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## \*\*\* Alternative Offense

### Infrastructure Good

#### **Infrastructure key to gender equality- focus on discourse of gender and transportation development prevents action**

Porter and Fernando '02 Gina and Priyantha ("Bridging the gap between gender and transport",Balancing the Load. Women, Gender and Transport, IFRTD Publications, 2002, Chapter 1)

Gender, however, has not been fully mainstreamed into either the infrastructure debate or the debate on rural transport services and IMTs. Agencies promoting labour based road construction and maintenance as a means of creating employment and incomes have made an effort to increase women’s participation in labour based activities. There are a number of ‘pilot projects’ and several guidelines, toolkits and the like that encourage transport sector professionals to develop more gender sensitive transport interventions (Booth et al, 2000). But, despite evidence (mostly from sub-Saharan Africa) that women and men in rural households have responsibility for different transport tasks; that women often carry a heavier burden in terms of time and effort spent on transport, and that with less access and control over resources, they have less opportunities than men to use transport technologies that could alleviate their ‘burden’, gender issues are still peripheral to much of rural transport policy and practice (Sibanda, 2001). While transport professionals have taken little account of gender, issues of access and mobility have been *marginalised* in much of the discourse on gender and development. Gender analysts, focusing on gender roles, resources and relations, have rarely considered in detail the role that improved transport plays in providing women with the resources to meet their practical needs (for example, enabling them to fulfil their responsibilities for water and firewood collection). Few have looked at how improving access and increasing mobility can address more strategic gender issues. Women’s transport burden contributes to women’s time poverty. Lack of time is a key constraint to women building up their assets and reducing their vulnerability. By reducing women’s transport burden, development interventions can increase their productivity and incomes and enhance their assets; they can also have more time to rest, to enjoy social life, to participate in community activities. Increasing women’s mobility can empower women to take greater control of their lives by increasing their access to markets and their exposure to education, training and information, and by providing more opportunities for their political participation.

#### **Mobility through transportation infrastructure key to break down gender binaries**

Hanson '10 Susan ,Ph.D, is a professor of Urban Geography at Clark University (Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography, "Gender and mobility: new approaches for informing sustainability", February 16, 2010, Vol 17.1 pp 5-23)

Frances Willard's book is a clear example of work that explores how mobility, including athleticism (and mobility's twin, confinement), are active agents in the creation of gender and class. Her fundamental goal is to demonstrate how mobility is empowering, with the capacity to transform women's as well as men's identities and subjectivities. For her, mobility is completely bound up with questions such as, ‘who am I?’, ‘what can I accomplish in life?’, ‘what do I see as possible?’ Willard's work exemplifies the most commonly embraced view of how mobility shapes gender: Mobility is empowering, and because it is empowering, more mobility, especially for women, is a good thing. For many geographers and planners, the empowering aspect of mobility is straightforward; it comes from seeing mobility as a means of access to opportunity, enabling people to get to the places, the destinations (schools, jobs, hospitals, stores, parks) where they want or need to go (e.g., Hanson and Hanson [1980](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0015); Kwan [1999](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0026)). Jennifer Mandel's (2004) study of women traders in Benin provides clear evidence of the empowering benefits of mobility; she found a strong relationship between women's physical mobility (ability to travel to wholesalers in specific other places and to access distant social networks) and livelihood: Women traders who were able to travel about had higher incomes. Interestingly, Mandel also learned that, for the women she studied, mobility was enabled by hiring someone to look after the household. But for women in some settings, mobility is empowering quite simply because it is a way to leave the house and enter the public domain. Saraswati Raju ([2005](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0047)) evaluated a women's development project carried out in many villages in Northern India; the project was designed to increase women's empowerment (which she defines as ‘undoing internalized oppression’) through, inter alia, increasing women's civic participation. One of the most empowering changes that women reported was simply the ability to move outside the home, into public spaces, and attend a variety of activities on their own. Being able to enter the public domain and talk with strangers for the first time increased women's self-confidence and, however incrementally, challenged gender power structures. In a similar vein, Juanita Sundberg ([2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0060)), who did a study of Mayan women's participation in a conservation program in Guatemala, quotes one of the participants as saying, At home when you have finished the housework, you may want to go somewhere, but there is nowhere to go. If I go out in the street, people will say, ‘that woman just wanders around.’… But with this responsibility [participating in the women's conservation group] I have somewhere to go. (2004, 59) This comment reminds us that mobility usually – but not always – entails ‘having somewhere to go’, a dimension of mobility that many take for granted. For these women in India and Guatemala, newly experienced mobility induced fundamental changes in their views of who they were – in their identities – and in so doing began to erode traditional gender ideologies and practices. The converse of these examples is, of course, cases where enforced immobility or denial of mobility is used to keep women in a subordinate position and to sustain traditional gender relations. In Willard's case, becoming a woman at 16 (that is, a middle-class woman in the mid-nineteenth century US) meant being bundled up in hoops and corsets and denied personal mobility and physical activity. Contemporary examples include the prohibition on Saudi women driving or the practice of chopadi in Nepal, which requires that women during menstruation or after childbirth be confined to a tiny hut away from the main dwelling. Rachel Silvey and Rebecca Elmhirst ([2003](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0056)) note that women in Indonesia are excluded from certain types of work (like street vending) because they are not supposed to be out and about after dark. Gerry Pratt and I found exactly the same prohibition on women's mobility and labor market participation in Worcester, Massachusetts in the late 1980s (Hanson and Pratt [1995](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0018)). The point is – and I think it is a well-known point – that women are quite literally kept in their place by being denied access to certain locations at certain times, and these proscriptions on mobility are not confined to women in the developing world by any means.[2](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#EN0002)

