## Environment Links

### Apocalyptic Scenarios

#### \_\_\_\_ Apocalyptic environment discourse create a politics of danger that make totalitarian control necessary in the name of ecological protection.

Waever, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, in ‘95

[Ole, , On Security, p. 63-64]

Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of environmen­tal or ecological security41 is its mobilization potential. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni­tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece­dented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of sig­nalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to per­sist in the environmental debates."42 Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very rea­sons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam­ple, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional.43 This, by itself, does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will. As I pointed out earlier, the field of secu­rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conven­tionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environ­mental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other envi­ronmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized gov­ernmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environ­mental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob­al environmental problems."45 It might, he points out, even lead to mili­tarization of environmental problems .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of national­ism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of envi­ronmental collectivism." Certainly, there is some risk that the logic of ecol­ogy, with its religious potentials and references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to totali­tarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.

### Warming

#### \_\_\_\_ Global warming and the oil economy are neither energy nor environment problems. They are national problems. The affirmative’s framing of solutions to these questions is trapped in a territorial myopia that can only try and force transnational forces to fit into the impossible box of nation-state management. As these solutions fall apart, the nation-state will resort to violently holding them together

Dalby, Associate prof. of Geography & Environmental studies at Carleton University, 2002 [Simon, Environmental Security, p. 64-69]

