that the historical construction of the state, upon which the unitary-actor model in international theory is based, represents a gendered, masculine model. In the West, the image of a foreign policy maker has been strongly associated with elite, white males and representations of hegemonic masculinity.

Link – Gendered Language

He/man language promotes male imagery at the expense of women.

Spender 91 (Dale, Feminist scholar, Man Made Language)

Through the introduction of he/man, males were able to take another step in ensuring that the thought of reality of our society is that the males become foreground while the females become the blurred and often indecipherable background. He/man makes males linguistically visible and females linguistically invisible. It promotes male imagery in everyday life at the expense of female imagery so that it seems reasonable to assume the world is male until proven otherwise. It reinforces the belief of the dominant group, that they, males, are the universal, the central, important category so that even those who are not member of the dominate group learn to accept this reality. It predisposes us to see more male in the world we inhabit, so that we can, for example, project male images on our past and allow females to go unnoticed; we can construct our theories of the past, including evolutionary ones, formulating explanations that are consistent only with the male experience. He/man also makes women outsiders, and are not just metaphorically. Through the use of he/man women cannot take their existence for granted: they must certainly seek self confirmation so that they are included in the human species.

Link – War on Terror

The discourse of the War on Terror necessarily portrays women as victims, needing heroic men to save them

**Johnstone 9** (Rachael, Law @ U of Akureyri Iceland, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 44, www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Feminist%20Theory%20and%20Gender%20 Studies%20Archive.pdf)IM

Finally, the discourse of the “War on Terror” itself revealed a perceived need for the state to define its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and women as victims.211 Chinkin and Charlesworth described the media responses in the immediate aftermath in which women were featured as heavenly rewards for terrorists or as victims of the attack, preferably widows of murdered men, rather than the women who themselves worked daily in the twin towers or in the rescue services.212 Women in the armed services and firefighting teams were conspicuous by their invisibility.213 Women in Afghanistan are depicted as victims of a brutal Taliban, requiring rescue by heroic (Western) men – though not political participation.214 The suffering women endure under the airpower of those same Western forces and the hardship encountered as essential services are put beyond their use are unfortunate “collateral damage” — a sacrifice for their greater long-term good.215 Susan Faludi’s 2007 investigative retrospect of the media in the aftermath of 9/11 provides thorough confirmation of the Australians’ early impressions.216 In such times, a feminist perspective of the state that seeks women’s empowerment and equal participation in the public sphere is unlikely to find favor.

The War on Terror has demoted women to being the victims

**Pettman 4** (Jan Jindy, Director of Women’s Studies @ ANU, Brown Journal of World Affairs 10(2), Winter/Spring 2004, p. 88)IM

In an early response to this crisis, Ann Tickner asked, “What can a feminist analysis add to our understanding of 9/11 and its aftermath?”20 She demonstrated that femi- nists do have some very important things to say regarding the gender of identity, vio- lence, and war, and specifically developed these insights in relation to 9/11 and Af- ghanistan. Likewise Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinin21 began their com- mentary with the claim that ‘concepts of sex and gender provide a valuable perspective on these devastating actions’.22 Both articles noted the apparent disappearance of women in the violence and what followed, as men—hijackers, rescuers, national security offic- ers, and media commentators—filled our screens and newspapers.23 “September 11 and its repercussions have appeared, then, to be all about men attacking, saving lives, and responding through further attack,” which seems normal.24 Substitute 19 women hijackers, commentators, and leaders, and a different scenario develops.25 So too women, let alone feminists, were not seen as authorities having anything to add to the analysis. For example, according to the Guardian survey of almost 50 opinion pieces in the New York Times in the first six weeks after the attack, only two were by women.26 It is quite wrong however to suggest that gender had disappeared or even that women were not present. Women appeared in ways long embedded in the gendered war story. They appeared alongside men as victims and relatives of victims of 9/11.

Link – War on Terror

The War on Terrorism forces states to take responsibility for the private actions of their citizens, while still ignoring the violations of women’s human rights in the private sphere

**Johnstone 9** (Rachael, Law @ U of Akureyri Iceland, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 24-25,www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Feminist%20Theory%20and%20Gender%20 Studies%20Archive.pdf)IM

An interpretation of the Security Council’s resolutions within the classical view of state responsibility would indicate that the degree of diligence due to prevent terrorism has been considerably expanded, particularly by Resolutions 1373 and 1540. This indicates a change in the primary rules without posing a challenge to the traditional view of state responsibility per se. As such, it is comparable to Cook’s approach of expanding positive obligations of states to protect individuals, particularly women, from “private” violations of human rights.117 Should the state fail to meet the standards required by the resolutions, the state will be responsible, not for the terrorist attacks (or private human rights violations) but for the separate delict of its failure to protect. “[T]hese alleged cases of State responsibility for the acts of individuals are really cases of responsibility of the State for omissions by its organs: the State is responsible for having failed to take appropriate measures to prevent or punish the individual’s act.” [A] state’s passiveness or indifference toward terrorist agendas within its own territory might trigger its responsibility, possibly on the same scale as though it had actively participated in the planning.

The War on Terror proves that states should be held responsible for private violations of international law – however they still turn a blind eye to the private abuse of women

**Johnstone 9** (Rachael, Law @ U of Akureyri Iceland, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 36,www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Feminist%20Theory%20and%20Gender%20 Studies%20Archive.pdf)IM

The United States’ administration in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 shared the “radical feminist” position, evidenced by the famous statement of the president on September 11 that “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”156 The president expanded upon this later the same month, stating: By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder . . . Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”157 In November 2001, he continued: “If you harbor terrorists, you are terrorists. If you train or arm a terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you feed a terrorist or fund a terrorist, you’re a terrorist, and you will be held accountable by the United States and our friends.”158 If this example of state practice and the wide opinio iuris in its support is to be considered as sufficient to constitute a new rule of customary international law, then the more radical feminists have won a battle, albeit in a manner they might themselves find difficult to support.184 In short, this new rule holds that states are responsible, directly responsible, for permitting private violations of international law to occur. Governments in such circumstances should anticipate the possibility of immediate repercussions against their own institutions, not just against the private actors who directly caused the harm.

Link – I-Law

International law banishes women to the private sphere where they are beyond the reach of state responsibility

**Johnstone 9** (Rachael, Law @ U of Akureyri Iceland, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 17, www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Feminist%20Theory%20and%20Gender%20 Studies%20Archive.pdf)IM

Charlesworth et al., recognized that the precise boundaries of what constitutes public and private vary between different cultures.35 Nonetheless, a common feature was that whenever there was a private sphere, women were found there.36 However, in areas considered public, women were missing, invisible, or few in number.37 This division of public and private spheres, emerging from the Western Liberal tradition, was now entrenched in international law.38 Not only are the spheres separate, but the private sphere and the women within it are regarded as less important.39 Moreover, “a universal pattern of identifying women's activities as private, and thus of lesser value, can be detected.”40 The classical principles of state responsibility assume that only acts of state give rise to human rights violations. Harms that occur in private might be unwelcome, but they are not considered matters of human rights or a fortiori international law.41 Charlesworth and Chinkin contest this assumption at the heart of international law. Charlesworth argues: “if violence against women is understood, not just as aberrant behavior, but as part of the structure of the universal subordination of women, it can never be considered a purely “private” issue.”55 Chinkin adds: “Why should the state only be responsible for the internationally wrongful acts of state organs? The state claims jurisdiction over the totality of functions within its territorial control; it might therefore be appropriate to assert its responsibility for all wrongful acts emanating from it, or from nationals subject to its jurisdiction.”56 Together, they argue: “There is no reason why the maintenance of a legal and social system in which violence against women is endemic and accepted should not engage state responsibility directly, whether or not women are treated differently from men in this respect.”57 Despite advances in human rights law with respect to states’ positive duties to protect, violations of the rights of women are still not taken as seriously as those of men.74 Moreover, the preference for civil and political rights reflects men’s experiences of the need for protection against the state. Charlesworth and Chinkin consider the right to life, largely understood as requiring protection against state threats, but not against the risk of being conceived female.

Link – I-Law

International law denies women a sense of self by failing to hold states responsible for violence against women

**Johnstone 9** (Rachael, Law @ U of Akureyri Iceland, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 43,www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Feminist%20Theory%20and%20Gender%20 Studies%20Archive.pdf)IM

Hand in hand with the liberalization of the market in the post-intervention economies comes the further reification of the public/private dichotomies long criticized by feminists in Western democracies, as women (and violence against them) are considered non-political. Women are effectively excluded from positions of governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and similarly have been largely excluded in negotiations between competing factions.207 The (male) self-declared leaders are presumed to speak for all and women’s rights become a matter of relative cultural values.208 This is self-determination of a highly selective “self.” Violence against women qua women is considered a matter of domestic law, and when domestic process fails to take it seriously, no questions are raised by the state’s allies about the legitimacy of the government or its sovereign inviolability.209 Despite changes in the language of state responsibility, little has changed for women since the “liberation” of Kuwait from the oppressive Iraqi invader in 1991, after which Kuwaiti women remained disenfranchised from the electoral process and foreign women found themselves targets of sexual violence by Kuwaiti men, often ostensibly under color of state authority.210

**Link – I-Law**

**International law continues the subordination of women because it does not require action in the face of abuse**

**Chinkin 99** (Christine, Int Law @ U of London, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, European Journal of International Law, p. 392)IM

The feminist critique also has particular resonance in international law. Because the state does not incur responsibility for violations committed within the private sector, it can ignore the continued subordination of women in that arena. Thus, domestic violence against women can be designated as a private wrong, an individual matter that is outside international scrutiny. The tradition of viewing sexual conduct as private allows sexual abuse by public officials, such as prison officials or police officers, also to be readily discounted as not coming within their official duties. Failure by a state to investigate and punish such matters is a continuation of the exclusion of family/private life even from domestic legal intervention and thus far from international accountability. Similarly, treatment of domestic foreign maids within foreign states can be factored out from international law. Diplomatic protection of aliens was the historic starting point for the formulation of principles of state responsibility and the basis for the differentiation between ultra vires acts of officials for which there is responsibility because of their apparent authority, and the private acts of individuals for which there is no responsibility. The employment of foreign maids falls within both of these areas: their household work is private and often concealed from domestic legal regulation and their employment, even by government officials, is not in that capacity. Yet their employment abroad is of major economic significance to many sending states and supported by receiving states. Their widespread abuse in many states is not private, but systemic, it is upheld by government policies that fail to enquire about their treatment or to offer protection against known abuses, and as such should engage state responsibility.

International law ignores private conduct, thereby masking abuse in the private sphere

**Chinkin 99** (Christine, Int Law @ U of London, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, European Journal of International Law, p. 387-388)IM

The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted on first reading in 1996 are currently being revised in light of government comments by the Special Rapporteur, James Crawford. Although their final form remains unresolved, significant parts of the Draft Articles have already been relied upon, for example by the International Court of Justice, as customary international law. The Special Rapporteur has emphasized that the articles do not encompass primary rules of international obligation, but describe the secondary rules of state responsibility for the commission of an internationally wrongful act. Responsibility of other international actors, such as international government organizations, and individual responsibility for international crimes do no form part of this reference. The concept of state responsibility rests upon distinguishing acts and omissions that can be attributed to the state from those that cannot, for it is axiomatic that private conduct is not in principle attributable to the state. Article 5 sets out the general principle of attribution to the state of the acts of its organs. Attribution does not depend upon a functional classification of activities but upon the characterization of the actor as a state organ, acting in that capacity. Nor is the position of a particular organ within the organizational structure of the state determinative. Identification of a state organ, and the responsibilities therein, is established primarily in accordance with international law.

**Link – I-Law**

**The universalism of international law prevents the protection of women’s human rights**

**Isoto 8** (Bibian, Int. Law, U of Guyana, Universalism and Regionalism in International Law, gedi.objectis.net/eventos-1/ilsabrasil2008/artigos/dheh/isoto.pdf)IM

Universalism assumes that the world is governed and operates under a single system that is applicable to states and other legal person**s**. However, although international law assumes that states are linked by a common purpose and destiny, it is submitted that the world’s diversity is reflected in the different ideologies, cultures, regions, economic advancement and other factors that affect international relations. Therefore, notwithstanding universalism, diversity is evident to any observer. The debate on universalism and regionalism in international law poses challenges and perspectives towards international cooperation and conflict resolution. Specifically, in the development and applicability for a uniform standard of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, the universality of human rights has been and is still a subject of intense debate. This of course poses challenges for the universal promotion and protection of human rights standards, in a diverse world. In some cases universalism is often viewed as a construct of western hegemony and imperialism, especially in respect to the promotion and protection of the human rights of women. This paper seeks to discuss how universalism and regionalism poses a challenge to international cooperation in the promotion and protection of women under the human rights corpus. Part II shall deal with the international law basis for universalism based on the provisions of different treaties as well as customary international law. Part III shall discuss human rights law, specifically analyzing the rights of women in relation to universalism and regionalism. Part IV shall place the debate on universalism and regionalism in respect to international humanitarian law in as far as it offers protection for women in respect to gender crimes. Part V concludes the paper.

Link – Nukes

Discourses about nuclear weapons are infused with dichotomies which favor the masculine over the feminine

**Duncanson and Eschle 8** (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New Political Science 30(4), p. 546)IM

We write from the perspective of a “feminist anti-militarism,”4 which “rejects both the military and political use of weapons of mass destruction in warfare or for deterrence. It is also deeply critical of the discourses which have framed public discussion of weapons of mass destruction.”5 Developing out of a long tradition of feminist involvement in peace and anti-war movements,6 this position is feminist because it sees gender as playing a key role in war, in the culture of readiness and enthusiasm for war known as militarism, and in the reliance on “weapons of mass destruction” like Trident. What is gender? Feminists now offer multiple and sometimes conﬂicting accounts of this key concept.7 Following Carol Cohn, perhaps the most important writer on gender and nuclear weapons, we want to emphasise three dimensions here.8 Firstly, gender as a category helps us understand the ways in which individual (and collective) identity is socially constructed around and through assumptions about male/female sexual difference, or the categories of masculinity and femininity. Secondly, gender is “a way of structuring relations of power,”9 one which most feminists agree “shows constancy in assigning greater value to that which is associated with masculinity and lesser value to that associated with femininity . . . the terms are not independent but form a hierarchical (unequal) relation.”10 Thirdly, “gender also functions as a symbolic system: our ideas about gender permeate and shape our ideas about many other aspects of society beyond male – female relations—including politics, weapons, and warfare.”11 This means that discourses about nuclear weapons, amongst other things, are infused with a series of conceptual dichotomies which ﬂow from and underpin the primary signiﬁers of masculine/feminine, with the masculine side of the dichotomy favoured over the feminine. We would add that feminist work has increasingly insisted on the complexity with which gender operates, intersecting with other forms of power and identity in context-speciﬁc ways. This means that we should not fall into the trap of thinking that there is only one form of masculinity and one of femininity—rather there are multiple versions of each, some of which are more dominant, or “hegemonic,” than others at particular places and times.12 As a result, we should expect a particular gendered discourse to construct and mobilise markers and symbols of multiple and even conﬂicting masculinities and femininities.

Nuclear imagery is inherently masculine in its dissociating us to the reality of the horror of nuclear catastrophe

Cohn 87 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, "Sex and Death in a world of Defense Intellectuals", http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3174209.pdf) PJ

Nuclear missiles are based in "silos." On a Trident submarine, which carries twenty-four multiple warhead nuclear missiles, crew members call the part of the submarine where the missiles are lined up in their silos ready for launching "the Christmas tree farm." What could be more bucolic-farms, silos, Christmas trees? In the ever-friendly, even romantic world of nuclear weaponry, ene-mies "exchange" warheads; one missile "takes out" another; weapons systems can "marry up"; "coupling" is sometimes used to refer to the wiring between mechanisms of warning and response, or to the psycho-political links between strategic (intercontinental) and theater (European-based) weapons. The patterns in which a MIRVed missile's nuclear war-heads land is known as a "footprint."21 These nuclear explosives are not dropped; a "bus" "delivers" them. In addition, nuclear bombs are not referred to as bombs or even warheads; they are referred to as "reentry vehicles," a term far more bland and benign, which is then shortened to "RVs," a term not only totally abstract and removed from the reality of a bomb but also resonant with the image of the recreational vehicles of the ideal family vacation. These domestic images must be more than simply one more form of distancing, one more way to remove oneself from the grisly reality behind the words; ordinary abstraction is adequate to that task. Something else, something very peculiar, is going on here. Calling the pattern in which bombs fall a "footprint" almost seems a willful distorting process, a playful, perverse refusal of accountability-because to be accountable to reality is to be unable to do this work. These words may also serve to domesticate, to tame the wild and uncontrollable forces of nuclear destruction. The metaphors minimize; they are a way to make phenomena that are beyond what the mind can encompass smaller and safer, and thus they are a way of gaining mastery over the unmasterable. The fire-breathing dragon under the bed, the one who threatens to incinerate your family, your town, your planet, becomes a pet you can pat.

Link – Nukes

The discourse of nuclear weapons is inherently phallic and ties to masculinity and sexual potency

**Duncanson and Eschle 8** (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New Political Science 30(4), p. 548)IM

On the ﬁrst point, feminists have long highlighted that the political and military power associated with nuclear weapons is linked metaphorically with sexual potency and masculinity. This linkage is neither arbitrary nor trivial: sexual metaphors are a way of mobilising gendered associations in order to create excitement about, support for and identiﬁcation with both the weapons and the political regime possessing them.15 Thus feminist histories of the development of the nuclear arms race in the decades after World War Two demonstrate(s) the extent to which it was a race to prove masculine prowess, fuelled by “missile” envy,16 with the nuclear weapons of the Cold War superpowers “wheeled out like monumental phalluses” on parade.17 Such imagery has proved seductive to many governments across time and space. Thus when India exploded ﬁve nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leader Balashaheb Thakeray argued that “[w]e have to prove that we are not eunuchs” and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was portrayed in a newspaper cartoon as propping up his coalition with a nuclear bomb, captioned “Made with Viagra.”18 Indeed, as Indian novelist Arundhati Roy has commented: Reading the papers, it was often hard to tell when people were referring to Viagra (which was competing for second place on the front pages) and when they were talking about the bomb—“We have superior strength and potency.”19 Similar language has permeated the nuclear discourse of the military and defence industry. In her ground-breaking study of the discourse of American defence intellectuals who formulated nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War, Cohn noted that sexualised metaphors, phallic imagery and the promise of sexual domination thrived.20 Lectures were dominated by discussion of: vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks—or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called “releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump.”21

Sexual imagery emasculates disarmament and denies the deadly consequences of nuclear deployment

**Duncanson and Eschle 8** (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New Political Science 30(4), p. 549)IM

Cohn suggests that such sexual imagery serves not only to underline the connections between masculine sexuality and nuclear weapons but also to minimise the seriousness of militarist endeavours.22 It makes the nuclear arms race seem the stuff of j ocular locker-room rivalry, denying its deadly consequences. Perhaps most importantly, sexualised metaphors are one of the reasons that talk of nuclear disarmament is so readily dismissed: “If disarmament is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?” Nonetheless, our overall impression is that the mobilisation of sexualised, masculine language and imagery is signiﬁcantly more muted in the White Paper than feminist critics would perhaps expect. It seems that there is a deliberate avoidance here of the more obviously masculine arguments and sexual metaphors, such as those about potency and penetration. Perhaps this is unsurprising from a government that claims to have been more open to feminist arguments than its predecessors.26 Although it may not brandish more overtly phallic imagery, it seems to us that the government has not fully relinquished the masculine-coded prestige and status that is associated with the celebration of ﬁrepower. Although the White Paper explicitly denies this, again perhaps due to an awareness of the feminist critique, arguing that “we maintain our nuclear forces as a means of deterring acts of aggression and not for reasons of status,”27 its acknowledgement of the special treatment afforded to nuclear weapons states indicates there is still pride in belonging to the club: “The NPT recognises the UK’s status (along with that of the US, France, Russia and China) as a nuclear weapon state.”

**Link – Nukes**

**The technostrategic discourse of nuclear weapons excludes all that is feminine**

**Duncanson and Eschle 8** (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New Political Science 30(4), p. 551)IM

Such bland descriptors as “stockpiles” and “deterrent system” bring us to the second strand of the feminist critique of the way in which states talk about nuclear weapons technology: the tendency to use highly “abstract, euphemistic and acronym-ridden language.”31 This point was developed by Cohn in her work on US defence intellectuals, in which she identiﬁed the deployment of terms such as “collateral damage,” “damage limitation weapon” and “clean bombs” as part of a discourse she labelled “technostrategic.”32 Such a discourse leaves out “the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity—all of which are marked [as] feminine.”33 For a member of the defence community to speak of such things would mean they risk being discredited and disempowered in the male-dominated world in which they operate. Conversely, ignoring such things helps defence intellectuals insulate themselves from the realities and consequences of their work. Interestingly, Cohn argues that it is not, ultimately, technostrategic language that is mobilised to justify nuclear weapons and decisions about their deployment and use. Rather, defence intellectuals and others rely for this task on “much more primitive ambiguous and contradictory axioms”—by insisting, for example, on the importance of “enhancing our deterrence” and “protecting our vital interests.”39 As Cohn points out,40 such axioms (assertions of fact or principle that are taken as self-evident, not requiring evidence or explanation), fail to provide grounds for discrimination between different defence systems; moreover they remove the need for explicit justiﬁcation of the need for nuclear weapons in the first place. A reliance on axioms is particularly evident in the White Paper.41 They include the following: “For 50 years our independent nuclear deterrent has provided the ultimate assurance of our national security”; “We believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential part of our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of the future” As Cohn points out, such axioms operate in “a realm where gender is just below the surface.”44 What she means by this is that the axioms gain their credence and “emotional valences” because they mobilise underlying assumptions about the state and about security which are suffused with gendered, and speciﬁcally masculine imagery

Link – Nukes

Abstract depictions of nuclear war are inherently masculine in their use as justification for the existence of nuclear weapons and security measures – feminist’s focus on individual epistemologies is the only way to break this cycle

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

Several anti-war feminists have focused less on the weapons themselves, and more on the discourse through which the weapons (and their use) are theorized and legitimated. They have written about both the sexual and domestic metaphors that turn the mind’s eye toward the pleasant and familiar, rather than toward images of indescribable devastation. They have identified in nuclear discourse techniques of denial and conceptual fragmentation. They have emphasized the ways that the abstraction and euphemism of nuclear discourse protect nuclear planners and politicians from the grisly realities behind their words. Speaking generally, antiwar feminists invite women and men to attend to the identities, emotions and discourses that allow us to accept the possible use of nuclear weapons.23 Perhaps the most general feminist concern is the willingness of intellectuals to talk-asusual about nuclear weapons (or about any atrocity). And this brings us back to the issue of the framing of Question Two. The question as it is posed seems in some ways similar to the abstract, distancing thinking that we have criticized – but in which we also participate. There is no mention of the horror, let alone a pause to rest with it. We move, or are moved, quickly to an abstract moral tone: “any circumstances” “might be morally permissible....” and then to comparisons. Abstract language and a penchant for distinctions are typical of philosophy, intrinsically unobjectionable, often a pleasure. It is continuous abstraction while speaking of actual or imagined horror that disturbs us. Abstract discussion of warfare is both the tool and the privilege of those who imagine themselves as the (potential) users of weapons. The victims, if they can speak at all, speak quite differently: An account of a nuclear blast’s effects by a US defense intellectual: [You have to have ways to maintain communications in a] nuclear environment, a situation bound to include EMP blackout, brute force damage to systems, a heavy jamming environment, and so on.24 An account by a Hiroshima survivor: Everything was black, had vanished into the black dust, was destroyed. Only the flames that were beginning to lick their way up had any color. From the dust that was like a fog, figures began to loom up, black, hairless, faceless. They screamed with voices that were no longer human. Their screams drowned out the groans rising everywhere from the rubble, groans that seemed to rise from the very earth itself.25 It should become apparent then, that our concern about abstract language is not only relevant to the *framing* of Question Two, but to its *content* – the justifiability of nuclear weapons’ use – as well. It is easier to contemplate and “justify” the use of nuclear weapons in the abstract language of defense intellectuals than in the descriptive, emotionally resonant language of the victim; from the perspective of the user rather than the victim. Anti- war feminists note that detailed, focal attention to the human impact of weapons’ use is not only considered out of bounds in security professionals’ discourse; it is also *delegitimated* by its association with the “feminine,” with insufficient masculinity, as is evident in this excerpt of an interview with a physicist: “Several colleagues and I were working on modeling counterforce nuclear attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments. At one point, we re- modeled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being 36 million immediate fatalities, there would only be 30 million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying, ‘Oh yeh, that’s great, only 30 million,’ when all of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, ‘Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking -- Only 30 million! Only 30 million human beings killed instantly?’ Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.” After telling this story to one of the authors, the physicist added that he was careful to never blurt out anything indicating that he was thinking about the victims again.26 Fear of feeling like a woman (or being seen as unmanly) silently works to maintain the boundaries of a distanced, abstract discourse, and to sustain the tone of Question Two – a tone which invites us to think abstractly, “objectively” about WMD use, without pausing with human particularities, passions and suffering.

Link – State

The ontology of the State as a unitary actor is heavily gendered, and excludes femininity from the actions of the State

**Duncanson and Eschle 8** (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New Political Science 30(4), p. 557)IM

In the dominant Realist view, upheld by both mainstream academics and the majority of policy-makers, states are “unitary actors whose internal characteristics, beyond an assessment of their relative capabilities, are not seen as necessary for understanding their vulnerabilities or security-enhancing behaviour.”70 This assumption that states act as coherent units draws its strength from their treatment as “notional persons” in early modern jurisprudence.71 Relatedly, the state is understood to be independent, signiﬁed by the status of sovereignty, which entails a claim not only to authority within a territory but to independence from, and legal equality to, other such authorities. Realists do not distinguish between the legal status of sovereignty and actual state practice; they assume that states are as independent from one another as they claim to be. Moreover, like a person, the state must be able to act—and act in particular ways. The fact of international anarchy (or lack of overarching government) is interpreted by realists as bringing with it a “self-help” system in which states cannot rely on others and must seek to defend themselves or perish. Finally, as Alan James makes clear, the state for Realists is a fundamentally rational actor: The state is said to behave rationally because it is pictured as bending its efforts in a consistent and calculated way towards a clearly-established goal. And it can be so depicted because it is a single unit. The analogy is with the sober and mature man who gives careful thought to the achievement of his purposes.72 As this quote indicates, the Realist state is a “manly state.”73 We can see here the systematic mobilising of gendered dichotomies such as active/passive, independent/(inter)dependent, and rational/irrational, and the assumption that the state ﬁts with the masculine side of the dichotomies. Needless to say, the model of rationality that James describes has been critiqued by countless feminist philosophers. Proponents of this model are accused of neglecting social context, both in terms of the domestic labour and relationships that make the processes of rational decision-making possible, and in terms of the consequences of the rational decisions made. In addition, proponents of this model of rationality are criticised for evacuating emotional and ethical dimensions of thought, historically gendered feminine, as highlighted in our discussion above about the limitations of technostrategic discourse. If Realism’s epistemology (its underlying conception of knowledge) is gendered, its ontology (its underlying conception about the self and agency) is equally so. Feminists would argue that James’s analogy comparing the state to a man is not accidental but intrinsic to how the state is understood: this is “an exclusionary masculine model of agency derived from a context of unequal gender relations, where primarily women’s child rearing and care-giving work supports the development of autonomous male selves.”75 In order to appear unitary, active and independent, then, these selves must mask their internal fractures, the constraints and tendencies to inertia that they might face, and their relations of (inter)dependency on internal and external others.