### Alt doesn’t solve

#### Feminist urban geography is over-generalizing- ignores structural issues and can’t be contextualized

Hanson '10 Susan ,Ph.D, is a professor of Urban Geography at Clark University (Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography, "Gender and mobility: new approaches for informing sustainability", February 16, 2010, Vol 17.1 pp 5-23)

Moving toward sustainable mobility will require improved understanding of how fully fleshed-out gender and fully fleshed-out mobility connect together differently in different contexts. The centrality of context is especially apparent in advancing a sustainability agenda, as the kinds of changes that will be required to move toward sustainability will be different for different places and times, depending, as they will, on particular context-specific knowledge bases and practices. Before describing my views on how to move forward on this matter of achieving a deeper comprehension of the role of context, I want to clarify what I mean by the term, and especially what aspects of context are likely to matter most to gender and mobility. Identifying the aspects of context that matter most to gender, mobility and sustainability should actually be the main outcome of the analysis I will propose later in this section, but some salient aspects of context are likely to be: (1) the individual's embeddedness in household, family and community; (2) the built environment (BE), including elements of transportation infrastructure, at varying spatial scales and how these elements relate to perceptions of personal safety and accessibility; (3) institutions, such as those governing the permitting process, property ownership or the design and construction of the BE and transportation systems; (4) access to the internet and other forms of information technology (such as the cell phone) that affect mobility; (5) cultural norms and expectations such as those governing gender-based labor market segmentation; childcare; travel over certain distances, at certain times, by certain modes or to certain places. Most studies of gender and mobility include some of these elements of social and geographic context. My central question in this section of the essay is how to increase understanding of the relationships among gender, mobility, and these and other relevant elements of social, cultural and geographic context. The kind of knowledge needed to move toward sustainable mobility emerges from in-depth, context-sensitive, place-based, qualitative and quantitative studies. Over the past few decades feminist geographers and others have undertaken a large number of such studies, which, for lack of synthesis, remain interesting, largely individual or free-standing, case studies. Taken collectively, these studies provide a range of findings, some of which are quite disparate. How might we go about making sense of this diversity to see how context affects the relationship between gender and mobility? Teasing out the effects of context will entail synthesizing this body of work, sorting through many context-sensitive studies to discern any patterns and generalizations lurking therein about how gender and mobility are inflected by certain aspects of context. I suspect that for many readers of this journal, the word ‘generalization’ sets off alarm bells and raises red, green and yellow flags. Geographers, especially feminist geographers, have long been suspicious of universals and overarching generalizations; knowledge does not mean much if it is not contextualized, if we do not know where it came from in terms of social and geographic context.

#### **Evidence based in a flawed epistemology**

Hanson '10 Susan ,Ph.D, is a professor of Urban Geography at Clark University (Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography, "Gender and mobility: new approaches for informing sustainability", February 16, 2010, Vol 17.1 pp 5-23)