The focus on geopolitical dangers rarely examines the specific causes of degradation in any detail. Often, in parallel with Kaplan, the environment is reduced to an exogenous factor or an¶ independent causal variable in analyses of conflict. This approach is usually in danger of replicating the faults¶ of environmental determinism in attributing simple causal power to natural environments in human affairs while¶ disregarding the specificities of human institutions in particular places.2 As subsequent chapters will explicate, it also frequently¶ overlooks the important cross-boundary patterns in the flows of resources and the politics involved in the¶ dispossession of peoples to facilitate resource extraction and the expansion of commercial agriculture. But before turning¶ to consider indigenous peoples and their politics, this chapter extends the analysis of new thinking in security by looking more closely at the geopolitical assumptions inherent in conventional security analyses of¶ environmental themes.¶ Given current criticisms of the geographical and spatial premises of international relations thinking, just what are the appropriate geographical frameworks for investigating matters of environmental change and conflict? This¶ chapter looks briefly at two arguments in the current international relations literature on environmental matters in order to investigate their geopolitical presuppositions: first, the environmental dimensions of the democratic¶ peace; and second, the matter of providing aid to states in the South to deal with environmental difficulties. Showing how the spatial premises of these arguments limit the analysis in a¶ way that fails to deal with the processes causing degradation by inadequately considering the appropriate scale, it¶ also suggests the need to think about the temporal dimensions of the processes involved. The post-cold war claims that environment is a new consideration for security analysis also raise the question of the appropriate¶ historical context in which to think about matters of environment and conflict. This is the subject of the latter part of this chapter.¶ ENVIRONMENTALLY BENIGN DEMOCRATIC PEACE?¶ While much of the literature on environmental security is pessimistic, if not downright alarmist, at least in its popular articulations, some other contemporary international relations literature on warfare is much more¶ optimistic about the future. Contemporary discussions of the "democratic peace" suggest that advanced industrial democracies do not fight each other and that major wars are obsolete in the nuclear age.3 Coupled to the¶ optimism that the end of the cold war will lead to the expansion of the number of democratic states in the world, this suggests that the future may avoid the major violent interstate confrontations of the past.¶ When the "democratic peace" argument is linked to considerations of the supposedly superior records of industrial democracies in environmental protection, it can be suggested that there is considerable hope for dealing with¶ environmental security questions.4 It seems that environmental problems occur more frequently in parts of the world that have authoritarian or communist regimes, so democratization should lead to environmental¶ improvement by enhancing political accountability. Here is the possibility of a virtuous circle: democracies do not usually fight each other, nor do they produce environmental destruction that might, according to the¶ "environmental degradation leading to conflict" argument, lead to instability and violence.¶ But there are a number of geopolitical arguments related to this position that need to be taken seriously in thinking about the formulation of an "environmentally benign democratic peace." The first apparently strengthens the¶ case in a slightly ironic way. While democracies are, according to recent scholarship, much less likely to fight each other than authoritarian regimes, some scholars have suggested that the historical record of the twentieth¶ century suggests that advanced socialist states are even less likely to fight.5 Whatever the empirical merits of this case, given the environmental record of the Soviet Union, clearly lack of bellicosity is not necessarily related¶ to environmental performance. Industrialization is not the issue in these formulations, democracy is.¶ The second geopolitical argument about the tendencies of democracies to be both peaceful and environmentally responsible suggests that the model is missing a number of crucial dimensions. In the period of the cold war,¶ democracies often exported their violence, getting involved in some nasty wars in the South, but the argument about the democratic¶ peace can be saved because the democracies did not fight each other, even by proxy. The tendency to get involved in violence in what is now termed the South is important in understanding the concept of democratic peace in¶ the current geopolitical context. The model of a zone of peace is premised on a zone of turmoil outside.¶ Third, by relying on such a formulation of the terms of understanding of the environmental security problematique, the environmentally benign democratic peace¶ argument does not include the point that many of the resources for Northern consumption are made available at¶ the cost of degradation in the South. This once again raises the questions of state-territorial assumptions¶ underlying the geopolitical units made into the objects of analysis in the discussion of the environmentally benign democratic peace. It also¶ suggests that environment has to be understood in terms of more than “tailpipe” emissions cleanup or aesthetic tropes of`¶ hygiene; total resource throughputs in ecosystems must be included.¶ If the Soviet Union was, as the center of a geopolitical bloc, both an advanced industrial socialist state and an environmentally destructive one, might this be because, at least in part, its resource extractions and its dirty¶ industries were within its borders? In comparison, the advanced democratic states have often acted in ways that effectively distance¶ themselves from the worst sources of pollution and degradation. If the non-Soviet world is understood as one¶ geopolitical bloc, the comparison might suggest that the environmentally benign peace is convincing only¶ because the hinterlands that are despoiled are substantially removed from the democratic states by the global¶ pattern of resource trading and "pollution exports."