Link – International Conflict

The aff’s classification of a conflict as “international” extends the portrayal of women as powerless and victimized

Isoto 8 (Bibian, Int. Law, U of Guyana, Universalism and Regionalism in International Law, gedi.objectis.net/eventos-1/ilsabrasil2008/artigos/dheh/isoto.pdf)IM

There is considerable empirical evidence that women are affected by armed conflict in ways that men are not.51 According to the Human Rights Watch, violence against women has been described as “among the most serious and pervasive human rights abuses that the international community now confronts.”52 Globally, women form only 2 percent of regular army personnel, but as civilians, they suffer disproportionately from conflict.53 During armed conflict, they are abducted to become the wives of the fighters.54 Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been understood as one of the spoils of the victor, and have been accepted as natural consequences of war.55 Mass rape and other organized forms of sexual violence and humiliation have been frequent and often used as instruments of fear, shame, and ethnic cleansing. It’s important to note that IHL makes a distinction between an international armed conflict that poses a threat to international peace and security and an internal conflict. This distinction between international conflicts therefore introduces the notion of universalism vs. regionalism in armed conflict. The classification of international conflict as a threat to international peace and security therefore warranting the use of force as provided for under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (universal conflict?) as opposed to an internal conflict that is limited to a particular area and does not pose a threat to international peace and security. It follows that better protection is offered to persons in international conflicts as opposed to internal conflict. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention places states under an obligation to protect women in international armed conflict “against any attack on their honor , in particular against rape , enforced prostitution , or any other form of indecent assault.”56 This article is not gender sensitive because it reinforces the notion of women as men’s property, rather than because they constitute violence. Feminists have criticized the use of the word protection as opposed to the prohibition.57

Link – Third World Women

The aff’s portrayal of Middle Eastern women as victims in need of Western savior furthers their subjugation

**Pettman 4** (Jan Jindy, Director of Women’s Studies @ ANU, Brown Journal of World Affairs 10(2), Winter/Spring 2004, p. 89)IM

Quite quickly Afghan women also appeared as victims of the deadly Taliban regime. They figured in a familiar guise, as symbols of difference, of Otherness, as border guards of the boundaries between Us and Them, marking their culture/religion, lack of civilization, barbarity, and unreformed religion.27 They were utilized in the equally familiar rescue romance, an inter- national triangle: our men setting out to rescue their women, from their men. The myth of protection foists upon men responsibilities of soldiering and on women the func- tion of being those for whom men must fight, underlining men as agents and women as passive pawns in international politics, regardless of what individual men and women are doing. These gendered civic identities also legitimize the military solution as a humanitarian, indeed progressive intervention. As many feminists, Afghani and international, pointed out, this was too easy a discovery of outrage and too sudden a conversion to the rights of Afghan women as “rights of convenience.”28 In a disconcerting twist, the plight of Afghan women was highlighted after 9/11 by Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, wives of the primary war lead- ers, as if it was a “women’s issue” or auxiliary aspect rather than a human rights or human security issue. Why not before? Why not now? Why not in other states hostile to women’s rights, for example in Saudi Arabia?29 “[T]he worry about Afghan women has become a battle cry of the West only after 9/11. It never prevented the United States in the past from supporting the Taliban against the Soviets or for them to support now the Northern Alliance forces that have been similar in their approach to women’s rights. Significantly, in the Western discus- sion on the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan there is constant mention of the West insisting on multi-ethnic participation in this government as a precondition for establishing democratic rule in Afghanistan. However, there is virtually never any men- tion let alone insistence that the women of Afghanistan would constitute part of this political process.”30

Link – IR

The aff’s version of IR uses women to legitimize masculine actions of domination and violence

**Pettman 4** (Jan Jindy, Director of Women’s Studies @ ANU, Brown Journal of World Affairs 10(2), Winter/Spring 2004, p. 90)IM

Feminists in IR routinely ask questions that are not usually asked in the disci- pline. They also attempt to listen to voices excluded from IR’s evidence and resources. In so doing, feminist responses brought another powerful dimension lacking in much mainstream IR, and in western read- ings of 9/11, by internationalizing the account.38 As a discipline, IR has long been U.S.-dominated, and therefore shaped by U.S. strategic and global interests and attention.39 IR feminists often draw on networks and affilia- tions with other international femi- nists, and pay attention to women’s voices in transnational forums and circuits, recog- nizing that these are always partial, and situated, including for many of us, only com- municating in English. These links have widened substantially through the emergence of e-mail and the Internet as key tools in transnational feminist and women’s organiz- ing. Always acknowledging the horror and loss of 9/11, these were placed alongside other dreadful and violent losses to other people in other places. These responses also reclaimed the international identity of 9/11, rejecting the appropriation of the tragedy as only “American,” that ignored the many other nationalities among the victims. Such moves, meant to complicate, internationalize, and gender the account, re- late to long-held feminist anxieties about the “unitary masculine actor” problem in IR that “turns a complex state and set of forces into a singular male opponent.”40 This personification of enemy states makes their demonization easier. It also facilitates America’s translation into victim/redeemer, reproducing bounded state identities that suppressed connections across and divisions within the different player states. Such constructions unleashed competitive masculinities into action: hence the ‘hard mascu- linity’ privileged in the dominant national/alliance mode.41 Feminists resisted the ways that 9/11 and its aftermath privileged the military solution and deployed ‘women’ in the war story as a method of legitimization. Feminists pointed to the use of women in the culture wars that lurked within the war talk, and shored up the binary Them vs. Us yet again.42 They also resisted the effect of masculinized responses in removing women as agents of knowledge. This in turn prompted the constant reassertion ‘not in our name,’ lest women’s plight/danger became grounds for masculinized action yet again.

Link/Impact – National Security

The justifications of rhetoric and even action on national security are necessarily and empirically rationalistic and masculine – the consequence of this is a disavowal of all things feminine, culminating in military adventurism and war.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 51-53) JM

Donna Haraway claims that all scientific theories are embedded in particular kinds of stories, or what she terms “fictions of science.”55 IR feminists, like some other critical theorists, particularly those concerned with genealogy, have examined the stories on which realism and neorealism base their prescriptions for states’ national-security behavior, looking for evidence of gender bias. Feminist reanalysis of the so-called “creation myths” of international relations, on which realist assumptions about states’ behavior are built, reveals stories built on male representations of how individuals function in society. The parable of man’s amoral, self-interested behavior in the state of nature, made necessary by the lack of restraint on the behavior of others, is taken by realists to be a universal model for explaining states’ behavior in the international system. But, as Rebecca Grant asserts, this is a male, rather than a universal, model: were life to go on in the state of nature for more than one generation, other activities such as childbirth and child rearing, typically associated with women, must also have taken place. Grant also claims that Rousseau’s stag hunt, which realists have used to explain the security dilemma, ignores the deeper social relations in which the activities of the hunters are embedded. When women are absent from these foundational myths, a source of gender bias is created that extends into international-relations theory.56 Feminists are also questioning the use of more scientifically based rational-choice theory, based on the instrumentally rational behavior of individuals in the marketplace that neorealists have used to explain states’ security-seeking behavior. According to this model, states are unproblematically assumed to be instrumental profit maximizers pursuing power and autonomy in an anarchic international system. Where international cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community but, rather, in terms of enlightened self-interest. Feminists suggest that rational-choice theory is based on a partial representation of human behavior that, since women in the West have historically been confined to reproductive activities, has been more typical of certain men.57 Characteristics such as self-help, autonomy, and power maximizing that are prescribed by realists as security-enhancing behavior are very similar to the hegemonic, masculine-gendered characteristics described in chapter 1. The instrumentally competitive behavior of states, which results in power balancing, is similar to equilibrium theory, or the market behavior of rational-economic man. Therefore, it tends to privilege certain types of behaviors over others. While states do indeed behave in these ways, these models offer us only a partial understanding of their behavior. As other IR scholars, too, have pointed out, states engage in cooperative as well as conflictual behavior; privileging these masculinist models tends to delegitimate other ways of behaving and make them appear less “realistic.” Does the fact that states’ national-security policies are often legitimated by appealing to masculine characteristics, such as power and self-help, mean that certain types of foreign-policy behaviors—standing tall, rather than wimping out—are seen as more legitimate than others? Could it be that men who, in the role of defense experts, must employ tough “masculine” language and suppress any “feminized” thoughts when constructing strategic options, come to regard more cooperative choices as unthinkable and co operative behavior as unlikely?58 Carol Cohn claims that the language we use shapes the way we view the world and thus how we act on it. Her analysis of the language of U.S. security experts, whose ideas have been important for mainstream security studies, suggests that this masculine-gendered discourse is the only permissible way of speaking about national security if one is to be taken seriously by the strategic community. This rational, disembodied language precludes discussion of the death and destruction of war, issues that can be spoken of only in emotional terms stereotypically associated with women. In other words, the limits on what can be said with the language of strategic discourse constrains our ability to think fully and well about national security. In their analysis of U.S. policy on bombing Indochina during the VietnamWar, Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan examine the discourse ofU.S. policymakers. They claim it was gendered.59 When policymakers spoke or wrote about South Vietnam, it was portrayed as weak and feminized, its population as hysterical and childlike; the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, were characterized as brutal fanatics—as manifesting a perverted form of masculinity. The authors claim that bombing policy, responding to these gendered portrayals, was different in each case. While not denying the reality of what policymakers do, Milliken and Sylvan, like Cohn, claim that words have power and, therefore, consequences; the way in which policymakers and scholars construct reality has an effect on how they act upon and explain that reality. Gender-differentiated images are often used in foreign policy to legitimate certain options and discredit others. Therefore, Walt’s aspiration for separating the “political” from the “scientific” is questionable. In other words, theories cannot be separated from political practice.

Link/Impact – Military Action

The containment of conflict-prone and anarchic scenarios is motivated by masculine fear of the feminine – this leads to the oppression of women.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 55-57) JM

Since its birth in early modern Europe, the Western state system has constructed its encounters with “uncivilized” or dangerous others in ways that have justified expansion, conquest, and a state of military preparedness. Such rhetoric is being deployed today with respect to dangers in the South. While I would not deny the very real problem of conflict in the South, such conflicts take on particular identities that render them intractable and often incomprehensible. Newly articulated North/South boundaries between mature and immature anarchies reinforce these distinctions. Anarchy, or the state of nature, is not only a metaphor for the way in which people or states can be expected to behave in the absence of government; it also depicts an untamed natural environment in need of civilization whose wide and chaotic spaces are often described as female. Such language was frequently used during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to legitimate colonial rule over peoples who were deemed incapable of governing themselves.63 It is not only threats from outside against which nationalist ideologies are created. The threats that states pose to their own citizens, issues of importance on the new security agenda, are often exacerbated by the manipulation of nationalist ideologies that pits ruling groups against “outsiders” within their own territory. Frequently, the reassertion of cultural or religious identities, in the name of national unity, may take the form of repressive measures against women. Nira Yuval-Davis suggests that the defining of women as the bearers of culture—a practice that often accompanies these movements— reinforces women’s inequality. When gender relations come to be seen as the “essence” of culture, women who stray outside the definition of “good women” can be punished for bringing shame to their families; besides solidifying ethnic identities, this can be used as a way of legitimizing the control and oppression of women.64 Such behavior is illustrated in the way women have been regulated by the Taliban in Afghanistan. National identities are often used by domestic elites to promote state or group interests and hide race and class divisions. Defining moments in collective historical memories are frequently wars of national liberation, great victories in battles against external enemies, or the glories of former imperialist expansion. Flags and national anthems are often associated with war. Scholars who study nationalism have emphasized the importance of warfare for the creation of a sense of national community. Not only does war mobilize the national consciousness, it also provides the myths and memories that create a sense of national identity, an identity for which people have been willing to die and kill.65 As Jean Elshtain asserts, societies are, in some sense, the “sum total” of their war stories.66War stories are often used to gain a society’s support for a war; frequently, these stories rely on the portrayal of a certain kind of masculinity associated with heroism and strength. These portrayals can be racialized as well as gendered; as Susan Jeffords notes, all the heroes in Hollywood’s 1980s Vietnam War and action-adventure films were white men.67 Rarely do war stories include stories about women.

\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

Impact – War

Masculine approaches to foreign policy to lead narrow-minded solutions and war.

Tickner 3 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 10(2), p. 54) JM

So to get back to your question, yes, I do think that the war in Iraq is a masculine approach. The emphasis on a strong military response closes off other more conciliatory options. This is not the same thing as saying that men always favor the use of force while women always favor more peaceful responses. Women supported this war, too, although there was a significant gender gap on the issue, at least until the war started. What I am saying that we are all socialized into regarding masculine norms as the correct way to operate—particularly in matters of foreign policy. This has the negative effect of shutting off other options. And the framing of the war on terrorism as good versus evil reflects the kind of dichotomous thinking that feminists find deeply problematic, as I have illustrated with my definition of gender. Feminists have written a great deal about the dangers of either/or categorizations and the tolerance for ambiguity, both of which could be useful here.

The hegemonic masculinity perpetuated by the aff justifies military adventurism, turning the case.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 49) JM

Claiming that the security-seeking behavior of states is described in gendered terms, feminists have pointed to the masculinity of strategic discourse and how this may impact on understanding of and prescriptions for security; it may also help to explain why women’s voices have so often been seen as inauthentic in matters of national security. Feminists have examined how states legitimate their security-seeking behavior through appeals to types of “hegemonic” masculinity. They are also investigating the extent to which state and national identities, which can lead to conflict, are based on gendered constructions. The valorization of war through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity depends on a feminized, devalued notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic. Since feminists believe that gender is a variable social construction, they claim that there is nothing inevitable about these gendered distinctions; thus, their analyses often include the emancipatory goal of postulating a different definition of security less dependent on binary and unequal gender hierarchies.

Impact – Laundry List

Masculine conceptions of international relations cause the worst form of violence including exploitation, environmental destruction, and militarism that results in endless violence

Zalewski 98 (Marysia Zalewski, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, 98 [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p86])

Whereas we think it important to avoid what Halliday calls "precipitate totalization," [9](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/98143646) we also think it worthwhile to recognize the very real connections between the domination of masculine paradigms in intellectual debate, on the one hand, and personal insecurity in the late twentieth century, the development of industrial capitalism, and ecological destruction, on the other. The recognition of these connections is nothing new; both Peterson and Tickner unpackage IR in this way ( Peterson 1992, 32; Tickner 1992). However, the relation between these connections and the dispute between realist and liberal forms of masculinity must also be recognized (see Chapter 1).

The shift from hierarchical to spatial world orders that occurred after the Middle Ages created an international realm in which the hypermasculinity of the warrior developed and finally flourished as realist hypermasculinity within the discipline of international relations. The intellectual response to conservatism from the Enlightenment produced a conception of reason that laid the foundations of the "rational man" of the following centuries of capitalist development. Finally, the liberal conception of progress as the natural outgrowth of increasing rationality produced the critical liberal conception of the gradual mastery of man over nature. The consequences are readily itemizable: (1) realist hypermasculinity is responsible for the emergence and eventual militarization of the state system with its imagery of protector/protected, inside/outside, and order/anarchy--a situation in which security for the few is bought at the cost of insecurity of the many ( Luckham 1983); (2) liberal masculinity's notions of competition, individuality, and rational economic man has meant prosperity for the few and exploitation of the many ( Wallerstein 1974; Amin 1974); (3) liberal conceptions of progress have fostered a split between man and nature where nature is to be dominated and is consequently responsible for the widespread degradation of the global environment ( Crosby 1986); (4) both liberal and realist conceptions of masculinity have been responsible for the fostering of the belief in the discovery of predictable regularities through which "science" can reveal eternal truths about "man" and "nature." This has allowed (hu)manity to ignore the myriad warning signs of imminent catastrophe ( Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992).

Impact – World Politics

Feminist theories are key to interpret world politics

**Keohane 89** (Robert, Journal of International Studies Vol. 18, No . 2 , p. 245)IM

Feminist standpoint theories argue that women's experiences at the margins of political life have given them perspectives on social issues that provide valid insights into world politics. From her vantage-point at the periphery, the feminist theorist offers a critique of theories constructed by men who put themselves in the position of policy-makers (or, as in Hans Morgenthau, look ' o v e r hi s shoul der ' ) . Inst ead, feminists critically examine international relations from t he s t a n d p o i n t o f people who have been systematically excluded from power. The feminist s t a n d p o i n t conception as I use it does n o t imply that feminist perspectives are necessarily s u p e r i o r in a n abs ol ut e sense t o t r a di t i ona l views - onl y t h a t t hey c o n t a i n crucial insights i nt o t he compl ex realities o f wor l d politics.

Impact - Liberalism

Liberalism allows for a patriarchal macroeconomic system which disproportionately hurts women and prevents gender equality

**Ruiz 7** (Tricia, Law @ U Wash, Oct. 15 2007, honors.csustan.edu/journals/Soundings/Ruiz.pdf)IM

Feminist critiques of liberalism address the economic inequalities inherent to free trade, which disproportionately affect women. Jacqui True argues that “male-centered macroeconomic indicators, such as the Gross National Product” undervalue the work of women.18 True also reports that “on a world scale, women are a disadvantaged group: they own one per cent of the world’s property and resources, perform sixty per cent of the labour, [and] are the majority of refugees, illiterate and poor persons.” (Ibid) This suggests that the capitalist structure is a patriarchal one, effectively marginalizing the participation and contributions of women in the economy, since much of their work is reflected in unpaid illegal or domestic settings that are not included in economic assessments. Indeed, liberalist institutions such as the WTO and multinational corporations have tended to create free trade agreements that weaken state protections on labor rights19 and public social funds, which has served to negatively affect the large proportion of women in the labor force. This in turn camouflages issues of female exploitation, such as the gendered division of labor and the increase in sex trafficking worldwide. Feminists also challenge liberalism’s claim that international institutions provide for ways in which women can be become more politically and socially acknowledged and empowered. Since the leaders and the processes of formal international organizations come from patriarchal systems, their work can keep women at a disadvantage. Hilary Charlesworth critiques some of the recent formal international conferences, such as the Beijing Declaration and Agenda 21 in Rio. She notes that the wording in the documents shows that while some consensus was achieved in progressing issues critical to women, not enough was achieved to arrive at the real changes proposed by feminists. Charlesworth outlines some of the disappointing results, such as the lack of agreement on the definition of gender, and inability to secure benchmarks for measuring progress.20 Such critiques underscore the challenges of feminist theory, because they indicate that highly publicized and widely supported liberalist women’s movements do not necessarily equate with the goal of achieving real gender equality.

Impact Helper – Patriarchy Root Cause of War

**War is the product of gendered understandings of life in which the masculine dominates the feminine – it can be removed only when these understandings change**

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 5, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)IM

The gender critique of war provides a generalized account of wars and the way they are fought. The gender critique tells us why we have wars at all. While it is suggestive with respect to the frequency, character, and scope of war, it does not try to account for the timing and location of specific wars. It tells us why war is viewed widely as an acceptable practice or way to resolve human differences (although this acceptance invariably is accompanied with obligatory protestations of reluctance). The gender critique of war, for example, cannot account for the timing and location of the 1991 Gulf War, although it can provide an explanation of the warring proclivities of modern Western states, especially the inconsistency between the peaceful rhetoric of the US and its incessant warring practices. It can account for the spectre of war in the aftermath of Vietnam, with the end of the Cold War, and with the election of George Bush. It is less able to account for the appearance of war in the Middle East in January of 1991. The opening intellectual orientation of the gender critique of war rests upon a constructivist view of human understanding and practice, that is, a view that anchors practices, including war, within humankind's self-made historico-cultural matrix. This view is contrasted starkly with those that ground human practices psychologically or biologically or genetically. War is not viewed as a natural practice as if delivered by the Gods; it arises out of human-created understandings and ways-of- living that have evolved over the millennia. More specifically, the assumption that men (the nearly exclusive makers and doers of war) are biologically hard-wired for aggression and violence is resisted, as is the related notion that women are naturally passive and non-violent. The explanation for war will not be found in testosterone levels. It is not the essential or bio-social male that makes war. War is the product of the gendered understandings of life—understandings of the celebrated masculine and the subordinated feminine—that have been fashioned over vast tracts of cultural time. And since war arises from human-created understandings and practices it can be removed when these understandings change. War is not insuperable. Indeed, the rooting of war in human created phenomena is recognized as a response to the political incapacitation associated with biologically determinist arguments: "Attempts of genetic determinists to show a biological basis for individual aggression and to link this to social aggression, are not only unscientific, but they support the idea that wars of conquest between nations are inevitable."8

Patriarchy is the root cause of war, which in turn recreates patriarchy

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 7, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)IM

The practices of war emerge within gendered understandings that inflect all spheres of social life. As we created "man" and "woman" we simultaneously created war. Contemporary warfare, in complementary terms, emerges within the inner-most sanctums of gendered life. Gender constructs are constitutive of war; they drive it and imbue it with meaning and sense. War should not be understood as simply derivative of the masculine ethos, although it numerous facets accord with the narratives and lore of masculinity. The faculty of war is our understanding of man and women, of manliness and womanliness, and particularly of the subordination of the feminine to the masculine. It is the twinning of the masculine and the feminine that nourishes the war ethic. This can be illustrated by examining the infusion of the language of war with heterosexual imagery typically of patriarchy, that is, with ideas of the prowess-laden male sexual subject conquering the servile female sexual object. Both sex and war are constituted through understandings of male domination and female subordination. The language is bound to be mutually reinforcing and easily interchangeable. War is a metaphor for sex and sex is a metaphor for war. A recent study of nicknames for the penis revealed that men were much more inclined to metaphorize the penis with reference to mythic or legendary characters (such as the Hulk, Cyclops, Genghis Khan, The Lone Ranger, and Mac the Knife), to authority figures and symbols (such as Carnal King, hammer of the gods, your Majesty, Rod of Lordship, and the persuader), to aggressive tools (such as screwdriver, drill, jackhammer, chisel, hedgetrimmer, and fuzzbuster), to ravening beasts (such as beast of burden, King Kong, The Dragon, python, cobra, and anaconda), and to weaponry (such as love pistol, passion rifle, pink torpedo, meat spear, stealth bomber, destroyer, and purple helmeted love warrior).11 The intuitive collocation of sexuality with domination, conquering, destruction, and especially instruments of war is confirmed by this study. Both sex and war, however, are manifestations of the gendered notions of power-over, submission, inequality, injury, contamination, and destruction. Both practices are integral expressions of patriarchal culture and proximate to its reproduction. It is hardly surprising that the language of sexuality and war is seamless.

**Impact Helper – Patriarchy Root Cause of War**

Patriarchy is the root cause of war

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 7, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)IM

On the other side of the war ledger is the flight from the feminine. War is premised upon the understanding that the feminine is the enemy of the warring essence. It is imperative to emphasize that war is not neglectful with respect to woman, or that it is merely non-inclusive, hesitant, or reluctant. Rather, war is axiomatically bound up with the fear of the feminine. The ideology of war involves the presupposition that womanliness is antithetical to war, that it will undermine the warring ethic. Warfare presupposes that woman is the enemy of man's crowning practice. It identifies the feminine as the castrating enemy of the manly/war scheme. Any suggestion of gravitation towards the feminine is equated with the decay of masculine resolve. The flight from the feminine entails the simultaneous denial and appropriation of the things women do. Labels such as heroism, bravery, and sacrifice, for example, are reserved for war; the attendant pain and loss of life in childbirth is socially repressed.15 There is no equivalent effort to commemorate or celebrate the bringing forth of life. In fact, childbirth has been epidemiologized over the last century, while gestation and birth imagery has been appropriated by weapons designers. Birthing does not have the recollective equivalent of war. At best, the womb is enlisted to further the war project, that is, to insure future soldiering generations. Womanliness is domesticated, in a sense, to ensure that it does not undermine war. Men's killing is acclaimed typically in terms of its "protective" function, that is, as protectors of the home and the hearth.16 Men are cast, in the end, as the most important caretakers.

Patriarchy is the root cause of war

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 9, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)IM

These motifs shade into outright loathing. War may be hell indeed; but it is driven by an ideology of hatred. Misogyny is the theory; war is the practice. Myths surrounding woman as the enemy of man (and the things men do) lay at the heart of war-thought. Modern war is connotatively inseparable from the dehumanizing representations of woman. The drive "to war" is recessed within the myth of woman as man's worst enemy. Modern warfare is a relentlessly Pandoran affair. Its abundant coital imagery is organically inspired by its mysogynistic cradle. Common parlance routinely asserts that an enemy that has been consigned to ignominious defeat is an enemy that has been "thoroughly fucked" (which resonates culturally as being reduced to a woman). It has been observed that the construction of a soldier requires the killing of the woman within.17 The training of the soldier is replete with a litany of disciplining epithets regarding the feminine. The transformation from boy-recruit into man-soldier requires the extirpation of any feminine traits and identities; it demands the vanquishing of any lurking womanliness. War is femicidal. This foreshadows, moreover, the vigilance with respect to the subversive feminine being looming within the warring fabric. Soldier and policymakers guard against the association of their actions or ideas with feminine traits. Regardless of its particular manifestation or definition of a practice, ritual, or goal linked to militaries and to battle, the ideology of war requires a strict, unrelenting overcoming of anything understood as womanly. Its discourse of identity and achievement, in other words, repudiates and disavows the feminine as much as it is embraces the masculine. This mysogynistic reflex undergirds the representation of opponents (on the war front and the "home" front) as women. Those opposing war routinely are dismissed in feminine terms, as being too emotional, too sentimental, as lacking in firmness and determination, as naïve, unthoughtful, weak, confused, and, in the branding coup de grâce, as unmanly (it is commonly suspected that peaceful people or doves, after all, don't "have balls"). There is a common and essential association between women and peace, an association that has permeated a share of social activism and scholarly research. Military enemies, moreover, typically are represented as woman. Military targets, especially the ground or earth itself, also are connotatively feminized in war-think. The practice of war surfaces within gendered understandings and identities. War embodies the rehearsal of patriarchal consciousness. Numerous leaders (mainly male but occasionally female) overtly draw upon gendered understandings for policy guidance. It is this sense of war being constituted and inflected through gender that informs the claim that patriarchy lies at the root of war. Without gender it is unlikely that war would arise as such a frequent alternative in human life, and that entire societies could be so extensively militarized regardless of the costs and trade-offs involved.

Impact Helper – Patriarchy Root Cause of War

War would not exist without patriarchy

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 19, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)IM

When contemplated from the perspective of gender the practice of war appears somewhat paradoxical. It is bound up with notions of masculinity and femininity. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how war would be understood as anything other than hideous, destructive, and terribly harmful in the absence of gender discourse. When abstracted from the context of patriarchy war is drained of its meaning. War rests upon the unself-conscious appropriation of patriarchy as a sense-managing universe. Gendered constructs, in short, are constitutive of the intersocial practice that has received the appellation war. War is about preserving patriarchal ways of life, and especially about preserving the subordination of women. Warfare is the technology of patriarchy—its most dramatic instrument of maintenance. It is very unlikely that war would create a meaningful emancipatory window for women when it is so fundamentally entwined with patriarchal culture. One must never lose sight of the fact that warfare is, as Thomas Paine observed more than two centuries ago, "the art of conquering at home."52 In a recent work Susan Gubar draws attention to the increasing sense of dread that many female intellectuals had during the Second World War, apprehensions impelled by the representation of woman as both booty and enemy. Such images and representations boded poorly for women in the post-war period, and Gubar contends that these intellectuals were intuiting that the war was, in effect, "a blitz on them."53

Patriarchy is the root cause of militarism and the commodification of women

**PCP 6** (People’s Charter for Peace, June 15 2006, www.networkers.org/userfiles/Peace%20Charter.pdf)IM

The links between patriarchy and war need to be emphasized. The very structure of the military is patriarchal. To galvanize to full potential the struggle against militarism, its gender-based approach has to be challenged. Since the very beginning of war, women have been considered spoils of war and, as victims, are today subsumed under the euphemistic phrase "collateral damage". The War on Terror intertwined with neo-liberal globalization has intensified exploitation and oppression of women, commodifying them, trafficking them, and thus systematically violating their dignity. The main casualties of war are women and children. The economic consequences of war are exacerbated by patriarchy. Militarization reinforces the sexual commodification of women. It also perpetuates sexual violence against women. Military occupation further degrades women.

\*\*\*Alternative\*\*\*

Alt – Ethnography

Alt is to conduct our analysis of international relations in a manner consistent with ethnography.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 55-57) JM

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz has described ethnography as “a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures in terms of which human actions are produced, perceived and interpreted and without which they would not exist.”34 It is not an experimental science in search of law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning; its task is to uncover the conceptual structures and meanings that inform subjects’ acts. Geertz speaks of an interpretive approach as an aid to gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can converse with them.35 Writing about the natural sciences rather than the social sciences, Evelyn Fox Keller describes the method used by biologist Barbara McClintock in a similar vein. She contrasts McClintock’s work on genetic transposition in corn with that more typical of modern science, which is premised on a division between the observer and the observed and the search for a single law of explanation, a methodology that encourages researchers to overlook difference. Claiming that “there’s no such thing as a central dogma into which everything will fit,” McClintock talked of her scientific investigations in terms of “listening to the material” or “letting the experiment tell you what to do.”36 In describing her “conversational” relationship with plants, McClintock urged respect for difference; she used the words affection and empathy to describe her form of thought.37 While Keller is careful not to conclude that McClintock was consciously doing feminist science, she does suggest that, being a woman with a commitment to personal integrity, McClintock had to insist on a different meaning of mind, nature, and the relation between them.38 In other words, given that the meaning of these terms and their relation to each other depend on gendered constructions, McClintock’s science required a different construction of gender. Empathy, listening, and conversation are words frequently used by IR feminists when describing their research. Christine Sylvester has used the term empathetic cooperation in connection with her fieldwork among women in Zimbabwe. She defines empathetic cooperation as the positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to concerns and agendas of those to whom we do not usually listen when building social theory. Quoting Trinh Minh-ha, Sylvester claims that empathy involves taking on the struggles of others by listening to what they have to say in a conversational style that does not push or direct; it is an ability to investigate questions in ways that open us up to the stories that have generally been bypassed.39 Cooperation is “a process of negotiation that (real) theorists join because they have taken on board enough of the texture of marginalised identities that their Self-identity with canonical knowledge is disturbed.”40 Similarly, Katharine Moon, an IR feminist doing second-generation empirical work, has described her fieldwork in Korea as an attempt to lift the curtains of invisibility that have shrouded Korean prostitutes’ existence. Influenced by the work of Enloe, Moon’s stories help us locate women in places not normally considered relevant to IR and to link their experiences to wider processes and structures that she investigated through the examination of national-security documents collected in the United States and Korea. Moon offers her research as a passageway for the voices of these women who were far from silent when she engaged them in conversation on topics that ranged from politics to child-rearing habits.41 She claims that many of the thoughts and experiences former prostitutes shared with her in regular conversations informed her thinking and writing.42 Her interviews are not intended to offer statistical evidence but “to give voice to people who most Koreans and Americans have never considered as having anything important to say or worth listening to.”43 Christine Chin’s work also responds to the question, Where are the women? Chin presents her fieldwork with domestic servants in Malaysia in a light similar to Moon’s. Describing her ethnographic research—which involved living in various neighborhoods in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, over a six-month period, she, too, rejects the survey method, which in Chin’s view oversimplifies complexities of life that cannot be distilled in a series of hypotheses to be tested. She describes her work as multimethod ethnographic research: she offers quotations from field notes that, she says, are a Some Pathways for IR Feminist Futures 143 style of evidence that allows her subjects to use their own words and speak about any issue they please. Chin writes about her efforts to establish trust and describes her analysis of her interviews as a study of narrativity, or how we come to construct our identities by locating ourselves within our life stories.44 Narrative is a method sometimes employed by feminists to further their goal of constructing knowledge that comes out of people’s everyday experiences. Such knowledge is important for reaching a level of selfunderstanding that can enable people to comprehend the hierarchical structures of inequality or oppression within which their lives are situated, and thereby move toward overcoming them. Laurel Richardson, a feminist sociologist, has claimed that narratives are quintessential to understanding the sociological. She outlines some of the consequences of adopting a narrative form as a way of acquiring and representing knowledge, suggesting that it can empower individuals and support transformative social projects. Narratives display the goals and intentions of human actors and are the primary way that individuals organize their experience into temporally meaningful episodes; narratives make the connections between events that constitute meaning. Explanation in a narrative mode is contextually embedded, whereas scientific explanation is abstracted from spatial and temporal contexts.45 Richardson describes narratives that give voice to those social groups who are marginalized—to what she calls the “collective story.” While people talk of specific events rather than articulating how sociological categories such as race, class, and gender have shaped their lives, she believes that their stories have transcendent possibilities for social action and societal transformation.46

Alt Solvency - Rejection

Patriarchy is at the heart of the military and the military industrial complex – there is no hope in solving violence in the affirmative’s framework – only the alternative solves

**Cock 92** (Jacklyn, Prof. of Sociology at the University of Witwatersrand, South African Defence Review, Issue No. 6 1992 http://www.iss.org.za/PUBS/ASR/SADR6/Cock.html) PJ

Militarism involves more than arms bearing and the practice of war. It has been defined as 'a set of attitudes and social practices which regards war and the preparation of war as a normal and desirable social activity. This is a broader definition than is common among scholars. It qualifies people other than John Wayne as militarists. But in an age when war threatens our survival it is as well to understand any behavior, however mild in appearance, which makes war seem either natural or desirable.' (Mann, 1987: 35) The role of women in military has been largely obscured and mystified by two competing perspectives - those of sexism and feminism. Both analyses exclude women from war on the grounds that they are bearers of 'special qualities'. Sexism excludes women from the ranks of the military on the grounds of their physical inferiority and unsuitability for fighting. As the weaker sex women must be 'protected' and 'defended'. One variant of feminism similarly excludes women but on opposite grounds - that of their innate nurturing qualities, their creativity and pacifism. Another variant of feminism excludes women on the grounds that men have a monopoly on power. The outcome of these perspectives is that war is understood as a totally male affair and the military as a patriarchal institution from which women are excluded and by whom women are often victimized. The military is viewed as the last bastion of male power-war as it's last preserve Cock continues (92 “ ”) Military training is a crucial agency of this socialisation. Men are socialised into a conception of masculinity that is violent. 'Military training is socialisation into masculinity carried to extremes.' (Roberts, 1984: 197). The notion of 'combat' is the fulcrum of this process. 'Combat' is the key dimension in the development of the masculinity\militarism nexus. Combat is presented as fundamental to the development of manhood and male superiority. (Enloe, 1983) Only in combat lies the ultimate test of a man's masculinity. The image of manhood inculcated through combat training hinges on aggression and dominance; it involves an emotional disconnection and an impacted sexuality. (Eisenhart, 1983) Through combat the man affirms his role as protector, and defender. In this sense the exclusion of women from combat roles is essential for maintaining the ideological structure of patriarchy. Cock concludes(92" "), Similarly Reardon has argued that militarism in general is expressive of a masculine ideology. Therefore, if women were included in the policy making process, feminine notions of defense and national security could bring about a more peaceful and less militarized world. Also it is suggested that the presence of women in combat units blurs and decreases the harshness of military life. It perhaps lessens the brutalization of young men thrown into an all male society for months on end. One could thus argue for women soldiers as an agency of degendering the military and loosening the militarism/masculinity connection. The function of the military and combat as a masculine proving ground will be eroded if women are fully integrated into the military.