Quantitative studies of how gender shapes mobility have been able to address gender processes only obliquely from variables that are at best rudimentary proxies for these concepts. For example, measures of ‘intra-household social relations’ are variables like ‘marital status’ or ‘number of children at home’, which are poor surrogates for – and not very rich ways to understand – the power dynamics and intricate processes of negotiation and conflict that go into ‘household decision making’. As another example, the fear of violence is a major influence on the travel patterns of many people, especially women, serving to curtail mobility as well as influencing time and route of travel (Wekerle[2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0067); Goddard, Handy, and Mokhtarian [2006](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0011); Loukaitou-Sideris and Fink [2009](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0029)), but data on these gendered processes are not routinely collected in mobility studies. Other key elements of household decision making, such as how a residential or work-place location is selected, or why some women might not venture beyond their ethnic neighborhood (e.g., because their male partners forbid them to do so), are not captured in most studies that focus on personal mobility. Nor has much systematic attention been paid to the daily travel patterns of international migrants, whose everyday post-migration travel is likely shaped in significant ways by their migration experiences. This body of work has also failed to consider what certain gendered mobility patterns mean to people in terms of how people view themselves or how they might be seen by others. For example, can one be a middle-class banker in Sao Paulo, Brazil and ride a bicycle to work (Vasconcellos [1997](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09663690903498225#CIT0066))? Because of this difficulty in grappling with the complexities of gender, the existing literature on how gender shapes mobility has been short on process while providing valuable insights on mobility patterns for large, representative samples. In sum, work that has focused on how gender shapes mobility has paid detailed attention to mobility but neglected gender; has been carried out mainly through quantitative studies, with large samples of individuals; has considered specific contexts only to a limited extent and, when it has considered context, has done so mainly in terms of the built environment or urban spatial structure to the neglect of social and cultural, and to some extent, non-urban contexts; and while indeed focusing on the role of mobility in everyday life, has not considered lived experience, the importance of identities or the meanings of various aspects of mobility. As this brief synthesis of two substantial branches of the gender and mobility literature has indicated, the two strands are different yet deeply complementary. Understanding how gender in all its complexity and diversity affects mobility and how mobility in all its complexity and diversity affects gender – and how each does so differently in different contexts – will require in-depth, contextualized studies, whether quantitative or qualitative in orientation. Each approach, as surveyed in this overview, has contributed significantly to understandings of gender and mobility, yet each alone is wanting.

### AT Epistemology

#### Epistemological concerns divert attention away from concrete political solutions- it’s a direct threat to solving war

Houghton 8 [David Patrick, professor of political science @ the University of Central Florida, International Politics, March, Volume 45, Issue 2, pg. 115]

Writing in 1989, Thomas Biersteker noted that 'the vast majority of scholarship in international relations (and the social sciences for that matter) proceeds without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises. In professional meetings, lectures, seminars and the design of curricula, we do not often engage in serious reflection on the philosophical bases or implications of our activity. Too often, consideration of these core issues is reserved for (and largely forgotten after) the introductory weeks of required concepts and methods courses, as we socialize students into the profession' (Biersteker, 1989). This observation -- while accurate at the time -- would surely be deemed incorrect were it to be made today. Even some scholars who profess regret at the philosophically self-regarding nature of contemporary of IR theory, nevertheless feel compelled to devote huge chunks of their work to epistemological issues before getting to more substantive matters (see for instance Wendt, 1999). The recent emphasis on epistemology has helped to push IR as a discipline further and further away from the concerns of those who actually practice IR. The consequent decline in the policy relevance of what we do, and our retreat into philosophical self-doubt, is ironic given the roots of the field in very practical political concerns (most notably, how to avoid war). What I am suggesting is not that IR scholars should ignore philosophical questions, or that such 'navel gazing' is always unproductive, for questions of epistemology surely undergird every vision of IR that ever existed. Rather, I would suggest that the existing debate is sterile and unproductive in the sense that the various schools of thought have much more in common than they suppose; stated more specifically, postpositivists have much more in common than they would like to think with the positivists they seek to condemn. Consequently, to the extent that there is a meaningful dialogue going on with regard to epistemological questions, it has no real impact on what we do as scholars when we look at the world 'out there'. Rather than focusing on epistemology, it is inevitably going to be more fruitful to subject the substantive claims made by positivists (of all metatheoretical stripes) and postpositivists to the cold light of day. My own view, as the reader may have gathered already, is that the empirical claims of scholars like Der Derian and Campbell will not often stand up to such harsh scrutiny given the inattention to careful evidence gathering betrayed by both, but this is a side issue here; the point is that substantive theoretical and empirical claims, rather than metatheoretical or epistemological ones, ought to be what divides the international relations scene today.