¶ ENVIRONMENTAL INSECURITY AND THE TERRITORIAL TRAP¶ As noted briefly in chapter 3 in discussing Kaplan's geopolitical imagination, the difficulties with the emergence of global arguments abut¶ environmental threats and the politics of specifying the nature and geography of the threat are reinforced when¶ the geographical assumptions of the "territorial trap" in the domain of international relations are added to the discussion.6 In John Agnew's terms, the¶ territorial trap occurs as a result of three assumptions prevalent in international relations thinking. First, states have exclusive powers over¶ their territories in terms of sovereignty. Second, domestic and foreign realms of state activity are essentially separate¶ spheres of activity. Third, the boundaries of states define the boundaries of societies contained within those-states.¶ Combined, these three elements lead to a state-territorial understanding of the workings of power that reifies the¶ practices of sovereign states to suggest that they are autonomous, permanent entities rather than understanding¶ them as temporary, changing, porous arrangements.¶ The operation of the territorial trap is especially clear in a mid1990s scholarly volume on "environmental aid" edited by Robert Keohane and Marc Levy. Although this work is not specifically about environmental insecurity,¶ its premises are similar to most of the key arguments in the environmental degradation leading to conflict literature and in the concern with transboundary environmental security threats. This investigation focuses on the¶ institutions that are appropriate to channel expertise and finance to poorer states to help alleviate environmental problems there. On the very first page of the introduction to this volume the reader is invited to imagine two¶ maps of the world, one showing the "relative severity of environmental problems," the other the distribution of "the capabilities governments have to cope with these problems."7¶ The territorial trap suggests that the variation in problems and capabilities is derived from endogenous factors¶ within autonomous entities. These assumptions about autonomous states obscure a crucial-third map of the¶ flows of resources, which are the sources of wealth that provide governmental capabilities and which cause¶ some key parts of the environmental degradation. But only the third imaginary geopolitical map, showing the¶ transboundary flows of resources, suggests that the interconnections between the first two maps are an essential¶ part of the processes that matter in understanding environmental insecurity and the causes of both degradation¶ and government capability.¶ These flows of resources in the third map are obviously not the whole story, but they ought to be crucial to those in the Northern states who make policies to deal with global problems precisely because they are the part of the¶ global picture over which the Northern geopolitical theorists of security can potentially have some immediate influence. This is because the large picture of global insecurities is cut through by an overarching irony that needs¶ to be kept in mind, but which is obscured by Keohane's cartographic specifications. The wealthy of this world have by far the largest environmental impact on the planet and usually have the means to avoid the impacts of¶ their actions.8 Specifying environment only in terms of pollution or of local conditions such as water or air quality obscures the larger ecological focus on the total impact of human activities, as well as the differential impacts¶ of these activities in various places.¶ Past emphases on common vulnerabilities are unlikely to hold as points of departure in future international fora. Political negotiations of global issues help reveal the limitations of conventional strategies of regime formation¶ in the face of, among other things, the power of global corporations and other transnational actors.9 But more important to discussions of security and international politics, the South and its new breed of policy makers now¶ insist on discussing issues that the North's nomenclature of future global dangers downplays or ignores. In the discourses of environmental threats, chaos as a result¶ of state failings, migration fears, or threats of disease, there is little recognition of the flows across borders that¶ may be partly responsible for the phenomena that are now feared. In the face of specifications of these global¶ dangers as coming from the poor and the South, any political dialogue and grand bargains over justice,¶ development, and economic arrangements seem doomed to failure.10¶ In short, the question of the location of environmentally benign societies is once again in part a convenience of¶ territorial state boundaries and the assumptions of states as the containers of both politics and environments.¶ The example comparing blocs, rather than states, suggests that the geopolitical categories used in discussing¶ environmental security are an important consideration that cannot be taken for granted. The exclusion of¶ resource flows and other transboundary processes from state-territorial understandings of politics brings us back¶ to the argument in chapter 3 concerning environmental discrimination and to Gunther Baechler's discussion of the disruptions caused by the¶ expansion of modernity, processes of colonization; and the expansion of the global economy. If the spatial¶ frameworks for discussing environmental security work to obscure the processes in motion, what about the questions of history and¶ the appropriateness of the temporal scales of international relations?¶ ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY¶ Much of the focus in the environmental security discussion has been on projecting current trends into the future¶ to anticipate likely disasters and instabilities that hopefully can be avoided by adopting appropriate policies in¶ advance or, in Kaplan's case, by being prepared for the coming chaos. This has been usefully challenged by Thomas Homer-Dixon's insistence¶ that environmental disruptions are already, in part, causing political conflict. But the questions raised by investigations of environmental history have yet to¶ be comprehensively incorporated into the discussions of either the larger questions of environment and security or the more focused scholarly investigation of the environmental degradation leading to political conflict¶ hypothesis. They also need to be linked to discussions of security because environmental history suggests that assumptions of normal weather patterns or stable and predictable climates are not an adequate premise for¶ discussing matters of environmental change. Change within fairly wide parameters-is-the-long-term- norm in ecological phenomena, so arguments that try to normalize particular patterns may operate to obscure natural¶ fluctuations.