Alt Solvency – Gendered Lens

The alternative is to vote negative. In questioning the masculine conceptions of the 1AC we are able to embrace a feminist ethic that challenges the inequalities and violence of the status quo

Moghadam 1 (Valentine, feminist scholar and author, “Violence and Terrorism: Feminist Observations on Islamist Movements, State, and the International System” Muse)

Our world desperately needs new economic and political frameworks in order to end the vicious cycle of violence and bring about people-oriented development, human security, and socio-economic justice, including justice for women. Such frameworks are being proposed in international circles, whether by some UN circles, the antiglobalization movement, or the global feminist movement. Women's peace movements in particular constitute an important countermovement to terrorism, and they should be encouraged and funded. Feminists and women's groups have long been involved in peace work, and their analyses and activities have contributed much to our understanding of the roots of conflict and the conditions for conflict resolution, human security, and human development. There is now a prodigious feminist scholarship that describes this activism while also critically analyzing international relations from various disciplinary vantage points, including political science.° The activities of antimilitarist groups such as the Women's international League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Women Strike for Peace, and the Women of Greenham Common are legendary, and their legacy lies in ongoing efforts to "feminize" peace, human rights, and development. At the third UN conference on women, in Nairobi in 1985, women decided that not only equality and development, but also peace and war were their affairs.° The Nairobi conference took place in the midst of the crisis of Third World indebtedness and the implementation of austerity policies recommended by the World Bank and the IME Feminists were quick to see the links between economic distress, political instability, and violence against women. As Lucille Mair noted after the Nairobi conference: This [economic] distress exists in a climate of mounting violence and militarism... violence follows an ideological continuum, starting from the domestic sphere where it is tolerated, if not positively accepted. It then moves to the public political arena where it is glamorized and even celebrated.... Women and children are the prime victims of this cult of aggression.14 Since the 1980s, when women activists formed networks to work more effectively on local and global issues, transnational feminist networks have engaged in dialogues and alliances with other organizations in order to make an impact on peace, security, conflict resolution, and social justice.. The expansion of the population of educated, employed, mobile, and politi­cally-aware women has led to increased activism by women in the areas of peace, conflict resolution, and human rights. Around the world, women have been insisting that their voices be heard, on the streets, in civil society organizations, and in the meeting halls of the multilateral organizations. Demographic changes and the rise of a "critical mass" of politically engaged women are reflected in the formation of many women's groups that are highly critical of existing po­litical structures; that question masculinist values and behav­iors in domestic politics, international relations, and conflict; and that seek to make strategic interventions, formulating solutions that are informed by feminine values. An important proposal is the institutionalization of peace education.

Alt Solvency - Ethnography

Ethnography solves – it challenges flawed understandings of the international system and replaces them with more comprehensive feminist localized analysis.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 143-144) JM

While IR feminists have employed ethnographic methods, often with these emancipatory goals in mind, they are not using ethnography only to narrate and understand people’s lives at the local level. IR feminists provide multilevel, mutually constituted constructions. Importantly, their investigations link everyday experiences with wider regional and global political and economic structures and processes. As discussed in chapter 2, Moon’s work demonstrates that military prostitution is not simply a women’s issue, but a matter of national security and international politics. The challenge of her work is to analyze the interaction between foreign governments and among governments and local groups.47 This type of understanding may reveal possibilities for social change. Likewise, Chin uses a neo-Gramscian perspective to demonstrate how domestic service is an issue that, rather than being a personal, private one, as is often assumed, involves the state and its international political and economic relations. Reinforcing the feminist claim of the interpenetration of the personal and political, Chin investigates the multicausal linkages between region (in this case, the East Asian region), state, and household. Although previous analyses have examined class and racial dimensions of what she calls the repressive developmental state, little work has been done on its gendered dimensions.48 Chin’s critical political-economy approach, one used by other feminists, too, differs from rationalistic approaches in that it takes into account both the material and ideational dimensions of social relations. Chin claims that a focus on legislation is not sufficient to account for the repressive policies of the state; one must also examine the ideological hegemony necessary to formulate and legitimate such economic policies.49 As these empirical studies demonstrate, gender is a system of meaning that comes to be expressed in legitimating discourses that keep prevailing power structures in place. For this reason, feminists have also been attracted to discourse analysis as a methodology.<CONTINUED>

Alt Solvency - Ethnography

Alternative solves – feminist perspectives on international relations break free of traditional epistemological constraints.

Tickner 92 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gender in International Relations Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*,p.14)

Conventional international relations theory has concentrated on the activities of the great powers at the center of the system. Feminist theories, which speak out of the various experiences of women-- who are usually on the margins of society and interstate politics-- can offer us some new insights on the behavior of states and the needs of individuals, particularly those on the peripheries of the international system. Feminist perspectives, constructed out of the experiences of women, can add a new dimension to our understanding of the world economy; since women are frequently the first casualties in times of economic hardship, we might also gain some new insight into the relationship between militarism and structural violence. However, feminist theories must go beyond injecting women's experiences into different disciplines and attempt to challenge the core concepts of the disciplines themselves. Concepts central to international relations theory and practice, such as power, sovereignty, and security, have been framed in terms that we associate with masculinity. Drawing on feminist theories to examine and critique the meaning of these and other concepts fundamental to international politics could help us to reformulate these concepts in ways that might allow us to see new possibilities for solving our current insecurities. Suggesting that the personal is political, feminist scholars have brought to our attention distinctions between public and private in the domestic polity: examining these artificial boundary distinctions in the domestic polity could shed new light on international boundaries, such as those between anarchy and order, which are so fundamental to the conceptual framework of realist discourse. Most contemporary feminist perspectives take the gender inequalities that I have described above as a basic assumption. Feminists in various disciplines claim that feminist theories, by revealing and challenging these gender hierarchies, have the potential to transform disciplinary paradigms. By introducing gender into the discipline of international relations, I hope to challenge the way in which the field has traditionally been constructed and to examine the extent to which the practices of international politics are related to these gender inequalities. The construction of hierarchical binary oppositions has been central to theorizing about international relations. 29 Distinctions between domestic and foreign, inside and outside, order and anarchy, and center and periphery have served as important assumptions in theory construction and as organizing principles for the way we view the world. Just as realists center their explanations on the hierarchical relations between states and Marxists on unequal class relations, feminists can bring to light gender hierarchies embedded in the theories and practices of world politics and allow us to see the extent to which all these systems of domination are interrelated. As Sarah Brown argues, a feminist theory of international relations is an act of political commitment to understanding the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated. "There is the need to identify the as yet unspecified relation between the construction of power and the construction of gender in international relations." 30 Acknowledging, as most feminist theories do, that these hierarchies are socially constructed, also allows us to envisage conditions necessary for their transcendence.

Alt Solvency – Nuclear Discourse/Nuclear Security

The discourse of nuclearism is inherently masculine and morally reprehensible – individual rejection is critical

Bidwai and Vanaik 2k (Praful, Fellow at Institute for Policy Studies and Achin, Fellow of the Transnational Institute of Amsterdam, New Nukes: India, Pakistan, and Global Disarmament) PJ

This raises a central point about the nature of the discourse of evil. Primo Levi, one of the wisest witnesses to the Holocaust, himself a survivor of Hitler’s concentration camps, explained the way ordinary Germans, at least in their overwhelming number, knowing the horrific manner in which Jews were being treated, nonetheless did not allow this to affect them seriously. Levi talked of the “banality of evil.” Of how the sheer frequency, regularity and reception of evil violence, as well as the persistent and routine rationalization and justification of its sources, mechanisms and effects in “normal” political and intellectual discourse – that is to say, the process by which such violence is made banal – serves to utterly dilute, and even disguise, the evil in question. Language, the medium of so much human thought, is itself manipulated to fulfill this function. It is used to make the human seem inhuman and to humanize the inhuman. In wartime, the “enemy” is called dehumanizing names – “Gooks” and “Charlies” in Vietnam – to help make their elimination more morally palpable. The same phenomenon exists in the everyday language of racism and sexism. The language and discourse of nuclearism is not only inescapably masculinist, aggressive, and morally callous. It is also euphemistic, deceptive, and misleading. The nuclearist discourse shows both these dehumanizing and falsely humanizing dimensions. Hence all the talk of “collateral damage,” “acceptable levels of damage,” “atomic democracy,” etc. US scientists called the first explosive device (July 1945) the “Gadget” and the first bombs dropped in Japan were named “Little Boy” and Fat Man.” The Soviets called their first bomb “The Article.” Britain called its first nuclear explosion “Hurricane;” France, the “Blue Mouse;” and China, its first weapon “Device 596.” India code-named the successful conduct of the 1974 explosion “The Smiling Buddha.” The 1998 tests were called simply “Shakti,” or power. The general discourse of nuclearism does more than make the morally unthinkable thinkable. It helps routinize and make banal the evil nature of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. When we support or oppose the possession or use or threat or capability of having nuclear weapons (just as when we support or oppose slavery and its justifications), we are, each one of us, making a moral statement that helps shape our own personalities and lives. This affects in howsoever small a way other lives and structures around us. But opposing nuclear weapons is not merely a personal matter. Certain universal evils must be recognized as such. They debase all of humanity – those that seeks to benefit from them as well as those who are its purported or actual victims. Such is the case with evils like apartheid, colonialism, and nuclearism, all of which insensate violence. They are often justified in the name of “national security,” “the national interest,” “national greatness,” etc. We cannot create a permanent nuclear-free world unless we value our common humanity and sustain a shared danger for such universal evils as nuclearism. Only on the basis of this shared but controlled anger and passion, whose wellsprings are our individual moral capacities, can we hope to build a wider consciousness across national boundaries. That alone can help bring about the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. To forget the horror and shame of what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to fail to draw moral as well as political lessons from it is to debase and degrade our common and universal humanity.

Epistemology First

View their claims as suspect – realist knowledge has been shaped by masculine epistemology.

Tickner 92 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gender in International Relations Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*,p.13-14)

Since, as I have suggested, the world of international politics is a masculine domain, how could feminist perspectives contribute anything new to its academic discourses? Many male scholars have already noted that, given our current technologies of destruction and the high degree of economic inequality and environmental degradation that now exists, we are desperately in need of changes in the way world politics is conducted; many of them are attempting to prescribe such changes. For the most part, however, these critics have ignored the extent to which the values and assumptions that drive our contemporary international system are intrinsically related to concepts of masculinity; privileging these values constrains the options available to states and their policymakers. All knowledge is partial and is a function of the knower's lived experience in the world. Since knowledge about the behavior of states in the international system depends on assumptions that come out of men's experiences, it ignores a large body of human experience that has the potential for increasing the range of options and opening up new ways of thinking about interstate practices. Theoretical perspectives that depend on a broader range of human experience are important for women and men alike, as we seek new ways of thinking about our contemporary dilemmas.

Individual Action Key

Sexism is embedded in our society – we need to integrate gender into our struggles and discussions

**Chew 7** (Huibin, June 16 2007, Left Turn: Notes from the Global Intifada, http://www.leftturn.org/?q=node/699)IM

This shallow vision of gender justice has so permeated even progressive circles, that our very definition of sexism is circumscribed. Too often, sexism is merely seen as a set of cultural behaviors or personal biases; challenging sexism is simply seen as breaking these gender expectations. But sexism is an institutionalized system, with historical, political, and economic dimensions. Just as it was built on white supremacy and capitalism, this country was built on patriarchy—on the sexual subjugation of women whether in war or “peace”, slavery or conquest; on the abuse of our reproductive capacity; the exploitation of both our paid and unpaid labor. Truly taking on an anti-sexist agenda means uprooting institutional patriarchy. To do so we must first, as a society, overcome our fears of addressing feminist issues and views. A deep analysis of how patriarchy operates is typically absent across progressive organizing in the US—whether for affordable housing, demilitarization, immigrant rights, or worker rights. In all of these struggles, women are heavily affected, and moreover, affected disproportionately in gendered ways, as women. Yet too often, organizers working on these issues do not recognize how they are gendered. In the process, they prioritize men’s experiences, and perpetuate sexism. Gender is ghettoized, rather than fully integrated into radical struggles. Appended to the main concerns of other movements, it is at best engaged on a single-issue, not systemic basis.

To make progress in human rights law the perspective of the socially subjugated must be acknowledged in public forums, such as debate

**Charlesworth 94** (Hillary, Law @ ANU, Human Rights of Women National and International Perspectives, p. 76, www.newschool.edu/.../Charlesworth\_What%20are%20Womens%20International%20 Human%20Rights.pdf)IM

How can international human rights law tackle the oppressed position of women worldwide? Women’s international human rights must be developed on a number of fronts. Certainly the relevance of the traditional canon of human rights to women is important to document. The instruments and institutions of the “first wave” of international law with respect to women must also be supported and strengthened. The potential of an individual complaints procedure under the Women’s Convention, for example, should be seriously explored. At the same time, rights that focus on harms sustained by women in particular need to be identified and developed, challenging the public/private distinction by bringing rights discourse into the private sphere. But, most fundamental and important, we must work to ensure that women’s voices find a public audience, perhaps in the context of debates and discussions over international relations, to reorient the boundaries of mainstream human rights law so that it incorporates an understanding of the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated. One way forward in international human rights law is to challenge the gendered dichotomy of public and private worlds.

\*\*\*AT’s\*\*\*

AT: Perm

Perm fails – plan’s methodological and epistemological approach to international relations is antithetical to that of feminist IR theory.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 3-5) JM

It is this lack of connection that motivates many of the issues raised in this book. While I have attempted to site feminist perspectives within the discipline, it will become clear from the topics addressed that IR feminists frequently make different assumptions about the world, ask different questions, and use different methodologies to answer them. Having reflected on reasons for these disconnections, as well as the misunderstandings over the potential usefulness of feminist approaches raised by some of the questions above, I believe that they lie in the fact that feminist IR scholars see different realities and draw on different epistemologies from conventional IR theorists. For example, whereas IR has traditionally analyzed security issues either from a structural perspective or at the level of the state and its decision makers, feminists focus on how world politics can contribute to the insecurity of individuals, particularly marginalized and disempowered populations. They examine whether the valorization of characteristics associated 4 introduction with a dominant form of masculinity influences the foreign policies of states. They also examine whether the privileging of these same attributes by the realist school in IR may contribute to the reproduction of conflict-prone, power-maximizing behaviors.11 Whereas IR theorists focus on the causes and termination of wars, feminists are as concerned with what happens during wars as well as with their causes and endings. Rather than seeing military capability as an assurance against outside threats to the state, militaries are seen as frequently antithetical to individual security, particularly to the security of women and other vulnerable groups. Moreover, feminists are concerned that continual stress on the need for defense helps to legitimate a kind of militarized social order that overvalorizes the use of state violence for domestic and international purposes. Conventional IPE has typically focused on issues such as the economic behavior of the most powerful states, hegemony, and the potential for building international institutions in an anarchic system populated by self-interested actors; within a shared state-centric framework, neorealists and neoliberals debate the possibilities and limitations of cooperation using the notion of absolute versus relative gains.12 Feminists more often focus on economic inequality, marginalized populations, the growing feminization of poverty and economic justice, particularly in the context of North/South relations. Whereas IR has generally taken a “top-down” approach focused on the great powers, feminist IR often begins its analysis at the local level, with individuals embedded in social structures. While IR has been concerned with explaining the behavior and interaction of states and markets in an anarchic international environment, feminist IR, with its intellectual roots in feminist theory more generally, is seeking to understand the various ways in which unequal gender structures constrain women’s, as well as some men’s, life chances and to prescribe ways in which these hierarchical social relations might be eliminated. These different realities and normative agendas lead to different methodological approaches. While IR has relied heavily on rationalistic theories based on the natural sciences and economics, feminist IR is grounded in humanistic accounts of social relations, particularly gender relations. Noting that much of our knowledge about the world has been based on knowledge about men, feminists have been skeptical of methodologies that claim the neutrality of their facts and the universality of their conclusions. This skepticism about empiricist methodologies extends to the possibility of developing causal laws to explain the behavior of states. While feminists do see structural regularities, such as gender and patriarchy, they define them as socially constructed and variable across time, place, and culture; understanding is preferred over explanation.13 These differences over epistemologies may well be harder to reconcile than the differences in perceived realities discussed above.

AT: Perm

Realism cannot be assimilated into feminist theory – 3 warrants.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 27-28) JM

In her assessment of the potential for finding a space in IR for feminist theory in the realist and liberal approaches of the interparadigm debate, Sandra Whitworth has suggested that, to incorporate gender, theories must satisfy three criteria: (1) they must allow for the possibility of talking about the social construction of meaning; (2) they must discuss historical variability; and (3) they must permit theorizing about power in ways that uncover hidden power relations. Whitworth claims that, in terms of these three criteria, there is little in realism that seems conducive to theorizing about gender.76 The liberal paradigm that has sought to enlarge concerns beyond the state-centric, national-security focus of realism might seem more promising; however, according to Whitworth, it is ahistorical and denies the material bases of conflict, inequality, and power. Introducing women and gender to the liberal paradigm would also encounter the same problems noted by critics of liberal feminism. Attempts to “bring women into IR” feed into the mistaken assumption that they are not there in the first place. As Cynthia Enloe tells us, women (as well as marginalized people more generally) are highly involved in world politics, but existing power structures, institutionalized in the split between the public and private spheres and what counts as “important,” keep them from being heard.77

There’s no net benefit to assimilating women into patriarchy.

Peterson 92 (Spike, prof of Political Science at the U of Arizona, *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, p.8)JM

In general, the deconstructive project documents the extent and tenacity of androcentric bias and the cultural codification of men as "knowers." It reveals women's exclusion from or trivialization within masculinist accounts and, especially, women's "absence" there as agents of social change. But even more significant, "adding women" to existing frameworks exposes taken-for-granted assumptions embedded in those frameworks. Across disciplines, feminists dis-cover the contradictions of "adding woman" to constructions that are literally defined by their "man-ness": the public sphere, rationality, economic power, autonomy, political identity, objectivity. The systematic inclusion of women—our bodies, activities, knowledge— challenges categorical givens, disciplinary divisions, and theoretical frameworks. It became increasingly clear that it was not possible simply to include women in those theories where they had previously been excluded, for this exclusion forms a fundamental structuring principle and key presumption of patriarchal discourse. It was not simply the range and scope of objects that required transformation: more profoundly, and threateningly, the very questions posed and the methods used to answer them . . . needed to be seriously questioned. The political, ontological and epistemological commitments underlying patriarchal discourses, as well as their theoretical contents required re-evaluation. 46 The reconstructive project marks the shift "from recovering ourselves to critically examining the world from the perspective of this recovery ... a move from margin to center." 47 Not simply seeking access to and participating within (but from the margins of) androcentric paradigms, feminist reconstruction explores the theoretical implications of revealing systemic masculinist bias and systematically adding women. Not surprisingly, the shift from "women as knowable" to "women as knowers" locates feminism at the heart of contemporary debates over what constitutes science and the power of "claims to know." This is difficult terrain to map, so I start from a vantage point that I hope is reasonably familiar.

AT: Perm/Link – Benign Logic/Reason

The political sphere uses a benign logic to appease feminist theory but discredits it in the process, especially in terms of militarism.

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

In discussion of biological weapons, as in issues of proliferation, the dichotomous division between reason and emotion is entwined with a similar division between [Western] Self and [unruly] Other, a particular instance of self and other, Us and Enemy typical of peace and arms negotiation. “One test of belonging and being heard in this group was whether one accepted the nature of the source of the BW problem. Did one accept the identity of the adversary?” That identity was often described in racist terms – e.g., “[they] don’t value human life the way we do” – and these remarks elicited no comment.48 ‘To belong and speak and be heard’ would mean ignoring the rules and interrupting the cool detached voice of reason. Again the gender discourse system is at work, frustrating these efforts. An objection which acknowledges emotion, which talks about the fate of bodies or lives, becomes an “outburst.” Reason ignores them in order to continue the discussion of weapons and their effects. Outbursts are “feminine”; in the silence that follows an outburst anyone, male or female, can “feel like a woman.” The effect of gender discourse depends upon a person’s complex personal and social identities. But for a feminist, who aims to speak as herself-who- isa- woman, the *accusation* of “being a woman” or a wimp has to be poignantly inhibiting. For feminists struggling to participate effectively, the final insult may be the realization that the negotiations, especially if they are presented as inclusive and democratic, are more ritualistic displays than political action. “In reality, major decisions are made in secret in the capitals, based on calculations that seek military (and increasingly commercial) advantages.”49 In the words of a male political scientist: “arms control is war by other means.” Real power is always already somewhere else by the time a woman takes her place at the table.50 Should women then give up the effort to join in negotiations? It seems that many do. [They] “get intimidated, and don’t put up with it, so they step aside.”51 But other women in increasing numbers are resisting ridicule and discrimination in order to make their views known. There are many reasons, personal and social, why some women persevere where others do not. Cultural attitudes toward women vary; women are more easily heard when many women are present, especially if they are linked in alliances that include all parties in conflict.

A2: Realism

Realism is a flawed mentality that legitimizes the violence it attempts to deter.

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

A so-called “realist” response to this jud gement might well pay lip-service to the “moral niceties” it embodies, but then argue that deterrence is worth those costs. Or, perhaps to be more accurate, it might argue that the results of a nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that the rest of these considerations are really an irrelevant distraction; deterring a WMD attack on our homeland is the precondition on which political freedom and social life depend, and so it must be thought about in a class by itself. We make two rejoinders to this claim. First, we note that in the culture of nuclear defense intellectuals, even raising the issue of costs is delegitimized, in large part through its association with “the feminine.” It is the kind of thing that “hysterical housewives” do; something done by people not tough and hard enough to look harsh “reality” in the eye, unsentimentally; not strong enough to separate their feelings from theorizing mass death; people who don’t have “the stones for war.” Feminist analysis rejects the cultural division of meaning which devalues anything associated with women or femininity. It sees in that same cultural valuing of the so-called “masculine” over the so-called “feminine” an explanation of why it appears so self-evident to many that what is called “military necessity” should appropriately be prioritized over all other human necessities. And it questions the assumptions that bestow the mantle of “realism” on such a constrained focus on weapons and state power. Rather than simply being an “objective” reflection of political reality, we understand this thought system as 1) a partial and distorted picture of reality, and 2) a major contributor to creating the very circumstances it purports to describe and protect against. Second, just as feminists tend to be skeptical about the efficacy of violence, they might be equally skeptical about the efficacy of deterrence. Or, to put it another way, if war is a “lie,” so is deterrence. This is not, of course, to say that deterrence as a phenomena never occurs; no doubt one opponent is sometimes deterred from attacking another by the fear of retaliation. But rather deterrence as a theory, a discourse and set of practices underwritten by that discourse, is a fiction.

A2: Realism

Realism is inherently masculine and makes violence inevitable – the Kritik is the only way to solve these forms of violence.

**Tickner 92** (J. Ann, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, 1992. Gender in International Relations, p. 41-44)

Behind this reification of state practices hide social institutions that are made and remade by individual actions. In reality, the neorealist depiction of the state as a unitary actor is grounded in the historical practices of the Western state system: neorealist characterizations of state behavior, in terms of self-help, autonomy, and power seeking, privilege characteristics associated with the Western construction of masculinity. Since the beginning of the state system, the national security functions of states have been deeded to us through gendered images that privilege masculinity. The Western state system began in seventeenth-century Europe. As described by Charles Tilly, the modern state was born through war; leaders of nascent states consolidated their power through the coercive extraction of resources and the conquest of ever-larger territories. Success in war continued to be imperative for state survival and the building of state apparatus.38 Throughout the period of state building in the West, nationalist movements have used gendered imagery that exhorts masculine heroes to fight for the establishment and defense of the mother country. The collective identity of citizens in most states depends heavily on telling stories about, and celebration of, wars of independence or national liberation and other great victories in battle. National anthems are frequently war songs, just as holidays are celebrated with military parades and uniforms that recall great feats in past conflicts. These collective historical memories are very important for the way in which individuals define themselves as citizens as well as for the way in which states command support for their policies, particularly foreign policy. Rarely, however, do they include experiences of women or female heroes. While the functions of twentieth-century states extend well beyond the provision of national security, national security issues, particularly in time of war, offer a sense of shared political purpose lacking in most other areas of public policy.39 The state continues to derive much of its legitimacy from its security function; it is for national security that citizens are willing to make sacrifices, often unquestioningly.40 Military budgets are the least likely area of public spending to be contested by politicians and the public, who are often manipulated into supporting military spending by linking it with patriotism. When we think about the state acting in matters of national security, we are entering a policy world almost exclusively inhabited by men. Men make national security policy both inside and outside the military establishment. Carol Cohn argues that strategic discourse, with its emphasis on strength, stability, and rationality, bears an uncanny resemblance to the ideal image of masculinity. Critics of U.S. nuclear strategy are branded as irrational and emotional. In the United States, these “defense intellectuals” are almost all white men; Cohn tells us that while their language is one of abstraction, it is loaded with sexual imagery.45 She claims that the discourse employed in professional and political debates about U.S. security policy “would appear to have colonized our minds and to have subjugated other ways of understanding relations among states.” Cohn suggests that this discourse has become the only legitimate response to questions of how best to achieve national security; it is a discourse far removed from politics and people, and its deliberations go on disconnected from the functions they are supposed to serve. Its powerful claim to legitimacy rests, in part, on the way national security specialists view the international system.

A2: Realism/Deterrence

Realism and deterrence are inherently masculine and re-perpetuate the violence they attempt to alleviate.

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ

Deterrence theory is an elaborate, abstract conceptual edifice, which posits a hypothetical relation between two different sets of weapons systems – or rather, between abstractions of two different sets of weapons systems, for in fact, as both common sense and military expertise tells us, human error and technological imperfection mean that one could not actually expect real weapons to function in the ways simply assumed in deterrence theory. Because deterrence theory sets in play the hypothetical representations of various weapons systems, rather than assessments of how they would actually perform or fail to perform in warfare, it can be nearly infinitely elaborated, in a never ending regression of intercontinental ballistic missile gaps and theater warfare gaps and tactical “mini- nuke” gaps, ad infinitum, thus legitimating both massive vertical proliferation and arms racing. Deterrence theory is also a fiction in that it depends upon “rational actors,” for whom what counts as “rational” is the same, independent of culture, history, or individual difference. It depends on those “rational actors” perfectly understanding the meaning of “signals” communicated by military actions, despite dependence on technologies that sometimes malfunction; despite cultural difference and the lack of communication that is part of being political enemies; despite the difficulties of ensuring mutual understanding even when best friends make direct face-to- face statements to each other. It depends on those same “rational actors” engaging in a very specific kind of calculus that includes one set of variables (e.g., weapons size, deliverability, survivability, as well as the “credibility” of their and their opponent’s threats), and excludes other variables (such as domestic political pressures, economics, or individual subjectivity). What is striking from a feminist perspective is that even while “realists” may worry that some opponents are so “insufficiently rational” as to be undeterrable, this does not lead them to search for a more reliable form of ensuring security, or an approach that is not so weapons-dependent. Cynthia Cockburn, in her study of women’s peace projects in conflict zones, describes one of the women’s activities as helping each other give up “dangerous day dreams.”35 From a feminist anti-war perspective, having WMD as deterrents is a dangerous dream. The dream of perfect rationality and control which underwrites deterrence theory is a dangerous dream, since it legitimates constructing a system that only could be (relatively) safe if that perfect rationa lity and control were actually possible. Deterrence theory itself is a dangerous dream because it justifies producing and deploying WMD, thereby making their accidental or purposive use possible (and far more likely) than if they were not produced at all, nor deployed in such numbers. “Realists” are quick to point out the dangers of not having WMD for deterrence when other states have them. Feminist perspectives suggest that that danger only appears so self-evidently greater than the danger of having WMD if you discount as “soft” serious attention to the costs of development and deployment.