#### Epistemological questions should be disregarded in the face of specific evidence- if we have evidence it proves our claim didn’t come out of thin air

Houghton 8 [David Patrick, professor of political science @ the University of Central Florida, International Politics, March, Volume 45, Issue 2, pg. 115]

This essay takes issue with the position that epistemology matters in such a fundamental way. The reasoning offered is as follows: it is not clear whether there exists any real alternative to the kind of 'observation' beloved by positivists, denigrated by postpositivists, but engaged in by both. While doing empirical work does not make one an empiricist in the philosophical sense of that term, it is far from clear that the epistemological position one adopts has much effect on the kind of truth claims one makes. The adoption of postpositivist epistemologies has not meant that 'anything goes' in the new postpositivist scholarship; every example in the growing body of that literature, which illustrates (or is intended to illustrate) a theoretical point is drawn from experience and observation, and is surely 'empirical' in nature. This raises the question of whether it is possible to be genuinely postpositivist at all. I argue here that ultimately it is not, for observations cannot be plucked out of thin air; one's truth claims about the world have to come from somewhere.

### AT Method Comes First

#### Method shouldn’t come first – prioritizing one at the expense of others creates tacit ontologies and leads to neglect of the original goals.

James **Fearon** ,Professor of Political Science at Stanford and Alexander Wendt, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago**,** Handbook of International Relations (eds. Carlsnaes et al),2002, p.68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problem it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical, and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist divide. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

### AT Kappeler

#### There is still value to treat the 1ac as a thought experiment with value for forms of action should it become possible in another situation

Edelman 88

Murray, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, U. of Wisconsin, “Constructing the Political Spectacle” U. of Chicago Press, p. 128-29

Such sensitivity is rare and is difficult to achieve and maintain, though there have been historical moments when large numbers of people have achieved it. Challengers of the dominant order try to promote it through "counter- discourses”: texts that challenge hegemony by undermining its presuppositions and offering alternatives. This tactic has occasionally worked for some for a time, though the very success of a particular counter-discourse may buttress hegemony by constructing a stable enemy or threat that justifies authority, as noted earlier. Emancipatory language does not focus on a specific alternative but rather builds an appreciation of the range of discourses, perspectives, and political realities: the diverse realities that go with immediate involvement and with self-conscious distancing; with synchronic analysis and with attention to history; with a passive posture and with struggle; with differences in class, gender, color, and ethnicity; with the constructions of art, science, political actions, and fantasy. Understanding the range of perspectives from which people constitute their worlds implies a critical posture. The writings of Max Weber on Verstehenll and of Alfred Schutz on existential phenomenology offers some confidence that it is feasible to understand a range of positions without subscribing to them. Such a stance makes it possible to plan concerted and effective action by taking the roles of the spectrum of significant actors. On occasion it may mean adopting forms of language and action that are strategic at the time but would be unrealistic or counterproductive in a different social situation.

## \*\*\* Impacts

### AT Root cause

#### Their root cause argument ignores the domination of vast amounts of people – leads to passivity and divisiveness

**Smith,** leading member of the US International Socialist Organization, **1994**

Sharon, International Socialism 62 Spring, <http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=311>

Within a few years of its founding, the radical wing of the women’s movement in the US had fragmented into inward looking consciousness-raising groups or personalistic living collectives. The slogan, ‘The personal is political,’ had been carried to its logical conclusion: changing one’s lifestyle was what mattered, not changing the world. Radical feminists had rejected the socialist explanation that the source of women’s oppression lies in class society, but replaced it with a theory which could not lead the movement forward. The reason was straightforward. The theory of patriarchy divorced the cause of women’s oppression from class society—a system which oppresses and exploits the vast majority of people for the benefit of a very few. Instead it targeted men—and men’s need to dominate women—as the root of the problem. This left the problem of women’s oppression as one to be fought out at the level of individual relationships. And it excluded men, whatever their social class, from playing a role in fighting for women’s liberation. Moreover, since separatism explains the division between men and women as biologically rooted, this means that the rupture must be permanent.

However radical the concept of patriarchy may have sounded in theory, in practice it was a recipe for passivity and divisiveness. Particularly when combined with the high degree of personalism which existed, the logic of separatism promoted fragmentation rather than unity on the basis of oppression. At the same time as it played down the immense differences which exist between women of different classes. The politics of separatism led directly to fragmentation even within radical feminist organisations. Although separatist theory argues that the main division in society is between men and women, it reduces women’s oppression to a problem of personal relationships. If that reasoning is used to understand other forms of oppression, then men are not the only oppressors: whites are oppressors, straight people are oppressors, and so forth. And many women suffer multiple forms of oppression, as victims of national or racial discrimination, or as lesbians. During the 1970s, as activism declined, radical feminist collectives became more and more fragmented and demoralised, and whole organisations became internalised and splintered along these lines.