### Managerialism

#### \_\_\_\_ Environmental discourses are biopolitical geopower which relies on the notion of the state being an objective observer removed from the population it controls thereby gaining the sovereignty to discipline and the population-appeals to this method of governmentality will inevitably collapse back into geopower and damn resistance

Timothy W. Luke, professor of political science at Virginia polytechnic institute and state university, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ecology: Departing from Marx, 1999, pg. 128-130

With the coevolution of human and nonhuman beings in the environmental, the historical began to envelope, circumscribe, or surround “the biological.” Environmentalized settings became a new emergent reality: “In the space of movement thus conquered, and broadening and organizing that space, methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life process­es and undertook to control and modify them.”29 Although Foucault does not explicitly define these spaces, methods, and knowledges as being “environmen­tal,” such discursive maneuvers are the point of origin for many human projects that feed into environmentalization. As biological existence is refracted through economic, political, and technological existence, hitherto natural “facts of life” pass into the force fields of artificial control in the form of eco­knowledge, creating spheres of intervention for geopower. Environments, therefore, emerge with biopower as an essential part of the constituting of modern “man,~~ who becomes the pretext for regulating life via biopolitics. For nearly a century of industrial revolution, Earth’s ecologies apparently remained another ancillary correlate of biopower, inhabiting discourses about species extinction, resource conservation, and overpopulation. Nonetheless, until the productive power regime of biopolitics became fully globalized (because nature itself is not entirely encircled), ecology was a fairly minor voice in the disciplinary chorus organizing development and growth. Things changed around the time of World War I, however, once the extensive expansionist strategies of development and growth employed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries collapsed, promoting the spread of conservationist ethics in Europe and North America, which fretted over conserving resources for these new resource-driven modes of intensive capitalist production. In addition, as new mediations of development and growth were constructed after 1945, the geopower-ecoknowledge nexus of environmentalized regulation comfortably supplemented the high-technology, capital-intensive develop­ment strategies that were implemented. The environment, if one follows Foucault, should not be understood as the given natural sphere of ecological processes that human society tries to keep under control or as a mysterious domain of obscure terrestrial events that human knowledge works to explain.30 Instead it emerges as a historical artifact that is openly constructed by power/knowledge systems; it cannot survive as an occluded reality beyond human comprehension. In this great productive network of power effects and knowledge claims, the simulation of spaces, the intensification of resources, the incitement of discoveries, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls, and the provocation of resistances can all be linked to one another. The immanent designs of nature, when and where they are “discovered” in environments, closely parallel the arts of government. In fact, the two be gin to merge in geopower/ecoknowledge systems. As Foucault sees the arts of government, they are essentially concerned with ways to introduce economy into the political practices of the state. In the eighteenth century government became the designation of a “level of reality, a field of intervention, through a series of complex processes” in which “government is the right disposition of things.”3’ Governmentality applies the techniques of instrumental rationality to the arts of everyday management. It evolves as an elaborate social formation, “a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security.

### Discourse of Environment

#### \_\_\_\_\_ “The environment” is not a pre-existing entity that we can objectively represent. It is constructed discursively based on inequalities fostered by capitalism and particularly our patterns of consumption.

Timothy W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, June-July 2003, Alternatives, p. 406-07