AT: Realism

Realism fails – it can’t even explain some of the most important events of the past 200 years.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 3-5) JM

Since its inception, at the beginning of the century, the discipline of international relations has gone through a series of debates over both its subject matter and the methodologies appropriate for its investigations. 1 None of these debates have been as fundamental as those of the last two decades. The end of the Cold War and the plurality of new issues on the global agenda, to which I referred in my introductory chapter, have been accompanied by increasing calls for rethinking the foundations of a discipline that appears to some to be out of touch with the revolutionary changes in world politics, as well as deficient in how to explain them. Justin Rosenberg has suggested that it is strange that momentous events, such as the collapse of Soviet Communism, the strains of European integration, and the economic growth of China (which presently contains one-fifth of the world’s population), events that are part of a gigantic world revolution of modernization, industrialization, nationalism, and globalization in which the West has been caught up for the last two hundred years, tend to be excluded from most IR theory.2 Instead of what he claims are arid debates about hegemonic stability or order versus justice, which abstract from real-world issues, Rosenberg calls for theory grounded in historical and social analyses. He suggests that global issues can be better explained through narrative forms of explanation rather than social-scientific methodologies of conventional IR.

AT: Realism

The realism inherent in IR excludes women’s voices and femininity – this prevents women from gaining influence in security policies

**Blanchard 3** (Eric, Signs 28(4), Summer 2003, p.1292)

Feminist incursions into the field of IR security can be usefully situated on the widening side of the "wid- ening" versus "narrowing" debate: the former argues that the scope of the neorealist concept of security needs to be expanded to address a range of threats, utilize a broader spectrum of methodologies, and address mounting ethical concerns (Kolodziej 1992); the latter argues that a move beyond the study of military force would deal a serious blow to the field's intellectual coherence while distracting from serious threats (Walt 1991). Critical se- curity discourse has generally invoked, but not engaged, feminist scholar- ship, and even approaches that imagined societal sectors of security (Buzan, Waver, and de Wilde 1998) have yet to take gender seriously (Hansen 2000).3 Feminists in IR argue that realism, dominated by elite, white, male practitioners, is a patriarchal discourse that renders women invisible from the high politics of IR even as it depends on women's subjugation as a "'domesticated' figure whose 'feminine' sensibilities are both at odds with and inconsequential to the harsh 'realities' of the public world of men and states" (Runyan and Peterson 1991, 68-69). Feminists in IR explain the exclusion of women from foreign policy decision making by pointing to the "extent to which international politics is such a thoroughly mas- culinized sphere of activity that women's voices are considered inauth- entic" (Tickner 1992, 4). Women's traditional exclusion from the military and continuing lack of access to political power at times presents women with a "catch-22" situation. For example, the importance of a candidate's military service as a qualification for government office in U.S. political campaigns puts women, who cannot appeal to this experience, at a dis- advantage in obtaining the elite status of national office and thus the ability to affect defense and security policies (Tobias 1990; cf. Elshtain 2000, 445).

Realism ignores human agency and identity and brutally excludes all that is feminine

**Blanchard 3** (Eric, Signs 28(4), Summer 2003, p.1312)IM

An important component of the study of IRis a self-positioning in the tradition of Western political theory-tracing an intellectual lineage to Machiavelli and Hobbes-particularly as it concerns the state. Feminist analysis of this ped- igree shows that the feminine has long served as a symbolic threat to mil- itarized Western conceptualizations of political community, from the ancient Greeks to the twentieth century; Aeschylus's Furies and Machiavelli's For- tuna are but two examples (Harstock 1983). Rebecca Grant (1991) argues that a gender bias in IR, transmitted unproblematically from Western po- litical thought to the study of IR, results in the question of gender being taken as irrelevant. For Grant, IR's interpretation of Hobbes allows "no room for the question of how gender relations affect the transition out of the brutish state of nature and into society," while Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famous stag hunt, often invoked as a parable of the problems of security, ignores the familial relations that control the hunter's defection from the hunting circle (10-15). Taking men as the sole political actors and citizens, the political theory borrowed by IR postulates a domestic/international divide premised on the private/public distinction that relegates women to a space outside politics (9). Jean Bethke Elshtain's rich blend of political theory, personal narrative, and history, Women and War ([1987] 1995), serves as a rejoinder to the discipline's philosophical conceit and issues a key challenge to the do- mestic/international divide that Grant identifies. In a sweeping survey of the discourse of war from the Greeks onward, Elshtain details women's complex relationships to the body politic, and thus to war, as they emerge from the narratives (war stories) that are constitutive of war. Elshtain focuses on the ways in which war's "productive destructiveness" inscribes and reinscribes men's and women's identities and thus the boundaries of community: "War creates the people. War produces power, individual and collective" (166-67). Reacting to what she sees as the onset of scientism and hyperrationality in academic IR, Elshtain critiques the retreat into abstraction that the quest for scientific certainty produced in "profes- sionalized" war discourse and attempts to revive the bond between politics and morality broken by Machiavelli. By reifying state behavior, Elshtain argues, the realist narrative ignores human agency and identity: "No chil- dren are ever born, and nobody ever dies, in this constructed world. There are states, and they are what is" (91).4

AT: Realism

Realism, the basis of international relations, is profoundly gendered and excludes the feminine

**Duncanson and Eschle 8** (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New Political Science 30(4), p. 553)IM

This is the third strand of the feminist critique of the way in which states talk about nuclear technology. Cohn’s assertion gains strong support from other feminist work, particularly that in the discipline of International Relations (IR), which has developed an extensive critique of the gendered underpinnings of dominant conceptions of both the state and security. Such work focuses its critique particularly on Realism, a school of thought that sees the world as an anarchic system of self-interested states struggling to defend themselves through military power. Since World War Two, Realism has been the dominant approach in IR as well as amongst statesmen, policy-makers and defence intellectuals, and the UK is no exception. As we will show below, the Realist world view is a masculinised one, in which “manly” states strive for self-reliance and security. Feminists in IR problematize the Realist approach to security on several grounds. Most obviously, they question why military threats from other states (or, more recently, from terrorist groups) are considered more important and immediate than the threat(s) to human life posed by poverty, HIV/AIDS, environmental destruction or domestic abuse, all of which are claimed to disproportionately affect women. As a corollary, they challenge the Realist reliance on destructive military technology, insisting that welfare budgets do more to provide genuine security for women than increased defence spending.46 Feminists also seek to undermine the view that security is something which can be possessed or guaranteed by the state. Instead, they have urged us to understand security as a process, immanent in our relationships with others, and always partial, elusive, and contested. Conceived in this way, it must involve subjects—including women—in the provision of their own security.47 Two gendered aspects of Realist conceptions of security are particularly important for our purposes. First, Realists correlate security with invulnerability, invincibility and impregnability. As Susannah Radst one has argued, however, i nvul nerabi l i t y i s an unachievable fantasy with obviously gendered connotations. It is the female body that is penetrated and impregnated while the male body remains, or ought to remain, intact and impermeable Second, and perhaps more important, Realist views of security cast the state and its military wing as “protector” and civilians within the state as “protected,” a dichotomy which is profoundly gendered. Judith Hicks Stiehm, for instance, highlights the historical association of the protector role with men and the protected role with women; further, she claims that the protector role gains meaning and status precisely through its privileging over those who are feminised as vulnerable.

**AT: Realism**

**Realism denies the use of diplomacy in foreign policy**

**Ruiz 7** (Tricia, Law @ U Wash, Oct. 15 2007, honors.csustan.edu/journals/Soundings/Ruiz.pdf)IM

Realism centers its theoretical structure on how the state seeks power and defends its national interests against other competing states within a global anarchy, or where there is the lack of authority higher than the state. States seek security through a balance of power in the international arena, primarily through military means, and resorting to war, if necessary. Realists generally view the state as the key actor in international politics, and de-emphasize – or, as feminist theory argues, ignore -- the role of the individual. Much feminist IR theory stems from a critique of realism(‘s), whose “socially constructed worldview continues to guide much thought about world politics.”14 First, feminists argue that realists overvalue the role of the state in defining international relations, without questioning how the state itself is internally structured, politically and socially. Feminist theory would consider how the state includes, or excludes, the views of its individual citizens, and how, in turn, the state’s domestic views translate into foreign policies. How would the definition of ‘security’ change? Would military and defense capabilities still be atop the agenda? Would women necessarily be less militaristic in their approach to IR issues? Gender equality can be linked to increased use of diplomacy and compromise in their state’s foreign policy. Another feminist critique of realism concerns how realists define and emphasize power in IR discussions. Feminists would ask: who defines power, who has it, and how is it used? If power is defined by a patriarchal and realist society, which seeks global balances of power, then power is equated with military and economic strength. But how would this change if the discussion included women’s viewpoints? Would the indicators of power be measured differently? Would power be seen as leadership in peace agreements, or might it be measured in terms of the ability to achieve transnational cooperation?

Realism precludes feminist discussion – it excludes individual citizens, fails to analyze the state and defines power as masculine military might

**Ruiz 7** (Tricia, Law @ U Wash, Oct. 15 2007, honors.csustan.edu/journals/Soundings/Ruiz.pdf)IM

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AT: Not Real World

Feminist IR is the most connected to everyday interpersonal experience.

Tickner 3 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 10(2), p. 50) JM

A lot of the empirical IR feminist work that’s now coming out, is grounded in the “real world.” Or maybe we should talk about multiple “real worlds” since the worlds that feminists are writing about have frequently been hidden from the agendas of international politics. Take Kathy Moon’s book which talks about military prostitution in Korea, or Elizabeth Prügl’s work on home-based labor. Jacquie True has just finished a book on the effects on women of the post-Communist transition in the Czech Republic. And all of Cynthia Enloe’s work is grounded in the “real world” although not the same “real world”—the world of states and statesmen—that IR has studied. While some feminist theory may be esoteric, much of it has evolved out of social movements and political practice. Frequently, feminists emphasize constructing theory out of practice, particularly the practice of everyday lives of ordinary people. I think that this is a strength of feminist theory. However, many IR theorists don’t think that it’s a legitimate way to build knowledge.

AT: Essentialism

K associates feminism, not women, with peace – the distinction is critical to problematizing essentialism and masculinity.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 60-61) JM

While this essentializing association of women with peace is problematic, it is the case that women in the United States have consistently shown less support for forceful means of pursuing foreign-policy goals than men, and this gender gap continues to grow. It was widest at the time of the Gulf War of 1991—although it closed somewhat once the fighting had begun.83 It has also been suggested that those who oppose military intervention are among those most likely to support feminist goals, a claim supported by an analysis of attitudes toward the peace process in the Middle East. A study of Israeli, Egyptian, Palestinian, and Kuwaiti attitudes toward the Arab/Israeli conflict, broken down by sex, found that men and women did not have different attitudes and there was no evidence of women being less militaristic. Using data collected between 1988 and 1994, the study did, however, find a strong positive correlation between attitudes toward support for equality of women and support for diplomacy and compromise. The authors therefore saw a connection between feminism and positive attitudes about the resolution of international conflict.84 This example is instructive; reducing unequal gender hierarchies could make a positive contribution to peace and social justice. Likewise, by moving beyond dichotomous ways of thinking about war and peace, problematizing the social construction of gender hierarchies, and exposing myths about male protection that these ways of thinking promote, we would be able to construct less-gendered and more-inclusive definitions of security. Offering a counterposition that rejects both the masculinity of war and a feminine peace, Mary Burguieres has argued for building a feminist security framework on common, ungendered foundations. She has suggested a role for feminism in dismantling the imagery that underlies patriarchy and militarism and a joint effort in which both women and men would be responsible for changing existing structures.85 Such efforts require a problematization of dichotomized constructions such as war and peace and realism and idealism in order to provide new ways of understanding these phenomena that can help us envisage a more robust notion of security.

AT: Butler

Bailing on legal change for parodic performance fails to break down gender categories and collapses into quietism

Nussbaum 2k (Martha, professor and philosopher, “The Professor of Parody”) PJ

So what does Butler's work add to this copious body of writing? *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies that Matter* contain no detailed argument against biological claims of "natural" difference, no account of mechanisms of gender replication, and no account of the legal shaping of the family; nor do they contain any detailed focus on possibilities for legal cahange. What, then, does Butler offer that we might not find more fully done in earlier feminist writings? One relatively original claim is that when we recognize the artificiality of gender distinctions, and refrain from thinking of them as expressing an independent natural reality, we will also understand that there is no compelling reason why the gender types should have been two (correlated with the two biological sexes), rather than three or five or indefinitely many. "When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice," she writes. From this claim it does not follow, for Butler, that we can freely reinvent the genders as we like: she holds, indeed, that there are severe limits to our freedom. She insists that we should not naively imagine that there is a pristine self that stands behind society, ready to emerge all pure and liberated: "There is no self that is prior to the convergence or who maintains `integrity' prior to its entrance into this conflicted cultural field. There is only a taking up of the tools where they lie, where the very `taking up' is enabled by the tool lying there." Butler does claim, though, that we can create categories that are in some sense new ones, by means of the artful parody of the old ones. Thus her best known idea, her conception of politics as a parodic performance, is born out of the sense of a (strictly limited) freedom that comes from the recognition that one's ideas of gender have been shaped by forces that are social rather than biological. We are doomed to repetition of the power structures into which we are born, but we can at least make fun of them; and some ways of making fun are subversive assaults on the original norms.

Strategically using gender categories is more politically effective

Baldwin 97 (Margaret A, Professor of Law at FSU, “Public Women and the Feminist State”)

However salutary the postmodern goal of de-essentializing women, postmodern theory ultimately effaces the specific situation of public women, and forfeits altogether any account of gender along the way. This difficulty, and its implications for political strategy, is often spoken of but rarely addressed seriously within postmodern feminism. Denise Riley offers the diktat that at such junctures women can know amongst themselves "that 'women' don't exist -- while maintaining a politics of [\*160] 'as if they existed' -- since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did." 434 Judith Butler makes the same tactical concession when she affirms the continued necessity of asserting "a generally shared conception of 'women'" 435 as a political strategy: Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity to speak as and for women, and I would not contest that necessity. Surely, that is the way in which representational politics operates, and . . . lobbying efforts are virtually impossible without recourse to identity politics. So we agree that demonstrations and legislative efforts and radical movements need to make claims in the name of women. 436

AT: Social Constructivism Not True

Gendered identities are formed by society, we aren’t just born with them, understanding this is key to gender justice

**Gibson 2** (Ian, Human Security post-9/11, www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.3/gibson.pdf)IM

To look at gender perspectives we must first refer to Reardon’s observations on the issue of gender. Gender is culturally and psychologically formulated through internalized forms of identity. It is fluid and changeable and so there is a degree of fluidity in sexual identity. Gender is biologically based but not biological and refers to “the social and cultural differences between the sexes.” (Reardon, 2001:37) Society makes us who we are and not the birth factor, we are limited by society expectations and so Reardon suggests that we need to become more gender aware. Women are constantly fighting stereotypes internally and externally which is extremely limiting for their and their society’s development. Moreover there isn’t any common function of the meaning of gender. A gendered aspect is how one lives in society. To understand this is to bring about gender justice.

\*\*\*Cuomo\*\*\*

Cuomo Module – Link - War as an Event

Treating war as an event that only happens when people are being shot or fighting is fundamentally flawed – it ignores multiple forms of war due like womyn’s oppression and ecological violence.

**Cuomo 96** (Chris, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at the Univerity of Georgia, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Published in Hypatia 11.4, p. 30-46)

Although my position is in agreement with the notion that war and militarism are feminist issues, I argue that approaches to the ethics of war and peace which do not consider “peacetime” military violence are inadequate for feminist and environmentalist concerns. Because much of the military violence done to women and ecosystems happens outside the boundaries of declared wars, feminist and environmental philosophers ought to emphasize the significance of everyday military violence. Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifi­cations for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event—an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typi­cally marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gen­dered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies—cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and onto­logical dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the every­day effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant pres­ence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems.

Cuomo Module – Crisis Politics

The crisis-based politics of the status quo serve to quiet activism by appealing to threats to security as the most-deserving of consideration. In order to combat violence, we have to rethinking our understanding of crisis.

**Cuomo 96** (Chris, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at the Univerity of Georgia, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Published in Hypatia 11.4, p. 30-46)

Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declara­tions of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embed­ded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connec­tions among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.

\*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

Aff: No Alt Solvency

K turns itself – associating men with war and women with peace reinforces hierarchy.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 59-60) JM

In a context of a male-dominated society, the association of men with war and women with peace also reinforces gender hierarchies and false dichotomies that contribute to the devaluation of both women and peace. The 60 gendered dimensions association of women and peace with idealism in IR, which I have argued is a deeply gendered concept, has rendered it less legitimate in the discourse of international relations. Although peace movements that have relied on maternal images may have had some success, they do nothing to change existing gender relations; this allows men to remain in control and continue to dominate the agenda of world politics, and it continues to render women’s voices as inauthentic in matters of foreign policymaking.

Aff: Link – Gendered State

The belief that the state is always-already patriarchal is both a fiction and prevents the women’s movement from securing lasting changes in gender relations.

Deborah L. Rhode, Professor, Stanford Law School; Director, Institute for Research on Women and Gender, Stanford University, April 1994, Harvard Law Review, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, p. 1184-1186

In many left feminist accounts, the state is a patriarchal institution in the sense that it reflects and institutionalizes male dominance. Men control positions of official power and men's interests determine how that power is exercised. According to Catharine MacKinnon, the state's invocation of neutrality and objectivity ensures that, "[t]hose who have freedoms like equality, liberty, privacy and speech socially keep them legally, free of governmental intrusion." n15 In this view, "the state protects male power [by] appearing to prohibit its excesses when necessary to its normalization." n16 So, for example, to the extent that abortion functions "to facilitate male sexual access to women, access to abortion will be controlled by 'a man or The Man.'" n17 Other theorists similarly present women as a class and elaborate the ways in which even state policies ostensibly designed to assist women have institutionalized their subordination. n18 So, for example, welfare programs stigmatize female recipients without providing the support that would enable them to alter their disadvantaged status. n19 In patriarchal accounts, the choice for many women is between dependence  [\*1185]  on an intrusive and insensitive bureaucracy, or dependence on a controlling or abusive man. n20 Either situation involves sleeping with the enemy. As Virginia Woolf noted, these public and private spheres of subordination are similarly structured and "inseparably connected; . . . the tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other." n21 This account is also problematic on many levels. To treat women as a class obscures other characteristics, such as race and economic status, that can be equally powerful in ordering social relations. Women are not "uniformly oppressed." n22 Nor are they exclusively victims. Patriarchy cannot account adequately for the mutual dependencies and complex power dynamics that characterize male-female relations. Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests. As a threshold matter, what constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. Almost any gender-related policy can be seen as either directly serving men's immediate interests, or as compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the system and stabilizing power relations. A framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or indirectly patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns. And if women are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created]  [\*1186]  leverage for the representation of women's interests." n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that the status of women is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks imply. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, feminists need more concrete and contextual accounts of state institutions than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it.

Aff: Link – Military

Distancing feminists from the military ensures they’ll always be outsiders, only able to drag down men not lift up women

Mazur 99 (Diane H. **Mazur** - Associate Professor of Law, U. of Florida. Captain, US Air Force, 1979-83 – 19**99** Spring, 22 Harv. Women's L.J. 39 “A CALL TO ARMS”)

The deliberate distance that legal feminists have created between women and the military has made it difficult for women of legal influence to speak persuasively about the institution. We will never win the war of narrative between "insider" and "outsider" if feminists always remain on the outside. Insider accounts will always have the credibility of expertise, and it is no answer to simply vow to "offer detailed accounts of the partiality and perpetuation of dominant, straight male perspectives." 135 Without participation, it is impossible; legal feminists have not been able to construct factually accurate accounts from a studied distance. Rather than seeking ways to discount the expertise of men, 136 we should instead work to increase the expertise of women.

Students lack discipline to pursue change, the military teaches organization and detail focus that benefits activists

Mazur 99 (Diane H. **Mazur** - Associate Professor of Law, U. of Florida. Captain, US Air Force, 1979-83 – 19**99** Spring, 22 Harv. Women's L.J. 39 “A CALL TO ARMS”)

As law teachers, we see it in the classroom; one might call it the "well . . . whatever" syndrome. When we try to remind students of the critically important nature of some seemingly insignificant fact, event, word, or turn of phrase, the weary but incredulous look we sometimes receive in return is one that speaks, "well . . . whatever." 180 While I am certainly [\*75] not recommending that law students need any form of adversative "law school boot camp," law students would be better off with enhanced skills of "concentration, attention to detail, and, above all, patience." 181 One of the objectives of military training is to scrub from civilians this comfortableness with approximation, and, furthermore, to teach a "Zen-like fetish for minor details" 182 that prevails even under conditions of severe physical stress and mental confusion. A training exercise that, to a feminist legal scholar, might appear to be nothing more than sadistic sport about triviality actually has a point, and it has a fair point. 183 Lack of familiarity with the military has disadvantaged legal feminists in their efforts to advance credible, productive arguments about gender issues in military training, but it has also disadvantaged feminist litigation in a more direct and consequential way. The quality of civil-rights representation depends on more than just expertise in civil-rights litigation; the most effective representation also requires an understanding of relevant factual context in the client's community:

Aff: State Key

The state can use its power to further feminist goals.

Tickner 1 (J. Ann, prof at the School of International Relations, USC, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 97-98) JM

While the relative absence of women from political institutions has led feminists, particularly Western feminists, to be suspicious of the state, they are also questioning visions of alternative models that advocate the devolution of power up to international governmental institutions, where often there are even fewer women in decision-making positions. Universal norms, such as standards of human rights, articulated at the international level are also being examined for gender bias. Typically, women’s movements, which strive for what they claim is a more genuine form of democracy, have been situated at the local level or in nongovernmental transnational social movements. As discussed in chapter 3, feminists have stressed the importance of these movements, not only in terms of their attempts to place women’s issues on the international agenda, but also in terms of their success in redefining political theory and practice and thinking more deeply about oppressive gender relations and how to reconstitute them. However, certain feminists have begun to question whether women’s participation in these nongovernmental arenas can have sufficient power to effect change; while they remain skeptical of the patriarchal underpinnings of many contemporary states, certain feminists are now beginning to reexamine the potential of the state as an emancipatory institution. Particularly for women and feminists from the South, democratization has opened up some space within which to leverage the state to deal with their concerns; many of them see the state as having the potential to provide a buffer against an international system dominated by its most powerful members. However, a genuinely democratic state, devoid of gender and other oppressive social hierarchies, would require a different definition of democracy, citizenship, and human rights, as well as a different relationship with the international system.

The law can be used to reverse violence. There is nothing inherent in the law that ties our hands

**Butler 97**(Judith, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC Berkeley**,**Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Routledge: New York, p. 98)

The state's exercise of this productive discursive function is under­estimated in the writings that favor of hate speech legislation. Indeed, they minimize the possibility of a misappropriation by the law in favor of a view of the law as politically neutral and malleable. **Matsuda argues that law, though formed in racism, can be redirected against racism. She figures the law as a set of "ratchet" tools, describing it in purely in­strumental terms, and discounting the productive misappropriations by which it proceeds. This view invests all power and agency in the sub­ject who would use such an instrument. However reactionary its his­tory, this instrument can be put in the service of a progressive vision, thus "defying the habit of neutral principles to entrench existing power:**' Later she writes: "**nothing inherent in law ties our hands**:' (50) approving of a method of doctrinal reconstruction. In other words, **legal language is precisely the kind of language that can be cited into a re­verse meaning, where the reversal takes a law with a reactionary his­tory and turns it into a law with a progressive aim.**

Aff: Perm Solvency

A critically realist approach, such as the perm, is essential to the feminist project

**New 4** (Caroline, Law @ ANU, Critical Realism, www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/archive/ALETHIAv1n1\_new2.pdf)IM

Like most poststructuralist feminists, Butler refers to the wrongs done to women. Yet it is hard to see why cruelties mat- ter, whether suffered by women or men, without some implicit moral realism. Why, for “tactical” reasons, do we want femi- nism to bring together the disparate groups of women? Why not let feminism itself go the way of gender, the target of the “subversive bodily acts” Butler recommends - i.e. of discursive, deconstructive ones? It can only be because Butler, and others, care about the real conditions of women’s lives, and want to see them ameliorated, which only makes sense in terms of a hidden ethic of human needs, and collective interests in the light of these. Again, critical realism has the tools to deconstruct - and thus expose — the limits post-structuralists put on their own decon- structions. The necessity of (critical) realism In this case, as in others, poststructuralists inevitably return to realism. In “Situated Knowledges”, Haraway famously retreats from her earlier view that feminist politics should be grounded, not on the category “woman”, but on an “ironic political myth” of the self as cyborg (1991, 145). Instead, she now returns to the notion of a “successor science”. My problem and “our” problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and know- ing subjects, a critical practice for recognising our own “semiotic technologies” for making meanings, and a no nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a “real” world... (Haraway 1991, 187). Yet even after this clear statement she adds: “the approach I am recommending is not a version of realism, which has proved a rather poor way of engaging with the world’s active agency” (ibid., 197). She simply does not realise that realism can recognise the his- toricity of theories and knowledge claims without assuming that what is true of our constructions need be true of their referents (Sayer 1997, 468). Feminism makes claims about the nature of social relations, and adduces various sorts of evidence for these. It points out the falsity of dominant accounts of the social world and argues on the basis of rival accounts that deep and wide changes should take place. A realist approach (and an ethically naturalist one) is therefore essential to the feminist project. To deal with the poststruc- turalist challenge, this realism needs to be critical.

Universalization is inescapable – prefer the critical realism of the perm to formulate emancipatory aims

**Poutanen 5** (Seppo, Researcher, Academy of Finland, July 2005, Critical Management Conference, interculture.fsu.edu/pdfs/pirott-quintero%20lispector\_and\_cixous.pdf)IM

The essential object of Tony Lawson’s contribution to the dialogue is to show how ontological analysis in critical realist style is able to benefit the explanatory goals (mainly meaning goals of standpoint epistemology), and critical and emancipatory goals of feminist research. In his first article, which he mostly uses to sketch the content of critical realism, Lawson (1999) notes general aversion among feminists towards realism and suggests a diagnosis of this phenomenon. According to his diagnosis, effective feminist critique of groundless a priori universalizing in research slides easily to a problematic position of opposing generalizing altogether. Lawson suspects feminists to see realism as an ontological underwriter of all false generalizing, and he stresses that only naive realism is prone to back misled universalizations. In contrast, Lawson considers generalizing/universalizing (is) an inescapable part of research and details how understanding the basic ontological nature of (social) reality in the critical realist way can help us to attain moderately correct or justified generalizations. Such generalizations concerning, especially, human nature, needs and interests are, in the view of Lawson, necessarily needed in formulations of emancipatory political aims.

Aff: Perm Solvency

Critical realism doesn’t exclude the consideration of femininity – it’s key to effective feminism

**Sayer 4** (Andrew, Lancaster U, UK, Economics Review no. 29, Dec. 6 2004, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue29/Sayer29.htm)IM

Van Staveren endorses Julie Nelson’s claim that critical realism has a built-in bias against emotion, counterposing this to science and reason. This mistakes realism for positivism. Critical realists Margaret Archer and Andrew Collier insistently reject the opposition of reason and emotion, arguing that emotions have a cognitive element, providing an embodied, usually unarticulated commentary on the world and our situation within it, often providing highly perceptive discriminations among situations (Archer, 2000, 2003; Collier, 2003). Hence both authors emphasize and value the intelligence of emotions. As Martha Nussbaum puts it, emotions are evaluative judgements regarding matters affecting or likely to affect well-being (Nussbaum, 2001). There is no reason why critical realists should not be comfortable with the idea of emotional reason. We are angry or happy about things, proud or ashamed of actions. We are more emotionally affected by the loss of a loved one than the loss of a pencil because the former is more important for our well-being: the differences in emotional responses are rational. Emotional reason involves a largely pre-discursive evaluation of things such as the way others treat us and the effect that this is having or is likely to have on us, for example whether they are respecting or humiliating us, befriending or threatening us. Emotions also reflect our deeply social nature (another universalist claim), for as social beings we are psychologically dependent on others for their recognition, love and approval. Anti-realism may be dominant in feminism, though often through a confusion between realism and positivism, but as I have tried to show, feminists can be realists and realists can be feminists, indeed without realism feminism is vulnerable to being dismissed as a form of relativism. For further arguments on the need of feminism to be realist, I refer readers to the work of Kate Soper (1995a and b), Caroline New (1998, 2003, 2004); and Linda Martín Alcoff (2005).