### AT War

#### Gender is not the root cause of war – Efforts to end gender injustice must start by dealing with war – Only the aff can provide the space necessary for change.

Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor of International Relations at American University, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, 2001, pp.411-412

I began this book hoping to contribute in some way to a deeper understanding of war – an understanding that would improve the chances of someday achieving real peace, by deleting war from our human repertoire. In following the thread of gender running through war, I found the deeper understanding I had hoped for – a multidisciplinary and multilevel engagement with the subject. Yet I became somewhat more pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end. The war system emerges, from the evidence in this book, as relatively ubiquitous and robust. Efforts to change this system must overcome several dilemmas mentioned in this book. First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

### AT Dehumanization/VTL

#### Policymakers should ignore value to life criteria

Szacki 96 – Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Warsaw (Jerzy, Liberalism After Communism, p 197)

Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or is attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement of society in the name of some one conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, 'political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.'59

### AT Violence

#### Moral obligations cannot guide actions - their claim ignores the genealogy of those principles

Caputo '93 (Against Ethics. John D„ Viljanova University, p. )

Principles, universals, laws are attempts on the part of thought to penetrate the density of events, to find the secret formula of events, to provide guardrails that safeguard the subject through the most treacherous twists and turns that events take. Events can be dangerous and principles try to make safe, to Keep us safe in the midst of dangerous events. Principles are to supply the rule that governs the unfolding or happening of events, or to provide a guide through the maze of events. Principles axe so many attempts to regulate or to find what regulates the a gibt, the sheer giving and coming to pass of events, the il y a or il arrive. Principles by to give us a standpoint above what happens and thus to get beyond events. The difficulty with principles is that principles are themselves caught up in what happens. The reason for that is that the au­thors of principles are no less subject to what happens than is anyone else, although they sometimes try to conceal this fart and to erase the genealogy of the principles they champion. Otherwise you would have to say the principles fell straight from the sky and into our laps. That has been said, and metaphysics often says some­thing rather like that,3 but the onus probandi falls on those who lay claim to such heavenly gifts, not on us who claim only to have suffered a disaster, to lead a damaged life, to be bereft of a heavenly guide, to begin where we are. From the standpoint of this minimalist metaphysics of events, a disas­ter simply means that we are caught up in the maze of events and are un­able to catch sight of a guiding star. Events yield to other events, but they do not yield to principles. Events follow other events, but they do not follow rules. The transition from one event to the next is neither necessary nor capricious, neither rule-bound nor disconnected. The transition is always something of a leap, a little chancy, perhaps, difficult but not impossible. The individual is always more or less on its own with this leap, always faced with more or less unique and idiosyncratic circumstances in which to make its way. The subject is forced to wade into the complexity of events, to make a first cut into a relatively dense thicket, a thicket that is (almost) impossible to clear. Clearings hardly happen. Philosophy, which is metaphysics, has conceived the question of the ac­tion that the individual takes in the midst of the singularity of an event as the problem of "judgment." Judgment is a function of the "faculty" of "ap-plying "principles." On the traditional model, the problem is to judge what happens with the aid of principles. If that is what judgment is, I must take a stand "against judgment." But judgment Is in a much more difficult situation than that, much more radically menaced and on its own than tra­ditional philosophy is prepared to admit. Metaphysical ethics wants to make judgment safe, but judgment is not safe, and this for two good reasons.

### AT Ableism

#### Integration cannot overcome attitudes and impairments that contribute to societal inaccessibility

Burleson ‘11 [Elizabeth is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, “Perspective on Economic Critiques of Disability Law: The Multifaceted Federal Role in Balancing Equity and Efficiency” 1/1]

A. Administrative and Judicial Enforcement

It is important to ensure not only a strong, well-funded, and capable infrastructure to enforce the ADA, but also a staff knowledgeable and supportive of its statutory goal of eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Ultimately, neither Congress nor the judiciary is capable of legislating a change in attitudes towards people with disabilities. Laura Rothstein notes that institutions of “[h]igher education had evolved practices, policies, and procedures before other sectors affected by the ADA (with the exception of K-12 education).”103 Society-wide, integration is at best a precursor to acceptance. It is not acceptance itself. Carrie Basas notes that, “the daily struggle of managing other people’s reactions to and stereotypes about disability can become a job in itself.”104 She goes on to point out that, When “reasonable accommodation” is bandied about, minds ultimately turn to a list of tangible tools, equipment, and changes in the physical environment such as large-screen monitors, curb cuts, automatic doors . . . . without considering the combined effects of impairments, the cultural weight of disability, and the longterm impact of societal inaccessibility.105

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