The “environment” remains an odd concept. While it has become more commonly used, this notion rarely captures the full range of all human beings’ interrelations with the various terrains, waters, climates, soils, architectures, technologies, societies, economies, cultures, and states surrounding them, particularly now in the 2000s. In most of its applications, the environment simply tags the workings of a strong but sloppy force. Environment is almost anything persisting “out there.” It is “everything” around us. It can be something “affecting” us. It could be a few things “within” us; yet, it is also a thing “upon which” we act. Environments, then, are omnipolitanized world constructs. What, for example, surrounds and impinges upon California—say, an electrical power grid that on a typical January day delivers more than 32,000 megawatts of electricity—is not what surrounds Chad—a country that, per day, uses less electricity than a few large office buildings in Los Angeles. Moreover, California’s many megawatts pollute the atmosphere and warm the globe for Chadians struggling to produce and use their few kilowatts. Such spatial­ized relations of extraction and utilization between the rich and the poor, across national, regional, and local boundaries, are not well explained solely in national—humanist terms. Alternative environmental—nonhumanist terms of analysis must be found to rein­terpret these relations. As the focus of power and the locus of subjectivity in world markets, the environment basically is being built and made already always accessible in the apparently almost accidental anarchy of markets. William Greider, for example, asks us to imagine a wondrous new machine, strong and supple, a machine that reaps as it destroys. It is huge and mobile, something like the machines of modem agriculture but vastly mole complicated and powerful. Think of this awesome machine running over open terrain and ignoring familiar boundaries. It plows across fields and fencerows with a fierce momentum in that is exhilarating to behold and also frightening. As it goes, the machine throws off enormous mows of wealth and bounty while it leaves behind great furrows of wreckage. Greider’s summations of many anxieties about global capitalism as “a wondrous new machine” focuses upon these environizing mecha­nisms getting closer to spinning entirely out of control. Still, he sug­gests that “before the machine can be understood, one must first be able to see it.” Haraway claims that “a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of the joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints.” Nevertheless, the world’s most pervasive and powerful structure for cyborganization is the market that Greider describes. What else, so continuously, thoroughly, and finally, crafts hybrids of machine and organism— human/animal, human/plant. human/mineral, human/machine­ as lived social realities? What other world-changing fiction can melt all that is solid into thin air and then conjure, once more, a solid abundance out of thin air? The market’s environizing power to gen­erate new environments, which are neither seen nor understood in all of their entirety, must be considered more closely. Environments contain various ecological niches that are not nature, as such, but rather denatured maths of Creation recon­structed artificially and deliberately by machinic ensembles. After nature disappears into the practices of performativity wrought by vast new fishing machines, farming machines, mining machines, timbering machines, and ranching machines, its materials and energies flow through transport machines and communication machines to manufacturing machines, managing machines, and military machines, as well as through living machines, leisure machines, and labor machines. Their cycles of growth and repro­duction extrude environizing nonhuman domains in the substance and space of global capitalist exchange, where many hybridized sorts of human and nonhuman beings feed off ecological carrying capacities in all the niches tied to larger machinic ensembles. These preserves of “deep technology,” rather than “the political,’ propound, in turn, the rarely disclosed technoscience practices of the contemporary empire anchoring modern nation-states and mar­kets to their national and transnational environmental niches.

## Alt Sovles

#### And, the alt solves—discursive dissent can move beyond securitization and seek political movements to protect the environment outside the State, this is also a link the permutation can’t solve.

Dalby 2002 (Simon, Prof. Geography and Political Economy @ Carleton U, *Environmental Security*, p. 156-159)

But also relevant is the fact that "world risk society" pushes politics beyond the conventional parameters, drawing political constituencies together for boycotts and protests around telegenically mediated instances of corporate perfidy and ecological destruction.44 These emergent discursive political communities are questioning the technical procedures of expert regulatory agencies and corporations on grounds that the ultimate effects of their habitual practices may lead to unforeseen ecological consequences. In the process, the legitimacy of state environmental experts is becoming highly politicized, and the administration of ecological regulations is being politically contested. This relates to the politics of transstate movements and to global regimes where interstate treaties may provide at least some loose framework apt to constrain state activities.45 Claims to expertise in environmental disputes are mobilized by both environmentalists and policy makers during the political bargaining processes of international regime formation.46 State development experts, pollution experts, medical science, and planning procedures are now all in doubt; the politics of technical expertise can no longer be obfuscated under an unquestioned acceptance of the writ of science. "Security experts" are not immune to these developments. The presentation of environment as a threat is a complex political process, not simply an issue "security experts" can paraphrase to elicit a conveniently adequate policy response. But it is a political process that in at least some ways gets well beyond the politics of sovereign states and the conventional assumptions of territorial identities.