Aff: A2: Link – Universalism

Feminist literature is more universalizing that security discourse

**Sayer 4** (Andrew, Lancaster U, UK, Economics Review no. 29, Dec. 6 2004, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue29/Sayer29.htm)IM

As regards universalism and appeals to human nature, there are dangers of identifying local and historically-specific characteristics as universal, and of failing to take seriously the remarkable variety of cultural forms, including gender orders, which shape people deeply. In response to the treatment of local variants as universal or as the norm, and the common tendency to naturalise contingent historical forms of domination, it is tempting to reject any notion of human nature. Human beings are indeed extraordinarily diverse, but we should ask what is it about them which enables them to exhibit such variety? Humans can be profoundly culturally shaped in a vast variety of ways, but not just anything can be culturally shaped. A lump of rock cannot take different cultural forms (it may be externally construed in different culturally mediated ways, and used in various ways, but limestone doesn’t change its nature when we think about it differently, any more than the earth changed shape when we decided it was round rather than flat.) Certain other species are capable of cultural variation too, but that just begs the same question: what is it about them which enables this? For it to be possible for anything to be shaped in a particular way (for example by culture) it must be the kind of thing which is susceptible to such shaping, that is, it must have (or have acquired) the affordances and resistances which allow such shaping. As Andrew Collier points out, far from removing the question of human nature, the phenomenon of cultural variety actually poses it. It presupposes a universal human capacity for cultural variation. Thus, a certain kind of universalism – though not uniformity, with which it is often confused – is presupposed by cultural variety (Collier, 2003). In this way, using a structured ontology, we can understand both sameness and difference: we can see that multiple variants and outcomes can be generated on the basis of common structures (see Lawson, 2003, p. 242). The abstract level does, contra van Staveren, “allow for relations and differences”, for social structures are constituted by internal relations and the whole point of abstraction is to tease out relations and differences that enable and constrain the blizzard of empirical data, and to distinguish which things are merely contingently associated and which necessarily or internally related (Sayer, 2000). Moreover, in line with Soper’s point, we need to identify the capacities of humans – and indeed other species - for flourishing and suffering, and their needs (Lawson, 2003), thus enabling critiques of not just economic theories but economic practices in terms of their effect on people’s well-being. This accords with the Aristotelian position of Martha Nussbaum, who has made important contributions to feminist development theory (Nussbaum, 2000). To be sure there are many different forms of flourishing and different cultures provide different conceptions of what constitutes flourishing, and Nussbaum attempts to accommodate this. But not just anything can be passed off as flourishing. If we were to insist that it was purely culturally relative then we would have no warrant for using terms like ‘oppression’. Again we encounter a relation between general human needs and specific, contingent variants, such as the general psychological need for recognition and the innumerable forms that recognition takes in different cultures. This is why Nussbaum describes her conception of the good as a ‘thick vague’ one, for while it includes many conditions of flourishing, they are expressed in terms vague enough to allow for cultural variation and hence avoid ethnocentrism. This also seems compatible with van Staveren’s largely favourable commentary on Aristotle’s and Adam Smith’s discussions of virtues, which mostly abstract from cultural variations (van Staveren, 1999). We cannot avoid some kind of universalism. Different cultures provide different norms but this presupposes that one of the distinctive features of humans is that they can understand, internalise or contest these, often through exploiting tensions and contradictions within cultural discourses, as in the case of the tension between ideals of equality and gender inequalities. The feminist literature, including van Staveren’s own work on the ethic of care presupposes that all humans are in need of care at various times in their lives, albeit in different ways. People are not just beings who have preferences and make choices, but beings who are vulnerable, and dependent on care. Thus all economies depend on, and distribute the provision and receipt of care. One of the contributions of this literature is to improve our economic theories by enriching our understanding of what it is to be human.

Aff: A2: Link – Private Sphere

Women’s rights fall within the political sphere – the state will be held politically accountable for violence committed against women

**Armstrong 1** (Sally, Sciences @ U of Toronto, https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/15693/1/MQ63042.pdf)IM

Moreover, the basis of the right to health needs to be fully explored to understand the intent of the authors of the documents and the obligations of the states that are required to implement them in, for example, access to health services that deliver preventative and medical care and proactive health policies that contribute to well being. Is it the right of a girl in Afghanistan to have access to health services? Is it the right of Canadian schoolgirls to regain access to physical and health education? And if so. can any of those rights be implemented with current international and regional Treaties? Considering that most of the documents were written by men and the law wasn’t feminized until a decade ago. Women’s experiences have been marginalized and the experiences of adolescent girls have been virtually ignored. However, in international law there is a difference between State responsibility and State accountability: The State is legally responsible but politically accountable (Cook. 2000). Women's rights invariably fa11 in the political sphere. As well, research conducted post 1979 on women's reproductive health, violence against women and abortion were excluded from the documents. Their inclusion today is problematic because of the power of fundamentalist States such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and the Vatican to delay the debate or even annul the hard-won articles that already exist, if the documents are opened for discussion.

Aff: War => Patriarchy

War reproduces patriarchy – creates cultural crises of gender and forces the gendering of every experience

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 4, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)IM

With the loosening of the positivist/Realist hold on international relations and the simultaneous rise of feminist analysis, intellectual space has been created to address war in terms of the social relations of power between men and women. This development places war within a broader patriarchal matrix, and has helped to develop an understanding of war as one (obviously important) manifestation of patriarchal violence. This development also has promoted a more unassuming character with respect to the subject matter itself. The concerns lies less with warfare or its destructive potential (although this concern remains) than it does with the relationship between warfare and the oppression of women. Primary concern, that is, rests less with war than with the reproduction of patriarchy. This paper addresses the gender critique of war directly. It argues that the gender critique of war has racked enough to be able to identify a preliminary thesis regarding war and the reproduction of patriarchy. The altered experiences and practices of war, combined with the sometimes dramatic modifications in gender representations (through propaganda, literature etcetera), are considerable. War produces cultural crises of gender, especially as it throws the historical contingency and cultural arbitrariness of gendered constructs into relief. There is the suggestion that through war traditional gendered constructs can modulate and unwind. An emerging sense of cultural crisis revolving around gender shifts typically accompanies both war and post-war periods. Indeed, much of the initial research on gender and war, in view of the extensive shifts in representations and practices during war, directly or indirectly explores the emancipatory effect of war upon women. To the extent that war is contingent upon such gendered constructs, constructs that the practice itself appears to threaten and endanger, the relationship between war and gender might be said to be paradoxical. The paradoxical dynamic between gender and war, however, is softened by the profundity of the links between war and patriarchy. The gendering of experiences during war, along with the restoration of traditional gendered constructs after war, more than compensate for any war- induced sundering of the patriarchal tapestry. While the practice of war suggests that it might encourage a rupture in the gendered fabric of society, it overwhelmingly contributes to patriarchal reproduction. Questions oriented around the emancipatory potential of war where women are concerned, therefore, run the risk of losing a perspective on the overall role of modern warfare in the reproduction of women's oppression.

Aff: War => Patriarchy

Gender oppression does not cause war, it’s the other way around

Goldstein 1 (Joshua, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, **2001**, War and Gender, p. 412)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate. "men of Africa" as a group?) are seen as a group precisely because they are generally dependent and oppressed, the analysis of specific historical differences becomes impossible, because reality is always apparently structured by divisions—two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive groups, the victims and the oppressors. Here the sociological is substituted for the biological in order, however, to create the same—a unity of women. Thus, it is not the descriptive potential of gender difference, but the privileged positioning and explanatory potential of gender difference as the origin of oppression that I question. In using "women of Africa" (as an already constituted group of oppressed peoples) as a category of analysis, Cutrufelli denies any historical specificity to the location of women as subordinate, powerful, marginai, central, or otherwise, vis-a-vis particular social and power networks. Women are taken as a unified "Powerless" group prior to the analysis in question. Thus, it is then merely a matter of specifying the context after the fact. "Women" are now placed in the context of the famiiy, or in the workplace, or within religious networks, almost as if these systems existed outside the relations of women with other women, and women with men. The problem with this analytic strategy is that it assumes men and women are already constituted as sexual-political subjects prior to their entry into the arena of social relations. Only if we subscribe to this assumption is it possible to undertake analysis which looks at the "effects" of kinship structures, colonialism, organization of labor, etc., on women, who are already defined as a group apparently because of shared dependencies, but ultimately because of their gender. But women are produced through these very relations as well as being implicated in forming these relations. As Michelle Rosaldo states: " . . . woman's place in human social life is not in any direct sense a product of the things she does (or even less, a function of what, biologically, she is) but the meaning her activities acquire through concrete social interactions."" That women mother in a variety of societies is not as significant as the value attached to mothering in these societies. The distinction between the act of mothering and the status attached to it is a very important one—one that needs to be made and analyzed contextually.

Aff: State Good

Critique grounded in discourse fails – it can’t undermine larger power structures.

Brown 1(Wendy, prof Political Science UC Berkeley, *Politics Out of History*, p. 35-37)JM

But here the problem goes well beyond superficiality of political analysis or compensatory gestures in the face of felt impotence. A moralistic, gestural politics often inadvertently becomes a regressive politics. Moralizing condemnation of the National Endowment for the Arts for not funding politically radical art, of the U.S. military or the White House for not embracing open homosexuality or sanctioning gay marriage, or even of the National Institutes of Health for not treating as a political priority the lives of HIV target populations (gay men, prostitutes, and drug addicts) conveys at best naive political expectations and at worst, patently confused ones. For this condemnation implicitly figures the state (and other mainstream institutions) as if it did not have specific political and economic investments, as if it were not the codification of various dominant social powers, but was, rather, a momentarily misguided parent who forgot her promise to treat all her children the same way. These expressions of moralistic outrage implicitly cast the state as if it were or could be a deeply democratic and nonviolent institution; conversely, it renders radical art, radical social movements, and various fringe populations as if they were not potentially subversive, representing a significant political challenge to the norms of the regime, but rather were benign entities and populations entirely appropriate for the state to equally protect, fund, and promote. Here, moralism’s objection to politics as a domain of power and history rather than principle is not simply irritating: it results in a troubling and confused political stance. It misleads about the nature of power, the state, and capitalism; it misleads about the nature of oppressive social forces, and about the scope of the project of transformation required by serious ambitions for justice. Such obfuscation is not the aim of the moralists but falls within that more general package of displaced effects consequent to a felt yet unacknowledged impotence. It signals disavowed despair over the prospects for more far-reaching transformations.

Aff: State Good

Benefits for women have long been achieved through the normative discourse of political structures

**Baldwin 97** (Margaret, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p 70)IM

Women have not been strangers to campaigns for and struggles with liberal state democracies. Feminists, especially feminist legal activists, have long participated in and sought benefits for all women within the political and judicial structures of the United State, Canada and the liberal states of Western Europe. The recent celebration of the 75th anniversary of the federal female suffrage in the United States is a reminder of the longevity and persistence of women’s demands for full political rights in this country, while the repeated defeat of a federal constitutional Equal Rights Amendment inspires continued activism. Successful campaigns for anti-discrimination legislation and litigation of gender-equity claims were significant advances for women achieved through the normative discourses and public institutions characteristic of liberal democracies. Women also have struggled in South Africa and in the former Soviet bloc to secure basic democratic guarantees. The continued integrity of the state systems through which these aims have been met is a matter toward which women cannot be indifferent, theoretically or otherwise.

Greater engagement, not rejection, of the modern state is key to solve

**Baldwin 97** (Margaret, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p 98)IM

Feminist political theorists advocate stronger models of group representation and participation as a structural response to this problem. These proposals draw significant inspiration from the role of consciousness-raising in feminist political practice. The intense involvement these proposals require of citizens, together with the locally based institutions upon which they depend, challenge the distanced, formalized decision-making that flattens women’s participation and furthers the false universalism of the interests represented in the public sphere. To that extent, feminists have participated in the localizing discourse characteristic of many modern attacks on the liberal state. Further, feminists often theorize “women” as a distinct political class, both within existing state borders and irrespective of state citizenships, thus advocating a form of nationalist identity independent of territorial affiliation. Women’s interests, and women’s commitments and conflicts, then are already deeply woven into the web of contemporary contests over the nature and future of the liberal state.

Working within dominant institutions subverts descriptive dichotomies, to include women

**Baldwin 97** (Margaret, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p 102)IM

This wide-angle presentation inevitably forfeits the complexity and nuance of a more tightly focused and thoroughly rendered account of a single aspect of women’s public or private experience. Yet I hope to recoup that loss by the gain in theoretical perspective accessed by the broader view. As Carole Pateman has suggested, such a framework may also be able to deconstruct the descriptive dichotomies that ensnare our theoretical imaginations and tell lies about the conditions of women’s real lives. The recognition that women are situated in one form or another “as women” in both private and public spheres already begins to undermine feminism’s typical understanding of women’s central political challenge as the movement from wholesale exclusion to public inclusion. Carole Pateman explains: “A feminist strategy that calls for the integration into citizenship of women’s distinctive contribution … rests on the assumption that ‘women’ and ‘difference’ need to be brought into the political order. The pertinent question is assumed to be whether sexual difference is politically relevant, or how ‘difference’ could be relevant. Thus the vital question is overlooked of how to subvert and change the manner in which women have already been incorporated, and so to transform the relation between ‘equality’ (men) and ‘difference’ (women).” The fact that the public sphere already includes women, even if not as full, self-determining citizens, suggests that the matter of inclusion is already more complicated than a single focus on women’s relegation to the private sphere might imply. Consequently, to the extent that a wide-angle perspective can account for the differential treatment of women within and across the public and private spheres, the more comprehensive the analysis of women’s political situation.

\*\* Feminist Jurisprudence\*\*

Jurisprudence 1NC (1/3)

1. The “rights” the affirmative promotes are a façade – they perpetuate masculine hierarchies by sustaining the public/private dichotomy that keeps victims of violence unheard

O’Hare 99 (Ursula A, LL.B. and LL.M. in Human Rights, Discrimination and Emergency Law from the Queen's University Belfast, “Realizing Human Rights for Women”, Muse)

A number of reasons have been put forward to explain why the international human rights community has been slow to respond to women's global disadvantage. At the heart of the problem is the exclusion of women's voices from the public world. Modern human rights law owes much to the legacy of national pressure for civil and political rights at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As women struggled for access to the public world during this time, men's voices were in the vanguard for political rights. 10 The emphasis on civil and political rights reflected man's desire to regulate his relationship to the state and to set the boundaries of permissible state interference in his life. 11 Male hegemony over public life [End Page 366] and institutions meant that rights came to be defined by men. 12 The present hierarchy within human rights law, which gives greater attention to civil and political rights as opposed to economic, social and cultural rights, can be perceived as a manifestation of the continuing dominance men have over the process of defining the content of rights. As Hilary Charlesworth comments, rights are "defined by the criterion of what men fear will happen to them." 13 The exclusion of women from the public sphere cannot simply be noted as a matter of historical record because the impact of this historic exclusion of women continues to be felt in the underrepresentation of women in those public decision making bodies of the global community that frame the dimensions of human rights. 14 Where women's voices are heard in international fora, they are heard in fora designed especially to deal [End Page 367] with women's issues and not within the "mainstream." 15 This has led to the charge that women's issues are "ghettoized" within the United Nations system--a charge that is supported by the fact that those international bodies responsible for women's issues have long suffered from more limited resources and weaker enforcement procedures than mainstream human rights bodies. The exclusion of women's voices from defining the content of human rights discourse has in turn meant that human rights law has evolved along a gendered "fault-line" that distinguishes between the public and private spheres for the purpose of legal regulation. The essence of the feminist critique of human rights law lies in the way in which it mediates the public and private spheres. Along these lines, two main arguments have emerged. 16 One argument suggests that the failure of the human rights system to reach women results from the deference it maintains toward the private sphere--human rights law privileges the public world while the private sphere is considered outside the scope of legal regulation. 17 Others argue that the myth of nonintervention in the private sphere, which has grown up in human rights discourse, simply masks the gendered application of human rights law. 18 Human rights law, according to this second argument, *does* attempt to regulate the private sphere, but has simply failed to do so in respect of issues that particularly touch women's lives. In either case, both theories argue that women's issues have not been taken seriously by the human rights community. 19 The extent to which the public/private dichotomy has shaped the human rights edifice is manifest in the theory of state responsibility for human rights abuses. Because human rights law is concerned with regulating the exercise of public power, it follows that only the state can be held responsible for human rights abuses. Those abuses committed by private actors within the private sphere do not attract the attention and shame of the human rights community. Of course, women operate across the public and [End Page 368] private spheres and the boundaries of those worlds do not remain fixed, but the importance of the distinction in human rights law between public and private is that for many women the public sphere has scant significance to their lives. 20 The maintenance of this public/private dichotomy works "to muffle and often completely silence the voices of women." 21 Moreover, it is an "artificial divide." 22 For as Catherine MacKinnon has argued, "[t]o act as if [the state is all there is to power] produces an exceptionally inadequate definition for human rights when so much of the second class status of women . . . is done by men to women prior to express state involvement." 23

Jurisprudence 1NC (2/3)

1. Militaristic violence due to patriarchal values inevitably results in extinction

Spretnak 89 (Charlene, MA in English at Berkeley, “Exposing Nuclear Phallacies, p. 60)

Women and men can live together and can relate to other societies in any number of cultural configurations, but ignorance of the configurations themselves locks a populace into blind adherence to the status quo. In the nuclear age, such unexamined acceptance may be fatal as cer`tain cultural assumptions in our own society are pushing us closer and closer to war. Since a major war could now easily bring on massive annihilation of almost unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing this madness of the nuclear arms race limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is needed-unless, as the doomsayers claim, we collectively harbor a death wish and no not really want to look closely at dynamics propelling us steadily toward the brink of extinction. The cause of nuclear arms proliferation is militarism. What is the cause of militarism? The traditional militarist explanation is that the “masters of war” in the militaryindustrial complex profit enormously from defense contracts and other war preparations. A capitalist economy periodically requires the economic boon that large-scale government spending, capitol investment, and worker sacrifice produce during a crisis of war. In addition, American armed forces, whether nuclear or conventional, are stationed worldwide to protect the status quo, which requires vast and interlocking American corporate interests. Suck an economic analysis alone in inadequate, as the recent responses to the nuclear arms race that ignore the cultural orientation of the nations involved: They are patriarchies. Militarism and warfare are continual features of patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill essential needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth.

Jurisprudence 1NC (3/3)

1. The alternative is to vote negative. Rejecting to act on masculine conceptions of the world allows for us to utilize a gendered analysis on questions of rights and violence

Amirthalingam 5 (Kumaralingam, Associate Professor and Director of International Programs, Faculty of Law and Associate, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, “Women’s Rights, International Norms, and Domestic Violence: Asian Perspectives”)

Domestic violence has been on the global agenda for several decades, and in the last two, has been the subject of considerable reform activity in Asia, particularly in Singapore and Malaysia, which have enacted legislation to deal with the problem.1 While domestic violence affects various parties (including partners,2 parents, children and extended family), this article is limited to partner violence and argues for an enhanced gender analysis of the problem in this region. The evidence suggests that domestic violence disproportionately affects women as victims. The World Health Organization, in its first World Report on Violence and Health in 2002, revealed that between 40 percent and 70 percent of women who die due to homicide are killed by current or former partners.3 The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has defined domestic violence in gender terms as “violence perpetrated in the domestic sphere which targets women because of their role within that sphere or as violence which is intended to impact, directly and negatively, on women within the domestic sphere.”4The significance of using gender as a basis of analysis is that it forces a paradigmatic shift away from domestic violence analysis best captured by the following observation: “Instead of asking why he batters, there is a tendency to ask why she stays.”5 A gendered analysis compels us instead to question why men resort to violence and why violence against women occurs and is tolerated in many societies. Restructuring the debate in this way is vital for meaningful legal reform, especially from the perspectives of criminal justice and human rights.6 The key to understanding domestic violence from a gender perspective is to appreciate that the root cause of violence lies in an unequal power relationship between men and women that is compounded in male dominated societies. As noted recently, “Violence is . . . a sign of the struggle for the maintenance of certain fantasies of identity and power. Violence emerges, in this analysis, as deeply gendered and sexualised.”7 In many jurisdictions, and particularly in Asia, domestic violence is seen as a private matter and considerations of family, culture, or religion tend to prevail over women’s interests. This article seeks to promote legal reform in this area (both in terms of subject matter and the region) by addressing international norms, gender analysis, and transcultural values. Section II of this article analyzes the recently enacted domestic violence laws in Malaysia and Singapore. While the legal reforms in both jurisdictions have been progressive, they have also been hindered by perceived cultural constraints and an inadequate appreciation of the gendered nature of domestic violence. Section III draws on feminist theories of family violence and international human rights discourse to create an alternative narrative that can better advance legal reform in the region. By defining family violence both as a gender issue and a human rights issue, the locus of domestic violence is shifted away from the private domain to the public, a critical step in the Asian context. The theoretical and philosophical arguments are designed to provide the tools with which to challenge certain Asian assumptions about domestic violence, family and cultural values, as well as the public/private divide that defines the boundaries of State regulation. This article finally suggests that Asian values are not incompatible with human rights discourse in general or women’s rights in particular.

Link – State

The state is inherently patriarchal and creates a façade of granting rights to assuage women and continue their victimization.

Rhode 94 (Deborah L, Professor of Law at Stanford University, “Feminism and the state”) PJ

A final line of feminist critique challenges liberalism's deference to individual preferences and its insistence that the state remain neutral  [\*1189]  between such preferences and between competing visions of the good life. Liberal frameworks frequently take women's objectives as given and assume that women can enlist the state on their behalf through group leverage in democratic processes. n33 Yet to an important extent, women's preferences are socially constructed and constrained. The state does not simply respond to expressed desires; it plays an active role in legitimating, suppressing, or redirecting them. Attempts to challenge inequality through conventional democratic measures fall short when subordinate groups adapt or accommodate their preferences to the unequal opportunities available. n34 As Kathy Ferguson puts it, liberalism "proceeds as if women were already free . . . when the entire force of the feminist critique is to show precisely the opposite. Part of the perniciousness of femininity in our society is that it produces people who claim to choose what they are supposed to want." n35 Contrary to conventional wisdom, most victims of discrimination do not identify themselves as such. Individuals generally want to believe in a "just world"; they prefer to avoid the hostility, as well as the diminished sense of efficacy and self-esteem, that acknowledging one's victimization typically entails. n36

The state inevitability manipulates laws in a masculine perspective.

Rhode 94 (Deborah L, Professor of Law at Stanford University, “Feminism and the state”) PJ

In many left feminist accounts, the state is a patriarchal institution in the sense that it reflects and institutionalizes male dominance. Men control positions of official power and men's interests determine how that power is exercised. According to Catharine MacKinnon, the state's invocation of neutrality and objectivity ensures that, "[t]hose who have freedoms like equality, liberty, privacy and speech socially keep them legally, free of governmental intrusion." n15 In this view, "the state protects male power [by] appearing to prohibit its excesses when necessary to its normalization." n16 So, for example, to the extent that abortion functions "to facilitate male sexual access to women, access to abortion will be controlled by 'a man or The Man.'" n17

The state marginalizes feminist perspectives and acts arrogantly on their behalf

Fellmeth 2k (Aaron Xavier, B.A. in Social Sciences from the University of California, “Feminism and International Law: Theory, Methodology, and Substantive Reform”) PJ

Some feminists also criticize state sovereignty on practical grounds. They claim that the state cannot represent women’s needs on an international level because women are not represented adequately at the state level.41 Obviously, this problem is best addressed by somehow increasing equal representation in the state halls of power. Others argue that the state represents a male concept of autonomy and disconnectedness, and does not reflect the female’s vision of herself as “connected to others through a web of relationships.”42 This view advances the extreme proposition that men generally do not value and identify with human relationships as much as women, and takes issue with the radical feminist notion that men and women are not fundamentally different. A final justification for abolishing state sovereignty relates to armed conflict; “public” international conflicts and “private” internal conflicts both harm women at least equally. The public/private distinction simply does not reflect women’s actual experiences of war.43

Link - State

The rights of “equality” apportioned to us by the state fail to acknowledge the source of women’s exclusion and therefore maintain it

**Snyder 3** (Mose, Law @ U of Connecticut, fe.uconn.edu/documents/Essay%20Connections/2003-2006/Snyder.pdf)IM

In "Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence," MacKinnon argues that although our legal system contains laws that ensure equality between men and women, these laws do not perform the function for which they are intended, because they employ a conception of equality that is biased in favor of male dominance. Our system conceives of equality as a state of Sameness, in which males and females are granted identical rights with respect to a situation. Correspondingly, inequality is construed as a state of difference. On this "sameness/difference" conception of equality, males and females in today's society are equal, i.e., the law guarantees them the same rights. However, MacKinnon believes that this is equality in name only, that women do not have true equality, and thus that there is something wrong with our gender equality laws (238-42). of difference. On this "sameness/difference" conception of equality, males and females in today's society are equal, i.e., the law guarantees them the same rights. However, MacKinnon believes that this is equality in name only, that women do not have true equality, and thus that there is something wrong with our gender equality laws (238-42). On the sameness/difference conception of equality, our legal system does not even confront what MacKinnon per~eives as th~ real roblem with pornography, let alone work to resolve It. The realIty of ~ornen's condition with respect to pornography is one of subordination, and our conception of equality, MacKinnon argues, must reflect this. When we make the re-vision from equality as sameness/difference to equality as dominance/submission, pornography can no longer be seen as a First Amendment issue (247). Once this change is made, our gender equality legislation will recognize the inequality involved in pornography, and will demand that it be removed. With MacKinnon's argument in mind, one can see clearly the parallels. between the. c.oncep~~l revi~ion she proposes and Rich:s prescriptIOn for the femIllst re-VISIOn of lIterature. The first three steps m Rich's algorithm instruct the re-viser to "take the work first of all as a clue to how we live, how we have been living, how we have been led to imagine ourselves" (629). We see this clearly in MacKinnon's essay; she begins by discussing what the law tells us about the condition and status of women today. Rich urges the re-viser of a text to consider "how we have been living" (629), and accordingly, MacKinnon points out some of the ways in which women have been excluded from the construction of legal systems. "Those with power in civil society," MacKinnon writes, "not usually women, design its norms and institutions, which become the status quo" (238). She notes that women, an often powerless faction of a society, are normally excluded from the writing of constitutions and legislation, and precedents established "before women were permitted to vote [ ... ] are considered valid bases for defeating 'unprecedented' interpretations or initiatives from women's point of view" (238). Through processes such as these, women have been kept from participating in the formation of our legal system, a system which now, under the guise of equality, works to maintain the subordination of women to men.

An appeal to women’s rights in the current legal system can only reinforce male dominance

**Tucker 8** (Judith, Law @ Georgetown, October 2008, Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law, p. 5)IM

Not all critics of liberal feminist theory accentuate the positive in woman- centeredness. Catharine MacKinnon, for one, seems to caution against romanticizing the experience of women even as she embraces the position that the woman’s point of view has been ignored in legal thought and practice. The fundamental problem, for MacKinnon, is that the legal system enshrines a gender hierarchy of subordination of the female by the male. This is not just difference, it is dominance. The law reflects and enables social and political institutions of inequality: women get unequal pay, do disrespected work, and are sexually abused. Such inequalities precede the law, which subsequently in the case of the liberal state legit- imates the idea of non-interference with the status quo and the correction of only those inequalities actually created by prior legal action. Indeed, the liberal notion of privacy, that restrains the state and the law from entering into the “private” world of body and home, permits the oppression and abuse of women to proceed apace in the venue, the home, where it is at its most pervasive. Any appeal to abstract rights in such a context of social inequality can only authorize and reinforce male dominance.7 The history of women’s experience, then, is a negative one which we draw on to reveal harms and abuses: there is little sense in MacKinnon’s writing of a superior female ethics of connection that can serve as an alternate basis for legal development. Still, there is a very real role for feminist jurisprudence – MacKinnon critiques the “traditional left” view that law can only reflect existing social relations. Rather, a proactive feminist jurisprudence needs to push for substantive rights for women. To the extent feminist law embodies women’s point of view, it will be said that its law is not neutral. It will be said that it undermines the legitimacy of the legal system. But the legitimacy of existing law is based on force at women’s expense. Women have never consented to its rule – suggesting that the system’s legitimacy needs repair that women are in a position to provide. It will be said that feminist law is special pleading for a particular group and one cannot start that or where will it end. But existing law is already special pleading for a particular group, where it has ended.8

Link – State

The laws of the state are bad – they ignore the individual, conceal pain and suffering and because they give rights they can revoke rights

**Fellmeth 2k** (Aaron, Int. Rel. @ Yale, Human Rights Quarterly 22(3), p. 666)IM

The second feminist analytical method is known as "feminist practical reasoning." According to one proponent, such reasoning values individualized fact-finding over bright-line rules, reasoning from context, and accounting for the perspectives of the powerless. 24 Feminist jurisprudence teaches respect for diverse perspectives because feminism itself is an "other" perspective, and it focuses on real-world experiences of women because the abstract theories characteristic of male-dominated economics, sociology, or political science often generalize about social conditions or effects, ignoring gender-based disparities. Most feminists share this inductive, contextual methodology focusing on women's perspectives and experiences. The uniquely "feminist" aspect of feminist practical reasoning is its focus on the excluded "other," not its methodology. 25 Rules are abhorrent per se because they operate deductively and gloss over individual pain. 26 For example, Katharine Bartlett objects to bright-line laws requiring minors to obtain parental consent before seeking an abortion because of the "actual accounts of the wrenching circumstances" of a minor. 27 Bartlett recognizes the value of rules as "necessities because we are not always good judges," that is, because sometimes the collective judgment of society is superior to that of many individuals. 28 However, she deplores their unnecessary uniformity, which prevents society from dealing with individual circumstances that may cause needless suffering. If nothing is a "given," nothing can be taken away.

The rights given to women by the state are inherently patriarchal

**Tucker 8** (Judith, Law @ Georgetown, October 2008, Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law, p. 3)IM

The approach with the longest lineage, reaching from mid-Victorian times up to the present, is that of liberal feminist thinkers. The liberal tradition, particularly prominent in the Anglo-American context, accepts law and legal institutions as based on principles of rationality, objectivity, and fairness in their dealings with an autonomous legal subject. The problem, as far as women and gender are concerned, is that certain aspects of law have built-in, and often hidden, inequalities between men and women as a result of the evolution of the law in a patriarchal social environ- ment. The feminist task, as far as liberal theorists are concerned, is to identify and correct those aspects of law that belie the liberal promise of equality and freedom of individuals before the law by discriminating against women. Examples of such discrimination include: disadvantaging women by allocating fewer material resources to them, as was long the case in property settlements in divorce cases; judging men and women’s similar actions in different ways, as in criminalizing the behavior of the female prostitute but not her male client; and assigning men and women to distinct social roles, as in the sex-based classifications of “breadwinner” and “home- maker.” Only with the eradication of such discriminatory laws and legal categories will women be able to realize the liberal promise of equal treat- ment as individuals with equal rights. The task is one of identification of such legal inequalities and their correction so that women can realize the promises of freedom and equality made by the liberal state and its legal institutions.1

The state’s standards of authority justify men’s right to exercise authority over women

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 127)IM

For Catharine MacKinnon, the state's most basic standards of authority summarize the male viewpoint's purposes. The purpose of having courts is to exhibit the relationship of men and women reduced to its jurisdictions. These jurisdictions include the biological and psychological but not often the political, which is the domain of men alone. Courts' decisions reveal the extent to which**,** as MacKinnon puts it in another context, "sexuality is gendered as gender is sexualized,"33 by justifying men's right to exercise authority. This is what is meant by legitimization. Since legal institutions help regularize men's power over time by demonstrating male jurisdictions, that is, the domains within which men exercise authority, they constitute an important historical source for interpreting the power relation of gender. MacKinnon argues that the adjudication of grievances turns on "whose meaning wins."34 An ahistorical and, therefore, unidiminensional reality is assumed to underlie law, and grievances that arise under a government of laws will be settled judicially in an outside-of-history atmosphere of impar- tiality. This presumed impartiality is made all the more possible today because increasingly violent states have merged perspective and situation. The definitive representation of state, society, public interest, and general welfare is "male pursuit of control over women's sexuality."35 Women do not control what is done to us; men's sexuality is inseparable from coercion and violence.

Link – State

Law cannot redress violence against women or prevent its occurrence – it will only continue to exclude women’s interests

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 126)IM

For West, whatever protection Rule of Law provides the individual man, bent on separation, from threat of annihilationÂ—this protection is a primary thrust of Rule of LawÂ—it will not redress harms experienced by women and prevent their future occurrence. Nor is protection forthcoming from Rule of Law, in the name of self-governance, worthwhile to women in their historical connectedness. To give one historical example: the National Woman's Party resisted the protection of working women through indus- trial legislation that was sought by virtually all major women's organiza- tions after 1920. In 1923, in preference to protection, the Woman's Party (NWP) introduced an equal rights amendment in order to, in Crystal East- man's words, "establish the principle that industrial legislation should apply to all workers ... in any given occupation and not to women workers alone."22 NWP believed that protective legislation discriminated against women in the paid workforce,23 while groups such as the National Women's Trade Union League placed the blame on woman's deficient organization and special needs as Mother of the Race.24 Although NWP found women to be analogous to men,23 it recognized that women's legal disability in earning their way26 had substantial effect on the standard of living with which many women and their families had to get by.27 (According to West, the "constitution" or a basic legal document of patriarchy is pornography, which is why pornography is not seriously prose- cuted32Â—to the exclusion of women's interests and denial of any potential for balancing.)

The aff’s insistance that rights must be given us by the state is central to patriarchy

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 129)IM

Copelon argues that an ethical sine qua non is needed to defeat the separation of public and private spheres of human activity that is central to patriarchal perspective. In the western world, the positivist treatment of public and private spheres of human activity as separate and distinct constitutes a form of order and also a set of means for patriarchs to try to order and maintain relationships among people. This order includes both the emotional and the rational and separates them from one another. In a world so ordered, women are placed in private and men in public spheres. Even though inequities exist among men in public and women in private spheres, to women fall "the 'emotional labor' of housework and children," to men, "the 'intellectual and manual labor' of science and public life."100 Rationality attaches to the scientific, the essential, the masculine. Emotion is nonscien- tific, dispensable, and feminine.101 By separating themselves from objects they seek to classify and measure, positivists try to maintain boundaries they have set. The positivist bifurcation of human activity into separated spheres of public and private produces sets of dual standards102 that govern social relations and rely on logic dependent on hierarchical derivations from difference.103 U.S. men, likely white and Anglo-Saxon, mostly propertied, able-bodied, in their middle years, English-speaking, and heterosexual, may participate in public processes, the mainstream; women/others poled out of the mainstream or prevented from entering it despite what they may have been led to expect, are assigned, to the extent possible, to private places, to byways seen as antithetical to bargaining and accommodation in public realms.104 Women/ others are assumed unqualified for or treated as disqualified from the work of superordinate representation.105

The basis of the rights given to us by the state is patriarchal

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 129)IM

Rhonda Copelon finds the U.S. Constitution(is) a key organizing device in determinations of autonomy/dependence and material independence/servi- tude. Therefore, her work is essential reading for U.S. legal historians. The premises of the Framers' patriarchal "understanding" present a powerful set of limitations that operate at both institutional and ideological levels. As did J. Marshall in his widely publicized speech during the 1987 Bicentennial of the Constitution,42 Copelon points out that the Framers sought to preserve the privilege of their class, race, and sex.43 Although our ideas about what constitutes equality have changed across time, they are accommodated, to the extent they are, in a framework not conducive to change or feminist historical analysis. Neither equality of opportunity, individual worth, nor private property will serve to disguise the character of the original Constitu- tion and Bill of Rights. The Reagan administration's attack on unenumer- ated rights that has evolved reveals the lack of legitimacy political actors will likely assign to progressive constitutional interpretation.44 An unenumerated right to privacy does not per se threaten distinctions between public and private domains of life. Rather, in Copelon's under- standing of them, judicial decisions about privacy of a liberal cast, present "a highly truncated, socially regressive concept of autonomy."45 Translitera- tion of this negative into positive, radical concept has become a target on the contemporary right-wing agenda. This transliteration is threatening to those who declaim "originalism" and denounce sexual self-determination because it carries with it an idea that society has an affirmative responsibility to individuals. This is not a patriarchal understanding nor an original component of the U.S. Constitution.

Link – State

The delineation of rights by the rule of law denies women’s worth and leads to brutalization

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 123)IM

Robin West's idea is that Rule of Law does not acknowledge the worth of women's connectedness to other human beings or real potential for tangible connection. By connectedness, West means women's existential experiences. She relies upon empirically based findings about the develop- ment of self and morality in women, by feminist scholars such as Carol Gilligan and Nancy Chodorow, to characterize structurally "the divide between radical and cultural feminism."13 Her point also is that brutalization may be the result of failure by Rule of Law to recognize women's humanity. West finds Rule of Law "coherent" in its acknowledgement of the threat to men of their physical existence, and its protection of the value attached to autonomy by liberals.14 The phrase "rule of law" refers to classical organization of rights as impartially and conventionally stipulated in the positivist tradition.1S Rule of Law is based in an idea that "we are each physically 'boundaried.' "16 This, West indicates, is a masculinist approach that denies women's essential or materially potential connectedness. In her critique, West connects with the frequent argument of contemporary women poets in the U.S., that the idea of an inflexibly confined self is fiction,17 and the post-structuralist argument that the classification, woman, is fiction. Law is replete with "fiction." According to Roman law, fictio is an assumption or supposition of the law. Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiction of law as something which is or may be false but is assumed or supposed true, saying fictio legis neminem laedil; i.e. fiction of law injures no one. A legal fiction may assume or suppose the existence of a state of facts that does not really exist. It is a rule of law that assumes as true, and will not allow to be disproved, something that is false but not perceived as impossible. Black's Dictionary claims that these assumptions are of an innocent or even beneficial character and that they are made for the advancement of justice.

Link – Justice

The aff’s view of justice is dominated by male power and prevents any semblance of equality

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 128)IM

MacKinnon states that much of women's experience in the world is treated as lacking efficacy or motive power and that feminism's design is to make valid women's "struggle for world."38 Unmodified by marxism or liberalism, radical feminists understand that, presently, the measure of truth is the interest, by men with power, in a universal but historically specific perception of reality. In this regard, private and public domains are inseparable. Struggle by women for awareness will make apparent the dynamic that constructs women and men on wholly relational grounds; it will feed women's power and analyze our grievances in a world we claim and also reject. Coming to know the politics and law of the historical conditions to which women are subject is coming to know our own lives. In raising our feminist consciousness, feminists' rejection of the objectification of desire turns on a comprehension of social life at once critical and self-encompassing. Although some women may not reject either the objec- tive or subjective conditions of their lives, they do not contradict feminism's design where their range of choices is constrained and their freedom to choose is limited. Instead, according to MacKinnon, "the man/woman difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define each other. This is the social meaning of sex and the distinctively feminist account of gender equality."39 Contemporary marxists have seen society as determined by class with state power accruing in a state-specific form. As MacKinnon comments, in this reading the matter of agency goes begging. Liberalism is no more concrete in its notion of self-contained or self-sufficient individuals in the abstract with abstruse claims enforceable by application of the reasonable man standard. Thinkers on the left may recommend abandoning the state because it is a tool of oppression, where liberals will see it as impartial and capable of deciding conflicts that underlie interest domains. Law functions for marxists as an ideology of legitimization, for liberals as principled stra- tegy; neither function will change women's subjection to institutions of rape, battery, and general sexual harassment in which state and law participate. It is going to take an ongoing revolution of politics, and relationships founded in work40 rather than gender, to produce an equalization of women's status vis Ã¡ vis men under the law. For MacKinnon, this exertion of power cannot be made in company with liberals and marxists. Rather, feminists need to show the coming together of critical consciousness in an analysis of privatization. In the private sphere, men demonstrate most compellingly what they have that women do not. Women will come to know what we will know, it seems to me MacKinnon is saying, when we are least neutral and most in touch with our own experiences of the world. For MacKinnon, feminists stand the greatest chance of comprehending that male power exists, unjustifiably, and that equality between women and men has never existed and will not come into existence until the construction of the masculine is seen for what it is, "its judgments . . . revealed in process and procedure, as well as adjudication and legislation. . . . Justice will require ... a new jurisprudence, a new relation between life and law."41

Link – Human Rights

Conceptions of human rights are fundamentally patriarchal in that they don’t recognize abuse within the family as an assault on autonomy

Amirthalingam 5 (Kumaralingam, Associate Professor and Director of International Programs, Faculty of Law and Associate, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, “Women’s Rights, International Norms, and Domestic Violence: Asian Perspectives”)

From a human rights perspective, the omission of forced sex from the definition of family violence is regrettable. Forcing a woman to have sex against her will is the most blatant form of enforcing male dominance.58 It is a brutal statement that she has absolutely no autonomy or rights. Article 9.2 of the Asian Human Rights Charter recognizes the particular significance of sexual violence against women and draws a link to patriarchy and Asian values: The roots of patriarchy are systemic and its structures dominate all institutions, attitudes, social norms and customary laws, religions and values in Asian societies, crossing the boundaries of class, culture, caste and ethnicity. Oppression takes many forms, but is most evident in sexual slavery, domestic violence, trafficking in women and rape . . . systematic rape is a war crime and a crime against humanity.59 To refuse to recognize marital rape as a crime on the basis that such matters are considered private is no longer tenable under international human rights obligations. The official policy of prioritizing the family over women needs to be reconsidered. The concluding remarks of the Women’s Crisis Centre in its memorandum reviewing the Malaysian DVA are pertinent: Some of the reservations that have been directed against the DVA stem from the concern that the Act would encourage the disintegration of the family unit. This conceptualization of domestic violence is fundamentally flawed. In providing protection to an abused person, the DVA is assisting someone whose family is already attacked by domestic violence. In other words, a victim who seeks the assistance of the DVA is, by definition, seeking refuge from a broken family.60 The argument that the Malaysian DVA is not anti-family is significant and valid, but more importantly, the guiding principle ought to be that women who are victims of domestic abuse deserve protection regardless of their marital status. This is one instance where Kantianism is imperative; women are individuals in their own right and not merely constituent elements of a family unit. This is not to devalue the family unit, merely to say that at the end of the day when a choice has to be made, the safety of the woman should prevail over the sanctity of the family unit.

Link – Human Rights/International Law

Human rights and international law are products of colonialist and masculine world views

Fellmeth 2k (Aaron Xavier, B.A. in Social Sciences from the University of California, “Feminism and International Law: Theory, Methodology, and Substantive Reform”) PJ

Although a few feminists have applied these techniques to the study of international law since 1991, the only feminist authors who have expressly attempted to advance a broad feminist theory of international law are Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright.30 Since the publication of their critique,= feminists have increasingly challenged the conceptual, procedural, and substantive aspects of international law. Most feminists who have challenged international law have claimed that international law is biased against women in its very conception. However, different schools of feminism may claim bias on different grounds. Radical feminists attack the very existence of states as subjects and objects of international law, claiming that the concept of the state results from a false dichotomy between “public” and “private” realms of life that privileges men and perpetuates their power over women. Liberal feminists may join in this criticism, but they may also claim that international law espouses a masculine “ethic of justice” that devalues women’s approaches to the same problems through an “ethic of care.” In this view, international law is in its conception a product of male thinking that does not speak for women. Finally, postmodern feminists claim that international human rights law is a product of colonialist thinking that fails to account for the diversity of women’s experiences.31 In this section, I will examine each of these arguments in turn.

Link – Human Rights/Rights Discourse

Human rights discourse is rooted in a hyper masculine, Western mentality that seeks to impose its hegemonic conceptions on the conquered

Fellmeth 2k (Aaron Xavier, B.A. in Social Sciences from the University of California, “Feminism and International Law: Theory, Methodology, and Substantive Reform”) PJ

Although the vast majority of states seem to accept the proposition that women need and should have human rights protection beyond that accorded to men, they often disagree bitterly about the scope of the rights. Cultural and religious beliefs in many states disfavor formal entitlements that most human rights activists take for granted, such as the rights to seek education and employment, to own property, to free speech, to marital choice and equality, and to religious freedom. Representatives of these states often claim that CEDAW and the similar women’s rights instruments represent “Western” conceptions of women’s rights that are ethnocentric and inapplicable to their cultures. They may indeed feel this way about human rights generally, although they may nonetheless acknowledge human rights against large-scale atrocities such as slavery or genocide. In this view, “Western” conceptions of human rights (including women’s rights) constitute a hegemonic or neocolonialist discourse.116 Some claim that human rights discourse is innocent but ignorant ethnocentrism; others declare that it is a cynical seizing of moral high ground to obscure an attempt to exercise international influence or imperialism. That ethnocentric philosophical beliefs are at the root of CEDAW and other human rights instruments cannot be denied. The concept of individual human rights is rooted in the thought of such European philosophers as Immanuel Kant and John Locke. Most of the earliest human rights instruments, including the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),117 were drafted without the participation of the colonized cultures in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The preponderant influence of European thought and belief in human rights law has led some human rights advocates to assume perhaps too much about the universality of the current international law of human rights. Even non-Western advocates of human rights sometimes cringe at the occasional displays of cultural insensitivity by their Western counterparts.

Link – Human Rights/Individual Rights

The notion of “human rights” is inherently masculine in that it excludes women

Charlesworth 95 (Hilary, Professor of Law at the University of Adelaide, “Human Rights as Men’s Rights”, p. 103) PJ

Although there is no doubt that the apartheid of gender is considerably more pervasive than the apartheid of race, it has never provoked the same degree of international concern or opprobrium. The international community usually couches discussion of the advancement of women in terms of the acquisition and implementation of rights particular to women. While this is certainly an important and valuable project, it can also obscure some basic elements contributing to the oppression of women. My central argument is that the current international human rights structure itself and the substance of many norms of human rights law create obstacles to the advancement of women. Because the law-making institutions of the international legal order have always been, and continue to be, dominated by men, international human rights law has developed to reflect the experiences of men and largely to exclude those of women, rendering suspect the claim of the objectivity and universality of international human rights law. Until the gendered nature of the human rights system itself is recognized and transformed, no real progress for women can be achieved.

Feminist jurisprudence recognizes that notions of “human rights” marginalize many populations – the alternative solves all oppression

Binion 95 (Gayle, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, “Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective”, Muse) PJ

Feminist jurisprudence provides very substantial challenges to human rights law as it is institutionally understood. These include both fundamental questions about the processes by which human rights are defined, adjudicated, and enforced, as well as questions about the substance of what is thereby "protected." And, while the focus of analysis is on women's experience, a feminist approach might have immediate implications for the rights of all disempowered peoples and raise questions about social organization generally. If it were necessary to offer one word to capture the essence of feminist jurisprudence, in general and in its significance for human rights analysis, it is *inclusion*. The enterprise critiques the experience of women as persons excluded from legal protection and from proportionate political and economic power. Feminist critics of legal institutions question whether these institutions are capable of protecting women. Legal institutions are viewed as hierarchical, adversarial, exclusionary, and unlikely to respect claims made by women. [17](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v017/17.3binion.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT17) In apparently stark contrast, exponents of the protection of human rights argue that human rights *must* be seen as a *legal* phenomenon. If principles of justice are not *legalized*, then they are subject to the unilateral control of nation states, and their abuse can be subjected to nothing more than the *ad hoc* expression of moral outrage by those who disagree with the challenged behavior. While the domestic or international codification of policy, like conventional or common law, provides no guarantee that the law will be respected, human rights advocates maintain nevertheless that "law" is a critically important arrow in their quiver. Even in situations in which litigation is either impossible or impractical, this view rests on the assumption that most states do not even want to *appear* to be in violation of [End Page 513] international law. [18](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v017/17.3binion.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT18) Despite the widely held view that all international law is simply international politics, being able to portray a claim as having the backing of "law" removes the dialogue from the realm of being nothing more than self-interested negotiation. A feminist analysis, in contrast, might well argue from experience that human rights law has been a miserable failure in protecting peoples from oppression. Despite this immediately apparent conflict over whether law is important in the protection of human rights, in a sense, the feminist concern and the classic human rights perspective may not be in fundamental disagreement over the question of reliance on law. This is because the major concern expressed by feminist critics of legal institutions, preeminently by Carole Smart, is that *litigation as a process* does not serve women. 19 Human rights advocates also know only too well that litigation is an extremely limited tool in this endeavor. 20 Thus, while women's experience would suggest that reliance on courts, judges, and lawyers to transform society is folly, feminists and traditional human rights activists are both able to appreciate, and perhaps agree, that developing *law as principle* *and rule* is not an enterprise to be jettisoned. The points of disagreement that are far more fundamental reflect on the political power that is represented in the process of defining these "legal" rights, the limitations on "rights" analysis, and the life experience that should underlie the substantive principles of human rights law to which the world ought to be committed. Where human rights advocates spar with the governmental powers-that-be largely over how they are treating political dissidents, feminist critics maintain that the diameter of the circle of inclusion in the realm of human rights law is entirely too narrow.

Link – International Law

International law inherently favors male norms and marginalizes feminist viewpoints

Fellmeth 2k (Aaron Xavier, B.A. in Social Sciences from the University of California, “Feminism and International Law: Theory, Methodology, and Substantive Reform”) PJ

Until recently, international law went unexamined by feminist legal scholars.1 While feminists have applied manifold theories of jurisprudence to the formal and informal legal systems of the United States and many other countries from New Guinea to Saudi Arabia, rarely have they directed their attention to the procedures and substance of the international legal system. Among those authors who have studied the subject, most tend to concentrate solely on women’s rights as an aspect of international human rights law, although a few, such as Judith Gardam and Robin Teske, have ventured into international humanitarian law and the law governing the conduct of armed conflict (ius in bello). Yet the broadest treatment of the subject remains the first. In 1991, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright jointly attempted a general feminist critique of international law in The American Journal of International Law.2 Their purpose was to show that “the structures of international lawmaking and the content of the rules of international law privilege men; if women’s interests are acknowledged at all, they are marginalized. International law is a thoroughly gendered system.”3 Their argument posits that international law is pervasively “gendered” or, more specifically, “male gendered,” conceptually, procedurally, and substantively—assertions that have been repeated by feminists many times since. I take for granted that women everywhere suffer from some degree of gender oppression in one form or another, that the distribution of power and economic resources worldwide enormously favors men, and that the laws of most states are strongly gender biased in both substance and enforcement. These injustices are so overt and widespread that it is difficult to peruse any conventional news source without finding evidence of them. However, gender inequalities do not necessarily speak to a significant gender bias in international law. The purposes of this article are to analyze the claims, advanced by feminists, that international law disfavors women’s interests and viewpoints conceptually, procedurally, and substantively; to identify the obstacles to international law recognizing women’s voices and protecting their interests; and to suggest possible solutions.

Link – Rights Discourse

Rights discourse is too abstract and is fundamentally masculine

Fellmeth 2k (Aaron Xavier, B.A. in Social Sciences from the University of California, “Feminism and International Law: Theory, Methodology, and Substantive Reform”) PJ

On the other hand, international law after 1945 is still characterized by the language of rights, which some feminists, including Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, seem to think are at least partly detrimental to women.112 These authors have described rights discourse as characterized by a masculine voice that is too abstract and absolute to represent women’s approaches to competing needs. Several arguments impugn the value of the concept of rights. According to one, “women’s rights” are an inadequate solution to female oppression because women’s rights sometimes compete with the “rights” of men, which means that women’s needs or desires may not always prevail over men’s. For example, religious rights or cultural beliefs may lead to continued oppression of women in fundamentalist societies, and protection of family rights might preserve the unequal power structure within the family in traditional societies. Another, broader argument is that rights discourse is simplistic and fails to solve the fundamental societal imbalances that give rise to the need for rights in the first place. After all, rights are only necessary when the rights holder does not have enough power (economic, political, or otherwise) to protect her own interests without public intervention.113

Link – Law/Individual Rights

The concept of “individual rights” is inherently masculine in that is suggests a separateness by which women do not apply

Smith 93 (Patricia, editor and author, “Feminist Jurisprudence”, p. 493-493, Jstor) PJ

The first purpose of this chapter is to put forward the global and critical claim that by virtue of their shared embrace of the separation thesis, all of our modern legal theory-by which I mean "liberal legalism" and "critical legal theory" collectively--is essentially and irretrievably masculine. My use of "I" above was inauthentic, just as the modern, increasing use of the female pronoun in liberal and critical legal theory, although well intended, is empirically and experientially false. For the cluster of claims that jointly con-stitute the "separation thesis"--the claim that human beings are, definitionally, distinct from one another, the claim that the referent of "I" is singular and unambiguous, the claim that the word individual has an uncontested biological meaning, namely, that we are each physically individuated from every other, the claim that we are individuals "first," and the claim that what separates us is epistemologically and morally prior to what connects us--while "trivially true" of men, are patently untrue of women. Indeed, perhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last decade has been that woman are "essentially connected," not "essentially separate," from the rest of human life, both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast feeding, and existentially, through the moral and practical life. If by human beings legal theorists mean women as well as men then the separation thesis is clearly false. If, alternatively, by human beings they mean those for whom the separation thesis is true, then women are not human beings. It's not hard to guess which is meant.

Link – Law

The law will endlessly subordinate women by classifying “proper” behavior

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 124)IM

One consequence of law in the U.S. is discrimination against groups of people in the distribution of benefits and burdens. Law must endlessly discriminate, or classify, in providing the standards by which people with a law-and-order maintaining perspective may predict their behavior. Most people have a law-and-order maintaining perspective. They are expected to because this stabilizes the regime.2 Women are one social group subordinated by this endless discrimination and allocation of valued things. In the words of Gaya tri Chakravorty Spivak, a denial by law of women to themselves expunges "the clitoris as the signifier of the sexed subject."3 To separate out, consistently, sexuality and reproduction in defining women's legal status would introduce to sex- and gender-based classifications a responsiveness not currently present. Legal reforms tend instead to justify dispossession, maintaining to the extent possible superordinate male-value-linked legal practices, including emphasis on women's reproductive function and de-emphasis of sexuality as social construct. Reforms fail to represent women's voices or, as Helene Cixous has written, "song before law."4 In this context, it seems futile to expect to recover representations of damage sustained by women, in our many cultural communities, and of what, as a matter of history, we have lost.5 In this regard, law as an embodiment of collective decision, as means to survival and self-destruction, seems insufficient for our needs.

Impact – Oppression/Otherization

Patriarchy is a self-fulfilling prophecy – the more unequally women are treated, the more they are subjugated

**Fellmeth 2k** (Aaron, Int. Rel. @ Yale, Human Rights Quarterly 22(3), p. 658-733)IM

Prior to the recent feminist focus on international law, feminists approached domestic legal systems with the basic assumption that the underlying purpose of feminist activism should be equal treatment of men and women under law and in the law. The seminal court case was Reed v. Reed, 7 in which the US Supreme Court annulled a state law granting males automatic preference over females in the appointment of estate administrators. After their victory in Reed, feminists began to challenge a wide variety of laws that evinced direct and indirect discrimination against women. Their method analyzed how substantive legal theories applied to fact scenarios to disadvantage women. Frances Olsen, for example, advocated very pragmatically that feminists should challenge those laws that currently have the most pernicious effects on women. 8 At the core of this mode of feminist critique is an attack on specific legal fictions drawing a boundary between men and women. Legal rules predicated on male/female differences are founded upon self-fulfilling prophecies. When the law treats men and women unequally, they become unequal by that very fact. More recently, certain radical feminists have come to attack the patriarchal state and its legal apparatus altogether as products and perpetuaters of male oppression. 9 This was in some cases a perhaps nihilistic response to the frustrating impossibility of true neutral legality in the face of certain biological differences between men and women, such as pregnancy and the disparity in general physical size and strength. For example, in 1974, feminists challenged the fact that California disability law covered virtually every medical condition, including several voluntary medical procedures, but did not cover pregnancy. 10 The Supreme Court upheld the law as nondiscriminatory, however, because, on its face, it did not discriminate against women. 11 According to the Court's reasoning, the law excluded the condition of pregnancy; both men and women can be non-pregnant; ergo, the law does not discriminate between men and women. The fact that only women do in fact become pregnant apparently did not influence the Court. This reasoning opened the absurd possibility of lupus or breast cancer being excluded without raising an issue of discrimination, as both men and women can be free from lupus and breast cancer. If one ignores the effects of the law and assumes that men and women are equal in every way, the Court was undoubtedly correct. However, equality does not mean "identicality." There is an unbreakable link between gender and such conditions as pregnancy and lupus. 12 In response to these setbacks, some feminists determined that the equality that women had achieved in some countries resulted in an equality on men's terms. Women being treated as equal to men too often meant women conforming to men's standards of cognition and behavior, health and illness, achievement and failure. To the extent that difference was recognized, perceived female traits, such as putting family before work, humanity before power, ecology before profit, or cooperation before justice, were considered weaknesses in women rather than legitimate differences in perspective. Feminists realized that "equality" meant that women do not benefit when their needs are less than men's, but that they suffer when their needs are greater. Most feminists now recognize that women have at least some different [End Page 663] needs than men and that equality of treatment does not necessarily mean equality in the types or amounts of resources that a society allocates to programs and causes that benefit one gender more than the other. 13 It is not just biological differences that mandate different treatment. Well-known facts of social inequality--such as the higher incidence of female poverty, the wage differential, the corporate "glass ceiling," the tendency for husbands to beat their wives more often and more severely than wives beat their husbands--all mean that equal laws in the books do not necessarily lead to equal results. For example, laws that mandate a minimum wage may raise general wage levels, but they do not fully redress the fact that women are generally paid less for equal work.

Patriarchy results in unchecked hegemony that seeks to dominate and cause violence

Clark 4 (Mary E, Professor of Biology at University of California, http://mail.kwu.edu:2092/citation.as...C3F5&fn=1&rn=1) PJ

Today's Western patriarchal world view now dominates globalwide dialogue among the "leaders" of Earth's nearly two hundred nation-states. Its Machiavellian/Realpolitik assumptions about the necessity of military power to preserve order within and between groups of humans trumps - and stifles - other potential viewpoints. Founded on the belief that "evil" is innate, it dictates that human conflict must be "controlled": global "law" backed by coercive force. This view, when cross-culturally imposed, becomes a selffulfilling prophecy, thus "legitimating" an escalating use of force. Western leaders (male and female) use a rhetoric couched in a "hegemonic masculinity" to justify their ready use of military force to coerce "those who are against us" into compliance.

Impact – Nuclear Holocaust

The terminal impact to patriarchy is nuclear holocaust

Spretnak 89 (Charlene, MA in English at Berkeley, “Exposing Nuclear Phallacies, p. 60)

Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay – all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in a ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust.

Alternative – Gender Analysis

Gender analysis provides the means by which to question the deeper, epistemological reasoning for today’s pervasive patriarchal violence

Amirthalingam 5 (Kumaralingam, Associate Professor and Director of International Programs, Faculty of Law and Associate, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, “Women’s Rights, International Norms, and Domestic Violence: Asian Perspectives”)

Feminist constructions of domestic violence provide an alternative lens through which to appraise the issue. From a feminist perspective, domestic violence is not an aberration; rather, it is the norm because it is culturally and legally accepted or tolerated. Feminism also shifts the focus from women to men by explaining why the male partner’s behavior traps women in violent relationships. Social psychologists have explained this phenomenon as a consequence of being exposed to a cycle of violence.72 According to this theory, domestic abuse occurs in a repeated cycle of three stages. The first is the tension-building stage, where the man becomes angry and the woman tries to calm him down to avoid being battered. This is followed by the actual violence, which in turn is followed by a loving phase, where the man tries to reconcile with the woman by assuring her that he still loves her while at the same time making her feel guilty. This creates a false hope in the relationship and the woman stays, thus perpetuating the cycle. After a while, the woman is simply unable to leave; what has been termed a condition of “learned helplessness” sets in.73 Through these cycles, the victim believes or resigns herself to the fact that she cannot help herself.74 Having explained why women are unable to leave, the more important question becomes why men batter. Perhaps, most importantly, feminist theorists reveal the hegemonic nature of domestic violence. While feminists have constructed their theories from a gender perspective, the central thesis really is about a power differential or inequality; domestic violence results when those who are in a position of power exercise control and dominance over others. However, on closer reflection, there may well be a paradox. Is it power or the yearning for power that causes violence? “It has been said that it is not power that corrupts, but lack of it that does.”75 Power has been categorized into five basic types: exploitative, manipulative, competitive, nutrient, and integrative. 76 The first two types are clearly negative forms of power and the first is arguably violence simply confused for power; in other words, it involves a person who needs to be violent to overcome a sense of insecurity, real or perceived. Unfortunately, violence has become synonymous with power and is thus legitimized. Even today, war is the preferred option to resolve conflict. Failure to carry out a threat of war is seen as a sign of weakness;77 violence thus equals power—from the bar room brawl through family violence to international conflict.78 Violence is a tool to perpetuate dominance and “violence in the family should be understood primarily as coercive control.”79 The gender analysis shows that domestic violence is located in an unequal power relationship and therefore the legal response to domestic violence cannot always be based on procedural equality; rather, it has to promote substantive equality. The gender perspective is essential in order to relocate the center of equilibrium, as well as to give the disempowered a greater voice in the legal system. Such an approach is particularly important in the Asian context, where the patriarchal and hierarchical structures have not facilitated an adequate appreciation of feminist perspectives in law and society. The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women underscored the historical exclusion of women’s voice in the public debate in Asia by reciting this famous quote: Why have you appeared before this gathering? Why do you bellow like a cow in labour? Your time must be near. Shameless women with no sense of decorum Bellow in gatherings of respectable men.80

Alternative – Consciousness Raising

The alternative is to vote negative. Rejection of masculine forms of legal interpretation opens up ways to change epistemologies and ontologies of domination through consciousness raising

MacKinnon 93 (Catharine, A., Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, “A Feminist View of the State”, 239-240) PJ

Law from the male point of view combines coercion with authority, policing society where its edges are exposed: at points of social resistance, conflict, and breakdown. Since there is no place outside this system from a feminist standpoint, if its solipsistic lock could be broken, such moments could provide points of confrontation, perhaps even openings for change. The point of view of a total system emerges as particular only when confronted, in a way it cannot ignore, by a demand from another point of view. This is why epistemology must be controlled for ontological dominance to succeed, and why consciousness raising is subversive. It is also why, when law sides with the powerless, as it occasionally has,2 it is said to engage in something other than law – politics or policy or personal opinion – and to delegitimate itself.3 When seemingly ontological conditions are challenged from the collective standpoint of a dissident reality, they become visible as epistemological. Dominance suddenly appears no longer inevitable. When it loses its ground it loosens its grip.

Alternative - Rejection Key

The exclusion of women from the human rights sphere can’t be ended by simply adding women – the entire system needs to be broken down

**Brems 97** ( Eva, Law @ U of Leuven, Human Rights Quarterly 19(1), p. 137)IM

Human rights are not what they claim to be, feminists say. They are a product of the dominant male half of the world, framed in their language, reflecting their needs and aspirations. Whereas the "rights of man" as originally conceived by the great liberal thinkers were not intended to include women, today's "universal human rights" still overlook them as a matter of fact. The feminist critique of human rights thus basically argues for the inclusion of women in the human rights protection system. Feminists of all strands 1 advance various means to realize this aim. Most at ease in the present human rights system are the "liberal feminists." 2 Their major concern, equal treatment of men and women, underlies the nondiscrimination provisions of most human rights treaties. 3 Liberal feminists stay within the existing human rights framework, using its language and logic to argue for an increased concern for women's needs. Karen Engle distinguishes between doctrinalists and institutionalists. 4 The first concentrate on bringing situations where they consider women's rights to be violated under the protection of specific existing human rights provisions. [End Page 137] The latter focus on improving the present institutional structure for the enforcement of the human rights of women. In the eyes of many feminists today, a liberal "add woman and stir" approach does not go far enough. Cultural feminists as well as radical feminists are convinced that a real inclusion of women in the human rights system requires a transformation of that system. 5 The human rights concept must get rid of the "maleness" with which its concepts and structure are imbued. Radical feminists maintain that all theories based on equality or difference make the same mistake of using a "male yardstick." They warn against valuing differences which are a product of a patriarchal society which needs to be dismantled. 20 The key "givens" are male dominance and female subordination, the central locus of which is the sexual sphere. 21 The fact that many women do not perceive their lives in this way is explained by a theory of "false consciousness." 22 Although radical feminists are stringent in their critique of law and rights as instruments for the perpetuation of male dominance, 23 research for this paper did not uncover any explicit rejection of human rights as such. Rather, like the cultural feminists, they recognize the strategic worth of [End Page 140] human rights. 24 From a completely different perspective, radical feminists come to some of the same conclusions as cultural feminists with regard to human rights. The public/private and other dichotomies have to be broken down because they are a cover-up for the maintenance of male dominance in the spheres that are subsequently kept outside human rights scrutiny. 25 The creation of new "women's human rights" and the recharacterization of existing rights are two means advocated to identify instances of women's subordination and of violence against women as human rights violations. 26

Alternative - Individual Action Key

The individual is the key starting point – to use group rights causes essentialism and eliminates individual cultural choices

**Brems 97** ( Eva, Law @ U of Leuven, Human Rights Quarterly 19(1), p. 162)IM

The third guideline for handling conflicts between feminism and cultural relativism is to take as a starting point the individual. Not the liberal concept of an abstract individual which is rejected by cultural relativists and feminists alike, but a contextualized individual, who conforms to our "specificity" guideline. To abandon the individual in favor of an approach through group rights would, however, deny the feminist concern about the oppressiveness of groups. If the viewpoint of the group is taken, there is a risk of essentialism, because it becomes difficult to take internal differences [End Page 162] and evolutions inside the group into account. Group rights are not the only way to express the "connectedness" or "embeddedness" of human beings in terms of human rights. Individual rights can have an important communal aspect. This is clear for family rights, religious rights, and associational rights. But also, if a certain way of speaking is characteristic for a particular community a communal dimension may be integrated into the freedom of speech. And some cultural or communal aspects of someone's way of life may be brought under the right to privacy. 134 Many other examples could be given, but the main point is that introducing specificity in an individual rights approach makes it possible to value a concrete person's communal ties, not those that the dominant forces inside the community would like to attribute to him or her. Each individual should have the right to practice his or her culture and traditions, but likewise, each individual should have the right to reject them, for instance because he or she has been influenced by contact with another culture or with international feminism. These influences are as much a part of reality as traditional culture is. The international human rights system should defend this "opt-out" possibility 135 and take up responsibility for the women who use it. 136

Alternative - Individual Rejection Solvency

To stop the entrapment of gender equality laws we should revise our definition of equality, beginning on an individual level

**Snyder 3** (Mose, Law @ U of Connecticut, fe.uconn.edu/documents/Essay%20Connections/2003-2006/Snyder.pdf)IM

Although this use of language has trapped women, Mackinnon indicates that it may have the power to liberate as well. The final step of Rich's re-vision algorithm takes the work (in this case, our legal codes) As "a clue to [ …] how we can begin to see and name-and therefore live – afresh" (Rich 629). MacKinnon sees this clue in the promise of equality made by our gender equality laws: On the level of the state, legal guarantees of equality in liberal regimes provide an opening. [...] From a perspective that understands that women do not have sex equality, this law means that, once equality is meaningfully defmed, the law cannot be applied without changing society. (242) According to MacKinnon, a redefinition of the term "equality" will solve the problem of our legal system's inherent bias. Once this renaming is achieved, the law will work to remove the dominant-subordinate trap, rather than merely freeing women to participate in it. . In "Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence," MacKinnon shows us the power that an act of re-vision can have. The effect may begin with but need not be limited to one person's life, identity, or voice and it need not be limited to the abstract. .. Here, MacKinnon urges a change that would affect all the women under our legal system in concrete ways. The method Rich proposes for such a conceptual re-vision is surprisingly relevant, as MacKinnon incorporates all of the steps Rich proposes in her schema for the revision of literature. It is a tribute to the flexibility and effectiveness of Rich's system that MacKinnon is able to incorporate it here, in a critique of law.

A2: Perm

The aff’s attempt at critical law is still masculinist – complete reconceptualization is needed

**Slavin 90** (Sarah, Poli Sci @ Buffalo State College, Winter 1990, Journal of Women’s History 1(3), p. 124)IM

According to West, Rule of Law is masculinist regardless of whether approached through legal liberalism or critical legal theory. Feminist theory can have nothing in common with either legal theory because feminist theory is out to describe the "subjectivity of human existence."1' This description or representation includes what it is like to be possessed by anotherÂ—one function of patriarchy. The application of feminist theory to Rule of Law works to tell women's stories20 about what would be the significance of love to "a well led public life."21 Feminist theory's application reveals women's construction by Rule of Law as persons unworthy of valorization. Feminist theory works to deconstruct this authoritative imagery. In West's view, a "Jurisprudence Unmodified" by legal liberalism or critical legal theory will be a reconstructive feminist jurisprudence. It will give voice to the subjectivity of women's experience and women's point of view about our lives. Legal reforms that feminists may already have achieved will be instrumental to this voicing of experiences and viewpoints. However, these reforms will need to be reconceptualized because, in their original form, they analogized harms done to women and women's needs to harms done to men and to men's needs.

Incorporating feminist views into a masculine logic co-opts our movement

Scales 93 (Ann C, Professor of Law at the University of Mexico, “Feminist Jurisprudence”, p. 98-99)

Male and female perceptions of value are not shared and, are perhaps not even perceptible to each other. 27 In our current genderized realm, therefore, the "rights-based" and "care-based" ethics cannot be blended. Patriarchal psychology sees value as differently distributed between men and women: Men are rational; women are not. Feminist psychology suggests different conceptions of value: Women are entirely rational, but society cannot accommodate them because the male standard has defined into oblivion any version of rationality but its own. 28 Paradigmatic male values like objectivity, are defined as exclusive, identified by their presumed opposites. Those values, cannot be content with multiplicity; they create the other and then devour it. Objectivity ignores context; reason is the opposite of emotion; rights preclude care. As long as the ruling ideology is a function of this dichotomization, incorporationism threatens to be mere cooptation, a more subtle version of female invisibility. By trying to make everything too nice, incorporationism represses contradictions. It usurps women's language in order to further define the world in the male image; it thus deprives women of the power of naming. [29](http://www.questia.com/read/78791228) Incorporationism means to give over the world, because it means to say to those in power: "We will use your language and we will let you interpret it."

The permutation incorporates the masculine logic – assuring sexism rearticulates itself

Scales 93 (Ann C, Professor of Law at the University of Mexico, “Feminist Jurisprudence”, p. 98)

Incorporationism presumes that we can whip the problem of social inequality by adding yet another prong to the already multipronged legal tests my students feel they must memorize. Incorporationism suffers from the same lack of vision as the "equal rights/ special rights" debate. Both presume, that male supremacy is simply a random collection of irrationalities in an otherwise rational coexistence. Both presume that instances of inequality are mere legal mistakes--a series of failures to treat equals as equals which we can fix if we can just spot the irrationality in enough cases. As Professor MacKinnon has demonstrated, however, from such viewpoints we cannot see that male supremacy is a complete social system for the advantage of one sex over another. 24 The injustice of sexism is not irrationality; it is domination. Law must focus on the latter, and that focus cannot be achieved through a formal lens. Binding ourselves to rules would help us only if sexism were a legal error.

Framework - Discourse First

Discourse permeates all knowledge - to deconstruct it we must produce feminine ways of seeing the world

**Tucker 8** (Judith, Law @ Georgetown, October 2008, Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law, p. 7)IM

The major difficulty with woman-centered approaches, according to a legal theorist like Drucilla Cornell, is that they rest on the premise that there is a knowable woman’s “nature.” But how do we come to know this nature? the deconstructive project resists the reinstatement of a theory of female nature or essence as a philosophically misguided bolstering of rigid gender identity which cannot survive the recognition of the performative role of language, and more specifically the metaphor. Thus deconstruction also demonstrates that there is no essence of Woman that can be effectively abstracted from the linguistic represen- tations of Woman. The referent Woman is dependent upon the systems of representation in which she is given meaning.10 Thus the Woman and for that matter the Man of legal discourse are discursive constructs, only two of many contributions from various fields of knowledge that gender society. Since this discursive project permeates all production of knowledge, we are not able to step outside language to ascertain the true nature of either the feminine or the masculine. At its most restrictive, the focus on deconstruction can lead away from giving any attention at all to women’s lived experience – the danger here is that feminists will posit law as a “gendering practice” and concentrate only on unveiling its “gendered narratives” without any reference to women’s lived experiences, and therefore without any sense of prospects for change in the system.11 In fairness to Cornell, this is not her position. On the contrary, she thinks that the project of deconstructing legal (or other) discourse can be done using imagination and metaphor to produce alternate visions, femi- nine ways of seeing a world in which gender plays out very differently – she believes in the power of utopian thinking. In this more activist deconstruc- tive mode, an exploration of the ways in which law and legal institutions construct gender takes its place as part of the larger project of examining gendering practices in the society as a whole with an eye to change. The law is just one small site of possible contest over gendered power relations, of course, and gender-neutral law, or rather law that realizes the full potential of both the masculine and the feminine, could only emerge in the context of a transformation of the entire society.

Framework – Rejection First

Our impact framework is to prioritize the dismantling of patriarchy – this change in impact calculus is critical to open the door to new structures and avoid extinction

French 92 (Marilyn, PhD from Harvard, “Beyond Power: On Women, Men, and Morals”, p.494-495) PJ

Just as our present morality offers us no imaginable alternative to the domination of power, to power as the highest good, so our present social and political situation provides us with no imaginable alternative to the three “worst” scenarios: global nuclear war; global totalitarianism; or desiccation of the planet. We cannot spread our minds into a distant future; like alcoholics, we take life one day at a time, plodding on, hoping the worst can be averted until we ourselves are dead. We choose the status quo, not in freedom but in despair; we fear action, since any act may entail something worse than the present situation. But if we decide actively to oppose patriarchal values, and try to create a new system, we find no clear direction. For our system incarnates patriarchal values; our institutions are invariably hierarchical. Hierarchy is a structure designed to retain and transmit power; thus as long as our institutions are hierarchical, power remains supreme. Yet, because power is indeed supreme, no alternative structure is as successful in our world. Experiments with more democratic arrangements, conducted in classrooms, businesses, and editorial offices during the 1970s, ended in rancor and nonproductiveness. Again we confront a closed and vicious circle. New structures can emerge successfully only in response to a new or different set of ends. When we value pleasure – human well-being – as much as profit (power), new structures will seem to generate themselves. And indeed, examples of forms other than hierarchy abound in the scientific disciplines at present, available to serve as metaphors for social and political arrangements. Many thinkers have suggested that our models of the universe are essentially metaphors, images that make concrete our vision of the relationships among forces in our world. Important shifts in scientific thinking are always followed by shifts in sociopolitical structures, whether because a shift in thought in one discipline eventually permeates culture as a whole, or because a shift in cultural attitudes is most easily perceptible in its most rigorous thinking – scientific thinking. In any case, although we may have difficulty imagining a business, say, structured other than hierarchically, we can stretch our imaginations by considering the new metaphors that have arisen in astronomy and sub-atomic theory, in human portrayal of the macro- and microcosm—and in biology and ecology.

\*\*Aff Answers\*\*

Aff: No Alternative Solvency

No Solvency – focus on the state allows non-state actors to elide scrutiny, activists support governmental responsibility and NGOs are worse than the state

**Binion 95** (Gayle, Poli Sci @ UC Santa Barbara, Human Rights Quarterly 17(3), p. 517)IM

It might be argued that the state is not the only powerful actor that wants to limit the reach of human rights to only the "public" domain. The pressure to do so might come as well from the "private" realm. Religious institutions and corporations, for example, have much to gain in the preservation of their autonomy from the illusion of invisibility that the two-spheres theory provides. If human rights concerns are focused solely on the state because of a theory of the insulation of the family as "private," the false illusion of a [End Page 517] dual-institution society is reinforced. Exceptionally powerful bodies beyond the familial patriarchy thereby escape scrutiny. Employers (of women and men) who pay unconscionably low wages for work under inhumane conditions would be unlikely to want international human rights law brought to bear against them. Religious orders with gender, race, or caste disqualification policies would similarly not welcome such attention. Under the two-spheres theory of society these institutions do not exist, and their practices are effectively shielded from international human rights review. Were women's experience the focus of human rights law, attention to the nongovernmental sphere would be heightened, and patterns of social organization and practices that are exploitative, not just of women and not just by familial patriarchs, but also by other powerful bodies, would be brought into bold relief. 29 The denial of the existence of a "private" realm of human rights violations is not limited to those with an apparent vested interest in the status quo. Human rights theorists, such as Alston, not uncommonly fear the dilution of human rights principles if the realms are expanded beyond the traditional. 30 Activist friends of human rights, such as Amnesty International, slow to view women as victims of denials of human rights, have held firm in their view that government must be seen as the perpetrator of the violations in order for their organization to act. 31 Prominent feminist theorists often have argued for only a very circumscribed realm of private human rights abuses. 32 The standard Anglo-American Bill of Rights view of government as the uniquely powerful potential evil-doer is as endemic in the traditional human rights nongovernmental (NGO) community as it is among governments themselves. [End Page 518]

Aff: Perm Solvency

Feminist objectives can be achieved successfully through state action

Lovenduski 5 (Joni, Professor of Politics at Birkbeck college, University of London, author of Women and European Politics and Feminizing politics; Cambridge university press)

Since the last quarter of the twentieth century there has been a proliferation of state agencies established to promost womens rights, often called women's policy agencies. WPAs are sometimes termed state feminist. State feminism is a contested term. To some it is an oxymoron. It has been variously defined as the activities of feminists or femocrats in government and administration (Hemes 1987; Sawer 1990), institutionalised feminism in public agencies (Eisenstein 1990; Outshoom 1994), and the capacity of the state to contribute to the fulfilment of a feminist agenda (Sawer 1990; Stetson 1987). In this book we define state feminism as the advocacy of women's movement demands inside the state. The establishment of WPAs changed the setting in which the women's movement and other feminists could advance their aims, as they offered, in principle, the possibility to influence the agenda and to further feminist goals through public policies from inside the state apparatus. WPAs could increase women's access to the state by furthering women's participation in political decision-making, and by inserting feminist goals into public policy. Thus WPAs may enhance the political representation of women. WPAs vary considerably in their capacity, resources and effectiveness, raising questions about the circumstances under which they are most likely to enhance women's political representation. To understand them we need to consider in detail the part they play in processes of incorporating women's interests (substantive representation) into policy-making, a requirement that is particularly important when the decisions are about political representation itself.

Perm solves – the power of the state needs to work in conjunction with power hierarchies, to be understood in the proper context

**Schwartzman 99** (Lisa, Philosophy @ U of NY Stony Brook, Hypatia 14(2), p. 33)IM

In response to this, a liberal might argue that because there are laws—both criminal and civil—preventing harms perpetrated by either the government or by individuals, protection already exists against the systemic harms of racism, [End Page 33] sexism, classism, etc. Whether an individual, group, or government commits these sorts of harms, laws already exist to address them. Focusing on civil law, and on constitutional law in particular, MacKinnon does not deny that the law provides a formal guarantee to respect and protect the rights of individuals to be treated "equally." Nonetheless, the way that liberal theorists interpret and employ these rights often renders them ineffective in bringing justice to people whose oppression is constituted through the operation of racial, sexual, and economic power structures. Without addressing and altering these power structures, MacKinnon argues, the formal granting of the rights to free speech, privacy, freedom, and equality are not going to succeed in bringing about justice and equality for women, or for other members of oppressed groups. 11 Although recent laws that recognize sexual harassment as a problem of sex equality are one exception to this, for the most part the law does not acknowledge explicitly the oppression of women and attempt to remedy it. Rather, the rights of women and members of other oppressed groups are recognized to the extent that the persons in these positions resemble white, upper-middle-class men. Note that MacKinnon is not suggesting that these structures of power are wholly independent of the state or that they will not change unless structures outside the realm of the state change first. MacKinnon sees the power of the state working in conjunction with these specific hierarchies—in both overt and covert ways. Thus, rather than interpreting these liberal rights and freedoms as simply rights against government intervention, MacKinnon argues that they must be understood in the context of inequality and oppression; they must be interpreted in such a way that they can begin to change these structures of oppression and thereby make it possible for people to exercise the formal rights that the Constitution legally grants them.

Aff: Perm Solvency

Pure rejection of the state’s provision of rights fails – working within the state is key

**Schwartzman 99** (Lisa, Philosophy @ U of NY Stony Brook, Hypatia 14(2), p. 42)IM

Clearly, it would be easy to interpret MacKinnon's objections to liberal rights theory as a simple rejection of certain rights—like the right to privacy or the right to free speech—if not all rights in general. Dworkin seems to interpret MacKinnon in this way when, in his review of Only Words, he writes: "She [MacKinnon] and her followers regard freedom of speech and thought as an elitist, inegalitarian ideal that has been of almost no value to women, blacks, and others without power; they say America would be better off if it demoted that ideal as many other nations have" (Dworkin 1993, 42). Elsewhere in this same article, Dworkin suggests that MacKinnon sees "equality" and "liberty" as opposed to one another, that she sees them as "competing constitutional value[s]" (1993, 36). On the one hand, Dworkin might be right: MacKinnon [End Page 42] seems to dismiss many of the rights that are currently discussed in liberal political debates. She offers numerous arguments about the way that these rights function to uphold the status quo, to obscure relations of power, and to prevent equality from being achieved. What I have suggested, however, is that this does not mean that she is rejecting "rights" per se, nor does it mean that one who endorses her criticisms of liberal rights theory must reject all use of rights. Although she writes harshly about rights, MacKinnon must be understood as criticizing the way that these rights have been formulated—and even the way that they currently function—outside of a critical analysis of society's structures of power and outside of questions of equality. It is only by asking these sorts of questions and by analyzing the social relations of power (in ways that go well beyond the simplistic individual/government dichotomy) that one could come up with a new conception of rights that would not suffer from the problems of liberalism. The criticisms of liberal rights theory that I have culled from MacKinnon's work do point to the need for an alternative theory of rights. Although I have not explained what a new conception of rights might look like, I have suggested that it would specify concretely the needs and interests of groups of oppressed people. Because liberals define rights abstractly (and because they tend to focus on individual, negative rights), they often take for granted social relations of power. As a result, the rights of people of color, women, working-class people, and other members of oppressed groups tend to be overlooked. The allegedly abstract way that liberal theory formulates and describes the rights to which individuals are said to be entitled often conceals the more concrete content that these rights have come to have in our society. In this way, the rights that upper-middle-class white men value and already enjoy are protected under the guise of treating individual preferences neutrally and protecting abstract rights. To change a system in which certain groups of people already have powers and freedoms that are—at least in practice—unavailable to others, an alternative theory of rights would have to include an analysis of who has power over whom, and it would have to concern itself with attempting to remedy these inequalities through changing society's institutions, practices, and structures of power, not a rejection of the institutions of society, or the provision of rights from the government and Rule of Law.

Using the law to recognize women’s rights is key to solve

**Fellmeth 2k** (Aaron, Int. Rel. @ Yale, Human Rights Quarterly 22(3), p. 658-733)IM

As discussed above, the causes of gender bias in international law are linked to the economic and political disempowerment of women within states, and to the dominance of financial profit over human rights in the international agenda. International law has slowly improved in recognizing women's human rights and is adopting an "ethic of care" to balance the traditional "ethic of justice," but the commitment of states to human rights concerns has not progressed adequately. Many of the poor countries of the world are getting poorer, and, in the vast majority of these less industrialized countries, the social, economic, and political situation of women has not significantly improved relative to men since the end of the Second World War. While attention to women's interests has increased greatly in industrialized states (and continues to improve), rape, the domestic assault of women, and political and economic inequality remain severe problems. 314 Wealthier states should establish a fund and offer technical assistance to less wealthy states to ensure compliance with human rights norms, particularly with respect to women. On the diplomatic level, the richer and more powerful states focus more on international economic matters primarily benefiting men than on pressuring other states--particularly dictatorships--to respect women's rights and other human rights and protect their citizens from gender-based discrimination. The fall of communism seems to have shifted this focus slightly, but there has been no momentous change, despite the fact that the democratic states no longer perceive a need to fund less economically developed states--regardless of their human rights records--to prevent them from falling under the sway of the Soviet Union. The solution to gender bias in international law is, therefore, not only to increase the representation of women in international organizations, but to augment their political and economic representation in the states that compose international society. As long as women are underrepresented in Nepalese politics and business, women's rights will be underenforced in Nepal. Certainly, **any reform within states will be helpful**. But on the international level, states should establish institutions focusing on compliance with human rights norms and women's rights particularly. States' tools [End Page 731] for encouraging women's representation in other states are largely limited to diplomacy and leading by example, and to drafting and adhering to their own treaties codifying the rights of women under international law. However, these treaties must be binding under international law, should disallow derogations, and should require states to take concrete steps toward implementing them.

Aff: Perm Solvency

Aff: State Good/Perm Solvency

Feminism has historically made progress through state action and policy making

Edwards 2 (Rebecca, assistant professor of history at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York “Do Feminist Historians Need a Theory of the State?” Muse) PJ

It hardly bears repeating that feminism has made the personal political, and that a decision to leave an abusive husband or refer to God as She can be understood as a political act. The liberating power of this insight has been well explored; what needs to be said is that it has costs. Among them is its tendency to obscure women’s relationships to the state and the ways in which private, cultural, or social acts have led, or failed to lead, to changes in government policy. Referring to almost every action as political makes such analysis more difficult. In my view policy change is the result of politics, which I define here, in the context of Western democracies treated in the books under review, as the process of electing and appointing representatives and making laws and regulations. Of course there can be causal links between individual consciousness, social movements, and elections and policies; defining politics more narrowly can help clarify what they are.

The personal is political – feminists should engage in policy making to undermine patriarchy

Lee 7 (Theresa Man Ling, author, “Rethinking the Personal and the Political: Feminist Activism and Civic Engagement” Muse)

Precisely what is at stake in asking whether feminist politics is congruent with civic engagement? To answer the question, I begin by placing the slogan “the personal is the political” in its historical context. American feminist activist Kathie Sarachild first used the term “consciousness-raising” to mean “the process by which women in small groups could explore the political aspects of personal life” (Rosen 2000, 197). Another activist, Pamela Allen, described how consciousness-raising groups operated: “The group is the first step in transcending the isolation. Here sometimes for the first time in her life a woman is allowed an identity independent of a man’s. *She is allowed to function intellectually* *as a thinker* rather than as a sex object, servant, wife or mother. In short, *the* *group establishes the social worth of the women present*, *a necessity if women are to* *take themselves seriously*” (1970/2000, 280; emphasis added). In particular, Allen emphasized the need for women to teach themselves “to think independently” if the “opening up” and “sharing” were to get past the stage of simply providing therapeutic relief for the participants (280–81). Ultimately, the goal of consciousness-raising was the generation of theory that was “rooted in concrete experience” (277). Theory was important because it facilitated the apprehension of the “totality” of women’s condition, without which effective change at both personal and social levels could not be initiated (280). Canadian feminist activist Anne Crocker echoed a similar understanding of consciousness-raising (1975, 38–39). As a focal point of second-wave activism, consciousness-raising was the first step toward women’s emancipation from patriarchy, which feminists deemed ubiquitous. Underlying this strategic breakthrough was the theoretical insight, originally offered by Simone de Beauvoir, that womanhood is a social and cultural construct: “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (1974, 301). Perhaps more profound was Beauvoir’s use of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic in understanding the dynamics of gender identity. According to Beauvoir, “Humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being. . . . She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other” (xviii–xix). Beauvoir’s analysis helped facilitate the second wave by pointing to the need for the feminist cause to go beyond procurement of formal equality (Friedan 1974, 8–9; Beauvoir 1976). Rather, feminism is about women’s living as free and autonomous individuals on women’s terms.

Aff: State Good/Perm Solvency

Feminist objectives should be attained through policy action

Lee 7 (Theresa Man Ling, author, “Rethinking the Personal and the Political: Feminist Activism and Civic Engagement” Muse)

I began this essay as an attempt to understand the legacy of the second wave by way of examining the kind of politics “the personal is political” implies. I conclude that there has to be some kind of boundary between the political and the personal because life when totally politicized can only resemble an Orwellian nightmare. In other words, it matters that feminist activism be deployed as civic engagement. Some may consider this position as a regressive act of co-opting an otherwise radical position within a liberal feminist framework. But the case put forth here regarding the politics of the personal does not in any way diminish its political import, which is that empowerment through the politicization of one’s life can only be achieved under one condition and that is, democracy. If anything, such an understanding facilitates the enrichment of feminism as a force of democracy rather than of liberalism, along with its baggage as the exclusive political enclave of white, middle-class women in the West.

Aff: State Good

Focus on the individual fails – institutions are key

**Morris 99** (Aldon, Sociology @ Northwestern, Annual Review of Sociology vol. 25, p. 529)IM

The American civil rights movement has had an impact beyond the shores of America. Many of the same reasons the civil rights movement influenced American social movements, appear to also be the source of its influence on in- ternational movements. The major exception is that the civil rights movement did not serve as the training ground for many of the activists who initiated movements outside the United States. What is clear, however, is that numerous international movements were influenced by the US civil rights movement. A similarity that movements share across the world is that they usually must confront authorities who have superior power. The major challenge for such movements is that they must develop a collective action strategy that will generate leverage enabling them to engage in power struggles with powerful opponents. The strategy of nonviolent direct action was first developed by Gandhi in South Africa and then used by Gandhi in the mass movement that overthrew British colonialism in India. Ghandi's use of nonviolence was im- portant to the civil rights movement because some key leaders of the civil rights movement-James Farmer, Bayard Rustin, James Lawson and Glenn Smiley-had studied Gandhi's movement and became convinced that nonvio- lence could be used by African Americans. Additionally, Gandhi became a hero and a source of inspiration for Martin Luther King Jr. It was the American civil rights movement that perfected and modernized nonviolent direct action. Because of this achievement, the civil rights movement was the major vehicle through which nonviolent direct action was spread to other movements inter- nationally. Nonviolent direct action has enabled oppressed groups as diverse as Black South Africans, Arabs of the Middle East, and pro-democracy dem- onstrators in China to engage in collective action. Leaders of these movements have acknowledged the valuable lessons they have learned from the civil rights movement (see Morris 1993). As Tarrow (1994) has pointed out, nonviolent direct action is a potent tool of collective action because it generates disruption and uncertainty that authorities must address. Tarrow captured how nonviolent direct action has spread domestically and internationally following the civil rights movement when he wrote: Because the civil rights movement developed a powerful tactical, ideologi- cal, and cultural repertoire of collective action available to a worldwide audi- ence through mass media and an extensive literature, it has served as a model of collective action nationally and internationally. Awareness of the civil rights movement is so widespread globally that oppressed people in distant lands seek out knowledge of its lessons so they can employ it in their own struggles. Diffusion processes are important in this regard, but they merely complement the active pursuit of information pertaining to the civil rights movement by those wishing to engage in collective action here and abroad. The national anthem of the civil rights movement, "We Shall Overcome," con- tinues to energize and strengthen the resolve of social movements worldwide.

Aff: State Good

Must use institutions of the dominant order to make change.

Charlesworth 99(Hilary, prof and dir of the Centre for International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National U, April, *The American Journal International Law* 93 A.J.I.L. p.380)JM

[\*380] The philosopher Elizabeth Grosz has pointed out that feminist theorizing typically requires an unarticulated balance between two goals. Feminist analysis is at once a reaction to the "overwhelming masculinity of privileged and historically dominant knowledges, acting as a kind of counterweight to the imbalances resulting from the male monopoly of the production and reception of knowledges" and a response to the political goals of feminist struggles. n2 The dual commitments of feminist methods are in complex and uneasy coexistence. The first demands "intellectual rigor," investigating the hidden gender of the traditional canon. The second requires dedication to political change. The tension between the two leads to criticism of feminist theorists both from the masculine academy for lack of disinterested scholarship and objective analysis and from feminist activists for co-option by patriarchal forces through participation in male-structured debates. n3 Feminist methodologies challenge many accepted scholarly traditions. For example, they may clearly reflect a political agenda rather than strive to attain an objective truth on a neutral basis and they may appear personal rather than detached. For this reason, feminist methodologies are regularly seen as unscholarly, disruptive or mad. They are the techniques of outsiders and strangers. Just as nineteenth-century women writers used madness to symbolize escape from limited and enclosed lives, n4 so twentieth-century feminist scholars have developed dissonant methods to shake the complacent and bounded disciplines in which they work. At the same time, most feminists are constrained by their environment. If we want to achieve change, we must learn and use the language and methods of the dominant order.

The state can advance progress – human rights are an example.

Burke-White 4 (William W., Lecturer of Public and International Affairs at Princeton U., *The Harvard Environmental Law Review* v. 17, Spring, p. 266-267)JM

The social beliefs explanation begins from the proposition that individuals within human rights protecting states share a preference for a minimum set of protections of human rights. This assumption is appropriate for two reasons. First, according to liberal political science theory, state policy represents the preferences of some subset of the domestic policy. n100 If the observed state policy is to protect human rights, then at least some subset of the domestic policy must share that preference. Second, even if individuals within a domestic polity seek a variety of differentiated ends, basic respect for human rights allows individuals to pursue--to some degree at least--those ends as they define them. Liberal theory thus suggests that individuals within a human rights respecting state tend to support basic human rights provisions. The next step in the social beliefs argument is to recognize that respect for human rights has an inherently universalist tendency. n101 Unlike cultural or national rights, human rights are just that--human. They apply as much [\*267] to those individuals within a domestic polity as to those outside the polity. Such cosmopolitan liberalism indicates that "the more people are free, the better off all are." n102 The net result is that individuals within a human rights respecting state tend, on the average, to support the human rights of individuals in other states as well. Given a set of universalist human rights values in states that respect human rights, the policy articulated by the government may be one which respects human rights at home and demands their protection abroad. This belief in a thin set of universal human rights may cause the leadership of the state to frame its security policy around that belief structure and to refrain from aggressive acts that would violate the human rights of citizens at home or abroad. As Peter Katzenstein argues, "security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors." n103 Acts of international aggression tend to impinge on the human rights of individuals in the target state and, at least temporarily, limit their freedom. After all, bombs, bullets, death and destruction are not consistent with respect for basic human rights. n104 Framed in the liberal international relations theory terms of policy interdependence, international aggression by State A imposes costs on State B, whose citizens' human rights will be infringed upon by the act of aggression. This infringement in turn imposes costs on citizens in State A, whose citizens have a preference for the protection of the human rights of citizens in both states. This shared value of respect for human rights thus may restrain State A from pursuing international aggression. n105 By contrast, a state which commits gross human rights violations against its own people will not be subject to this restraint. Such violations often occur when the government has been "captured" by a select minority that chooses to violate human rights. If the citizens themselves are not in favor of human rights at home, they are unlikely to be committed to the enforcement of human rights abroad. Where capture occurs, the government is not responsive to the preferences of the domestic polity. In such cases, even if there is a strong preference among citizens to protect human rights at home and abroad, the government is unlikely to respond to those interests and its policies will not be constrained by them.

Aff: State Good

The state is key to change - Without it, feminism is vacuous theorizing.

Young 90(Iris Marion, prof of Public and International Affairs at the U of Pittsburgh, *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory*, p. 89-90)JM

Within the context of antifeminist backlash, the effect of gynocentric feminism may be accommodating to the existing structure. Gynocentric feminism relies on and reinforces gender stereotypes at just the time when the dominant culture has put new emphasis on marks of gender difference. It does so, moreover, by relying on many of those aspects of women's traditional sphere that traditional patriarchal ideology has most exploited and that humanist feminists such as Beauvoir found most oppressive--reproductive biology, motherhood, s domestic concerns. Even though its intentions are subversive, such renewed attention to traditional femininity can have a reactionary effect on both ourselves and our listeners because it may echo the dominant claim that women belong in a separate sphere. Humanist feminism calls upon patriarchal society to open places for women within those spheres of human activity that have been considered the most creative, powerful, and prestigious. Gynocentric feminism replies that wanting such things for women implies a recognition that such activities are the most humanly valuable. It argues that in fact, militarism, bureaucratic hierarchy, competition for recognition, and the instrumentalization of nature and people entailed by these activities are basic disvalues.24 Yet in contemporary society, men still have most institutionalized power, and gynocentric feminism shows why they do not use it well. If feminism turns its back on the centers of power, privilege, and individual achievement that men have monopolized, those men will continue to monopolize them, and nothing significant will change. Feminists cannot undermine masculinist values without entering some of the centers of power that foster them, but the attainment of such power itself requires at least appearing to foster those values. Still, without being willing to risk such co optation, feminism can be only a moral position of critique rather than a force for institutional change. Despite its intention, I fear that gynocentric feminism may have the same consequence as the stance of moral motherhood that grew out of nineteenth century feminism a resegregation of women to a specifically women's sphere, outside the sites of power, privilege, and recognition. For me the symptom here is what the dominant culture finds more threatening. Within the dominant culture a middle aged assertive woman's claim to coanchor the news alongside a man appears considerably more threatening than women's claim to have a different voice that exposes masculinist values as body denying and selfish. The claim of women to have a right to the positions and benefits that have hitherto been reserved for men, and that male dominated institutions should serve women's needs, is a direct threat to male privilege. While the claim that these positions of power themselves should be eliminated and the institutions eliminated or restructured is indeed more radical, when asserted from the gynocentric feminist position it can be an objective retreat. Gynocentrism’s focus on values and language as the primary target of its critique contributes to this blunting of its political force. Without doubt, social change requires changing the subject, which in turn means developing new ways of speaking, writing, and imagining. Equally indubitable is the gynocentric feminist claim that masculinist values in Western culture deny the body, sensuality, and rootedness in nature and that such denial nurtures fascism, pollution, and nuclear games. Given these facts, however, what shall we do? To this gynocentrism has little concrete answer. Because its criticism of existing society is so global and abstract, gynocentric critique of values, language, and culture of masculinism can remove feminist theory from analysis of specific institutions and practices, and how they might be concretely structurally changed in directions more consonant with our visions.

Aff: State Good

Simple theory fails – we must use institutions.

Charlesworth 99(Hilary, prof and dir of the Centre for International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National U, April, *The American Journal International Law* 93 A.J.I.L. p.379)JM

[\*379] I have mixed feelings about participating in this symposium as the feminist voice. On the one hand, I want to support the symposium editors' attempt to broaden the standard categories of international legal methodologies by including feminism in this undertaking. On the other hand, I am conscious of the limits of my analysis and its unrepresentativeness -- the particularity of my nationality, race, class, sexuality, education and profession shapes my outlook and ideas on international law. I clearly cannot speak for all women participants in and observers of the international legal system. I also hope that one day I will stop being positioned always as a feminist and will qualify as a fully fledged international lawyer. My reservations are also more general because presenting feminism as one of seven rival methodological traditions may give a false sense of its nature. The symposium editors' memorandum to the participants encouraged a certain competitiveness: we were asked, "Why is your method better than others?" I cannot answer this question. I do not see feminist methods as ready alternatives to any of the other methods represented in this symposium. Feminist methods emphasize conversations and dialogue rather than the production of a single, triumphant truth. n1 They will not lead to neat "legal" answers because they are challenging the very categories of "law" and "nonlaw." Feminist methods seek to expose and question the limited bases of international law's claim to objectivity and impartiality and insist on the importance of gender relations as a category of analysis. The term "gender" here refers to the social construction of differences between women and men and ideas of "femininity" and "masculinity" -- the excess cultural baggage associated with biological sex.

We can use the state to fight against oppression and violence.

Derrida 2K (Jacques, French Philosopher, [http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j002/articles/art\_derr.htm] AD: 6/28/10)JM

Q: Two essential problems of globalisation are the dissolution of the state and the impotence of politics. In your recently published text 'Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!', you develop certain ideas concerning a new right to asylum and a new balance of power between the different places of the political in view of a possible new role of the city. How do you think philosophy could and should react to the problems mentioned with a kind of institutional fantasy? JD: I am not sure I understand what you call 'institutional fantasy'. All political experimentation like the initiative of the 'refugee city', despite its limits and its inevitably preliminary character, has in it a philosophical dimension. It requires us to interrogate the essence and the history of the state. All political innovation touches on philosophy. The 'true' political action always engages with a philosophy. All action, all political decision making, must invent its norm or rule. Such a gesture traverses or implies philosophy. Meanwhile, at the risk of appearing self-contradictory, I believe that one must fight against that which you call the 'dissolution of the state' (for the state can in turn limit the private forces of appropriation, the concentrations of economic power, it can retard a violent depoliticisation that acts in the name of the 'market'), and above all resist the state where it gives in too easily to the nationalism of the nation state or to the representation of socio-economic hegemony. Each time one must analyse, invent a new rule: here to contest the state, there to consolidate it. The realm of politics is not co-extensive with the state, contrary to what one believes nowadays. The necessary repoliticisation does not need to serve a new cult of the state. One ought to operate with new dissociations and accept complex and differentiated practices.

Aff: State Good

Critique grounded in discourse fails – it can’t undermine larger power structures.

Brown 1(Wendy, prof Political Science UC Berkeley, *Politics Out of History*, p. 35-37)JM

But here the problem goes well beyond superficiality of political analysis or compensatory gestures in the face of felt impotence. A moralistic, gestural politics often inadvertently becomes a regressive politics. Moralizing condemnation of the National Endowment for the Arts for not funding politically radical art, of the U.S. military or the White House for not embracing open homosexuality or sanctioning gay marriage, or even of the National Institutes of Health for not treating as a political priority the lives of HIV target populations (gay men, prostitutes, and drug addicts) conveys at best naive political expectations and at worst, patently confused ones. For this condemnation implicitly figures the state (and other mainstream institutions) as if it did not have specific political and economic investments, as if it were not the codification of various dominant social powers, but was, rather, a momentarily misguided parent who forgot her promise to treat all her children the same way. These expressions of moralistic outrage implicitly cast the state as if it were or could be a deeply democratic and nonviolent institution; conversely, it renders radical art, radical social movements, and various fringe populations as if they were not potentially subversive, representing a significant political challenge to the norms of the regime, but rather were benign entities and populations entirely appropriate for the state to equally protect, fund, and promote. Here, moralism’s objection to politics as a domain of power and history rather than principle is not simply irritating: it results in a troubling and confused political stance. It misleads about the nature of power, the state, and capitalism; it misleads about the nature of oppressive social forces, and about the scope of the project of transformation required by serious ambitions for justice. Such obfuscation is not the aim of the moralists but falls within that more general package of displaced effects consequent to a felt yet unacknowledged impotence. It signals disavowed despair over the prospects for more far-reaching transformations.

Aff: State Good

Benefits for women have long been achieved through the normative discourse of political structures

**Baldwin 97** (Margaret, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p 70)IM

Women have not been strangers to campaigns for and struggles with liberal state democracies. Feminists, especially feminist legal activists, have long participated in and sought benefits for all women within the political and judicial structures of the United State, Canada and the liberal states of Western Europe. The recent celebration of the 75th anniversary of the federal female suffrage in the United States is a reminder of the longevity and persistence of women’s demands for full political rights in this country, while the repeated defeat of a federal constitutional Equal Rights Amendment inspires continued activism. Successful campaigns for anti-discrimination legislation and litigation of gender-equity claims were significant advances for women achieved through the normative discourses and public institutions characteristic of liberal democracies. Women also have struggled in South Africa and in the former Soviet bloc to secure basic democratic guarantees. The continued integrity of the state systems through which these aims have been met is a matter toward which women cannot be indifferent, theoretically or otherwise.

Greater engagement, not rejection, of the modern state is key to solve

**Baldwin 97** (Margaret, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p 98)IM

Feminist political theorists advocate stronger models of group representation and participation as a structural response to this problem. These proposals draw significant inspiration from the role of consciousness-raising in feminist political practice. The intense involvement these proposals require of citizens, together with the locally based institutions upon which they depend, challenge the distanced, formalized decision-making that flattens women’s participation and furthers the false universalism of the interests represented in the public sphere. To that extent, feminists have participated in the localizing discourse characteristic of many modern attacks on the liberal state. Further, feminists often theorize “women” as a distinct political class, both within existing state borders and irrespective of state citizenships, thus advocating a form of nationalist identity independent of territorial affiliation. Women’s interests, and women’s commitments and conflicts, then are already deeply woven into the web of contemporary contests over the nature and future of the liberal state.

Working within dominant institutions subverts descriptive dichotomies, to include women

**Baldwin 97** (Margaret, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p 102)IM

This wide-angle presentation inevitably forfeits the complexity and nuance of a more tightly focused and thoroughly rendered account of a single aspect of women’s public or private experience. Yet I hope to recoup that loss by the gain in theoretical perspective accessed by the broader view. As Carole Pateman has suggested, such a framework may also be able to deconstruct the descriptive dichotomies that ensnare our theoretical imaginations and tell lies about the conditions of women’s real lives. The recognition that women are situated in one form or another “as women” in both private and public spheres already begins to undermine feminism’s typical understanding of women’s central political challenge as the movement from wholesale exclusion to public inclusion. Carole Pateman explains: “A feminist strategy that calls for the integration into citizenship of women’s distinctive contribution … rests on the assumption that ‘women’ and ‘difference’ need to be brought into the political order. The pertinent question is assumed to be whether sexual difference is politically relevant, or how ‘difference’ could be relevant. Thus the vital question is overlooked of how to subvert and change the manner in which women have already been incorporated, and so to transform the relation between ‘equality’ (men) and ‘difference’ (women).” The fact that the public sphere already includes women, even if not as full, self-determining citizens, suggests that the matter of inclusion is already more complicated than a single focus on women’s relegation to the private sphere might imply. Consequently, to the extent that a wide-angle perspective can account for the differential treatment of women within and across the public and private spheres, the more comprehensive the analysis of women’s political situation.

Aff: Law Good/Perm Solvency

Laws should be used to promote effective promotion of women’s rights

 **Fellmeth 2k** (Aaron, Int. Rel. @ Yale, Human Rights Quarterly 22(3), p. 658-733)IM

The criticism of international law theory itself offered by Charlesworth and her colleagues in the American Journal of International Law is helpful insofar as it identifies a serious systemic procedural inequity that women are significantly (though not entirely) excluded from state participation in the formation of international law. However, this criticism does not offer an alternative theory of law. Nor does it challenge law per se; it merely challenges the equity of the composition of its organs as well as some of the substantive results of the world public order. After all, human rights are only one part of international law. In any case, this criticism is weakened by the fact that most feminists have, so far, largely ignored the progress of the international legal system in its substantive standards protecting women's rights. The argument that international law is really just "international men's law" would have been much more convincing prior to 1945. Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright really do not take issue directly with the international legal system except insofar as it reflects the pattern of male dominance at the state level. [End Page 730] A critique of the international legal system must also assess the extent to which international law has incorporated a "woman's voice" reflective of women's experiences and has, in fact, protected the rights it promises them on paper. Such a critique must conclude that, since the Second World War, international law has increasingly emphasized equality, inclusiveness, cooperation, caring about individuals, and other aspects of the ethic of care, but that progress remains inadequate. It is, however, adequate to prove that feminists should not discount reform of existing laws, instead of rejection of them, as a means of progress.

Empirically proven – redistribution of rights is effectively initiated through the state, the feminist movement hasn’t found its medium yet

**Morris 99** (Aldon, Sociology @ Northwestern, Annual Review of Sociology vol. 25, p. 529)IM

The most distinctive aspect of the modem civil rights movement was its demonstration that an oppressed, relatively powerless group, can generate so- cial change, through the oppressive state, with the widespread use of social protest. For nearly two dec- ades, this movement perfected the art of social protest. The far ranging and complex social protest it generated did not emerge immediately. Rather it evolved through time making use of trial and error. By the mid 1950s Southern Black leaders had not yet fully grasped the idea that the fate of Jim Crow rested in the hands of the Black masses. Even though protest against racial inequality occurred throughout the first half of the cen- tury, it tended to be localized and limited in scope. With the exception of the Garvey Movement and A Philip Randolph's March On Washington Move- ment (MOWM), the mass base of the prior protests was too restricted to threaten the Jim Crow order. Both the Garvey and MOWM movements had limited goals and were relatively short lived. By 1950 the legal method was the dominant weapon of Black protest, and it required skilled lawyers rather than mass action. The legal method depended on the actions of elites external to the Black community whereby Blacks had to hope that white judges and Supreme Court justices would issue favorable rulings in response to well-reasoned and well-argued court cases. The 1955 Montgomery, Alabama, year-long mass-based bus boycott and the unfolding decade of Black protest changed all this. These developments thrust the power capable of overthrowing Jim Crow into the hands of the Black community. Outside elites, including the courts, the Federal Government, and sympathetic whites, would still have roles to play. However, massive Black protest dictated that those roles would be in response to Black collective action rather than as catalysts for change in the racial order. A decisive shift in the power equation between whites and Blacks grew out of the struggle to desegre- gate Alabama buses.

Aff: Alternative Causes

The problem is enforcement of laws, not the existence of laws in the first place

**Fellmeth 2k** (Aaron, Int. Rel. @ Yale, Human Rights Quarterly 22(3), p. 658-733)IM

Most importantly, reform should be directed to the inadequate enforcement of human rights law. Women suffer disproportionately when human rights laws go underenforced, which may contribute to the perception of patriarchal legal systems. In contrast, the disproportionate emphasis on economic law enforcement benefits men disproportionately, given their control over the world's economic assets. While the international community has not agreed upon the creation of a human rights enforcement authority with direct police powers, law can leverage improvement in state attention to women's interests through a variety of mechanisms, from economic sanctions to public opinion. International fora provide women with the opportunity to broadcast their concerns worldwide, establish women's interests on the international agenda, and engage in a multilogue that may lead to agreement upon human rights norms that transcend cultural differences, as Nader has opined. 315 [End Page 732] An expanding core of human rights, including the rights of women, has traveled from support in public opinion to the rhetoric of elites to international legal instruments and the formation of some monitoring and reporting institutions. It is time for a telling additional step of holding states accountable for the realization of the standards they espouse. Feminists should not gratuitously reject law and its processes. Neglect of the existing tools of law supporting the advancement of women, rejection of "masculine" institutions and social control techniques, or categorical rejection of assistance based upon its source in the "wrong" gender or ethnicity waste a major asset for the advancement of the feminist political and social agendas.

Aff: Discourse Doesn’t Shape Reality

Discussions of theoretical academics don’t actually influence policymaking.

Tuathail 96(Gearóid, Professor of Government and International Affairs atVirginia Tech, “The patterned mess of history and the writing of critical geopolitics: a reply to Dalby, Political Geography”, AQB)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decisionmakers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problemsolving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly selfinterested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

There is nothing outside of discourse, it is simply discourse.

Kaufman 95(Jill, professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, Central Michigan University “Other ways: Postmodernism and performance praxis” The Southern Communication Journal Vol. 60, Iss. 3; pg. 222, 11 pgs proquest)AQB

If the lack of consistency between postmodernism's self-styled allegiance to the oppositional and its collaboration with the existing state of academic practice were its only shortcoming, it should be enough to prevent us from unquestioningly embracing it as a theory. More disquieting still, however, is its postulation of the way the world around us works. Theory that presumes to talk about culture must stand the test of reality. Or, as Andrew King states, "culture is where we live and are sustained. Any doctrine that strikes at its root ought to be carefully scrutinized" (personal communication, February 11, 1994). If one subjects the premise of postmodernism to scrutiny, the consequences are both untenable and disturbing. In its elevation of language to the primary analysis of social life and its relegation of the de-centered subject to a set of language positions, postmodernism ignores the way real people make their way in the world. While the notion of decentering does much to remedy the idea of an essential, unchanging self, it also presents problems. According to Clarke (1991): Having established the material quality of ideology, everything else we had hitherto thought of as material has disappeared. There is nothing outside of ideology (or discourse). Where Althusser was concerned with ideology as the imaginary relations of subjects to the real relations of their existence, the connective quality of this view of ideology has been dissolved because it lays claim to an outside, a real, an extra-discursive for which there exists no epistemological warrant without lapsing back into the bad old ways of empiricism or metaphysics. (pp. 25-26) Clarke explains how the same disconnection between the discursive and the extra-discursive has been performed in semiological analysis: Where it used to contain a relation between the signifier (the representation) and the signified (the referent), antiempiricism has taken the formal arbitrariness of the connection between the signifier and signified and replaced it with the abolition of the signified (there can be no real objects out there, because there is no out there for real objects to be). (p. 26)

Aff: Discourse Doesn’t Shape Reality

Prefer policy analysis – Only way to question social constructions.

Kaufman 95(Jill, professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, Central Michigan University “Other ways: Postmodernism and performance praxis” The Southern Communication Journal Vol. 60, Iss. 3; pg. 222, 11 pgs proquest)AQB

The fact that government and big business fund approximately 90 percent of sociological study, not to study people in government and big business, but to investigate others who are not in power (Reynolds, 1990), explains how disciplinary emphases are shaped by those in authority. Performing dominance would help to emphasize the institutional conditions of authority and power that, as Merod (1987) declares, "separate people from the democratic control of their environment" (p. 188). Such a study will prove increasingly important in the future when bureaucratic structures of power will control more information about our personal lives. Williams and Sjborg maintain that powerful "Others" are the ones who social scientists are reluctant to understand because "knowledge of such persons could undermine the legitimacy of the upper sectors of society" (1993, p. 190). Performance of power would include narratives of corporate executives, politicians, lawyers, teachers, judges, doctors, researchers, military commanders, public administrators, school officials, and law enforcement personnel. These people are "Other" to many of us, but because their values set the standard for our own comfortable middle class lives, we often do not perceive them as such.(8) Performance of whiteness poses the problem of introducing still another monolithic category to our practice and would thus have to be approached with the kind of caution required for all such performances. Labeling it as such, however, would hold two potential advantages. Performance of whiteness would expand the texts now under consideration to include white supremacy groups, skinheads, and other organizations whose rise in this country and throughout the world should not be ignored. While they usually lack the institutional power of the other groups mentioned, their narratives hold an obvious key to explaining the denial and fear that more subtly motivate those with institutional power. Performance of whiteness and power also offers an opportunity to white people to perceive ourselves as "Other." It enables us to deconstruct what Connor (1989) calls "the very structures of the dominant and marginal" by critiquing the dominant (p.233). As a corollary to performance of whiteness, we might perform the fragmented process by which we build perceptions of someone who is different from us. This performance of our sense of difference might focus upon the political, economic, sexual, and ethnic shards that construct "Otherness." Such a process would help us respond to hook's (1992) proposal to "interrogate the way assuming the position of an outsider looking in, as well as interpreter, can, and often does, pervert and distort one's perspective" (pp. 152-53). As Kozol (1992) recommends: "More people have to concentrate on how we perpetrate the distortions" involved in perceptions of people as "Others."

Discourse of the “other” can create negative images that trivialize the other.

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I did not want to participate in creating the illusion that if, one, say, goes to an auditorium...and hears someone speak about conditions in one country or another and then has wine and cheese afterward with the person who is speaking and goes home to the life and the life does not change at all...that one has done their part. (pp. 63-64) Consuming audiences tend to respond well to the assurance that there is no threat of real difference that might require change in thought or action. In the service of this reassurance, commodification of other cultures fosters stereotypes. Simplified, static, easily accessible images are packaged and projected, fitting into pre-established frames of reference. These fixed forms, presenting essentialist ideas of a group of people, may be positive as well as negative. As hooks (1990, 1992) points out, good stereotypes and imagery can also be damaging. Romantic and essentialized images of oppressed people can trivialize their struggle. Lumping people together in categories of "Other" can have the same effect. Groups are conferred with clusters of common attributes based primarily upon their relative lack of power within the social hierarchy. Imposition of the "Other" label masks distinctions within a group, such as race, class, sex, age, sexual preference, values, religion, politics, and geographic genealogy. Individuals from marginalized groups object to the double standard by which individuals from the dominant culture can see themselves as unique but thrust upon "Others" the burden of being a spokesperson for the entire group of which their perceived "Otherness" makes them a member (Moore, 1992; White, 1992). In discourses of subjectivity, details about a person matter. As Minh-ha (1989) reasons, details about a person help to rewrite them as subject (42).

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Using discourse as a logical mode of realities production is impossible.

Rodwell 5(Jonathan, Lecturer in Politics at Manchester Metropolitan University Department of Philosophy and Politics, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson” )AQB

Next, discourse analysis as practiced exists within an enormous logical cul-de-sac. Born of the original premise that each discourse and explanation has it’s own realities, what results is a theoretical approach in which a critique is actually impossible because by post-structural logic a critique can only operate within it’s own discursive structure and on it’s own terms. If things only exist within specific languages and discourse you must share the basic premises of that discourse to be able to say anything about it. But what useful criticisms can you make if you share fundamental assumptions? Moreover remembering the much argued for normative purposes of Jackson’s case he talks about the effects of naturalizing language and without blushing criticises the dangerous anti-terror rhetoric of George W. Bush. The only problem is Jackson has attempted to illustrate that what is moral or immoral depends on the values and structures of each discourse. Therefore why should a reader believe Richard Jackson’s idea of right and wrong any more than George W. Bush’s? Fundamentally if he wishes to maintain that each discourse is specific to each intellectual framework Jackson cannot criticise at all. By his own epistemological rules if he is inside those discourses he shares their assumptions, outside they make no sense What actually occurs then is an aporia - a logical contraction where a works own stated epistemological premises rob it of the ability to contain any critical force. Such arguments are caught between the desire to maintain that all discursive practices construct their own truths, in which case critiques are not possible as they are merely one of countless possible discursive truths with no actually reason to take then seriously, or an appeal to material reality, but again the entire premises of post structural linguistics rejects the idea of a material reality.**[vii]** In starting from a premise that it is not possible to neutrally describe the real world, the result is that without that real world, discourse analysis actually has nothing to say.

History is the dominant tool that shapes reality.

Rodwell 5(Jonathan, Lecturer in Politics at Manchester Metropolitan University Department of Philosophy and Politics, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson” )AQB

The issue of the material real world, or ‘evidence’ is actually the issue at the heart of the weakness of post-structural discourse analysis, though it does hold the potential to at least rescue some of it’s usefulness. The problem is simple, in that the only way Jackson or any post-structuralist can operationalise their argument is with an appeal to material evidence. But by the logic of discourse analysis there is no such thing as neutral ‘evidence’. To square this circle many post-struturalist writers do seem to hint at complexity and what post-structural culturalists might call ‘intertextuality’, arguing for ‘favouring a complexity of interactions’ rather than ‘linear causality’**[viii]**. The implication is that language is just one of an endless web of factors and surely this prompts one to pursue an understanding of these links. However, to do so would dangerously undermine the entire post-structural project as again, if there are discoverable links between factors, then there are material facts that are identifiable regardless of language. Consequently, rather than seeking to understand the links between factors what seems to happen is hands are thrown up in despair as the search for complexity is dropped as quickly as it is picked up. The result is one-dimensional arguments that again can say little. This is evident in Jackson’s approach as he details how words have histories and moreover are part of a dialectic process in which ‘they not only shape social structures but are also shaped by them’.[ix] However we do not then see any discussion of whether, therefore, it is not discourse that is the powerful tool but the effect of the history and the social structure itself. Throughout Jackson’s argument it is a top down process in which discourse disciplines society to follow the desire of the dominant, but here is an instance of a dialectic process where society may actually be the originating force, allowing the discourse in turn to actually to be more powerful. However we simply see no exploration of this potential dialectic process, merely the suggestion it exists.

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Language doesn’t change the material.

Rodwell 5(Jonathan, Lecturer in Politics at Manchester Metropolitan University Department of Philosophy and Politics, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson” )AQB

Consequently because there is no interaction between the language the culture and the material then there is not much that can actually be done. All that is done is to repeatedly detail the instances where the same tropes occur time and time again and suggest they have an impact.[x] What cannot be explained however is why those tropes exist or how they have an influence. So, for example, Jackson is unable to explain how the idea that the members of the emergency services attending the scene at the World Trade Centre on 9/11 were heroes is a useful trope disciplining the populace via the tool of Hollywood blockbusters and popular entertainments heroes. All he is able to claim is that lots of films have heroes, lots of stories have heroes and people like heroes. All might be true but what exactly is the point? And how do we actually know the language has the prescribed effect? Indeed how do we know people don’t support the villain in films instead of heroes?

Aff: Focus on D-Course Fails

Discourses inevitable – We won’t ever be able to escape because language also acts as a barrier.

Eagleton 96(Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at the University of Lancaster “The illusions of postmodernism” Pg. 12)AQB

**Grasping the shape of a totality requires some tiresomely rigorous thought**, which is one reason why those who don't need to do it can revel in ambiguity and indeterminacy. There are those who need to know roughly how things stand with them in order to be free, and those for whom phrases like 'how things stand' smack of objectivism, scientism, phallocentrism, transcendentally disinterested subjects and a number of other creepy affairs. (There would also seem to be those for whom utterances like 'Lord John Russell then became Prime Minister' are insidious instances of 'positivism'.) **In the imagi­nary epoch we are postulating**, we might expect that a good deal of blood and ink would be spilt over questions of epistemology - oddly, in a way, since **this is hardly the most world-shaking area of philosophical inquiry.** But there would presumably be a need to account for how and whether we can know the world in the face of the apparent collapse of some classical epistemological models, a collapse closely related to the loss of a sense of political agency. For practice is of course one of the primary ways in which we encounter the world; and if any very ambitious forms of it are denied us, then it is not long before we will catch ourselves wondering whether there is really anything out there, or at least anything quite so fascinating as ourselves. Perhaps **we are all simply trapped within the prison house of our discourse**. It is a revealing metaphor, which grasps **language as obstacle rather than hori­zon**, and one could imagine a bodily analogy to it: If **only I could get out of my own head I could see whether there was anything out there. If only I could escape from behind the walls of my body I could encounter the world directly. As it is,** I have to operate upon it in this lumbering, long-range fash­ion. But **a body of course just is a way of acting upon the world, a mode of access to it, a point from which a world is coherently organized.** \*A body is where there is something to be done\ as Maurice Merleau-Ponty once put it. **Just the same is true of language, the inside of which is also an outside, whose 'interior' is constituted as a ceaseless opening to an 'exterior', a constant self-surpassing or surge towards objects.**